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diff --git a/old/54279-0.txt b/old/54279-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5fc7aa8..0000000 --- a/old/54279-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28495 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's A History of the Peninsula War, by Charles Oman - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: A History of the Peninsula War - Vol. II, Jan. - Sep. 1809. From the Battle of Corunna to - The End of the Talavera Campaign - -Author: Charles Oman - -Release Date: March 4, 2017 [EBook #54279] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULA WAR *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps - are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - - - - -[Illustration: _General Joseph Palafox_ - _From the Portrait by Goya in the Prado Gallery._ - _Walker & Cockerell Ph. Sc._] - - - - - A HISTORY OF THE - PENINSULAR WAR - - BY - CHARLES OMAN, M.A. - - FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE - AND DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE) - IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA - DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID - - - VOL. II - - JAN.-SEPT. 1809 - - FROM THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA TO THE - END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN - - - WITH MAPS, PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS - - - OXFORD - AT THE CLARENDON PRESS - 1903 - - - - - HENRY FROWDE, M.A. - PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - LONDON, EDINBURGH - NEW YORK - - - - -PREFACE - - -The second volume of this work has swelled to an even greater bulk -than its predecessor. Its size must be attributed to two main -causes: the first is the fact that a much greater number of original -sources, both printed and unprinted, are available for the campaigns -of 1809 than for those of 1808. The second is that the war in its -second year had lost the character of comparative unity which it -had possessed in its first. Napoleon, on quitting Spain in January, -left behind him as a legacy to his brother a comprehensive plan for -the conquest of the whole Peninsula. But that plan was, from the -first, impracticable: and when it had miscarried, the fighting in -every region of the theatre of war became local and isolated. Neither -the harassed and distracted French King at Madrid, nor the impotent -Spanish Junta at Seville, knew how to combine and co-ordinate the -operations of their various armies into a single logical scheme. Ere -long, six or seven campaigns were taking place simultaneously in -different corners of the Peninsula, each of which was practically -independent of the others. Every French and Spanish general fought -for his own hand, with little care for what his colleagues were -doing: their only unanimity was that all alike kept urging on their -central governments the plea that their own particular section of the -war was more critical and important than any other. If we look at -the month of May, 1809, we find that the following six disconnected -series of operations were all in progress at once, and that each -has to be treated as a separate unit, rather than as a part of one -great general scheme of strategy--(1) Soult’s campaign against -Wellesley in Northern Portugal, (2) Ney’s invasion of the Asturias, -(3) Victor’s and Cuesta’s movements in Estremadura, (4) Sebastiani’s -demonstrations against Venegas in La Mancha, (5) Suchet’s contest -with Blake in Aragon, (6) St. Cyr’s attempt to subdue Catalonia. -When a war has broken up into so many fractions, it becomes not only -hard to follow but very lengthy to narrate. Fortunately for the -historian and the student, a certain amount of unity is restored in -July, mainly owing to the fact that the master-mind of Wellesley has -been brought to bear upon the situation. When the British general -attempted to combine with the Spanish armies of Estremadura and La -Mancha for a common march upon Madrid, the whole of the hostile -forces in the Peninsula [with the exception of those in Aragon and -Catalonia] were once more drawn into a single scheme of operations. -Hence the Talavera campaign is the central fact in the annals of -the Peninsular War for the year 1809. I trust that it will not be -considered that I have devoted a disproportionate amount of space to -the setting forth and discussion of the various problems which it -involved. - -The details of the battle of Talavera itself have engaged my special -attention. I thought it worth while to go very carefully over the -battle-field, which fortunately remains much as it was in 1809. A -walk around it explained many difficulties, but suggested certain -others, which I have done my best to solve. - -In several other chapters of this volume I discovered that a -personal inspection of localities produced most valuable results. -At Oporto, for example, I found Wellesley’s passage of the Douro -assuming a new aspect when studied on the spot. Not one of the -historians who have dealt with it has taken the trouble to mention -that the crossing was effected at a point where the Douro runs -between lofty and precipitous cliffs, towering nearly 200 feet above -the water’s edge! Yet this simple fact explains how it came to pass -that the passage was effected at all--the French, on the plateau -above the river, could not see what was going on at the bottom of the -deeply sunk gorge, which lies in a ‘dead angle’ to any observer who -has not come forward to the very edge of the cliff. I have inserted a -photograph of the spot, which will explain the situation at a glance. -From Napier’s narrative and plan I am driven to conclude that he had -either never seen the ground, or had forgotten its aspect after the -lapse of years. - -A search in the Madrid _Deposito de la Guerra_ produced a few -important documents for the Talavera campaign, and was made most -pleasant by the extreme courtesy of the officers in charge. It -is curious to find that our London Record Office contains a good -many Spanish dispatches which do not survive at Madrid. This -results from the laudable zeal with which Mr. Frere, when acting -as British minister at Seville, sent home copies of every Spanish -document, printed or unprinted, on which he could lay his hands. -Once or twice he thus preserved invaluable ‘morning states’ of the -Peninsular armies, which it would otherwise have been impossible to -recover. Among our other representatives in Spain Captain Carroll -was the only one who possessed to a similar degree this admirable -habit of collecting original documents and statistics. His copious -‘enclosures’ to Lord Castlereagh are of the greatest use for the -comprehension of the war in the Asturias and Galicia. - -Neither Napier nor any other historian of the Peninsular War has gone -into the question of Beresford’s reorganization of the Portuguese -army. Comparing English and Portuguese documents, I have succeeded -in working it out, and trust that Chapter III of Section XIII, and -Appendix No. V, may suffice to demonstrate Beresford’s very real -services to the allied cause. - -It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge much kind help that I have -received from correspondents on both sides of the sea, who have -come to my aid in determining points of difficulty. Of those in -England I must make particular notice of Colonel F. A. Whinyates, -R.A., a specialist in all matters connected with the British -artillery. I owe to him my Appendix No. XI, which he was good enough -to draw up, as well as the loan of several unpublished diaries of -officers of his own arm, from which I have extracted some useful -and interesting facts. I must also express my obligation to Mr. -E. Mayne, for information relating to Sir Robert Wilson’s Loyal -Lusitanian Legion, of which his relative, Colonel W. Mayne, was in -1809 the second-in-command. The excerpts which he was kind enough to -collect for me have proved of great service, and could not have been -procured from any other quarter. Nor must I omit to thank two other -correspondents, Colonel Willoughby Verner and the Rev. Alexander -Craufurd, for their notes concerning the celebrated ‘Light Division,’ -in which the one is interested as the historian of the old 95th, and -the other as the grandson of Robert Craufurd, of famous memory. - -Of helpers from beyond the Channel I must make special mention of -Commandant Balagny, the author of _Napoléon en Espagne_, who has -supplied me with a great number of official documents from Paris, -and in especial with a quantity of statistics, many of them hitherto -unpublished, which serve to fix the strength and the losses of -various French corps in 1809. I also owe to him my Appendix VI (iii), -a most interesting _résumé_ of the material in the French archives -relating to the strange ‘Oporto conspiracy’ of Captain Argenton -and his confederates. This obscure chapter of the history of the -Peninsular War is, I think, brought out in its true proportions -by the juxtaposition of the English and French documents. It is -clear that Soult’s conduct was far more sinister than Napier will -allow, and also that the plot to depose the Marshal was the work -of a handful of military intriguers, not of the great body of -highly-placed conspirators in whose existence the mendacious Argenton -has induced some historians to believe. - -At Madrid General Arteche placed at my disposal, with the most -bountiful liberality, his immense stores of knowledge, which I had -learnt to appreciate long before, as a conscientious student of his -_Guerra de la Independencia_. He pointed out to me many new sources, -which had escaped my notice, and was good enough to throw light on -many problems which had been vexing me. For his genial kindness I -cannot too strongly express my obligation. - -Of the officers at the Madrid _Deposito de la Guerra_, whose courtesy -I have mentioned above, I must give special thanks to Captain Emilio -Figueras, from whom (just as these pages are going to press) I have -received some additional figures relating to the Army of Estremadura -in 1809. - -Finally, as in my first volume, I must make special acknowledgement -of the assistance of two helpers in Oxford--the indefatigable -compiler of the Index, and Mr. C. E. Doble, whose corrections and -suggestions have been as valuable in 1903 as in 1902. - - C. OMAN. - - ALL SOULS COLLEGE, - _June 20, 1903_. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - SECTION IX - AFTER CORUNNA (JAN.-FEB. 1809) - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. The Consequences of Moore’s Diversion: Rally of the - Spanish Armies: Battle of Ucles 1 - - II. Napoleon’s departure from Spain: his plans for the - Termination of the War: the Counter-Plans of the - Junta: Canning and Cadiz 15 - - - SECTION X - THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGN IN CATALONIA - - I. The Siege of Rosas 37 - - II. St. Cyr relieves Barcelona: Battles of Cardadeu and - Molins de Rey 58 - - III. The Campaign of February, 1809: Battle of Valls 76 - - - SECTION XI - THE SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA (DEC. 1808-FEB. 1809) - - I. The Capture of the Outworks 90 - - II. The French within the Walls: the Street-fighting: the - Surrender 115 - - - SECTION XII - THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN LA MANCHA AND ESTREMADURA - - I. The Rout of Ciudad Real 143 - - II. Operations of Victor and Cuesta: the Battle of Medellin 149 - - - SECTION XIII - SOULT’S INVASION OF PORTUGAL - - I. Soult’s Preliminary Operations in Galicia (Jan.-March - 1809) 170 - - II. Portugal at the moment of Soult’s Invasion: the Nation, - the Regency, and Sir John Cradock 196 - - III. The Portuguese Army: its History and its Reorganization 208 - - IV. Combats about Chaves and Braga: Capture of Oporto - (March 10-29, 1809) 223 - - V. Soult’s halt at Oporto: Operations of Robert Wilson and - Lapisse on the Portuguese Frontier: Silveira’s defence - of Amarante 250 - - VI. Intrigues at Oporto: the Conspiracy of Argenton 273 - - - SECTION XIV - WELLESLEY’S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL (MAY 1809) - - I. Sir Arthur Wellesley: the general and the man 286 - - II. Wellesley retakes Oporto 312 - - III. Soult’s Retreat from Oporto 343 - - - SECTION XV - OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN SPAIN (MARCH-JUNE 1809) - - I. Ney and La Romana in Galicia and the Asturias 367 - - II. The French abandon Galicia 390 - - III. Operations in Aragon: Alcañiz and Belchite - (March-June 1809) 406 - - - SECTION XVI - THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN (JULY-AUG. 1809) - - I. Wellesley at Abrantes: Victor evacuates Estremadura 433 - - II. Wellesley enters Spain 449 - - III. Wellesley and Cuesta: the interview at Mirabete 463 - - IV. The March to Talavera: Quarrel of Wellesley and Cuesta 483 - - V. Concentration of the French Armies: the King takes - the offensive: Combats of Torrijos and Casa de Salinas 494 - - VI. The Battle of Talavera: the Preliminary Combats - (July 27-28) 507 - - VII. The Battle of Talavera: the Main Engagement (July 28) 527 - - VIII. The Retreat from Talavera 559 - - IX. The end of the Talavera Campaign: Almonacid 599 - - - APPENDICES - - I. The ‘Army of the Centre,’ Jan. 11, 1809. The Spanish Army - at the Battle of Ucles 621 - - II. The Garrison of Saragossa 622 - - III. The French Army in Spain, in Feb. 1809 624 - - IV. The Spanish Army at Medellin 627 - - V. The Portuguese Army in 1809: organization and numbers 629 - - VI. Papers relating to the intrigues at Oporto, - April-May 1809 632 - - VII. Strength of Wellesley’s Army, May 6, 1809 640 - - VIII. Soult’s Report on Galicia, June 25, 1809 642 - - IX. Suchet’s and Blake’s Armies, May and June 1809 643 - - X. Papers relating to the Talavera Campaign: strength and - losses of the British, Spanish, and French Armies 645 - - XI. The British Royal Artillery in the Peninsula, 1809 654 - - XII. Venegas’s Army of La Mancha in June-July 1809 655 - - - INDEX 657 - - -MAPS AND PLANS - - - I. UCLES AND ROSAS _To face_ 54 - - II. GENERAL MAP OF CATALONIA: BATTLE OF VALLS ” 88 - - III. SARAGOSSA, THE SECOND SIEGE ” 134 - - IV. MEDELLIN ” 166 - - V. BRAGA (LANHOZO) AND OPORTO ” 248 - - VI. NORTHERN PORTUGAL, SHOWING SOULT’S AND WELLESLEY’S - CAMPAIGNS OF 1809 ” 360 - - VII. ALCAÑIZ AND MARIA ” 426 - - VIII. TALAVERA ” 550 - - IX. CENTRAL SPAIN, SHOWING THE LOCALITIES OF - THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN ” 596 - - -ILLUSTRATIONS - - JOSEPH PALAFOX, EQUESTRIAN PORTRAIT BY GOYA _Frontispiece_ - - A PORTUGUESE CAVALRY SOLDIER, 1809 212 - - A PORTUGUESE INFANTRY SOLDIER, AND A MAN OF THE ORDENANZA 222 - - THE DOURO ABOVE OPORTO, THE LOCALITY OF WELLESLEY’S - CROSSING 336 - - COINS STRUCK IN SPAIN DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR 478 - - - - -ERRATA IN VOL. II - - -The following facts I discovered in Madrid and Lisbon when it was too -late to correct the chapters in which the mis-statements occur. - -(1) Page 82, note 93. I have found from a Madrid document that part, -though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present at Valls. -One battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: one marched with Reding: -about 800 men therefore must be added to my estimate of the Spanish -infantry. - -(2) Page 318, note 394. I found in Lisbon that the regiments which -marched with Beresford to Lamego were not (as I had supposed) nos. 7 -and 19, but nos. 2 and 14, with the 4th cazadores. Those which joined -from the direction of Almeida were two battalions of no. 11 (1st of -Almeida) and one of no. 9. - -(3) Page 366. A dispatch of Beresford at Lisbon clears up my doubts -as to Silveira’s culpability. Beresford complains that the latter -lost a whole day by marching from Amarante to Villa Pouca without -orders; the dispatch directing him to take the path by Mondim thus -reached him only when he had gone many miles on the wrong road. The -time lost could never be made up. - - - - -SECTION IX - -AFTER CORUNNA - -(JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1809) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOORE’S DIVERSION: RALLY OF THE SPANISH ARMIES: -BATTLE OF UCLES - - -With the departure of Napoleon from Madrid on December 21, the -offensive action of the French army in central Spain came to a -stand. The Emperor had taken away with him the field army, which -had been destined to deliver those blows at Lisbon and Seville -that were to end the war. The troops which he had left behind him -in the neighbourhood of Madrid were inadequate in numbers for any -further advance, and were forced to adopt a defensive attitude. The -only regions in which the invaders continued to pursue an active -policy were Aragon and Catalonia, from which, on account of their -remoteness, the Emperor had not withdrawn any troops for his great -encircling movement against Sir John Moore. In both those provinces -important operations began on the very day on which Bonaparte set out -to hunt the English army: it was on December 21 that Lannes commenced -the second siege of Saragossa, and that St. Cyr, after relieving -Barcelona, scattered the army of Catalonia at the battle of Molins de -Rey. But the campaigns of Aragon and Catalonia were both of secondary -importance, when compared with the operations in central Spain. As -the whole history of the war was to show, the progress of events in -the valley of the lower Ebro and in the Catalan hills never exercised -much influence on the affairs of Castile and Portugal. It is not, -therefore, too much to assert that it was Moore’s march on Sahagun, -and that march alone, which paralysed the main scheme of the Emperor -for the conquest of Spain. - -Between December 21 and January 2 the central reserves of the French -army had been hurried away to the Esla and the plains of northern -Leon. It was not till the new year had come that the Emperor began -to think of sending some of them back to the neighbourhood of -Madrid. The 8th Corps had been incorporated with the 2nd, and sent -in pursuit of Moore: the corps of Ney and the division of Lapisse -were left to support Soult in his invasion of Galicia. The Imperial -Guard marched back to Valladolid. Of all the troops which had been -distracted to the north-west, only Dessolles’ division of the Central -Reserve returned to the capital. Such a reinforcement was far from -being enough to enable Joseph Bonaparte, and his military adviser -Jourdan, to assume the offensive towards the valleys of the Tagus -and Guadiana. The consequences of Moore’s diversion were not only -far-reaching but prolonged: it was not till the middle of March -that the army of the king was able to resume the attempt to march -on Seville, and by that time the condition of affairs had been -profoundly modified, to the advantage of the Spaniards. - -The intervening time was not one of rest for Joseph and his army. -Their movements require careful attention. When Napoleon hurried -the main body of his troops across the Somosierra in pursuit of -the British, he left behind him the corps of Victor, shorn of -Lapisse’s division, the whole of the corps of Lefebvre[1], and the -three independent cavalry divisions of Lasalle, Latour-Maubourg and -Milhaud--in all 8,000 horse and 28,000 foot with ninety guns. There -was also the Royal Guard of King Joseph, four battalions of foot, -and a regiment of horse, beside two skeleton regiments of Spanish -deserters, which the ‘Intrusive King’ was raising as the nucleus of a -new army of his own[2]. - - [1] Save two Dutch and one German regiment of Leval’s division, - which had been left behind on garrison duty in Biscay and Old - Castile. - - [2] This was done by the Emperor’s orders. The _cadres_ of these - regiments, called _Royal-Étranger_ and _Royal-Napoléon_, were - formed partly of Frenchmen, partly of Spanish _Afrancesados_. The - rank and file of the first regiment were to be raised from the - Swiss and Germans who had served in the old Spanish army: some - of them had adhered to the French, others, when taken prisoners - in the late campaign, had offered to serve King Joseph. The - second regiment was to be composed of native Spaniards. See - _Correspondance de Napoléon_, 14,531. - -Of these troops the incomplete German division of Leval (2nd of the -4th Corps) and King Joseph’s guards formed the garrison of Madrid. -This force seeming too small, the division of Ruffin (1st of the 1st -Corps) was ordered in to reinforce them. The rest of the army lay -in two concentric semicircles outside Madrid: the inner semicircle -was formed of infantry: there was a regiment at Guadalajara[3], a -whole division under Marshal Victor himself at Aranjuez[4], and two -divisions of the 4th Corps under Marshal Lefebvre at Talavera[5]. -Outside these troops was a great cavalry screen. In front of -Victor the three cavalry brigades of Latour-Maubourg’s division -lay respectively at Tarancon, Ocaña, and Madridejos, watching the -three roads from La Mancha. West of them lay Milhaud’s division -of dragoons, in front of Talavera, in the direction of Navalmoral -and San Vincente, observing the passes of the Sierra de Toledo. -Lastly, as a sort of advanced guard in the direction of Estremadura, -Lasalle’s light cavalry had pushed on to the great bridge of Almaraz, -behind which the wrecks of the mutinous armies of Belvedere and San -Juan were beginning to collect, under their new commander Galluzzo[6]. - - [3] The 55th, a stray remnant left behind by Dessolles. - - [4] Division of Villatte. It had one battalion detached, along - with the 26th Chasseurs, at Toledo. - - [5] Division of Valence and Sebastiani. - - [6] Lasalle’s division (often altered in composition) now - consisted of the 10th and 26th Chasseurs, 9th Dragoons and Polish - Lancers. - -The Emperor’s parting orders to Jourdan had been to send forward -Lasalle and Lefebvre to deal a blow at the Estremaduran army. They -had, he wrote, twice the numbers necessary to break up the small -force of disorganized troops in front of them. On December 24, -Lefebvre was to cross the Tagus, scatter Galluzzo’s men to the winds, -and then come back to Talavera, after building a _tête-de-pont_ at -Almaraz. Lasalle’s cavalry would be capable of looking after what was -left of this force, for it would not give trouble again for many a -week to come. Victor, on the side of La Mancha, must keep watch on -any movements of the Spaniards from the direction of Cuenca or the -Sierra Morena. He would have no difficulty in holding them off, for -‘all the débris of the insurgent armies combined could not face even -the 8,000 French cavalry left in front of them--to say nothing of the -infantry behind[7].’ - - [7] See for all these details _Nap. Corresp._, 14,609. - -The first portion of the orders of the Emperor was duly carried out. -On December 24 the Duke of Dantzig advanced from Talavera upon the -bridges of Arzobispo and Almaraz, behind which lay 6,000 or 7,000 of -Galluzzo’s dispirited levies. He made no more than a feint at the -first-mentioned passage, but attacking the more important bridge of -Almaraz carried it at the first rush, and took the four guns which -Galluzzo had mounted on the southern bank to command the defile. -The Spaniards, scattered in all directions, abandoned the banks of -the Tagus, and placed themselves in safety behind the rugged Sierra -de Guadalupe. So far the Emperor’s design was carried out: but -Lefebvre then took a most extraordinary step. Instead of returning, -as he had been ordered, to Talavera, and remaining in that central -position till further orders should be sent him, he went off on an -inexplicable adventure of his own. Leaving only Lasalle’s cavalry -and two Polish battalions on the Tagus, he turned north, as if -intending to join the Emperor, crossed the mountains between New -and Old Castile, and on January 5 appeared at Avila in the latter -province[8]. Not only was the march in complete contravention of the -Emperor’s orders, but it was carried out in disobedience to five -separate dispatches sent from Madrid by Jourdan, in the name of King -Joseph. Lefebvre paid no attention whatever to the ‘lieutenant of the -Emperor,’ in spite of vehement representations to the effect that -he was exposing Madrid by this eccentric movement. It was indeed -an unhappy inspiration that led him to Avila, for at this precise -moment the Spaniards were commencing a wholly unexpected offensive -advance against the Spanish capital, which Lefebvre, if he had -remained at Talavera, might have aided in repelling. Much incensed -at his disobedience Napoleon deprived him of the command of the 4th -Corps, and sent him back to France. ‘This marshal,’ he wrote to King -Joseph, ‘does nothing but make blunders: he cannot seize the meaning -of the orders sent him. It is impossible to leave him in command of -a corps;--which is a pity, for he is a brave enough fellow on the -battle-field[9].’ Sebastiani, Lefebvre’s senior divisional general, -replaced him in command of his corps. - - [8] Napier misrepresents this move in the strangest way, saying - (i. 364) merely that ‘the Duke of Dantzig recrossed the Tagus and - took post between Talavera and Plasencia.’ Avila is fifty miles - north of these places, and on the other side of the Guadarrama. - - [9] Napoleon to Joseph from Valladolid, Jan. 9, _Nap. Corresp._, - 14,671. - -The new Spanish advance upon Madrid requires a word of explanation. -We have seen that the weary and dilapidated Army of the Centre, now -commanded by the Duke of Infantado, had reached Cuenca on December -10, after escaping from the various snares which Napoleon had set for -it during its march from Calatayud to the valley of the upper Tagus. -When he had escaped from Bessières’ pursuit, the duke proceeded to -give his army a fortnight’s much-needed rest in the mountain villages -round Cuenca. He sent back to Valencia the wrecks of Roca’s division, -which had originally been raised in that kingdom. It had dwindled -down to 1,455 men, from its original 8,000[10]. The other troops, the -2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions of the old army of Andalusia[11], had not -suffered quite so much, as they had not been seriously engaged at -Tudela, but they were half-starved and very disorderly. Infantado was -forced to shoot an officer and two sergeants for open mutiny before -he could restore the elements of discipline[12]. - - [10] See the figures furnished by the Valencian Junta in - Argüelles, ii. 74. It must he remembered that 4,800 of the - division had escaped to Saragossa, and took part in its defence. - - [11] The 1st division had only four battalions present, the - others having been at Madrid, in the army of San Juan. - - [12] The officer, a Lieutenant Santiago, had refused to march on - Cuenca, and when the order was repeated, unlimbered his battery - across the road and threatened to fire on the troops who were - marching in that direction. See Arteche, iii. 12. - -The province of Cuenca is the most thinly peopled and desolate of -all the regions of Spain[13], and though some stores and food were -procured from Valencia, it was impossible to re-equip the army in -a satisfactory way. Winter clothing, in particular, was absolutely -unprocurable, and if the men had not been placed under roofs in -Cuenca and the villages around, they must have perished of cold. -But a fortnight’s rest did much for them: many stragglers came -up from the rear, a few reinforcements were received, and to the -surprise of the whole army the brigade of the Conde de Alacha, which -had been cut off from the rest of the troops on the day of Tudela, -turned up intact to join its division. This detachment, it will -be remembered[14], had been left in the mountains near Agreda, to -observe the advance of Marshal Ney: after the rout it had nearly -fallen into the hands of the 6th Corps, and had been forced to turn -off into obscure by-paths. Then, passing in haste between the French -divisions in New Castile, it had finally succeeded in reaching Cuenca. - - [13] It had only 311 inhabitants to the square league in 1803, as - compared with 926 in Andalusia, and 2,009 in Guipuzcoa. - - [14] See vol. i. p. 437. - -Infantado, finding that the French still hung back and advanced -no further into his mountain refuge, proceeded to reorganize his -army; the three weakened battalions of the old line regiments were -consolidated into two or often into one. The four divisions of the -original Andalusian host were amalgamated into two, with an extra -‘vanguard’ and ‘reserve’ composed of the best troops[15]. This -rearrangement had not yet been fully completed when the duke made -up his mind that he would venture on an advance against Madrid. He -could learn of nothing save cavalry in his front, and he had received -early notice of the departure of Napoleon to the north. Giving the -command of his vanguard and the greater part of his cavalry to -General Venegas, he bade him descend into the plains, and endeavour -to surprise the brigade of dragoons which lay at Tarancon[16]. This -task Venegas attempted to execute on Christmas Day: he had already -turned the town with half his force, and placed himself across the -line of retreat of the dragoons, before they knew of his approach. -Warned, just in time of his danger, the French brigadier resolved to -cut his way through: he charged down on the enemy, who fell into a -line of battalion squares with long intervals between them. Dashing -between the squares the two regiments got through with the loss of -fifty or sixty men. The Spanish cavalry, which arrived late on the -field, made no attempt to pursue. On the same day Infantado had sent -out another column under General Senra, with orders to march on -Aranjuez: finding that it was held not only by cavalry but by a heavy -force of infantry, the Spanish brigadier wisely halted at a discreet -distance, for which he was sharply taken to task by his chief. It is -certain that if he had gone on, Victor would have made mincemeat of -his little force of 4,000 men. - - [15] For these changes see Appendix I. - - [16] Perreimond’s brigade of Latour-Maubourg’s division. - -Although the advance of Venegas and Senra soon stopped short, the -news that the Spaniards were descending in force into the plain -of New Castile was most discomposing to King Joseph, who was at -this moment very weak in troops. Lefebvre had just started on his -eccentric march to Avila: Dessolles was not yet back from the north, -and there was no disposable reserve at Madrid save the single -division of Ruffin, for the king’s guards and Leval’s Germans were -barely enough to hold down the capital, and could not be moved. The -situation was made worse by the revolt of several of the small towns -of the upper Tagus, including Chinchon and Colmenar, which rose under -the belief that Infantado’s army would soon be at their gates. There -was nothing between the duke and Madrid save the single infantry -division of Villatte, which lay with Marshal Victor at Aranjuez, and -the six dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg, a force of little more -than 9,000 sabres and bayonets. - -Fortunately for King Joseph, Infantado was a most incapable general, -and allowed his opportunity to slip by. By driving in the French -cavalry screen, he had given notice of his existence, and spread -alarm up to the gates of Madrid. But in order to profit by the -situation he should have dashed in at once, before the enemy had time -to draw together. If he had marched from Cuenca with his reserves, in -the wake of Venegas, he could have brought 20,000 men to bear upon -Victor, before the latter could receive the very moderate succours -that King Joseph could send him. Instead of doing anything of the -kind, he remained quiescent at his head quarters, and did not even -send Venegas any further orders, either to advance or to retreat. -From December 26 to January 11, the Spanish vanguard lay at Tarancon, -as if with the express intention of giving the French time to -concentrate. The duke meanwhile, as his dispatches show, was drawing -up a grandiose plan of operations, which included not only the -eviction of King Joseph from Madrid, but the cutting of Napoleon’s -communication and the raising of the siege of Saragossa! He was -most anxious to induce the Central Junta to move forward all their -other forces to aid him. But they could do nothing, so deplorable -was the state of their army, but bid the weak division of 6,000 men, -which was guarding the Sierra Morena, to begin a demonstration in -La Mancha. In pursuance of this order Del Palacio made a forward -movement, as dangerous as it was useless, to Villaharta on the upper -Guadiana. - -Jourdan and the Intrusive King, meanwhile, were for ten days in a -state of great anxiety, expecting every moment to hear that the whole -Spanish army had descended from the mountains and thrown itself upon -the upper Tagus. They ordered Victor to move from Aranjuez to Arganda -to parry such a blow, and made preparations for reinforcing him with -Ruffin’s division, while the rest of the garrison of Madrid, with -the French civilians, and the mass of _Afrancesados_, were to shut -themselves up in the forts on the Retiro, being too few to hold the -entire city. But the expected advance of Infantado never occurred, -and Jourdan and Victor were able to put down the insurrection of the -little towns in the plain without any interruption. Chinchon was -stormed, and the whole male population put to the sword; at Colmenar -there were executions on a large scale, and a fine of 50,000 piastres -was levied. The rest of the insurgents fled to the hills[17]. - - [17] Jourdan confesses to this massacre in the most open way. - ‘Le 27e Léger s’étant présenté aux portes de Chinchon, fut - reçu à coups de fusil. Cette provocation occasionna la perte - des habitants: ils furent _tous_ tués, et la ville incendiée.’ - _Mémoires du Maréchal Jourdan_, 139. - -On January 8, 1809, the fears of Joseph and Jourdan came to a happy -end, for on that day the division of Dessolles marched in from Old -Castile, while on the 10th the 4th Corps appeared, having been sent -back in haste from Avila by the Emperor. This reinforcement of more -than 20,000 men completely cleared the situation. The French line of -defence could now be re-established: Valence’s Polish division was -placed at Toledo: Leval’s Germans, completed by the arrival of their -belated Dutch brigade, were sent to Talavera. Sebastiani’s division, -with Dessolles and the king’s guard, remained to garrison Madrid. -Ruffin was sent out to join Victor, who was ordered to march at once -on Tarancon and fall upon the Spanish corps which had remained there -in such strange torpidity since Christmas day[18]. The Emperor, -sending these orders from Valladolid, expressed himself in a somewhat -contemptuous strain as to his brother’s fears. ‘The army of Castaños’ -(i.e. of Infantado) ‘was as great a fiction as that of La Romana: -rumour made them 20,000 strong, while really there were not more than -5,000 of them[19]. Victor had ten times as many men as were necessary -for clearing off the Spaniards. The panic at Madrid had been absurd -and discreditable: all that was wanted was to catch and hang a dozen -_mauvais sujets_, and the capital would keep quiet.’ - - [18] All these movements are most clearly set forth in Jourdan’s - _Mémoires_, by far the best authority for the campaign of Ucles. - - [19] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,637 and 14,684. - -On January 12 Victor marched from Aranjuez with the twenty-one -battalions of Villatte’s and Ruffin’s divisions, the squadrons of -light horse which formed his corps-cavalry, and the three brigades -of dragoons composing the division of Latour-Maubourg--in all some -12,000 foot and 3,500 horse. He did not find Venegas at Tarancon: on -hearing that the French were massing in front of him, that officer -had called in the outlying brigade of Senra, and had retired ten -miles to Ucles, in the foot-hills of the mountains of Cuenca. He sent -news of Victor’s approach to Infantado, but the latter gave him no -definite orders either to fight or to retreat. He merely forwarded to -him three or four more battalions of infantry, and announced that he -was coming up from Cuenca with the reserves: he fixed no date for his -probable arrival. - -Much troubled by the want of definite orders, Venegas doubted -whether he ought to hold his ground and await his chief, or fall -back into the mountains. After some hesitation he resolved to take -the more dangerous course, tempted by the fine position of Ucles, -which offered every advantage for a defensive action. He had with -him about 9,500 infantry in twenty-two very weak battalions, some of -which had no more than 250 or 300 bayonets. Of cavalry he had nine -incomplete regiments, giving only 1,800 sabres[20]. There were but -five guns with the army, of which one had broken down, and was not -fit for service. The town of Ucles lies in the midst of a long ridge -stretching north-east and south-west, with a steep slope towards -the plain, from which the French were approaching. Venegas drew up -his men in a single long line, with the town in the centre. Four -battalions were barricaded in Ucles: six took post to the left of -it, eight to the right. Only one was held back in reserve, but three -with four regiments of cavalry were left out in front, to observe the -French advance, in the neighbourhood of the village of Tribaldos. -The four guns and the remainder of the cavalry were drawn up before -the town. It is almost needless to point out the faults of this -order-of-battle--over-great extension and the want of a reserve. The -position was too long for the numbers available. Moreover the men -were not in good fighting trim: though several of the old regiments -from Baylen were among them, their spirits were low: they had not yet -recovered from the dreadful fatigues of the retreat from Tudela, and -they had little confidence in their leaders. - - [20] Beside the twenty battalions given in the Appendix to - Arteche, iv, Venegas’s narrative shows that at least two more - (Baylen and Navas de Tolosa) were present. - -Victor marched from Tarancon at daybreak on January 13, with one -division on each of the two routes which lead eastward from that -place, Villatte’s on the southern road which goes directly to Ucles, -Ruffin’s on the longer and more circuitous path, which, running -parallel to the other, ultimately rejoins it at Carrascosa some -way behind that town. The majority of Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry -accompanied the former column. - -Already on the previous night Victor’s vedettes had discovered the -Spanish outpost at Tribaldos: very early on the following morning it -was driven in by the advance of Villatte’s column, and joined the -main body of the army of Venegas. The Marshal then pushed forward to -the foot of the hills, to reconnoitre the enemy’s position. Having -discerned the lie of the ground, and the distribution of the Spanish -forces, his mind was soon made up. Orders were promptly sent to -Ruffin to leave the road on which he was advancing, and to close in -upon the right flank and rear of Venegas’s army. Meanwhile Villatte -and the cavalry drew up in front of Ucles, with a strength of about -7,000 bayonets and 2,500 sabres. The dragoons were placed in the -centre; in front of them was ranged a battery, which commenced to -shell the town and the Spanish horse drawn up before its gates. -This was only a demonstration: the real blow was to be given by an -attack on the Spanish left, where the hillside was of easier access -than on the steep and rocky northern end of the ridge. Villatte’s -second brigade, the 94th and 95th regiments, executed a circular -march under the eyes of the enemy, and having turned their extreme -flank, rapidly climbed the hill and formed up at right angles to the -Spanish line. These six battalions fell upon the exposed wing and -rolled it up without much difficulty, till they arrived under the -very walls of Ucles, driving the enemy before them. Venegas, who was -watching the fight from the court of the monastery which dominates -the town, had tried to hurry up reinforcements from his right wing: -but they arrived too late to be of any use. When the attack on the -enemy’s left was seen to be making good progress, and the attention -of the Spaniards was distracted to that point, Victor directed the -first brigade of Villatte’s division to assail the steep hill on the -Spanish right. They carried it with ease, for half the defenders had -been withdrawn to reinforce the left, and the rest were demoralized -by the evident disaster on the other flank. The whole of Venegas’s -army fled eastward without any further endeavour to hold their -ground, the considerable force of cavalry in the centre making no -attempt, as it would appear, to cover the retreat of the foot. Such -rearguard as there was consisted of two or three infantry battalions -under General Giron. - -Suddenly the Spaniards of the right wing and centre saw rising up in -front of them, as they fled, an imposing line of French infantry, -barring their further progress. This force consisted of the nine -battalions of Ruffin’s division. They had lost their way while -seeking for the Spanish flank, and (like Ferguson at Roliça) made too -wide a circle to enable them to intervene in the actual fighting. -But the very length of their turning movement proved advantageous, -as they had now got into the direct rear of the retreating army. -Driven on by the pursuing dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, the Spaniards -found themselves rushing into the very arms of Ruffin’s division. -The disaster was complete, and more than half of Venegas’s army was -encircled and captured. Most of the cavalry, indeed, escaped, by -dispersing and riding rapidly round the flanks of Ruffin’s line. But -the slow-moving infantry was trapped: a few battalions from the left -wing got off to the south-east, and General Giron with a remnant of -his brigade cut his way through a gap between two French regiments. -All the rest had to surrender. - -Of Venegas’s 11,000 men, about 1,000 had been killed or wounded: four -generals, seventeen colonels, 306 other officers and 5,560 rank and -file were captured[21]. The French secured the four guns which formed -the sole artillery of the beaten army, and twenty standards[22]. -Their own loss was insignificant--Victor returned his total -casualties at 150 men, and probably did not much understate them, as -he had met with no serious resistance. - - [21] These numbers are probably exact: Jourdan quotes them - from his own official report to Berthier of Jan. 20. See his - _Mémoires_, p. 144. - - [22] As the wrecks of fifteen or sixteen battalions had - surrendered, there seems no reason to doubt the number of - standards. But the Spaniards asserted that Victor eked out his - trophies, by taking down the old battle-flags of the knights of - Santiago from their church in Ucles. - -Though they had suffered so little, the French showed great ferocity -after the fight. They not only sacked the town of Ucles, but executed -in cold blood sixty-nine of its notables, including many monks, who -were accused of having fired on the assailants from their convent -windows. When the column of Spanish prisoners was sent off to Madrid, -orders were given (it is said by Victor himself) that those who would -not keep up with the rest should be shot, and we have good French -authority to the effect that this was regularly done; thirty or more -a day, mostly the wounded and the sick, were shot by the wayside when -they dropped behind[23]. - - [23] Cf. the _Mémoires_ of Rocca (of the 2nd Hussars, Victor’s - corps-cavalry), p. 68, and Schepeler. - -What, meanwhile, had happened to the Spanish Commander-in-chief, and -the 9,000 men whom he had retained at Cuenca? Infantado had started -to join Venegas on January 12: he slept that night at Horcajada, -fifteen miles to the east of Ucles. Resuming his march next morning, -he had got as far as Carrascosa, when a disorderly mob of 2,000 -routed infantry hurtled into his vanguard. Questioning the fugitives, -he learnt the details of the battle of Ucles, and found that the -victorious army of the French was only five miles away. Then with a -promptitude very different from his torpor of the last three weeks, -the duke turned his column to the rear, and made off with all speed. -He first returned to his base at Cuenca to pick up his baggage and -stores, and then marched by vile cross-roads and in abominable -weather to Chinchilla in the kingdom of Murcia, which he reached on -January 20. His artillery, forced to go at a snail’s pace among the -hills and torrents, and escorted by a single cavalry regiment only, -was surprised and captured by Digeon’s dragoons at Tortola, a few -miles to the south of Cuenca (Jan. 18). Fifteen guns were lost on -this occasion: several of the French authorities ingeniously add them -to the trophies of Ucles, and write as if they had all been taken -from Venegas in open battle[24]. - - [24] Notably the ever-inaccurate _Victoires et Conquêtes_, and - Thiers. The usually-sensible Belmas makes the Spanish prisoners - amount to 13,000 men, two thousand more than Venegas ever put in - line. - -Victor after occupying Cuenca, and finding that Infantado was now -too far away to be pursued with any chance of success, turned down -into the plains of La Mancha, to strike at the small Andalusian -force which had advanced under Del Palacio, to lend countenance to -Infantado’s projects for a march on Madrid. This division, some 6,000 -strong, had reached Villaharta on the upper Guadiana, but when the -news of Ucles arrived, its commander hastily drew it back to the foot -of the passes. Finding no enemy to attack, Victor, after crossing La -Mancha unopposed, took up his post at Madridejos, on the high-road -between Madrid and the Despeña Perros, and waited for further orders -from Head Quarters. - -It was only after the victory of Ucles that King Joseph was permitted -by his brother to make his formal entry into Madrid. Up to this -moment he had been told to stop at the Palace of the Pardo, far -outside the walls, and only to pay furtive and unostentatious -visits to his official abode in the city. When the inhabitants of -the capital had been sufficiently impressed by the arrival of the -numerous columns of the 4th Corps and of Dessolles, and had seen -the banners and the prisoners taken at Ucles paraded through their -streets, their king was once more sent among them. Joseph made his -appearance on January 22, passed through a long lane of French -bayonets to the church of San Isidro, where a _Te Deum_ was chanted -for the late victories, and then entered his palace. Here he received -numerous deputations of Spaniards who swore him fealty. But the moral -effect of these oaths was not very great, for the local notables -attended under the pressure of the bayonet. Napoleon had sent orders -that every town in Castile of more than 2,000 souls must dispatch -delegates to Madrid, or the consequences would be unpleasant[25]. The -delegates appeared, but it may be guessed with what feelings they -mouthed their oaths and their protestations of joy and loyalty. Yet -Joseph, determined to play the part of the benevolent monarch, took -the whole farce seriously, and answered with lavish declarations of -his love and sympathy for the great Spanish nation. Sentiments of -the kind were to be the staple of his fruitless and copious oratory -for the next four years. His heart would have sunk within him if -only he could have recognized their futility: but 1809 was but just -beginning, and he was far from realizing the full meaning of his -position: it took a very long time to thoroughly disenchant this -hard-working and well-meaning prince. - - [25] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,729, from Valladolid, Jan. 16. - - - - -SECTION IX: CHAPTER II - -NAPOLEON’S DEPARTURE FROM SPAIN: HIS PLANS FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE -WAR: THE COUNTER-PLANS OF THE JUNTA - - -Four days after the battle of Ucles Napoleon quitted Spain. He had -rested at Valladolid from January 6 to January 17, after his return -from the pursuit of Sir John Moore. Though he had failed to entrap -the British Army he was not discontented with his achievements. -He was fully convinced that he had broken the back of the Spanish -insurrection, and that he could safely return to France, leaving -the completion of the work to his brother and his marshals. He was -anxious to hear that Saragossa had fallen, and that the English had -been driven out of the Peninsula. When these two events should have -come to pass, his armies might resume, under the guidance of his -subordinates, the original advance against Portugal and Andalusia -which had been so effectually frustrated by Moore’s daring move. - -Meanwhile he spent full eleven days at Valladolid, busy with all -manner of desk-work, connected not merely with Spain, but with the -affairs of the whole continent. He was evidently anxious to leave -an impression of terror behind him: he hectored and bullied the -unfortunate Spanish deputations that were compelled to come before -him in the most insulting fashion. His harangues generally wound up -with the declaration that if he was ever forced to come back to Spain -in arms, he would remove his brother Joseph, and divide the realm -into subject provinces, which should be governed by martial law. Some -French soldiers (probably marauders) having been assassinated, he -arrested and threatened to hang the whole municipality of Valladolid, -finally releasing them only when three persons accused (rightly -or wrongly) of the murders were delated to him and executed. He -sent advice to King Joseph to deal in the same way with Madrid: -nothing would keep the capital quiet, he wrote, but a good string -of executions[26]. It was to be many years before he realized that -hanging did no good in Spain, and was only repaid by additional -assassinations. In return for this good advice to his brother, he -extorted from him fifty of the choicest pictures of the royal gallery -at Madrid; but in compensation Joseph was invited to annex all that -he might choose from the private collections of the exiled Spanish -nobility and the monasteries of the capital[27]. - - [26] ‘Faites donc pendre une douzaine d’individus à Madrid: il - n’y manque point de mauvais sujets, et sans cela il n’y aura rien - de fait.’ _Nap. Corresp._, 14,684. Compare Lecestre, _Lettres - inédites de Napoléon_, i. 275, where orders are given that thirty - persons, who had already been acquitted by the civil tribunals, - should he rearrested, tried again before a court martial, and - promptly shot! Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 16, 1809. - - [27] ‘Je préfèrerais que vous prissiez tous les tableaux qui - se trouvent dans les maisons confisquées et dans les couvents - supprimés, et que vous me fissiez présent d’une cinquantaine de - chefs-d’œuvre. Vous sentez qu’il ne faut que de bonnes choses.’ - _Nap. Corresp._, 14,717. - -Suggestions have sometimes been made that Napoleon hastened his -departure from Spain, because he saw that the suppression of the -insurrection would take a much longer time than he had originally -supposed, and because he wished to transfer to other hands the -lengthy and inglorious task of hunting down the last armies of the -Junta. This view is certainly erroneous: his three months’ stay in -Spain had not opened the Emperor’s eyes to the difficulties of the -business that he had taken in hand. Though many of his couriers and -aides-de-camp had already been ambuscaded and shot by the peasantry, -though he was already beginning to see that a blockhouse and a -garrison would have to be placed at every stage on the high-roads, -he believed that these sinister signs were temporary, and that the -country-side, after a few sanguinary lessons had been given, would -sink down into the quiet of despair. - -His final legacy to his brother, on departing, was a long dispatch -giving a complete plan of operations for the next campaign. Soult, -after forcing the English to embark, was to march on Oporto. Napoleon -calculated that he ought to capture it on February 1, and that on -February 10 he would be in front of Lisbon. The Portuguese levies he -practically disregarded as a fighting force, and he was ignorant that -there still remained 8,000 or 10,000 British troops on the Tagus, who -would serve to stiffen their resistance. - -When Soult should have captured Oporto, and be well on the way -to Lisbon, Victor was to go forward with his own 1st Corps, the -division of Leval from the 4th Corps, and the cavalry of Milhaud, -Latour-Maubourg, and Lasalle. He was to strike at Estremadura, occupy -Merida and Badajoz, and join hands with Soult along the Tagus. -Lisbon being reduced, Victor was to borrow a division from Soult and -march on Seville with 40,000 men. With such a force, as the Emperor -calculated, he would subdue the whole of Andalusia with ease. - -Meanwhile Saragossa must (as Napoleon rightly thought) fall some -time in February. When it was disposed of, the 3rd and 5th Corps -would provide a garrison for Aragon, and then march on Valencia, -which would be attacked and subdued much about the same time that -Victor would arrive at Seville. St. Cyr would have made an end of -the Catalans long before. Thus the whole Peninsula would be subdued -ere the summer was over. There was nowhere a Spanish army that could -make head against even 10,000 French troops. The only possible -complication would be that Moore’s army might conceivably take ship, -not for England, but for Lisbon or Cadiz. If the English, ‘the only -enemy who could create difficulties,’ took this course, the Emperor -might have to give further orders. But it does not seem that he -regarded this as a likely contingency, since he had conceived an even -exaggerated idea of the losses and demoralization which the British -had suffered in the retreat to Corunna. To Joseph he wrote, ‘reserve -yourself for the expedition to Andalusia, which may start three weeks -hence. With 40,000 men, marching by an unexpected route [i.e. by -Badajoz, not by La Carolina], you will surprise the enemy and force -him to submit. This is an operation which will make an end of the -war: I leave the glory of it to you[28].’ To Jerome Napoleon he wrote -in the most laconic style, ‘the Spanish affair is done with[29],’ and -then proceeded to discuss the general politics of the Continent, as -if his whole attention could now be given to the doings of Austria -and Russia. On January 18 he rode out of Valladolid, and after -six days of incessant travel reached Paris on the 24th. His first -care after his arrival was to scare the intriguers of the capital -into good behaviour. His second was to endeavour to treat Austria -after the same fashion. He had not yet made up his mind whether the -ministers of Francis II meant mischief, or whether they had merely -been presuming on his long absence in Spain: on the whole he thought -that they could be reduced to order by bold language, and by the -ostentatious movement of troops on the Rhine and upper Danube. But he -was not sure of his conclusion: in his correspondence letters stating -that Austria has been brought to reason, alternate with others -in which she is accused of incorrigible perversity, and a design -to make war in the spring[30]. The Emperor’s suspicions are most -clearly shown by the fact that in February he ordered the whole of -the Imperial Guard, except two battalions and three squadrons, to be -brought up from Spain and directed on Paris[31]. In the same month he -sent secret orders to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, -to bid them be ready to mobilize their contingents at short notice. - - [28] Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 11, 1809, _Nap. Corresp._, 14,684. - - [29] Almost the same words are found in a dispatch to Mollien - of Jan. 24, ‘Aujourd’hui les affaires d’Espagne sont à peu près - terminées.’ This was written _after_ the Emperor had returned to - Paris. - - [30] Cf., for example, _Nap. Corresp._, 14,741 and 14,749, - where Austria is said to have changed her tone and stopped her - preparation, with 14,721 and 14,779, which show a most hostile - spirit against her. - - [31] For the details, see _Nap. Corresp._, 14,780, written to - Bessières from Paris on Feb. 15. - -It is clear that as regards the affairs of Spain the Emperor was in -January and February, 1809, as much deluded as he had been seven -months before, in June, 1808. The whole plan of campaign which he -dictated at Valladolid, and sent as his parting gift to Joseph and -Jourdan, was absolutely impracticable, and indicated a fundamental -ignorance of the character of the Spanish war. It would have been a -perfectly sensible document if the struggle had been raging in Italy -or Germany, though even there the calculations of distance and time -would have been rather hazardous. Twenty-three days were given to -Soult to expel the English, to pacify Galicia, to take Oporto, and -to march on Lisbon! Even granting that all had gone as the Emperor -desired, the estimate was too short by half. It was midwinter; -Galicia and northern Portugal form one of the most mountainous -regions in Europe: their roads are vile; their food supplies are -scanty; their climate at that season of the year detestable. Clearly -the task given to Soult could not be executed in the prescribed -time[32]. - - [32] As a matter of fact, as has been stated elsewhere, Soult - though working his hardest did not leave Corunna till Feb. 20, - 1809, nor take Oporto till March 29. - -But this is a minor point: it was not so much in his ‘logistics’ that -the Emperor went wrong as in his general conception of the character -of the war. He imagined that in dealing with Spain he might act as -if he were dealing with Austria or Prussia--indeed that he had an -enormous extra advantage in the fact that the armies of Ferdinand VII -were infinitely inferior in mere fighting power to those of Francis -II or Frederick William III. By all the ordinary rules of modern -warfare, a nation whose capital had been occupied, and whose regular -armies had been routed and half-destroyed, ought to have submitted -without further trouble. The Emperor was a little surprised that -the effect of Espinosa and Gamonal, of Tudela and Ucles, had not -been greater. He had almost expected to receive overtures from the -Junta, asking for terms of submission. But somewhat disappointed -though he might be, he had not yet realized that Spain was not as -other countries. The occupation of Madrid counted for little or -nothing. The insurrectionary armies, when driven into a corner, did -not capitulate, but dispersed, and fled in small parties over the -hills, to reunite on the first opportunity. Prussian or Austrian -troops under similar circumstances would have quietly laid down their -arms. But to endeavour to grasp a Spanish corps was like clutching -at a ball of quicksilver: the mass dispersed in driblets between the -fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately -united to form a new force. Large captures of Spaniards only took -place on the actual battle-field (as at Ucles or Ocaña), or when an -army had shut itself up in a fortress and could not get away, as -happened at Saragossa and Badajoz. Unless actually penned in between -bayonets, the insurgents abandoned cannon and baggage, broke their -ranks and disappeared, to gather again on some more propitious day, -either as fresh armies or as guerrilla bands operating upon the -victor’s lines of communication. - -Nor was this all: in Italy, Germany, and Austria Bonaparte had dealt -with regions where the population remained quiescent when once the -regular army had been beaten. Risings like that of Verona in 1797, or -of the Tyrol in 1805, were exceptional. The French army was wont to -go forward without being forced to leave large garrisons behind it, -to hold down the conquered country-side. A battalion or two placed in -the chief towns sufficed to secure the communication of the army with -France. Small parties, or even single officers bearing dispatches, -could ride safely for many miles through an Italian or Austrian -district without being molested. It was not thus in Spain: the -Emperor was to find that every village where there was not a French -garrison would be a focus of active resistance, and that no amount of -shooting or hanging would cow the spirits of the peasantry. It was -only after scores of aides-de-camp had been murdered or captured, and -after countless small detachments had been destroyed, that he came to -realize that every foot of Spanish soil must not only be conquered -but also held down. If there was a square of ten miles unoccupied, a -guerrilla band arose in it. If a district thirty miles long lacked a -brigade to garrison it, a local junta with a ragged apology for an -army promptly appeared. Three hundred thousand men look a large force -on paper, but when they have to hold down a country five hundred -miles broad they are frittered away to nothing. This Great Britain -knows well enough from her recent South African experience: but it -was not a common matter of knowledge in 1809. If the Emperor had been -told, on the day of his entry into Madrid, that even three years -later his communication with Bayonne would only be preserved by the -maintenance of a fortified post at every tenth milestone, he would -have laughed the idea to scorn. Still more ridiculous would it have -appeared to him if he had been told that it would take a body of 300 -horse to carry a dispatch from Salamanca to Saragossa, or that the -normal garrison of Old Castile would have to be kept at 15,000 men, -even when there was no regular Spanish army nearer to it than Oviedo -or Astorga. In short he, and all Europe, had much to learn as to the -conditions of warfare in the Peninsula. If he had realized them in -March, 1808, there would have been no treachery at Bayonne, and the -‘running sore,’ as he afterwards called the Spanish war, would never -have broken forth. - -Meanwhile the conquest of Spain was hung up for a month and more -after the victory of Ucles. The Emperor had bidden Joseph and Jourdan -to wait till the February rains were over, before sending out the -great expedition against Andalusia; the siege of Saragossa was -prolonged far beyond expectation, and Soult in Galicia (as we shall -presently see) found the time-allowance which his master had set him -inadequate to the verge of absurdity. The French made no further move -of importance till March. - -The Central Junta, therefore, were granted three full months from the -date of their flight from Aranjuez to Seville, in which to reorganize -their armies for the oncoming campaign of 1809--a respite which they -gained (as we have already shown) purely and solely through Moore’s -splendid inspiration of the march to Sahagun. - -The members of the Junta trailed into Seville at various dates -between December 14 and December 17. Their rapid journey at midwinter -through the Sierra de Guadalupe and the still wilder Sierra Morena -had been toilsome and exhausting[33]. It proved fatal to their -old president, Florida Blanca, who died of bronchitis only eleven -days after he had arrived at Seville. In his stead a Castilian -Grandee of unimpeachable patriotism but very moderate abilities, -the Marquis of Astorga, was elected to the presidential chair. The -Junta had no enviable task before it: the news of the disasters -on the Ebro and the fall of Madrid had thrown the nation into a -paroxysm of unreasoning fury. Ridiculous charges of treason were -being raised against all those who had been in charge of the war. -Blake and Castaños (of all people!) were being openly accused of -having sold themselves to Napoleon. There were a number of political -assassinations in the regions to which the French had not yet -penetrated: most of the victims were old friends of Godoy. It looked -at first as if the central government would be unable to restore any -sort of order, or to organize any further resistance. Some of the -local juntas, whose importance had disappeared with the meeting of -the Supreme Junta, showed signs of wishing to resume their ancient -independence. Those of Seville and Jaen were especially disobliging. -But the evils of disunion were so obvious that even the most -narrow-minded particularists settled down after a time into at least -a formal obedience to the central government. - - [33] It will be remembered (see vol. i. p. 529), that they went - via Talavera, Merida, and Llerena. - -The enforced halt made by the French after Napoleon’s departure for -Madrid was the salvation of Spain. By the month of January things -were beginning to assume a more regular aspect, and some attempt -was made to face the situation. The most favourable part of that -situation was that money at least was not wanting for the moment. The -four or five millions of dollars which the British Government had -distributed to the provincial Juntas and to the ‘Central’ had long -been spent, and in 1809 no more than £387,000 in specie was advanced -to Spain. Spent also was the enormous amount of money accruing from -patriotic gifts and local assessments. But there had just arrived -at Cadiz a large consignment of specie from America. The Spanish -colonies in the New World had all adhered without hesitation to the -cause of Ferdinand VII, and their first and most copious contribution -had just come to hand. Not only had the Governors of Mexico and -Peru and the other provinces strained every nerve to raise money, -but a vast patriotic fund had been collected by individuals. There -were rich merchants and land-holders in America who made voluntary -offerings of sums as large as 100,000 or 200,000 dollars apiece. -The money which came to hand early in 1809 amounted to more than -£2,800,000, and much more was received ere the close of the year. It -was with this sum, far more than with British money, that the Spanish -armies were paid and fed: but their equipment mainly came from -England. The stores of arms, clothing, and munition which had existed -in the arsenals of the Peninsula when the war broke out, had all been -exhausted in the autumn, and had not even sufficed to equip fully the -unfortunate armies which were beaten on the Ebro. The government and -the local juntas had set up new manufactories at Seville, Valencia, -and elsewhere, which were already turning out a large quantity of -weapons, accoutrements, and uniforms: it was now that the armies -began to appear in the rough brown cloth of the country and in -leather shakos, abandoning the old white uniform and plumed hat -which had been the garb of the Spanish line. But the reclothing and -rearmament of the troops could never have been completed without the -enormous consignments of cloth, powder, muskets, lead, and leather -work which came from England. It is true that much was lost by the -fortune of war before it could be utilized--notably the considerable -amount of muskets, ammunition, and cloth which had been landed in -Galicia for La Romana’s army. This, as we have seen, was either -destroyed by Sir John Moore’s army or captured by Soult, because -the Galician Junta had kept it waiting too long at the base. But -all that went to Andalusia, Valencia, and Catalonia came safely to -hand. Palafox’s army was re-equipped, just before the second siege of -Saragossa began, with British stores sent up by Colonel Doyle from -Tarragona. The armies of the south and east also received enormous -consignments of necessaries. - -It remains to speak of the purely military aspect of the Junta’s -position. When January began, the wrecks of the Spanish armies were -distributed in a wide semicircle reaching from Oviedo to Gerona, -while the French lay in their midst. In the Asturias there were still -14,000 or 15,000 men under arms: the relics of Acevedo’s division of -Blake’s army had fallen back, and joined the other levies which the -local Junta had assembled. The whole force was watching the two lines -on which the French could conceivably move during the winter--the -coast route from Santander to Gijon, and the pass of Pajares which -leads from Leon to Oviedo. - -In Galicia, La Romana’s army, now engaged in the miserable retreat -from Astorga to Orense, had fallen into the most wretched condition. -Of the 22,000 men who had been assembled at Leon in December only -6,000 or 7,000 were now to be found: the Galician battalions had -melted home when the army fell back among their native mountains. -They cannot be much blamed, for they were suffering acute starvation: -in the spring they came back to join the colours readily enough. -The regulars, who still hung together, were famished, naked, -typhus-ridden, and incapable of any great exertion. Their general’s -only care was to keep them as far as possible from Soult and Ney, -till the winter should have passed by, and food and clothing be -procured. - -Between La Romana’s men at Orense and the army of Estremadura on -the Tagus there was no Spanish force in the field. When Lapisse -and D’Avenay had occupied Zamora and Salamanca, the only centre of -resistance in Leon was the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was held -by a handful of local militia. Portuguese troops were beginning to -collect in its rear at Almeida, but with them the Junta had nothing -to do. - -The Estremaduran army had now passed from the hands of Galluzzo to -those of Cuesta. The Junta, in spite of the memories of Cabezon -and Rio Seco, had once more given the obstinate and incapable old -soldier an important command. Apparently they had been moved by the -widespread but idiotic cry imputing treachery to the generals who -had been beaten on the Ebro, and gave Cuesta an army because (with -all his faults) no one ever dreamed of accusing him of treachery or -sympathy with the French. His forces consisted (1) of the wrecks -of Belvedere’s army from Gamonal, (2) of the débris of San Juan’s -army from Madrid, (3) of new Estremaduran levies, which had not gone -forward to Burgos in October, but had remained behind to complete -their organization, (4) of the four dismounted cavalry regiments from -Denmark, which had been sent to the south when La Romana landed at -Santander, in order to procure equipment and horses. In all, the army -of Cuesta had no more than 10,500 foot and 2,000 or 2,500 horse. The -spirit of the old troops of San Juan and Belvedere was still very -bad, and they were hardly recovered from their December mutinies and -murders. After Lefebvre had driven them back from the Tagus, and -occupied the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, the Estremadurans had -retired to Merida and Truxillo: on January 11 their most advanced -position was at the last-named place. - -To the east of Estremadura lay the weakest point of the Spanish line: -Andalusia and its mountain barrier of the Sierra Morena were almost -undefended in January, 1809. It will be remembered that all through -the autumn of the preceding year the local juntas, intoxicated -with the fumes of Baylen, had let the months slip by without doing -much to organize the ‘Army of Reserve,’ of which they had spoken -so much in August and September. It resulted that, when Reding had -marched for Catalonia, and the last belated fractions of Castaños’ -army had been forwarded to Madrid, Andalusia was almost destitute -of troops. When the Junta fled to Seville, it looked around for an -army with which to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena. Nothing -of the kind existed: the only force available consisted of nine or -ten battalions, mainly new levies, which were dispersed through the -‘Four Kingdoms’ completing their armament and organization. They were -hastily mobilized and pushed forward to the Sierra Morena, but not -more than 6,000 bayonets and 500 sabres could be collected. This was -the sole force that lay between the French at Madrid and the Junta at -Seville. The charge of the division, whose head quarters were placed -at La Carolina, was given to the Marquis del Palacio, who in the -general shifting of commanders had just been recalled from Catalonia. - -The British Government’s knowledge of the danger to which Andalusia -was exposed, from the absolute want of troops to defend it, led to an -untoward incident, which did much to endanger its friendly relations -with the Junta. On hearing of the fall of Madrid, and of Moore’s -retreat towards Galicia, Canning harked back to one of his old ideas -of the previous summer, the notion that British troops might be -sent to the south of Spain, if a safe basis for their operations -were secured. This, as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs -believed, would best be provided by the establishment of a garrison -in Cadiz. It was all-important that this great centre of commerce -should not fall into the hands of the French, and early in January it -was known in London that there was no adequate Spanish force ready to -defend the passes of Andalusia. If Napoleon had an army large enough -to provide, not only for the pursuit of Moore, but for the dispatch -of a strong corps for an attack on Seville, it seemed probable that -the French might overrun Southern Spain as far as the sea, without -meeting with serious opposition. Accordingly, Canning wrote to Frere, -on the fourteenth day of the new year, 1809, to offer the assistance -of a considerable British force for the defence of Andalusia, if -Cadiz were placed in their hands. - -‘The question of the employment of a British army in the south -of Spain,’ he wrote, ‘depends essentially upon the disposition -of the Spanish Government to receive a corps of that army into -Cadiz. Without the security to be afforded by that fortress, it is -impossible to hazard the army in the interior, after the example of -the little co-operation which Sir John Moore represents himself to -have received from the Spaniards in the north.... In consequence of -the imminent danger, and of the pressing necessity for immediate -decision arising from Sir John Moore’s retreat, and from the -defenceless state in which you represent Andalusia to be, His -Majesty’s Government have deemed it right (without waiting for the -result of your communication with the Central Junta) to send a force -direct to Cadiz, to be admitted into that fortress. Four thousand -men under Major-General Sherbrooke are directed to sail immediately, -and he is informed that he is to expect instructions from you on -his arrival, containing the determination of the Spanish Government -respecting his admission into Cadiz.... In the event of a refusal -of the Junta to afford this proof of confidence, Major-General -Sherbrooke is directed to proceed to Gibraltar[34].’ - - [34] Canning to Frere, Jan. 14, 1809 (Record Office). - -The last paragraph of this dispatch shows that Canning’s intentions -were perfectly honourable, and that he did not intend to bring any -pressure to bear upon the Junta in the event of their refusing to -admit a British garrison into Cadiz. His views were founded upon the -information available in London when he wrote, and he was under the -impression that a French army might probably be marching upon Seville -at the moment when his letter would reach Frere’s hands. But--as we -have seen--the diversion of the main force of Napoleon’s army of -invasion against Moore, had rendered any such expedition impossible, -and no immediate danger was really to be apprehended. - -The same idea, however, had entered into Frere’s mind, and long -before he received Canning’s dispatch he had been sounding members -of the Central Junta as to the way in which they would look on -a proposal to send British troops to Cadiz. The answer which he -received from their secretary, Martin de Garay, was not reassuring: -Don Martin ‘energetically repudiated’ the project: there would be -no objection, he said, to admit a garrison, if Cadiz became ‘the -ultimate point of retreat’ of the armies and government of Spain. -But the danger that had appeared so pressing some weeks before had -passed by, the French had stopped their advance, and the Junta were -now hoping to defend Estremadura and the course of the Tagus. The -invaders, as they trusted, would be met and checked on the line -of Alcantara and Almaraz. They deprecated any sending of British -troops to Cadiz, and hoped that Lisbon would be the point to which -reinforcements would be dispatched, as its evacuation would have -deplorable results. De Garay, in a second letter, spoke of rumours -to the effect that Cradock was proposing to evacuate Portugal, and -trusted that they were not true. As a matter of fact they were, and -that timid commander was already making secret preparations to embark. - -Frere gave up for the present any idea of pressing the project -further, unless the French should recommence their advance on -Andalusia. He had not yet received Canning’s dispatch from London, -and did not know that the home government had taken to heart the plan -for occupying Cadiz and sending a large expedition to Andalusia. But -on February 2, before any hint of the kind had reached him, he was -informed by a dispatch from Lisbon that troops had been already sent -off to Cadiz[35]. This step was the work of Sir George Smith, one of -the numerous British military agents in the Peninsula, who had taken -upon himself to force events to an issue, without first taking the -precaution of communicating either with the home government or the -British ambassador at Seville. Smith was a hasty and presumptuous -man, full of zeal without discretion. The defencelessness of -Andalusia had impressed him, just as it had impressed Canning and -Frere. But instead of opening communications with the Junta, as -they had both done, he had merely written in very urgent terms to -Cradock, and adjured him to detach troops from the scanty garrison of -Portugal in order to secure Cadiz. The general, when thus pressed, -consented to fall in with the scheme, and set aside a brigade under -Mackenzie, which he shipped off from Lisbon at twenty-four hours’ -notice (February 2). He also ordered the 40th regiment, then in -garrison at Elvas, to march on Seville. Both Cradock and Smith were -gravely to blame, for they had no authorization to attempt to occupy -Cadiz, without obtaining the consent of the Spanish Government[36]. -They should have consulted both Frere and the Junta before moving a -man: but it was only when the troops had actually embarked that they -thought fit to notify their action to the ambassador at Seville. - - [35] The 29th, 3/27th, and 2/9th regiments. - - [36] As Canning wrote to Frere, after receiving the news of the - abortive expedition, ‘The enclosed copy of the instructions under - which Sir G. Smith was sent out, will show you that the step - taken by that officer was not to have been taken _except at the - direct solicitation of the Spanish authorities_.... He has been - directed to leave Cadiz at once, and you may assure the Junta - that no separate or secret commission was, has been, or ever will - be entrusted to any officer or other person,’ Feb. 26 (Record - Office). - -On receiving their letters Frere was placed in an unenviable -position. Having just seen his own proposals negatived by the Junta -in polite but decisive terms, he now learnt that a British force had -been sent off to carry out precisely the plan which the Spaniards had -refused to take into consideration. Four days later he was informed -that Mackenzie’s brigade, which had chanced upon a favourable wind, -was actually lying in Cadiz harbour, and that Sir George Smith was -endeavouring to induce the local authorities of the place to permit -them to land. The Junta, as was inevitable, suspected Frere of having -been in the plot, and imagined that he was trying to force their hand -by the display of armed force. Cadiz was at Smith’s mercy, for it -was only garrisoned by its urban guards; and the populace were by no -means unwilling to see the British land, for the fear of the French -was upon them, and they welcomed the approach of reinforcements of -any kind. - -The supreme authority in Cadiz at this moment was the Marquis of -Villel, a special commissioner sent down by the Central Junta, of -which he was a member. He refused to be cajoled by Smith, and very -properly referred his demand for permission to disembark to the -government at Seville. The latter, not unnaturally incensed, turned -for explanations to Frere. The ambassador’s conduct when placed in -this dilemma was by no means wise or straightforward. Instead of -frankly disavowing Smith’s action, he adopted the tortuous course[37] -of pretending that the expedition from Lisbon had been sent with -his knowledge and consent, but that he would not allow it to land -without the leave of the Junta. The Spaniards replied in terms of -some indignation, and returned a frank negative to the demand. Their -secretary, de Garay, wrote that the unexpected appearance of General -Mackenzie’s force was ‘painful and disagreeable intelligence, Cadiz -being no longer in danger from the French, and two Spanish regiments -being already on their way to reinforce the garrison. The measure -which had been taken would admit of a thousand interpretations, and -a consent to hand over the fortress to the British would compromise -the Central Junta with the whole nation.’ The fact was that Spanish -public opinion was strongly opposed to allowing the British to obtain -a foothold in Cadiz; there was a deeply-rooted notion abroad that, if -once occupied, the place might be kept permanently in our hands, and -be turned into a second Gibraltar. - - [37] Frere, by his own showing, exceeded the bounds of diplomatic - evasion. He writes to Canning (Feb. 9) to say that the dispatch - of the Lisbon troops had been a complete surprise to him, as he - had not received any information on the subject. ‘It occurred - to me, however, that it was best to take it upon myself, and to - affect to consider it a thing of course, and to say that I had - sent orders in conformity with the note which I had received from - Mr. de Garay. In order to give this some semblance of truth, I - did afterwards write a letter to Lisbon to this effect, and sent - it off before I dispatched my note to Mr. de Garay. This did not - prevent me from being assailed by remonstrances.’ Finally he - proceeded to tell the Junta ‘that he only wished to see Cadiz - occupied in the extreme case of an immediate attack by the - French’ (Record Office). - -Unfortunately for the credit of Great Britain with her allies, -tumults broke out at Cadiz within a few days of the arrival of -Mackenzie’s army, which supplied an excuse to malevolent Spaniards -for attributing the worst motives to their allies. As a matter of -fact they were not stirred up by Sir George Smith or any other -emissary of the British Government, but were the results of the -eccentric behaviour of the Marquis de Villel[38]. This personage -was a very strange character, a sort of nineteenth-century Spanish -Puritan, with a taste for playing the benevolent despot. He -attributed the misfortunes of his country (and not without much -reason) to her moral decadence. His idea of the way to commence her -regeneration was peculiar, considering the circumstances of the -time. He issued an edict commanding all married pairs living apart, -to reunite, issued laws repressing theatre-going, late hours, and -gambling, legislated concerning the length of ladies’ skirts, and -organized a grand _battue_ against women of light reputation, of whom -he imprisoned some scores. When he proceeded to engage in a sort of -moral inquisition into the private life of all classes, he naturally -became very unpopular, and on the first opportunity the populace rose -against him. He had ordered into the city a newly-embodied ‘Swiss’ -battalion, raised from the prisoners of Dupont’s army and other -deserters of all nationalities. The cry was raised by his enemies -that he was admitting Frenchmen in disguise into the sacred fortress, -with the purpose of betraying it to the enemy. Other rumours were -put about to the effect that he was deliberately neglecting the -fortifications, and supplying the batteries with powder adulterated -with sand[39]. - - [38] For Villel’s eccentricities in detail see Toreno, i. pp. - 375-6, and Arteche, v. p. 107. - - [39] See Col. Leslie (of the 29th), _Memoirs_, p. 94. - -When the foreign battalion drew near to Cadiz on February 22, and -began to march up the long spit which connects the city with the Isla -de Leon, the storm burst. A mixed multitude of rioters shut the gates -against the troops, and then swept the streets, maltreating Villel’s -subordinates, and slaying Don José Heredia the commander of the -coast-guard, a person very unpopular with the smugglers, who formed -an appreciable element in the crowd. The High Commissioner himself -was besieged in his house, hunted from it, and nearly murdered: he -only escaped by the kind offices of the head of a Capuchin convent, -who took him within his gates, and made himself responsible to the -rioters for keeping the refugee in safe custody. The mob next tried -to break open the state prison, for the purpose of slaying General -Caraffa and other political captives. Fortunately Felix Jones, the -military Governor, succeeded in saving these unhappy persons, by the -not over-willing aid of the urban guards, many of whom had joined in -the outbreak. - -The rioters expressed great friendliness for the British, and many of -them kept inviting the troops in the offing to come ashore. It was -very lucky that no attention was paid to these solicitations[40], -for if they had landed the worst suspicions of the Junta would have -appeared justified, and the insurrection would have been attributed -to the machinations of Frere or Smith. Fortunately the latter had -died, only a few days before the troubles broke out, the victim of -a fever which carried him off after no more than twenty-four hours -of illness. If he had survived till the twenty-second, he would have -been quite capable of taking the fatal step of listening to the -appeals of the rioters, and ordering the troops ashore. - - [40] Mackenzie wrote that ‘it was evident that the people were - favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was - frequently called for during the tumult.’ But ‘the utmost care - was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any - part whatever on this occasion, and except when I was applied to - by the Governor for the interference of some British officers as - mediators, we stood perfectly clear.’ Dispatch to Castlereagh in - the Record Office, dated Lisbon, March 13, 1809. - -As it turned out the whole expedition ended in an absurd fiasco. -When the riots had died down, the Junta recalled the eccentric de -Villel, but they would not listen to any proposals from Frere for -admitting British troops into Cadiz, even when he suggested that -only two battalions should remain there, while the rest, including -Sherbrooke’s division, which was expected to arrive in a few days, -should come up and join the 40th regiment at Seville, with the -ultimate purpose of marching into Estremadura. The Junta replied -that ‘the loyalty of the British Ministry and the generosity of its -efforts to assist Spain were beyond suspicion: but the National -Government must respect national prejudices, and avoid exposing -itself to censure. If there were any urgent danger, they would have -no hesitation in admitting the troops of their allies into Cadiz. But -the French were still far away, and there was no immediate prospect -of their approach. The British expedition would be more usefully -employed in Catalonia, or in some other theatre of war, than in -Cadiz[41].’ By March 4, when this final answer was sent to Frere, the -state of affairs had so much changed, that the representations made -by the Junta were more or less correct. The imminent danger which had -existed in January had passed away. - - [41] Martin de Garay to Frere, March 4 (Record Office). - -Accordingly, after lying idly for four weeks in their transports, -and gazing with much unsatisfied curiosity on the white houses, the -green shutters, and the flat roofs of Cadiz, across the beautiful -bay, Mackenzie’s regiments set sail again for Lisbon on March 6. As -they ran out of the harbour, they met Sherbrooke’s belated convoy, -whose arrival had been delayed by fearful tempests in the Bay of -Biscay. The whole force, 6,000 bayonets strong, was brought back to -Portugal. It might have been of infinite service to Cradock if it had -remained at Lisbon and had never been sent to Cadiz, and its presence -might have induced him to adopt measures less timid and futile than -those which (as we shall see) he had pursued during January and -February[42]. - - [42] Napier enlarges on this incident at great length in pages - 14-19 of his second volume. In his persistent dislike for - Canning, Castlereagh and Mr. Frere, as well as for the Spaniards, - he concludes that the business ‘indicated an unsettled policy, - shallow combination, and had agents on the part of the British - Cabinet, and an unwise and unworthy disposition in the Supreme - Junta,’ while Smith was ‘zealous and acute’ and Cradock ‘full of - zeal and moral courage.’ It is hard to give an unqualified assent - to any one of these views. Smith was wrong in acting without - giving any notice of his intentions to the Junta: Cradock’s zeal - was equally untempered by discretion. The British Cabinet, acting - on the information available in the end of December, was right to - be anxious about Cadiz, and equally right to abandon its attempt - to occupy the place in March, when the conditions of the war had - changed, and the Junta had shown its dislike to the proposal. - As to the Spaniards, the matter was only broached to them in - February, when the danger of an immediate French advance had - passed away, and they were entirely justified in their answer, - which was framed as politely as could be contrived. We must not - blame them overmuch for their suspicion: England, though now a - friend, had long been an enemy--and the fate of Gibraltar was - always before their eyes. - -But this unfortunate incident has detained us too long; we must -return to the state of the Spanish armies at the end of the month of -January. Beyond the levies of the Marquis Del Palacio at La Carolina, -there was a long gap in the Spanish line of defence. The next force -under arms was the army of Infantado, now engaged in its exhausting -winter march from Cuenca to the Murcian border. After the rout of -Ucles it was still 12,000 strong, though destitute of all supplies -and not fit for immediate service. The Junta ordered it to march from -Chinchilla to join Del Palacio’s force at the mouth of the Despeña -Perros, and so to strengthen the defences of Andalusia. This was -done, and the two forces were safely united, so that when a few more -new battalions had been brought up from Granada, 20,000 men were -placed between Victor and Andalusia. The Junta removed Infantado from -command, rightly judging that he had sacrificed Venegas at Ucles by -his neglect to send orders and his sloth in coming up to join his -subordinate. The charge of the force at La Carolina (still called -‘the Army of the Centre’) was made over to General Cartaojal. - -Beyond Infantado’s depleted corps lay the army of Valencia. Its -nucleus was the remains of the old division of Llamas and Roca, which -had served with Castaños at Tudela. The local Junta rapidly recruited -this skeleton force from 1,500 up to 5,000 men[43]. They added to -it several new regiments raised during the winter in Valencia and -Murcia, and by February had 10,000 men available for succouring -Aragon and Catalonia, though their quality left much to be desired. - - [43] See the table in Argüelles on p. 74 of his Appendix-volume. - -A little further north Palafox was still holding out with splendid -desperation in Saragossa, where he had shut himself up with the whole -army of Aragon. His original 32,000 men were already much thinned -by pestilence and the sword, but in January their spirit was yet -unbroken, and though it was clear that they were doomed to final -destruction, if they were not relieved from the outside, yet they -were still doing excellent work in detaining in front of them the -whole of the 3rd and 5th French Army Corps. - -There yet remains to be described the strongest of all the Spanish -armies, that of Catalonia. In addition to the original garrison of -the province, and to its gallant _miqueletes_ and _somatenes_, there -had been gradually drafted into the principality (1) the greater -part of the garrison of the Balearic Isles, some 9,000 men; (2) -Reding’s Granadan division which started from its home over 10,000 -strong; (3) 2,500 men of Caraffa’s old division from Portugal; (4) -the Marquis of Lazan’s Aragonese division from the side of Lerida, -about 4,000 bayonets. Thus in all some 32,000 men in organized corps -had been massed in Catalonia, and the _somatenes_ added some 20,000 -irregulars. Of course the Spanish strength in January did not reach -these figures. Many men had been lost at the siege of Rosas and in -the battles of Cardadeu and Molins de Rey: yet there were still -40,000 troops of one sort or another available; the spirit of the -country was irritated rather than lowered by the late defeats; the -French only occupied the ground that was within the actual circle of -fire of their garrisons. If the Catalans had been content to avoid -general engagements, and to maintain an incessant guerrilla warfare, -they might have held their own. Though the enemy had a very capable -commander in General St. Cyr, they had as yet accomplished nothing -more than the capture of the antiquated fortress of Rosas, the relief -of Barcelona, and the winning of two fruitless battles. Catalonia -remained unsubdued till the very end of the struggle. - -Reckoning up all their armies, the Junta had in the end of January -some 135,000 men in arms,--a force insufficient to face the French in -the open, for the latter (even after the departure of the Imperial -Guard) had still nearly 300,000[44] sabres and bayonets south of the -Pyrenees, but one quite capable of keeping up the national resistance -if it were only conducted upon the proper lines. For, as Napoleon -and his marshals had yet to learn, no Spanish district could be -considered conquered unless a garrison was left in each of its towns, -and flying columns kept in continual motion through the open country. -Of the 288,000 French who now lay in Spain more than half were really -wanted for garrison duty. A district like Galicia was capable of -keeping 40,000 men employed: even the plains of Old Castile and Leon -swallowed up whole divisions. - - [44] 288,000 on Feb. 15. See Napier’s extracts from the Imperial - muster rolls, i. 514. These numbers include the sick and detached. - -But, unfortunately for Spain, the mania for fighting pitched battles -was still obsessing the minds of her generals. Within a few weeks -three wholly unnecessary and disastrous engagements were to be -risked, at Valls, Ciudad Real, and Medellin. Instead of playing a -cautious defensive game, and harassing the French, the Spaniards -persisted in futile attempts to face the enemy in general actions, -for which their troops were wholly unsuited. The results were so -deplorable that but for a second British intervention--Wellesley’s -march to Talavera--Andalusia would have been in as great peril in -July, 1809, as it had been in January. - -The Central Junta must take its share of the responsibility for this -fact no less than the Spanish generals. It still persisted in its old -error of refusing to appoint a single commander-in-chief, so that -each army fought for its own hand, without any attempt to co-ordinate -its actions with those of the others. Indeed several of the generals -were at notorious enmity with their colleagues--notably Cuesta and -Venegas. It was to no purpose that the Central Government displayed -great energy in organizing men and collecting material, if, when -the armies had been equipped and sent to the front, they were used -piecemeal, without any general strategical scheme, and led ere long -to some miserable disaster, such as Ucles, or Medellin, or Ocaña. The -Junta, the generals, and the nation were all alike possessed by the -delusion that with energy and sufficient numbers they might on some -happy morning achieve a second Baylen. But for such a consummation -Duponts and Vedels are required, and when no such convenient -adversaries were to be found, the attempt to encompass and beat a -French army was certain to end in a catastrophe. - -The only Spanish fighters who were playing the proper game in 1809 -were the Catalonian _somatenes_, and even they gave battle far -too often, and did not adhere with a sufficient pertinacity to -the harassing tactics of guerrilla warfare. General Arteche has -collected in his fourth volume something like a dozen schemes for -the expulsion of the French from Spain, which were laid before the -Junta, or ventilated in print, during this year. It is interesting to -see that only one of them advocates the true line of resistance--the -avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy’s flanks and -communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands instead -of great masses[45]. Some of the other plans are the wild imaginings -of ignorant fools--one wiseacre wished to run down the French -columns with pikemen in a sort of Macedonian phalanx, another to arm -one-sixth of the troops with hand-grenades! But the majority of the -Junta’s self-constituted advisers thought that numbers were the only -necessary thing, and proposed to save Spain by crushing the invaders -with levies _en masse_ of all persons between sixteen and fifty--one -enthusiast makes the age-limit fourteen to seventy! - - [45] See Arteche, iv. 115-51: the advocate of the guerrilla game - was a certain Faustino Fernandez. - -These were the views of the nation, and the generals and the Junta -were but infected with the common delusion of all their compatriots. -They would not see that courage and raw multitudes are almost -helpless when opposed by equal courage combined with skill, long -experience of war, superior tactics, and intelligent leading. - - - - -SECTION X - -THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGN IN CATALONIA - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE SIEGE OF ROSAS - - -Before we follow further the fortunes of Southern Spain, it is -necessary to turn back and to take up the tale of the war on the -Eastern coast at the point where it was left in Section V. - -The same torpor which was notable in the operations of the main -armies of the Spaniards and the French during the months of September -and October was to be observed in Catalonia also. On the Ter and the -Llobregat the inability of the French to move was much more real, and -the slackness of the Spaniards even more inexplicable, than on the -Ebro and the Aragon. - -In the early days of September the situation of the invaders was -most perilous. After the disastrous failure of the second siege of -Gerona, it will be remembered that Reille had withdrawn to Figueras, -close to the French frontier, while Duhesme had cut his way back to -Barcelona, after sacrificing all his artillery and his baggage on the -way. Both commanders proceeded to report to the Emperor that there -was need for ample reinforcements of veteran troops, or a catastrophe -must inevitably ensue. Meanwhile Reille preserved a defensive -attitude at the foot of the Pyrenees; while Duhesme could do no more -than hold Barcelona, and as much of its suburban plain as he could -safely occupy without risking overmuch his outlying detachments. -He foresaw a famine in the winter, and devoted all his energies to -seizing and sending into the town all foodstuffs that he could find -in the neighbourhood. His position was most uncomfortable: the late -expedition had reduced his force from 13,000 to 10,000 sabres and -bayonets. The men were demoralized, and when sent out to forage saw -_somatenes_ behind every bush and rock. The populace of Barcelona -was awaiting a good opportunity for an _émeute_, and was in constant -communication with the insurgents outside. - -The blockade was not as yet kept up by any large section of the -Captain-General’s regular troops, nor had any attempt been made to -run lines around the place. It was conducted by an elastic cordon of -four or five thousand _miqueletes_, supported by no more than 2,000 -infantry of the regular army and possessing five or six field-guns. -The charge of the whole line was given to the Conde de Caldagues, -who had so much distinguished himself in the previous month by his -relief of Gerona. He had been entrusted with a force too small to -man a circuit of twelve or fifteen miles, so that Duhesme had no -difficulty in pushing sorties through the line of Spanish posts, -whenever he chose to send out a sufficiently strong column. But any -body that pressed out too far in pursuit of corn or forage, risked -being beset and mishandled on its return march by the whole of the -_somatenes_ of the country-side. Hence there was a limit to the power -to roam of even the largest expeditions that Duhesme could spare -from his depleted garrison. The fighting along the blockading cordon -was incessant, but never conclusive. On September 2 a strong column -of six Italian battalions swept aside the Spaniards for a moment -in the direction of San Boy, but a smaller expedition against the -bridge of Molins de Rey was repulsed. The moment that the Italians -returned to Barcelona, with the food that they had scraped together -in the villages, Caldagues reoccupied his old positions. There were -many skirmishes but no large sorties between September 2 and October -12, when Milosewitz took out 2,000 men for a cattle-hunt in the -valley of the Besos. He pierced the blockading line, routing the -_miqueletes_ of Milans at San Jeronimo de la Murtra, and penetrated -as far as Granollers, twenty miles from Barcelona, where he made an -invaluable seizure, the food dépôt of the eastern section of the -investing force. But he was now dangerously distant from his base, -and as he was returning with his captures, Caldagues fell upon him -at San Culgat with troops brought from other parts of the blockading -line. The Italians were routed with a loss of 300 men[46], and their -convoy was recaptured. After this Duhesme made no more attempts to -send expeditions far afield: in spite of a growing scarcity of food, -he could not afford to risk the loss of any more men by pushing his -sorties into the inland. - - [46] So Vacani. Laffaille gives the incredible figure of 48! - -Meanwhile Reille at Figueras was in wellnigh as forlorn a situation. -His communications with Perpignan were open, so that he had not, -like Duhesme, the fear of starvation before his eyes. But in other -respects he was almost as badly off: the _somatenes_ were always -worrying his outposts, but this was only a secondary trial. The main -trouble was the want of clothing, transport, and equipment: the -heterogeneous mob of _bataillons de marche_, of Swiss and Tuscan -conscripts, had been hurried to the frontier without any proper -preparations: this mattered comparatively little during the summer; -but when the autumn cold began Reille found that troops, who had -neither tents nor greatcoats, and whose original summer uniforms were -now worn out, could not keep the field. His ranks were so thinned by -dysentery and rheumatic affections that he had to put the men under -cover in Figueras and the neighbouring towns, and even to withdraw -to Perpignan some of his battalions, whose clothing was absolutely -dropping to pieces. His cavalry, for want of forage in the Pyrenees, -were sent back into Languedoc, where occupation was found for them -by Lord Cochrane who was conducting a series of daring raids on -the coast villages between the mouth of the Rhone and that of the -Tech[47]. Reille continued to solicit the war minister at Paris for -clothing and transport, but could get nothing from him: all the -resources of the empire were being strained in September and October -to fit out the main army, which was about to enter Spain on the side -of Biscay, and Napoleon refused to trouble himself about such a minor -force as the corps at Figueras. - - [47] See Cochrane’s _Autobiography_, pp. 269-85. - -The Spaniards, therefore, had in the autumn months a unique -opportunity for striking at the two isolated French forces in -Catalonia. Two courses were open to them: they might have turned -their main army against Barcelona, and attempted to besiege instead -of merely to blockade Duhesme: or on the other hand they might have -left a mere cordon of _somatenes_ around Duhesme, and have sent all -their regulars to join the levies of the north and sweep Reille -across the Pyrenees. The resources at their disposition were far -from contemptible: almost the whole garrison of the Balearic Isles -having disembarked in Catalonia, there were now some 12,000 regulars -in the Principality, and the local Junta had put so much energy -into the equipment of the numerous _tercios_ of _miqueletes_ which -it had raised, that the larger half of them, at least 20,000 men, -were more or less ready for the field. Moreover they were aware that -large reinforcements were at hand. Reding’s Granadan division, 10,000 -strong, was marching up from the south, and was due to arrive early -in November. The Aragonese division under the Marquis of Lazan, which -had been detached from the army of Palafox, was already at Lerida. -Valencia had sent up a line regiment[48], and the remains of the -division of Caraffa from Portugal were being brought round by sea to -the mouth of the Ebro[49]. Altogether 20,000 men of new troops were -on the way to Catalonia, and the first of them had already come on -the scene. - - [48] Two battalions of the 2nd of Savoia: the old regiment - of the name had been completed to four battalions, two were - with Castaños and called 1st of Savoia, the other two came to - Catalonia. - - [49] Four battalions of Provincial Grenadiers of Old and New - Castile had already come up. - -Unfortunately the Marquis Del Palacio, the new Captain-General -of Catalonia, though well-intentioned, was slow and undecided to -the verge of absolute torpidity. Beyond allowing his energetic -subordinate Caldagues to keep up the blockade of Barcelona he did -practically nothing. A couple of thousand of his regulars, based -on Gerona and Rosas, lay opposite Reille, but were far too weak -to attack him. About 3,000 under Caldagues were engaged in the -operations around Barcelona. The rest the Captain-General held back -and did not use. All through September he lay idle at Tarragona, -to the great disgust of the local Junta, who at last sent such -angry complaints to Aranjuez that the Central Junta recalled him, -and replaced him by Vives the old Captain-General of the Balearic -Islands, who took over the command on October 28. - -This gave a change of commander but not of policy, for Vives was as -slow and incapable as his predecessor. We have already had occasion -to mention the trouble that he gave in August, when he refused to -send his troops to the mainland till actually compelled to yield by -their mutiny. When he took over the charge of operations he found -20,000 foot and 1,000 horse at his disposition, and the French -still on the defensive both at Barcelona and at Figueras. He had a -splendid opportunity, and it was not yet too late to strike hard. But -all that he chose to attempt was to turn the blockade of Barcelona -into an investment, by tightening the cordon round the place. To -lay siege to the city does not seem to have been within the scope -of his intentions, but on November 6 he moved up to the line of the -Llobregat with 12,000 infantry and 700 horse, mostly regulars. He -had opened negotiations with secret friends within the walls, and -had arranged that when the whole forces of Duhesme were sufficiently -occupied in resisting the assault from outside, the populace should -take arms and endeavour to seize and throw open one of the gates. -But matters never got to this point: on November 8 several Spanish -columns moved in nearer to Barcelona, and began to skirmish with the -outposts of the garrison. But the attack was incoherent, and never -pressed home. Vives then waited till the 26th, when he had received -more reinforcements, the first brigade of Reding’s long-expected -Granadan division. On that day another general assault on Duhesme’s -outlying posts was delivered, and this time with considerable -success: several of the suburban villages were carried, over a -hundred Frenchmen were captured, and the line of blockade was drawn -close under the walls. Duhesme had no longer any hold outside the -city. But Barcelona was strong, and its garrison, when concentrated -within the place, was just numerous enough to hold its own. Duhesme -had thought for a moment of evacuating the city and retiring into the -citadel and the fortress of Montjuich: but on mature consideration -he resolved to cling as long as possible to the whole circuit of the -town. He had heard that an army of relief was at last on the way, -and made up his mind to yield no inch without compulsion. - -Thus Vives wasted another month without any adequate results: he -had, with the whole field army of Catalonia, done nothing more than -turn the French out of their first and weakest line of defence. The -fortress was intact, and to all intents and purposes might have been -observed as well by 10,000 _somatenes_ as by the large force which -Vives had brought against it. - -Meanwhile the enemy, utterly unopposed on the line of the Pyrenees, -was getting together a formidable host for the relief of Barcelona. -When he had recognized that Reille’s extemporized army was -insufficient alike in quantity and in quality for the task before -it, the Emperor had directed on Perpignan (as we have already -seen[50]) two strong divisions of the Army of Italy, one composed of -ten French battalions under General Souham, the other of thirteen -Italian battalions. The order to dispatch them had only been given -on August 10, and the regiments, which had to be mobilized and -equipped, and then to march up from Lombardy to the roots of the -Pyrenees, did not begin to arrive at Perpignan till September 14: the -artillery, and the troops which came from the more distant points, -only appeared on October 28. Even then there was a further week’s -delay, for the Emperor had monopolized for the main army, on the -side of the Bidassoa, all the available battalions of the military -train: the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees had no transport save that -which the regiments had brought with them, and it was with the -greatest difficulty that a few hundred mules and some open carts were -collected from the French border districts. It was only on November -5 that the army crossed the Pyrenees, by the great pass between -Bellegarde and La Junquera. - - [50] Vol. i. p. 333. - -The officer placed in command was General Gouvion St. Cyr, who -afterwards won his marshal’s bâton in the Russian war of 1812. He was -a general of first-rate ability, who had served all through the wars -of the Revolution with marked distinction: but he disliked Bonaparte -and had not the art to hide the fact. This had kept him back from -earlier promotion. St. Cyr was by no means an amiable character: he -was detested by his officers and his troops as a confirmed grumbler, -and selfish to an incredible degree[51]. He was one of those men who -can always show admirable and convincing reasons for not helping -their neighbours. _C’était un mauvais compagnon de lit_, said one of -the many colleagues, whom he had left in the lurch, while playing -his own game. From his morose bearing and his dislike for company he -had got the nickname of ‘_le hibou_.’ He was cautious, cool-headed, -and ready of resource, so that his troops had full confidence in -him, though he never commanded their liking. Even from his history -of the Catalonian war, one can gather the character of the man. It -is admirably lucid, and illustrated with original documents, Spanish -no less than French, in a fashion only too rare among the military -books of the soldiers of the Empire. But it is not only entirely -self-centred, but full of malevolent insinuations concerning Napoleon -and the author’s colleagues. In his first chapter he broaches the -extraordinary theory that Napoleon handed over to him the Catalonian -army without resources, money, or transport, in order that he might -make a fiasco of the campaign and ruin his reputation! He actually -seems to have believed that his master disliked to have battles won -for him by officers who had not owed to him the beginning of their -fortunes[52], and would have been rather pleased than otherwise to -see the attempt to relieve Barcelona end in a failure. - - [51] For several curious and interesting stories concerning - St. Cyr, the reader may search the third volume of Marbot’s - _Mémoires_. Marbot is not an authority to be followed with much - confidence, but the picture drawn of the marshal is borne out by - other and better writers. - - [52] ‘On ne pourra pas échapper à la pensée que Napoléon, avec sa - force immense, a été assez faible pour ne vouloir que des succès - obtenus par lui-même, ou du moins sous ses yeux. Autrement on eût - dit que la victoire était pour lui une offense: il en voulait - surtout à la fortune quand elle favorisait les armes d’officiers - qui ne lui devaient pas leur élévation.’ _Journal de l’Armée de - Catalogne_, p. 26. - -These are, of course, the vain imaginings of a jealous and suspicious -hypochondriac. It is true that Napoleon disliked St. Cyr, but he -did not want to see the campaign of Catalonia end in a disaster. He -gave the new general a fine French division of veteran troops, and, -as his letter to the Viceroy Eugène Beauharnais shows, the picked -regiments of the whole Italian army. The Seventh Corps mustered -in all more than 40,000 men, and 25,000 of these were concentrated -under St. Cyr’s hand at Perpignan and Figueras. It is certain that -the troops were not well equipped, and that the auxiliary services -were ill represented. But this was not from exceptional malice on -Napoleon’s part: he was always rather inclined to starve an army with -which he was not present in person, and at this moment every resource -was being strained to fit out the main force which were to deliver -the great blow at Madrid. Catalonia was but a ‘side show’: and when -St. Cyr tries to prove[53] that it was the most important theatre of -war in the whole peninsula, he is but exaggerating, after the common -fashion of poor humanity, the greatness of his own task and his own -victories. - - [53] St. Cyr, p. 23. - -Before starting from Perpignan St. Cyr refitted, as best he could, -the dilapidated battalions of Reille, which were, he says, in -such a state of nudity that those who had been sent back within -the French border had to be kept out of public view from motives -of mere decency[54]. The whole division had suffered so much from -exposure that instead of taking the field with the 8,000 men which it -possessed in August, it could present only 5,500 in November, after -setting aside a battalion to garrison Figueras[55]. - - [54] Ibid., p. 19. - - [55] For composition see the table of the 7th Corps in Appendix - of vol. i. The figures given by St. Cyr are Pino 8,368, Souham - 7,712, Chabot 1,988, Reille 4,000. The last is an understatement, - as shown by the morning state of Reille’s division in Relmas, ii. - 456, which shows 4,612 excluding the garrison of Figueras, more - than 1,000 strong. - -But though Reille was weak, and the division of Chabot (a mere corps -of two Neapolitan battalions and one regiment of National Guards) -was an almost negligible quantity, the troops newly arrived from -Italy were both numerous and good in quality. Souham’s ten French -battalions had 7,000 bayonets, Pino’s thirteen Italian battalions -had 7,300. Their cavalry consisted of one French and two Italian -regiments, making 1,700 sabres. The total force disposable consisted -of 23,680 men, of whom 2,096 were cavalry, and about 500 artillery. -In this figure are not included the National Guards and dépôts left -behind to garrison Bellegarde, Montlouis, and other places within -the French frontier, but only the troops available for operations -within Catalonia. - -On his way to Perpignan, St. Cyr had visited the Emperor at Paris, -so as to receive his orders in person. Napoleon informed him that he -left him _carte blanche_ as to all details; the one thing on which he -insisted was that Barcelona must be preserved: ‘si vous perdiez cette -place, je ne la reprendrais pas avec quatre-vingt mille hommes.’ -This then was to be the main object of the coming campaign: there -were about two months available for the task, for Duhesme reported -that, though food was growing scarce, he could hold out till the end -of December. To lessen the number of idle mouths in Barcelona he -had been giving permits to depart to many of the inhabitants, and -expelling others, against whom he could find excuses for severity. - -The high-road from Figueras to Barcelona was blocked by the fortress -of Gerona, whose previous resistance in July and August showed -that its capture would be a tedious and difficult matter. St. Cyr -calculated that he had not the time to spare for the siege of this -place: long ere he could expect to take it, Duhesme would be starved -out. He made up his mind that he would have to march past Gerona, -and as the high-road is commanded by the guns of the city, he would -be forced to take with him no heavy guns or baggage, but only light -artillery and pack-mules, which could use the by-paths of the -mountains. It was his first duty to relieve Barcelona by defeating -the main army of Vives. When this had been done, it would be time -enough to think of the siege of Gerona. - -But there was another fortress which St. Cyr resolved to clear -out of his way before starting to aid Duhesme. On the sea-shore, -only ten miles before Figueras, lies the little town of Rosas, -which blocks the route that crawls under the cliffs from Perpignan -and Port-Vendres to the Ampurdam. The moment that the French army -advanced south from Figueras, it would have Rosas on its flank, and -even small expeditions based on the place could make certain of -cutting the high-road, and intercepting all communications between -the base and the field force that had gone forward. But it was more -than likely that the Spaniards would land a considerable body of -troops in Rosas, for it has an excellent harbour, and every facility -for disembarkation. Several English men-of-war were lying there; it -served them as their shelter and port of call while they watched for -the French ships which tried to run into Barcelona with provisions, -from Marseilles, Cette, or Port-Vendres. Already they had captured -many vessels which endeavoured to pierce the blockade. - -St. Cyr therefore was strongly of opinion that he ought to make -an end of the garrison of Rosas before starting on his expedition -to aid Duhesme. The place was strategically important, but its -fortifications were in such bad order that he imagined that it might -be reduced in a few days. The town, which counted no more than 1,500 -souls, consisted of a single long street running along the shore. It -was covered by nothing more than a ditch and an earthwork, resting -at one end on a weak redoubt above the beach, and at the other upon -the citadel. The latter formed the strength of the place: it was a -pentagonal work, regularly constructed, with bastions, and a scarp -and counterscarp reveted with stone. But its resisting power was -seriously diminished by the fact that the great breach which the -French had made during its last siege in 1794 had never been properly -repaired. The government of Godoy had neglected the place, and, when -the insurrection began, the Catalans had found it still in ruins, -and had merely built up the gap with loose stones and barrels filled -with earth. A good battering train would bring down the whole of -these futile patchings in a few days. A mile to the right of the -citadel was a detached work, the Fort of the Trinity, placed above a -rocky promontory which forms the south-eastern horn of the harbour. -It had been built to protect ships lying before the place from being -annoyed by besiegers. The Trinity was built in an odd and ingenious -fashion: it was commanded at the distance of only 100 yards by the -rocky hill of Puig-Rom: to prevent ill effects from a plunging fire -from this elevation, its front had been raised to a great height, -so as to protect the interior of the work from molestation. A broad -tower 110 feet high covered the whole side of the castle which faces -inland. ‘Nothing in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent -heights, could have been better adapted for holding out against -offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them. The -French battery on the cliff was too elevated for artillery to reach, -while the tower, which prevented their shot from reaching the body -of the fort, also prevented any return fire at them, even if the fort -had possessed artillery. In consequence of the elevated position of -the French on the cliff, they could only breach the central portion -of the tower. The lowest part of the breach they made was nearly -sixty feet above its base, so that it could only be reached by long -scaling ladders[56].’ It is seldom that a besieger has to complain of -the difficulty caused to him by the possession of ground completely -dominating a place that he has to reduce: but in the course of -the siege of Fort Trinity the French were undoubtedly incommoded -by the height of the Puig-Rom. The garrison below, hidden in good -bomb-proofs and covered by the tower, suffered little harm from their -fire. To batter the whole tower to pieces, by a downward fire, was -too long and serious a business for them; they merely tried to breach -it. - - [56] Lord Cochrane’s _Autobiography_, i. 303. He adds ‘A pretty - correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the - unnautical reader will imagine our small force placed in the nave - of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western - tower from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower, - so that the breach in course of formation corresponds to the - great west window of the Abbey. It was no easy matter to them to - scale the external wall of the tower up to the great window, and - more difficult still to get down from the window into the body - of the church. These were the points I had to provide against, - for we could not prevent the French either from breaching or from - storming.’ - -If the ground in front of Fort Trinity was too high for the French, -that of the town of Rosas was too low. It was so marshy that in wet -weather the ditches of their siege works filled at once with water, -and their parapets crumbled into liquid mud. The only approach -on ground of convenient firmness and elevation was opposite a -comparatively narrow front of the south-eastern corner of the place. - -The garrison of Rosas, when St. Cyr undertook its siege, was -commanded by Colonel Peter O’Daly, an officer of the Ultonia, who -had distinguished himself at Gerona; it was composed of a skeleton -battalion (150 men) of the governor’s own Irish corps, of half the -light infantry regiment 2nd of Barcelona, of a company of Wimpffen’s -Swiss regiment, and 120 gunners. These were regulars: of new levies -there were the two _miquelete tercios_ of Lerida and Igualada, with -some companies of those of Berga and Figueras. The whole force -was exactly 3,000 strong. It would be wrong to omit the mention of -the British succours which took part in the defence. There lay in -the harbour the _Excellent_, 74, and two bomb-vessels: when the -_Excellent_ departed on November 21 she was replaced by the _Fame_, -another 74-gun ship, and during the last days of the siege Lord -Cochrane in his well-known frigate the _Impérieuse_ was also present. -It is well to remember their exact force, for the French narrators of -the leaguer of Rosas are prone to call them ‘the British squadron,’ -a term which seems rather too magnificent to apply to a group of -vessels never numbering more than one line-of-battle ship, one -frigate, and two bomb-vessels. - -St. Cyr moved forward on November 5, with the four divisions of -Souham, Pino, Reille, and Chabot, which (as we have seen) amounted in -all to about 23,000 men. He had resolved to use Pino and Reille--some -12,000 men--for the actual siege, and Souham and Chabot for the -covering work. Accordingly the weak division of the last-named -officer was left to watch the ground at the foot of the passes, in -the direction of Figueras and La Junquera, while Souham took up the -line of the river Fluvia, which lay across the path of any relieving -force that might come from the direction of Gerona. St. Cyr remained -with the covering army, and gave the conduct of the siege to Reille, -perhaps because he had already made one attack on the town in August. - -On November 6 Reille marched down to the sea, driving before him -the Spanish outlying pickets, and the peasantry of the suburban -villages, who took refuge with their cattle in Rosas. On the seventh -the investment began, Reille’s own division taking its position on -the marshy ground opposite the town, while Pino encamped more to the -left, upon the heights that face the fort of the Trinity. The head -quarters were established at the village of Palau. A battalion of the -2nd Italian light infantry was placed far back, to the north-east, to -keep off the _somatenes_ of the coast villages about Llanza and Selva -de Mar from interfering in the siege. - -Next day the civil population of Rosas embarked on fishing-vessels -and small merchantmen, and departed to the south, abandoning -the whole town to the garrison. They just missed seeing some -sharp fighting. The covering party who had been detached to the -neighbourhood of Llanza were beset during a dense mist by the -_somatenes_ of the coast: two companies were cut to pieces or -captured; the rest were saved by General Fontane, who led out -three battalions from Pino’s lines to their assistance. While this -engagement was in progress, the garrison sallied out with 2,000 men -to beat up the main camp of the Italians; they were repulsed after -a sharp fight; the majority got back to the citadel, but one party -being surrounded, Captain West of the _Excellent_ landed with 250 of -his seamen and marines, cut his way to them, and brought them off in -safety. West had his horse shot under him (a curious note to have to -make concerning a naval officer), and lost ten men wounded. - -After the eighth there followed seven days of continuous rain, which -turned the camp of Reille’s division into a marsh, and effectually -prevented the construction of siege works in the low-lying ground -opposite to the town. The only active operation that could be -undertaken was an attempt to storm the fort of the Trinity, -which the French believed to be in far worse condition than was -actually the case. It was held by eighty Spaniards, under the Irish -Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald, and twenty-five of the _Excellent’s_ -marines[57]. The six voltigeur and grenadier companies of the 2nd -Italian light infantry delivered the assault with great dash and -resolution. But as the strong frontal tower of the fort was high -and unbreached, they could make no impression, their ladders proved -useless, and they were repulsed with a loss of sixty men. Their -leader, the _chef-de-bataillon_ Lange, and several other officers -were left dead at the foot of the walls. - - [57] James’s _Naval History_, v. p. 90. - -Seeing that nothing was to be won by mere escalade, Reille had to -wait for his siege artillery, which began to arrive from Perpignan -on November 16. He at once started two batteries on the Puig-Rom to -breach the Fort of the Trinity, and when the ground had begun to grow -dry in front of the town, opened trenches opposite its north-eastern -angle. When a good _emplacement_ had been found a battery was -established which played upon the citadel, and commanded so much -of the harbour that Reille hoped that the British ships would be -compelled to shift their anchorage further out to sea. The Spaniards -and the _Excellent_ replied with such a heavy fire that in a few -hours the battery was silenced, after its powder magazine had been -exploded by a lucky shell [November 19]. - -Next day, however, the French repaired the damage and mounted more -guns, whose fire proved so damaging that Captain West had to move -further from the shore. The assailants had established a marked -superiority over the fire of the besieged, and availed themselves of -it by pushing out parallels nearer to the town, and building four -more breaching batteries. With these additional resources they began -to work serious damage in the unstable bastions of the citadel. They -also knocked a hole in the Fort of the Trinity: but the breach was so -far from the foot of the wall that it was still almost inaccessible, -the heaps of rubbish which fell into the ditch did not even reach the -lowest part of the gap. - -On the twenty-first the _Excellent_ was relieved by the _Fame_, and -Captain West handed over the task of co-operating with the Spaniards -to Captain Bennett. The latter thought so ill of the state of -affairs, that after two days he withdrew his marines from the Trinity -Fort, an action most discouraging to the Spaniards. But at this -juncture there arrived in the bay the _Impérieuse_ frigate, with her -indefatigable commandant Lord Cochrane, a host in himself for such a -desperate enterprise as the defence of the much-battered town. He got -leave from his superior officer to continue the defence, and manned -the Trinity again with his own seamen and marines. They had hardly -established themselves there, when the Italian brigade of Mazzuchelli -made a second attempt to storm the fort: but it was repulsed without -even having reached the foot of the breach. - -Cochrane, seeing that the battery which was playing on the Trinity -was on the very edge of a precipitous cliff, resolved to try whether -it would not be possible to surprise it at night, by landing -troops on the beach at the back of the Puig-Rom; if they could get -possession of the guns for a few minutes he hoped to cast them over -the declivity on to the rocks below. O‘Daly lent him 700 _miqueletes_ -from the garrison of the town, and this force was put ashore with -thirty of the _Impérieuse’s_ marines who were to lead the assault. -The Italians, however, were not caught sleeping, the attack failed, -and the assailants were beaten back to the rocks by the beach, with -the loss of ten killed and twenty wounded, beside prisoners[58]. -The boats of the frigate only brought off 300 men, but many more -escaped along the beach into the hilly country to the east, and were -neither captured nor slain [November 23]. The sortie, however, had -been disastrous, and the Governor, O’Daly, was so down-hearted at -the loss of men and at the way in which the walls of the citadel -were crumbling before his eyes, that he began to think of surrender. -Nor was he much to blame, for the state of things was so bad that -it was evident that unless some new factor was introduced into the -siege, the end was not far off. The utter improbability of relief -from without was demonstrated on the twenty-fourth. Julian Alvarez, -the Governor of Gerona and commander of the Spanish forces in the -Ampurdam, was perfectly well aware that it was his duty to do what he -could for the succour of Rosas. But his forces were insignificant: -Vives had only given him 2,000 regular troops to watch the whole -line of the Eastern Pyrenees, and of this small force half was shut -up in Rosas. Nevertheless Alvarez sallied out from Gerona with -two weak battalions of Ultonia and Borbon, and half of the light -infantry regiment of Barcelona. Picking up 3,000 local _miqueletes_ -he advanced to the line of the Fluvia, where Souham was lying, -with the division that St. Cyr had told off to cover the siege. -The Spaniards drove in the French outposts at several points, but -immediately found themselves opposed by very superior numbers, and -brought to a complete stand. Realizing that he was far too weak to -do anything, Alvarez retreated to Gerona after a sharp skirmish. If -he had pushed on he would infallibly have been destroyed. O’Daly -received prompt news of his colleague’s discomfiture, and saw that -relief was impossible. The fact was that Vives ought to have brought -up from Barcelona his whole field army of 20,000 men. With such a -host Souham could have been driven back, and Reille compelled to -relax the investment, perhaps even to raise the siege. But the -Captain-General preferred to waste his men and his time in the futile -blockade of Duhesme, who could have been just as well ‘contained’ by -10,000 _somatenes_ as by the main Spanish army of Catalonia. The only -attempt which Vives made to strengthen his force in the Ampurdam was -to order up to Gerona the Aragonese division of 4,000 men under the -Marquis of Lazan, which was lying at Lerida. This force arrived too -late for the skirmish on the Fluvia, and when it did appear was far -too small to accomplish anything. Alvarez and Lazan united had only -8,000 bayonets, while St. Cyr’s whole army (as we have already seen) -was 25,000 strong, and quite able to maintain the siege, and at the -same time to provide a covering force against a relieving army so -weak as that which now lay at Gerona. - - [58] Compare the narrative of Lord Cochrane, i. 299-300, with - those of Belmas, ii. 441, and St. Cyr. The latter is, of course, - wrong in saying that the whole sortie was composed of British - seamen and marines. It is curious that Cochrane states his own - loss at more than the French claimed to have killed or taken. - -The siege operations meanwhile were pushed on. Fresh batteries were -established to sweep the harbour, and to render more difficult the -communication of the citadel and the Trinity fort with the English -ships. A new attack was started against the eastern front of the -town, and measures were taken to concentrate a heavier fire on the -dilapidated bastion of the citadel, which had been destroyed in the -old siege of 1794 and never properly repaired. On the twenty-sixth -an assault was directed by Pino’s division against the town front. -This was defended by no more than a ditch and earthwork: the -Italians carried it at the first rush, but found more difficulty in -evicting the garrison from the ruined houses along the shore. Five -hundred _miqueletes_, who were barricaded among them, made a very -obstinate resistance, and were only driven out after sharp fighting. -One hundred and sixty were taken prisoners, less than a hundred -escaped into the citadel: the rest perished. The besiegers at once -established a lodgement in the town, covering themselves with the -masonry of the demolished houses. It was in vain that the _Fame_ and -_Impérieuse_ ran close in shore and tried to batter the Italians out -of the ruins. They inflicted considerable loss, but failed to prevent -the enemy from finding shelter. Next night the lodgement in the town -was connected with the rest of the siege works, and used as the base -for an attack against a hitherto unmolested front of the citadel. - -Just after the storming of the town, the garrison received the -only succour which was sent to it during the whole siege; a weak -battalion of regulars from the regiment of Borbon was put ashore near -the citadel under cover of the darkness. It would have been more -useful on the preceding day, for the defence of the outer works. -After the arrival of this small succour the Governor, O’Daly, sent -eighty men of the Irish regiment of Ultonia to reinforce Cochrane in -the Trinity fort, withdrawing a similar number of _miqueletes_ to the -citadel. - -The guns established by the besiegers in their new batteries among -the ruins of the town made such good practice upon the front of the -citadel that Reille thought it worth while on the twenty-eighth to -summon the Governor to surrender. O’Daly made a becoming answer, -to the effect that his defences were still intact and that he -was prepared to continue his resistance. To cut him off from his -communication with the sea, the only side from which he could expect -help, Reille now began to build batteries along the water-front of -the town, which commanded the landing-places below the citadel. The -English ships proved unable to subdue these new guns, and their power -to help O’Daly was seriously diminished. It was only under cover of -the darkness that they could send boats to land men or stores for -the citadel. On the thirtieth they tried to take off the sick and -wounded, who were now growing very numerous in the place: but the -shore-batteries having hit the headmost boat, the rest drew off and -abandoned the attempt. The prospects of the garrison had grown most -gloomy. - -Meanwhile the Trinity fort had been perpetually battered for ten -days, and the hole in the great frontal tower was growing larger. -It can hardly be called a breach, as owing to the impossibility of -searching the lower courses of the wall by the plunging fire from the -Puig-Rom, the lowest edge of the gap was forty feet from the ground. -The part of the tower which had been opened was the upper section -of a lofty bomb-proof casemate, which composed its ground story. -Lord Cochrane built up, with the débris that fell inwards, and with -hammocks filled with earth and sand, new walls inside the bomb proof, -cutting off the hole from the interior of the tower: thus enemies -entering at the gap would find that they had only penetrated into the -upper part of a sort of cellar. The ingenious captain also set a long -slide or shoot of greased planks just under the lip of the hole, so -that any one stepping in would be precipitated thirty feet into the -bottom of the casemate. But the mere sight of this mantrap, as he -called it, proved enough for the enemy, who never pushed the attack -into it. - -On November 30 Pino’s division assaulted the fort, the storming -party being composed of six grenadier and voltigeur companies of the -1st and 6th Italian regiments. They came on with great courage, and -planted their ladders below the great hole, amid a heavy fire of -musketry from the garrison. The leaders succeeded in reaching the -edge of the ‘breach,’ but finding the chasm and the ‘mantrap’ before -them, would not enter. They were all shot down: grenades were dropped -in profusion into the mass at the foot of the ladders, and after a -time the stormers fled back under cover, leaving two officers and -forty men behind them. They were rallied and brought up again to the -foot of the breach, but recoiled after a second and less desperate -attempt to enter. The garrison lost only three men killed and two -wounded, of whom four were Spaniards. They captured two prisoners, -men who had got so far forward that they dared not go back under the -terrible fire which swept the foot of the tower. These unfortunates -had to be taken into the fort by a rope, so inaccessible was the -supposed breach. After this bloody repulse, the besiegers left Lord -Cochrane alone, merely continuing to bombard his tower, and throwing -up entrenchments on the beach, from which they kept up an incessant -musketry fire on the difficult landing-place by which the fort -communicated with the ships. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF UCLÉS - JANUARY 13TH 1809] - -[Illustration: SIEGE OF ROSAS - NOV. 6 TO DEC. 5 1809] - -Their main attention was now turned to the citadel, where O’Daly’s -position was growing hopeless. ‘Their practice,’ says Cochrane, ‘was -beautiful. So accurately was their artillery conducted that every -discharge “ruled a straight line” along the lower part of the walls. -This being repeated till the upper portion was without support, as -a matter of course the whole fell into the ditch, forming a breach -of easy ascent. The whole proceedings were clearly visible from the -Trinity[59].’ On December 3 the Governor played his last card: the -worst of the damage was being done by the advanced batteries placed -among the ruins of the town, and it was from this point that the -impending assault would evidently be delivered. O’Daly therefore -picked 500 of his best men, opened a postern gate, and launched -them at night upon the besiegers’ works. The sortie was delivered -with great dash and vigour: the trench guards were swept away, the -breaching batteries were seized, and the Spaniards began to throw -down the parapets, spike the guns, and set fire to the platforms and -fascines. But heavy reserves came up from the French camp, and their -attack could not be resisted. Before any very serious damage had been -done, the besieged were driven out of the trenches by sheer force of -numbers, and forced to retire to the citadel, leaving forty-five dead -behind them. Reille acknowledged the loss of one officer and twelve -men killed, and nineteen men wounded. - - [59] Cochrane, _Autobiography_, i. 307. - -On the fourth the siege works were pushed forward to within 200 yards -of the walls of the citadel, and the breach already established -in the dilapidated bastion was enlarged to a great breadth. After -dark the French engineers got forward as far as the counterscarp, -and reported that an assault was practicable, and could hardly -fail. The same fact was perfectly evident to O’Daly, who sent out a -_parlementaire_ to ask for terms. He offered to surrender in return -for leave to take his garrison off by sea. Reille naturally refused, -as the Spaniards were at his mercy, and enforced an unconditional -surrender. - -The state of things being visible to Lord Cochrane on the next -morning, he hastily evacuated the Trinity fort, which it was useless -to hold after the citadel had fallen. His garrison, 100 Spaniards and -eighty British sailors and marines, had to descend from the fort by -rope ladders, as the enemy commanded the proper point of embarkation. -They were taken off by the boats of the _Fame_ and _Impérieuse_ under -a heavy musketry fire, but suffered no appreciable loss. The magazine -was left with a slow match burning, and exploded, ruining the fort, -before the garrison had got on board their ships. - -St. Cyr, in his journal of the war in Catalonia, suggests that -Bennett and Cochrane ought to have tried to take off the garrison of -the citadel in the same fashion. But this was practically impossible: -the communication between the citadel and the sea had been lost -for some days, the French batteries along the beach rendering -the approach of boats too dangerous to be attempted. If Captain -Bennett had sent in the limited supply of boats that the _Fame_, the -_Impérieuse_ and the two smaller vessels[60] possessed they would -probably have been destroyed. For they would have had to make many -return journeys in order to remove 2,500 men, under the fire of heavy -guns placed only 200 or 300 yards away from the landing-place. It -was quite another thing to remove 180 men from the Trinity, where -the enemy could bring practically nothing but musketry to bear, and -where the whole of the garrison could be taken off at a single trip. -Another futile charge made by the French against the British navy, is -that the _Fame_ shelled the beach near the citadel while the captive -garrison was marching out, and killed several of the unfortunate -Spaniards. If the incident happened at all (there is no mention of -it in Lord Cochrane or in James) it must have been due to an attempt -to damage the French trenches; Captain Bennett could not have known -that the passing column consisted of Spaniards. To insinuate that the -mistake was deliberate, as does Belmas, is simply malicious[61]. - - [60] These were the two bomb-vessels _Meteor_ and _Lucifer_. The - _Magnificent_ 74 came up the same day, but after the evacuation - of the Trinity. - - [61] St. Cyr does not say so (p. 50), but only that the Spaniards - imagined that it was done deliberately. Belmas (p. ii. 453) asks - if it was not irritation on the part of the British. Arteche does - not repulse the silly suggestion, as he reasonably might (iv. - 270). - -O’Daly went into captivity with 2,366 men, leaving about 400 more -in hospital. The total of the troops who had taken part in the -defence, including the reinforcements received by sea, had been about -3,500, so that about 700 must have perished in the siege. The French -loss had been at least as great--Pino’s division alone lost thirty -officers and 400 men killed and wounded[62], besides many sick. It -is probable that the total diminution in the ranks of Reille’s two -divisions was over 1,000, the bad weather having told very heavily on -the ill-equipped troops. - - [62] Belmas, ii. 454, and Vacani, ii. 315, agree in these figures. - -So ended an honourable if not a very desperate defence. The place -was doomed from the first, when once the torpid and purblind Vives -had made up his mind to keep his whole force concentrated round -Barcelona, and to send no more than the insignificant division of -Alvarez and Lazan to the help of O’Daly. Considering the dilapidated -condition of the citadel of Rosas, and the almost untenable state of -the town section of the fortifications, the only wonder is that the -French did not break in at an earlier date. The first approaches of -Reille’s engineers were, according to Belmas, unskilfully conducted, -and pushed too much into the marsh. When once they received a right -direction, the result was inevitable. Even had the artillery failed -to do its work Rosas must nevertheless have fallen within a few days, -for it was insufficiently provisioned, and, as the communication -with the sea had been cut off since November 30, must have yielded -ere long to starvation. The French found an ample store of guns -(fifty-eight pieces) and much ammunition in the place, but an utterly -inadequate supply of food. - - -[N.B.--Belmas, St. Cyr, and Arteche have all numerous slips in their -narration, from not having used the British authorities. Vacani’s -account is, on the whole, the best on the French side. Much may be -learnt from James’s _Naval History_, vol. v, but more from Lord -Cochrane’s picturesque autobiography. From this, e.g., alone can -it be ascertained that the column which attacked the Puig-Rom on -November 23 was composed of _miqueletes_, not of British soldiers. -Cochrane is represented by several writers as arriving on the -twenty-fourth or even the twenty-sixth, while as a matter of fact -he reached Rosas on the twenty-first. It may interest some to know -that Captain Marryat, the novelist, served under Cochrane, and -was mentioned in his dispatch. So the description of the siege of -Rosas in Marryat’s _Frank Mildmay_, wherein his captain is so much -glorified, is a genuine personal reminiscence, and not an invention -of fiction.] - - - - -SECTION X: CHAPTER II - -ST. CYR RELIEVES BARCELONA: BATTLES OF CARDADEU AND MOLINS DE REY - - -When Rosas had fallen St. Cyr was at last able to take in hand the -main operation which had been entrusted to him by Napoleon--the -relief of Barcelona. While the siege was still in progress he had -received two letters bidding him hasten to the relief of Duhesme -without delay[63], but he had taken upon himself the responsibility -of writing back that he must clear his flank and rear before he dared -move, and that he should proceed with the leaguer of Rosas, which -could only last a few days longer, unless he received formal orders -to abandon the undertaking. He ventured to point out that the moral -and political effects of taking such a step would be deplorable[64]. -Napoleon’s silence gave consent, and St. Cyr’s plea was justified by -the fall of the place on December 5. - - [63] Berthier to St. Cyr, Burgos, Nov. 13. ‘Si Roses tarde à être - pris, il faut marcher sur Barcelone sans s’inquiéter de cette - place, &c.,’ and much to same effect from Coubo, Nov. 16 [wrongly - printed in St. Cyr, Nov. 10]. - - [64] St. Cyr to the Emperor, Nov. 17, from Figueras. - -Rosas having been captured, the French general had now at his -disposition all his four divisions, those of Souham, Pino, Reille, -and Chabot, which even after deducting the casualties suffered in -the siege, and the losses experienced by the covering troops from -the bad weather, still amounted to 22,000 men. After counting up -the very considerable forces which the Spaniards might place in his -way, he resolved to take on with him for the relief of Barcelona -the troops of Souham, Pino, and Chabot, and to leave behind only -those of Reille. With about 5,000 or 5,500 soldiers of not very good -quality that officer was to hold Figueras and Rosas, watch Gerona, -and protect the high-road to Perpignan. St. Cyr himself with the -twenty-six battalions and nine squadrons forming the other three -divisions, a force of some 15,000 infantry and 1,500 horse, took his -way to the south. - -The first obstacle in his way was Gerona: but if he stopped to -besiege and take it, it was clear that he would never reach Barcelona -in time to save Duhesme from starvation: that general had reported -that his food would only last till the end of December, and Gerona -would certainly hold out more than three weeks. Indeed, as we shall -see, when it was actually beleaguered in the next year, it made a -desperate defence, lasting for nearly six months[65]. St. Cyr saw -from the first that he must leave the fortress alone, and slip past -it. As it commanded the high-road, this resolution forced him to -abandon any intention of taking forward his artillery and his wheeled -transport. They could not face the rugged by-paths on to which he -would be compelled to throw himself, and he marched without a single -gun, and with his food and provisions borne on pack-horses and mules, -of which he had a very modest provision. - - [65] May 30 to Dec. 10, 1809. - -St. Cyr was quite well aware that if General Vives were to resign -the blockade of Barcelona to his _miqueletes_ and _somatenes_, and -to come against him with his whole army, the task of relieving -Duhesme would be dangerous if not impossible. There are but two -roads from Gerona to Barcelona, and across each of them lie half a -dozen positions which, if entrenched and held by superior numbers, -he could not hope to force. These two routes are the coast-road -by Mataro and Arens de Mar--which the French had used for their -first march to Gerona in August--and the inland road up the valley -of the Besos by Hostalrich and Granollers. But the former had -been so conscientiously destroyed by Lord Cochrane and the local -_somatenes_[66] that St. Cyr regarded it as impassable; there were -places where it had been blasted away for lengths of a quarter or -a half of a mile. Moreover, at many points the army would have to -defile under the cliffs for long distances, and might be shelled by -any British men-of-war that should happen to lie off the coast[67]. -Accordingly the French general determined to try the inland road, -though he would have to march round Gerona and the smaller fortress -of Hostalrich, and though it was cut by several admirable positions, -where the Catalans might offer battle with reasonable prospects of -success. It was all-important that Vives should be left as long as -possible in uncertainty as to his adversary’s next move, and that the -Catalans should be dealt with in detail rather than in mass. St. Cyr -resolved, therefore, to make a show of attacking Gerona, and to try -whether he could not catch Lazan and Alvarez, and rout them, before -the Captain-General should come up to their assistance. - - [66] See vol. i. p. 331. - - [67] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, p. 58. - -On December 9, therefore, St. Cyr had his whole corps, minus the -division of Reille, concentrated on the left bank of the river Ter. -On the next day he manœuvred as if about to envelop Gerona. He had -hoped that this move would tempt Lazan and Alvarez to come out and -meet him in the open. But fully conscious that their 8,000 men would -be exposed to inevitable defeat, the two Spanish officers wisely kept -quiet under the walls of their stronghold. Having worked round their -flank, St. Cyr on the eleventh sent back the whole of his artillery -and heavy baggage to Figueras, and plunged into the mountains; at La -Bispal he distributed four days’ biscuit to his men, warning them -that there would be no further issue of rations till they reached -Barcelona. The light carts which had been dragged thus far with the -food were burnt. As to munitions, each soldier had fifty cartridges -in his pouch, and the pack-mules carried 150,000 more, a reserve -of only ten rounds for each man[68]. The equipment of the army, in -short, was such that if it failed to force its way to Barcelona -within six days it must starve, while if it was forced to fight -three or four heavy engagements it would be left helpless, without -a cartridge for a final battle. The general, if not the men in the -ranks, fully realized the peril of the situation. - - [68] St. Cyr says that Napoleon falsified his report, when - reprinting it in the _Moniteur_, and put 150 instead of 50 rounds - per man, to disguise the risk that had been run (p. 58). - -On the twelfth St. Cyr pushed along the mountains above Palamos and -San Feliu, brushing away a body of _miqueletes_ from the coast-land -under Juan Claros, who tried to hold the defile. On the thirteenth -the French reached Vidreras, where they were again on a decent road, -that which goes from Gerona to Malgrat. They now perceived that -they were being followed by Lazan and the garrison of Gerona, whose -camp-fires were visible on the heights to the north, while troops, -evidently detached from the blockade of Barcelona, were visible in -front of them. It was clear that St. Cyr had at least succeeded in -placing himself between the two main forces which the enemy could -oppose to him, and might engage them separately. He might also count -on the Spaniards looking for him on the Malgrat-Mataro road, on -which he was now established, while it was his intention to abandon -it, in order to plunge inland once more, and to fall into the main -_chaussée_ to Barcelona, south of Hostalrich. That a path existed, -along which such a movement could be carried out, was only known to -the general by the report of a Perpignan smuggler, who had once kept -sheep among these hills. But when exploring parties tried to find -it, they lost their way, and reported that no such route existed. If -this was the fact, St. Cyr was ruined: but he refused to believe the -officers who assured him that the smuggler had erred, and pushing -among the rocks finally discovered it himself. During his exploration -he was nearly cut off by a party of _somatenes_, and his escort had -to fight hard in order to save him. - -But the road was found, and on the fifteenth the army followed it, -almost in single file, while the dragoons had to dismount and lead -their horses. They saw the fortress of Hostalrich in the valley below -them, and passed it in sight of the garrison. Some of the latter came -out, and skirmished with the rearguard of St. Cyr’s long column, -but they were too weak to do much harm, while Lazan, whose advent -from the north would have caused more serious difficulties, had been -completely eluded, and never came in sight. - -In the afternoon the whole expeditionary force safely descended into -the Barcelona _chaussée_ near San Celoni, from which place they drove -out four battalions of _miqueletes_, the first troops that the tardy -Vives had detached from his main army. The men were much fatigued, -and the _somatenes_ were beginning to give trouble both in flank and -rear, but St. Cyr insisted that they should not encamp by San Celoni, -but push southward through the difficult defile of the Trentapassos, -so that they might not find it held against them on the following -morning. This was done, and the best of the many positions which -the Spaniards might have held to oppose the march of the invaders -was occupied without the least resistance. St. Cyr encamped at the -southern end of the pass, and saw before him, when the night had -fallen, a line of watch-fires far down the valley of the Besos which -showed that the Spaniards from the leaguer of Barcelona had at last -come out to oppose him. - -The conduct of Vives during the last six days had been in perfect -keeping with the rest of his slow and stupid guidance of the -campaign. He had received in due course news of the fall of Rosas, -and soon after the additional information that St. Cyr had crossed -the Ter and was threatening Gerona. Opinion was divided in the camp -of the Catalans as to whether the French were about to lay siege to -that fortress, or to pass it by and make a dash for the relief of -Duhesme. If they sat down before Gerona there was no need to hurry: -if they should pass it by, it would be necessary to move at once, -in order to occupy the defiles against them. The opinion of the -more intelligent officers was that St. Cyr would be forced to march -to aid Duhesme, whose want of provisions was well known by secret -intelligence sent out from Barcelona. Unfortunately Vives inclined -to the other side: he preferred to believe the alternative which did -not impose on him the necessity for instant and decisive action. He -did nothing, and pretended to be waiting for further news. It reached -him on the night of December 11-12, in the form of a message from the -Junta of Gerona, to the effect that the French had sent back their -artillery and were plunging into the mountains in the direction of La -Bispal, so that it was clear that they must be marching to relieve -Duhesme. It might have been expected that the Captain-General would -now at last break up from his lines, and hasten to throw himself -across the path of the approaching enemy. But after holding a long -and fruitless council of war he contented himself with sending -out Reding, with that part of the newly-arrived Granadan division -which had reached Catalonia. On the twelfth therefore the Swiss -General started by the inland road with seven battalions of his own -Andalusian levies and a regiment of cavalry. Next day he reached -Granollers and halted there. At the same time Francisco Milans, with -four tercios of _miqueletes_, was sent out to guard the coast-road, -the other possible line of approach by which St. Cyr might arrive. -Reding had 5,000 men, Milans 3,000: but Vives still lay before -Barcelona with two-thirds of his army, at least 16,000 or 17,000 -bayonets. It was in vain that Caldagues, the preserver of Gerona, -implored him to leave no more than a screen of _miqueletes_ in the -lines, and to sally forth to fight with every regular soldier that he -could muster. The Captain-General refused to listen, supporting his -inactivity by pleading that the advice sent from Gerona did not speak -of the enemy’s force as very large: the defiles, he urged, were so -difficult that Reding and Milans, aided by Lazan, ought to be able to -hold them against any small expeditionary force. - -Thus St. Cyr was left to work out his daring plan without any serious -opposition. The only force with which he came in contact was Milans’ -brigade of _miqueletes_, who, finding the coast-road clear, had -crossed the mountains and occupied San Celoni. These were the troops -whom St. Cyr drove away on the afternoon of the fifteenth, before -entering the defile of the Trentapassos. - -On receiving news of this combat, which had taken place only -twenty-one miles from his lines, Vives at last set out in person. -But persisting in his idiotic notion of blocking Barcelona to the -last moment, he left Caldagues before the place with 12,000 men, -and marched with a single brigade of 4,000 bayonets to join Reding. -Moving all through the night of the fifteenth-sixteenth he joined -the Granadans at daybreak at Cardadeu on the high-road. Their united -strength was only 9,000 men, of whom 600 were cavalry, and seven -guns[69]. This was the whole force which fought St. Cyr, for Lazan, -moving with culpable slowness, was still far north of San Celoni, -when he should have been pressing on the rear of the French, while -Milans with the _miqueletes_, who had been beaten on the previous -day, was some miles away in the mountains on the right, and quite out -of touch with his commander-in-chief. Nine thousand Spaniards, in -short, were within ten miles of the field, yet took no part in the -battle. St. Cyr in his central position kept them apart, and they -failed to combine with Vives and his force at Cardadeu. - - [69] Cf. Cabanes, with Arteche, iv. 276. - -The valley of the Besos at this point has broadened out, and is -no longer the narrow defile that is seen a few miles further to -the north. But there is much broken ground on both sides of the -high-road. A little way north of Cardadeu is a low hill covered with -pines, lying to the right of the _chaussée_: at the foot of the hill -is a ravine which the road has to cross at right angles, and which -falls into the stream called the Riera de la Roca. The country-side -was composed partly of cultivated ground, partly of thickets of pine -and oak, which rendered it difficult for either side to get a general -view of its adversaries’ movements. - -Vives, who had only reached his fighting-ground at dawn, had no time -to reconnoitre his position, or to make any elaborate scheme for -getting the best use out of the _terrain_. He hastily drew up his -army in two lines across the high-road: the front line was behind -the ravine, the second higher up on the pine-clad hill. Reding’s -troops held the right wing on the lowest ground, and extended as -far as the river Mogent, a branch of the Besos. Vives’ own Catalan -regiments formed the centre and left: they were mainly placed on the -hill commanding the road, with three guns in front of their centre, -and two further to the left on a point from which they could enfilade -a turn of the _chaussée_. The _miqueletes_ of Vich, on the extreme -left, held a spur of the higher mountains which bound the valley of -the Besos. The reserve drawn up on the high-road, behind the main -position, consisted of two guns, two squadrons of horse (Husares -Españoles, lately arrived from Majorca) and two battalions. - -St. Cyr could make out very little of his adversaries’ force or -position; the woods and hills masked the greater part of the -Spanish line. But he knew that he must attack, and that promptly, -for every hour that he delayed would give time for Lazan to come -up in his rear, and Milans on his left flank. He left behind him -at the southern outlet of the Trentapassos the three battalions -of Chabot’s division, with orders to hold the defile at all costs -against Lazan, whenever the latter should appear. With the other -twenty-three battalions forming the divisions of Pino and Souham -he marched down the high-road to deal with Vives. It was necessary -to attack at once: ‘the biscuit distributed at La Bispal was just -finished: the cartridges were running low, for many had been spent -in the preceding skirmishes. There was, in fact, only ammunition -for one hour of battle[70].’ St. Cyr saw that he must win by one -short and swift stroke, or suffer a complete disaster. Accordingly, -he had resolved to form his two strong divisions--more than 13,000 -men--into one great column, which was to charge the Spanish centre -and burst through by its own impetus and momentum. Pino’s thirteen -Italian battalions formed the head of the mass: Souham’s ten French -battalions its rear. The General’s plan is best expressed in his -own words: his orders to Pino, who was to lead the attack, ran as -follows:-- - - [70] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, p. 64. - -‘The corps must fight in the order in which I have arranged it this -morning. There is neither time nor means to make dispositions to -beat the Spaniards more or less thoroughly. The country-side is so -broken and wooded that it would take three hours to reconnoitre -their position, and in two hours Lazan may be on the spot attacking -our rear. Not a minute can be lost: we must simply rush at and -trample down[71] the corps in our front, whatever its strength may -be. Our food is done, our ammunition almost exhausted. The enemy -has artillery, which is a reason the more for haste: the quicker we -attack, the less time will he have to shell us. There must be no -attempt to feel his position; not one battalion must be deployed. -Though his position is strong we must go straight at it in column, -and burst through the centre by striking at that one point with our -whole force. The enemy must be given no time to prepare his defence -or bring up his reserves. You must not change the disposition in -column in which we march, even in order to take great numbers of -prisoners. Our sole end is to break through and to get as close as we -can to Barcelona this evening. Our camp-fires must be visible to the -garrison by night, to show that we are at hand to raise the siege.’ - - [71] ‘Il faut passer sur le ventre au corps de troupes en face, - quel que soit son nombre.’ St. Cyr, p. 66. - -This order of battle was most hazardous: if St. Cyr had found in -front of him two steady English divisions instead of Reding’s raw -Granadan levies and the gallant but untrained Catalan _miqueletes_, -it is certain that affairs would have gone as at Busaco or Talavera. -Dense columns attacking a fair position held by good troops in line -are bound to suffer terrible losses, and ought never to succeed. But -St. Cyr knew the enemies with whom he had to deal, and his method -was well adapted to his end. If he ran some risk of failing at the -commencement of the action, it was simply because his subordinates -did not follow out his directions. - -General Pino, on whom the responsibility of opening the attack -devolved, started with every intention of obedience. But when he -arrived at the foot of the Spanish position, and the balls began to -fall thickly among his leading battalions, he lost his head. His -column only faced the Spanish right centre, and the heavy flanking -fire from the hostile wings daunted him. Instead of pushing straight -before him with his whole force, as St. Cyr had ordered, he threw -out five battalions of Mazzuchelli’s brigade to his left[72], and -two battalions under General Fontane to his extreme right[73]; the -six battalions of his rear brigade were not yet up to the front, -and took no part in the first assault. Thus he attacked on a front -of three-quarters of a mile, instead of at one single point. His -columns, after driving in the Spanish front line, came to a stand -half-way up the hill, in a very irregular array, the flanks thrown -forward, the centre hanging somewhat back. Reding, against whom the -main attack of Mazzuchelli’s brigade had been directed, brought up -his second line, and when the Italians were slackening in their -advance hurled at them two squadrons of hussars, and led forward his -whole division. The assailants broke, and fell back with loss. - - [72] Three battalions of the 4th of the line, and two of the 2nd - Light Infantry. - - [73] One battalion of the 2nd Light Infantry and one of the 7th - of the line. - -St. Cyr, coming up to the front at this moment, was horrified to -mark the results of Pino’s disobedience of his orders. But he had -still Souham’s division in hand, and flung it, in one solid mass of -ten battalions, upon Reding’s right; at the same time he commanded -Pino to throw the two regiments of his intact rear brigade upon -the Spanish centre[74], while Fontane’s two battalions continued -to demonstrate against the enemy’s left. The result was what might -have been expected: the column of Souham burst through the Granadan -division, and completely routed the right wing of the Spanish army: -at the same moment Pino’s main column forced back Vives and the -Catalans along the line of the high-road. All at once fell into -confusion, and, when St. Cyr bade his two Italian cavalry regiments -charge up the _chaussée_, the enemy broke his ranks and fled to -the hills. Five of the seven Spanish guns were captured, with two -standards and some 1,500 unwounded prisoners. Reding, who stayed -behind to the last, trying to rally a rearguard for the protection -of the routed host, was nearly taken prisoner, and had to draw his -sword and cut his way out. Vives, whose conduct on this day was -anything but creditable, scrambled up a cliff after turning his horse -loose, and came almost alone to the sea-shore near Mongat, where he -was picked up by the boats of the _Cambrian_ frigate, and forwarded -to Tarragona. Besides the prisoners the Spaniards lost at least a -thousand men, and many of the _miqueletes_ dispersed to their homes. -St. Cyr acknowledged 600 casualties, nearly all of them, as might -have been expected, in Pino’s division. - - [74] Three battalions each of the 1st and 6th of the line. - -Reding at last succeeded in rallying some troops at Monmalo near San -Culgat, and covered the retreat of the main mass of the fugitives -to join the troops who had been left in the lines before Barcelona. -As to the detached Spanish corps under Milans and the Marquis of -Lazan, the former never came down from the hills till the fighting -was over, though it was only four or five miles from the scene of -action[75]. The latter, which was following in St. Cyr’s rear, moved -with such extreme slowness that it had not yet reached San Celoni -when the battle was fought, and did not even get into contact with -Chabot’s division, which had been left behind to guard against its -approach[76]. On learning of the defeat the Marquis marched back to -Gerona, and rejoined Alvarez. Thus Vives got no assistance whatever -from his outlying corps: if Lazan is to be trusted, this was largely -the fault of the Commander-in-chief himself, for no dispatch from -him reached his subordinates after December 14, and they had no -knowledge of his movements or designs. - - [75] See the account of Cabanes, who was with Milans this day, in - his _History of the War in Catalonia_. - - [76] See the narrative of an officer in the division of Lazan, - printed by Cabanes as an appendix. - -Meanwhile Caldagues, who had been left in charge of the blockade, had -maintained his post, and repulsed a heavy sortie which Duhesme and -the garrison had directed against his posts on the sixteenth. But -when the news of the battle of Cardadeu reached him in the evening, -he evacuated all the parts of his line which lay to the east of the -Llobregat, and concentrated his 12,000 men at Molins de Rey and San -Boy, on the further bank of that river. He was forced to abandon at -Sarria the large dépôt of provisions from which the left wing of the -investing force had been fed. - -The road from Cardadeu and San Culgat to Barcelona being thus left -open, St. Cyr marched in triumph into Barcelona on the morning of the -seventeenth. He complains in his memoirs that he did not discover -one single vedette from the garrison pushed out to meet him, and -that Duhesme did not come forth to receive him, or give him a single -word of thanks. Indeed, when the Governor at last presented himself -to meet the commander of the Seventh Corps, he spent his first words -not in expressing his appreciation for the service which had been -rendered him, but in demonstrating that he had never been in danger, -and could have held out for six weeks more. He was somewhat abashed -when St. Cyr replied by presenting him with a copy of one of his own -former dispatches to Berthier, which painted the condition of the -garrison in the blackest colours, and asked for instant succours lest -the worst might happen[77]. - - [77] St. Cyr, as any reader of his _Mémoires_ can see, was - malicious and sarcastic. But Duhesme has a bad reputation for - carelessness and selfishness, and his writings make an even worse - impression than those of St. Cyr. Probably the latter’s narrative - is fairly correct. - -It was clear that the two generals would not work well together, but -as St. Cyr held the supreme command, and was determined to assert -himself, Duhesme could do no more than sulk in silence. The conduct -of the operations against the Catalans had been taken completely out -of his hands. - -St. Cyr’s daring march to Barcelona had been crowned with complete -success. It was by far the most brilliant operation on the French -side during the first year of the war. That it was perilous cannot -be denied: if the commander of the Seventh Corps had found the -whole army of Vives entrenched at the passage of the Tordera, or -across the defile of the Trentapassos, it seems impossible that he -could have got forward to Barcelona. Thirty thousand men, of whom -half were regular troops, might have been opposed to him, and they -could have brought artillery against him, while he had not a single -piece. If once checked he must have retreated in haste, for he had -only ammunition for a single battle. But the rapid and unexpected -character of his movements entirely puzzled the enemy, and he was -fortunate in having a Vives to contend against. ‘When the enemy has -no general,’ as Schepeler remarks while commenting on this campaign, -‘any stroke of luck is possible.’ Against a capable officer St. Cyr -would probably have failed, but he had a shrewd suspicion of the -character of his opponent from what had happened during the siege -of Rosas: he dared much, and his daring was rewarded by a splendid -victory. - -The campaign, however, was not yet completed. Barcelona had been -relieved, but only a fraction of the Spanish army had been met and -beaten. Caldagues lay behind the Llobregat with 11,000[78] men who -had not yet been engaged. Reding had joined him with the wrecks of -the troops which had fought at Cardadeu, some 3,000 or 4,000 men. -They lined the eastern bank of the river, only six or seven miles -from the suburbs of Barcelona, occupying the entrenchments which -had been constructed to shut in Duhesme during the blockade. These -were strengthened with several redoubts, some of them armed with -heavy artillery, and the positions were good, but too extensive -for a force of 14,000 or 15,000 men. Their weak point was that the -Llobregat even in December is fordable in many places, and that if -the French attacked in mass at one point they were almost certain -of being able to force their way through the line. Reding, and his -second-in-command Caldagues, were both of opinion that it would be -wise to evacuate the lines, if St. Cyr should come out in force -against them, and to fall back on the mountains in their rear, -which separate the valley of the Llobregat from the coast-plain of -Tarragona. Here there was a strong position at the defile of Ordal, -where it was intended to construct an entrenched camp. But there was -a strong temptation to hold on in the old lines for as long a time -as possible, for by retiring to Ordal the army would leave open the -high-road to Lerida and Saragossa, and give up much of the plain to -the incursions of the French foragers. Reding sent back to Vives, -who had now landed in his rear and placed himself at Villanueva de -Sitjas, to ask whether he was to retreat at once, or to hold his -ground. The Captain-General sent back the inconclusive reply that -‘he might fall back on Ordal if he could not defend the line of the -Llobregat.’ Thus he threw back the responsibility on his subordinate, -and Reding, anxious to vindicate his courage before the eyes of the -Catalans, resolved after some hesitation to retain his positions, -though he had grave doubts of the possibility of resistance. - - [78] Some of his _miqueletes_ had absconded during the withdrawal - from the eastern half of the river. - -He was not allowed much time to ponder over the situation. The reply -of Vives only reached him on the night of December 20-21. On the next -morning St. Cyr came out of Barcelona and attacked the lines. He -had brought with him every available man: Duhesme had been left to -hold the city with Lecchi’s Italians alone: his other division (that -of Chabran), together with the three which had formed the army of -succour--those of Souham, Pino, and Chabot--were all directed against -the lines. The plan of St. Cyr was to demonstrate against the bridge -of Molins de Rey, the strongest part of the Spanish position, with -Chabran’s 4,000 men, while he himself crossed the fords lower down -the Llobregat with the 14,000 bayonets of the other three divisions, -and turned the right flank of the enemy. - -At five o’clock on a miserable gusty December morning the French -came down towards the river: Chabran led off by making a noisy -demonstration opposite the redoubts at the bridge, on the northern -flank of the position. This, as St. Cyr had intended, drew Reding’s -attention to that flank: he reinforced his left with troops drawn -from his right wing on the lower and easier ground down stream. An -hour later the other attacking columns advanced, that of Souham -crossing the ford of San Juan Despi, while Pino and Chabot passed -by that of San Feliu. No proper attempt was made to dispute their -advance. Outnumbered, and strung out along a very extensive position, -the Catalans soon saw their line broken in several places. The only -serious opposition made was by the centre, which advanced down hill -against Souham and tried to charge him, but gave back long before -bayonets had been crossed. - -The most fatal part of Reding’s position was that on his extreme -right Chabot’s three battalions had got completely round his flank, -and kept edging in on the rear of his southern wing, which abandoned -hill after hill as it saw its retreat threatened. Pino and Souham -had only to press on, and each regiment in their front gave way in -turn when it saw its exposed flank in danger. At last the whole of -the Spanish right and centre was pushed back in disorder on to the -still intact left behind the bridge of Molins de Rey. Now was the -time for Chabran to turn his demonstration into a real attack: if -he had crossed the river and advanced rapidly, he would have caught -the shaken masses in front, while the rest of the army chased them -forward into his arms. But being timid or unenterprising, he let the -flying enemy pass across his front unmolested, and only forded the -river when they had gone too far to be caught. The unhappy Vives came -up at this moment, just in time to see his whole army on the run, and -headed their flight to the hills. - -Thus the Spaniards got away without any very crushing losses, -though their historian Cabanes confesses that if Chabran had moved -a quarter of an hour earlier he would have captured half the army -of Catalonia. As it was, St. Cyr took about 1,200 prisoners only, -though his dragoons pursued the routed enemy for many miles. It was -a great misfortune for the Catalans that among these captives was -the Conde de Caldagues, the one first-rate officer in their ranks. -He was taken by the pursuers at Vendrell, many miles from the field, -when his exhausted horse fell under him. St. Cyr captured the whole -artillery of the Spaniards, twenty-five cannon[79], of which several -were pieces of heavy calibre, mounted in redoubts. The field-pieces -were more useful to him, as he was very short of artillery; he had -brought none with him, while Duhesme had been obliged to destroy the -greater part of his during the retreat from Gerona in August. He -also made prize of a magazine of 3,000,000 cartridges and of many -thousands of muskets, which the routed enemy cast away in their haste -to escape over the hills. Some of the fugitives fled south, and did -not stop till they reached Tortosa and the Ebro: others dispersed in -the direction of Igualada and Lerida, but the main body rallied at -Tarragona. - - [79] St. Cyr says twenty-five in his report to Napoleon, but - increases the number to fifty in his _Mémoires_, p. 87. - -The victorious French divisions were pushed far out from the -battle-field so as to occupy not only the whole plain of the -Llobregat, but also the defiles over the hills leading to Tarragona. -Chabran was placed at Martorell, Chabot at San Sadurni, Souham at -Vendrell, and Pino at Villanueva de Sitjas and Villafranca. Thus the -pass of Ordal was in the victor’s hands, and he had it in his power -to march against Tarragona without having any further positions to -force. But the siege of that place did not form, at present, any part -of St. Cyr’s designs. His aim was first to collect such magazines at -Barcelona as would feed his whole army of 25,000 men till the harvest -was ripe, and secondly to reopen his communication with France. The -sea route was rendered dangerous by the English ships, which were -continually hovering off the coast. The land route was blocked by -the fortresses of Hostalrich and Gerona. St. Cyr imagined that it -was more important to make an end of these places, and open his -route to Perpignan, than to attack Tarragona. The latter place was -strong, and the greater part of the Catalan army had taken refuge in -it. The siege would need, as he supposed, many months, and could not -be properly conducted till a battering-train and a large store of -ammunition had been brought down from France. - -It is possible that the French general might have come to another -conclusion if he had been aware of the state of panic and -disorganization among the Catalans at this moment. The _miqueletes_ -had mostly dispersed to their homes, the regular troops were -mutinous, and the populace was crying treason and looking for -scape-goats. The incapable Vives was frightened into resignation, -and finally replaced by Reding, whose courage at least was beyond -suspicion, if his abilities were not those of a great general. The -smaller towns were full of tumults and assassination: at Lerida -a certain Gomez declared himself dictator and began to seize and -execute all suspected persons. He did not stop till he was caught -and beheaded by a battalion which Reding sent out against him. In -short, anarchy reigned in Catalonia for ten days, and it is possible -that if St. Cyr had marched straight to Tarragona he might have -taken the place, though its inhabitants were working hard at their -fortifications, and vowing to emulate Saragossa. Many historians of -the war have blamed the French general for not making the attempt: -but there was much to urge in his defence. It is perfectly possible -that the Tarragonese might have made a gallant stand, in spite of -all their troubles, for the garrison was large if disorderly. If -they held out, St. Cyr had neither a siege equipage nor sufficient -magazines to feed his army when concentrated in a single spot. The -French troops were exhausted, and suffering dreadfully from the -inclement winter weather. Lazan and Alvarez were in full force in the -Ampurdam, and were giving Reille’s weak division much trouble. - -Probably therefore St. Cyr was justified in halting for a month, -which he employed in clearing the whole country-side for thirty miles -round Barcelona, and in collecting the stores of food which his army -required before it could make another move. The halt allowed time -for the Catalans to rally, and for Reding to reorganize his army: -by February he was ready once more to try his fortune in the field. -Indeed, he was ere long more formidable than St. Cyr had expected, -for he was joined by the second brigade of his own Granadan division, -which came up from Valencia not long after the battle of Molins de -Rey, and the last reserves from Majorca had also sailed to aid him, -after giving over the fortifications of the Balearic Isles to the -marines of the fleet, and the urban guards of Palma and Port Mahon. -The _miqueletes_, too, returned to their standards when the first -panic was over, and in a month Catalonia could once more show an army -of 30,000 men. The first incident which occurred to encourage the -insurgents was that on January 1. Lazan fell upon and very severely -handled a detached battalion of Reille’s division at Castellon in -the Ampurdam[80], and when Reille came up against him in person with -2,500 men, inflicted on him a sharp check at the fords of the Muga. -Not long after, however, the Marquis withdrew from this region, and -marched back toward Aragon, taking with him his own division and -leaving only the weak corps of Alvarez to deal with Reille. His -retreat was caused by the news of his brother’s desperate position -in Saragossa. Hoping to make a diversion in favour of Palafox, Lazan -marched to Lerida, where he began to gather in all the men that he -could collect before moving back to his native province. Thus the -pressure on Reille was much reduced. - - [80] This was the 4th battalion of the 2nd of the line, which had - joined Reille in the late autumn, and did not form part of his - original division as detailed in the Appendix to vol. i. St. Cyr - says that it only lost sixty prisoners besides some casualties. - Lazan wrote that he took ninety prisoners, and killed or wounded - over 200 more Frenchmen. - -St. Cyr’s men, meanwhile, made many expeditions into the valleys -above Barcelona. They cleared the defile of Bruch leading into the -upper valley of the Llobregat, which the _somatenes_ had held so -gallantly against Schwartz and Chabran in June. They took, but did -not hold, the almost inaccessible peak of Montserrat, and on the -coast-road dominated the country as far as Mataro. But they could not -reopen the communications with France: their general did not dare to -set about the siege of Gerona while Reding had still the makings of -an army in the direction of Tarragona. It was not till that brave but -unfortunate officer had received his _third_ defeat in February that -St. Cyr was able to turn his attention to the north, and the road to -Perpignan. For the present, the French general found himself mainly -occupied by the imperious necessity for scraping together food not -only for his own army, but for the great city of Barcelona, where -both the garrison and the people were living from hand to mouth. -For the resources of the neighbouring plain were nearly exhausted, -and the only external supply came from occasional merchantmen from -Cette or Marseilles, whose captains were tempted to run the British -blockade by the enormous price which they could secure for their -corn if it could be brought safely through. It was only somewhat -later that the Emperor directed the naval authorities in Provence to -dispatch regular convoys to Barcelona under a strong escort, whenever -the British cruisers were reported to have been blown out to sea. -Meanwhile the problem of food supplies remained almost as urgent -a question for St. Cyr as the movements of his adversaries in the -field. - - - - -SECTION X: CHAPTER III - -THE CAMPAIGN OF FEBRUARY, 1809: BATTLE OF VALLS - - -More than a month had elapsed since the battle of Molins de Rey -before any important movements were made in Catalonia. Early in -February St. Cyr drew in his divisions from the advanced positions -in the plain of Tarragona, which they had taken up after the victory -of Molins de Rey. They had eaten up the country-side, and were being -much harassed by the _miqueletes_, who had begun to press in upon -their communications with Barcelona, in spite of all the care that -was taken to scour the country with small flying columns, and to -scatter any nucleus of insurgents that began to grow up in the French -rear. Owing to the dispersion of the divisions of the 7th Corps these -operations were very laborious; between the new year and the middle -of February St. Cyr calculated that his men had used up 2,000,000 -cartridges in petty skirmishes, and suffered a very appreciable -loss in operations that were practically worthless[81]. Accordingly -he drew them closer together, in order to shorten the dangerously -extended line of communication with Barcelona. - - [81] St. Cyr, _Campagne de Catalogne_, p. 98. - -Reding, during this period of waiting, had been keeping quiet in -Tarragona, where he was reorganizing and drilling the harassed -troops which had been beaten at Cardadeu and Molins de Rey. He had, -as we have already seen, received heavy reinforcements from the -South[82] and the Balearic Isles[83]; but it was not in numbers only -that his army had improved. St. Cyr’s inaction had restored their -_morale_. They were too, as regards food and munitions, in a much -better condition than their adversaries, as they could freely draw -provisions from the plain of the Lower Ebro and the northern parts -of Valencia, and were besides helped by corn brought in by British -and Spanish vessels from the whole eastern Mediterranean. Reding had -also got a good supply of arms and ammunition from England. As he -found himself unmolested, he was finally able to rearrange his whole -force, so as not only to cover Tarragona, but to extend a screen of -troops all round the French position. He now divided his army into -two wings: he himself, on the right, kept in hand at Tarragona the -1st Division, consisting mainly of the Granadan troops: while General -Castro was sent to establish the head quarters of the 2nd Division, -which contained most of the old battalions of the army of Catalonia, -at Igualada. Their line of communication was by Santa Coloma, -Sarreal, and Montblanch. This disposition was probably a mistake: -while the French lay concentrated in the middle of the semicircle, -the Spanish army was forced to operate on outer lines sixty miles -long, and could not mass itself in less than three or four days. By -a sudden movement of the enemy, either Reding or Castro might be -assailed by superior numbers, and forced to fall back on an eccentric -line of retreat before he could be succoured by his colleague. - - [82] Regiments of Santa Fé, and 1st of Antequera, three - battalions with 3,600 men in November, and probably 3,000 in - February. - - [83] Swiss Regiment of Beschard, about 2,000 strong, and Majorca - Militia [sometimes called ‘Palma’], 600 strong. - -It would seem that, encouraged by St. Cyr’s quiescence, his own -growing strength, and the protestations of the Catalans, Reding had -once more resolved to resume the offensive. The extension of his left -to Igualada was made with no less ambitious a purpose than that of -outflanking the northern wing of the French army, and then delivering -a simultaneous concentric attack on its scattered divisions as they -lay in their cantonments. Such a plan presupposed that St. Cyr would -keep quiet while the preparations were being made, that he would -fail to concentrate in time, and that the Spanish columns, operating -from two distant bases, would succeed in timing their co-operation -with perfect accuracy. At the best they could only have brought some -30,000 men against the 23,000 of St. Cyr’s field army--a superiority -far from sufficient to give them a rational chance of success. It is -probable that at this moment Reding’s best chance of doing something -great for the cause of Spain would have been to leave a strong -garrison in Tarragona, and march early in February with 20,000 men to -the relief of Saragossa, which was now drawing near the end of its -powers of resistance. Lannes and Junot would have had to raise the -siege if an army of such size had come up against them. But, though -intending to succour Saragossa in a few weeks, Reding was induced -by the constant entreaties of the Catalans to undertake first an -expedition against St. Cyr. He sent off no troops to aid the Marquis -of Lazan in his fruitless attempt to relax the pressure on his -brother’s heroic garrison, but devoted all his attention to the 7th -Corps. - -St. Cyr was not an officer who was likely to be caught unprepared by -such a movement as Reding had planned. The extension of the Spanish -line to Igualada and the upper Llobregat had not escaped his notice, -and he was fully aware of the advantage which his central position -gave him over an enemy who had been obliging enough to draw out his -fighting strength on an arc of a circle sixty miles from end to end. -Without fully realizing Reding’s intentions, he could yet see that -the Spaniards were giving him a grand opportunity of beating them -in detail. He resolved to strike a blow at their northern wing, -convinced that if he acted with sufficient swiftness and energy he -could crush it long ere it could be succoured from Tarragona. - -It thus came to pass that Reding and St. Cyr began to move -simultaneously--the one on exterior, the other on interior -lines--with the inevitable result. On February 15 Castro, in -accordance with the instructions of the Captain-General, began to -concentrate his troops at Igualada, with the intention of advancing -against the French divisions at San Sadurni and Martorell. At the -same time orders were sent to Alvarez, the Governor of Gerona, -to detach all the men he could spare for a demonstration against -Barcelona, in order to distract the attention of Duhesme and the -garrison. Reding himself, with the troops at Tarragona, intended to -march against Souham the moment that he should receive the news that -his lieutenants were ready to strike. - -At the same moment St. Cyr started out on his expedition against -Igualada. He took with him Pino’s Italian division[84], and ordered -Chabot and Chabran to concentrate with him at Capellades, seven or -eight miles to the south-east of Castro’s head quarters. By taking -this route he avoided the northern bank of the Noya and the defiles -of Bruch, and approached the enemy from the side where he could most -easily cut him off from reinforcements coming from Tarragona. - - [84] Troops from Barcelona under Lecchi came out to replace Pino - at Villafranca. - -The concentration of the three French columns was not perfectly -timed, those of Pino and Chabran finding their way far more difficult -than did Chabot. It thus chanced that the latter with his skeleton -division of three battalions, arrived in front of Capellades many -hours before his colleagues. His approach was reported to Castro at -Igualada, who sent down 4,000 men against him, attacked him, and beat -him back with loss[85] into the arms of Pino, who came on the scene -later in the day [Feb. 17]. The Spaniards were then forced to give -back, and retired to Pobla de Claramunt on the banks of the Noya, -where they were joined by most of Castro’s reserves. St. Cyr had now -concentrated his three divisions, and hoped that he might bring the -enemy to a pitched battle. He drew up in front of them all his force, -save one of Pino’s brigades, which he sent to turn their right [Feb. -18]. The Spaniards, having a fine position behind a ravine, were at -first inclined to fight, and skirmished with the enemy’s main body -for some hours. They narrowly missed capturing both St. Cyr and Pino, -who had ridden forward with their staff to reconnoitre, and fell into -an ambush of _miqueletes_, from which they only escaped by the speed -of their horses[86]. - - [85] Chabot lost a Neapolitan colonel (Carascosa) and many other - prisoners. - - [86] St. Cyr says nothing of his own danger, but the incident - is given at length by Vacani, iii. 93, who mentions that one of - Pino’s aides-de-camp was wounded. - -But late in the day the Spanish General received news that -Mazzuchelli, with the detached Italian brigade, was already in his -rear and marching hard for Igualada. He immediately evacuated his -position in great disorder, and fell back on his head quarters, -closely pursued by St. Cyr. The main body of the Spaniards, with -their artillery, just succeeded in passing through Igualada before -the Italians came up, and fled by the road to Cervera. The rear was -cut off, and had to escape in another direction by the path leading -to Manresa. Both columns were much hustled and lost many prisoners, -yet they fairly outmarched their pursuers and got away without any -crushing disaster[87]. But their great loss was that in Igualada -the French seized all the magazines which had been collected from -northern Catalonia for the use of Castro’s division. This relieved -St. Cyr from all trouble as to provisions for many days: he had now -food enough not only to provide for his field army, but to send back -to Barcelona. - - [87] ‘Si nous ne fîmes pas dans cette affaire le nombre de - prisonniers que nous eussions dû y faire,’ says St. Cyr, ‘c’est - que dans cette journée l’ennemi fit plus usage de ses jambes que - de ses armes. Quelques centaines seulement, la plupart blessés, - tombèrent entre nos mains’ [_Campagne de Catalogne_, p. 107]. - -St. Cyr had now done all the harm that was in his power to the -Spanish left wing--he had beaten them, seized their magazines, -driven them apart, and broken their line. He imagined that they were -disposed of for many days, and now resolved to turn off for a blow at -Reding and the other half of the Catalonian army, who might meanwhile -(for all that he knew) be attacking Souham with very superior numbers. - -Accordingly on Feb. 19 he started off with Pino’s division to join -Souham and fall upon Reding, leaving Chabot and Chabran, with all -the artillery of the three divisions, to occupy Igualada and guard -the captured magazines from any possible offensive return on the -part of Castro. He marched by cross-roads along the foot-hills of -the mountains of the great central Catalonian sierra, intending -to descend into the valley of the Gaya by San Magin and the abbey -of Santas Cruces, where (as he had learnt) lay the northernmost -detachments of Reding’s division[88]. Thus he hoped to take the enemy -in flank and beat him in detail. He sent orders to Souham to move -out of Vendrell and meet him at Villarodoña, half-way up the course -of Gaya, unless he should have been already attacked by Reding and -forced to take some other line. - - [88] The details of this cross-march in a badly-surveyed country, - where the maps are very deficient, are more easily to be made - out from Vacani’s narrative (pp. 95-8) than from St. Cyr’s own - account. - -At San Magin the French commander came upon some of Reding’s troops, -about 1,200 men with two guns, under a brigadier named Iranzo. -They showed fight, but were beaten and sought refuge further down -the valley of the Gaya in the fortified abbey of Santas Cruces. So -bare was the country-side, and so bad the maps, that St. Cyr found -considerable difficulty in tracking them, and in discovering the best -way down the valley. But next day he got upon their trail[89], and -beset the abbey, which made a good defence and proved impregnable -to a force unprovided with artillery. St. Cyr blockaded it for two -days, and then descended into the plain, where he got in touch with -Souham’s division, which had advanced from Vendrell, and was now -pillaging the hamlets round Villarodoña, in the central valley of the -Gaya[90] [February 21]. - - [89] St. Cyr (p. 109) has a curious story to the effect that he - had failed entirely to find the road, but ultimately discovered - it by giving leave to a wounded Spanish officer to return to - Tarragona. He was followed at a discreet distance by scouts, who - noted the way that he took, and he thus served as a guide of - Pino’s division as far as the convent of Santas Cruces. - - [90] Souham had anticipated St. Cyr’s orders, and started to - advance from Vendrell before his chief’s dispatch from Igualada - came to hand. - -Meanwhile Reding was at last on the move. On receiving the news of -the combat of Igualada, he had to choose between the opportunity -of making a counter-stroke at Souham, and that of marching to the -aid of his lieutenant, Castro. He adopted the latter alternative, -and started from Tarragona on February 20 with an escort of about -2,000 men, including nearly all his available cavalry[91]. It was -his intention to pick up on the way the outlying northern brigades -of his division. This he succeeded in doing, drawing in to himself -the troops which were guarding the pass of Santa Cristina, and -Iranzo’s detachment at Santas Cruces. This force, warned of his -approach, broke through the blockade at night, and reached its -chief with little or no loss [February 21]. Thus reinforced Reding -pushed on by Sarreal to Santa Coloma, where Castro joined him with -the rallied troops of his wing, whom he had collected when the -French attack slackened. They had between them nearly 20,000 men, an -imposing force, with which some of the officers present suggested -that it would be possible to fall upon Igualada, crush Chabot and -Chabran, and recover the lost magazines. But Reding was nervous -about Tarragona, dreading lest St. Cyr might unite with Souham and -fall upon the city during his absence. After holding a lengthy -council of war[92] he determined to return to protect his base of -operations. Accordingly, he told off the Swiss General Wimpffen, -with some 4.000 or 5,000 of Castro’s troops, to observe the French -divisions at Igualada, and started homeward with the rest of his -army, about 10,000 infantry, 700 cavalry, and two batteries of field -artillery[93]. He had made up his mind to return by the route of -Montblanch and Valls, one somewhat more remote from the position -of St. Cyr on the Gaya than the way by Pla, which he had taken in -setting out to join Castro. Reding could only have got home without -fighting by taking a circuitous route to the east, via Selva and -Reus: the suggestion that he should do so was made, but he replied -that having baggage and artillery with him he was forced to keep to -a high-road. He chose that by Valls, though he was aware that the -place was occupied: but apparently he hoped to crush Souham before -Pino could come to his aid. He was resolved, it is said, not to -court a combat, but on the other hand not to refuse it if the enemy -should offer to fight him on advantageous ground. [February 24.] The -truth is, that he was bold even to rashness, could never forget the -great day of Baylen, in which he had taken such a splendid part, and -was anxious to wash out by a victory the evil memories of Cardadeu -and Molins de Rey. He set out on the evening of February 24, and by -daybreak next morning was drawing near the bridge of Goy, where the -high-road to Tarragona crosses the river Francoli, some two miles -north of the town of Valls. His troops, as was to be expected, were -much exhausted by the long march in the darkness[94]. - - [91] Two battalions of _miqueletes_ (Lerida and 1st of - Tarragona), 300 cavalry, a field-battery, and a battalion of - Reding’s own regiment of Swiss, about 2,100 men in all. - - [92] Col. Doyle was present at this council: his account of it - is in the Record Office. He declares that he himself was all for - fighting, that Reding wavered, and the majority refused to take - risks. - - [93] There is a detailed estimate of Reding’s army given by St. - Cyr in his Appendix no. 11. He says that the figures were given - him by ‘a Spanish general taken prisoner at Valls,’ which must - mean the Marquis of Casteldosrius, the only officer of that rank - captured. The names of nearly all the battalions cited in this - list are to be verified, either in Reding’s dispatch or in the - narrative of Cabanes--all indeed except the regiment of Baza, - and the three Miquelet Tercios, 1st and 2nd of Tarragona and - Lerida. But it is probable that Casteldosrius gave St. Cyr a - morning state of the whole army collected at Santa Coloma on the - twenty-fourth, and that these corps (with a total force of 3,000 - men) formed part of the force left with Wimpffen at Santa Coloma. - I am driven to this conclusion by the statement of Doyle in his - letter written from Santa Coloma, on the day before the battle, - that Reding was marching “with 500 horse and a little over 10,000 - foot,” for Tarragona. Doyle is arguing in favour of fighting, and - has no object in understating the numbers. His figures are borne - out by all the Spanish narratives. The force must have stood as - follows:-- - - INFANTRY. - - Granadan Division: - - Reding’s Swiss (one batt.) 500 - Iliberia (or 1st of Granada) 1,860 - Santa Fé (two batts.) 2,300 - 1st of Antequera 1,100 - ------ - 5,760 - - From the Old Catalan Army: - - Guards [150 Spanish, 280 Walloons] 430 - Soria 1,000 - 2nd of Savoia 800 - Provincial Grenadiers of Old and New Castile 1,300 - Wimpffen’s Swiss (two batts.) 1,140 - Palma Militia 350 - ------ - 5,020 - - CAVALRY. - - Husares of Granada 450 - Husares Españoles 250 - ---- - 700 - ARTILLERY. - - 2 batteries, 8 guns 200 - - SAPPERS. - - 1 Company 100 - ------ - Total 11,800 - - [Erratum from p. xii: I have found from a Madrid document that - part, though not the whole, of the Regiment of Baza was present - at Valls. One battalion was left behind with Wimpffen: one - marched with Reding: about 800 men therefore must be added to my - estimate of the Spanish infantry.] - - [94] These details are from Doyle’s letter of Feb. 24, in the - Record Office. - -St. Cyr, meanwhile, had not been intending to strike a blow at -Tarragona. He regarded it as much more necessary to beat the -enemy’s field army than to close in upon the fortress, which would -indubitably have offered a long and obstinate resistance. When he -got news of Reding’s march to Santa Coloma he resolved to follow -him: he was preparing to hasten to the succour of his divisions at -Igualada, when he learnt that the Swiss general had turned back, -and was hurrying home to Tarragona. He resolved, therefore, to try -to intercept him on his return march, and blocked his two available -roads by placing Souham’s division at Valls and Pino’s at Pla. They -were only eight or nine miles apart, and whichever road the Spaniards -took the unassailed French division could easily come to the aid of -the other. - -Reding’s night march, a move which St. Cyr does not seem to have -foreseen, nearly enabled him to carry out his plan. In fact, as we -shall see, he had almost made an end of the French division before -the Marshal, who lay himself at Pla with the Italians, arrived to -succour it[95]. - - [95] The French forces engaged at Valls were:-- - - Souham’s Division: - 1st Léger (three batts.). - 42nd of the Line (three batts.). - - Provisional regiment: - [One batt. each of 3rd Léger and 67th Line, two batts. - 7th Line.] - - 10 battalions, about 5,500 men. - 24th Dragoons, about 500 men, two batteries. - - Pino’s Division: - 1st Italian Light Regiment (three batts.). - 2nd Italian Light Regiment (three batts.). - 4th Line (three batts.). - 6th ” ” ” - 7th ” (one batt.). - - 13 battalions, about 6,500 men. - 7th Italian Dragoons (‘Dragoons of Napoleon’) and Italian - Royal Chasseurs, together about 800 men. - - Total about 13,800 men, a force somewhat superior to that of the - Spaniards, if the latter had only the corps given in the last - table. - -In the early morning, between six and seven o’clock, the head of the -long Spanish column reached the bridge of Goy, and there fell in -with Souham’s vedettes. The sharp musketry fire which at once broke -out warned each party that a combat was at hand. Souham hastily -marched out from Valls, and drew up his two brigades in the plain -to the north of the town, placing himself across the line of the -enemy’s advance. Reding at first made up his mind to thrust aside the -French division, whose force he somewhat undervalued, and to hurry -on his march toward Tarragona. The whole of his advanced guard and -part of his centre crossed the river, deployed on the left bank, -and attacked the French. Souham held his ground for some hours, but -as more and more Spanish battalions kept pressing across the bridge -and reinforcing the enemy’s line, he began after a time to give -way--the numerical odds were heavily against him, and the Catalans -were fighting with great steadiness and confidence. Before noon the -French division was thrust back against the town of Valls, and Reding -had been able to file not only the greater part of his army but all -his baggage across the Francoli. The way to Tarragona was clear, and -if he had chosen to disengage his men he could have carried off the -whole of his army to that city without molestation from Souham, who -was too hard hit to wish to continue the combat. It is even possible -that if he had hastily brought up all his reserves he might have -completely routed the French detachment before it could have been -succoured. - -But Reding adopted neither one course nor the other. After driving -back Souham, he allowed his men a long rest, probably in order to -give the rear and the baggage time to complete the passage of the -Francoli. While things were standing still, St. Cyr arrived at full -gallop from Pla, where he had been lying with Pino’s division, to -whom the news of the battle had arrived very late. He brought with -him only Pino’s divisional cavalry, the ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ and -Royal Chasseurs, but had ordered the rest of the Italians to follow -at full speed when they should have got together. As Pla is no more -than eight miles from Valls, it was expected that they would appear -within the space of three hours. But, as a matter of fact, Pino did -not draw near till the afternoon: one of his brigades, which lay far -out, received contradictory orders, and did not come in to Pla till -past midday[96], and the Italian general would not move till it had -rejoined him. Three hours were wasted by this _contretemps_, and -meanwhile the battle might have been lost. - - [96] Vacani, iii. 105-6. This fact is mentioned by no other - author. - -On arriving upon the field with the Italian cavalry, St. Cyr rode -along Souham’s line, steadied it, and displayed the horsemen in his -front. Seeing the French rallying, and new troops arriving to their -aid, the Spanish commander jumped to the conclusion that St. Cyr had -come up with very heavy reinforcements, and instead of continuing his -advance, or pressing on his march toward Tarragona, suddenly changed -his whole plan of operations. He would not stand to be attacked in -the plain, but he resolved to fight a defensive action on the heights -beyond the Francoli, from which he had descended in the morning. -Accordingly, first his baggage, then his main body, and lastly his -vanguard, which covered the retreat of the rest, slowly filed back -over the bridge of Goy, and took position on the rolling hills to the -east. Here Reding drew them up in two lines, with the river flowing -at their feet as a front defence, and their batteries drawn up so as -to sweep the bridge of Goy and the fords. The right wing was covered -by a lateral ravine falling into the Francoli; the left, facing the -village of Pixamoxons, was somewhat ‘in the air,’ but the whole -position, if long, was good and eminently defensible. - -St. Cyr observed his adversary’s movement with joy, for he would have -been completely foiled if Reding had refused to fight and passed on -toward Tarragona. Knowing the Spanish troops, a pitched battle with -superior numbers was precisely what he most desired. Accordingly he -took advantage of the long time of waiting, while Pino’s division -was slowly drawing near the field, to rest and feed Souham’s tired -troops, and then to draw them up facing the southern half of Reding’s -position, with a vacant space on their right on which the Italians -were to take up their ground, when at last they should arrive. - -When St. Cyr had lain for nearly three hours quiescent at the foot -of the heights, and no reinforcements had yet come in sight, Reding -began to grow anxious. He had, as he now realized, retired with -unnecessary haste from in front of a beaten force, and had assumed a -defensive posture when he should have pressed the attack. At about -three o’clock he made up his mind that he had committed an error, -but thinking it too late to resume the fight, resolved to retire on -Tarragona by the circuitous route which passes through the village -of Costanti. He sent back General Marti to Tarragona to bring out -fresh troops from the garrison to join him at that point, and issued -orders that the army should retreat at dusk. He might perhaps have -got off scatheless if he had moved away at once, though it is equally -possible that St. Cyr might have fallen upon his rearguard with -Souham’s division, and done him some damage. But he waited for the -dark before marching, partly because he wished to rest his troops, -who were desperately fatigued by the night march and the subsequent -combat in the morning, partly because he did not despair of fighting -a successful defensive action if St. Cyr should venture to cross the -Francoli and attack him. Accordingly he lingered on the hillside in -battle array, waiting for the darkness[97]. - - [97] Arteche, v. 207-9, makes Reding deliver a second attack - on Souham in the early afternoon. This is, I think, an error, - caused by a misreading of Cabanes’ somewhat confused account of - the fight, from which it might be possible (if no other sources - existed) to deduce a second Spanish advance. But Cabanes is - really dealing with the later phases of the first combat only. - It is conclusive that neither Reding himself, in his official - dispatch, St. Cyr, Doyle, nor Vacani mention any engagement in - the early afternoon. - -This gave St. Cyr his chance; at three o’clock Pino’s belated -division had begun to come up: first Fontane’s brigade, then, an hour -and a half later, that of Mazzuchelli, whose absence from Pla had -caused all the delay. It was long past four, and the winter afternoon -was far spent when St. Cyr had at last got all his troops in hand. - -Allowing barely enough time for the Italians to form in order of -battle[98], St. Cyr now led forward his whole army to the banks -of the Francoli. The two divisions formed four heavy columns of a -brigade each: and in this massive formation forded the river and -advanced uphill, driving in before them the Spanish skirmishers. The -Italian dragoons went forward in the interval between two of the -infantry columns; the French cavalry led the attack on the extreme -right, near the bridge of Goy. - - [98] St. Cyr in his Memoirs (p. 123) makes the curious statement - that he silenced his artillery after it had fired only three - rounds, lest he should frighten off the Spaniards before he - could reach them with his infantry, and so prevent the latter - from closing and winning as decisive a victory as possible. One - is almost prone to doubt the story, and to suppose that the - cessation of fire was due to the fear of killing his own men when - they were getting close to the Spanish line. Arteche puts this - incident too early in the fight, during Reding’s supposed second - attack. - -For a moment it seemed as if the two armies would actually cross -bayonets all along the line, for the Spaniards stood firm and opened -a regular and well-directed fire upon the advancing columns. But St. -Cyr had not miscalculated the moral effect of the steady approach of -the four great bodies of infantry which were now climbing the hill -and drawing near to Reding’s front. Like so many other continental -troops, who had striven on earlier battle-fields to bear up in line -against the French column-formation, the Spaniards could not find -heart to close with the formidable and threatening masses which were -rolling in upon them. They delivered one last tremendous discharge -at 100 yards’ distance, and then, when they saw the enemy looming -through the smoke and closing upon them, broke in a dozen different -places and went to the rear in helpless disorder, sweeping away the -second line, higher up the hill, which ought to have sustained them. -The only actual collision was on the extreme left, near the bridge -of Goy, where Reding himself charged, with his staff, at the head of -his cavalry, in a vain attempt to save the desperate situation. He -was met in full career by the French 24th Dragoons, and thoroughly -beaten. In the _mêlée_ he was surrounded, three of his aides-de-camp -were wounded[99] and taken, and he himself only cut his way out -after receiving three sabre wounds on his head and shoulders, which -ultimately proved fatal. - - [99] Among them was an English officer named Reid. - -If there had not been many steep slopes and ravines behind the -Spanish position, nearly the whole of Reding’s army must have -perished or been captured. But the country-side was so difficult that -the majority of the fugitives got away, though many were overtaken. -The total loss of the Spaniards amounted to more than 3,000 men, of -whom nearly half were prisoners[100]. All the guns of the defeated -army, all its baggage, and several stands of colours fell into the -hands of the victors. The French lost about 1,000 men, mostly in the -early part of the engagement, when Souham’s division was driven back -under the walls of Valls. - - [100] Including Colonels Dumont and Antunez commanding - respectively the Walloon and Spanish guards, the Marquis of - Casteldosrius commanding the cavalry brigade, three of Reding’s - aides-de-camp, and eighty other officers. Two colonels were - killed, a brigadier-general (Saint Ellier) and many other - superior officers wounded. - -[Illustration: PART OF CATALONIA - TO ILLUSTRATE ST CYR’S CAMPAIGN - NOV. 1808 TO MARCH 1809] - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF VALLS - FEB. 25 1809] - -The Spaniards had not fought amiss: St. Cyr, in a dispatch to -Berthier, acknowledges the fact--not in order to exalt the merit of -his own troops, but to demonstrate that the 7th Corps was too weak -for the task set it and required further reinforcements[101]. But -Reding did not give his men a fair chance; he hurried them into the -fight at the end of a long night march, drew them off just when they -were victorious, and altered his plan of battle thrice in the -course of the day. No army could have done itself justice with such -bad leading. - - [101] ‘Votre Altesse me dit qu’il n’y a rien autour de nous - qui puisse résister à 6,000 hommes. Je lui demande pardon. La - division Souham a été quelque temps seule le 25, et nous avons - vu qu’il était temps que l’autre division arrivât.... On ne peut - nier que les troupes espagnoles gagnent tous les jours, et nous - sommes forcés de leur rendre justice; à la bataille de Valls - elles se sont très-bien battues.’ St. Cyr to Berthier, Valls, - March 6, 1809. - -The wrecks of the beaten force straggled into Tarragona, their -spirits so depressed that it was a long time before it was possible -to trust them again in battle. When they once more took the field it -was under another leader, for Reding, after lingering some weeks, -died of his wounds, leaving the reputation of a brave, honest, and -humane officer, but of a very poor general. - -St. Cyr utilized his victory merely by blockading Tarragona. He -moved Souham to Reus, and kept Pino at Valls, each throwing out -detachments as far as the sea, so as to cut off the city from all -its communications with the interior. An epidemic had broken out in -the place, in consequence of the masses of ill-attended wounded who -cumbered the hospitals. It would seem that the French General hoped -that the pestilence might turn the hearts of the garrison towards -surrender. If so, he was much deceived: they bore their ills with -stolid patience, and being always victualled from the sea suffered -no practical inconvenience from the blockade. It seems indeed that -St. Cyr would have done far better to use the breathing time which he -won at the battle of Valls for the commencement of a movement against -Gerona. Till that place should be captured, and the high-road to -Perpignan opened, there was no real security for the 7th Corps. Long -months, however, were to elapse before this necessary operation was -taken in hand. - - - - -SECTION XI - -THE SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA - -(DECEMBER 1808-FEBRUARY 1809) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE CAPTURE OF THE OUTWORKS - - -While Napoleon was urging on his fruitless pursuit of Sir John -Moore, while St. Cyr was discomfiting the Catalans on the Besos and -the Llobregat, and while Victor was dealing his last blow to the -dilapidated army of Infantado, there was one point on which the war -was standing still, and where the French arms had made no great -progress since the battle of Tudela. Saragossa was holding out, with -the same tenacity that she had displayed during the first siege in -the July and August of the preceding summer. In front of her walls -and barricades two whole corps of the Emperor’s army were detained -from December, 1808, till February, 1809. As long as the defence -endured, she preserved the rest of Aragon and the whole of Valencia -from invasion. - -The battle of Tudela had been fought on November 23, but it was not -till nearly a month later that the actual siege began. The reason -for this delay was that the Emperor had called off to Madrid all the -troops which had taken part in the campaign against Castaños and -Palafox, save Moncey’s 3rd Corps alone. This force was not numerous -enough to invest the city till it had been strengthened by heavy -reinforcements from the North. - -After having routed the Armies of Aragon and the Centre, Marshal -Lannes had thrown up the command which had been entrusted to him, -and had gone back to France. The injuries which he had suffered -from his fall over the precipice near Pampeluna[102] were still far -from healed, and served as the excuse for his retirement. Moncey, -therefore, resumed, on November 25, the charge of the victorious -army: on the next day he was joined by Ney, who, after failing -to intercept Castaños in the mountains[103], had descended into -the valley of the Ebro, with Marchand and Dessolles’ divisions of -infantry, and Beaumont’s light cavalry brigade. On the twenty-eighth -the two marshals advanced along the high-road by Mallen and Alagon, -and on the second day after appeared in front of Saragossa with -all their troops, save Musnier’s division of the 3rd Corps and the -division of the 6th Corps lately commanded by Lagrange, which had -followed the retreating army of Castaños into the hills on the road -to Calatayud. They were about to commence the investment of the city, -when Ney received orders from the Emperor, dispatched from Aranda, -bidding him leave the siege to Moncey, and cross the mountains into -New Castile with all the troops of the 6th Corps: he was to find -Castaños, and hang on his heels so that he should not be able to -march to the help of Madrid. - - [102] See vol. i. p. 436. - - [103] See vol. i. pp. 446-7. - -Accordingly the Duke of Elchingen marched from the camp in front -of Saragossa with the divisions of Marchand and Dessolles, and -the cavalry brigades of Beaumont and Digeon. At Calatayud he -came up with the force which had been dispatched in pursuit of -Castaños,--Musnier’s division of the 3rd Corps, and that of the 6th -Corps which Maurice Mathieu had taken over from Lagrange, who had -been severely wounded at Tudela[104]. Leaving Musnier at Calatayud -to protect his communications with Aragon, Ney picked up Maurice -Mathieu, and passed the mountains into New Castile, where he fell -into the Emperor’s sphere of operations. We have seen that he took a -prominent part in the pursuit of Sir John Moore and the invasion of -Galicia. - - [104] Few of the French historians mention these changes, but - they are quite certain. On Nov. 23 ‘the division Maurice Mathieu’ - means the 1st of the 3rd Corps; on Dec. 1, it means the 2nd of - the 6th Corps. - -Moncey, meanwhile, was left in front of Saragossa with his 1st, 3rd, -and 4th Divisions--the 2nd being still at Calatayud. This force -consisted of no more than twenty-three battalions, about 15,000 men, -and was far too weak to undertake the siege. The Marshal was informed -that the whole corps of Mortier was to be sent to his aid, but it -was still far away, and with very proper caution he resolved to draw -back and wait for the arrival of the reinforcements. If the Spaniards -got to know of his condition, they might sally out from Saragossa and -attack him with more than 30,000 men. Moncey, therefore, drew back -to Alagon, and there waited for the arrival of the Duke of Treviso -and the 5th Corps. It was not till December 20 that he was able to -present himself once more before the city. - -Thus Saragossa gained four weeks of respite between the battle of -Tudela and the commencement of the actual siege. This reprieve was -invaluable to Palafox and the Aragonese. They would have been in -grave danger if Lannes had marched on and assaulted the city only two -days after the battle, and before the routed army had been rallied. -Even if Ney and Moncey had been permitted to begin a serious attack -on November 30, the day of their arrival before the place, they would -have had some chance of success. But their sudden retreat raised the -spirits of the defenders, and the twenty extra days of preparation -thus granted to them sufficed to restore them to full confidence, -and to re-establish their belief in the luck of Saragossa and the -special protection vouchsafed them by its patron saint Our Lady of -the Pillar. Napoleon must take the blame for all the consequences of -Ney’s withdrawal. He had ordered it without fully realizing the fact -that Moncey would be left too weak to commence the siege. Probably he -had over-estimated the effect of the defeat of Tudela on the Army of -Aragon. For the failure of Ney’s attempt to surround Castaños he was -only in part responsible, though (as we have seen) he had sent him -out on his circular march two days too late[105]. But to draw off the -6th Corps to New Castile (where it failed to do any good), before the -5th Corps had arrived to take its place before Saragossa, was clearly -a blunder. - - [105] See vol. i. pp. 446-7. - -Palafox made admirable use of the unexpected reprieve that had been -granted him. He had not, it will be remembered, taken part in person -in the battle of Tudela, but had returned to his head quarters on the -night before that disaster. He was occupied in organizing a reserve -to take the field in support of his two divisions already at the -front, when the sudden influx of fugitives into Saragossa showed him -what had occurred. In the course of the next two days there poured -into the place the remains of the divisions of O’Neille and St. -March from his own Army of Aragon. With them came Roca’s men, who -properly belonged to Castaños, but having fought in the right wing -had been separated from the main body of the Andalusian army[106]. -In addition, fragments of many other regiments of the Army of the -Centre straggled into Saragossa. At least 16,000 or 17,000 men of -the wrecks of Tudela had come in ere four days were expired. To help -them, Palafox could count on all the newly organized battalions of -his reserve, which had never marched out to join the field army: they -amounted to some 10,000 or 12,000 men, but many of the regiments had -only lately been organized and had not received their uniforms or -equipment. Nor was this all: several belated battalions from Murcia -and Valencia came in at various times during the next ten days[107], -so that long ere the actual siege began Palafox could count on -32,000 bayonets and 2,000 sabres of more or less regularly organized -corps. He had in addition a number of irregulars--armed citizens -and peasants of the country-side--whose numbers it is impossible to -fix, for though some had been collected in _partidas_ or volunteer -companies, others fought in loose bands just as they pleased, and -without any proper organization. They may possibly have amounted to -10,000 men at the time of the commencement of the siege, but so many -were drafted into the local Aragonese battalions before the end of -the fighting, that when the place surrendered in February, there were -less than a thousand[108] of these unembodied irregulars under arms. - - [106] By far the larger part of Roca’s division reached - Saragossa; the Spanish returns show that 4,500 men joined - Palafox, and only 1,500 escaped to Cuenca with the rest of the - ‘Army of the Centre.’ - - [107] Among these were the 1st and 2nd Tiradores de Murcia, the - regiment of Florida Blanca, the 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Murcia, - and the 3rd Volunteers of Valencia, all of which had arrived too - late for Tudela. - - [108] To be exact, 756 was the number of _paisanos_ as opposed to - _tropa_ in the return of the garrison on Feb. 20. See Arteche, - Appendix to vol. iv. - -But it was not so much for the reorganization of his army as for the -strengthening of his fortifications that Palafox found the respite -during the first three weeks of December profitable. During the first -siege it will be remembered that the fortifications of Saragossa -had been contemptible from the engineer’s point of view: the flimsy -mediaeval _enceinte_ had crumbled away at the first fire of the -besiegers, and the real defence had been carried out behind the -barricades. By the commencement of the second siege everything had -changed, and the city was covered by a formidable line of defences, -executed, as was remarked by one of the French generals[109], -with more zeal and energy than scientific skill, but presenting -nevertheless most serious obstacles to the besieger. - - [109] See Cavallero’s criticism of this statement of Rogniat on - p. 17 of his interesting little work. - -After the raising of the first siege by Verdier, the Spaniards had -been for some time in a state of such confidence and exultation -that they imagined that there was no need for further defensive -precautions. The next campaign was to be fought, as they supposed, -on the further side of the Pyrenees. But the long suspension of -the expected advance during the autumn months began to chill their -spirits, and, as the year drew on, it was no longer reckoned -unpatriotic or cowardly to take into consideration the wisdom of -strengthening the inland fortresses in view of a possible return of -the French. In September, Colonel San Genis, the engineer officer who -had worked for Palafox during the first siege, received permission -to commence a series of regular fortifications for Saragossa. The -work did not progress rapidly, for the Aragonese had not as yet -much belief in the possibility that they might be called on once -again to defend their capital. San Genis only received a moderate -sum of money, and the right to requisition men of over thirty-five -from the city and the surrounding villages. The labour had to be -paid, and therefore the labourers were few. The new works were -sketched out rather than executed. Things progressed with a leisurely -slowness, till in November the dangers of the situation began to be -appreciated, and the approach of the French reinforcements drove the -Saragossans to greater energy. But it was only the thunderclap of -Tudela that really alarmed them, and sent soldiers and civilians, -men, women, and children, to labour with feverish haste at the -completion of the new lines. Between November 25 and December 20 the -amount of work that was carried out was amazing and admirable. If Ney -and Moncey had been allowed to commence the regular siege before the -month of November had expired, they would have found the whole system -of works in an incomplete condition. Three weeks later Saragossa had -been converted into a formidable fortress. - -The only point where San Genis’ scheme had not been fully developed -was the Monte Torrero. It will be remembered that this important -hill, whose summit lies only 1,800 yards from the walls of Saragossa, -overlooks the whole city, and had been chosen during the first siege -as the _emplacement_ for the main breaching batteries. To keep the -French from this commanding position was most important, and the -Spanish engineer had intended to cover the whole circuit of the -hill with a large entrenched camp, protected by continuous lines of -earthworks and numerous redoubts, with the Canal of Aragon, which -runs under its southern foot, as a wet ditch in its front. But, when -the news of Tudela arrived, little or nothing had been done to carry -out this scheme: the fortification of the city had absorbed the main -attention of the Aragonese, and while that was still incomplete -the Monte Torrero had been neglected. In December it was too late -to begin the building of three or four miles of new earthworks, -and in consequence nothing was constructed on the suburban hill -save one large central redoubt, and two small works serving as -_têtes-de-pont_, at the points where the Madrid and the La Muela -roads cross the Canal of Aragon. St. March’s Valencian division, -still 6,000 strong, was told off for the defence of the hill, but had -no continuous line of works to cover it. The only strength of the -position lay in the canal which runs round its foot: but this was not -very broad, and was fordable at more than one point. In short, the -Monte Torrero constituted an outlying defence which might be held for -some time, in order to keep the besiegers far off from the body of -the place, rather than an integral part of its line of defence. - -It was on the works of Saragossa itself that the energy of more -than 60,000 enthusiastic labourers, military and civilian, had -been expended during the month that followed Tudela. The total -accomplished in this time moves our respect: it will be well to take -the various fronts in detail. - -On the Western front, from the Ebro to the Huerba, there had been -in August nothing more than a weak wall, many parts of which were -composed of the rear-sides of convents and buildings. In front of -this line there had been constructed by November 10 a very different -defence. A solid rampart reveted with bricks taken from ruined -houses, and furnished with a broad terrace for artillery, and a ditch -forty-five feet deep now covered the entire western side of the -city. The convents of the Augustinians and the Trinitarians, which -had been outside the walls during the earlier siege, had been taken -into this new _enceinte_ and served as bastions in it. There being -a space 600 yards long between them, where the curtain would have -been unprotected by flanking fires, a great semicircular battery had -been thrown out, which acted as a third bastion on this side. Strong -earthworks had also been built up to cover the Portillo and Carmen -gates. As an outlying fort there was the castle of the Aljafferia, -which had received extensive repairs, and was connected with the -_enceinte_ by a ditch and a covered way. It would completely enfilade -any attacks made on the north-western part of the new wall. - -On the Southern front of the defences the work done had been even -more important. Here the new fortifications had been carried down -to the brink of the ravine of the Huerba, so as to make that stream -the wet ditch of the town. Two great redoubts were pushed beyond -it: one called the redoubt of ‘Our Lady of the Pillar’ lay at the -bridge outside the Santa Engracia gate. It was provided with a deep -narrow ditch, into which the water of the river had been turned, and -armed with eight guns. The corresponding fort, at the south-east -angle of the town, was made by fortifying the convent of San José, -on the Valencia road, just beyond the Huerba. This was a quadrangle -120 yards long by eighty broad, furnished with a ditch, and with a -covered way with palisades, cut in the counterscarp. It held twelve -heavy guns, and a garrison of no less than 3,000 men. Between San -José and the Pillar redoubt, the old town wall above the Huerba had -been strengthened and thickened, and several new batteries had been -built upon it. It could not well be assailed till the two projecting -works in front of it should be reduced, and if they should fall it -stood on higher ground and completely commanded their sites. The -convent of Santa Engracia, so much disputed during the first siege, -had been turned into a sort of fortress, and heavily armed with guns -of position. - -On the eastern front of the city from San José to the Ebro, the -Huerba still serves as a ditch to the place, but is not so steep or -so difficult as in its upper course. Here the suburb of the Tanneries -(Las Tenerias), where that stream falls into the Ebro, had been -turned into a strong projecting redoubt, whose fire commanded both -the opposite bank of the Ebro on one side, and the lower reaches of -the Huerba on the other. Half way between this redoubt and San José -was a great battery (generally called the ‘Palafox Battery’) at the -Porta Quemada, whose fires, crossing those of the other two works, -commanded all the low ground outside the eastern front of the city. - -It only remains to speak of the fortifications of the transpontine -suburb of San Lazaro. This was by nature the weakest part of the -defences, as the suburb is built in low marshy ground on the river’s -edge. Here deep cuttings had been made and filled with water, three -heavy batteries had been erected, and the convents of San Lazaro and -Jesus had been strengthened, crenellated and loopholed, and turned -into forts. The whole of these works were joined by palisades and -ditches. They formed a great _tête-de-pont_, requiring a garrison -of 3,000 men. As an additional defence for the flanks of the suburb -three or four gunboats, manned by sailors brought up from Cartagena, -had been launched on the Ebro, and commanded the reach of the river -which runs along the northern side of the city. - -Yet great as were the works which now sheathed the body of Saragossa, -the people had not forgotten the moral lesson of the first siege. -When her walls had been beaten down, she had resisted behind her -barricades and the solid houses of her narrow streets. They fully -realized that this might again have to be done, if the French -should succeed in breaking in at some point of the long _enceinte_. -Accordingly, every preparation was made for street fighting. Houses -were loopholed, and communications were pierced between them, without -any regard for private property or convenience. Ground-floor windows -were built up, and arrangements made for the speedy and solid closing -of all doors. Traverses were erected in the streets, to guard as -far as was possible against the dangers of a bombardment, and an -elaborate system of barricades, arranged in proper tactical relation -to each other, was sketched out. The walls might be broken, but the -people boasted that the kernel should be harder than the shell. - -Outside the city, where the olive groves and suburban villas and -summer houses had given much cover to the French during the first -siege, a clean sweep had been made of every stone and stick for 800 -yards around the defences. The trees were felled, and dragged into -the city, to be cut up into palisades. The bricks and stones were -carried off to revet the new ramparts and ditches. The once fertile -and picturesque garden-suburbs were left bald and bare, and could be -perfectly well searched by the cannon from the walls, so that the -enemy had to contrive all his cover by pick and shovel, or gabion and -fascine. - -The soldiery, whose spirits had been much dashed by the disaster of -Tudela, soon picked up their courage when they noted the enthusiasm -of the citizens and the strength of the defences. Indeed, it was -dangerous for any man to show outward signs of doubt or fear, for the -Aragonese had been wrought up to a pitch of hysterical patriotism -which made them look upon faintheartedness as treason. Palafox -himself did his best to keep down riots and assassinations, but his -followers were always stimulating him to apply martial law in its -most rigorous form. A high gallows was erected in the middle of the -Coso, and short shrift was given to any man convicted of attempted -desertion, disobedience to orders, or cowardice. Delations were -innumerable, and the Captain-General had the greatest difficulty in -preserving from the popular fury even persons whom he believed to -be innocent. The most that he could do for them was to shut them -up in the prisons of the Aljafferia, and to defer their trial till -the siege should be over. The fact was that Palafox was well aware -that his power rested on the unlimited confidence reposed on him by -the people, and was therefore bent on crossing their desires as -little as he could help. He was careful to take counsel not only -with his military subordinates, but with all those who had power -in the streets. Hence came the prominence which is assigned in all -the narratives of the siege to obscure persons, such as the priests -Don Basilio (the Captain-General’s chaplain) and Santiago Sass, and -to the demagogues ‘Tio Jorge’ and ‘Tio Marin.’ They represented -public opinion, and had to be conciliated. It is going too far to -say, with Napier, that a regular ‘Reign of Terror’ prevailed in -Saragossa throughout the second siege, and that Palafox was no -more than a puppet, whose strings were pulled by fanatical friars -and bloodthirsty gutter-politicians. But it is clear that the -Captain-General’s dictatorial power was only preserved by a careful -observation of every gust of popular feeling, and that the acts -of his subordinates were often reckless and cruel. The soldiers -disliked the fanatical citizens: the work of Colonel Cavallero, the -engineer officer who has left the best Spanish narrative of the -siege, is full of this feeling. He sums up the situation by writing -that ‘The agents of the Commander-in-chief sometimes abused their -power. Everything was demanded in the name of King and Country, -every act of disobedience was counted as high treason: on the other -hand, known devotion to the holy cause gave unlimited authority, and -assured impunity for any act to those who had the smallest shadow of -delegated power. Even if the citizens had not been unanimous in their -feelings, fear would have given them an appearance of unanimity. -To the intoxication of confidence and national pride caused by -the results of the first siege, to the natural obstinacy of the -Aragonese, to the strength of a dictatorial government supported -by democratic enthusiasm, there was added an exalted religious -fanaticism. Our Lady of the Pillar, patroness of Saragossa, had, it -was supposed, displayed her power by the raising of the first siege: -it had been the greatest of her miracles. Anything could be got from -a people in this frame of mind[110].’ - - [110] Cavallero, pp. 68-9. Belmas translates the paragraph almost - word for word in ii. 144-5 of his work, without acknowledgement. - -Palafox knew well how to deal with his followers. He kept himself -always before their eyes; his activity was unceasing, his supervision -was felt in every department. His unending series of eloquent, if -somewhat bombastic, proclamations was well suited to rouse their -enthusiasm. He displayed, even to ostentation, a confidence which he -did not always feel, because he saw that the strength of the defence -lay in the fact that the Aragonese were convinced in the certainty of -their own triumph. The first doubt as to ultimate success would dull -their courage and weaken their arms. We cannot blame him, under the -circumstances, if he concealed from them everything that was likely -to damp their ardour, and allowed them to believe everything that -would keep up their spirits. - -Meanwhile he did not neglect the practical side of the defence. The -best testimony to his capacity is the careful accumulation which -he made of all the stores and material needed for a long siege. -Alone among all the Spanish garrisons of the war, that of Saragossa -never suffered from hunger nor from want of resources. It was the -pestilence, not starvation, which was destined to prove the ruin of -the defence. Before the French investment began Palafox had gathered -in six months’ provisions for 15,000 men; the garrison was doubled by -the arrival of the routed army from Tudela: yet still there was food -for three months for the military. The citizens had been directed -to lay in private stocks, and to feed themselves: this they had -done, and it was not till the end of the siege that they began to -run short of comestibles. Even when the place fell there were still -large quantities of corn, maize, salt fish, oil, brandy, and forage -for horses in the magazines[111]. Only fresh meat had failed, and -the Spaniard is never a great consumer of that commodity. Military -stores had been prepared in vast quantities: there was an ample -stock of sandbags, of timber for palisading, of iron work and spare -fittings for artillery. Instead of gabions the garrison used the -large wicker baskets employed for the vintage, which were available -in profusion. Of artillery there were some 160 pieces in the place, -but too many of them were of small calibre: only about sixty were -16-pounders or heavier. Of these more than half were French pieces, -abandoned by Verdier in August in his siege-works, or fished out of -the canal into which he had thrown them. Of cannon-balls there was -also an ample provision: a great part, like the siege-guns, were -spoil taken in the deserted camp of the French in August. Shells, -on the other hand, were very deficient, and the workmen of the local -arsenal could not manufacture them satisfactorily. The powder was -made in the place throughout the siege: the accident in July, when -the great magazine in the Seminary blew up with such disastrous -results, had induced Palafox to order that no great central store -should be made, but that the sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal should -be kept apart, and compounded daily in quantities sufficient for -all requirements. So many thousand civilians were kept at work on -powder-and cartridge-making that this plan never failed, and no great -explosions took place during the second siege. - - [111] Cavallero, pp. 81 and 148. - -It will be remembered that want of muskets had been one of the chief -hindrances of the Aragonese during the operations in July and August. -It was not felt in December and January, for not only had Palafox -collected a large store of small arms during the autumn, to equip his -reserves, but he received, just before the investment began, a large -convoy of British muskets, sent up from Tarragona by Colonel Doyle, -who had gone down to the coast by the Captain-General’s desire, -to hurry on their transport. As the siege went on, the mortality -among the garrison was so great that the stock of muskets more than -sufficed for those who were in a state to bear arms. - -Such were the preparations which were made to receive the French, -when they should finally present themselves in front of the walls. -All had been done, save in one matter, to enable the city to make -the best defence possible under the circumstances. The single -omission was to provide for a field force beyond the walls capable -of harassing the besiegers from without, and of cutting their -communications with their base. From his 40,000 men Palafox ought -to have detached a strong division, with orders to base itself upon -Upper Aragon, and keep the French in constant fear as to their -supplies and their touch with Tudela and Pampeluna. Ten thousand -men could easily have been spared, and the mischief that they might -have done was incalculable. The city had more defenders than were -needed: in the open country, on the other hand, there was no nucleus -left for further resistance. Almost every available man had been -sent up to Saragossa: with the exception of Lazan’s division in -Catalonia, and of three other battalions[112], the whole of the -32,000 men raised by the kingdom of Aragon were inside the walls. -Outside there remained nothing but unorganized bands of peasants to -keep the field and molest the besiegers. The only help from without -that was given to the city was that supplied by Lazan’s small -force, when it was withdrawn from Catalonia in January, and 4,000 -men could do nothing against two French army corps. Even as it was, -the French had to tell off the best part of two divisions to guard -their communications. What could they have done if there had been a -solid body of 10,000 men ranging the mountains, and descending at -every favourable opportunity to fall upon some post on the long line -Alagon-Mallen-Tudela-Pampeluna by which the besiegers drew their food -and munitions from their base? - - [112] The battalions of Alcañiz, Tauste, and _Tiradores de - Doyle_; the last were at Jaca, and afterwards served with Blake’s - army at Maria and Belchite. They are wrongly put in Saragossa, in - Arteche, iv. Appendix. - -It would seem that the neglect of Palafox to provide for this -necessary detachment arose from three causes. The first was his -want of real strategical insight--which had been amply displayed -during the autumn, when he was always urging on his colleagues his -ridiculous plan for ‘surrounding’ the French army, by an impossible -march into Navarre and the Pyrenees. The second was his conviction, -well-founded enough in itself, that his troops would do much better -behind walls than in the open[113]. The third was a strong belief -that the siege would be raised not by any operations from without, -but by the rigours of the winter. In average years the months of -January and February are tempestuous and rainy in Aragon. The low -ground about Saragossa is often inundated: even if the enemy were not -drowned out (like the besiegers of Leyden in 1574), Palafox thought -that they would find trench-work impossible in the constant downpour, -and would be so much thinned by dysentery and rheumatism that they -would have to draw back from their low-lying camps and raise the -siege. Unfortunately for him the winter turned out exceptionally -mild, and (what was worse) exceptionally dry. The French had not -to suffer from the awful deluge which in Galicia, during this same -month, was rendering the retreat of Sir John Moore so miserable. -The rain did no more than send many of the besiegers to hospital: it -never stopped their advance or flooded their trenches. - - [113] See the remarks in defence of Palafox in Arteche, iv. 332-4. - -When Palafox had nearly completed his defences--the works on the -Monte Torrero alone were still hopelessly behindhand--the French at -last began to move up against him. On December 15 Marshal Mortier -arrived at Tudela with the whole of the 5th Corps, veterans from -the German garrisons who had not yet fired a shot in Spain. Their -ranks were so full that though only two divisions, or twenty-eight -battalions, formed the corps, it counted 21,000 bayonets. It had also -a brigade of two regiments of hussars and chasseurs as corps-cavalry, -with a strength of 1,500 sabres. The condition of Moncey’s 3rd Corps -was much less satisfactory: it was mainly composed of relics of the -original army of Spain--of the conscripts formed into provisional -regiments with whom Napoleon had at first intended to conquer the -Peninsula[114]. Its other troops, almost without exception, had -taken part in the first siege of Saragossa under Verdier, a not very -cheerful or inspiriting preparation for the second leaguer[115]. All -the regiments had been thinned by severe sickness in the autumn; on -October 10 they had already 7,741 men in hospital--far the largest -figure shown by any of the French corps in Spain. The number had -largely increased as the winter had drawn on, and the battalions -had grown so weak that Moncey consolidated his four divisions into -three during his halt at Alagon. The whole of the 4th division was -distributed between the 2nd and 3rd, so as to bring the others up -to a decent strength. On December 20 the thirty-eight battalions -only made up 20,000 effective men for the siege, while more than -10,000 lay sick, some with the army, some in the base hospitals -at Pampeluna. The health of the corps grew progressively worse -in January, till at last in the middle days of the siege it had -15,000 men with the colours, and no less than 13,000 sick. We find -the French generals complaining that one division of the 5th Corps -was almost as strong and effective at this time as the whole -combined force of the 3rd Corps[116]. Nevertheless these weary and -fever-ridden troops had to take in charge the main part of the siege -operations. - - [114] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, 121st, and 2nd Legion of - Reserve were all formed in this way. - - [115] These were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula, 44th and - 14th of the line, and one battalion each of the 70th and 5th - Léger. - -During the twenty days of his halt at Alagon, Moncey had employed -his sappers and many of his infantry in the manufacture of gabions, -wool-packs, and sandbags for the projected siege. He was continually -receiving convoys of heavy artillery and ammunition from Pampeluna, -and when Mortier came up on December 20, had a sufficiency of -material collected for the commencement of the leaguer. The two -marshals moved on together on that day, and marched eastward towards -Saragossa, with the whole of their forces, save that four battalions -were left to guard the camp and dépôts at Alagon, and three more -at Tudela to keep open the Pampeluna road[117]. Gazan’s division -crossed the Ebro opposite Tauste, to invest the transpontine suburb -of Saragossa: the rest of the army kept to the right bank. Late in -the evening both columns came in sight of the city. They mustered, -after deducting the troops left behind, about 38,000 infantry, -3,500 cavalry, and 3,000 sappers and artillerymen. They had sixty -siege-guns, over and above the eighty-four field-pieces belonging to -the corps-artillery of Mortier and Moncey. The provision of artillery -was copious--far more than the French had turned against many of -the first-class fortresses of Germany. The Emperor was determined -that Saragossa should be well battered, and had told off an extra -proportion of engineers against the place, entrusting the general -charge of the work to his aide-de-camp, General Lacoste, one of the -most distinguished officers of the scientific corps. - - [116] See the table in Belmas, ii. 381. - - [117] These were all detached from Moncey. The Alagon garrison - consisted of four battalions of the 2nd Legion of Reserve, 2,500 - strong. At Tudela were three battalions of the 121st regiment, - 1,800 bayonets. - -When the reinvestment began, Gazan on the left bank established -himself at Villanueva facing the suburb of San Lazaro. Mortier -with Suchet’s division took post at San Lamberto opposite the -western front of the city. Moncey, marching round the place, ranged -Grandjean’s troops opposite the Monte Torrero, on the southern front -of the defences, and Morlot further east near the mouth of the -Huerba. His other division, that of Musnier, formed the central -reserve, and guarded the artillery and the magazines. The Spaniards -made no attempt to delay the completion of the investment, and kept -quiet within their walls. - -On the next morning the actual siege began. It was destined to last -from December 20 to February 20, and may be divided into three -well-marked sections. The first comprises the operations against the -Spanish outworks, and terminates with the capture of the two great -bridge-heads beyond the Huerba, the forts of San José and Our Lady of -the Pillar: it lasted down to January 15. The second period includes -the time during which the besiegers attacked and finally broke -through the main _enceinte_ of the city: it lasts from January 16 to -January 27. The third section consists of the street-fighting, after -the walls had been pierced, and ends with the fall of Saragossa on -February 20. - -Having reconnoitred the whole circuit of the Spanish defences on -the very evening of their arrival before the city (December 20), -Moncey and Mortier recognized that their first task must be to evict -the Spaniards from the Monte Torrero, the one piece of dominating -ground in the whole region of operations, and the spot from which -Saragossa could be most effectively attacked. They were rejoiced to -see that the broad hill was not protected by any continuous line -of entrenchments, but was merely crowned by a large open redoubt, -and defended in front by the two small bridge-heads on the Canal of -Aragon. There was nothing to prevent an attempt to storm it by main -force. This was to be made on the following morning: at the same -time Gazan, on the left bank of the Ebro, was ordered to assault the -suburb of San Lazaro. Here the marshals had underrated the strength -of the Spanish position, which lay in such low ground and was so -difficult to make out, that it presented to the observer from a -distance an aspect of weakness that was far from the reality. - -At eight on the morning of December 21 three French batteries, placed -in favourable advanced positions, began to shell the redoubts on the -Monte Torrero, with satisfactory results, as they dismounted some of -the defender’s guns and exploded a small dépôt of reserve ammunition. -An hour later the infantry came into action. Moncey had told off for -the assault the divisions of Morlot and Grandjean, twenty battalions -in all[118]. The former attacked the eastern front of the position, -fording the canal and assailing the left-hand _tête-de-pont_ on -the Valencia road from the flank. The latter, which had passed the -canal far outside the Spanish lines, and operated between it and -the Huerba, attacked the south-western slopes of the hill. The -defence was weak, and when a brigade of Grandjean’s men pushed in -between the main redoubt on the crest and the Huerba, and took the -western part of the Spanish line in the rear, the day was won. St. -March’s battalions wavered all along the line; and as his reserves -could not be induced to fall upon the French advance, the Valencian -general withdrew his whole division into the city, abandoning the -entire circuit of the Monte Torrero. The assailants captured seven -guns--some of them disabled--in the three redoubts, and a standard -of the 5th regiment of Murcia. They had only lost twenty killed and -fifty wounded; the Spanish loss was also insignificant, considering -the importance of the position that was at stake, and hardly any -prisoners were taken[119]. The besiegers had now the power to bombard -all the southern front of Saragossa, and dominated, from the slopes -of the hill, the two advanced forts of San José and the Pillar. The -leaders of the populace were strongly of opinion that the Valencian -division had misbehaved, and they were not far wrong. Palafox had -great difficulty in protecting St. March, whose personal conduct -had been unimpeachable, from the wrath of the multitude, who wished -to make him responsible for the weakness shown by his men[120]. The -officer who lost the Monte Torrero in the first siege had been tried -and shot[121]: St. March was lucky to escape even without a reprimand. - - [118] Morlot’s division was short of the 121st and the 2nd Legion - of Reserve, left behind at Alagon and Tudela, and had only nine - battalions present. - - [119] Moncey to Berthier, Dec. 23. - - [120] Cavallero, pp. 89-90. - - [121] See vol. i. p. 153. - -Meanwhile things had gone very differently at the other point where -the French had tried to break down the outer defences of the city. -The attack on the transpontine suburb of San Lazaro had been allotted -to Gazan’s division. This was a very formidable force, 9,000 veterans -of the best quality, who were bent on showing that they had not -degenerated since they fought at Friedland. Owing to some slight -mistake in the combination, Gazan only delivered his attack at one -o’clock, two hours after the fighting on the Monte Torrero had -ceased. His leading brigade, that of Guérin, six battalions strong, -advanced against the northern and eastern fronts of the defences -of the suburb. The Spaniards were holding as an outwork a large -building called the Archbishop’s Tower (Torre del Arzobispo)[122] -on the Villanueva road, 600 yards in front of the main line of -entrenchments. This Gazan’s men carried at the first rush, killing -or capturing 300 men of a Swiss battalion[123] which held it. They -then pushed forward towards the inner fortifications, but were taken -in flank by a heavy artillery fire from a redoubt which they had -overlooked. This caused them to swerve towards the Barcelona road, -where they got possession of a house close under the convent of -Jesus, and threatened to cut off the garrison of that stronghold -from the rest of the defenders of the suburb. At this moment a -disgraceful panic seized the defenders of the San Lazaro convent, -which lay directly in front of the assailants. They abandoned their -post, and began to fly across the bridge into Saragossa. But Palafox -came up in person with a reserve, and reoccupied the abandoned post. -He then ordered a sortie against the buildings which the French -had seized, and succeeded in driving them out and compelling them -to retire into the open ground. Gazan doubted for a moment whether -he should not send in his second brigade to renew the attack, for -the six battalions that had borne the brunt of the first fighting -had now fallen into complete disorder. But remembering that if this -force failed to break into the suburb he had no reserves left, and -that Palafox might bring over the bridge as many reinforcements as -he chose, the French general resolved not to push the assault any -further. He drew back and retired behind the Gallego stream, where he -threw up entrenchments to cover himself, completely abandoning the -offensive. For two or three days he did not dare to move, expecting -to be attacked at any moment by the garrison. A sudden rise of the -Ebro had cut off his communication with Moncey, and he could neither -send the marshal an account of his check, nor get any orders from -him[124]. His casualty-list was severe, thirty officers and 650 men -killed and wounded: the Spaniards lost somewhat less, even including -the 300 Swiss who were cut to pieces at the Archbishop’s Tower. - - [122] Belmas calls it a factory (ii. 151), but Palafox in his - dispatch gives the name above. - - [123] ‘Suizos de Aragon.’ - - [124] An officer of sappers named Henri, and one of his privates, - tried to reopen communication by swimming the river on an - ice-cold night. They reached the further bank, but died of - exhaustion among the reeds, where their corpses were found next - morning: thus the message was never delivered. Belmas, ii. 153. - -Palafox next morning issued a proclamation, extolling the valour -shown in the defence of the suburb, treating the loss of the Monte -Torrero as insignificant, and exaggerating the losses of the French. -The Saragossans were rather encouraged than otherwise by the results -of the day’s fighting, and spoke as if they had merely lost an -outwork by the unsteadiness of St. March’s Valencians, while the main -hostile attack had been repulsed. But it is clear that the capture -of the dominating heights south of the city was an all-important -gain to the French. Without the Monte Torrero they could never have -pressed the siege home. As to the failure at the suburb, it came -from attacking with headlong courage an entrenched position that had -not been properly reconnoitred. The assault should never have been -delivered without artillery preparation, and was a grave mistake. -But clearly Mortier’s corps had yet to learn what the Spaniards were -like, and to realize that to turn them out from behind walls and -ditches was not the light task that they supposed. - -Moncey so thoroughly miscalculated the general effect of the fighting -upon the minds of the Spaniards, that next morning he sent in to -Palafox a flag of truce, with an officer bearing a formal demand for -the surrender of the city. ‘Madrid had fallen,’ he wrote: ‘Saragossa, -invested on all sides, had not the force to resist two complete -_corps d’armée_. He trusted that the Captain-General would spare the -beautiful and wealthy capital of Aragon the horrors of a siege. Ample -blood had already been shed, enough misfortunes already suffered by -Spain.’ Palafox replied in the strain that might have been expected -from him--‘The man who only wishes to die with honour in defence of -his country cares nothing about his position: but, as a matter of -fact, he found that his own was eminently favourable and encouraging. -In the first siege he had held out for sixty-one days with a garrison -far inferior to that now under his command. Was it likely that -he would surrender, when he had as many troops as his besiegers? -Looking at the results of the fighting on the previous day, when -the assailants had suffered so severely in front of San Lazaro, he -thought that he would be quite as well justified in proposing to the -Marshal that the besieging army should surrender “to spare further -effusion of blood,” as the latter had been to make such a proposition -to him. If Madrid had fallen, Madrid must have been sold: but he -begged for leave to doubt the truth of the rumour. Even at the worst -Madrid was but a town, like any other. Its fate had no influence on -Saragossa[125].’ - - [125] The two letters may be found in full in the appendices to - Belmas, vol. ii. - -Having received such an answer Moncey had only to set to work as fast -as possible: his engineer-in-chief, General Lacoste, after making a -thorough survey of the defences, pronounced in favour of choosing two -fronts of attack, both starting on the Monte Torrero, and directed -the one against the fort of San José and the other against that of -the Pillar. These projecting works would have to be carried before -any attempt could be made against the inner _enceinte_ of the town. -At the same time, Lacoste ordered a third attack, which he did not -propose to press home, to be made on the castle of the Aljafferia, -on the west side of the town. It was only intended to distract the -attention of the Spaniards from the points of real danger. On the -further bank of the Ebro, Gazan’s division was directed to move -forward again, and to entrench itself across all the three roads, -which issue from the suburb, and lead respectively to Lerida, Jaca, -and Monzon. He was not to attack, but merely to blockade the northern -exits of Saragossa. Communications with him were established by -means of a bridge of boats and pontoons laid above the town. Gazan -succeeded in shortening the front which he had to protect against -sorties by letting the water of the Ebro into the low-lying fields -along its banks, where it caused inundations on each of his flanks. - -On the twenty-third the preliminary works of the siege began, -approaches and covered ways being constructed leading down from the -Monte Torrero to the spots from which Lacoste intended to commence -the first parallels of the two attacks on the Pillar and San José. -Preparations of a similar sort were commenced for the false attack on -the left, opposite the Aljafferia. Six days were occupied in these -works, and in the bringing up of the heavy artillery, destined to arm -the siege-batteries, from Tudela. The guns had to come by road, as -the Spaniards had destroyed all the barges on the Canal of Aragon, -and blown up many of its locks. It was not till some time later that -the French succeeded in reopening the navigation, by replacing the -sluice-gates and building large punts and floats for the carriage of -guns or munitions. - -Just before the first parallel was opened Marshal Moncey was recalled -to Madrid [December 29], the Emperor being apparently discontented -with his delays in the early part of the month. He was replaced in -command of the 3rd Corps by Junot, whose old divisions had been made -over (as we have seen in the first volume) to Soult’s 2nd Corps. This -change made Mortier the senior officer of the besieging army, but he -and Junot seem to have worked more as partners than as commander and -subordinate. Junot, in his report to the Emperor[126] on the state in -which he found the troops, enlarges at great length on the deplorable -condition of the 3rd Corps. Many of the battalions had never received -their winter clothing, hundreds entered the hospitals every day, and -there was no corresponding outflow of convalescents. No less than 680 -men had died in the base hospital at Pampeluna in November, and the -figure for December would be worse. He doubted if there were 13,000 -infantry under arms in his three divisions--here he exaggerated -somewhat, for even a fortnight later the returns show that his -‘present under arms,’ after deducting all detachments and sick, were -still over 14,000 bayonets: on January 1, therefore, there must -have been 15,000. He asked for money, reinforcements, and a supply -of officers, the commissioned ranks of his corps showing a terrible -proportion of gaps. On the other hand, he conceded that the 5th -Corps was in excellent condition, its veterans suffering far less -from disease than his own conscripts. Either of Gazan’s and Suchet’s -divisions was, by itself, as strong as any two of the divisions of -the 3rd Corps. - - [126] Junot to Berthier, Jan. 1, 1809. - -On the night of the twenty-ninth--thirtieth, within twelve hours -of Moncey’s departure, the first parallel was opened, both in the -attack towards San José and in that opposite the Pillar fort. When -the design of the besiegers became evident, Palafox made three -sallies on the thirty-first, but apparently more with the object of -reconnoitring the siege-works and distracting the workers than with -any hope of breaking the French lines, for there were not more than -1,500 men employed in any of the three columns which delivered the -sorties. The assault on the trenches before San José was not pressed -home, but opposite the false attack at the Aljafferia the fighting -was more lively; the French outposts were all driven in with loss, -and a squadron of cavalry, which had slipped out from the Sancho -gate, close to the Ebro, surprised and sabred thirty men of a picket -on the left of the French lines. Palafox made the most of this small -success in a magniloquent proclamation published on the succeeding -day. He should have sent out 15,000 men instead of 3,000 if he -intended to get any profit out of his sorties. An attack delivered -with such a force on some one point of the lines must have paralysed -the siege operations, and might have proved disastrous to the French. - -Meanwhile the besiegers, undisturbed by these sallies, pushed forward -their works on the northern slopes of the Monte Torrero. The attack -opposite San José got forward much faster than that against the -Pillar: its second parallel was commenced on January 1, and its -batteries were all ready to open by the ninth. The other attack was -handicapped by the fact that the ground sloped down more rapidly -towards the Huerba, so that the trenches had to be made much deeper, -and pushed forward in perpetual zigzags, in order to avoid being -searched by the plunging fire from the Spanish batteries on the other -side of the stream, in the _enceinte_ of the town. To get a flanking -position against the Pillar redoubt, the left attack was continued -by another line of trenches beyond the Huerba, after it has made its -sharp turn to the south. - -Before the engineers had completed their work, and long ere the -breaching batteries were ready, a great strain was thrown upon the -besiegers by fresh orders from Napoleon. On January 2, Marshal -Mortier received a dispatch, bidding him march out to Calatayud -with one of his two divisions, and open up the direct communication -with Madrid. Accordingly he departed with the two strong brigades -of Suchet’s division, 10,000 bayonets. This withdrawal threw much -harder work on the remainder of the army: Junot was left with not -much more than 24,000 men, including the artillerymen, to maintain -the investment of the whole city. He was forced to spread out the -3rd Corps on a very thin line, in order to occupy all the posts from -which Suchet’s battalions had been withdrawn. Morlot’s division -came down from the Monte Torrero to occupy the ground which Suchet -had evacuated: Musnier had to cover the whole of the hill, and to -support both the lines of approach on which the engineers were busy. -Grandjean’s division remained on its old front, facing the eastern -side of the city, and Gazan still blockaded the suburb beyond the -Ebro. As the last-named general had still 8,000 men, there were -only 15,000 bayonets and the artillery available for the siege, a -force far too small to maintain a front nearly four miles long. If -Palafox had dared to make a general sortie with all his disposable -men, Junot’s position would have been more than hazardous. But -the Captain-General contented himself with making numerous and -useless sallies on a petty scale, sending out the most reckless and -determined of his men to waste themselves in bickering with the -guards of the trenches, when he should have saved them to head a -general assault in force upon some weak point of the siege lines. The -diaries and narratives of the French officers who served at Saragossa -are full of anecdotes of the frantic courage shown by the besieged, -generally to no purpose. One of the strangest has been preserved by -the very prosaic engineer Belmas, who tells how a priest in his robes -came out on January 6 in front of Gazan’s lines, and walked among -the bullets to within fifty yards of the trenches, when he preached -with great unction for some minutes, his crucifix in his hand, to the -effect that the French had a bad cause and were drawing down God’s -anger upon themselves. To the credit of his audience it must be said -that they let him go off alive, contenting themselves with firing -over his head, in order to see if they could scare him into a run. - -At daybreak on January 10, the whole of the French batteries opened -upon San José and the Pillar fort. The fire against the latter was -distant and comparatively ineffective, but the masonry of San José -began to crumble at once: its walls, solid though they were, had -never been built to resist siege artillery. The roofs and tiles came -crashing down upon the defenders’ heads, and most of their guns were -silenced or injured. The besiegers suffered little--Belmas says -that only one officer and ten men fell, though two guns in the most -advanced battery were disabled. The loss of the Spaniards on the -other hand was numbered by hundreds, more being slain by the fall -of stones and slates than by the actual cannon balls and shells of -the assailants. At nightfall Palafox withdrew most of the guns from -the convent, but replaced the decimated garrison by three fresh -battalions. It was clear that the work would fall next day unless the -besiegers were driven off from their batteries. At 1 A.M., therefore, -300 men made a desperate sally to spike the guns. But the French were -alert, and had brought up two field-pieces close to the convent, -which repressed the sortie with a storm of grape. - -Next morning the bombardment of San José recommenced, and by the -afternoon a large breach had been established in its southern wall. -At four o’clock General Grandjean launched a picked force, composed -of the seven voltigeur companies of the 14th and 44th regiments, -upon the crumbling defences[127]. The garrison had already begun -to quit the untenable post, and only a minority remained behind to -fight to the last. The storming column entered without much loss, -partly by laying scaling-ladders to the foot of the breach, partly by -using a small bridge of planks across the ditch, which the Spaniards -had forgotten to remove. They only lost thirty-eight men, and made -prisoners of about fifty of the garrison who had refused to retire -into the city when the rest fled. - - [127] Belmas, ii. 175. - -Though San José was thus easily captured, it was difficult to -establish a lodgement in it, for the batteries on the _enceinte_ -of Saragossa searched it from end to end, dominating its ruined -quadrangle from a superior height. But during the night the besiegers -succeeded in blocking up its gorge, and in connecting the breach with -their second parallel by a covered way of sandbags and fascines. -The convent was now the base from which they were to attack the -town-walls behind it. - -But before continuing the advance in this direction it was necessary -to carry the fort of Our Lady of the Pillar, the other great -outwork of the southern front of Saragossa. The main attention of -the besiegers was directed against this point from the twelfth to -the fifteenth, and their sapping gradually took them to within a -few yards of the counterscarp. The Spanish fire had been easily -subdued, and a practicable breach established. On the night of the -fifteenth-sixteenth the fort was stormed by the Poles of the 1st -regiment of the Vistula. They met with little or no resistance, the -greater part of the garrison having withdrawn when the assault was -seen to be imminent. A mine under the glacis exploded, but failed -to do any harm: another, better laid, destroyed the bridge over the -Huerba, behind the fort, when the work was seen to be in the power of -the assailants. Lacoste reported to Junot that the Poles lost only -one killed and two wounded--an incredibly small casualty list[128]. - - [128] Lacoste to Junot, Jan. 16, in Belmas, ii. 378. - -The fall of the fort of the Pillar gave the French complete -possession of all the ground to the south of the Huerba, and left -them free to attack the _enceinte_ of the city, which had now lost -all its outer works save the Aljafferia: in front of that castle the -‘false attack’ made little progress, for the besiegers did not press -in close, and contented themselves with battering the old mediaeval -fortress from a distance. On that part of the line of investment -nothing of importance was to happen. - - - - -SECTION XI: CHAPTER II - -SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA: THE FRENCH WITHIN THE WALLS: THE STREET-FIGHTING: -THE SURRENDER - - -Lacoste’s first care, when the Pillar and San José had both fallen -into his hands, was to connect the two works by his ‘third parallel,’ -which was drawn from one to the other just above the edge of the -ravine of the Huerba. In order to assail the walls of the city that -stream had to be crossed, a task of some difficulty, for its bed was -searched by the great batteries at Santa Engracia along the whole -front between the two captured forts, while north of San José the -‘Palafox Battery’ near the Porta Quemada completely overlooked the -lower and broader part of the river bed. The Spaniards kept up a fast -and furious fire upon the lost works, with the object of preventing -the besiegers from moving forward from them, or constructing fresh -batteries among their ruins. In this they were not successful: -the French, burrowing deep among the débris, successfully covered -themselves, and suffered little. - -The second stage of the siege work, the attack on the actual -_enceinte_ of Saragossa, now began. The two points on which it was -directed were the Santa Engracia battery--the southern salient of -the town--and the extreme south-eastern angle of the place, where -lay the Palafox Battery and the smaller work generally known as the -battery of the Oil Mill (Molino de Aceite). The former was less than -200 yards from the Pillar fort, the latter not more than 100 from San -José, but between them ran the deep bed of the Huerba. - -From the twelfth to the seventeenth the French were busily engaged -in throwing up batteries in the line of their third parallel, and on -the morning of the last-named day no less than nine were ready. Five -opened on Santa Engracia, four on the Palafox battery: at both points -they soon began to do extensive damage, for here the walls had not -been entirely reconstructed (as on the western front of the city), -but only patched up and strengthened with earthworks at intervals. -The masonry of the convent of Santa Engracia suffered most, and began -to fall in large patches. Palafox saw that the _enceinte_ would -be pierced ere long, and that street-fighting would be the next -stage of the siege. Accordingly he set the whole civil population -to work on constructing barricades across the streets and lanes of -the south-eastern part of the city, in the rear of the threatened -points, and turned every block of houses into an independent fort by -building up all the doorways and windows facing towards the enemy. -The spirits of the garrison were still high, and the Captain-General -had done his best to keep them up by issuing gazettes containing -very roseate accounts of the state of affairs in the outer world. -His communication with the open country was not completely cut, for -thrice he had been able to send boats down the Ebro, which took their -chance of running past the French batteries at night, and always -succeeded. One of these boats had carried the Captain-General’s -younger brother, Francisco Palafox, who had orders to appeal to -the Catalans for help, and to raise the peasants of Lower Aragon. -Occasional messengers also got in from without: one arrived on -January 16 from Catalonia, with promises of aid from the Marquis of -Lazan, who proposed to return from Gerona with his division, in order -to fall upon the rear of the besiegers. Palafox not only let this be -known, but published in his Official Gazette some utterly unfounded -rumours, which the courier had brought. Reding, it was said, had -beaten St. Cyr in the open field: the Duke of Infantado was marching -from Cuenca on Aragon with 20,000 men. Sir John Moore had turned to -bay on the pursuing forces of the Emperor, and had defeated them at -a battle in Galicia in which Marshal Ney had been killed[129]. To -celebrate this glorious news the church bells were set ringing, the -artillery fired a general salute, and military music paraded the -town. These phenomena were perfectly audible to the besiegers, and -caused them many searchings of heart, for they could not guess what -event the Saragossans could be celebrating. - - [129] Was this a distorted rumour of the combat of Cacabellos, - and the death of General Colbert, the commander of Ney’s - corps-cavalry, on Jan. 3? - -The garrison needed all the encouragement that could be given to -them, for after the middle of January the stress of the siege began -to be felt very heavily. Food was not wanting--for, excepting fresh -meat and vegetables, everything was still procurable in abundance. -But cold and overcrowding were beginning to cause epidemic disorders. -The greater part of the civil population had taken refuge in their -cellars when the bombardment began, and after a few days spent in -those dark and damp retreats, from which they only issued at night, -or when they were called on for labour at the fortifications, began -to develop fevers and dysentery. This was inevitable, for in most of -the dwellings from twenty to forty persons of all ages were crowded -in mere holes, no more than seven feet high, and almost unprovided -with ventilation, where they lived, ate, and slept, packed together, -and with no care for sanitary precautions[130]. The malignant fevers -bred in these refuges soon spread to the garrison: though under -cover, the soldiery were destitute of warm clothing (especially the -Murcian battalions), and could not procure enough firewood to cook -their meals. By January 20 there were 8,000 sick among the 30,000 -regular troops, and every day the wastage to the hospital grew more -and more noticeable. Many officers of note had already fallen in -the useless sorties, and in especial a grave loss had been suffered -on January 13, when Colonel San Genis, the chief engineer of the -besieged, and the designer of the whole of the defences of the -city, was killed on the ramparts of the Palafox battery, as he was -directing the fire against the new entrenchment which the French were -throwing up across the gorge of the San José fort[131]. He had no -competent successor as a general director, for his underlings had no -grasp of siege-strategy, and were only good at details. They built -batteries and barricades and ran mines in pure opportunism, without -any comprehensive scheme of defence before their eyes. - - [130] For the description of these miserable and most - insalubrious refuges, see Cavallero, pp. 90-100. - - [131] I give the date of San Genis’ death from Arteche, iv. - Belmas, on the other hand, puts it on Jan. 26, and Cavallero - apparently on Jan. 28, for he says that it was three days before - that of Lacoste, who was shot on Feb. 1. - -The French meanwhile were very active, though the constant increase -of sickness in the 3rd Corps was daily thinning the regiments, -till the proportion of men stricken down by fever was hardly less -than that among the Spaniards. On the seventeenth and eighteenth -Lacoste began to contrive a descent into the bottom of the ravine -of the Huerba, by a series of zigzags pushed forward from the third -parallel, both in the direction of Santa Engracia and in that of the -Palafox battery. The latter was repeatedly silenced by the advanced -batteries of the besiegers, but they could not subdue the incessant -musketry fire from windows and loopholes which swept the whole bed -of the Huerba, and rendered the work at the head of the new sap most -difficult and deadly. Sometimes it had to be completely abandoned -because of the plunging fire from the city[132]. Yet it was always -resumed after a time: the French found that their best and easiest -work was done in the early morning, when, for day after day, a -dense fog rose from the Ebro, which rendered it impossible for the -Spaniards to see what was going on, or to aim with any certainty -at the entrenchments. Irritated at the steady if slow progress of -the enemy, Palafox launched on the afternoon of January 23 the most -desperate sortie that his army had yet essayed against the advanced -works of the French. At four o’clock on that day[133] three columns -dashed out and attacked the line of trenches: one, as a blind, was -sent out opposite the Aljafferia, to distract the attention of -Morlot’s division from the main sally. The other two were serious -attacks, but both made with too small numbers--apparently no more -than 200 picked men in each. The left-hand column became hotly -engaged with the trenches to the north of San José, and got no -further forward than a house a little beyond the Huerba, from which -they expelled a French post. But the right-hand force carried out -a very bold programme. Crossing the Huerba below Santa Engracia, -they broke through the third parallel, and then made a dash at two -mortar-batteries in the second parallel which had particularly -annoyed the defence on that morning. The commander of the sortie, -Mariano Galindo, a captain of the Volunteers of Aragon, led his -men so straight that they rushed in with the bayonet on the first -battery and spiked both its pieces. They were making for the second -when they were overwhelmed by the trench guard and by reinforcements -hurrying up from Musnier’s camp. Of a hundred men who had gone -forward with Galindo from the third parallel twelve were killed and -thirty, including their brave leader, taken prisoners. The French -stated their loss at no more than six killed and five wounded, a -figure that seems suspiciously low, considering that the first line -of trenches had been stormed by the assailants, and a battery in the -second line captured and disabled. Galindo had gone forward more than -500 yards, into the very middle of the French works, before he was -checked and surrounded. It was a very gallant exploit, but once more -we are constrained to ask why Palafox told off for it no more than a -mere handful of men. What would have happened had he thrown a solid -column of 10,000 men upon the siege-works, instead of a few hundred -volunteers? - - [132] Belmas, ii. 198. - - [133] Oddly enough, Belmas places this sortie on Jan. 21, on - which day, as Arteche shows, none of the Spanish accounts speak - of a sortie, while the latter give at great length details of the - fighting on the twenty-third. Probably the Spanish date is the - correct one. - -On the twenty-second, the day before Galindo’s sortie, Junot was -superseded in command of the besieging army by Lannes, who had been -restored to health by two months’ holiday, and was now himself -again. He arrived just in time to take charge of the important task -of storming the main _enceinte_, for which Junot’s preparations -were now far advanced. But though the siege operations looked not -unpromising, he found the situation grave and dangerous. Belmas and -the other French historians describe this as the most critical epoch -of the whole Saragossan episode[134]. The fact was that at last -there were beginning to be signs of movement in the open country of -Aragon. During the month that had elapsed since the siege began, the -peasantry had been given time to draw together. Francisco Palafox, -after escaping from the city, had gone to Mequinenza, and was -arming the local levies with muskets procured from Catalonia. He -had already a great horde assembled in the direction of Alcañiz. -On the other bank of the Ebro Colonel Perena had been organizing -a force at Huesca, from northern Aragon and the foot-hills of the -Pyrenees. Lastly, it was known that Lazan was on his way from -Gerona to aid his brothers, and had brought to Lerida his division -of 4,000 men[135], a comparatively well-organized body of troops, -which had been under arms since October. Even far back, on the way -to Pampeluna, insurgents had gathered in the Sierra de Moncayo, and -were threatening the important half-way post of Tudela, by which the -besieging army kept up its communication with France. - - [134] Belmas, ii. 203. - - [135] Napier (i. 376) calls them ‘Catalonians’: but they were all - Aragonese, sent to aid Catalonia in October. - -Hitherto these gatherings had looked dangerous, but had done no -actual harm. General Wathier, with the cavalry of the 3rd Corps, had -scoured the southern bank of the Ebro and kept off the insurgents; -but now they were pressing closer in, and on January 20 a battalion, -which Gazan had sent out to drive away Perena’s levies, had been -checked and beaten off at Perdiguera, only twelve miles from the camp -of the besiegers. - -Lannes could not fail to see that if he committed himself to -the final assault on Saragossa, and entangled the 3rd Corps in -street-fighting, he might find himself assailed from the rear on -all points of his lines. There were no troops whatever in front of -Saragossa to form a ‘covering-force’ to beat off the insurgents, if -they should come down upon his camps while he was storming the city, -for the 3rd Corps and Gazan’s division had now only 20,000 infantry -for the conduct of the siege. - -Accordingly the Marshal resolved to undo the Emperor’s arrangements -for keeping up the line of communication with Madrid, and to draw in -Mortier, with Suchet’s strong and intact division, from Calatayud, -where he had been lying for the last three weeks. This was the -only possible force which he could use to provide himself with a -covering army. The touch with Madrid, a thing of comparatively minor -importance, had to be sacrificed, except so far as it could be kept -up by the division of Dessolles, which had now come back from the -pursuit of Sir John Moore, and had pushed detachments back to its old -posts at Sigüenza and Guadalajara. - -Mortier therefore evacuated Calatayud by the orders of Lannes, and -came back to the Ebro: passing behind the besieging army he crossed -the river and took post at Perdiguera with 10,000 men, facing the -levies of Perena in the direction of Huesca. It was only when he -had made certain of having this powerful reinforcement close at -hand, ready to deal with any interference from without, that Lannes -dared to proceed with the assault. At the same time that Mortier -arrived at Perdiguera, he sent out Wathier, with two battalions and -two regiments of cavalry, to deal with the insurgents of the Lower -Ebro, where Francisco Palafox had been busy. Four or five thousand -peasants with one newly-levied regiment of Aragonese volunteers tried -to resist this small column, but were beaten on the twenty-sixth -in front of the town of Alcañiz, which fell into Wathier’s hands, -and with it 20,000 sheep and 1,500 sacks of flour, which had been -collected for the revictualling of Saragossa, in case the investment -should be broken. They were a welcome windfall to the besieging army, -where food was none too plentiful, since the plain country where it -lay encamped had now been eaten bare, and convoys of food from Tudela -and Pampeluna were rare and inadequate. - -On January 24 the French had succeeded in pushing three approaches -across the Huerba, and were firmly established under its northern -bank. Two days later they made lodgements in ruins, cellars, and -low walls where buildings had been pulled down, in the narrow space -between the town wall and the river bank, below the Palafox battery. -The cannon of the defenders could only act intermittently: every -night the parapets were repaired, but every morning after a few hours -of artillery duel the Spanish guns were silenced by the dreadful -converging fire poured in upon them. Meanwhile Palafox was heaping -barricade upon barricade in the quarters behind the threatened -points, and fortifying the houses and convents which connected them. - -The final crisis arrived on the twenty-seventh. There were now -three practicable breaches,--two were on the side of the Palafox -battery, one in the convent of Santa Engracia. To storm the first and -second Lannes told off the light companies of the first brigade of -Grandjean’s division; to the third was allotted the 1st regiment of -the Vistula from Musnier’s division. Heavy supports lay behind them, -in the third parallel, with orders to rush in if the storming parties -should prove successful. - -The assault was delivered with great dash and swiftness at noon on -the twenty-seventh. On two points it was successful. At the most -northern breach the assailants reached the summit of the wall, but -could not get down into the city, on account of the storm of musketry -from barricades and houses that swept the gap into which they had -advanced. They merely made a lodgement in the breach itself, and -could penetrate no further. But in the central breach, close beneath -the Palafox battery, the voltigeurs not only passed the walls, but -seized the ‘Oil Mill’ which abutted on them, and a triangular block -of houses projecting into the town. At the Santa Engracia breach they -were even more fortunate: the Poles carried the convent with their -first rush: its outer wall had been battered down for a breadth of -thirty yard and entering there the stormers drove out the Spaniards -from the interior buildings of the place, and got into the large -square which lies behind it, where they seized the Capuchin nunnery. -Thus a considerable wedge was driven through the _enceinte_, and the -Spaniards had to evacuate the walls for some little distance on each -side of Santa Engracia. From the stretch to the west of that convent -they were driven out by an unpremeditated assault of Musnier’s -supports, who ran out from the trenches on the left of the Huerba, -and escaladed the dilapidated wall in front of them, when they saw -the garrison drawing back on account of the flanking fire from Santa -Engracia. They got possession of the whole outer _enceinte_ as far as -the Trinitarian convent by the Carmen gate. - -These successes were bought at the moderate loss of 350 men, of -whom two-thirds fell in the fighting on the Santa Engracia front; -the Spaniards lost somewhat more, including a few prisoners. In any -ordinary siege the day would have settled the fate of the place, for -the besiegers had broken through the _enceinte_ in two places, and -though the space seized inside the Palafox battery was not large, yet -on each side of Santa Engracia the assailants had penetrated so far -that a quarter of a mile of the walls was in their possession. But -Saragossa was not as other places, and the garrison were perfectly -prepared with a new front of defence, composed of batteries and -crenellated houses in rear of the lost positions. Two wedges, one -large and one small, had been driven into the town, but they had to -be broadened and driven further in if they were to have any effect. - -On the twenty-eighth, therefore, a new stage of the siege began, and -the street-fighting, which was to last for twenty-four days more, -had its commencement. Lannes had heard, from those who had served -under Verdier in the first siege, of the deplorable slaughter and -repeated repulses that had followed the attempt to carry by main -force the internal defences of the city. To hurl solid columns of -stormers at the barricades and the crenellated houses was not his -intention. He had made up his mind to advance by sap and mine, as -if he were dealing with regular fortifications. His plan was to use -each block of houses that he gained as a base for the attack upon the -next, and never to send in the infantry with the bayonet till he had -breached by artillery, or by mines, the building against which the -assault was directed. This form of attack was bound to be slow, but -it had the great merit of costing comparatively little in the way of -casualties. The fact was that the Marshal had not the numbers which -would justify him in wasting lives by assaults which might or might -not be successful, but which were certain to prove very bloody. The -whole Third Corps, as we have already seen, did not now furnish much -more than 13,000 bayonets, while Gazan’s men were all occupied in -watching the suburb, and Suchet’s lay far out, as a covering corps -set to watch Perena and Lazan. - -There was no one single dominating position in the city whose -occupation was likely to constrain the besieged to surrender. The -whole town is built on a level, and its fifty-three solidly-built -churches and convents formed so many forts, each of which was -defensible in itself and could not be reduced save by a direct -attack. All that could be done was to endeavour to capture them one -by one, in the hope that at last the Saragossans would grow tired -of their hopeless resistance, and consent to surrender, when they -realized that things had gone so far that they could only protract, -but could not finally beat off, the slow advance of the besieging -army. - -The work of the French, therefore, consisted in spreading out from -their two separate lodgements on the eastern and southern sides of -the city, with the simple object of gaining ground each day and of -driving the Spaniards back towards the centre of the place. On the -right attack the most important objective of the besiegers was the -block of monastic buildings to the north of the Palafox battery, -the twin convents of San Augustin and Santa Monica, which lay along -the northern side of the small wedge that they had driven into the -north-eastern corner of the town. As these buildings lay on ground -slightly higher than that which the French had occupied, it was -difficult to attack them by means of mines. But an intense converging -fire was brought to bear upon them, both from batteries outside the -walls, playing across the Huerba, and by guns brought inside the -captured angle of the _enceinte_. The outer walls of Santa Monica -were soon a mass of ruins: nevertheless the first attack on it -[January 29] was beaten off, and it was only on the next day, after -twenty-four hours more of furious bombardment, that Grandjean’s men -succeeded in storming, first the convent and then its church, after a -furious hand-to-hand fight with the defenders. - -After establishing themselves in Santa Monica the French were able -to capture some of the adjoining houses, and to turn their attention -against its neighbour San Augustin. They ran two mines under it, and -at the same time battered it heavily from the external batteries -beyond the Huerba. On February I the explosion took place: it opened -a breach in the east end of the convent church, and the storming -party, entering by the sacristy, got possession of the choir chapels -and the high altar. But the Spaniards rallied in the nave, ran a -barricade of chairs and benches across it, and held their own for -some time, firing down from the pulpit and the organ loft with -effect. Some climbed up into the roof and picked off the French -through the holes which the bombardment had left in the ceiling. -For some hours this strange indoor battle raged within the spacious -church. But at last the French carried the nave, and at night only -the belfry remained untaken. Its little garrison pelted the French -with grenades all day, and saved themselves at dusk by a sudden and -unexpected dash through the enemy. - -In the first flush of success, after San Augustin had been stormed, -the 44th regiment, from Grandjean’s division, tried to push on -through the streets towards the centre of the town. They captured -several barricades and houses, and struggled on till they had nearly -reached the Coso. But this sort of fighting was always dangerous -in Saragossa: the citizens kept up such a fierce fire from their -windows, and swarmed out against the flanks of the column in such -numbers, that the 44th had to give back, lost all that it had taken -beyond San Augustin, and left 200 dead and wounded behind. Even -the formal official reports of the French engineers speak with -respect of the courage shown by the besieged on this day. The houses -which they had lost in the afternoon they retook in the dusk, by -an extraordinary device. Finding the French solidly barricaded in -them, and proof against any attack from the street, hundreds of the -defenders climbed upon the roofs, tore up the tiles and entered by -the garrets, from which they descended and drove out the invaders by -a series of charges which cleared story after story[136]. Many monks, -and still more women, were seen among the armed crowds which swept -the assailants back towards Santa Monica. It was especially noticed -that the civilians did far more of the fighting than the soldiers. -This was their own special battle. - - [136] Report of General Laval (commanding-in the trenches this - day) to Lannes, in Appendix xxvi, of Belmas, vol. ii. Cf. von - Brandt, p. 34. - -Irritated at his losses on this day, Lannes issued a general order, -expressly forbidding any attempts to storm houses and barricades by -main force. After an explosion, the troops were to seize the building -that had been shattered, and to cover themselves in it; they were not -to go forward and fall upon intact defences further to the front. - -While the struggle was raging thus fiercely from January 28 to -February 1, in the eastern area of street-fighting, there had been a -no less desperate series of combats all around Santa Engracia, on the -southern front of attack. Here Musnier’s division was endeavouring -to drive the Spaniards out of the blocks of houses to the right and -left of the captured convent. They worked almost entirely by mines, -running tunnels forward from beneath the convent to blow down the -walls of the adjoining dwellings. But even when the mines had gutted -the doomed buildings, it was not easy to seize them: the few men who -survived the explosion did not fly, but held out among the ruins, -and had to be bayonetted by the assailants who rushed out from the -convent to occupy the new lodgements. Time after time the defenders, -though perfectly conscious that they were being undermined, and that -by staying on guard they were courting certain death, refused to -evacuate the threatened houses or to retire into safety. Hence their -losses were awful, but the French too suffered not a little, while -pushing forward to occupy each building as it was cleared by the -explosion. The constant rain of musket balls from roofs and church -towers searched out the ruins in which they had to effect their -lodgements, and many of the assailants fell before they could cover -themselves among the débris. - -On the thirty-first the Spaniards made a sudden rush from the -Misericordia buildings, to recover the Trinitarian convent, the most -western point on the _enceinte_ which had fallen into the hands of -the French at the assault of the twenty-seventh. They charged in upon -it with the greatest fury, and blew open the gate with a four-pounder -gun which they dragged up by hand to the very threshold. But the -French had built up the whole entrance with sandbags, which held -even when the doors had been shattered; and, after persisting for -some time in a fruitless attempt to break in, the Saragossans had to -retire, foiled and greatly thinned in numbers. - -On the following day (February 1) the French began to move forward -from Santa Engracia towards the Coso, always clearing their way by -explosions, and risking as few men as possible. Nevertheless they -could not always keep under cover, and this day they suffered a -severe loss: their chief engineer, General Lacoste, was shot through -the head, while reconnoitring from a window the houses against which -his next attack was to be directed[137]. He was succeeded in command -by Colonel Rogniat, one of the French historians of the siege. That -officer, as he tells us, discovered that his sappers were using too -large charges of powder, which destroyed the roofs and four walls of -each house that they undermined, so that the infantry who followed -had no cover when they first took possession. He therefore ordered -the substitution of smaller measures of powder, so as to throw down -only parts of the wall of the building nearest to the French lines, -and to leave the roof and the outer walls uninjured. In this way it -was much more easy to establish a lodgement, since the storming-party -were covered the moment that they had dashed into the shattered -shell. The only plan which the Spaniards could devise against this -method of procedure, was to set fire to the ruins, and to prevent -the entry of the assailants by burning down all that was left of the -house. As the buildings of Saragossa contained little woodwork, and -were not very combustible[138], the besieged daubed the walls with -tar and resin to make them blaze the better. When an explosion had -taken place, the surviving defenders set fire to the débris of floors -and roofs before retiring[139]. In this way they sometimes kept the -French back for as much as two days, since they could not make their -lodgement till the cinders had time to cool. Countermining against -the French approaches was often tried, but seldom with success, -for there were no trained miners in the city: the one battalion of -sappers which Palafox possessed had been formed from the workmen of -the Canal of Aragon, who had no experience in subterranean work. On -the other hand the French had three whole companies of miners, beside -eight more of sappers, who were almost as useful in the demolition of -the city. They maintained a distinct ascendent underground, though -they not unfrequently lost men in the repeated combats with knife and -pistol which ensued when mine and countermine met, and the two sides -fought for the possession of each other’s galleries. - - [137] There is a full account of his death in Legendre, i. - 149; that officer was in the room with him, when he and his - aide-de-camp, Lalobe, were simultaneously shot through the head - as they peered out of a side window where they thought themselves - unobserved. - - [138] The ceilings in all the better sort of houses were made of - vaulted arches, not of beams and boards. - - [139] See Cavallero, p. 120, and compare Belmas, ii. 253. - -The first week of February was now drawing to its close, and the -advance of the French into the city, though steady, had been -extremely slow. Every little block of five or six houses cost a day -to break up, and another to entrench. The waste of life, though not -excessive, was more than Lannes could really afford, and he waited -impatiently, but in vain, for any signs that the obstinacy of the -defence was slackening. But though he could not see it, the garrison -were being tried far more hardly than the besiegers. It was not so -much the loss by fire and sword that was ruining them as the silent -ravages of the epidemic fevers. Since the French had got within the -walls, and the bombardment of the city was being carried on from a -shorter range than before, the civilian population had been forced to -cling more closely than ever to its fetid cellars, and the infectious -fever which had appeared in January was developing at the most -fearful rate. Living under such insanitary conditions, and feeding -on flour and salt fish, for the vegetables had long been exhausted, -the Saragossans had no strength to bear up against the typhus. Whole -families died off, and their bodies lay forgotten, tainting the air -and spreading the contagion. Even where there were survivors, they -could not easily dispose of the dead, for the urban cemeteries were -gorged, and burials took place in trenches hastily opened in streets -or gardens. Outside the churches there were hundreds of corpses, -some coffined, others rolled in shrouds or sheets, waiting in rows -for the last services of the church, which the surviving clergy were -too few to read. The shells from the incessant bombardment were -continually falling in these open spaces, and tearing the dead to -pieces. Ere the siege was over there was a mass of mutilated and -decaying bodies heaped in front of every church door. Hundreds more -lay in the debatable ground for which the Spaniards and French were -contending, and the whole town reeked with contagion. The weather -was generally still and warm for the time of year, with a thick fog -rising every morning from the low ground by the Ebro. The smoke from -the burning houses lay low over the place, and the air was thick -with the mingled fumes of fire and pestilence. If it nauseated the -French, who had the open country behind them, and were relieved by -regiments at intervals, and allowed a rest in their camps outside -the walls, it was far more terrible to the Spaniards. The death rate -rose, as February drew on, from 300 up to 500 and even 600 a day. -The morning state of the garrison on the fourth day of the month -showed 13,737 sick and wounded, and only 8,495 men under arms. As the -total had been 32,000 when the siege began, nearly 10,000 men must -already have perished by the sword or disease. The civil population, -containing so many women, children, and aged persons, was of course -dying at a much quicker rate. Yet the place held out for sixteen -days longer! Palafox himself was struck down by the fever, but still -issued orders from his bed, and poured out a string of hysterical -proclamations, in which his delirium is clearly apparent. - -The terrible situation of the Saragossans was to a large extent -concealed from the besiegers, who only saw the line of desperate -fighting-men which met them in every house, and could only guess at -the death and desolation that lay behind. Every French eye-witness -bears record to the low spirits of the troops who were compelled to -fight in the long series of explosions and assaults which filled the -early weeks of February. The engineer Belmas, the most matter-of-fact -of all the historians of the siege, turns aside for a moment from his -traverses and mining-galleries, to describe the murmurs of the weary -infantry of the 3rd Corps. ‘Who ever heard before,’ they asked, ‘of -an army of 20,000 men being set to take a town defended by 50,000 -madmen? We have conquered a quarter of it, and now we are completely -fought out. We must halt and wait for reinforcements, or we shall all -perish, and be buried in these cursed ruins, before we can rout out -the last of these fanatics from their last stronghold[140].’ Lannes -did his best to encourage the rank and file, by showing them that the -Spaniards were suffering far more than they, and by pointing out that -the moment must inevitably come when the defence must break down from -mere exhaustion. He also endeavoured to obtain reinforcements from -the Emperor, but only received assurances that some conscripts and -convalescents for the 3rd Corps should be sent to him from Pampeluna -and Bayonne. No fresh regiments could be spared from France, when -the affairs of Central Europe were looking so doubtful[141]. The -best plan which the Marshal could devise for breaking down the -resolution of the Spaniards was to lengthen his front of attack, and -so endeavour to distract the attention of the besieged from the main -front of advance towards the Coso. - - [140] Belmas, ii. 294. Cf. Rogniat and Legendre. - - [141] Berthier to Lannes, Paris, Feb. 10. - -This was only to be done by causing the division of Gazan, which had -so long remained passive in front of the suburb, to open an energetic -attack on that outlying part of the fortress. The advantage to be -secured in this direction was not merely that a certain amount of -the defenders would be drawn away from the city. If the suburb were -captured it would be possible to erect batteries in it, which would -search the whole northern side of Saragossa, the one quarter of the -city which was still comparatively unaffected by the bombardment. -Here the bulk of the civil population was crowded together, and -here too Palafox had collected the greater part of his stores and -magazines. If the last safe corner of the city were exposed to a -bombardment from a fresh quarter, it would probably do much to lower -the hopes of the defenders. - -During the last days of January Gazan’s division had pressed back -the Spanish outposts in front of the suburb, and on the thirtieth of -that month Lannes had sent over two companies of siege artillery, to -construct batteries opposite the convents of Jesus and San Lazaro. -It was not till February 2-3, however, that he ordered a serious and -active attack to be pressed in this quarter. From the trench which -covered the front of Gazan’s investing lines a second parallel was -thrown out, and two breaching batteries erected against the Jesus -convent: on the fourth an advance by zigzags was pushed still further -forward, and more guns brought up. Some little delay was caused by -an unexpected swelling of the Ebro, which inundated that part of the -trenches which lay nearest to the river: but by the eighth all was -ready for the assault. The Jesus convent, as a glance at the map -will readily show, was the most projecting point of the defences of -the suburb, and was not well protected by any flanking fire from the -other works--indeed it was only helped to any appreciable extent by -a long fire across the water from the northern side of Saragossa, -and by the few gunboats which were moored near the bridge. It was a -weak structure--merely a brick convent with a ditch beyond it--and -the breaching batteries had found no difficulty in opening many large -gaps in its masonry. On the eighth it was stormed by Taupin’s brigade -of Gazan’s division: the garrison made a creditable resistance, -which cost the French ninety men, and then retired to San Lazaro -and the main fortifications of the suburb. The French established -themselves in the convent, and connected it with their siege-works, -finally turning its ruins into part of the third parallel, which they -began to draw out against the remaining transpontine works. They -would probably have proceeded to complete their operations in this -direction within the next two or three days, if it had not been for -an interruption from without. The two brothers, Lazan and Francisco -Palafox, had now united their forces, and had come forward to the -line of the Sierra de Alcubierre, only twenty miles from Saragossa, -the former with his 4,000 men from Catalonia, the latter with a mass -of peasants. Mortier, from his post at Perdiguera, reported their -approach to Lannes, and the latter went out in person to meet them, -taking with him Guérin’s brigade of Gazan’s division, and leaving -only that of Taupin to hold the lines opposite the suburb. Faced by -the 12,000 veteran bayonets of the 5th Corps, the two Palafoxes felt -that they were helpless, and retreated towards Fraga and Lerida, -without attempting to fight. On the thirteenth, therefore, Lannes -came back to the siege with the troops that he had drawn away from -it. While he was absent Palafox had a splendid opportunity for a -sortie on a large scale against Taupin and his isolated brigade, for -only 4,000 men were facing the suburb. But the time had already gone -by in which the garrison was capable of such an advance. They could -not now dispose of more than 10,000 men, soldiers and peasants and -citizens all included, and none of these could be drawn away from the -city, where the fighting-line was always growing weaker. Indeed, its -numbers were so thinned by the epidemic that Palafox was guarding -the Aljafferia with no more than 300 men, and manning the unattacked -western front with convalescents from the hospitals, who could -hardly stand, and often died at their posts during the cold and damp -hours of the night. All his available efficients were engaged in the -street-fighting with the 3rd Corps. - -For while the attack on the suburb was being pressed, the slow -advance of the besiegers within the walls was never slackened. -On some days they won a whole block of houses by their mining -operations: on others they lost many men and gained no advantage. The -right attack was extending itself towards the river, and working -from the convent of San Augustin into the quarter of the Tanneries. -At the same time it was also moving on toward the Coso, but with -extreme slowness, for the Spaniards made a specially desperate -defence in the houses about the University and the Church of the -Trinity. One three-storied building, which covered the traverse -across the Coso to the south of the University, stood _ten_ separate -assaults and four explosions, and held out from the ninth to the -eighteenth, effectually keeping back the advance of the besiegers -in this direction[142]. Nor could the French ever succeed in -connecting their field of operations on this front with that which -centred around Santa Engracia. Down to the very end of the siege the -Saragossans clung desperately to the south-eastern corner of the -city, and kept control of it right down to the external walls and the -bank of the Huerba, where they still possessed a narrow strip of 300 -yards of the _enceinte_. - - [142] Belmas, ii. 314, and before. - -The left attack of the French, that from the Santa Engracia side, -made much more progress, though even here it was slow and dearly -bought. On February 10, however, in spite of several checks, the -besiegers for the first time forced their way as far as the Coso, -working through the ruined hospital which had been destroyed in the -first siege. On the same day, at the north-western angle of their -advance, they made a valuable conquest in the church and convent of -San Francisco. A mine was driven under this great building from the -ruins of the hospital, and filled with no less than 3,000 pounds of -powder. It had not been discovered by the Spaniards, and the convent -was full of fighting-men at the moment of the explosion. The whole -grenadier company of the 1st regiment of Valencia and 300 irregulars -were blown up, and perished to a man[143]. Nor was this all: in -the northern part of the building was established the main factory -for military equipment of the Army of Aragon: it was crammed with -workpeople, largely women, for Palafox had forgotten or refused to -withdraw the dépôt to a less convenient and spacious but more safe -position. All these unfortunate non-combatants, to the number of at -least 400, perished, and the roof-tops for hundreds of yards around -were strewn with their dismembered limbs. - - [143] In Lejeune, i. 169, the reader will find some horrible - anecdotes of this explosion. - -It might have been expected that, as the immediate consequence of -this awful catastrophe, the French would have made a long step -forward in this direction. But such was not the case: before the -smoke had cleared away Spaniards rushed forward from the inner -defences, and occupied part of the ruins of San Francisco. A body -of peasants, headed by the _émigré_ colonel de Fleury, got into the -bell-tower of the convent, which had not fallen with the rest, and -kept up from its leads a vigorous plunging fire upon the besiegers, -when they stole forward to burrow into the mass of débris. But -with the loss of some thirty men the French succeeded in mastering -two-thirds of the ruins: next day they cleared the rest, and stormed -the belfry, where de Fleury and his men were all bayonetted after -a desperate fight on the winding stairs. It was first from the -commanding height of this steeple that the French officers obtained a -full view of the city. The sight was encouraging to them: they could -realize how much the inner parts of the place had suffered from the -bombardment, and noted with their telescopes the small number of -defenders visible behind the further barricades, the heaps of corpses -in the streets, and the slow and dejected pace of the few passengers -visible. Two great gallows with corpses hanging from them especially -attracted the eyes of the onlookers[144]. Other circumstances united -on this and the following day (February 11-12) to show that the -defence was at last beginning to slacken. A great mob of peasants, -mainly women, came out of the Portillo gate towards Morlot’s -trenches, and prayed hard for permission to go through the lines to -their villages. They were not fired on, but given a loaf apiece, and -then driven back into the city. It was still more significant that at -night, on the eleventh, four or five bodies of deserters stole out -to the French; they were all foreigners, belonging to the ‘Swiss’ -battalion[145] which was shut up in Saragossa: several officers -were among them. To excuse themselves they said that Palafox and -the friars were mad, and that they judged that all further defence -had become impossible. Yet the siege was to endure for nine days -longer[146]! - - [144] Lejeune, i. 177. - - [145] The ‘Suizos de Aragon,’ of which the unfortunate Fleury had - been colonel, had not all perished on Dec. 21. - - [146] Arteche, iv. 472, and Lejeune, i. 179. - -Though the two main attacks continued to press slowly forward, and -that on the left had now reached the Coso and covered a front of -100 yards on the southern side of that great street, it was not on -this front that the decisive blow was destined to be given. On the -eighteenth Lannes determined to deliver the great assault on the -suburb, where the batteries in the third parallel and about the -Jesus convent had now completely shattered the San Lazaro defences. -All Gazan’s men being now back in their trenches, since Mortier’s -expedition had driven off the Marquis of Lazan, Lannes considered -that he might safely risk the storm. Fifty-two siege-guns played on -San Lazaro throughout the morning of the eighteenth, and no less -than eight practicable breaches were opened in it and the works to -its right and left. At noon three storming columns leaped out of the -trenches and raced for the nearest of these entries. All three burst -through: there was a sharp struggle in the street of the suburb, and -then the French reached and seized a block of houses at the head of -the bridge, which cut the defence in two and rendered a retreat into -Saragossa almost impossible. The Spaniards, seeing that all was lost, -split into two bodies: one tried to force its way across the bridge; -but only 300 passed; the rest were slain or captured. The main part, -consisting of the defenders of the western front of the suburb, -formed in a solid mass and, abandoning their defences, tried to -escape westward up the bank of the Ebro, into the open country. They -got across the inundation in their front, but when they had gone thus -far were surrounded by two regiments of French cavalry, and forced to -surrender. They numbered 1,500 men, under General Manso, commanding -the 3rd division of Palafox’s army, the one which furnished the -garrison of the suburb. The officer commanding the whole transpontine -defence, Baron de Versage, had been killed by a cannon-ball on the -bridge. - -[Illustration: SECOND SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA - DEC. 1808 TO FEB. 1809] - -This was not the only disaster suffered by the Saragossans on the -eighteenth: at three in the afternoon, when the news of the loss -of the suburb had had time to spread round the town, and the -attention of the besieged was distracted to this side, Grandjean’s -division attacked the houses and barricades in the north-eastern part -of the city, which had so long held them at bay. A great mine opened -a breach in the University, which was stormed, and with it fell the -houses on each side, as far as the Coso. At the same time another -attack won some ground in the direction of the Trinity convent, and -the Ebro. Next day the Spaniards in this remote corner of the town, -almost cut off from the main body of the defenders, and now battered -from the rear by new works thrown up in the suburb, in and about San -Lazaro, drew back and abandoned the quarter of the Tanneries, the -quays, and the outer _enceinte_ looking over the mouth of the Huerba. - -On the nineteenth it was evident that the end had come: a third of -the ever-dwindling force of effective men of which Palafox could -dispose had been killed or captured at the storm of San Lazaro. The -city was now being fired on from the north, the only side which had -hitherto been safe. The epidemic was worse than ever--600 a day are -said to have died during the final week of the siege. The last mills -which the garrison possessed had lately been destroyed, and no more -flour was issued, but unground corn, which had to be smashed up -between paving-stones, or boiled and eaten as a sort of porridge. -The supply of powder was beginning to run low; not from want of -material to compound it, but from the laboratories having been mostly -destroyed and from the greater part of the arsenal workmen having -died. Only about 700 pounds a day [six quintals] could now be turned -out, and the daily expenditure in the mines and barricades came to -much more. - -On this morning the French noted that at many points the defence -seemed to be slackening, and that parts of the line were very -feebly manned. They made more progress this day than in any earlier -twenty-four hours of the siege. Their main work, however, was to run -six large mines under the Coso, till they got below the houses on its -further side, somewhat to the right of San Francisco. Rogniat placed -3,000 pounds of powder in each, a quantity that was calculated to -blow up the whole quarter. - -It was not necessary to use them. The spirits of the defenders had -at last been broken, and surrender was openly spoken of--though its -mention ten days earlier would have cost the life of the proposer. -Palafox on his sick bed understood that all was over; he sent for -General St. March and resigned the military command to him. But in -order that he might not seem to be shirking his responsibility, and -trying to put the ignominy of asking for terms on his successor, -he sent his aide-de-camp Casseillas to Lannes, offering surrender, -but demanding that the troops should march out with the honours of -war and join the nearest Spanish army in the field. Then he turned -his face to the wall, and prepared to die, for the fever lay heavy -upon him, and broken with despair and fatigue he thought that he -had not many hours to live. St. March’s appointment not being well -taken--the loss of the Monte Torrero was still remembered against -him--Palafox’s last act was to give over charge of the city to a -Junta of thirty-three persons[147], mainly local notables and clergy, -to whom the finishing of the negotiations would fall. - - [147] Their names can be found on p. 494 of Arteche, vol. iv. - -Of course Lannes sent back the Captain-General’s aide-de-camp with -the message that he must ask for unconditional surrender, and that -the proposal that the garrison should be allowed to depart was -absurd. The fighting was resumed on the morning of the twentieth, -and the French were making appreciable progress, when the Junta -once more sent to ask terms from the besiegers. It was not without -some bitter debate among themselves that they took this step, for -there was still a minority, including St. March and the priest Padre -Consolation, who wished to continue the resistance. They were backed -by a section of the citizens, who began to collect and to raise angry -cries of Treason. But the whole of the soldiery and the major part -of the civilian defenders were prepared to yield. At four o’clock in -the afternoon they sent out to ask for a twenty-four hours’ truce to -settle terms of surrender. Lannes granted them two hours to send him -out a deputation charged with full powers to capitulate, and ordered -the bombardment and the mining to cease. His aide-de-camp, who bore -the message, was nearly murdered by fanatics in the street[148], and -was rescued with difficulty by some officers of the regular army. -But the Junta sent him back with the message that the deputation -should be forthcoming, and within the stipulated time eleven of its -members came out from the Portillo gate[149], to the Marshal’s head -quarters on the Calatayud road. There was not much discussion: Lannes -contented himself with pointing out to the Spaniards that the place -was at his mercy: he had the plan of his siege-works unrolled before -them, and pointed out the position of the six great mines under the -Coso[150], as well as those of the advanced posts which he had gained -during the last two days. The deputies made some feeble attempts to -secure that the name of Ferdinand VII should appear in the articles -of capitulation, and that the clergy should be guaranteed immunity -and undisturbed possession of their benefices. Lannes waved all such -proposals aside, and dictated a form of surrender which was on the -whole reasonable and even generous. The garrison should march out -on the following day, and lay down its arms 100 yards outside the -Portillo gate. Those who would swear homage to King Joseph should -have their liberty, and might take service with him if they wished. -Those who refused the oath should march as prisoners to France. -The city should be granted a general pardon: the churches should -be respected: private property should not be meddled with. The -citizens must surrender all their weapons of whatever sort. Any civil -magistrates or employés who wished to keep their places must take the -oath of allegiance to King Joseph. - - [148] In Lejeune, i. 194-5, will be found a most picturesque - account of the interview of the French envoy with the - fever-ridden and despairing Junta, almost hysterical with rage - and shame, but accepting the inevitable. - - [149] It is notable that there was not a single churchman among - them, though there were eight among the thirty-three members - of the Junta. The clergy represented to the last the fighting - section. - - [150] Lejeune, in his interesting narrative of this interview, - says that he saw one of the deputies pore over the map and - recognize his own house among the mined buildings; he crossed - himself five or six times, and cried in accents of bitter grief - ‘_Ah la Casa Ciscala_.’ The name of Don Joachim Ciscala does - occur among the eleven signatures, so the story is probably true. - Lejeune, i. 198. - -On the following morning the garrison marched out: of peasants and -soldiers there were altogether about 8,000 men, 1,500 of whom were -convalescents from the Hospitals. ‘Never had any of us gazed on a -more sad or touching sight,’ writes Lejeune; ‘these sickly looking -men, bearing in their bodies the seeds of the fever, all frightfully -emaciated, with long black matted beards, and scarcely able to hold -their weapons, dragged themselves slowly along to the sound of the -drum. Their clothes were torn and dirty: everything about them bore -witness to terrible misery. But in spite of their livid faces, -blackened with powder, and scarred with rage and grief, they bore -themselves with dignity and pride. The bright coloured sashes, the -large round hats surmounted by a few cock’s-feathers which shaded -their foreheads, the brown cloaks or _ponchos_ flung over their -varied costumes, lent a certain picturesqueness to their tattered -garb. When the moment came for them to pile their arms and deliver up -their flags, many of them gave violent expression to their despair. -Their eyes gleamed with rage, and their savage looks seemed to -say that they had counted our ranks, and deeply regretted having -surrendered to such a small army of enemies[151].’ - - [151] Lejeune, i. 202. - -Another and more matter-of-fact eye-witness adds, ‘They were a most -motley crowd of men of all ages and conditions, some in uniform, more -without it. The officers were mostly mounted on mules or donkeys, and -were only distinguished from the men by their three-cornered hats and -their large cloaks. Many were smoking their _cigarillos_ and talking -to each other with an aspect of complete indifference. But all were -not so resigned. The whole garrison, 8,000 to 10,000 strong, defiled -in front of us: the majority looked so utterly unlike soldiers, -that our men said openly to each other that they ought not to have -taken so long or spent so much trouble in getting rid of such a -rabble[152].’ The column was promptly put in motion for France, under -the escort of two of Morlot’s regiments. Many died on the way from -the fever whose seeds they carried with them. Few or none, as might -have been supposed, took advantage of the offer to save themselves -from captivity by taking the oath to King Joseph. - - [152] Von Brandt, _Aus meinem Leben_, pp. 43-4. - -It is sad to have to confess that the French did not keep to the -terms of the capitulation. That Lannes could not restrain his men -from plunder, as he had promised, was hardly surprising. There were -so many empty houses and churches containing valuables, that it was -not to be wondered at that the victors should help themselves to all -they could find. But they also plundered occupied houses, and even -stole the purses of the captive officers. What was worse was that -many assassinations took place, especially of clergy, for the French -looked upon the priests and friars as being mainly responsible for -the desperate defence. Two in especial, Padre Basilio Bogiero, the -chaplain of Palafox, and Santiago Sass, a parish priest, were shot -in cold blood two days after the surrender[153]. Public opinion in -the French ranks was convinced that they, more than any one else, -had kept the Captain-General up to the mark. Palafox himself was -treated with great brutality. As he lay apparently moribund, the -French officer who had been made interim governor of Saragossa came -to his bedside, and bade him to sign orders for the surrender of -Jaca and Monzon. When he refused, this colonel threatened to have -him shot, but left him alone when threats had no effect. Ere he was -convalescent he was sent off to France, where the Emperor ordered -that he should be treated, not as a prisoner of war, but as guilty -of treason, and shut him up for many years as a close captive in the -donjon of Vincennes. - - [153] For details, see Arteche, iv. 512-3. - -The state in which Saragossa was found by the French hardly bears -description. It was a focus of corruption, one mass of putrefying -corpses. According to a report which Lannes elicited from the -municipal officers, nearly 54,000 persons had died in the place -since the siege began[154]. Of these about 20,000 were fighting-men, -regular or irregular, the rest were non-combatants. Only 6,000 had -fallen by fire and sword: the remainder were victims of the far more -deadly pestilence. A few days after the siege was ended Lannes stated -that the total population of the town was now only 15,000 souls, -instead of the 55,000 which it had contained when the siege began. -But his estimate does not include some thousands of citizens who had -fled into the open country, the moment that they were released from -investment, in order to escape from the contagion in the city. ‘Il -est impossible que Saragosse se relève,’ wrote the marshal; ‘cette -ville fait horreur à voir.’ It was weeks indeed before the dead were -all buried: months before the contagion of the siege-fever died out -from the miserable city. Even after five years of the capable and -benevolent government of Suchet it was still half desolate, and no -attempt had been made to rebuild the third of its houses and churches -which had been reduced to ashes by the mines and the bombardment. - - [154] Lannes to Berthier, March 19, 1809. - -The French losses in front of Saragossa are not easy to calculate. -Belmas says that the total of casualties was about 3,000 in the -infantry, but he takes no notice of the losses by siege-fever, except -to say that many died from it. He does not give the losses of the -artillery, except of that small part of it which was not attached -either to the 3rd or to the 5th Corps. Considering that the 3rd Corps -alone had 13,123 sick on January 15, and that typhus is a notoriously -deadly disease, it is probable that the total losses of the French -during the siege amounted to 10,000 men. It is hard otherwise to -explain the difference between the 37,000 men that the 3rd Corps -counted in October, and the 14,000 men which it mustered when Suchet -took over its command in April. The sufferings of the 5th Corps -were small in comparison, for till February began it took no very -serious part in the siege, and its health was notoriously far better -than that of Junot’s divisions[155]. But we cannot be far wrong in -concluding with Schepeler and Arteche that the total French loss must -have been 10,000 men, rather than the 4,000 given by Napier, who is -apparently relying on Rogniat. That officer gives only the casualties -in battle, and not the losses in hospital. - - [155] It seems quite clear that the ‘1,500 men in hospital’ which - Belmas mentions on ii. 327 is a misprint for 15,000. For his own - figures show that (p. 381) there were 13,000 invalids six weeks - earlier, and before the deadly street-fighting had begun. How - many died we cannot say, but Suchet in April had only 10,527 men - present in nineteen battalions (_Mémoires_, i. 331), with eight - more battalions ‘on command,’ which would give another 4,000. Von - Brandt (p. 50) carefully says that the total of 3,000 dead does - not include ‘the thousands who perished in hospital.’ - -So ended the siege of Saragossa--a magnificent display of civic -courage, little helped by strategy or tactics. For Palafox, though a -splendid leader of insurgents, was, as his conduct in October and -November had shown, a very poor general. He made a gross initial -mistake in shutting up 40,000 fighting-men in a place which could -have been easily defended by 25,000. If he had sent one or two -divisions to form the nucleus of an army of relief in Lower Aragon, -with orders to harass, but not to fight pitched battles, it is hard -to see how the siege could have been kept up. His second fault was -the refusal to make sorties on a large scale during the first half -of the siege, while he was still in possession of great masses of -superfluous fighting-men. He sent out scores of petty sallies of a -few hundred men, but never moved so many as 5,000 on a single day. -Such a policy worried but could not seriously harm the French, while -it destroyed the willing men of the garrison; if the Captain-General -had saved up all the volunteers whom he lost by tens and twenties in -small and fruitless attacks on the trenches, he could have built up -with them a column-head that would have pierced through the French -line at any point that he chose. Anything might have been done during -the three weeks while Mortier was at Calatayud, and especially during -the days when Gazan with his 8,000 men was cut off by the floods, and -isolated on the further bank of the Ebro. - -The Captain-General’s conduct, in short, was not that of a capable -officer. But it is absurd to endeavour to represent him as a coward, -or as a puppet whose strings were pulled by fanatical friars. He knew -perfectly well what he was doing, and how to manage the disorderly -but enthusiastic masses of the population[156]. There can be no doubt -that his personal influence was all-important, and the effect of his -constant harangues and proclamations immense. It would be quite as -true to say that the friars and the mob-orators were his tools, as -that he was theirs. He had to humour them, but by humouring them he -got out of them the utmost possible service. Against the stories that -his proclamations were written for him, and that he had to be goaded -into issuing every order that came from his head quarters, we have -the evidence of Vaughan and others who knew him well. It is unanimous -in ascribing to him incessant activity and an exuberant fluency in -composition. Arteche has preserved some minutes on the siege which he -wrote long after the Peninsular War was over: they are interesting -and well-stated, but more creditable to him as a patriot than as a -military man[157]. There can be no doubt that the garrison might have -been much more wisely handled: but it is doubtful whether under any -other direction it would have shown so much energy and staying power. -There is certainly no other Spanish siege, save that of Gerona, where -half so much resolution was shown. If the defence had been conducted -by regular officers and troops alone, the place would probably have -fallen three weeks earlier. If the monks and local demagogues had -been in command, and patriotic anarchy alone had been opposed to -the French, Saragossa would possibly have fallen at an even earlier -date, from mere want of intelligent direction. Palafox, with all his -faults, supplied the connecting link between the two sections of the -defenders, and kept the soldiery to work by means of the example of -the citizens, while he restrained the citizens by dint of his immense -personal influence over them, won in the first siege. In short, he -may have been vain, bombastic, and a bad tactician, but he was a good -Spaniard. If there had been a few dozen men more of his stamp in -Spain, the task of the French in 1808-9 would have been infinitely -more difficult. The example of Saragossa was invaluable to the nation -and to Europe. The knowledge of it did much to sicken the French -soldiery of the whole war, and to make every officer and man who -entered Spain march, not with the light heart that he felt in Germany -or Italy, but with gloom and disgust and want of confidence. They -never failed to do their duty, but they fought without the enthusiasm -which helped them so much in all the earlier wars of the Empire. - - [156] The foundation for most of the stories against Palafox - seems to be Lannes’ letter to Napoleon of 19 mars: ‘Ce - pauvre misérable prêtait seulement son nom aux moines et aux - intrigants.’ I cannot find anywhere the source from which Napier - draws his statement that Palafox hid himself in a bomb-proof, and - lived ‘in a disgusting state of sensuality,’ shirking all the - dangers of the siege (i. 389). - - [157] Arteche, iv. 507-8. - - - - -SECTION XII - -THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN LA MANCHA AND ESTREMADURA - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL - - -By the middle of the month of February, as we have already seen, -Andalusia was once more covered by two considerable Spanish armies: -Cartaojal, with the wrecks of Infantado’s host and the new levies of -Del Palacio, was holding the great passes at the eastern end of the -Sierra Morena. Cuesta had rallied behind the Guadiana the remains -of the army of Estremadura. He was at present engaged in reducing -it to order by the only method of which he was master, the shooting -of any soldier who showed signs of disobedience or mutiny[158]. The -army deserved nothing better: its dastardly murder of its unfortunate -general in December justified any amount of severity in his successor. - - [158] There are details in the diary of a citizen of Badajoz in - the _Vaughan Papers_. - -Meanwhile Victor, after his victory at Ucles, and his vain attempt -to surprise Del Palacio, had passed away to the west, leaving -nothing in the plains of La Mancha save the dragoons of Milhaud and -Latour-Maubourg, who were placed as a cavalry screen across the -roads to the south, with their divisional head quarters at Ocaña and -Madridejos respectively. - -The Marshal drew back to the valley of the Tagus, and marched by -Toledo on Almaraz; this was in strict execution of the plan dictated -by Napoleon before he left Spain. It will be remembered that he had -directed that, when the February rains were over, Victor should -move on Badajoz, to assist by his presence in that direction the -projected attack of Soult on Lisbon. Only when Estremadura and -Portugal had been subdued was the attack on Andalusia to be carried -out. Soult, as we shall see, was (by no fault of his own) much slower -in his movements than Napoleon had expected, and Victor waited in -vain at Talavera for any news that the invasion of Portugal was in -progress. Hence the Spaniards gained some weeks of respite: the ranks -of their armies were filled up, and the spirits of their generals -rose. - -Cartaojal remained for some time at La Carolina, reorganizing and -recruiting the depleted and half-starved battalions which Infantado -had handed over to him. He had expected to be attacked by Victor, -but when he learnt that the Marshal had gone off to Toledo, and that -La Mancha was covered only by a thin line of cavalry, he began to -dream of resuming the offensive. Such a policy was most unwise: it -shows that Cartaojal, like so many other Spanish generals, was still -possessed with the fatal mania for grand operations and pitched -battles. He had in his head nothing less than a plan for thrusting -back the cavalry screen opposite to him, and for recovering the whole -of La Mancha. If Victor’s corps had been the only force available -to oppose him, there would have been something to say for the plan. -An advance on Toledo and Madrid must have brought back the Duke of -Belluno from his advance towards Estremadura. But, as a matter of -fact, Jourdan and King Joseph had not left the roads to La Mancha -unguarded: they had drafted down from Madrid two infantry divisions -of the 4th Corps, whose command Sebastiani had now taken over from -Lefebvre. The first division lay at Toledo: the third (Valence’s -Poles) at Aranjuez; thus the former supported Latour-Maubourg, the -latter Milhaud. - -Ignorant, apparently, of the fact that there was anything but cavalry -in his front, Cartaojal resolved to beat up the French outposts. -With this object he told off half his infantry and two-thirds of his -horse, under the Duke of Albuquerque, a gallant and enterprising, -but somewhat reckless, officer, of whom we shall hear much during -the next two years of the war. Marching with speed and secrecy, -Albuquerque, with 2,000 horse and 9,000 infantry, fell upon Digeon’s -brigade of dragoons at Mora on February 18. He tried to cut it off -with his cavalry, while he attacked it in front with his foot. But -Digeon saw the danger in time, and fell back in haste, after losing a -few men of the 20th Dragoons and some of his baggage. His demand for -assistance promptly brought down Sebastiani, with the 1st division of -the 4th Corps, and the two remaining brigades of Latour-Maubourg’s -cavalry. The moment that he heard that a heavy force had arrived -in his front, Albuquerque retired as far as Consuegra, where the -French caught up his rear, and inflicted some loss upon it. He then -fell still further back, crossed the Guadiana, and took post at -Manzanares. Sebastiani did not pursue him beyond Consuegra, giving as -his excuse the exhausted condition of the country-side[159]. - - [159] For these operations compare Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. - 178-9, and Arteche, v. 228-31. - -Cartaojal meanwhile, with the rest of his army, had come up from the -passes to Ciudad Real, following in wake of Albuquerque’s advance. -When he met with his lieutenant they fell to quarrelling, both as to -what had already occurred, and as to what should now be done, for -the Duke was anxious to induce his chief to make a general advance -on Toledo, while Cartaojal desired him to take a single division of -infantry and to try the adventure himself. While they were disputing, -orders came from the Supreme Junta that troops were to be detached -from the Army of La Mancha to strengthen that of Estremadura. -Cartaojal took the opportunity of getting rid of Albuquerque, by -putting him at the head of the detachment which was to be sent to -Cuesta. The Duke, not loth to depart, went off with a division of -4,500 infantry and a regiment of cavalry[160], and marched down the -Guadiana into Estremadura. - - [160] The cavalry regiment had only 264 sabres: the infantry - battalions were Campomayor, Tiradores de Cadiz, Granaderos - del General, militia of Cordova, Guadix and Osuna. Only the - first-named was an old regular corps. - -Cartaojal remained for the first three weeks of March at Ciudad Real -and Manzanares with the main body of his force, about 2,500 horse -and 10,000 foot, keeping behind him, at the foot of the passes, a -reserve of 4,000 men under La Peña. This was tempting providence, -for he was now aware that the whole 4th Corps, as well as a great -mass of cavalry, was in front of him, and that he might be attacked -at any moment. His position, too, was a faulty one; he had descended -into the very midst of the broad plain of La Mancha, and had occupied -as his head quarters an open town, easy to turn on either flank, and -with a perfectly fordable river as its sole defence. As if this peril -was not sufficient, Cartaojal suddenly resolved that he would make -the dash at Toledo which Albuquerque had proposed to him, though he -had refused to send his whole army against that point when the scheme -was pressed upon him by his late second-in-command. The nearest -hostile troops to him were a regiment of Polish lancers, belonging -to Lasalle’s division, which lay at Yébenes, twenty miles outside -Toledo. Making a swift stroke at this force, while it was far from -expecting any advance on his part, Cartaojal drove it in, killing -or taking nearly 100 of the Poles (March 24). But Sebastiani came -up to their aid with an infantry division and three regiments of -Milhaud’s dragoons. The Spaniard refused to accept battle, and fell -hastily back to Ciudad Real, where he established his whole army -behind the river Guadiana, in and about the open town. He was most -unsafe in the midst of the vast plain, and was soon to rue his want -of caution. Sebastiani had been joined by his Polish division and by -part of his corps-cavalry, and having some 12,000 or 13,000 men in -hand[161], had resolved to pay back on Cartaojal the beating up of -his outpost at Yébenes. On March 26, Milhaud’s division of dragoons -seized the bridge of Peralvillo, close to Ciudad Real, and crossed -to the southern bank of the Guadiana. The Spanish general called -up all his cavalry, and some of his foot, and marched to drive the -dragoons back. They withdrew across the water, but still held the -bridge, behind which they had planted their artillery. Next morning -Sebastiani’s infantry came up, and he determined to attack Ciudad -Real. Cartaojal, who was taken completely off his guard, was suddenly -informed that column after column was pressing across the bridge and -marching against him. He did not dream for a moment of fighting, -but gave orders for an instant retreat towards the passes. He threw -out his cavalry and horse artillery to cover the withdrawal of his -infantry, who hurried away in half a dozen small bodies across the -interminable plain. Sebastiani charged the Spanish horse with his -Polish lancers and Dutch hussars, supported by Milhaud’s dragoons. -The covering force broke and fled, and the pursuers came up with -several of the columns of the retreating infantry. Some of them were -dispersed, others were surrounded and taken prisoners. The pursuit -was continued next morning, till it was interrupted by a fearful -burst of rain, which darkened the horizon, hid the fugitives, and -stopped the chase, or Cartaojal’s army might have been entirely -destroyed. He lost in this rout, which it would be absurd to call a -battle, five guns, three standards, and more than 2,000 prisoners, -among whom were sixty-one officers. The loss in killed and wounded -was probably not very great, for there had been no attempt at a -stand, and the troops which were cut off had surrendered without -resistance[162]. The loss of the French was insignificant, probably -less than 100 men in all. They had stayed their pursuit at Santa Cruz -de Mudela, from whence they returned to Ciudad Real, where they lived -on the magazines which Cartaojal had collected before his unfortunate -march on Yébenes. Sebastiani dared not follow the fugitives into the -mountains, as he had received orders to clear La Mancha, but not to -invade Andalusia: that was to be the task of Victor. - - [161] He had his own original division of the 4th Corps (twelve - batts.), Valence’s Poles (six batts.), the 3rd Dutch Hussars - (part of his corps-cavalry), the regiment of Polish lancers, and - Milhaud’s three regiments, the 12th, 16th and 21st Dragoons: - apparently in all 12,744 men. - - [162] It seems clear that the 2,000 killed and wounded, given by - Jourdan (p. 186) and _Victoires et Conquêtes_, is merely a rough - estimate. Belmas’ figures (i. 69) are still more absurd: he makes - the Spaniards lose 9,000 men from an army which did not exceed - 16,500 all told, including the rear division of La Peña. - -Cartaojal recrossed the Despeña Perros, and established his head -quarters at Sta Elena, in front of La Carolina. His army had been -more frightened than hurt, and when the stragglers came in, still -numbered 2,000 horse and 12,000 infantry. But he was not allowed -to retain its command. Justly indignant at the carelessness with -which he had allowed himself to be surprised in front of Ciudad -Real, and at his general mismanagement, the Supreme Junta deposed -him, and replaced him by Venegas, though the record of the latter’s -operations at Ucles was hardly encouraging to the soldiery. By the -middle of April the army had been reinforced by new Granadan levies, -and could take the field, although its state of discipline was bad -and its _morale_ much shaken by the late events. - - - - -SECTION XII: CHAPTER II - -OPERATIONS OF VICTOR AND CUESTA: BATTLE OF MEDELLIN - - -While Cartaojal and his Andalusian levies were faring so ill in La -Mancha, the army of Estremadura and its obstinate old general were -going through experiences of an even more disastrous kind. Cuesta, -it will be remembered, had rallied about Badajoz and Merida the -demoralized troops that had served under San Juan and Galluzzo. He -was, contrary to all expectation, allowed to remain unmolested for -some weeks. The irrational movement of Lefebvre to Plasencia and -Avila[163] had left him for the moment almost without an enemy in -his front. Along the middle Tagus he had nothing opposed to him save -Lasalle’s four regiments of light cavalry, supported by Leval’s -German division at Talavera. While Victor was engaged in the campaign -of Ucles, and in his subsequent circular march through La Mancha to -Toledo, the army of Estremadura enjoyed a time of complete rest. -Cuesta’s fault was not want of energy: after shooting a competent -number of mutineers, and disgracing some officers who had shown signs -of cowardice, he distributed his troops into three new divisions -under Henestrosa, Trias, and the Duke Del Parque, and began to move -them back towards the Tagus. As there was nothing in his way except -Lasalle’s light horse, he was able to take up, at the end of January, -the same line which Galluzzo had been forced to evacuate in December. -The French cavalry retired behind the river to Oropesa, abandoning -the great bridge of Almaraz, the main passage of the Tagus, on -January 29. Thereupon Cuesta broke the bridge, a difficult task, for -his mines failed, and the work had to be completed with the pick. It -was so badly managed that when the key-stone at last gave way, an -engineer officer and twenty-six sappers were still upon the arch, -and were precipitated into the river, where they were every one -drowned. The Captain-General then established his head quarters at -Deleytosa, a central point in the mountains, from which he commanded -the two passages of the Tagus, that at Almaraz and that by the -Puente del Conde, near Meza de Ibor. He arranged his 15,000 men with -advanced guards at the water’s edge, opposite each of the possible -points of attack, and reserves on the high ground to the rear. This -forward position gave much encouragement to the peasantry of New -Castile, and bands of guerrillas began (for the first time) to be -seen on the slopes of the Sierra de Gredos and the Sierra de Toledo. -There was a feeling of uneasiness even up to the gates of Madrid. - - [163] See pp. 4-5 of this volume. - -To restrain the advances of the Spaniards, King Joseph sent out -Lasalle’s cavalry and Leval’s Germans on February 19, with orders -to clear the nearer hills. They crossed the Tagus at the bridge of -Arzobispo, a little below Talavera, and forced back the division of -Trias, which was watching this flank of Cuesta’s position. But the -country was almost impassable for cavalry, a mere mass of ravines and -spurs of the Sierra de Guadalupe, and after advancing as far as the -pass of San Vincente, and seeing the Spaniards begin to gather in -force on his front and flank, Lasalle retreated, and recrossed the -Tagus without having effected anything of importance. - -It was not till a month later that the French took the offensive -in earnest. Victor was now returned from his excursion into La -Mancha, with his two divisions of the 1st Corps, and the six dragoon -regiments of Latour-Maubourg, whom he had drawn off to Toledo, -handing over the charge of observing Cartaojal to Milhaud and -Sebastiani. Uniting these forces to those of Leval and Lasalle, he -massed at Talavera an army of some 22,000 or 23,000 men, of whom -5,000 were admirable cavalry[164]. - - [164] This is the estimate of Jourdan (_Mémoires_, p. 181), and - exactly agrees with the figures which I give on p. 152. - -Joseph and Jourdan were now of the opinion that it was time for -Victor to move forward on Estremadura, in accordance with the great -plan for the conquest of southern Spain, which the Emperor had left -behind as his legacy when he departed from Valladolid. It was true -that this movement was to have been carried out in co-operation with -the advance of Marshal Soult upon Portugal; but no news could be got -of the Duke of Dalmatia’s present position. The last dispatch from -him was nearly a month old. Writing from Orense on February 24 he -had stated that he hoped to be at Chaves by March 1, and should then -march on Oporto and Lisbon. According to Napoleon’s calculations he -was to be at the last-named city within ten days of the capture of -Oporto. It was therefore, in the opinion of Joseph and Jourdan, high -time that Victor should start, in order to get in touch with Soult -when the Portuguese capital should be occupied. - -The Duke of Belluno, however, raised many difficulties, even when he -had been shown the Emperor’s orders. He complained that he ought to -have the help of Lapisse’s division, the second of his own Corps, -which still lay at Salamanca. He doubted whether he could dare to -take on with him, for an expedition into Estremadura, the German -division of Leval: he ought, perhaps, to leave it at Talavera and -Almaraz, in order to keep up his communications with Madrid. If this -were done he would muster only 16,000 men for his great forward -movement, and he had the gravest doubt whether Soult could or would -give him the assistance of which the Emperor had written, even if he -seized Lisbon within the appointed time. Finally, he was short of -engineer officers, sappers, horses, and reserve ammunition. - -Much of what the Duke of Belluno wrote was true: in particular, the -idea of co-operation with Soult was perfectly chimerical: Napoleon -had worked out all his logistics to an erroneous result, from want of -a real conception of the conditions and difficulties of war in the -Peninsula. But some of the pleas which Victor urged merely serve to -show his disinclination to accept the task which had been set him; -and in especial he underrated the numbers of his troops beyond the -limit of fair statement. He had with him nine battalions of Ruffin’s -division, twelve of Villatte’s, eight of Leval’s; of cavalry he had -six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, three of Lasalle’s -light cavalry[165], two regiments of his own corps-cavalry, and the -Westphalian regiment of the 4th Corps which was attached to Leval’s -Germans. The total must have amounted to 15,000 infantry, and about -5,500 cavalry: he had also sixty guns with 1,600 artillerymen[166]. - - [165] 26th and 10th Chasseurs and 9th Dragoons; the fourth - regiment, the Polish lancers, was with Sebastiani (see pp. 146-7). - - [166] The February figures for Victor’s men _présents sous les - armes_ are:-- - - 1st Division, Ruffin 5,429 - 3rd Division, Villatte 6,376 - German Division [deducting one battalion] 3,127 - Corps-cavalry [two regiments] 1,386 - Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons 2,527 - Lasalle’s three regiments 1,121 - Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_ 487 - Artillery of 1st Corps 1,523 - Leval’s artillery (two batteries) 184 - ------ - Total 22,160 - -In spite of his reluctance Victor was forced to yield to the pressure -of Jourdan and the Emperor’s explicit orders. On March 14 he began to -make his preparations to cross the Tagus and to attack Cuesta: it was -reported to him that the roads starting from the two bridges which -were in his power, those of Talavera and Arzobispo, were neither of -them practicable for artillery, and that only the route by Almaraz -was suitable for the guns and heavy baggage. But the bridge of -Almaraz was broken, and beyond it were visible entrenchments thrown -up by the Spaniards, and a considerable body of troops--the division -of General Henestrosa. The Duke of Belluno determined to clear the -way for a crossing at Almaraz, by sending infantry across the Tagus -by the passages higher up-stream, with orders to sweep the southern -bank till they came opposite to the broken bridge. They were to -dislodge the force behind it, and then the artillery, the baggage, -and cavalry were to cross on a bridge of rafts, which was being -prepared close to Almaraz, in order to be ready the moment that it -should be wanted. - -On March 15, therefore, Leval’s Germans crossed the Tagus by the -bridge of Talavera, with some of Lasalle’s cavalry, while on the -next morning Victor himself passed at Arzobispo with the divisions -of Villatte and Ruffin. The combined column pushed westward by a bad -road on the hillside overhanging the river, in a difficult country -of rocks and woods, seamed with countless ravines, where cavalry -could barely act and artillery would have been perfectly useless. -Cuesta, on hearing of this movement to turn his flank, threw back -his right wing, and bade it make a stand behind the ravine of the -little river Ibor, which falls into the Tagus half-way between -Arzobispo and Almaraz. His force in this direction consisted of the -division of the Duke del Parque, about 5,000 strong, with six guns. -On the seventeenth Victor’s columns, with the Germans of Leval at -their head, arrived before the defiles of Meza de Ibor, and found -themselves confronted by the Duke, who was firmly established on -the other side of the ravine, in a fine position, with his guns on -a projecting rock which enfiladed the high-road. Victor directed -Leval’s eight[167] battalions to cross the ravine, and storm the -heights on the other side. This they did in very gallant style, but -not without heavy losses, for the Estremadurans, confident in the -strength of their rugged fighting-ground, made a long and vigorous -resistance, till the Germans actually came to close quarters with -them and ran in with the bayonet. Del Parque’s line then crumpled -up, and dispersed over the hillsides: finding it impossible to bring -off his guns, he cast them over the precipice into the ravine below. -The Germans lost seventy killed and 428 wounded while climbing the -difficult slopes: Del Parque’s men probably suffered far less, as -they absconded when the enemy closed, and had been under cover till -that moment. The supposition of some French authorities that the -defenders of Meza de Ibor lost 1,000 men is most improbable. The -country was one exactly suited for a cheap defence, and for an easy -scattering over the hills in the moment of defeat. - - [167] One Hessian battalion was still absent, in garrison at - Segovia, so the total of the division was not much over 3,000. - -The Duke fell back on Deleytosa, higher up the side of the Sierra de -Guadalupe, where Cuesta had established his head quarters. Here he -was joined by another of the Estremaduran divisions, that of General -Trias, nearly 5,000 strong. Henestrosa, with the rest of the army, -was still watching the passage at Almaraz, where Cuesta had made up -his mind that the main attack of the French would be delivered. He -persisted for some time in believing that Victor’s movement across -the Talavera and Arzobispo bridges was merely a feint; and thus it -was that Del Parque had been left alone to bear the first brunt of -the attack. When he was at last convinced that the bulk of Victor’s -infantry was on his flank, and that Almaraz was hopelessly turned, -the old Captain-General hastily sent orders to Henestrosa to abandon -his entrenchments opposite the bridge, and to retreat on Truxillo -across the mountains. He himself took that path without delay, and -got off in safety with his two leading divisions, but Henestrosa had -to brush across the front of the advancing French, and was in some -danger. Luckily for him Victor was more set on clearing the road from -Almaraz than on pursuing the enemy. - -When Henestrosa had disappeared, the passage was open, and the -cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and Beaumont, guarding the artillery and -baggage-train of the 1st Corps, crossed on the rafts which had been -prepared long before, and joined the infantry and the Marshal. The -passage presented more difficulties than had been expected, for it -proved impossible to construct a permanent bridge; the stream was -very fierce, and the anchors by which the floats were moored found -no hold in the smooth rocky bottom. The guns passed either by being -sent over on rafts or by means of a rope ferry, which was with some -difficulty rigged up. It was not till some time later that a solid -bridge of boats was built at this most important passage[168]. One -cavalry regiment was left behind to protect it[169]. - - [168] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 182. - - [169] Apparently the Westphalian _Chevaux Légers_, which had - hitherto been attached to Leval’s German division. - -Cuesta, when he had united his three divisions, would have dearly -loved to give battle to Victor behind Truxillo, in the excellent -position of the Puerto de Santa Cruz, where the _chaussée_ from -Madrid to Badajoz crosses the Sierra de Guadalupe. His love for -general engagements was by no means cured by the event of his -experiments at Cabezon and Medina de Rio Seco. But he was withheld -from offering battle not by mere prudence, but by the fact that -he was expecting to receive two considerable reinforcements. The -Marquis de Portago was bringing up a detachment from Badajoz--three -battalions[170] which had been intended to form the nucleus of a -new Fourth division that was being organized in that fortress. At -the same moment Albuquerque was expected from the east, at the head -of the 4,500 men whom the Supreme Junta had detached from the -army of La Mancha, and had sent down the Guadiana to join that of -Estremadura. Cuesta wished to pick up these 7,000 men before he gave -battle. - - [170] Four more had to be left behind in the fortress. - -Accordingly he evacuated the pass of Santa Cruz, and fell back -southward towards his reinforcements, leaving Henestrosa with the -bulk of his cavalry to act as a rearguard. That officer carried out -his duty with a dash and a vigour that were rare in Spanish armies -at this date. When the fiery Lasalle came pressing up against him -with his usual fury, the Spanish general contrived to inflict on him -two distinct checks. At Berrocal, half-way down the defile of Santa -Cruz, he made a sudden halt and drove in the leading squadron of the -French by a charge of his Royal Carbineers, a small remnant of the -Guard-Cavalry which had been serving with the Army of Estremadura -since its formation [March 20]. The French lost ten killed and -fifteen wounded[171]. - - [171] Jourdan, p. 182. - -This was a trifle, but on the next day Henestrosa scored a far more -tangible advantage. Noting that Lasalle’s leading regiment, the 10th -Chasseurs, had got far ahead of the rest of the division, and was -pushing on with reckless haste, he laid a trap for it in front of -the village of Miajadas. Presenting a small body of cavalry on the -high-road, he hid on each side of it a strong regiment of his own -horse, with orders to fall upon the flank and rear of the French when -they should have passed the ambush. The two corps set aside for this -surprise were Infante and Almanza, both regiments of La Romana’s army -from Denmark, which had not yet drawn their sabres since the war -commenced. - -Colonel Subervie of the 10th Chasseurs, advancing with heedless -confidence to charge the body of Spaniards in front of him, suddenly -saw himself enveloped and surrounded by the two regiments placed -in ambush. There was a furious _mêlée_, in which the chasseurs -lost one officer and sixty-two men killed and about seventy more -wounded, before they could cut their way out of the snare. The -sight of Lasalle’s main body coming up in haste to the rescue made -Henestrosa give the order for a prompt retreat, which he accomplished -without loss. ‘We arrived,’ writes a French officer of one of the -supporting regiments, ‘too late, and saw nothing but a cloud of dust -in the distance, made by the Spaniards as they rode away, and the -colonel of the 10th tearing his hair at the sight of his numerous -wounded[172].’ This lesson taught Lasalle more caution: it was -creditable to Henestrosa, though it must be confessed that he had two -men to one in the skirmish, in addition to the advantage of taking -his enemy by surprise. Oddly enough the regiments which accomplished -this successful _coup_ on the twenty-first were the same which -behaved worst in the great battle of the next week[173]. - - [172] Rocca, p. 268. - - [173] See pp. 162-3. - -At Miajadas, where this skirmish had taken place, the road descending -from the pass of Santa Cruz forks in two directions. One branch goes -towards Merida and Badajoz, the other and less important to Medellin, -La Serena, and the upper Guadiana. It would have been natural for -Cuesta to take the former route, which brought him nearer to his -base at Badajoz, and at the same time enabled him to cover the main -road to Andalusia, at which Victor was presumably aiming. But the -old general left this line unprotected, and retired by the eastern -path to Medellin. His main object was to secure his junction with the -reinforcements from La Mancha, which Albuquerque was bringing to him. -They were nearing La Serena, and would be cut off from him if he took -the road to Badajoz. At the same time he argued that, as he had thus -placed himself on the flank of the French, they could not afford to -march past him, since the moment that they left Merida behind them he -would be enabled to cut their communications with Madrid. He imagined -that Victor would prefer to fight him, and would not dare either to -take in hand the siege of Badajoz, or to advance against Andalusia, -without clearing his flank by a general action. The moment that he -should have picked up Albuquerque, Cuesta was prepared to indulge the -enemy with a fight, and if he were not attacked himself he intended -to take the offensive. This was sheer madness; even when he had drawn -in his last reserves the old general had but 20,000 foot and 3,000 -horse[174], a number which only exceeded Victor’s total by three or -four thousand men because the latter had been dropping detachments -between Almaraz and Merida. Considering the relative value of the -individual soldiery of the two armies, Cuesta’s behaviour was that of -a criminal lunatic. We shall see that his tactics were as bad as his -strategy. - - [174] The Spanish statements that Cuesta had only 2,200 horse - seem disproved by a letter from Cuesta’s camp, Col. D’Urban to - Cradock (April 7), to the effect that Cuesta had already rallied, - after Medellin, fully 3,000 horse, but only 6,000 or 7,000 foot - [Record Office]. - -The Marshal had left the two Dutch battalions of Leval’s division -at Truxillo, in charge of his sick: he dropped the 1st Dragoons of -Latour-Maubourg’s division at Miajadas, to guard the cross-roads, -and sent out the 4th and 9th from the same division along the upper -Guadiana, where they soon learnt of Cuesta’s presence on the other -side of the river. Lasalle’s light horse rode down to Merida, and -occupied the old Roman capital of western Spain without having to -strike a blow. Learning that the Spaniards had not retreated in -this direction, but by the eastern road, the Marshal (as Cuesta had -supposed likely) directed the bulk of his infantry on Medellin; -only the division of Ruffin remained behind, at the cross-roads of -Miajadas. - -Meanwhile Cuesta had evacuated Medellin, and fallen back to La -Serena, where Albuquerque joined him on the twenty-seventh. The -moment that the army was united, he turned back, and retraced his -steps towards his former position. On the twenty-eighth he reached -the town of Don Benito, only five miles from Medellin, and learnt -to his great pleasure that Victor was before him and quite ready to -fight. The Marshal had swept the whole country-side with his numerous -cavalry during the last four days, and discovering that there was no -Spanish force opposite him in any direction save that of La Serena, -had ordered Lasalle and Ruffin to march up and join him from Merida -and Miajadas. On the morning of the twenty-ninth he had his entire -army united, save the two Dutch battalions left at Truxillo, two -more of Leval’s battalions left at Merida[175], the 1st Dragoons at -Miajadas, and one other cavalry regiment which had been told off to -guard the bridge of Almaraz. He cannot have had less than 13,000 -infantry and 4,500 horse, even when allowance is made for the sick -and the losses at Meza de Ibor and Miajadas. Cuesta outnumbered him -by 6,000 infantry, but was overmatched in cavalry by more than three -to two, since he had but 3,000 sabres, and even more hopelessly in -artillery, since Victor had brought over fifty guns to the field, -while he had only thirty. - - [175] Frankfort and the 1st of Hesse. See Sausez’s _Régiment de - Francfort_, p. 30. - -Having been joined in the early morning by Lasalle’s and Ruffin’s -detachments, Victor had drawn out his army in front of Medellin, when -his cavalry brought him the news of the approach of the Spaniards. -Medellin, an ancient town dominated by a Moorish citadel on a lofty -hill, lies in the angle between the river Guadiana and the Hortiga -torrent. The latter, easily fordable in March and dry in June, is -an insignificant stream but flows at the bottom of a steep ravine. -The Guadiana, on the other hand, is a river of the first class: the -great bridge which leads into Medellin is no less than 450 yards -long. There were several fords up-stream from the bridge, but in -March, when the river was high, it is doubtful whether they were -practicable. Victor’s line, drawn in a quarter of a circle from the -Hortiga to the Guadiana, was well protected on either flank by the -broad river and the steep ravine. His order of battle was rather odd: -its front line was composed of a division of infantry (Villatte’s of -twelve battalions) in the centre, with two projecting wings, each -composed of a cavalry division supported by two battalions of Leval’s -Germans. On the right, near the Hortiga, was Latour-Maubourg with -five of his six regiments of dragoons[176] and ten horse artillery -guns. On the left, beside the Guadiana, was Lasalle with three of -his own light cavalry regiments, and the 2nd Hussars of Victor’s -corps-cavalry. The remaining battalion of Leval’s division[177] was -with Villatte in the centre. Ruffin’s division, forming the reserve, -lay far to the rear on the further side of the Hortiga. He had with -him one cavalry regiment[178] and a reserve of artillery: one -battalion was detached to guard the baggage, which was parked at the -bridge-head below the town. - - [176] The sixth regiment (1st Dragoons) was still absent at - Miajadas. - - [177] The division had started with nine battalions, but two (as - will be remembered) were left behind at Truxillo, and two more - at Merida. Those with Lasalle were the two Baden battalions, - those with Latour-Maubourg a Nassau battalion, and one formed of - the united light companies of the division. The second Nassau - battalion was to the rear, with Villatte. See Sémélé’s narrative, - p. 463. - - [178] 5th Chasseurs, of the corps-cavalry of the 1st Corps. - -Victor’s army, therefore, formed a short and compact arc of a circle, -a mile and a half outside of Medellin. Facing him, three or four -miles away, was the Spanish army, ranged in a much larger arc, also -extending from the Hortiga to the Guadiana, in front of the town of -Don Benito. It was deployed along a series of gentle heights, on -either side of the main road from Medellin. The position, though -rather long for the Spanish numbers, presented many advantages for a -defensive battle: but it was Cuesta’s intention to go forward, not -to receive the attack of the French. He saw with pleasure that the -enemy had come half-way to meet him, and was about to fight with a -difficult defile (the bridge of Medellin) in his rear. Secure from -being outflanked by Victor’s numerous cavalry, for the two streams -covered his wings, he resolved to march straight before him and to -bear down the French line by a direct frontal attack. On his left -were the divisions of Del Parque and Henestrosa, eight battalions in -a single line, all deployed four deep. They had no supports whatever, -save one battalion of grenadiers which marched behind their centre. -On their outside flank rode three regiments of cavalry, close to -the ravine of the Hortiga[179]. The centre was composed of the four -battalions of the division of Trias, all drawn up in the same fashion -as the left wing. The right was formed by Portago’s incomplete -division[180] (only three battalions) and by the contingent from La -Mancha which Albuquerque had just brought up--seven strong battalions -with 4,500 bayonets. Outside Albuquerque’s extreme right, and on the -banks of the Guadiana, was placed a cavalry force corresponding to -that on the extreme left, and also formed of three regiments[181]. -A few remaining squadrons of cavalry were posted in the intervals -between the wings and the centre[182]. The artillery went forward, -each battery with the division to which it was attached. This was a -most extraordinary order of battle: with the object of securing his -flanks and of covering the whole space between the rivers, Cuesta -was advancing with a front of nearly four miles and a depth of only -four men! There is no parallel in modern history for such a dangerous -array. If any single point in the long line gave way, there was no -reserve with which to fill the gap and save the day. And it was -morally certain that a weak point would be found somewhere, for many -of the battalions were raw troops which had never seen fire, and the -greater part of the others had graduated in the school of panic under -Belvedere and San Juan. - - [179] These were the regiments Infante and Almanza (from Denmark) - and the new cavalry regiment of Toledo. Letter of Sir Benjamin - D’Urban to Cradock, April 8, 1809 (Record Office). - - [180] Its remainder was garrisoning Badajoz. Those on the field - were Badajoz (two batts.), and 3rd of Seville (one batt.). - - [181] Apparently these regiments were Albuquerque’s regiment - from the Andalusian army, with the Cazadores de Llerena (a new - Estremaduran corps) and Del Rey (one of the Baltic regiments). - - [182] These were the two hussar regiments, Voluntarios de España, - and Maria Luisa, the latter of which had been re-named ‘Hussars - of Estremadura’. - -Cuesta, however, was eminently satisfied with himself and with his -order of battle: he intended to envelop the shorter French line with -converging fire, to thrust it back on to the defile of Medellin, -and if possible to seize the bridge behind its left flank, and to -endeavour to cut off its retreat. Blind self-confidence could go no -further! - -When Victor advanced from Medellin he was aware of the proximity of -the Spaniards, and could see their cavalry vedettes on all the hills -in front of Don Benito, but it was not till his army had marched some -distance across the bare and level fields, that Cuesta revealed his -order of battle. When the French were well advanced in the plain, -the whole Army of Estremadura crowned the heights, and then swept -downward from them, in one continuous line forming an exact quarter -of a circle. The infantry was well closed up; each regiment had its -mounted officers in front, and the generals were riding up and down -the line, perpetually supervising the dressing of their battalions, -for they were quite conscious that in the order which Cuesta had -chosen any gap or wavering in the line would be ruinous. Each -division had its battery in front, and in the long intervals between -the guns a very thick line of skirmishers covered the advance of the -main body. - -Facing this imposing line, as it will be remembered, the French had -the five dragoon regiments of Latour-Maubourg on the right, and the -four light cavalry regiments of Lasalle on the left, each supported -by two of Laval’s German battalions. The centre under Villatte was -somewhat ‘refused,’ and was much farther from the Spaniards than were -the two powerful wings of cavalry. As the enemy advanced, Victor -bade Latour-Maubourg and Lasalle to seize any good opportunity for -a charge, but not to risk, unless circumstances favoured them, a -general attack on the Spaniards, until they should have begun to lose -their order. The wings of the enemy being covered by the two rivers, -there could be no question of flank attacks, and frontal charges by -cavalry on unbroken infantry are proverbially dangerous. - -When, however, the armies drew near, Latour-Maubourg thought that he -saw his chance, and bade one of his brigades (2nd and 4th Dragoons) -charge Del Parque’s infantry in the Spanish left-centre. The attack -completely failed: a fortunate discharge of the Duke’s divisional -battery blew a gap in the centre of the charging line; the battalions -on each side stood firm and opened a heavy fire, and the dragoons -went to the rear in disorder. Their flight exposed the flank of the -two German battalions which formed the centre of Latour-Maubourg’s -line. The Spanish infantry pressed forward, and engaged them with -vigour. This determined Victor to order his right wing to fall back -and to get into line with Villatte, before making another stand. -Accordingly Latour-Maubourg retired, his unbroken regiments moving -off in very good order, but suffering considerably from the fire of -the Spanish skirmishers, who ran forward with great rapidity and -pressed them hard. - -The retreat of the right wing made it necessary for Lasalle on the -left to conform to the general movement. He also began to draw back -towards Medellin. ‘For two hours,’ writes one of his officers[183], -‘we gave back slowly and quietly, facing about at every fifty yards -to show a front, and to dispute the ground. Amid the endless whizzing -of bullets flying over our heads, and the deafening roar of the -shells, which rent the air and tore up the earth around us, we heeded -only the voice of our commanders. The further we retired the louder -shouted our foes. Their skirmishers were so numerous and daring that -they sometimes compelled ours to fall back for protection into our -ranks. They kept calling to us from a distance that no quarter should -be given, and that Medellin should be the Frenchman’s grave. General -Lasalle was riding backward and forward in front of his division, -with a lofty, fearless air. In the space which separated us there -might be seen the horses of disabled friends and foes, running on -every side, most of them wounded, some of them dragging their dead -masters by the stirrup, and struggling to free themselves from the -unmanageable load.’ - - [183] Rocca (of the 2nd Hussars), _Mémoires de la Guerre - d’Espagne_, 80. - -In this fashion the French retired before the advancing army of -Cuesta, till they drew near the point where Victor intended to make -his stand. The right wing reached the new line of defence first: it -halted on the crest of the rising-ground to the north of the point -where Villatte’s infantry stood. The Marshal placed ten guns in -line, ordered the two German battalions to stand firm on each flank -of the artillery, and sent up the 94th of the Line from Villatte’s -division to aid them, as well as a battalion of picked grenadiers. -Latour-Maubourg’s horsemen, now all in good order again, covered -their flanks. - -Then came the critical moment of the battle. If the Spaniards could -still push their advance, and thrust back the French infantry, -Victor’s position would be very serious. For a moment it seemed that -they might succeed. The battalions of Henestrosa and Del Parque came -forward with a steadiness that Spanish troops had not yet often -shown during the war. They closed upon the guns, in spite of their -rapid fire, and attacked the three battalions on their flanks, which -had been thrown into square for fear of cavalry attacks, and were -therefore not in very good order for defending themselves against -infantry. - -The leading Spanish officers had actually ridden into the -battery[184], and were cutting down the gunners, when Latour-Maubourg -ordered his dragoons to charge. The moment that he saw them on the -move, Cuesta, who had been riding on this flank, with the three -regiments of cavalry which covered the end of his line, ordered a -counter-charge against the flank of the advancing French. Then -followed a disgraceful scene: the Spanish squadrons rode forward in -an irresolute way for a few score yards, and then suddenly halted, -turned, and galloped to the rear in a disorderly mass before they had -arrived anywhere near the French dragoons. They collided with Cuesta, -upset him and rode over him[185]: the old man was with difficulty -saved and set upon his horse by his aides-de-camp. The fugitives -never drew rein, and fled far away to the north, almost without -losing a man. Their conduct was all the more disgraceful, because -two of the three regiments were old troops from the Baltic, which -had come back with La Romana and had not shared in any of the early -disasters of the Spanish armies. - - [184] Cuesta in his dispatch mentions that General Henestrosa, - Captain Yturrigarey, and the English Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin - D’Urban were the first three into the battery. - - [185] In a dispatch in the Record Office, Cuesta says that the - particular corps which rode down himself and his staff was the - raw ‘Toledo’ regiment. - -The result of this shameful panic was instant disaster to the whole -Spanish right wing. Of Latour-Maubourg’s division one brigade went -off in pursuit of the routed cavalry, but the other three regiments -charged in flank the battalions of Henestrosa and Del Parque, just -as they stormed the French battery on which they were intent. A -long line without supports, such as that which these two divisions -presented, was helpless when attacked by cavalry on the flank--it -suffered exactly the same fate which befell Colborne’s brigade at -Albuera two years later. While engaged in front with the three -battalions already before it, and with the regiment which Villatte -had sent up to aid them, it could not throw back its flank to face -the horsemen: nor had it any reserve whatever that could be utilized -to hold off Latour-Maubourg. The whole line was rolled up, and dashed -into atoms. Many men were cut down, a few captured, the remainder -fled in utter disorder towards the north. The French urged the -pursuit with cruel vigour, merciless all the more because they had -for a moment doubted of their victory. - -While this struggle was raging on the northern part of the field, -Lasalle had been still falling back before the divisions of -Albuquerque, Portago, and Trias, across the plain which borders the -Guadiana. The Spanish line were still moving forward with great -steadiness, but had begun to fall into a sort of _échelon_ formation, -with the cavalry near the river most in advance, the infantry of -Albuquerque a little behind, and the Estremaduran battalions of the -centre still further to the rear. The fact was that General Eguia, to -whom Cuesta had given the charge of his whole right wing, was trying -to edge his cavalry between Lasalle and the Guadiana, in order to cut -him off from the bridge of Medellin. This end of the line, therefore, -was pushing forward very rapidly, while Trias, on the other hand, was -coming forward rather slowly, from a desire not to lose touch with -Del Parque’s division, the nearest troops to him in the other half of -the army. - -Lasalle was keeping an anxious eye on the development of the action -further to the north, and the moment that he saw Latour-Maubourg -halt and prepare to charge, followed his example. His first blow was -delivered at the cavalry next the river: he flung against them the -2nd Hussars, with a chasseur regiment in support. These two corps, -charging with great fury, easily broke the Andalusian lancers, -who were leading the pursuit, and hurled them back upon the other -squadrons of the Spanish right. The whole body was thrown into -disorder and driven off the field, leaving the flank of Albuquerque’s -division completely uncovered. Lasalle then re-formed his men and -prepared to charge the infantry. He had been reinforced meanwhile -by one of Villatte’s brigades (63rd and 95th of the Line) and by -the one battalion of Leval’s Germans, which had hitherto remained -with the centre. While these seven battalions of fresh troops -delivered a frontal attack on Albuquerque and Trias, Lasalle hurled -his four regiments of cavalry upon their unprotected right flank. -The Spaniards were doomed to destruction, but for some time kept -up a show of resistance; Albuquerque had got two or three of his -battalions out of line into column, and for a moment these held back -Lasalle’s chasseurs. But the fight lasted for a few minutes only: -a new French force was coming up. Latour-Maubourg, returning from -the pursuit of Cuesta with two of his dragoon regiments, appeared -upon the flank and rear of Trias’ division and charged in upon it -from behind. This last assault was decisive: the whole Spanish line -broke up and fled eastward over the open ground along the river. -The six regiments of French cavalry were soon in pursuit, and rode -in among the flying horde, using the sabre with reckless cruelty, -and far more intent on slaughter than on taking prisoners. Lasalle’s -chasseurs were specially savage, having to avenge the bloody check -which they had received at Miajadas in the preceding week[186]. -‘Our troops,’ says a French witness, ‘who had been threatened with -no quarter by the Spaniards if they had been overpowered, and who -were enraged by five hours of preliminary fighting, at first spared -no one. The infantry, following behind at a distance, dispatched -the wounded with their bayonets. Most of all they were pitiless to -such of the Spanish regiments as were without a proper military -uniform[187].’ Another eye-witness describes the pursuit as ‘one -continuous slaughter till night fell.’ Some of the Spanish battalions -dispersed in the most helpless confusion, and fled in all directions -when the line was broken. Others tried to close up and to defend -themselves: this made their flight slower, and sometimes led to their -complete extermination. Rocca says that he saw the two regiments of -Spanish and Walloon Guards lying dead _en masse_ in the order which -they had occupied at the moment of the breaking of the line[188]. -The statement is borne out, at least as to the Walloons, by the fact -that the next morning-state of Cuesta’s army which has been preserved -shows that regiment with only 300 men surviving out of two whole -battalions[189]. If any of the infantry of the Spanish right wing -escaped at all, it was partly owing to the fact that the two cavalry -regiments in the centre of the line[190] showed a much better spirit -than their comrades on the wings, and protected the flight of some -battalions. Moreover a frightful thunderstorm swept over the plains -late in the afternoon, darkened the whole horizon, and caused the -French squadrons to halt and cease their pursuit. - - [186] Half-a-dozen French authorities speak of the wrath of the - chasseurs as justifiable, because their comrades at Miajadas had - been murdered (_égorgés_, or _lâchement assassinés_). But the - Spaniards had killed them in fair fight. - - [187] Rocca, _Mémoires_, p. 82. - - [188] Ibid., p. 84. - - [189] See the Table in Arteche, vi. 476. - - [190] These were the hussar regiments ‘Volunteers of Spain’ and - ‘Estremadura’ (late Maria Luisa). Cuesta says in his dispatch - that they saved the battalions of Merida, and Provincial of - Badajoz, which had been surrounded and nearly cut off. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF MEDELLIN - MARCH 28TH 1809] - -The slaughter, nevertheless, had been terrible. Of the 10,000 men -whom the Spaniards lost on this fatal day three-fourths fell by the -edge of the sword: only 1,850 prisoners were sent back to Talavera, -and even if some others had succeeded in escaping during their march -to the rear, it is certain that the Spanish casualty-list amounted -to at least 7,500 men. Nine standards were taken--less than might -have been expected, for the twenty-three Spanish battalions present -must have brought forty-six to the field. Twenty pieces of artillery -fell into the hands of the French, out of the thirty which Cuesta had -possessed. Some few batteries therefore (perhaps the horse artillery -of the evasive cavalry brigades) had succeeded in escaping from the -rout. - -Most French authors unite in stating that the total loss on their -side was only 300 men[191]. This figure is as absurd as that given -for Soult’s losses at Corunna: there were five hours of fighting, -and for a long time the battle had gone by no means in favour of -Victor’s men. It is improbable that they suffered less than 1,000 -casualties, and the figure may have been higher, for one brigade -of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons was beaten back while charging -guns--always a bloody business for cavalry--while the German -battalions which retired across the plain in column, played on by -artillery and harassed by skirmishers, must also have suffered -severely. - - [191] This is the figure given by Jourdan, and General Sémélé, - who ought to have known the facts. It is, of course, reproduced - by Thiers, and the other historians. But I agree with Napier - (ii. 71) in considering the figure ‘scarcely credible.’ Rocca - says that the French lost 4,000 men, but from the context, I - suspect this to be a misprint for 400. Schepeler, always a very - well-informed and impartial writer, guesses at 2,000, and he may - not be far wrong. - -Cuesta’s cavalry, owing to the disgraceful cowardice shown by the -majority of the regiments, had got off comparatively intact. The -whole of his dreadful losses had fallen on his infantry, and they -had been scattered so far and wide over the Estremaduran plain that -it was many days before he could get together a respectable force. -He took refuge at Monasterio[192] in the mountains in the direction -of Andalusia, and sent urgent appeals for reinforcements to the -Central Junta. It might have been expected that the Junta would -disgrace him and remove him from command, as they had Cartaojal, -Infantado, and Castaños. But apparently they were rather cheered -by the fact that Cuesta had seriously disputed the victory with -the French, than angered with the want of generalship which he had -shown. They voted that he and his army had deserved well of the -State, and distributed honours and promotion to all the officers whom -he recommended for good conduct during the action. Rocca remarks -that they must have had in their minds the doings of the Romans -after Cannae, when the steadfast Senate thanked the consul Varro -‘for not having despaired of the republic,’ instead of removing him -for rashness and incompetence[193]. At any rate, they conferred on -Cuesta the post of Captain-General of Estremadura, and hurried up to -reinforce him all the troops that they could spare, a strong brigade -of new Granadan levies[194], and a division drawn from the army of -Cartaojal consisting of nine old battalions of regular troops with a -force of 6,000 bayonets[195]. Thus reinforced the host of Cuesta was -as strong as on the eve of Medellin, and once more mustered 20,000 -foot and 3,000 horse. By the middle of April the whole had been drawn -together, and reorganized into five divisions of foot and two of -horse. This was the army that was to co-operate with Wellesley in the -campaign of Talavera. - - [192] By April 8 he had collected there 3,000 horse and 6,000 or - 7,000 foot. Letter of D’Urban to Cradock, April 8. - - [193] Rocca, _Mémoires_, p. 86. - - [194] Regiment of Velez-Malaga (three batts.), and 2nd battalion - of Antequera, 3,600 bayonets in all. - - [195] Also some stray squadrons of cavalry which had gone to the - rear to get horses in Andalusia (Letter of Frere to Castlereagh - in Record Office). - -‘In any other country of Europe,’ wrote Marshal Jourdan, ‘the gaining -of two such successes as Medellin and Ciudad Real would have reduced -the country-side to submission, and have enabled the victorious -armies to press forward to new conquests. In Spain the reverse was -the case: the greater the disaster suffered by the national troops, -the more willing were the population to rise and take arms. Already -the communications between Victor and Sebastiani were cut: several -bearers of dispatches were massacred, and even some detachments cut -off. An insurrection almost burst out at Toledo, where a garrison -of insufficient strength had been left. It was only averted by the -providential arrival of an officer with a reinforcement of 500 men. -The communications of the 1st Corps with Madrid were in no better -state: bands of insurgents gathered in the valley of the Tietar, and -threatened to fall upon Almaraz and to break the bridge of boats. The -King had to send down in haste 600 bayonets from Madrid to preserve -this all-important post[196].’ At the same time the road from Almaraz -to Salamanca was closed by a trifling Spanish force of two battalions -under the brigadier Carlos d’España which had been levied about -Caceres and Bejar, and occupied the pass of Baños. It was aided by -a battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian legion, which Sir Robert Wilson -had sent forward from Almeida. Thus Lapisse at Salamanca could only -communicate with Victor at Merida by the circuitous route of Arevalo, -Madrid, and Almaraz. - - [196] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, pp. 187-8. - -The Duke of Belluno had been ordered by the Emperor to beat the Army -of Estremadura, and then to get into touch with Soult, who should -have been due at Lisbon long ere this. But no news of the 2nd Corps -had come to hand: it was known to have penetrated into northern -Portugal, but its exact position could not be learnt. Victor, -refusing to move till he had news of his colleague, cantoned his -army at Merida and Medellin, and put the old castles of both these -places, as well as that of Truxillo, in a state of defence. He would -probably have done well to utilize the time of necessary waiting in -laying siege to Badajoz. But he contented himself with watching that -fortress and observing the reorganized army of Cuesta, which had -now grown once more to a respectable force, and might have harassed -considerably any part of the 1st Corps which should attempt to molest -the capital of Estremadura. Instead of attacking the place, Victor -contented himself with sending to it vain summonses to surrender, and -with endeavouring to discover whether it might not contain traitors -ready to negotiate with King Joseph. He brought down from Madrid, -as his agent, a Spanish magistrate named Sotelo, who had become a -zealous _Afrancesado_. Through this person he addressed letters both -to the governor of Badajoz and to the Central Junta at Seville. -After setting forth all the evils which the continuance of the war -was bringing upon Spain, Sotelo stated that his king was ready to -grant the most liberal and benevolent terms to the Junta, in order -to spare further effusion of blood. The letter was duly forwarded -to Seville, where it was laid before the government. The ironical -answer was promptly returned ‘that if Sotelo possessed full powers to -negotiate for peace on the basis of the restoration of Ferdinand VII, -and the prompt evacuation of Spain by the French armies, peace would -be possible. If not, the Junta must continue to carry out the mandate -conferred upon it by the nation; according to which it could conclude -no truce or treaty except on the two conditions stated above.’ Sotelo -tried to continue the negotiation, but his offers were disregarded, -and Victor soon realized that he would obtain no further advantages -save by his sword. He remained at Merida waiting in vain for the news -of Soult’s advance on Lisbon, which was, according to Napoleon’s -orders, to be the signal for the 1st Corps to resume its advance. - - -N.B.--For the campaign of Medellin I have used the narratives of -Rocca and Sémélé (the latter often very inaccurate), the _Mémoires_ -of Jourdan, the day-book of the Frankfort regiment of Laval’s -division, and Victor’s correspondence with King Joseph, and on the -Spanish side the dispatches of Cuesta, also two letters from D’Urban -(British attaché on Cuesta’s staff) to Cradock, and some enclosures -sent by Frere to Castlereagh. - - - - -SECTION XIII - -SOULT’S INVASION OF PORTUGAL - - - - -CHAPTER I - -SOULT’S PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS IN GALICIA - -(JANUARY 19-MARCH 6, 1809) - - -After the departure of Bonaparte for Paris there were, as we have -already shown, only two points in the Peninsula where the strength -of the French armies was such as to allow them to continue the great -movement of advance which their master had begun. We have already -seen how Victor, after advancing from the Tagus to the Guadiana, -found his initiative exhausted, even after his victory at Medellin. -He had halted, and refused to take the offensive against Lisbon or -Andalusia till he should be heavily reinforced. - -It remains to be seen how the other French army available for -immediate field operations had fared. Moore’s daring march and -the ensuing retreat had drawn up into the extreme north-west of -the Peninsula the 2nd, 6th, and 8th _corps d’armée_. Of these the -last-named had been dissolved at the new year, and the bulk of its -battalions had been transferred to Soult’s corps, which on January -20 had a nominal effective of more than 40,000 men. Ney’s Corps, the -6th, was much smaller, and does not seem to have amounted to more -than 16,000 or 18,000 sabres and bayonets. But between Astorga, the -rearmost point occupied by Ney, and Corunna, which Soult’s vanguard -had entered on January 19, there were on paper 60,000 men available -for active operations. Nor had they to guard their own communications -with Madrid or with France. Lapisse’s numerous division had been -left at Salamanca; there was a provisional brigade at Leon[197]; -Bonnet held Santander with another division; there were detachments -in Zamora, Valladolid, and the other chief towns of the Douro valley. -Somewhat later, in April, the Emperor moved another whole army -corps, that of Mortier, into Old Castile, when it became available -after the fall of Saragossa. Even without this reinforcement he -thought that the rear of the army in Galicia was adequately covered. -The parting instructions of Bonaparte to Soult have already been -cited: when the English should have embarked, the Duke of Dalmatia -was to march on Oporto, and ten days later was to occupy Lisbon. -We have already seen that the scheme of dates which Napoleon laid -down for these operations was impossible, even to the borders of -absurdity: Oporto was to be seized by February 1, and Lisbon by -February 10! But putting aside this error, which was due to his -persistent habit of ignoring the physical conditions of Spanish roads -and Spanish weather, the Emperor had drawn up a plan which seemed -feasible enough. Ney’s corps was to move up and occupy all the chief -strategical points in Galicia, taking over both the garrison duty -and the task of stamping out any small lingering insurrections in -the interior. This would leave Soult free to employ the whole of his -four divisions of infantry and his three divisions of cavalry for the -invasion of Portugal. Even allowing for the usual wastage of men in a -winter campaign, the Emperor must have supposed that, with a nominal -effective of 43,000 men, Soult would be able to provide more than -30,000 efficients for the expedition against Lisbon[198]. Considering -that the Portuguese army was still in the making, and that no more -than 8,000 British troops remained in and about Lisbon, the task -assigned to the Duke of Dalmatia did not on the face of it appear -unreasonable. - - [197] It was composed of the few battalions of the 8th Corps - which had not been drafted into the 2nd. - - [198] When the Emperor looked at the half-monthly returns of the - army, which were forwarded to him as regularly as possible, and - which pursued him wheresoever he might go, he must have seen - the following statistics--those of Jan. 15 in the French War - Office--for the 2nd Corps, taking the gross totals:-- - - Infantry: Merle 12,119; Mermet 11,810; Delaborde 5,038; Heudelet - 6,592: Total 35,559. - - Cavalry: Lorges 1,769; Lahoussaye 3,087; Franceschi 2,512: Total - 7,368. Artillery and Train 1,468. - - Total of the whole corps 44,395. By Jan. 30, it had risen to - 45,820. - -But in Spain the old saying that ‘nothing is so deceptive as -figures--except facts,’ was pre-eminently true. No map--those of 1809 -were intolerably bad--could give the Emperor any idea of the hopeless -condition of Galician or Portuguese mountain-roads in January. No -tables of statistics could enable him to foresee the way in which -the population would receive the invading army. We may add that -even an unrivalled knowledge of the realities of war would hardly -have prepared him to expect that the campaign of Galicia would, in -one month, have worn down Soult’s available effectives to a bare -23,000 men. Such was the modest figure at which the 2nd Corps stood -on January 30, for it had no less than 8,000 men detached, and the -incredible number of over 10,000--one man in four--in hospital. -For this figure it was not the muskets of Moore’s host which were -responsible: it was the cold and misery of the forced marches from -Astorga to Corunna, which seem to have tried the pursuer even more -than the pursued. The 8,000 ‘detached’ were strung out in small -parties all the way from Leon to Lugo--wherever the Marshal had been -obliged to abandon stores or baggage that could not travel fast, he -had been forced to leave a guard: he had also dropped small garrisons -at Villafranca, Lugo, and Betanzos, to await Ney’s arrival; but the -most important drain had been that of his dismounted dragoons[199]. -In his cavalry regiments half the horses had foundered or perished: -the roads so deadly to Moore’s chargers had taken a corresponding -toll from the French divisions, and at every halting-place hundreds -of horsemen, unable to keep up with the main body, had been left -behind. In any other country than Spain these involuntary laggards -would have found their way to the front again in a comparatively -short time. But Soult was commencing to discover that one of the main -features of war in the Peninsula was that isolated men, or even small -parties, could not move about in safety. The peasantry were already -beginning to rise, even before Moore’s army took its departure; they -actually cut the road between Betanzos and Lugo, and between Lugo -and Villafranca, within a few days after the battle of Corunna. This -forced the stragglers to mass, under pain of being assassinated. -Hundreds of them were actually cut off: the rest gathered in small -wayside garrisons, and could not get on till they had been formed -into parties of considerable strength. The rearmost, who had been -collected at Astorga by General Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, -did not join the corps for months--and this body was no less than -2,000 or 2,500 strong. The other detachments could not make their way -to Corunna even when Marshal Ney had come up: it was only by degrees, -and after delays covering whole weeks, that they began to rejoin. -The only solid reinforcement received by Soult, soon after the -departure of the English army, consisted of his rear division, that -of Heudelet, which came up from Lugo, not many days after the battle -of January 16. - - [199] The state of the cavalry of the 2nd Corps on Jan. 30 gives - the following astounding result:-- - - _Present under Arms._ _Absent._ _Sick._ - Lorges 809 617 108 - Lahoussaye 1,130 1,400 256 - Franceschi 1,120 991 208 - ----- ----- --- - 3,059 3,008 572 - - The drain under the second column represents mainly the men who - had dropped to the rear, from losing their horses or being unable - to take them on. - -Soult was still far from suspecting the full difficulty of the -task that was before him. He had been much encouraged by the tame -way in which the Governor of Corunna had surrendered on January -19. If Alcedo had made the least semblance of fight he could have -detained the Marshal before his walls for an indefinite time. The -city was only approachable by a narrow and well-fortified isthmus, -and the French could not have battered this formidable front to any -effect with the six-pounders which formed their only artillery. -The surrender of the place gave Soult some food, the considerable -resources of a rich harbour town, and (most important of all) a -large number of guns of position, suitable for use against the other -fortress which he must take ere he moved on against Portugal. - -This place was Ferrol, the second naval arsenal of Spain, which -faces Corunna across the broad inlet of Ares Bay--only thirteen -miles distant by water, though the land road thither by Betanzos, -round the head of the fiord, is forty miles long. To make sure of -this place was obviously Soult’s first duty: if left unmolested it -would prove a dangerous nucleus round which the Galician insurgents -could concentrate. For it contained a regular garrison, consisting -of the dépôts and half-trained recruits of La Romana’s army, and -of 4,000 or 5,000 sailors. There were lying in the harbour, mostly -half-dismantled and unready for sea[200], no less than eight -line-of-battle ships and three frigates. Their crews, much depleted, -but still numerous, had been landed to assist the soldiers in -garrisoning the forts[201]. In addition several thousand citizens -and peasants had taken arms, for muskets abounded in Ferrol, from -the stores lately received from England. With these resources it is -clear that a governor of courage and resolution might have made a -long defence; they were far greater than those with which Palafox -had preserved Saragossa; and Ferrol was no open town, but a fortress -which had been kept in good repair for fear of the English. But, -for the misfortune of Galicia, the commander of Ferrol, Admiral -Melgarejo, was a traitor at heart. He was one of the old bureaucrats -who had only followed the patriotic cause because it seemed for -the moment to be in the ascendant; if patriotism did not pay, he -was perfectly prepared to come to terms and to do homage to Joseph -Bonaparte. - - [200] For the state of this squadron see the report by Admiral De - Courcy in the _Parliamentary Papers_ for 1809, Spain, March 29, - 1809, p. 4. - - [201] The marines had been taken away in July, 1808, and formed - half a brigade in the division of the Army of Galicia. But the - seamen were available. - -On January 23 Soult marched against Ferrol with the infantry division -of Mermet, the dragoons of Lorges, and the heavy guns which he -had found in Corunna. He left Delaborde in garrison at the latter -place, posted Merle at Betanzos, a half-way house between the two -fortresses, and directed Franceschi’s cavalry division on Santiago -and Lahoussaye’s on Mellid, in order to see whether there was any -Spanish field-force visible in western Galicia. On the twenty-fifth -the Marshal presented himself in front of Ferrol, and summoned the -place to surrender. Melgarejo was determined not to fight, and -several of his chief subordinates supported him. The armed citizens -persisted in their idea of defending the place, but when the French -broke ground in front of the walls and captured two small outlying -redoubts, they allowed themselves to be overpersuaded by their -treacherous chief. On January 26 the place surrendered, and on the -following day Soult was received within the walls. The capitulation -had two shameful clauses: by the first the civil and military -authorities undertook to take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph. -By the second the splendid men-of-war in the harbour were handed over -intact, a most valuable acquisition for the Emperor if Galicia was -to remain under his control. Any one but a traitor would have burnt -or scuttled them before surrendering. But Melgarejo, after receiving -high testimonials from Soult, hastened up to Madrid and took office -under the _Rey Intruso_[202]. Along with the squadron 1,500 naval -cannon, an immense quantity of timber, cordage, and other stores, and -20,000 muskets newly imported from England, fell into the hands of -the French. - - [202] The Supreme Junta very properly condemned him and Alcedo, - the governor of Corunna, to the penalties of high treason. - -On the day after Ferrol was occupied, Soult received the last -communication from the Emperor which was to reach him for many a -day[203]. It was dated from Valladolid on January 17. We have already -had occasion to refer to it more than once, while dealing with the -controversies of King Joseph and Marshal Victor. This dispatch -repeated the Emperor’s former orders, with some slight concession in -the matter of dates. Instead of reaching Oporto on February 1 the -Marshal was to be granted four extra days, and after taking Oporto -on February 5, he was to reach Lisbon on the sixteenth instead of -the tenth. Soult was also told that he would not have to depend -on his own resources alone: Victor with the 1st Corps would be at -Merida by the time that the 2nd Corps was approaching the Portuguese -capital: he would be instructed to send a column in the direction of -Lisbon, to make a diversion in favour of the attack from the north, -and at the same time Lapisse from Salamanca should move on Ciudad -Rodrigo and Almeida. Bessières was, so the Emperor said, under strict -orders to send Lapisse forward into Portugal the moment that the -news should reach him that the 2nd Corps had captured Oporto. This -combination sinned against the rules of strategy, as they had to be -practised in Spain. The Emperor had yet to realize that in order -to make operations simultaneous, when troops starting from bases -several hundred miles apart are to co-operate, it is necessary that -their generals should be in free communication with each other. But -Soult, when he had advanced into Portugal, was as much out of touch -with the other French corps as if he had been operating in Poland or -Naples. It was literally months before accurate information as to his -situation and his achievements reached Salamanca, Merida, or Madrid. -The movements of Victor and Lapisse being strictly conditioned by -the receipt of news concerning Soult’s progress, and that news being -never received, or received too late, the combination never did and -never could take place. Napoleon had forgotten to reckon with the -ubiquitous Spanish insurgent: here, as in so many cases, he was -unconsciously assuming that the bearer of dispatches could ride -freely through the country, as if he were in Saxony or Lombardy; -and that Soult could make known his movements and his desires as -often as he pleased. French critics of the Emperor generally confine -themselves to censuring him for sending the 2nd Corps to attempt -unaided a task too great for it[204]; this is not quite fair, for -he had intended to support Soult by two strong diversions. The real -fault lay in ignoring the fact that in Spain combined operations, -which presuppose constant communication between the participants, -were practically impossible. The same error was made in 1810, when -Drouet was told to co-operate in Masséna’s invasion of Portugal, and -in 1811 when Soult was directed to lend a helping hand to that same -invasion. It is impossible to give effective aid to a colleague whose -condition and whose whereabouts are unknown. - - [203] Compare _Instructions de l’Empereur_ of Jan. 17, with - Berthier to Soult of Jan. 21. - - [204] ‘Il faut croire,’ says St. Chamans, Soult’s senior - aide-de-camp, ‘que Napoléon, au moment où il ordonna une pareille - opération, était possédé d’un esprit de vertige. Comment - pouvait-il risquer, au milieu d’un royaume insurgé, un si faible - corps d’armée, sans communication avec ses autres troupes - d’Espagne?’ [_Mémoires_, p. 117]. ‘Tout était en erreur,’ says Le - Noble, another 2nd Corps writer, ‘dans le projet de soumettre le - Portugal en 1809 avec une armée si faible et dépourvue de moyens. - L’Empereur a montré une confiance aveugle’ (p. 65). - -On January 29 the Duke of Dalmatia set to work to reorganize his -army for the great expedition that had been assigned to him. It was -impossible to march at once, as the Emperor had commanded, because -Ney had not yet arrived at the front, and it was necessary to turn -over the charge of Corunna and Ferrol to him before departing further -south. Moreover, there were many other arrangements to be made: -a base hospital had to be organized at Corunna for the thousands -of sick and wounded belonging to the 2nd Corps. Its transport had -to be reconstructed, for most of the animals had died during the -forced marches in pursuit of Moore[205]. A new stock of munitions -had to be served out from the stores so fortunately captured at -Ferrol. The military chest of the corps had been left behind at -Astorga, and showed no signs of appearing: to provide for the more -urgent day-by-day needs of the army, the Marshal had to squeeze -forced contributions out of the already exhausted towns of Corunna, -Ferrol, and Santiago, which had long ago contributed all their -surplus resources to the fitting out of Blake’s army of Galicia. -These same unhappy places had to submit to a heavy requisition of -cloth and leather, for the replacing of the garments and boots worn -out in the late marches. But even with the aid of 2,500 English -greatcoats discovered in store at Corunna, and other finds at Ferrol, -the wants of the army could not be properly supplied; it started -on the campaign in a very imperfectly equipped condition[206]. The -most dangerous point in its outfit was the want of mules: most of -the valleys of inner Galicia and northern Portugal are destitute -of carriage roads. To bring up the food and the reserve ammunition -pack-animals were absolutely necessary, and Soult could only collect -a few hundreds. Even if his men should succeed in living on the -country, and so solve the problem of carrying provisions, they could -not hope to pick up powder and lead in the same way. When, therefore, -the heavy baggage on wheels had to be left behind, the 2nd Corps was -only able to carry a very insufficient stock of cartridges: twice, -as we shall see, it almost exhausted its ammunition and was nearly -brought to a standstill on the way to Oporto. - - [205] The authors, English and French, who express a humanitarian - horror at the shooting of 3,000 horses and mules before the - embarkation of Moore’s army, forget what a godsend these would - have been to Soult, if the English had left them to fall intact - into his hands. The slaughter was dreadful, but perfectly - necessary and justifiable. - - [206] All these details come from Le Noble, who as - _Ordonnateur-en-Chef_ of the 2nd Corps, had full experience of - the difficulty of equipping it for the Portuguese expedition. - -It was not till February had already begun that Soult was able to -move forward the whole of his army, for he refused to withdraw -Delaborde’s division from Corunna and Mermet’s from Ferrol, till Ney -should have brought up troops of the 6th Corps to relieve them. The -Duke of Elchingen, though apprised of the Emperor’s orders, lingered -long at Lugo, and it was not till he came down in person to the -coast that Soult could call up his rear divisions. Meanwhile a small -exchange of troops between the two corps was carried out: Ney, being -short of cavalry, received a brigade of Lorges’ dragoons to add to -his own inadequate force of two regiments of light horse. In return -he made over to the 2nd Corps three battalions of the 17th Léger, -which had accompanied him hitherto. They were added to Delaborde’s -division, which had been only eight battalions strong. - -Even before the troops from Ferrol and Corunna were able to move, -Soult had put the rest of his army on the march for Portugal. On -January 30 Franceschi’s light horsemen started along the coast-road -from Santiago to Vigo and Tuy, while further inland Lahoussaye’s -division of dragoons, quitting Mellid, took the rough mountain path -across the Monte Testeyro, by Barca de Ledesma and Cardelle, which -leads to Rivadavia and Salvatierra on the lower Minho. Merle’s and -Heudelet’s infantry started several days later, and were many miles -behind the advanced cavalry. - -Lahoussaye’s division met with no opposition in the rugged -region which it had to cross, and occupied Salvatierra without -difficulty. Franceschi scattered a few peasants at the defile of -Redondela outside Vigo, and then found himself at the gates of that -harbour-fortress. The governor, no less weak and unpatriotic than -those of Ferrol and Corunna, surrendered without firing a shot. His -excuse was that he had only recruits, and armed townsfolk, to man -his walls and handle his numerous artillery. But his misconduct -was even surpassed by that of the Governor of Tuy, who capitulated -to Franceschi’s 1,200 horsemen three days later in the same style, -though he was in command of 500 regular troops, and was implored -to hold out by the local junta. Throughout Galicia, in this unhappy -month, the officials and military chiefs showed a most deplorable -spirit, which contrasted unfavourably with that of the lower classes, -both in the towns and the country-side. - -The way to the frontier of Portugal had thus been opened, with an -ease which seemed to justify Napoleon’s idea that the Spaniards -would not hold out, when once their field armies had been crushed. -Franceschi and Lahoussaye reported to the Duke of Dalmatia that -they had swept the whole northern bank of the Minho, and that there -was nothing in front of them save the swollen river and a few bands -of Portuguese peasantry, who were observing them from Valenza, the -dilapidated frontier fortress of the neighbouring kingdom. - -Both the French and the Galicians of the coast-line might well have -forgotten the fact that there was still a Spanish army in existence -within the borders of the province. It is long since we have had -occasion to mention the fugitive host of the Marquis of La Romana. -After being hunted out of Ponferrada by Soult on January 3, he had -followed in the wake of Craufurd’s brigades on their eccentric -retreat down the valley of the Sil. But while the British troops -pushed on to Vigo and embarked, the Spaniards halted at Orense. -There the Marquis endeavoured to rally his demoralized and starving -host, with the aid of the very limited resources of the district. He -had only 6,000 men left with the colours, out of the 22,000 who had -been with him at Leon on December 25, 1808. But there were several -thousands more straggling after him, or dispersed in the side valleys -off the road which he had followed. Most of these men had lost -their muskets, many were frost bitten, or suffering from dysentery. -The surviving nucleus of the army was composed almost entirely of -the old regulars: the Galician militia and new levies had not been -able to resist the temptation to desert, when they found themselves -among their native mountains. The Marquis hoped that, when the -spring came round, they would find their way back to the army: in -this expectation, as we shall see, he was not deceived. For nearly -a fortnight the wrecks of the army were undisturbed, and La Romana -was able to collect enough efficients to constitute two small corps -of observation, one of which he posted in the valley of the Sil, to -watch for any signs of a movement of the French from the direction -of Ponferrada, while the other, in the valley of the Minho, kept -a similar look out in the direction of Lugo. The latter force was -unmolested, but on January 17 General Mendizabal, who was watching -the southern road, reported the approach of a heavy hostile column. -This was Marchand’s division of Ney’s corps: the Marshal had divided -his force at Ponferrada; he himself with Maurice Mathieu’s division -had kept the main road to Lugo, while Marchand had been told off to -clear the lateral valleys and seize Orense. La Romana very wisely -resolved that his unhappy army was unfit to resist 8,000 French -troops. On January 19 he evacuated Orense, and fled across the Sierra -Cabrera to Monterey on the Portuguese frontier. Here at last he found -rest, for Marchand did not follow him into the mountains, but, after -a short stay in Orense, marched to Santiago, where he was directed to -relieve Soult’s garrison. - -The Marquis was completely lost to sight in his frontier fastnesses, -and was able to do his best to reorganize his battered host. By -February 13 he had 9,000 men under arms, nearly all old soldiers, -for the Galician levies were still scattered in their homes. His -dispatches during this period are very gloomy reading: he complains -bitterly of the apathy of the country-side and the indiscipline of -his officers. What could be expected of subalterns, he asks, when -a general (Martinengo of the 2nd division) had absconded without -asking leave or even reporting his departure? ‘I know not where the -patriotism, of which every one boasted, is now to be found, since -on the smallest reverse or misfortune, they lose their heads, and -think only of saving themselves--sacrificing their country and -compromising their commander.’ Much harassed for want of food, La -Romana kept moving his head quarters; he was sometimes at Verin and -Monterey, sometimes at Chaves just inside the Portuguese frontier, -more frequently at Oimbra. He had only nine guns left; there was -no reserve of ammunition, and the soldiers had but few cartridges -remaining in their boxes. The strongest battalion left in the army -had only 250 bayonets--many had but seventy or eighty, and others -(notably the Galician local corps) had completely disappeared. He -besought the Central Junta to obtain from the British money, muskets, -clothing, and above all ammunition, or the army would never be fit to -take the field[207]. A similar request in the most pressing terms was -sent to Sir John Cradock at Lisbon. - - [207] Most of these details are from two interesting dispatches - of La Romana in the Foreign Office papers at the Record Office. - They are dated from Chaves on Jan. 28 and Feb. 13. They are - unpublished and seem to be unknown even to General Arteche, who - has made such a splendid collection of the materials in the - Spanish archives which bear on this obscure corner of the war. - There was an English officer, Captain Brotherton, with the army - of La Romana: but his reports, which Napier had evidently seen, - are now no longer to be found. No doubt they were bound up in the - January-March 1809 book of Portuguese dispatches, which since - Napier’s day has disappeared from the Record Office, leaving no - trace behind. - -Soult could not but be aware that La Romana’s army, or some shadow -of it, was still in existence: but since it sedulously avoided any -contact with him, and had completely evacuated the coast-land of -Galicia, he appears to have treated it as a ‘negligible quantity’ -during his first operations. Its dispersion, if it required any -further dispersing, would fall to the lot of Ney and the 6th Corps, -not to that of the army sent against Portugal. - -Franceschi and Lahoussaye, as we have already seen, reached the Minho -and the Portuguese border on February 2. It was only on the eighth -that the Duke of Dalmatia set out from Santiago to follow them, in -company with the division of Merle. Those of Delaborde and Mermet, -released by the arrival of Ney, took the same route on the ninth and -tenth respectively. The rear was brought up by the reserve and heavy -artillery, and by that brigade of Lorges’ dragoons which had not -been handed over to the 6th Corps. The coast-road being very good, -Soult was able to concentrate his whole army within the triangle -Tuy, Salvatierra, Vigo by the thirteenth, in spite of the hindrances -caused by a week of perpetual storm and rain. - -It was the Marshal’s intention to enter Portugal by the great -coast-road, which crosses the Minho at Tuy and proceeds to Oporto -by way of Valenza and Braga. But as Valenza was a fortress, and its -cannon commanded the broad ferry at which the usual passage was made, -it was clearly necessary to choose some other point for crossing -the frontier river. After a careful survey Soult fixed on a village -named Campo Saucos, only two miles from the mouth of the Minho, -as offering the best starting-point. He established a battery of -heavy guns on his own side of the river, and collected a number of -fishing-boats[208], sufficient to carry 300 men at a voyage. As he -could not discover that the Portuguese had any regular force opposite -him, he resolved to attempt the passage with these modest resources. - - [208] These boats were brought to Campo Saucos overland, for - a full mile and more. They came from La Guardia and other - fishing-villages on the coast; but finding it impossible to - get them over the bar of the Minho in such furious weather, - and against the swollen stream, Soult dragged them from the - beach north of the mouth to the crossing-point on rollers, much - as Mohammed II did with his galleys at the famous siege of - Constantinople in 1453. But Soult’s vessels were, of course, much - smaller. - -There would have been no great difficulty in the enterprise during -ordinary weather. But the incessant rains had so swelled the Minho -that it was now a wild, ungovernable torrent, which it was hard to -face and still harder to stem. When the heavy Atlantic surf met -the furious current of the stream, during the rising of the tide, -the conflict of the waters made the passage absolutely impossible. -It had to be attempted at the moment between the flow and the -ebb--though there was at that hour another danger--that the boats -might be carried past the appointed landing-place and wrecked on -the bar at the mouth of the river. But this chance Soult resolved -to risk: on February 16, long before daybreak, his twenty or thirty -fishing-boats, each with a dozen men on board, launched out from -the northern shore, and struck diagonally across the stream, as -the current bore them. They were at once saluted by a heavy but -ill-directed fire from the Portuguese bank, where hundreds of -peasants were at watch even during the hours of darkness. The -soldiers rowed and steered badly--Soult had only been able to give -them as guides a mere handful of men trained to the water[209]. The -furious current swept them away: probably also their nerve was much -tried by the fusillade, which, though more noisy than dangerous, -yet occasionally picked off a rower or a helmsman. The general -result was that only three boats with thirty-five or forty men got -to the appointed landing-place, where they were made prisoners by -the Portuguese. The rest were borne down-stream, and came ashore at -various points on the same side from which they had started, barely -avoiding shipwreck on the bar. - - [209] Soult had got together a few dozen seamen, French prisoners - of war, found at Corunna and Ferrol, who had been captured at sea - by Spanish cruisers. They were not ‘marines’ as Napier calls them - (ii. 38), but _marins_ (see Le Noble, p. 75, and again p. 78). - -The attempt to pass the Minho, therefore, ended in a ridiculous -fiasco: it showed the limitations of the French army, which among -its numerous merits did not possess that of good seamanship. Soult -was deeply chagrined, not because of the insignificant loss of men, -but because of the check to his prestige. He resolved that he would -not risk another such failure, and at once gave orders for the whole -army to march up-stream to Orense, the first point where there was a -bridge over the Minho. This entailed a radical change in his general -plan of operations, for he was abandoning the good coast-road by Tuy -and Valenza for a very poor mountain-way from Orense to Chaves along -the valley of the Tamega. There was another important result from -the alteration--the new route brought the French army down upon La -Romana’s camp of refuge: his cantonments in and about Monterey lay -right across its path. But neither he nor Soult had yet realized -the fact that they were about once more to come into collision. The -Marshal did not know where the Marquis was; the Marquis did not at -first understand the meaning of the Marshal’s sudden swoop inland. -Some of the Spanish officers, indeed, were sanguine enough to imagine -that the French, after their failure on the lower Minho, would -abandon Galicia altogether[210]! - - [210] Letter of Captain Brotherton [now lost] quoted in Napier, - ii. 438, and dated from Oimbra on Feb. 21. - -The whole French army had now made a half-turn to the left, and -was marching in a north-easterly direction. Lahoussaye’s dragoons, -starting from Salvatierra, led the advance, Heudelet’s division -marched at the head of the infantry; Delaborde, Mermet, and Merle, -each at a convenient interval from the preceding division, stretched -out the column to an interminable length. The heavy artillery and -wagon train brought up the rear. Nine hundred sick, victims of the -detestable weather of the first fortnight of February, were left -behind at Tuy under the guard of a half-battalion of infantry. - -It was on the march from Tuy to Orense that Soult began to realize -the full difficulties of his task. He had already met with small -insurgent bands, but they had been dispersed with ease, and he had -paid little attention to them. Now however, along the steep and -tiresome mountain road above the Minho, they appeared in great force, -and showed a spirit and an enterprise which were wholly unexpected -by the French. The fact was that in the month which had now elapsed -since the battle of Corunna, the peasantry and the local notables -had found time to take stock of the situation. The first numbing -effect of the presence of a large hostile army in their midst had -passed away. Ruthless requisitions were sweeping off their cattle, -the only wealth of the country. Although Soult had issued pacific -proclamations, and had tried to keep his men in hand, he could not -restrain the usual plundering propensities of a French army on the -march. Enough atrocities had already been committed to make the -Galicians forget the misconduct of Moore’s men. La Romana, from his -refuge at Monterey, had been dispersing appeals to the patriotism -of the province, and sending out officers with local knowledge -to rouse the country-side. These probably had less effect on the -Galicians--the Marquis was a stranger and a defeated general--than -the exhortations of their own clergy. In the first rising of the -peasantry most of the leaders were ecclesiastics: in the region -which Soult was now traversing the peasantry were raised by Mauricio -Troncoso, Abbot of Couto, and a friar named Giraldez, who kept the -insurgents together until, some weeks later, they handed over the -command to military officers sent by La Romana or by the Central -Junta. In the valley of the Sil, beyond Orense, it was Quiroga, -Abbot of Casoyo, who first called out the country-side[211]. Every -narrative of the Galician insurrection, whether French or Spanish, -bears witness to the fact that in almost every case the clergy, -regular and secular, were the earliest chiefs of the mountaineers. It -was characteristic of the whole rising that many of the bands took -the field with the church-banners of their parishes as substitutes -for the national flag. - - [211] All the details of the Galician insurrection may be found - in the very interesting _Los Guerrilleros Gallegos de 1809_, of - Pardo de Andrade, reprinted at Corunna in 1892. It is absolutely - contemporary and mainly composed of original documents written by - men who shared in the rising. But naturally it contains errors - and exaggerations. - -This much is certain, that as soon as the violent February rains -showed signs of slackening, the whole of rural Galicia flew to arms. -From Corcubion on the surf-beaten headland of Finisterre, to the -remote headwaters of the Sil under the Sierra de Penamarella, there -was not a valley which failed to answer the appeal which La Romana -had made and which the clergy had circulated. From the weak and -sporadic movements of January there sprang in February a general -insurrection, which was all the more formidable because it had no -single focus, was based on no place of arms, and was directed not by -one chief but by fifty local leaders, each intimately acquainted with -the district in which he was about to operate. - -The first result of this widespread movement was to complete the -severance of the communications between the various French divisions -in Galicia. From the earliest appearance of the invaders, as we -have already seen, there had been intermittent attempts to cut the -lines of road by which the 2nd and 6th Corps kept touch with each -other and with Madrid. But hitherto a convoy, or escort of a couple -of hundred men, could generally brush aside its assailants, and get -through from post to post. In February this power of movement ceased: -the insurgents became not only more numerous and more daring, but -infinitely more skilful in their tactics. Instead of endeavouring -to deliver combats in the open, they broke the bridges, burnt the -ferry-boats, cut away the road in rocky places, and then hung -persistently about any corps that was on the move, as soon as it -began to get among the obstacles. They fired on it from inaccessible -side-hills, attacked and detained its rearguard so as to delay its -march, thus causing a gap to grow between it and the main body, and -only closed when the column was beginning to get strung out into a -series of isolated groups. The convoys which were being sent up from -Astorga to the 2nd and 6th Corps were especially vulnerable to such -tactics: the shooting of a few horses in a defile would hopelessly -block the progress of everything that was coming on from behind. The -massing of men to repair or rehorse disabled wagons only gave the -lurking insurgent a larger and an easier target. Hence the bringing -up to the front of the heavy transport of the French army became such -a slow and costly business, that the attempt to move it was after -a time almost abandoned. Another point which the insurgents soon -perceived was the helplessness of the French cavalry among rocks -and defiles. A horseman cannot get at an enemy who lurks above his -head in precipitous crags, refuses to come down to the high-road, -and takes careful shots from his eyrie into the squadron below. If, -worried beyond endurance, the French officers dismounted some of -their men to charge the hillside, the lightly-equipped peasants fled -away, and were out of sight before the dragoons in their heavy boots -could climb the first fifty yards of the ascent. The copious annals -of the Galician guerrilla bands almost invariably begin with tales of -the annihilation of insufficiently guarded convoys, or of the defeat -and extermination of small bodies of cavalry caught in some defile. A -very little experience of such petty successes soon taught them the -right way to deal with the French. The invaders could not be beaten -_en masse_, but might be cut off in detail, harassed into exhaustion, -and so isolated one from the other that it would require the sending -out of a considerable expedition to carry a message between two -neighbouring garrisons, or to forward a dispatch down the high-road -to Madrid. - -In a very short time intercommunication between the various sections -of the French army in Galicia became so rare and uncertain, that each -commander of a garrison or chief of a column found himself in the -condition of a man lost in a fog. His friends might be near or far, -might be faring ill or prosperously, but it was almost impossible -to get news of them. Every garrison was surrounded with a loose -screen of insurgents, which could only be pierced by a great effort. -Each column on the march moved on surrounded by a swarm of active -enemies, who closed around again in spite of all attempts to brush -them off. In March and April Ney, on whom the worst stress of the -insurrection fell, could only communicate with his outlying troops -by taking circular tours at the head of a force of several thousand -men. Sometimes he found, instead of the post which he had intended -to visit, only a ruined village full of corpses. Ere the Galician -rising was three months old, the bands had become bold and skilful -enough to cut off a strong detachment or to capture a place held by a -garrison several hundreds strong. In June they actually stopped the -Marshal himself, with a whole division at his back, in his attempt to -march from Santiago to recapture Vigo. - -But these times were still far in the future: and when, on February -17, Soult started on his march along the Minho from Tuy to Orense, -the peasantry were far from being the formidable opponents that -they afterwards became. Nevertheless, the progress of the 2nd Corps -was toilsome and slow in the extreme. The troops had been divided -between two paths, of which the so-called high-road, a mile or -two from the river, was only a trifle less impracticable than the -rougher path along the water’s edge. Lahoussaye’s dragoons had been -put upon the latter track; Heudelet’s infantry division led the -advance on the upper road. All day long the march was harassed by -the insurgents, who descended from the hills and hung on the left -flank of Heudelet’s column, delivering partial attacks whenever -they thought that they saw an opportunity. The French advanced with -difficulty, much incommoded by the need of dragging on their cannon, -which could hardly be got forward even with the aid of the infantry. -Lahoussaye, on the other path, was assailed in a similar way, besides -being molested by the Portuguese, who moved parallel to him on the -south side of the Minho, taking long shots at his dragoons wherever -the path was close enough to the water’s edge to be within range of -their own bank. If the peasantry had confined themselves to these -tactics, they might have harassed Soult at small cost to themselves. -But they had not yet fully learnt the guerrilla’s trade. At Mourentan -on the path by the river, and at Francelos on the high-road, they -had resolved to offer direct resistance to the enemy, and so put -themselves within reach of the invader’s claws. At each place they -had barricaded the village, had run a rough entrenchment across the -road, and stood to receive the frontal shock of the French attack. -They were, of course, routed with great slaughter when they thus -exposed themselves in close combat: several hundred perished, among -whom were many of their clerical leaders. Thus Soult was able -to push on and occupy Rivadavia, which he found evacuated by its -inhabitants. His soldiery had sacked and burnt all the villages on -the way, and (according to the Spanish narratives) shot all adult -males whom they could catch, whether found with arms or not[212]. - - [212] Long details of all this fighting may he found in the - narrative of the Alcalde of Rivadavia, on pp. 130-44 of vol. - ii. of _Los Guerrilleros Gallegos_. The details are probably - exaggerated, but the reader can hardly refuse to believe that - there is a solid substratum of truth. The Alcalde notes that the - infantry were far better behaved than Lahoussaye’s dragoons, of - whom he tells tales of quite incredible ferocity, even alleging - that they burnt the wounded. - -On the eighteenth, having cut his way as far as Rivadavia, the Duke -of Dalmatia came to the conclusion that it was hopeless to endeavour -to carry on with him his heavy artillery and his baggage. On such -roads as he had been traversing, and amid the continual attacks -of the insurgents, they would be of more harm than use. In all -probability they would ere long fall so far behind that, along with -their escort, they would become separated from the army, and perhaps -fall into the hands of the Spaniards. Accordingly he sent orders to -the rear of the column that Merle’s division should conduct back to -Tuy all the heavy baggage and thirty-six guns of large calibre. Only -twenty pieces, mostly four-pounders, were to follow the expedition. -When the wagons had been turned back, there were only pack-horses -and mules sufficient to carry 3,000 rounds for the guns, and 500,000 -cartridges for the infantry. This was a dangerously small equipment -for an army which had a whole kingdom to conquer, and which was -forced to waste many shots every day on keeping off the irrepressible -insurgents. But Soult was determined that he should not be accused -of shrinking from the task imposed on him, or allowing himself to be -thwarted by bands of half-armed peasants. - -The heavy guns and the train, therefore, were deposited at Tuy, along -with the large body of sick and wounded who had already been left -there. General Lamartinière, an officer in whom Soult placed much -confidence, was left in command. He was warned that he would have to -take care of himself, as his communication with the army would be -cut the moment that Merle’s troops resumed their march to join the -rear of the advancing column. Nor did Soult err in this: when the -2nd Corps had gone on its way, Tuy and the neighbouring post of Vigo -were immediately beset by a thick swarm of peasants, who kept them -completely blockaded. - -Having thus freed himself from every possible incumbrance, the Duke -of Dalmatia pushed briskly on for Orense and its all-important -bridge. The insurgents had not fallen back very far, and on the -nineteenth Heudelet’s division had two smart engagements with them, -and drove them back to Masside, in the hills to the left of the road. -The valley was here wider and the route better than on the previous -day, and much more satisfactory progress was made. On the twentieth, -still pushing on, Soult found that the ferry of Barbantes, ten miles -below Orense, was passable. The Galicians had scuttled the ferry-boat -in an imperfect fashion: some voltigeurs crossed on a raft, repaired -the boat, and set it working again. Soult then pushed across the -river some of Mermet’s battalions, intending to send them to Orense -by the south bank, if it should be found that the bridge was broken. -Meanwhile Heudelet continued to advance by the road on the north -side: his column arrived at its goal, and found Orense undefended and -its bridge intact. The townsfolk made no attempt to resist: they had -not left their dwellings like the peasants, and their magistrates -came out to surrender the place in due form. They appealed to Soult’s -clemency, by showing him that they had kept safe and properly cared -for 136 sick French soldiers, left behind by Marchand when he had -marched through the town in the preceding month. - -Where, meanwhile, it will be asked, was the army of La Romana? The -Marquis had now 9,000 men collected at Oimbra and Monterey, and it -might have been expected that he would have moved forward to defend -the line of the Minho and the bridge of Orense, as soon as he heard -of the eastward march of the 2nd Corps. He made no such advance: his -dispatches show that the sole precautions which he took were to send -some officers with fifty men to aid the peasants of the lower Minho, -and afterwards to order another party, only 100 strong, to make sure -that the ferry-boats between Tuy and Orense were all destroyed or -removed--a task which (as we have already seen) they did not fully -perform. If he had brought up his whole force, instead of sending -out these paltry detachments, he would have made the task of Soult -infinitely more bloody and dangerous, though probably he could not -have prevented the Marshal from carrying out his plan. His quiescence -is not to be explained as resulting from a reluctance to fight, -though he was fully conscious of the low _morale_ of his army, and -was at his wits’ end to complete its dilapidated equipment. It came -from another cause, and one much less creditable to his military -capacity. Underrating Soult’s force, which he placed at 12,000 -instead of 22,000 men, he was labouring under the idea that the 2nd -Corps was about to retire from Galicia altogether, in face of the -general insurrection and the want of food. The march of the French to -Orense appeared in his eyes as the first stage of a retreat up the -valley of the Sil to Ponferrada and Astorga, and he imagined that the -province would soon be quit of them. Hence he contented himself with -stirring up the peasantry, and left to them the task of harassing -Soult’s columns, being resolved to make the proverbial ‘bridge of -gold’ for a flying enemy. From this vain dream he was soon to be -awakened. - -From the 21st to the 24th of February the Duke of Dalmatia was busily -employed in bringing up the rear divisions of his army to Orense. -None of them reached that place without fighting, for the bands which -had been driven off by Heudelet and Lahoussaye returned to worry -the troops of Delaborde, Merle, and Mermet, when they traversed the -route from Salvatierra to Orense. Jardon’s brigade of the last-named -division had a sharp fight near Rivadavia, and Merle had to clear -his way at Crecente by cutting to pieces a body of insurgents which -had fortified itself in that village. When the whole army was -concentrated between Rivadavia and Orense, the Marshal sent out large -detachments to sweep the valleys in the immediate neighbourhood of -those places. They found armed peasantry in every direction, but in -each case succeeded in thrusting them back into their hills, and -returned to Orense driving before them large herds of cattle, and -dragging behind them country wagons with a considerable amount of -grain. The longest and most important of these expeditions was one -made by Franceschi, who marched, with his own horsemen and one of -Heudelet’s brigades, along the road which the whole army was destined -to take in its invasion of Portugal. They routed one band of peasants -at Allariz, and another at Ginzo, half way to Monterey [February 23]. -Still there was no sign of La Romana’s army, which remained behind -the mountains of the Sierra Cabrera in complete quiescence, though -Franceschi’s advanced posts were only twenty miles away[213]. - - [213] Le Noble says (p. 96) that at Ginzo the peasants had with - them General Mahy and La Romana’s vanguard division. But General - Arteche gives documentary evidence (p. 347) to prove that on that - day Mahy and his troops were at Baltar, twenty miles away behind - the mountains. If there were regulars present they were only - detachments or stragglers. - -Soult kept his head quarters at Orense for nine days, during which -he was busied in collecting stores of food, repairing his artillery, -whose carriages had been badly shaken by the villainous roads, and in -endeavouring to pacify the country-side by proclamations and circular -letters to the notables and clergy. In this last scheme he met with -little success; from the bishop of Orense downwards almost every -leading man had taken refuge in the hills, and refused to return. -Silence or defiant replies answered the Marshal’s epistolary efforts. -His promises of protection and good government were sincere enough; -but the commentary on them was given by the excesses and atrocities -which his troops were committing in every outlying village. It was -not likely that the Galicians would come down from their fastnesses -to surrender[214]. - - [214] For the bishop of Orense’s sarcastic reply see Arteche, v. - 351. For the general effect of the proclamation see St. Chamans: - of the atrocities of the French, _Los Guerrilleros Gallegos_ give - ample and sometimes incredible accounts. - -The general advance of the army towards Portugal had been fixed for -March 4. It was not made under the most cheerful conditions. Not -only were the neighbouring peasantry still defiant as ever, but -bad news had come from the north. An aide-de-camp of Marshal Ney, -who had struggled through to Orense in despite of the insurgents, -brought a letter from his chief, which reported that the rising had -become general throughout the province, and apparently expressed -strong doubts as to the wisdom of invading Portugal before Galicia -was subdued. The Duke of Elchingen, as it would seem, wished his -colleague to draw back, and to aid him in suppressing the bands of -the coast and the upper Minho [215]. He might well doubt whether the -6th Corps would suffice for this task, if the 2nd Corps marched far -away towards Oporto, and got completely out of touch. Soult, however, -had the Emperor’s orders to advance into Portugal in his pocket. He -knew that if he disobeyed them no excuse would propitiate his master. -Probably he was not sorry to leave to Ney the unenviable task of -dealing with the ubiquitous and irrepressible Galician insurgents. -He sent back the message that he should march southward on March 4, -and continued his preparations. This resolve was not to the liking -of some of his subordinates: many of the officers who had served -with Junot in Portugal by no means relished the idea of returning to -that country. They did not conceal their feelings, and made the most -gloomy prophecies about the fate of the expedition. It was apparently -Loison who formed the centre of this clique of malcontents: he found -many sympathizers among his subordinates. Their discontent was the -basis upon which, two months later, the strange and obscure ‘Oporto -Conspiracy’ of Captain D’Argenton was to be based. At the present -moment, however, they contented themselves with denunciations of -the madness of the Emperor in planning the expedition, and of the -blind obedience of the Marshal in undertaking it. They told their -comrades that the numbers, courage, and ferocity of the Galicians -were as nothing compared with those of their southern neighbours, and -that during the oncoming operations those who found a sudden death -upon the battle-field would be lucky, for the Portuguese not only -murdered but tortured the prisoners, the wounded, and the stragglers. -It was fortunate for Soult that the majority of his officers paid -comparatively little attention to these forebodings, which they -rightly ascribed to the feelings of resentment and humiliation with -which the members of Junot’s army remembered the story of their -former disasters[216]. But it did not make matters easier for the -Marshal that even a small section of his lieutenants disbelieved in -the feasibility of his undertaking, and expected disaster to ensue. -Yet the opening scenes of the invasion of Portugal were to be so -brilliant and fortunate, that for a time the murmurs of the prophets -of evil were hushed. - - [215] See Le Noble (p. 98) for this dispatch and its effect on - the _morale_ of the army. - - [216] For the malcontents and their views see Le Noble, pp. - 98-9. St. Chamans, on the other hand (p. 119), says that the - army started in good spirits and with a great contempt for all - insurgents, Spanish or Portuguese. As a trusted staff officer of - the Marshal, he no doubt represents the optimistic view at head - quarters. - -On March 4 the Marshal’s head quarters were moved forward from Orense -to Alariz, on the road to Monterey and the frontier. The main body of -the army accompanied him, but Franceschi and Heudelet were already -far in front at Ginzo, only separated from La Romana’s outposts by -the Sierra Cabrera. From that point there are two difficult but -practicable roads[217] into Portugal: the one descends the valley of -the Lima and leads to Oporto by Viana and the coast. It is easier -than the second or inland route, which after crossing the Sierra -Cabrera descends to Monterey and Chaves, the frontier town of the -Portuguese province of Tras-os-Montes. But every military reason -impelled Soult to choose the second alternative. By marching on Viana -he would leave La Romana, whose presence he had now discovered, far -in his rear. The Marquis would be a bad general indeed if he did not -seize the opportunity of slipping back into Galicia, reoccupying -Orense, and setting the whole country-side aflame. It was infinitely -preferable to fall upon him from the front, rout him, and fling him -back among the Portuguese. Accordingly Franceschi, leading the whole -army, crossed the mountains on the fifth, and came hurtling into La -Romana’s cantonments long ere he was expected. Heudelet was just -behind him, Mermet and Delaborde a march further back: Merle brought -up the rear, guarding a convoy of 800 sick and wounded whom the -Marshal had resolved to bring on with him, rather than to leave them -at Orense to fall a prey to the insurgents. The dragoons of Lorges -and Lahoussaye were kept out on the right and left respectively, -watching the one the valley of the Lima, the other the head waters of -the Tamega. - - [217] There was also a third road, that by Montalegre and - Ruivaens, by which Soult ultimately evacuated Portugal; but as it - was not available for wheeled traffic, it could not be used by an - army with artillery. - -Down to the last moment the Marquis had been giving out his intention -of retiring into Portugal and co-operating with General Silveira, the -commandant of the Tras-os-Montes, in the defence of Chaves and the -line of the Tamega. But he was on very strained terms with his ally, -who showed no great alacrity to receive the Spaniards across the -frontier: his troops had been quarrelling with the Portuguese, and -he was very reluctant to expose his half-rallied battalions to the -ordeal of a battle, which Silveira openly courted. - -On the very day on which Soult started from Orense, La Romana made -up his mind that, instead of joining the Portuguese, he would -escape eastwards by the single road, over and above that of Chaves, -which was open to him. Accordingly his army suddenly started off, -abandoning the meagre magazines which it had collected at Oimbra -and Verin, and made for Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of the -province of Leon, by the road which coasts along the north side of -the Portuguese frontier, through Osoño and La Gudina. This sudden -move bore the appearance of a mean desertion of the Portuguese in -their day of peril: but it was in other respects wise and prudent. -It discomfited all Soult’s plans, since he failed to catch the -army of Galicia, which escaped him and placed itself on his flank -and rear instead of on his front. It was small consolation to the -Marshal that Franceschi came on the rearguard of the Spaniards at -La Trepa near Osoño and routed it. Seven skeleton regiments, only -1,200 bayonets in all, under General Mahy, were caught retiring along -a hillside and completely ridden down by the French cavalry. Three -standards and 400 prisoners were captured, 300 men more were killed, -the rest dispersed. But La Romana’s main body, meanwhile, had got -away in safety, and Soult had failed to strike the blow which he -intended[218]. He was soon to hear of the Marquis again, in quarters -where he little expected and still less desired to find him[219]. - - [218] Compare the narrative of the colonel of the Barcelona Light - Infantry, printed by Arteche in v. 359-61 of his _Guerra de la - Independencia_, with the highly-coloured account in Le Noble, - 104-5. The seven Spanish Corps engaged were Segovia, Zamora, - Barcelona, Majorca, Orense, Betanzos, Aragon. None of them had - more than 200 bayonets in line: the Galician regiments far less. - The three last-named corps lost a flag each. [Betanzos should be - substituted for Tuy in the list in Le Noble, p. 105, line 10.] - - [219] Napier (ii. 47) is wrong in saying that La Romana escaped - via Braganza; he did not enter Portugal, but kept on his own side - of the frontier, on the Monterey-La Gudina-Puebla de Senabria - road. - -Meanwhile the Portuguese were left alone to bear the brunt of the -attack of the 2nd Corps. It is time to relate and explain their -position, their resources, and their designs. - - - - -SECTION XIII: CHAPTER II - -PORTUGAL AT THE MOMENT OF SOULT’S INVASION: THE NATION, THE REGENCY, -AND SIR JOHN CRADOCK - - -Soult’s vanguard crossed the Portuguese frontier between Monterey and -Chaves on March 9, 1809: it was exactly five months since the last -of Junot’s troops had evacuated the realm on October 9, 1808. In the -period which had elapsed between those two dates much might have been -done to develop--or rather to create--a scheme of national defence -and a competent army. Unhappily for Portugal the Regency had not -risen to the opportunity, and when the second French invasion came -upon them the military organization of the realm was still in a state -of chaos. - -During the autumn months of 1808 the Portuguese Government had been -almost as sanguine and as careless as the Spanish Supreme Junta. -They had seen Junot beaten and expelled: they still beheld a large -British army in their midst; and they did not comprehend the full -extent of the impending danger, when the news came that Bonaparte was -nearing the Pyrenees, and that the columns of the ‘Grand Army’ were -debouching into the Peninsula. It was not till Moore had departed -that they began to conceive certain doubts as to the situation: nor -was it till Madrid had fallen that they at last realized that the -invader was once more at their gates, and that they must prepare to -defend themselves. - -There were still two months of respite granted to them. -Portugal--like Andalusia--was saved for a moment by Moore’s march to -Sahagun. The great field army which Napoleon had collected for the -advance on Lisbon was turned off northwards to pursue the British, -and on the New Year’s day of 1809 the only French force in proximity -to the frontier of the realm was the division of Lapisse, which -Bonaparte had dropped at Salamanca to form the connecting link -between Soult and Ney in Galicia, and the troops under Victor and -King Joseph in the vicinity of Madrid. - -But the danger was only postponed, not averted, by Moore’s daring -irruption into Old Castile. This the Portuguese Regency understood; -and during the first two months of 1809 they displayed a considerable -amount of energy, though it was in great part energy misdirected. -Their chief blunder was that instead of straining every nerve to -complete their regular army, on which the main stress of the invasion -was bound to fall, they diverted much of their zeal to the task of -raising a vast _levée en masse_ of the whole able-bodied population -of the realm. This error had its roots in old historical memories. -The deliverance of Portugal from the Spanish yoke in the long war of -independence in the seventeenth century, had been achieved mainly -by the _Ordenanza_, the old constitutional force of the realm, -which resembled the English _Fyrd_ of the Middle Ages. It had done -good service again in the wars of 1703-12, and even in the shorter -struggle of 1762. But in the nineteenth century it was no longer -possible to reckon upon it as a serious line of defence, especially -when the enemy to be held back was not the disorderly Spanish army -but the legions of Bonaparte. When there were not even arms enough -in Portugal to supply the line-battalions with a musket for every -man, it was insane to summon together huge masses of peasantry, and -to make over to them some of the precious firearms which should -have been reserved for the regulars. The majority, however, of the -_Ordenanza_ were not even supplied with muskets, they were given -pikes--weapons with which their ancestors had done good service in -1650, but which it was useless to serve out in 1809. The Regency -had procured some 17,000[220] from the British Government, and had -caused many thousands more to be manufactured. Both on the northern -and the eastern frontier great hordes of country-folk, equipped with -these useless and antiquated arms, were gathered together. Destitute -of discipline and of officers, insufficiently supplied with food, -the prey of every rumour, true or false, that ran along the border, -they were a source of danger rather than of strength to the realm. -The cry of ‘treachery,’ which inevitably arises among armed mobs, -was always being raised in their encampments. Hence came tumults and -murders, for the peasantry had a strong suspicion of the loyalty of -the governing classes--the result of the subservience to the French -invader which had been displayed by many of the authorities, both -civil and military, in 1808. Orders which they did not understand, -or into which a sinister meaning could be read by a suspicious mind, -generally caused a riot, and sometimes the assassination of the -unfortunate commander whom the Regency had placed over the horde. -In Oporto the state of affairs was particularly bad: the bishop, -though a sincere patriot and a man of energy, had drunk too deeply -of the delights of power during his rule in the summer months. After -being made a member of the Regency by Dalrymple, he should have -remained at Lisbon and worked with his colleagues. But returning to -his own flock, he reassumed the authority which he had possessed -during the early days of the insurrection, and pursued a policy of -his own, which often differed from that of his Regency at large, and -was sometimes in flagrant opposition to it. His position, in fact, -was similar to that of Palafox at Saragossa, and like the Aragonese -general he often practised the arts of demagogy in order to keep -firm his influence over the populace. He was all for the system of -the _levée en masse_; and summoned together unmanageable bands which -he was able neither to equip nor to control. He praised their zeal, -was wilfully blind to their frequent excesses, and seldom tried to -turn their energies into profitable channels. Indeed, he was so -ignorant of military matters himself, that he had no useful orders -to give. He ignored the advice of the Portuguese generals in his -district, and got little profit from that of two foreign officers -whom the British Government sent him--the Hanoverian General Von -der Decken and the Prussian Baron Eben. These gentlemen he seems to -have conciliated, and to have played off against the native military -authorities. But if they gave him good counsel, there are no signs in -his actions that he turned it to account. All the British witnesses -who passed through Oporto in January and February 1809, describe the -place as being in a state of patriotic frenzy, and under mob law -rather than administered by any regular and legal government[221]. -The only fruitful military effort made in this part of Portugal was -that of the gallant Sir Robert Wilson, who raised there in November -and December his celebrated ‘Loyal Lusitanian Legion.’ This was -intended to be the core of a subsidiary Portuguese division in -British pay, distinct from the national army. When Wilson arrived -in Oporto the bishop welcomed him, and forwarded in every way the -formation of the corps. In a few days the Legion had 3,000 recruits -of excellent quality, of whom Wilson could arm and clothe only some -1,300, for the equipment which he had brought with him was limited. -He soon discovered, however, that the bishop’s zeal in his behalf was -mainly due to the desire to have a solid force at hand which should -be independent of the Portuguese generals. He wished the Legion to -be, as it were, his own body-guard. Sir Robert was ill pleased, and -being unwilling to mix himself in the domestic feuds of the bishop -and the Regency, or to become the tool of a faction, quitted Oporto -as soon as his men could march. With one strong battalion, a couple -of squadrons of cavalry, and an incomplete battery--under 1,500 men -in all--he moved first to Villa Real (Dec. 14), and then to the -frontier, where he posted himself near Almeida and took over the task -of observing Lapisse’s division, which from its base at Salamanca -was threatening the Portuguese border. Of his splendid services in -this direction we shall have much to tell. The unequipped portion of -the Legion, left behind at Oporto, was handed over to Baron Eben, -and became involved in the tumultuous and unhappy career of the -bishop[222]. - - [220] List of Arms sent to Portugal on p. 9 of _Parliamentary - Papers_ for 1809. - - [221] The Portuguese volume for December 1808 and - January-February 1809 in the Record Office being mysteriously - lost, Cradock’s correspondence and that of the other British - officers in Portugal is no longer available. But Napier took - copious notes from it, while it was still forthcoming; they will - be found on pp. 425-31 of his vol. ii, and bear witness to a - complete state of anarchy in Oporto. - - [222] The first battalion used to call the second ‘Baron Eben’s - runaways’ when they met again, as Mayne assures us in his - _History of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion_. - -Meanwhile Lisbon was almost as disturbed as Oporto, and might -have lapsed into the same state of anarchy, if a British garrison -had not been on the spot. The mistaken policy of the Regency had -led to the formation of sixteen so-called ‘legions[223]’ in the -capital and suburbs. These tumultuary levies had few officers and -hardly any arms but pikes. They were under no sort of discipline, -and devoted themselves to the self-imposed duty of hunting for -spies and ‘_Afrancesados_.’ Led by demagogues of the streets, they -paraded up and down Lisbon to beat of drum, arresting persons whom -they considered suspicious, especially foreign residents of all -nationalities. The Regency having issued a decree prohibiting this -practice [January 29], the armed levies only assembled in greater -numbers next night, and engaged in a general chase after unpopular -citizens, policemen, and aliens of all kinds. Many fugitives were -only saved from death by taking refuge in the guard-houses and the -barracks where the garrison was quartered. Isolated British soldiers -were assaulted, some were wounded, and parties of ‘legionaries’ -actually stopped aides-de-camp and orderlies carrying dispatches, -and stripped them of the documents they were bearing. The mob was -inclined, indeed, to be ill-disposed towards their allies, from the -suspicion that they were intending to evacuate Lisbon and to retire -from the Peninsula. They had seen the baggage and non-combatants -left behind by Moore put on ship-board; early in February they -beheld the troops told off for the occupation of Cadiz embark and -disappear. When they also noticed that the forts at the Tagus mouth -were being dismantled[224] they made up their minds that the British -were about to desert them, without making any attempt to defend -Portugal. Hence came the malevolent spirit which they displayed. It -died down when their suspicions were proved unfounded by the arrival -of Beresford and other British officers, at the beginning of March, -with resources for the reorganization of the Portuguese army, and -still more when a little later heavy reinforcements from England -began to pour into the city. But in the last days of January and the -first of February matters at Lisbon had been in a most dangerous and -critical condition: the Regency, utterly unable to keep order, had -hinted to Sir John Cradock that he must take his own measures against -the mob, and for several days the British general had kept the -garrison under arms, and planted artillery in the squares and broader -streets--exactly as Junot had done seven months before. The ‘legions’ -were cowed, and most fortunately no collision occurred: if a single -shot had been fired in anger, there would have been an end of the -Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and it is more than likely that Cradock--a -man of desponding temperament--would have abandoned the country. - - [223] They were raised by a decree of Dec. 23, 1808. - - [224] This was a proper precaution, as the sea-forts could be of - no use for defending Lisbon from a land attack, while, if Lisbon - got into French hands again, they would have been invaluable for - resisting an attack from the side of the sea. But Cradock was far - too precipitate in commencing an operation which betrayed such - want of confidence. - -His force at this moment was by no means large: when Moore marched -for Salamanca in October he had left behind in Portugal six -battalions of British and four of German infantry[225], three -squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons (the regiment that had been so -much cut up at Vimiero), one of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the King’s -German Legion, and five batteries, only one of which was horsed. -From Salamanca, when on the eve of starting on the march to Sahagun, -Sir John had sent back two regiments to Portugal, in charge of his -great convoys of sick and heavy baggage[226]. To compensate for this -deduction from his army he had called up a brigade of the troops left -in Portugal; but only one battalion of it--the 82nd--reached him -in time to join in his Castilian campaign[227]. The net result was -that seven British infantry regiments from Moore’s army were left -behind, in addition to the four German corps. Two more had arrived -from England in November[228], and a fresh regiment of dragoons in -December[229]. - - [225] These were the 2/9th, 29th, 1/40th, 1/45th, 82nd, 97th, - and 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th line battalions of the King’s German - Legion. - - [226] The 1/3rd and 5/60th. The last battalion was mainly - composed of foreigners, and had received more than 200 recruits - from the deserters of Junot’s army. Moore would not trust it, and - sent it back. It afterwards did splendid service under Wellesley. - - [227] The battalions that did not get up in time were the 1/45th - and 97th. - - [228] These were the 3/27th and 2/31st, which had sailed with - Baird from Portsmouth, but were sent on from Corunna to Lisbon - when the rest of Baird’s expedition landed in Galicia. - - [229] The 14th Light Dragoons. - -Thus when Sir John Cradock took over the command at Lisbon on -December 14, 1808, he had at his disposal in all thirteen battalions -of infantry, seven squadrons of cavalry, and five batteries, a force -of about 12,000 men[230]. But not more than 10,000 were effective, -for Sir John Moore had left behind precisely those of his regiments -which were most sickly, when he marched for Spain. He had moreover -discharged more than 2,000 additional sick upon Portugal ere he began -field operations: they were encumbering the hospitals of Almeida and -Lamego when Cradock appeared. The 10,000 men fit for service were -scattered all over Portugal: the two battalions, which had just come -back from Spain, and the two others which had been too late to join -Moore, were in the north, at Almeida and Lamego[231]. One battalion -was in garrison at Elvas[232]. Six lay in Lisbon, as also did the -whole of the cavalry and guns[233]: two were on the march from -Abrantes to Almeida[234]. - - [230] Napier (ii. 5) much under-estimates when he calls the - whole ‘10,000 including sick.’ Cradock’s regiments add up to - about 12,133 men including those in hospital. In addition there - were all Moore’s sick, who, though many had died in the interim, - presented on Feb. 18 in Portugal convalescents to the number of - 2,000 men. - - [231] The 1/3rd, 1/45th, 5/60th, and 97th. - - [232] The 1/40th. - - [233] The four German battalions, the 3/27th and 2/31st. - - [234] The 2/9th and 29th. - -Such a dispersion of forces would have appalled the most enterprising -of generals, and this was a title to which Cradock had certainly no -claims. The two obvious courses between which he had to choose, were -either to concentrate his little army on the frontier and make as -much display of it in the face of the French as might be possible, -or to abandon all idea of protecting exterior Portugal, and collect -the scattered regiments in or about Lisbon. Cradock chose the second -alternative. He argued that he was too weak to be of any effectual -service on the frontier, and moreover found that there would be a -vast difficulty in moving forward even the Lisbon garrison, for -nearly all the available transport had been requisitioned for the -use of Moore’s army, and had been carried off into Spain. Neither of -these pleas is convincing: with regard to the first, it is merely -necessary to point out that Sir Robert Wilson, with 1,500 men of -the Lusitanian Legion, not yet three months old, made his presence -felt on the frontier, checked Lapisse, and kept the whole province -of Salamanca in a state of unrest. Ten thousand British bayonets -and sabres could have done much more. As to the food and supplies, -Cradock was arguing in the old eighteenth-century style, as if a -British army was bound to move with all its baggage and impedimenta, -its women and children. If he had chosen to ‘march light,’ and to -take the route through the fertile and well-peopled Estremadura, he -could have reached Abrantes or Almeida or any other goal that he -chose. - -The fact was that the reasons for refusing to adopt a ‘forward -policy’ were moral and not physical. Cradock, in common with Sir John -Moore and many other British officers, believed that Portugal could -not be defended, and was thinking more of securing himself a safe -embarkation than of exercising any influence on the main current of -the war. - -When Moore’s army had passed out of sight, and was known to be -retiring in the direction of Galicia, it seemed to Cradock that -his own position was hopeless. Even if granted time to concentrate -his scattered battalions, he would be forced to fly to the sea and -take shipping the moment that any serious French force crossed the -frontier. He had not sufficiently accurate information to enable him -to see that both Lapisse at Salamanca, and the weak divisions of the -4th Corps which lay in the valley of the Tagus, could not possibly -move forward against him. It would have been insane for either of -these forces to have attacked Portugal--the one was at this moment -less than 10,000, the other about 12,000 strong--they were without -communications, and separated by 100 miles of pathless sierras. -Moreover the troops in the valley of the Tagus were fully occupied in -observing the Spanish army of Estremadura. At the opening of the New -Year, therefore, Cradock was in absolutely no danger, and might have -gone forward either to Abrantes or to Almeida in perfect security. In -the first position he would have menaced the flank of the 4th Corps: -in the second he would have exercised a useful pressure on Lapisse. -In either case he would have encouraged the Portuguese and lent moral -support to the Spaniards. - -But Cradock was possessed by that miserable theory which was so -frequently expounded by the men of desponding mind during the -early years of the Peninsular War, to the effect that Portugal was -indefensible, and would have to be evacuated whenever a strong French -force approached its frontier[235]. It was fortunate for England and -for Europe that Wellesley had other views. The history of the next -three years was to show that a British general could find something -better to do than to pack up his baggage and prepare to embark, -whenever the enemy came down in superior strength to the Portuguese -border. - - [235] Sir John Moore himself ventilated this view in a letter - to Lord Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 25, 1808. It is this - fact that explains Napier’s very tender treatment of Cradock, - who quoted Moore as his justifying authority. Moreover Cradock - had been very obliging in placing all his papers at Napier’s - disposal, a fact which prepossessed the historian in his favour. - -No doubt Cradock would have had to take to his transports if the -French had possessed on January 1, 1809, an army of 40,000 men -available for the invasion of Portugal, and ready to advance. They -did not happen to own any such force; and till he was certain that -such a force existed, Cradock was gravely to blame for ordering every -British soldier to fall back on Lisbon, and for openly commencing to -destroy the sea-forts of the capital. It is true that the dispatches -which he received from home gave him many directions as to what he -was to do if the enemy appeared in overpowering strength: he was to -blow up the shore batteries, destroy all military and naval stores, -and embark with the British troops and as many Portuguese as could -be induced to follow. But this was only to take place ‘upon the -actual approach of the enemy towards Lisbon in such strength as may -render all further resistance ineffectual[236].’ To commence these -preparations when the nearest troops of the enemy were at Salamanca -and Almaraz was premature and precipitate in the highest degree. Till -the French began to move, every endeavour should have been made to -encourage the Portuguese and to maintain a show--even if it were but -a vain show--of an intention to defend the frontier. If Lapisse had -heard that Cradock was at Almeida he would have been nailed down to -Salamanca: if Victor had heard that he was at Alcantara, or even at -Abrantes, he would never have dared to pursue Cuesta into southern -Estremadura. - - [236] Castlereagh to Cradock, Dec. 24, 1808. Napier makes on - this the curious remark that the ministry gave contradictory - orders when they told Cradock to make a show of preparation for - resistance, yet to get ready for embarkation if it should prove - necessary. - -Cradock, however, drew into Lisbon every available man: Brigadier -Cameron, with the troops from Almeida and Oporto, started back on a -weary march from the north, via Coimbra, bringing not only his own -four battalions, but 1,500 convalescents and returned stragglers from -Moore’s army. Richard Stewart, with the two battalions that had been -at Abrantes, also came in to the capital, and all the British troops -were concentrated by the beginning of February, save the 40th regiment, -which still lay at Elvas. Having thus got together about 10,000 men, -Cradock, with almost incredible timidity, began to draw them back to -Passo d’Arcos, a place behind Lisbon near the mouth of the Tagus, from -which embarkation was easy. When Villiers, the British minister at -Lisbon, remonstrated with him on the deplorable political consequences -of assuming this ignoble position on the water’s edge, Cradock replied, -“I must object to take up a ‘false position,’ say Alcantara, or to -occupy the heights in front of Lisbon, which would only defend a -certain position, and leave the remainder [of Portugal?] to the power -of the enemy, one which we must leave upon his approach, and seek -another, bearing the appearance of flight, and yet not securing our -retreat. The whole having announced the intention of defending Lisbon, -but giving up that idea upon the approach of the enemy, for positions -liable to be turned on every side cannot be persevered in by an -inferior force.” - -On the day [February 15] upon which Cradock wrote this extraordinary -piece of English prose composition, whose grammar is as astounding -as its argument, the nearest French troops were at Tuy in Galicia, -Salamanca in Leon, and the bridge of Arzobispo on the central Tagus, -points respectively 230, 250, and 240 miles distant from Lisbon as -the crow flies, and infinitely more by road. Further comment is -hardly necessary. - -At this moment Cradock might have had at his disposal 2,000 more -British troops, but he had chosen to fall in with Sir George Smith’s -hasty and unauthorized scheme for the occupation of Cadiz[237], -and had sent off to that port a whole brigade[238], under General -Mackenzie. He also dispatched orders to Colonel Kemmis of the 40th -to hand over Elvas to the Portuguese, and march to Seville. The -battalion moved into Andalusia, and placed itself at the disposition -of Mr. Frere, who found it as useless as the force which Smith had -drawn off to Cadiz. It was several months before the 40th rejoined -the army of Portugal. - - [237] See p. 27. - - [238] The 3/27th, 2/9th, 29th, and some small details of - artillery, &c. - -Influenced by the remonstrances of Mr. Villiers, and somewhat -comforted by the fact that the French armies had nowhere crossed the -Portuguese frontier, Cradock was at last persuaded to give up his -position at Passo d’Arcos; he fixed his head quarters at Lumiar, left -2,000 men in garrison at Lisbon, and cantoned the remainder of his -army at Saccavem and other places a few miles in front of the city. -This was better than leaving them on the sea-shore; but the move was -no more than a miserable half measure. It was almost as indicative -of an intention to depart without fighting as the retreat to Passo -d’Arcos had been. In short, from January to the end of April the -British army exercised no influence whatever on the military affairs -of the Peninsula. Yet by March it was beginning to grow formidable -in numbers: early in that month all the troops which had been drawn -off to Cadiz were sent to Lisbon, and by the addition of seven good -battalions to his corps[239] Cradock found himself at the head of -over 16,000 men. There were but 800 effective cavalry, and of the six -batteries only two, incredible as it may seem, were properly horsed, -though three months had passed by since the general had begun his -first complaints on this point[240]. But 16,000 British troops were -a force not to be despised, and if Wellesley or some other competent -officer had been in command, we cannot doubt that they would have -been turned to some profitable use. Under Cradock they remained -cantoned in the suburbs of Lisbon for the whole time during which -Soult was completing his conquest of Oporto and northern Portugal, -and Victor executing his invasion of Estremadura. It was not till -Soult’s advanced guard was on the Vouga [April 6] that Hill and -Beresford[241] succeeded in inducing the general to carry forward his -head quarters to Leiria and his outposts to Thomar[242]. Fortunately -his tenure of command was at last drawing to an end. On April 22 Sir -Arthur Wellesley arrived in Lisbon and took over charge of the troops -in Portugal. How startling were the consequences of this change of -generals we shall soon see: ere May was out the whole Peninsula -realized once more that there was a British Army within its limits--a -fact that might well have passed unnoticed during the last four -months. - - [239] Not only Mackenzie’s brigade, but also Tilson’s brigade, - the 2/87th and 1/88th, and the stronger battalions of H. - Campbell, which had gone to Cadiz directly from England--the - first battalions of the 2nd (Coldstream) and 3rd (Scots Fusilier) - Guards. - - [240] In a letter of March 20 to Mr. Villiers, Cradock makes the - astounding statement that after scouring all Portugal for horses - for three months, he was still unable to provide them for four - out of his six batteries. - - [241] Cradock’s controversial letters to Lord Londonderry, - printed in the latter’s history (ii. 286-7), do no more than bear - out Londonderry’s accusations of torpidity against Sir John. - - [242] Cradock contended that before the arrival of Hill and - Sherbrooke and the return of Mackenzie from Cadiz, he had only - 10,225 men, and, deducting sick and garrisons for the Lisbon - forts, could only have marched out with 5,221. [Letter to - Londonderry on p. 302, vol. ii. of the latter’s work.] He had - sent 3,500 men to Cadiz and Seville, on Sir George Smith’s - unhappy inspiration, or his force would have been much larger. - As to the resolution to march against Soult, which he afterwards - claimed to have made, it is sufficient to say that Wellesley on - his arrival wrote to Castlereagh that ‘Sir John Cradock does - not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving - forward: on the contrary he appears (by his letters to Mr. - Villiers) to have intended to go no further till he should hear - of Victor’s movements.’ [_Well. Corresp._, Lisbon, April 24.] - - - - -SECTION XIII: CHAPTER III - -THE PORTUGUESE ARMY: ITS HISTORY AND ITS REORGANIZATION - - -While the Regency was wasting much of its energy on the arming of -the undisciplined masses of the _Ordenanza_, and while Cradock sat -supine at Passo d’Arcos and at Saccavem, one useful piece of work at -least was being taken in hand. This was the reorganization of the -Portuguese regular army, a task which the Regency determined, though -only so late as February, 1809, to hand over to a British general -officer. - -To explain the chaotic condition of the force at the moment when -Soult was just about to enter Portugal, a short account of its -previous history is necessary. It had received its existing shape -from a foreign hand, that of the well-known ‘Conde de La Lippe,’ -i.e. the German Marshal, Frederick Count of Lippe-Bückeburg, who -had been entrusted with its command during the short war with Spain -in 1762. He it was who first gave Portugal an army of the modern -type, modelled on the ordinary system of the eighteenth century, -and showing many traces of adaptations from a Prussian original. -The Marshal was a great organizer and a man of mark: his name is -perhaps best remembered in connexion with the citadel of Elvas, -which he rebuilt, and christened La Lippe after himself: under that -designation we shall repeatedly have to mention it while describing -the early years of the Peninsular War. - -As he left it, the Portuguese army consisted of twenty-four regiments -of the line, each forming a single battalion of seven companies and -806 men. There were twelve regiments of cavalry, each originally -composed of no more than 240 sabres, and three regiments of artillery -of eight batteries each, besides a few garrison companies of that -arm. After La Lippe’s departure the army had shared in the general -decay of strength and organization in the kingdom, which prevailed -during the reign of the mad queen Maria, and her son the feeble -Prince-Regent John. But the lack of mere numerical strength was not -nearly so fatal to its efficiency as the rustiness and rottenness of -its internal machinery. Under an octogenarian commander-in-chief, the -Duke of Alafoens, every department of the army had been decaying in -the latter years of the eighteenth century. All the typical faults -of an army of the _ancien régime_ after a long period of peace were -developed to the highest possible pitch. Commissions were sold, or -given away by intrigue and corruption, often to persons of unsuitable -rank and education[243]: promotion was slow and perfectly arbitrary: -the pay of the officers was very low, while every incentive to petty -jobbing and embezzlement was afforded by the vicious system under -which the colonel contracted with the government for his regiment, -and the captain with the colonel for his company. In the Portuguese -army, as in all others where this antiquated practice prevailed, the -temptation to fill the muster-rolls with ‘dead-heads’ and absentees, -so that the contractor might save their food and pocket their pay, -had been too strong for the ordinary officer to resist. Hence came -the empty ranks of the battalions, the ludicrous disproportion -of horses to men in the cavalry, the depleted condition of the -regimental stores and equipment. - - [243] All authorities agree as to the inferior character and - status of a great part of the Portuguese officers. Dumouriez - remarks [1766] that ‘their pay does not enable them to live - better than the common soldiers, whose comrades and relatives - they often are. The subaltern ranks are filled from the - inferior classes, and their hatred of foreigners prevents their - association with, or receiving any improvement from, them: hence - it is that they remain in such ignorance and wretchedness’ (p. - 17). Halliday remarks (p. 106) that ‘even captains had not - the rank of gentlemen.’ Compare with this Patterson’s curious - note (vol. i. p. 250), ‘The familiarity that subsists between - the native officers and their men renders ineffective all - the authority of the former, at the same time defeating the - object to be attained by discipline. They eat, gamble, and - drink together. I have even seen them waltzing and figuring - off in the _contra-danza_, captains with corporals, majors - with drumboys--all Jack-fellows well met, and excellent boon - companions. They will not of themselves do anything, their good - qualities must be elicited by strangers. I know of nothing that - stamps the character of Lord Beresford as a man of energy and - perseverance, more than the way in which he has organized them, - and from a miserable undisciplined rabble produced, in course of - time, a fair body of fighting troops, who performed (encouraged - by their English officers) some spirited service during the war.’ - -The short Spanish war of 1801-2 had revealed the complete -disorganization of the army. Hasty measures were taken to strengthen -it: in the moment of panic every infantry regiment was ordered to -raise a second battalion, and though the number of companies per -battalion was lowered from seven to five, yet as each of them was -now to consist of 150 instead of 116 men, the total strength of each -infantry corps was raised to 1,500 officers and men. At the same time -the cavalry regiments were supposed to have been increased to 470 -sabres[244], and a fourth regiment of artillery was created. Nor was -this all: an ‘Experimental Legion’ for light infantry service, eight -companies strong, with a couple of squadrons and a horse-artillery -battery attached to it, was soon afterwards raised by the Marquis -D’Alorna. - - [244] Of these, twelve squadrons were originally cuirassiers - (Dumouriez, p. 18), but their armament had been discarded before - 1800, and one regiment only was light horse. - -But after the peace of Badajoz had been signed the army was allowed -to sink back into its old sloth and inefficiency. When Junot entered -Portugal in December, 1807, it is doubtful if there were as many -as 20,000 troops really embodied, though the nominal total of the -national army reached nearly 50,000 men[245]. - - [245] - - Twenty-four regiments of infantry of two battalions each 36,000 - twelve regiments of cavalry at 470 5,640 - four regiments of artillery at 989 3,956 - ten garrison companies of artillery (veterans) 1,300 - ‘Experimental Legion,’ engineers, &c. 1,500 - ------ - Total 48,396 - - Halliday gives an even larger figure, 52,204. - -Portugal had a few keen soldiers (such as Gomez Freire de Andrade, -and the renegade D’Alorna), who had received abroad a good military -education, and had even written military books. But the majority of -the officers were slack, ignorant, and incompetent; while the men -were half-drilled, badly disciplined, and ill-equipped. The only -attempt which had been made to introduce any of the modern military -discoveries which had been worked out in the wars of the French -Revolution, consisted in the creation of the already-mentioned -‘Experimental Legion’ which D’Alorna had been allowed to raise and -to train with a new light-infantry drill, adapted by himself from -French models. The main body of the army looked with some jealousy -and suspicion on this corps, and had made no effort to copy it. - -The French invasion of Portugal had dashed to pieces the old regular -army. Junot, it will be remembered, had disbanded the greater part -of the men, and formed with the remainder a few battalions, which he -had begun to send off to France ere the insurrection of June, 1808, -broke out. Some of them took an involuntary share in the first siege -of Saragossa: others were hurled into the red holocaust of Wagram. - -When Portugal rose against the invader, the local juntas endeavoured -to call back to arms all the dispersed officers and men, to serve as -a nucleus for the insurrectionary hosts. The system of recruiting -which La Lippe had introduced made this comparatively easy: he had -instituted regimental districts in a very complete form. Each corps -was named after a particular town or region[246], drew its conscripts -from that locality, and was usually quartered in it. When Junot -disbanded the old army, the men naturally returned to their homes. -It resulted that when, for example, the Oporto Junta summoned out -to service the late members of the 6th and 18th regiments of the -line, the two units belonging to the Oporto district, it could be -certain of finding the greater part of the rank and file without much -difficulty. To reconstitute in a hurry the corps of officers was a -much harder matter: a disproportionate number of the more competent -holders of commissions had been drafted into the contingent sent -to France: comparatively few resided in their proper regimental -districts, many in Lisbon, which was still in Junot’s hands. Hence -the battalions which fought under Leite at Evora, or accompanied -Wellesley to Vimiero, bore their old names indeed, but were not -merely ill-equipped and low in numbers, but lacked a due supply of -officers. Considering the inefficiency of the regiments even before -they were destroyed by Junot, they might now be described as no more -than ‘the shadow of a shade.’ - - [246] Except two Lisbon regiments, named Viera Tellez and Freire, - from former colonels of distinction [Nos. 4 and 16]. - -When the French had been driven out of Portugal, and the Junta of -Regency took in hand the reconstruction and enlargement of the army, -the problem of organization seemed almost insoluble. The government -decreed that the regiments of infantry of the line should be raised -to their full establishment of 1,500, a figure which they had never -really attained in the old days. It was also decided to create six -new battalions of riflemen (Cazadores), a class of infantry of -which D’Alorna’s ‘Experimental Legion’ had hitherto been the sole -representatives in Portugal. As to the cavalry and artillery, it was -an obvious fact that the dearth of horses in the kingdom made it -impossible to enlarge the number of units. The twelve old regiments -of horse[247], the thirty-two old batteries of artillery were to be -reconstructed, but no new ones were to be created. - - [247] It was intended, however, to give each cavalry regiment an - extra squadron. - -Considering that the old corps of officers in Portugal was -notoriously incompetent, it was hard to see how the expanded army was -to be drilled and disciplined. About 25,000 recruits were suddenly -shot into the old _cadres_; they could be readily procured, for -not only were volunteers forthcoming in great numbers, but if they -ran short a stringent conscription law was in existence. But how -were the regiments to be officered? It was true that a considerable -amount of the raw material for officers was obtainable, for patriotic -enthusiasm was driving the young men of the upper classes into the -army, in a way that had never before been seen--the service had not -hitherto been popular, owing to its poor pay and prospects. But one -cannot officer raw recruits with equally raw ensigns, and call the -result a regular army. Moreover, arms and equipment were lamentably -deficient: Junot had confiscated and destroyed almost all the store -of arms belonging to the old army: it is said that the insurgents -had not 10,000 serviceable muskets among them when Wellesley landed. -The British had distributed some 42,000 more between August and -December[248]; but what were these among so many? There were to be -over 50,000 regulars, when the establishment was completed, and -the Regency hoped to call out some 40,000 militia when the first line -of defence had been equipped, and after that to arm the vast masses -of the _Ordenanza_. - - [248] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1309. Return No. 5, p. 9. - -[Illustration: _Portuguese Dragoon of the 1st (Alcantara) Regiment_ - _From a drawing of 1809._ - _Walker & Cockerell Ph. Sc._] - -The natural results followed. In obedience to the decree issued by -the Regency, a considerable number of men were collected at each -regimental dépôt. Of these about one-third, on an average, were old -soldiers: but the proportion varied, for some corps had suffered more -than others from the drafts of trained men which Junot had sent off -to France. A good many of the regiments succeeded, so far as numbers -went, in constituting their two battalions without much difficulty. -Others were less fortunate, and could only raise one: two were so -hopelessly incomplete that Beresford distributed the few hundred men -whom they could produce among other corps, and temporarily disbanded -them[249]. It was the same with the cavalry, of which two regiments -were wholly without horses, and several were so absurdly short of -mounts that they could not be used[250]. Even of the corps which -were not dissolved, several were so weak that they had not recruited -themselves up to half their nominal strength even by September[251]. -This was more especially the case in the Alemtejo, where the -population displayed an apathy that contrasted strongly with the -turbulent enthusiasm prevalent in Lisbon and in the North. - - [249] The 8th and 22nd, both Alemtejo regiments, were entirely - drafted off, and were raised again afresh with recruits in the - autumn. - - [250] The 2nd and 3rd, both Alemtejo regiments, were never horsed - during the whole war, and did foot-service in garrisons of the - interior. - - [251] In September the 3rd, 5th, 15th, 21st, and 24th had not - raised their second battalions. Of these the 5th and 15th were - Alemtejo regiments. - -Two invaluable sets of Returns, in the Record Office, show us that, -as far as mere numbers went, the Regency had not done so much as -it should, in the way of increasing the total of men under arms, -during the two months that followed the Convention of Cintra. On -September 13, according to a report from Baron Decken, who had -gone round the insurrectionary armies of Freire, Leite, and the -Monteiro Mor, there were under arms 13,272 line infantry, 3,384 light -infantry (Cazadores), 1,812 cavalry, and 19,000 militia: the force -of artillery is not given. But of these 37,000 men only 13,600 -had serviceable weapons and equipment, and were fit to take the -field[252]. - - [252] Report of Baron Decken, Sept. 13, 1808 (Record Office). - -On November 26 these figures had risen to 22,361 infantry, 3,422 -cavalry, 4,031 artillery, and 20,880 militia. But, owing to the -importation of English muskets during the last two months, there were -now 31,833 men properly equipped, of whom 2,052 were mounted men. The -remaining 19,000 had still nothing more than pikes, or non-military -firearms, such as fowling-pieces and blunderbusses: 1,400 cavalry -were still without horses[253]. - - [253] Return of the Portuguese army, Nov. 26 (Record Office). - -The figures are very moderate, but the worst part of the situation -was that a collection of 1,000 or 1,500 men does not constitute -a regiment, even if 300 or 400 of them chance to have been old -soldiers. There were not, it is clear, muskets enough to arm more -than two-thirds of the rank and file: belts, pouches, knapsacks, and -other equipment were still more deficient. Yet the really fatal point -was that there was a wholly inadequate number of officers, and that -of those who were forthcoming the elder men were mostly incompetent, -and the younger entirely untrained. In the official correspondence of -the early months of 1809 the most prominent fact that emerges is the -difficulty that was found in discovering colonels and majors capable -of licking into shape the incoherent mass of men at the regimental -head quarters, and of teaching the newly-appointed junior officers -their duty. It seemed that their long peace-service in small garrison -towns had taken all energy and initiative out of the seniors of the -army of the _ancien régime_. They gazed with despair on the task -before them, and seemed quite incapable of coping with it. When a -British general took over the command of the Portuguese army, he -complained that ‘Long habits of disregard to duty, and consequent -laziness, make it not only difficult but almost impossible to induce -the senior officers of this service to enter into any regular and -continued attention to the duties of their situations, and neither -reward nor punishment will induce them to bear up against the -fatigue[254].’ It was only when a whole generation of colonels had -been cleared away that the army grew efficient, and the reorganized -regiments began to distinguish themselves in the field. - - [254] Beresford to Wellesley, _Wellington Supplementary - Dispatches_, vi. p. 774. - -For the purpose of mobilization every regiment had been sent in the -autumn of 1808 to its proper head quarters, in the centre of its -recruiting district. There they still lay in the end of February, -when Soult was drawing near the frontier. There was absolutely no -Portuguese army in the field, only a number of battalions, squadrons, -and batteries, in a more or less imperfect state of organization, -scattered broadcast over the country. They were, as we have already -seen, still insufficiently supplied with arms and equipment. Of -transport and train, to enable them to move, there was hardly a -trace. The only thing approaching a concentration of force was that -in Lisbon and its immediate vicinity there were seven regiments -of foot and three of horse, which were there assembled simply -because their head quarters and their recruiting ground lay in this -quarter[255]. Of the remainder of the infantry two regiments were in -Algarve, in the far south; five in the Alemtejo; four in Beira; two -in the Tras-os-Montes, four in Oporto and the adjoining province of -Entre-Douro-e-Minho. It was with the last six alone that Soult had to -deal when he invaded northern Portugal[256]: not one of the others -was moved up to aid the northern regiments in holding him back. - - [255] These were the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th of the - line, and the 1st, 4th, and 7th cavalry. Of the foot the 1st, - 4th, 10th, and 16th were Lisbon regiments, the 7th was named from - and belonged to Setubal, the 13th to Peniche, the 19th to Cascaes. - - [256] These were the 6th, 9th, 12th, 18th, 21st, and 24th. The - 6th and 18th belonged to Oporto, the 9th to Viana, the 12th to - Chaves, the 21st to Valenza, the 24th to Braganza. - -Impressed with the state of hopeless disarray in which their army -lay, and conscious that for stores and weapons to equip it, and money -to pay it, they could look only to Great Britain, the Regency asked -in February for the appointment of a British commander-in-chief. This -was the best pledge that they could give of their honest intention -to place all their military resources at the disposition of their -allies. It had another obvious advantage: Bernardino Freire, Leite, -Silveira, the Monteiro Mor, and the other Portuguese generals -commanding military districts were at feud with each other. It would -be very difficult to place one above the rest, and to secure for -him loyal co-operation from his subordinates. It was probable that -an Englishman, a stranger to their quarrels and intrigues, would be -better obeyed. - -The Regency, it would seem, suggested that they would be glad to see -the post of commander-in-chief given to Sir Arthur Wellesley. But -the victor of Vimiero refused to accept it, probably because he had -already secured from Lord Castlereagh the promise that he should be -sent out again to Portugal to supersede Cradock. When he had declined -the offer it was, to the surprise of most men, passed on to General -Beresford. This officer had the advantage of knowing Portuguese; he -had commanded one of Moore’s brigades during the Corunna retreat, -and had seen much service on both sides of the Atlantic. He was a -comparatively young man, being only in his forty-first year, and -was very junior in his rank, having only become a major-general in -1807. Many officers who were his elders had coveted the post, and -some friction was caused by the fact that with his new Portuguese -commission he outranked several of his seniors in Cradock’s army. -Beresford was a good fighting-man, and a hard worker; but he was -neither a tactician nor a strategist, and did not shine when placed -in independent command--as witness Albuera. When Wellington had -learnt his limitations, he never gave him a task of any great -difficulty, and in the later years of the war either kept him under -his own eye or sent him on errands where it was not easy to go -wrong. For really responsible work in 1812-14 he always used Hill, -Hope, or Graham. But in 1809 Beresford was, but for his undoubted -courage, more or less of an unknown quantity to his colleagues and -his subordinates. Fortunately he turned out a good organizer, if a -mediocre general. For what he did in the way of reforming, and almost -recreating, the Portuguese army he deserves considerable credit. -Every one will remember the quaint story of how he was received by -his army after a short absence, with the ingenuous cry of ‘Long live -Marshal Beresford--who takes care of our stomachs[257].’ This in -one way was a high compliment--it was not every general, English, -French, or Spanish, who succeeded in filling his soldiers’ bellies -during the Peninsular War. The power to do so was not the least among -the qualities necessary for a commander-in-chief. - - [257] The same story is told of General Robert Craufurd and his - cazadores, in Costello’s _Memoirs_. - -Why the British cabinet chose Beresford, from among many possible -candidates, for the very responsible post now put in his charge, it -is hard to see. Castlereagh knew him, as being (like himself) one of -a powerful Anglo-Irish family connexion, with strong parliamentary -influence. This may have told in his favour: it was perhaps also -remembered that he was a personal friend of Wellesley, whom -Castlereagh was intending to send out to command the British army -in Portugal, and moreover his junior. This would facilitate matters -when the two generalissimos had to act together; Beresford would -probably prove a more tractable colleague and subordinate to the -self-confident, autocratic, and frigid Wellesley, than any officer -who was a stranger to him or his senior in years and service. It is -by no means impossible that Castlereagh nominated him at Sir Arthur’s -private suggestion. But into the secrets of ministerial patronage it -is useless to pry. - -Appointed to his new post in February, only a month after he had -returned from the Corunna expedition, Beresford at once set sail for -Lisbon, and took up the command ere three weeks had expired since -his appointment. He arrived at the very moment at which Soult was -about to pass the northern frontier, and was at once gazetted as a -Portuguese field marshal. After a short survey of those parts of his -command which lay in and about Lisbon, he reported to the Regency -that the dearth of officers, and especially of competent superior -officers, was so great, that he could not hope to reorganize the -army unless he were allowed to give commissions in the Portuguese -service to many foreigners. As a preliminary measure he asked for -volunteers from Sir John Cradock’s army, and obtained about enough -English officers to give three to each regiment. The main inducement -which attracted candidates was Beresford’s pledge that every one -accepted for the Portuguese service should gain a step--a lieutenant -would become a captain, a captain a major. The Marshal at once -placed all the battalions with notoriously inefficient commanders -in charge of British officers, and drafted into them a larger -proportion of his volunteers than was given to those which were in -better state. He also got leave from the British cabinet to offer -Portuguese commissions to officers serving in corps on the home -station. This gave him by the end of the year some scores of men of -the sort required, and it was by them that the new army was mainly -formed and disciplined[258]. The British drill was introduced, and -to teach it Beresford was allowed to borrow many non-commissioned -officers from Cradock’s regiments[259]. As was but natural, there -arose considerable friction between the new comers and the native -Portuguese officers, over whose heads they were often placed. This -was inevitable, but led to less harm than might have been expected, -because the rank and file, quick to recognize soldierly qualities, -took kindly to their new commanders, and served them loyally and well. - - [258] For notes on the difficulties and friction caused by - clashing pretensions of British and Portuguese seniority in rank, - see _Wellington Dispatches_, vol. iv. pp. 368-81, 394-5, and - several other letters to Castlereagh and Beresford. - - [259] Largely from the 1/3rd foot. See _Wellington Dispatches_, - vol. iv. p. 463. Other regiments also contributed. - -In the beginning Beresford’s reorganization only extended to the -regiments in Lisbon and the south. Those stationed beyond the Douro -were already in the field, and actively engaged with Soult. They had -hardly received any assistance, either of officers or of arms and -equipment, before they became involved in the campaign of March, -1809[260]. In fairness to them this must be borne in mind, when their -conduct in battle is compared with that of the reorganized army in -the following year. The Portuguese Regency, in their report on the -Oporto campaign sent to their Prince on May 31, 1809, pleaded with -truth ‘that the armies formed in the northern provinces were motley -assemblies, whose numbers and good will bore witness to the zeal of -the people, and their determination not to accept the French yoke, -but which could not with any propriety be called regular troops. -They were composed of incomplete and fractional regiments, and the -larger proportion of the rank and file consisted of recruits, many -of whom had not been a month under arms. Some of the corps were -short of muskets: those which had them were armed with weapons of bad -quality[261], and various calibre. All were deficient in the most -essential articles of equipment. It was not fair to expect that such -troops could oppose with any prospect of success a well-armed and -well-disciplined veteran army like that of France[262].’ - - [260] A few British officers had arrived, such as Col. Patrick - who commanded the 12th of the line in Silveira’s army. - - [261] Some of the muskets sent by the British were in the hands - of the Oporto troops, but none had reached the Tras-os-Montes - regiments of Silveira’s army. - - [262] All this is analysed from the Portuguese historian Da Luz - Soriano. - -The regular troops, and the totally undisciplined _Ordenanza_ levies, -did not form the whole military force of Portugal. There also -existed, mainly on paper, another line of defence for the kingdom. -This was the militia: according to the old military system of the -realm each regimental district had to supply not only its line -battalion, but also two (or sometimes one) battalions of militia. -There should have been forty-three such regiments in existence in -1808, and early in 1809 the Regency ordered that they should be -raised to forty-eight, and that each should consist of two battalions -of 500 men each[263]. This force, however, was purely a paper army: -the militia had not been called out since the war of 1802; there were -a few officers bearing militia commissions, but no rank and file. -When the Regency decreed its mobilization, all that could be done was -that the local authorities should tell off such eligible young men -as had not been embodied in the regular army, for militia recruits. -But as there were neither officers to drill them, nor muskets to -arm them, the conscription was but a farce. The men were not even -called out in many districts, since it was useless to do so till arms -could be procured for them. But in the two northern provinces, when -Soult crossed the frontier, the militia-men took the field alongside -with the _Ordenanza_, from whom they were distinguished by name -alone, for they were almost as destitute of uniform, weapons, and -officers as the _levée en masse_ itself. It would seem that most of -the other border regiments of militia were also mobilized in the -spring of 1809, in the neighbourhood of Almeida, Castello Branco, -and Elvas. That they were perfectly useless was shown in Mayne’s -fight with Victor at the bridge of Alcantara (May 14), when their -conduct contrasted shamefully with the steady and obstinate fighting -of the Lusitanian Legion[264]. In June, Wellesley ordered that all -men for whom there were no arms should be sent home on furlough, and -that the regiments should endeavour to drill and exercise their men -by relays of 200 at a time, each batch being kept two months under -arms. This was apparently because there were not arms, officers, or -drill-sergeants enough to provide for more than a small proportion -of the available number of militia-men[265]. In this way between -8,000 and 10,000 militia were to be out during the times of the year -when the country-side could best spare them from the labour of the -fields. The rest were to be left at home, unless an actual invasion -of Portugal should occur. From the modest scope of this plan, it may -easily be guessed what the state of the militia had been four months -earlier, when Soult was in the Tras-os-Montes, and Beresford had -barely begun his work of reorganization. - - [263] For the local organization and nomenclature of the - militia regiments, the reader is referred to the table of the - Portuguese army in Appendix II. It will be seen that there were - theoretically sixteen regiments in the provinces invaded by - Soult, beyond the Douro. - - [264] See Mayne, _History of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion_, p. - 231, and _Wellington Dispatches_, vol. iv. p. 350. - - [265] _Wellington Dispatches_, vol. iv. pp. 389-90 and 478 [June, - 1809]. - -The militia-men were supposed to provide their own uniforms, the -result of which was that few save the officers ever owned uniforms at -all. In 1810 Wellesley had to make formal representation to Masséna -that they were part of the armed force of the Portuguese kingdom, -and not banditti, as the Marshal threatened to deny the rights of -regular combatants to any prisoners not wearing a military dress. -The officers, however, had a blue uniform similar to that of the -line, save that they had silver instead of gold lace on their collars -and wrists. The militia were not entitled to any pay when mobilized -within the limits of their own province. When taken over its border -officers and men were supposed to draw half the pay of the regulars -of corresponding rank, but did not find it easy to obtain the modest -stipend to which they were entitled. - -Throughout the war the Portuguese militia were only intermittently -in the field: the longest continuous piece of service which they -performed was that during Masséna’s invasion, when they were all -mobilized for more than a year on end, from June 1810 to July 1811. -At other times, the whole or parts of various regiments were under -arms for periods of varying length, either to relieve the regulars -from garrison duty, or to watch the less-exposed frontier points -in times when the French were active in the neighbouring districts -of Spain. They were very seldom exposed to the ordeal of battle, -as their presence in the line would have been a source of danger -rather than a help. But they were useful for secondary work, such as -guarding convoys, maintaining lines of communication, and (most of -all) restraining minor raids by small bodies of the enemy. During -Masséna’s invasion the greater part of them were not drawn within the -lines of Torres Vedras, like the Portuguese regulars, but left out in -the country-side, to shift for themselves. Here they did invaluable -service in cutting the Marshal’s line of communication with Spain, -and harassing all his detachments. It was they who surprised and -captured his wounded and his dépôt at Coimbra, who worried Drouet, -and who turned back Gardanne, when he tried to push forward from -Almeida in order to join the main French army. - -But all this was in the far future when the spring campaign of -1809 began. At that date, as we have already seen, the militia -were as undisciplined, as ill-armed, and as useless as the mass of -_Ordenanza_ levies, with which they were confused. - -A word must be added as to the theoretical organization of this last -force. It dated back to the Middle Ages, and had been regularly used -during the days of the enfranchisement of Portugal from the yoke of -the Spanish Hapsburgs, in the seventeenth century. The ‘ordinance’ -was a Royal decree summoning to arms all males between sixteen and -sixty with the exception of ecclesiastics. In districts owning a -feudal lord, that person was ex-officio declared chief-captain -(_capitão mor_) of his fief, and charged with the summoning of his -vassals to the field. Where manorial customs had disappeared, the -senior magistrate of the town, village, or district had to take -up the post of _capitão mor_, unless a substitute was named by -the crown. It was the duty of this commander to call out all the -able-bodied men of his region, to divide them into companies of 250 -men, and to name a captain, ensign, sergeant, clerk (_meirinho_), -and ten corporals for each of these bodies. Persons able to provide -a horse were to serve apart, as cavalry, under separate commanders; -but no one ever saw or heard of mounted _Ordenanza_ troops during -the Peninsular War; all the horses of the country did not suffice -to provide chargers even for the twelve regiments of the regular -army. The whole levy was supposed to be called out twice a year by -the _capitão mor_, in order that it might be seen that every man -was properly enrolled in a company. But as a matter of fact the -_Ordenanza_ had not been summoned out, save in 1762 and 1802, since -the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Nor had any care been -taken to see that every householder possessed a weapon of some sort, -as the law directed. When they mustered in 1809, the men with pikes -outnumbered those with fowling-pieces or blunderbusses, and the men -furnished with no more than scythes on poles, or goads, or such-like -rustic weapons, were far more numerous than the pikemen. - -The whole mass was perfectly useless; it was cruel to place it in the -field and send it against regular troops. Tumultuous, undisciplined, -unofficered, it was doomed to massacre whenever it allowed the enemy -to approach. It would have been well to refrain from calling it -out altogether, and to turn over the few serviceable arms which it -possessed to the militia. - -NOTE.--By far the best account of the Portuguese army and military -system is to be found in Halliday’s _Present state of Portugal and -the Portuguese Army_, an invaluable book of 1812. Something can -be gleaned from Dumouriez’s _Essay on the military topography of -Portugal_ [1766]. A little information comes from Foy, but many of -his statements in his vol. ii. are inaccurate. The Wellington and -Beresford dispatches in the Record Office are, of course, full of -information, but would be very unintelligible but for Halliday’s -explanatory memoir, as they presuppose knowledge of the details of -organization, but do not generally describe them. For the Lusitanian -Legion, see Mayne’s monograph on that corps, and the dispatches of -Sir Robert Wilson. I have inserted in an appendix a table of the -reorganized army as it stood in the autumn of 1809. - -[Illustration: _Portuguese Infantry - a Private of the Lisbon Regiment - and a man of the Algarve Ordenanza. - From a drawing of 1809. - Walker & Cockerell Ph. So._] - - - - -SECTION XIII: CHAPTER IV - -COMBATS ABOUT CHAVES AND BRAGA: CAPTURE OF OPORTO (MARCH 10-29, 1809) - - -When La Romana marched off to the east, and abandoned his Portuguese -allies to their own resources, the duty of defending the frontier -fell upon General Francisco Silveira, the military governor of the -Tras-os-Montes. He had mobilized his forces at Chaves the moment that -Soult’s departure from Orense became known, and had there gathered -the whole levy of his province. The total amounted to two incomplete -line regiments[266] four battalions of disorderly and ill-equipped -militia[267], the skeletons of two cavalry regiments, with hardly 200 -horses between them[268], and a mass of the local _Ordenanza_, armed -with pikes, goads, scythes, and fowling-pieces. The whole mass may -have numbered some 12,000 men, of whom not 6,000 possessed firearms -of any kind[269]. Against them the French marshal was marching at the -head of 22,000 veterans, who had already gained experience in the art -of mountain-warfare from their recent campaign in Galicia. The result -was not difficult to foresee. If the Portuguese dared to offer battle -they would be scattered to the winds. - - [266] The 12th and 24th regiments--Chaves and Braganza. - - [267] Militia of Chaves, Villa Real, Miranda, and Braganza. - - [268] The 6th and 9th cavalry. - - [269] Brotherton to Castlereagh, March 13. - -Silveira’s levies were not the only force in arms on the frontier. -The populous province of the Entre-Douro-e-Minho[270], roused to -tumultuous enthusiasm by the bishop of Oporto, had sent every -available man, armed or unarmed, to the front. A screen of militia -and regulars under General Botilho was watching the line of the lower -Minho: a vast mass of _Ordenanza_, backed by a very small body of -line troops lay in and about Braga, under General Bernardino Freire; -another multitude was still thronging the streets of Oporto and -listening to the windy harangues of the bishop. But none of these -masses of armed men were sent to the aid of Silveira. He was not one -of the bishop’s faction, nor was he on good terms with his colleague -Freire. Neither of them showed any inclination to combine with him, -and their followers, in the true spirit of provincial particularism, -thought of nothing but defending their own hearths and homes, and -left the Tras-os-Montes to take care of itself. Yet they had for -the moment no enemy in front of them but the small French garrison -of Tuy, and could have marched without any risk to join their -compatriots. - - [270] Entre-Douro-e-Minho had a population of 500,000 souls, - Tras-os-Montes only 180,000. - -Relying on the aid of La Romana, General Silveira had taken post -at Villarelho on the right bank of the Tamega, leaving the defence -of the left bank to the Spaniards, whom he supposed to be still -stationed about Monterey and Verin. On the very day upon which the -Army of Galicia absconded, the Portuguese general sent forward a -detachment, consisting of a line regiment and a mass of peasants, to -menace the flank of the French advance. This force, having crossed -the Spanish frontier, got into collision with the enemy near Villaza. -Since Franceschi’s horsemen and Heudelet’s infantry had turned off -to the east in pursuit of La Romana, the Portuguese fell in with -the leading column of Soult’s main body--a brigade of Lahoussaye’s -dragoons supported by Delaborde’s division. This force they ventured -to attack, but were promptly beaten off by Foy, the brigadier of -the advanced guard, who routed them and captured their sole piece -of artillery. The shattered column fell back on the main body at -Villarelho, and then Silveira, hearing of the departure of the -Spaniards, resolved to retire and to look for a defensive position -which he might be able to hold by his own unaided efforts. There -was none such to be found in front of Chaves, for the valley of -the Tamega widens out between Monterey and the Portuguese frontier -fortress, and offers no ground suitable for defence. Accordingly -Silveira very prudently decided to withdraw his tumultuary army to -the heights of San Pedro, a league to the south of the town, where -the space between the river and the mountains narrows down and -offers a short and compact line of resistance. But he waited to be -driven in, and meanwhile left rear-guards in observation at Feces de -Abaxo on the left, and Outeiro on the right bank, of the Tamega. - -Soult halted three days at Monterey in order to allow his rearguard -and his convoy of sick to close up with the main body. But on March -10 he resumed his advance, using the two parallel roads on the two -banks of the Tamega. Franceschi’s light horse and Heudelet’s division -pushed down the eastern side, Caulaincourt’s brigade of dragoons[271] -and Delaborde’s infantry down the western side of the river. Merle -and Mermet were still near Verin. As the Tamega was unfordable in -most places, the army seemed dangerously divided, but Soult knew well -that he was running little or no risk. Both at Feces and Outeiro the -Portuguese detachments, which covered Silveira’s main body, tried to -offer serious resistance. They were of course routed, with the loss -of a gun and many prisoners. - - [271] Of Lahoussaye’s division. - -On hearing that his enemy was drawing near, Silveira ordered -his whole army to retreat behind Chaves to the position of San -Pedro[272]. This command nearly cost him his life; the ignorant -masses of militia and _Ordenanza_ could only see treason in the -proposed move, which abandoned the town to the French. The local -troops refused to march, and threatened to shoot their general: -he withdrew with such of his men as would still obey orders, but -a mixed multitude consisting of part of the 12th regiment of the -line (the Chaves regiment), and a mass of _Ordenanza_ and militia, -remained behind to defend the dilapidated town. Its walls had never -been repaired since the Spaniards had breached them in 1762; of -the fifty guns which armed them the greater part were destitute of -carriages, and rusting away in extreme old age; the supply of powder -and cannon-balls was wholly insufficient for even a short siege. But -encouraged by the advice of an incompetent engineer officer[273], who -said that a few barricades would make the place impregnable, 3,000 -men shut themselves up in it, and aided by 1,200 armed citizens, -defied Soult, and opened a furious fire upon the vedettes which he -pushed up to the foot of the walls. The Marshal sent in a fruitless -summons to surrender, and then invested the place on the evening of -the tenth; all night the garrison kept up a haphazard cannonade, -and shouted defiance to the French. Next morning Soult resolved -to drive away Silveira from the neighbouring heights, convinced -that the spirits of the defenders of Chaves would fail the moment -that they saw the field army defeated and forced to abscond. The -divisions of Delaborde and Lahoussaye soon compelled Silveira to -give ground: he displayed indeed a laudable prudence in refusing to -let himself be caught and surrounded, and made off south-eastward -towards Villa Real with 6,000 or 7,000 men. The Marshal then summoned -Chaves to surrender for the second time; the garrison seem to have -tired themselves out with twelve hours of patriotic shouting, and to -have used up great part of their munitions in their silly nocturnal -fireworks. When they saw Silveira driven away, their spirits sank, -and they allowed their leader, Magelhaes Pizarro, to capitulate, -without remonstrance. In short, they displayed even more cowardice -on the eleventh than indiscipline upon the tenth of March. On the -twelfth the French entered the city in triumph. - - [272] Brotherton to Cradock, from Povoa de Aguiar, March 13. - - [273] He was called Magelhaes Pizarro, but cannot be said to - have shown either the endurance of the Portuguese seaman, or the - reckless courage of the Spanish _conquistador_, whose historic - names he bore. - -Soult was much embarrassed by the multitude of captives whom he had -taken: he could not spare an escort strong enough to guard 4,000 -prisoners to a place of safety. Accordingly he made a virtue of -necessity, permitted the armed citizens of Chaves to retire to their -homes, and dismissed the mass of 2,500 _Ordenanza_ and militia-men, -after extracting from them an oath not to serve against France during -the rest of the war. The 500 regulars of the 12th regiment were -not treated in the same way. The Marshal offered them the choice -between captivity and enlisting in a Franco-Portuguese legion, which -he proposed to raise. To their great discredit the majority, both -officers and men, took the latter alternative--though it was with the -sole idea of deserting as soon as possible. At the same moment Soult -made an identical offer to the Spanish prisoners captured from Mahy’s -division at the combats of Osoño and La Trepa on March 6: they -behaved no better than the Portuguese: several hundred of them took -the oath to King Joseph, and consented to enter his service[274]. - - [274] See Naylies, p. 81; St. Chamans, p. 120; Le Noble, p. 120; - and Des Odoards, p. 213. - -The Duke of Dalmatia had resolved to make Chaves his base for -further operations in Portugal. He brought up to it from Monterey -all his sick and wounded, including those who had been transported -from Orense; the total now amounted to 1,325, of whom many were -convalescents already fit for sedentary duty. To guard them a single -company of a French regiment, and the inchoate ‘Portuguese Legion,’ -were detailed, while the command was placed in the hands of the _chef -de bataillon_ Messager. The flour and unground wheat found in the -place fed the army for several days, and the small stock of powder -captured was utilized to replenish its depleted supply of cartridges. - -From Chaves Soult had the choice of two roads for marching on Oporto. -The more obvious route on the map is that which descends the Tamega -almost to its junction with the Douro, and then strikes across to -Oporto by Amarante and Penafiel. But here, as is so often the case -in the Peninsula, the map is the worst of guides. The road along -the river, frequently pinched in between the water and overhanging -mountains, presents a series of defiles and strong positions, is -considerably longer than the alternative route, and passes through -difficult country wellnigh from start to finish. - -The second path from Chaves to Oporto is that which strikes westward, -crosses the Serra da Cabrera, and descends into the valley of the -Cavado by Ruivaens and Salamonde. From thence it leads to Braga, on -the great coast-road from Valenza to Oporto. The first two or three -stages of this route are rough and difficult, and pass through ground -even more defensible than that on the way to Amarante and Penafiel. -But when the rugged defiles of the watershed between the Tamega and -the Cavado have been passed, and the invader has reached Braga, -the country becomes flat and open, and the coast plain, crossed by -two excellent roads, leads him easily to his goal. It has also to -be remembered that, by adopting this alternative, Soult took in -the rear the Portuguese fortresses of the lower Minho, and made it -easy to reopen communications with Tuy and the French forces still -remaining in Galicia. - -If any other persuasion were needed to induce the Marshal to take the -western, and not the eastern, road to Oporto, it was the knowledge of -the position of the enemy which he had attained by diligent cavalry -reconnaissances. It was ascertained that Silveira with the remains of -his division had fallen back to Villa Pouca, more than thirty miles -away, in the direction of Villa Real. He could not be caught, and -could retreat whithersoever he pleased. Freire, on the other hand, -was lying at Braga with his unwieldy masses, and had made no attempt -to march forward and fortify the passes of the Serra da Cabrera. -By all accounts that the horsemen of Franceschi could gather, the -defiles were blocked only by the _Ordenanza_ of the mountain villages. - -This astounding news was absolutely correct. Freire’s obvious course -was to defend the rugged watershed, where positions abounded. But -he contented himself with placing mere observation posts--bodies -of thirty or 100 men--in the passes, while keeping his main army -concentrated. The truth was that he was in a state of deep depression -of mind, and prepared for a disaster. Judging from the line which he -adopted in the previous year, while co-operating with Wellesley in -the campaign against Junot, we may set him down as a timid rather -than a cautious general. He had no confidence in himself or in his -troops: the indiscipline and mutinous spirit of the motley levies -which he commanded had reduced him to despair, and he received -no support from the Bishop of Oporto and his faction, who were -omnipotent in the province. Repeated demands for reinforcements of -regular troops had brought him nothing but the 2nd battalion of the -Lusitanian Legion, under Baron Eben. The Bishop kept back the greater -part of the resources of which he could dispose, for the defence of -his own city, in front of which he was erecting a great entrenched -camp. Freire had also called on the Regency for aid, but they had -done no more than order two line battalions under General Vittoria -to join him, and these troops had not yet crossed the Douro. When he -heard that the French were on the march, and that he himself would -be the next to receive their visit, he so far lost heart that he -contemplated retiring on Oporto without attempting to fight. Instead -of defending the defiles of Ruivaens and Salamonde, he began to send -to the rear his heavy stores, his military chest, and his artillery -of position. This timid resolve was to be his ruin, for the excitable -and suspicious multitude which surrounded him had every intention of -defending their homes, and could only see treason and cowardice in -the preparations for retreat. In a few days their fury was to burst -forth into open mutiny, to the destruction of their general and their -own ultimate ruin. - -Soult meanwhile had set out from Chaves on March 14, with Franceschi -and Delaborde at the head of his column, as they had been in all the -operations since their departure from Orense. Mermet and Lahoussaye’s -dragoons followed on the fifteenth: Heudelet, with whom were the head -quarters’ staff and the baggage, marched on the sixteenth: Merle, -covering the rear of the army, came in from Monterey on that day, -and started from Chaves on the seventeenth. Only Vialannes’ brigade -of dragoons[275] was detached: these two regiments were directed to -make a feint upon Villa Real, with the object of frightening and -distracting Silveira, lest he should return to his old post when -he heard that the French army had departed, and fall upon the rear -of the marching columns. They beat up his outposts at Villa Pouca, -announced everywhere the Marshal’s approach with his main body, -and retired under cover of the night, after having deceived the -Tras-os-Montes troops for a couple of days. - - [275] Lorges’ other brigade, that of Fournier, had been (as it - will be remembered) left behind in Galicia with Marshal Ney. - -The divisions of Delaborde and Franceschi, while clearing the passes -above Chaves, met with a desperate but futile resistance from the -_Ordenanza_ of the upper Cavado valley. Practically unaided by -Freire, who had only sent to the defile of Salamonde 300 regular -troops--a miserable mockery of assistance--the gallant peasantry did -their best. ‘Even the smallest villages,’ wrote an aide-de-camp of -Soult, ‘tried to defend themselves. It was not rare to see a peasant -barricade himself all alone in his house, and fire from the windows -on our men, till his door was battered in, and he met his death on -our bayonets. The Portuguese defended themselves with desperation, -and never asked for quarter: if only these brave and devoted fellows -had possessed competent leaders, we should have been forced to give -up the expedition, or else we should never have got out of the -country. But their resistance was individual: each man died defending -his hamlet or his home, and a single battalion of our advanced -guard easily cleared the way for us. I saw during these days young -girls in the fighting-line, firing on us, and meeting their death -without recoiling a step. The priests had told them that they were -martyrs, and that all who died defending their country went straight -to paradise. In these petty combats, which lasted day after day, we -frequently found, among the enemy’s dead, monks in their robes, their -crucifixes still clasped in their hands. Indeed, while advancing -we could see from afar these ecclesiastics passing about among the -peasants, and animating them to the combat[276].... While the columns -were on the march isolated peasants kept up a continual dropping fire -on us from inaccessible crags above the road: at night they attacked -our sentries, or crept down close to our bivouacs to shoot at the -men who sat round the blaze. This sort of war was not very deadly, -but infinitely fatiguing: there was not a moment of the day or night -when we had not to be upon the _qui vive_. Moreover, every man who -strayed from the ranks, whether he was sick, drunk, tired, or merely -a marauder, was cut off and massacred. The peasants not only murdered -them, but tortured them in the most horrid fashion before putting -them to death[277].’ - - [276] Every French diarist of Soult’s army has tales of the stoic - courage displayed by the Portuguese clergy. A story from Naylies - of Lahoussaye’s dragoons may serve as an example. Near Braga he - came on a cart escorted by a single priest with a gun on his - shoulder. He was the chaplain of a convent, who was taking out - of harm’s way a party of nuns. When he saw himself overtaken, he - quietly waited in the middle of the road, shot the first dragoon - dead, and was killed by the second as he was trying to reload his - musket. - - [277] St. Chamans, _Mémoires_, pp. 119-21. - -Among scenes of this description Franceschi and Delaborde forced -their way down the valley of the Cavado, till they arrived at the -village of Carvalho d’Este, six miles from Braga, where they found -a range of hills on both sides of the road, occupied by the whole -horde of 25,000 men who had been collected by Freire. The division -which followed the French advanced guard had also to sustain several -petty combats, for the survivors of the _Ordenanza_ whom Delaborde -had swept out of the way, closed in again to molest each column, as -it passed by the defiles of Venda-Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde. -Mermet’s division, which brought up the rear, had to beat off a -serious attack from Silveira’s army[278]. For that general, as soon -as he discovered that he had been fooled by Lorges’ demonstration, -sent across the Tamega a detachment of 3,000 men, who fell upon -Soult’s rear. But a single regiment drove them off without much -difficulty: they drew back to their own side of the mountains, and -did not quit the valley of the Tamega. - - [278] For combats waged by Lahoussaye’s dragoons, who were in the - middle of the long column, see the journal of Naylies (pp. 83-4). - For attacks on Mermet, in the rear column, see Fantin des Odoards - (p. 214). - -It was on March 17 that Franceschi and Delaborde pushed forward -to the foot of the Portuguese position, which swept round in a -semicircle on each side of the high-road. Its western half was -composed of the plateau of Monte Adaufé, whose left overhangs the -river Cavado, while its right slopes upward to join the wooded Monte -Vallongo. This latter hill is considerably more lofty than the -Monte Adaufé and less easy of access. In front of the position, and -bisected by the high-road, is the village of Carvalho d’Este: at the -foot of the Monte Vallongo is another village, Lanhozo, whose name -the French have chosen to bestow on the combat which followed. To the -left-rear of the Monte Adaufé, pressed in between its slopes and the -river, is a third village, Ponte do Prado, with a bridge across the -Cavado, which is the only one by which the position can be turned. -The town of Braga lies three miles further to the rear. The invaders -halted on seeing the whole range of hills, some six miles long, -crowned with masses of men in position. Franceschi would not take -it upon himself to attack such a multitude, even though they were -but peasantry and militia, of the same quality as the horde that had -been defeated near Chaves a few days before. He sent back word to the -Marshal, and drew up in front of the position to await the arrival of -the main body. But noting that a long rocky spur of the Monte Adaufé -projected from the main block of high ground which the enemy was -holding, he caused it to be attacked by Foy’s brigade of infantry, -and drove back without much difficulty the advanced guard of the -Portuguese. The possession of this hill gave the French a foothold on -the heights, and an advantageous _emplacement_ for artillery such as -could not be found in the plain below. - -It was three days before the rest of Soult’s army joined the leading -division--not until the twentieth was his entire force, with the -exception of Merle’s infantry, concentrated at the foot of the -enemy’s position, and ready to attack. This long period of waiting, -when every mind was screwed up to the highest pitch of excitement, -had completely broken down the nerve of the Portuguese, who spent the -hours of respite in hysterical tumult and rioting. Freire, as we have -already seen, had been planning a retreat on Oporto, but he found the -spirit of his army so exalted that he thought it better to conceal -his project. He pretended to have abandoned the idea of retiring, -and gave orders for the construction of entrenchments and batteries -on the Monte Adaufé, to enfilade the main approach by the high-road. -But he could not disguise his down-heartedness, nor persuade his -followers to trust him. Presently the wrecks of the _Ordenanza_ -levies, who had fought at Salamonde, fell back upon Braga, loudly -accusing him of cowardice, for not supporting them in their advanced -position. The whole camp was full of shouting, objectless firing in -the air, confused cries of treason, and mutinous assemblies. On the -day when the French appeared in front of the position Freire grew so -alarmed at the threats against his life, which resounded on every -side, that he secretly quitted Braga to fly to Oporto. But he was -recognized and seized by the _Ordenanza_ of Tobossa, a few miles to -the rear. They brought him back to the camp as a prisoner, and handed -him over to Baron Eben, the colonel of the 2nd battalion of the -Lusitanian Legion, who had been acting as Freire’s second-in-command. -This officer, an ambitious and presumptuous man, and a great ally of -the Bishop of Oporto, played the demagogue, harangued the assembled -multitude, and readily took over the charge of the army. He consigned -his unfortunate predecessor to the gaol of Braga, and led on the -mutineers to reinforce the array on Monte Adaufé. When Eben had -departed, a party of _Ordenanza_ returned to the city, dragged out -the wretched Freire, and killed him in the street with their pikes. -The same afternoon they murdered Major Villasboas, the chief of -Freire’s engineers, and one or more of his aides-de-camp. They also -seized and threw into prison the _corregidor_ of Braga, and several -other persons accused of sympathy with the French. Eben appears to -have winked at these atrocities--much as his friend the Bishop of -Oporto ignored the murders which were taking place in that city. By -assuming command in the irregular fashion that we have seen, he had -made himself the slave of the hysterical horde that surrounded him, -and had to let them do what they pleased, lest he should fall under -suspicion himself[279]. - - [279] I agree with General Arteche in thinking that Eben’s - dispatch to Cradock, from which this narrative is mainly drawn, - does him no credit. Indeed, it is easy to adopt the sinister - view that Eben was aiming at getting the command, did nothing to - discourage the mob, and was indirectly responsible for Freire’s - murder. As Arteche remarks ‘with a little more resolution and - a little less personal ambition, the Baron could probably have - prevented the catastrophe’ (vol. v. p. 393). But Freire’s conduct - had been so cowardly and incapable that the peasants were - reasonably incensed with him. Why had he not defended the rugged - defiles of Venda Nova and Salamonde, and what could excuse his - absconding and abandoning his army? - -It would seem, however, that Eben did the little that was possible -with such material in preparing to oppose Soult. He threw up more -entrenchments on the Monte Adaufé, mounted the few guns that he -possessed in commanding situations, and did his best to add to the -lamentably depleted store of munitions on hand. Even the church roofs -were stripped for lead, when it was found that there was absolutely -no reserve of cartridges, and that the _Ordenanza_ had wasted half -of their stock in demonstrations and profitless firing at the French -vedettes. On the morning of the nineteenth he extended his right -wing to some hills below the Monte Vallongo, beyond the village of -Lanhozo, a movement which threatened to outflank and surround that -part of the French army which was in front of him, and to cut it off -from the divisions still in the rear. This could not be tolerated, -and Mermet’s infantry were dispatched to dislodge the 2,000 men who -had taken up this advanced position. They were easily beaten out of -the village and off the hill, and retired to their former station -on the Monte Vallongo. The French here captured two guns and some -prisoners. Soult gave these men copies of a proclamation which he had -printed at Chaves, offering pardon to all Portuguese who should lay -down their arms, and sent them back into Eben’s lines under a flag -of truce. When the _Ordenanza_ discovered what the papers were, they -promptly put to death the twenty unfortunate men as traitors, without -listening to their attempts to explain the situation. - -On the morning of March 20, Soult had been joined by Lorges’ -dragoons and his other belated detachments, and prepared to attack -the enemy’s position. To defend it Eben had now, beside 700 of -his own Legion[280], one incomplete line regiment (Viana, no. 9), -the militia of Braga and the neighbouring places, and some 23,000 -_Ordenanza_ levies, of whom 5,000 had firearms, 11,000 pikes, and the -remaining 7,000 nothing better than scythes, goads, and instruments -of husbandry. There were about fifteen or twenty pieces of artillery -distributed along the front of the six-mile position, the majority -of them in the entrenchments on the Monte Adaufé, placed so as to -command the high-road. - - [280] Eben’s dispatch is in the Record Office, in the - miscellaneous volume at the end of the Portugal 1809 series. - -Knowing the sort of rabble that was in front of him, Soult made no -attempt to turn or outflank the Portuguese, but resolved to deliver a -frontal attack all along the line, in the full belief that the enemy -would give way the moment that the charge was pushed home. He had now -about 3,000 cavalry and 13,000 infantry with him--Merle being still -absent. He told off Delaborde’s division with Lahoussaye’s dragoons -to assail the enemy’s centre, on both sides of the high-road, where -it crosses the Monte Adaufé. Mermet’s infantry and Franceschi’s -light horse attacked, on the left, the wooded slopes of the Monte -Vallongo. Heudelet’s division, on the right, sent one brigade to -storm the heights above the river, and left the other brigade as a -general reserve for the army. Lorges’ dragoons were also held back in -support. - -As might have been expected, Soult’s dispositions were completely -successful. When the columns of Delaborde and Heudelet reached -the foot of the enemy’s position, the motley horde which occupied -it broke out into wild cheers and curses, and opened a heavy but -ineffective fire. They stood as long as the French were climbing up -the slopes, but when the infantry debouched on to the plateau of -Monte Adaufé they began to waver and disperse[281]. Then Soult let -loose the cavalry of Lahoussaye, which had trotted up the high-road -close in the rear of Delaborde’s battalions, the 17th Dragoons -leading. There was no time for the reeling mass of peasants to -escape. ‘We dashed into them,’ wrote one officer who took part in -the charge[282]; ‘we made a great butchery of them; we drove on -among them pell-mell right into the streets of Braga, and we pushed -them two leagues further, so that we covered in all four leagues -at full gallop without giving them a moment to rally. Their guns, -their baggage, their military chest, many standards fell into our -power[283].’ - - [281] Eben, in his report, says that at the moment of the French - assault one of his guns in the battery commanding the high-road - burst, and killed many of those standing about, and that the rout - commenced with the stampede caused by this explosion. - - [282] Naylies [of the 19th Dragoons], p. 87. - - [283] Even while flying through the streets of Braga, some of - the routed horde found time to pay a visit to the town gaol, and - to murder the _corregidor_ and the other prisoners who had been - placed there on the eighteenth. - -Such was the fate of the Portuguese centre, on each side of the -high-road. Further to the right, above the Cavado, Heudelet was -equally successful in forcing his way up the northern slopes of the -Monte Adaufé; the enemy broke when he reached the plateau, but as -he had no heavy force of cavalry with him, their flight was not so -disastrous or their loss so heavy as in the centre. Indeed, when they -had been swept down into the valley behind the ridge, some of the -Portuguese turned to bay at the Ponte do Prado, and inflicted a sharp -check on the Hanoverian legion, the leading battalion in Heudelet’s -advance. It was not till the 26th of the line came up to aid the -Germans that the rallied peasantry again broke and fled. They only -lost 300 men in this part of the field. - -Far to the left, in the woods on the slope of the Monte Vallongo, -Mermet and Franceschi had found it much harder to win their way to -the edge of the plateau than had the troops in the centre. But it -was only the physical obstacles that detained them: the resistance -of the enemy was even feebler than in the centre. By the time that -the infantry of Mermet emerged on the crest of the hill, the battle -had already been won elsewhere. The Portuguese right wing crumpled up -the moment that it was attacked, and fled devious over the hillsides, -followed by Franceschi’s cavalry, who made a dreadful slaughter among -the fugitives. Five miles behind their original position a body of -militia with four guns rallied under the cliffs on which stands the -village of Falperra. The cavalry held them in check till Mermet’s -leading regiment, the 31st Léger, came up, and then, attacked by both -arms at once, the whole body was ridden down and almost exterminated. -‘The commencement was a fight, the end a butchery,’ wrote an officer -of the 31st; ‘if our enemies had been better armed and less ignorant -of the art of war, they might have made us pay dearly for our -victory. But for lack of muskets they were half of them armed with -pikes only: they could not manœuvre in the least. How was such a mob -to resist us? they could only have held their ground if they had been -behind stone walls[284].’ - - [284] Fantin des Odoards, p. 216. - -The rout and pursuit died away in the southern valleys beyond Braga, -and Soult could take stock of his victory. He had captured seventeen -guns, five flags, and the whole of the stores of Eben’s army: he had -killed, according to his own estimate, some 4,000 men[285], and taken -only 400 prisoners. This shocking disproportion between the dead and -the captives was caused by the fact that the French in most parts -of the field had given no quarter. Some of their historians explain -that their cruelty resulted from the discovery that the Portuguese -had been murdering and mutilating the stragglers who fell into their -hands[286]. But it was really due to the exasperation of spirit that -always accompanies guerrilla warfare. Constantly worried by petty -ambushes, ‘sniped’ in their bivouacs, never allowed a moment of rest, -the soldiers were in a state of nervous irritation which found vent -in needless and unjustifiable cruelty. In the fight they had lost -only forty killed and 160 wounded, figures which afford no excuse for -the wholesale slaughter in the pursuit to which they gave themselves -up. - - [285] Eben, in his report to Cradock at the Record Office, says - 1,000 only, of whom more than 200 belonged to the Lusitanian - Legion. - - [286] Le Noble, p. 142. St. Chamans, p. 121. Naylies and Fantin - des Odoards, though both mentioning the slaughter in which they - took part, do not give this justification for it. The latter says - that the French gave no quarter save to men in uniform. - -In the first flush of victory the French supposed that they had made -an end of the _Ordenanza_, and that northern Portugal was at their -feet. ‘Cette journée a été fatale à l’insurrection portugaise,’ wrote -one of the victors in his diary[287]. But no greater mistake could -have been made: though many of the routed horde dispersed to their -homes, the majority rallied again behind the Avé, only ten or twelve -miles from the battle-field. Nor did the battle of Braga even open -the way to Galicia: General Botilho, with the levies of the Valenza -and Viana district, closed in behind Soult and blocked the way to -Tuy, the nearest French garrison. The Marshal had only conquered the -ground on which he stood, and already his communication with Chaves, -his last base, had been intercepted by detachments sent into the -passes by Silveira. - - [287] Fantin des Odoards, p. 216. - -Soult halted three days at Braga, a time which he utilized for the -repair of his artillery, and the replenishing of the cartridge boxes -of his infantry from the not too copious supply of munitions captured -from the Portuguese. His cavalry scoured the country down the Cavado -as far as Barcelos, and southward to the line of the Avé, only to -find insurgents everywhere, the bridges broken, and the fords dredged -up and staked. - -The Marshal, however, undaunted by the gloomy outlook, resolved to -march straight for his destined goal, without paying any attention to -his communications. He now made Braga a temporary base, left there -Heudelet’s division in charge of 600 sick and wounded, and moved on -Oporto at the head of his three remaining infantry divisions and all -his cavalry. - -Two good _chaussées_, and one additional mountain road of inferior -character, lead from Braga to Oporto, crossing the Avé, the one -four, the next six, the third twenty-four miles from the sea. The -first and most westerly passes it at Ponte de Avé, the second at -Barca de Trofa, where there is both a bridge and a wide ford, the -third and least obvious at Guimaraens not far from its source in the -Serra de Santa Catalina. Soult resolved to use all three for his -advance, wisely taking the difficult road by Guimaraens into his -scheme, since he guessed that it would probably be unwatched by the -Portuguese, precisely because it was far less eligible than the other -two. He was perfectly right: the Bishop of Oporto, the moment that -he heard of the fall of Braga, pushed up some artillery and militia -to aid the _Ordenanza_ in defending both the Ponte de Avé and the -Barca de Trofa bridges. Each was cut: batteries were hastily thrown -up commanding their approaches, and entrenchments were constructed in -their rear. At Barca de Trofa the ford was dredged up and completely -blocked with _chevaux de frise_. But the remote and secondary passage -at Guimaraens was comparatively neglected, and left in charge of such -of the local _Ordenanza_ as had returned home after the rout of Braga. - -Soult directed Lorges’ dragoons against the western road: he himself -with Delaborde’s and Merle’s infantry and Lahoussaye’s cavalry took -the central _chaussée_ by Barca de Trofa. On the difficult flanking -path by Guimaraens he sent Franceschi’s light horse and Mermet’s -infantry. On both the main roads the Portuguese positions were so -strong that the advancing columns were held back: Soult would not -waste men--he was beginning to find that he had none to spare--in -attempting to force the entrenched positions opposite him. After -feeling them with caution, he pushed a column up-stream to a small -bridge at San Justo, which had been barricaded but not broken. Here -he established by night a heavy battery commanding the opposite bank. -On the morning of the twenty-sixth he opened fire on the Portuguese -positions across the water, and, when the enemy had been well -battered, hurled the brigade of General Foy at the fortified bridge. -It was carried, and Delaborde’s division was beginning to pass, when -it met another French force debouching on the same point. This was -composed of Mermet and Franceschi’s men: they had beaten the local -_Ordenanza_ at Guimaraens, crossed the Avé high up, and were now -pushing along the southern bank to take the Barca de Trofa position -in the flank. Thus Soult found that, even if his frontal assault at -San Justo had failed, his left-hand column would have cleared the way -for him a few hours later, being already across the river and in the -enemy’s rear. Indeed his lateral detachment had done all that he had -expected from it, and at no great cost. For though the _Ordenanza_ -had opposed it bravely enough, they had never been able to hold it -back. The only notable loss that had been sustained was that of -General Jardon, one of Mermet’s brigadiers, who had met his death by -his own recklessness. Finding his men checked for a moment, he had -seized a musket and charged on foot at the head of his skirmishing -line. This was not the place for a brigadier-general, and Jardon died -unnecessarily, doing the work of a sub-lieutenant. - -Finding the French across the river at San Justo, the Portuguese, who -were defending the lower bridges, had to give way, or they would have -been surrounded and cut off. They yielded unwillingly, and at Ponte -de Avé actually beat off the first attempt to evict them. But in the -end they had to fly, abandoning the artillery in the redoubts that -covered the two bridges[288]. - - [288] Le Noble (pp. 157-8), and Napier following him, say that - the Portuguese murdered their commander, Brigadier-General - Vallongo, when the bridges were forced, tore him in pieces, and - buried his scattered members in a dunghill. It is a relief to - know from Da Luz Soriano, the Portuguese historian, that nothing - of the kind occurred, and that there was no officer of the name - of Vallongo in the Portuguese army. - -On the twenty-seventh, therefore, Soult was able to press close in -to Oporto, for the line of the Avé is but fifteen miles north of the -city. On approaching the heights which overhang the Douro the French -found them covered with entrenchments and batteries ranged on a long -front of six or seven miles, from San João de Foz on the sea-shore -to the chapel of Bom Fin overlooking the river above the town. Ever -since the departure of the French from Orense and their crossing of -the frontier had become known, the whole of the populace had been at -work on the fortifications, under the direction of Portuguese and -British engineer officers. In three weeks an enormous amount of work -had been done. The rounded summits of the line of hills, which rise -immediately north of the city, and only half a mile in advance of -its outermost houses, had been crowned with twelve redoubts armed -with artillery of position. The depressions between the redoubts had -been closed by palisades and abattis. Further west, below the city, -where the line of hills is less marked, the front was continued by -a deep ditch, fortified buildings, and four strong redoubts placed -in the more exposed positions. It ended at the walls of San João da -Foz, the old citadel which commands the mouth of the Douro, and had -in this direction an outwork in another ancient fort, the castle of -Quejo, on the sea-shore a mile north of the estuary. There were no -less than 197 guns of various calibres distributed along the front of -the lines. Nor was this all: the main streets of the place had been -barricaded to serve as a second line of defence, and even south of -the river a battery had been constructed on the height crowned by the -Serra Convent, which overlooks the bridge and the whole city. - -To hold this enormous fortified camp the Bishop of Oporto had -collected an army formidable in numbers if not in quality. There -was a strong nucleus of troops of the regular army: it included the -two local Oporto regiments (6th and 18th of the line), two more -battalions brought in by Brigadier-General Vittoria, who had been too -late to join in the defence of Braga, a battalion of the regiment -of Valenza (no. 21), a fraction of that of Viana (no. 9), with the -wrecks of the 2nd battalion of the Lusitanian Legion, which had -escaped from Eben’s rout of the twentieth, and the skeleton of an -incomplete cavalry regiment (no. 12, Miranda). In all there cannot -have been less than 5,000 regular troops in the town, though many of -the men were recruits with only a few weeks of service. To these may -be added three or four militia regiments in the same condition as -were the rest of the corps of that force, i.e. half-armed and less -than half-disciplined[289]. But the large majority of the garrison -was composed of the same sort of levies that had already fought -with such small success at Chaves and Braga--there were 9,000 armed -citizens of Oporto and a somewhat greater number of the _Ordenanza_ -of the open country, who had retired into the city before Soult’s -advancing columns. The whole mass--regulars and irregulars--may have -made up a force of 30,000 men--nothing like the 40,000 or 60,000 of -the French reports[290]. Under the Bishop the military commanders -were three native brigadier-generals, Lima-Barreto, Parreiras, -and Vittoria. Eben had been offered the charge of a section of -the defences, but--depressed with the results of his experiment -in generalship at Braga--he refused any other responsibility than -that of leading his battalion of the Lusitanian Legion. The Bishop -had allotted to Parreiras the redoubts and entrenchments on the -north of the town, to Vittoria those on the north-east and east, to -Lima-Barreto those below the town as far as St. João da Foz. The -regulars had been divided up, so as to give two or three battalions -to each general; they were to form the reserve, while the defences -were manned by the militia and _Ordenanza_. There was a lamentable -want of trained gunners--less than 1,000 artillerymen were available -for the 200 pieces in the lines and on the heights beyond the river. -To make up the deficiency many hundreds of raw militia-men had been -turned over to the commanders of the batteries. The natural result -was seen in the inferior gunnery displayed all along the line upon -the fatal twenty-ninth of March. - - [289] Apparently the regiments of Oporto, Baltar, Feira, and - Villa de Conde. - - [290] I draw these deductions from Beresford’s and Eben’s reports - in the Record Office. Beresford (writing to Castlereagh on March - 29, the day of the storm) complains that he can get no proper - ‘morning states’ out of the officers at Oporto, but says that - the Bishop has there nos. 6 and 18 of the line, Vittoria’s two - battalions and the wrecks of the 2nd Lusitanian Legion. He speaks - of two or three militia regiments, 9,000 armed citizens, and - an indefinite number of _Ordenanza_. Eben gives some details - concerning his own doings. Da Luz Soriano mentions Champlemond - and his battalion of the 21st of the line. As to the _Ordenanza_, - 9,000 seems a high estimate for the local Oporto horde, for that - town with 70,000 souls had already supplied two regiments of the - line, two battalions of the Lusitanian Legion, and a militia - regiment, 6,500 men in all. - -To complete the picture of the defenders of Oporto it must be -added that the anarchy tempered by assassination, which had been -prevailing in the city ever since the Bishop assumed charge of the -government, had grown to a head during the last few days. On the -receipt of the news of the disaster at Braga it had culminated in a -riot, during which the populace constituted a sort of Revolutionary -Tribunal at the Porto do Olival. They haled out of the prisons all -persons who had been consigned to them on a charge of sympathizing -with the French, hung fourteen of these unfortunates, including -the brigadier-general Luiz da Oliveira, massacred many more in -the streets, and dragged the bodies round the town on hurdles. -The Bishop, though he had 5,000 regular troops at hand, made -no attempt to intervene--‘he could not stand in the way of the -righteous vengeance of the people upon traitors.’ On the night of -the twenty-eighth he retired to a place of safety, the Serra Convent -across the river, after bestowing his solemn benediction upon the -garrison, and handing over the further conduct of the defence to the -three generals whose names we have already cited. - -The town of Oporto was hidden from Soult’s eyes by the range of -heights, crowned by fortifications, which lay before him. For the -place was built entirely upon the downslope of the hill towards -the Douro, and was invisible till those approaching it were within -half a mile of its outer buildings. It is a town of steep streets -running down to the water, and meeting at the foot of the great -pontoon-bridge, more than 200 yards long, which links it to the -transpontine suburb of Villa Nova, and the adjacent height of the -Serra do Pilar. The river front forms a broad quay, along which -were lying at the time nearly thirty merchant ships, mostly English -vessels laden with port wine, which were wind-bound by a persistent -North-Wester, and could not cross the bar and get out to sea. - -Although his previous attempts to negotiate with the Portuguese had -not been very fortunate, the Marshal thought it worth while to send -proposals for an accommodation to the Bishop. He warned him not -to expose his city to the horrors of a sack, pointed out that the -raw levies of the garrison must inevitably be beaten, and assured -him that ‘the French came not as enemies, but as the deliverers -of Portugal from the yoke of the English. It was for the benefit -of these aliens alone that the Bishop would expose Oporto to the -incalculable calamities attending a storm[291].’ The bearer of the -Marshal’s letter was a Portuguese major taken prisoner at Braga, who -would have been massacred at the outposts if he had not taken the -precaution of explaining to his countrymen that Soult had sent him -in to propose the surrender of the French army, which was appalled at -the formidable series of defences to which it found itself opposed! -The reply sent by the Bishop and his council of war was, of course, -defiant, and bickering along the front of the lines immediately -began. While the white flag was still flying General Foy, the most -distinguished of Soult’s brigadiers, trespassed by some misconception -within the Portuguese picquets and was made prisoner. While being -conducted into the town he was nearly murdered, being mistaken -for Loison, for whom the inhabitants of Oporto nourished a deep -hatred[292]. - - [291] Le Noble, p. 161. - - [292] Some of the French writers say that Foy was taken prisoner - while carrying a flag of truce and a second letter for the - Bishop’s eye. But what really seems to have happened was that he - conceived a notion that one of the Portuguese outposts wished - to surrender, rode in amongst them, and began to urge them to - lay down their arms. But they seized him and sent him to the - rear; his companion, the _chef de bataillon_ Roger, drew his - sword and tried to cut his way back to his men, whereupon he was - bayonetted. One cannot blame the Portuguese, for officers, in - time of truce, have no right to come within the enemy’s lines, - still less to urge his troops to desertion. Foy proved that - he was not Loison by holding up his two hands. Loison being - one-handed (as his nickname _Maneta_ shows), the populace at once - saw that they had made a mistake. I follow the narrative in Girod - de l’Ain’s new life of Foy (p. 78), corroborated by Le Noble (p. - 162). Napier (ii. p. 57), of course, gives a version unfavourable - to the Portuguese. - -On finding that the Portuguese were determined to fight, Soult began -his preparations for a general assault upon the following day. He -drove in the enemy’s outposts outside the town, and captured one or -two small redoubts in front of the main line. Having reconnoitred the -whole position, he told off Delaborde and Franceschi to attack the -north-eastern front, Mermet and one brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons -to storm the central parts of the lines, due north of the city, where -the fortifications were most formidable, Merle and the other brigade -of Lahoussaye to press in upon the western entrenchments below the -city. There was no general reserve save Lorges’ two regiments of -cavalry, and these had the additional task imposed upon them of -fending off any attack on the rear of the army which might be made -by scattered bodies of _Ordenanza_, who were creeping out into the -woods along the sea-coast, and threatening to turn the Marshal’s -right flank. - -Soult had but 16,000 men available,--of whom 3,000 were cavalry, -and therefore could not be employed till the infantry should have -broken through the line of fortifications which completely covered -the Portuguese front. Nevertheless he had no doubts of the result, -though he had to storm works defended by 30,000 men and lined with -197 cannon. He now knew the exact fighting value of the Portuguese -levies, and looked upon Oporto as his own. - -The Marshal’s plan was not to repeat the simple and simultaneous -frontal attack all along the line by which he had carried the day -at Braga. There was a good deal of strategy in his design: the two -flank divisions were ordered to attack, while the centre was for -a time held back. Merle, in especial, was directed to do all that -he could against the weakest point of the Portuguese line, in the -comparatively level ground to the west of the city. Soult hoped that -a heavy attack in this direction would lead the enemy to reinforce -his left from the reserves of his centre, and gradually to disgarnish -the formidable positions north of the city, when no attack was made -on them. If they committed this fault, he intended to hurl Mermet’s -division, which he carefully placed under cover till the critical -moment, at the central redoubts. A successful assault at this point -would finish the game, as it would cut the Portuguese line in two, -and allow the troops to enter the upper quarters of the city in their -first rush. - -The French were under arms long ere dawn, waiting for the signal to -attack. The Portuguese also were awake and stirring in the darkness, -when at three o’clock a thunderstorm, accompanied by a terrific -hurricane from the north-west, swept over the city. In the midst of -the elemental din some of the Portuguese sentinels thought that they -had seen the French columns advancing to the assault: they fired, the -artillery followed their example, and for half an hour the noise of -the thunderstorm was rivalled by that of 200 guns of position firing -at nothing. Just as the gunners had discovered their mistake, the -tempest passed away, and soon after the day broke. So drenched and -weary were the French, who had been lying down under the torrential -rain, that Soult put off the assault for an hour, in order to allow -them to dry themselves and take some refreshment; the pause also -allowed the sodden ground to harden. - -At seven all was again ready, and Merle’s and Delaborde’s regiments -hurled themselves at the entrenchments above and below the city. Both -made good progress, especially the former, who lodged themselves -in the houses and gardens immediately under the main line of the -Portuguese left wing, and captured several of its outlying defences. -Seeing the position almost forced, Parreiras, the commander of the -central part of the lines, acted just as Soult had hoped, and sent -most of his reserve to reinforce the left. The Marshal then bade -Merle halt for a moment, but ordered Delaborde, on his eastern flank, -to push on as hard as he could. The general obeyed, and charged right -into the Portuguese entrenchments, capturing several redoubts and -actually breaking the line and getting a lodgement in the north-east -corner of the city. Parreiras, to aid his colleague in this quarter, -drew off many of his remaining troops, and sent them away to the -right, thereby leaving his own section of the line only half -manned. Thereupon Soult launched against the central redoubts his -main assaulting column, Mermet’s division and the two regiments of -dragoons. The central battalion went straight for the main position -above the high-road, where the great Portuguese flag was flying on -the strongest redoubt. The others attacked on each side. This assault -was decisive: the Portuguese gunners had only time to deliver two -ineffective salvos when the French were upon them. They charged into -the redoubts through the embrasures, pulled down the connecting -abattis, and swept away the depleted garrison in their first rush. -The line of the defenders was hopelessly broken, and Mermet’s -division hunted them down the streets leading to the river at full -speed. - -The centre being thus driven in, the Portuguese wings saw that all -was lost, and gave way in disorder, looking only for a line of -retreat. Vittoria, with the right wing, abandoned his section of -the city and retreated east along the Vallongo road, towards the -interior: he got away without much loss, and even turned to bay and -skirmished with the pursuing battalions of Delaborde when once he -was clear of the suburbs. Far other was the lot of the Portuguese -left wing, which had the sea behind it instead of the open country. -General Lima-Barreto, its commander, was killed by his own men: -he had given orders to spike the guns and double to the rear the -moment that he saw the central redoubts carried. Unfortunately for -himself, he was among a mass of men who wished to hold on to their -entrenchments in spite of the disaster on their right. When he -reiterated his order to retreat, he was shot down for a traitor. -But Merle’s division soon evicted his slayers, and sent them flying -towards St. João da Foz and the sea. There was a dreadful slaughter -of the Portuguese in this direction: some escaped across the river -in boats, a large body slipped round Merle’s flank and got away to -the north along the coast (though Lorges’ dragoons pursued them among -the woods above the water and sabred many): others threw themselves -into the citadel of St. João and capitulated on terms. But several -thousands, pressed into the angle between the Douro and the ocean, -were slaughtered almost without resistance, or rolled _en masse_ into -the water. - -The fate of the Portuguese centre was no less horrible. Their -commander, Parreiras, fled early, and got over the bridge to report -to the Bishop the ruin of his army. The main horde followed him, -though many lingered behind, endeavouring to defend the barricades -in the streets. When several thousands had passed the river, some -unknown officer directed the drawbridge between the central pontoons -to be raised, in order to prevent the French from following. This was -done while the larger part of the armed multitude was still on the -further bank, hurrying down towards the sole way of escape. Nor was -it only the fighting-men whose retreat was cut off: when the news -ran round the city that the lines were forced, the civil population -had rushed down to the quays to escape before the sack began. It was -fortunate that half the people had left Oporto during the last two -days and taken refuge in Beira. But tens of thousands had lingered -behind, full of confidence in their entrenchments and their army of -defenders. A terrified mass of men, women, and children now came -pouring down to the bridge, and mingled with the remnants of the -routed garrison. The pontoons were still swinging safely on their -cables, and no one, save those in the front of the rush, discovered -that there was a fatal gap in the middle of the passage, where the -drawbridge had been raised. There was no turning back for those -already embarked on the bridge, for the crowds behind continued to -push them on, and it was impossible to make them understand what had -happened. The French had now begun to appear on the quays, and to -attack the rear of the unhappy multitude: their musketry drowned the -cries of those who tried to turn back. At the same time the battery -on the Serra hill, beyond the river, opened upon the French, and -the noise of its twenty heavy guns made it still more impossible to -convey the news to the back of the crowd. For more than half an hour, -it is said, the rush of fugitives kept thrusting its own front ranks -into the death-trap, forty feet broad, in the midst of the bridge. -If anything more was needed to add to the horror of the scene, it -was supplied by the sudden rush of a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, -which--cut off from retreat to the east--galloped down from a side -street and ploughed its way into the thickest of the crowd at the -bridge-head, trampling down hundreds of victims, till it was brought -to a standstill by the mere density of the mass into which it had -penetrated. So many persons, at last, were thrust into the water that -not only was the whole surface of the Douro covered with drowning -wretches, but the gap in the bridge was filled up by a solid mass of -the living and the dead. Over this horrid gangway, as it is said, -some few of the fugitives scrambled to the opposite bank[293]. - - [293] Le Noble, and Napier following him, state that the breach - in the bridge was caused merely by some of the central pontoons - sinking under the weight of the passing multitude. Hennegan, - who was present in Oporto that day, says the same. But it seems - safer to follow Da Luz Soriano and other Portuguese witnesses, - who state that no such accident occurred, but that the early - fugitives pulled up the drawbridge in order to stay the pursuit, - reckless as to the fate of those who were behind them. Historians - telling a story to the discredit of their own party may generally - be trusted. - -At first the French, who had fought their way down to the quay, had -begun to fire upon the rear of the multitude which was struggling to -escape. But they soon found that no resistance was being offered, and -saw that the greater part of the flying crowd was composed of women, -children, and non-combatants. The sight was so sickening that their -musketry died down, and when they saw the unfortunate Portuguese -thrust by thousands into the water, numbers of them turned to the -charitable work of helping the strugglers ashore, and saved many -lives. The others cleared the bridge-head by forcing the fugitives -back with the butt ends of their muskets, and edging them along the -quays and into the side streets, till the way was open. In the late -afternoon some of Mermet’s troops mended the gap in the bridge with -planks and rafters, and crossed it, despite of the irregular fire of -the Portuguese battery on the heights above. They then pushed into -the transpontine suburb, expelled its defenders, and finally climbed -the Serra hill and captured the guns which had striven to prevent -their passage. - -Meanwhile the parts of Oporto remote from the pontoon-bridge had -been the scene of a certain amount of desultory fighting. Many -small bodies of the garrison had barricaded themselves in houses, -and made a desperate but ineffectual attempt to defend them. In the -Bishop’s palace at the south end of the town 400 militia held out -for some hours, and were all bayonetted when the gates were at last -burst open. Street-fighting always ends in rapine, rape and arson, -and as the resistance died down the victors turned their hands -to the usual atrocities that follow a storm. It was only a small -proportion of them who had been sobered and sickened by witnessing -the catastrophe on the bridge. The rest dealt with the houses and -with the inhabitants after the fashion usual in the sieges of that -day, and Oporto was thoroughly sacked. It is to the credit of Soult -that he used every exertion to beat the soldiers off from their prey, -and restored order long ere the following morning. It is to be wished -that Wellington had been so lucky at Badajoz and San Sebastian. - -[Illustration: COMBAT OF BRAGA - (OR LANHOZO) - MARCH 20TH 1809] - -[Illustration: OPORTO - MARCH-MAY 1809 - SHOWING THE PORTUGUESE LINES] - -The French army had lost, so the Marshal reported, no more than -eighty killed and 350 wounded, an extraordinary testimony to the -badness of the Portuguese gunnery. How many of the garrison and -the populace perished it will never be possible to ascertain--the -figures given by various contemporary authorities run up from -4,000 to 20,000. The smaller number is probably nearer the truth, -but no satisfactory estimate can be made. It is certain that some -of the regiments which took part in the defence were almost -annihilated[294], and that thousands of the inhabitants were drowned -in the river. Yet the town was not depopulated, and of its defenders -the greater proportion turned up sooner or later in the ranks of -Silveira, Botilho, and Trant. The slain and the drowned together may -perhaps be roughly estimated at 7,000 or 8,000, about equally divided -between combatants and non-combatants. - - [294] E.g. the 21st of the line had even in September, nearly - six months after the storm, only 193 men under arms. - -Soult meanwhile could report to his master that the first half of -his orders had been duly carried out. He had captured 200 cannon, a -great store of English ammunition and military equipment, and more -than thirty merchant vessels, laden with wine. He had delivered Foy -and some dozens of other French captives--for it would be doing the -Portuguese injustice to let it be supposed that they had killed or -tortured all their prisoners. In short, the victory and the trophies -were splendid: yet the Marshal was in reality almost as far from -having completed the conquest of northern Portugal as on the day -when he first crossed its frontier. He had only secured for himself -a new base of operation, to supersede Chaves and Braga. For the next -month he could do no more than endeavour ineffectually to complete -the subjugation of one single province. The main task which his -master had set before him, the capture of Lisbon, he was never able -to contemplate, much less to take in hand. Like so many other French -generals in the Peninsula, he was soon to find that victory is not -the same thing as conquest. - - -N.B.--The sources for this part of the Portuguese campaign are very -full. On the French side we have, besides the Marshal’s dispatches, -the following eye-witnesses: Le Noble, Soult’s official chronicler; -St. Chamans (one of the Marshal’s aides-de-camp); General Bigarré, -King Joseph’s representative at the head quarters of the 2nd Corps; -Naylies of Lahoussaye’s dragoons; and Fantin des Odoards of the 31st -Léger. On the Portuguese side we have the lengthy dispatches of Eben, -the narrative of Hennegan (who had brought the British ammunition to -Oporto), some letters from Brotherton, who was first with La Romana -and then with Silveira, and a quantity of official correspondence in -the Record Office, between Beresford and the Portuguese. - - - - -SECTION XIII: CHAPTER V - -SOULT’S HALT AT OPORTO: OPERATIONS OF WILSON AND LAPISSE ON THE -PORTUGUESE FRONTIER: SILVEIRA’S DEFENCE OF AMARANTE - - -Oporto had been conquered: the unhappy levies of the Bishop had been -scattered to the winds: by the captures which it had made the French -army was now, for the first time since its departure from Orense, -in possession of a considerable store of provisions and an adequate -supply of ammunition. Soult was no longer driven forward by the -imperative necessity for finding new resources to feed his troops, -nor forced to hurry on the fighting by the fear that if he delayed -his cartridges would run short. He had at last leisure to halt and -take stock of his position. The most striking point in the situation -was that he was absolutely ignorant of the general course of the war -in the other regions of the Peninsula. When he had been directed -to march on Oporto, he had been assured that he might count on the -co-operation of Lapisse, who was to advance from Salamanca with his -9,000 men, and of Victor, who was to stretch out to him a helping -hand from the valley of the Tagus. It was all-important to know how -far the promised aid was being given: yet the Marshal could learn -nothing. More than two months had now elapsed since he had received -any dispatches from the Emperor. It was a month since he had obtained -his last news of the doings of his nearest colleague, Ney, which had -been brought to him, as it will be remembered, just as he was about -to leave Orense. At that moment the Duke of Elchingen had been able -to tell him nothing save that the communications between Galicia and -Leon had been broken, and that the insurrection was daily growing -more formidable. After this his only glimpse of the outer world had -been afforded by Portuguese letters, seized in the post-offices of -Braga and Oporto, from which he had learnt that his garrisons left -behind at Vigo and Tuy were being beleaguered by a vast horde of -Galician irregular levies. ‘The march of the 2nd Corps,’ wrote one of -Soult’s officers, ‘may be compared to the progress of a ship on the -high seas: she cleaves the waves, but they close behind her, and in a -few moments all trace of her passage has disappeared[295].’ To make -the simile complete, Fantin des Odoards should have compared Soult to -the captain of a vessel in a dense fog, forging ahead through shoals -and sandbanks without any possibility of obtaining a general view of -the coast till the mists may lift. To all intents and purposes, we -may add, the fog never dispersed till May had arrived, and Wellesley -hurtled down in a dreadful collision on the groping commander, ere he -had fully ascertained his own whereabouts. - - [295] Fantin des Odoards, _Journal_, April 28, p. 226. - -When the whole country-side is up in arms, as it was in Galicia and -northern Portugal in the spring of 1809, it is useless to dispatch -small bodies of men in search of news. They are annihilated in a -few hours: but to make large detachments and send them out on long -expeditions, so weakens the main army that it loses its power of -further advance. This was the fate of the 2nd Corps after the fall of -Oporto. Soult, compelled to seek for information at all costs, had -to send one of his four infantry divisions back towards Galicia, to -succour Tuy and Vigo and obtain news of Ney, while another marched -eastward to the Tras-os-Montes, to look for signs of the advance of -Lapisse from Salamanca. When these detachments had been made, the -remainder of the army was too weak to resume the march on Lisbon -which the Emperor had commanded, and was forced to remain cantoned in -the neighbourhood of Oporto. - -The details of Soult’s disposition of his troops after the fall of -Oporto were as follows: Franceschi’s cavalry, supported by Mermet’s -division of infantry, were pushed forward across the Douro on the -road to Coimbra, to watch the movements of the wrecks of the Bishop’s -army, which had retired to the line of the Vouga. Merle’s division -and half Delaborde’s remained in garrison at Oporto, while Lorges’ -and one brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons were kept not far from -them, in the open country north of the city, about Villa de Conde -and Vallongo. The other brigade of Lahoussaye’s division, supported -by Foy’s infantry, was sent out on an expedition towards the -Tras-os-Montes, with orders to brush away Silveira and seek for news -of the expected approach of Lapisse. Loison was placed in command -of this detachment. Finally, Heudelet’s division, which had been -guarding the sick and the stores of the army at Braga, was ordered to -send on all the _impedimenta_ to Oporto, and then to prepare to march -northward in order to relieve Tuy and Vigo, and to get into touch -with Ney and the 6th Corps. - -It was clear that the further movements of the Duke of Dalmatia would -depend on the intelligence which Loison and Heudelet might obtain. If -Ney should have crushed the Galician insurgents, if Lapisse should be -met with somewhere on the borders of Spain, matters would look well -for the resumption of the advance on Lisbon. It was also to be hoped -that Lapisse would be able to give some information as to the doings -of Victor and the 1st Corps. For it was necessary to find out how the -Duke of Belluno had been faring in Estremadura, and to know whether -he was prepared to co-operate in that general movement against the -Portuguese capital which the Emperor had prescribed in his parting -instructions from Valladolid. - -As a matter of fact, Victor, having beaten Cuesta at Medellin on the -day before Soult captured Oporto (March 28), had reached the end of -his initiative, and was now lying at Merida, incapable, according to -his own conception, of any further offensive movement till he should -have received heavy reinforcements. Ney in Galicia was fighting hard -against the insurgents, and beginning to discover that though he -might rout them a dozen times he could not make an end of them. He -had not a man to spare for Soult’s assistance. - -There remained Lapisse, who in his central position at Salamanca -should have been, according to Napoleon’s design, the link between -Ney, Victor, and Soult. He had been directed, as it will be -remembered[296], to move on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, to capture -both these fortresses, and then to advance into Portugal and to -strike at Abrantes: when he arrived there it was hoped that he would -find Soult on his right and Victor on his left, and would join them -in the general assault on Lisbon. There can be no doubt that Napoleon -was giving too heavy a task to Lapisse: he had but a single division -of infantry--though it was a strong one of twelve battalions--and -one provisional brigade of cavalry[297], in all about 9,000 men. -This was ample for the holding down of the southern parts of the -kingdom of Leon, or even for the attack on Almeida and Rodrigo: -but it was a small force with which to advance into the mountains -of central Portugal or to seize Abrantes. If he had carried out -his instructions, Lapisse would have had to march for nearly 200 -miles through difficult mountain country, beset every day by the -_Ordenanza_, as Soult had been in his shorter route from Orense to -Oporto. And if he had ever cut his way to Abrantes, he ought to have -found himself faced by Cradock’s 9,000 British troops and by the -reorganized Portuguese regular army, which lay in and about Lisbon, -with a strength which even in February was not less than 12,000 men. - - [296] See p. 175. - - [297] On Feb. 1 the force was, _présents sous les armes_, 7,692 - infantry, about 1,000 cavalry, and 200 gunners. - -Napoleon had given Lapisse too much to do: but on the other hand that -general performed far too little. Though he could never have reached -Abrantes, he ought to have reached Almeida, where his presence would -have been of material assistance to Soult, more especially if he had -from thence pushed exploring columns towards Lamego and Vizeu, before -plunging into the mountains on the road to the south. As a matter of -fact, Lapisse in February and March never advanced so much as fifty -miles from Salamanca, and allowed himself to be ‘contained’ and -baffled, for two whole months, by an insignificant opposing force, -commanded by a general possessing that enterprise and initiative -which he himself entirely lacked. - -The officer who wrecked this part of Napoleon’s plan for the invasion -of Portugal was Sir Robert Wilson, one of the most active and capable -men in the English army, and one who might have made a great name -for himself, had fortune been propitious. But though he served with -distinction throughout the Napoleonic war, and won golden opinions -in Belgium and Egypt, in Prussia and Poland, no less than in Spain, -he never obtained that command on a large scale which would have -enabled him to show his full powers. It may seem singular that a man -who won love and admiration wherever he went, who was decorated by -two emperors for brilliant feats of arms done under their eyes, who -was equally popular in the Russian, the Austrian, or the Portuguese -camp, who had displayed on a hundred fields his chivalrous daring, -his ready ingenuity, and his keen military insight, should fail to -achieve greatness. But Wilson, unhappily for himself, had the defects -of his qualities. When acting as a subordinate his independent and -self-reliant character was always getting him into trouble with his -hierarchical superiors. He was not the man to obey orders which he -believed to be dangerous or mistaken: he so frequently ‘thought for -himself’ and carried out plans quite different from those which had -been imposed upon him, that no commander-in-chief could tolerate him -for long. His moves were always clever and generally fortunate, but -mere success did not atone for his disobedience in the eyes of his -various chiefs, and he never remained for long in the same post. All -generals, good and bad, agree in disliking lieutenants who disregard -their orders and carry out other schemes--even if they be ingenious -and successful ones[298]. It must be added that Wilson dabbled -in politics on the Whig side, and was not a favourite with Lord -Castlereagh, a drawback when preferments were being distributed. - - [298] Wellington, e.g., writes to him on August 5, 1809, ‘It - is difficult for me to instruct you, when every letter that I - receive from you informs me that you have gone further off, and - are executing some plan of your own.’ - -But when trusted with any independent command, and allowed a free -hand, Wilson always did well. Not only had he all the talents of an -excellent partisan chief, but he was one of those genial leaders -who have the power to inspire confidence and enthusiasm in their -followers, and are able to get out of them double the work that an -ordinary commander can extort. He was in short one of those men who -if left to themselves achieve great things, but who when placed in a -subordinate position quarrel with their superiors and get sent home -in disgrace. From the moment when Beresford assumed command of the -Portuguese army his relations with Wilson were one long story of -friction and controversy, and Wellesley (though acknowledging his -brilliant services) made no attempt to keep him in the Peninsula. -He wanted officers who would obey orders, even when they did not -understand or approve them, and would not tolerate lieutenants who -wished to argue with him[299]. - - [299] It is most unfortunate that while Wilson wrote and - published admirable narratives of his doings in Prussia and - Poland in 1806-7, and of his Russian and German campaign of - 1812-3, he has left nothing on record concerning Portugal in - 1808-9. Moreover the life, by his son-in-law, breaks off in 1807, - and was never finished. My narrative is constructed from his - dispatches in the Record Office, the correspondence of Wellesley - and Beresford, and Mayne and Lillie’s _Loyal Lusitanian Legion_. - -It was Wilson who first showed that the new levies of Portugal -could do good service in the field. While Silveira and Eben were -meeting with nothing but disaster in the Tras-os-Montes and the -Entre-Douro-e-Minho, he was conducting a thoroughly successful -campaign on the borders of Leon. From January to April, 1809, he, -and he alone, protected the eastern frontier of Portugal, and with a -mere handful of men kept the enemy at a distance, and finally induced -him to draw off and leave Salamanca, just at the moment when Soult’s -operations on the Douro were becoming most dangerous. - -The force at his disposal in January, 1809, consisted of nothing -more than his own celebrated ‘Loyal Lusitanian Legion.’ We have -already had occasion to mention this corps while speaking of the -reorganization of the Portuguese army (see page 199). On December 14, -as we have seen, he had led out his little brigade of Green-coats -towards the frontier[300]. - - [300] It will he remembered that it was only the first division - of the Legion that marched. The second, which could not go - forward for want of uniforms and arms, was left behind in charge - of Baron Eben. That officer had strict orders to move out to - Almeida the moment that he should receive the muskets, &c. that - were on their way from England. Eben, however, disregarded his - instructions, became one of the Bishop’s clique, and involved his - men in the campaign against Soult, thereby marring Wilson’s plans - and depriving him of half his proper force. - -Wilson’s reasons for moving forward were partly political, -partly military: on the one hand he wished to get away from the -neighbourhood of the Bishop of Oporto, whose intrigues disgusted -him; on the other he saw that it was necessary to bring up a force -to cover the frontier of Portugal, when Moore marched forward into -Spain. As long as Moore had remained at Salamanca, there was a strong -barrier in front of Portugal: but when he departed it was clear that -the kingdom must defend itself. Wilson therefore advanced to Pinhel, -near Almeida, and there established his little force in cantonments. - -He was at this place when the startling developments of the campaign -in the last ten days of December, 1808, took place. Moore retired on -Galicia, Napoleon’s army swept on into Leon, and Wilson found himself -left alone with the whole defence of the north-eastern frontier -of Portugal thrown on his hands. He soon heard of the storming of -Zamora and Toro, and learnt that Lapisse’s division had arrived at -Salamanca. Three marches might bring that general to the border. - -A few days later Wilson received from Sir John Cradock the news that -he had ordered the British garrison to evacuate Almeida[301], and -to retire on Lisbon, as the whole remaining force in Portugal would -probably have to embark in a few days. The new commander-in-chief -added that he should advise Wilson to bring off his British officers -and depart with the rest, as the Portuguese would be unable to make -any head against Bonaparte, and it would be a useless sacrifice -to linger in their company and be overwhelmed. This pusillanimous -counsel shocked and disgusted Wilson: he called together his -subordinates, and found that they agreed with him in considering -Cradock’s advice disgraceful. They resolved that they could not -desert their Portuguese comrades, and were in honour bound to see -the campaign to an end, however black the present outlook might -appear[302]. - - [301] It consisted of the 45th and 97th regiments. - - [302] Napier, who is very friendly to Cradock, makes no mention - of this extraordinary dispatch. But it is fully substantiated by - Mayne and Lillie, who were both present at Wilson’s council of - war, and heard the matter discussed. See their _History of the - Lusitanian Legion_, p. 43. - -When therefore the British garrison of Almeida was withdrawn, Wilson -entered that fortress with the Legion and took charge of it. He -obtained from the Regency leave to appoint his lieutenant-colonel, -William Mayne, as the governor, and also received permission to -assume command of the local levies in the neighbourhood. These -consisted of the skeletons of two line regiments (nos. 11 and 23) -whose reorganization had but just begun. There were also two militia -regiments (Guarda and Trancoso) to be raised in the district, but at -this moment they existed only in name, and possessed neither officers -nor arms. For immediate action Wilson could count upon nothing but -the 1,300 men of the Lusitanian Legion. - -Nevertheless he resolved to advance at once, and to endeavour to -impose on Lapisse by a show of activity. Leaving the Portuguese -regulars and 700 men of the Legion to garrison Almeida, he crossed -the frontier with his handful of cavalry (not 200 sabres), two guns, -and 300 men of his light companies. Passing the Spanish fortress -of Ciudad Rodrigo he advanced some distance on the Salamanca road, -and took up his position behind the Yeltes river, with his right -resting on the inaccessible Sierra de Francia, and his left at San -Felices, half way to the Douro. His whole force constituted no more -than a thin line of pickets, but he acted with such confidence and -decision, beating up the French outposts with his dragoons, raiding -well forward in the direction of Ledesma and Tamames, and stirring up -the peasants of the mountain country to insurrection, that Lapisse -gave him credit for having a considerable force at his back. The -French general had expected to meet with no opposition on his way -to Almeida, believing that Cradock was about to embark, and that -the Portuguese would not fight. He was accordingly much surprised -to find a long line in his front, occupied by troops dressed like -British riflemen, and commanded by British officers--whose strength -he was unable to ascertain. He halted, in order to take stock of his -opponent, when a bold push would have shown him that only a skeleton -army was before him. In an intercepted dispatch of February[303] he -reported that the peasantry informed him that Wilson had 12,000 men, -and that as many more were in garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. - - [303] See the _Lusitanian Legion_, p. 47. - -As the weeks wore on, and the winter drew to an end, Wilson obtained -some slight reinforcements. When he first advanced the Spaniards -could give him no help, for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo itself -consisted of nothing but its six companies of urban militia, and -a new battalion of 500 men, which had been on the point of setting -out to join La Romana when its way to Leon was intercepted by the -French. There were 1,400 men to man a fortress which required a -garrison of 4,000[304]! But before January was out, Pignatelli, the -captain-general of Castile, had sent into the place a regiment which -he had raised in the mountains of Avila, and Carlos d’España[305] had -begun to form some new battalions from the peasantry of the Ciudad -Rodrigo district, stiffened by stragglers from La Romana’s army[306]. -In February the Central Junta gave Wilson a provisional command over -the Spanish forces in Leon, and he used his authority to draw upon -the garrison of Rodrigo for detachments to strengthen his outposts. -He also requisitioned men from Almeida, when the Portuguese regiments -there placed had begun to fill up their ranks to a respectable -strength. A few cavalry of the re-formed 11th of the line were -especially useful to him for scouting work. - - [304] This fact comes from a letter of Ramon Blanco, governor - of Ciudad Rodrigo, dated Jan. 13, which Frere sent home to - Castlereagh, and which is therefore now in the Record Office. - Blanco complains that he is absolutely without trained - artillerymen of any sort. - - [305] Carlos d’España, whose name we shall so frequently meet - during the succeeding years, was no Spaniard, but a French - _émigré_ officer of the name of D’Espagne. Englishmen, on account - of his name, sometimes took him for a prince of the Spanish royal - family. - - [306] Sir Robert Wilson to Frere, dated Jan. 29, in the Record - Office. The regiment sent by Pignatelli was called ‘Volunteers of - Avila.’ - -With this small assistance, Wilson, whose total force never exceeded -400 horse and 3,000 infantry, kept Lapisse employed throughout -February and March. He beat up the French quarters on several -occasions, and twice captured large convoys of provisions which -were being directed on Salamanca; to fall upon one of these, a -great requisition of foodstuffs from Ledesma, he dashed far within -Lapisse’s lines, but brought out all the wagons in safety and -delivered them to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. At last, emboldened -by his adversary’s timidity, he extended his right beyond the Sierra -de Francia, and established part of the Legion under Colonel Mayne in -the Puerto de Baños, the main pass between Salamanca and Estremadura. -Thus Lapisse was completely cut off from all communication with -Victor and the French army on the Tagus, save by the circuitous route -through Madrid. - -Jourdan, writing in the name of King Joseph, had duly transmitted to -Lapisse the Emperor’s orders to march on Abrantes, the moment that -it should be known that Soult had arrived at Oporto. He had even -reiterated these directions in February, though both he and the King -doubted their wisdom. Victor had written to Madrid to suggest that -Alcantara would be a much better and safer objective for the division -to aim at than Abrantes[307]. He wished to draw Lapisse’s troops -(which properly belonged to the 1st Corps) into his own sphere of -operations, and repeatedly declared that without them he had no hope -of bringing his Estremaduran campaign to a happy end, much less of -executing any effective diversion against Portugal. Jourdan agreed -with him, opining that Lapisse would miscarry, if he invaded central -Portugal on an independent line of operations. But no one was so -convinced of this as Lapisse himself, who, with his exaggerated ideas -of the strength of Wilson, was most reluctant to move forward. As -late as the end of March the Emperor’s orders were still ostensibly -in vigour[308], and the general only excused himself for not -marching, by pretending that he could not venture to advance till he -had certain news of Soult’s movements. This the Galician insurgents -were obliging enough to keep from him. - - [307] Victor to King Joseph, from Toledo, Feb. 3, 1809. - - [308] This is shown by a letter of March 23 from Solignac, one of - Lapisse’s brigadiers, which was intercepted by guerrillas. The - general writes to his friend Raguerie that the march on Abrantes - is certain, and that letters for him had better be readdressed to - Lisbon [Record Office]. - -At last, however, Jourdan yielded to Victor’s wishes, and authorized -Lapisse to drop down on to Alcantara, keeping outside the limits of -Portugal, instead of making the attack on Rodrigo and the subsequent -dash at Abrantes which the Emperor had prescribed[309]. Overjoyed -at escaping from the responsibility which he dreaded, Lapisse first -prepared to march southward by the Puerto de Baños. But when he -found it held by Mayne and the troops of Wilson’s right wing, he made -no attempt to force the passage, but resolved to carry out his design -by stratagem. Massing his division, he marched on Ciudad Rodrigo upon -April 6. He pierced with ease the feeble screen of Wilson’s outposts -and appeared in front of the Spanish fortress, which he duly summoned -to surrender. But though the place might easily have been carried by -a _coup de main_ in January, it was now safe against anything but -a formal siege, and Lapisse had neither a battering-train nor any -real intention of attacking. When the governor returned a defiant -answer, the French division made a show of sitting down in front -of the walls. This was done in order to draw Wilson to the aid of -the place, and the move was successful. Calling in all his outlying -detachments from the nearer passes and collecting some of Carlos -d’España’s levies, Sir Robert took post close to the walls of Ciudad -Rodrigo, with a battalion of the Legion under Colonel Grant, some -other Portuguese troops and four guns[310]. - - [309] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 189, show that he and Joseph - authorized the move, at Victor’s instance, and prove that it was - not made on Lapisse’s own responsibility, as Napier supposes [ii. - 72], but in obedience to superior orders. - - [310] This narrative is from Mayne and Lillie, supplemented by - Jourdan and other French sources. Wilson thought that he had - foiled a real attack on Rodrigo, but was mistaken: Lapisse was - only feinting. - -Having thus lured Wilson away from the passes, the French general -suddenly broke up by night, and made a forced march for the Puerto -de Perales, the nearest mountain-road to Alcantara. He thus obtained -a full day’s start, and got off unmolested. Sir Robert and Carlos -d’España followed on his track as soon as they discovered his -departure, and Mayne also pursued, from the Puerto de Baños, but none -of them could do more than harass his rearguard, with which they -skirmished for three days in the passes. It would not have been wise -of them to attempt more, even if they could have got into touch with -the main body, for the French division was double their strength. -Meanwhile the peasantry of the Sierra de Gata endeavoured to stop -Lapisse’s progress, by blocking the defiles; but he swept them away -with ease, and they never succeeded in delaying him for more than a -few hours. Their incessant ‘sniping’ and night attacks exasperated -the French, who dealt most ruthlessly with the country-side as they -passed. When they arrived at Alcantara, and found the little town -barricaded, they not only refused all quarter to the fighting-men -when they stormed the place, but committed dreadful atrocities on the -non-combatants. Not only murder and rape but mutilation and torture -are reported by credible witnesses[311]. After the houses had been -sacked, the very tombs in the churches were broken open in search of -plunder. Leaving Alcantara full of corpses and ruins [April 12], the -division marched on by Caceres and joined Victor in his camp near -Merida[312] [April 19]. - - [311] It is impossible to make out why Alcantara was treated so - much worse than other places taken by storm, but the facts are - well vouched for. The report of the local authorities to Cuesta - says that not only all peasants taken with arms in their hands, - but more than forty non-combatants were butchered, and that not - a woman who had remained in the place escaped rape. Lillie, - the historian of the Lusitanian Legion, who was with the force - that pursued Lapisse from Rodrigo, says that he saw the traces - of ‘acts of barbarity that would disgrace the most savage and - uncivilized of mankind’--corpses deliberately mutilated and laid - out to roast on piles of burning furniture, with the bodies of - domestic animals, such as pigs and dogs, placed on the top of the - pile as if in jest [_Lusitanian Legion_, pp. 66-7]. The German - historian Schepeler gives very similar details, adding the note - about the dragging up of bones and coffins from the churches. - - [312] All Napier’s criticism (ii. 85-6) on Lapisse’s movement to - Alcantara is vitiated by his ignorance of the fact that Jourdan - and the King, at Victor’s instance, had sent him orders to go - there. But nothing can excuse his previous inaction in February - and March. He ought to have attacked Rodrigo before the end of - January, when it was still almost without a garrison, and in a - state of great disrepair. - -Since Lapisse, then, had moved off far to the south, and thrown -in his lot with his old comrades of the 1st Corps, it was in vain -that Soult sought for news of him on the Douro after the fall -of Oporto. When Loison set out to cross the Tamega and to enter -the Tras-os-Montes, in order that he might obtain information of -the movements of the division at Salamanca, that division was -making ready for its march to Alcantara; a fortnight later it had -disappeared from the northern theatre of operations altogether, and -Soult’s last chance of obtaining external help for his invasion of -Portugal was gone. This section, in short, of Napoleon’s great plan -for the march on Lisbon had been foiled, and foiled almost entirely -by Sir Robert Wilson’s happy audacity and resourceful generalship. -But for him, the timidity of Cradock, the impotence of the -Spaniards, and the disorganization of the Portuguese army might have -brought about the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, at the same -moment that Soult was entering Portugal on its northern frontier. His -services have never received their proper meed of praise, either from -the government which he served so well, or from the historians who -have told the annals of the Peninsular War. - -We must now return to the details of the Duke of Dalmatia’s -operations. His movements were clearly dependent on the results of -the two expeditions under Heudelet and Loison, which he had sent out -to the north and the east after his victory of March 29. - -Heudelet, after discharging on to Oporto the sick and wounded and the -stores which he had been guarding at Braga, started out northward -on April 6, with the 4,000 infantry of his own division and Lorges’ -dragoons, whom the Marshal had ordered up to his aid from Villa de -Conde. Heudelet was ordered to disperse the insurgents in the valleys -of the Lima and Minho, and to relieve Tuy and Vigo, where the French -garrisons were known to be in a state of siege. To reach them it was -necessary to pierce through the screen of militia and _Ordenanza_ -under General Botilho, which had cut off all communication between -Galicia and the army of Portugal since the month of February. - -On April 7 the French general neared the line of the Lima, only to -find the bridges barricaded and Botilho’s horde entrenched behind -them. After some preliminary skirmishing, fords were discovered, -which Heudelet’s infantry passed upon the following morning, sending -the unfortunate Portuguese flying in every direction and capturing -the three guns which formed their sole artillery. On the tenth -the frontier fortress of Valenza was reached: it was found to be -in a dilapidated condition, and garrisoned by only 200 men, who -surrendered at the first summons. Tuy, where General Lamartinière had -been shut up for the last seven weeks, faces Valenza across the broad -estuary of the Minho, so that Heudelet was now in full communication -with it. - -Lamartinière, as it will be remembered[313], had been left behind, -with Soult’s heavy artillery, wheeled transport, and sick, when the -2nd Corps marched for Orense on February 16. He had gathered in -several belated detachments which had started from Santiago in the -hope of joining the rear of the marching column, so that he had the -respectable force of 3,300 men, though 1,200 of them were invalids or -convalescents. The walls of Tuy were in a bad state of repair, but -the governor had found no great difficulty in maintaining himself -against the Galician insurgents on his own side of the Minho, and -the Portuguese levies from the other bank which Botilho sent to -the aid of the Spaniards. But he had been completely shut in since -Soult’s departure, and could give no information concerning Ney’s -operations in northern Galicia, or the general progress of the war -in the other parts of Spain. The only news which he could supply was -that Vigo, the next French garrison, had fallen into the hands of the -enemy. On his way to Portugal Soult had dropped a force of 700 men -at that fortress, lest its excellent harbour should be utilized by -the British for throwing in supplies to the Galician insurgents. The -paymaster-general of the 2nd Corps, with his treasure and its escort, -had lagged behind during the Marshal’s advance, and, being beset by -the peasantry, had entered Vigo instead of pushing on to Tuy. - - [313] See p. 188. - -When Soult had passed out of sight on the way to Orense, the -Galicians of the coast-land, headed by Pablo Morillo, a lieutenant -of the regular army whom La Romana had sent down from the interior, -and by Manuel Garcia Del Barrio[314], a colonel dispatched by the -Central Junta from Seville, had taken arms in great numbers, and -blockaded Vigo. The French commander, Colonel Chalot, found himself -unable to defend the whole extent of the fortifications for sheer -want of men, and could not prevent the insurgents from establishing -themselves close under the walls and keeping up a continual fire upon -the garrison. He believed that a serious assault would infallibly -succeed, and only refused to surrender because he was ashamed to -yield to peasants. On March 23 two English frigates, the _Lively_ -and _Venus_, appeared off the harbour mouth, and began to supply the -insurgents with ammunition, and to land heavy naval guns for their -use. On the twenty-seventh one of the gates was battered in, and the -Galicians were preparing to storm the place, when Chalot surrendered -at discretion, only stipulating that he and his men should be handed -over to the British, and not to the Spaniards. This request was -granted, and Captain Mackinley received twenty-three officers and -nearly 800 men as prisoners, besides a number of sick and several -hundred non-combatants belonging to the train, and camp-followers. -The plunder taken consisted of sixty wagons, 339 horses, and more -than £6,000 in hard cash, composing the military chest of the 2nd -Corps [March 28]. - - [314] Napier’s ‘Colonel Barrois.’ - -The Galicians had somewhat relaxed the blockade of Tuy in order to -press that of Vigo, and on the very day when Chalot surrendered, -General Lamartinière had sent out a flying column to endeavour to -communicate with his colleague. It returned pursued by the Spaniards, -to report to the governor that Vigo had fallen[315]. On its way back -to Tuy it suffered a loss of seventy prisoners and nearly 200 killed -and wounded. - - [315] Most of these details as to the fall of Vigo come from - a contemporary account in Andrade’s collection, printed in - _Los Guerrilleros Gallegos_, pp. 129-37. Le Noble asserts that - only 794 men were captured, but Captain Mackinley says that he - received nearly 1,300 prisoners, including 300 sick and many - non-combatants. He had the best opportunities of knowing, and - must be followed. Le Noble and the Spaniards do not give the - French commander’s name, but I find that of Chalot as the senior - officer among the prisoners in the list in the Record Office. - Next to him is the paymaster-general Conscience. Toreno and - Schepeler agree with Captain Mackinley in giving the number of - the prisoners at over 1,200. - -Heudelet and Lamartinière had now some 7,000 men collected at Tuy, -a force with which they could easily have routed the whole of -the insurgents of the Minho, and forced them to retire into the -mountains. But Soult’s orders to his lieutenants were to avoid -operations in Galicia, and to concentrate towards Portugal. Tuy was -evacuated, and its garrison transferred across the frontier-river -to the Portuguese fortress of Valenza. Before the transference was -completed, the French generals received an unexpected visit from -some troops of the 6th Corps. Ney, disquieted as to the condition of -Tuy and Vigo, had sent a brigade under Maucune to seek for news of -their garrisons. This force, cutting its way through the insurgents, -came into Tuy on April 12. Thus Heudelet was at last able to get -news of the operations of Ney. The information received was not -encouraging: the Duke of Elchingen was beset by the Galicians on -every side: La Romana had cut off one of his outlying garrisons, that -of Villafranca, and his communications with Leon were so completely -cut off that he had no reports to give as to the progress of affairs -in the rest of Spain. Finding that Vigo was lost, and the garrison of -Tuy relieved, Maucune retraced his steps and returned to Santiago, -harassed for the whole of his march by the insurgents of the -coast-land. - -Meanwhile Heudelet’s communication with Oporto had been interrupted, -for the Portuguese, routed on the Lima a week before, had come back -to their old haunts, seized Braga, and blocked the high-road and -the bridges. Soult only got into touch with his expeditionary force -by sending out Lahoussaye with 3,000 men to reopen the road to the -North. When this was done, he bade Heudelet evacuate Valenza (whose -fortifications turned out to be in too bad order to be repaired -in any reasonable space of time), and to disperse his division in -garrisons for Braga, Viana, and Barcelos. The whole of the convoy and -the sick from Tuy were sent up to Oporto. - -The net result of Heudelet’s operations was that the Marshal, -at the cost of immobilizing one of his four infantry divisions, -obtained a somewhat precarious hold upon the flat country of -Entre-Douro-e-Minho. The towns were in his hands, but the _Ordenanza_ -had only retired to the hills, and perpetually descended to worry -Heudelet’s detachments, and to murder couriers and foraging parties. -Meanwhile 4,000 men were wasted for all purposes of offensive action. -Vigo, Tuy, and Valenza had all been abandoned, and touch with the -army of Galicia had been completely lost. - -Even this modest amount of success had been denied to Soult’s -second expedition, that which he had sent under Loison towards the -Tras-os-Montes. The enemy with whom the French had to deal in this -region was Silveira, the same officer who had been defeated between -Monterey and Chaves in the early days of March, when the 2nd Corps -crossed the Portuguese frontier. He had fled with the wrecks of -his force towards Villa Real, at the moment when Soult marched on -Braga, and the Marshal had fondly hoped that he was now a negligible -quantity in the campaign. This was far from being the case: the -moment that Silveira heard that the French had crossed the mountains -and marched on Braga, he had rallied his two regular regiments and -his masses of _Ordenanza_, and pounced down on the detachment under -Commandant Messager, which Soult had left in garrison at Chaves. -This, it will be remembered, consisted of no more than a company -of infantry, a quantity of convalescents and stragglers, and the -untrustworthy Spanish-Portuguese ‘legion,’ which had been formed -out of the prisoners captured on March 6 and 12[316]. On the very -day upon which Soult was routing Eben in front of Braga, Silveira -appeared before the walls of Chaves with 6,000 men. Messager retired -into the citadel, abandoning on the outer walls of the town a few -guns, which the Portuguese were thus enabled to turn against the -inner defences. After a siege of five days and much ineffective -cannonading, the governor surrendered, mainly because the native -‘legion’ was preparing to open the gates to Silveira. Twelve hundred -men were captured, of whom only one-third were Frenchmen capable of -bearing arms, the rest being sick or ‘legionaries.’ - - [316] Le Noble, though he mentions the formation of the legion - (p. 120), omits to state that it was left at Chaves. But St. - Chamans establishes this fact (p. 120); he calls the corps - ‘les Espagnols et Portugais qui se disaient de notre parti.’ - Des Odoards (p. 212) also speaks of the ‘legion,’ as does - Naylies (p. 81). Its existence explains both the feebleness - of Messager’s defence, and the large number of prisoners whom - Silveira captured. The fighting force of the garrison was only - the one company, plus some hundreds of convalescents, who in the - fortnight since Soult’s departure had been able to resume their - arms. - -Having made this successful stroke, Silveira marched down the Tamega -to Amarante, making a movement parallel to Soult’s advance on Oporto. -His recapture of Chaves brought several thousands more of _Ordenanza_ -to his standard, and at Amarante he was joined on the thirtieth by -many of the fugitives who had escaped from the sack of Oporto on the -previous day. He spread his army, now amounting to 9,000 or 10,000 -men, along the left bank of the Tamega, whose bridges and fords he -protected with entrenchments. Advanced guards were pushed out on the -further side of the river on the three roads which lead to Oporto. - -When, therefore, the troops under Loison, which Soult had sent out -towards the Tras-os-Montes, drew near the Tamega, they found the -Portuguese in force. The cavalry could get no further forward than -Penafiel; when Foy’s infantry came up (April 7) Loison tried to -force the enemy back, both on the Amarante and on the Canavezes -road. He failed at each point, and sent back to the Marshal to ask -for reinforcements. Seeing him halt, Silveira, whose fault was not a -want of initiative, actually crossed the river with his whole army, -and fell upon the two French brigades. He was checked, but not badly -beaten, and Loison remained on the defensive (April 12). - -At this moment Soult heard of the fall of Chaves, full seventeen -days after it had happened. Realizing that Silveira was now growing -formidable, he sent to Loison’s aid General Delaborde with the second -of his infantry brigades, and Lorges’ dragoons. These reinforcements -brought the troops facing Silveira up to a total of some 6,500 -men--nearly a third of Soult’s whole disposable force. As Heudelet -was still absent on the Minho with 4,000 men more, the Marshal had -less than 10,000 left in and about Oporto. It was clear that the -grand march on Lisbon was not likely to begin for many a long day. - -On April 18 Loison advanced against Silveira, who boldly but unwisely -offered him battle on the heights of Villamea in front of Amarante. -Considering that he had but 2,000 regulars and 7,000 or 8,000 -half-armed militia and _Ordenanza_, his conduct can only be described -as rash in the extreme. He was, of course, beaten with great loss, -and hustled back into the town of Amarante. He would have lost both -it and its bridge, but for the gallantry of Colonel Patrick, an -English officer commanding a battalion of the 12th of the line, who -rallied his regiment in the streets, seized a group of houses and a -convent at the bridge-head and beat off the pursuers[317]. Patrick -was mortally wounded, but the passage of the river was prevented. -This saved the situation: Silveira got his men together, planted his -artillery so as to command the bridge, and took post in entrenchments -already constructed on the commanding heights on the left bank. Next -day Loison stormed the buildings at the bridge-head, but found that -he could get no further forward. The town was his, but he could -not debouch from it, as the bridge was palisaded, built up with a -barricade of masonry and raked by the Portuguese artillery. Soult -now sent up to aid Loison still further reinforcements, Sarrut’s -brigade of infantry from Merle’s division and the second brigade of -Lahoussaye’s dragoons. Thus no less than 9,000 French troops, nearly -half the army of Portugal, were concentrated at Amarante. - - [317] Silveira to Beresford (Record Office). Cf. Foy’s dispatch - to Loison (April 19), in which he owns that he failed to hold the - convent, and retired with a loss of ninety-one men of the 17th - regiment. - -The fact that twelve whole days elapsed between the arrival of these -last succours and the forcing of the passage of the Tamega had -no small influence on the fate of Soult’s campaign. Hitherto the -initiative had lain with him, and he had faced adversaries who could -only take the defensive. This period was nearly at an end, for on -April 22 Wellesley had landed at Lisbon, the English reinforcements -had begun to arrive, and an army, differing in every quality from -the hordes which the Marshal had encountered north of the Douro, was -about to assume the offensive against him. By the time that Loison at -last forced the bridge of Amarante, the British were already on the -march for Coimbra and Oporto. - -Silveira and his motley host, therefore, were doing admirable service -to the cause of their country when they occupied 9,000 out of Soult’s -21,000 men from April 20 to May 2 on the banks of the Tamega. The -ground was in their favour, but far stronger positions had been -forced ere now, and it was fortunate that this one was maintained for -so many days. The town of Amarante, it must be remembered, lies on -comparatively low ground: its bridge is completely commanded by the -heights on which Silveira had planted his camp and his batteries. The -river flows in a deep-sunk ravine, and was at this moment swollen -into an impassable torrent by the melting of the mountain snows. -Loison more than once sent swimmers by night, in search of places -where the strength of the current might be sufficiently moderate -to allow of an attempt to pass on rafts or boats. Not one of these -explorers could get near the further bank: they were swept off by -the rushing water and cast ashore far down stream, on the same side -from which they had started. There had been bridges above Amarante -at Mondim and Aroza, and below it at Canavezes, but reconnaissances -showed that they had all three been blown up, and that Portuguese -detachments were watching their ruins, to prevent any attempt to -reconstruct them. Loison found, therefore, that he could not turn -Silveira’s position by a flanking movement: there was nothing to do -save to wait till the river should fall, or to attempt to force the -bridge of Amarante at all costs. Continual rains made it hopeless to -expect the subsidence of the Tamega for many days, wherefore Loison -devoted all his energies to the task of capturing the bridge. Even -here there was one difficulty to be faced which might prove fatal: -the French engineers had discovered that the structure was mined. It -was necessary, therefore, not only to drive back the Portuguese, but -to prevent them from blowing up the bridge at the moment of their -retreat. - -Loison had entrusted the details of the attack on the bridge to -Delaborde, whose infantry held the advanced posts. That officer -first tried to approach the head of the bridge by means of a flying -sap; but when it had advanced a certain distance the fire of the -Portuguese from across the river became so deadly, that after many -men had been killed in the endeavour to work up to the palisades -on the bridge, the attempt had to be abandoned. The next device -recommended by the engineers was that an attempt should be made to -lay a trestle bridge at a spot some way below the town, where a -mill-dam contracted the width of the angry river. This was found to -be impossible, the stream proving to be far deeper than had been -supposed, while the Portuguese from the left bank picked off many of -the workmen [April 25]. - -Soult was now growing vexed at the delay, and sent two guns of -position from Oporto to Loison, to enable him to subdue the fire of -the enemy’s batteries. He also offered to call up Heudelet’s division -from Braga, even at the cost of abandoning his hold on the northern -part of the province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho. But a mere increase -of his already considerable force would have been of no service to -Loison; it was a device for passing the Tamega that he needed. - -Such a scheme was at last laid before him by Captain Bouchard, one -of his engineers[318]. The French officers had discovered, by a -careful use of their glasses, that the Portuguese mine, which was -to destroy the bridge, was situated in its left-hand arch, and that -the mechanism by which it was to be worked was not a ‘sausage’ or a -train of powder[319], but a loaded musket, whose muzzle was placed -in the mine, while to its trigger was attached a cord which ran to -the nearest trenches beyond the river. The musket was concealed -in a box, but its cord was visible to those provided with a good -telescope. Bouchard argued that if the cord could be cut or broken, -the enemy would not be able to touch off the mine, and he had thought -out a plan for securing his end. He maintained that an explosion at -the French side of the bridge would probably sever the cord without -firing the mine, and that a sudden assault, made immediately after -the explosion, and before the Portuguese could recover themselves, -might carry the barricades. In spite of the strongly-expressed doubts -of Foy and several other generals, Bouchard was finally permitted to -carry out his scheme. - - [318] Napier, ii. pp. 80-1, consistently mis-calls him Brochard. - - [319] Either of these might easily have been fired by a casual - shot, during the long cannonading which had been in progress. The - Portuguese, therefore, avoided them. - -He executed it on the night of May 2, when a dense fog chanced to -favour his daring and hazardous proceedings. Having first told off -some _tirailleurs_ to keep up a smart fire on the enemy’s trenches -and distract his attention, he sent four sappers, each provided with -a small powder-barrel, on to the bridge. The men, dressed in their -grey _capotes_, crawled on hands and knees, each rolling his barrel -(which was wrapped in cloth to deaden the sound) before him. They -kept in the shadow, and getting close under the parapet of the bridge -crept on till they reached the outermost Portuguese palisade. One -after another, at long intervals, each got forward unobserved, left -his barrel behind, and crawled back. The fourth sapper, starting to -his feet on his return journey, was observed by the Portuguese and -shot down, but Silveira’s men did not realize what he had been doing, -and merely took him for some daring explorer who was endeavouring -to spy out the state of the defences. After waiting for an hour, -Bouchard sent out a fifth sapper, who dragged behind him a ‘sausage’ -of powder thirty yards long, which he successfully connected with the -four barrels. All was now ready, and a battalion of picked grenadiers -from Delaborde’s division, filed silently down into the street near -the bridge-head: a whole brigade came behind them. - -At two o’clock Bouchard fired his sausage, and the explosion -followed. There were two chances of failure--one that the apparatus -for firing the mine might not be disturbed by the concussion, the -other that the shock might prove too strong, reach the mine, and -destroy the bridge. Neither of these fatalities took place: the -explosion duly broke the cord, shattered the nearest palisades, -but did not affect the mine. Before the smoke had cleared away -Delaborde’s grenadiers had dashed out on to the bridge, scrambled -over the barricades, and driven off the guard on the further -side. Regiment after regiment followed them, and charged up the -mountain-side towards Silveira’s batteries and entrenchments. None -of the Portuguese were under arms, save the few companies guarding -the debouches from the bridge. These were swept away, and the French -columns came storming into the bivouacs of the enemy before he was -well awake. Hardly half a dozen cannon shots were fired on them from -the batteries, and the greater part of the army of the Tras-os-Montes -fled without firing a shot. Silveira escaped almost naked by the back -window of the house above the bridge in which he had been sleeping. - -All the ten guns in the Portuguese batteries, five standards, and -several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the victorious -French, who lost (it is said) no more than two killed and seven -wounded. Their good fortune had been extraordinary: without the -opportune fog which hid their advance, their preliminary operations -would probably have been discovered. If their explosion had done -a little more or a little less than was hoped, the bridge might -have been totally destroyed, or its barricades left practically -uninjured--either of which chances would have foiled Bouchard’s plan. -But the luck of the army of Portugal was still in the ascendant, and -all went exactly as had been intended. - -Thus the Tamega was passed, and Silveira decisively beaten: his -levies had fled in all directions, and Soult opined that it would -take a long time to rally them. The day after the fight Loison -was joined at Amarante by Heudelet’s division from Braga, which, -in obedience to the Marshal’s orders, had marched to join the -expeditionary force, leaving only a single battalion behind to hold -Viana. This was an unfortunate move, as on Heudelet’s departure the -_Ordenanza_ came down from the Serra de Santa Catalina, and overran -the district which had been evacuated, in spite of Lorges’ dragoons, -who had been directed to keep the roads clear after the infantry had -been withdrawn. - -Meanwhile there were far more troops at Amarante than were needed -for the pursuit of Silveira, so Soult called back to Oporto the -division of Delaborde, leaving to Loison the infantry of Heudelet -and Sarrut, with Lahoussaye’s two brigades of dragoons, a force of -about 7,000 men. He ordered his lieutenant to scour the country as -far as Villa Real, and to send reconnaissances on the roads toward -Chaves and Braganza, with the object of frightening the insurgents -to retreat as far as possible. But Loison was not to advance for -more than two days’ march into the Tras-os-Montes, for rumours were -beginning to arrive concerning the appearance of British troops in -the direction of Coimbra, and the Marshal wished to keep his various -divisions close enough to each other to enable them to concentrate -with ease. If there were any truth in the news from the south, it -would be dangerous to allow a force which formed a third of the -whole army of Portugal to go astray in the heart of the mountains -beyond the Tamega. Loison accordingly marched off on May 8 towards -Villa Real, which he occupied without meeting with resistance. He -learnt that Silveira and his regulars had crossed the Douro, and gone -off in the direction of Lamego; but Botilho had fled up the Tamega -towards Chaves, and the _Ordenanza_ were lurking in the hills. He -then returned to Amarante, where we may leave him, at the end of his -tether, while we describe the state of affairs in Oporto. - - - - -SECTION XIII: CHAPTER VI - -INTRIGUES AT OPORTO: THE CONSPIRACY OF ARGENTON - - -It will have occurred to every student of the operations of the army -of Portugal during the month of April, that it was strange that -Marshal Soult should have remained quiescent at Oporto, while the -fate of his entire campaign was at stake during the fighting on the -Tamega. His head quarters were only thirty miles from Amarante--but -one day’s ride for himself and his staff--yet he never paid a single -flying visit to the scene of operations, even after he had come to -the conclusion that Loison was mismanaging the whole business. He -sent his lieutenant many letters of reproach, forwarded to him guns -of position, and ample reinforcements, but never came himself to -the spot to urge on the advance, even when ten and twelve days had -elapsed since the first unsuccessful attempts to force the passage of -the Tamega. - -The explanation of this persistent refusal of the Marshal to quit -Oporto is to be found in the political not the military state of -affairs. At Chaves he had proclaimed himself Viceroy of Portugal: -his viceroyalty at that moment embraced only just so much soil as -was covered by the encampments of his battalions. But after the -capture of Oporto and the occupation of the neighbouring towns of -the Entre-Douro-e-Minho, his position assumed an air of reality, and -he himself allowed the duties of the viceroy to trespass on those of -the commander of the Second Corps d’Armée. Nay more, there is good -reason to believe that he was not merely dreaming of setting up a -stable government in northern Portugal, but of something else. The -evidence as to his intentions is hard to weigh, for most of it comes -from the letters and diaries of men who disliked him, but there are -certain facts which cannot be disguised, and the inference from them -is irresistible. - -With the example of Murat’s exaltation before them, the more -ambitious and capable of Napoleon’s marshals could not refrain from -dreaming of crowns and sceptres. Nothing seemed impossible in those -astounding days, when the Emperor was creating sovereigns and realms -by a stroke of the pen, whenever the notion seized him. The line -between an appanaged duke and a vassal prince was a very thin one--as -the case of Berthier shows. Junot had dreamed of royalty at Lisbon -in 1808, and there seems little doubt that the same mirage of a -crown floated before Soult’s eyes at Oporto in 1809. The city itself -suggested the idea: in the Treaty of Fontainebleau Napoleon had put -on paper the project for creating a ‘king of Northern Lusitania,’ -with Oporto as his capital and the Entre-Douro-e-Minho as his realm. -Soult was cautious and wary, but he was also greedy and ambitious. -If, on the one hand, he had a wholesome fear of his master, he had -on the other good reasons for believing that it might be possible to -force his hand by presenting him with a _fait accompli_. - -There was in the city the nucleus of a party which was not wholly -indisposed to submit to the French domination. It was mainly composed -of those enemies of the Bishop of Oporto who had been suffering from -his anarchical rule of the last two months. They were the friends -and relatives of those who had perished by the dagger or the rope, -during the mob-law which had prevailed ever since Dom Antonio -returned from Lisbon. To these may be added some men of purely -material interests, who saw that the insurrection was ruining them, -and a remnant of the old corrupt bureaucracy which had submitted once -before to Junot--whose only thought was to keep or gain profitable -posts under the government of the day, whatever that government might -be. The whole body of dissidents from the cause of patriotism and -independence was so small and weak, that it is impossible to believe -that they would have taken any overt action if they had not received -encouragement from Soult. - -This much is certain--that when the disorders which accompanied the -capture of Oporto were ended, Soult showed himself most anxious to -conciliate the Portuguese, not only by introducing a regular and -orderly government, but by going out of his way to soothe and flatter -any notable who lingered in the city. In his anxiety to win over -the clergy he caused new silver vessels and candelabra to be made -to replace those which had been stolen from the churches in the -sack[320]. He filled up all civil appointments, whose holders had -fled, from the small number of persons who were ready to adhere to -the French. He again, as already at Chaves, endeavoured to enlist -a native military force, by putting tempting offers before those -officers of the regular army who had been made prisoners. All this -might have had no other cause than the wish to build up a party -of _Afrancesados_, such as already existed in Spain, and Soult -openly declared that such was his object[321]. This was the only -purpose that he avowed in his dispatches to the Emperor, and in his -communications with his colleagues. - - [320] See Le Noble (Soult’s partisan and official vindicator), p. - 207, and Fantin des Odoards, p. 227. - - [321] See his conversation with his aide-de-camp, St. Chamans, - in the latter’s _Mémoires_, p. 139. The Marshal said that he was - in a hazardous military position and that ‘je ne puis m’en tirer - qu’en divisant les Portugais entre eux, et j’emploie pour cela le - meilleur moyen politique qui soit en mon pouvoir.’ Compare Fantin - des Odoards, p. 227. - -But if the Marshal had no ulterior object in view, it is singular -that all his native partisans concurred in setting on foot a movement -for getting him saluted as king of northern Portugal. The new -municipal authorities, whom he had established in the half-deserted -towns occupied by his troops, sent in petitions begging him to assume -the position of sovereign. Documents of this kind came in from Braga, -Barcelos, Guimaraens, Feira, Oliveira and Villa de Conde. In Oporto -proclamations were posted on the walls declaring that ‘the Prince -Regent by his departure to Brazil had formally resigned his crown, -and that the only salvation for Portugal would be that the Duke of -Dalmatia, the most distinguished of the pupils of the great Napoleon, -should ascend the vacant throne[322].’ A priest named Veloso and -other persons went about in the street delivering harangues in favour -of the creation of the ‘kingdom of Northern Lusitania.’ A register -was opened in the municipal buildings to be signed by all persons -who wished to join in the petition to the Marshal to assume the -regal title, and a certain number of signatures were collected. A -newspaper, called the _Diario do Porto_, was started, to support -the movement, and ran for about a month. It is said that Soult’s -partisans even succeeded in gathering small crowds together, before -the mansion where his head quarters were established, to shout -_Viva o Rei Nicolao!_ and that the acclamations were acknowledged -by showers of copper coins thrown from the windows[323]. The latter -part of this story is no doubt an invention of Soult’s enemies, but -it was believed at the time by the majority of the French officers, -and ‘_Le Roi Nicolas_’ was for the future his nickname in the army -of Portugal[324]. On April 19 the Marshal ordered his chief of the -staff, General Ricard, to issue a circular letter to the generals -of divisions and brigades[325], inviting their co-operation in the -movement, and assuring them that no disloyalty to the Emperor would -be involved even if the Marshal assumed regal powers[326]. This -document is the most convincing piece of evidence that exists as to -Soult’s intentions. In it there is no attempt made to conceal the -movement that had been set on foot: the writer’s only preoccupation -is to show that it was not directed against Napoleon. When, five -months later, Ricard’s circular came under the Emperor’s eye, it -roused his wrath to such a pitch that he wrote in the most stinging -and sarcastic terms to Soult. ‘He is astounded,’ he says, ‘to find -the chief of the staff suggesting to the generals that the Marshal -should be requested to take up the reins of government, and assume -the attributes of supreme authority. If he had assumed sovereign -power on his own responsibility, it would have been a crime, clear -_lèse-majesté_, an attack on the imperial authority. How could a -man of sense, like Soult, suppose that his master would permit him -to exercise any power that had not been delegated to him? No wonder -that the army grew discontented, and that rumours got about that the -Marshal was working for himself, not for the Emperor or France. After -receiving this circular, it is doubtful whether any French officer -would not have been fully justified in refusing to obey any further -orders issued from Oporto[327].’ - - [322] Fantin des Odoards, writing at Oporto under the date May 5, - says that he had just read this proclamation on the walls, and - was astounded at it, for the great bulk of the population was so - hostile that the project seemed absolutely insane. - - [323] St. Chamans, aide-de-camp to Soult, speaks of the crowds - assembled by Veloso and others (p. 134): Bigarré says that - General Ricard threw money to the crowd for seven days running - from the Marshal’s balcony, and then stopped because the harvest - of _vivas_ was not large enough (p. 245). - - [324] See Fantin des Odoards, p. 229, and Jourdan, p. 218. - - [325] This strange document will be found printed in the Appendix. - - [326] See Chamans, pp. 134 and 140. He ends with observing that - Soult ‘aurait voulu se faire demander pour roi de Portugal par - les habitants, qu’alors, le premier pas fait, il aurait sollicité - les suffrages de l’armée, ils auraient été consignés sur des - registres pour chaque corps, et il aurait mis toutes ces pièces - sous les yeux de l’Empereur, en lui demandant son approbation.’ - - [327] Napoleon to Soult from Schönbrunn, Sept. 26, _Nap. - Corresp._, 15,871. - -This was written from Vienna, before the Emperor had received any -full and exact account of the details of Soult’s intrigues. Had he -but known them all, it is doubtful if he would have granted his -lieutenant the complete pardon and restoration to favour with which -his dispatch concludes[328]. - - [328] Napier’s conclusions as to Soult’s conduct are wholly - warped by his strong predilection for the Marshal--which dated - back to the time when the latter dealt kindly with his wounded - brother on the day after Corunna. He understates Soult’s - encouragement of the movement, and will have us believe that - it was purely the work of the Portuguese. He omits all mention - of Ricard’s circular, and finally suppresses all mention of - Napoleon’s angry upbraidings except the following (ii. p. 75): - ‘The Emperor wrote to Soult that the rumour had reached him, - adding, with a delicate allusion to the Marshal’s previous - services, “I remember nothing but Austerlitz.”’ Now it was not - a _rumour_ which had reached Schönbrunn, but a copy of Ricard’s - circular, which the Emperor quotes _verbatim_. Therefore Napoleon - was writing with tangible evidence, not with camp reports, - to guide him. How far Napier’s sentence above gives a fair - impression of the tone of the dispatch which I have reproduced, - I leave the reader to judge. It was a surprise to myself when I - put the two together. Once and for all, it must be remembered - that Napier can never be trusted when Soult is in question--the - Marshal’s intrigues, his greed, his shameful plundering of - Andalusian churches, are all concealed. - -There can be no doubt that the Duke of Dalmatia might have put a -stop to all the activity of his Portuguese friends by merely raising -his hand. It would have sufficed for him to assure the deputations -which visited him that his duty as the lieutenant of the Emperor -forbade him to listen to their proposals. He could have caused -the proclamations to be torn down, and have silenced the street -orators. ‘They could not have made him king against his own will,’ -as one of his officers remarked[329]. But no action of the kind -was taken; and the movement was openly encouraged. The Marshal’s -explanation, that he was only taking the best means in his power to -build up a French party in Oporto, will not stand examination. Why -should the scheme involve his own promotion to the throne, if his -views were disinterested, and his actions merely intended to serve -his master’s ends? Is it conceivable that the Portuguese should, of -their own accord, and without any suggestion from without, have hit -upon the idea of crowning a conqueror whose very name was strange -to them three weeks before, and whose hands were red with the blood -of thousands of their fellow countrymen? Clever and cautious though -the Marshal was, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he -had for once allowed his ambition to take the bit between its teeth, -and to whirl him off into an enterprise that was worthy of the most -hair-brained of adventurers. - - [329] Fantin des Odoards, p. 220. - -Meanwhile the consequences of his intrigue were strange and various. -The army received the news of what was going on at Oporto with -puzzled surprise. Of those who were not present at the centre of -affairs, some refused to believe the stories that reached them, and -merely observed that the Marshal was not such a fool as to take in -hand a plan that was both treasonable to his master and preposterous -in itself[330]. Others, particularly his personal enemies, not only -credited the information but began to concert measures for resisting -him if he should try to carry out his scheme. This party was very -strong among the officers of Junot’s old army of Portugal, who had -been transferred in large numbers to the 2nd Corps. They disliked the -expedition, had been prophesying disaster from the first, and had -criticized every move of the Marshal. Now they found in the news of -his intrigue another excuse for running counter to his orders. There -is good reason for believing that Loison and Delaborde had actually -conferred on the necessity for seizing and imprisoning the Marshal -if he should take the final step and allow himself to be proclaimed -king. Both these generals were faithful adherents of Napoleon, -and had no thought save that of serving their master. But there -were other officers who watched the progress of affairs with very -different eyes. - - [330] So writes Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, who, being - absent at Amarante and elsewhere, never saw the doings in Oporto: - ‘Il s’est répandu dans l’armée qu’il aspirait à la souveraineté - du pays: on en conçut d’abord quelques inquiétudes, qui furent - bientôt dissipées’ (p. 119). - -There had existed in the French army from the day when the empire was -first proclaimed, a party of malcontents who still regarded Bonaparte -as a usurper, and were only biding their time till it might be safe -to deal a blow at him. Hitherto his career had been so uniformly -successful that no opportunity had arisen. But secret societies, of -which the _Philadelphes_ was the best known, were at work all through -the years of the Emperor’s reign: their one object was to be ready -for a _coup d’état_ when the favourable moment should arrive. The -history of these associations is so obscure that it is impossible to -estimate their strength at any given time--no trustworthy historian -ever arose from their ranks to tell the story of their schemes, when -lips were unsealed by the fall of Napoleon[331]. It is only by the -sudden appearance of phenomena like Malet’s conspiracy of 1812, and -the plot which we are now about to describe, that the reality of the -existence of these secret societies is proved. - - [331] Charles Nodier’s _Histoire des conspirations militaires - sous l’Empire_ is unfortunately quite untrustworthy. He was - never among the _Philadelphes_, and writes as a credulous and - ill-informed outsider. Nevertheless there is a basis of fact - underlying his work. - -In the army of Portugal there was a group of officers who belonged to -the band of the discontented, and were perfectly prepared to execute -a _pronunciamiento_ against the empire if the times and circumstances -proved propitious. We know the names of four[332]: Donadieu, colonel -of the 47th of the line; Lafitte, colonel of the 18th Dragoons; his -brother, a captain in the same regiment, who was serving on Soult’s -staff; and Argenton, another captain, who was adjutant of Lafitte’s -regiment; two other plotters are hidden under the assumed names of -‘Dupont’ and ‘Garis,’ by which they were introduced to Wellesley. -There were _certainly_ other officers implicated, for it is -inconceivable that six men could have planned an insurrection unless -they were sure of a certain measure of support. At this moment they -were carrying on an active propaganda of discontent, especially among -the officers of Delaborde’s division and of Lahoussaye’s dragoons. -There were many men who saw the full iniquity of the Spanish War, -and were disgusted at finding themselves involved in it[333]. Others -loathed the hanging and burning, the shooting of priests and women, -the riding down of half-armed peasants, which had been their lot for -the last two months. Still more were simply discontented at being -lost in a remote corner of Europe, where glory and profit were both -absent, and where ignominious death at the hands of the lurking -‘sniper’ or the midnight assassin came all too frequently--sometimes -death accompanied by torture. It was three months since the army had -received a mail from France; they might as well have been in Egypt -or America, and they felt themselves forgotten by their master. In -many a mind the question arose whether the game was worth playing: -must they for ever persist in this wretched interminable campaign, in -order that the Duke of Dalmatia might become a king, or even in order -that the Emperor might be able to apply the Continental System in its -full rigour to this land of brutish peasants and fanatical monks? A -speedy return to France seemed the one thing desirable. - - [332] The names of Argenton, Lafitte, and Donadieu are public - property. Napier gives them, as does Bigarré. The names of - ‘Dupont’ and ‘Garis’ are in suppressed paragraphs of the - _Wellington Dispatches_ which Gurwood chose to omit, and are also - found in the minutes of Argenton’s trial at Paris. - - [333] The reader may trace this feeling in Foy’s diaries, and - Naylies (p. 67). - -It is easy to understand that the conspirators found many -sympathizers, so long as they confined themselves to setting forth -the miseries of the campaign, and to criticizing the Marshal and the -Emperor. But they erred when they took a general readiness to grumble -for a sign that the army was ripe for revolt. However discontented -the officers might be, there were very few of them who were prepared -to engage in the game of high treason. The vast majority were still -unable to dissociate the idea of the Emperor from the idea of -France. It was only a few who could rise (or sink) to the conception -of turning their arms against Bonaparte in order to free France -from autocracy. This bore too close a resemblance to treachery to -be palatable to men of honour. None save exalted Jacobins, or men -of overweening ambition and few scruples, could contemplate the -idea with patience. When we find that the plans of the conspirators -included not merely a _pronunciamiento_, but the conclusion of a -secret pact with the enemies in arms against them, we are driven to -conclude that they belonged to the last-named of these classes--that -their heads were turned with the grandiose notion of getting an army -into their power and changing the fate of Europe. - -The conspirators, observing the course of affairs at Oporto, were -fully convinced that Soult would within a few days declare himself -‘King of Northern Lusitania.’ This act would produce an outburst of -wrath in the army, and they hoped to turn the inevitable mutiny to -their own profit. They intended to seize the Marshal, and then to -make an appeal to the soldiery, not in the name of Napoleon but in -that of France. They were also prepared to lay hands on any general -who might attempt to assume command of the troops in the Emperor’s -interest[334]. Donadieu and Lafitte had secured some of the officers -of their own regiments, and believed that the men would follow them. -The other corps, as they hoped, would be drawn away after them, and -the cry of liberty and the promise of an instant return to France -would lure the whole army into rebellion. So far the plot, though -rash and hazardous, might conceivably have been carried out. But -their next step was to be the issue of an appeal to Ney’s divisions -and the other French troops in northern Spain to join them, and -march upon the Pyrenees. Even though there were members of the -secret societies scattered all through the army, it seems absolutely -impossible to believe that they could have carried away with them -into open revolt the whole of their companions. The movement of -protest against Napoleon would have begun and ended with the 2nd -Corps, if even it got so far as the initial _pronunciamiento_[335]. -To be effective it would have required a strong backing in France, -and the list of the leaders in that country, on whom the conspirators -said that they relied for aid, does not give us a high opinion of -the strength and organization of the plot. The persons named were -the old Jacobin general Lecourbe, Macdonald who--though they did not -know it--had just been taken back into favour by the Emperor, and -Dupont, who was in prison and incapable for the moment of helping -himself or any one else[336]. They also spoke of sending for Moreau -from America, and placing him at the head of the whole movement. -But it is clear that they were not in actual communication with the -generals in France, much less with the exiled victor of Hohenlinden. -The whole plan was ill-considered; it was the result of the intense -irritation against Soult and Bonaparte felt by the officers of the -army of Portugal, acting upon the disordered ambition of a knot -of intriguers. Anger and vain self-confidence blinded them to the -inadequacy of their resources. - - [334] Napier and Le Noble both hint that Loison was in the - plot, and perhaps Delaborde, though they do not actually name - these officers. But I think that their innocence is proved by - Argenton’s declaration to Wellesley (Wellesley to Castlereagh, - May 7, Record Office), that Loison was attached to Bonaparte, and - would certainly seize Soult if he proclaimed himself king for - ‘ambitious abuse of his authority and disobedience to his master.’ - - [335] This, at the time, was Wellesley’s eminently sensible - conclusion. He wrote to Castlereagh on April 27, ‘I doubt whether - it will be quite so easy as their emissary thinks to carry their - intentions into execution: I also doubt whether it follows that - the successful revolt of this one corps would be followed by - that of others, and I am convinced that the method proposed - by M. D’Argenton would not answer that purpose.’ _Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. 276. - - [336] These are the names omitted in the printed version of the - _Wellington Dispatches_: that of Moreau does not occur there, but - is to be found in the confession which Argenton made to Soult: - see Le Noble, p. 236. - -It was a main condition of the projected outbreak that Soult’s -position should be made impossible: the most favourable course of -events, so the conspirators held, would be that he should persist -in his monarchical ambitions and proclaim himself king. When he did -so, the party loyal to Bonaparte among his officers would make an -attempt--successful or unsuccessful--to seize his person. Chaos and -civil strife within the army would result, and it was then that the -conspirators intended to show their hand. It would seem that their -Machiavellian foresight went so far that they proposed to wait till -the Marshal should be imprisoned, or should find himself involved -in hostilities with the Bonapartists, and then offer him the aid of -their regiments, on condition that he should put himself at the head -of the anti-imperialist movement. All this was too ingenious for -practical work. But the next development of the plot was even more -astonishing in its futile cunning. - -The conspirators wished to draw the English commander at Lisbon into -their scheme--it was Cradock whom they had in view, for Wellesley -was in England when the plot began, and when it developed he had -landed indeed, but his arrival was not known. The part which they had -allotted to Cradock was twofold--he was to be asked to send secret -advice to the Portuguese notables of the north, ordering them to -feign an enthusiastic approval of Soult’s designs on the crown, and -to join with all possible clamour in the demonstrations at Oporto. -When this unexpected outburst of devotion to his person should be -forthcoming, they supposed that the Marshal would not hesitate any -longer to assume the crown. Then would follow civil strife and the -desired opportunity for intervention by the conspirators. The second -request which they intended to make was that Cradock should bring -up the British army to the front, and place it so as to make it -dangerous or impossible for Soult to force his way out of Portugal in -the direction of the middle Douro and Salamanca. They suggested Villa -Real in the Tras-os-Montes as a suitable position for him. Their -idea in making this proposal was that the army would be filled with -despair at seeing its best line of retreat cut off (that by Galicia -was growing to be considered impossible), and would therefore be more -incensed against Soult, and at the same time more inclined to secure -safety by coming to a pact and agreement with the enemy[337]. - - [337] It must be remembered that the whole plot was far advanced, - and that Argenton had placed himself in treasonable communication - with the British, before Wellesley landed. Sir Arthur came ashore - on the night of April 22. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, - he received a visit from Beresford, who came down from Coimbra - to tell him that a French officer, bearing the message of the - conspirators, had come within the Portuguese lines on the Vouga - on the twenty-first. Argenton arrived at Lisbon the same night, - and had his first interview with the new commander-in-chief, - whom he found in charge of the British army, and not (as he had - expected) Sir John Cradock. The three requests made were (1) - that Wellesley would ‘press upon Soult’s Corps’--the seizure of - Villa Real being suggested, (2) that he would give passports to - Argenton and two others to go to France, (3) that he would stir - up the Portuguese to flatter and deceive Soult into taking overt - steps of treason. Cf. _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 274 [Lisbon, - April 27] and 308 [Coimbra, May 7]. - -The officer who volunteered for the dangerous task of going within -the English lines was Captain Argenton, the adjutant of Lafitte’s -regiment of dragoons. He was a vain, ready, plausible man, full of -resources but destitute of firmness: his character is sufficiently -shown by the fact that he ultimately wrecked the plot by his -indiscretion in tampering with loyal Bonapartists, who delated him, -and that when seized he betrayed the whole scheme to Soult in the -hope of saving his life. Clearly he was deficient both in the caution -and in the stoic courage required for a conspirator--successful or -unsuccessful. - -We must note that he started from the camp of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, -near Amarante, on April 19, that he reached the French outposts on -the Vouga and got into communication with Major Douglas, one of -Beresford’s officers in the Portuguese service, on the twenty-first, -finally, that at the invitation of Douglas and Beresford he came -into Lisbon and reached that city on the twenty-fifth, just in time -to meet the newly-landed Wellesley. The plot meanwhile stood still -in his absence, for the Duke of Dalmatia did not take the overt step -which would have given the plotters their opportunity--he refrained -from accepting the crown which his Portuguese partisans were so -continually pressing him to assume. Nothing decisive had occurred, -when the situation was suddenly changed by the appearance of the -British army upon the offensive on May 7[338]. - - [338] It is to these days, and probably to some date about May - 4-7, that belongs General Bigarré’s curious story about the - conspirators (see his _Mémoires_, p. 235, and Le Noble, p. 238; - the latter printed the story in 1821 without names, the former’s - version was only given to the light a few years ago; they agree - in every point). The story is too good to be omitted. Bigarré - says that, walking the quay of Oporto on a moonlight night, - he came on Lafitte and Donadieu, muffled in their cloaks and - vehemently discussing something in a dark corner. He stole up - to them unnoticed, slapped his friend Donadieu on the back, and - suddenly shouted in their ears ‘_Ah! je vous y prends, Messieurs - les conspirateurs_.’ Lafitte whipped out a pistol, and had nearly - shot the practical joker, before Donadieu could reassure him that - this was only a boisterous piece of fun and that Bigarré knew - nothing. It was not till much later that the latter found out - what had been brewing. - - -N.B.--For some documents bearing on Argenton’s conspiracy see -Appendix at the end of this volume. - - - - -SECTION XIV - -WELLESLEY’S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL - -(MAY 1809) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY - - -On Nov. 25, 1808, Sir John Moore, in answer to a question from Lord -Castlereagh, wrote the following conclusions as to the practicability -of defending Portugal[339]: - - [339] In common fairness to Moore, it is necessary to quote - Wellesley’s own words on their fundamental difference of opinion - as to the possibility of defending Portugal. ‘I have as much - respect as any man can have for the opinion and judgement of Sir - J. Moore, and I should mistrust my own (if opposed to his) in - a case where he had an opportunity of knowing and considering. - But he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and _could_ know - nothing of its existing state.’ Yet he says that ‘The greatest - disadvantage under which I labour is that Sir John Moore gave an - opinion that the country could not be defended by the army under - his command.’ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, from Vizeu, April 2, - 1810. - -‘I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible -against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, -but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain it -will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese -are without a military force ... no dependence can be placed on any -aid that they can give. The British must in that event, I conceive, -immediately take steps to evacuate the country. Lisbon is the only -port, and therefore the only place from whence the army, with its -stores, can embark.... We might check the progress of the enemy while -the stores are embarking, and arrangements are being made for taking -off the army. Beyond this the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should -not be thought of.’ - -Four months later, on March 7, 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley answered -the same question, put to him by the same minister, in very different -terms. - -‘I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, -whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain, and that in -the meantime measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be -highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French. My -notion was that the Portuguese military establishment ought to be -revived, and that in addition to those troops His Majesty ought to -employ about 20,000 British troops, including about 4,000 cavalry. -My opinion was that, even if Spain should have been conquered, the -French would not be able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force -than 100,000 men. As long as the contest may continue in Spain, this -force [the 20,000 British troops], if it could be placed in a state -of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might -eventually decide the contest.’ - -Between these two divergent views as to the practicability of -defending Portugal, Lord Castlereagh had to make his decision. On -it--though he could not be aware of the fact--depended the future -of Britain and of Bonaparte. He carefully considered the situation; -after the disasters of the Corunna retreat it required some moral -courage for a minister to advise the sending of another British -army to the Peninsula. Moore’s gloomy prognostications were echoed -by many military experts, and there were leading men--soldiers and -politicians--who declared that the only thing that now remained to -be done was to withdraw Cradock’s 10,000 sabres and bayonets from -Lisbon, before the French came near enough to that city to make their -embarkation difficult. - -Castlereagh resolved to stake his faith on the correctness of -Wellesley’s conclusions: all through these years of contest he had -made him his most trusted adviser on things military, and now he did -not swerve from his confidence. He announced to him, privately in the -end of March, and officially on April 2[340], that the experiment of -a second expedition to Portugal should be tried, and that he himself -should have the conduct of it. Reinforcements should at once be sent -out to bring the British army at Lisbon up to a total of 30,000 -men--the number to which Wellesley, on consideration, raised the -original 20,000 of which he had spoken. Beresford had already sailed, -with orders to do all that he could for the reorganization of the -disorderly native forces of Portugal. The few regiments in England -that were ready for instant embarkation were sent off ere March -ended, and began to arrive at Lisbon early in April[341]. Others were -rapidly prepared for foreign service; but it was a misfortune that -the Corunna battalions were still too sickly and depleted to be able -to sail, so that troops who had seen nothing of the first campaign -had to be sent out. The majority of them were ‘second battalions’ -from the home establishment[342], many of them very weak in numbers -and full of young soldiers, as they had been drained in the previous -year to fill their first battalions up to full strength. Finally, -just behind the first convoys of reinforcements, Wellesley himself -set sail from Portsmouth, after resigning his position as Under -Secretary for Ireland, which, by a curious anomaly, he had continued -to hold all through the campaign of Vimiero, and the proceedings of -inquiry concerning the Convention of Cintra. He sailed upon April -14, in the _Surveillante_ frigate, had the narrowest of escapes -from shipwreck on the Isle of Wight during the first night of his -voyage, but soon obtained favourable winds and reached Lisbon on the -twenty-second, after a rapid passage of less than eight days. Just -before he started there had been received from Portugal not only -the correct intelligence that Soult had stormed Oporto upon March -29, but a false rumour that Victor had been joined by the corps of -Sebastiani[343] and had after his victory at Medellin laid siege to -Badajoz[344]. If this had been true, the Duke of Belluno would have -been strong enough to move against Portugal with 25,000 men, after -detaching a competent force to watch the wrecks of Cuesta’s army. -Fortunately the whole story was an invention: but it kept Wellesley -in a state of feverish anxiety till he reached Lisbon. His fears are -shown by the fact that he drew up a memorandum for Lord Castlereagh, -setting forth the supposed situation, and asking what he was to do -on arriving, if he should find that Cradock had already embarked his -troops and quitted Portugal[345]. The Secretary of State, equally -harrassed by the false intelligence, replied that he was to make an -effort to induce the Spaniards to let him land the army at Cadiz, -and, if they should refuse, might reinforce the garrison of Gibraltar -to 8,000 men, and bring the rest of the expeditionary force back to -England[346]. - - [340] The official notice is dated April 2 (_Wellington - Supplementary Dispatches_, vi. p. 210), but several letters dated - late in March show that the matter had been already settled. - - [341] The troops from the abortive expedition to Cadiz, under - Mackenzie, Sherbrooke and Tilson, turned up about the middle of - March at Lisbon. But Hill, with the first body of the second - batch of reinforcements, only appeared upon April 5. - - [342] Of the first ten battalions to appear, seven were 2nd - battalions--those of the 7th, 30th, 48th, 53rd, 66th, 83rd, 87th - regiments. Some were very weak, with less than 750 bayonets, e.g. - the 7th (628 men), 30th (698 men), 66th (740 men). - - [343] This came from Beresford at Lisbon (see _Wellington - Supplementary Dispatches_, vi. p. 219). - - [344] Wellesley to the Duke of Richmond, April 14 (_Supplementary - Dispatches_, vi. 227). - - [345] _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, vi. 221-2. It - is very creditable to Sir Arthur that, adverting to another - possibility, viz. that Cradock may have plucked up courage to go - out against the French, and have successfully beaten them off, he - declares that ‘he could not reconcile it with his feelings’ to - supersede a successful general. He remembered his own state of - mind when supplanted by Burrard on the day of Vimiero. - - [346] Castlereagh to Wellesley, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vi. - 222 and 228. - -It was therefore an immense relief to Wellesley to find, when he -landed, that the news from Estremadura was false, that Victor had -not been reinforced, and that the 1st Corps was lying quiescent at -Merida. Soult was still at Oporto, Cradock had not been molested, and -the French invasion was at a standstill. - -It is comparatively seldom that the historian is able to compare in -detail a general’s original conception of a plan of campaign with the -actual scheme which he carried out. Still less common is it to find -that the commander has placed on record his ideas as to the general -policy to be pursued during a war, before he has assumed charge of -his army or issued his first orders. It is therefore most fortunate -that we have three documents from Wellesley’s hand, written early -in 1809, which enable us to understand the principles on which he -believed that the Peninsular War should be fought out. These are -his _Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal_, which we have already -had occasion to quote, and the two dispatches to Lord Castlereagh -and to Mr. Frere which he wrote immediately after his arrival in -Lisbon. The first gives us his general view of the war. He believed -that an English army of 20,000 or 30,000 men, backed by the levies -of Portugal, would be able to maintain itself on the flank of the -French army in Spain. Its presence there would paralyse all the -offensive actions of the enemy, and enable the Spaniards to make -head against the invaders as long as Portugal remained unsubdued. -The news that a British army had once more taken the field would, -he considered, induce the French to turn their main efforts against -Portugal[347], but he believed that considering the geography of the -country, the character of its people, and the quality of the British -troops, they would fail in their attempt to overrun it. They could -not succeed, as he supposed, unless they could set aside 100,000 -men for the task, and he did not see how they would ever be able -to spare such a large detachment out of the total force which they -then possessed in the Peninsula--a force whose numerical strength -(in common with all British statesmen and soldiers of the day) he -somewhat underrated. Being in the secrets of the Ministry, he was -already aware in March that a new war in Germany was about to break -out within the next few months. When Austria took the field, Napoleon -would not be able to spare a single battalion of reinforcements for -Spain. If the Spaniards pursued a reasonable military policy, and -occupied the attention of the main armies of the French, the enemy -would never be able to detach a force of 100,000 for the invasion of -Portugal. He would underrate the numbers required, make his attempt -with insufficient resources, and be beaten. When Wellesley landed at -Lisbon, and found that Soult had halted at Oporto, that Victor lay -quiescent at Merida, and that Lapisse with the troops from Salamanca -had gone southward to join the 1st Corps, and so severed the only -link which bound together the army in Northern Portugal and the army -in Estremadura, he was reassured as to the whole situation. Soult and -Victor, isolated as they now were, would each be too weak to beat the -Anglo-Portuguese army. They were too far apart to make co-operation -between them possible, considering the geography of Central Portugal, -and the fact that the whole country behind each was in a state of -insurrection[348]. - - [347] Memorandum of March 7, ‘As soon as the newspapers shall - have announced the departure of officers for Portugal, the French - armies in Spain will receive orders to make their movements - towards Portugal, so as to anticipate our measures for its - defence,’ &c. - - [348] It is noteworthy that Wellesley, when he was placed in - communication with Argenton three days later, considered that - one of the few useful facts which he had got from the plotter - was that Soult and his army had no knowledge of where Victor - might be, or of what he was doing. This was a far more precious - piece of information than any details as to the conspiracy, which - Wellesley regarded from the first as doomed to failure: see - _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 274. - -But ‘the best defensive is a vigorous local offensive,’ and Wellesley -saw the advantage of the central position of the British army upon -the Tagus. A few marches would place it at a point from which it -could fall either upon Victor to the right or Soult to the left, -before either marshal could be in a position to lend help to his -colleague, probably long before he would even be aware that his -colleague was in danger. Wellesley could strike at the one or the -other, with almost perfect certainty of catching him unreinforced. -Ney, it was true, lay behind Soult, but he was known to be entangled -in the trammels of the vigorous Galician insurrection. Victor had -Sebastiani in his rear, but the 4th Corps was having occupation -found for it by the Spanish army of La Mancha. It was improbable -that either Soult or Victor, if suddenly attacked, could call up any -appreciable reinforcements. Victor, moreover, had Cuesta to observe, -and could not move off leaving 20,000 Spaniards behind him. Soult -was known to be distracted by Silveira’s operations on the Tamega. -Wellesley, therefore, saw that it was well within his power to strike -at either of the marshals. He would, of course, be obliged to place -a ‘containing force’ in front of the one whom he resolved to leave -alone for the present. But this detachment need not be very large, -and might be composed for the most part of Portuguese troops: its -duty would be to distract, but not to fight the enemy. - -On the whole Wellesley thought it would be best to make the first -onslaught on Soult. ‘I should prefer an attack on Victor,’ he wrote, -two days after landing, ‘in concert with Cuesta, if Soult were not -in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom, and of the -favourite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive -him. Any operation upon Victor, connected with Cuesta’s movements, -would require time to concert, which may as well be employed in -dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal, before bringing the -British army to the eastern frontier[349].... I intend to move -upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangement, on which I can -depend, for the defence of the Tagus, to impede or delay Victor’s -progress, in case he should come on while I am absent.’ ‘I think it -probable,’ he wrote on the same day but in another letter, ‘that -Soult will not remain in Portugal when I pass the Mondego: if he -does, I shall attack him. If he should retire, I am convinced that it -would be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain -on the defensive in the North of Portugal, and act vigorously in -co-operation with Cuesta against Victor[350].’ - - [349] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Lisbon, April 24. I have - ventured to substitute ‘before bringing’ in the last sentence for - the unmeaning ‘and to bring’ which is clearly a _lapsus calami_. - - [350] Wellesley (to Mr. Frere, at Seville) from Lisbon, April - 24. In many sentences this dispatch is only a repetition of that - to Castlereagh. But in others Sir Arthur makes his meaning more - clear, by a more detailed explanation. - -Further forward it was impossible to look: a blow at Soult, followed -by another at Victor, was all that could at present be contemplated. -Wellesley was directed, by the formal instructions which he had -received from Castlereagh, to do all that was possible to clear -Portugal and the frontier provinces of Spain from the enemy, but -not to strike deep into the Peninsula till he should have received -permission from home to do so. Nevertheless he had devoted some -thought to the remoter possibilities of the situation. If Portugal -were preserved, and Soult and Victor beaten off, more ambitious -combinations might become possible. He expressed his conviction that -the French occupation of Spain would only be endangered when a very -large force, acting in unison under the guidance of a single mind, -should be brought together. The co-operation of the English army and -that of Cuesta ‘might be the groundwork of further measures of the -same and a more extended description[351].’ He was under no delusions -as to the easiness of the task before him: he did not hurry on in -thought, to dream of the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula -as a goal already in sight. But he believed that he and his army -‘might be highly useful to the Spaniards and might eventually decide -the contest[352].’ - - [351] Wellesley to Frere, Lisbon, April 24, 1809. - - [352] _Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal_, of March 7. - -It is the survey of documents such as these that enables us to -appreciate Wellesley at his best. He had gauged perfectly well the -situation and difficulties of the French. He saw exactly how much -was in his own power. The whole history of the Peninsular War for -the next two years is foreseen in his prophetic statement, that with -30,000 British troops and the Portuguese levies he would guarantee -to hold his own against any force of less than 100,000 French, and -that he did not think that the enemy would find it easy to collect -an army of that size to send against him. This is precisely what he -accomplished: for the first fifteen months after his arrival he held -with ease that frontier which Moore had described as ‘indefensible -against a superior force.’ When at last Napoleon, free from all -other continental troubles, launched against him an army under -Masséna, which almost reached the figure[353] that he had described -as irresistible in 1809, he showed in 1810-11 that he had built up -resources for himself which enabled him to beat off even that number -of enemies. Though four-fifths of Spain had been subdued, he held his -own, because he had grasped the fundamental truth that (to use his -own words) ‘the more ground the French hold down, the weaker will -they be at any given point.’ In short, he had fathomed the great -secret, that Napoleon’s military power--vast as it was--had its -limits: that the Emperor could not send to Spain a force sufficient -to hold down every province of a thoroughly disaffected country, -and also to provide (over and above the garrisons) a field army -large enough to beat the Anglo-Portuguese and capture Lisbon. If the -French dispersed their divisions, and kept down the vast tracts of -conquered territory, they had no force left with which to take the -offensive against Portugal: if they massed their armies, they had to -give up broad regions, which immediately relapsed into insurrection -and required to be subdued again. This was as true in the beginning -of the war as in the end. In 1809 the army that forced Wellesley -to retreat after Talavera was only produced by evacuating the -whole province of Galicia, which passed back into the hands of the -insurgents. In 1812, in a similar way, the overpowering force which -beat him back from Burgos, had been gathered only by surrendering to -the Spanish Government the whole of the four kingdoms of Andalusia. -On the other hand, during the long periods when the enemy had -dispersed himself, and was garrisoning the whole south and centre of -Spain, e.g. for the first six months of 1810, and for the last six -months of 1811, Wellesley held his own on the Portuguese frontier -in complete confidence, assured that no sufficient force could be -brought up against him, till the enemy either procured new troops -from France or gave up some great section of the regions which he was -holding down. A detailed insight into the future is impossible to -any general, however great, but already in April 1809 Wellesley had -grasped the main outlines of the war that was to be. - - [353] If to Masséna’s field army of 60,000 men we add the troops - on his communications (viz. the 9th Corps and the garrisons of - Rodrigo and Almeida) and also the force which Soult and Mortier - brought up against Badajoz and Elvas--a force against which - Wellesley had to provide, by making large detachments--the full - number of 100,000 is reached. - -Before passing on to the details of the campaign on the Douro, with -which Wellesley’s long series of victories began, it is well to -take a glance at the man himself, as he sat at his desk in Lisbon -dictating the orders that were to change the face of the war. - -Arthur Wellesley was now within a few days of completing his fortieth -year. He was a slight but wiry man of middle stature, with a long -face, an aquiline nose, and a keen but cold grey eye. Owning an iron -constitution on which no climate or season seemed to make the least -impression, he was physically fit for all the work that lay before -him--work more fatiguing than that which falls to most generals. For -in the Peninsula he was required, as it soon appeared, to be almost -as much of a statesman as of a general; while at the same time, owing -to the inexperience of the British officers of that day in warfare on -a large scale, he was obliged for some time to discharge for himself -many of the duties which properly fall to the lot of the chief of -the staff, the commissary-general, the paymaster-general, and the -quartermaster-general in a well organized army. No amount of toil, -bodily or mental, appeared too much for that active and alert mind, -or for the body which seven years of service in India seemed to have -tanned and hardened rather than to have relaxed. During the whole of -his Peninsular campaigns, from 1808 to 1814, he was never prostrated -by any serious ailment. Autumn rains, summer heat, the cold of -winter, had no power over him. He could put up with a very small -allowance of sleep, and when necessary could snatch useful moments of -repose, at any moment of the twenty-four hours when no pressing duty -chanced to be on hand. His manner of life was simple and austere in -the extreme; no commander-in-chief ever travelled with less baggage, -or could be content with more Spartan fare. Long after his wars were -over the habit of bleak frugality clung to him, and in his old age -men wondered at the bare and comfortless surroundings that he chose -for himself, and at the scanty meals that sustained his spare but -active frame. Officers who had long served in India were generally -supposed to contract habits of luxury and display, but Wellesley -was the exception that proved the rule. He hated show of any kind; -after the first few days of the campaign of 1809 he discarded the -escort which was wont to accompany the commander-in-chief. It was on -very rare occasions that he was seen in his full uniform: the army -knew him best in the plain blue frock coat, the small featherless -cocked hat, and the short cape, which have been handed down to us -in a hundred drawings. Not unfrequently he would ride about among -his cantonments dressed like a civilian in a round hat and grey -trousers[354]. He was as careless about the dress of his subordinates -as about his own, and there probably never existed an army in which -so little fuss was made about unessential trappings as that which -served in the Peninsula from 1809 to 1814[355]. Nothing could be less -showy than its head-quarters’ staff--a small group of blue-coated -officers, with an orderly dragoon or two, riding in the wake of the -dark cape and low glazed cocked hat of the most unpretentious of -chiefs. It contrasted in the strangest way with the plumes and gold -lace of the French marshals and their elaborately ornate staffs[356]. - - [354] See, for example, the anecdote in Sir G. L’Estrange’s - _Reminiscences_, p. 194. Picton was equally given to the use (or - abuse) of _mufti_, and fought Quatre Bras in a tall hat! - - [355] ‘Provided we brought our men into the field well appointed, - and with sixty good rounds in their pouches, he never looked to - see whether our trousers were black or blue or grey. Scarcely any - two officers dressed alike. Some wore grey braided coats, others - brown, some liked blue: many from choice or necessity stuck to - the “old red rag.” We were never tormented with that greatest of - _bores_ on active service, uniformity of dress.’ _Grattan’s With - the 88th_, p. 50. - - [356] To find a humorous contrast to Wellington’s staff, the - reader might consult Lejeune’s account of that of Berthier, who - had allowed him to design a special and gorgeous uniform, all - fur feathers and braid, for his aides-de-camp. Lejeune dwells - with the enthusiasm of a tailor on his efforts and their glorious - effect on parade [Lejeune, i. p. 95]. - -Considered as a man Wellesley had his defects and his limitations; -we shall have ere long to draw attention to some of them. But from -the intellectual point of view he commands our undivided admiration -as a practical soldier[357]. A careful study of his dispatches -leaves us in a state of wonder at the imbecility of the school -of writers--mostly continental--who have continued to assert for -the last eighty years that he was no more than a man of ordinary -abilities, who had an unfair share of good luck, and was presented -with a series of victories by the mistakes and jealousies of the -generals opposed to him. Such assertions are the results of blind -ignorance and prejudice. When found in English writers they merely -reflect the bitter hatred that was felt toward Wellesley by his -political opponents during the second and third decades of the -nineteenth century. In French military authors they only represent -the resentful carpings of the vanquished army, which preferred to -think that it was beaten by anything rather than by the ability of -the conqueror. In 1820 every retired colonel across the Channel -was ready to demonstrate that Toulouse was an English defeat, that -Talavera was a drawn battle, and that Wellesley was over-rash or -over-cautious, a fool or a coward, according as their thesis of the -moment might demand[358]. They were but echoing their Emperor’s -rancorous remark to Soult, on the hillside of La Belle Alliance, when -after telling the Marshal that he only thought his old adversary a -good general because he had been beaten by him, he added, ‘Et moi, je -vous dis que Wellington est un mauvais général, et que les Anglais -sont de mauvaises troupes[359].’ - - [357] Lord Roberts, in his _Rise of Wellington_, only slightly - overstates his case when he observes that the more we study - Wellesley’s life in detail, the more we respect him as a general - and the less we like him as a man. If we come upon much that is - hard and unsympathetic, there are too many redeeming traits to - justify the statement in its entirety. - - [358] The reader curious in such things may find as much as he - desires of this sort of stuff in Thiébault, Marbot, Le Noble and - Lemonnier Delafosse. - - [359] These phrases are preserved in the notes of Soult’s - aide-de-camp Baudus. - -Bonaparte consistently refused to do justice to the abilities of -the Duke. He regarded him as a bitter personal enemy, and his whole -attitude towards Wellesley was expressed in the scandalous legacy to -Cantillon[360] which disgraces his last will and testament. In strict -conformity with their master’s pose, his followers, literary and -military, have refused to see anything great in the victor of June -18, 1815. Even to the present day too many historians from the other -side of the straits continue to follow in the steps of Thiers, and to -express wonder at the inexplicable triumphs of the mediocre general -who routed in succession all the best marshals of France. - - [360] Cantillon was the assassin who fired on Wellington in Paris - on Sept. 10, 1818. - -To clear away any lingering doubts as to Wellesley’s extraordinary -ability, the student of history has only to read a few of his more -notable dispatches. The man who could write the two Memoranda to -Castlereagh dated September 5, 1808, and March 7, 1809[361], foresaw -the whole future of the Peninsular War. To know, at that early -stage of the struggle, that the Spaniards would be beaten when--and -wherever they offered battle, that the French, in spite of their -victories, would never be able to conquer and hold down the entire -country, that 30,000 British troops would be able to defend Portugal -against any force that could be collected against them, required the -mind of a soldier of the first class. When the earliest of those -memoranda was written, most Englishmen believed that the Spaniards -were about to deliver their country by their own arms: Wellesley saw -that the notion was vain and absurd. When, on the other hand, he -wrote the second, the idea was abroad that all was lost, that after -Corunna no second British army would be sent to the Peninsula, and -that Portugal was indefensible. Far from sharing these gloomy views -he asks for 30,000 men, and states that though Spain may be overrun, -though the Portuguese army may be in a state of hopeless disarray, -he yet hopes with this handful of men to maintain the struggle, and -eventually to decide the contest. How many generals has the world -seen who could have framed such a prophecy, and have verified it? - - [361] Wellington to Castlereagh, Zambujal, Sept. 5, 1808, and - London, March 7, 1809. - -To talk of the good fortune of Wellesley, of his ‘lucky star,’ is -absurd. He had, like other generals, his occasional uncovenanted -mercies and happy chances: but few commanders had more strokes of -undeserved disappointment, or saw more of their plans frustrated -by a stupid subordinate, an unexpected turn of the weather, an -incalculable accident, or a piece of false news. He had his fair -proportion of the chances of war, good and bad, and no more. If -fortune was with him at Oporto in 1809, or at El Bodon in 1811, how -many were the occasions on which she played him scurvy tricks? A few -examples may suffice. In May 1809 he might have captured the whole -of Soult’s army, if Silveira had but obeyed orders and occupied -the impregnable defile of Salamonde. On the night of Salamanca he -might have dealt in a similar fashion with Marmont’s routed host, if -Carlos d’España had not withdrawn the garrison of Alba de Tormes, -in flat disobedience to his instructions, and so left the fords -open to the flying French. It is needless to multiply instances of -such incalculable misfortune; any serious student of the Peninsular -War can cite them by the dozen. Masséna’s invasion of Portugal in -1810 would have been checked by the autumn rains, and never have -penetrated far within the frontier, but for the unlucky bomb which -blew up the grand magazine at Almeida, and reduced in a day a -fortress which ought to have held out for a month. In the autumn -of 1812 the retreat beyond the Douro need never have been made, if -Ballasteros had obeyed orders, and moved up from Granada to threaten -Soult’s flank, instead of remaining torpid in his cantonments 200 -miles from the theatre of war. - -Wellington was not the child of fortune; he was a great strategist -and tactician, placed in a situation in which the military dangers -furnished but half his difficulties. He had to cherish his single -precious British army corps, and to keep it from any unnecessary -loss, because if destroyed it could not be replaced. With those -30,000 men he had promised to keep up the war; the home government -was reluctant to risk the whole of its available field army in one -quarter, and for years refused to raise his numbers far above that -total. It was not till the middle of 1810 that his original five -divisions of infantry were increased to six, nor till 1811 that his -seventh and eighth divisions were completed[362]. Right down to 1812 -it was certain that if he had lost any considerable fraction of his -modest army, the ministry might have recalled him and abandoned -Portugal. He had to fight with a full consciousness that a single -disaster would have been irreparable, because it would have been -followed not by the sending off of reinforcements to replace the -divisions that might be lost, but by an order to evacuate the -Peninsula. His French opponents fought under no such disabilities; -when beaten they had other armies at hand on which to fall back, and -behind all the inexhaustible reserve of Napoleon’s conscription. -Considering the campaigns of 1809-10-11 it is not Wellington’s -oft-censured prudence that we find astonishing, but his boldness. -Instead of wondering that he did not attempt to relieve Rodrigo or -Almeida in July-August 1810, or to fall upon Masséna at Santarem -in January 1811, we are filled with surprise at the daring which -inspired the storming of Oporto, and the offering of battle at Busaco -and Fuentes d’Oñoro. When a defeat spelt ruin and recall, it required -no small courage to take any risks: but Wellesley had the sanest -of minds; he could draw the line with absolute accuracy between -enterprise and rashness, between the possible and the impossible. -He had learned to gauge with wonderful insight the difficulties and -disabilities of his enemies, and to see exactly how far they might -be reckoned upon in discounting the military situation. After some -time he arrived at an accurate estimate of the individual marshals -opposed to him, and was ready to take the personal equation into -consideration, according as he had to deal with Soult or Masséna, -Marmont or Jourdan. In short, he was a safe general, not a cautious -one. When once the hopeless disparity between his own resources and -those of the enemy had ceased to exist, in the year 1812, he soon -showed the worth of the silly taunts which imputed timidity to him, -by the smashing blows which reduced Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, -and the lightning-stroke which dashed to pieces Marmont’s army at -Salamanca. In the next year, when for the first time he could count -on an actual superiority of force[363], his irresistible march to -Vittoria displayed his mastery of the art of using an advantage to -the uttermost. Napoleon himself never punished a strategic fault on -the part of the enemy with such majestic ease and confidence. - - [362] The Fifth Division was not completed till Oct. 8, 1810, the - Sixth and Seventh on March 8, 1811. - - [363] Though even then the superiority, such as it was, consisted - entirely of Spanish troops of doubtful quality. - -Of Wellington as a tactician we have already had occasion to speak in -the first volume of this work[364]. It is only necessary to repeat -here that the groundwork of his tactics was his knowledge of the -fact that the line could beat the column, whether on the offensive -or the defensive. The _data_ for forming the conclusions had been in -possession of any one who chose to utilize them, but it was Wellesley -who put his knowledge to full account. Even before he left India, it -is said, he had grasped the great secret, and had remarked to his -confidants that ‘the French were sweeping everything before them -in Europe by the use of the formation in column, but that he was -fully convinced that the column could and would be beaten by the -line[365].’ Yet even though the epoch-making, yet half-forgotten, -fight of Maida had occurred since then, the first Peninsular battles -came as a revelation to the world. After Vimiero and Talavera it -became known that the line was certainly superior for the defensive, -but it was only the triumphant line-advance of Salamanca that -finally divulged the fact that the British method was equally sure -and certain for the attack. If Wellesley’s reputation rested on the -single fact that he had made this discovery known to the world, he -would have won by this alone a grand place in military history. But -his reputation depends even more on his strategical than on his -tactical triumphs. He was a battle-general of the first rank, but -his talents on the day of decisive action would not have sufficed to -clear the French out of Spain. His true greatness is best shown by -his all-embracing grasp of the political, geographical, and moral -factors of the situation in the Peninsula, and by the way in which -he utilized them all when drawing up the plans for his triumphant -campaigns. - - [364] See pp. 114-22 of vol. i. - - [365] The same idea is well marked in a conversation reported by - Croker, which took place in London, on the eve of Wellesley’s - departure to assume command of the troops at Cork with whom he - was about to sail for the Peninsula. After a long reverie, he - was asked the subject of his thoughts. ‘To say the truth,’ he - replied, ‘I am thinking of the French I am going to fight. I - have not seen them since the campaign in Flanders [1794-5] when - they were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of victory under - Buonaparte must have made them better still. They have besides a - new system of strategy, which has outmanœuvred and overwhelmed - all the armies of Europe. ’Tis enough to make one thoughtful; but - no matter, the die is cast: they may overwhelm me, but I don’t - think they will outmanœuvre me. First, because I am not afraid - of them, as everybody else seems to be; and secondly, because, - if all I hear of their system be true, I think it a false one - against steady troops. I suspect all the continental armies are - half beaten before the battle begins. I, at least, will not be - frightened beforehand.’ Croker’s _Diary and Correspondence_, vol. - i. p. 13, under the date June 14, 1808. - -As to tactics indeed, there are points on which it would be easy to -point out defects in Wellesley’s method--in especial it would be -possible to develop the two old, but none the less true, criticisms -that he was ‘pre-eminently an infantry general,’ and that ‘when he -had won a battle he did not always utilize his success to the full -legitimate end.’ The two charges hang closely together, for the one -defect was but the consequence of the other; a tendency to refrain -from making the greatest possible use of his cavalry for breaking up -an enemy who had already begun to give ground, and for pursuing him -_à outrance_ when he was well on the run, was the natural concomitant -of a predilection for the use of infantry in the winning of battles. -If Napoleon had commanded the British army at Salamanca, Marmont’s -troops would have been annihilated by a rapid cavalry pursuit, -instead of merely scattered. If Wellington had commanded the French -army in the Jena-Auerstadt campaign, it is reasonably certain that -Hohenlöhe’s broken divisions would have escaped into the interior, -instead of being garnered in piecemeal by the inexorable and untiring -chase kept up by the French horse. The very distrust which Wellington -expressed for the capacities of the British cavalry[366], who after -all were admirable troops when well handled, is but an illustration -of the fact that he was no true lover of the mounted arm. But of this -we have already spoken, and it is unnecessary to dwell at greater -length on his minor deficiencies than on his numerous excellencies on -the day of battle. - - [366] See vol. i. p. 119. - -A far more serious charge against Wellesley than any which can -be grounded on his tactical faults, is that, though he won the -confidence of his army, he could never win their affection. ‘The -sight of his long nose among us on a battle morning,’ wrote one -of his veterans, ‘was worth ten thousand men, any day of the -week[367].’ But it was not personal attachment to him which nerved -his soldiers to make their best effort: he was feared, respected, -and followed, but never loved. He was obeyed with alacrity, but not -with enthusiasm. His officers and his men believed, and believed -rightly, that he looked upon them as admirable tools for the task -that had been set him, and did his best to keep those tools unbroken -and in good repair, but that he felt no deep personal interest in -their welfare. It is seldom that the veterans who have served under a -great commander have failed to idolize as well as to respect him. But -Wellesley’s men, while acknowledging all his greatness, complained -that he systematically neglected both their feelings and their -interests[368]. It was but too true: he showed for his army, the -officers no less than the rank and file, a certain coldness that was -partly bred of intellectual contempt, partly of aristocratic hauteur. -There are words of his on record concerning his men which can never -be forgiven, and words, too, not spoken in the heat of action or the -moment of disappointment, but in the leisure of his later years. -Take, for example, the passage in Lord Stanhope’s _Conversations -with the Duke of Wellington_, where he is speaking of the rank and -file: ‘they are the scum of the earth; English soldiers are fellows -who have enlisted for drink. That is the plain fact--they have _all_ -enlisted for drink[369].’ He described the men who won Talavera as ‘a -rabble who could not bear success,’ and the Waterloo troops as ‘an -infamous army’--the terms are unpardonable. His notions of discipline -were worthy of one of the drill sergeants of Frederic the Great. ‘I -have no idea of any great effect being produced on British soldiers,’ -he once said before a Royal Commission, ‘by anything but the fear of -immediate corporal punishment.’ Flogging was the one remedy for all -evils, and he declared that it was absolutely impossible to manage -the army without it. For any idea of appealing to the men’s better -feeling, or moving them by sentiment, he had the greatest contempt. - - [367] See Kincaid, chap. v, May 3, 1811. - - [368] The feelings, expressed more or less clearly in a hundred - memoirs, may be summed up in a paragraph by Wm. Grattan of the - 88th. ‘In his parting General Order to the Peninsular army he - told us that he would never cease to feel the warmest interest - for our welfare and honour. How this promise was kept every one - knows. That the Duke of Wellington is one of the most remarkable - (perhaps the greatest) man of the present age, few will deny. But - that he neglected the interests and feelings of his Peninsular - army, as a body, is beyond all question. And were he in his grave - to-morrow, hundreds of voices that now are silent would echo what - I write’ (p. 332). - - [369] _Conversations with the Duke of Wellington_, p. 14. [Nov. - 4, 1831.] - -The most distressing feature in Wellington’s condemnation of the -character of his soldiery is that he was sinning against the light: -officers, of less note but of greater heart, were appealing to the -self-respect, patriotism, and good feeling of their men, with the -best results, at the very moment that Wellesley was denouncing them -as soulless clods and irreclaimable drunkards. It was not by the -lash that regiments like Donnellan’s 48th or Colborne’s 52nd, or -many other corps of the Peninsular army were kept together. The -reminiscences of the Napiers, and many other regimental officers of -the better class, are full of anecdotes illustrating the virtues of -the rank and file. There are dozens of diaries and autobiographies -of sergeants and privates of Wellesley’s old divisions, which prove -that there were plenty of well-conditioned, intelligent, sober and -religious men in the ranks--it is only necessary to cite as examples -the books of Surtees, Anton, Morris, and Donaldson[370]. If there -were also thousands of drunkards and reckless brutes in the service, -the blame for their misdoings must fall to a great extent on the -system under which they were trained. The ruthless mediaeval cruelty -of the code of punishment alone will account for half the ruffianism -of the army. - - [370] It is often forgotten that there was a strong religious - element in the rank and file of the Peninsular army. In a letter - from Cartaxo [Feb. 3, 1811], Wellington mentions, with no great - pleasure, the fact that there were three separate Methodist - meetings in the Guards’ brigade alone, and that in many other - regiments there were officers who were accustomed to preach and - pray with their men. For the spiritual experiences of a sergeant - in the agonies of conversion, the reader may consult the diary of - Surtees of the 95th during the year 1812. - -The same indiscriminate censure which Wellesley poured on his men he -often vented on his officers, denouncing them _en masse_ in the most -reckless fashion. There were careless colonels and stupid subalterns -enough under him, but what can excuse such sweeping statements as -that ‘When I give an order to an officer of the line it is, I venture -to say, a hundred to one against its being done at all,’ or for his -Circular of November, 1812, declaring that all the evils of the -Burgos retreat were due ‘to the habitual inattention of the officers -of regiments to their duty.’ It was a bitter blow to the officers of -the many battalions which had kept their order and discipline, to -find themselves confused with the offending corps in the same general -blast of censure. But by 1812 they were well accustomed to such -slashing criticism on the part of their commander. - -Such a chief could not win the sympathy of his army, though he might -command their intellectual respect. Equally unfortunate were his -autocratic temper and his unwillingness to concede any latitude of -instructions to his subordinates, features in his character which -effectually prevented him from forming a school of good officers -capable of carrying out large independent operations. He trained -admirable generals of division, but not commanders of armies, for -he always insisted on keeping the details of operations, even in -distant parts of the theatre of war, entirely under his own hand. -His preference for Hill as a commander of detached corps came -entirely from the fact that he could trust that worthy and gallant -officer to make no movements on his own initiative, and to play a -safe waiting game which gave his chief no anxiety. In his younger -days, while serving under other generals, Wellesley had been by no -means an exponent of blind obedience or unquestioning deference to -the orders of his superiors. But when placed in command himself he -was autocratic to a fault. He was prone to regard any criticism of -his directions as insubordination. He preferred a lieutenant on -whom he could rely for a literal obedience to orders, to another -of more active brain who possessed initiative and would ‘think for -himself.’ There was hardly an officer in the Peninsular army to whom -he would grant a free hand even in the carrying out of comparatively -small tasks[371]. His most trusted subordinates were liable to -find themselves overwhelmed with rebukes delivered in the most -tempestuous fashion if they took upon themselves to issue a command -on their own responsibility, even when the great chief was many -leagues away. Sometimes when their inspirations had been obviously -useful and successful, he would wind up his harangue, not with an -expression of approval, but with a recommendation to the effect -that ‘matters had turned out all right, but they must never again -act without orders[372].’ This was not the way to develop their -strategical abilities, or to secure that intelligent co-operation -which is more valuable than blind obedience. It may be pleaded in -Wellesley’s defence that at the commencement of the war he had many -stupid and discontented officers under him, and that their carpings -at his orders were often as absurd as they were malevolent. But it -was not only for them that he reserved his thunders. They fell not -unfrequently on able and willing men, who had done no more than think -for themselves, when an urgent problem had been presented to them. -He was, it must be confessed, a thankless master to serve: he was -almost as pitiless as Frederic the Great in resenting a mistake or -an apparent disobedience to orders. The case of Norman Ramsay may -serve as an example. Ramsay was perhaps the most brilliant artillery -officer in the Peninsular army: the famous charge of his guns through -a French cavalry regiment at Fuentes d’Oñoro is one of the best-known -exploits of the whole war. But at Vittoria he made an error in -comprehending orders, and moved forward from a village where the -commander-in-chief had intended to keep him stationed. He was placed -under arrest for three weeks, cut out of his mention in dispatches, -and deprived of the brevet-majority which had been promised him. His -career was broken, and two years later he fell, still a captain, at -Waterloo. - - [371] Robert Craufurd and Hill were perhaps the only exceptions. - - [372] Take, for example, his behaviour to Sir James MacGrigor, - perhaps the most successful of his chiefs of departments. - MacGrigor, being at Salamanca, while Wellesley was at Madrid [Aug. - 1812], ordered on his own authority the bringing up of stores for - the mass of wounded left behind there after the battle. He then - came to bring his report to Madrid. ‘Lord Wellington was sitting - to a Spanish painter [Goya] for his portrait when I arrived, and - asked me to sit down and give him a detail as to the state of the - wounded at Salamanca. When I came to inform him that for their - relief I had ordered up purveying and commissariat officers, he - started up, and in a violent manner reprobated what I had done. - His Lordship was in a passion, and the Spanish artist, ignorant - of the English language, looked aghast, and at a loss to know - what I had done to enrage him so much. “I shall be glad to know,” - he asked, “who is to command the army, I or you? I establish one - route, one line of communications for the army; you establish - another, and order up supplies by it. As long as you live, sir, - never do that again; never do _anything_ without my orders.” I - pleaded that there was no time to consult him, and that I had - to save lives. He peremptorily desired me “never again to act - without his orders.” ... A month later I was able to say to him, - “My Lord, recollect how you blamed me at Madrid for the steps - which I took on coming up to the army, when I could not consult - your Lordship, and acted for myself. Now, if I had not, what - would the consequences have been?” He answered, “It is all right - as has turned out; but I recommend you still _to have my orders - for what you do_.” This was a singular feature in the character - of Lord Wellington.’ MacGrigor’s _Autobiography_, pp. 302-3 and - 311. - -It would almost seem that Wellesley had worked out for himself some -sort of general rule, to the effect that incompetent being more -common than competent subordinates, it would be safer in the long -run to prohibit all use of personal initiative, as the occasions on -which it would be wisely and usefully employed would be less numerous -than those on which it would result in blunders and perils. He had a -fine intellectual contempt for many of the officers whom he had to -employ, and never shrank from showing it. When once he had made up -his mind, he could not listen with patience to advice or criticism. -It was this that made him such a political failure in his latter -days: he carried into the cabinet the methods of the camp, and could -not understand why they were resented. His colleagues ‘started up -with crotchets,’ he complained: ‘I have not been used to that in the -early part of my life. I was accustomed to carry on things in quite -a different manner. I assembled my officers and laid down my plan, -and it was carried into effect without any more words[373].’ For -councils of war, or other devices by which a weak commander-in-chief -endeavours to discharge some of the burden of responsibility upon the -shoulders of his lieutenants, Wellesley had the greatest dislike. He -never allowed discussion as long as he held supreme authority in the -field: he would have liked to enforce the same rule in the cabinet -when he became prime minister of England. Sometimes he had glimpses -of the fact that it is unwise to show open scorn for the opinion of -others, especially when they are men of influence or capacity[374]. -But it was not often that the idea occurred to him. His reception of -an officer who came with a petition or a piece of advice was often -such that the visitor went away boiling with rage, or prostrated -with nervous exhaustion. Charles Stewart is said to have wept after -one stormy interview with his chief, and Picton, whose attempts at -familiarity were particularly offensive to the Duke, would go away -muttering words that could not be consigned to print[375]. A passage -from the memoir of the chief of one of his departments may suffice to -paint the sort of scene which used to occur:-- - - [373] Salisbury MSS., 1835. Quoted in Sir Herbert Maxwell’s - _Wellington_, ii. 194. - - [374] Take, as a rare instance of recognition of this fact, his - remark in 1828 that ‘When the Duke of Newcastle addressed to me a - letter on the subject of forming an Administration, I treated him - with contempt. No man _likes_ to be treated with contempt. I was - wrong.’ Ibid. ii. 213. - - [375] For a record of such an interview by an eye-witness see - Gronow’s _Reminiscences_, p. 66. - -‘One morning I was in his Lordship’s small apartment, when two -officers were there, to request leave to go to England. A general -officer, of a noble family, commanding a brigade, advanced, saying, -“My Lord, I have of late been suffering much from rheumatism--.” -Without allowing him time to proceed further, Lord Wellington rapidly -said--“and you must go to England to get cured of it. By all means. -Go there immediately.” The general, surprised at his Lordship’s -tone and manner, looked abashed, while he made a profound bow. To -prevent his saying anything more, his Lordship turned to address me, -inquiring about the casualties of the preceding night[376],’ &c. - - [376] Sir James MacGrigor’s _Memoirs_, pp. 304-5. - -Hardly less humiliating to many of Wellesley’s subordinates than -personal interviews of this kind, were the letters which they -received from him, when he chanced to be at a distance. He had not -the art, probably he had not the wish, to conceal the fact that he -despised as well as disliked many of those whom the fortune of war, -or the exigencies of home patronage, placed under his command. The -same icy intellectual contempt which he showed for the needy peers, -the grovelling place-hunters, and the hungry lawyers of Dublin, when -he was under-secretary for Ireland, pierces through many of his -letters to the officers of the army of Portugal. Very frequently -his mean opinion of their abilities was justifiable--but there was -no need to let it appear. In this part of the management of men -Wellesley was deficient: he failed to see that it is better in the -end to rule subordinates by appealing to their zeal and loyalty -than to their fears, and that a little commendation for work well -performed goes further in its effect on an army than much censure -for what has been done amiss. When he has to praise his officers in -a dispatch, the terms used are always formal and official in the -extreme--it is the rarest thing to find a phrase which seems to come -from the heart. The careful reader will know what importance to -attach to these expressions of approval, when he notes that the names -of subordinates whom Wellesley despised and distrusted are inserted, -all in due order of seniority, between those of the men who had -really done the work[377]. All commanders-in-chief have to give vent -to a certain amount of these empty and meaningless commendations, -but few have shown more neglect in discriminating between the really -deserving men and the rest than did the victor of Salamanca and -Waterloo. Occasionally this carelessness as to the merits and the -feelings of others took the form of gross injustice, more frequently -it led to nothing worse than a complete mystification of the readers -of the dispatch as to the relative merits of the persons mentioned -therein[378]. - - [377] He honourably mentioned Murray in his Oporto dispatch, and - Tripp in his Waterloo dispatch! Both had behaved abominably. - - [378] Take, for example, the case of Baring of the K. G. L. at - Waterloo. In a dispatch, not written immediately after the battle - (when accurate information might have been difficult to procure), - but _two months_ later, Wellesley says that La Haye Sainte was - taken at two o’clock, ‘through the negligence of the officer - who commanded the post.’ Yet if anything is certain, it is that - Baring held out till six o’clock, that his nine companies of the - K. G. L. kept back two whole French divisions, and that when - he was driven out, the sole cause was that his ammunition was - exhausted, and that no more could be sent him because the enemy - had completely surrounded the post. If Wellington had taken any - trouble about the ascertaining of the facts, he could not have - failed to learn the truth. - -The explanation of this feature in Wellesley’s correspondence is a -fundamental want of broad sympathy in his character. He had a few -intimates to whom he spoke freely, and it is clear that he often -showed consideration and even kindness to his aides-de-camp and other -personal retainers; there were one or two of his relatives to whom he -showed an unswerving affection, and whose interests were always near -his heart[379]. Among these neither his wife nor his elder brother -Richard, the great Governor-General of India, were to be numbered. He -quarrelled so bitterly with the latter that for many years they never -met. No doubt there were faults on both sides, yet Wellington might -have borne much from the brother who started him on his career. But -for him the position of Resident in Mysore would not have been given -to so junior an officer, nor would the command of the army that won -Assaye and Argaum have been placed in his hands. It is small wonder -that the grievances and petty ambitions of the average line officer -never touched the heart of the man who could be estranged from his -own brother by a secondary political question. - - [379] See especially his charming letters to his niece, Lady - Burghersh, lately published. - -It has often been noted that when the wars were over he showed little -predilection for the company of his old Peninsular officers. Some of -his most trusted subordinates hardly looked upon his face after 1815: -he clearly preferred the company of politicians and men of fashion to -that of the majority of his old generals. They only met him at the -formal festivity of the annual Waterloo Banquet. - -The remembrance of the countless panegyrics upon Wellington, not -only as a general but as a man, which have appeared during the last -sixty years, has made it necessary, if painful, to speak of his -limitations. For two whole generations it seemed almost treasonable -to breathe a word against his personal character--so great was the -debt that Britain owed him for Salamanca and Waterloo. His frigid -formalism was regarded with respect and even admiration: his lack -of geniality and his utter inability to understand the sentimental -side of life were even praised as signs of Spartan virtue. Certain -episodes which did not fit in too happily with the ‘Spartan hero’ -theory were deliberately ignored[380]. The popular conception of -Arthur Wellesley has been largely built up on laudatory sketches -written by those who knew him in his old age alone. He lives in our -memories as a kind of Nestor, replete with useful and interesting -information, as Lord Stanhope drew him in his _Conversations with the -Duke of Wellington_. This was not the man known to his contemporaries -in the years of the Peninsular War. - - [380] His relations with the other sex were numerous and - unedifying. From his loveless and unwise marriage, made on - a point of duty where affection had long vanished, down to - his tedious ‘correspondence with Miss J.,’ there is nothing - profitable to be discovered. See Greville’s _Diaries_ [2nd - Series], iii. 476. - -Yet there was much to admire in Wellesley’s personal character. -England has never had a more faithful servant. Though intensely -ambitious, he never allowed ambition to draw him aside from the most -tedious and thankless daily tasks. When once convinced that it was -his duty to undertake a piece of work, he carried it through with -unswerving industry and perseverance, if not always with much tact -or consideration for the feelings of others[381]. He was unsparing -of himself, careless of praise or blame, honest in every word and -deed. He was equally ready to offend his king or to sacrifice his -popularity with the multitude, when he thought that he had to face a -question in which right and wrong were involved. He was essentially, -what he once called himself, using a familiar Hindustani phrase, -‘a man of his salt.’ In spite of all his faults he stands out a -majestic figure in the history of his time. It is the misfortune of -the historian that when he sees so much to admire and to respect, he -finds so little that commands either sympathy or affection. - - [381] When we read Wellington’s interminable controversies with - the Portuguese Regency and the Spanish Junta, we soon come to - understand not merely the way in which they provoked him by their - tortuous shuffling and their helpless procrastination, but still - more the way in which he irritated them by his unveiled scorn, - and his outspoken exposure of all their meannesses. A little - more diplomatic language would have secured less friction, and - probably better service. - - - - -SECTION XIV: CHAPTER II - -WELLESLEY RETAKES OPORTO - - -On arriving at Lisbon, Wellesley, as we have already seen, was -overjoyed to find that the situation in Portugal remained just as it -had been when he set sail from Portsmouth: Victor was still quiescent -in his cantonments round Merida: Soult had not moved forward on -the road toward Coimbra, and was in the midst of his unfruitful -bickerings with the army of Silveira. Lapisse had disappeared -from his threatening position in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and had -passed away to Estremadura. All the rumours as to an immediate -French advance on Badajoz and Abrantes, which had arrived just as -the new commander-in-chief was quitting England, had turned out to -be baseless inventions. There were reassuring dispatches awaiting -him from the English attachés with the armies of Cuesta and La -Romana[382], which showed that Galicia was in full insurrection, and -that a respectable force was once more threatening Victor’s flank. -Accordingly it was possible to take into consideration plans for -assuming the offensive against the isolated French armies, and the -defensive campaign for the protection of Lisbon, which Wellesley had -feared to find forced upon him, was not necessary. - - [382] Monro to Beresford, April 15, and MacKinley’s inclosure from - Vigo of April 16, 1809. - -Within thirty-six hours of his arrival the British commander-in-chief -had made up his mind as to the strategy that was incumbent on him. -He resolved, as we have already seen, to leave a containing force -to watch Victor, while he hastened with the main body of his army -to strike a blow at Soult, whose corps was clearly in a state of -dispersion, which invited attack. The Duke of Dalmatia was operating -at once upon the Minho, the Tamega, and the Vouga, and it seemed -likely that a prompt stroke might surprise him, in the midst of the -movement for concentration which he would be compelled to make, when -he should learn that the British were in the field. - -The forces available for Wellesley’s use consisted of some 25,000 -British[383] and 16,000 Portuguese troops. Cradock, urged on by -Hill and Beresford, had advanced with the main body of his army to -Leiria and lay there upon the twenty-fourth, the day upon which he -received Wellesley’s notification that he had been superseded and -was to sail to take up the governorship of Gibraltar. But four or -five newly arrived corps still lay at Lisbon, and more were expected. -The army was very weak in cavalry, there were but four regiments and -fractions of two others available[384]. Of the infantry there were -only present five of the battalions[385] which had served at Vimiero -and knew the French and their manner of fighting. The rest were all -inexperienced and new to the field, and the majority indeed were -weak second battalions, which had not originally been intended for -foreign service, and had been made up to their present numbers by -large and recent drafts from the militia[386]. Even at Talavera, six -months after the campaign had begun, it is on record that many of the -men were still showing the names and numbers of their old militia -regiments on their knapsacks. The battalions which had joined in -Moore’s march into Spain only began to reappear in June, when Robert -Craufurd brought back to Lisbon the 1/43rd, 1/52nd and 1/95th, which -were to form the nucleus of the famous Light Division. The remainder -of the Corunna troops, when they had been rested and recruited, were -drawn aside to take part in the miserable expedition to Walcheren. -When Wellesley first took the field therefore, these veterans of the -campaign of 1808 were only represented by the two ‘battalions of -detachments’ which General Cameron had organized from the stragglers -and convalescents of Moore’s army. - - [383] Excluding troops that arrived at Lisbon just after - Wellesley’s arrival. - - [384] The 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, 14th and 16th Light - Dragoons, with one squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons of the K. - G. L., and two of the 20th Light Dragoons. - - [385] The 2/9th, 1/45th, 29th, 5/60th and 97th. - - [386] Of Wellesley’s twenty-one British battalions, ten were 2nd - battalions, [of the 7th, 9th, 24th, 30th, 31st, 48th, 53rd, 66th, - 83rd, 87th], two were single-battalion regiments [the 29th and - 97th], three first battalions [of the 3rd, 45th and 88th], two - Guards’ battalions [1st Coldstreams and 1st Scots Fusiliers], two - ‘battalions of detachments,’ one a 3rd battalion (27th), one a - 5th battalion [60th]. - -The Portuguese troops which Wellesley found available for the -campaign against Soult consisted entirely of the line regiments -from Lisbon and the central parts of the realm, which Beresford had -been reorganizing during the last two months. The troops of the -north had been destroyed at Oporto, or were in arms under Silveira -on the Tamega. Those of the south were garrisoning Elvas, or still -endeavouring to recruit their enfeebled _cadres_ at their regimental -head quarters. But Beresford had massed at Thomar and Abrantes -ten[387] line regiments, some with one, some with their statutory two -battalions, three newly raised battalions of Cazadores, and three -incomplete cavalry regiments, a force amounting in all to nearly -15,000 sabres and bayonets. Though Wellesley considered that they -‘cut a bad figure,’ and that the rank and file were poor and the -native officers ‘worse than anything he had ever seen,’ he was yet -resolved to give them a chance in the field. Beresford assured him -that they had improved so much during the last few weeks, and were -showing such zeal and good spirit, that it was only fair that they -should be given a trial[388]. - - [387] These regiments were the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th, - 15th, 16th, 19th, raised respectively at Lisbon (1st, 4th, 10th, - 16th), Estremoz (3rd), Setubal (7th), Peniche (13th), Villa - Viciosa (15th), Cascaes (19th), Campomayor (20th), the 1st, 4th - and 5th Cazadores, and 1st, 4th and 7th Cavalry. - - [388] It is fair to the Portuguese to note that other witnesses - of May 1809 speak much more favourably of them. Londonderry (i. - p. 305) writes that ‘they had applied of late so much ardour to - their military education that some were already fit to take the - field, and it only required a little experience to put them on a - level with the best troops in Europe. There was one brigade under - General Campbell (the 4th and 10th regiments), which struck me as - being in the finest possible order: it went through a variety of - evolutions with a precision and correctness which would have done - no discredit to our own army.’ - -Accordingly Wellesley resolved to brigade certain picked battalions -among his English troops, and to take them straight to the front, -while he told off others to form part of the ‘containing force’ -which was to be sent off to watch Victor and the French army of -Estremadura. The remainder, under Beresford himself, were to act as -an independent division during the march on Oporto. - -Five days of unceasing work had to be spent in Lisbon before -Wellesley could go forward, but while he was making his arrangements -with the Portuguese regency, drawing out a new organization for -Beresford’s commissariat, and striving to get into communication -with Cuesta, the British troops were already being pushed forward -from Leiria towards Coimbra, and the Portuguese were converging -from Thomar on the same point, so that no time was being lost. -It was during this short and busy stay at Lisbon that Wellesley -was confronted with the conspirator Argenton, who had come up to -the capital in company with Major Douglas. He did not make a good -impression on the commander-in-chief, who wrote home that he had no -doubt as to the reality of the plot against Soult, and the discontent -of the French army, but thought it unlikely that any good would come -from the plot[389]. He refused to promise compliance with Argenton’s -two requests, that he would direct the Portuguese to fall in with -Soult’s plans for assuming royal power, and that he would bring the -British army forward to a position in which it would threaten the -retreat of the 2nd Corps on Leon. The former savoured too much of -Machiavellian treachery: as to the latter, he thought so little of -the profit likely to result from the plot, that he would not alter -his plans to oblige the conspirators. The only information of certain -value that he had obtained from the emissary was that Soult had -no idea of Victor’s position or projects. All that he granted to -Argenton was passports to take him and his two friends, ‘Captains -Dupont and Garis,’ to England, from whence they intended to cross -into France, in order to set their friends in the interior on the -move. Great care was taken that Argenton on his return journey to -Oporto should see as little as possible of the British army, lest he -should be able to tell too much about its numbers and dispositions. -He was conducted back by Douglas to the Vouga, by a circuitous route, -and safely repassed Franceschi’s outposts[390]. - - [389] _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 273-5, 276. To Castlereagh. - Wellesley says that the plot will probably fail, and that even - if the 2nd Corps mutinied, they would not carry away the other - French armies, as Argenton hoped. He had therefore refused to - commit himself to anything. - - [390] _Wellington Dispatches_, ii. 306. - -On the twenty-ninth Wellesley at last got clear of Lisbon, where the -formal festivities and reception arranged in his honour had tried him -even more than the incessant desk-work which had to be got through -before the organization of his base for supplies was completed. On -April 30 he pushed forward to Leiria, on May 1 to Pombal, on the -second he reached Coimbra and found himself in the midst of his army, -which had only concentrated itself at that city during the last five -days. - -All was quiet in the front: Trant, who was holding the line of the -Vouga with 3,000 disorderly militia and some small fragments rallied -from the line regiments which had been dispersed at Oporto, reported -that Franceschi and the French light cavalry had remained quiescent -for many days. The same news came in from Wilson, who, after pursuing -Lapisse to Alcantara, had come back with part of his troops to the -neighbourhood of Almeida, and had a detachment at Vizeu watching the -flank of the French advance. Silveira reported from Amarante that he -was still holding the line of the Tamega, and had at least 10,000 -enemies in front of him. All therefore seemed propitious for the -great stroke. - -Wellesley’s plan, as finally worked out in detail, was to push -forward his main body upon Oporto with all possible speed, while -sending a flanking column under Beresford to cross the Douro near -Lamego, join Silveira, and intercept Soult’s line of retreat upon -the plains of Leon by way of the Tras-os-Montes. If he could move -fast enough, he hoped to catch the Marshal with his army still -unconcentrated. His design, as he wrote to Castlereagh, was ‘to -beat or cripple Soult,’ to thrust him back into Galicia; he doubted -whether it would be possible to accomplish more with the force that -was at his disposal, but if any chance should occur for destroying or -surrounding the enemy he would do his best. Rumours that the Marshal -was preparing to evacuate Oporto were in the air: if they were true, -and the French were already making ready to retreat, it was unlikely -that they would stand long enough to run into danger. - -The detailed arrangements for the distribution of the troops were as -follows:-- - -It was first necessary to provide a ‘containing force’ to hold back -Victor, in case he should make an unexpected move down the Tagus -or the Guadiana. For this purpose Wellesley told off one of his -brigades, that of Mackenzie, together with two regiments of heavy -cavalry and one of infantry which had lately arrived at Lisbon, and -were now on their march to Santarem. With these four battalions, one -field battery, and eight squadrons, Mackenzie was to take post at -Abrantes, and behind the line of the Zezere[391]. There he was to -be joined by the larger half of Beresford’s reorganized Portuguese -army--seven battalions of line troops, three of Cazadores, five -squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries[392]. He would also have -three regiments of militia at his disposal, to garrison the fortress -of Abrantes. His whole force, excluding the militia, would amount -to 1,400 British and 700 Portuguese cavalry, nearly 3,000 British -infantry, 6,000 Portuguese infantry, and four batteries. These 12,000 -men ought to be able to hold back any force that Victor could detach -for a raid along the Tagus: for, having Cuesta’s army in his front, -it was absolutely impossible that he could march with his whole corps -into Portugal. If the Marshal moved forward south of the Tagus, that -river should be held against him, and since it was in full flood it -would be easy to keep him back, as all the boats and ferries could -be destroyed, and it would be useless for him to present himself -opposite Vella Velha, Abrantes, or Santarem. If he advanced north of -the Tagus, the line of the Zezere was to be maintained against him -as long as possible, then those of the Nabao and Rio Mayor. But the -main army would be back from the north, to reinforce the ‘containing -force,’ long ere the Marshal could push so far. As an outlying post -on this front Wellesley ordered Colonel Mayne, with the part of -Wilson’s Lusitanian Legion that had not returned to the north and a -militia regiment, to occupy Alcantara. He was to break its bridge if -forced out of the position. - - [391] The regiments were, giving their force present with the - colours from the return of May 5:-- - - 3/27th Foot 726 - 2/31st ” 765 - 1/45th ” 671 - 2/24th ” [From Lisbon] 750 - ----- - 2,912 - - 3rd Dragoon Guards 698 - 4th Dragoons 716 - One battery Field Artillery - [Captain Baynes’s], six-pounders 120 - ----- - 1,534 - - Total 4,446 - - - [392] The Portuguese regiments were:--1st Foot [La Lippe] one - batt., 3rd and 15th Foot [1st and 2nd of Olivenza] each one - batt., 4th Foot [Freire] and 13th Foot [Peniche] two batts. each. - 1st, 4th and 5th Cazadores, one batt. each. Five squadrons of - the 4th and 7th cavalry. Total, 6,000 foot, 700 horse, and three - field-batteries, about 7,100 men. - -Victor being thus provided for, Wellesley could turn the rest of -his army against Soult at Oporto. For the main operation he could -dispose of 17,000 British and 7,000 Portuguese troops present with -the colours, after deducting the sick, the men on detached duty, and -one single battalion left in garrison at Lisbon. He divided them, as -we have already stated, into a larger force destined to execute the -frontal attack upon Soult, and a smaller one which was to cut off his -retreat into central Spain. - -The flanking column, 5,800 men in all, was entrusted to Beresford: -it was composed of one British brigade (that of Tilson) consisting -of 1,500 bayonets[393], a single British squadron (the 4th of the -14th Light Dragoons) with five battalions[394], three squadrons[395], -and two field-batteries of Portuguese. These troops were originally -directed to join Silveira at Amarante, and co-operate with him in -defending the line of the Tamega. But on May 3 there arrived at -Coimbra the unwelcome news that Loison had forced the bridge of -Amarante, and that Silveira in consequence had retired south of the -Douro and was lying at Lamego with the wrecks of his army, some 4,000 -men at most. This untoward event did not cause Wellesley to change -the direction of Beresford’s column, but rendered him more cautious -as to pushing it beyond the Douro. He ordered his lieutenant to pick -up Sir Robert Wilson’s small force at Vizeu[396], to join Silveira -at Lamego, and then to guide his further operations by the attitude -of the French. If they tried to pass the Douro he was to oppose -them strenuously; if they still clung to the northern bank and had -not advanced far beyond Amarante, he might cross, and occupy Villa -Real, if he thought the move safe and the position behind that town -defensible. But he was to risk nothing; if the whole of Soult’s corps -should retreat eastward he was not to attempt to stop them, ‘for,’ -wrote Wellesley, ‘I should not like to see a single British brigade, -supported by 6,000 or 8,000 Portuguese, exposed to be attacked by -the French army in any but a very good post[397].’ If Loison alone -were left on the Tamega, Beresford might take post at Villa Real -and fight: if, however, Soult should appear at the head of his -entire force, it would be madness to await him: the column must fall -back and allow him to pass. ‘Remember,’ added Wellesley in another -letter[398], ‘that you are a commander-in-chief _and must not be -beaten_: therefore do not undertake anything with your troops if you -have not some strong hope of success.’ Beresford’s column was sent -off a day before the rest of the army, in order to allow the flanking -movement time to develop before the frontal attack was pushed home. -He left Coimbra on May 6, was at Vizeu on the eighth, and joined -Silveira at Lamego on the tenth; all his movements passed completely -unobserved by the enemy, owing to the wide sweep to the right which -he had been ordered to make. - - [393] Viz. 2/87th, 669 bayonets, 1/88th, 608 bayonets, five - companies of the 5/60th, 306 bayonets. - - [394] Two battalions each of the regiments nos. 7 (Setubal), - 19 (Cascaes), and one of no. 1 (La Lippe), as far as I can - ascertain, composed this force. - - [Erratum from p. xii: I found in Lisbon that the regiments which - marched with Beresford to Lamego were not (as I had supposed) - nos. 7 and 19, but nos. 2 and 14, with the 4th cazadores. Those - which joined from the direction of Almeida were two battalions of - no. 11 (1st of Almeida) and one of no. 9.] - - [395] Regiment, no. 1. - - [396] Wilson had been removed by Beresford from his own - Lusitanian Legion, and told to take up the command of the Brigade - at Almeida: it was, apparently, with two battalions drawn from - the garrison of that fortress that he now joined Beresford. - - [397] Wellesley to Beresford, Coimbra, May 7. _Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. 309. - - [398] Ibid. iv. 320. - -The infantry of Wellesley’s main force, with which the frontal attack -on Oporto was to be made, consisted of six brigades of British, -one of the King’s German Legion, and four picked battalions of -Portuguese who were attached respectively to the brigades of A. -Campbell, Sontag, Stewart, and Cameron. Of cavalry, in which he was -comparatively weak, he had the whole of the 16th, three squadrons -of the 14th, and two of the 20th Light Dragoons, with one squadron -more from the 3rd Light Dragoons of the King’s German Legion. The -artillery, twenty-four guns in all, was composed of two British and -two German field-batteries. No horse artillery had yet been received -from England, though Wellesley had been urging his need for it on the -home authorities, at the same time that he made a similar demand for -good light infantry, such as that which had formed the light brigade -of Moore’s army[399], and for remounts to keep his cavalry up to full -fighting strength. The army was not yet distributed into regular -divisions, but the beginnings of the later divisional arrangement -were indicated by the telling off the brigades of Richard Stewart -and Murray to serve together under Edward Paget (who had commanded -Moore’s reserve division with such splendid credit to himself during -the Corunna retreat), while those of H. Campbell, A. Campbell, and -Sontag were to take their orders from Sherbrooke, and those of Hill -and Cameron to move under the charge of the former brigadier. The -cavalry was under General Cotton, with Payne as brigadier; the senior -officer of artillery was General E. Howorth[400]. - - [399] _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. pp. 270, 281, 305. - - [400] The whole force consisted of the following, present with - the colours:-- - - CAVALRY: _Officers._ _Men._ - - 14th Light Dragoons 20 471 - 16th ” ” 37 673 - 20th ” ” 6 237 - 3rd ” ” K.G.L. 3 57 - - INFANTRY: - - H. Campbell’s brigade: - Coldstream Guards 33 1,194 - 3rd Foot Guards 34 1,228 - One company 5/60th 2 61 - - A. Campbell’s brigade: - 2/7th Foot 26 559 - 2/53rd Foot 35 787 - One company 5/60th 4 64 - 1/10th Portuguese -- -- - - Sontag’s brigade: - 97th Foot 22 572 - 2nd Batt. Detachments 35 787 - One company 5/60th 2 61 - 2/16th Portuguese -- -- - - R. Stewart’s brigade: - 29th Foot 26 596 - 1st Batt. Detachments 27 803 - 1/16th Portuguese -- -- - - Murray’s brigade: - 1st Line Batt. K.G.L. 34 767 - 2nd ” ” 32 804 - 5th ” ” 28 720 - 7th ” ” 22 688 - - Hill’s brigade: - 1/3rd Foot 28 719 - 2/48th Foot 32 721 - 2/66th Foot 34 667 - One company 5/60 Foot 2 61 - - Cameron’s brigade: - 2/9th Foot 27 545 - 2/83rd Foot 29 833 - One company 5/60 Foot 2 60 - 2/10th Portuguese -- -- - - With Lawson’s battery of 3-pounders, and Lane’s, Heyse’s, and - Rettberg’s of 6-pounders. Allowing 600 each for the Portuguese - battalions, the total comes to 16,213 infantry, 1,504 cavalry, - and 550 gunners, also sixty-four men of the wagon train, and - thirty-nine engineers. Total, 18,370. - -It will be noted that of the total force with which Wellesley was -about to assail the 2nd Corps, about 16,400 were British troops -and 11,400 Portuguese. Considering that Soult had at least 23,000 -sabres and bayonets, of whom not more than 2,200 were in his -hospitals, and that over three-eighths of the allies were untried -and newly-organized levies, it cannot be denied that the march on -Oporto showed considerable self-confidence, and a very nice and -accurate calculation of the chances of war on the part of the British -Commander-in-chief. - -On the very day on which the vanguard marched out from Coimbra -upon the northern road, Wellesley received a second visit from the -conspirator Argenton, who had returned from consulting his friends -at Oporto and Amarante. He brought little news of importance: Soult -had not yet proclaimed himself king, and therefore the plotters -had taken no open steps against him. The French army had not begun -to move, but it appeared that the Marshal was pondering over the -relative advantages of the lines of retreat available to him, for -Argenton brought a memorandum given him by (or purloined from) some -staff-officer, which contained a long exposition of the various -roads from Oporto, and stated a preference for that by Villa Real -and the Tras-os-Montes[401]. He had a number of futile propositions -to lay before Wellesley, and especially urged him to make sure of -Villa Real and to cut off the Marshal’s retreat on Spain. The traitor -was sent back, with no promises of compliance; and every endeavour -was made to keep from him the fact that the allied army was already -upon the move. Unfortunately he had passed many troops upon the -road from Coimbra to the Vouga, and had guessed at what he had not -seen. On the following day he passed through the French lines on his -return journey, and by the way endeavoured to spread the propaganda -of treason. One of the infantry brigades which lay in support of -Franceschi’s cavalry was commanded by a general Lefebvre, with whom -Argenton had long served as aide-de-camp. Knowing that his old chief -was weak and discontented[402], the emissary of the malcontents -paid a midnight visit to him, revealed to him the outlines of the -conspiracy, and endeavoured to enroll him as a fellow plotter. He -had misjudged his man: Lefebvre listened to everything without -showing any signs of surprise or anger, but hastened to bear the -tale to Soult, and arranged for Argenton’s arrest on his return to -Oporto upon the following morning. Confronted with the Marshal, the -traitor held his head high, and boasted that he was the agent of a -powerful body of conspirators. He invited Soult to declare against -the Emperor, and deliver France from servitude. He also warned him -that Wellesley had arrived at Coimbra, and told him that 30,000 -British troops of whom 3,000 at least were cavalry, would fall upon -Franceschi that day. Thus, owing to his conference with Argenton, -Wellesley lost the chance of surprising Soult, who was warned of the -oncoming storm exactly at the moment when it was most important that -he should still be kept in the dark as to the force that was marching -against him [May 8]. - - [401] Wellington to Beresford, from Coimbra, May 7, 1809. - - [402] He told Wellesley that the general was ‘a man of weak - intellect,’ and that he thought that he had won him over to the - plot from the way in which he received the news of it. Wellesley - to Castlereagh, May 15, from Oporto. - -Soult sent back Argenton to his prison, after threatening him with -death: but uncertain as to the number of the conspirators, he was -thrown for a moment into a state of doubt and alarm. He probably -suspected Loison and Lahoussaye of being in the plot against him, as -well as the real traitors--possibly Mermet also[403]. Feeling the -ground, as it were, trembling beneath his feet, he began to make -instant preparations for retreat: orders were sent to Franceschi to -fall back on Oporto, and not to risk anything by an attempt to hold -off Wellesley longer than was prudent. Loison was informed that he -must clear the road beyond Amarante, as the army was about to retire -by the Tras-os-Montes, and he would now form its advanced guard. -Lorges at Braga was directed to gather in the small fractions of -Heudelet’s division which had been left at Viana and other places -in the north, and to march in their company upon Amarante by the -way of Guimaraens. The Marshal saw, with some dismay, that these -isolated detachments would not be able to join the main body till the -fourteenth or fifteenth of May; it was necessary to hold Oporto as -long as possible in order to give them time to come up. - - [403] This may be perhaps inferred from Soult’s letter to King - Joseph, written after the retreat, in which he says that he had - intended to pack off Lahoussaye and Mermet from the front: ‘À - cette époque j’ai voulu faire partir ces généraux, qui n’ont - pas toujours fait ce qui était de leur pouvoir pour le succès - des opérations; mais j’ai preféré attendre d’être arrivé à - Zamora, afin de ne pas accréditer les bruits d’intrigues et de - conspirations qui eurent lieu à Oporto, auxquels ils n’ont pas - certainement pris aucune part.’ [Intercepted letter in Record - Office.] - -Next day Soult contrived to extort some more information from the -unstable Argenton. Receiving a promise of life for himself and pardon -for his fellow conspirators (which the Marshal apparently granted -because he thought that accurate information concerning the plot -would be worth more to him than the right to shoot the plotters), the -captain gave up the names of all the leaders. Much relieved to find -that none of his generals were implicated, Soult did no more than -arrest the two colonels, Lafitte and Donadieu, leaving the smaller -fry untouched[404]. He kept his promise to Argenton by hushing up -the whole matter. The colonels suffered no harm beyond their arrest: -Argenton escaped from custody (probably by collusion with the officer -placed in charge of his person)[405], and got back to the English -lines the day after the capture of Oporto[406]. Some months later he -secretly revisited France, was recognized, captured, and shot on the -Plain of Grenelle[407]. - - [404] Soult so far managed to forget the whole business that - he, two years later, sent the younger Lafitte to present to the - Emperor the English flags captured at Albuera! [See St. Chamans, - p. 133.] - - [405] Most of this comes from Argenton’s confession to Wellesley - on May 13. See _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. p. 339. He said that - he slipped away from the gendarmes at the advice of Lafitte, who - told him that his friends would come to no harm if the chief - witness against them vanished. - - [406] The extraordinary clemency shown to the conspirators by - Soult, the providential escape of Argenton, the favours which the - Marshal afterwards lavished on Lafitte, and the trouble which - he took to hush up the whole matter, led many of his enemies to - suspect that he himself had been in the plot, and had intended - to combine his scheme for Portuguese kingship with a rising - against Bonaparte at the head of his _corps d’armée_: Argenton’s - confession made this impossible. - - [407] For further details on Argenton’s fate, see the Appendix. - -At the very moment when Soult was cross-examining Argenton, issuing -hurried orders for the concentration of his troops, and preparing -for a retreat upon Amarante, Wellesley’s advanced guard was drawing -near the Vouga and making ready to pounce upon Franceschi. Two roads -lead northward from Coimbra, the main _chaussée_ to Oporto which -runs inland via Ponte de Vouga and Feira, and a minor route near the -coast, which passes by Aveiro and Ovar. Five of Wellesley’s brigades -and the whole of his cavalry marched by the former route. Moving -forward under the screen of Trant’s militia, which still held the -line of the Vouga, they were to fall on the enemy’s front at dawn -on May 10. The five squadrons of the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons -under Cotton led the advance: then followed the infantry of Edward -Paget--the two brigades of Murray and Richard Stewart. Sherbrooke’s -column marched in support, ten miles to the rear. It was intended -that the whole mass should rush in upon Franceschi’s pickets, and -roll them in upon his main body before the advance from Coimbra was -suspected. Unhappily Soult had already warned his cavalry commander -of the coming storm upon the ninth, and he was not caught unprepared. - -Meanwhile the remaining two infantry brigades of Wellesley’s army, -those of Hill and Cameron, were to execute a turning movement against -Franceschi’s flank. Orders had been sent to the magistrates of the -town of Aveiro, bidding them collect all the fishing-boats which were -to be found in the great lagoon at the mouth of the Vouga--a broad -sheet of shallow water and sandbanks which extends for fifteen miles -parallel to the sea, only separated from it by a narrow spit of dry -ground. At the northern end of this system of inland waterways is -the town of Ovar, which lay far behind Franceschi’s rear. Hill was -directed to ship his men upon the boats, and to throw them ashore at -Ovar, where they were to fall upon the flank of the French, when they -should be driven past them by the frontal advance of the main body. - -If all had gone well, the French detachment might have been -annihilated. Franceschi had with him no more than the four weak -cavalry regiments of his own division[408], not more than 1,200 -sabres, with one light battery, and a single regiment of infantry. -But not far behind him was the rest of Mermet’s division, eleven -battalions of infantry with a strength of some 3,500 men. One -regiment, the 31st Léger, lay at Feira, near Ovar, while Ferrey’s -brigade was five miles further back, at Grijon. - - [408] 1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs and Hanoverian - Chevaux-légers. - -On the night of the ninth the British advanced guard reached the -Vouga: after only a few hours’ repose the cavalry mounted again at 1 -A.M., and pushed forward in order to fall upon the enemy at daybreak. -The night march turned out a failure, as such enterprises often do in -an unexplored country-side seamed with rocks and ravines. The rear -of the cavalry column got astray and fell far behind the leading -squadrons: much time was lost in marching and countermarching, and at -dawn the brigade found itself still some way from Albergaria Nova, -the village where Franceschi’s head quarters were established[409]. -It was already five o’clock when they fell in with and drove back -the French outlying pickets: shortly after they came upon the whole -of Franceschi’s division, drawn out in battle array on a rough -moor behind the village, with a few companies of infantry placed -in a wood on their flank and their battery in front of their line. -General Cotton saw that there was no chance of a surprise, and very -wisely declined to attack a slightly superior force of all arms with -the 1,000 sabres of his two regiments. He resolved to wait for the -arrival of Richard Stewart’s infantry brigade, the leading part of -the main column. When Franceschi advanced against him he refused to -fight and drew back a little[410]. Thus some hours of the morning -were wasted, till at last there arrived on the field Lane’s battery -and a battalion of the 16th Portuguese, followed by the 29th and -the 1st Battalion of Detachments. Like the cavalry, the infantry -had been much delayed during the hours of darkness, mainly by the -impossibility of getting the guns up the rocky defile beyond the -Vouga, where several caissons had broken down in the roadway. It -was only after daylight had come that they were extricated and got -forward on to the upland where lies the village of Albergaria. - - [409] For details of this fatiguing night march and its gropings - in the dark see Tomkinson’s (16th Dragoons) _Diary_, pp. 4-5, and - Hawker’s (14th Light Dragoons) _Journal_, p. 47. - - [410] The Light Dragoons, says Hawker (_Journal_, p. 48), - ‘finding ourselves opposed by a heavy column of cavalry, retired - a little.’ Their total loss was one officer and two men wounded, - and one man missing. On this slender foundation Le Noble founds - the following romance (p. 240). ‘Le général Franceschi charge à - la tête de sa division ceux qui l’attaquent en front, renverse - la première ligne, et tandis qu’elle se rétablit, se retire, - et fond avec 6 pièces et deux régiments sur la colonne qui le - tournait par sa droite. L’ennemi est culbuté, la colonne recule, - et le général se retire sur Oliveira avec quelques prisonniers.’ - All this fuss produced _four_ casualties in the two English - regiments. See official report of casualties for May 10, 1809. - -Wellesley himself came up along with Stewart’s brigade, and had -the mortification of seeing all his scheme miscarry, owing to the -tardiness of the arrival of his infantry. For at the very moment -when Franceschi caught sight of the distant bayonets winding up the -road, he hastily went to the rear, leaving the 1st Hussars alone in -position as a rearguard. This regiment was charged by the 16th Light -Dragoons, and driven in with some small loss. Under cover of this -skirmish the French division got away in safety through the town of -Oliveira de Azemis, which lay behind them, and after making two more -ineffectual demonstrations of a desire to stand, fell back on the -heights of Grijon, where Mermet’s infantry division was awaiting them. - -The whole day’s fighting had been futile but spectacular. ‘I must -note,’ says an eye-witness, ‘the beautiful effect of our engagement. -It commenced about sunrise on one of the finest spring mornings -possible, on an immense tract of heath, with a pine wood in rear -of the enemy. So little was the slaughter, and so regular the -manœuvring, that it all appeared more like a sham-fight on Wimbledon -Common than an action in a foreign country[411].’ The picturesque -side of the day’s work must have been small consolation to Wellesley, -who thus saw the first stroke of his campaign foiled by the chances -of a night march in a rugged country--a lesson which he took to -heart, for he rarely, if ever again, attempted a surprise at dawn in -an unexplored region. - - [411] Hawker, pp. 49-50. Tomkinson has words to much the same - effect, ‘it was more like a field-day than an affair with the - enemy: all the shots went over our heads, and no accident - appeared to happen to any one’ (p. 6). - -An equal disappointment had taken place on the flank near the -sea. Hill’s brigade had marched down to Aveiro, where the local -authorities had worked with excellent zeal and collected a -considerable number of boats, enough to carry 1,500 men at a trip. -During the night of the ninth-tenth the flotilla was engaged in -sailing up the long lagoon which leads to Ovar. It was quite early -in the morning when the brigade came to land, and if Franceschi had -been driven in at an early hour he would have found Hill in a most -threatening position on his flank. But the French cavalry was still -ten or twelve miles away, engaged in its bloodless demonstration -against Cotton’s brigade. Finding from the peasants that there were -French infantry encamped quite close to him, at Feira, and that the -English main column was still at a distance, Hill kept his men within -the walls of Ovar, instead of engaging in an attempt to intercept -Franceschi’s retreat. He was probably quite right, as it would have -been dangerous to thrust three battalions, without cavalry or guns, -between Mermet’s troops at Feira and the retiring columns of the -French horsemen. Hill therefore sent back his boats to bring up -Cameron’s brigade from Aveiro, and remained quiet all the morning. -At noon his pickets were driven in by French infantry: Mermet had at -last heard of his arrival, and had sent out the three battalions of -the 31st Léger from Feira to contain him and protect Franceschi’s -flank. The _voltigeur_ companies of this force pressed in upon Hill, -but would not adventure themselves too far. The afternoon was spent -in futile skirmishing, but at last the retreating French cavalry went -by at a great pace, and the English Light Dragoons, following them -in hot pursuit, came up with the 31st Léger. Hill, seeing himself -once more in touch with his friends, now pushed out of Ovar in force, -and pressed on the French _voltigeur_ companies, which hastily -retired, fell back on their regiment, and ultimately retired with -it and rejoined Mermet’s main body on the heights above Grijon. The -skirmishing had been almost bloodless--Hill lost not a single man, -and the French infantry only half-a-dozen wounded[412]. - - [412] The best account of this little skirmish is in the - _Journal_ of Fantin des Odoards of the 31st Léger (p. 230). - Napier does not mention that the reason why Hill did not move - in the afternoon was simply that he was already ‘contained,’ - and engaged with a force of French infantry of nearly his own - strength. - -On the morning of May 11, therefore, Hill’s troops on the left -and Cotton’s and Paget’s on the right lay opposite the position -which Mermet and Franceschi had taken up. Sherbrooke was still more -than ten miles to the rear, having barely crossed the Vouga, while -Cameron had not yet sailed up from Aveiro. Wellesley had therefore -some 1,500 cavalry and 7,000 infantry under his hand, with which to -assail the 1,200 horse and 4,200 foot of the two French divisions. -The enemy were strongly posted: Grijon lies in a valley, with woods -and orchards around it and a steep hillside at its back. The French -_tirailleurs_ held the village and the thickly-wooded slopes on each -side of it: behind them the fifteen battalions of Mermet were partly -visible among the trees on the sky-line of the heights. - -Wellesley was anxious to see whether the enemy intended to hold his -ground, or would retire before a demonstration: he therefore threw -the light companies of Richard Stewart’s brigade into the woods -on each side of Grijon. A furious fire at once broke out, and the -advancing line of skirmishers could make no headway. Realizing that -the French intended to fight a serious rearguard action, Wellesley -refused to indulge them with a frontal attack and determined to -turn both their flanks. While Cotton’s cavalry and the two English -battalions of Stewart’s brigade drew up opposite their centre, -Murray’s Germans marched off to the left, to get beyond Mermet’s -flank, while Colonel Doyle, with the battalion of the 16th Portuguese -which belonged to Stewart’s brigade, entered the woods on the extreme -right. Hill’s brigade, a mile or two to the left of Murray, pushed -forward on the Ovar-Oporto road, at a rate which would soon have -brought them far beyond the enemy’s rear. - -The meaning of these movements was not long hidden from the French: -the 1st and 2nd battalions of the King’s German Legion, led by -Brigadier Langwerth, were soon pressing upon their right flank, while -the Portuguese battalion plunged into the woods on the other wing -with great resolution. Wellesley himself was watching this part of -the advance with much interest: it was the first time that he had -sent his native allies into the firing line, and he was anxious to -see how they would behave. They surpassed his expectations: the 16th -was a good regiment, with a number of students of the University -of Coimbra in its ranks. They plunged into the thickets without a -moment’s hesitation, and in a few minutes the retiring sound of the -musketry showed that they were making headway in the most promising -style. This sight was an enormous relief to the Commander-in-chief: -if the Portuguese could be trusted in line of battle, his task became -immeasurably more easy. ‘You are in error in supposing that these -troops will not fight,’ he wrote to a down-hearted correspondent: -‘one battalion has behaved remarkably well under my own eyes[413].’ - - [413] Wellesley to Mackenzie [the latter had written that - he dared not trust his Portuguese battalions], _Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. p. 350. - -Mermet and Franceschi did not hesitate for long, when they saw their -flank guard beaten in upon either side, and heard that Hill was -marching upon their rear. They gave orders for their whole line to -retire without delay: the plateau behind them was so cut up with -stone walls enclosing fields, that the cavalry could be of no use in -covering the retreat, so Franceschi went to the rear first at a round -trot. Mermet followed, leaving the three battalions of the 31st Léger -to act as a rearguard[414]. - - [414] See Fantin des Odoards. Le Noble (incorrect as always) says - that the 47th brought up the rear. - -The whole British line now pressed in as fast as was possible in the -woods and lanes: the infantry could never overtake the enemy, but -two squadrons of the 16th and 20th Light Dragoons, galloping along -the high road, came up with Mermet’s rear a mile beyond the brow of -the hill. Charles Stewart, who was leading them on, was one of those -cavalry officers who thoroughly believe in their arm, and think that -it can go anywhere and do anything. He at once ordered Major Blake of -the 20th to charge the enemy, though the French were retiring along -a narrow _chaussée_ bordered with stone walls. Fortunately for the -dragoons their opponents were already shaken in _morale_: the three -battalions were not well together, isolated companies were still -coming in from the flanks, and the colonel of the 31st had completely -lost his head. On being charged, the rearguard fired a volley, which -brought down the front files of the pursuing cavalry, but then -wavered, broke, and began scrambling over the walls to escape out of -the high road into the fields. There followed a confused _mêlée_, for -the English dragoons also leaped the walls, and tried to follow the -broken enemy among thickets and ploughland. Of those of the French -who fled down the high road many were sabred, and a considerable -number captured: indeed the eagle of the regiment was in considerable -danger for some time. But the British had no supports at hand; they -scattered in reckless pursuit of the men who had taken to the fields, -and many were shot down when they had got entangled among trees and -walls. However, the charge, if somewhat reckless, was on the whole -successful: the dragoons lost no more than ten killed, one officer -and thirty troopers wounded, with eight or ten missing, while the -French regiment into which they had burst left behind it over 100 -prisoners and nearly as many killed and wounded[415]. - - [415] There are two excellent accounts of this charge in the - diaries of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons and Fantin des - Odoards of the 31st Léger. The former (pp. 9-11) holds that the - charge was indefensible, and blames Charles Stewart for ordering - it, and Major Blake for carrying it out. A different impression - is received from the French diarist, who speaks of it as a - complete rout of his regiment and very disastrous. ‘Assaillis - en détail nous avons été facilement mis en désordre, attendu - notre morcellement et la confusion que des charges audacieuses - de cavalerie mettaient dans nos rangs. Les trois bataillons ont - lâché pied et se sont enfuis à vau de route. Si le pays n’avait - pas offert des murs, des fossés et des haies, ils auraient été - entièrement sabrés.... Peu à peu les débris du régiment se sont - ralliés a la division, qui était en position à une lieue de - Porto. Notre perte a été considérable, mais notre aigle, qui a - couru de grands dangers dans cette bagarre, a fort heureusement - été sauvée.... Les dragons étaient acharnés a nous poursuivre, - et mal a pris ceux qui au lieu de gagner les collines out suivi - le vallon et la grande route’ (p. 231). It seems probable (a - thing extremely rare in military history) that Tomkinson and Des - Odoards, the two best narrators of the fight, actually met each - other. The former mentions that he chased an isolated French - infantry man, fired his pistol at his head, but missed, and that - he was at once shot in the shoulder by another Frenchman and - disabled. Then turning back, he was again fired at by several men - and brought down. Des Odoards says that he was chased by a single - English dragoon, who got up to him, fired at him point blank and - missed, whereupon a corporal of his company, who had turned back - to help him, shot the dragoon, who dropped his smoking pistol at - Des Odoards’ feet, and rolled off his horse. The narratives seem - to tally perfectly. - -For the rest of the day Mermet and Franceschi continued to fall back -before the advancing British, without making more than a momentary -stand. At dusk they reached Villa Nova, the transpontine suburb of -Oporto, which they evacuated during the night. The moment that they -had crossed the bridge of boats Soult caused it to be blown up, -and vainly believed himself secure, now that the broad and rapid -Douro was rolling between him and his enemy. The total loss of the -French in the day’s fighting had been about 250 men, of whom 100 -were prisoners. That of the British was two officers and nineteen -men killed, six officers and sixty-three men wounded, and sixteen -men missing. Nearly half the casualties were in the ranks of the -two squadrons of dragoons, the rest were divided between the light -companies of the 1st Battalion of Detachments, the 1st and 2nd -battalions of the German Legion, and the 16th Portuguese[416]. - - [416] The officers killed were Captain Detmering of the 1st K. - G. L., and a Portuguese ensign of the I/16th. Those wounded were - Captain Ovens and Lieutenant Woodgate of the 1st Battalion of - Detachments, Lieutenants Lodders and Lahngren of the K. G. L., - Cornet Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons, and a Portuguese - lieutenant of the 1/16th. It would seem that some of the fourteen - ‘missing’ were infantry killed in the woods, whose bodies were - never found, but several belonged to the maltreated dragoon - squadrons, and were taken from having pursued too fast and far. - -On the night of the eleventh-twelfth, when Mermet and Franceschi -had joined him, Soult had collected in Oporto the main body of his -army: he had in hand of cavalry Franceschi’s four regiments, and of -infantry fifteen battalions of Mermet’s division, seven battalions -of Merle’s (forming Reynaud’s brigade), and seven of Delaborde’s, a -force in all of about 10,000 bayonets and 1,200 sabres. Only a few -miles away, at Baltar, on the road to Amarante, were Caulaincourt’s -dragoons and the remaining regiment of Delaborde’s division, an -additional force of somewhat over 2,000 men. With 13,000 men at his -disposal and a splendid position behind the Douro, he imagined that -he might retreat at leisure, maintaining the line of the impassable -river for some days more. He intended to hold Oporto long enough to -enable Loison to clear the road to Villa Real, and to allow Lorges -and the belated troops from the north time to march in to Amarante. -He was somewhat vexed to have received no news from Loison for four -days, but, when last heard of [on May 7], that general was moving -forward into the Tras-os-Montes, with orders to push on and open -a way for the army as far as the Spanish border. Silveira having -retired to the south bank of the Douro, the Marshal had no doubt that -Loison would easily brush away the _Ordenanza_, and open for the -whole _corps d’armée_ the passage to Zamora and the plains of Leon. - -Meanwhile the only danger which the Marshal feared was that Wellesley -might send forward the fleet of fishing-boats which had carried -Hill to Ovar, bring them to the estuary of the Douro, and use them -to pass troops across its lowest reach, just within the bar at -its mouth. Accordingly he told Franceschi to patrol carefully the -five miles of the river that lie between Oporto and the sea. The -infantry was comfortably housed in the city, with pickets watching -the quays: every boat on the river, as it was supposed, had either -been destroyed or brought over to the north bank. Wellesley would, as -Soult calculated, be compelled to spend several days in making his -preparations for passing the Douro, since he had no means of pushing -his army across the broad stream, save the fishing-smacks which he -might bring round from the lagoon of Ovar. - -The Marshal therefore was quite at his ease, even though he knew that -Wellesley’s vanguard was at Villa Nova in force. He imagined that he -could count on ample time for the evacuation of Oporto, and began -to make arrangements for a leisurely retreat. His first care was to -send off eastward all his convalescents, his reserve ammunition, -and his wheeled vehicles, of which he had collected a fair supply -during his seven weeks’ halt at Oporto. These were to march, under -the convoy of Mermet’s division, during the course of the morning. -The other troops from Merle’s and Delaborde’s divisions, together -with Franceschi’s horse, were to watch the lower Douro and check any -attempt of the British to cross. The Marshal was himself lodged at a -villa on the high ground west of the city, from which he commanded -a fine view of the whole valley from Oporto to the sea: the view -up-stream was blocked by the hill crowned by the Serra Convent, where -the river makes a slight bend in order to get round the projecting -heights on the southern bank. So thoroughly were both Soult and his -staff impressed with the idea that Wellesley would endeavour to -operate below, and not above, the city, that while the lower reaches -of the Douro were watched with the greatest care, a very inefficient -look-out was kept on the banks above Oporto: there would seem to -have been but a single battalion placed in that direction, and this -small force was lying far back from the river, with no proper system -of pickets thrown forward to the water’s edge. Yet the opposite bank -was full of cover, of thickets, gardens and olive groves, screening -several lanes and by-paths that had led down to ferries. Such of the -boats as had not been scuttled had been brought over to the north -bank, but they were not all protected by proper guards. All this was -inexcusably careless--the main blame must fall on the Marshal for his -_parti pris_ in refusing to look up-stream: though some must also -be reserved for General Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, and for -Foy, the brigadier whose battalions were in charge of the eastern -suburb of the city. But the fact was that none of the French officers -dreamed of the possibility that Wellesley might make an attempt, on -the very morning of his arrival, to cross the tremendous obstacle -interposed in his way by the rolling stream of the Douro. That he -would deliver a frontal attack on them in full daylight was beyond -the limits of the probable. They had no conception of the enterprise -of the man with whom they had to deal. - -There was this amount of truth in their view, that the British -General would not have made his daring stroke at Oporto, unless -he had ascertained that the carelessness of his adversaries had -placed an unexpected chance in his hands. By ten o’clock in the -morning Wellesley had concentrated behind Villa Nova the whole of -his force--the three columns of Paget, Hill, and Sherbrooke were now -up in line. They were kept out of sight of the enemy, some in the -lateral lanes of the suburb, but the majority hidden behind the back -slope of the hills, where orchards and vineyards gave them complete -cover from observers on the northern bank. - -While the troops were coming up, Sir Arthur mounted the Serra -height, and reconnoitred the whole country-side from the garden -of the convent. He had with him Portuguese notables who were well -acquainted with Oporto and its suburbs, including several persons -who had come over the river on the preceding day, and could give him -some notion of the general disposition and emplacement of the French -army. Sweeping the valley with his glasses he could see Franceschi’s -vedettes moving about on the heights down-stream, and heavy columns -of infantry forming up outside the north-eastern gates of the city. -At eleven o’clock this body moved off, escorting a long train of -wagons--it was Mermet’s division starting for Amarante in charge of -Soult’s convoy of sick and reserve artillery. On the quays, below the -broken bridge, many French pickets were visible, ensconced at the -openings of the streets which lead down to the water. But turning -his glass to the right, Wellesley could note that up-stream matters -looked very quiet, the rocky banks above the deep-sunk river were -deserted, and nothing was visible among the gardens and scattered -houses of the south-eastern suburb. It was possible that French -troops might be ensconced there, but no sign of them was to be seen. - -Many intelligence-officers had already been sent off, to scour the -southern bank of the river, and to ascertain whether by any chance -the enemy had overlooked some of the boats belonging to the riverside -villages. In a short time two valuable pieces of news were brought up -to the Commander-in-chief. The large ferry-boat at Barca d’Avintas, -four miles above the city, had been scuttled, but not injured beyond -the possibility of hasty repairs. It was already being baled out -and mended by the villagers. Nearer at hand a still more important -discovery was made. Colonel Waters, one of the best scouts in the -army, had met, not far south of the suburban village of Cobranloes, -an Oporto refugee, a barber by trade, who had crossed over from the -north bank in a small skiff, which he had hidden in a thicket. The -man reported that the opposite bank was for the moment unguarded by -the French, and pointed to four large wine-barges lying stranded -below the brink of the northern shore, with no signs of an enemy -in charge. Yet the position was one which should have been well -watched: here a massive building, the bishop’s Seminary, surrounded -by a high garden wall, lies with its back to the water. It was an -isolated structure, standing well outside the eastern suburb, in -fairly open ground, which could be easily swept by artillery fire -from the dominating position of the Serra heights. Waters had with -him as guide the prior of Amarante, and by his aid collected three or -four peasants from the neighbouring cottages. After some persuasion -from the ecclesiastic, these men and the barber consented to join the -British officer in a raid on the stranded barges on the further bank. -It was a hazardous undertaking, for one French picket had lately been -seen to pass by, and another might appear at any moment. But the -necessary half-hour was obtained; Waters and his fellows entered the -barber’s skiff, crossed the river unseen, got the four barges afloat, -and returned with them to the southern bank. They turned out to be -big clumsy vessels, capable of holding some thirty men apiece. The -explorer had noted that the Seminary buildings above were perfectly -empty. - -On receiving this intelligence, Wellesley resolved to take the chance -which the fates offered him. If the French had shown themselves -alert and vigilant, he could not have dared to throw troops across -the river into their midst. But they seemed asleep at high noon, and -their manifest negligence encouraged him. His mind was soon made up: -he ordered Murray with two battalions of his brigade[417], two guns, -and two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, to march hard for Barca -d’Avintas, cross on the ferry, and seize a position on the opposite -bank capable of being defended against superior numbers. But this -(as the small force employed sufficiently demonstrates) was only -intended as a diversion. The main blow was to be delivered nearer -at hand. Wellesley had resolved to endeavour to seize the abandoned -Seminary, and to throw his main body across the river at this point -if possible. The local conditions made the scheme less rash in fact -than it appears on the map. The east end of the Serra hill completely -commands all the ground about the Seminary: three batteries[418] -were quietly pushed into the convent garden and trained upon the -roads leading to that isolated building--one along the shore, the -other further inland. If the place could once be seized, it would -be possible to protect its garrison by fire across the water. There -were only two artillery positions on the French bank, from which -the Seminary could be battered: one, close to the water’s edge, was -completely under the guns of the Serra convent. The other, on the -heights by the chapel of Bom Fin, was rather distant, and could not -be used against boats crossing the river, as they would be invisible -to gunners working on this emplacement. Cannon placed there might -do some damage to the Seminary buildings, but could not prevent the -garrison from being reinforced. Realizing all this at a glance, -Wellesley hurried down Hill’s brigade to the water’s edge, and the -moment that the leading company of the Buffs had got on board the -barges, bade them push off. In a quarter of an hour the first vessel -was over, and a subaltern and twenty-five men rushed up into the -empty enclosure of the Seminary, and closed the big iron gate opening -into the Vallongo road, which formed its only land-exit. The men from -the other barges were just behind: they set themselves to lining the -garden wall and to piling up wood and earth against it, in order to -give themselves a standing-place from which they could fire over the -coping. The barges went back with all speed, and were again loaded -and sent off. Meanwhile Wellesley and his staff were looking down in -breathless anxiety on the quiet bend of the river, the silent suburb, -and the toiling vessels. At any moment the alarm might be given, and -masses of the enemy might debouch from the city and dash in upon the -Seminary before enough men were across to hold it. For the best part -of an hour the Commander-in-chief must have been fully aware that -his daring move might end only in the annihilation of two or three -companies of a good old regiment, and a check that would appear as -the righteous retribution for recklessness. - - [417] 1st and 2nd Line battalions of the K.G.L., also a - detached company of rifles of the K.G.L. - - [418] Lane’s and Lawson’s British guns, and one K.G.L., battery. - -But no stir was seen in Oporto: the barges crossed for a second time -unmolested: on their third trip they carried over General Edward -Paget, whom Wellesley had placed in command of the whole movement. -More than half the Buffs had passed, and the Seminary was beginning -to be adequately manned, when at last some shots were heard outside -the gates, and a few minutes later a line of French _tirailleurs_, -supported by three battalions in column, came rushing down upon the -enclosures. A full hour had passed between the moment when the first -boatload of British soldiers had been thrown across the river, and -the time when the French discovered them! - -[Illustration: WELLESLEY’S PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. - -N.B. The trees on the cliff to the right are close outside the -enclosure of the Serra Convent: the roof of the Seminary is just -visible over the crest of the hill on the other bank. In the -background are the low slopes above Avintas.] - -The fact was that the enemy’s commander was in bed, and his staff -breakfasting! The Duke of Dalmatia had sat up all night dictating -dispatches, and making his arrangements for a leisurely flitting, -for he intended to stay two days longer in Oporto, so as to cover -the march of his other divisions towards Amarante and Villa Real. -His desk-work finished, he went to bed at about nine o’clock[419], -in full confidence that he was well protected by the river, and that -Wellesley was probably engaged in the laborious task of bringing up -boats to the mouth of the Douro, which would occupy him for at least -twenty-four hours. The staff were taking their coffee, after a late -_déjeuner_, when the hoof-beats of a furious rider startled them, -and a moment later Brossard, the aide-de-camp of General Foy, burst -into the Villa shouting that the English had got into the town. Led -to the Marshal’s bedside, he hurriedly explained that Foy had just -discovered the enemy passing by boats into the Seminary, and was -massing his brigade for an attack upon them. The Marshal started -up, sent his staff flying in all directions to warn the outlying -troops, ordered all the remaining _impedimenta_ to be sent off on -the Vallongo road, and dispatched Brossard back to Foy to tell him -to ‘push the English into the river.’ He was hardly dressed and on -horseback, when the noise of a distant fusillade, followed by heavy -artillery fire, gave the news that the attack on the Seminary had -already begun. - - [419] Soult’s doings on this day are best told by his - aide-de-camp St. Chamans, who was with him all the morning. No - attention need be paid to the narrative of his panegyrist Le - Noble, who tells a foolish story to the effect that a commandant - Salel came at six o’clock (more than four hours before the Buffs - began to pass), and assured some of Soult’s staff that the - English were already crossing the river. ‘On hearing this,’ says - Le Noble, ‘the Marshal sent for Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, - and asked if there was any truth in the rumour. The latter denied - it and Soult was reassured. If only Salel had been believed, - all the English who had then passed might have been killed or - captured,’ and a disaster avoided. As a matter of fact Quesnel - was right, and not a British soldier had yet crossed [_Campagne - de Galice_, p. 247]. - -It had been only at half-past ten that Foy, riding along the heights -by the Chapel of Bom Fin, had been informed that there were boats -on the river, filled with red-coated soldiery. It took him wellnigh -three-quarters of an hour to bring up his nearest regiment, the -17th Léger, and only at 11.30 did the attack on the Seminary begin. -The three battalions beset the northern and western sides of the -Seminary, and made a vigorous attempt to break in, while some guns -were hurried down to the river bank, just below the building, to fire -upon the barges that were bringing up reinforcements. - -Wellesley, from his eyrie on the Serra heights, had been watching -for the long-expected outburst of the French. The moment that they -came pressing forward, he gave orders for the eighteen guns in the -convent garden to open upon them. The first shot fired, a round of -shrapnel from the 5½-inch howitzer of Lane’s battery, burst just -over the leading French gun on the further bank, as it was in the -act of unlimbering, dismounted the piece, and by an extraordinary -chance, killed or wounded every man and horse attached to it[420]. -A moment later came the blast of the other seventeen guns, which -swept the level ground to the west of the Seminary with awful effect. -The French attack reeled back, and the survivors fled from the open -ground into the houses of the suburb, leaving the disabled cannon -behind them. Again and again they tried to creep forward, to flank -the English stronghold, and to fire at the barges as they went and -came, but on every occasion they were swept away by the hail of -shrapnel. They could, therefore, only attack the Seminary on its -northern front, where the buildings lay between them and the Serra -height, and so screened them from the artillery. But in half an -hour the 17th Léger was beaten off and terribly mauled; they had to -cross an open space, the Prado do Bispo, in order to get near their -adversaries, and the fire from the garden wall, the windows, and the -flat roof of the edifice, swept them away before they could close. - - [420] This interesting fact I owe to the diary of Captain Lane, - still in manuscript, of which a copy has been sent me by Col. - Whinyates, R. A., a specialist on the history of the British - artillery in the Peninsula. - -Meanwhile the English suffered little: the only serious loss -sustained was that of General Edward Paget, whose arm was shattered -by a bullet. He was replaced in command by Hill, who (like him) had -crossed in one of the earlier barges. The number of troops in the -building was always growing larger, the Buffs were all across, and -the 66th and 48th were beginning to follow. - -After a short slackening in the engagement, General Delaborde came -up, with the three battalions of the 70th of the line, to support -his brigadier. This new force executed a far more sustained and -desperate attack on the Seminary than had their predecessors. -Hill in his letters home called it ‘the _serious_ attack.’ But it -had no better fortune than the last: a thousand English infantry, -comfortably ensconced behind stone walls, and protected on their -flanks by the storm of shot and shell from the opposite bank of the -river, could not easily be moved. So well, indeed, were they covered, -that in three hours’ fighting they only lost seventy-seven men[421], -while the open ground outside was thickly strewn with the dead and -wounded Frenchmen. - - [421] Viz. 1/3rd, fifty men, 2/48th, seventeen men, 2/66th, ten - men, killed and wounded. The French 17th alone lost 177 [Foy’s - Dispatch]. - -Soult was now growing desperate: he ordered up from the city -Reynaud’s brigade, which had hitherto guarded the quays in the -neighbourhood of the broken bridge. His intention was to make one -more attack on the Seminary, and if that failed to draw off in the -direction of Vallongo and Amarante. This move made an end of his -chances; he had forgotten to reckon with the Portuguese. The moment -that the quays were left unguarded, hundreds of citizens poured out -of their houses and ran down to the water’s edge, where they launched -all the boats that had been drawn ashore, and took them over to the -English bank. Richard Stewart’s brigade and the Guards who had been -waiting under cover of the houses of Villa Nova, immediately began -to embark, and in a few moments the passage had begun. The 29th was -first formed up on the northern bank, and dashed up the main street -into the city, meeting little or no opposition; the 1st Battalion of -Detachments and the Guards’ brigade soon followed. In half an hour -they had come upon the flank of the French force which was attacking -the Seminary, and had taken in the rear and captured one of Soult’s -reserve batteries, whose horses were shot down before they could -escape along a narrow lane. As the British went pouring through -Oporto the whole population, half mad with joy, stood cheering at the -windows and on the roofs, waving their handkerchiefs and shouting -_Viva_. The rabble poured down into the streets, and began to attack -the French wounded, so that Sherbrooke had to detach a company to -protect them from assassination[422]. - - [422] All this is well described by Leslie of the 29th (p. 113), - Stothert of the Scots Fusilier Guards (p. 41), and Cooper of the - 2/7th, who crossed later. - -When Soult found himself thus attacked in the flank, he saw that -there was no more to be done, and bade the whole army retreat at -full speed along the road to Vallongo and Baltar. They went off in a -confused mass, the regiments all mingled together, and the artillery -jammed in the midst of the column. Hill came out of the Seminary and -joined in the pursuit, which was urged for three miles. ‘They made -no fight,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘every man seemed running for his -life, throwing away their knapsacks and arms, so that we had only -the trouble of making many prisoners every instant, all begging for -quarter and surrendering with great good humour[423].’ - - [423] Leslie, ibid. - -The French army might have been still further mauled, and indeed -almost destroyed, if Wellesley’s detached force under Murray had -been well handled by its commander. The two battalions of the German -Legion, with their attendant squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, -had crossed the Douro at the ferry of Barca d’ Avintas wholly -unopposed. It was a slow business, but the detachment was over -long ere Soult had abandoned his attack on the Seminary. Advancing -cautiously along the river bank, Murray suddenly saw the whole French -army come pouring past him in total disorder on the line of the -Vallongo road. He might have made an attempt to throw himself across -their path, or at least have fallen upon their flank and endeavoured -to cut the column in two; but thinking them far too strong for his -small force, and forgetting their demoralization, he halted and -allowed them to go by. When all had passed, General Charles Stewart, -who had been sent in search of Murray by the Commander-in-chief, -came galloping up to the force, and took from it a squadron of the -14th[424], with which he made a dash at the enemy’s last troops. The -French had now formed a sort of rearguard, but the dragoons rode -into it without hesitation. The French generals were bringing up the -rear, and trying to keep their men steady. Delaborde was unhorsed -and for a moment was a prisoner, but escaped owing to his captor -being killed. Foy received a sabre cut on the shoulder. The infantry -broke, and nearly 300 of them were cut off and captured. But the -dragoons also suffered heavily; of about 110 men who took part in the -charge no less than thirty-five men were killed and wounded. Murray, -who watched the whole skirmish from his position on a neighbouring -hillside, gave no assistance to his cavalry, though the intervention -of his two battalions would have led to the capture of the whole of -Soult’s rearguard. It was to infantry of Sherbrooke’s division that -the dragoons turned over their prisoners before rejoining their other -squadron[425]. - - [424] So Hawker of that regiment, who took part in the charge, - and describes it well. In Wellesley’s dispatch, _two_ squadrons - are wrongly named. - - [425] The best account of this charge is the diary of Hawker; - it runs as follows: ‘After going at full speed, enveloped in a - cloud of dust for nearly two miles, we cleared our infantry, and - that of the French appeared. A strong body was drawn up in close - column, with bayonets ready to receive us on their front. On each - side of the road was a stone wall, bordered outwardly with trees. - On our left, in particular, numbers of the French were posted - with their pieces resting on the wall, which flanked the road, - ready to give us a running fire as we passed. This could not but - be effectual, as our men (in threes) were close to the muzzles of - their muskets, and barely out of the reach of a _coup de sabre_. - In a few seconds the ground was covered with our men and horses. - Notwithstanding this we penetrated the battalion in the road, the - men of which, relying on their bayonets, did not give way till - we were close upon them, when they fled in confusion. For some - time the contest was kept up hand to hand. After many efforts - we succeeded in cutting off 300, of whom most were secured as - prisoners. But our loss was very considerable. Of fifty-two - men in the leading troop ten were killed, and eleven severely - wounded (besides others slightly), and six taken prisoners.’ (Of - the last all save one succeeded in slipping off and got back.) - Out of four officers engaged three were wounded: Hervey, the - major in command, lost an arm. Foy called the attack ‘une charge - incroyable.’ - -So ended the battle of Oporto, daring in its conception, splendidly -successful in its execution, yet not so decisive as it might have -been, had Murray but done his duty during the pursuit. The British -loss was astoundingly small--only twenty-three killed, ninety-eight -wounded, and two missing: among the dead there was not a single -officer: the wounded included a general (Paget) and three majors. -The casualties of the French were, as was natural, much greater: -the attacks on the Seminary had cost them dear. They lost about 300 -killed and wounded and nearly as many prisoners in the field, while -more than 1,500 sick and wounded were captured in the hospitals of -Oporto[426]. The trophies consisted of the six field-pieces taken -during the fighting, a great number of baggage wagons, and fifty-two -Portuguese guns, dismounted but fit for further service, which were -found in the arsenal. Soult had destroyed, before retreating, the -rest of the cannon which he had captured in the Portuguese lines on -March 29. - - [426] Fantin des Odoards (p. 233) says that the French left - 1,800 men in the hospitals. This is probably a little too high - an estimate: there were only 2,150 French sick in Braga, Viana, - and Oporto on May 10--five-sixths of them at Oporto. But many - convalescents had marched with Mermet early on the eleventh. - Wellington in his first dispatch merely says that he had taken - 700 sick in the hospitals. But three days later, in a letter - to Admiral Berkeley, he writes that he has 2,000 sick, wounded - and captured French in his hands, and must send them to England - at once (_Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 337). He therefore asks - for shipping for them at the rate of two tons per man. Allowing - for 300 unwounded prisoners at Oporto, and 100 at Grijon, there - remain 1,500, or somewhat more, for the men in hospital. - - - - -SECTION XIV: CHAPTER III - -SOULT’S RETREAT FROM OPORTO - - -The headlong charge of Hervey’s squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons -was the last molestation which fell to the lot of Soult’s retreating -column on the afternoon of May 12. Marching till dark, the disordered -infantry encamped at Baltar, ten miles from Oporto, where they -fell in with the detached regiment of Delaborde’s division and -with Caulaincourt’s dragoons, who had been guarding this half-way -stage between Amarante and Oporto, ever since Loison had marched on -into the Tras-os-Montes ten days before. Of the rest of the French -army, Franceschi (always in the post of danger) covered the rear at -Vallongo, just west of Baltar. Mermet, with the division that had -marched from Oporto before Wellesley’s attack was developed, had -encamped on the Souza river, four miles ahead of the main column. -The Marshal had thus nearly 13,000 men concentrated, and proposed -next day to push on for Amarante, in the wake of Loison, who (as he -supposed) must now be well ahead in the Tras-os-Montes, clearing -for him the way into Spain. It was disquieting, however, to find -that no news from that general had yet come to hand--indeed he had -not been heard of since May 7, when he was just starting out on his -expedition. Wherever Loison might be, the Marshal was bound to follow -him in haste, since it was certain that Wellesley would be close at -his heels, and that no time was to be lost in lingering. - -At half-past one in the morning Soult was roused from sleep, and -informed that the long-expected messenger from Loison had at last -arrived[427]. The news which he brought was nothing less than -appalling: the French detached corps had been not only checked but -beaten, the bridge of Amarante had been lost, and Loison was hastily -retreating to the north-west at the moment that his chief was moving -eastward to join him. - - [427] See Le Noble, _Campagne de Galice_, pp. 250-2. - -Beresford’s turning movement, in fact, had been completely -successful--far more so than Wellesley had thought likely; he had not -only succeeded in placing himself across the French line of retreat -into Spain, but had beaten Loison and thrown him back into Soult’s -arms. - -What had happened was shortly this. On May 8 Beresford had picked -up Wilson’s detachment at Vizeu: on the tenth he had met Silveira -at Lamego. He had thus concentrated some 10,500 or 11,000 men, all -Portuguese save Tilson’s brigade and the single squadron of the -14th Light Dragoons. Learning at Lamego that, as late as the ninth, -Loison was still in the neighbourhood of Amarante, and had not yet -penetrated far into the Tras-os-Montes, Beresford resolved to take -the risk of passing the Douro and to throw his army directly across -the path of the advancing French. On the tenth, the same day on -which the force from Coimbra reached Lamego, he sent Silveira over -the river by the bridge of Peso da Regoa, which had never passed out -of the hands of the Portuguese and had a strong _tête-de-pont_ on -its northern side. Silveira had barely crossed when Loison, who had -spent the previous day at Mezamfrio, ten miles away on the Amarante -road, came up against him with Heudelet’s and Sarrut’s infantry and -Marisy’s dragoons--about 6,500 sabres and bayonets. Emboldened by -having entrenchments to help him, and by knowing that Beresford was -close behind, Silveira stood firm at the _tête-de-pont_ and accepted -battle. - -Loison was somewhat discouraged by his adversary’s confidence, and -did not fail to note the masses of troops on the southern bank of -the Douro, which were moving up to the bridge to support Silveira. -However, late in the afternoon he attacked the Portuguese, but was -steadily met and beaten off with some loss[428]. Thereupon he drew -back and retired to Mezamfrio. On the following day (May 11) he -continued his retreat to Amarante, closely pursued by Silveira, who -kept driving in his rearguard wherever it attempted to make a stand. - - [428] Loison reported to Soult that he lost only a _chef de - bataillon_ and eighty men, but that the horses of himself and - Generals Heudelet and Maransin were killed under them. The - figures given are probably an understatement. - -Beresford meanwhile brought his own troops across the Douro on May -11, in the wake of Silveira’s division. On the twelfth he pushed -forward to Amarante, intending to fight Loison if the latter should -try to hold his ground beyond the bridge. But on his approach he -found that the French rearguard (Sarrut’s brigade) had already been -driven across the water by the Portuguese[429]. The bridge, however, -still remained in Loison’s hands, and as it was no less defensible -from the eastern than from the western bank, the army could get no -further forward. - - [429] The British brigade of Tilson was to have led the attack. - They were burning for a fight. ‘I never witnessed so much - enthusiasm,’ writes an eye-witness, ‘as was shown by the men. - The advance was a perfect trot, but on our arrival we found the - enemy had fled.’ (From an unpublished letter of Lord Gough, - then colonel of the 87th regiment, which has been placed at my - disposal by the kindness of Mr. R. Rait of New College, who is - preparing a life of that officer.) - -Matters were now at a deadlock, for if Beresford could not cross -the Tamega, it was clear that Loison, even if heavily reinforced -from Oporto, would not be able to force the imposing position on -the heights commanding the bridge, which was now held by 11,000 -men, including a British brigade. But he might, and should, have -continued to hold the town and the bridge-head, till further orders -reached him from Soult. Instead of doing so, he made up his mind -to retreat at once, and marched off early on the evening of May 12 -along the road to Guimaraens and Braga. Thus at the moment when -Soult was retiring on Amarante, Loison abandoned the position which -covered his chief’s chosen line of retreat. Moreover, he was so -tardy in sending news of his intentions to head quarters, that the -aide-de-camp who bore his dispatch only reached Baltar after midnight -on the twelfth-thirteenth: this was the first report that Soult had -received from him since May 8. It was a military crime of the highest -magnitude that he had neither informed his chief of the check at -Peso da Regoa on the tenth, nor of his retreat to Amarante on the -eleventh. Knowledge of these facts would have been invaluable to -the Marshal, since it would have shown him that the route through -the Tras-os-Montes was blocked, and that he must not count upon an -undisturbed retreat into Spain. If he had known of this, he would not -have evacuated Oporto by the Baltar road, but would have been forced -to march northward on Braga or Guimaraens, instead of due east. So -strange, in fact, was Loison’s slackness, that Soult’s advocates -have not hesitated to accuse him of deliberate treachery, and have -hinted that he was engaged in Argenton’s plot--a hypothesis which -would have explained his conduct clearly enough. But, as a matter -of fact, Argenton’s revelations to Wellesley show that this was not -the case, and that the conspirators looked upon Loison and Delaborde -as the two officers who were most likely to give them trouble. It -must therefore have been sheer military incapacity, and disgust at -the whole Portuguese expedition, which lay at the bottom of Loison’s -misbehaviour. Disbelieving in Soult’s plan of campaign, he was -probably bent on compelling his chief to retire to Braga, and was (of -course) quite ignorant of the fact that Wellesley’s capture of Oporto -had changed the whole face of affairs, and that the retreat in that -direction was no longer open. - -Despondent, tired out by the work of the preceding day, and suffering -physically from a heavy fall from his horse during the retreat, Soult -was roused from his slumbers to read Loison’s disastrous dispatch. -When he had made out its full meaning he was appalled. All his plans -were shattered, and he was clearly in imminent danger, for Wellesley -from Oporto and Beresford from Amarante might converge upon him in -the morning, with nearly 30,000 men, if it should chance that they -had made out his position. No help could come from Loison, who, -having now reached Guimaraens, was separated from the main body by -the roadless expanse of the rugged Serra de Santa Catalina. Eastward -lay one hostile force, westward another, to the south was the -impassable Douro, to the north the inhospitable mountains. It was -useless to think of making a desperate dash at Beresford’s army: in -open ground an attack on the Portuguese might have been practicable, -but the bridge of Amarante was a post impossible to force in a hurry, -and while the attack on it was in progress, it was certain that -Wellesley would come up from the rear. The situation and the results -of Baylen would inevitably be reproduced. - -Realizing this, the Duke of Dalmatia came to the conclusion that -the only course open to him was to abandon everything that could -not be carried on his men’s backs, and to make a desperate attempt -to cross the Serra de Santa Catalina before the news of his straits -had reached the enemy. He imagined that there must be some sort -of a footpath from Baltar or Penafiel to Guimaraens: in a thickly -peopled country like Northern Portugal, the hill-folk have short cuts -of their own--the only difficulty for the stranger is to discover -them. Hasty inquiries in the bivouac of the army produced a Navarese -camp-follower, who said that he knew the localities and could point -out a bad mule-track, which climbed the hillside above the Souza -torrent, and came down into the valley of the Avé, not far south of -Guimaraens[430]. It was the kind of path in which the army would meet -every sort of difficulty, and where the head of the column might be -stopped by a couple of hundred _Ordenanza_, if it should chance that -the Portuguese peasantry were on the alert. But it seemed the only -practicable way out of the situation, and the Marshal resolved to try -it. - - [430] ‘Un de ces Navarrins, qui vont tous les ans en Portugal - parcourir les villages pour y couper les cochons qu’on veut - engraisser,’ says Le Noble [p. 254]. ‘Une espèce de contrebandier - que le général Dulauloi avait trouvé,’ says St. Chamans, Soult’s - aide-de-camp (p. 147). - -At daybreak the army was warned of its danger; and wasting no time -on councils of war or elaborate orders, Soult sent round word that -the troops were to abandon everything that could not be carried on -the backs of men or horses, and to take to the hills. An immense mass -of baggage and plunder had to be left on the banks of the Souza, -including the whole of the heavy convoy which Mermet had escorted -out of Oporto on the previous day. The Marshal even decided that the -infantry should turn out of their knapsacks everything except food -and cartridges, an order which those who had in their possession -gold plate and other valuable plunder of small bulk took care to -disobey. The cannon were destroyed by being placed mouth to mouth -and discharged simultaneously in pairs. As much of the reserve -ammunition for infantry as could be packed in convenient bundles -was laden on the backs of the artillery horses. The rest, with all -the powder wagons, was collected in a mass, ready to be fired when -the army should have absconded. One curious circumstance, which -displays better than anything else the hurry of the retreat, is worth -mentioning. The military chest of the 2nd Corps was well filled--it -is said to have contained nearly £50,000 in Portuguese silver. The -Marshal ordered the paymaster-in-chief to serve out all that he could -to the regimental paymasters. Only two of these officials could be -found, and they were unable to carry off more than a fraction of the -money. Soult then ordered the treasure-chests to be broken open, and -sent word that the men, as they passed, might help themselves. But -hardly a soldier took advantage of the offer: they looked at the -bulky bags of _cruzados novos_, shook their heads, and hurried on. -Those who were tempted at first were seen, later in the day, tossing -the weighty pieces into the ravine of the Souza. Perceiving that -there was no way of getting rid of the mass of silver, Soult at last -ordered the _fourgons_ containing it to be dragged alongside of the -powder wagons. When the train was exploded, after the rearguard had -passed, the money was scattered to the winds. For years after the -peasants of Penafiel were picking up stray coins on the hillside[431]. - - [431] Several of the French diarists relate this curious - incident. ‘L’argent blanc ne tentait personne,’ says Fantin des - Odoards, p. 234, ‘à cause de sa pesanteur et de son inutilité - momentaire. On permit le pillage des fourgons du payeur, et chose - inouïe, il n’y fut presque pas touché. Les soldats regardaient - en passant les sacs, secouaient la tête et s’éloignaient sans y - mettre la main. Pour moi, je m’emparai d’un sac de 2,400 francs; - cette lourde somme m’embarassait: elle aurait blessé mon cheval, - et après l’avoir portée pendant une lieue je l’abandonnai’ [p. - 234]. ‘Les grenadiers du 70e servaient d’escorte au trésor,’ says - Le Noble, ‘l’intendant-général les invita de prendre des fonds. - Ayant rencontré leur officier, le lieutenant Langlois, à Toro, - il lui demanda ce qu’avaient pu emporter ses soldats. “_Rien_,” - répliqua-t-il, “ils portaient la caisse à tour de rôle pour - quelque distance, et la jetèrent ensuite.”’ Naylies also mentions - the dispersion of the treasure. The reader will compare this - incident with the rolling of Moore’s treasure down the cliffs of - Herrerias during the Corunna retreat. Soult certainly scattered - his cash more widely. - -As the French army was beginning its weary climb over the Serra de -Santa Catalina a heavy drenching rain commenced to fall. It lasted -for three days, and added much to the miseries of the retreat; but -it was not without its advantages to the fugitive host, for it kept -the Portuguese peasantry indoors, and it would seem that no one in -the mountain villages got wind of the movement for many hours. It -was not till the French had crossed the ridge and descended, late -in the dusk, on to the village of Pombeiro in the valley of the Avé -that they began to be molested by the _Ordenanza_. After a few shots -had been fired the peasants were driven off. Next morning [May 14] -Soult got into communication with Loison, who was still lying at -Guimaraens with all his troops. On the same day Lorges’ dragoons and -the garrison of Viana came in from the north, and the whole army, -still over 20,000 strong, was reconcentrated. The first danger, that -of destruction piecemeal, had been avoided. But Soult’s desperate -move had only warded off the peril for the moment: he had still to -fear that Wellesley and Beresford might close in upon him before he -could get clear of the mountains. - -It remains to be seen how the two British generals had employed the -day during which the French were scaling the heights of the Serra -de Santa Catalina. Wellesley had crossed in person to Oporto long -ere the fighting was over, and had established his head quarters -in Soult’s villa on the heights, where he and his staff thought -themselves fortunate in finding ready for their consumption the -excellent dinner which had been prepared for the Marshal. As long -as daylight lasted the British infantry continued to be ferried -over to the city, but they were not all across when night fell. The -artillery, the train, and all the regimental baggage were still on -the wrong side of the river, and as the great bridge was destroyed -beyond hope of repair, all the _impedimenta_ had to be brought over -in boats and barges. It was mainly this fact that delayed Wellesley -from making an early move on the thirteenth. He could not advance -without his guns and his reserve ammunition, and did not receive them -till the day was far spent and the natural hour for marching was -past. There were other circumstances which hindered him from pressing -on as he would have liked to do. The infantry were tired out: they -had marched more than eighty miles during the last four days, and -had fought hard at Grijon and Oporto. Human nature could do no more -without a halt, and Wellesley was forced to grant it. Moreover, -there was the question of food to be taken into consideration. The -troops had outrun their supplies, and the provision wagons were still -trailing up from Coimbra. In Oporto no stores of any importance were -discovered, for Soult had stopped collecting more than he could -carry, the moment that he made up his mind to retreat, and had been -living from hand to mouth during the last few days of his sojourn in -the city. The only thing that abounded was port wine, and from that -the soldiers had to be kept away, or results disastrous to discipline -would have followed[432]. - - [432] When the troops got at the wine they drank only too well: - Hartmann in his _Journal_ records that twenty of his German - Legion gunners drank forty-one bottles of port at a sitting (p. - 71). - -With great reluctance, therefore, Wellesley resolved to halt for -a day, only sending forward Murray and the German Legion, with a -couple of squadrons, along the Baltar road. This brigade did not come -up with Soult’s rearguard, though they found ample traces of his -passage in the shape of murdered stragglers and abandoned plunder. -No doubt the Commander-in-chief would have directed them to push on -further, and have supported them with every battalion that could -still march ten miles, if only he had been aware of the fact that -Beresford had got possession of the bridge of Amarante, and that the -enemy was therefore in a trap. But he was only in communication with -his lieutenant by the circuitous route of Lamego and Mezamfrio, and -the last news that he had received of the turning column led him to -believe that it was still in the neighbourhood of Villa Real, and -that Loison continued to hold the passage of the Tamega. Writing to -Beresford on the night of the capture of Oporto, he desired him to -make every effort to hold on to Villa Real, and to keep Soult in -check till he himself could overtake him[433]. - - [433] _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 327. To Marshal Beresford, - from Oporto, night of the twelfth. - -It was not till the afternoon of the thirteenth that Wellesley -obtained information that put him on the right track. The -intelligence officer with Murray’s column[434] sent him back word -that heavy explosions had been heard at Penafiel, and that the smoke -of large fires was visible along the hillside above it. This gave -a strong hint of what was probably taking place in that direction, -but it was not till five in the afternoon that full information came -to hand. This was brought by the Portuguese secretary of General -Quesnel, who had deserted his employer and ridden back to Oporto, -to give the valuable news which would save him from being tried for -treason for serving the enemy. He gave an accurate and detailed -account of all that had happened to Soult’s column, and had seen it -start off on the break-neck path to Guimaraens. Only about Loison was -he uncertain--that officer, he said, was probably still at Amarante, -holding back Silveira and Beresford[435]. - - [434] A Captain Mellish, _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 330 [to - Murray] and 332 [to Beresford]. - - [435] Deposition of the Secretary to the late Governor of - Oporto. _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, vi. 262 [May 13, - afternoon]. - -On receipt of this important intelligence Wellesley sent orders to -Murray to press on his small force of cavalry, and some mounted -rifles (if he could secure horses or mules) as far as Penafiel, to -verify the secretary’s information[436]. A later dispatch bade him -press on to Amarante, if Loison was still there, in order to take -that officer in the rear; but if he were gone, the Legionary brigade -was to follow Soult over the hills towards Guimaraens and Braga, and -endeavour to catch up his rearguard[437]. The orders arrived too -late: Murray, on the morning of the fourteenth, learnt that Loison -had long ago departed, and that Soult was far on his way. He followed -the Marshal across the Serra de Santa Catalina, but never got near -him, though he picked up many French stragglers, and saw the bodies -of many more, who had been assassinated by the peasantry[438]. - - [436] _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 330, afternoon of May 13. - - [437] Ibid. iv. 332, morning of May 14. - - [438] It is astonishing to find that Murray succeeded in taking - two light three-pounder guns over this difficult path. The fact - reflects great credit on his gunners. - -Meanwhile Beresford had acted with great decision, and with an -intelligence which he did not always display. When, on the morning -of the thirteenth, he found that the French had disappeared, and -that Amarante (after having been thoroughly sacked)[439] had been -abandoned to him, he did not waste time in a fruitless pursuit of -Loison in the direction of Guimaraens, but resolved to endeavour -to cut off the retreat of the whole French army towards the north. -If they had absconded by way of Braga, the chase would fall to -Wellesley’s share, but if they had taken the other road by Chaves, -all would depend on his own movements. Accordingly he resolved to -march at once on the last named town, without waiting for orders -from the Commander-in-chief. Having hastily collected three days’ -provisions, he moved off himself by the high-road up the valley of -the Tamega, detaching Silveira and his division to strike across -country, and occupy the defiles of Ruivaens and Salamonde on the -Braga-Chaves road, where it would be possible to detain, if not to -stop, the retreating columns of Soult if they should take this way -[May 14]. While on his march Beresford received Wellesley’s letters, -which prescribed to him exactly the line of conduct that he had -already determined to pursue[440]. After three difficult marches in -drenching rain, which turned every rivulet into an almost impassable -torrent, and spoilt the inadequate provision of bread which had been -served out to the men, the division reached Chaves about 12 p.m. -on the night of the sixteenth-seventeenth. The men were absolutely -exhausted; though the distance covered had not exceeded some fourteen -or fifteen miles per day, yet the rain, the starvation, and the bad -road had much thinned the ranks, and those who had kept up with the -colours were dropping with fatigue. The slowness of the column’s -advance was certainly not Beresford’s fault; he had allowed only a -six hours’ halt each day on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth, -and had been pushing on as hard as was, humanly speaking, possible. -Nevertheless he was too late: on the seventeenth, the all-important -day of the campaign, he held Chaves, but his troops were too tired -to start early or to march far. The bad weather which made the French -retreat so miserable, had at least saved the flying army from its -pursuers[441]. - - [439] The state of Amarante was dreadful. ‘I was never witness to - such a scene of misery and horror as here presented itself,’ says - Lord Gough in an unpublished letter to his father. ‘Every house - and public building of every description, with the exception of a - monastery which covered the passage of the bridge, a chapel, and - about five detached houses, was burnt to the ground, with many of - the late inhabitants lying dead in the streets.’ - - [440] The best testimony to Beresford’s good conduct is that - Wellesley (_Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 343) says that he had - exactly anticipated the instructions sent him, and carried them - out on his own initiative. Napier’s criticism (ii. 116-7) is - unfair and misleading. - - [441] The best account of Beresford’s forced march is to be found - in the unpublished letter of Lord Gough (then major of the 87th) - which, as I have already mentioned, has been shown me by Mr. R. - Rait of New College. He says: ‘The business of crossing the river - took the Brigade (Tilson’s) four hours: the evening set in with - a most dreadful fall of rain, which continued all night, and the - next three days and nights. Our road lay over almost impassable - mountains, made more so by the rain that swelled the mountain - rivulets into rivers. In the dark many men lost the column, - several fell into pits excavated by the falling water: many lay - down in the road from fatigue and hunger, and the greater part - lost their shoes.... Next day we pursued our melancholy march at - five o’clock, the men nearly fainting with hunger: about twelve - we fell in with some cars of bread belonging to a Portuguese - division, which Gen. Tilson pressed for the men; this (with - some wine) enabled us to proceed, and that night at twelve we - reached Chaves, after a forced march of three days, with only - twelve hours’ halt. The men were without a shoe to their feet, - and hundreds fallen out from fatigue and hunger.... The 88th had, - of 700 with which they joined us, only 150 in the ranks.... Part - of the officers and nearly all the men had their feet cut to the - bone for want of shoes.’ - -Soult meanwhile had gathered in Loison and Lorges, and his whole army -was concentrated at Guimaraens on the morning of the fourteenth. From -the point where he now lay, in the upper valley of the Avé, there -are only two carriage roads, that to Amarante by which Loison had -arrived, and that to Braga. There was a bare chance that if Wellesley -had received his information late, and moved slowly, it might be -possible to escape from him by the road to Braga. If, however, he -had marched promptly from Oporto, he would be able to intercept the -retreating army at that place. Soult refused to take this risk, and -resolved instead to plunge once more into the mountains, and to cross -the watershed between the Avé and the Cavado by a rugged hill-path, -no better than that which had served him between Penafiel and -Guimaraens. It was accordingly necessary to sacrifice all the guns, -munitions, and baggage belonging to Loison and Lorges, just as those -of Mermet and Delaborde had been destroyed on the banks of the Souza. -The guns were burst, the ammunition exploded, the baggage piled in -heaps and burned. After this second holocaust the army struck up a -track by the Salto torrent, which ultimately brought them over the -crest, and down upon the village of Lanhozo, eight miles from Braga, -and just at the foot of the position which Eben had occupied during -his unhappy battle on March 20. The weather had been abominable, and -the rearguard had been forced to bivouac in misery on the hills, -the darkness having come down upon them before the descent into the -valley of the Cavado was completed. - -Next morning Soult sent out Lahoussaye’s dragoons down the valley -of the Cavado towards Braga, to see if that city was already in -Wellesley’s hands or whether it was still possible to escape across -his front and gain the high road to Galicia. As the Marshal had -feared would be the case, they met British light cavalry pushing -briskly up the road towards them; it was clear that the pursuers were -already in Braga, and Soult at once ordered his columns to turn their -faces to the north-east, and follow the road up the Cavado towards -Salamonde and Ruivaens. The British were ere long visible in close -pursuit. - -Sir Arthur had quitted Oporto on the fourteenth with his whole force -except the brigade of Murray, which had already gone forth on the -eastern line of pursuit, and the 20th Light Dragoons, which he had -been ordered to send back to Lisbon. On that day his army covered -twenty-two miles of road in vile weather, and slept at Villa Nova de -Famelicção. On the fifteenth the British started early, and their -vanguard had already marched twelve miles and reached Braga when -the French dragoons were descried. The latter, seeing themselves -forestalled, retired on their main body, and when Wellesley’s men -mounted the crest of the Monte Adaufé (Eben’s old position in the -battle of March 20), they caught a glimpse of the whole French -army retiring up the valley. Soult, immediately on hearing that -the pursuers were in Braga, had commenced a new retreat. He had -rearranged his order of march. Loison now led the column, with -Heudelet’s division and Lorges’ dragoons: then came the droves of -artillery horses and pack-mules, with the reserve ammunition and the -little baggage that had been saved, followed by Delaborde and Mermet. -Merle’s infantry and Franceschi’s horse were in the rear, under the -Marshal’s own command. In this order the French remounted the stream -of the Cavado as far as Salamonde, where the broad valley narrows -down to a defile. They were followed by the British light dragoons, -but the infantry of the pursuing column had not got far beyond Braga, -where Wellesley’s head quarters were established that night. Murray’s -German brigade, which had crossed the mountains from Guimaraens in -Soult’s wake, joined the main body on this evening. - -On reaching Salamonde Soult was informed by the cavalry in his front -that they had been brought to stand at the bridge of Ponte Nova, a -few miles up the defile, by a body of _Ordenanza_, who had taken up -the wooden flooring of the bridge, torn down its balustrades, and -barricaded themselves upon the further side. Unless they could be -dislodged ruin stared the Marshal in the face: for the British were -close in his rear, and there was no lateral line of escape from the -precipitous defile. Surrender next morning must follow. In this -crisis Soult saw no chance of safety before him save a dash at the -half-demolished bridge. When darkness had fallen he sent for Major -Dulong, an officer of the 31st Léger, who enjoyed the reputation of -being the most daring man in the whole army, and told him that he -must surprise the Portuguese by a sudden rush at midnight, and win -the passage at all costs. He was allowed to pick 100 volunteers from -his own regiment for the enterprise. - -The safety of a whole army has seldom depended upon a more desperate -venture than that which Dulong took in hand. Nothing remained of the -bridge save the two large cross-beams, no more than three or four -feet broad; they were slippery with continuous rain, and had to be -passed in complete darkness under the driving sleet of a bitter north -wind. Fortunately for the assailants the same cold and wet which -made their enterprise so dangerous had driven the _Ordenanza_ under -cover: they had retired to some huts a little way beyond the bridge. -If they left any one on guard, the sentinel had followed his friends, -for when Dulong and his party crept up to the passage they found it -absolutely deserted. They crossed in single file, and reached the -further side unobserved, losing one man who slipped and fell into the -fierce river below. A moment later they came on the Portuguese, who -were surprised in their sleep: many were bayonetted, the rest fled -in dismay--they were but a few score of peasants, and were helpless -when once the passage had been won. - -For six hours Soult’s sappers were working hard to replace the -flooring of the ruined bridge with tree trunks, and boards torn from -the houses of the neighbouring village. At eight it was practicable, -and the troops began to cross. It was a long business: for 20,000 -men with 4,000 cavalry horses and a great drove of pack-animals had -to be passed over the narrow, rickety, and uneven structure, whose -balustrades had not been replaced. All the day was spent in hurrying -the troops across, but they got forward so slowly that Soult saw -himself forced to place a strong rearguard in position, to hold back -the pursuers till the main body was safe. He left behind a brigade of -Merle’s division, and two of Franceschi’s cavalry regiments, ranged -behind a lateral ravine which crosses the road some distance below -the bridge. They were placed with their right on the rough river bank -and their left on the cliffs which overhang the road; orders were -given to the effect that they must hold on at all costs till the army -had completed the passage of the Ponte Nova. At half-past one the -British light dragoons arrived in front of the position, saw that -they could not force it, and started a bickering fire with the French -pickets, while they waited for the main body to come up. - -Owing to the long distance which Wellesley’s infantry had to cover, -the day wore on without any serious collision on this point. But -meanwhile Soult found that another and more serious danger lay ahead -of him. After crossing the Cavado at the Ponte Nova there were two -paths available for the army--the main road leads eastward to Chaves -by way of Ruivaens, a branch, however, turns off north to Montalegre -and the sources of the Misarella, the main affluent of the Cavado. -The former was the easier, but there was a grave doubt whether Chaves -might not already be in the hands of Beresford and his turning -column--as a matter of fact it only arrived there a few hours after -Soult stood uncertain at the parting of the ways. Bearing this in -mind, the Marshal resolved to take the more rugged and difficult -path; but when Loison and the vanguard were engaged in it they found -that the bridge over the Misarella, the _Saltador_ as it was called -from the bold leap which its single arch makes across the torrent, -was held against them. Again it was only with _Ordenanza_ that the -army had to deal: Beresford had just reached Chaves, but his troops -were some miles further back; Silveira, who ought to have been at -Ruivaens that morning, had not appeared at all. But Major Warre, -an officer of Beresford’s staff, had ridden ahead to rouse the -peasantry, and had collected several hundred half-armed levies at -the _Saltador_ bridge, which he encouraged them to hold, promising -that the regulars would be up to support them before nightfall. -Unfortunately he could not persuade them to destroy the bridge, on -which all the cross-communications of the Misarella valley depend. -But they had thrown down its parapets, built an _abattis_ across its -head, and thrown up earthworks on each side of it so as to command -the opposite bank. This, unhappily, was not enough to hold back -20,000 desperate men, who saw their only way of salvation on the -opposite bank. - -When Loison found his advance barred, he made an appeal to that same -Major Dulong who had forced the Ponte Nova on the preceding night. -Again that daring soldier volunteered to conduct the forlorn hope: -he was given a company of _voltigeurs_ to lead the column, and two -battalions of Heudelet’s division to back them. Forming the whole in -one continuous mass--there was only room for four men abreast--he -dashed down towards the bridge amid a spluttering and ineffective -fire from the Portuguese entrenchments on the opposite bank. The -column reached the arch, passed it, was checked but a moment while -tearing down the _abattis_, and then plunged in among the scared -_Ordenanza_, who fled in every direction, leaving the passage free. -Dulong was wounded, but no more than eighteen of his companions were -hit, and at this small sacrifice the army was saved. Late in the -afternoon the whole mass began to stream up the Montalegre road; -they had no longer anything more to fear than stray shots from the -scattered _Ordenanza_, who hung about on the hillsides, firing into -the column from inaccessible rocks, but doing little damage. - -If Dulong had failed at the Saltador Soult would have been lost, -for just as the passage was forced the rumbling of cannon began to -be heard from the rear. Merle was attacked by the British, and was -being driven in. At five o’clock the Guards’ brigade, forming the -head of Wellesley’s infantry, had come up with the French rearguard. -It was formidably posted, but Sir Arthur thought that it might be -dislodged. Accordingly he placed the two three-pounders, which -accompanied the column, on the high road, and began to batter the -French centre, while he sent off the three light companies of the -brigade[442] to turn the French left flank on the cliffs to the -south. When the crackling of their musketry was heard among the -rocks, he silenced his guns and flung the Guards upon the enemy’s -main body. They broke, turned, and fled in confusion, though the -regiment on the road, the 4th Léger, was considered one of the best -in the French army[443]. - - [442] The brigade had a company of the 5/60th attached, so had - three instead of two light companies. - - [443] ‘Il y avait à l’arrière-garde un excellent régiment - d’infanterie légère, qui (vu la nature du terrain) pouvait - facilement braver une armée entière: et bien, à l’apparition - de l’ennemi, il s’est débandé sans qu’on ait pu lui faire - entendre raison. La confusion qui a été le résultat de cette - terreur panique a été épouvantable. Fantassins et cavaliers se - précipitaient les uns sur les autres, jetaient leurs armes, et - luttaient à qui courrait le plus vite. Le pont étroit et sans - parapet ne pouvait suffire à l’impatience des fuyards, ils se - pressaient tellement que nombre d’hommes furent précipités et - noyés dans le torrent ou écrasés sous les pieds des chevaux. Si - les Anglais avaient été en mesure de profiter de cette épouvante, - je ne sais pas en vérité ce que nous serions devenus, tant la - peur est contagieuse, même chez les plus braves soldats.’ Fantin - des Odoards, p. 236. - -The chase continued as far as the Ponte Nova, which the broken -troops crossed in a struggling mass, thrusting each other over the -edge (where the balustrades were wanting) till the torrent below was -choked with dead men and horses. The British guns were brought up -and played upon the weltering crowd with dreadful effect. But the -night was already coming on, and the darkness hid from the pursuers -the full effect of their own fire. They halted and encamped, having -slain many and taken about fifty prisoners, of whom one was an -officer. It was only at daybreak that they realized the terrors -through which the French had passed. ‘The rocky bed of the Cavado,’ -says an eye-witness, ‘presented an extraordinary spectacle. Men and -horses, sumpter animals and baggage, had been precipitated into -the river, and literally choked its course. Here, with these fatal -accompaniments of death and dismay, was disgorged the last of the -plunder of Oporto. All kinds of valuable goods were left on the road, -while above 300 horses, sunk in the water, and mules laden with -baggage, fell into the hands of the grenadier and light companies of -the Guards. These active-fingered gentry found that fishing for boxes -and bodies out of the stream produced pieces of plate, and purses and -belts full of gold money. Amid the scenes of death and desolation -arose their shouts of the most noisy merriment[444].’ - - [444] Lord Munster’s _Campaign of 1809_, pp. 177-8. - -On the night of the 17th Soult’s army poured into Montalegre, a -dilapidated old town on the edge of the frontier, from which all the -inhabitants had fled. Little or no food could be procured, and the -houses did not suffice to shelter more than a part of the troops. -Next morning the 2nd Corps took to its heels once more, and climbed -the Serra de Gerez, which lies just above the town. On descending -its northern slope they had at last entered Spain, and had reached -safety. But the country was absolutely desolate: for twenty miles -beyond Montalegre there was hardly a single village on this rugged -by-path. Still dreading pursuit, the Marshal urged on his men as fast -as they could be driven forward, and in two long marches at last -reached Orense. - -Wellesley, however, had given up any hope of catching the 2nd -Corps, when once it had passed the Saltador and reached the Spanish -frontier. He had halted the British infantry at Ruivaens, and only -sent on in chase of the flying host the 14th Light Dragoons and the -division of Silveira, which had at last appeared on the scene late -in the evening of the seventeenth. What this corps had been doing -during the last forty-eight hours it is impossible to discover. It -had started from Amarante on the same day that Beresford marched for -Chaves, and ought to have been at Ruivaens on the sixteenth, when it -would have found itself just in time to intercept Soult’s vanguard -after it had passed the Ponte Nova. Apparently the same wild weather -and constant rain which had delayed Beresford’s column had checked -his subordinate. At any rate it is certain that Silveira, though he -had a shorter route than his chief, only got to Ruivaens late on -the seventeenth, while the other column had reached Chaves more than -twelve hours earlier. - -The French had disappeared, and it was only next morning that -Silveira followed them up on the Montalegre road. He captured a few -laggards by the way, but on reaching the little town found that -Soult’s rearguard had quitted it two hours before his arrival[445]. -By Wellesley’s orders he pushed on for one day more in pursuit, but -found that the enemy was now so far ahead that he could do no more -than pick up moribund stragglers. On the nineteenth, therefore, he -turned back and retraced his steps to Montalegre[446]. - - [445] The French rearguard actually saw Silveira arriving. - Naylies, p. 90. - - [446] For this part of the pursuit see the diary of Hawker - [of the 14th Light Dragoons], who returned to Montalegre with - Silveira’s men. - -Much the same fortune had befallen Beresford’s column. By Wellesley’s -orders Tilson’s brigade and their Portuguese companions marched from -Chaves by Monterey on the eighteenth, on the chance that Soult, after -passing the Serra de Gerez, might drop into the Monterey-Orense -road. But the Marshal had not taken this route: he had kept to -by-paths, and marched by Porquera and Allariz, to the left of the -line on which Beresford’s pursuit was directed. At Ginzo the cavalry -of the pursuing column picked up fifty stragglers, and came into -contact with a small party of Franceschi’s _chasseurs_, which Soult -had thrown out to cover his flank. Learning from the peasantry that -the French had gone off by a different route, Beresford halted and -returned to Chaves. His men were so thoroughly worn out, and the -strength of the column was so much reduced, that he could have done -little more even if he had come upon the main body of the enemy[447]. - - [447] These details are mainly from the letter of Gough of the - 87th, which I have already had occasion to quote, when dealing - with Beresford’s movements. I cannot find any corroboration for - Napier’s account of Beresford’s and Silveira’s pursuit in ii. pp. - 112-3 of his history. - -[Illustration: NORTHERN PORTUGAL - TO ILLUSTRATE MARSHAL SOULT’S CAMPAIGN - OF MARCH TO MAY 1809] - -On May 19 Soult’s dilapidated and starving host poured into Orense, -where they could at last take a day’s rest and obtain a decent meal. -The Marshal caused the troops to be numbered, and found that he had -brought back 19,713 men. As he had started from the Spanish frontier -with 22,000 sabres and bayonets, and had received 3,500 more from -Tuy, when Lamartinière’s column joined him, it would appear that he -had left in all some 5,700 men behind him. Of these, according to the -French accounts[448], about 1,000 had fallen in the early fighting, -or died of sickness, before Wellesley’s appearance on the Vouga. -About 700, mostly convalescents, had been captured at Chaves by -Silveira[449]. After the storm of Oporto the British army found 1,500 -sick in the hospitals of that city, of Braga and of Viana[450]. They -also took some 400 unwounded prisoners at Oporto and at Grijon[451]. -It results therefore that the losses of the actual retreat from -Baltar to Orense, between the thirteenth and the nineteenth of May, -must have been rather more than 2,000 men. But all these had been -able-bodied fighting-men--the sick, as we have seen, were abandoned -before the break-neck march over the mountains began: adding them and -the prisoners of the eleventh-twelfth, to the actual casualties of -the retreat, on the same principle which we used when calculating the -losses of Moore’s army in the Corunna campaign, we should get a total -of 4,000 for the deficiency in the French ranks during the nine days -which elapsed between Wellesley’s passage of the Vouga and Soult’s -arrival at Orense. Thus it would seem that about one-sixth of the -2nd Corps had been destroyed in that short time--a proportion almost -exactly corresponding to that which Moore’s force left behind it in -the retreat from Sahagun to Corunna, wherein 6,000 men out of 33,000 -were lost. - - [448] See mainly Le Noble’s calculation on pp. 353-4 of his - _Campagne de 1809_. - - [449] The rest of Silveira’s prisoners were Hispano-Portuguese - ‘legionaries,’ see p. 266. - - [450] Napier (ii. 113) says, ‘1,800 at Viana and Braga, 700 at - Oporto,’ figures that should be reversed, for at the two last - places only the sick of Heudelet’s and Lorges’ divisions were - captured, while at Oporto the main central hospital fell into the - hands of the British. Le Noble says that there were 2,150 men in - hospital altogether on May 10. - - [451] See p. 341. - -In other respects these two famous retreats afford some interesting -points of comparison. Moore had an infinitely longer distance to -cover: in mere mileage his men marched more than twice as far as -Soult’s[452]: their journey occupied twenty days as against nine. On -the other hand the French had to use far worse roads. From Benavente -to Corunna there is a good _chaussée_ for the whole distance: -from Baltar to Orense the 2nd Corps had to follow impracticable -mule-tracks for more than half the way. As to the weather, there -was perhaps little to choose between the two retreats: the nine -days of perpetual rain, during which Soult effected his passage of -four successive mountain chains, was almost as trying as the cold -and snow through which the British had to trudge. Moore’s men were -not so hardly pressed by starvation as the 2nd Corps, and they were -moving through a country-side which was not actively hostile, if it -could scarcely be described as friendly. On the other hand they were -pursued with far greater vigour than the French: their rearguard -was beset every day, and had constantly to be fighting, while -Soult’s troops were hard pressed only on two days--the sixteenth and -seventeenth of May. This advantage the Marshal gained by choosing an -unexpected line of retreat over obscure by-paths: if he had taken -either of the high-roads by Braga and Chaves his fate would have been -very different. On this same choice of roads depends another contrast -between the two retreats: to gain speed and safety Soult sacrificed -the whole of his artillery and his transport. When he arrived at -Orense, as one of his officers wrote, ‘the infantry had brought -off their bayonets and their eagles, the cavalry their horses and -saddles--everything else had been left behind--the guns, the stores, -the treasure, the sick.’ Moore, in spite of all the miseries of his -march, carried down to Corunna the whole of his artillery, part of -his transport, and the greater number of his sick and wounded. If -he lost his military chest, it was not from necessity but from the -mismanagement of the subordinates who had charge of it. His army was -in condition to fight a successful battle at the end of its retreat, -and so to win for itself a safe and honourable departure. - - [452] The respective distances seem to be about 255 and 120 miles. - -Both generals, it will be observed, were driven into danger by causes -for which they did not regard themselves as responsible. Soult was -placed in peril by attempting to carry out his master’s impracticable -orders. Moore thought himself bound to run the risk, because he had -realized that there was a political necessity that the English army -should do something for the cause of Spain, for it could not with -honour retire to Portugal before it had struck a blow. In their -management of their respective campaigns both made mistakes. Moore -hurried his men too much, and did not take full advantage of the many -positions in which he could have held off the pursuer by judicious -rearguard actions. Soult’s faults were even greater: nothing can -excuse his stay at Oporto during the days when he should have been -directing Loison’s movements at Amarante. That stay was undoubtedly -due to his vain intrigues with the Portuguese malcontents; it was -personal ambition, not any military necessity, which detained him -from his proper place. Still more worthy of blame was his disposition -of his forces at the moment when the British troops crossed the -Vouga: they were scattered in a dangerous fashion, which made -concentration difficult and uncertain. But the weakest feature of his -whole conduct was that he allowed himself to be surprised in Oporto -by Wellesley on May 12. When an army in close touch with the enemy is -taken unawares at broad midday, by an irruption of its opponents into -the middle of the cantonments, the general-in-chief cannot shift the -blame on to the shoulders of subordinates. It was Soult’s duty to see -that his officers were taking all reasonable precautions to watch the -British, and he most certainly did not do so. Indeed, we have seen -that he turned all his attention to the point of least danger--the -lower reaches of the Douro--and neglected that on which the British -attack was really delivered. It was only when he found himself on -the verge of utter ruin, on May 13, that he rose to the occasion, -and saved his army, by the daring march upon Guimaraens which foiled -Wellesley’s plans for intercepting his retreat. To state that ‘his -reputation as a general was nowise diminished by his Portuguese -campaign’ is to do him more than justice[453]. It would be more true -to assert that he showed that if he could commit faults, he could -also do much towards repairing their consequences. - - [453] Napier, ii. 113. - -As to Wellesley, it is not too much to say that the Oporto campaign -is one of his strongest titles to fame. He had, as we have already -seen, only 16,400 British and 11,400 Portuguese troops[454], of -whom the latter were either untried in the field or demoralized by -their previous experiences beyond the Douro. His superiority in mere -numbers to Soult’s corps of 23,000 men was therefore small, and he -was lamentably destitute of cavalry and artillery. It was no small -feat to expel the enemy from Northern Portugal in nine days, and to -cast him into Galicia, stripped of his guns and baggage, and with a -gap of more than 4,000 men in his ranks. This had been accomplished -at the expense of no more than 500 casualties, even when the soldiers -who fell by the way from sickness and fatigue are added to the 300 -killed and wounded of the engagements of May 11, 12, and 17. There is -hardly a campaign in history in which so much was accomplished at so -small a cost. Wellesley had exactly carried out the programme which -he had set before himself when he left Lisbon--the defeat of the -enemy and the deliverance of the two provinces beyond the Douro. He -had expressly disclaimed any intention or expectation of destroying -or capturing the 2nd Corps[455], which some foreign critics have -ascribed to him in their anxiety to make out that he failed to -execute the whole project that he had taken in hand. - - [454] See p. 321. - - [455] ‘In respect to Soult, I shall omit nothing that I can do - to destroy him--but I am afraid that with the force I have at my - disposal, it is not in my power to prevent him retreating into - Spain.’ Wellesley to Frere, May 9, 1809. - -There was, it is true, one short moment at which he had it in his -power to deal Soult a heavier blow than he had contemplated. On the -night of May 12-13, when the Marshal in his bivouac at Baltar learnt -of Loison’s evacuation of Amarante, the main body of the 2nd Corps -was in a deplorable situation, and must have been destroyed, had -the British been close at hand. If Wellesley had pursued the flying -foe, on the afternoon of the victory of Oporto, with all his cavalry -and the less fatigued regiments of his infantry, nothing could have -saved the French. But the opportunity was one which could not have -been foreseen: no rational officer could have guessed that Loison -would evacuate Amarante, and so surrender his chief’s best line -of retreat. It was impossible that Wellesley should dream of such -a chance being thrown into his hands. He constructed his plans on -the natural hypothesis that Soult had still open to him the route -across the Tamega; and he was therefore more concerned with the idea -that Beresford might be in danger from the approach of Soult, than -with that of taking measures to capture the Marshal. His men were -fatigued with the long march of eighty miles in four days which had -taken them from the Mondego to Oporto: his guns and stores had not -yet passed the bridgeless Douro. It was natural, therefore, that he -should allow himself and his army a night’s rest before pressing on -in pursuit of Soult. It will be remembered that he did push Murray’s -brigade along the Baltar road in the tracks of the Marshal, but that -officer never came up with the French. If blame has to be allotted to -any one for the failure to discover the unhappy situation of the 2nd -Corps upon the morning of the thirteenth, it would seem that Murray -must bear the burden rather than the Commander-in-chief. He should -have kept touch, at all costs, with the retreating French, and if -he had done so would have been able to give Wellesley news of their -desperate plight. - -As to the pursuit of Soult, between the fourteenth and the -eighteenth, it is hard to see that more could have been done than -was actually accomplished. ‘It is obvious,’ as Wellesley wrote to -Castlereagh, ‘that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipment, -and baggage, and everything that can strengthen it and enable it -to act together as a body; and if it abandons all those who are -entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its -progress[456], it must be able to march by roads on which it can -not be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army -which has not made the same sacrifices[457].’ This puts the case in -a nutshell: Soult, after he had abandoned his sick and destroyed -his guns and wagons, could go much faster than his pursuers. The -only chance of catching him was that Beresford or Silveira might be -able to intercept him at the Misarella on the seventeenth. But the -troops of the former were so exhausted by their long march in the -rain from Amarante, that although they reached Chaves on the night -of the sixteenth-seventeenth, they were not in a condition to march -eighteen miles further on the following morning. Whether Silveira, -who had taken a shorter but a more rugged route than Beresford, -might not have reached Ruivaens ten or twelve hours earlier than -he did is another matter. Had he done so, he might have held the -cross-roads and blocked the way to Montalegre. We have no details of -his march, though we know that he had a bad mountain-path to traverse -in abominable weather. All military critics have joined in condemning -him[458], but without a more accurate knowledge of the obstacles that -he had to cross, and of the state of his troops, we can not be sure -of the exact amount of blame that should fall upon him. It is at any -rate clear that Wellesley was not responsible for the late arrival of -the Portuguese division at Ruivaens and the consequent escape of the -enemy. - - [456] From Montalegre, May 18, 1809. - - [457] i.e. its sick and wounded. - - [458] Napier, Arteche, and Schepeler all agree in this, the - former only making the excuse that Silveira may not have fully - understood Beresford’s orders, owing to the difficulty of - language. But Beresford spoke and wrote Portuguese fluently. - -[Erratum from p. xii: A dispatch of Beresford at Lisbon clears up my -doubts as to Silveira’s culpability. Beresford complains that the -latter lost a whole day by marching from Amarante to Villa Pouca -without orders; the dispatch directing him to take the path by Mondim -thus reached him only when he had gone many miles on the wrong road. -The time lost could never be made up.] - -Beyond Montalegre it would have been useless to follow the flying -French. An advance into Galicia would have taken the British army -too far from Lisbon, and have rendered it impossible to return in -time to the Tagus if Victor should be on the move. That marshal, as -we shall see, was showing signs of stirring from his long spell of -torpidity, and it was a dispatch from Mackenzie, containing the news -that the 1st Corps was on the move, that made Wellesley specially -anxious to check the pursuit, and to draw back to Central Portugal -before matters should come to a head in Estremadura. He could safely -calculate that it would be months rather than weeks before Soult -would be in a condition to cause any trouble on the northern frontier. - - -N.B.--There are admirable accounts of the horrors of Soult’s retreat -in the works of Le Noble, St. Chamans, Fantin des Odoards, and -Naylies. The pursuit of the main body of the English army is well -described by four eye-witnesses--Lord Londonderry, Stothert, Hawker, -and Lord Munster. For the march of Beresford’s corps I have only the -details given by Lord Gough’s letter, cited heretofore. - - - - -SECTION XV - -OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN SPAIN (MARCH-JUNE 1809) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -NEY AND LA ROMANA IN GALICIA AND THE ASTURIAS - - -While following the fortunes of Soult and the 2nd Corps in Northern -Portugal, we have been constrained to withdraw our attention from -Galicia, where we left Marshal Ney busied in a vain attempt to beat -down the insurrections which had sprung up in every corner of the -kingdom, at the moment when the melting of the snows gave notice -that spring was at hand. It was with no good will that the Duke of -Elchingen had seen his colleague depart from Orense and plunge into -the Portuguese mountains. Indeed he had done his best to induce -Soult to disregard the Emperor’s orders, and to join him in a -strenuous effort to pacify Galicia before embarking on the march to -Oporto[459]. When he found that his appeal had failed to influence -the Duke of Dalmatia, and that the 2nd Corps had passed out of sight -and left the whole of Galicia upon his hands, he was constrained to -take stock of his position and to think out a plan of campaign. - - [459] See p. 192. - -Ney had at his disposal some 17,000 men, consisting of the -twenty-four infantry battalions of his own corps, which formed the -two divisions of Marchand and Maurice Mathieu, of the two regiments -of his corps-cavalry, and of Fournier’s brigade of Lorges’ dragoons, -which Soult, by the Emperor’s orders, had transferred to him before -crossing the Minho. Among his resources it would not be fair to count -the two garrisons at Vigo and Tuy which the 2nd Corps had left -behind it. They numbered more than 4,000 men, but were so placed as -to be more of a charge than a help to Ney. They failed to keep him in -touch with Soult, and their necessities distracted some of his troops -to their aid when he was requiring every man for other purposes. - -On March 10, when he was left to his own resources, Ney had -concentrated the greater part of his corps in the north-western -corner of Galicia. He had placed one brigade at Lugo, a second with -Fournier’s dragoons at Mondonedo, in observation of the Asturias, -a third at Santiago, the remainder at Corunna and Ferrol. The -outlying posts had been called in, save a garrison at Villafranca, -the important half-way stage between Lugo and Astorga, where the -Marshal had left a battalion of the 26th regiment, to keep open his -communication with the plains of Leon. The insurgents were already so -active that touch with this detachment was soon lost, the peasants -having cut the road both east and west of Villafranca. - -The whole month of March was spent in a ceaseless endeavour to keep -down the rising in Northern Galicia: the southern parts of the -kingdom had been practically abandoned, and the French had no hold -there save through the garrisons of Tuy and Vigo, both of which (as -we have seen in an earlier chapter) were blockaded by the local -levies the moment that Soult had passed on into Portugal. - -Ney’s object was to crush and cow the insurgents of Northern Galicia -by the constant movement of flying columns, which marched out from -the towns when his brigades were established, and made descents on -every district where the peasantry had assembled in strength. This -policy had little success: it was easy to rout the Galicians and to -burn their villages, but the moment that the column had passed on -the enemy returned to occupy his old positions. The campaign was -endless and inconclusive: it was of little use to kill so many scores -or hundreds of peasants, if no attempt was made to hold down the -districts through which the expedition had passed. This could not -be done for sheer want of numbers: 16,000 men were not sufficient -to garrison the whole of the mountain valleys and coast villages of -this rugged land. The French columns went far afield, even as far -as Corcubion on the headland of Cape Finisterre, and Ribadeo on the -borders of Asturias: but though they scathed the whole region with -fire and sword, they made no impression. Moreover, they suffered -serious losses: every expedition lost a certain number of stragglers -cut off by the peasantry, and of foragers who had wandered too far -from the main body in search of food. All were murdered: for the -populace, mad at the burning of their homes and the lifting of their -cattle--their only wealth--never gave quarter to the unfortunate -soldiers who fell into their hands. - -It is curious and interesting to compare Ney’s actual operations -with the orders which the Emperor had sent to him[460]. In these he -was directed to establish his head quarters at Lugo, and to leave no -more than a regiment at Ferrol and another regiment at Betanzos and -Corunna. He was to keep a movable column of three battalions at work -between Santiago and Tuy, to ‘make examples’ and prevent the English -from landing munitions for the insurgents. With the rest of his -corps, five regiments of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, he was -to establish himself at Lugo, and from thence to send out punitive -expeditions against rebellious villages, to seize hostages, to lend -aid if necessary to Soult’s operations in Portugal, and finally ‘to -utilize the months of March and April, when there is nothing to fear -on the Galician coasts, for an expedition to conquer the Asturias.’ -Here we have all Napoleon’s illusions concerning the character of the -Peninsular War very clearly displayed. He supposes that a movable -column of one regiment can hold down a rugged coast region one -hundred miles long, where 20,000 insurgents are in arms. He thinks -that punitive expeditions, and the taking of hostages, will keep a -province quiet without there being any need to establish garrisons -in it. ‘Organize Galicia,’ he writes, ‘make examples, for severe -examples well applied are much more effective than garrisons.... -Leave the policing of the country to the Spanish authorities. If you -cannot occupy every place, you can watch every place: if you cannot -hold every shore-battery to prevent communication with the English, -you can charge the natives with this duty. Your movable columns will -punish any of the people of the coast who behave badly.’ - - [460] Napoleon to Ney, from Paris, Feb. 18, 1809. - -To Ney, when he received this dispatch, many weeks after it had been -written, all this elaborate advice must have appeared very futile. -Considering the present attitude of the whole population of Galicia, -he must have been much amused at the proposal that he should entrust -them with the task of keeping off the British, should ‘organize’ -them, and ‘make them police themselves.’ As to ‘severe examples’ he -had now been burning villages and shooting monks and alcaldes for two -months and more: but the only result was that the insurrection flared -up more fiercely, and that his own stragglers and foragers were being -hung and tortured every day. As to the idea of movable columns, he -had (on his own inspiration) sent Maucune to carry out precisely the -operations that the Emperor desired in the country between Santiago -and Tuy. The column had to fight every day, and held down not one -foot of territory beyond the outskirts of its own camp. And now, in -the midst of all his troubles, he was ordered to attempt the conquest -of the Asturias, no small undertaking in itself. The Emperor’s letter -ended with the disquieting note that ‘no further reinforcements can -be sent to Galicia. It is much more likely that it may be necessary -to transfer to some other point one of the two divisions of the Sixth -Corps[461].’ - - [461] ‘Ne comptez sur aucun renfort: croyez plutôt qu’on pourrait - être dans le cas de porter ailleurs une de vos divisions.’ - -We have hitherto had little occasion to mention the two Spanish -regular armies on which Ney, in addition to all his troubles with -the insurgents, had to keep a watchful eye. The first was the force -in the principality of Asturias, which had been lost to sight since -the day on which it fled homeward after the battle of Espinosa. The -second consisted of the much-tried troops of La Romana, who since -their escape from Monterey had enjoyed some weeks of comparative -rest, and were once more ready to move. - -The Asturian force was far the larger in point of numbers, and ought -to have made its influence felt long ere now. But even more than -the other Spaniards, the Asturians were given over to particularism -and provincial selfishness. In 1808 they had done nothing for -the common cause save that they had lent the single division of -Acevedo--comprising about half their provincial levy[462]--to -the army which Blake led to defeat in Biscay. After Espinosa this -corps had not retired with La Romana to Leon, but had fallen back -within the frontier of its native principality, and had joined the -large reserve which had never gone forward from Oviedo. During the -three winter months, the Asturians had contented themselves with -reorganizing and increasing the numbers of their battalions, and with -guarding the passes of the Cantabrian chain. They had refused to send -either men or money to La Romana, thereby provoking his righteous -indignation, and furnishing him with a grudge which he repaid in due -season. When he was driven away from their neighbourhood, and forced -to retire towards Portugal, they still kept quiet behind their hills, -and made but the weakest of attempts to distract the attention of the -enemy. There were at first no French forces near them save Bonnet’s -single division at Santander, which was fully occupied in holding -down the Montaña, and a provisional brigade at Leon consisting of -some stray battalions of the dissolved Eighth Corps[463]. As neither -of these forces had any considerable reserves behind them[464], when -once Ney and Soult had passed on into Galicia, it is clear that a -demonstration in force against Santander or Leon would have thrown -dismay along the whole line of the French communications, and have -disarranged all the Emperor’s plans for further advance. - - [462] Acevedo’s division, deducting the regular troops [Hibernia - (two batts.), and Provincial of Oviedo], had some 6,000 men: - while 5,200 remained behind in Asturias. See pp. 632 and 637 of - vol. i. - - [463] Apparently consisting in February of three battalions and a - Spanish Legion which Napoleon had organized out of the prisoners - of Blake’s and La Romana’s armies: 2,998 men in all. The - Legion waited till it had received arms and clothing, and then - deserted _en masse_ and went to join the insurgents. For angry - correspondence on this incident see Napoleon to King Joseph, Feb. - 20, and King Joseph to Napoleon, March 7, 1809. - - [464] The total of French troops in Old Castile, garrisoning - Valladolid, Soria, Palencia, and Burgos, &c., was only 5,342 men. - Nothing was disposable for field operations save Kellermann’s - division of dragoons. In Biscay, behind Bonnet, there were only - 1,762 men, and in Alava 876. Practically nothing could have been - sent to reinforce Leon or Santander, till Mortier’s corps came up. - -The only operation, however, which the Asturians undertook was a -petty raid into Galicia with 3,000 or 4,000 men, who went to beat -up Ney’s detachment at Mondonedo on April 10, and were driven off -with ease[465]. The Junta had fully 20,000 men under arms, but they -contrived to be weak at every point by trying to guard every point. -They had sent, to observe Bonnet, the largest body of their troops, -nearly 10,000 men, under General Ballasteros: he had taken up the -line of the Deba, and lay with his head quarters at Colombres, -skirmishing occasionally with the French outposts. At the pass of -Pajares, watching the main road that descends into the plain of -Leon, were 3,000 men, and 2,000 more at La Mesa guarded a minor -defile. Another division of 4,000 bayonets was at Castropol, facing -Ney’s detachment which had occupied Mondonedo: this was the column -which had made the feeble advance in April to which we have already -alluded. Finally, a Swiss Lieutenant-General named Worster lay at -Oviedo, the capital of the principality, with a small reserve of -2,000 men[466]. It does not seem that Cienfuegos, the Captain-General -of Asturias, exercised any real authority, as the Junta took upon -itself the settling of every detail of military affairs[467]. Thus -a whole army was wasted by being distributed all along the narrow -province, awaiting an attack from an enemy who was far too weak to -dream of advancing, and who, as a matter of fact, did not move till -May. La Romana might well be indignant that the Asturians had done -practically nothing for the cause of Spain from December to March, -especially since they had obtained more than their share of the -British arms and money[468] which had been distributed in the autumn -of 1808. - - [465] For this fiasco see Toreno, i. pp. 400-1. - - [466] These dispositions of the Asturian army, which have never - before been published, are taken from a dispatch from the Junta - at Oviedo, which Mr. Frere sent to Lord Castlereagh on March 24 - [Record Office]. The regiments were:-- - - At Colombres, under Maj.-General F. Ballasteros: - Luanco, Castropol, Navia, Luarca, Villaviciosa, Llanes, Cangas - de Oñis, Cangas de Tineo, Don Carlos. - - At Pajares and Farna, under Brigadier Don Christoval Lili: - Siero, Provincial of Oviedo, Covadonga. - - At La Mesa, under Brigadier Don F. Manglano: - Riva de Sella, Pravia. - - At Castropol, under Colonel T. Valdez: - Lena, Grado, Salas, Ferdinando VII. - - At Oviedo, under Lieut.-General Worster: - Gijon, Infiesto. - - The Junta report that they have over 20,000 men, the regiments - being very strong, some of them reaching 1,200 bayonets, or even - more. - - [467] Carrol to La Romana, March 28, ‘The Junta, in fact, command - the armies in every respect. They have absolute power, and - have rendered themselves highly obnoxious to the people of the - province, and are at present entirely guided by the will and - caprice of three or four individuals...’ - - [468] Such also was the opinion of Captain Carrol, the British - representative at Oviedo. He writes to Castlereagh on Feb. 10 in - the following terms: ‘I am sorry to have to represent that the - supplies hitherto granted to this province have not been applied - (to use the mildest expressions) with that judgment and economy - that might have been expected, and that the benefits resulting to - this province and the common cause are by no means proportionate - to the liberality with which those supplies were granted by the - British Government’ [Record Office]. Toreno, as a patriotic - Asturian, hushes up all these scandals. - -Ney’s new troubles in April did not spring from the activity of the -Asturian troops, but from that of the much-battered army of Galicia, -which was destined in this month to achieve the first success that -had cheered its depleted ranks since the combat of Guenes. When -La Romana, on March 8, had found himself free from the pursuit of -Franceschi’s cavalry, he had marched by leisurely stages to Puebla de -Senabria on the borders of Leon. He doubted for a moment whether he -should not turn southward and drop down, along the edge of Portugal, -to Ciudad Rodrigo, the nearest place of strength in Spanish hands. -But, after much consideration, he resolved to leave behind him the -weakest of his battalions and his numerous sick, together with his -small provision of artillery, and to strike back into Galicia with -the best of his men. It would seem that he was inspired partly by the -desire of cutting Ney’s communications, partly by the wish to get -into touch with the Asturians, whose torpidity he was determined to -stir up into action. Accordingly he left at Puebla de Senabria his -guns and about 2,000 men, the skeletons of many ruined regiments, -under General Martin La Carrera, while with the 6,000 infantry that -remained he resolved to cross the Sierra Negra and throw himself -into the upper valley of the Sil. The road by Corporales and the -sources of the Cabrera torrent proved to be abominable; if the army -had possessed cannon or baggage it could not have reached its goal. -But after several hard marches La Romana descended to Ponferrada on -March 16. He learnt that the insurrection had compelled the French to -concentrate all their small posts, and that there was no enemy nearer -than Villafranca on the one hand and Astorga on the other. Thus he -found himself able to take possession of the high-road from Astorga -to Lugo, and to make use of all the resources of the Vierzo, and -of Eastern Galicia. He might have passed on undisturbed, if he had -chosen, to join the Asturians. But learning that the French garrison -at Villafranca was completely isolated, he resolved to risk a blow at -it, in the hopes that he might reduce it before Ney could learn of -his arrival and come down from Lugo to its aid. He was ill prepared -for a siege, for he had but one gun with him--a 12-pounder which he -had abandoned in January when retreating from Ponferrada to Orense, -and which he now picked up intact, with its store of ammunition, at a -mountain hermitage, where it had been safely hidden for two months. - -Marching on Villafranca next day he fell upon the French before -they had any conception that there was a hostile force in their -neighbourhood. He beat them out of the town into the citadel after a -sharp skirmish, and then surrounded them in their refuge, and began -to batter its gates with his single gun. If the garrison could have -held out for a few days they would probably have been relieved, for -Ney was but three marches distant. But the governor, regarding the -old castle as untenable against artillery, surrendered at the first -summons. Thus La Romana captured a whole battalion of the 6th Léger, -600 strong[469], together with several hundreds more of convalescents -and stragglers who had been halted at Villafranca, owing to the -impossibility of sending small detachments through the mountains[470] -when the insurgents were abroad[471]. - - [469] The number of unwounded prisoners was 574, that of killed - and wounded nearly 700. - - [470] The captives were sent off immediately into the Asturias. - Carrol saw them arrive at Oviedo. - - [471] There is a long dispatch of Mendizabal to La Romana in the - Record Office, giving details of the storm of Villafranca, which - was all over in four hours. - -Having accomplished this successful stroke La Romana was desirous -of pursuing his way to the Asturias, where he was determined to -make his power felt[472]. He took with him only one regiment (that -of La Princesa, one of his old corps from the Baltic), and handed -over the temporary command of the army to General Mahy, with orders -to hold on to the Vierzo as long as possible, but to retire on the -Asturias if Ney came up against him in force. The Marshal, however, -did not move from Lugo; when he heard of the fall of the garrison of -Villafranca, he was already so much entangled with the insurrection -that he could spare no troops for an expedition to the Vierzo. In -order to reopen the communication with Astorga he would have had to -call in his outlying brigades, and at the present moment he was more -concerned about the fate of Tuy and Vigo than about the operations of -La Romana. Accordingly, Mahy was left unmolested for the greater part -of a month in his cantonments along the banks of the Sil; it was a -welcome respite for the much-wandering army of Galicia. - - [472] Captain Carrol had written to him a few days before to beg - him to hasten to Oviedo: ‘I strongly advise your Excellency’s - repairing to this city (Oviedo), and adopting such plans and - measures for the better government of the province and the active - operations of the army as your Excellency shall think meet.’ - There were similar appeals from Spanish officers discontented - with the Junta. - -Romana meanwhile betook himself to Oviedo with his escort, and on -arriving there on April 4 entered into a furious controversy with -the Junta. Finding them obstinate, and not disposed to carry out -his plans without discussion, he finally executed a petty _coup -d’état_[473]. It bears an absurd resemblance to Cromwell’s famous -dissolution of the Long Parliament. Coming into their council-room, -with Colonel Joseph O’Donnell and fifty grenadiers of the Princesa -regiment, he delivered an harangue to the members, accusing them of -all manner of maladministration and provincial selfishness. Then he -signed to his soldiers and bade them clear the room[474]. - - [473] It may be worth while to quote the opening clauses of - La Romana’s proclamation explaining his _coup d’état_; it is - dated the day after his ‘purge’ of the Junta: a copy exists in - the Record Office, forwarded to Castlereagh by Carrol:--‘Me es - forzoso manifestar con mucho sentimiento que la actual Junta - de Asturias, aunque de las mas favorecidas por la generosidad - britannica en toda classe de subsidios, es la que menos ha - coadyuvado a la grande y heroyca empresa de arrojar a los - enemigos de nuestro patrio suelo. Formada esta Junta por intriga, - y por la prepotencia de algunos sugetos y familias conexionadas, - se propuse arrogarse un poder absoluto e indefinido: serven los - individuos mutuamente en sus proyectos y despiques, desechan con - pretextos infundidos y aun calumniosos al que no subscribiese a - ellos, y contentan a los menesterosos con comisiones o encargos - de interes,’ &c. - - [474] Carrol, who was an eye-witness of the scene, thought that - the Marquis ‘had re-formed the Junta in the most quiet, peaceable - and masterly manner.’ The last epithet seems the most appropriate - of the three. Carrol to Castlereagh, April 10, 1809 [in Record - Office]. - -La Romana then, on his own authority, nominated a new Junta; but -many of its members refused to act, doubting the legality of his -action, while the dispossessed delegates kept up a paper controversy, -and sent reams of objurgatory letters to the Government at Seville. -Ballasteros and his army, at the other side of the Principality, -seem to have paid little attention to La Romana, but the Marquis so -far got his way that he began to send much-needed stores, medicines, -munitions, and clothing to his troops in the Vierzo. He even -succeeded in procuring a few field-pieces for them[475], which were -dragged with difficulty over the passes viâ Cangas de Tineo. - - [475] Letters of La Romana to Mahy in Appendix to Arteche, vol. - vi. p. 145. - -Thus strengthened Mahy, much to his chief’s displeasure, advanced -from the Vierzo towards Lugo, with the intention of beating up the -French brigade there stationed. He took post at Navia de Suarna, just -outside the borders of the Asturias, and called to his standards all -the peasantry of the surrounding region. La Romana wrote him urgent -letters, directing him to avoid a battle and to await his own return. -‘He should remember that it was the policy of Fabius Maximus that -saved Rome, and curb his warlike zeal[476].’ It is satisfactory to -find that one Spanish general at least was free from that wild desire -for pitched battles that possessed most of his contemporaries. - - [476] Ibid., p. 146. - -Mahy, thus warned, halted in his march towards Lugo, and remained in -his cantonments in the valley of the Navia. His chief should have -returned to him, but lingered at Oviedo till April was over, busy -in the work of reorganization and in the forwarding of supplies. -Meanwhile the French hold on Southern Galicia had completely -disappeared: Vigo had fallen in March, Tuy had been evacuated. -Maucune’s column had cut its way back to Santiago with some -difficulty, bringing to Ney the news of Soult’s capture of Oporto, -but also the assurance that the whole valley of the Minho and the -western coast-land had passed into the hands of the insurgents. - -What the Duke of Elchingen’s next move would have been, if he had not -received further intelligence from without, we cannot say. But in the -first week in May the long-lost communication with Madrid was at last -reopened, and he was ordered to take his part in a new and broad plan -of operations against La Romana’s army and the Asturias. - -Ever since La Romana had stormed Villafranca, and all news from -Galicia had been completely cut off, King Joseph and his adviser -Jourdan had been in a state of great fear and perplexity as to the -condition of affairs in the north-west. Soult had long passed out of -their ken, and now Ney also was lost to sight. In default of accurate -information they received all manner of lugubrious rumours from -Leon and Astorga, and imagined that the Sixth Corps was in far more -desperate straits than was actually the case. Fearing the worst, they -resolved to find out, at all costs, what was going on in Galicia. -To do so it was necessary to fit out an expedition sufficiently -strong to brush aside the insurgents and communicate with Ney. -Troops, however, were hard to find. Lapisse had already marched -from Salamanca to join Victor. In Old Castile and Leon there were -but Kellermann’s dragoons and a few garrisons, none of which could -leave their posts. Marshal Bessières, to whom the general charge of -the northern provinces had been given by the Emperor, could show -conclusively that he was not able to equip a column of even 5,000 men -for service in Galicia. - -The only quarter whence troops could be procured was Aragon, where -everything had remained quiet since the fall of Saragossa. The -Emperor had issued orders that of the two corps which had taken part -in the siege, the Third only should remain to hold down the conquered -kingdom: hence Mortier and the Fifth should have been disposable to -reinforce the troops in Old Castile. But, with the Austrian war upon -his hands, Napoleon was thinking of withdrawing Mortier and his -15,000 men from Spain. In a dispatch dated April 10, he announced -that the Marshal was to retire from Aragon to Logroño in Navarre, -from whence he might possibly be recalled to France if circumstances -demanded it[477]. At the same moment King Joseph was writing to -Mortier to summon him into Old Castile, and pointing out to him that -the safety of the whole of Northern Spain depended upon his presence. -Much perplexed by these contradictory orders, the Duke of Treviso -took a half-measure, and marched to Burgos, which was actually in Old -Castile, but lay only three marches from Logroño and upon the direct -route to France. A few days later the Emperor, moved by his brother’s -incessant appeals, and seeing that it was all-important to reopen -the communication between Ney and Soult, permitted Mortier to march -to Valladolid, where he was in a good position for holding down the -entire province of Old Castile. He also gave leave to the King to -employ for an expedition to Galicia the two regiments of the Third -Corps, which had escorted the prisoners of Saragossa to Bayonne, and -which were now on their homeward way to join their division in Aragon. - - [477] Napoleon to Joseph, from Paris, April 10, 1809. - -It was thus possible to get together enough troops to open the -way to Galicia. The charge of the expedition was handed over to -Kellermann, who was given his own dragoons, the two regiments from -Bayonne, a stray battalion of Leval’s Germans from Segovia, a Polish -battalion from Buitrago, and a provisional regiment organized from -belated details of the Second and Sixth Corps, which had been lying -in various garrisons of Castile and Leon[478]. He had altogether -some 7,000 or 8,000 men, whom he concentrated at Astorga on April -27. Marching on Villafranca he met no regular opposition, but was -harassed by the way by the peasantry, who had abandoned their -villages and retired into the hills. Mahy had moved off the main -road by making his advance to Navia de Suarna, and was not sighted -by Kellermann, nor did the Spaniard think fit to meddle with such a -powerful force as that which was now passing him. - - [478] For details concerning the composition of this expedition - see Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 196. - -On May 2 the column reached Lugo, where it fell in with Maurice -Mathieu’s division of the Sixth Corps, and obtained full information -as to Ney’s position. The Marshal was absent at Corunna, but sent his -chief of the staff to meet Kellermann and concert with him a common -plan of operations. It was settled that they should concentrate their -attention on La Romana and the Asturians, leaving southern Galicia -alone for the present, and taking no heed of Soult, of whom they had -received no news for a full month. - -For the destruction of the Spanish armies of the north a concentric -movement was planned. Ney undertook to concentrate the main body -of his corps at Lugo, and to fall on the Asturians from the west, -crushing Mahy on the way. He stipulated, however, that he should -be allowed to return to Galicia as quickly as possible, lest the -insurgents should make havoc of his garrisons during his absence. -Kellermann was to retrace his steps to Astorga and Leon, and from -thence to march on the Asturias by the pass of Pajares, its great -southern outlet. At the same moment Bonnet at Santander was to be -requested to fall on from the east, and to attack Ballasteros and the -division that lay behind the Deba. - -When it was reported to Mahy and La Romana that Kellermann had -turned back from Lugo, and was retreating upon Astorga, they failed -to grasp the meaning of his movement, and came to the conclusion -that his expedition had been sent out with no purpose save that -of communicating with Ney. Unconscious that a simultaneous attack -from all sides was being prepared against them, they failed to -concentrate. By leaving small ‘containing’ detachments at the -outlying posts, they could have massed 20,000 men against any one of -the French columns: but they failed to see their opportunity and were -caught in a state of complete dispersion. Ballasteros with 9,000 men -still lay opposite Bonnet; Worster at Castropol did not unite with -Mahy’s army at Navia de Suarna; and La Romana remained at Oviedo with -two regiments only. - -Hence came hopeless disaster when the French attack was at last -let loose upon the Asturias. On May 13 the Duke of Elchingen drew -together at Lugo four of the eight infantry regiments which formed -the Sixth Corps, with two of his four cavalry regiments, and eight -mountain-guns carried by mules. This formed a compact force of 6,500 -bayonets and 900 sabres[479]. He left behind him four battalions and -a cavalry regiment under Maucune at Santiago, the same force under -the cavalry brigadier Fournier at Lugo, two battalions at Corunna, -one at Betanzos, and one at Ferrol. - - [479] The force that marched on the Asturias was composed of the - 25th Léger, 27th and 59th of Maurice Mathieu’s division, the 39th - from Marchand’s, the 3rd Hussars, and 25th Dragoons. - - Maucune’s detachment consisted of two battalions each of the 6th - Léger and the 76th, with the 15th Chasseurs and one battery. - - Fournier’s detachment was composed of the 15th Dragoons, two - battalions of the 69th, and one of the 76th. - -The obvious route by which the Marshal might have advanced on Oviedo -was the coast-road by Mondonedo and Castropol, which Worster was -guarding. But in order to save time and to fall upon the enemy on an -unexpected line, he took a shorter but more rugged mountain road by -Meyra and Ibias, which led him into the valley of the Navia. This -brought him straight upon Mahy’s army: but that general, when he learnt -of the strength that was directed against him, retreated in haste after -a skirmish at Pequin, and fled, not to the Asturias, but westward into -the upper valley of the Minho. [May 14.] This move was vexatious to -Ney, who would have preferred to drive him on to Oviedo, to share in -the general rout that was being prepared for the Asturians. The Marshal -refused to follow him, and pushed on to Cangas de Tineo in the valley -of the Narcea, capturing there a large convoy of food and ammunition -which was on its way from La Romana to Mahy. On May 17 he hurried on -to Salas, on the 18th he was at the bridge of Gallegos on the Nora -river, only ten miles from Oviedo. Here for the first time he met with -serious opposition: hitherto he had suffered from nothing but casual -‘sniping’ on the part of the peasantry. His march had been so rapid -that La Romana had only heard of his approach on the seventeenth[480], -and had not been able to call in any of his outlying detachments. -The Marquis was forced to attempt to defend the passage of the Nora -with nothing more than his small central reserve--the one Galician -regiment (La Princesa, only 600 bayonets) that he had brought with him -from Villafranca, and one Asturian battalion--not more than 1,500 men. -Naturally he was routed with great loss, though Ney allows that the -Princesa regiment made a creditable defence at the bridge[481]. The -Spanish troops therefore dispersed and fled eastward, while Romana rode -down to the seaport of Gijon and took ship on a Spanish sloop of war -along with the members of his Junta. The Marshal seized Oviedo on the -nineteenth: the place was pillaged in the most thorough fashion by his -troops. In his dispatch he makes the excuse that a few peasants had -attempted to defend some barricades in the suburbs, and that they, not -the soldiery, had begun the sack. _Credat Judaeus Apella!_ The ways -of the bands of Napoleon are too well known, and we shall not believe -that it was Spaniards who stole the cathedral plate, or tore the bones -of the early kings of Asturias from their resting-places in search of -treasure[482]. On May 20 Ney marched with one regiment down to Gijon, -where he found 250,000 lbs. of powder newly landed from England, and -a quantity of military stores. An English merchantman was captured -and another burnt[483]. A detached column occupied Aviles, the second -seaport of the Asturias. - - [480] Carrol gives an excellent account of the French invasion - in a long dispatch written from Vigo on June 3. He says that the - Marquis only heard of Ney’s approach by the peasants flying from - Cangas de Tineo on the morning of May 17. He himself was sent - out to verify the incredible information, and came on the French - as they were crossing the Navia, only thirty miles from Oviedo. - He rode back in haste, and met one Asturian battalion coming up, - and afterwards the regiment of La Princesa. Romana had no other - troops, and only a few hundred half-armed peasantry joined in the - defence of the bridge of Gallegos. - - [481] ‘Ce dernier pont de Gallegos fut assez bien défendu par le - régiment de la Princesse, mais néanmoins il fut enlevé, ainsi - qu’une pièce de douze.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21. - - [482] ‘Les magasins et les plus riches maisons de la ville furent - pillés par les paysans et la populace. Ces malheureux, ivres - d’eau-de-vie, entreprirent de défendre la ville et firent feu - dans toutes les rues.’ Ney to King Joseph, Oviedo, May 21. - - [483] They were called the Pique and the Plutus. Carrol was - nearly captured while burning the latter, and escaped in an open - boat. - -On the following day, May 21, a detachment sent inland from Oviedo -up the valley of the Lena, with orders to search for the column -coming from the south, got into touch with that force. Kellermann -had duly reached Leon, where he found orders directing him to send -back to Aragon the two regiments of the Third Corps which had been -lent him[484], and to take instead a division of Mortier’s corps, -which was now disposable for service in the north. Accordingly he -picked up Girard’s (late Suchet’s) division, and leaving one of its -brigades at Leon, marched with the other and the remainder of his -original force, to storm the defiles of Pajares. He had with him -between 6,000 and 7,000 troops, a force with which he easily routed -the Asturian brigade of 3,000 men under Colonel Quixano, which had -been set to guard the pass. At the end of two days of irregular -fighting, Kellermann descended into the valley of the Lena and met -Ney’s outposts on May 21. The routed enemy dispersed among the hills. - - [484] The 116th and 117th of Morlot’s division. - -It remains to speak of the third French column which started to -invade the Asturias, that of Bonnet. This general marched from -Santander on May 17 with 5,000 men, intending to attack Ballasteros, -and force his way to Oviedo by the coast-road that passes by San -Vincente de la Barquera and Villaviciosa. But he found no one to -fight, for Ballasteros had been summoned by La Romana to defend -Oviedo, and had started off by the inland road viâ Cangas de Oñis and -Infiesto. The two armies therefore were marching parallel to each -other, with rough mountains between them. On reaching Infiesto on -May 21, Ballasteros heard of the fall of Oviedo and of the forcing -of the pass of Pajares: seeing that it would be useless to run into -the lion’s mouth by proceeding any further, he fell back into the -mountains, and took refuge in the upland valley of Covadonga, the -site of King Pelayo’s famous victory over the Moors in the year 718. -Here he remained undiscovered, and was gradually joined by the wrecks -of the force which Ney had routed at Oviedo, including O’Donnell and -the Princesa regiment. Bonnet passed him without discovering his -whereabouts, advanced as far as Infiesto and Villaviciosa, and got -into touch with Kellermann. - -Thus the three French columns had all won their way into the heart -of the Asturias, but though they had seized its capital and its -seaports, they had failed to catch its army, and only half their task -had been performed. Of all the Asturian troops only the two small -forces at Oviedo and Pajares had been met and routed. Worster had not -been molested, Mahy had doubled back into Galicia, Ballasteros had -gone up into the mountains. If the invasion was to have any definite -results, it was necessary to hunt down all these three divisions. -But there was no time to do so: Ney was anxious about his Galician -garrisons; Bonnet remembered that he had left Santander in charge of -a weak detachment of no more than 1,200 men. Both refused to remain -in the Asturias, or to engage in a long stern chase after the elusive -Spaniards, among the peaks of the Peñas de Europa and the Sierras -Albas. They decided that Kellermann with his 7,000 men must finish -the business. Accordingly they departed each to his own province--and -it was high time, for their worst expectations had been fulfilled. -Mahy in the west and Ballasteros in the east had each played the -correct game, and had fallen upon the small garrisons left exposed in -their rear. Moreover, the insurgents of Southern Galicia had crossed -the Ulla and marched on Santiago. If Ney had remained ten days longer -in the Asturias, it is probable that he would have returned to find -the half of the Sixth Corps which he had left in Galicia absolutely -exterminated. - -The Marshal, however, was just in time to prevent this disaster. -Handing over the charge of the principality to Kellermann, he marched -off on May 22 by the coast-road which leads to Galicia by the route -of Navia, Castropol, and Ribadeo. He hoped to deal with Worster by -the way, having learnt that the Swiss general had advanced from -Castropol by La Romana’s orders, and was moving cautiously in the -direction of Oviedo. But Worster was fortunate enough to escape: he -went up into the mountains when he heard that Ney was near, and had -the satisfaction of learning that the Marshal had passed him by. The -rivers being in flood, and the bridges broken, the French had a slow -and tiresome march to Ribadeo, which they only reached on May 26. -Next day the Duke of Elchingen was at Castropol, where he received -the news that Lugo had been in the gravest peril, and had only been -relieved by the unexpected appearance of Soult and the Second Corps -from the direction of Orense. - -The sequence of events during the Marshal’s absence had been -as follows. When Mahy found that he had escaped pursuit, he had -immediately made up his mind to strike at the French garrisons. He -tried to persuade Worster to join him, or to attack Ferrol, but could -not induce him to quit the Asturias. So with his own 6,000 men Mahy -marched on Lugo, beat General Fournier (who came out to meet him) -in a skirmish outside the walls, and drove him into the town. Lugo -had no fortification save a mediaeval wall, and the Spaniards were -in great hopes of storming it, as they had stormed Villafranca. But -when they had lain two days before the place, they were surprised to -hear that a large French force was marching against them; it was not -Ney returning from the Asturias, but the dilapidated corps of Soult -retreating from Orense. Wisely refusing to face an army of 19,000 -men, Mahy raised the siege and retired to Villalba in the folds of -the Sierra de Loba. On May 22 Soult entered Lugo, where he was at -last able to give his men nine days’ rest, and could begin to cast -about him for means to refit them with the proper equipment of an -army, for, as we have seen, they were in a condition of absolute -destitution and wholly unable to take the field. - -At Castropol Ney heard at one and the same moment that Lugo had -been in danger and that it had been relieved. But he also received -news of even greater importance from another quarter. Maucune and -the detachment which he had left at Santiago had been defeated in -the open field by the insurgents of Southern Galicia, and had been -compelled to fall back on Corunna. This was now the point of danger, -wherefore the Marshal neither moved to join Soult at Lugo, nor set -himself to hunt Mahy in the mountains, but marched straight for -Corunna to succour Maucune. - -The force which had defeated that general consisted in the main of -the insurgents who had beleaguered Tuy and Vigo in March and April. -They were now under Morillo and Garcia del Barrio, who were beginning -to reduce them to some sort of discipline, and were organizing them -into battalions and companies. But the core of the ‘Division of the -Minho,’ as this force was now called, was composed of the small body -of regulars which La Romana had left at Puebla de Senabria, under -Martin La Carrera. That officer, after giving his feeble detachment -some weeks of rest, had marched via Monterey and Orense to join the -insurrectionary army. He brought with him nine guns and 2,000 men. On -May 22 Carrera and Morillo crossed the Ulla and advanced on Santiago -with 10,000 men, of whom only 7,000 possessed firearms. Maucune -came forth to meet them in the Campo de Estrella[485], outside the -city, with his four battalions and a regiment of chasseurs, thinking -to gain an easy success when the enemy offered him battle in the -open. But he was outnumbered by three to one, and as the Galicians -showed much spirit and stood steadily to their guns, he was repulsed -with loss. Carrera then attacked in his turn, drove the French into -Santiago, chased them through the town, and pursued them for a -league beyond it. Maucune was wounded, and lost 600 men--a fifth of -his whole force--and two guns. He fell back in disorder on Corunna. -He had the audacity to write to Ney that he had retired after an -indecisive combat: but the Marshal, reading between the lines of his -dispatch, hastened to Corunna with all the troops which had returned -from the Asturias, and did not consider the situation secure till he -learnt that Carrera had not advanced from Santiago. - - [485] The plain from which Santiago gets its name of Santiago de - Compostella. - -Leaving his main body opposite the ‘Division of the Minho,’ the Duke -of Elchingen now betook himself to Lugo, to concert a joint plan of -operation with Soult [May 30]. The results of their somewhat stormy -conference must be told in another chapter. - -Meanwhile the situation behind them was rapidly changing. On May 24 -La Romana, who had landed at Ribadeo, rejoined Mahy and his army -at Villalba. The Marquis, on surveying the situation, came to the -conclusion that it was too dangerous to remain in the northern angle -of Galicia, between the French army at Lugo and the sea. He resolved -to return to the southern region of the province, and to get into -touch with Carrera and the troops on the Minho. He therefore bade -his army prepare for another forced march across the mountains. They -murmured but obeyed, and, cautiously slipping past Soult’s corps by -a flank movement, crossed the high-road to Villafranca and reached -Monforte de Lemos. From thence they safely descended to Orense, -where La Romana established his head quarters [June 6]. Thus the -Spaniards were once more in line, and prepared to defend the whole of -Southern Galicia. - -We have still to deal with the state of affairs in the Asturias. -After Ney’s departure on May 22, Kellermann lay at Oviedo and Bonnet -at Infiesto. But a few days later the latter general received the -disquieting news that Ballasteros, whose movements had hitherto -escaped him, was on the move towards the east, and might be intending -either to make a raid into the plains of Castile, or to descend on -Santander and its weak garrison. - -Ballasteros, as a matter of fact, had resolved to stir up trouble in -Bonnet’s rear, with the object of drawing him off from the Asturias. -Leaving his refuge at Covadonga on May 24 he marched by mule-tracks, -unmarked on any map, to Potes in the upper valley of the Deba. There -he remained a few days, and finding that he was unpursued, and that -his exact situation was unknown to the French, resolved to make a -dash for Santander. Starting on June 6 and keeping to the mountains, -he successfully achieved his end, and arrived at his goal before the -garrison of that place had any knowledge of his approach. On the -morning of June 10 he stormed the city, driving out General Noirot, -who escaped with 1,000 men, but capturing 200 of the garrison and 400 -sick in hospital, as well as the whole of the stores and munitions of -Bonnet’s regiments. Among his other prizes was the sum of £10,000 in -cash, in the military chest of the division. Some of the French tried -to escape by sea, in three corvettes and two luggers which lay in the -harbour, but the British frigates _Amelia_ and _Statira_, which lay -off the coast, captured them all. This was a splendid stroke, and if -Ballasteros had been prudent he might have got away unharmed with -all his plunder. But he lingered in Santander, though he knew that -Bonnet must be in pursuit of him, and resolved to defend the town. -The French general had started to protect his base and his dépôts, -the moment that he ascertained the real direction of Ballasteros’ -march. On the night of June 10 he met the fugitive garrison and -learnt that Santander had fallen. Late on the ensuing day he reached -its suburbs, and sent in two battalions to make a dash at the place. -They were beaten off; but next morning Bonnet attacked with his -whole force, the Asturians were defeated, and Ballasteros’ raid -ended in a disaster. He himself escaped by sea, but 3,000 of his men -were captured, and the rest dispersed. The French recovered their -sick and prisoners, and such of their stores as the Spaniards had -not consumed[486]. The wrecks of Ballasteros’ division drifted back -over the hills to their native principality, save one detachment, -the regulars of La Romana’s old regiment of La Princesa. This small -body of 300 men turned south, and by an astounding march across -Old Castile and Aragon reached Molina on the borders of Valencia, -where they joined the army of Blake. They had gone 250 miles through -territory of which the French were supposed to be in military -possession, but threaded their way between the garrisons in perfect -safety, because the peasantry never betrayed their position to the -enemy. - - [486] All this may be studied in two dispatches of Bonnet to King - Joseph, dated Santander, June 12 and June 20. - -Disastrous as was its end, Ballasteros’ expedition had yet served its -purpose. Not only had it thrown the whole of the French garrisons in -Biscay and Guipuzcoa into confusion, but even the Governor of Bayonne -had been frightened and had sent alarming dispatches to the Emperor. -This was comparatively unimportant, but it was a very different -matter that Bonnet had been forced to evacuate the Asturias, all of -whose eastern region was now free from the invaders. - -More was to follow: Kellermann still lay at Oviedo, worried but -not seriously incommoded by Worster and the Asturians of the west. -But a few days after Bonnet’s departure he received a request from -Mortier (backed by orders from King Joseph), that the division of -the 5th Corps which had been lent him should instantly return to -Castile. This was one of the results of Wellesley’s campaign on -the Douro, for Mortier, hearing of Soult’s expulsion from Northern -Portugal, imagined that the British army, being now free for further -action, would debouch by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo and fall upon -Salamanca. He needed the aid of his second division, which Kellermann -was forced to send back. But it would have been not only useless -but extremely dangerous to linger at Oviedo with the small remnant -of the expeditionary force, when Girard’s regiments had been -withdrawn. Therefore Kellermann wisely resolved to evacuate the whole -principality, and returned to Leon by the pass of Pajares in the -third week of June. - -Thus ended in complete failure the great concentric attack on the -Asturias. The causes of the fiasco were two. (1) The French generals -chose as their objective, not the enemy’s armies, but his capital -and base of operations. Both Ney and Bonnet while marching on Oviedo -left what (adapting a naval phrase) we may call an ‘army-in-being’ -behind them, and in each case that army fell upon the detachments -left in the rear, and pressed them so hard that the invading forces -could not stay in the Asturias, but were forced to turn back to -protect their communications. (2) In Spain conquest was useless -unless a garrison could be left behind to hold down the territory -that was overrun. But neither Ney, Kellermann, nor Bonnet had any -troops to devote to such a purpose: they invaded the Asturias with -regiments borrowed from other regions, from which they could not long -be spared. As later experience in 1811 and 1812 showed, it required -some 8,000 men merely to maintain a hold upon Oviedo and the central -parts of the principality. The invaders had no such force at their -disposition--the troops from the 6th Corps were wanted in Galicia, -those of the 5th Corps in Castile, those of Bonnet in the Montaña. If -it were impossible to garrison the Asturias, the invasion dwindled -down into a raid, and a raid which left untouched the larger part -of the enemy’s field army was useless. It would have been better -policy to hunt Mahy, Worster, and Ballasteros rather than to secure -for a bare three weeks military possession of Oviedo and Gijon. If -Soult had not dropped from the clouds, as it were, to save Lugo: -if Ballasteros had been a little more prudent at Santander, the -Asturian expedition would have ended not merely in a failure, but in -an ignominious defeat. It should never have been undertaken while -the Galician insurrection was still raging, and while no troops were -available for the permanent garrisoning of the principality. - -Searching a little deeper, may we not say that the ultimate cause -of the fiasco was Napoleon’s misconception of the character of the -Spanish war? It was he who ordered the invasion of the Asturias, and -he issued his orders under the hypothesis that it could be not only -conquered but retained. But with the numbers then at the disposal of -his generals this was impossible, because the insurrection absorbed -so many of their troops, that no more could be detached without -risking the loss of all that had been already gained. By grasping at -the Asturias Napoleon nearly lost Galicia. Only Soult’s appearance -prevented that province from falling completely into the hands of -Mahy and La Carrera: and that appearance was as involuntary as it was -unexpected. If the Duke of Dalmatia had been able to carry out his -original design he would have retreated from Oporto to Zamora and not -to Orense. If Beresford had not foiled him at Amarante, he would have -been resting on the Douro when Fournier was in such desperate straits -at Lugo. In that case Ney might have returned from Oviedo to find -that his detachments had been destroyed, and that Galicia was lost. -It was not the Emperor’s fault that this disaster failed to occur. - - - - -SECTION XV: CHAPTER II - -THE FRENCH ABANDON GALICIA - - -When, upon May 30, 1809, Ney arrived at Lugo, and met Soult in -conference, it seemed that, now or never, the time had come when a -serious endeavour might be made to subdue the Galician insurgents. -The whole force of the 2nd and 6th Corps was concentrated in the -narrow triangle between Ferrol, Corunna, and Lugo. The two marshals -had still 33,000 men fit for service, after deducting the sick. If -they set aside competent garrisons for the three towns that we have -just named, they could still show some 25,000 men available for field -operations, and with such a force Ney was of the opinion that the -insurrection might be beaten down. It was true that the 2nd Corps -was in a deplorable condition as regards equipment, but on the other -hand Corunna and Ferrol were still full of the stores of arms and -ammunition that had been captured when they surrendered. Clothing, no -doubt, was lamentably deficient, and Ney could only supply hundreds -where Soult asked for thousands of boots and _capotes_; but he -refitted his colleague’s troops with muskets and ammunition, and -furnished him with eight mountain-guns--field-pieces the Duke of -Dalmatia would not take, though a certain number were offered him; -for after his experience of the way that his artillery had delayed -him in February and March he refused to accept them. Horses and -mules were unattainable--nearly half Soult’s cavalry was dismounted, -and he had lost most of his sumpter-beasts between Guimaraens and -Montalegre. Nevertheless, the corps, after a week’s rest at Lugo, -was once more capable of service. Its weakly men had been left in -hospital at Oporto, or had fallen by the way in the dreadful defiles -of Ruivaens and Salamonde. All that remained were war-hardened -veterans, and Soult, out of his 19,000 men, had no more than 800 -sick and wounded. He resolved to disembarrass himself of another -hindrance, his dismounted cavalry, and in each regiment made the 3rd -and 4th squadrons hand over their chargers to the 1st and 2nd. The -1,100 troopers thus left without mounts were armed with muskets, and -formed into a column, to which were added the _cadres_ of certain -infantry battalions belonging to the regiments which had suffered -most. In these the 3rd, or the 3rd and 4th, battalions turned over -their effective rank and file to the others, while the officers and -non-commissioned officers were to be sent home to their dépôts to -organize new units. The whole body was placed under General Quesnel, -who was directed to cut his way to Astorga by the great high-road: -it was hoped that he would come safely through, now that La Romana -had withdrawn his army to Southern Galicia. The expedient was a -hazardous one; but the column was fortunate: it was forced to fight -with a large assembly of peasants at Doncos, half-way between Lugo -and Villafranca, but reached its goal with no great loss, though for -every mile of the march it was being ‘sniped’ and harassed by the -guerrillas. - -Soult’s available force, after he had sent his sick into the -hospitals of Lugo, and had dismissed Quesnel’s detachment, was about -16,500 or 17,000 sabres and bayonets. Ney had about 15,000 men left. -The two marshals were bound, both by the Emperor’s orders and by the -mere necessities of the situation, to co-operate with each other. But -there was a fundamental divergence between their aims and intentions. -Ney had been given charge of Galicia, and he regarded it as his duty -to conquer and hold down the province. He refused to look beyond his -orders, or to take into consideration the progress of operations -in other parts of the Peninsula. Soult, on the other hand, always -loved to play his own game, and had no desire to stay in Galicia in -order to lighten his colleague’s task. He was disgusted with the -land, its mountains, and its insurgents, and was eager to find some -excuse for quitting it. He had no difficulty in discovering many -excellent reasons for retiring into the plains of Leon. The first -was the dilapidated state of his troops: in spite of the resources -which Ney had lent, the 2nd Corps still lacked clothing, pay, and -transport. Soult had written to King Joseph on May 30 to ask that all -these necessaries might be sent forward to Zamora, where he intended -to pick them up. A still more plausible plea might be found in the -general state of affairs in Northern Spain. The Emperor’s main object -was the expulsion of the British army from the Peninsula. But if the -2nd Corps joined the 6th in a long, and probably fruitless, hunt -after the evasive La Romana, Wellesley would be left free to march -whithersoever he might please. He might base himself on Almeida and -Ciudad Rodrigo, and make a sudden inroad into Leon and Old Castile, -where the small corps of Mortier would certainly prove inadequate to -hold him back. Or he might go off to the south, and fall upon Victor -in Estremadura, a move which might very probably lead to the loss of -Madrid. Soult therefore was of opinion that his duty was to drop down -into Leon, and there join with Mortier in making such a demonstration -against Portugal as would compel the British army to stand upon the -defensive, and to abandon any idea of invading Spain either by the -valley of the Douro or that of the Tagus. ‘He could not keep his eye -off Portugal,’ as Jourdan and King Joseph, no less than Ney, kept -complaining[487]. There cannot be the least doubt that Soult was -quite right in turning his main attention in this direction. It was -the English army that was the most dangerous enemy; and it was the -flanking position of Portugal that rendered the French movements -toward the south of Spain hazardous or impracticable. - - [487] The phrase occurs in a dispatch of Jourdan’s written in - August. - -Nevertheless all the Duke of Dalmatia’s arguments seemed to his -colleague mere excuses destined to cover a selfish determination -to abandon the 6th Corps, and to shirk the duty of co-operating in -the conquest of Galicia. He insisted that Soult must aid him in -crushing La Romana before taking any other task in hand. And he had -a strong moral claim for pressing his request, because it was from -the resources which he had furnished that the 2nd Corps had been -re-equipped and rendered capable of renewed service in the field. -The marshals wrangled, and their followers copied them, for a fierce -feud, leading to a copious exchange of recrimination and many duels, -sprang up during the few days that the staffs of the two corps lay -together at Lugo[488]. At last Soult yielded, or feigned to yield, -to Ney’s instances: he promised to lend his aid for the suppression -of the Galician insurrection under certain conditions. A plan for -combined action was accordingly drawn up. - - [488] There is clear evidence of this quarrel in the diaries and - memoirs of the officers of both corps. ‘Nous fûmes d’abord bien - reçus à Lugo’--writes Soult’s aide-de-camp St. Chamans--‘mais le - Maréchal Ney étant arrivé, les choses changèrent de face, et on - eût dit que nous n’étions plus un corps français: tout nous était - refusé: même nos malades mouraient en foule dans les hôpitaux, - faute d’aliments: car tout était réservé, par les ordres de Ney, - pour son corps d’armée, et on peut bien dire qu’on nous traita - de Turc en Maure’ (p. 150). Des Odoards is equally precise: - ‘Une fâcheuse mésintelligence a éclaté entre les troupes de Ney - et les nôtres: les duels sont survenus, et peu s’en est fallu - qu’oubliant que nous sommes, les uns et les autres, enfants de - la France, il n’y ait eu engagement général. Le non-succès de - notre entreprise, l’état de délabrement de notre tenue, out servi - de texte aux mauvaises plaisanteries, aux propos outrageants, - dont des scènes sanguinaires ont été la suite. Les soldats seuls - ont d’abord pris part à ces rixes, puis elles ont gagné les - officiers, et s’il faut croire certain bruits, les maréchaux ont - eu eux-mêmes une entrevue fort orageuse’ (p. 240). According to - the common report this ‘stormy interview’ actually ended in Ney’s - drawing his sword upon Soult, and being only prevented by General - Maurice Mathieu from assailing him. This tale was told to Captain - Boothby (see his _Memoirs_, ii. p. 31) by a French officer who - said that he had been an eye-witness of the scene. - -According to this scheme Ney was to advance from Corunna to Santiago -with the 6th Corps, and was to drive the main body of the insurgents -southward in the direction of Vigo and Tuy, following the line of -the great coast-road. Soult meanwhile was to operate in the inland, -against the enemy’s exposed flank. He was to march from Lugo down -the valley of the upper Minho, pushing before him all that stood in -his way, with the object of thrusting the enemy on to Orense, and -then towards the sea. If all went right, La Romana’s army as well as -the insurgents of the coast, would finally be enclosed between the -two marshals and the Atlantic cliffs, and, as it was hoped, would -be exterminated or forced to surrender. The obviously weak point of -the plan was that it did not allow sufficiently for the power which -the enemy possessed of escaping, by dispersion, or by taking to the -mountains. Even if the details of the two movements had been carried -out with perfect accuracy, it is probable that the Galicians would -have crept out of some gap, or slipped away between the converging -corps, or saved themselves by a headlong retreat into Portugal. -The Marshals might have captured Vigo and Orense: it is extremely -unlikely that they could have done more, especially as they had to -deal with a general like La Romana, who had made up his mind that his -duty was to avoid pitched battles, and to preserve his army at all -costs. If Cuesta or Blake had been in command the scheme would have -been much more feasible; but La Romana was the only Spanish commander -then in the field who had resolved never to fight if he could help it. - -On June 1 Ney and Soult parted, starting the one upon the road to -Corunna, the other upon that which makes for Orense by the valley of -the upper Minho. It would seem that neither of them had any great -confidence in the success of the plan adopted, and that each was -possessed by the strongest doubts as to the loyalty with which his -colleague would support him. Soult was on the watch for any good -excuse for throwing up the scheme and retiring to Zamora. Ney was -determined not to risk himself and his corps overmuch, lest he should -find himself left in the lurch by Soult at the critical moment[489]. - - [489] ‘Il se sépara de Ney, avec lequel il eût l’air d’arrêter, - pour la conservation de la Galice, un plan de campagne auquel - tous les deux étaient, je crois, résolus d’avance de ne pas - se conformer, car ils voulaient le moins possible se trouver - ensemble.’ St. Chamans (p. 151). This represents the view of - Soult’s staff. - -Meanwhile the Spaniards had been straining every nerve to reorganize -the army of Galicia, employing the short time of respite that -they had gained in drafting back into the old corps the numerous -stragglers who began to return to their colours as the summer drew -on, and in raising new battalions of volunteers. La Romana lay in -person at Orense with the main body of the original army, which -had now risen to a force of about 7,000 properly equipped men, and -nearly 3,000 unarmed recruits: he had still only four guns[490]. The -‘Division of the Minho’ was no longer under Carrera and Morillo: they -had been superseded by the arrival of the Conde de Noroña to whom -the Central Junta had given over the command. This officer found -himself at the head of about 10,000 men, of whom only about 2,500 -were regulars, the rest were peasantry new to the career of arms, but -so much exhilarated by their late successes at Vigo and the Campo -de Estrella, that it was hard to hold them back from taking the -offensive[491]. Fortunately Noroña was gifted not only with tact but -with caution: he knew how to keep the horde together without allowing -them to get out of hand, and utterly refused to risk them in the open -field[492]. - - [490] La Romana (June 1, in the Record Office) gives present at - Orense 9,633 men--of whom 7,094 were old soldiers, including 381 - cavalry and 379 artillery. - - [491] Carrol to Castlereagh, from Vigo, June 11. - - [492] For some notes concerning Noroña’s character see Arteche, - vi. 188. - -On June 5 Ney arrived before Santiago with the main body of the -6th Corps--eighteen battalions, three cavalry regiments and two -batteries: he had again left Corunna, Ferrol, and Lugo in the charge -of very small garrisons, and was by no means without misgivings as -to their fate during his absence. But he thought that his first duty -was to concentrate a field force sufficiently large to face and beat -the whole army of Galicia, in case La Romana should join Noroña for a -combined attack on the 6th Corps. - -On the news of the Marshal’s approach the Spanish general drew back -all his forces behind the estuary known as the Octavem (or Oitaben), -a broad tidal stretch of water where several small mountain torrents -meet at the head of a long bay. Noroña might have disputed the lines -of the Ulla and the Vedra, but neither of these rivers affords such -a good defensive position as the Oitaben. Here the hills of the -interior come down much nearer to the sea than they do at the mouths -of the Ulla and the Vedra, so that there is a much shorter line to -defend, between low-water mark and the foot of the inaccessible -Sierra de Suido. There was no road inland by which the position could -be turned, so that the Galicians had only to guard the six miles of -river-bank between the sea and the mountain. There were two bridges -to be watched: the more important was that of Sampayo, where the -main _chaussée_ to Vigo passes the Oitaben just where it narrows -down and ceases to be tidal. The second was that of Caldelas, four -miles further inland, where a side-road to the village of Sotomayor -crosses the Verdugo, the most northern of the three torrents which -unite to form the Oitaben. Noroña had broken down four arches of -the great Sampayo bridge. That of Caldelas he had not destroyed, -but had barricaded: he had drawn a double line of trenches on the -hillside that dominates it, and placed there a battery containing -some of his small provision of artillery--he had but nine field-guns -and two mortars taken from the walls of Vigo. Morillo was given -charge of this part of the position, Noroña took post himself at -Sampayo. He had neglected no minor precaution that was possible--some -gunboats, one of which was manned by English sailors drawn from the -two frigates in the bay, patrolled the tidal part of the Oitaben, and -flanked the broken bridge. Winter, the senior naval officer present, -put his marines on shore: along with sixty stragglers from Moore’s -army, who had been liberated by the peasants from French captivity, -they garrisoned Vigo, which lies a few miles beyond the Oitaben. - -On June 7 Ney reached the front of the position and ascertained -that the bridge of Sampayo was broken. His artillery exchanged some -objectless salvos with that of Noroña, while his cavalry rode inland -to look for possible points of passage. They could find none save -the fortified bridge of Caldelas, and a very difficult ford just -above it, commanded, like the bridge, by the Spanish trenches on the -hillside. The Marshal was also informed that at the Sampayo itself -there was another ford, passable only at low tide for three hours at -a time. - -These reports were by no means encouraging: the Spanish position was -almost impregnable, and there was no way of turning it. Indeed the -only road by which the enemy could be taken in flank or rear was -that from Orense to Vigo, along the Minho. This Ney could not reach: -but supposing that Soult had carried out the plan of operations to -which he had assented on June 1, it was just possible that he might -appear, sooner or later, on that line, and so dislodge the enemy. -However it was equally possible that he might be still far distant, -and so Ney resolved to make an attempt to force the passage of -the Oitaben. On the morning of June 8 therefore, after a long but -fruitless cannonade, one body of infantry endeavoured to pass at the -ford opposite the village of Sampayo[493], while another, with some -cavalry, attempted to cross the other ford at Caldelas, and to storm -its bridge. At both places the Galicians stood their ground, and the -heads of the column were exposed to such a furious fire that they -suffered heavily and failed to reach the further bank. The Marshal -therefore drew them back, and refused to persist in an attack which -would only have had a chance of success if the enemy had misbehaved -and given way to panic. The French lost several hundred men[494], the -Galicians, safe in their trenches, suffered far less. - - [493] Carrol, writing from Vigo two days later, says that the - French infantry ‘seemed determined _at any risk_ to cross the - water at low tide,’ that they came on very boldly, but could not - face the fire, and finally gave back. - - [494] Carrol, in the letter just quoted, says that thirty-nine - dead bodies were left before the bridge-head of Caldelas, which - the French could not carry off because of the hot fire that - played upon the spot. He estimates the French total loss at 300, - while that of Noroña was only 111. - -That evening Ney received news which convinced him that Soult had -left him in the lurch, and had no intention of prosecuting his march -on Orense, to turn the enemy’s flank. It was reported that the 2nd -Corps, after making only two days’ march from Lugo, had stopped short -at Monforte de Lemos, and showed no signs of moving forward. Indeed -the Duke of Dalmatia had put the regiments into cantonments and was -evidently about to make a lengthy halt. - -Since the Duke of Elchingen was now convinced that the enemy could -not be dislodged from behind the Oitaben without his colleague’s aid, -and since that colleague showed no signs of appearing within any -reasonable time, the game was up. On the morning of the ninth Ney -gave orders for his troops to draw off, and to retire by the road -to Santiago and Corunna. He made no secret of his belief that Soult -had deliberately betrayed him, and had never intended to keep his -promise[495]. Without the aid of the 2nd Corps he had no hopes of -being able to suppress the Galician insurrection. But till he should -learn precisely what his colleague was doing, he could not make up -his mind to abandon the province. He therefore sent off on June 10 an -aide-de-camp with a large escort, by the circuitous route via Lugo. -This officer bore a dispatch, which explained the situation, reported -the check at Sampayo, and demanded that the 2nd Corps should not -move any further away, but should return to lend aid to the 6th in -its time of need. It was more than ten days before an answer was -received. But on the twenty-first Soult’s reply came to hand: he -had been found marching, not towards Orense, but eastward, in the -direction of the frontiers of Leon. He refused to turn back, alleging -that this was not in the bond signed at Lugo, and that his troops -were in such a state of exhaustion that he was forced to lead them -into the plains, to rest them and refit them. Such a reply seemed to -justify Ney’s worst suspicions; abandoned by his colleague, and with -the care of the whole of Galicia thrown upon his hands, he refused -to risk the safety of the 6th Corps in the unequal struggle. He -evacuated Corunna and Ferrol on the twenty-second and concentrated -his whole force at Lugo. There he picked up the sick and wounded of -Soult’s corps as well as his own, and in six forced marches retired -along the high-road by Villafranca to Astorga, which place he reached -on June 30. Every day he had been worried and molested by the local -guerrillas, but neither Noroña nor La Romana had dared to meddle -with him. In his anger at the constant attacks of the insurgents, he -sacked every place that he passed, from Villafranca and Ponferrada -down to the smallest hamlets. Twenty-seven Galician towns and -villages are said to have been burned by the 6th Corps during its -retreat. Such conduct was unworthy of a soldier of Ney’s calibre: it -can only be explained by the fact that he was almost beside himself -with wrath at being foiled by Soult’s breach of his plighted word, -and vented his fury on the only victims that he could reach. - - [495] ‘I have been assured,’ says Napier (ii. 127), ‘by an - officer of Ney’s personal staff [Col. D’Esménard] that he rashly - concluded that personal feelings had swayed Soult to betray the - 6th Corps. In this error he returned in wrath to Corunna.’ But - was his conclusion rash, or wrong? - -We must now turn back to trace the steps of the 2nd Corps in its -devious march from Lugo to the plains of Leon. Soult had sent out -Loison with one division by the road down the left bank of the Minho -on June 1. He himself followed with the rest of the army on the next -day. On the third the Marshal reached the little town of Monforte de -Lemos, between the Minho and the Sil, which he found deserted by its -inhabitants. In obedience to La Romana’s orders they had all gone up -into the mountains. - -If Soult had been honestly desirous of carrying out his compact with -Ney, his next step would have been to make a rapid march on Orense. -He must have been able to calculate that his colleague would now be -in touch with Noroña’s forces somewhere to the south of Corunna, -and it was his duty to co-operate by descending the Minho in the -enemy’s rear. The mere fact that he remained for the unconscionable -space of eight days at Monforte, is a sufficient proof that he never -intended to carry out his part of the compact. During this time [June -3-11], while Ney was fighting out to an unsuccessful end his campaign -against Noroña, Soult was absolutely quiescent, at a place only -thirty miles from his starting-point at Lugo. He was unmolested save -by small bands of local guerrillas, who fled to the hills whenever -they were faced. His official chronicler Le Noble pleads that there -were no fords to be found either over the Minho or over the Sil[496]. -But in eight days, unopposed by any serious enemy, the engineers of -the 2nd Corps could certainly have built bridges if the Marshal had -ordered them to do so. Meanwhile the troops rested, and rejoiced in -the abundant supplies of food and wine which they gathered in from -the neighbourhood, for Monforte lies in the centre of a fertile -upland and its neighbourhood had never before suffered from the ills -of war[497]. - - [496] Le Noble, p. 280. - - [497] Fantin des Odoards, p. 242. - -On the eleventh Soult at last moved on. But it was not in the -direction of Orense. He had no news of Ney, and professed to be -concerned that the 6th Corps had not yet been heard of on the -Orense road. Finally he announced that he was compelled to believe -that the Duke of Elchingen had not executed his part of the joint -campaign[498], and that there was no longer any reason that the 2nd -Corps should carry out its share of the plan. Accordingly he marched, -not toward Ney, but in the opposite direction, up the valley of the -Sil, with his face set towards the east. He pretended that he hoped -to catch and disperse the corps of La Romana, to whom he attributed -a design of marching on Puebla de Senabria--the same movement that -the Marquis had executed once before in the first days of March. But -as a matter of fact La Romana was at Orense, and far from having -any intention of retreating eastward, if he were attacked by the 2nd -Corps, he was looking on Portugal as his line of retreat[499]. - - [498] ‘Le Maréchal crut, _ou feignit de croire_, que Ney avait - changé d’idée,’ says his aide-de-camp St. Chamans, p. 151. - - [499] La Romana writes to Carrol from Orense, on June 9, to - say that he had been intending to march by cross-roads to fall - on Ney’s flank, and so aid the division of Noroña. But Soult’s - appearance at Monforte with 12,000 men [an under-estimate] - compels him to remain behind to observe that marshal [Record - Office]. - -On the thirteenth Soult reached Montefurado, where the Sil is bridged -by masses of rocks which have fallen into its bed: the river forces -its way beneath them by a tunnel sixty feet broad, which is supposed -to have been cut by the Romans. Crossing on this natural bridge, -he turned southward to follow the valley of the Bibey, which leads -to Puebla de Senabria and the plains of Leon. He met no resistance -save from the local insurgents, headed by the Abbot of Casoyo and -a partisan called El Salamanquino, who received little or no aid -from the regular army. Indeed the only Spanish troops in this remote -corner of Galicia were 200 men under an officer called Echevarria, -a dépôt left behind at Puebla de Senabria by La Carrera, when he -had marched to Vigo in May. This handful of men joined the local -guerrillas, and the appearance of their uniforms among the enemy’s -ranks served Soult as an excuse for stating that he was contending -with the army of La Romana. Any reader of his dispatches would -conclude that during the last days of June he was opposed by a -considerable body of that force. As a matter of fact he was never -anywhere near the Galician army, which lay first at Orense, then at -Celanova, finally at Monterey on the Portuguese frontier, always -moving to the right, parallel with the Marshal’s advance, so as to -avoid being outflanked on its southern wing. It was with the peasants -of the valley of the Bibey alone that Soult had to do. Thrusting -them to right and left, and cruelly ravaging the country-side on -both banks of the river, he reached Viana on June 16. From thence -Franceschi sent a flying expedition over the hills to La Gudina, on -the road from Monterey to Puebla de Senabria. It brought back news -that La Romana had come down to Monterey when the 2nd Corps moved to -Viana, but that he was evidently not marching eastward. It had met -and routed a party of Spanish cavalry sent out from Monterey[500]; -the prisoners taken from them said that the Marquis was returning to -Orense now that he had seen the 2nd Corps committing itself to an -advance up the valley of the Bibey, and passing away in the direction -of the plains of Leon. - - [500] Carrol was with this party. He had come out from Vigo to - join La Romana, was at La Gudina on June 16, and retreated to - Monterey when Franceschi attacked that point. The Marquis turned - back when he saw Franceschi move off eastward, and retired to his - old head quarters at Orense. If Soult had pushed westward, the - Spaniards had the choice between the road to Chaves and that back - to Orense, and were in no danger. - -It was while halting at Larouco, during this march, that Soult -received the dispatch which Ney had written to him from Santiago on -June 10. His reply, as we have already seen, was a peremptory refusal -to turn back to the aid of the 6th Corps. He asserted that he had -fulfilled his part of the bargain made at Lugo (which he assuredly -had not), and refused to undertake any further offensive operations -with troops in a state of utter destitution and fatigue. He declared -to his staff, and wrote to King Joseph, that he believed that Ney had -deliberately mismanaged his expedition against Vigo, and had suffered -himself to be checked, in order to have an excuse for detaining -the 2nd Corps in Galicia[501]. Why, he asked, had not the Duke of -Elchingen sent a turning column against Orense, instead of making a -frontal attack against the line of the Oitaben? The plain answer to -this query--viz. that Ney with a field-force of only 10,000 men, and -having three weak garrisons behind him, could not afford either to -divide his army or to go too far from Corunna and Lugo--he naturally -did not give. - - [501] ‘Il (Ney) m’engageait à rester en Galice, et me - représentait qu’il pourrait résulter pour lui de fâcheuses - conséquences si j’en sortais. Cette proposition m’étonna: il me - parut que M. le Maréchal Ney se conduisait à m’obliger à rester - en Galice: car certainement rien ne l’empêchait de manœuvrer sur - Orense, tandis que moi-même j’agissais contre La Romana.... Je - me crus encore plus obligé qu’auparavant de suivre mon premier - projet.’ Soult to Joseph, June 25. - -Accordingly, on June 23, Soult abandoned the valley of the Bibey, -and crossed the watershed of the Sierra Segundera in two columns, -one descending on to La Gudina, the other on to Lobian. On the -twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth the whole army was united at Puebla -de Senabria. The town was taken without a shot being fired; and the -French found there several cannon which La Carrera had not carried -off when he marched to Vigo, and which Echevarria had spiked but -neglected to destroy. The corps rested for five days in Puebla -de Senabria, where it obtained abundance of food and comfortable -lodging. But Franceschi and his light-horse, now reduced to not -more than 700 sabres, were pushed on at once to Zamora, to bear -news to King Joseph of the approach of the 2nd Corps, and to beg -that the stores, money, artillery, and clothing, which Soult had -demanded in his letter from Lugo, might be forwarded to him as soon -as possible[502]. Although the authorities at Madrid had heard -nothing of the doings of the Marshal since June 1, they had already -prepared much of the material required, and sent it to Salamanca. -From thence it was now transferred to Zamora and Benavente, where it -was handed over to the war-worn 2nd Corps. Other stores were procured -from Valladolid and even from Bayonne. But the artillery, the most -important of all the necessaries, was long in coming. - - [502] On reaching Zamora, Franceschi handed over the charge of - his division to General Pierre Soult, the Marshal’s brother, and - rode on towards Madrid with no escort but two aides-de-camp. They - were captured near Toro by the celebrated guerrilla chief El - Capuchino (Fray Juan Delica), who sent the important dispatches - which they were bearing to Seville: Frere instantly forwarded a - copy to Wellesley (July 9), who thus got invaluable information - as to Soult’s situation and future intentions. In the Record - Office there is a letter requesting that the news of Franceschi’s - captivity may be sent to his wife in Paris, which was duly done. - The unfortunate general was imprisoned first at Granada and then - at Cartagena: in both places, it is said, he was treated with - unjustifiable rigour, and kept in close confinement within four - walls--it was the same usage that Napoleon meted out to Palafox. - He died of a fever in 1811, after two years’ captivity. - -Soult’s main body had broken up from Puebla de Senabria on June 29: -from thence Mermet’s, Delaborde’s, and Lorges’ troops marched to -Benavente, and those of Merle and Heudelet to Zamora. In these places -they enjoyed a few days of rest and began to refit themselves. But -it was not long before they were called upon to take part in another -great campaign, and once more to face their old enemies the English. - -The first care of the Duke of Dalmatia, after he had emerged from the -Galician Sierras, had been to write long justificatory dispatches to -the Emperor and King Joseph. They are most interesting documents, -and explain with perfect clearness his reasons for abandoning Ney -and returning to the valley of the Douro. His main thesis is that -it was his duty to keep the English in check, since they were the -one really dangerous enemy in the Peninsula. Since it was notorious -that Wellesley had quitted Northern Portugal, it was practically -certain that he must be intending to march southward, to fall upon -Victor, and strike a blow at Madrid. It was necessary, therefore, -that the 2nd Corps should follow him, and be ready to aid in the -defence of the capital. The safety of Madrid was far more important -than the subjection of Galicia, and the Marshal had no hesitation -in sacrificing the lesser object in order to secure the greater. -Ney, he thought, would be strong enough to make head against Noroña -and La Romana united: but he could not hope to hold down the whole -of Galicia, and he would have either to be reinforced, or to be -permitted to evacuate the province. - -As to the conquest of Galicia, it would take many men and many -months. At present it would be impossible to find the forces -necessary for its complete subjection. This could only be done by -fortifying not merely Corunna, Ferrol, and Lugo, but also Tuy, -Monterey, Viana, and Puebla de Senabria. Each of these places should -be given a garrison of 5,000 or 6,000 men, and furnished with stores -calculated to last for four months. In addition there would have to -be blockhouses built along the high-road from Lugo to Villafranca, -and on several other lines. Columns operating from each of the seven -great garrisons should be continually moving about, keeping open the -communication between stronghold and stronghold, and chastising the -insurgents. - -Thus Soult calculated that the subjection of Galicia would require -from 35,000 to 42,000 men, continually on the move, and never liable -to be called upon for any service outside the province. It was -absurd, therefore, for him to suggest in a later paragraph that Ney -might be left to hold his own. What was the use of setting 15,000 -men to work on a task that would strain the energies of 35,000? And -where was King Joseph to find the additional 20,000 men, if the 2nd -Corps were withdrawn into Leon to watch the British army? No such -force could be drawn from any other part of Spain, and it would be -useless to ask for reinforcements from France while the Austrian War -was calling every available man to the Danube. Soult’s view, clearly, -was that Galicia would have to be abandoned for the present, though -he did not choose to say so. Till the English had been destroyed, or -driven into the sea, King Joseph would never be able to find 35,000 -men to lock up in the remote and mountainous north-western corner of -the Peninsula[503]. - - [503] There is so much valuable information in these dispatches - of Soult, dated June 25, from Puebla de Senabria, that I have - printed the most important paragraphs as an Appendix--omitting - the lengthy narrative of the operations on the Sil and the - Bibey in which the Marshal vainly flattered himself that he - had dispersed the armies of La Romana and ‘Chavarria’ (i.e. - Echevarria). - -There is not the slightest doubt that Soult’s views were perfectly -correct. Looking at the war in the Peninsula as a whole, it was a -strategical blunder to endeavour to hold Galicia before Portugal had -been conquered. And while the force of the French armies in Spain -remained at its present figure, it was impossible to spare two whole -army corps for this secondary theatre of operations. The attempt -to subdue the province had only been made because Moore had drawn -after him to Corunna the armies of Soult and Ney: and, since they -were on the spot, the temptation to use them there was too great to -be withstood. This is but one more instance of the way in which the -famous march to Sahagun had disarranged all the Emperor’s original -plans for the conquest of the Peninsula. - -It has often been debated whether it would be truer to say that -Galicia was delivered by Wellesley’s operations or by the valour -and obstinacy of its own inhabitants. After giving all due credit -to the gallant peasantry who checked Ney and harassed Soult, to the -prudence of the untiring La Romana, and to Noroña’s cautious courage, -it is yet necessary to decide that the real cause of the evacuation -of the province by the invaders was the presence of the victorious -British army in Portugal. The two Marshals might have maintained -themselves there for an indefinite time, if they could have shut -their eyes to what was going on elsewhere. But Soult was quite -right in believing that it would be mad to persist in the attempt to -subdue Galicia, while Wellesley was in the field, and nothing lay -between him and Madrid but the 22,000 men of the 1st Corps. If he -and Ney had lingered on in the north, engaged in fruitless hunting -after La Romana, while July and August wore on, Madrid would have -fallen into the hands of Wellesley and Cuesta, and King Joseph would -once more have been forced to go upon his travels, to Burgos or -elsewhere. The Talavera campaign only failed of success because the -2nd and the 6th Corps were withdrawn from the Galician hills just -in time to concentrate at Salamanca and fall upon the rear of the -victors. If they had been wandering around Monterey or Mondonedo at -the end of July, instead of being cantoned in the plains of Leon, the -capital of Spain would undoubtedly have been recovered by Wellesley -and Cuesta--though whether those ill-assorted colleagues could have -held it for long is another question. Into such possibilities it is -useless to make inquiry. - - -N.B.--My best authority for this campaign is the set of dispatches -by Carrol in the Record Office. He was at Vigo from June 3 to June -14; with La Romana from June 16 to July 11. Thus he was on the spot -for the fight on the Oitaben, and also for the operations against -Soult. Napier’s narrative is more than usually faulty in dealing -with the end of the Galician campaign. He writes as a partisan of -Soult, and his whole tale is drawn from the Marshal’s dispatches and -from the book of the panegyrist, Le Noble. His whole picture of the -desperate condition of La Romana is untrue: the Marquis had always -open to him a safe retreat into Portugal, and his army was never -engaged with Soult at all. Carrol’s dispatches make this quite clear. -The map (facing p. 125 of vol. ii.) is so hopelessly inaccurate both -as to distances, and as to the relative positions of places to each -other, that I can only compare it to those ingenious diagrams which -a railway produces, in order to show that it possesses the shortest -route from London to Edinburgh, or from Brussels to Berlin. - - - - -SECTION XV: CHAPTER III - -OPERATIONS IN ARAGON: ALCAÑIZ AND BELCHITE - -(MARCH-JUNE 1809) - - -When, upon February 20, the plague-stricken remnant of the -much-enduring garrison of Saragossa laid down their arms at the feet -of Lannes, it seemed probable that the whole of North-Eastern Spain -must fall a helpless prey to the invader. The time had come when the -3rd and the 5th Corps, freed from the long strain of the siege, were -once more available for field-operations. For the last two months -almost every dispatch that the Emperor or King Joseph wrote, had -been filled with plans and projects that began with the words ‘When -Saragossa shall have fallen.’ If only Palafox and his desperate -bands were removed, it would be easy to trample down Aragon, to take -Catalonia in the rear, and finally to march to the gates of Valencia, -and end the struggle on the eastern coast. - -Now at last the 30,000 men of Mortier and Junot could be turned to -other tasks, and there seemed to be every reason to expect that -they would suffice to carry out the Emperor’s designs. There was no -army which could be opposed to them, for, only a few days after the -capitulation of Saragossa, Reding had risked and lost the battle of -Valls, and the wrecks of his host had taken refuge within the walls -of Tarragona. - -The only surviving Spanish force which was under arms in the valley -of the Ebro consisted of the single division, not more than 4,000 -strong, under the Marquis of Lazan. After his vain attempt to come -to the rescue of Saragossa in the early days of February, Lazan had -drawn back to Fraga and Monzon, forced to look on from afar at the -last stage of his brother’s desperate resistance. In the rest of the -kingdom of Aragon there were but two or three scattered battalions -of new levies[504], and some guerrilla bands under Perena and other -chiefs. - - [504] See sect. xi. chap. i. pp. 101-2. - -The mistaken policy which had led Joseph Palafox to shut up in -Saragossa not only his own army but also the succours which he had -procured from Valencia and Murcia, now bore its fruit. There was no -force left which could take the field against the victorious army -of Lannes. It seemed therefore that the war in Aragon must come to -a speedy end: the French had but to advance and the whole kingdom -must fall into their hands. The national cause, however, was not -quite so desperate as might have been supposed. Here, as in other -regions of Spain, it was ere long to be discovered that it was one -thing to destroy a Spanish army, and another to hold down a Spanish -province. A French corps that was irresistible when concentrated on -the field of battle, became vulnerable when forced to divide itself -into the number of small garrisons that were needed for the permanent -retention of the territory that it had won. Though the capital of -Aragon and its chief towns were to remain in the hands of the enemy -for the next five years, yet there were always rugged corners of the -land where the struggle was kept up and the invader baffled and held -in check. - -Yet immediately after the fall of Saragossa it seemed for a space -that Aragon might settle down beneath the invader’s heel. Lannes, -whose health was still bad, returned to France, but Mortier and -Junot, who now once more resumed that joint responsibility that they -had shared in December, went forth conquering and to conquer. They -so divided their efforts that the 5th Corps operated for the most -part to the north, and the 3rd Corps to the south of the Ebro, though -occasionally their lines of operations crossed each other. - -The kingdom of Aragon consists of three well-marked divisions. On -each side of the Ebro there is a wide and fertile plain, generally -some thirty miles broad. But to the north and the south of this rich -valley lie range on range of rugged hills. Those on the north are -the lower spurs of the Pyrenees: those to the south form part of the -great central ganglion of the Sierras of Central Spain, which lies -just where Aragon, Valencia, and New Castile meet. - -The valley of the Ebro gave the French little trouble: it was not a -region that could easily offer resistance, for it was destitute of -all natural defences. Moreover, the flower of its manhood had been -enrolled in the battalions which had perished at Saragossa, and few -were left in the country-side who were capable of bearing arms--still -fewer who possessed them. The plain of Central Aragon lay exhausted -at the victor’s feet. It was otherwise with the mountains of the -north and the south, which contain some of the most difficult ground -in the whole of Spain. There the rough and sturdy hill-folk found -every opportunity for resistance, and when once they had learnt by -experience the limitations of the invader’s power, were able to keep -up a petty warfare without an end. Partisans like Villacampa in the -southern hills, and Mina in the Pyrenean valleys along the edge of -Navarre, succeeded in maintaining themselves against every expedition -that was sent against them. Always hunted, often brought to bay, they -yet were never crushed or destroyed. - -But in March 1809 the Aragonese had not yet recognized their own -opportunities: the disaster of Saragossa had struck such a deep blow -that apathy and despair seemed to have spread over the greater part -of the kingdom. When Mortier and Junot, after giving their corps -a short rest, began to spread movable columns abroad, there was -at first no resistance. The inaccessible fortress of Jaca in the -foot-hills of the Pyrenees surrendered at the first summons; its -garrison was only 500 strong, yet it should have made some sort of -defence against a force consisting of no more than a single regiment -of Mortier’s corps, without artillery. [March 21[505].] The fall -of this place was important, as it commands the only pass in the -Central Pyrenees which is anything better than mule-track. Though -barely practicable for artillery or light vehicles, it was useful for -communication between Saragossa and France, and gave the French army -of Aragon a line of communication of its own, independent of the long -and circuitous route by Tudela and Pampeluna. - - [505] Toreno gives some curious details about the surrender - of Jaca, which he says was largely due to the intrigues of a - friar named José de Consolation, who preached resignation and - submission to God’s will in such moving terms that the greater - part of the garrison deserted! He was afterwards found to have - been an agent of the French. The Central Junta sent the Governor - Campos, the Corregidor Arcón, and the officers commanding the - artillery and engineers before a court-martial, which condemned - them all to death. Only the engineer was caught (he had openly - joined the French) and shot. [Arteche, vi. p. 10.] - -Other columns of Mortier’s corps marched against Monzon and Fraga, -the chief towns in the valley of the Cinca. On their approach the -Marquis of Lazan retired down the Ebro to Tortosa, and both towns -were occupied without offering resistance. Another column marched -against Mequinenza, the fortress at the junction of the Ebro and -Segre: here, however, they met with opposition; the place was only -protected by antiquated sixteenth-century fortifications, but it -twice refused to surrender, though on the second occasion Mortier -himself appeared before its walls with a whole brigade. The Marshal -did not besiege it, deferring this task till he should have got all -of Eastern Aragon well in hand. At this same time he made an attempt -to open communications with St. Cyr in Catalonia, sending a regiment -of cavalry under Colonel Briche to strike across the mountains -beyond the Segre in search of the 7th Corps. Briche executed half -his mission, for by great good fortune combined with very rapid -movement, he slipped between Lerida and Mequinenza, got down into -the coast-plain and met Chabot’s division of St. Cyr’s army at -Montblanch. When, however, he tried to return to Aragon, in order to -convey to the Duke of Treviso the information as to the distribution -of the 7th Corps, he was beset by the _somatenes_, who were now on -the alert. So vigorously was he assailed that he was forced to turn -back and seek refuge with Chabot. Thus Mortier gained none of the -news that he sought, and very naturally came to the conclusion that -his flying column had been captured or cut to pieces. - -Meanwhile Junot and the 3rd Corps were operating south of the Ebro. -The Duke of Abrantes sent one of his three divisions (that of -Grandjean) against Caspe, Alcañiz, and the valleys of the Guadalope -and Martin, while another (that of Musnier) moved out against the -highlands of the south, and the mountain-towns of Daroca and Molina. -Most of the battalions of his third division, that of Morlot, were -still engaged in guarding on their way to France the prisoners of -Saragossa. - -Of the two expeditions which Junot sent out, that which entered the -mountains effected little. It lost several small detachments, cut off -by the local insurgents, and though it ultimately penetrated as far -as Molina, it was unable to hold the place. The whole population had -fled, and after remaining there only six days, the French were forced -to return to the plains by want of food. [March 22--April 10.] The -Aragonese at once came back to their former position. - -Grandjean, who had moved against Alcañiz, had at first more -favourable fortune. He overran with great ease all the low-lying -country south of the Ebro, and met with so little opposition that he -resolved to push his advance even beyond the borders of Valencia. -Accordingly he ascended the valley of the Bercantes, and appeared -before Morella, the frontier town of that kingdom, on March 18. -The place was strong, but there was only a very small garrison in -charge of it[506], which retired after a slight skirmish, abandoning -the fortress and a large store of food and equipment. If Grandjean -could have held Morella, he would have secured for the French army -a splendid base for further operations. But he had left many men -behind him at Caspe and Alcañiz, and had but a few battalions in -hand. He had gone too far forward to be safe, and when the Junta of -Valencia sent against him the whole of the forces that they could -collect--some 5,000 men under General Roca--he was compelled to -evacuate Morella and to fall back on Alcañiz. [March 25.] - - [506] Only the single regiment, America, whose cadre, sent back - by Infantado from Cuenca, was being filled up with recruits from - the Morella district. [Junot to King Joseph, from Saragossa, - March 25.] - -Mortier and Junot were concerting a joint movement for the completion -of the conquest of Eastern Aragon, and an advance against Tortosa, -when orders from Paris suddenly changed the whole face of affairs. -The Emperor saw that war with Austria was inevitable and imminent: -disquieted as to the strength of the new enemy, he resolved to draw -troops from Spain to reinforce the army of the Danube. The only -corps which seemed to him available was that of Mortier, and on -April 5 he ordered that the Duke of Treviso should concentrate his -troops and draw back to Tudela and Logroño. It might still prove to -be unnecessary to remove the 5th Corps from the Peninsula; but at -Logroño it would be within four marches of France if the Emperor -discovered that he had need of its services in the north. On the same -day Napoleon removed Junot from his command, probably on account of -the numerous complaints as to his conduct sent in by King Joseph. -To replace him General Suchet, the commander of one of Mortier’s -divisions, was directed to take charge of the 3rd Corps[507]. - - [507] See Joseph’s letter of April 6, and the Emperor’s orders, - from Paris, of April 5 and April 10. - -Ten days later the imperial mandate reached Saragossa, and on -receiving it Mortier massed his troops and marched away to Tudela. -We have already seen[508] that his corps was never withdrawn from -Spain, but merely moved from Aragon to Old Castile. But its departure -completely changed the balance of fortune on the Lower Ebro. The -number of French troops in that direction was suddenly reduced by one -half, and the 3rd Corps had to spread itself out to the north, in -order to take over all the positions evacuated by Mortier. It was far -too weak for the duty committed to its charge, and at this moment it -had not even received back the brigade sent to guard the Saragossa -prisoners, which (it will be remembered) had been called off and lent -to Kellermann[509]. There were hardly 15,000 troops left in the whole -kingdom of Aragon, and these were dispersed in small bodies, with -the design of holding down as much ground as possible. The single -division of Grandjean had to cover the whole line from Barbastro to -Alcañiz--places seventy miles apart--with less than 5,000 bayonets. -The second division, Musnier’s, with its head quarters at Saragossa, -had to watch the mountains of Upper Aragon. Of the 3rd division, that -of Morlot, the few battalions that were available were garrisoning -Jaca and Tudela, on the borders of Navarre. No sooner had Mortier’s -corps departed, than a series of small reverses occurred, the -inevitable results of the attempt to hold down large districts with -an inadequate force. Junot, who was still retained in command till -his successor should arrive, seemed to lack the courage to draw in -his exposed detachments: probably his heart was no longer in the -business, since he was under sentence of recall. Yet he had six weeks -of work before him, for by some mischance the dispatch nominating -Suchet to take his place reached Saragossa after that general had -marched off at the head of his old division of Mortier’s corps. -Cross-communication being tardy and difficult, it failed to catch -him up till he had reached Valladolid. Returning from thence with a -slow-moving escort of infantry, Suchet did not succeed in joining -his corps till May 19. He found it in a desperate situation, for the -last four weeks had seen an almost unbroken series of petty reverses, -and it looked as if the whole of Aragon was about to slip out of the -hands of the French. It was fortunate for the 3rd Corps that its new -commander, though hitherto he had never been placed in a position -of independent responsibility, proved to be a man of courage and -resource--perhaps indeed the most capable of all the French generals -who took part in the Peninsular War. A timid or unskilful leader -might have lost Aragon, and imperilled the hold of King Joseph on -Madrid. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the entire French -position in Spain would have been gravely compromised if during the -last weeks of May the 3rd Corps had been under the charge of a less -skilful and self-reliant commander. - - [508] See p. 378. - - [509] See p. 378. - -In the month that elapsed before Suchet’s arrival the consequences -of the withdrawal of the 5th Corps from the Lower Ebro were making -themselves felt. The Aragonese were not slow to discover the decrease -in the numbers of the invaders, and to note the long distances that -now intervened between post and post. The partisans who had retired -into Catalonia, or had taken refuge in the mountains of the south -and the north, began to descend into the plains and to fall upon the -outlying French detachments. On May 6 Colonel Perena came out of -Lerida, and beset the detachment of Grandjean’s division which held -the town and fortress of Monzon, with a horde of peasants and some -Catalan _miqueletes_. The governor, Solnicki, thereupon fell back -to Barbastro, the head quarters of Habert’s brigade. That general -considered that he was in duty bound to retake Monzon, and marched -against it with six battalions and a regiment of cuirassiers. He -tried to cross the Cinca, not opposite the town, but much lower -down the stream, at the ferry of Pomar. [May 16.] But just as his -vanguard[510] had established itself on the other bank, a sudden -storm caused such a rising of the waters that its communication -with the main body was completely cut off. Thereupon Habert marched -northward, and tried to force a passage at Monzon, so as to secure -a line of retreat for his lost detachment. The bridge of that town -however had been barricaded, and the castle garrisoned: Habert was -held at bay, and the 1,000 men who had crossed at the ferry of Pomar -were all cut off and forced to surrender. After marching for three -days among the insurgents, and vainly endeavouring to force their -way through the horde, they had to lay down their arms when their -cartridges had all been exhausted. [May 19.] Only the cuirassiers -escaped, by swimming the river when the flood had begun to abate, and -found their way back to Barbastro. - - [510] It consisted of eight _compagnies d’élite_, viz. the - _voltigeur_ companies of the 14th Line, and the 2nd of the - Vistula, and the grenadier and voltigeur companies of the 116th - of the Line, with half a squadron of the 13th Cuirassiers. [Von - Brandt, p. 62.] - -In consequence of this disaster the French lost their grip on the -valley of the Cinca, for the insurgents, under Perena and the Catalan -chief Baget, moved forward into the Sierra de Alcubierre and raised -the whole country-side in their aid. Habert, fearing to be cut off -from Saragossa, thereupon retired to Villafranca on the Ebro, and -abandoned all North-Eastern Aragon[511]. - - [511] This little campaign can be studied in detail in Von - Brandt, pp. 60-8. He was serving as lieutenant in the 2nd of - the Vistula, and gives many details which are not to be found - in Suchet or Arteche. Toreno would seem (ii. 10) to be wrong in - saying that Habert tried to storm Monzon, and got over the river - there, but was beaten back by Baget. Von Brandt says that there - was nothing but a hot fire across the water, and that the attack - could not be pushed home. - -Meanwhile the other brigade of Grandjean’s division, which still -lay at Alcañiz, south of the Ebro, was also driven in by the -Spaniards. Its commander Laval was attacked by a large force coming -from Tortosa, and was forced to draw back to San Per and Hijar -[May 18-19]. At the news of his retreat all the hill-country of -Southern Aragon took arms, and the bands from Molina and the other -mountain-cities extended their raids down the valley of the Huerta -and almost to the gates of Saragossa. - -The Spanish force which had seized Alcañiz was no mere body of -armed peasants, but a small regular army. General Blake had just -been given the post of commander-in-chief of all the forces of -the _Coronilla_--the old kingdom of Aragon and its dependencies, -Valencia and Catalonia. Burning to atone for his defeats at Zornoza -and Espinosa by some brilliant feat of arms, he was doing his best -to collect a new ‘Army of the Right.’ From Catalonia he could draw -little or nothing: the troops which had fought under Reding at Valls -were still cooped up in Tarragona, and unfit for field-service. But -Blake had concentrated at Tortosa the division of the Marquis of -Lazan--the sole surviving fraction of the old Army of Aragon--and the -troops which he could draw from Valencia. These last consisted at -this moment of no more than the reorganized division of Roca from the -old ‘Army of the Centre.’ Its depleted _cadres_ had been sent back -by Infantado from Cuenca, and the Junta had shot into them a mass of -recruits, who in a few weeks had raised the strength of the division -from 1,500 to 5,000 bayonets. Other regiments were being raised in -Valencia, but in the early weeks of May they were not yet ready -for the field, though by June they gave Blake a reinforcement of -nearly 12,000 men[512]. Murcia could provide in May only one single -battalion for Blake’s assistance: all its field army had perished at -Saragossa. The total force of the new ‘Army of the Right’ when it -advanced against Alcañiz was less than 10,000 men--the Valencians in -its ranks outnumbered the Aragonese by four to three. - - [512] It is necessary to enter a protest against Napier’s - statement (vol. ii. p. 252), that Valencia did not do its fair - share in defending the general cause of Spain--that ‘from - the very commencement of the insurrection its policy was - characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that - overwhelmed the other parts of the country.’ The contribution of - Valencia to the national armies raised in 1808-9, compares well - with that of the other provinces. These troops, too, were not - used for local defence, but employed in other parts of Spain. - Argüelles’ answer to Napier on this point seems conclusive: (see - the Appendix-volume of his _Observaciones_, &c.). The troops sent - out by Valencia were:-- - - Men. - (1) To join the division of Llamas in the ‘Army of the - Centre’ [Roca’s later division], thirteen battalions, - about 6,000 - (2) To join the division of O’Neille in Aragon, one - regiment 800 - (3) To join the division of St. March in Aragon, nine - battalions 6,000 - (4) Joined Palafox at Saragossa between the date of Tudela - and the commencement of the siege, one battalion 500 - (5) Sent to Catalonia in December, two battalions 800 - (6) Raised to recruit Roca’s division in January 4,000 - (7) Raised to join Blake between April and June 1809 11,881 - ------ - Total 29,981 - - These figures are exclusive of cavalry and artillery, and in some - cases are under-estimated, as no morning-states of the troops - survive for the earlier months of the campaign of 1808, and - these totals are taken from returns made late in the year, when - the regiments had begun to run low in numbers. For the enormous - monetary contribution made by Valencia in 1808-9, see the tables - in Argüelles. - -When Suchet therefore arrived at Saragossa on May 19, and took over -the command of the 3rd Corps from the hands of Junot, the prospect -seemed a gloomy one for the French. Their outlying detachments had -been forced back to the neighbourhood of Saragossa: the central -reserve (Musnier’s two brigades) was small: the third division -(with the exception of one regiment) was still absent--one of its -brigades was with Kellermann in Leon[513], and some detachments were -scattered among the garrisons of Navarre. After the sick and the -absent had been deducted, Suchet found that he had not much more -than 10,000 men under arms, though the nominal force of the 3rd -Corps was still about 20,000 sabres and bayonets. Nor was it only -in numbers that the Army of Aragon was weak: its _morale_ also left -much to be desired. The newly-formed regiments which composed more -than half of the infantry[514] were in a deplorable condition, a -natural consequence of the haste with which they had been organized -and sent into the field. Having been originally composed of companies -drawn from many quarters, they still showed a mixture of uniforms of -different cut and colour, which gave them a motley appearance and, -according to their commander, degraded them in their own eyes and -lowered their self-respect[515]. They had not yet fully recovered -from the physical and moral strain of the siege of Saragossa. Their -pay was in arrear, the military chest empty, the food procured from -day to day by marauding. There was much grumbling among the officers, -who complained that the promotions and rewards due for the capture -of Saragossa had almost all been reserved for the 5th Corps. The -guerrilla warfare of the last few weeks had disgusted the rank and -file, who thought that Junot had been mismanaging them, and knew -absolutely nothing of the successor who had just replaced him. The -whole corps, says Suchet, was dejected and discontented[516]. - - [513] See p. 378. - - [514] The 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, and 121st of the line were - all formed from the ‘Provisional Regiments’ of 1808. - - [515] Suchet’s _Mémoires_. i. p. 11. - - [516] ‘Le 3me corps avait beaucoup souffert au siège de - Saragosse. L’infanterie était considérablement affaiblie: les - régiments de nouvelle formation surtout se trouvaient dans un - état déplorable, par les vices inséparables d’une organisation - récente et précipitée.... Des habits blancs bleus et de formes - différentes, restes choquants de divers changements dans - l’habillement, occasionnaient dans les rangs une bigarrure - qui achevait d’enlever à des soldats déjà faibles et abattus - toute idée de considération militaire. L’apparence de la misère - les dégradait à leurs propres yeux ... Dans un état voisin du - découragement, cette armée était loin de compenser par sa force - morale le danger de sa faiblesse numérique.’ Suchet, p. 16. - - Von Brandt speaks to much the same effect, and says that some - of the troops gave a bad impression, and that he saw battalions - which looked as if they would not stand firm against a sudden and - fierce attack, such as that which Mina and his guerrillas used to - deliver [p. 61]. - -Nevertheless there was no time to rest or reorganize these sullen -battalions: the Spaniards were pressing in so close that it was -necessary to attack them at all costs: the only other alternative -would have been to abandon Saragossa. Such a step, though perhaps -theoretically justifiable under the circumstances, would have ruined -Suchet’s military career, and was far from his thoughts. Only two -days after he had assumed the command of the corps, he marched out -with Musnier’s division to join Laval’s troops at Hijar. [May 21.] He -had sent orders to Habert to cross the Ebro and follow him as fast -as he was able: but that general, who was still on the march from -Barbastro to Villafranca, did not receive the dispatch in time, and -failed to join his chief before the oncoming battle[517]. - - [517] From a casual reading of Suchet, i. 17-21, it might be - thought that the general had been joined by Habert before the - battle. But he certainly was not, as the Memoirs of Von Brandt, - who was with Habert, show that this brigade was at Villafranca, - forty miles from Alcañiz, on the twenty-third, and only started - (too late) to join its chief on the twenty-fourth. The mention - of the 2nd of the Vistula on p. 21 of Suchet is a misprint for - the 3rd of the Vistula of Musnier’s division. Half the 13th - Cuirassiers was also absent with Habert. - -On May 23, however, Suchet, with Musnier’s and Laval’s men, presented -himself in front of Blake’s position at Alcañiz. He had fourteen -battalions and five squadrons with him--a force in all of about -8,000 men, with eighteen guns[518]. He found the Spaniards ready -and willing to fight. They were drawn up on a line of hills to the -east of Alcañiz, covering that town and its bridge. Their position -was good from a tactical point of view, but extremely dangerous when -considered strategically: for Blake had been tempted by the strong -ground into fighting with the river Guadalope at his back, and had -no way of crossing it save by the single bridge of Alcañiz and a -bad ford. It was an exact reproduction of the deplorable order of -battle that the Russians had adopted at Friedland in 1807, though not -destined to lead to any such disaster. The northern and highest of -the three hills occupied by the Spaniards, that called the Cerro de -los Pueyos, was held by the Aragonese troops. On the central height, -called the hill of Las Horcas, was placed the whole of the Spanish -artillery--nineteen guns--guarded by three Valencian battalions: this -part of the line was immediately in front of the bridge of Alcañiz, -the sole line of retreat. The southern and lowest hill, that of La -Perdiguera, was held by Roca and the rest of the Valencians, and -flanked by the small body of cavalry--only 400 sabres--which Blake -possessed[519]. The whole army, not quite 9,000 strong, outnumbered -the enemy by less than 800 bayonets, though in French narratives it -is often stated at 12,000 or 15,000 men[520]. - - [518] According to Suchet’s own figures from his May 15 return, - the forces engaged must have been:-- - - Musnier’s Division: - 114th Line (three batts.) 1,627 - 115th Line (three batts.) 1,732 - 1st of the Vistula (two batts.) 1,039 - 121st Line (one batt. only) 400 - Detachment of the 64th and 40th of - the Line [General’s escort] 450 - ------- - 5,248 - - Laval’s Brigade: - 14th Line (two batts.) 1,080 - 3rd of the Vistula (two batts.) 964 - Cavalry, 4th Hussars 326 - Half 13th Cuirassiers 200 - Artillery 320 - ------- - 2,890 - Total 8,138 - - [519] The Spanish line-of-battle was as follows:-- - - Left wing, General Areizaga: - Daroca, Volunteers of Aragon, Tiradores de Doyle, - Reserve of Aragon, 1st Tiradores de Murcia, Company - of Tiradores de Cartagena--five and one-sixth batts. 2,669 - - Centre, Marquis of Lazan: - Volunteers of Valencia, Ferdinando VII, 3rd batt. of - America, detachment of Traxler’s Swiss--three and a - half batts. 1,605 - - Right wing, General Roca: - 3rd batt. of Savoia, 2nd batt. of America, 1st of - Valencia (three batts.), 2nd Cazadores of Valencia, - 1st Volunteers of Saragossa--seven batts. 3,742 - - Cavalry (detachments of Santiago, Olivenza, and Husares - Españoles) 445 - - Artillery 245 - - - [520] Napier, for example, following French sources, gives Blake - 12,000 men. - -Suchet seems to have found some difficulty at first in making out -the Spanish position--the hills hid from him the bridge and town of -Alcañiz, whose position in rear of Blake’s centre was the dominant -military fact of the situation. At any rate, he spent the whole -morning in tentative movements, and only delivered his main stroke -in the afternoon. He began by sending Laval’s brigade against the -dominating hill on the right flank of the Spanish position. Two -assaults were made upon the Cerro de los Pueyos, which Suchet in his -autobiography calls feints, but which Blake considered so serious -that he sent off to this flank two battalions from his left wing and -the whole of his cavalry. Whether intended as mere demonstrations or -as a real attack, these movements had no success, and were repelled -by General Areizaga, the commander of the Aragonese, without much -difficulty. The Spanish cavalry, however, was badly mauled by -Suchet’s hussars when it tried to deliver a flank charge upon the -enemy at the moment that he retired. - -When all the fighting on the northern extremity of the line had -died down, Suchet launched his main attack against Blake’s centre, -hoping (as he says) to break the line, seize the bridge of Alcañiz, -which lay just behind the hill of Las Horcas, and thus to capture -the greater part of the Spanish wings, which would have no line of -retreat. The attack was delivered by two of Musnier’s regiments[521] -formed in columns of battalions, and acting in a single mass--a -force of over 2,600 men. A column of this strength often succeeded -in bursting through a Spanish line during the Peninsular War. But on -this day Suchet was unlucky, or his troops did not display the usual -_élan_ of French infantry. They advanced steadily enough across the -flat ground, and began to climb the hill, in spite of the rapid and -accurate fire of the artillery which crowned its summit. But when -the fire of musketry from the Spanish left began to beat upon their -flank, and the guns opened with grape, the attacking columns came to -a standstill at the line of a ditch cut in the slope. Their officers -made every effort to carry them forward for the few hundred yards -that separated them from the Spanish guns, but the mass wavered, -surged helplessly for a few minutes under the heavy fire, and then -dispersed and fled in disorder. Suchet rallied them behind the five -intact battalions which he still possessed, but refused to renew -the attack, and drew off ere night. He himself had been wounded in -the foot at the close of the action, and his troops had suffered -heavily--their loss must have been at least 700 or 800 men[522]. -Blake, who had lost no more than 300, did not attempt to pursue, -fearing to expose his troops in the plain to the assaults of the -French cavalry. - - [521] Three battalions of the 114th of the Line, and two of the - 1st of the Vistula. - - [522] Suchet gives a very poor account of Alcañiz in his - _Mémoires_. In spite of his many merits, he did not take a - beating well, and slurs over this action, just as in 1812 he - slurs over his defeat at Castalla. He does not even give an - estimate of his killed and wounded, and has the assurance to say - that he left the enemy only ‘l’opinion de la victoire’ (i. 20). - Blake clearly makes too much of the French attack on his right in - his dispatch. - -The morale of the 3rd Corps had been so much shaken by its -unsuccessful début under its new commander, that a panic broke out -after dark among Laval’s troops, who fled in all directions, on -a false alarm that the Spanish cavalry had attacked and captured -the rearguard. Next morning the army poured into San Per and Hijar -in complete disorder, and some hours had to be spent in restoring -discipline. Suchet discovered the man who had started the cry of -_sauve qui peut_, and had him shot before the day was over[523]. - - [523] Suchet, _Mémoires_, p. 20. - -The French had expected to be pursued, and many critics have blamed -Blake for not making the most of his victory and following the -defeated enemy at full speed. The Spanish general, however, had good -reasons for his quiescence: he saw that Suchet’s force was almost -as large as his own; he could not match the French in cavalry; -and having noted the orderly fashion in which they had left the -battle-field, he could not have guessed that during the night they -would disband in panic. Moreover--and this was the most important -point--he was expecting to receive in a few days reinforcements -from Valencia which would more than double his numbers. Till they -had come up he would not move, but contented himself with sending -the news of Alcañiz all over Aragon and stimulating the activity of -the insurgents. As he had hoped, the results of his victory were -important--the French had to evacuate every outlying post that they -possessed, and the whole of the open country passed into the hands of -the patriots. Perena and the insurgents of the north bank of the Ebro -pressed close in to Saragossa: other bands threatened the high-road -to Tudela: thousands of recruits flocked into Blake’s camp, but he -was unfortunately unable to arm or utilize them. - -Within a few days, however, he began to receive the promised -reinforcements from Valencia--a number of fresh regiments from the -rear, and drafts for the corps that were already with him[524]. He -also used his authority as supreme commander in Catalonia to draw -some reinforcements from that principality--three battalions of -Reding’s Granadan troops and one of _miqueletes_: no more could -be spared from in front of the active St. Cyr. Within three weeks -after his victory of Alcañiz he had collected an army of 25,000 men, -and considered himself strong enough to commence the march upon -Saragossa. It was in his power to advance directly upon the city by -the high-road along the Ebro, and to challenge Suchet to a battle -outside its southern gates. He did not, however, make this move, but -with a caution that he did not often display, kept to the mountains -and marched by a side-road to Belchite [June 12]. Here he received -news of Napoleon’s check at Essling, which had happened on the -twenty-second of the preceding month; it was announced as a complete -and crushing defeat of the Emperor, and encouraged the Spaniards in -no small degree. - - [524] The drafts were so large that the troops of Lazan’s - division, which had numbered 3,979 in May, were 5,679 in June, - those of Roca rose similarly from 3,449 to 5,525. The Valencian - Junta claimed to have sent in all 11,881 men to reinforce Blake, - and the returns bear them out. They also gave him 2,000,000 - reals in cash--about £22,000--raised by a special contribution - in fifteen days. Their report says that they had sent on every - armed man in the province, and that the city was only guarded by - peasants armed with pikes. (Argüelles.) - -From Belchite Blake, still keeping to the mountains, pursued his -march eastward to Villanueva in the valley of the Huerba. This move -revealed his design; he was about to place himself in a position from -which he could threaten Suchet’s lines of communication with Tudela -and Logroño, and so compel him either to abandon Saragossa without -fighting, or to come out and attack the Spanish army among the hills. -Blake, in short, was trying to manœuvre his enemy out of Saragossa, -or to induce him to fight another offensive action such as that of -Alcañiz had been. After the experience of May 25 he thought that he -could trust his army to hold its ground, though he was not willing -to risk an advance in the open, across the level plain in front of -Saragossa. - -Suchet meanwhile had concentrated his whole available force in -that city and its immediate neighbourhood; he had drawn in every -man save a single column of two battalions, which was lying at La -Muela under General Fabre, with orders to keep back the insurgents -of the southern mountains from making a dash at Alagon and cutting -the high-road to Tudela. He had been writing letters to Madrid, -couched in the most urgent terms, to beg for reinforcements. But -just at this moment the Asturian expedition had drawn away to the -north all the troops in Old Castile. King Joseph could do no more -than promise that the two regiments from the 3rd Corps which had -been lent to Kellermann should be summoned back, and directed to -make forced marches on Saragossa. He could spare nothing save these -six battalions, believing it impossible to deplete the garrison of -Madrid, or to draw from Valladolid the single division of Mortier’s -corps, which was at this moment the only solid force remaining in the -valley of the Douro. - -Suchet was inclined to believe that he might be attacked before this -small reinforcement of 3,000 men could arrive, and feared that, with -little more than 10,000 sabres and bayonets, he would risk defeat -if he attacked Blake in the mountains. The conduct of his troops in -and after the battle of Alcañiz had not tended to make him hopeful -of the result of another action of the same kind. Nevertheless, when -Blake came down into the valley of the Huerba, and began to threaten -his communications, he resolved that he must fight once again; the -alternative course, the evacuation of Saragossa and a retreat up the -Ebro, would have been too humiliating. Suchet devoted the three weeks -of respite which the slow advance of the enemy allowed him to the -reorganization of his corps. He made strenuous exertions to clothe -it, and to provide it with its arrears of pay. He inspected every -regiment in person, sought out and remedied grievances, displaced -a number of unsatisfactory officers, and promoted many deserving -individuals. He claims that the improvement in the morale of the -troops during the three weeks when they lay encamped at Saragossa was -enormous[525], and his statements may be verified in the narrative of -one of his subordinates, who remarks that neither Moncey nor Junot -had ever shown that keen personal interest in the corps which Suchet -always displayed, and that the troops considered their new chief both -more genial and more business-like than any general they had hitherto -seen, and so resolved to do their best for him[526]. - - [525] Suchet, _Mémoires_, p. 23. - - [526] Von Brandt, _Aus meinem Leben_, i. 67. - -Forced to fight, but not by any means confident of victory, the -French commander discharged on to Tudela and Pampeluna his sick, -his heavy baggage, and his parks, before marching out to meet Blake -upon June 14. The enemy, though still clinging to the skirts of the -hills, had now moved so close to Saragossa that it was clear that he -must be attacked at once, though Suchet would have preferred to wait -a few days longer, till he should have rallied the brigade from Old -Castile. These two regiments, under Colonel Robert, had now passed -Tudela, and were expected to arrive on the fifteenth or sixteenth. -But Blake had now descended the valley of the Huerba, and had pushed -his outposts to within ten or twelve miles of Saragossa. He had -reorganized his army into three divisions, one of which (mainly -composed of Aragonese troops) was placed under General Areizaga, -while Roca and the Marquis of Lazan headed the two others, in which -the Valencian levies predominated. Of the total of 25,000 men which -the muster-rolls showed, 20,000 were in line: the rest were detached -or in hospital. There were about 1,000 untrustworthy cavalry and -twenty-five guns. - -In his final advance down the Huerba, Blake moved in two columns. -Areizaga’s division kept to the right bank and halted at Botorrita, -some sixteen miles from Saragossa. The Commander-in-chief, with the -other two divisions, marched on the left bank, and pushing further -forward than his lieutenant, reached the village of Maria, twelve -miles from the south-western front of the city. A distance of six -or seven miles separated the two corps. Thus Blake had taken the -strategical offensive, but was endeavouring to retain the tactical -defensive, by placing himself in a position where the enemy must -attack him. But he seems to have made a grave mistake in keeping his -columns so far apart, on different roads and with a river between -them. It should have been his object to make sure that every man was -on the field when the critical moment should arrive. - -Already on the morning of the fourteenth the two armies came into -contact. Musnier’s division met the Spanish vanguard, thrust it back -some way, but then came upon Blake and the main body, and had to give -ground. Suchet, on the same evening, established his head quarters at -the Abbey of Santa Fé, and there dictated his orders for the battle -of the following day. Having ascertained that Areizaga’s division was -the weaker of the two Spanish columns, he left opposite it, on the -Monte Torrero, a mile and a half outside Saragossa, only a single -brigade--five battalions--under General Laval, who had now become -the commander of the 1st Division, for Grandjean had been sent back -to France. Protected by the line of the canal of Aragon, these 2,000 -men[527] were to do their best to beat off any attack which Areizaga -might make against the city, while the main bodies of both armies -were engaged elsewhere. The charge of Saragossa itself was given -over to Colonel Haxo, who had but a single battalion of infantry[528] -and the sapper-companies of the army. - - [527] 44th of the Line, 1,069 bayonets, and 3rd of the Vistula, - 964 bayonets, according to Suchet’s figures. - - [528] Apparently a battalion of the 121st of the Line, the rest - of which regiment was still in Navarre. - -Having set aside these 3,000 men to guard his flank and rear, Suchet -could only bring forward Musnier’s division, and the remaining -brigade of Laval’s division (that of Habert), with two other -battalions, for the main attack. But he retained with himself the -whole of his cavalry and all his artillery, save one single battery -left with the troops on Monte Torrero. This gave him fourteen -battalions--about 7,500 infantry--800 horse, and twelve guns--less -than 9,000 men in all--to commence the battle. But he was encouraged -to risk an attack by the news that the brigade from Tudela was now -close at hand, and could reach the field by noon with 3,000 bayonets -more. It would seem that Suchet (though he does not say so in his -_Mémoires_) held back during the morning hours, in order to allow -this heavy reserve time to reach the fighting-ground. - -Blake was in order of battle along the line of a rolling hill -separated from the French lines by less than a mile. Behind his -front were two other similar spurs of the Sierra de la Muela, each -separated from the other by a steep ravine. On his right flank was -the river Huerba, with level fields half a mile broad between the -water’s edge and the commencement of the rising ground. The village -of Maria lay to his right rear, some way up the stream. The Spaniards -were drawn out in two lines, Roca’s division on the northernmost -ridge, Lazan’s in its rear on the second, while the cavalry filled -the space between the hills and the river. Two battalions and half a -battery were in reserve, in front of Maria. The rest of the artillery -was placed in the intervals of the first line. - -The French occupied a minor line of heights facing Blake’s front: -Habert’s brigade held the left, near the river, having the two -cavalry regiments of Wathier in support. Musnier’s division formed -the centre and right: a squadron of Polish lancers was placed far -out upon its flank. The only reserve consisted of the two stray -battalions which did not belong either to Musnier or Habert--one of -the 5th Léger, another of the 64th of the Line[529]. - - [529] The battalion of the 5th Léger belonged to Morlot’s - division, the rest of which was dispersed in Navarre or absent: - that of the 64th was one which Suchet had brought from Valladolid - as his personal escort, and which properly belonged to the 5th - Corps. - -Blake’s army was slow in taking up its ground, while Suchet did not -wish to move till the brigade from Tudela had got within supporting -distance. Hence in the morning hours there was no serious collision. -But at last the Spaniards took the initiative, and pushed a cautious -advance against Suchet’s left, apparently with the object of worrying -him into assuming the offensive rather than of delivering a serious -attack. But the cloud of skirmishers sent against Habert’s front grew -so thick and pushed so far forward, that at last the whole brigade -was seriously engaged, and the artillery was obliged to open upon the -swarm of Spanish _tirailleurs_. They fell back when the shells began -to drop among them, and sought refuge by retiring nearer to their -main body[530]. - - [530] Suchet says the morning was occupied in mere ‘tiraillement’ - of the Spanish skirmishers and the 2nd of the Vistula. This is - not borne out by the narrative of Von Brandt, of that corps. - He says that the enemy came on ‘sehr lebhaft,’ that both - battalions of his regiment were deeply engaged, that a regiment - of Spanish dragoons in yellow [he calls it Numancia, but it was - really Olivenza] charged into the skirmishing-line and nearly - broke it. The 2nd of the Vistula used up all its cartridges, - and lost ground. ‘Die Kavalleriezüge wurden jedoch jedesmal - zurückgewiesen, aber nichtsdestoweniger verloren wir allmählich - Terrain.’ The Spaniards were only driven off by a battery being - drawn forward into the fighting-line. Then the fight stood still, - but the regiment had suffered very heavily, and was finally drawn - back and put into the reserve. (_Aus meinem Leben_, pp. 71-2.) - -About midday the bickering died down on the French left, but shortly -after the fire broke out with redoubled energy in another direction. -Disappointed that he could not induce Suchet to attack him, Blake -had at last resolved to take the offensive himself, and columns -were seen descending from his extreme left wing, evidently with the -intention of turning the French right. Having thus made up his mind -to strike, the Spanish general should have sent prompt orders to his -detached division under Areizaga, to bid it cross the Huerba with -all possible speed, and hasten to join the main body before the -engagement had grown hot. It could certainly have arrived in two -hours, since it was but six or seven miles away. But Blake made no -attempt to call in this body of 6,000 men (the best troops in his -army) or to utilize it in any way. He only employed the two divisions -that were under his hand on the hillsides above Maria. - -The attack on the French right, made between one and two o’clock, -precipitated matters. When Suchet saw the Spanish battalions -beginning to descend from the ridge, he ordered his Polish lancers -to charge them in flank, and attacked them in front with part of the -114th regiment and some _voltigeur_ companies. The enemy was thrown -back, and retired to rejoin his main body. Then, before they were -fully rearranged in line of battle, the French general bade the whole -of Musnier’s division advance, and storm the Spanish position. He was -emboldened to press matters to an issue by the joyful news that the -long-expected brigade from Tudela had passed Saragossa, and would be -on the field in a couple of hours. - -The eight battalions of the 114th, 115th, and the 1st of the Vistula -crossed the valley and fell upon the Spanish line between two and -three o’clock in the afternoon. Roca’s men met them with resolution, -and the fighting was for some time indecisive. Along part of the -front the French gained ground, but at other points they were beaten -back, and to repair a severe check suffered by the 115th, Suchet had -to engage half his reserve, the battalion of the 64th, and to draw -into the fight the 2nd of the Vistula from Habert’s brigade upon -the left. This movement restored the line, but nothing appreciable -had been gained, when a violent hailstorm from the north suddenly -swept down upon both armies, and hid them for half an hour from each -other’s sight. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF ALCAÑIZ - MAY 23RD 1809] - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF MARIA - JUNE 15TH 1809] - -Before it was over, Suchet learnt that Robert and his brigade had -arrived at the Abbey of Santa Fé, on his right rear. He therefore -resolved to throw into the battle the wing of his army which he had -hitherto held back,--Habert’s battalions and the cavalry. When the -storm had passed over, they advanced against the Spanish right, in -the low ground near the river. The three battalions[531] of infantry -led the way, but when their fire had begun to take effect, Suchet -bade his hussars and cuirassiers charge through the intervals of -the front line. The troops here opposed to them consisted of 600 -cavalry under General O’Donoju--the whole of the horsemen that Blake -possessed, for the rest of his squadrons were with Areizaga, far away -from the field. - - [531] The 2nd of the Vistula having been distracted to the - centre, Habert had only the two battalions of the 14th of the - Line, and one of the 5th Léger from the reserve. - -The charge of Wathier’s two regiments proved decisive: the Spanish -horse did not wait to cross sabres, but broke and fled from the -field, exposing the flank of the battalions which lay next them in -the line. The cuirassiers and hussars rolled up these unfortunate -troops, and hunted them along the high-road as far as the outskirts -of Maria; here they came upon and rode down the two battalions which -Blake had left there as a last reserve, and captured the half-battery -that accompanied them. - -The Spanish right was annihilated, and--what was worse--Blake had -lost possession of the only road by which he could withdraw and -join Areizaga. Meanwhile Habert’s battalions had not followed the -cavalry in their charge, but had turned upon the exposed flank of -the Spanish centre, and were attacking it in side and rear. It is -greatly to Blake’s credit that his firmness did not give way in this -distressing moment. He threw back his right, and sent up into line -such of Lazan’s battalions from his rear line as had not yet been -drawn into the fight. Thus he saved himself from utter disaster, and -though losing ground all through the evening hours, kept his men -together, and finally left the field in a solid mass, retiring over -the hills and ravines to the southward. ‘The Spaniards,’ wrote an -eye-witness, ‘went off the field in perfect order and with a good -military bearing[532].’ But they had been forced to leave behind them -all their guns save two, for they had no road, and could not drag the -artillery up the rugged slopes by which they saved themselves. Blake -also lost 1,000 killed, three or four times that number of wounded, -and some hundreds of prisoners. The steadiness of the retreat is -vouched for by the small number of flags captured by the French--only -three out of the thirty-four that had been upon the field. Suchet, -according to his own account, had lost no more than between 700 and -800 men. - - [532] ‘Ihr Rückzug geschah in aller Ordnung und militärischer - Haltung. Sie lagerten in der Nacht uns gegenüber, und hielten - am anderen Morgen die Höhen von Botorrita ganz in der Nähe des - Schlachtfeldes.’ [Von Brandt, i. 73.] - -When safe from pursuit the beaten army crossed the Huerba far above -Maria, and rejoined Areizaga’s division at Botorrita on the right -bank of that stream. - -Next morning, to his surprise, Suchet learnt that the enemy was still -in position at Botorrita and was showing a steady front. The victor -did not march directly against Blake, as might have been expected, -but ordered Laval, with the troops that had been guarding Saragossa, -to turn the Spaniards’ right, while he himself manœuvred to get round -their left. These cautious proceedings would seem to indicate that -the French army had been more exhausted by the battle of the previous -day than Suchet concedes. The turning movements failed, and Blake -drew off undisturbed at nightfall, and retired on that same road to -Belchite by which he had marched on Saragossa, in such high hopes, -only four days back. - -The battle of Maria had been on the whole very creditable to -the Valencian troops. But the subsequent course of events was -lamentable. On the way to Belchite many of the raw levies began to -disband themselves: the weather was bad, the road worse, and the -consciousness of defeat had had time enough to sink into the minds -of the soldiery. When Blake halted at Belchite, he found that he had -only 12,000 men with him: deducting the losses of the fifteenth, -there should have been at least 15,000 in line. Of artillery he -possessed no more than nine guns, seven that had been with Areizaga, -and two saved from Maria[533]. - - [533] Suchet (i. 24) says that Blake had been reinforced by 4,000 - Valencians, when he fought at Belchite. This seems to have been - an error, his reinforcement being Areizaga’s 6,000 men picked up - at Botorrita, who were all Aragonese. - -It can only be considered therefore a piece of mad presumption on -the part of the Spanish general that he halted at Belchite and again -offered battle to his pursuers. The position in front of that town -was strong--far stronger than the ground at Maria. But the men were -not the same; on June 15 they had fought with confidence, proud of -their victory at Alcañiz and intending to enter Saragossa in triumph -next day. On June 18 they were cowed and disheartened--they had -already done their best and had failed: it seemed to them hopeless -to try the fortunes of war again, and they were half beaten before a -shot had been fired. The mere numerical odds, too, were no longer in -their favour: at Maria, Blake had 13,000 men to Suchet’s 9,000--if we -count only the troops that fought, and neglect the 3,000 French who -came up late in the day, and were never engaged. At Belchite, Blake -had about 12,000 men, and Suchet rather more, for he had gathered in -Laval’s and Robert’s brigades--full 5,000 bayonets, and could put -into line 13,000 men, even if allowance be made for his losses in the -late battle[534]. It is impossible to understand the temerity with -which the Spanish general courted a disaster, by resolving to fight a -second battle only three days after he had lost the first. - - [534] He had twenty-two battalions and eight squadrons at - Belchite (as he says himself, _Mémoires_, i. p. 34), while at - Maria he had only fourteen battalions and seven squadrons. - -Blake’s centre was in front of Belchite, in comparatively low-lying -ground, much cut up by olive groves and enclosures. His wings were -drawn up on two gentle hills, called the Calvary and El Pueyo: the -left was the weaker flank, the ridge there being open and exposed. -It was on this wing therefore that Suchet directed his main effort; -he sent against it the whole of Musnier’s division and a regiment -of cavalry, while Habert’s brigade marched to turn the right: the -centre was left unattacked. The moment that Musnier’s attack was well -pronounced, the whole of the Spanish left wing gave way, and fell -back on Belchite, to cover itself behind the walls and olive-groves. -Before the French division could be re-formed for a second attack, -an even more disgraceful rout occurred on the right wing. Habert’s -brigade had just commenced to close in upon the Spaniards, when a -chance shell exploded a caisson in rear of the battery in Blake’s -right-centre. The fire communicated itself to the other powder-wagons -which were standing near, and the whole group blew up with a terrific -report. ‘This piece of luck threw the whole line into panic,’ writes -an eye-witness, ‘the enemy thought that he was attacked in the rear. -Every man shouted Treason! whole battalions threw down their arms -and bolted. The disorder spread along the entire line, and we only -had to run in upon them and seize what we could. If they had not -closed the town-gates, which we found it difficult to batter in, I -fancy that the whole Spanish army would have been captured or cut to -pieces. But it took some time to break down the narrow grated door, -and then a battalion stood at bay in the Market Place, and had to be -ridden down by our Polish lancers before we could get on. Lastly, we -had to pass through another gate to make our exit, and to cross the -bridge over the Aguas in a narrow formation. This gave the Spaniards -time to show a clean pair of heels, and they utilized the chance with -their constitutional agility. We took few prisoners, but got their -nine guns, some twenty munition wagons, and the whole of their very -considerable magazines. General Suchet wrote up a splendid account of -the elaborate manœuvres that he made. But I believe that my tale is -nearer to the facts, and that the order of battle which he published -was composed _après coup_. The whole affair did not last long enough -for him to carry out the various dispositions which he details[535].’ - - [535] Certainly on reading Suchet’s report one would not be - inclined to think that the whole matter was such a disgraceful - rout as Von Brandt (i. 74-5) describes in the above paragraphs. - -The whole Spanish army was scattered to the winds. It was some days -before the Aragonese and Catalans began to rally at Tortosa, and the -Valencians at Morella. The total loss in the battle had not been -large--Suchet says that only one regiment was actually surrounded and -cut to pieces, and only one flag taken[536]. But of the 25,000 men -who had formed the ‘Army of the Right’ on June 1, not 10,000 were -available a month later, and these were in a state of demoralization -which would have made it impossible to take them into action. - - [536] _Mémoires_, p. 36. - -Suchet was therefore able to set himself at leisure to the task of -reducing the plains of Aragon, whose control had passed out of his -hands in May. He left Musnier’s division at Alcañiz to watch all -that was left of Blake’s army, while he marched with the other two -to overrun the central valley of the Ebro. On June 23 he seized -Caspe and its long wooden bridge, and crossed the river. Next he -occupied Fraga and Monzon, and left Habert[537] and the 3rd division -to watch the valley of the Cinca. With the remaining division, that -of Laval, he marched back to Saragossa [July 1], sweeping the open -country clear of guerrilla bands. Then he sat down for a space in -the Aragonese capital, to busy himself in administrative schemes for -the governance of the kingdom, and in preparation for a systematic -campaign against the numerous insurgents of the northern and southern -mountains, who still remained under arms and seemed to have been -little affected by the disasters of Maria and Belchite. - - [537] Morlot’s division had been handed over to Habert, who - resigned his brigade of Laval’s division to the Polish colonel - Chlopicki. - -Thus ended Blake’s invasion of Aragon, an undertaking which promised -well from the day of Alcañiz down to the battle of June 15. It -miscarried mainly through the gross tactical error which the general -made in dividing his army, and fighting at Maria with only two-thirds -of his available force. His strategy down to the actual moment of -battle seems to have been well-considered and prudent. If he had put -the Aragonese division of Areizaga in line between the river and -the hill, instead of his handful of untrustworthy cavalry, it seems -likely that a second Alcañiz might have been fought on the fatal -fifteenth of June. For Suchet’s infantry attack had miscarried, -and it was only the onslaught of his cavalry that won the day. Had -that charge failed, Saragossa must have been evacuated that night, -and the 3rd Corps would have been forced back on Navarre--to the -entire dislocation of all other French operations in Spain. If King -Joseph had received the news of the loss of Aragon in the same week -in which he learnt that Soult and Ney had evacuated Galicia, and -Kellermann the Asturias, he would probably have called back Victor -and Sebastiani and abandoned Madrid. For a disaster in the valley of -the Douro or the Ebro, as Napoleon once observed, is the most fatal -blow of all to an invader based on the north, and makes central Spain -untenable. While wondering at Blake’s errors, we must not forget to -lay part of the blame at the door of his lieutenant Areizaga--the -incapable man who afterwards lost the fatal fight of Ocaña. An -officer of sound views, when left without orders, would have ‘marched -to the cannon’ and appeared on the field of Maria in the afternoon. -Areizaga sat quiescent, six miles from the battle-field, while the -cannon were thundering in his ears from eleven in the morning till -six in the afternoon! - -As for Suchet, we see that he took a terrible risk, and came -safely through the ordeal. There were many reasons for evacuating -Saragossa, when Blake came down the valley of the Huerba to cut the -communications of the 3rd Corps. But an enterprising general just -making his début in independent command, could not well take the -responsibility of retreat without first trying the luck of battle. -Fortune favoured the brave, and a splendid victory saved Saragossa -and led to the reconquest of the lost plains of Aragon. Yet, with -another cast of the dice, Maria might have proved a defeat, and -Suchet have gone down to history as a rash officer who imperilled the -whole fate of the French army in Spain by trying to face over-great -odds. - - - - -SECTION XVI - -THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN - -(JULY-AUGUST 1809) - - - - -CHAPTER I - -WELLESLEY AT ABRANTES: VICTOR EVACUATES ESTREMADURA - - -When Wellesley’s columns, faint but pursuing, received the orders -which bade them halt at Ruivaens and Montalegre, their commander -was already planning out the details of their return-march to the -Tagus. From the first moment of his setting forth from Lisbon, he had -looked upon the expedition against Soult as no more than a necessary -preliminary to the more important expedition against Victor. He would -have preferred, as we have already seen[538], to have directed his -first blow against the French army in Estremadura, and had only been -induced to begin his campaign by the attack upon Soult because he saw -the political necessity for delivering Oporto. His original intention -had been no more than to manœuvre the 2nd Corps out of Portugal. But, -owing to the faulty dispositions of the Duke of Dalmatia, he had been -able to accomplish much more than this--he had beaten the Marshal, -stripped him of his artillery and equipment, destroyed a sixth of his -army, and flung him back into Galicia by a rugged and impracticable -road, which took him far from his natural base of operations. He had -done much more than he had hoped or promised to do when he set out -from Lisbon. Yet these ‘uncovenanted mercies’ did not distract him -from his original plan: his main object was not the destruction of -Soult, but the clearing of the whole frontier of Portugal from the -danger of invasion, and this could not be accomplished till Victor -had been dealt with. The necessity for a prompt movement against -the 1st Corps was emphasized by the news, received on May 19 at -Montalegre, that its commander was already astir, and apparently -about to assume the offensive. Mackenzie reported from Abrantes, with -some signs of dismay, that a strong French column had just fallen -upon Alcantara, and driven from it the small Portuguese detachment -which was covering his front. - - [538] See p. 292. - -Accordingly Wellesley turned the march of his whole army southward, -the very moment that he discovered that the 2nd Corps had not fallen -into the trap set for it at Chaves and Ruivaens. He had resolved to -leave nothing but the local levies of Silveira and Botilho to watch -Galicia, and to protect the provinces north of the Douro. ‘Soult,’ -he wrote, ‘will be very little formidable to any body of troops -for some time to come.’ He imagined--and quite correctly--that the -Galician guerrillas and the army of La Romana would suffice to find -him occupation. He did not, however, realize that it was possible -that not only Soult but Ney also would be so much harassed by the -insurgents, and would fall into such bitter strife with each other, -that they might ere long evacuate Galicia altogether. This, indeed, -could not have been foreseen at the moment when the British turned -southwards from Montalegre. If Wellesley could have guessed that by -July 1 the three French Corps in Northern Spain--the 2nd, 5th, and -6th--would all be clear of the mountains and concentrated in the -triangle Astorga-Zamora-Valladolid, he would have had to recast his -plan of operations. But on May 19 such a conjunction appeared most -improbable, and the British general could not have deemed it likely -that a French army of 55,000 men, available for field-operations, -would be collected on the central Douro, at the moment when he had -committed himself to operations on the Tagus. Indeed, for some weeks -after he had departed from Oporto the information from the north -made any such concentration appear improbable. While he was on his -march to the south he began to hear of the details of Ney’s and -Kellermann’s expedition against the Asturias, news which he received -with complacency[539], as it showed that the French were entangling -themselves in new and hazardous enterprises which would make it -more difficult than ever for them to collect a force opposite the -frontier of Northern Portugal. Down to the very end of June Wellesley -had no reason to dread any concentration of French troops upon his -flank in the valley of the Douro. It was only in the following month -that Soult was heard of at Puebla de Senabria and Ney at Astorga. By -that time the British army had already crossed the frontier of Spain -and commenced its operations against Victor. - - [539] See the letter to Colonel Bourke, _Wellington Dispatches_, - iv. 390-400. - -At the moment when Wellesley turned back from Montalegre and set his -face southward, he had not yet settled the details of his plan of -campaign. There appeared to be two courses open to him. The first was -to base himself upon Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and advance upon -Salamanca. This movement, which he could have begun in the second -week of June, would undoubtedly have thrown into disorder all the -French arrangements in Northern Spain. There would have been no force -ready to oppose him save a single division of Mortier’s corps--the -rest of that marshal’s troops were absent with Kellermann in the -Asturias. This could not have held the British army back, and a bold -march in advance would have placed Wellesley in a position where he -could have intercepted all communications between the French troops -in Galicia and those in and about Madrid. The movement might appear -tempting, but it would have been too hazardous. The only force that -could have been used for it was the 20,000 troops of Wellesley’s -own army, backed by the 12,000 or 15,000 Portuguese regulars whom -Beresford could collect between the Douro and the Tagus. The -Spaniards had no troops in this direction save the garrison of Ciudad -Rodrigo, and a battalion or two which Carlos d’España had raised on -the borders of Leon and Portugal. On the other hand, the news that -the British were at Salamanca or Toro would certainly have forced -Ney, Soult, and Kellermann to evacuate Galicia and the Asturias and -hasten to the aid of Mortier. They would have been far too strong, -when united, for the 30,000 or 35,000 men of Wellesley and Beresford. -La Romana and the Asturians could have brought no corresponding -reinforcements to assist the British army, and must necessarily have -arrived too late--long after the French corps would have reached the -Douro[540]. The idea of a movement on Salamanca, therefore, did not -even for a moment enter into Wellesley’s mind. - - [540] Napier (ii. 149) calls this alternative plan of campaign ‘a - movement in conjunction with Beresford, del Parque, and Romana - by Salamanca.’ This is a most inappropriate description of it: - about June 10, when operations might have commenced, Del Parque’s - army did not yet exist. There were only three or four of Carlos - d’España’s battalions at or near Rodrigo. La Romana, on the other - hand, was at Orense facing Soult, and could not have reached - Almeida or Rodrigo for weeks after the campaign would have begun. - -The other alternative open to the British general, and that which -he had from the first determined to take in hand, was (as we have -already seen) a march against Victor. Such a movement might be -carried out in one of two ways. (1) It would be possible to advance -against his flank and rear by keeping north of the Tagus, and -striking, by Coria and Plasencia, at Almaraz and its great bridge of -boats, across which ran the communication between the 1st Corps and -Madrid. This operation would have to be carried out by the British -army alone, while the Spanish army of Estremadura, acting from a -separate base, kept in touch with Victor but avoided compromising -itself by any rash attack upon him. The Marshal, placed in a central -position between Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s forces, would certainly try -to beat one of them before they got the chance of drawing together. -(2) It was equally possible to operate against Victor not on separate -lines, but by crossing the Tagus, joining the Spaniards somewhere in -the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and falling upon the Marshal with the -united strength of both armies. This movement would be less hazardous -than the other, since it would secure the concentration of an army -of a strength sufficient to crush the 25,000 men at which the 1st -Corps might reasonably be rated. But it would only drive Victor back -upon Madrid and King Joseph’s reserves by a frontal attack, while the -other plan--that of the march on Almaraz--would imperil his flank and -rear, and threaten to cut him off from the King and the capital. - -Before making any decision between the two plans, Wellesley wrote -to Cuesta, from Oporto on May 22, a letter requesting him to state -his views as to the way in which the operations of the British and -Spanish armies could best be combined. He informed him that the -troops which had defeated Soult were already on their way to the -south, that the head of the column would reach the Mondego on the -twenty-sixth, and that the whole would be concentrated near Abrantes -early in June. It was at that place that the choice would have to be -made between the two possible lines of attack on Victor--that which -led to Almaraz, and that which went on to Southern Estremadura. -A few days later Wellesley dispatched a confidential officer -of his staff--Colonel Bourke--to bear to the Spanish general a -definite request for his decision on the point whether the allied -armies should prepare for an actual junction, or should manœuvre -from separate bases, or should ‘co-operate with communication,’ -i.e. combine their movements without adopting a single base or a -joint line of advance. Bourke was also directed to obtain all the -information that he could concerning the strength, morale, and -discipline of Cuesta’s army, and to discover what chance there was -of securing the active assistance of the second Spanish army in the -south--that which, under General Venegas, was defending the defiles -in front of La Carolina[541]. - - [541] See the ‘Memorandum for Lieut.-Col. Bourke’ in _Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. 372-3. - -It was clear that some days must elapse before an answer could arrive -from the camp of the Estremaduran army, and meanwhile Wellesley -continued to urge the counter-march of his troops from the various -points at which they had halted between Oporto and Montalegre. All -the scattered British brigades were directed on Abrantes by different -routes: those which had the least distance to march began to arrive -there on the eleventh and the twelve of June. - -The Commander-in-chief had resolved not to take on with him the -Portuguese regulars whom he had employed in the campaign against -Soult. Both the brigades which had marched on Amarante under -Beresford, and the four battalions which had fought along with -Wellesley in the main column, were now dropped behind. They were -destined to form an army of observation, lest Mortier and his 5th -Corps, or any other French force, might chance to assail the front -between the Douro and the Tagus during the absence of the British -in the south. Beresford, who was left in command, was directed to -arrange his troops so as to be able to support Almeida, and resist -any raid from the direction of Salamanca or Zamora. The main body -of the army lay at Guarda, its reserves at Coimbra. The Portuguese -division which had been lying on the Zezere in company with -Mackenzie’s troops, was also placed at Beresford’s disposition, so -that he had about eighteen battalions, four regiments of cavalry, and -five or six batteries--a force of between 12,000 and 15,000 men. It -was his duty to connect Wellesley’s left wing with Silveira’s right, -and to reinforce either of them if necessary. The Commander-in-chief -was inclined to believe, from his knowledge of the disposition of the -French corps at the moment, that no very serious attack was likely -to be directed against Northern Portugal during his absence--at the -most Soult might threaten Braganza or Mortier Almeida. But it was -necessary to make some provision against even unlikely contingencies. - -The only Portuguese force which Wellesley had resolved to utilize for -the campaign in Estremadura was the battalion of the Loyal Lusitanian -Legion, under Colonel Mayne, which had been stationed at Alcantara -watching the movements of Victor. Sir Robert Wilson, now recalled -from Beresford’s column and placed once more with his own men, was -to take up the command of his old force, and to add to it the 5th -Cazadores, a regiment which had hitherto been lying with Mackenzie’s -division at Abrantes. With these 1,500 men he was to serve as the -northern flank-guard of the British army when it should enter Spain. - -When Wellesley first started upon his march, he was under the -impression that his plan of campaign might be settled for him by -the movements of Victor rather than by the devices of Cuesta. The -rapidity of his progress was partly caused by the news of the -Marshal’s attack on Alcantara, an operation which might, as it -seemed, turn out to be the prelude of a raid in force upon Central -Portugal. That it portended an actual invasion with serious designs -Wellesley could not believe, being convinced that Victor would have -to leave so large a proportion of his army to observe Cuesta, that -he would not be able to set aside more than 10,000 or 12,000 men for -operations in the valley of the Tagus[542]. But such a force would be -enough to sweep the country about Castello Branco and Villa Velha, -and to beat up Mackenzie’s line of defence on the Zezere. - - [542] Wellesley to Mackenzie, from San Tyrso, May 21. - -The actual course of events on the Tagus had been as follows. Victor, -even after having received the division of Lapisse, considered -himself too weak either to march on Cuesta and drive him over the -mountains into Andalusia, or to fall upon Central Portugal by an -advance along the Tagus[543]. He had received vague information of -the formation of Mackenzie’s corps of observation on the Zezere, -though apparently he had not discovered that there was a strong -British contingent in its ranks. But he was under the impression that -if he crossed the Guadiana in force, to attack Cuesta, the Portuguese -would advance into Estremadura and cut his communications; while if -he marched against the Portuguese, Cuesta would move northward to -attack his rear. Accordingly he maintained for some time a purely -defensive attitude, keeping his three French infantry divisions -concentrated in a central position, at Torremocha, Montanches, and -Salvatierra (near Caceres), while he remained himself with Leval’s -Germans and Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons in the neighbourhood of -Merida, observing Cuesta and sending flying columns up and down the -Guadiana to watch the garrison of Badajoz and the guerrillas of the -Sierra de Guadalupe. He had not forgotten the Emperor’s orders that -he was to be prepared to execute a diversion in favour of Marshal -Soult, when he should hear that the 2nd Corps was on its way to -Lisbon. But, like all the other French generals, he was profoundly -ignorant of the position and the fortunes of the Duke of Dalmatia. On -April 22 the head-quarters staff at Madrid had received no more than -a vague rumour that the 2nd Corps had entered Oporto a month before! -They got no trustworthy information concerning its doings till May -was far advanced[544]. Victor, therefore, depending on King Joseph -for his news from Northern Portugal, was completely in the dark as -to the moment when he might be called upon to execute his diversion -on the Tagus. The Portuguese and Galician insurgents had succeeded -in maintaining a complete blockade of Soult, and thus had foiled all -Napoleon’s plans for combining the operations of the 1st and the 2nd -Corps. - - [543] Compare the two dispatches of Victor to Jourdan of April 25 - (acknowledging the receipt of Lapisse’s division) and of May 21. - - [544] See King Joseph to Napoleon, of the dates April 22 and May - 24, 1809. - -Victor was only stirred up into a spasmodic activity in the second -week in May, by the news that a Portuguese force had crossed the -frontier and occupied Alcantara, where the great Roman bridge across -the Tagus provided a line of communication between North-Western -and Central Estremadura. This detachment--as we have already -seen--consisted of no more than Colonel Mayne’s 1st battalion of the -Loyal Lusitanian Legion, brought down from the passes of the Sierra -de Gata, and of a single regiment of newly-raised militia--that of -the frontier district of Idanha. They had with them the six guns -of the battery of the Legion and a solitary squadron of cavalry, -Wellesley had thrown forward this little force of 2,000 men to -serve as an outpost for Mackenzie’s corps on the Zezere. But rumour -magnified its strength, and Victor jumped to the conclusion that -it formed the vanguard of a Portuguese army which was intending -to concert a combined operation with Cuesta, by threatening the -communication of the 1st Corps while the Spaniards attacked its front. - -Labouring under this delusion, Victor took the division of Lapisse -and a brigade of dragoons, and marched against Alcantara upon the -eleventh of May. As he approached the river he was met at Brozas -by Mayne’s vedettes, whom he soon drove in to the gates of the -little town. Alcantara being situated on the south side of the -Tagus, it was impossible to defend it: but Mayne had barricaded and -mined the bridge, planted his guns so as to command the passage, -and constructed trenches for his infantry along the northern bank. -After seizing the town, Victor opened a heavy fire of artillery and -musketry against the Portuguese detachment. It was met by a vigorous -return from the further bank, which lasted for more than three hours -before the defence began to flag. The Marshal very properly refused -to send forward his infantry to attempt the storm of the bridge -till his artillery should have silenced that of the defenders. -At about midday the Idanha militia, who had already suffered not -inconsiderable losses, deserted their trenches and fled. Thereupon -Mayne fired his mine in the bridge, but unhappily for him the tough -Roman cement defied even the power of gunpowder; only one side of the -arch was shattered; the crown of the vault held firm, and the passage -was still possible. The Legion still kept its ground, though it had -lost many men, and had seen one of his guns dismounted, and the rest -silenced by the French artillery. But when Victor hurled the leading -brigade of Lapisse’s division at the bridge he succeeded in forcing -it[545]. Mayne drew off his legionaries in good order and retreated -to the pass of Salvatierra, leaving behind him a gun and more than -250 killed and wounded[546] [May 14]--a heavy loss from the 1,000 men -of the single battalion which bore the whole brunt of the fighting. - - [545] Compare Victor to Jourdan of May 21, with the account - of the combat in Appendix I of Mayne and Lillie’s _Lusitanian - Legion_. - - [546] The exact losses of the L. L. L. were--killed, three - officers and 103 rank and file; wounded, five officers and 143 - rank and file; missing, fifteen rank and file. Of the Idanha - militia, Mayne returned the whole as missing next morning. - -Victor went no further than Alcantara, having satisfied himself that -the Portuguese force which had made such a creditable resistance -consisted of a single weak brigade, and did not form the vanguard of -an army bent on invading Estremadura. After remaining for no more -than three days at Alcantara, and trying in vain to obtain news of -the whereabouts of Soult--who was at that moment being hunted past -Guimaraens and Braga in the far north--the Marshal drew back his -troops to Torremocha near Caceres. - -His advance, though it had only lasted for six days, and had not been -pushed more than a few miles beyond Alcantara, had much disturbed -General Mackenzie, who dreaded to find himself the next object of -attack and to see the whole of the 1st Corps debouching against him -by the road through Castello Branco. Wellesley wrote to him that he -need not be alarmed, that Victor could not spare more than 10,000 -or 12,000 men for his demonstration, and that the 8,000 British and -Portuguese troops behind the Zezere were amply sufficient to maintain -defensive operations till the main army from the north should come -up. He expressed his opinion that the French force at Alcantara -was ‘a mere reconnoitring party, sent out for the purpose of -ascertaining what has become of Soult,’ a conclusion in which he was -perfectly right. Mackenzie[547], who betrayed an exaggerated want of -confidence in his Portuguese troops, was profoundly relieved to see -the enemy retire upon the seventeenth. He had advanced from Abrantes -and taken up a defensive position along the Sobreira Formosa to -resist the Marshal, but he had done so with many searchings of heart, -and was glad to see the danger pass away. When Victor had retired -into Central Estremadura, Mayne came back with all due caution, and -reoccupied the bridge of Alcantara. - - [547] See Wellesley to Mackenzie, May 21, and also Wellesley to - Frere on the same day. _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 350-1. - -Wellesley, therefore, had been perfectly well justified in his -confidence that nothing was to be feared in this direction. The -French could not possibly have dared to undertake more than a -demonstration in the direction of Castello Branco. King Joseph’s -orders to Victor had prescribed no more[548], and the Marshal had -accomplished even less. In his letter of excuse to Jourdan he -explained that he would gladly have left Lapisse’s division at -Alcantara, or even have moved it forward for some distance into -Portugal[549], if he had not found it absolutely impossible to feed -it in the bare and stony district north of the Tagus, where Junot’s -army had been wellnigh starved in November 1807. The peasantry of the -villages for fifteen leagues round Alcantara had, as he declared, -gone off into the mountains with their cattle, after burying their -corn, and he had found it impossible to discover food for even three -days’ consumption of a single division. - - [548] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 190. - - [549] A move by which he flattered himself that he would not only - ‘inquiéter les Anglais,’ but also ‘dégager le duc de Dalmatie,’ - an end which no raid with 8,000 or 10,000 men to Castello Branco - could possibly have accomplished. Victor to Jourdan, May 29. - -During Victor’s absence at Alcantara, Cuesta had sent down a part of -his troops to make a raid on Merida, the Marshal’s advanced post on -the Guadiana. It failed entirely; the garrison, two battalions of -Leval’s German division, maintained themselves with ease in a large -convent outside that town, which Victor had patched up and turned -into a place of some little strength. On hearing that the Spaniards -were descending from the mountains, King Joseph ordered the Duke of -Belluno to attack them at once. But on the mere news of the Marshal’s -approach Cuesta called back his detachment into the passes, sweeping -off at the same time the inhabitants of all the villages along the -Guadiana, together with their cattle and their stores of provisions. - -At the beginning of June Victor began to press the King and Jourdan -for leave to abandon his hold on Southern Estremadura, and to -fall back towards the Tagus. He urged that his position was very -dangerous, now that Cuesta’s army had been recruited up to a force -of 22,000 infantry and 6,000 horse, especially since the Portuguese -had once more got possession of Alcantara. His main contention was -that he must either be reinforced up to a strength which would -permit him to attack Andalusia, or else be permitted to withdraw -from the exhausted district between the Guadiana and the Tagus, in -order to seek a region where his men would be able to live. The only -district in this neighbourhood where the country-side was still -intact was that north of the Tagus, around the towns of Plasencia and -Coria--the valleys of the Alagon and Tietar. To move the army in this -direction would involve the evacuation of Central Estremadura--it -would be necessary to abandon Merida, Truxillo, and Caceres, with -the sacrifice of a certain amount of prestige. But unless the 1st -Corps could be reinforced--and this, as Victor must have known, -was impossible[550]--there was no other alternative. The internal -condition of the army was growing worse day by day. ‘The troops are -on half rations of bread: they can get little meat--often none at -all. The results of starvation are making themselves felt in the -most deplorable way. The men are going into hospital at the rate of -several hundreds a day[551].’ A few days later Victor adds, ‘If I -could even get together enough biscuit to feed the army for merely -seven or eight days I should not feel so uncomfortable. But we have -no flour to issue for a bread ration, so cannot bake biscuit[552].’ -And again he adds, ‘The whole population of this region has retired -within Cuesta’s lines, after destroying the ovens and the mills, and -removing every scrap of food. It seems that the enemy is resolved to -starve us out, and to leave a desert in front of us if we advance.... -Carefully estimating all my stores I find that I have barely enough -to last for five days in hand. We are menaced with absolute famine, -which we can only avoid by moving off, and there is no suitable -cantonment to be found in the whole space between Tagus and Guadiana: -the entire country is ruined.’ - - [550] He suggests in a letter of June 8, that Mortier’s corps - should be brought up to Plasencia to help him. But this was - wholly impracticable. - - [551] Victor to Jourdan, from Torremocha, May 24. - - [552] Victor to Jourdan, May 29. - -Joseph and Jourdan replied to the first of these dismal letters by -promising to send the 1st Corps 300,000 rations of biscuit, and by -urging its commander to renew his attack on Alcantara, in order -to threaten Portugal and ‘disengage the Duke of Dalmatia’--who, -on the day when their dispatch was written, was at Lugo, in the -north of Galicia, some 300 miles as the crow flies from Victor’s -head quarters[553]. They received the answer that such a move was -impossible, as Mayne had just blown up the bridge of Alcantara, and -it was now impossible to cross the Tagus[554]. - - [553] Jourdan to Victor, June 1. - - [554] Victor to Jourdan, June 8. Oddly enough he was wrong in his - statement by two days, for Mayne blew up the bridge on the tenth - only. - -A few days later the news arrived at Madrid that Soult had been -defeated and flung out of Portugal[555]. It had taken three weeks -for information of this transcendent importance to reach the king! -Seriously alarmed, Joseph and Jourdan sent Victor his long-denied -permission to retire from Estremadura and place himself behind the -Tagus. They do not seem to have guessed that the victorious Wellesley -would make his next move against the 1st Corps, but imagined that -he would debouch into Old Castile by way of Rodrigo and Salamanca, -wherefore their main idea was to strengthen Mortier and the army -in the valley of the Douro[556]. Thus it fell in with their views -that Victor should draw back to the line of the Tagus, a general -concentration of all the French troops in the Peninsula seeming -advisable, in face of the necessity for resisting the supposed -attack on Old Castile. Another reason for assuming a defensive -attitude was the gloomy news from Aragon, where Suchet, after -his defeat at Alcañiz, had retired on Saragossa and was sending -despairing appeals for reinforcements to Madrid. - - [555] June 10, Joseph to Napoleon. - - [556] Cf. Joseph’s letters of June 10 and June 16 to Napoleon: - but there seems to be much vacillation in his decisions. - -Accordingly, the 1st Corps evacuated Estremadura between the -fourteenth and the nineteenth of June, and, crossing the Tagus, -disposed itself in a position on the northern bank, with its right -wing at Almaraz and its left at Talavera. Here Victor intended to -make his stand, being confident that with the broad river in front of -him he could easily beat off any attack on the part of the Spanish -army. - -But when Wellesley and Cuesta first began to correspond concerning -their joint movement against the French in Estremadura, Victor was -still in his old cantonments, and their scheme of operations had been -sketched out on the hypothesis that he lay at Merida, Torremocha, and -Caceres. It was with the design of assailing him while he still held -this advanced position, that Cuesta drew up his paper of answers to -Wellesley’s queries and dispatched it to Abrantes to meet the British -general on his arrival[557]. - - [557] Cuesta’s replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and - June 6, i.e. ten and eight days respectively before Victor began - his retreat beyond the Tagus on June 14. - -If the old Captain-General’s suggestions were by no means marked -with the stamp of genius, they had at least the merit of variety. -He offered Wellesley the choice between no less than three plans of -campaign. (1) His first proposal was that the British army should -descend into Southern Estremadura, and join him in the neighbourhood -of Badajoz. From thence the united host was to advance against Victor -and assail him in front. But meanwhile Cuesta proposed to send out -two subsidiary columns, to turn the Marshal’s flanks and surround -him. One was to base itself on Alcantara and march along the northern -bank of the Tagus to seize Almaraz: the other was to push by La -Serena through the Guadalupe mountains to threaten Talavera. By these -operations, if Victor would be good enough to remain quiet in his -present cantonments, he would be completely surrounded, his retreat -would be cut off, and he would finally be compelled to surrender. -The scheme was of course preposterous. What rational man could have -supposed it likely that the Marshal would remain quiescent while -his flanks were being turned? He would certainly have hastened to -retire and to throw himself upon the detached columns, one or both of -which he could have annihilated before the main armies of the allies -could get within touch of him[558]. Wellesley refused to listen for -a moment to this plan of campaign. (2) The second proposal of Cuesta -was that the British army should pass the Tagus at Alcantara and -operate against Victor’s flank, while the Spanish army attacked him -in front. To this the same objection could be urged: it presupposed -that the Frenchman would remain fixed in his present cantonments: but -he certainly would not do so when he heard that he was to be assailed -on both flanks; he would retire behind the Tagus at once, and the -British army would have wasted its march, and be obliged to return to -the north bank of that river: moreover, it would involve a very long -movement to the south to get in touch with Victor’s flank. Probably -it would be necessary to descend as far into Estremadura as Caceres, -and, when that point was reached, the Marshal could make the whole -manœuvre futile by retiring at once behind the Tagus at Almaraz. To -follow him to the north bank the British would have to retrace their -steps to Alcantara. - - [558] Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [_Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. 402]: ‘At all events these two detachments - on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak to produce any - great effect upon the movements of Victor.... I think it would - be nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the - passage [of the Tagus] with a part only of his force, while with - the other part he would beat one or both of the detachments sent - round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been - sent from La Serena toward Talavera, being between the corps - of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.’ Wellesley also - points out that it is useless to expect that Victor would wait in - his present cantonments: at the first news of the approach of the - British army he will retire to Almaraz and Arzobispo. - -The third proposal of Cuesta--the only one in which Wellesley could -find any prospect of success, was that the British army, keeping -north of the Tagus, should march by Castello Branco on Plasencia. -There it would be in the rear of Victor’s best line of retreat by -the bridge of Almaraz. If the manœuvre could be kept very secret, -and executed with great speed, Almaraz, perhaps also the subsidiary -passage at Arzobispo, might be seized. Should the Marshal get early -news of the movement, and hurry back across the Tagus to fend off -this stab in the rear, Wellesley was prepared to fight him in the -open with equal forces, conceiving that he was ‘sufficiently strong -to defend himself against any attack which Victor might make.’ He -hoped that Cuesta was able to guarantee that he also was competent -to hold his own, supposing that the Marshal, neglecting the British -diversion, should concentrate his corps and strike at the Spanish -army. - -On the whole, therefore, Wellesley was not disinclined to fall in -with this plan, which had the extra merit of remaining feasible even -if Victor withdrew north of the Tagus before either of the allied -armies had completed its march. He made one countersuggestion, viz. -that Cuesta might move eastward, with the whole or part of his army, -join the army of Venegas in La Mancha, and attack Sebastiani, leaving -the British alone to deal with Victor. But he did not wish to press -this plan, thinking that an attack on the enemy’s left was on first -principles less advisable than one on his right, because it did not -offer any chance of cutting him off from Madrid[559]. - - [559] I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to Bourke, - regarding Cuesta’s three plans of campaign. - -The answer to Cuesta’s proposals was sent off from Abrantes, which -Wellesley, preceding his army by three or four days’ march, reached -upon June 8. He had now under his hand Mackenzie’s Anglo-Portuguese -force, but the leading brigades of the troops who had fought at -Oporto could not arrive before the eleventh or twelfth. There -was thus ample time to concert the joint plan of campaign before -the whole army would be concentrated and ready to move. But when -Cuesta’s reply to the dispatch of June 8 came to hand upon June 13, -Wellesley was much vexed to find that the old Captain-General had -expressed a great dislike for the idea that the British army should -march upon Plasencia and Almaraz--though it had been one of his own -three suggestions. He now pleaded urgently in favour of the first -of his original alternatives--that Wellesley should come down to -Badajoz and join him in a frontal attack upon Victor. With much -reluctance the British general resolved to comply, apparently moved -by his ally’s openly expressed dislike to being left to face Victor -alone. ‘I must acknowledge,’ he wrote to Colonel Bourke, ‘that _I_ -entertain no apprehension that the French will attack General Cuesta: -I am much more afraid that they are going away, and strengthening -themselves upon the Tagus[560].’ To the Spanish General he sent a -dispatch to the same effect, in which he pledged himself to march to -join the army of Estremadura, though he frankly stated that all his -information led him to believe that Victor had no intention of taking -the offensive, and that the junction was therefore unnecessary. He -expressed his hope that Cuesta would avoid all fighting till they had -met, the only possible danger to the allied cause being that one of -the two armies should suffer a defeat before the other had started on -the combined movement to which they were committed[561]. - - [560] Wellesley to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14. - - [561] Wellesley to Cuesta, from Abrantes, June 14. - -Fortunately for all parties concerned, the march on Badajoz which -Wellesley so much disliked never had to be begun, for on the day -after he had sent off his dispatch to Cuesta he received reliable -information from several sources, to the effect that Victor had -evacuated and blown up the fortified convent of Merida, and had -sent off all his baggage and heavy artillery towards Almaraz. -During the next four days the whole of the 1st Corps marched for -that all-important bridge, and crossed it. On the nineteenth Victor -had established his entire army north of the Tagus, at Almaraz, -Arzobispo, and Talavera. Thus the whole face of affairs was changed, -and the advance of the British army into Southern Estremadura was -rendered unnecessary. It was fortunate that the news of the retreat -of the 1st Corps was received at Abrantes just in time to allow of -the countermanding of the march of Wellesley’s army on Badajoz, for -that fruitless movement would have begun if the Duke of Belluno had -been able to retain his starving army in its positions for a few days -longer. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER II - -WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN - - -The retreat of Victor beyond the Tagus forced Wellesley to concert -yet another plan of operation with Cuesta, since the position of -the French army, on which the whole of the recently adopted scheme -depended, had just suffered a radical change. It was clear that -every consideration now pointed to the necessity for adopting -the combination which Wellesley had urged upon his colleague in -his letter of June 8, viz. that the British army should move on -Plasencia and Almaraz. It would now be striking at the flank instead -of the rear of Victor’s corps, but it was clear that under the new -conditions it would still be in a position to roll up his whole army, -if he should endeavour to defend the passages of the Tagus against -the Spaniards, who were now approaching them from the front. For -Cuesta had descended from the mountains when he heard of Victor’s -retreat, and was now approaching Almaraz. - -It took some time, however, to induce the Captain-General to consent -to this move. To the extreme vexation of his colleague he produced -other plans, so gratuitously impracticable that Wellesley wrote to -Castlereagh to say that he could conceive no explanation for the old -man’s conduct save a desire to refuse any scheme urged on him by -others, and a resolve to invent and advocate alternative plans of his -own out of mere pride and wrongheadedness. ‘The best of the whole -story,’ he added[562], was that Cuesta was now refusing to accept a -plan which he himself had suggested in one of his earlier letters, -merely because that plan had been taken up and advocated by his ally. -‘The obstinacy of this old gentleman,’ he concluded, ‘is throwing -out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had[563].’ - - [562] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abrantes, June 17. The real cause - of Cuesta’s angry and impracticable attitude will be shown in the - next chapter. - - [563] Wellesley to Frere from the same place, June 14. - -The necessity for working out a new scheme for the combined -operations of the British and Spanish armies, in view of Victor’s -retreat to Almaraz, entailed the loss of a few days. It would have -been impossible to start on the advance to Plasencia till Cuesta had -promised to accept that movement as part of the joint campaign. There -was also some time to be allowed for concluding an agreement with -Venegas, the General of the La Carolina army, whose connexion with -the campaign must become much more intimate, now that the fighting -was to take place not in Estremadura, but further north, in the -valley of the Tagus. For while Victor lay at Merida and Sebastiani at -Manzanares and Ciudad Real, the Spanish forces which faced them were -very far apart. But when Victor retired to Talavera, and Sebastiani -to Madridejos, in the end of June, Cuesta and Venegas--each following -the corps opposed to him--could draw closer together. It was evident -that the Andalusian army ought to be made to play an important part -in the combined operations of July. - -It would be unfair to the Spanish generals to let it be supposed -that the necessity for settling on a common scheme of operations -with them was the sole cause which detained Wellesley at Abrantes -from the eighth to the twenty-seventh of June. The leading brigades -of the British troops from Oporto had begun to reach Abrantes on the -eleventh, and the more belated columns came up on the fourteenth and -fifteenth. But it would have been impossible to have moved forward -without some further delay, even if Wellesley had been in possession -of a complete and satisfactory plan of operations on the day upon -which his whole force was concentrated on the line of the Zezere. At -the least he would have required another week for preparations. - -His hindrances at this moment were manifold. The first was the -distressed condition of those of his brigades which had seen -most service during the Oporto campaign. Many regiments had been -constantly on the march from May 9 to June 14, without obtaining -more than two days’ rest in the whole time. Their shoes were worn -out, their jaded baggage-animals had dropped to the rear, and they -were leaving so many stragglers on the way that it was absolutely -necessary to give them a moderate rest at Abrantes, in order to -allow the ranks to grow full and the belated baggage to come up. -The regiments which had followed Beresford in the forced march -from Amarante to Chaves were worst off--they had never completely -recovered from the fatigues of those three days of constant rain and -storm spent on the stony roads of the Tras-os-Montes[564]. In any -case some delay must have occurred before all the troops were ready -to march. But many circumstances conspired to detain the army at -Abrantes for several days after the moment at which Wellesley had -determined to start for Plasencia. The first was the non-arrival of -convoys of shoes and clothing which he had ordered up from Lisbon. -The transport of the army was not yet fully organized, its officers -were lacking in experience, if not in zeal, and orders were slowly -executed. Many corps had, in the end, to start for Spain without -receiving the much-needed stores, which were still trailing up from -Santarem to Abrantes when Wellesley gave the signal to advance. -Another hindrance was the lack of money: the army was obliged to pay -for its wants in coin, but hard cash was so difficult to procure -both in London and in Lisbon that arrears were already beginning to -grow up. At first they vexed the soul of Wellesley almost beyond -endurance, but as the war dragged on they only grew worse, and the -Commander-in-chief had to endure with resignation the fact that both -the pay of the men and the wages of the Portuguese muleteers and -followers were overdue for many months. In June 1809 he had not yet -reached this state of comparative callousness, and was endeavouring -to scrape together money by every possible device. He had borrowed -£3,000 in Portuguese silver from the merchants of the impoverished -city of Oporto: he was trying to exchange bills on England for -dollars at Cadiz, where the arrival of the American contribution had -produced a comparative plenty of the circulating medium. Yet after -all he had to start from Abrantes with only a comparatively moderate -sum in his military chest[565], the rest had not reached him on June -28, the treasure convoy having taken the unconscionable time of -eleven days to crawl forward from Lisbon to Abrantes--a distance of -no more than ninety miles[566]. - - [564] With regard to these regiments [5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th], - Wellesley writes in very bitter terms to Donkin on June 16, - saying that the number of their stragglers was scandalous, and - that the laggards were committing all manner of disorders in the - rear of the army. It is fair to remember that the battalions - had suffered exceptional hardships, as may be seen from the - narratives of Gough of the 87th, and Grattan of the 88th. - - [565] The main convoy only reached Abrantes when Wellesley had - advanced to Plasencia, in Spain. See letter to the officer - commanding Artillery at Castello Branco, dated July 8, from - Plasencia. - - [566] Cf. Wellesley to Frere, June 14, to Commissary-General - Murray, June 16, both from Abrantes, and to Castlereagh, June 27. - -A third cause of delay was the time spent in waiting for -reinforcements from Lisbon. Eight or nine regiments had landed, or -were expected to arrive within the next few days. It was in every -way desirable to unite them to the army before the campaign should -begin. This was all the more necessary because several corps had -to be deducted from the force which had been used in the Oporto -campaign. Under stringent orders from home, Wellesley had sent back -two infantry battalions and part of two cavalry regiments to Lisbon, -to be embarked for Gibraltar and Sicily[567]. In return he was to -receive a much larger body of troops. But while the deduction was -immediate, the addition took time. Of all the troops which were -expected to reinforce the army, only one battalion caught him up at -Abrantes, while a second and one regiment of Light Dragoons[568] -joined later, but yet in time for Talavera. Thus at the commencement -of the actual campaign the force in the field was, if anything, -slightly less in numbers than that which had been available in -May. It was particularly vexatious that the brigade of veteran -light infantry, for which Wellesley had made a special demand on -Castlereagh as early as April, did not reach Abrantes till long after -the army had moved forward. These three battalions, the nucleus of -the famous Light Division[569], had all gone through the experiences -of Moore’s campaign, and were once more under their old leader Robert -Craufurd. Detained by baffling winds in the Downs, the transports -that bore them only reached Lisbon at various dates between June 28 -and July 2, though they had sailed on May 25. Their indefatigable -brigadier hurried them forward with all speed to the front, but in -spite of his exertions, they only came up with the main army after -the day of battle was over. The same was the fate of two batteries of -horse artillery[570]--an arm in which Wellesley was wholly deficient -when he marched into Spain. They arrived late, and were still far to -the rear when the march from Abrantes began. - - [567] The 2/9th and 2/30th were sent to Gibraltar in May. The two - squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons and the one squadron of the - 3rd Hussars of the K. G. L. were sent to Sicily at the same time. - - [568] The 1/48th, 1/61st, and 23rd Light Dragoons. - - [569] 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/95th. Of these three units only 1/43rd - had been in Robert Craufurd’s old brigade, during the march - to Sahagun. The other two had been in Anstruther’s brigade of - Paget’s reserve; they had therefore fought at Corunna, while - Craufurd and the ‘flank brigade’ which includes the 1/43rd, had - been detached from the main army and had embarked at Vigo. - - [570] A and I troops. The first joined in company with Craufurd. - The second only appeared much later. - -It thus resulted that although there were over 33,000 British troops -in the Peninsula at the commencement of July 1809, less than 21,000 -could be collected for the advance on Plasencia which was now about -to begin. More than 8,000 men lay at Lisbon, or were just starting -from that city, while 4,500 were in hospital[571]. The sick seemed -more numerous than might have been expected at the season of the -year: though the fatigues of the Oporto campaign accounted for -the majority of the invalids, yet Wellesley was of opinion that a -contributory cause might be found in the slack discipline of certain -regiments, where inefficient commanding officers had neglected -sanitary precautions, and allowed their men to neglect personal -cleanliness, or to indulge to excess in wine and unripe fruit and -vegetables. It was his opinion that the number of men in hospital -should never exceed ten per cent. of the total force. But all through -the war he found that this proportion was exceeded. - - [571] Writing to Castlereagh on June 30, Wellesley remarks that - ‘according to your account I have 35,000 men--according to my - own I have only 18,000,’ but this was before he had been joined - by the 1/61st, the 23rd Dragoons, and certain details. It is - certain, from the careful table of troops engaged at Talavera - which is to be found in the Record Office, that somewhat over - 22,000 men entered Spain, and that after deducting sick left at - Plasencia and elsewhere, just 20,600 fought at Talavera. - -With the internal condition of many of his regiments Wellesley was -far from satisfied. His tendency to use the plainest, indeed the -harshest, terms concerning the rank and file, is so well known that -we are not surprised to find him writing that ‘the army behave -terribly ill: they are a rabble who cannot bear success any more -than Sir John Moore’s army could bear failure[572].’ He complained -most of all of the recruits sent him from the Irish militia, who -were, he said, capable of every sin, moral or military. Though -he was ‘endeavouring to tame the troops,’ yet there were several -regiments in such bad order that he would gladly have sent them -home in disgrace if he could have spared a man. The main offence, -of course, was robbery of food from the Portuguese peasantry, often -accompanied by violence, and now and then by murder. The number of -assistant-provost-marshals was multiplied, some offenders were caught -and hanged, but marauding could not be suppressed, even while the -troops were receiving full rations in their cantonments at Abrantes. -When they were enduring real privation, in the wilds of Estremadura, -matters grew much worse. Though many regiments were distinguished -for their good behaviour, yet there were always some whose excesses -were a disgrace to the British army. Their Commander never shrank -from telling them so in the most incisive language; he was always -complaining that he could not get a sufficient number of the -criminals flogged or hanged, and that regimental court-martials were -far too lenient in their dealings with offenders[573]. - - [572] These topics occur in many dispatches to Castlereagh. - Perhaps the most notable is that of May 31, 1809, written at - Coimbra. - - [573] Wellesley’s anxiety to make examples may be traced in - the series of letters concerning a private of the 29th which - occur in his July dispatches. The man had been acquitted by a - court-martial on the ground of insanity, but this did not satisfy - the Commander-in-chief, who sends repeated orders that the award - must be revised, and the man, if possible, executed. - -It was at Abrantes that Wellesley first arranged his army in -divisions, and gave it the organization which, with certain -modifications, it was to maintain during the rest of the war. His six -regiments of cavalry were to form a single division consisting of one -heavy and two light brigades, commanded respectively by Fane, Cotton, -and Anson. The twenty-five battalions of infantry were distributed -into four divisions of unequal strength under Generals Sherbrooke, -Hill, Mackenzie, and A. Campbell. Of these the first was by far the -largest, counting four brigades of two battalions each: the first -(Henry Campbell’s) was formed of the two battalions of Guards, the -second (Cameron’s) of two line regiments, the third and fourth, -under Low and Langwerth, comprised the infantry of the King’s German -Legion. The second and third divisions each consisted of two brigades -of three battalions each[574]. The fourth, and weakest, showed only -five battalions in line. Of artillery there were only thirty guns, -eighteen English and twelve German: all were field-batteries, as none -of the much-desired horse artillery had yet reached the front[575]. -They were all of very light calibre, the heaviest being a brigade of -heavy six-pounders belonging to the German Legion. - - [574] Viz. 2nd, Tilson and Richard Stewart; 3rd, Mackenzie and - Donkin; 4th, A. Campbell and Kemmis. - - [575] A and I batteries R. H. A. were both late for Talavera. - -On June 28 the army at last moved forward: that day the head quarters -were at Cortiçada, on the Sobreira Formosa. On the thirtieth Castello -Branco, the last Portuguese town, was reached. On July 3 the leading -brigades passed the Elga, the frontier river, and bivouacked on -the same night around Zarza la Mayor, the first place in Spanish -Estremadura. At the same time Sir Robert Wilson’s small column of -1,500 Portuguese crossed the border a little further north, and -advanced in a direction parallel to that of the main army, so as to -serve as a flank guard for it in the direction of the mountains. - -King Joseph meanwhile was in a state of the most profound ignorance -concerning the impending storm. As late as July 9 he wrote to his -brother that the British had not as yet made any pronounced movement, -and that it was quite uncertain whether they would invade Galicia, -or strike at Castile, or remain in the neighbourhood of Lisbon[576]! -On that day the head of the British army had entered Plasencia, and -was only 125 miles from Madrid. It is impossible to give any better -testimonial than this simple fact to the way in which the insurgents -and the guerrillas served the cause of the allies. Wellesley had -been able to march from Oporto to Abrantes, and from Abrantes to -Plasencia, without even a rumour of his advance reaching Madrid. All -that Joseph had learnt was that there was now an allied force of -some sort behind Alcantara, in the direction of Castello Branco. He -took it for granted that they were Portuguese, but in one dispatch -he broaches the theory that there might be a few English with -them--perhaps from having heard a vague report of the composition of -Mackenzie’s division on the Zezere in May. He therefore wrote in a -cheerful tone to the Emperor that ‘if we have only got to deal with -Cuesta and the Portuguese they will be beaten by the 1st Corps. If -they have some English with them, they can be beaten equally well by -the 1st Corps, aided by troops which I can send across the Tagus via -Toledo’ (i.e. the 5,000 or 6,000 men of the Central Reserve which -could be spared from Madrid). ‘I am not in the least disquieted,’ -he continued, ‘concerning the present condition of military affairs -in this part of Spain[577].’ In another epistle to his brother he -added that ‘if the English should be at the back of Cuesta, it would -be the happiest chance in the world for the concluding of the whole -war[578].’ - - [576] Joseph to Napoleon, from Talavera, July 9, 1809. - - [577] Joseph to Napoleon, from Almagro, July 2, 1809. - - [578] Joseph to Napoleon, from Madridejos, July 3, 1809. It is - fair to the King to say that in this letter he concludes that he - had better call Mortier down into New Castile if the English are - really on the move. - -It was lucky for the King that he was not induced to try the -experiment of falling upon Wellesley and Cuesta with the 28,000 men -of Victor and the Central Reserve. If he had done so, he would have -suffered a frightful disaster and have lost Madrid. - -In the end of June and the first days of July Joseph’s main attention -had been drawn off to that part of his front where there was least -danger, so that he was paying comparatively little heed to the -movements of the allies on the lower Tagus. He had been distracted -by a rash and inexplicable movement of the Spanish army of La -Mancha. When General Venegas had heard of the retreat of Victor from -Estremadura, and had been informed that Cuesta was about to move -forward in pursuit of the 1st Corps, he had concluded that his own -troops might also advance. He argued that Sebastiani and the 4th -Corps must beat a retreat, when their right flank was uncovered by -Victor’s evacuation of the valley of the Guadiana. He was partly -justified in his idea, for Joseph had drawn back Sebastiani’s -main body to Madridejos when Victor abandoned Merida. It was safe -therefore to advance from the Despeña Perros into the southern skirts -of La Mancha, as far as Manzanares and the line of the Guadiana. But -to go further forward was dangerous, unless Venegas was prepared -to risk a collision with Sebastiani. This he was certainly not in -a condition to do: his troops had not yet recovered from the moral -effects of the rout of Ciudad Real, and his brigades were full of -new battalions of untried Andalusian reserves. He should have been -cautious, and have refused to move without concerting his operations -with Cuesta: to have had his corps put _hors de combat_ at the very -beginning of the joint campaign of the allied armies would have been -most disastrous. - -Nevertheless Venegas came down from the passes of the Sierra Morena -with 18,000 infantry, 3,000 horse, and twenty-six guns, and proceeded -to thrust back Sebastiani’s cavalry screen and to push in his -outposts in front of Madridejos. The French general had in hand at -this moment only two infantry divisions and Milhaud’s dragoons; his -third division and his light cavalry were still absent with Victor, -to whom they had been lent in March for the campaign of Medellin. But -with 13,000 foot and 2,000 horse[579] he ought not to have feared -Venegas, and could have given a good account of him had he chosen to -attack. But having received exaggerated reports of the strength of -the Spanish army, he wrote to the King that he was beset by nearly -40,000 men and must be reinforced at once, or he would have to fall -back on Madrid[580]. Joseph, fully believing the news, sent orders to -Victor to restore to the 4th Corps the divisions of Leval and Merlin, -and then, doubting whether these troops could arrive in time, sallied -out of Madrid on June 22 with his Guards and half the division of -Dessolles--about 5,500 men. - - [579] The July strength of Sebastiani’s corps, _présents sous les - armes_, was 1st division (French) 8,118, 2nd division (Valence’s - Poles) 4,784, Milhaud’s dragoons 2,249--total 15,151. - - [580] Joseph to Napoleon, from Illescas, June 23: ‘Le général - Sebastiani a devant lui des forces triples des siennes.’ Joseph - to Napoleon, from Moral, July 1: ‘L’armée de 36,000 à 40,000 - hommes qui menaçait le 4me Corps s’est enfuie et a repassé la - Sierre Morena.’ - -It was lucky for Venegas that Sebastiani had refused to fight him, -but still more lucky that the news of the King’s approach reached -him promptly. On hearing that Joseph had joined the 4th Corps on -June 25 he was wise enough to turn on his heel and retreat in all -haste towards his lair in the passes of the Sierra Morena. If he had -lingered any longer in the plains he would have been destroyed, for -the King, on the arrival of Leval’s and Merlin’s divisions, would -have fallen upon him at the head of 27,000 men. As it was, Venegas -retired with such promptitude to Santa Cruz de Mudela, at the foot of -the passes, that the French could never catch him. Joseph pursued him -as far as Almagro and El Moral, on the southern edge of La Mancha, -and there stopped short. He had received, on July 2, a dispatch -from Victor to the effect that Cuesta had repaired the bridge of -Almaraz and begun to cross the Tagus, while a body of 10,000 allied -troops, presumably Portuguese, had been heard of in the direction of -Plasencia[581]. (This was in reality the whole army of Wellesley!) -Rightly concluding that he had pushed the pursuit of Venegas too far, -the King turned back in haste, left Sebastiani and the 4th Corps -behind the Guadiana, and returned with his reserve to Toledo, in -order to be in a position to support Victor. His excursion to Almagro -had been almost as reckless and wrongheaded as Venegas’s advance to -Madridejos, for he had separated himself from Victor by a gap of 200 -miles, at the moment when the British army was just appearing on -the Marshal’s flank, while Cuesta was in his front. If the allied -generals had concentrated their forces ten days earlier--a thing that -might well have happened but for the vexatious delays at Abrantes -caused by Cuesta’s impracticability--the 1st Corps might have been -attacked at the moment when Joseph lay at the foot of the Sierra -Morena, in a position too remote from Talavera to allow him to come -up in time to succour Victor. - - [581] For all this see Joseph to Napoleon, from Moral [July 1], - and from Almagro [July 2]. - -While the King was absent on his expedition in pursuit of Venegas the -most important change in the situation of affairs on the Tagus was -that the Duke of Belluno had drawn back his troops from the line of -the Tagus, where they had been lying since June 19, and had retired -behind the Alberche. His retreat was not caused by any apprehension -as to the appearance of Wellesley on his flank--a fact which was -completely concealed from him--but by sheer want of provisions. On -June 25 he sent to the King to say that his army was again starved -out of its cantonments, and that he had eaten up in a week the small -remnant of food that could be squeezed out of the country-side -between the Tagus and the Tietar, and was forced to transfer himself -to another region. ‘The position,’ he wrote, ‘is desperate. The -1st Corps is on the eve of dissolution: the men are dropping down -from mere starvation. I have nothing, absolutely nothing, to give -them. They are in a state of despair.... I am forced to fall back on -Talavera, where there are no more resources than here. We must have -prompt succour, but where can it be found? If your Majesty abandons -me in my present wretched situation, I lose my honour, my military -record--everything. I shall not be to blame for the disaster which -menaces my troops, but I shall have to bear the blame. Tomorrow -I shall be at Talavera, waiting your Majesty’s orders. The enemy -[Cuesta] has a pontoon-train: if he wishes to cross the Tagus he can -do so, for the 1st Corps can no longer remain opposite him. Never was -there a more distressing situation than ours[582].’ - - [582] Victor to King Joseph, from the head quarters of the 1st - Corps, Calzada, near Oropesa, June 25. Intercepted dispatch in - the Record Office. - -On June 26, therefore, Victor transferred himself to Talavera, and -adopted a position behind the Alberche, after burning the materials -of the late pontoon bridge at Almaraz, which he had taken up and -stored in case they might again be needed. His movement was a lucky -one for himself, as it took him further away from Wellesley’s army, -which was just about to start from Abrantes with the object of -turning his flank. It puzzled Cuesta, who sought for some other -explanation of his departure than mere starvation, and was very -cautious in taking advantage of it. However, on the day after -the French had withdrawn, he pushed troops across the Tagus, and -prepared to construct another bridge at Almaraz to replace that -which the French had destroyed. His cavalry pushed out to Navalmoral -and Oropesa, and further to the east he passed some detachments -of infantry across the bridge of Arzobispo, which Victor--most -unaccountably--had left intact. Fortunately he did no more, and -refrained from advancing against Talavera, a step which from his -earlier record we should judge that he might well have taken into -consideration. - -On the part of the allies things were now in a state of suspense -from which they were not to stir for a fortnight. Cuesta was waiting -for Wellesley, Wellesley was pushing forward from Zarza la Mayor to -join Cuesta. Venegas was recovering at Santa Cruz de Mudela from the -fatigues of his fruitless expedition into La Mancha. - -But on the French side matters suffered a sudden change in the last -days of July--the hand of the Emperor was stretched out from the -banks of the Danube to alter the general dispositions of the army -of Spain. On June 12 he had dictated at Schönbrunn a new plan of -campaign, based on information which was already many weeks old -when it reached him. At this date the Emperor was barely aware that -Soult was being pressed by Wellesley in Northern Portugal. He had -no detailed knowledge of what was taking place in Galicia or the -Asturias, and was profoundly ignorant of the intrigues at Oporto -which afterwards roused his indignation. But he was convinced that -the English army was the one hostile force in Spain which ought to -engage the attention of his lieutenants. Acting on this belief he -issued an order that the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps--those of Soult, -Mortier, and Ney--were to be united into a single army, and to be -told off to the task of evicting Wellesley from Portugal. They were -to put aside for the present all such subsidiary enterprises as the -subjection of Galicia and the Asturias, and to devote themselves -solely to ‘beating, hunting down, and casting into the sea the -British army. If the three Corps join in good time the enemy ought -to be crushed, and then the Spanish war will come to an end. But the -troops must be moved in masses and not march in small detachments.... -Putting aside all personal considerations, I give the command of -the united army to the Duke of Dalmatia, as the senior marshal. His -three Corps ought to amount to something between 50,000 and 60,000 -men[583].’ - - [583] Napoleon to Clarke [Minister of War], from Schönbrunn, June - 12, 1809. - -This dispatch reached King Joseph at El Moral in La Mancha on July -1, and Soult at Zamora on July 2. It had been drawn up in view of -events that were taking place about May 15. It presupposed that the -British army was still in Northern Portugal, in close touch with -Soult, and that Victor was in Estremadura[584]. As a matter of fact -Soult was on this day leading his dilapidated corps down the Esla, -at the end of his retreat from Galicia. Ney, furious at the way -in which his colleague had deserted him, had descended to Astorga -three days before. Mortier was at Valladolid, just about to march -for Villacastin and Madrid, for the King had determined to draw him -down to aid in the defence of the capital. Finally, Cuesta, instead -of lying in the Sierra Morena, as he was when Napoleon drew up his -orders, was now on the Tagus, while Wellesley was no longer in touch -with Soult on the Douro, but preparing to fall upon Victor in New -Castile. The whole situation was so changed that the commentary which -the Emperor appended to his orders was hopelessly out of date--as was -always bound to be the case so long as he persisted in endeavouring -to direct the course of affairs in Spain from the suburbs of Vienna. - - [584] The Emperor’s dispatch contained many rebukes to Victor for - not pushing towards the North, to join hands with Soult. Jourdan - very truly remarks that if the 1st Corps had been sent in that - direction, King Joseph must infallibly have lost Madrid. - -Soult was overjoyed at receiving the splendid charge which the -Emperor’s decree put into his hands, though he must have felt secret -qualms at the idea that ere long some account of his doings at Oporto -must reach the imperial head quarters and provoke his master’s wrath. -There was a bad quarter of an hour to come[585]. But meanwhile he -was given a formidable army, and might hope to retrieve the laurels -that he had lost in Portugal, being now in a position to attack the -British with an overwhelming superiority of numbers. It must have -been specially delightful to him to find that Ney had been put under -his orders, so that he would be able to meet his angry colleague in -the character of a superior officer dealing with an insubordinate -lieutenant. - - [585] The Emperor’s stormy dispatch came in due course, but only - in September, see pp. 276-7. - -Soult’s first action, on finding himself placed in command of the -whole of the French forces in North-western Spain, was to issue -orders to Mortier to march on Salamanca, and to Ney to bring the -6th Corps down to Benavente. These dispositions clearly indicate an -intention of falling upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and assailing -Northern Portugal--the plan which the Duke of Dalmatia had broached -to the King in his letter from Puebla de Senabria on June 25, before -he had received the news that the 5th and 6th Corps had been added to -his command. - -It is clear that on July 2 Soult had no knowledge of Wellesley’s -movements, and thought that the British army was quite as likely to -be aiming at Salamanca as at Madrid. It is also evident that he was -aware that he would be unable to move for some weeks. Till the 2nd -Corps should have received the clothing, munitions, and artillery -which had been promised it, it could not possibly take the field for -the invasion of Portugal. - -Soult, therefore, was obliged to wait till his stores should be -replenished, and till the two corps from Astorga and Valladolid -should concentrate on his flanks. It was while he was remaining -perforce in this posture of expectation that the news of the real -condition of affairs in New Castile was at last brought to him. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER III - -WELLESLEY AND CUESTA: THE INTERVIEW AT MIRABETE - - -It was not till the third day of July that Wellesley had been able to -cross the Spanish border. Since Victor had assumed his new position -to the north of the Tagus as early as the nineteenth of the preceding -month, there was a perilous fortnight during which Cuesta and his -army were left alone to face the French. All through this time of -waiting, the British Commander-in-chief was haunted by the dread that -the old Captain-General might repeat his earlier errors, and once -more--as at Rio Seco and Medellin--court a pitched battle. Wellesley -had done his best to urge caution, by letters written not only to -Cuesta himself, but to his Chief-of-the-staff O’Donoju and to Colonel -Roche, who had now replaced Bourke as British representative at the -head quarters of the Army of Estremadura. Fortunately they were not -needed: the Spanish General was for once cautious: he followed Victor -at a respectful distance, and when he had reached the Tagus and -repaired the bridge of Almaraz, held back his army to the southern -bank and only pushed a few small detachments beyond the stream to -search for the enemy. Since the French had withdrawn to Talavera on -June 26 there was no collision. The cavalry of the 1st Corps were -discovered upon the upper Tietar and the Alberche, but they preserved -a defensive attitude, and the Spaniards did not provoke them by any -rash attempt to drive them back upon their main body. All remained -quiet, as Wellesley had rather desired than expected. - -Cuesta’s strategical position, therefore, was perfectly secure, -since he kept his main body to the south of the river, and showed -no desire to meddle with Victor before the arrival of the British. -At this moment military affairs were not the only things that were -engaging the attention of the old Captain-General. He was watching -with considerable anxiety the course of events at Seville, where -he was aware that he had many enemies. Ever since his high-handed -action against the deputies of Leon in the preceding autumn, he knew -that the Central Junta, and especially its Liberal wing, viewed -him with suspicion and dislike. It was with great reluctance that -they had placed him in command of the Estremaduran army, and if he -had not been popular with the Conservative and clerical party and -with some of the military cliques, he would not have retained his -post for long. At this moment there were many intrigues stirring -in Andalusia, and if some of them were directed against the Junta, -others had no other end than the changing of the commanders of -the various armies. While the Junta were debating about forms of -government, and especially about the summoning of a national Cortes -in the autumn, there were a number of officers of damaged reputation -whose main object was to recover the military rank of which they had -been deprived after misfortunes in the field. Infantado, who thought -that it was absurd that he should have been disgraced after Ucles, -while Cuesta had been rewarded after Medellin, was at the head of one -party of intriguers, which included Francisco Palafox and the Conde -de Montijo, and had secured the aid of Colonel Doyle, late British -agent in Aragon and Catalonia, an officer who showed a lamentable -readiness to throw himself into the intestine quarrels of the Spanish -factions[586]. Their actions went to the very edge of high treason, -for Montijo stirred up a riot at Granada on April 16, attacked the -provincial authorities, and almost succeeded in carrying out a -_pronunciamiento_ which must have led to civil war. The Junta did no -more than banish him to San Lucar, from which place he continued his -plots with Infantado, in spite of the warning that he had received. - - [586] Doyle, as his numerous letters in the Record Office show, - was such a furious partisan of the family of Palafox, that he - believed that all the Spanish authorities were in a conspiracy to - keep them down. He especially hated Blake. - -In Seville, faction if not so openly displayed was equally violent. -There was, as we have already said, a large section of the Junta -whose dearest wish would have been to displace Cuesta: it was they -who had obtained the nomination of Venegas to take charge of the -troops in La Mancha, merely because he was known to be an enemy of -the elder general. Yet since the two armies would have to co-operate -in any attempt to recover Madrid, it was clearly inexpedient that -their commanders should be at enmity. Some of the politicians at -Seville were set on giving high command to the Duke of Albuquerque, -an energetic and ambitious officer, but one gifted with the talent -of quarrelling with every superior under whom he served: he was -now bickering with Cuesta just as in March he had bickered with -Cartaojal. The Duke was a great admirer of all things English, and -a personal friend of Frere, the British minister. The latter did -his best to support his pretensions, often expressing in official -correspondence with the Junta a desire that Albuquerque might be -given an independent corps, and entrusted with the charge of the -movement that was to be concerted in conjunction with Wellesley’s -army. - -But it was not so much Albuquerque as Wellesley himself that Cuesta -dreaded as a possible successor. For Frere was possessed with the -notion that the time had now arrived at which it would be possible to -press for the appointment of a single Commander-in-chief of all the -Spanish armies. The obvious person to fill this post was the victor -of Vimiero and Oporto, if only Spanish pride would consent to the -appointment of a foreigner. Frere had sufficient sense to refrain -from openly publishing his idea. But he was continually ventilating -it to his private friends in the Junta, in season and out of season. -There can be no doubt that both from the military and the political -point of view the results of Wellesley’s exaltation to the position -of Generalissimo would have been excellent. If he had controlled -the whole of the Spanish armies in the summer of 1809, the course -of affairs in the Peninsula would have taken a very different turn, -and the campaign of Talavera would not have been wrecked by the -hopeless want of co-operation between the allied armies. But it was -not yet the time to press for the appointment: great as Wellesley’s -reputation already was, when compared with that of any Spanish -general, it was still not so splendid or so commanding as to compel -assent to his promotion[587]. Legitimate national pride stood in the -way, and even after Espinosa, and Tudela, and Medellin the Spaniards -could not believe that it was necessary for them to entrust the whole -responsibility for the defence of their country to the foreigner. -Only a few of the politicians of Seville showed any liking for the -project. Wellesley himself would have desired nothing so much as -this appointment, but being wiser and less hopeful than Frere, he -thought it useless to press the point. When the sanguine diplomat -wrote to him, early in June, to detail his attempts to bring home the -advisability of the project to his Spanish friends, the general’s -reply was cautious in the extreme. ‘I am much flattered,’ he said, -‘by the notion entertained by some of the persons in authority at -Seville, of appointing me to the command of the Spanish armies. I -have received no instruction from Government upon that subject: but -I believe that it was considered an object of great importance in -England that the Commander-in-chief of the British troops should -have that situation. But it is one more likely to be attained by -refraining from pressing it, and leaving it to the Spanish themselves -to discover the expediency of the arrangement, than by any suggestion -on our parts.’ He concluded by informing Frere that he could not -conceive that his insinuation was likely to have any effect, and that -the opinion of the British Ministry was probably correct--viz. that -at present national jealousy made the project hopeless[588]. - - [587] On June 9, Frere writes to tell Wellesley that if he could - only have destroyed Soult at Oporto, instead of merely chasing - him across the frontier, it would have been possible to secure - him the post of Generalissimo at once. This chance had gone by, - but ‘your friends here (among whom you may count Mr. de Garay) - are doing their best for you.’ [Record Office, from Seville, June - 9, 1809.] - - [588] Wellington to Frere, from Abrantes, June 16, 1809. - -Now it was impossible that Frere’s well-meaning but mistaken -endeavours should escape the notice of Cuesta’s friends in Seville. -The British Minister had spoken to so many politicians on the -subject, that we cannot doubt that his colloquies were promptly -reported to the Captain-General of Estremadura. This fact goes far to -explain Cuesta’s surly and impracticable behaviour towards Wellesley -during the Talavera campaign. He disliked his destined colleague -not only because he was a foreigner, and because he showed himself -strong-willed and outspoken during their intercourse, but because -he believed that the Englishman was intriguing behind his back to -obtain the post of Generalissimo. This belief made him determined to -assert his independence on the most trifling matters, loth to fall -in with even the most reasonable plans, and suspicious that every -proposal made to him concealed some trap. He attributed to Wellesley -the design of getting rid of him, and was naturally determined to do -nothing to forward it. - -The English officers who studied Cuesta’s conduct from the outside, -during the Talavera campaign, attributed his irrational movements and -his hopeless impracticability to a mere mixture of pride, stupidity, -and obstinacy. They were wrong; the dominant impulse was resentment, -jealousy, and suspicion--a combination far more deadly in its -results than the other. He awaited the approach of Wellesley with a -predisposition to quarrel and a well-developed personal enmity, whose -existence the British general had not yet realized. - -We have dealt in the last chapter with the strength and organization -of the British army at the moment when Wellesley crossed the -frontier on July 3. It remains to speak of the two Spanish armies -which were to take part in the campaign. We have already seen that -Cuesta’s host had been reinforced after Medellin with a new brigade -of Granadan levies, and a whole division taken from the army of La -Mancha[589]. Since that date he had received large drafts both of -infantry and cavalry from Andalusia. Six more regiments of horse -had reached him, besides reinforcements for his old corps. All were -now strong in numbers, and averaged between 400 and 500 sabres, so -that by the middle of June he had fully 7,000 mounted men under his -orders. Eight or nine additional regiments of infantry had also come -to hand since April--some of them new Andalusian levies, others -old corps whose _cadres_ had been filled up since the disaster of -Ucles. His infantry counted about 35,000 bayonets, divided into five -divisions and a ‘vanguard’: the latter under Zayas was about 4,000 -strong, each of the others exceeded 5,000. The cavalry formed two -divisions, under Henestrosa and Albuquerque, one composed of seven, -one of six regiments. There were thirty guns--some of heavy calibre, -nine-and twelve-pounders--with about 800 artillerymen. The whole -army, inclusive of sick and detached, amounted to 42,000 men, of whom -perhaps 36,000 were efficients present with the colours[590]. - - [589] I can nowhere find the date of the transference, but it - took place before July: the old regiments of Calatrava, Sagunto, - Alcantara, and Pavia, which were with Venegas’s army in March, - had been transferred to Cuesta’s by June, as also the new - regiments of Sevilla, and Cazadores de Madrid. My most valuable - source of information is an unpublished dispatch of Cuesta’s in - the Madrid War Office, which gives all the names of regiments, - but not their numbers. - - [590] These totals may be regarded as certain, being drawn from - the dispatch of Cuesta’s alluded to above, which I was fortunate - enough to find at Madrid. Unfortunately no regimental figures are - given, only the gross total. - -The second Spanish army, that of La Mancha under Venegas, was much -weaker, having furnished heavy detachments to reinforce Cuesta before -it took the field in June. Its base was the old ‘Army of the Centre,’ -which had been commanded by Castaños and Infantado. Some twenty -battalions that had seen service in the campaign of Tudela were still -in its ranks: they had been recruited up to an average of 500 or -600 bayonets. The rest of the force was composed of new Andalusian -regiments, raised in the winter and spring, some of which had taken -part in the rout of Ciudad Real under Cartaojal, while others had -never before entered the field. The gross total of the army on June -16 was 26,298 men, of whom 3,383 were cavalry. Deducting the sick in -hospital, Venegas could dispose of some 23,000 sabres and bayonets, -distributed into five divisions. The horsemen in this army were not -formed into separate brigades, but allotted as divisional cavalry -to the infantry units. There was little to choose, in point of -efficiency, between the Estremaduran army and that of La Mancha; both -contained too many raw troops, and in both, as was soon to be proved, -the bulk of the cavalry was still as untrustworthy as it had shown -itself in previous engagements. - -The Spaniards therefore could put into the field for the campaign -of July on the Tagus some 60,000 men. But the fatal want of unity -in command was to prevent them from co-ordinating their movements -and acting as integral parts of a single army guided by a single -will. Venegas was to a certain degree supposed to be under Cuesta’s -authority, but as he was continually receiving orders directly from -the Junta, and was treated by them as an independent commander, he -practically was enabled to do much as he pleased. Being a personal -enemy of Cuesta, he had every inducement to play his own game, -and did not scruple to do so at the most important crisis of the -campaign,--covering his disregard of the directions of his senior -by the easy pretext of a desire to execute those of the central -government. - -On July 15, the day when his share in the campaign commenced, the -head quarters of Venegas were at Santa Cruz de Mudela, just outside -the northern exit of the Despeña Perros. His outposts lay in front, -at El Moral, Valdepeñas, and Villanueva de los Infantes. He was -divided by a considerable distance--some twenty-five miles--from the -advanced cavalry of Sebastiani’s corps, whose nearest detachment was -placed at Villaharta, where the high-road to Madrid crosses the river -Giguela. - -Meanwhile we must return to Wellesley, who having crossed the -frontier on July 3, was now moving forward by short marches to -Plasencia. On the fourth the head quarters were at Zarza la Mayor, -on the sixth at Coria, on the seventh at Galisteo; on the eighth -Plasencia was reached, and the general halted the army, while -he should ride over to Almaraz and confer in person with Cuesta -on the details of their plan of campaign. In the valley of the -Alagon, where the country was almost untouched by the hand of war, -provisions were obtainable in some quantity, but every Spanish -informant agreed that when the troops dropped down to the Tagus they -would find the land completely devastated. Wellesley was therefore -most anxious to organize a great dépôt of food before moving on: -the local authorities professed great readiness to supply him, and -he contracted with the Alcaldes of the fertile Vera de Plasencia -for 250,000 rations of flour to be delivered during the next ten -days[591]. Lozano de Torres, the Spanish commissary-general sent -by the Junta to the British head quarters, promised his aid in -collecting the food, but even before Wellesley departed to visit -Cuesta, he had begun to conceive doubts whether supplies would be -easily procurable. The difficulty was want of transport--the army had -marched from Portugal with a light equipment, and had no carts to -spare for scouring the country-side in search of flour. The General -had relied on the assurances sent him from Seville to the effect -that he would easily be able to find local transport in the intact -regions about Coria and Plasencia: but he was disappointed: very -few carts could be secured, and the store of food in the possession -of the army seemed to shrink rather than to increase during every -day that the army remained in the valley of the Alagon, though the -region was fruitful and undevastated. It is certain that the British -commissaries had not yet mastered the art of gathering in provisions -from the country-side, and that the Spanish local authorities could -not be made to understand the necessity for punctuality and dispatch -in the delivery of the promised supplies. - - [591] Wellesley to Frere, _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. 524. - -On July 10 Wellesley started off with the head-quarters staff to -visit Cuesta, at his camp beyond the bridge of Almaraz, there to -concert the details of their joint advance. Owing to an error made -by his guides he arrived after dusk at the hamlet below the Puerto -de Mirabete, around which the main body of the Army of Estremadura -was encamped. The Captain-General had drawn out his troops in the -afternoon for the inspection of the British commander. When at -last he appeared they had been four hours under arms in momentary -expectation of the arrival of their distinguished visitor, and -Cuesta himself, though still lame from the effect of his bruises at -Medellin, had sat on horseback at their head during the greater part -of that time. - -Two admirable accounts of the review of the Estremaduran host in the -darkness were written by members of Wellesley’s staff. It is well -worth while to quote one of them[592], for the narrative expresses -with perfect clearness the effect which the sight of the Spanish -troops made upon their allies:-- - - [592] That of Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) on pp. 382-3 of - the first volume of his _History of the Peninsular War_. - -‘Our arrival at the camp was announced by a general discharge of -artillery, upon which an immense number of torches were made to blaze -up, and we passed the entire Spanish line in review by their light. -The effect produced by these arrangements was one of no ordinary -character. The torches, held aloft at moderate intervals, threw a -red and wavering light over the whole scene, permitting at the same -time its minuter parts to be here and there cast into the shade, -while the grim and swarthy visages of the soldiers, their bright arms -and dark uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as the -flashes fell upon them. Nor was Cuesta himself an object to be passed -by without notice: the old man preceded us, not so much sitting upon -his horse as held upon it by two pages, at the imminent risk of being -overthrown whenever a cannon was discharged, or a torch flamed out -with peculiar brightness. His physical debility was so observable as -clearly to mark his unfitness for the situation which he held. As to -his mental powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging, inasmuch -as he scarcely uttered five words during the continuance of our -visit: but his corporal infirmities were ever at absolute variance -with all a general’s duties. - -‘In this way we passed by about 6,000 cavalry drawn up in rank -entire, and not less than twenty battalions of infantry, each of 700 -to 800 bayonets. They were all, without exception, remarkably fine -men. Some indeed were very young--too young for service--particularly -among the recruits who had lately joined. But to take them all -in all, it would not have been easy to find a stouter or more -hardy looking body of soldiers in any European service. Of their -appointments it was not possible to speak in the same terms of -commendation. There were battalions whose arms, accoutrements, and -even clothing might be pronounced respectable[593]: but in general -they were deficient, particularly in shoes. It was easy to perceive, -from the attitude in which they stood, and the manner in which they -handled their arms, that little or no discipline prevailed among -them: they could not but be regarded as raw levies. Speaking of them -in the aggregate they were little better than bold peasantry, armed -partially like soldiers, but completely unacquainted with a soldier’s -duty. This remark applied to the cavalry as much as to the infantry. -Many of the horses were good, but the riders manifestly knew nothing -of movement or of discipline: and they were on this account, as -also on that of miserable equipment, quite unfit for service. The -generals appeared to have been selected by one rule alone--that of -seniority. They were almost all old men, and, except O’Donoju and -Zayas, evidently incapable of bearing the fatigues or surmounting -the difficulties of a campaign. It was not so with the colonels and -battalion commanders, who appeared to be young and active, and some -of whom were, we had reason to believe, learning to become skilful -officers.... Cuesta seemed particularly unwilling that any of his -generals should hold any serious conversation with us. It is true -that he presented them one by one to Sir Arthur, but no words were -exchanged on the occasion, and each retired after he had made his -bow.’ Albuquerque, of whom the Captain-General was particularly -jealous, had been relegated with his division to Arzobispo, and did -not appear on the scene. - - [593] As to the equipment of the Spaniards, the following - quotation from Leslie (p. 135) may be worth giving: ‘Their - uniforms were of every variety of colour, the equipment and - appointments of the most inferior description. One could - not but lament these defects, for the men were remarkably - fine, possessing all the essential qualities to make good - soldiers--courage, patience, and soberness. Their officers, - in general, were the very reverse! The line infantry were in - blue uniforms with red facings. The Provincial Corps, called - “Volunteers,” were mostly dressed in the brown Spanish cloth of - the country, with green or yellow facings. Some had chakoes, - others broad-brimmed hats with the rim turned up at one side: - all had cap-plates of tin announcing their designation. Some had - belts, others none. They had no pouches, but a broad belt of soft - leather, in which were placed a row of tin tubes, each holding a - cartridge, with a fold of leather to cover them, fastened round - the waist. The cavalry were heavy and light dragoons, with some - regiments of Hussars. Some were tolerably well dressed, in blue - or yellow uniforms with red facings. Some had boots, but more - long leather leggings, coming up above the knee. The horses were - small, active, and hardy, of the Spanish Barbary breed.’ - -The all-important plan of campaign was settled at a long -conference--it lasted for four hours--on the morning of the following -day. According to all accounts the scene at the interview must have -been curious. Cuesta could not, or would not, speak French: Wellesley -was not yet able to express himself fluently in Spanish. Accordingly, -O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Army of Estremadura, acted as -interpreter between them, rendering Wellesley’s views into Spanish -and Cuesta’s into English. The greater part of the discussion -consisted in the bringing forward of plans by the British commander -and their rejection by the Captain-General. Cuesta was full of -suspicion, and saw a trap in every proposal that was made to him: -he imagined that Wellesley’s main object was to edge him out of the -supreme command. He was almost silent throughout the interview, only -opening his lips to give emphatic negatives, for which O’Donoju -proceeded to find ingenious and elaborate explanations. - -It was not the principles on which the campaign was to be conducted, -but the details of the distribution of the troops on which the -trouble arose. The enemy’s position and force was fairly well known -to both generals, except in one all-important particular. They were -aware that Victor lay behind the Alberche with not much more than -22,000 men, that Sebastiani was at Madridejos with a somewhat smaller -force[594], and that King Joseph with his central reserve, which they -over-estimated at 12,000 men, was able at any moment to join the -1st Corps. Hence they expected to find some 34,000 French troops at -Talavera, and rightly considered that with the 55,000 men of their -two armies they ought to give a good account of them. Sebastiani, as -they supposed, might be left out of the game, for occupation for him -would be found by the army of La Mancha, which was to be told off for -this purpose and directed to cling to the skirts of the 4th Corps and -never to lose sight of it. As Venegas would have, according to their -calculations, nearly double the numbers of Sebastiani, he would have -no difficulty in keeping him in check. - - [594] They estimated him at only 10,000 men, but he had really - 20,000, Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 15, from Plasencia. - -But it was not only on the French troops in New Castile that watch -had to be kept. It was necessary to take into account the enemy -beyond the mountains, in the valley of the Douro. The allied generals -were aware that Mortier and Soult must both be considered. The former -they knew to be at Valladolid, and they had learnt that King Joseph -was proposing to bring him down towards Madrid--as was indeed the -fact. Accordingly they expected that he might turn up in a few days -somewhere in the direction of Avila. Soult they knew to be at Zamora, -and from the dispatches captured with General Franceschi ten days -before, they had a good knowledge of his force and intentions. A -study of these documents led them to conclude that he could not move -for many weeks, owing to the dilapidated state of his corps--which -he had painted in the most moving terms in his letters to King -Joseph[595]. They also gathered that if he moved at all, he would -be inclined to threaten Northern Portugal or Ciudad Rodrigo: in the -dispatches captured with Franceschi he had named Braganza as a point -at which he might strike. Accordingly they opined that he need not -be taken very seriously into consideration, especially as he was -wholly destitute of artillery[596]. Yet he might be drawn into the -field by the news that Madrid was in danger. If he were induced to -bring help to the King, he would almost certainly work by making -a diversion against the communications of the British army, and -not by directly joining himself to Joseph’s army by the long and -circuitous march from Zamora to Madrid. To carry out such a diversion -he would be obliged to cross the lofty Sierra de Francia by one of -the passes which lead from the Salamanca region into the valley of -the Alagon--perhaps by the defile of Perales, but much more probably -by the better known and more practicable pass of Baños. Wellesley -took the possibility of this movement into serious consideration, -but did not think that it would be likely to cause him much danger -if it should occur, for he believed that Soult would bring with him -no more than the 15,000 or 18,000 men of his own 2nd Corps. That he -would appear not with such a small force, but with Ney and Mortier -in his wake, leading an army of 50,000 bayonets, did not enter into -the mind of the British commander. Mortier was thought to be moving -in the direction of Avila: Ney was believed to be contending with the -Galician insurgents in the remote regions about Lugo and Corunna. The -news of his arrival at Astorga had not yet reached the allied camps, -and he was neglected as a factor in the situation. Wellesley and -Cuesta had no conception that any force save that of Soult was likely -to menace their northern flank and their line of communications when -they committed themselves to their advance on Madrid. To provide -against a possible movement of the 2nd Corps into the valley of the -Tagus, therefore, all that was necessary was to hold the defiles of -Perales and Baños. The former had already been seen to, for even -before the meeting of Wellesley and Cuesta, Carlos d’España had -blocked it with two or three battalions drawn from the garrison of -Ciudad Rodrigo. For the latter Wellesley hoped that Cuesta would -provide a sufficient garrison[597]. The old Captain-General promised -to do so, but only sent 600 men under the Marquis Del Reino, a wholly -inadequate detachment[598]. - - [595] Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: ‘Je - me propose de reposer les troupes trois ou quatre jours: pendant - ce temps elles se prépareront des subsistances, on raccommodera - la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrés, et je menacerai de - nouveau le Portugal: peut-être même je ferai faire une incursion - vers Bragance, afin d’opérer une diversion qui ne peut pas - manquer de produire quelque effet.... Je me fais précéder à - Zamora (où je compte être rendu le 2 juillet) par l’ordonnateur - Le Noble, qui doit réclamer près l’intendant-général de l’armée - des moyens en tout genre qui me manquent--tel que l’habillement, - chaussure, ambulance, officiers de santé, administration, - transport militaire, payeurs, argent pour solde et dépenses - extraordinaires, postes etc. J’ai l’honneur de supplier Votre - Majesté de daigner donner des ordres pour qu’il soit fait droit - a ses demandes: mes besoins sont très grands.... Il y a plus de - cinq mois que je n’ai reçu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par - conséquent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.’ - - [596] Wellesley’s views at this moment appear in his - correspondence, e.g. to Mr. Villiers, July 8: ‘I defy Soult to do - Beresford or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its - present situation--or any amelioration of that situation which - can be produced in a short period of time.’ To Beresford, July 9: - ‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything - with his corps for some time, but I think that column ought to be - watched.’ To Beresford, July 14: ‘I do not believe that Ney has - quitted Galicia, at least we have not heard that he has. Soult - can do nothing against Portugal, for he is in a most miserable - state, without arms, artillery or ammunition, stores, &c.’ - - [597] Wellesley to Beresford, July 9: ‘I have not forgotten - either the Puerto de Baños or the Puerto de Perales, and have - called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already - held, and the latter will be so in a day or two.’ [This was - unfortunately not to be the case.] - - [598] I cannot discover the names of the two very weak - battalions, the smallest in Cuesta’s army, which were detached - for this purpose under Del Reino. They are _not_ the same as the - two battalions which joined Wilson (Merida and 3rd of Seville). - -Wellesley’s first proposal to his Spanish colleague was that the -main bodies of both armies should advance against Victor, while -a detachment of 10,000 men should move out to the left, in the -direction of Avila, to look for Mortier, if he were to be found in -that direction, and if not to turn the enemy’s right and threaten -Madrid. He hoped that Venegas and the army of La Mancha might at the -same time move forward against Sebastiani, and keep him so fully -employed that he would not be able to spare a man to aid Victor and -King Joseph. - -Cuesta at once refused to make any detachment in the direction of -Avila from his own army, and suggested that Wellesley should find -the 10,000 men required for this diversion. The English general -objected that it would take exactly half his force, and that he -could not split up such a small unit, while the Spaniards could -easily spare such a number of troops from their total of 36,000 men. -This argument failed to move Cuesta, and the project was dropped, -Wellesley thinking that it was not strictly necessary, though very -advisable[599]. - - [599] Wellesley to Frere, July 13: ‘You will see, in the - accompanying letter, an account of my endeavour to prevail on - General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila. I agree with you - that it would be a great advantage from a military point of view - ... but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider - the movement to be _necessary_ as a military measure.’ Frere and - Wellesley had hoped that Albuquerque might be placed in command - of this large detachment, and might distinguish himself at its - head. - -The only flanking force which was finally set aside for operations on -the left wing, for the observation of the French about Avila and the -feint at Madrid, consisted of Sir Robert Wilson’s 1,500 Portuguese, -and a corresponding body of two battalions and one squadron from -the Spanish army[600]--about 3,500 men in all. It played a part of -some little importance in the campaign, but it is hard to see that -it would have exercised any dominant influence even if it had been -raised to the full strength that Wellesley had desired. Mortier, as -a matter of fact, was not near Avila, and so the 10,000 men sent in -this direction would not have served the end that the British general -expected. The 5th Corps had been called off by Soult, contrary to -the wishes of the King, and no body of troops was needed to contain -it, on this part of the theatre of war. It was ultimately to appear -at a very different point, where no provision had been made for its -reception. - - [600] Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville - (810 bayonets). - -Far more important were the arrangements which Wellesley and Cuesta -made for the diversion on their other flank. It was from the -miscarriage of this operation, owing to the wilful disobedience of -the officer charged with it, that the failure of the whole campaign -was to come about. They agreed that Venegas with the 23,000 men -of the army of La Mancha, was to move up the high-road from his -position at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and drive Sebastiani before him. -Having pushed back the 4th Corps to the Tagus, Venegas was then to -endeavour to force the passage of that river either at Aranjuez or -at Fuentedueñas, and to threaten Madrid. It was calculated that -Sebastiani would be forced to keep between him and the capital, and -would be unable to spare a man to reinforce Victor and King Joseph. -Thus Wellesley and Cuesta with 56,000 men would close on the King -and the Marshal, who could not have more than 35,000, and (as it was -hoped) defeat them or at least manœuvre them out of Madrid. A glance -at the map will show one peculiarity of this plan: it would have been -more natural to bid Venegas march by the bridge of Toledo rather than -by those of Aranjuez and Fuentedueñas; to use the latter he would -have to move towards his right, and to separate himself by a long -gap from the main army of the allies. At Toledo he would be within -thirty-five miles of them--at Aranjuez seventy, at Fuentedueñas 100 -miles would lie between him and the troops of Wellesley and Cuesta. -It would appear that the two generals at their colloquy came to the -conclusion that by ordering Venegas to use the eastern passages of -the Tagus they would compel Sebastiani to remove eastward also, -so that he would be out of supporting distance of Victor. They -recognized the bare possibility that Sebastiani might refuse to -devote himself to the task of holding back the army of La Mancha, -might leave Madrid to its fate, and then hurry off to join the King -and the 1st Corps in an assault on the main Anglo-Spanish army. In -this case they settled that Venegas should march on the capital and -seize it, a move which (as they supposed) would force Joseph to -turn back or to re-divide his army[601]. But it is clear that they -did not expect to have to fight Victor, the King, and Sebastiani -combined, as they were ultimately forced to do at Talavera on July -28. They supposed that Venegas would find occupation for the 4th -Corps, and that they might count on finding only the 1st Corps and -Joseph’s Madrid reserves in front of them. - - [601] All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed - in Cuesta’s Apologetic _Manifesto_, published after his - resignation, than in Wellesley’s _Dispatches_ to Castlereagh and - Frere. - -When armies are working in a joint operation from separate bases -it is all-important that they should time their movements with the -nicest exactitude. This Wellesley and Cuesta attempted to secure, -by sending to Venegas an elaborate time-table. He was ordered to -be at Madridejos on July 19, at Tembleque on the twentieth, at -Santa Cruz de la Zarza on the twenty-first, and at the bridge of -Fuentedueñas on the twenty-second or twenty-third. All this was on -the supposition that Sebastiani would have about 12,000 men and would -give ground whenever pressed. If he turned out by some unlikely -chance--presumably by having rallied the King’s reserves--to be much -stronger, Venegas was to manœuvre in the direction of Tarancon, to -avoid a general action, and if necessary to retreat towards the -Passes from which he had started. It would be rather an advantage -than otherwise if (contrary to all probability) the French had -concentrated their main force against the army of La Mancha, for this -would leave Victor helpless in front of the united hosts of Wellesley -and Cuesta, which would outnumber him by two to one. - -[Illustration: SPANISH COINS OF THE PERIOD OF THE PENINSULAR WAR] - -What the allied generals never expected was that Venegas would let -Sebastiani slip away from his front, without any attempt to hold him, -and would then (instead of marching on Madrid) waste the critical -days of the campaign (July 24-29) in miserable delays between Toledo -and Aranjuez, when there was absolutely no French field-force between -him and Madrid, nor any hostile troops whatever in his neighbourhood -save a weak division of 3,000 men in garrison at Toledo. The failure -of the Talavera campaign is due even more to this wretched indecision -and disobedience to orders on the part of Venegas than to the -eccentricities and errors of Cuesta. If the army of La Mancha had -kept Sebastiani in check, and refused to allow him to abscond, there -would have been no battles on the Alberche on July 27-28, for the -French would never have dared to face the Anglo-Spaniards of the -main host without the assistance of the 4th Corps. - -But to return to the joint plan of Wellesley and Cuesta: on July 23, -the day on which Venegas was to reach Fuentedueñas (or Aranjuez) -the 56,000 men of the grand army were to be assailing Victor behind -the Alberche. The British were to cross the Tietar at Bazagona on -the eighteenth and follow the high-road Navalmoral-Oropesa. The -Estremadurans, passing the Tagus at Almaraz and Arzobispo, were -to move by the parallel route along the river bank by La Calzada -and Calera, which is only five or six miles distant from the great -_chaussée_. Thus the two armies would be in close touch with each -other, and would not be caught apart by the enemy. On reaching -Talavera they were to force the fords of the Alberche and fall upon -Victor in his cantonments behind that stream. Sir Robert Wilson -and the 3,500 men of his mixed Spanish and Portuguese detachment -were to move up as the flank-guard of the allied host, and to push -by the head waters of the Tietar for Escalona on the side-road to -Madrid[602]. - - [602] Cuesta’s and Wellesley’s accounts of their joint plan on - the whole agree wonderfully well. - -Criticisms of the most acrimonious kind have been brought to bear on -this plan by English, French, and Spanish writers. Many of them are -undeserved; in particular the tritest objection of all, made _ex post -facto_ by those who only look at the actual course of the campaign, -that Wellesley was exposing his communications to the united forces -of Soult, Ney, and Mortier. There was on July 10, when Cuesta and -Wellesley met, no reason whatever for apprehending the contingency -of the march of the three marshals upon Plasencia. Soult, as his own -letters of June 25 bore witness, was not in a condition to move--he -had not a single piece of artillery, and his troops were in dire -need of rest and re-equipment. Ney was believed to be at Corunna or -Lugo--Soult’s intercepted dispatches spoke of the 6th Corps as being -destined to remain behind in Galicia, and he (as the allied generals -supposed) ought best to have known what his colleague was about to -do. How could they have guessed that, in wrath at his desertion by -the Duke of Dalmatia, Ney would evacuate the whole kingdom, abandon -fortresses like Ferrol and Corunna, and march for Astorga? Without -Ney’s corps to aid him, Soult could not possibly have marched on -Plasencia--to have done so with the 2nd Corps alone would have -exposed him to being beset by Wellesley on one side and by Beresford -on the other. As to Mortier and the 5th Corps, Cuesta and Wellesley -undervalued their strength, being unaware that Kellermann had sent -back from the Asturias the division that had been lent him for his -expedition to Oviedo. They thought that the Duke of Treviso’s force -was more like 7,000 than 17,000 bayonets, and--such as it was--they -had the best of reasons for believing that it was more likely to -march on Madrid by Avila than to join Soult, for they had before them -an intercepted dispatch from the King, bidding Mortier to move down -to Villacastin in order to be in supporting distance of the capital -and the 1st Corps. - -On the whole, therefore, the two generals must be excused for not -foreseeing the descent of 50,000 men upon their communications, -which took place three weeks after their meeting at the bridge of -Almaraz: the data in their possession on July 10 made it appear most -improbable. - -A much more valid criticism is that which blames the method of -co-operation with Venegas which was employed. ‘Double external lines -of operations’ against an enemy placed in a central position are -notoriously perilous, and the particular movement on Fuentedueñas, -which the army of La Mancha was ordered to execute, was one which -took it as far as possible from Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s main body. -Yet it may be urged in their defence that, if they had drawn in -Venegas to join them, they would have got little profit out of having -23,000 more Spaniards on the Alberche. Sebastiani on the other hand, -who could join Victor at the same moment that the corps from La -Mancha joined the allies, would bring some 17,000 excellent troops to -Talavera. The benefit of drawing in Venegas would be much less than -the disadvantage of drawing in Sebastiani to the main theatre of war. -Hence came the idea that the army from the Passes must be devoted to -the sole purpose of keeping the 4th Corps as far as possible from -the Alberche. Even knowing that Venegas was hostile to Cuesta, and -that he was a man of no mark or capacity, Wellesley could not have -expected that he would disobey orders, waste time, and fail utterly -in keeping touch with Sebastiani or threatening Madrid. - -The one irreparable fault in the drawing up of the whole plan of -campaign was the fundamental one that Wellesley had undertaken -to co-operate with Spanish armies before he had gauged the weak -points of the generals and their men. If he had held the post of -commander-in-chief of the allied forces, and could have issued -orders that were obeyed without discussion, the case would have been -different. But he had to act in conjunction with two colleagues, -one of whom was suspicious of his intentions and jealous of his -preponderant capacity, while the other deliberately neglected to -carry out clear and cogent orders from his superior officer. Cuesta’s -impracticability and Venegas’s disobedience could not have been -foreseen by one who had no previous experience of Spanish armies. -Still less had Wellesley realized all the defects of the Spanish -rank and file when placed in line of battle. That he did not hold an -exaggerated opinion of their merits when he started on the campaign -is shown by letters which he wrote nine months before[603]. But he -was still under the impression that, if cautiously handled, and not -exposed to unnecessary dangers, they would do good service. He had -yet to witness the gratuitous panic of Portago’s division on the -eve of Talavera, and the helplessness of the Spanish cavalry at the -combats of Gamonal and Arzobispo. After a month’s experience of -Cuesta and his men, Wellesley vowed never again to take part in grand -operations with a Spanish general as his equal and colleague. This -was the teaching of experience--and on July 10 the experience was yet -to come. - - [603] See Wellington to Castlereagh, from Ramalhal, Sept. 1808. - -The interview at the bridge of Almaraz had not been very satisfactory -to Wellesley, but it was far from having undeceived him as to the -full extent of the difficulties that lay before him. He wrote to -Frere at Seville that he had been on the whole well received, and -that Cuesta had not displayed any jealousy of him. As that sentiment -was at this moment the predominant feeling in the old man’s breast, -it is clear that he had succeeded in hiding it. But the obstinate -silence of Wellesley’s colleague had worried him. O’Donoju had done -all the talking, and ‘it was impossible to say what plans the general -entertains.’ He was moreover somewhat perturbed by the rumours -which his staff had picked up from the Estremaduran officers, to the -effect that Cuesta was so much the enemy of the Central Junta that he -was plotting a _pronunciamiento_ for its deposition[604]. As to the -fighting powers of the Spanish army, Wellesley wrote to Castlereagh -that ‘the troops were ill clothed but well armed, and the officers -appeared to take pains with their discipline. Some of the corps of -infantry were certainly good, and the horses of the cavalry were -in good condition.’ Only ten days later he was to utter the very -different opinion that ‘owing to their miserable state of discipline -and their want of officers properly qualified, these troops are -entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre however simple[605],’ -and that ‘whole corps, officers and men, run off on the first -appearance of danger[606].’ - - [604] ‘The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt - for the Junta and the present form of government, great - confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for - the Junta, and will overturn that government. This sentiment - appears to be so general that I conceive that the Duke of - Albuquerque must entertain it equally with others: but I have not - seen him.’ Wellesley to Frere from Plasencia, July 13. - - [605] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Talavera, Aug. 1. - - [606] Wellesley to his brother the Marquis Wellesley, Deleytosa, - Aug. 8. - -The British Commander-in-chief had indeed many moral and mental -experiences to go through between the interview at Mirabete on July -10, and the retreat from Talavera on August 2! - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IV - -THE MARCH TO TALAVERA: QUARREL OF WELLESLEY AND CUESTA - - -Having returned to his army on July 12, Wellesley gave orders for -the whole force to get ready for a general advance on the morning of -the eighteenth, the day which had been chosen for the commencement -of operations at the conference of Almaraz. It would have been in -every way desirable to have moved out at once, and not to have waited -for these six days. If the march against Victor had been fixed for -the thirteenth or fourteenth, the French would have been caught -unprepared, for as late as the seventeenth King Joseph and his -adviser Jourdan were under the impression that the force at Plasencia -consisted of nothing more than a Portuguese division of 10,000 men, -and it was only on the twenty-second that they received the definite -information that the whole British army was upon the Tietar[607]. -It is clear that, by advancing five days earlier than he actually -did, Wellesley might have caught the enemy in a state of complete -dispersion--the 4th Corps being on July 20 still at Madridejos in La -Mancha, and the King with his reserves at Madrid. If attacked on the -seventeenth or the eighteenth, as he might well have been, Victor -would have found it impossible to call up Sebastiani in time, and -must have fallen back in haste to the capital. The allies could then -have cut him off from the 4th Corps, which must have retreated by a -circuitous route, and could not have rejoined the main body of the -French army in time for a battle in front of Madrid. - - [607] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, and his letter to Soult of July - 17, in which no sign whatever appears of the knowledge of the - advance of the British from Portugal. - -It would appear that Wellesley had fixed the date of his advance -so late as the eighteenth mainly because of the difficulty as to -the collection of provisions, which was now looming before him in -larger proportions than ever. But it is possible that the necessity -for allowing some days for the transmission of the plan of campaign -to Venegas also counted for something in the drawing up of the -time-table. It would have been rash to start before the army of La -Mancha was prepared to take its part in the joint plan of operations. -So much depended upon the diversion which Venegas was to execute, -that it would have been a mistake to move before he could break -up from his distant cantonments at Santa Cruz de Mudela. No word, -however, concerning this appears in Wellesley’s correspondence. From -July 13 to July 18 his dispatches show anxiety about nothing save his -food and his transport. Every day that he stayed at Plasencia made -him feel more uncomfortable concerning the all-important question -of supplies. The corn which the Alcaldes of the Vera had promised -to secure for him had begun to come in, though in driblets and -small consignments, but there was no means of getting it forward: -transport was absolutely unprocurable[608]. Wellesley sent officers -to scour the country-side as far as Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo, but -they could procure him neither mules nor carts. He also pressed -the Spanish commissary-general, Lozano de Torres, to hunt up every -animal that could be procured, but to small effect. The fact was -that Estremadura was not at any time rich in beasts or vehicles, and -that the peasantry had sent away most of those they owned while the -French lay at Almaraz, lest they should be carried off by the enemy. -Wellesley, who did not understand the limited resources of this part -of Spain, was inclined to believe that the authorities were hostile -or even treacherous. The Central Junta had promised him transport in -order to make sure of his starting on the campaign along the Tagus, -and when transport failed to appear, he attributed it to ill-will -rather than to poverty. No doubt he was fully justified in his view -that an army operating in a friendly country may rationally expect -to draw both food and the means to carry it from the regions through -which it is passing. But sometimes the provisions or the transport -are not forthcoming merely because the one or the other is not to -be found. It is certain that both Estremadura and the valley of the -central Tagus were at this moment harried absolutely bare: Victor’s -despairing letters from Caceres in May and from La Calzada in June -are sufficient proof of the fact. In a district where the Marshal -said that ‘he could not collect five days’ provisions by any manner -of exertion,’ and that ‘his men were dropping down dead from actual -starvation, so that he must retire or see his whole corps crumble -away[609],’ it is clear that the Central Junta could not have created -food for the British army. Cuesta’s troops were living from hand to -mouth on supplies sent forward from Andalusia, or they could not -have continued to exist in the land. The only district which was -intact was that between Coria and Plasencia, and this was actually -at the moment feeding the British army, and had done so now for ten -days or more. But unfortunately the Vera could give corn but no -draught animals. If Wellesley had known this, he must either have -exerted himself to procure more transport before leaving Abrantes--a -difficult task, for he had already drained Portugal of carts and -mules--or have refused to march till the Spaniards sent him wagon -trains from Andalusia. It would have taken months for the Junta to -collect and send forward such trains: they had dispatched all that -they could procure to Cuesta. The campaign on the Tagus, in short, -would never have been fought if Wellesley had understood the state of -affairs that he was to encounter. - - [608] That food was coming in, but no transport, is clearly - proved by Wellesley’s letter to the Junta of Plasencia on July - 18: ‘Upon entering Spain I expected to derive that assistance - in provisions and other means [i.e. transport] which an army - invariably receives from the country in which it is stationed, - more particularly when it has been sent to aid the people of - that country. _I have not been disappointed in the expectation - that I had formed of receiving supplies of provisions, and I am - much obliged to the Junta for the pains they have taken._ I am - convinced that they did everything in their power to procure us - the other means we required [transport], although I am sorry to - say that we have not received them.’ - - [609] See pp. 443 and 459. - -The causes, therefore, of the deadlock that was about to occur -were partly the light-hearted incompetence of the Central Junta in -promising the British army the use of resources which did not exist, -partly Wellesley’s natural ignorance of the miserable state of -Central Spain. He had never entered the country before, and could -not know of its poverty. He had trusted to the usual military theory -that the country-side ought to provide for a friendly army on the -march: but in Spain all military theories failed to act. Napoleon -committed precisely similar errors, when he directed his army corps -to move about in Castile as if they were in Germany or Lombardy, and -found exactly the same hindrances as did the British general. In -later years Wellesley never moved without a heavy train, and a vast -provision of sumpter-beasts and camp-followers. In July 1809 he had -still to learn the art of conducting a Spanish campaign. - -Meanwhile he was beginning to feel most uncomfortable about the -question of provisions. His anxiety is shown by his letters to -Frere and Beresford; ‘it is impossible,’ he wrote, ‘to express the -inconvenience and risk that we incur from the want of means of -conveyance, which I cannot believe the country could not furnish, -_if there existed any inclination to furnish them_. The officers -complain, and I believe not without reason, that the country gives -unwillingly the supplies of provisions that we have required ... -and we have not procured a cart or a mule for the service of -the army[610].’ But to O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the -Estremaduran army, he wrote in even more drastic terms, employing -phrases that were certain to provoke resentment. He had, he said, -scoured the whole region as far as Ciudad Rodrigo for transport, and -to no effect. ‘If the people of Spain are unable or unwilling to -supply what the army requires, I am afraid that they must do without -its services.’ He had been forced to come to a painful decision, and -‘in order to be fair and candid to General Cuesta’ he must proceed -to inform him that he would execute the plan for falling upon Victor -behind the Alberche, but that when this had been done he would -stir no step further, and ‘begin no new operation till he had been -supplied with the means of transport which the army requires[611].’ - - [610] Wellesley to Frere, Plasencia, July 16. - - [611] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Plasencia, July 16. - -After dispatching this ultimatum, whose terms and tone leave -something to be desired--for surely Cuesta was the last person to be -saddled with the responsibility for the pledges made by his enemies -of the Central Junta--Wellesley issued orders for the army to march. -He had been joined at Plasencia by the last of the regiments from -Lisbon, which reached him in time for Talavera[612], but had been -forced to leave 400 sick behind him, for the army was still in a -bad condition as regards health. It was therefore with little over -21,000 men that he began his advance to the Alberche. It was executed -with punctual observance of the dates that had been settled at the -interview at Almaraz. On July 18 the army crossed the Tietar on a -flying bridge built at Bazagona, and lay at Miajadas. On the next -night the head quarters were at Centinello; on the twentieth the -British entered Oropesa. Here Cuesta joined them with his whole army, -save the two battalions lent to Wilson, and the two others under -the Marquis Del Reino which had been sent to the Puerto de Baños. -Deducting these 2,600 bayonets and his sick, he brought over 6,000 -horse and 27,000 foot to the rendezvous. The junction having taken -place on the twenty-first, the advance to Talavera was to begin next -morning. Oropesa lies only nineteen miles from that town, and as -Victor’s cavalry vedettes were in sight, it was clear that contact -with the enemy would be established during the course of the day. -Accordingly the allied armies marched with caution, the Spaniards -along the high-road, the British following a parallel path on the -left, across the slopes of the hills which divide the valley of the -Tietar from that of the Tagus. - - [612] The 1/61st Foot and 23rd Light Dragoons. - -About midday the Spaniards fell in with the whole of the cavalry -division of Latour-Maubourg, which Victor had thrown out as a -screen in front of Talavera. He had ascertained on the evening of -the preceding day that Cuesta was about to move forward, and was -anxious to compel him to display his entire force. Above all he -desired to ascertain whether the rumours concerning the presence of -British troops in his front were correct. Accordingly he had left -two battalions of infantry in the town of Talavera, and thrown out -the six regiments of dragoons in front of it, near the village of -Gamonal. The Spaniards were advancing with Albuquerque’s cavalry -division as an advanced guard. But seeing Latour-Maubourg in his -front the Duke refused to attack, and sent back for infantry and -guns. Cuesta pushed forward the division of Zayas to support him, but -even when it arrived the Spaniards made no headway. They continued -skirmishing for four hours[613] till the British light cavalry began -to appear on their left. ‘Though much more numerous than the enemy,’ -wrote an eye-witness, ‘they made no attempt to drive him in, but -contented themselves with deploying into several long lines, making a -very formidable appearance. We had expected to see them closely and -successfully engaged, having heard that they were peculiarly adapted -for petty warfare, but we found them utterly incapable of coping -with the enemy’s _tirailleurs_, who were driving them almost into a -circle.’ - - [613] ‘And,’ adds Lord Munster, from whom this quotation is taken - (p. 199), ‘it is my belief that they would have continued _till - now_ if we had not aided them.’ - -On the appearance, however, of Anson’s cavalry upon their flank the -French went hastily to the rear, skirted the suburbs of Talavera, and -rode off along the great Madrid _chaussée_ to the east, followed by -the British light dragoons. As they passed the town two small columns -of infantry came out of it and followed in their rear. Albuquerque -sent one of his regiments against them, but could not get his men to -charge home. On three separate occasions they came on, but, after -receiving the fire of the French, pulled up and fell into confusion. -The impression made by the Spanish cavalry on the numerous British -observers was very bad. ‘No men could have more carefully avoided -coming to close quarters than did the Spaniards this day[614],’ wrote -one eye-witness. ‘They showed a total lack not only of discipline but -of resolution[615],’ observes another. - - [614] Londonderry, i. 392. - - [615] Lord Munster, p. 200. - -After crossing the plain to the north of Talavera the French, both -cavalry and infantry, forded the Alberche and halted on the further -bank. On arriving at the line of underwood which masks the river the -pursuers found the whole of Victor’s corps in position. The thickets -on the further side were swarming with _tirailleurs_, and two -batteries opened on Anson’s brigade as it drew near to the water, and -sent balls whizzing among Wellesley’s staff when he pushed forward to -reconnoitre the position. - -It was soon seen that Victor had selected very favourable -fighting-ground: indeed he had been staying at Talavera long enough -to enable him to get a perfect knowledge of the military features of -the neighbourhood. The 1st Corps was drawn up on a range of heights, -about 800 yards behind the Alberche, with its left resting on the -impassable Tagus, and its right on a wooded hill, behind which the -smaller river makes a sharp turn to the east, so as to cover that -flank. The position was formidable, but rather too long for the -22,000 men who formed the French army. Having learnt from the people -of Talavera that the enemy had received no reinforcements up to that -morning, from Madrid or any other quarter, Wellesley was anxious to -close with them at once. The afternoon was too far spent for any -attempt to force the passage on the twenty-second, but on the next -day (July 23) the British general hoped to fight. The Alberche was -crossed by a wooden bridge which the enemy had not destroyed, and was -fordable in many places: there seemed to be no reason why the lines -behind it might not be forced by a resolute attack delivered with -numbers which were as two to one to those of the French. - -Accordingly Wellesley left the 3rd division and Anson’s light horse -in front of the right wing of Victor’s position, and encamped the -rest of his army some miles to the rear, in the plain between -Talavera and the Alberche. In the same way Albuquerque and Zayas -halted for the night opposite the bridge on the French left, while -the main body of the Spaniards occupied the town in their rear. In -the evening hours Wellesley endeavoured to urge upon Cuesta the -necessity for delivering an attack at dawn: he undertook to force -the northern fords and to turn the enemy’s right, if his colleague -would attack the southern fords and the bridge. The Captain-General -‘received the suggestion with dry civility,’ and asked for time to -think it over. After a conference with his subordinates, he at last -sent word at midnight that he would accept the proposed plan of -operations. - -At 3 o’clock therefore on the morning of the twenty-third, Wellesley -brought down Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions to the ground -opposite the fords, and waited for the arrival of the Spanish columns -on his right. They did not appear, and after long waiting the -British general rode to seek his colleague. He found him opposite -the bridge of the Alberche, ‘seated on the cushions taken out of -his carriage, for he had driven to the outposts in a coach drawn by -nine mules, the picture of mental and physical inability.’ The old -man murmured that the enemy’s position had not been sufficiently -reconnoitred, that it would take time to get his army drawn out -opposite the points which it was to attack, that he was not sure -of the fords, that the bridge over which his right-hand column -would have to advance looked too weak to bear artillery, and many -other things to the same effect--finally urging that the forcing -of the Alberche must be put off to the next day. As he had not got -his troops into battle order, it was clear that the morning would -be wasted, but Wellesley tried to bargain for an attack in the -afternoon. The Captain-General asked for more time, and would listen -to no arguments in favour of fighting on that day. After a heated -discussion Wellesley had to yield: he could not venture to assail the -French with his own army alone, and without any assistance from the -Spaniards. Accordingly it was agreed that the advance should not be -made till the dawn of the twenty-fourth. - -In the afternoon the pickets sent back information that Victor seemed -to be on the move, and that his line was growing thin. Cuesta was -then persuaded to go forward to the outposts; he was hoisted on to -his horse by two grenadiers, while an aide-de-camp stood on the other -side to conduct his right leg over the croup and place it in the -stirrup. Then, hunched up on his saddle, he rode down to the river, -observed that the greater part of the enemy were still in position, -and refused to attack till next morning. - -At dawn, therefore, on the twenty-fourth the allied army moved -forward to the Alberche in three columns, and found, as might have -been expected, that the French had disappeared. On seeing the masses -of redcoats opposite his right upon the previous day, Victor had -realized at last that he had before him the whole British army. He -had sent his train to the rear in the afternoon, and drawn off his -entire force after dusk. By dawn he was more than ten miles away, on -the road to Santa Ollala and Madrid. It was useless to pursue him -with any hope of forcing him to a battle. The chance of crushing him -before he should receive any further reinforcements had disappeared. -It is not at all to his credit as a general that he had held his -ground so long; if he had been attacked on the twenty-third, as -Wellesley had desired, he must certainly have suffered a disaster. -He had but 22,000 men; and it is clear that, while the Spaniards -were attacking his left and centre, he could not have set aside men -enough to hold back the assault of the solid mass of 20,000 British -troops upon his right. He should have vanished on the twenty-second, -the moment that Latour-Maubourg reported that Wellesley’s army was in -the field. By staying for another day on the Alberche he risked the -direst disaster. - -The British general would have been more than human if he had not -manifested his anger and disgust at the way in which his colleague -had flinched from the agreement to attack, and sacrificed the -certainty of victory. He showed his resentment by acting up to the -terms of his letter written from Plasencia five days before, i.e. by -announcing to Cuesta that, having carried out his pledge to drive -the French from behind the Alberche, he should now refuse to move -forward, unless he were furnished with transport sufficient to make -it certain that the army could reach Madrid without any privations. -He was able to state with perfect truth that he had already been -forced to place his troops on half-rations that very morning: to -the 10,000 men of Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s divisions and of -Anson’s light cavalry, he had only been able to issue 5,000 rations -of bread[616]. Nothing, of course, could be found at Talavera, where -the French had been quartered for many days. Victor had only been -maintaining his troops by the aid of biscuit sent down from Madrid, -and by seizing and threshing for himself the small amount of corn -which had been sown in the neighbourhood that spring. Wellesley was -wrong in supposing that the 1st Corps had been supporting itself -with ease from the country-side[617]. He was equally at fault when -he asserted that the ‘Spanish army has plenty to eat.’ Cuesta was at -this moment complaining to the Junta that he was short of provisions, -and that the food which he had brought forward from the Guadiana was -almost exhausted. Meanwhile every exertion was being made to collect -flour and transport from the rear: Wellesley wrote to O’Donoju that -he had at last hopes of securing some wagons from the Plasencia -district within three days, and that ‘in the meantime he might get -something to eat.’ He had some days before sent orders back even so -far as Abrantes, to order up 200 Portuguese carts which had been -collected there, and the Central Junta had informed him that a train -for his use had already started from Andalusia. But ‘there was no -very early prospect of relieving the present distress[618].’ - - [616] Wellesley to Sherbrooke, Talavera, July 24. - - [617] Wellesley to Castlereagh, July 24. - - [618] Wellesley to Beresford, from Plasencia, July 14. - -Cuesta was, as might have been expected, as angry with Wellesley for -refusing to move forward from Talavera, as Wellesley was with Cuesta -for missing the great opportunity of July 23. When informed that the -British army was not about to advance any further, he announced that -he for his part should go on, that Victor was in full flight, and -that he would pursue him to Madrid. ‘In that case’ dryly observed -Wellesley, ‘Cuesta will get himself into a scrape; but any movement -by me to his assistance is quite out of the question. If the enemy -discover that we are not with him, he will be beaten, or must return. -The enemy will make this discovery to-day, if he should risk any -attempt upon their rearguard at Santa Ollala[619].’ In reply to the -Captain-General’s declaration that he should press Victor hard, his -colleague only warned him that he would be wiser ‘to secure the -course of the Tagus and open communication with Venegas, while the -measures should be taken to supply the British army with means of -transport[620].’ The Spaniard would not listen to any such advice, -and hurried forward; though he had been for many weeks refusing to -fight the 1st Corps when it lay in Estremadura, he was now determined -to risk a second Medellin. Apparently he was obsessed by the idea -that Victor was in full retreat for Madrid, and would not make a -serious stand. Underlying his sudden energy there was also some -idea that he would disconcert his masters of the Central Junta by -recovering the capital: he had discovered, it would seem, that -the Junta had sent secret orders to Venegas, directing him to take -charge of the city on its reconquest, and giving him authority to -nominate the civil and military officers for its administration. If -the Army of Estremadura seized Madrid, while the Army of La Mancha -was still lingering on the way thither, all these plans would be -frustrated[621]. - - [619] Wellesley to Frere, Talavera, July 25. - - [620] Ibid.; and also Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 25. - - [621] Cf. Arteche, vi. 358, with Wellesley’s remarks on the - inexplicable eagerness of Cuesta to be in Madrid on an early day. - -Accordingly Cuesta pushed on very boldly on the afternoon of the -twenty-fourth, dividing his army into two columns, of which one -marched on Santa Ollala by the high-road to the capital, while the -other moved by Cevolla and Torrijos on the side-road to Toledo. He -was uncertain whether Victor had retired by one or by both of these -routes: if all his corps had taken the former path, the natural -deduction was that he was thinking only of Madrid: if the Toledo -road had also been used, there was reason for concluding that the -Marshal must be intending to join Sebastiani and the 4th Corps, who -might be looked for in that direction. Late in the day the Spanish -general ascertained that the main body of Victor’s army had taken the -latter route: he proceeded to follow it, placing his head quarters -that night at Torrijos, only fifteen miles from Toledo. Next morning -he learnt to his surprise and dismay that he had in front of him not -only the 1st Corps, but also Sebastiani and the King’s reserves from -Madrid: for just at this moment the whole French force in New Castile -had been successfully concentrated, and nearly 50,000 men were -gathered in front of the 33,000 troops of the Army of Estremadura. -Venegas’s diversion had utterly failed to draw off the 4th Corps -to the East; the King had come down in haste from Madrid, and thus -the whole plan of campaign which the allied generals had drawn up -had been foiled--partly by the sloth of Venegas, partly by Cuesta’s -inexplicable and perverse refusal to fight on July 23 upon the line -of the Alberche. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER V - -CONCENTRATION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES: THE KING TAKES THE OFFENSIVE: -COMBATS OF TORRIJOS AND CASA DE SALINAS - - -It is now necessary to turn to the French camp, in order to realize -the course of events which had led to the concentration of such a -formidable force in the environs of Toledo. Down to the twenty-second -of July Joseph and his adviser Jourdan had remained in complete -ignorance of the advance of Wellesley upon Plasencia, and seem to -have been perfectly free from any apprehension that Madrid was in -danger. Since their return from their fruitless pursuit of the -army of La Mancha, they had been spending most of their energy in -a controversy with Soult. The Duke of Dalmatia, not content with -the command of the three army corps which Napoleon had put at his -disposal, had been penning elaborate dispatches to the King to demand -that the greater part of the remaining French troops in Spain should -be used to co-operate in his projected campaign against the English -in Portugal. He wrote on July 13 to urge on Joseph the necessity (1) -of drawing large detachments from the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, -in order to form a corps of observation in the kingdom of Leon to -support his own rear; (2) of placing another strong detachment at -Plasencia to cover his flank; (3) of transferring every regiment that -could be spared from Madrid and New Castile to Salvatierra on the -Tormes, just south of Salamanca, in order to form a reserve close in -his rear, which he might call up, if necessary, to strengthen the -60,000 men whom he already had in hand. He also demanded that Joseph -should send him at once 200,000 francs to spend on the fortification -of Zamora, Toro, and other places on the Douro, as also 500,000 -francs more for the present expenses of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps. -If this were granted him, together with 2,000,000 rations of flour, -and a battering-train of at least forty-eight heavy guns for the -sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, he thought that he should be -in a position to deliver a serious attack on Northern Portugal, and -ultimately to drive the British army into the sea[622]. - - [622] Soult to Joseph, July 13. Compare with this Jourdan to - Soult of July 17, the reply to these modest demands. - -On the day upon which the Duke of Dalmatia made these comprehensive -demands upon King Joseph, the British army had been for ten days in -Spain, and was preparing to advance from Plasencia on Madrid. It was -therefore an exquisitely inappropriate moment at which to demand -that the greater part of the King’s central reserve should be sent -off from the capital to the neighbourhood of Salamanca. There were -other parts of Soult’s lists of requisitions which were equally -impracticable. It is clear that Suchet could not have spared a man -from Aragon, and that St. Cyr, with the siege of Gerona on his hands, -would have found it absolutely impossible to make large detachments -from Catalonia. Even if he and Suchet had been able to send off -troops to Leon, they would have taken months to reach the Galician -frontier. The demand for 700,000 francs in hard cash was also most -unpalatable: King Joseph was at this moment in the direst straits -for money: his brother could send him nothing while the Austrian war -was in progress, and as he was not in proper military possession of -any large district of Spain, he was at this moment in a condition of -hopeless bankruptcy. He confessed to Soult that he was living from -hand to mouth, by the pitiful expedient of melting down and coining -the silver plate in the royal palace at Madrid. - -Jourdan therefore replied, in the King’s behalf, to Soult that he -must do his best with the 60,000 men already at his disposition, -that no troops from Catalonia, Aragon, or Madrid could be spared, -and that money could not be found. All that could be given was the -battering-train that had been demanded, 600,000 rations of biscuit, -and an authorization to raise forced contributions in Old Castile. -For the protection of his flanks and his communications the Marshal -must utilize Kellermann’s dragoons and the other unattached troops in -the valley of the Douro, a force which if raised to 12,000 men by -detachments from the 5th or 6th Corps could keep La Romana and the -Galicians in check[623]. - - [623] Jourdan to Soult, July 17, 1809, from Madrid. - -It is curious to note how entirely ignorant both Soult and the King -were as to the real dangers of the moment. Soult had drawn up, and -Joseph acceded to[624], a plan for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, -and an invasion of Northern Portugal--operations which would take -long weeks of preparation--at the time when Madrid was in imminent -danger from the combined armies of Wellesley, Cuesta, and Venegas. -The Marshal’s plan was perfectly correct from the point of view of -the higher strategy--the main objective of the French was certainly -the British army, and it would have been highly advisable to invade -Northern Portugal with 60,000 men in the front line, and 40,000 -in support, if the circumstances of the moment had permitted it. -But these circumstances were hidden alike from Soult and the King, -owing to the impossibility of obtaining accurate information of -the movements of the allies. The fundamental difficulty of all -French operations in the Peninsula was that the commanders could -never discover the whereabouts of the enemy till he actually came -in contact with their outposts. Hence it chanced that Soult was -planning, and Joseph approving, a campaign on the borders of Northern -Portugal, at the precise moment when the British were on the march -for Talavera. - - [624] ‘Le roi pense, comme vous, qu’il est important de s’emparer - de Ciudad Rodrigo; cette place servira de place d’armes aux - troupes qui seront dans le cas d’entrer en Portugal.’--Ibid. - -It was actually not until July 22 that the King’s eyes were at last -unsealed. Victor having come into collision with the cavalry of -Wellesley’s advanced guard, sent news to Madrid that the British army -had joined Cuesta, and had reached the Alberche. On the same day, -by a fortunate chance, there also arrived in the capital another -emissary of Soult, with a message much less impracticable than that -which had last been sent. This was General Foy, whom the Duke of -Dalmatia had dispatched on July 19, after receiving very definite -rumours that the British were moving in the valley of the Tagus, -and not approaching Old Castile[625]. The Marshal sent word that -in this case he must of course concert a common plan of operations -with the King, and abandon any immediate action against Portugal. He -suggested that his best plan would be to concentrate his three corps -at Salamanca, and to march against the flank and rear of the English -by way of Bejar and the Puerto de Baños. If the King could cover -Madrid for a time with the 1st and 4th Corps, he would undertake to -present himself in force upon Wellesley’s line of communications, a -move which must infallibly stop the advance of the allies towards the -capital. If they hesitated a moment after his arrival at Plasencia, -they would be caught between two fires, and might be not merely -checked but surrounded and destroyed. Soult added, however, that he -could not move till the 2nd Corps had received the long-promised -provision of artillery which was on its way from Madrid, and till he -had rallied Ney’s troops, who were still at Astorga, close to the -foot of the Galician mountains. - - [625] Compare Le Noble’s account of Soult’s proposals (pp. 312-3) - with Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, and with the _Vie Militaire du Général - Foy_, p. 83. - -Napoleon, at a later date, criticized this plan severely, declaring -that Soult ought to have marched on Madrid to join the King, and -not on Plasencia. He grounded his objections to the scheme on the -strategical principle that combined operations on external lines -should be avoided. ‘The march of Marshal Soult,’ he wrote, ‘was -both dangerous and useless--dangerous, because the other army might -be beaten (as happened at Talavera) before he could succour it, so -that the safety of all my armies in Spain was compromised: useless, -because the English had nothing to fear; they could get behind the -Tagus in three hours; and whether they crossed at Talavera or at -Almaraz, or anywhere else, they could secure a safe line of retreat -on Badajoz.’ Against this criticism the defence made by both Soult -and King Joseph was that it would have required a much longer time -to bring the three corps from the Douro to Madrid than to Plasencia; -that it would have taken them at least ten days to reach Madrid, and -that during those days the King and his army might have been beaten -and driven out of the capital by the united forces of Wellesley, -Cuesta, and Venegas. It was, of course, impossible to foresee on -July 22 that Wellesley would refuse to pursue Victor beyond Talavera, -or that Venegas would let Sebastiani slip away from him. Accordingly -King Joseph and Jourdan fell in with Soult’s suggestion, because -they thought that he would come sooner into the field if he marched -on Plasencia, and would remove the pressure of the British army from -them at a comparatively early date. As a matter of fact, he took a -much longer time to reach Plasencia than they had expected: they had -hoped that he might be there on July 27, while his vanguard only -reached the place on August 1, and his main body on the second and -third[626]. But it seems clear that the expectation that he would -intervene on the earlier date was far too sanguine. Soult dared not -move till his three corps were well closed up, and since Ney had to -come all the way from Astorga, it would have been impossible in any -case to mass the army at Plasencia much earlier than was actually -done. Napoleon’s remark that Soult could not hope to catch or -surround the British army seems more convincing than his criticism -of the march on Plasencia. If the passes of the Sierra de Gata had -been properly held, and prompt news had been transmitted to Talavera -that the French were on the move from the valley of the Douro, -Wellesley would have had ample time to cover himself, by crossing -the Tagus and transferring his army to the line of operations, -Truxillo-Badajoz. The British general always defended himself by this -plea: and complained that those who spoke of him as being ‘cut off -from Portugal,’ by the arrival of Soult at Plasencia, forgot that he -had as good a base at Elvas and Badajoz as at Abrantes. - - [626] For the controversy about the expected date of Soult’s - arrival at Plasencia, see Joseph’s and Jourdan’s letter to - Napoleon, in Ducasse’s _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, and on the other - side Le Noble’s _Campagne de 1809_. - -But we must not look too far forward into the later stages of the -campaign. It is enough to say that Jourdan and Joseph sent back -Foy to rejoin Soult, on the same day that he had reached Madrid, -bearing the orders that the Marshal was to collect his three corps -with the greatest possible haste, and to march by Salamanca on -Plasencia, where they trusted that he might present himself on the -twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth of the current month. Meanwhile it -was necessary to hold back Cuesta and Wellesley till the Duke of -Dalmatia’s operations in their rear began to produce their effect. -The only possible way of doing this was to concentrate in all haste -every available man in New Castile, and to cover Madrid as long -as possible. This massing of the French forces turned out to be -perfectly feasible, since Venegas had neglected to press in upon -Sebastiani, so that it was possible to withdraw the whole 4th Corps -from in front of him, and to send it to reinforce Victor, without -any immediate danger. Accordingly, the 1st Corps was directed to -fall back from its perilous advanced position on the Alberche, and -to draw near to Toledo: Sebastiani was told to abandon Madridejos -and La Mancha, and to hasten by forced marches toward the same -point: while the King himself resolved to leave Madrid with the -slenderest of garrisons, and to carry the rest of the central reserve -to the general rendezvous. Accordingly, he left only one brigade -of Dessolles’ division, with a few of his untrustworthy Spanish -levies, to hold the capital: the total did not amount to much over -4,000 men, and General Belliard, the governor of the city, was -warned that he must be prepared to retreat into the Retiro forts, -with his troops and the whole body of the _Afrancesados_ and their -families, if anything untoward should occur. For it was possible -that an insurrection might break out, or that Venegas might succeed -in slipping into Madrid by the roads from the east, or again, that -Wilson (whose column had been heard of at Escalona and was believed -to be much larger than was actually the case), might attempt a _coup -de main_ from the west. Leaving Belliard in this dangerous and -responsible position, the King marched out upon the twenty-third -with the remaining brigade of Dessolles’s division, the infantry and -cavalry of his French Guard, two squadrons of chasseurs and fourteen -guns, a force of some 5,800 men[627]. He had reached Navalcarnero, -with the intention of joining Victor on the Alberche, when he -received the news that the Marshal had retired towards Toledo, and -was lying at Bargas behind the Guadarrama river. Here Joseph joined -him on the morning of July 25. - - [627] The whole consisted of: - - Infantry of the Guard 1,800 - _Chevaux-Légers_ of the Guard 250 - Godinot’s Brigade of Dessolles’s Division 3,350 - 27th Chasseurs (two squadrons) 250 - Artillery (two batteries) 200 - ----- - Total 5,850 - - -On their concentration a force of 46,000 men was collected, Victor -having brought up 23,000, the King 5,800, and Sebastiani 17,500. The -latter had placed four of the six Polish battalions of Valence’s -division in Toledo, and was therefore short by 3,000 bayonets of -the total force of his corps. With such a mass of good troops at -their disposition, Joseph, Jourdan, and Victor were all agreed that -it was right to fall upon the Spaniards without delay. They were -astonished to find that the British army was not in their front, but -only Cuesta’s troops. They had expected to see the whole allied host -before them, and were overjoyed to discover that the Estremadurans -alone had pushed forward to Torrijos and Santa Ollala. Instead, -therefore, of being obliged to fight a defensive battle behind the -river Guadarrama, it was in their power to take the offensive. - -This was done without delay: on the morning of July 26 the French -army advanced on Torrijos, with the 1st Corps at the head of the -column. But Cuesta, when once he had discovered the strength of the -force in his front, had resolved to retreat. Victor found opposed -to him only the division of Zayas and two cavalry regiments, which -had been told off to cover the withdrawal of the Estremaduran army. -The Marshal sent out against this rearguard the chasseurs of Merlin -and the dragoons of Latour-Maubourg, who drove in the Spanish horse, -almost exterminating the unfortunate regiment of Villaviciosa, which, -in retiring, chanced to blunder against the high stone walls of some -enclosures from which exit was difficult[628]. Zayas then went to -the rear, and retired towards the cavalry division of Albuquerque, -which Cuesta hastily sent to his assistance. The French cavalry -took some time to re-form for a second attack, and their infantry -was still far off. The Spanish rearguard therefore, covered by -Albuquerque’s horse, had time enough to fall back on the main body, -which was already in full retreat. Their cavalry then followed, and -being not very strenuously pursued by Merlin and Latour-Maubourg, got -off in safety. The whole army, marching at the best of its speed, -and in considerable disorder, finally reached the Alberche without -being caught up by the enemy. Cuesta found the British divisions of -Sherbrooke and Mackenzie guarding the river: Wellesley had sent them -forward when he heard of the approach of the French, and had placed -the former on the hills above the further side of the bridge, to -cover the passage, and the latter in reserve. He rode out himself to -meet the Spanish general, and begged him to carry his army beyond -the Alberche, as it would be extremely dangerous to be caught with -such an obstacle behind him, and no means of retreat save a long -bridge and three fords. But Cuesta tempted providence by declaring -that he should encamp on the further bank, as his troops were too -exhausted to risk the long defile across the bridge after dark. His -sullen anger against Wellesley for refusing to follow him on the -twenty-fourth was still smouldering in his breast, and the English -were convinced that he remained on the wrong side of the river out -of pure perversity, merely because his colleague pressed him to put -himself in safety. He consented, however, to retreat next morning to -the position which Wellesley had selected in front of Talavera. - - [628] ‘The cavalry regiment of Villaviciosa, drawn up in an - enclosure with but one exit, was penned in by the enemy and cut - to pieces without a possibility of escape. A British officer - of engineers, present with them, saved himself by his English - horse taking at a leap the barrier which the Spanish horses were - incapable of clearing.’ Lord Munster, p. 208. - -The French made no appearance that night, though they might well have -done so, and the Spanish army, bivouacing confusedly in the narrow -slip of flat ground between the heights and the Alberche, enjoyed -undisturbed rest during the hours of darkness. It is impossible not -to marvel at the slackness with which Victor conducted the pursuit: -he had twelve regiments of splendid cavalry to the front[629], and -could undoubtedly have pressed the Estremadurans hard if he had -chosen to do so. Cuesta’s retreating columns were in such a state of -confusion and disorder that a vigorous assault on their rear might -have caused a general _débandade_. But after driving in Zayas in the -early morning, Victor moved very slowly, and did not even attempt -to roll up Albuquerque’s cavalry rearguard, though he could have -assailed it with very superior numbers. When taxed with sloth by -Marshal Jourdan, he merely defended himself by saying that the horses -were tired, and that the infantry was still too far to the rear to -make it right for him to begin a combat which might develop into a -general engagement. But it is hard to see that he would have risked -anything by pressing in upon Albuquerque, for if Cuesta had halted -his whole army in order to support his rearguard, there was nothing -to prevent the French cavalry from drawing off, and refusing to close -till the main body of the 1st Corps should come up. - - [629] He had six regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons, 3,200 - sabres, four regiments of Merlin’s Division, 1,007 sabres, two - regiments of Beaumont’s (corps-cavalry of 1st Corps) 980--a total - of over 5,000 men. - -Thanks to Victor’s slackness the Spaniards secured an unmolested -retreat across the Alberche on the following morning. It is said -that Cuesta, in sheer perversity and reluctance to listen to any -advice proffered him by Wellesley, delayed for some hours before -he would retreat, and that when at last he yielded to the pressing -solicitations of his colleague he remarked to his staff ‘that he had -made the Englishman go down on his knees’ before consenting. - -All through the morning hours of the twenty-seventh the Army of -Estremadura was pouring across the bridge and the fords, not in the -best order. They had almost all passed, when about noon the French -cavalry began to appear in their front. When the enemy at last began -to press forward in strength, Wellesley directed Sherbrooke’s and -Mackenzie’s divisions to prepare to evacuate their positions on the -eastern bank, which they did as soon as the last of the Spaniards had -got into safety. The first division passed at the bridge, the third -at the fords near the village of Cazalegas: then Sherbrooke marched -by the high-road towards Talavera, while Mackenzie, who had been told -off as the rearguard, remained with Anson’s light horse near the -ruined Casa de Salinas, a mile to the west of the Alberche. - -It may seem strange that Wellesley made no attempt to dispute the -passage of the river, but the ground was hopelessly indefensible. The -left bank (Victor’s old position of July 22) completely commands the -right, the one being high, the other both low and entirely destitute -of artillery positions. Moreover, a great part of the _terrain_ -was thickly strewn with woods and olive plantations, which made it -impossible to obtain any general view of the country-side. They -would have given splendid cover for an army advancing to storm the -heights on the French bank, but were anything but an advantage to -an army on the defensive. For, unable to hold the actual river bank -because of the commanding hills on the further side, such an army -would have been forced to form its line some way from the water, and -the tangled cover down by the brink of the stream would have given -the enemy every facility for pushing troops across, and for pressing -them into the midst of the defender’s position without exposing them -to his fire. Wellington had examined the line of the Alberche upon -the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, and had pronounced it absolutely -untenable; ‘no position could be worse,’ he wrote to O’Donoju[630], -but he had discovered one of a very different kind a little to the -rear, and had already settled the way in which it was to be occupied. -It presented so many advantages that even Cuesta had consented to -accept it as a good fighting-ground, and the Estremaduran army was -at this very moment occupied in arraying itself along that part of -the line which had been allotted to it. Sherbrooke’s division was -retiring across the plain to fall into the section which Wellesley -had chosen for it, and Hill’s and Campbell’s troops were moving to -their designated ground. Only Mackenzie and the light cavalry had yet -to be established in their post. - - [630] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Cazalegas, July 25. - -In the act of withdrawing, this division became involved in an -unfortunate combat, which bid fair for a moment to develop into a -disaster. Its two brigades had been halted close to the ruined house -called the Casa de Salinas, in ground covered partly with underwood -and partly with olive groves. The cavalry had been withdrawn to the -rear, as it was impossible to use it for vedettes in such a locality. -The infantry was supposed to have a chain of pickets thrown out in -its front, but it would appear that they must have been badly placed: -as one eye-witness confesses, ‘we were by no means such good soldiers -in those days as succeeding campaigns made us, and sufficient -precautions had not been taken to ascertain what was passing in the -wood[631],’ and between it and the ford below Cazalegas. French -cavalry alone had hitherto been seen, and from cavalry Mackenzie’s -troops were certainly safe in the tangled ground where they were now -lying. - - [631] Lord Munster, p. 210. - -But already Victor’s infantry had reached the front, and its leading -division, that of Lapisse, had forded the Alberche far to the north, -and had entered the woods without being observed by the outlying -pickets of Mackenzie’s left brigade[632]. It had even escaped the -notice of Wellesley himself, who had just mounted the roof of the -ruined Casa de Salinas, the only point in the neighbourhood from -which anything like a general view of the country-side could be -secured. While he was intent on watching the heights above the -Alberche in his front, and the cavalry vedettes descending from them, -the enemy’s infantry was stealing in upon his left. - - [632] Several eye-witnesses declare that Lapisse’s division - escaped notice owing to a curious chance. Before abandoning the - further bank of the Alberche, Mackenzie’s troops had set fire to - the huts which Victor’s corps had constructed on the Cazalegas - heights, during their long stay in that position. The smoke from - the burning was driven along the slopes and the river bottom - by the wind, and screened one of the fords from the British - observers in the woods; over this ford came Lapisse’s unsuspected - advance. - -Lapisse had promptly discovered the line of British outposts, and -had succeeded in drawing out his division in battle order before it -was observed. He had deployed one regiment, the 16th Léger, as a -front line, while the rest of his twelve battalions were coming on in -support. - -While, therefore, Wellesley was still unconscious that the enemy was -close upon him, a brisk fire of musketry broke out upon his left -front. It was the French advance driving in the pickets of Donkin’s -brigade. The division had barely time to stand to its arms--some -men are said to have been killed before they had risen from the -ground--and the Commander-in-chief had hardly descended from the -roof and mounted his charger, when the enemy was upon them. The -assault fell upon the whole front of Donkin’s brigade, and on the -left regiment (the 2/31st) of that of Mackenzie himself. So furious -and unexpected was it, that the 87th, 88th, and 31st were all broken, -and driven some way to the rear, losing about eighty prisoners. It -was fortunate that the French advance did not strike the whole line, -but only its left and centre. The 1/45th, which was just outside the -limit of Lapisse’s attack, stood firm, and on it Wellesley re-formed -the 31st, while, a little further to the north, the half-battalion of -the 5/60th also held its ground and served as a rallying-point for -the 87th and 88th. The steadiness of the 1/45th and 5/60th saved the -situation; covered by them the division retired from the woods and -formed up in the plain, where Anson’s light horsemen came to their -aid and guarded their flanks. The French still pressed furiously -forward, sending out two batteries of horse artillery to gall the -retreating columns, but they had done their worst, and during the -hours of the late afternoon Mackenzie’s infantry fell back slowly and -in order to the points of the position which had been assigned to -them. Donkin’s brigade took post in the second line behind the German -Legion, while Mackenzie’s own three regiments passed through the -Guards and formed up in their rear. Their total loss in the combat -of Casa de Salinas had been 440 men--the French casualties must have -been comparatively insignificant--probably not 100 in all[633]. - - [633] Unfortunately the French returns do not separate the losses - of the twenty-seventh from those of the twenty-eighth of July. - Only the 16th Léger can have suffered any appreciable damage. - -From the moment when the fray had begun in the woods till dusk, -the noise of battle never stopped, for on arriving in front of the -allied position, the French artillery drew up and commenced a hot, -but not very effective, fire against those of the troops who held the -most advanced stations. As the cannonade continued, the different -regiments were seen hurrying to their battle-posts, for, although the -arrangements had all been made, some brigades, not expecting a fight -till the morrow, had still to take up their allotted ground. - -‘The men, as they formed and faced the enemy, looked pale, but the -officers riding along their line, only two deep, on which all our -hopes depended, observed that they appeared not less tranquil than -determined. In the meanwhile the departing sun showed by his rays -the immense masses moving towards us, and the last glimmering of the -light proved their direction to be across our front, toward the left. -The darkness, only broken in upon by the bursting shells and the -flashes of the French guns, closed quickly upon us, and it was the -opinion of many that the enemy would rest till the morning[634].’ - - [634] Lord Munster, p. 212. - -Such, however, was not to be the case: there was to be hard fighting -in front of Talavera before the hour of midnight had arrived. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VI - -THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA: THE PRELIMINARY COMBATS - -(JULY 27-28) - - -The position which Wellesley had selected as offering far better -ground for a defensive battle than any which could be found on the -banks of the Alberche, extends for nearly three miles to the north -of the town of Talavera. It was not a very obvious line to take -up, since only at its northern end does it present any well marked -features. Two-thirds of the position lie in the plain, and are only -marked out by the stony bed of the Portiña, a brook almost dried up -in the summer, which runs from north to south and falls into the -Tagus at Talavera. In the northern part of its course this stream -flows at the bottom of a well-marked ravine, but as it descends -towards the town its bed grows broad and shallow, and ceases to be -of any tactical or topographical importance. Indeed, in this part of -the field the fighting-line of the allies lay across it, and their -extreme right wing was posted upon its further bank. - -The town of Talavera, a place of 10,000 souls, which had been a -flourishing industrial centre in the sixteenth century, but had long -sunk into decay, lies in a compact situation on the north bank of -the Tagus. It possesses a dilapidated bridge of forty-five arches, -the only passage across the river between Arzobispo and Toledo. Its -site is perfectly flat, save for a low knoll crowned by the chapel of -Nuestra Señora del Prado, just outside the eastern, or Madrid, gate, -and overlooking the _Alameda_ (public promenade) and the neighbouring -gardens. The place had no suburbs, but was surrounded by a broad -belt of olive groves and enclosures, which extend for a full mile to -the north and east, and hide the houses and walls from the traveller -approaching from either of those directions. When the allies entered -Talavera they found it deserted by most of its inhabitants, who had -fled up into the villages of the Sierra de Toledo during the French -occupation. Many, however, descended to reoccupy their homes when the -enemy departed. Victor’s men had plundered most of the houses, and -turned many of the churches into barracks or stables: hence the town -presented a picture of abject desolation[635]. - - [635] ‘The French troops during their stay had been guilty of - great excesses: a number of houses were completely destroyed, - and the furniture burnt for fuel. In every quarter were to be - seen marks of the devastation they had committed. The Cathedral, - a handsome modern building, was uninjured, the enemy having - contented himself with carrying off all the splendid ornaments - used in the ceremonies of religion. But in the church of San - Antonio the French had destroyed everything, and converted it - into a barrack,’ &c. Stothert’s _Narrative of the Campaigns of - 1809-11_, pp. 81-2. - -For a mile and a half beyond the northern wall of Talavera the -ground covered by gardens and olive groves is perfectly flat; it -then commences to rise, and swells up into a long hill, the Cerro de -Medellin. This height runs from east to west, so that its front, and -not the full length of its side, overhangs the Portiña ravine. Its -loftiest point and its steepest face are presented to that declivity, -while to the west and south it has gentle and easily accessible -slopes, sinking gradually down into the plain. This hill, the most -commanding ground in the neighbourhood of Talavera, had been chosen -by Wellesley as the position of his left wing. It formed, including -its lower slopes, about one-third of the line which he had determined -to occupy, the rest of the front lying in the low ground among the -olives and gardens. North of the Cerro de Medellin is a narrow -lateral valley, only half a mile broad, separating this hill from the -main chain of the Sierra de Segurilla, the mountains which form the -watershed between the basin of the Tagus and that of the Tietar. The -British general had intended at first that his position should extend -no further north than the hill, but in the course of the action he -was compelled to lengthen his front, and to post troops both in the -valley and on the mountain spurs beyond it. - -By the agreement made with Cuesta, at the conference near the bridge -of the Alberche on the evening of the twenty-sixth, it was settled -that the Spanish army should hold the town of Talavera and the -wooded and enclosed ground for a mile beyond it. The British had -their right among the olive groves, but their centre and left on -the open slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. This order of battle was -the only one which it was possible to adopt. Wellesley had already -discovered that the army of Estremadura could not manœuvre, and -would be much safer behind walls and enclosures than in the open, -and Cuesta had gladly accepted the proposal that he should occupy -this part of the position. Having only a little more than a mile of -front to defend, he was able to provide a double and triple line with -his 32,000 men[636]. His Vanguard and 1st division, under Zayas, -occupied the eastern outskirts of the town, with a battery placed -upon the knoll crowned by the chapel of Nuestra Señora del Prado. A -brigade of cavalry (four regiments) was deployed in the open ground -of the Prado, close to the bank of the Tagus. The 2nd division, that -of Iglesias, held Talavera, whose ancient walls, though imperfect in -many places, were still quite defensible. The 3rd and 4th divisions -(Manglano and Portago) were ranged in a double line among the gardens -and enclosures to the north of the town, as far as a low hillock -called the Pajar de Vergara, where they touched Wellesley’s left. -Behind them were the rest of Cuesta’s cavalry (ten regiments) and the -5th division (Bassecourt) forming the reserves. - - [636] The Spaniards had lost 1,000 men, mainly by dispersion, in - the retreat from Torrijos on the twenty-sixth. - -The Spanish position was immensely strong. The front was completely -screened by groves and enclosures occupied by skirmishers: the -first line was drawn up along the slightly sunken road leading from -Talavera to the north, which provided the men with an excellent -parapet and good cover[637]. The second line was equally well placed -behind the Portiña rivulet, which was bordered by trees along its -whole front. The only good artillery position was that outside the -Madrid gate, in front of Zayas’ division, but three other batteries -were planted in the least defective emplacements that could be found -in the front line. The rest of the Spanish guns were in reserve, in -line with Bassecourt and the cavalry. - - [637] Cf. Londonderry, i. 403; and Arteche, vi. 293. - -The northern half of the position had its strong points, but also -its defects. For the first half mile beyond the Spanish left it was -still covered by groves and gardens, and had on its right front the -little eminence of the Pajar de Vergara. On this knoll a redoubt had -been commenced, but no more had been done than to level a space, -eighty yards long and twenty feet broad, on its summit, and to throw -up the excavated earth in front, thus forming a bank three or four -feet high. In this work, indifferently well protected, lay Lawson’s -battery of 3-pounders, the lightest guns of Wellesley’s artillery. -Beside and behind them were the five battalions of the 4th division, -Campbell’s brigade in the front line, Kemmis’s in the second, to the -rear of the Portiña. - -On the left of the 4th division the enclosed ground ended, and cover -ceased. Here, forming the British centre, were drawn up the eight -battalions of Sherbrooke’s division, in a single line. The Guards’ -brigade, under Henry Campbell, was in perfectly flat level ground, -without shade or cover. Next to them, where there is a gentle -ascent towards the foot of the Cerro de Medellin, were Cameron’s -two battalions; while the two weak brigades of the King’s German -Legion, under Langwerth and Low, continued the front on to the -actual hill, with the Portiña, now flowing in a well-marked ravine, -at their feet[638]. The whole of this part of the British line was -bare rolling ground covered with long dry grass and scattered shrubs -of thyme. There was no cover, and before the Guards’ and Cameron’s -brigades the front was not defined by any strong natural feature. On -the other hand, the _terrain_ on the opposite side of the Portiña was -equally bare, and gave no advantage to an enemy about to attack. - - [638] Thus, counting from right to left, the front of - Sherbrooke’s brigade was composed as follows: 1st Coldstream - Guards, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards, 61st, 83rd, 1st Line K. G. L., - 2nd ditto, 5th ditto, 7th ditto. - -It was otherwise in the portion of the front where the four German -battalions of Langwerth and Low were placed. They had a steep ravine -in front of them, but on the opposite side, as a compensating -disadvantage, the rolling upland swells into a hill called the -Cerro de Cascajal, which, though much less lofty than the Cerro -de Medellin, yet afforded good artillery positions from which the -English slopes could be battered. - -Behind Sherbrooke’s troops, as the second line of his centre, -Wellesley had drawn up his 3rd division and all his cavalry. Cotton’s -light dragoons were in the rear of Kemmis’s brigade of the 4th -division. Mackenzie’s three battalions supported the Guards: then -came Anson’s light and Fane’s heavy cavalry, massed on the rising -slope in the rear of Cameron. Lastly Donkin’s brigade, which had -suffered so severely in the combat of Casa de Salinas, lay high up -the hill, directly in the rear of Low’s brigade of the King’s German -Legion. - -It only remains to speak of the British left, on the highest part -of the Cerro de Medellin. This section of the front was entrusted -to Hill’s division, which was already encamped upon its reverse -slope. Here lay the strongest point of the position, for the hill -is steep, and well covered in its front by the Portiña, which now -flows in a deep stony ravine. But it was also the part of the -British fighting-ground which was most likely to be assailed, since -a quick-eyed enemy could not help noting that it was the key of the -whole--that if the upper levels of the Cerro de Medellin were lost, -the rest of the allied line could not possibly be maintained. It -was therefore the part of the position which would require the most -careful watching, and Wellesley had told off to it his most capable -and experienced divisional general. But by some miscalculation, on -the evening of the twenty-seventh Hill’s two brigades were not lying -on their destined battle-line, but had halted half a mile behind -it--Richard Stewart’s battalions on the left, Tilson’s on the right -flank of the reverse slope. It is difficult to see with whom the -responsibility lay, for Wellesley was far to the right, engaged -in planting Mackenzie’s troops in their new position behind the -centre, while Hill had ridden over towards Talavera to search for -his Commander-in-chief and question him about details, and returned -rather late to give his brigadiers the exact instruction as to the -line they were to take up at nightfall[639]. There were piquets on -the crest, and the greater part of the front slopes were covered by -Low’s two battalions of the King’s German Legion, but the actual -summit of the Cerro was not occupied by any solid force, though the -brigades that were intended to hold it lay only 800 yards to the -rear. It was supposed that they would have ample time to take up -their ground in the morning, and no one dreamt of the possibility of -a night attack. - - [639] It would seem, on the whole, that the responsibility for - the absence of the division from its destined fighting-ground - lay with Hill, generally the most cautious and reliable of - subordinates. He says, in a memorandum drawn up in 1827, in - answer to an inquiry about Talavera, that he had gone to dine in - Talavera, and then saw Mackenzie’s division come back into the - line. Returning to his own troops, he found them moving out of - their bivouac, but not on their fighting-ground. He was getting - them into line, when the firing suddenly began in his front. - - These details I give from the valuable (unpublished) map by - Lieut. Unger of the K. G. L. artillery, which Colonel Whinyates - has been good enough to place at my disposition. It carefully - marks the emplacement of every British battery. Elliott was at - this moment in command of the battery which had been under Baynes - during the Oporto campaign, while Sillery had that which had been - under Lane. - -Of the very small force of artillery which accompanied the British -army, we have already seen that Lawson’s light 3-pounder battery -had been placed in the Pajar de Vergara entrenchment. Elliott’s and -Heyse’s were in the centre of the line; the former placed in front -of the Guards, the latter before Langwerth’s brigade of the German -Legion. Rettberg’s heavy 6-pounders were on the Cerro de Medellin, -with Hill’s division: at dusk they had been brought back to its -rear slope and were parked near Richard Stewart’s brigade. Finally -Sillery’s battery was in reserve, between the two lines, somewhere -behind Cameron’s brigade of Sherbrooke’s division. This single -unit was the only artillery reserve of which Wellesley could dispose. - -The precise number of British troops in line was 20,194, after -deducting the losses at Casa de Salinas; that of the Spaniards was -within a few hundreds of 32,000. The French, as we have already seen, -had brought a little more than 46,000 men to the field, so that the -allies had a superiority of some 6,000 in mere numbers. If Wellesley -could have exchanged the Army of Estremadura for half their strength -of British bayonets, he might have felt quite comfortable in his -strong position. But his confidence in the value of his allies, even -when firmly planted among walls and groves, was just about to receive -a rude shock. - -It was about seven o’clock when the heads of Victor’s columns, -following in the wake of the horse artillery which had been galling -Mackenzie’s retreat, emerged from the woods on to the rolling plateau -facing the allied position. Ruffin appeared on the right, and -occupied the Cascajal hill, opposite the Cerro de Medellin. Villatte -followed, and halted in its rear. More to the left Lapisse, adopting -the same line that had been taken by Mackenzie, halted in front of -the British centre: the corps-cavalry, under Beaumont, was drawn -up in support of him. Latour-Maubourg’s six regiments of dragoons, -further to the south, took ground in front of the Spaniards. The King -and Sebastiani were still far to the rear: their infantry was only -just passing the Alberche, though their advanced cavalry under Merlin -was already pushing forward in the direction of Talavera down the -high-road from Madrid[640]. - - [640] All these details are from the report drawn up by Sémélé, - the chief of the staff of the 1st Corps, at Talavera on Aug. 10. - -If Napoleon, or any other general who knew how to make himself -obeyed, had been present with the French army, there would have been -no fighting on the evening of July 27. But King Joseph counted for -little in the eyes of his nominal subordinates, and hence it came to -pass that the impetuous Victor took upon himself the responsibility -of attacking the allies when only half the King’s army had come -upon the field. With no more object, as it would seem, than that of -harassing the enemy, he sent to the front the batteries belonging -to Ruffin, Lapisse, and Latour-Maubourg, to join in the cannonade -which his horse artillery had already begun. At the same time -Merlin’s light horse pressed forward in the direction of Talavera, -to feel for the front of the Spaniards, whose exact position was -hidden by the olive groves. The British artillery replied, but no -great harm was done to either side. Yet in the Spanish part of the -line a dreadful disaster was on the point of occurring. When the -artillery fire began, and the French light horse were seen advancing, -the Estremaduran troops between Talavera and the Pajar de Vergara -delivered a tremendous salvo of infantry fire along the whole line, -though the enemy was too far off to take any damage. But, immediately -after, four battalions of Portago’s division, which formed part of -the left of Cuesta’s line and touched Campbell’s right, suddenly -shouted ‘treason!’ broke, and went off to the rear in complete -disorder. Wellesley, who, as it chanced, was behind Campbell’s -troops, and witnessed the whole rout, declared that he could -conceive no reason for their behaviour except that they must have -been frightened by the crash of their own tremendous volley[641]. -Two of these four battalions were troops who had never been in -action before: the other two had been badly cut up at Medellin, -and brought up to strength by the incorporation of a great mass of -recruits[642]. This might have excused a momentary misconduct, but -not a prolonged rush to the rear when the enemy was still half a mile -off, still less the casting away of their arms and the plundering -of the British camp, through which the multitude fled. Cuesta -sent cavalry to hunt them up, and succeeded in hounding back the -majority to their ranks, but many hundreds were still missing on the -following morning. They fled in small bands all down the valley of -the Tagus, dispersing dismal information on all sides. It is sad to -have to acknowledge that in their rush through the British camp they -carried away with them some commissaries and a few of the baggage -guard, who did not halt till they got to Oropesa, twenty miles from -the field[643]. Strange to say, this panic had no appreciable ill -effects: the French were not in a position to take advantage of it, -having no troops, save a few light horse, in front of the spot where -it occurred. The Spaniards to the right and rear of the absconding -regiments did not flinch, and as the second line held firm, there was -no actual gap produced in the allied position. But Wellesley noted -the scene, and never forgot it: of all that he had witnessed during -the campaign, this was the sight that struck him most, and most -influenced his future conduct. Cuesta also took account of it in his -own fashion, and at the end of the battle of the next day proposed -to decimate in the old Roman fashion, the battalions that had fled! -He actually chose by lot some 200 men from the fugitives, and after -trying them by court-martial prepared to shoot them. His British -colleague begged off the majority, but the old Captain-General -insisted on executing some twenty-five or thirty who were duly put to -death on the morning of the twenty-ninth[644]. - - [641] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 25: ‘Two thousand of them - ran off on the evening of the twenty-seventh, not 100 yards from - where I was standing, who were neither attacked, nor threatened - with an attack, and who were only frightened by the noise of - their own fire. They left their arms and accoutrements on the - ground, their officers went with them, and they plundered the - baggage of the British army, which had been sent to the rear. - Many others went, whom I did not see.’ - - [642] The panic-stricken regiments were Leales de Fernando VII, - which had been garrisoning Badajoz when Medellin was fought, - Badajoz (two batts.) which had been in the battle, and Toledo. - - [643] ‘I wish I could assert with truth that this retrogression - was confined to our Spanish allies. But the truth must be told, - and I regret to say that stragglers from the British army were - among them, taking a similar direction to the rear. As they - passed, they circulated reports of a most disheartening nature.’ - Col. Leach’s _Rough Sketches_, p. 81. He was with Craufurd’s - brigade, then coming up by forced marches from Plasencia, - which met the fugitives near Oropesa on the morning of the - twenty-eighth. ‘The road was crowded with fugitives, Spaniards - innumerable, and lots of English commissary clerks, paymasters - and sutlers, to say nothing of a few soldiers who said they were - _sick_.’ _Autobiography_ of Sir George Napier, p. 108. - - [644] ‘Early in the morning some twenty-five Spanish soldiers, - dressed in white, attended by several Popish priests, were - marched up to the front of our regiment and shot. One, a young - lad of nineteen or twenty years, dropped before the party fired, - but to no use. For after the volley at ten paces, the firing - party ran forward and shooting them in the head or breast - completed their horrid work. These unfortunates belonged to - regiments that had given way in the late battle.’ _Diary_ of - Cooper (of the 7th Fusiliers), pp. 25-6. - -After the panic had died down, Victor gradually withdrew his -batteries[645], but it was with no intention of bringing the combat -to a real termination. He had resolved to deliver a night attack on -the key of the British position, when the whole of his corps should -have reached the front. Having reconnoitred the allied lines, and -noted the distribution of their defenders, he had determined to -storm the Cerro de Medellin in the dark. During his long stay at -Talavera he had acquired a very thorough knowledge of its environs, -and understood the dominating importance of that height. If he -could seize and hold it during the night, he saw that the battle of -the next day would be already half won. Accordingly, still without -obtaining King Joseph’s leave, he determined to assail the Cerro. He -told off for the storm his choicest division, that of Ruffin, whose -nine battalions were already ranged on the front of the Cascajal -heights. At the same time Lapisse’s division was to distract the -attention of the British centre by a noisy demonstration against its -front. - - [645] That the panic took place at dusk, and not during the - night attack, is completely proved by the _Journal_ of General - Sémélé, where it is noted as occurring in consequence of Victor’s - earliest demonstration; as also by Wellesley’s note. - -Night attacks are proverbially hazardous and hard to conduct, and -it cannot be disputed that Victor showed an excessive temerity in -endeavouring to deliver such a blow at the steady British troops, at -an hour when it was impossible to guarantee proper co-operation among -the attacking columns. But for an initial stroke of luck he ought not -to have secured even the small measure of success that fell to his -lot. - -At about nine o’clock, however, Ruffin moved down to the attack. -Each of his three regiments was formed in battalion columns, the 9th -Léger in the centre, the 96th on its left, the 24th on its right. -The first-named regiment was to deliver a frontal attack, the other -two to turn the flanks of the hill and attack over its side-slopes. -At the appointed moment the three regiments descended simultaneously -into the ravine of the Portiña, and endeavoured to carry out their -respective sections of the programme. The 9th, chancing on the place -where the ravine was most easily negotiable, crossed it without much -difficulty, and began to climb the opposite slope. On mounting half -way to the crest, it suddenly came on Low’s brigade of the German -Legion, lying down in line, with its pickets only a very small -distance in advance of the main body. It is said that the brigadier -was labouring under the delusion that some of Hill’s outposts were -in his front, and that he was screened by them. It is at any rate -clear that he was taken wholly unprepared by the midnight attack of -the French. His sentries were trampled down in a moment, and the -9th Léger ran in upon the Germans, firing into them point blank and -seizing many of them as prisoners almost ere they were awake. The -7th K. G. L. was completely broken, and lost 150 men--half of them -prisoners--in five minutes. The 5th, the right-hand battalion of -Low’s brigade, came off better, as it was not in the direct path of -the French; but it was flung sideways along the southern slope of -the hill, and could not be re-formed for some time. Meanwhile the -three French columns, somewhat separated from each other in this -first clash of arms, went straight on up the Cerro, and in a few -minutes were nearing its crest. The two leading battalions actually -reached and crowned it, without meeting with any opposition save -from the outlying picket of Richard Stewart’s brigade. The third was -not far behind, and it seemed almost certain that the position might -be won. At this moment General Hill, who was occupied in drawing -out his division on the rear slope, but had not yet conducted it -to its fighting-ground, interfered in the fight. He had seen and -heard the sudden outbreak of musketry on the frontal slopes, as -the French broke through Low’s brigade. But when it died down, he -was far from imagining that the cause was the complete success of -the enemy. Nevertheless, he directed his nearest brigade, that of -Richard Stewart, to prepare to support the Germans if necessary. He -was issuing his orders to the colonel of the 48th, when he observed -some men on the hill top fire a few shots in his direction. ‘Not -having an idea,’ he writes, ‘that the enemy were so near, I said to -myself that I was sure it was the old Buffs, as usual, making some -blunder.’ Accordingly he galloped up the hill, with his brigade-major -Fordyce, shouting to the men to cease firing. He rode right in among -the French before he realized his mistake, and a voltigeur seized -him by the arm and bade him surrender. Hill spurred his horse, which -sprang forward and got clear of the Frenchman, who lost his hold but -immediately raised his musket and fired at three paces’ distance, -missing the General but hitting his charger. Hill escaped in the -midst of a scattering volley, which killed his companion Fordyce, and -got back as fast as he could to Richard Stewart’s brigade. Without -delaying for a moment, even to change his wounded horse, he led on -the nearest regiments to recover the hill top. So great was the -confusion, owing to the sudden attack in the dark, that Stewart’s -men moved forward, not in their proper order, but with the 1st -Battalion of Detachments on the right, the 29th in the centre, and -the 1/48 on the left. This arrangement brought the first-named unit -first into touch with the enemy. The Detachments came into immediate -collision with the leading battalions of the French, who were now -somewhat in disorder, and trying to re-form on the ground they had -won. The two forces opened a furious fire upon each other, and both -came to a standstill[646]. But Hill, coming up a moment later at the -head of his centre regiment, cleared the hill top by a desperate -charge: passing through the Detachments, the 29th delivered a volley -at point-blank range and closed. The enemy broke and fled down the -slope that they had ascended. The 29th wheeled into line and followed -them, pouring in regular volleys at short intervals. But before -they had gone far, they became dimly conscious of another column to -their left, pushing up the hill in the darkness. This was the rear -battalion of the 9th Léger, which had fallen somewhat behind its -fellows. It was moving up diagonally across the front of the British -regiment, with drums beating and loud shouts of _vive l’Empereur_. -Taken in flank by the fire of the right companies of the 29th, it -could make no effective resistance, and ere long broke and rolled -back in disorder into the bed of the Portiña, where it met with the -wrecks of the rest of the regiment, and retired in company with them -up the slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal. - - [646] The Battalion of Detachments was decidedly checked. They - got somewhat into confusion, and halted. ‘The soldiers seemed - much vexed,’ writes Leslie of the 29th, ‘we could hear them - bravely calling out “There is nobody to command us! Only tell us - what to do, and we are ready to dare anything.” There was a fault - somewhere.’ Leslie, p. 144. - -The remainder of Ruffin’s division took little or no part in the -fighting. The three battalions of the 24th, which ought to have -mounted the hill on the right, lost their way in the darkness and -wandered up the valley between the Cerro de Medellin and the northern -mountains: they never came into action. The 96th, on the left of the -attack, chanced upon a part of the Portiña ravine which was very -precipitous: they found it difficult to descend, were very late in -reaching the other side, and then fell into a futile bickering fight -with the 5th and 2nd battalions of the King’s German Legion, which -terminated--with small damage to either party--when the main attack -in the centre was seen to have failed. - -The loss of the French in this night battle was about 300 men, -almost all in the 9th Léger. It included sixty-five prisoners, among -whom was the colonel of the regiment, who was left on the ground -desperately wounded. The British casualties were somewhat heavier, -entirely owing to the disaster to the 5th and 7th battalions of -the K. G. L., which suffered when surprised, a loss of 188 men, -eighty-seven of whom were made captives. Richard Stewart’s brigade, -which bore the brunt of the fighting and decided the affair, had only -125 killed and wounded[647]. - - [647] Though the French official reports of casualties do not - give any officers of the 9th Léger as prisoners, it is certain - that Colonel Meunier was taken. See Leslie, p. 143. Being - recovered, along with the other wounded prisoners, when Talavera - was evacuated, his name did not get down among the list of - missing, which was only drawn up on Aug. 10. - -Thus ended, in well-deserved failure, Victor’s night attack, of which -it may suffice to say that even its initial success was only due to -the gross carelessness of Low’s brigade in failing to cover their -front with a proper screen of outlying pickets. To attack in the dark -across rugged and difficult ground was to court disaster. The wonder -is not that two-thirds of the division went astray, but that the -other third almost succeeded in the hazardous enterprise to which it -was committed. Great credit is due to the 9th Léger for all that it -did, and no blame whatever rests upon the regiment for its ultimate -failure. The Marshal must take all the responsibility. - -The wrecks of the French attacking columns having rolled back beyond -the ravine, and the flanking regiments having abandoned their futile -demonstrations, the Cerro de Medellin was once more safe. The troops -occupying it were rearranged, as far as was possible, in the dark. -The front line on its left and highest part was now formed by Richard -Stewart’s brigade, ranged, not in its proper order of seniority, -but with the 29th on the left, the 1st Battalion of Detachments in -the centre, and the 1/48 on the right. Tilson’s brigade, the other -half of Hill’s division, was to the south of Stewart, continuing his -line along the crest. Low’s battalions of the King’s German Legion -were drawn off somewhat to the right, closing in towards Langwerth’s -brigade, so as to leave the central slopes of the Cerro de Medellin -entirely to Hill’s men. Donkin’s brigade of Mackenzie’s division lay -close behind them. After the warning that had been given by Victor’s -first assault, the greatest care was taken to make a second surprise -impossible. Stewart’s and Low’s brigades threw forward their pickets -to the brink of the Portiña ravine, so close to the enemy that all -night they could hear the _Qui vive_ of the sentries challenging -the visiting rounds, only two or three hundred yards above them. On -several occasions the outposts opened fire on each other, and the -word ‘stand to your arms,’ ran along the whole line. In front of -Sherbrooke’s division, about midnight, there was a false alarm, which -led to a whole brigade delivering a volley at an imaginary column of -assault, while their own pickets were still out in front, with the -result that two officers and several men were killed or wounded[648]. -A similar outbreak of fire, lasting for several minutes, ran along -the front of the Spanish lines an hour later. It seems to have been -caused by French foragers, in search of fuel, blundering against the -Estremaduran pickets on the edge of the olive groves. - - [648] See the Diary of Boothby of the R. E., one of the victims - of this unhappy fusilade, p. 5. - -Altogether the night was not a peaceful one, and the troops were much -harassed by the perpetual and unnecessary calls to stand to their -arms. Many of them got little sleep, and several British diarists -have left interesting impressions on record of their long vigil. -There was much to keep them awake: not only the repeated blaze -of fire running along parts of the allied line, but the constant -signs of movement on the French side of the Portiña. Some time -after midnight long lines of torches were seen advancing across -and to the right of the Cerro de Cascajal; these were markers with -flambeaux, sent out to fix the points on which Victor’s artillery -were to take up their positions, as was soon shown by the rattling of -gun-carriages, the noise of wheels, and the cracking of whips, which -were plainly heard in the intervals of stillness, when the hostile -pickets ceased their bickering musketry fire. The French were pushing -up their guns into the very front of their line, and when the dawn -began to break they were visible only 600 or 800 yards away from the -British lines. A few deserters came over during the night, mainly -from Leval’s German division; all agreed that the enemy was about to -deliver a second attack in the early morning. - -The dawn was an anxious moment: with the growing light it was -possible to make out broad black patches dotting the whole of the -rolling ground in front of the British army. Every instant rendered -them more visible, and soon they took shape as French regiments -in battalion columns, ranged on a front of nearly two miles, from -the right end of the Cerro de Cascajal to the edge of the woods -facing the Pajar de Vergara. The object which drew most attention -was an immense solid column at the extreme right of the hostile -line, on the lower slopes above the Portiña, with a thick screen of -_tirailleurs_ already thrown out in its front, and evidently ready -to advance at the word of command. The other divisions lay further -back: in front of them artillery was everywhere visible: there were -four batteries on the midslope of the Cascajal hill, and six more -on the rolling ground to the south. In the far distance, behind the -infantry, were long lines of cavalry dressed in all the colours of -the rainbow--fifteen or sixteen regiments could be counted--and far -to the rear of them more black masses were slowly rolling into view. -It was easily to be seen that little or nothing lay in front of the -Spaniards, and that at least five-sixths of the French army was -disposed for an attack on the British front. There were 40,000 men -visible, ready for the advance against the 20,000 sabres and bayonets -of Wellesley’s long red line[649]. - - [649] There are admirable narratives of the night-vigil and the - dawn of Talavera, in the narratives of Leslie, Leith-Hay, and - Lord Munster. - -An attack was imminent, yet there were many things which might have -induced the French generals to hold back. Was it worth while to -assail the allies in the admirable position which they now held, when -it was possible to drive them out of it without risking a battle? -Orders had been sent to Soult, six days before, to bid him fall on -Wellesley’s communications by way of Plasencia. It was believed that -he must have started ere now, and that the news of his approach would -reach the enemy within the next forty-eight hours. This intelligence -would compel them to go behind the Tagus, and to abandon the Talavera -position. Both Jourdan and King Joseph were doubtful of the policy -of risking a general action. But the initiative was taken out of -their hands by Victor. He had already placed his corps so close -to the British lines that it would have been hard to withdraw it -without an engagement. He had also, during the night, sent a dispatch -to the King, stating that he should storm the Cerro de Medellin at -dawn unless he received counter-orders. He appeared so confident of -success that Joseph and his adviser Jourdan did not venture to bid -him desist. They were, as the latter confessed, largely influenced by -the knowledge that if they refused, Victor would delate them to the -Emperor for culpable timidity in letting the British army escape[650]. - - [650] ‘Le duc de Bellune rendit compte au roi du résultat de sa - première attaque, et le prévint qu’il la renouvellerait au point - du jour. Peut-être aurait on dû lui donner l’ordre d’attendre.... - Mais ce maréchal, étant resté longtemps aux environs de Talavera, - devait connaître parfaitement son terrain, et il paraissait si - sûr du succès, que le roi le laissait libre d’agir comme il le - désirait.... Il sentait que s’il adopterait l’avis du Maréchal - Jourdan le duc de Bellune ne manquerait pas d’écrire à l’empereur - “qu’on lui avait fait perdre l’occasion d’une brillante victoire - sur les Anglais”.’ Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 256 and 259. - -The Duke of Belluno was still persisting in his idea that it might -be possible to seize the key of Wellesley’s position by a partial -attack, without engaging the rest of his corps till it had already -been won. Accordingly he gave orders to his subordinates Lapisse -and Villatte that they were not to move till Ruffin, with the -first division, should have gained the Cerro de Medellin. In a -similar way the King made the advance of the 4th Corps conditional -on the preliminary success of Victor’s right. This seems to have -been bad policy, as it left Wellesley free to devote the whole -of his attention to the point where the first attack was to be -delivered. It was clear that the threatening column on the lower -slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal would start the game. Victor had -drawn up his troops in the following order. Ruffin on the extreme -left, and considerably in advance, was to attack the Cerro on its -north-eastern and eastern fronts. Behind him on the summit of the -Cascajal hill, were Villatte’s twelve battalions, and in rear of -all the two regiments of Beaumont, the Marshal’s corps-cavalry. To -Villatte’s left, but on lower ground opposite Sherbrooke’s line, lay -Lapisse’s division, with Latour-Maubourg’s six regiments of dragoons -in support. This completed the array of the 1st Corps: on their left -stood Sebastiani and his 4th Corps, facing the Guards, Campbell, -and the northernmost battalions of the Spanish army, opposite the -Pajar de Vergara. Sebastiani’s French division was on his right, his -German division on his left, while the stray Polish brigade (the -only part of Valence’s division that was on the field) supported the -Germans. In second line was Merlin’s light horse, while Milhaud’s six -regiments of dragoons lay out on the extreme left, observing the town -of Talavera. King Joseph and his reserve--the Guards and the brigade -of Dessolles--were far to the rear, just outside the woods round the -Casa de Salinas. - -At about five in the morning the watchers on the Cerro de Medellin -saw the smoke of a gun curl up into the air from the central battery -in front of Villatte’s division. The ensuing report was the signal -for the whole of Victor’s artillery to open, and twenty-four guns -spoke at once from the Cascajal heights, and thirty more from the -lower ground to their right. The cannonade was tremendous, and the -reply wholly inadequate, as Wellesley could only put four batteries -in line, Rettberg’s on the summit of the Cerro, Sillery’s from the -lower slope near Donkin’s position, and those of Heyse and Elliott -from the front of Sherbrooke’s division. The French fire was both -accurate and effective, ‘they served their guns in an infinitely -better style than at Vimiero: their shells were thrown with -precision, and did considerable execution[651].’ Wellesley, who stood -in rear of Hill’s line on the commanding height, at once ordered -Richard Stewart’s and Tilson’s brigades to go back from the sky-line, -and to lie down. But no such device was practicable in Sherbrooke’s -division, where the formation of the ground presented no possibility -of cover, and here much damage was done. After a few minutes the -English position was obscured, for the damp of the morning air -prevented the smoke from rising, and a strong east wind blew it -across the Portiña, and drove it along the slopes of the Cerro[652]. -So thick was the atmosphere that the defenders heard rather than saw -the start of Ruffin’s division on its advance, and only realized its -near approach when they saw their own skirmishers retiring up the -slope towards the main line. The light companies of Hill’s division -came in so slowly and unwillingly, turning back often to fire, and -keeping their order with the regularity of a field-day. The general, -wishing to get his front clear, bade the bugles sound to bring them -in more quickly, and as they filed to the rear in a leisurely way was -heard to shout (it was one of the only two occasions on which he was -known to swear), ‘D--n their filing, let them come in anyhow[653].’ - - [651] Eliott’s Narrative, in his _Defence of Portugal_, p. 238. - - [652] Lord Munster, p. 226. - - [653] Leslie, p. 147. The other occasion on which Hill used - strong language was at the battle of St. Pierre in 1814, when - Wellington remarked: ‘If Hill is beginning to swear we had better - get out of the way.’ - -When the light companies had fallen back, the French were at last -visible through the smoke. They had mounted the lower slopes of the -Cerro without any loss, covered by their artillery, which only ceased -firing at this moment. They showed nine battalions, in three solid -columns: Victor had arranged the divisions with the 24th in the -centre, the 96th on the left, and the 9th Léger, which had suffered -so severely in the night-battle, upon the right. This arrangement -brought the last-named regiment opposite their old enemies of the -29th, and the Battalion of Detachments, while the 1/48th and 2/48th -had to deal with the French centre, and the Buffs and 66th with -their left. When Ruffin’s columns had got within a hundred yards of -the sky-line, Hill bade his six battalions stand to their feet and -advance. As they lined the crest they delivered a splendid volley, -whose report was as sharp and precise as that of a field-day. The -effect was of course murderous, as was always the case when line met -column. The French had a marked superiority in numbers; they were -nearly 5,000 strong, Hill’s two brigades had less than 4,000[654]. -But there was the usual advantage that every British soldier could -use his weapon, while the French, in column of divisions, had the -normal mass of useless muskets in the rear ranks. The first volley -brought them to a standstill--their whole front had gone down at the -discharge--they lost the impetus of advance, halted, and kept up a -furious fire for some minutes. But when it came to a standing fight -of musketry, there was never a doubt in any Peninsular battle how the -game would end. The French fire began ere long to slacken, the front -of the columns shook and wavered. Just at this moment Sherbrooke, -who had noted that the divisions in his own front showed no signs -of closing, took the 5th battalion of the King’s German Legion out -of his left brigade[655], and sent it against the flank and rear -of Ruffin’s nearest regiment--the 96th of the line. When the noise -of battle broke out in this new quarter, the French lost heart and -began to give ground. Richard Stewart, at the northern end of the -British line, gave the signal to his brigade to charge, and--as a -participator in this fray writes, ‘on we went, a wall of stout hearts -and bristling steel. The enemy did not fancy such close quarters, and -the moment our rush began they went to the right-about. The principal -portion broke and fled, though some brave fellows occasionally faced -about and gave us an irregular fire.’ Nothing, however, could stop -Hill’s division, and the whole six battalions rushed like a torrent -down the slope, bayonetting and sweeping back the enemy to the line -of black and muddy pools that marked the course of the Portiña. Many -of the pursuers even crossed the ravine and chased the flying French -divisions right into the arms of Villatte’s troops, on the Cascajal -hill. When these reserves opened fire, Hill’s men re-formed on the -lower slope of the Cerro, and retired to their old position without -being seriously molested, for Victor made no counter-attack. - - [654] Ruffin had 5,200 men, minus about 300 lost on the previous - night, while Hill had 3,853, minus 138 lost in that same battle - in the dark. - - [655] This operation is described in the narrative of the K. G. - L. officer, printed by Beamish (p. 212). The narrator, however, - mistakes the French regiment’s number, and says twenty-six for - ninety-six. - -Ruffin’s three regiments had been terribly punished: they had lost, -in forty minutes’ fighting, 1,300 killed and wounded, much more -than a fourth of their strength. Hill’s brigades had about 750 -casualties[656], including their gallant leader, who received a wound -in the head, and had to go to the rear, leaving the command of his -division to Tilson. The loss of the German battalion which had struck -in upon the French rear was insignificant, as the enemy never stood -to meet it. - - [656] These losses can be accurately ascertained. Ruffin’s - whole loss in the two days of fighting was 1,632, of whom 300 - of the 9th Léger had fallen on the night of July 27. He was - not seriously engaged during the rest of the day, so must have - lost 1,300 in this fight. Hill’s total loss on July 28 was 835, - but much of it was suffered in the afternoon, when (though not - attacked by infantry) his division was under a heavy shell fire. - -Thus was Victor’s second attempt to storm the Cerro de Medellin -rebuked. It was a rash and unscientific operation, and received a -merited chastisement. The Marshal should have sent in all his corps, -and attacked the whole British line, if he wished to give his men a -fair chance. He obviously underrated the troops with which he had to -deal--he had never seen them before the combat of Casa de Salinas -on the previous day--and had no conception of the power of the line -against the column. Even now baffled rage seems to have been his -main feeling, and his only desire was to make the attempt again with -larger forces. - -The whole engagement had taken about an hour and a half, and the -morning was still young when the Marshal re-formed his line, and -reported his ill-success to the King. After the cannonade died down -he bade his men take their morning meal, and the British on the -Cerro could see the whole 1st Corps turn to cooking, behind their -strong line of pickets. A sort of informal armistice was established -in a short time; both parties wished to use the stagnant water of -the Portiña, and after a little signalling hundreds of men came -down with their canteens from either side, and filled them with the -muddy fluid. In spite of the heavy fighting which had just ended, -all parties agree that a very friendly spirit was shown. The men -conversed as best they could, and were even seen to shake hands -across the pools. Many of the officers came down a little later, -and after a short colloquy agreed that either party might take off -its wounded without molestation. As there were hundreds of French -lying on the west bank of the Portiña, and a good many English on -its further side, there was a complete confusion of uniforms as the -bearers passed and repassed each other at the bottom of the ravine. -But no difficulties of any sort arose, and for more than two hours -the two parties were completely mixed. This was the first example of -that amicable spirit which reigned between the hostile armies all -through the war, and which in its later years developed into that -curious code of signals (often described by contemporaries), by which -French and English gave each other notice whenever serious work was -intended, refraining on all other occasions from unnecessary outpost -bickering or sentry-shooting. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VII - -THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA: THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT - -(JULY 28) - - -The informal armistice which had followed the combat of the early -morning had drawn to an end, when at about 10 o’clock the British -observers on the Cerro de Medellin saw a large and brilliant staff -riding along the French line from right to left. It finally halted, -and took post on the most commanding point of the Cascajal heights. -This was the entourage of King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, who had -determined to make a careful examination of the allied lines before -committing themselves to any further action. When they halted on the -summit of the hill, from which the best general view was obtainable, -Victor came to meet them, and a council of war was held. - -It soon developed into a lengthy and animated dispute; lasting for -more than an hour. Jourdan was of opinion that, considering the -strength of the hostile position, and the decisive way in which the -1st Corps had been repulsed, it would be unwise to proceed with -another attack. He pointed out that Wellesley would now be perfectly -aware that his left was the point which must be assailed, and that -movements visible behind the British line showed that it was already -being reinforced. The only good move now available was to endeavour -to turn the Cerro by the little valley to its north-east, which -separates it from the Sierra de Segurilla: but it was clear that the -enemy realized this as well as themselves. A considerable body of -cavalry was already appearing at its southern end. If the Duke of -Belluno, instead of delivering two frontal assaults, had been prudent -enough to push men down this valley under cover of the darkness, so -as to have a lateral attack ready at dawn, something might have been -done. But now the imperial troops would have to win the valley by -hard fighting, before they could use it as a starting-point for the -assault on the hill. If a general attack were delivered, and the army -were once more repulsed, it risked its line of communication and its -retreat on Madrid. For the whole Spanish host might come out of the -woods and fall upon its flank, while it was engaged with the British, -and in that case the Madrid road would be cut, and the King would -have to retreat on Avila, sacrificing his capital and his arsenals. -On the whole Jourdan held that it would be wise and prudent to assume -a defensive posture, and either to hold the present position or to -retire to the more favourable ground behind the Alberche, four miles -to the rear. In a few days the enemy would hear of Soult’s operations -upon their line of communication, and would be forced to break up and -retire. - -Very different, as might have been expected, were Victor’s views. He -declared that the British position was far from impregnable, and that -the prestige of the French army would be destroyed if it retired, -after two partial checks, from in front of an enemy who had not been -seriously attacked. The only fault in the preceding operations had -been that the whole army had not joined in, at the moment when the -Cerro had been stormed. If the King would undertake to use the 4th -Corps against the allied centre, he pledged himself to break their -right with his own three divisions of infantry. He would not only -assail the Cerro from in front, but would turn it from both flanks. -If such an attack did not succeed _il faudrait renoncer à faire la -guerre_. This phrase he dinned into Joseph’s and Jourdan’s ears so -repeatedly that they both saved it up for future use, and taunted him -with it in the acrimonious correspondence which followed the battle. - -King Joseph would have preferred to follow Jourdan’s cautious plan, -and to hold back. Sebastiani, whose opinion he asked, agreed with -him. But both seem to have been terrorized by the Marshal’s stormy -tirades, and still more by the thought of what the Emperor would -say, if he heard that battle had been refused, contrary to Victor’s -advice. The ultimate decision was still in the balance, when two -pieces of news were received: the first was a dispatch from General -Valence, the Governor of Toledo, to effect that the army of Venegas, -whose position had hitherto been unknown--for nothing had been heard -of him since Sebastiani had escaped from his front--had at last come -on the scene. His advanced guard had presented itself before the -bridges of Toledo, and was already skirmishing there. The second item -of intelligence was a dispatch from Soult, acknowledging the receipt -of the orders which had been sent to him upon the twenty-second, and -stating his intention of carrying them out at the earliest possible -moment. But he complained that the promised train of artillery had -not yet reached the 2nd Corps, and declared that he could not move -till it had come to hand, and till he had brought down the 6th Corps -from Astorga. He was therefore of opinion that he could not possibly -reach Plasencia till August 3, perhaps not till two days later. - -This news was decisive: it was now clear that the Duke of Dalmatia -would not be able to bring pressure to bear upon the rear of the -allies for some six or seven days. Meanwhile Venegas was within two -marches of Madrid, and had nothing in front of him save the four -Polish battalions at Toledo. If the King refused to fight, and took -up a defensive position on the Alberche, he would have to detach -15,000 men to hold back the army of La Mancha from the capital. -This would leave him with only 30,000 men to resist Wellesley and -Cuesta, and it was clear that such a force would be overmatched -by the allies. If he kept a larger number in their front, Venegas -would be able to capture Madrid, the thing of all others which -Joseph was resolved to prevent. Accordingly the King and Jourdan -reluctantly fell in with Victor’s plans, and consented to fight in -the afternoon. If they defeated the British and the Estremadurans on -the twenty-eighth, the army of La Mancha could easily be disposed of -upon the twenty-ninth or thirtieth. - -This decision once made, it only remained to settle the details -of the attack. The King determined to assail the British centre -and right with the infantry of Sebastiani’s corps--twenty-three -battalions in all, or some 14,000 men. Victor with the three infantry -divisions of the 1st Corps--thirty-three battalions, still over -16,000 strong in spite of their losses--undertook to fall upon the -English left, to storm the Cerro de Medellin and also to turn it on -its northern side, so as to envelop Wellesley’s flank. The Spaniards -were to be left alone behind their walls and orchards--only Milhaud’s -dragoons were told off to watch the exits from Talavera. Of the rest -of the cavalry a few could be utilized in Victor’s turning movement -in the valley below the Sierra de Segurilla: but the main body--all -Beaumont’s and Latour-Maubourg’s eight regiments--were ranged in -a second line, to act as a reserve for the frontal attack of the -infantry, and to aid it if it were checked. The King’s Guards and -the brigade of Dessolles were to be kept back, and only utilized to -clinch the victory or to retrieve a repulse. - -The 30,000 men who were to deliver the grand assault on the allied -position were drawn up as follows. Leval’s Germans advanced on the -left, taking as their objective the battery on the Pajar de Vergara. -They faced Campbell’s British division, and slightly overlapped -it, so as to cover the three or four battalions on the extreme -northern wing of Cuesta’s line. In their rear as supports followed -the two Polish battalions from Valence’s division. On Leval’s right, -Sebastiani’s four French regiments continued the line: this was the -strongest division on the field and counted over 8,000 bayonets. It -faced the Guards and the right battalion of Cameron’s brigade. Here -ended the troops of the 4th Corps: beyond them Victor’s 2nd division, -that of Lapisse, was about to assail the German Legion and Cameron’s -left-hand regiment, the 83rd. Still further north Villatte’s division -lay opposite the steepest slopes of the Cerro de Medellin. This -position looked more formidable in the eyes of the Duke of Belluno -since he had seen his first two assaults upon it fail. It was now -heavily manned: Tilson’s, Richard Stewart’s, and Donkin’s brigades -were all visible upon its crest. After some hesitation the Marshal -resolved to leave it alone for the present, and not to attack it -till some impression should have been made upon other parts of -Wellesley’s line. Accordingly he left in front of it only Villatte’s -second brigade--the six battalions of the 94th and 95th regiments. -The other brigade--the 27th and 63rd--was directed to join in the -flanking movement to the north of the Cerro, which was to encompass -Wellesley’s extreme left. But the main force told off for this -advance consisted of the much-tried remnants of Ruffin’s division, -now not more than 3,700 strong. The employment of these troops for -such a critical operation seems to have been a mistake--they had -already received two bloody checks, and had lost more than a third -of their officers and 1,500 men in the late fighting. Though good -regiments, they could now be considered as little more than ‘a spent -force.’ This fact sufficiently explains the feebleness of the French -advance upon this part of the field during the afternoon hours. - -Behind the French infantry of the 4th and 1st Corps were deployed no -less than twelve regiments of horse: Latour-Maubourg’s three brigades -of dragoons were drawn up in the rear of Lapisse and Sebastiani: -Beaumont supported Villatte, and lastly the four regiments of -Merlin’s (late Lasalle’s) division followed Ruffin in his turning -movement. Far to the rear Dessolles and Joseph’s Guards took up a -position facing the British centre, from which they could support the -right or the left of their own front line as might be necessary. - -The drawing up of this line of battle took time, and while the French -were shifting their positions and establishing their new front, -Wellesley had ample leisure to provide against the oncoming storm. He -had established himself upon the crest of the Cerro, and from thence -could overlook every movement of the enemy. Of the new dispositions -the only one which struck him as likely to cause trouble was the -extension of Ruffin and Villatte to the northward. It was clear that -they were intending to advance up the valley that separates the -Sierra de Segurilla from the Cerro de Medellin, in order to take -the hill in the flank, and assail the 2nd Division from the side. -It was therefore necessary to make arrangements for checking this -manœuvre. Wellesley’s first order was that Fane’s and Anson’s cavalry -should move round the back of the Cerro, and take up new ground at -the head of the valley. From this position they would be able to -charge in the flank any force that might push up the trough of the -depression, in order to get behind Hill’s line. He also withdrew half -Rettberg’s battery from the front of the height, and placed it on -a projecting lateral spur from which it could enfilade the valley. -Nor were these his only precautions; he sent a hasty message to -Cuesta, pointing out that the greater part of the Spanish line was -not threatened, and asking if he could spare reinforcements for the -left wing. The Spanish general behaved in a more liberal fashion than -might have been expected from his previous conduct. He consented to -lend Wellesley his reserve division, that of Bassecourt, about 5,000 -strong, and also put at his disposition a battery of twelve-pounders, -heavier guns than any which the British army possessed. The French -were so slow in moving that there was ample time, before the battle -grew hot, to send Bassecourt’s division round the rear of the British -line, and to place it on the lower slopes of the Sierra de Segurilla, -so as to continue to the northward the front formed by the British -cavalry. Of the Spanish guns placed at Wellesley’s disposition, -four were put into the Pajar de Vergara redoubt, by the side of -Lawson’s battery: the other two accompanied Bassecourt’s infantry, -and were placed on the northern spur of the Cerro de Medellin, near -Rettberg’s six-pounders. Somewhat later the Duke of Albuquerque -brought round the whole of his cavalry division--six regiments and -a horse-artillery battery--to the same quarter, and drew them up in -two lines to the rear of Anson’s and Fane’s brigades. But before he -arrived the battle had already begun. - -When the whole of the French infantry was ready, at about two o’clock -in the afternoon, the King gave orders for the artillery to open, -and eighty guns of the 1st and 4th Corps began to play upon the -British line. In some places the troops were only some 600 yards -from the enemy’s batteries, and the loss in many regiments was very -appreciable before a single musket had been fired. Only thirty -British and six Spanish pieces could reply: they were overwhelmed -from the first by the superior number of the French guns. It was -therefore with joy that Wellesley’s infantry saw that the artillery -engagement was not to last for long. All along the hostile line the -battalion-columns of Ruffin, Lapisse, Sebastiani, and Leval were -moving up to the attack, and when they reached the front, and threw -out their screen of tirailleurs, the guns grew silent. Only from the -Cerro de Cascajal, where Villatte was hanging back in obedience to -Victor’s orders, did the cannonade against Hill’s brigades continue. - -The first troops to come into collision with the allies were Leval’s -Germans, upon the extreme left of the French line. This, it is said, -was contrary to the King’s orders; he had intended to hold this -division somewhat back, as it was in danger of being outflanked by -the Spaniards if it made a premature advance[657]. But Leval had a -tangled terrain of vines and olive groves in his front: when once he -had entered it he lost sight of the troops on his right, and fearing -to be late on account of the obstacles in his front, committed the -opposite fault. He came rushing in upon Campbell’s outpost line -half an hour before the other divisions had closed with the British -centre, the time being then 2.30 in the afternoon. - - [657] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 260. - -The nine battalions of the German division were arrayed in a single -line of battalion columns[658], with a thick screen of tirailleurs in -their front. But their order had been so much broken up by the walls -and thickets that the 4,500 bayonets appeared to the British like -one confused mass of skirmishers. They came on fast and furiously, -chasing the pickets of the 7th and 53rd before them, till they -emerged into the comparatively open ground in front of the Pajar de -Vergara[659]. Here the defence was standing ready for them: Campbell -had brought up one battalion of his rear brigade into his front -line, so that the 40th, as well as the 53rd and 7th, were facing the -attack. On his right lay the redoubt with its ten guns: further to -the south the two left-hand units of the French division were opposed -to troops of Cuesta’s army. Hence it came that while the Nassau and -Dutch regiments faced the British infantry, the Baden regiment was in -front of the guns, while the Hessians and the Frankfort battalion had -to do with the Spaniards. - - [658] Their order from left to right was as follows: - Frankfort-Hesse (two batts.), Baden (two batts.), Holland (two - batts.), Nassau (two batts.). - - [659] There is a legend which occurs in all French narratives of - Talavera--starting with the contemporary accounts, and including - Desprez’s and Jourdan’s _Mémoires_. It is to the effect that - Leval’s division, in its first advance, came upon an English - battalion, which several writers call the 45th, lying in front - of the rest of the allied line. It is alleged that the Nassau - regiment surrounded and almost captured it--that they would have - taken it prisoner indeed _en masse_, if the troops on their - left (Holland and Baden) had held firm. But at least ‘on lui - prit une centaine d’hommes, le major, le lieutenant-colonel, et - le colonel--ce dernier mourut de ses blessures’ (Jourdan). No - such incident can have occurred, for (1) no English regiment - lost more than twenty-one ‘missing’ on this side of the field. - (2) No English officer of higher rank than a captain was taken - prisoner in the battle. (3) Only one officer was killed in the - whole of Campbell’s division, and he was a lieutenant of the 7th - Fusiliers. (4) The 45th was not engaged with Leval’s men, but lay - to the left and supported the Guards in resisting Sebastiani: it - lost one officer (a captain) and twelve men missing, but this - was in the great _mêlée_ in the centre, at the end of the day’s - fighting: it had no officer killed. I am driven to conclude - that the whole is some gross exaggeration of the surprise of - Campbell’s pickets in the vineyards, and that instead of a - ‘battalion’ we should read the light companies of the division. - Cooper of the 7th Fusiliers, who was in the skirmishing line, - says that the Germans got close among them by calling out - ‘Españoles’ and pretending to be Spaniards. A few prisoners - (twenty-six in all) were lost in this way. - -When the Germans surged out from among the olive groves into the -comparatively open ground in front of the Pajar de Vergara, the -musketry opened along both lines at a distance of about 200 yards, -the assailants delivering a rolling fire, while the defenders of -the position answered with regular battalion volleys. Several times -Leval’s men advanced a few score paces, and the distance between -the two divisions was growing gradually less. But the attacking -force was evidently suffering more than the allies: in the centre -especially, where the ten guns of the redoubt were firing canister -into the disordered mass, the casualties of the Baden battalions were -terrible: they could not bear up against the blasts of _mitraille_, -and after their colonel, von Porbeck, had fallen, they broke and -began to recoil. Seeing part of the enemy’s line falling into -disorder, General Campbell ordered his front line to charge. Then -Colonel Myers of the 7th, seizing the King’s colour of his regiment, -ran out in front of the line and calling ‘Come on, Fusiliers,’ led -the advance[660]. His own battalion, the 40th and the 53rd, at once -closed with the Nassau and Dutch regiments, who shrank back into the -thickets and melted away from the front. The victors pursued them for -some distance, capturing in their onward career a whole battery of -six guns, which was being brought forward to reply to the artillery -of the redoubt, but had failed to reach the clearing before the line -in front of them gave way. The three battalions on Leval’s extreme -left, which had the Spaniards in front of them, had been exchanging -volleys with their opponents without notable advantage on either -side, when the rest of the division broke. When their companions -retired they also were forced to draw back, in order to prevent -themselves from being turned on both flanks. Campbell was cautious -enough to stop his men before they had gone far forward among the -thickets, and brought them back to their old position: he spiked the -guns that he had taken, and left them in the clearing in front of -the redoubt. His losses had been very small, owing to his admirable -self-restraint in calling back his charging regiments before they got -out of hand. - - [660] This was the Myers who fell in storming the famous hill of - Albuera in 1811. See Cooper (of the 7th), p. 22. - -Leval therefore was able to rally his division at leisure, upon the -two Polish battalions which formed its supports. He had lost in the -three-quarters of an hour during which he was engaged some six or -seven hundred men. The battle was raging by now all down the line, -and when the Germans were re-formed, they received orders to advance -for a second time, to cover the flank of Sebastiani’s division, -now hotly engaged with Sherbrooke’s right brigades. Neglecting -chronological considerations, in order to finish the narrative of -the action in this quarter, it may suffice to say that Leval’s -second attack was made at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon: it was -not delivered with so much energy as had been shown in his first. It -encountered the same obstacles, and could not surmount them. Once -more the advance rolled up through the olive groves, and reached the -clearing in front of the battery. Again the head of the attacking -masses withered away under the musketry fire and the salvos from the -English and Spanish guns, and the whole finally went to the rear -in disorder. Campbell, in repelling this attack, used his second -brigade as well as his first, and pushed the enemy further back than -he had done during the earlier fighting: the Spaniards also came out -of their line and continued to flank the retreating enemy with two -or three battalions and a half-battery[661]. As the Hessians and -Frankforters in their front began to give way, they were assailed -by one of Henestrosa’s cavalry regiments, the _Regimiento del Rey_, -which charged with great spirit, and cut up many men before they -could form square. The bulk of the two battalions, however, clubbed -together in a mass and retired into the woods, defending themselves -as best they could. The victorious Spanish horsemen while following -them, came upon a second French battery which (like that captured -by the British brigade on their left) was being brought forward by -a narrow lane between two olive groves. They cut down the gunners -and took four pieces, which were dragged back into the redoubt. This -was by far the best piece of work done by Spanish cavalry during the -whole of the first years of the war, and did much to atone for the -panic of the previous night in the eyes of the British observers upon -the right wing. - - [661] ‘Another lull in the storm, and fresh formation. “Here they - come again” said many voices: so they did, but we were ready - and gave them such a warm reception that they speedily went to - the right-about. As in their first attack they now left behind - several pieces of cannon, which we secured as before. After these - two attacks and sharp repulses we were not troubled with their - company any more.’ Cooper, p. 23. - -The repulse of Leval’s division was complete, and its wrecks, once -more rallied upon the two Polish battalions in their rear, drew -back into the plain, and were completely put out of action. In this -attack they lost not only the four guns taken by the Spaniards, but -seven more pieces of artillery. Convinced that he could not carry -the Pajar de Vergara position unless he could bring guns to bear -upon the redoubt, and check the ravages of its salvos of canister, -Leval had tried to push his remaining two batteries into the firing -line. Again, as in the first attack, they were left helpless when -the infantry broke, and became the prey of the pursuers. It would -seem that he lost on this day seventeen guns in all[662]. The total -of the casualties in his division were 1,007, nearly a quarter of -its force: the colonels of the Baden and Frankfort regiments and the -major commanding the Dutch battery had been left on the field[663]. -Campbell had suffered on a very different scale--he had only lost 236 -men, and it is improbable that the Spaniards on his right had more -than 150 or 180 casualties, since they only fought with one wing of -the attacking force. Wellesley, not without reason, gave the highest -praise in his dispatch to Campbell, for the admirable and cautious -defence which he had made. The management of the 4th Division, -indeed, contrasted strongly with that of the troops to its left, -where Sherbrooke’s brigades--as we shall see--risked the loss of the -battle by their rash pursuit of the enemy, far beyond the limits of -the position which had been given them to defend. - - [662] There can be no rational doubt that the total number of - guns taken was seventeen, as set forth in Charles Stewart’s - report to Wellesley, as Adjutant-general, viz. ‘four - eight-pounders, four six-pounders, one four-pounder, one six-inch - howitzer, taken by Brigadier-general A. Campbell’s brigade, - with one six-inch howitzer and six other guns left by the enemy - and found in the woods’ of which four were in the hands of the - Spaniards. Wellesley, in his dispatch, made the error of stating - that twenty guns had been taken, being under the impression that - the Spaniards had captured seven pieces, while they themselves - only claim four--a Captain Piñero was mentioned in Eguia’s - dispatch for causing them to be brought back to the Spanish line. - The British took thirteen guns: three days after the battle - Wellesley made them over to his allies. He writes to O’Donoju - [Talavera, Aug. 1]: ‘We have got thirteen pieces of French - artillery, which I wish to give over to the Spanish army--the - other seven [four] you have already got. I shall be obliged if - you will urge General Cuesta to desire the commanding officer - of his artillery to receive charge of them from the officer - commanding the British artillery.’ This is surely conclusive as - to the numbers. - - Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ acknowledges the loss of apparently - _all_ Leval’s guns--three batteries. ‘L’artillerie du général - Leval, qu’on avait imprudemment engagée au milieu des bois, des - vignes et des fosses, ayant eu la plupart de ses chevaux tués, - ne put pas être retirée; événement fâcheux qu’on eut le tort - impardonnable de cacher au roi’ [p. 261]. Desprez says that _six_ - pieces only were lost: Thiers allows _eight_. - - But the most interesting point of the controversy comes out - in Napoleon’s correspondence with his brother Joseph. On Aug. - 25, the Emperor writes in hot anger to say that he sees from - the English newspapers that Joseph had lost twenty guns, a - fact concealed in the King’s dispatch. He desires to be told - at once the names of the batteries that were captured and the - divisions to which they belonged. Jourdan replies in the King’s - behalf on Sept. 15, that _no_ guns have been lost--four pieces - of Leval’s artillery had been for a moment in the hands of the - British, but they were recaptured. Joseph himself writes to the - same effect next day: ‘Wellesley n’a pris aucune aigle, il n’en - montrera pas plus que de canons.’ On the nineteenth, Jourdan - writes to Clarke, the Minister of War, to say that he has just - found out that _two_ guns had been lost by Leval. Sénarmont, - the artillery chief of the 4th Corps, explains to Jourdan, in a - letter of September 27, that _ten_ pieces had been lost in the - olive groves, but that all were recovered save _two_, one Dutch - six-pounder, and one French eight-pounder. The truth comes out in - Desprez’s narrative. He says that the King, hearing that Leval - had left guns abandoned in front of the Pajar de Vergara, ordered - Sebastiani to have them brought in: ‘Le général assura que déjà - elles avaient été reprises. Cette assertion était inexacte. Le - général Sebastiani était-il lui-même en erreur? Ou les ordres - donnés lui paraissaient-ils inexécutables? Je n’ai jamais eu - le mot de l’énigme: quoi qu’il en soit, les pièces tombèrent - le lendemain au pouvoir de l’ennemi. Le Général Sénarmont, qui - commandait l’artillerie, ne rendit pas compte de cette perte. Le - général Sebastiani l’avait prié avec instance de la cacher. Aussi - dans son rapport sur la bataille Joseph déclara-t-il positivement - qu’on n’avait pas perdu un canon. Plus tard les journaux anglais - firent connaître la vérité. L’Empereur, qui savait apprécier - leur exactitude, reprocha à son frère de l’avoir trompé. Joseph - eut assez de délicatesse pour accepter ces reproches et ne point - déclarer de quelle manière les choses s’étaient passées’ [p. 491]. - - In short, Sebastiani and Sénarmont conspired to hide the truth, - and Joseph, who liked them both (see his letters in Ducasse, - especially vi. 456, where on Sept. 30 he sends Sénarmont a gold - box as a sort of ‘consolation prize’), hushed the matter up in - their interests. The most curious part of the matter is that on - Sept. 27, Sénarmont was able to say with literal exactness that - only two pieces were missing, for fifteen of the lost guns had - been retaken on August 5, behind the bridge of Arzobispo, during - the retreat of Cuesta’s army. They had been given back to their - owners long before September, so were no longer missing. But this - can hardly be called ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth.’ - - [663] The losses were killed: officers six, men ninety-seven: - wounded, officers twenty-four, men 803: prisoners, seventy-seven - men. Campbell lost killed: officers one, men thirty-two: wounded, - officers six, men 171: missing, officers one, men twenty-five--a - total of 236. The Spaniards may have had 150 casualties--it is - difficult to see that they can have suffered much more, as they - had only two hostile regiments in front of them. - -We must now turn to their doings--the most desperate fighting that -occurred during the day. Sherbrooke’s eight battalions had to -endure the preliminary cannonade for more than half an hour after -Campbell’s men were closely engaged with the enemy. It was not till -three o’clock that the two French divisions opposed to them began -to descend towards the Portiña, in an orderly and imposing array. -Each of the French generals had drawn up his twelve battalions in -two lines--the front line deployed in column of divisions, the -supporting line in solid column of battalions. But there was this -difference in their arrangements, that Lapisse had placed his -brigades one behind the other, while Sebastiani had preferred to work -his brigades side by side, each with one regiment in first and one -in second line. The former therefore had Laplannes’ brigade (16th -Léger and 45th Line) opposed to Low’s and Langwerth’s regiments of -the German Legion and Cameron’s 2/83rd. The latter had the 28th of -Rey’s and the 58th of Liger-Bellair’s brigades ranged over against -the 1/61st and the British Foot-Guards. When the cannonade of the -French batteries ceased, the twelve battalions of their first line, -preceded by the usual swarm of _tirailleurs_, moved down toward the -Portiña. They crossed the brook and pressed on towards the red line -that stood awaiting their approach, driving before them with ease -the comparatively insignificant screen of light troops that lay in -front of the British centre. Sherbrooke, who was responsible for the -whole line of the defence, since his division exactly covered the -ground on which the French attack was delivered, had issued orders -that the troops were not to fire till the enemy came within fifty -yards of them, and that they were then to deliver a single volley and -charge. This programme was executed with precise obedience: though -suffering severely from the enemy’s musketry, the division held in -its fire till the hostile columns were close upon them, and then -opened with one tremendous discharge which crashed out simultaneously -along the whole eight battalions. The leading ranks of Lapisse’s and -Sebastiani’s front line went down in swathes,--one French witness -says that the infantry of the regiments of the 4th Corps lost a third -of their numbers in less than ten minutes. When the charge which -Sherbrooke had ordered followed close upon the blasting musketry -fire, the enemy retired in disorder and fell back beyond the Portiña. - -The divisional general had apparently forgotten to caution his -colonels against the danger of carrying their advance too far. -Instead of contenting themselves with chasing the broken enemy as -far as the brook, and then returning to their positions, the four -brigades of the 1st division all crossed the water and pursued the -French into their own ground; the German Legion on the left actually -began to push them up the lower slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal, -while the Guards on the right went forward far into the rolling plain -in front of them. Cameron halted his two battalions not far beyond -the Portiña; but on each side of him the pursuit was pressed with -reckless energy, and without any remembrance of the fact that the -enemy had strong reserves. - -Thus it came to pass that a disaster followed the first success of -Sherbrooke’s division. Both the Germans on the left and the Guards on -the right found themselves in face of intact troops, behind whom the -broken front line of the enemy took refuge. They were in no condition -to begin a new combat, for they were in complete disorder, and there -was a broad gap on the inner flank of each brigade, owing to the fact -that Cameron had halted and refused to push forward into danger. -Hence came a perilous crisis: the French reserves moved forward, -the guns on the Cascajal height enfiladed the German Legion, while -two regiments of Latour-Maubourg’s dragoons moved in upon the right -flank of the Guards. The whole of the six battalions that had joined -in the reckless advance were forced to recoil, fighting desperately -but losing ground every moment, and pressed into clumps and masses -that presented no trace of their former line of battle. When they -fell back to the point where Cameron had stopped, the 61st and 83rd -became involved in their retreat, and were forced to repass the -Portiña in their company. The French followed with shouts of victory, -pushing their advantage to the utmost and slaughtering the disordered -battalions by hundreds. The disaster was worst on the left, where -half the strength of the 2nd Line Battalion of the German Legion--387 -men--was destroyed in twenty minutes, and the 5th battalion of that -same corps lost over 100 prisoners. The Guards suffered almost as -heavily: out of their 2,000 men 611 went down killed or wounded: but -they left no prisoners behind. - -It seemed that the day might well be lost, for Wellesley’s reserves -were small. Such as they were, however, they were at once put into -action. Mackenzie brought forward his brigade to the ground which the -Guards had originally covered, and drew them up to withstand the rush -of Sebastiani’s division--the 2/24th on the right, the 2/31st on the -left, with the 1/45th between them. The disordered household troops -passed through their intervals, and rallied behind them with splendid -promptness: ‘their good humour and determination after such dreadful -losses’ says an eye-witness, ‘was shown by their giving a loud hurrah -as they took up their new ground[664].’ At the same time Cotton -brought up the single brigade of light cavalry which was in reserve, -and drew them up on Mackenzie’s right, so as to cover his flank. -Sebastiani came up with great boldness against the fresh front thus -presented to him, and for twenty minutes there was a furious musketry -battle in the British right centre. Mackenzie himself fell, and his -three battalions lost 632 men out of about 2,000: but they held their -own, and finally the enemy recoiled. They were helped somewhat in -their inclination to retreat by a charge of the Light Dragoons upon -the flank of their left-hand regiment, the 75th, which had about 150 -men sabred[665]. Thus on this point the battle was saved: the main -credit must go to Mackenzie’s brigade, which has never received the -praise that was its due, for its general was killed, and thus no -report from the 3rd division was sent in to Wellesley, who omitted -all mention of its doings in his Talavera dispatch[666]. It is never -too late to do homage to forgotten valour, and to call attention to -a neglected feat of arms. The services of the 24th, 31st, and 45th -saved the day for Britain[667]. - - [664] Lord Munster, p. 231. - - [665] General Desprez, relating the doings of Sebastiani’s - division, says that the 75th were cut up by _Spanish_ light - horse: but there were no cavalry of that nation in this part of - the field, and it would seem that the French were misled by the - blue uniforms of the Light Dragoons. - - [666] Except that he mentioned the colonels of the 31st and 45th - among the officers who had done well in the battle. - - [667] The only place where a good account of the doings of - Mackenzie’s brigade is to be found is in the excellent regimental - history of the 24th. I fully share the indignation expressed by - its author at the unmerited oblivion in which its splendid doings - have been lying for so many years. [See Paton’s _Annals of the - 24th Regiment_.] - -Sebastiani therefore drew back terribly mauled: his division had -lost _all_ its four colonels, seven of its twelve battalion-chiefs, -seventy other officers and 2,100 rank and file--including some sixty -prisoners. There was no more fight left in them. They recoiled into -the plain, and drew up at last not far from the wrecks of Leval’s -division, a full mile beyond the Portiña. - -Meanwhile, however great may have been the danger in the British -right-centre, that in the left-centre was even greater. Cameron’s, -Low’s, and Langwerth’s brigades were all in the most desperate -position: the former, not having pushed so far to the front as the -four German battalions, had suffered least of the three--though it -had lost 500 men out of 1,400. But the Legionary troops were in far -worse case--Langwerth had been killed, and his brigade was reduced -from 1,300 to 650 bayonets--just fifty per cent. of the men had been -lost. Low had gone into action with only 950 rank and file, owing to -the heavy casualty-list of the preceding night. Of these he now lost -350, including 150 made prisoners in the disorderly retreat down the -slope of the Cerro de Cascajal. That these troops ever rallied and -made head at all, when they had recrossed the Portiña, is much to -their credit. - -The situation was saved by Wellesley’s own prescience. The moment -that he saw the rash attack on the French line to which Sherbrooke -had committed himself, he looked round for supports which might -be utilized to stay the inevitable reaction that must follow. -Mackenzie’s brigade was available on the right-centre, and was used -as we have seen. But there were no infantry reserves behind the -left-centre: it was necessary to send down troops from the Cerro -de Medellin. Villatte was then threatening its front, Ruffin was -marching to turn its northern flank, and Wellesley did not dare -to detach a whole brigade from the key of the position. He took, -however, Richard Stewart’s strongest battalion, the 1/48th under -Colonel Donnellan (which had still over 700 bayonets in line even -after its losses in the morning) and sent it at full speed down the -southern slope of the Cerro. It arrived in time to take position on -the old ground of the British line, at the moment that the retreating -masses came rolling back across the Portiña. If the 48th had been -carried away in the general backward movement, the day would have -been lost: but the regiment stood firm, and allowed Cameron’s and -Langwerth’s troops to pass by its flanks and form up in its rear. -While it was holding back Lapisse’s central advance, the defeated -brigades rallied and re-formed with admirable celerity, and the -battle was restored. Here, as further to the right, the fighting now -resolved itself into a furious musketry-combat between enemies both -of whom were now spent and weakened by their previous exertions[668]. -In such a duel the line had always the advantage over the column in -the end. The French, when once brought to a standstill by the 1/48th, -lost their _élan_, and stood heaped together in disorderly masses, -keeping up a rolling fire but gaining no ground. Howorth turned -upon them the batteries on the Cerro de Medellin, which enfiladed -their flank and added to their confusion. General Lapisse himself -was killed at this moment, as he was trying to urge on his men to -a final advance. It was probably, however, not his death--on which -all the French accounts lay great stress--but rather the defeat -of Sebastiani’s division on their immediate right which finally -shook the _morale_ of the French regiments, and induced them to -move back, first at a slow pace, then in undisguised retreat. The -shattered remnants of the German Legion and of the 1/48th, 1/61st, -and 2/83rd were in no condition to follow. Seldom have two combatants -so thoroughly mauled each other as had the twelve French and the -seven allied battalions which fought in this part of the field. Of -the 6,800 men of Lapisse’s division, the general, sixty-nine other -officers, and 1,700 men were _hors de combat_. Of 4,300[669] British -and German troops opposed to them almost exactly the same number had -been lost--a general (Langwerth), seventy-seven officers, and 1,616 -men. That the smaller force should ever have held its ground after -losing more than a third of its number is almost miraculous. There -was no such a victory as this during the whole war, save Albuera. - - [668] In most modern English narratives of Talavera it is stated - that the 1/48th supported the Guards. This must be a mistake, - caused by a misreading of Wellesley’s dispatch. It is certain - that the Guards fell back on Mackenzie’s brigade. Contemporary - accounts by officers of the 2/24th speak of the Coldstreams - passing through them to re-form: the Scots Fusiliers therefore - must have had the 2/31st and 1/45th behind them. Donnellan and - the 1/48th really supported Langwerth’s German battalions, as - Lord Londonderry (the only historian who has got the facts right) - clearly shows (i. p. 410). It is curious that the historians of - the battle have not seen that the Germans, in their dreadfully - mauled condition, could not have been rallied without external - aid: this aid was given by Donnellan, while Mackenzie was saving - the Guards. - - [669] The figures are (after deducting the losses of the earlier - combats): Low’s brigade 964, Langwerth’s 1,315, Cameron’s 1,306, - 1/48th 700, a total of 4,285. The losses were: Low 326, Langwerth - 721, Cameron 547, 1/48th _about_ 100, a total of 1,694, including - officers. (See tables in Appendix.) - -While the main stress of the battle had been rolling across the -lower slopes, above the middle course of the Portiña, matters had -been comparatively quiet on the Cerro de Medellin. Victor, it will -be remembered, had ordered that Villatte was to make no serious -attack on the height until the divisions to his left had made some -impression upon the British centre. But Lapisse and Sebastiani, in -spite of their temporary successes, had never broken into Wellesley’s -position. The assault on the Cerro therefore was never made, though -a furious artillery fire was kept up against its garrison throughout -the afternoon. The handful of British guns upon the crest could -make no adequate reply: hence the three brigades of Tilson, Richard -Stewart, and Donkin were suffering very serious losses from the long -cannonade. Wellesley had made them shelter themselves, as far as was -possible, behind the sky-line. Nevertheless the storm of shot and -shell that beat upon the position was not without effect. In Donkin’s -brigade no one, save the light companies skirmishing along the lower -slopes, discharged a musket that afternoon, yet the casualties in its -ranks were no less than 195[670]. Hill’s two brigades, though better -covered, had still many killed and wounded. That the return-fire of -the British artillery and skirmishers was not altogether ineffective -is shown by the fact that the two regiments of Villatte’s second -brigade, which held the opposite slope, lost 185 men, and even the -squadrons of Beaumont in its rear had a few troopers disabled[671]. -Nevertheless the fighting in this part of the field was not only -indecisive but comparatively innocuous to both sides, when compared -with the awful slaughter that was going on to their right. - - [670] For a description of the sufferings of the 88th, whose - battalion companies did not fire a single shot, during the - cannonade of the afternoon, see Grattan’s _Connaught Rangers_, - vol. iii. p. 91. - - [671] For these losses, see the Talavera Appendix. - -It only remains to tell of the combat to the north of the Cerro, in -the narrow valley that separated the British position from the Sierra -de Segurilla. Here the engagement began at a much later hour than in -the centre. All the observers on the hill speak of the first contest -of Campbell and Leval as being concluded, and of that of Sherbrooke -and Sebastiani as being at its height, before the French right wing -began to move. - -The French troops in this direction, it will be remembered, were the -three regiments of Ruffin, now mere wrecks of their former selves, -and the first brigade of Villatte’s division, that of Cassagne. The -six battalions of the latter force were near the Cerro de Medellin, -while Ruffin’s men stood further to the north, under the Sierra de -Segurilla. In support of them both lay Merlin’s division of light -cavalry. - -At the moment when Victor had received permission to turn the flank -of the Cerro, it had appeared that he would meet little opposition. -But long ere the French were ready to advance, they had seen allied -troops arriving in haste and taking up their position at the southern -end of the valley. First Fane’s and Anson’s cavalry had drawn up on -the level ground, then Bassecourt’s Spanish infantry had appeared on -the rocky slopes of the Sierra, and had thrown out a long skirmishing -line opposite Ruffin’s right. Lastly Albuquerque’s whole cavalry -division had ridden round from the rear of the centre, and taken post -behind Anson and Fane. There were now over 5,000 bayonets and 5,000 -sabres in face of the French brigades. - -It was clear that any attempt to storm the northern face of the Cerro -would expose the troops that attempted it to a flank attack from -the allied troops in the valley. It was this that made Ruffin and -Villatte (who was present in person with Cassagne’s brigade) very -chary of molesting Hill’s position. On the other hand if the French -advanced up the valley to attack the cavalry at its southern end, -they would expose themselves to a flanking fire from the guns on the -Cerro and from Hill’s right-hand infantry brigade. - -Nevertheless, when the roar of the invisible battle on the other side -of the Cascajal height was at its loudest, the two French generals -began a cautious advance towards the front. They at once came under -a tiresome flanking artillery fire from the Cerro: half Rettberg’s -battery of the German Legion had been placed on a spur from which -it enfiladed Villatte’s nearest regiment. Two heavy Spanish -twelve-pounders opened from another part of the slope[672], and -Albuquerque had also placed his horse-artillery guns in a position -from which they bore up the valley. The pieces that accompanied the -French advance, being in the trough of the depression, could do -little harm in return. - - [672] Hartmann of the K.G.L. artillery has a note on these - pieces: they were useful because of their heavy calibre, none - of the British guns being heavier than six-pounders. They were - bright new brass cannon from the arsenal at Seville: their - machinery for sighting and elevation was of a most primitive - type--a century out of date. The lieutenant in command seemed - unable to hit anything with them, whereupon Hartmann got off his - horse, himself laid a gun, and had the luck to dismount a French - piece in the valley. After this the Spaniards fired better and - did very good service. - -After advancing as far as the path which leads from Talavera to -Segurilla, Ruffin deployed his right regiment, the much depleted -9th Léger, and sent it up the Sierra to form a screen opposite -Bassecourt’s infantry. The other six battalions, the 24th and 96th, -advanced in column along the valley, with the 27th from Cassagne’s -brigade on their left; presently the whole came level with the -northern slope of the Cerro, just reaching the farm of Valdefuentes -at its foot. - -At this moment Lapisse’s attack had already been beaten off, and -Wellesley was able to turn his attention from the centre to the flank -of his line[673]. Crossing the crest of the Cerro, he studied for -a moment the situation of the French regiments, and then sent down -orders for Anson’s brigade of light dragoons to charge them, with -Fane’s heavy cavalry in support. The moment that the British horsemen -were seen to be advancing the enemy hastily formed squares--the -24th and 96th slightly to the west of the Segurilla road, the 27th -in a more advanced position just under the walls of the farm of -Valdefuentes. A battalion of _grenadiers réunis_, and the 63rd of the -Line, which formed Villatte’s supports, also fell into square far to -the rear. The concentration of the French regiments in vast masses -of three battalions each gave a great opportunity to the allied -artillery, which found easy targets in the square blocks of men at -their feet. - - [673] That the charge of Anson’s light dragoons came after - victory had been secured in the centre is clear from several - eye-witnesses, e.g. Leith-Hay of the 29th, who was on top of - the Cerro, and close to Wellesley, writes: ‘The favourable - termination of the battle in the centre created great excitement: - the cheer, which had been re-echoed from the height had hardly - died away, when a scene of another character was in preparation. - The movements of the divisions Ruffin and Villatte had during - the late contest been vacillating and uncertain. Formed to all - appearance to attack the height, they had even advanced some - distance towards its base. Sir Arthur crossed with rapid steps - from the right of the 29th to the part of the hill looking down - on Anson’s brigade. It was immediately known that a charge would - take place’ (i. p. 158). - -As Anson’s brigade advanced, the right regiment, the 23rd Light -Dragoons, found itself opposite the large square of the 27th -Léger, while the 1st Light Dragoons of the German Legion faced the -smaller masses of the 24th and 96th. The ground seemed favourable -for a charge, and though an attack on unbroken infantry is always -hazardous, the squadrons came on with great confidence and were soon -closing in at headlong speed upon the hostile line. - -An unforeseen chance of war, however, wrecked the whole plan. The -long dry waving grass of the valley seemed to show a level surface, -but the appearance was deceitful. About a hundred and fifty yards in -front of the French squares was a narrow but deep ravine, the bed of -a small winter-torrent which discharges its waters into the Portiña -during the rainy season. It was about fifteen feet broad and ten feet -deep in the northern part of the field, a little narrower in its -southern course. There were many places at which it could be crossed -with ease by a horseman moving alone and at a moderate pace. But for -squadrons riding knee to knee at headlong speed it was a dangerous -obstacle, and indeed a trap of the most deadly sort. It was wholly -invisible to the horsemen till they came upon it. Colonel Elley, the -second in command of the 23rd, who rode two lengths ahead of the -front line of his regiment, mounted on a grey horse, and conspicuous -to every observer on the Cerro de Medellin, was the first man to -discover the peril[674]. His charger cleared it at a bound; but -knowing that the inferior mounts of the rank and file would certainly -come to grief, he wheeled round on the further bank, threw up his -hand and tried to wave back his followers. It was too late: the two -squadrons of the front line were on the brink of the ravine before -they could understand his action. Some of the troopers cleared the -obstacle in their stride; some swerved in time and refused to take -the leap; others scrambled into and over the less difficult points -of the ditch: but many fell horse and man into the trap, and were -then crushed by the rear rank falling in on top of them. There were -several broken necks, and scores of broken arms and legs in the -leading squadrons. The second line got warning of the obstacle by -seeing the inexplicable disorder into which their fellows had fallen. -They slackened their pace, but were borne into the confused mass at -the ravine before they could entirely bring themselves to a stand. -Meanwhile the front face of the square formed by the 27th Léger -opened fire on the unhappy regiment. - - [674] Leith-Hay, p. 159. - -The German light dragoons, on the northern side of the valley, came -upon the fatal cutting at a point where it was somewhat shallower and -broader than in front of the 23rd--one of their officers estimates it -in his narrative at eighteen feet in width and six or eight in depth. -Their disaster therefore was not so complete as that of their British -comrades. But many troopers of the first line were unhorsed, and -others, though keeping their saddles, could not manage to scramble up -the further side of the ravine. The rear squadrons came up in time -to add to the confusion, and reined up among the survivors of the -front[675]. - - [675] Napier, ii. 176, has a story that Col. Arentschildt of the - German dragoons discovered the ravine in time, and checked his - line, crying, ‘I will not kill my young mans’--thereby saving - his regiment and taking no part in the charge. This is entirely - disproved by the narratives of the officers of the 1st K.G.L. - Dragoons, quoted in Beamish’s _History of the King’s German - Legion_. The evidence of Colonel von der Decken alone suffices to - show that the regiment fell into the trap, suffered severe losses - therein, and then executed a disorderly and ineffective charge on - Ruffin’s squares, after which it returned to its old position, - with a loss of nearly forty men. Napier seems to have been misled - by the statement of Major Ponsonby of the 23rd, to the effect - that the Germans turned back at the ravine. He also says that - Seymour, Colonel of the 23rd, was wounded, but that officer’s - name does not appear in the casualty list. - -The two regiments were now in utter confusion, and had already -suffered severe loss both by the fall into the ravine and by the -French musketry which had opened upon them. Their colonels would -have been wise to give up the attempt to advance and to fall back in -their old position. How could squadrons in such a disordered state -hope to break into French squares? But both Seymour of the 23rd and -Arentschildt were officers of high mettle, and throwing prudence to -the winds they collected such of their men as had leaped or scrambled -over the ravine, and led them against the hostile infantry. Probably -little more than half of either corps took part in the final charge. - -Be this as it may, both the 23rd and the Legionary dragoons made an -attempt to gallop in upon the squares in their front. The Germans -rode at that of the 24th regiment, received its fire, and were -repulsed, though a few men fell close in upon the bayonets. They then -galloped off and fell back up the valley. Far more disastrous was the -fate of the English regiment. The survivors of the two left squadrons -charged the square of the 27th Léger, were repulsed with heavy loss, -recrossed the ravine, and struggled back to the British lines. But -Colonel Elley and the right squadrons, having no enemy immediately in -their front, rode furiously between the French square and the farm of -Valdefuentes, and charged a line of cavalry which was visible a few -hundred yards to the rear[676]. This was the leading brigade [10th -and 26th Chasseurs] of Merlin’s division, which was acting in support -of Villatte and Ruffin. The squadrons in front of the 23rd swerved -to the side when charged[677], but on passing them the British -dragoons found another regiment of Merlin’s second line opposed to -them[678]. They dashed at it, whereupon the regiment that had evaded -them swung round and fell upon their rear. Encircled by fivefold -numbers the remnant of Drake’s and Allen’s squadrons of the 23rd -were annihilated. Only a few well-mounted officers[679], including -their leader Elley, and two or three troopers cut their way through -the enemy, rode off to the northward, and ultimately escaped to -Bassecourt’s Spanish line on the Sierra de Segurilla. The total loss -of the regiment was 207 killed, wounded and missing out of 450 sabres -who took the field in the morning. Of these, three officers and 105 -men were prisoners--most of them wounded. - - [676] In this charge they carried away with them, and almost - captured, Generals Villatte and Cassagne, who had failed to take - refuge in the square of the 27th, and were caught outside it. - [Sémélé’s Report.] - - [677] In the French official reports it is said that General - Strolz, the brigadier, drew aside the 10th Chasseurs, in order - to fall upon the British dragoons from the flank. Rocca (p. 104) - says that the regiment was charged and broke, but rallied again. - _Victoires et Conquêtes_ has: ‘le 10me de chasseurs ne pouvait - soutenir cette charge, ouvrit ses rangs, mais bientôt rallié il - chargea ses adversaires en queue.’ As the regiment only lost five - killed it does not seem likely that it was broken. The French - records do not give the number of its wounded. - - [678] This was the Westphalian _Chevaux-légers_ regiment. - - [679] Among the other officers who cut their way through was - Lord George William Russell, desperately wounded by a cut on the - shoulder. Only three officers (two wounded) were taken prisoners - from these two squadrons: two others were killed: it would - seem therefore that out of twelve present with the two right - squadrons, several succeeded in getting out of the trap. Elley - says that the whole body that followed him did not exceed 170 - sabres, and that seven or eight only cut their way through the - enemy. - -It was late in the afternoon when the survivors of the 23rd found -their way back to the western end of the valley, and the battle in -the centre had long died down to a cannonade. Ruffin and Villatte -now had it in their power to advance again, but did not do so. If -they had gone further forward they would have lent their flank still -more to Hill’s troops upon the Cerro, and would have had to deploy, -a movement which would have exposed them, when no longer protected -by formation in square, to charges from the mass of allied cavalry -still visible in their front--Fane’s brigade and Albuquerque’s -strong division. Bassecourt’s Spaniards were holding their ground -against the flank-guard which had been sent up on to the Sierra de -Segurilla, and to drive them back Ruffin would have had to detach -more battalions from his main column. News had been received that -the central attack had completely failed. It was natural, therefore, -that after some hesitation the French right wing retired, and fell -back up the valley of the Portiña. Villatte’s two regiments had lost -about 200 men while standing in square under the fire of the guns on -the Cerro. They could no longer be regarded as fresh troops fit for -a prolonged advance, while the wrecks of Ruffin’s battalions, having -now been under fire three separate times in eighteen hours, were -utterly exhausted. It is clear that Victor could not have dared to -risk a serious attack upon the British left with these forces. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF TALAVERA - THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT - 3 TO 5 P.M. JULY 28TH 1809] - -The battle had now come to a standstill: of the five French infantry -divisions in the front line those of Leval, Sebastiani, and Lapisse -were reforming their diminished ranks in the plain, far to the east -of the Portiña, while Villatte and Ruffin had fallen back on to the -slopes of the Cerro de Cascajal. The only intact infantry still -remaining at the disposition of the King were his own 1,800 Guards, -and the 3,300 bayonets of Dessolles. With these and with Villatte’s -two brigades, which had only lost 400 men, it would have been -possible to prepare one more assault upon the British position. -Victor, raging with anger at his third repulse, was anxious to -continue the action, though he had lost nearly one man in four of -his infantry, and had not won an inch of ground. The King was less -hopeful: the frightful slaughter had subdued his spirits, and he -asked himself whether the 5,000 men of his reserve would suffice to -break the thin red line against which the whole of the 1st and 4th -Corps had hurled themselves in vain. For a moment he seemed inclined -to risk his last stake, and the Guards and Dessolles were ordered -to move forward. But they had not gone far when a counter-order was -sent to check them: Milhaud, whose dragoons had spent the whole day -in observing the Spanish lines, had sent in a message to the effect -that Cuesta was at last showing signs of life, and that he could see -numerous troops pushing to the front among the olive groves in front -of the town. The news was not true, for nothing more than vedettes -and small exploring parties had been sent out by the Spanish general. -But the very suspicion that the Army of Estremadura might at last -be preparing to take the initiative was enough to damp the very -moderate ardour of King Joseph. If he committed himself to one final -dash at the English, and engaged both his reserve and the rallied -divisions of his front line, in an attack upon their allied centre -and left, what could he do in the event of the sudden appearance of -the whole Spanish army in the act of turning his southern flank? -Twenty-five thousand men, or more, might suddenly sally out from -the screen of groves, and fling themselves upon the left flank of -Sebastiani’s corps. To hold them back nothing would be available but -the 5,000 sabres of Milhaud and Latour-Maubourg; of infantry not one -man would be left to parry such a stroke. The King could not flatter -himself that anything but a disaster could ensue. Even if it were -not true that the Spaniards were already in motion, there was every -reason to believe that they might deliver an attack when they saw -the last French reserves put into action against the British. Few -generals would have resisted such a tempting opportunity. It was to -be remembered also that some of the Spaniards had actually come out -of their lines, and fallen upon Leval’s flank, when the last assault -had been pressed against the Pajar de Vergara. A third advance in -this quarter might yet rouse the whole Estremaduran army out of its -apathy, and induce it to charge home upon Sebastiani’s left wing. - -Jourdan and most of the members of Joseph’s staff were convinced -that it would be mad to deliver a last attack on the British line, -in face of the possible consequences of an advance by the Spaniards. -The Marshal declared that[680] it was impossible to proceed with any -further scheme of advance, and that the only safe course was to draw -back the whole army towards the Alberche. His master was relieved to -find a good reason for ending a battle which had been begun without -his permission, and continued under his very reluctant sanction. -Orders were sent along the whole line, directing both the 1st and the -4th Corps to abandon their fighting-ground and fall back to their -old position of the twenty-seventh. The cavalry divisions of Merlin, -Latour-Maubourg, and Milhaud were to cover the retreat. - - [680] The best account of all this comes from the _Mémoire_ of - General Desprez, who was riding with the head-quarters staff at - this moment. - -Victor was furious at receiving these directions. He averred to the -officer who bore the King’s dispatch that from his point of vantage -on the Cascajal he could command a view of the whole Spanish army, -and that he was positive that not a Spaniard had moved. He even -pretended to observe signs of a retreat in Wellesley’s lines, and -persisted that the mere demonstration of a fourth attack would induce -the allies to abandon their position. How he came to form any such -conclusion it is hard to see, for the whole British army was still -preserving its old ground, and no one from the Commander-in-chief -down to the youngest private was dreaming of a movement to the rear. -It would indeed have been insane to desert a strong position, in -order to retreat across the open in face of an army possessing 7,000 -excellent cavalry! But Victor, still loth to withdraw and to own -himself beaten, sent word to the King that he took it upon himself to -remain on the slopes of the Cascajal till he should receive further -orders, and that he yet hoped that the reserve might be sent forward -and the battle renewed. - -When Victor’s message reached the King, it had already been -discovered that all the rumours concerning the advance of the -Spaniards were false. But the hour was now late, and (as Jourdan -observed) if the army were to gain a final success--a most -problematical occurrence--there would be no daylight left in which -to push it to its legitimate end. He thought it better to take the -prudent course, to refuse to risk the reserve, whose defeat would -have the most fatal consequences, and to prepare for a retreat. The -orders were accordingly issued that the army should fall back to -its old camping-ground of the morning, deferring the passage of the -Alberche till the next day[681]. - - [681] All this is again derived from Desprez, who both carried - the King’s orders to Victor, and bore back Victor’s remonstrances - to the King. - -While the French commanders were in controversy concerning their -movements, the battle had died down into a cannonade, kept up with -great vehemence by the batteries on the Cerro de Cascajal. The -British and German guns never ceased their reply, but--as had been -the case during the whole day--they were far too few to subdue the -enemy’s fire: considering how they were overmatched, it is wonderful -that there was but one piece disabled, and that only sixty-six -gunners were put _hors de combat_. The opposing batteries were hit -almost as hard, for the artillery of the 1st Corps had sixty-four -casualties. - -A distressing accident took place during this final strife between -the hostile batteries: a large area of dry grass on the lower -slopes of the Cerro de Medellin took fire, from smouldering wadding -fanned by the wind. Many of the severely wounded of both sides -were scorched, and some burnt to death, by the short but devouring -conflagration that ran along the hillside[682]. - - [682] Lord Munster, p. 235; Leith-Hay, p. 162. - -By dusk the whole of the 4th Corps was rolling to the rear, and the -last rays of daylight showed Wellesley the welcome view of a general -retreat opposite his right and centre. Victor clung obstinately to -the Cerro de Cascajal till far into the hours of darkness. But at -last the cold fit supervened, his spirits sank, and he withdrew at -3 A.M. full of resentment, and well stocked with grievances for -the acrimonious correspondence with Joseph and Jourdan in which he -indulged for the next six weeks. - -There can be little doubt that Jourdan was right in refusing to -fall in with the younger marshal’s plans for a fourth assault on -the British. Wellesley was well settled into his fighting-ground: -at the southern end of his line Campbell was perfectly safe at the -Pajar de Vergara redoubt. He had lost no more than 236 men, so that -his whole division was practically intact. Hill’s brigades on the -Cerro were also in perfectly good order--they had not been attacked -since the morning, and would have been quite competent to defend -themselves at five o’clock in the afternoon. The cannonade which they -had been enduring had done some harm, but there were still 3,000 -men in line, to hold a most formidable position. The only point of -the British front on which the French could have hoped to make any -impression was the centre. Here the Guards and Cameron’s brigade had -suffered heavily, and the four battalions of the German Legion even -worse--they had lost a full fifty per cent. of their numbers. But -Mackenzie’s division was now in line with Sherbrooke’s, its first -brigade supporting the Guards, its second (Donkin’s) linked to the -Germans. Considering the way in which the British centre had dealt -with the 15,000 bayonets of Sebastiani and Lapisse during the main -engagement, the French critics who hold that they would have given -way before the 5,000 men of Dessolles and the Royal Guard, even when -backed by the rallied divisions, show a very optimistic spirit. -Moreover when the battle had waxed hot in this quarter, the French -would have had no certainty that Campbell and the Spaniards might not -have fallen upon their flank. For Leval’s much depleted division was -no longer in front of the British right--it had been withdrawn behind -Sebastiani[683], and there was nothing to prevent the reserve-brigade -of the 4th division from going to the aid of Sherbrooke’s men. The -chances of war are incalculable, but there seems no reason to believe -that Victor’s judgement as to the probability of success was any -better at five o’clock in the afternoon than it had been at five -o’clock in the morning. Jourdan was the wiser man. - - [683] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 262. - -Thus ended the battle of Talavera, in which 16,000 British supported -and repulsed the attack of 26,000 French infantry--omitting from the -total of the assailants the division of Villatte, which was only -slightly engaged. The Cerro de Medellin was strong ground, but not -so strong as to counterbalance a superiority of 10,000 men. The real -fighting power of Wellesley’s foot-soldiery was shown in the lower -parts of the field, where Sherbrooke’s and Mackenzie’s 8,000 bayonets -achieved their marvellous success over the 15,000 men of Lapisse -and Sebastiani. Doomed to apparent ruin by their own rash valour -in pursuing the enemy across the Portiña, they yet recovered their -line, re-established the battle, and finally won an almost incredible -victory. The ‘First Division’ of the Peninsular army,--the Guards -and the German Legion who fought side by side throughout the whole -war,--had many proud days between 1809 and 1814, but surely Talavera -was the most honourable of them all. Yet probably Mackenzie’s brigade -and Donnellan’s 48th must claim an even higher merit--it was their -prompt and steady help which gave their comrades time to re-form, and -warded off the possibility of disaster at the critical moment. - -The Spaniards had little to do upon July 28, but what little they -had to do was well done. The charge of the cavalry regiment Rey was -well timed and gallantly delivered. The few battalions engaged near -the Pajar de Vergara and in Bassecourt’s division behaved steadily. -The artillery sent to aid the British was manfully worked and did -good service. But if only the Spanish army had been able to manœuvre, -what a difference there must have been in the battle! When Leval, -Sebastiani, and Lapisse fell back in disorder at 4 P.M., what would -have been the fate of the French if Cuesta could have led out 25,000 -men upon their flank and rear? He did not attempt to do so, and -probably he was right. Yet it was hard for a British army to have to -fight in line with allies who were perfectly useless for any large -offensive movement. - -The losses of Talavera, as we have already shown, were tremendous -on both sides. Adding together the casualties of the twenty-seventh -and the twenty-eighth, the British lost 5,365 men, 801 killed, 3915 -wounded, and 649 missing. Of the last-named 108 belonged to the -unfortunate 23rd Dragoons, and nearly 300 to the German Legion. -Two generals, Mackenzie and Langwerth, had been killed, and three -colonels, Ross of the Coldstream Guards, Donnellan of the 48th, and -Gordon of the 83rd. - -The French losses were decidedly heavier, though the percentage in -the regiments was in most cases far lower than that in the victorious -British force. The total was 7,268, of whom 761 were killed, 6,301 -wounded, and 206 missing[684]. General Lapisse and von Porbeck of the -Baden regiment, one of Leval’s brigadiers, were the only officers -of distinction slain. But the number of field-officers wounded was -enormous--in Sebastiani’s division _all_ the colonels, and seven out -of twelve of the battalion commanders were disabled. - -Cuesta never issued any proper return of his casualties. He stated -in one of his dispatches that they amounted to 1,201 men. This -figure cannot possibly represent killed and wounded alone. Only one -cavalry regiment, five or six battalions, and three batteries were -engaged, none of them heavily. The British troops which fought in -their neighbourhood had very modest losses, which made it incredible -that the comrades in line with them should have suffered to the -extent of more than 400 or 500 men. The balance must represent the -missing from the stampede of Portago’s division upon the night of -the twenty-seventh. Major-General Manglano, who commanded one of -the divisions near the Pajar de Vergara, and de Lastra, the gallant -colonel of the _regimiento del Rey_, were wounded. - -The only trophies taken on either side were the seventeen guns of -Leval’s division captured by Campbell and the Spanish cavalry. - - [684] These ‘missing’ do not include the French wounded taken on - the field, and recovered when Victor came back to Talavera on - Aug. 6 and captured the British hospitals. The French return was - drawn up only after Aug. 18, when these men had been released. - - -N.B.--I have used of British sources mainly Lord Londonderry, Lord -Munster, Leslie and Leith-Hay of the 29th, Stothert of the Guards, -Cooper of the 2/7th, Hawker of the 14th Light Dragoons, and letters -of Elley and Ponsonby of the 23rd Light Dragoons. Of French sources I -have found Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, Victor’s dispatches and controversial -letters with King Joseph, Sémélé’s journal of the 1st Corps, and -Desprez’s narrative the most useful. From Colonel Whinyates I have -received an unpublished map, drawn on the spot by Unger of the K.G.L., -which fixes all the artillery position with admirable accuracy. - - -NOTES ON THE TOPOGRAPHY OF TALAVERA - -I looked over the proofs of the last three chapters, seated on the -small square stone that marks the highest point of the Cerro de -Medellin, after having carefully walked over the whole field from end -to end, on April 9, 1903. The ground is little changed in aspect, -but the lower slopes of the Cerro, and the whole of its opposite -neighbour the Cascajal hill, are now under cultivation. The former -was covered with barley nine inches high, and the rough vegetation -of thyme and dry grass, which the narratives of 1809 describe, was -only to be seen upon the higher and steeper parts of the hill, and -on the sides of the ravine below. The latter is steep but neither -very broad nor particularly difficult to negotiate. Even in April the -Portiña had shrunk to a chain of pools of uninviting black water. -The ditch fatal to the 23rd Light Dragoons, in the northern valley, -is still visible. In its upper part, where the German regiment met -it, the obstacle is practically unchanged. But nearer to the farm of -Valdefuentes it has almost disappeared, owing to the extension of -cultivation. There is only a four-foot drop from a field into a piece -of rough ground full of reeds and bent-grass, where the soil is a -little marshy in April. I presume that when the field was made, the -hollow was partly filled up, and the watercourse, instead of flowing -in a well-defined narrow ditch, has diffused itself over the whole -trough of the ground. - -In the central parts of the field the Portiña forms a boundary, but -not an obstacle. Where Cameron and the Guards fought Sebastiani’s -8,000 men, the ground is almost an exact level on both sides of the -little stream. There is no ‘position’ whatever on the English bank, -which is, if anything, a little lower than the French. The Pajar -de Vergara is a low knoll twenty feet high, now crowned by a large -farmhouse, which occupies the site of the old battery. The ground in -front of it is still covered with olive groves, and troops placed -here could see nothing of an advancing enemy till he emerges from -the trees a hundred yards or so to the front. On the other hand -an observer on the summit of the Cerro de Medellin gets a perfect -bird’s-eye view of this part of the ground, and could make out the -enemy all through his progress among the olives. Wellesley must have -been able to mark exactly every movement of Leval’s division, though -Campbell could certainly not have done so. In the Spanish part of -the line the groves have evidently been thinned, as there are now -many houses, forming a straggling suburb, pushed up to and along -the railway, which now crosses this section of the line. In 1809 -Talavera was still self-contained within its walls, which it has now -overstepped. The Cascajal is practically of the same height as the -main eastern level of the Cerro de Medellin: but the triple summit of -the latter is much loftier ground; and standing on it one commands -the whole of the Cascajal--every one of Villatte’s battalions must -have been counted by Wellesley, who could also mark every man along -the whole French front, even into and among the olive groves occupied -by Leval’s Germans. Victor on the Cascajal could get no such a -general view of the British position, but could see very well into -Sherbrooke’s line. Hill’s troops, behind the first crest of the Cerro -de Medellin, and Campbell’s in the groves must have been much less -visible to him. There is a ruined house, apparently a mill, in the -ravine between the two Cerros. As it is not mentioned in any report -of the battle, I conclude that it was not in existence in 1809. The -Pajar de Vergara farm is also modern, and the only building on the -actual fighting-ground which existed on the battle-day was evidently -the farm of Valdefuentes, which is alluded to by several narrators, -French and English. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER VIII - -THE RETREAT FROM TALAVERA - - -When the dawn of July 29 had arrived, the plain and the rolling hills -in front of the allied position were seen to be absolutely deserted. -No trace of the French army was visible save the heaps of dead upon -the further side of the Portiña: the wounded had been carried off, -with the exception of those who had fallen within the British lines, -and so become prisoners of war. It was soon discovered that the -enemy had left a screen of cavalry along the western bank of the -Alberche: but whether his main body lay close behind the stream, or -had retired towards Madrid, could not be ascertained without making -a reconnaissance in force. Such an operation was beyond Wellesley’s -power on the morning after the battle. He was neither able nor -willing to send out a large detachment to beat up the enemy’s camps, -with the object of ascertaining his situation and intentions. The -British army was utterly exhausted: on the preceding day the men -had fought upon half-rations: when the contest was over they had -found that only a third of a ration had been issued: this scanty -pittance was sent up to the regiments in the evening, as they still -lay in battle-order on the ground that they had held during the day. -Water was almost equally deficient: it was difficult to procure: -nothing but the wells of the few houses in the rear of the position -being available. Only on the morning of the twenty-ninth, when the -departure of the enemy had become certain, were the troops allowed to -return to their old bivouacs in the rear, and there to seek repose. -Even then it was only a minority of the men who could be spared from -duty. The gathering in of the vast numbers wounded--French as well -as English--and their removal into Talavera demanded such enormous -fatigue-parties that the larger number of the survivors had to be -told off to this work and were denied the rest that they had so well -earned. - -It is certain that the British army could have done nothing upon the -twenty-ninth even if their commander had desired to push forward -against the enemy. The men were not only tired out by two days of -battle, but half-starved in addition. But Wellesley was far from -feeling any wish to pursue the French. His infantry had suffered so -dreadfully that he could not dream of exposing them to the ordeal -of another engagement till they had been granted a respite for the -refreshment of body and spirit. Of his divisions only that of A. -Campbell--the smallest of the four--was practically intact. The -others had suffered paralysing losses--in Hill’s ranks one man out -of every four had been stricken down, in Mackenzie’s one man in -every three, while Sherbrooke’s frightful casualty-list showed that -nearly two men out of five were missing from the ranks. Never, save -at Albuera, was such slaughter on the side of the victors seen again -during the whole course of the Peninsular War. ‘The extreme fatigue -of the troops,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘the want of provisions, and the -number of wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving -from my position[685].’ - - [685] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Aug. 1, _Wellington Dispatches_, - iv. p. 553. - -On the morning of the twenty-ninth the depleted strength of the -army was partly compensated by the arrival of the first of those -reinforcements from Lisbon which Wellesley had been anxiously -expecting. At about six o’clock Robert Craufurd came upon the scene -with the three regiments of his Light Brigade--all old battalions -who had shared in Moore’s Corunna campaign. He was accompanied by -a battery of horse artillery (A troop), the first unit of that arm -which came under Wellesley’s command. But the Light Brigade were -almost as weary as their comrades who had fought in the battle: they -had only reached Talavera by a forced march of unexampled severity. -Hearing at Navalmoral that the two armies were in presence, Robert -Craufurd had hurried forward with almost incredible swiftness. -Dropping his baggage and a few weakly men at Oropesa he had marched -forty-three miles in twenty-two hours, though the day was hot and -every soldier carried some fifty pounds’ weight upon his back. All -day long the cannon was heard growling in the distance, and at short -intervals the brigade kept meeting parties of Spanish fugitives, -interspersed with British sutlers and commissaries, who gave the -most dismal accounts of the progress of the fight. In spite of his -desperate efforts to get up in time Craufurd reached the field -thirteen hours too late, and heard to his intense chagrin that the -battle had been won without his aid[686]. Weary though his men were, -they were at once hurried to the front, to relieve A. Campbell’s -division on the line of advanced posts. There they found plenty -of employment in burying the dead, and in gathering up the French -wounded, whom it was necessary to protect from the fury of the -Spanish peasantry. - - [686] For excellent accounts of this forced march see Col. Leach - (95th), _Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier_ (pp. - 81-2), and Sir George Napier’s _Autobiography_, pp. 108-10. - The distance was forty-three miles, not as W. Napier states - sixty-two. That all the stragglers met on the way were not - Spaniards is unfortunately evident from both narratives. Nor were - all the British stragglers non-combatants. - -The arrival of Craufurd’s brigade did something towards filling up -the terrible gap in the ranks of the British infantry, but was far -from enabling Wellesley to assume the offensive. Indeed the advent -of fresh troops only accentuated the difficulty of feeding the army. -Corn was still almost unobtainable; the supplies from the Vera -de Plasencia showed no signs of appearing, and even oxen for the -meat-ration, which had hitherto been obtainable in fair quantities, -were beginning to run short. Nothing was to be had from Talavera -itself, where Victor had exhausted all the available food many weeks -before, nor could any assistance be got from the Spanish army, who -were themselves commencing to feel the pinch of starvation. - -All Wellesley’s hopes at this juncture were founded on the idea that -the diversion of Venegas upon the Upper Tagus would force the French -host in his front to break up, in order to save Madrid from an attack -in the rear. The army of La Mancha had failed to keep Sebastiani in -check, and to prevent him from appearing on the field of Talavera. -But since the enemy had concentrated every available man for the -battle, it was certain that Venegas had now no hostile force in his -front, and that the way to the capital was open to him. If he had -pushed on either by Aranjuez or by Toledo, he must now be close to -the capital, and King Joseph would be obliged to detach a large force -against him. That detachment once made, the army behind the Alberche -would be so much weakened that it would be unable to face the British -and Cuesta. If it offered fight, it must be beaten: if it retired, -the allies would follow it up and drive it away in a direction which -would prevent it from rejoining the troops that had been sent against -Venegas. On the twenty-ninth Wellesley was under the impression that -the army of La Mancha had already brought pressure to bear upon the -French, for a false report had reached him that on the previous day -it had captured Toledo. His dispatches written after the arrival of -this rumour indicate an intention of moving forward on the thirtieth -or thirty-first. The King, he says, must now detach troops against -Venegas. This being so, it will be necessary to induce Cuesta to -advance, supporting him with the British army ‘as soon as it shall be -a little rested and refreshed after two days of the hardest fighting -that I have ever been a party to. We shall certainly move towards -Madrid, if not interrupted by some accident on our flank[687].’ - - [687] Wellington to Beresford, Talavera, July 29, 1809. - -The last words of this sentence are of great importance, since -they show that already upon the day after Talavera Wellesley was -beginning to be uneasy about his left flank. Some time before the -battle he had received news from the north, to the effect that -both Ney and Kellermann had returned to the valley of the Douro, -after evacuating Galicia and the Asturias[688]. He had therefore -to take into consideration the chance that the enemy might move -southward, and fall upon his line of communication with Portugal, -not only with the corps of Soult, but with a large additional force. -Unfortunately the information that had reached him from the plains -of Leon had been to the effect that Ney’s and Kellermann’s troops -were much reduced in numbers and efficiency, so that even when they -had joined Soult the total of the French field army upon the Douro -would not much exceed 20,000 men[689]. This misconception affected -all his plans: for if the hostile force about Salamanca, Zamora, -and Benavente was no greater than was reported, it followed that -any expedition sent against his own communications could not be -more than 12,000 or 15,000 strong, since Soult would be forced to -leave a containing force in front of Beresford and Del Parque, who -now lay in the direction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Any French -advance against Bejar and Plasencia, therefore, would, as Wellesley -supposed, be a mere raid, executed by a comparatively small force. -He doubted whether Soult dared undertake such an operation: ‘the -enemy,’ he wrote, ‘would not like to venture through the passes into -Estremadura, having me on one side of him, and you [Beresford] and -Romana upon the other[690].’ He was therefore not much disturbed -in mind about the movements of the French in the valley of the -Douro. If he had but known that not 20,000 men but 50,000 men were -now concentrating at Salamanca, his feelings would have been far -different. But it was not till some days later that it began to -dawn upon him that Soult was far stronger than he had supposed, and -that there might be serious danger to be feared from this quarter. -Meanwhile he hoped to prevent any advance of the French in the -direction of Plasencia, by causing a strong demonstration to be -made in the valley of the Douro. He wrote to Beresford that he must -contrive to arrange for joint action with La Romana and the Army of -Galicia. If they appeared in strength in the direction of Ciudad -Rodrigo, the Duke of Dalmatia might be deterred from making any -movement to the south. If, however, the Spaniards proved helpless or -impracticable, the Portuguese army would have to confine itself to -the defence of its own frontier. - - [688] On July 14 Wellesley writes to Beresford that he does not - believe that Ney has quitted Galicia [_Wellington Dispatches_, - iv. 510], because of the tenour of the captured dispatches of - Soult to King Joseph. These, of course, had been written under - the idea that the 6th Corps was still holding on to Corunna and - Lugo: it was not till some days later that Soult learned of - his colleagues’ unexpected move. But Wellesley knew of Ney’s - move before the battle of Talavera, as is shown by _Wellington - Dispatches_, iv. 545. - - [689] ‘The enemy have on the Douro and in the neighbourhood not - less than 20,000 men, being the remains of the Corps of Soult, - Ney, and Kellermann.’ To Frere, July 30. - - [690] To Beresford, from Talavera, July 29, 1809. - -On the morning of July 30 Wellesley received the first definite -information which led him to conclude that the French forces from the -north were actually contemplating the raid upon his communications -which on the preceding day he had regarded as doubtful. The Marquis -Del Reino, whom, as it will be remembered, Cuesta had sent to the -Puerto de Baños with two weak battalions, reported that troops -from the Douro valley were threatening his front. At the same time -messages were received from the Alcaldes of Fuente Roble and Los -Santos, places on the road between Salamanca and Bejar, to the effect -that they had received orders from Soult to prepare 12,000 and 24,000 -rations respectively, for troops due to arrive on July 28. The -numbers given counted for little in Wellesley’s estimation, since -it is the commonest thing in the world for generals to requisition -food for a far larger force than they actually bring with them. But -at least it seemed clear that some considerable detachment from -Salamanca was on its way towards the Puerto de Baños. In consequence -of this fact Wellesley wrote to the Spanish government, and also -informed Cuesta, that in the event of a serious attempt of the enemy -to cut his communications, he should ‘move so as to take care of -himself,’ and do his best to preserve Portugal[691]--in other words, -that he should abandon the projected march on Madrid which had been -his main purpose on the preceding day. He was still, however, under -the impression that Soult had no very large force with him, as is -sufficiently shown by the fact that on the thirty-first he suggested -to Cuesta that it would be well to detach one of his divisions--say -5,000 men--to strengthen the insignificant force which was already -in position at the Puerto de Baños. ‘I still think,’ he wrote, ‘that -the movements of General Beresford with the Portuguese army on the -frontier, and that of the Duque del Parque from Ciudad Rodrigo, -combined with the natural difficulties of the country, and the -defence by the Marquis Del Reino, may delay the enemy’s advance till -the arrival of your division[692].’ It is clear that when he wrote -in these terms Wellesley was still labouring under the delusion that -Soult’s advance was a mere raid executed by one or two divisions, and -not a serious operation carried out by a large army. - - [691] Wellesley to Frere, July 30. ‘My first duty is to attend - to the safety of Portugal: at all events if my flank and - communication with Portugal are not secured for me, while I am - operating in the general cause, I must move to take care of - myself, and then the general cause will suffer.’ - - [692] Wellesley to O’Donoju, July 31, 1809. - -While Wellesley was spending the three days which followed the battle -of the twenty-eighth in resting his men and pondering over his next -move, the enemies whom he had defeated at Talavera were in a state -of even greater uncertainty and indecision. By daylight on July 29, -as we have already seen, the whole French army had retired behind -the Alberche, leaving only a screen of cavalry upon its western -bank. The King was under the impression that Wellesley and Cuesta -would probably follow him up ere the day had passed, and drew up -his whole force along that same line of heights which Victor had -occupied upon the twenty-second and twenty-third of the month. But -when nothing appeared in his front during the morning hours save a -few vedettes, he realized that he might count upon a short respite, -and took new measures. After sending off to his brother the Emperor -a most flagrantly mendacious account of the battle of Talavera[693], -he proceeded to divide up his army. As Wellington had foreseen, -he detached a large force to hold back Venegas and the army of La -Mancha, who were at last coming into the field upon his flank. He was -bound to do so, under pain of imperilling the safety of Madrid. - - [693] A few lines of this astounding document may be worth - quoting--‘Sire, hier l’armée anglaise a été forcée dans ses - positions. Outre les 25 à 30 mille Anglais de Wellesley, nous - avons eu affaire à l’armée de Cuesta, qui s’élevait de 35 à - 40 mille hommes. Le champ de bataille _sur lequel nous sommes - établis_ (!) est jonché de leurs morts.... Je me mets en marche - pour secourir Madrid, qui est menacé par un corps de Portugais - arrivés à Navalcarnero, et par l’armée de Venegas, qui tente de - pénétrer par Aranjuez.... J’ai un regret, sire, c’est celui de - n’avoir pas fait prisonnière toute l’armée anglaise.’ _Mémoires - de Joseph_, vi. 284. Napoleon, not deceived for a moment by this - rhodomontade, sent back a scathing rebuke to his brother for - endeavouring to hide the truth from him. (Napoleon to Jourdan, - Aug. 21.) - -It is time to cast a glance at the operations of the incompetent -general whose sloth and disobedience had wrecked the plan that -Wellesley and Cuesta had drawn out at their conference near -Almaraz. On July 16 Venegas had begun to move forward from El -Moral, Valdepeñas, and Santa Cruz de Mudela, in accordance with -the directions that had been sent him. He occupied Manzanares and -Daimiel, and then came into collision with Sebastiani’s cavalry at -Villaharta and Herencia, for the 4th Corps had not yet begun to -withdraw towards Madrid. Owing to the profound ignorance in which the -enemy still lay as to the advance of Wellesley and Cuesta, Sebastiani -had not, on the nineteenth, received any order to fall back or to -join Victor and the King. Thus, when pressed by the advanced troops -of Venegas, he did not retire, but held his ground, and showed every -intention of accepting battle. Learning from the peasantry that he -had the whole of the 4th Corps in front of him, and might have to -deal with nearly 20,000 men, the Spanish general halted, and refused -to advance further. In so doing he was fulfilling the spirit of the -instructions that had been sent him, for Cuesta and Wellesley had -wished him to detain Sebastiani and keep in touch with him--not -to attack him or to fight a pitched battle. They had taken it for -granted that the Frenchman would receive early news of their own -advance, and would already be in retreat before Venegas came up with -him. But it was not till July 22, as we have already seen, that -Victor and King Joseph obtained certain intelligence of the march of -the allies upon Talavera. Until the orders for a retreat arrived from -Madrid, the 4th Corps was kept in its old position at Madridejos, -and courted rather than avoided an engagement with the army of La -Mancha[694]. - - [694] For these operations I am relying on General Arteche’s - excerpts from the _Vindicacion de los Agravios_, published by - Venegas in his own defence. - -Venegas, after summoning his divisional generals to a council of war, -refused to attack Sebastiani, and wisely, for his 23,000 men would -certainly have been beaten by the 20,000 Frenchmen who still lay in -front of him. From the nineteenth to the twenty-second the two armies -faced each other across the upper Guadiana, each waiting for the -other to move. Late on the twenty-third, however, Sebastiani received -his orders to evacuate La Mancha, and to hasten to Toledo in order to -join Victor and the King, in a combined assault upon Wellesley and -Cuesta. - -It was on the next day that Venegas committed the ruinous error which -was to wreck the fate of the whole campaign. On the morning of the -twenty-fourth the 4th Corps had disappeared from his front: instead -of following closely in the rear of Sebastiani with all speed, -and molesting his retreat, as his orders prescribed, he made no -attempt to prevent the 4th Corps from moving off, nor did he execute -that rapid flanking march on Aranjuez or Fuentedueñas which his -instructions prescribed. He moved forward at a snail’s pace, having -first sent off to Cuesta an argumentative letter, in which he begged -for leave to direct his advance on Toledo instead of on the points -which had been named in his orders. On the twenty-sixth he received -an answer, in which his Commander-in-chief authorized him to make his -own choice between the route by Aranjuez and that by Toledo. - -Venegas had already committed the fatal error of letting Sebastiani -slip away unmolested: he now hesitated between the idea of carrying -out his own plan, and that of obeying Cuesta’s original orders, and -after much hesitation sent his first division under General Lacy -towards Toledo, while he himself, with the other four, marched by -Tembleque upon Aranjuez. So slow and cautious was their advance -that Lacy only arrived in front of Toledo on July 28--the day that -the battle of Talavera was fought, while Venegas himself occupied -Aranjuez twenty-four hours later, on the morning of the twenty-ninth. -He had taken six days to cross the sixty miles of open rolling plain -which lie between the Guadiana and the Tagus, though he had been -absolutely unopposed by the enemy whom he had allowed to slip away -from his front. Sebastiani had marched at the rate of twenty miles -a day when he retired from Madridejos to Toledo, Venegas and Lacy -followed at the rate of ten and twelve miles a day respectively. Yet -the special duty imposed on the army of La Mancha had been to keep in -touch with the 4th Corps. Further comment is hardly necessary. - -On the morning of the day when Wellesley was assailed by the forces -of Victor and King Joseph, General Lacy appeared in front of Toledo. -The town was held by 3,000 men of Valence’s Polish division: it is -practically impregnable against any attack from the south, presenting -to that side a front of sheer cliff, overhanging the river, and -accessible only by two fortified bridges. To make any impression on -the place Lacy would have had to cross the Tagus at some other point, -and then might have beset the comparatively weak northern front -with considerable chances of success. But he contented himself with -demonstrating against the bridges, and discharging some fruitless -cannon-shot across the river. General Valence, the Governor of -Toledo, reported to Jourdan that he was attacked, and his message, -reaching the battle-field of Talavera after Victor’s second repulse, -had a certain amount of influence on the action of King Joseph. The -place was never for a moment in danger, as Lacy made no attempt to -pass the Tagus in order to press his attack home. - -On the following morning (July 29) Venegas reached the other great -passage of the Tagus, at Aranjuez, with two of his divisions, and -occupied the place after driving out a few French vedettes. He -pressed his cavalry forward to the line of the Tajuna, and ere -nightfall some of them had penetrated almost as far as Valdemoro, the -village half way between Aranjuez and Madrid. No signs of any serious -hostile force could be discovered, and secret friends in the capital -sent notice that they were being held down by a very weak garrison, -consisting of no more than a single French brigade and a handful of -the King’s Spanish levies. There was everything to tempt Venegas to -execute that rapid march upon the capital which had been prescribed -in his original orders, but instead of doing so this wretched officer -halted for eight whole days at Aranjuez [July 29 to August 5]. - -On the day after Talavera Jourdan and Joseph had not yet discovered -the whereabouts of the main body of the army of La Mancha: but Lacy -had made such a noisy demonstration in front of Toledo that they -were inclined to believe that his chief must be close behind him. -Accordingly the garrison of Toledo was reinforced by the missing -brigade of Valence’s Polish division, and raised to the strength of -4,700 men. The King, with the rest of Sebastiani’s corps and his own -Guards and reserves, marched to Santa Ollala, and on the next day -[July 30] placed himself at Bargas, a few miles in rear of Toledo. -In this position he would have been wholly unable to protect Madrid, -if Venegas had pressed forward on that same morning from Aranjuez, -for that place is actually nearer to the capital than the village -at which Joseph had fixed his head quarters. The sloth displayed by -the Spanish general was the only thing which preserved Madrid from -capture. On August 1, apprised of the fact that the main body of -the army of La Mancha was at Aranjuez and not before Toledo, Joseph -transferred his army to Illescas, a point from which he would be able -to attack Venegas in flank, if the latter should move forward. Only -Milhaud’s division of dragoons was thrown forward to Valdemoro, on -the direct road from Aranjuez to Madrid: it drove out of the village -a regiment of Spanish horse, which reported to Venegas that there was -now a heavy force in his front. For the next four days the King’s -troops and the army of Venegas retained their respective positions, -each waiting for the other to move. The Spaniard had realized that -his chance of capturing Madrid had gone by, and remained in a state -of indecision at Aranjuez. Joseph was waiting for definite news of -the movements of Wellesley and Cuesta, before risking an attack on -the army of La Mancha. He saw that it had abandoned the offensive, -and did not wish to move off from his central position at Illescas -till he was sure that Victor was not in need of any help. Yet he was -so disturbed as to the general state of affairs that he sent orders -to General Belliard at Madrid to evacuate all non-combatants and -civilians on to Valladolid, and to prepare to shut himself up in the -Retiro. - -The doings of Victor, during the five days after he had separated -from the King, require a more lengthy consideration. Left behind -upon the Alberche with the 1st Corps, which the casualties of the -battle had reduced to no more than 18,000 men, he felt himself in a -perilous position: if the allies should advance, he could do no more -than endeavour to retard their march on Madrid. Whether he could -count on any further aid from the King and Sebastiani would depend -on the wholly problematical movements of Venegas. Somewhat to his -surprise Wellesley and Cuesta remained quiescent not only on the -twenty-ninth but on the thirtieth of July. But an alarm now came from -another quarter: it will be remembered that the enterprising Sir -Robert Wilson with 4,000 men, partly Spaniards, partly Portuguese of -the Lusitanian Legion, had moved parallel with Wellesley’s northern -flank during the advance to Talavera. On the day of the battle he had -‘marched to the cannon’ as a good officer should, and had actually -approached Cazalegas, at the back of the French army, in the course -of the afternoon. Learning of the results of the fight, he had -turned back to his old path upon the twenty-ninth, and had entered -Escalona on the upper Alberche. At this place he was behind Victor’s -flank, and lay only thirty-eight miles from Madrid. There was no -French force between him and the capital, and if only his division -had been a little stronger he would have been justified in making a -raid upon the city, relying for aid upon the insurrection that would -indubitably have broken out the moment that he presented himself -before its gates. - -It was reported to Victor on the thirtieth not only that Wilson was -at Escalona, but also that he was at the head of a strong Portuguese -division, estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men. The Marshal determined -that he could not venture to leave such a force upon his rear while -the armies of Wellesley and Cuesta were in his front, and fell back -ten miles to Maqueda on the high road to Madrid. On the following -day, still uneasy as to his position, he retired still further, to -Santa Cruz, and wrote to King Joseph that he might be forced to -continue his retreat as far as Mostoles, almost in the suburbs of -Madrid [Aug. 2]. He was so badly informed as to the movements of the -allies, that he not only warned the King that Wilson was threatening -Madrid, but assured him that the British army from Talavera had -broken up from its cantonments and was advancing along the Alberche -towards the capital[695]. Joseph, better instructed as to the actual -situation of affairs, replied by assuring him that Wellesley and -Cuesta were far more likely to be retreating on Almaraz than marching -on Madrid, as they must have heard ere now of Soult’s advance on -Plasencia. He ordered the Marshal to fall back no further, and to -send a division to feel for Wilson at Escalona. On detaching Villatte -to execute this reconnaissance [Aug. 5] Victor was surprised to find -that Sir Robert’s little force had already evacuated its advanced -position, and had retreated into the mountains. For the last four -days indeed Victor had been fighting with shadows--for the British -and Estremaduran armies had never passed the Alberche, while Wilson -had absconded from Escalona on receiving from Wellesley the news that -Soult had been heard of at the Puerto de Baños. In consequence of the -needless march of the 1st Corps to Maqueda and Santa Cruz, the allied -generals were able to withdraw unmolested, and even unobserved, from -Talavera, and were far upon their way down the Tagus before their -absence was suspected. The erratic movements of Victor may be excused -in part by the uniform difficulty in obtaining accurate information -which the French always experienced in Spain. But even when this -allowance is made, it must be confessed that his operations do not -tend to give us any very high idea of his strategical ability. He was -clearly one of those generals, of the class denounced by Napoleon, -_qui se font des tableaux_, who argue on insufficient data, and take -a long time to be convinced of the error of their original hypothesis. - - [695] Jourdan to Belliard, Aug. 3, from Illescas: ‘Le duc de - Belluno dit que toute l’armée anglaise marche sur la rive droite - de l’Alberche, et qu’hier elle était à une lieue d’Escalona.’ - -Neither Victor nor King Joseph, therefore, exercised any influence -over the doings of Wellesley and Cuesta at Talavera between the 29th -of July and the 3rd of August. The allies worked out their plans -undisturbed by any interference on the part of the old enemies whom -they had beaten on the battle day. Down to August 1 the British -general had been unconvinced by the rumours of Soult’s approach, -at the head of a large army, which were persistently arriving from -the secret agents in the direction of Salamanca[696]. It was only -on the evening of that day that he received news so precise, and so -threatening, that he found himself forced to abandon for the moment -any intention of pushing on towards Madrid, in consequence of the -impending attack on the line of his communications with Portugal. It -was announced to him that the vanguard of the French army from the -north had actually entered Bejar on the twenty-ninth and was driving -in the trifling force under the Marquis Del Reino, which Cuesta had -sent to the Puerto de Baños. - - [696] There are two letters of Wellington to Castlereagh, written - on Aug. 1; both indicate that Wellesley was still unconvinced - as to Soult’s intention, and the second states that he does - not believe that the French will pass the Puerto de Baños. The - definite news came at night. - -Whatever might be the force at Soult’s disposal--and Wellesley was -still under the delusion that it amounted at most to a single corps -of 12,000 or 15,000 men--it was impossible to allow the French to -establish themselves between the British army and Portugal. If they -were at Bejar on the twenty-ninth they might easily reach Plasencia -on the thirty-first. On receiving the news Cuesta, who had hitherto -shown the greatest reluctance to divide his army, detached his 5th -division under Bassecourt, with orders to set out at the greatest -possible speed, and join the Marquis Del Reino. This move was tardy -and useless, for it is four long marches from Talavera to Plasencia, -so that Bassecourt must arrive too late to hold the defiles. If he -found the French already established on the river Alagon, his 5,000 -men would be utterly inadequate to ‘contain’ double or triple that -number of Soult’s troops. As a matter of fact the enemy had entered -Plasencia on the afternoon of August 1, before the Spanish division -had even commenced its movement to the west[697]. - - [697] Napier seems to have the dates wrong here: he says that - the 5th Corps seized Plasencia on July 31 [vol. ii. p. 184], - But Soult’s official report to the Minister of War, dated Aug. - 13, says that his vanguard forced the Puerto de Baños on the - twenty-ninth, but only captured Plasencia on Aug. 1. If Plasencia - had fallen on the thirty-first, Wellesley and Cuesta would have - known the fact on the second: but as it was captured on the first - only, they were still in ignorance when their conference took - place. - -On the morning of August 2 Wellesley and Cuesta held a long and -stormy conference. The Captain-General proposed that Wellesley -should detach half his force to assist Bassecourt, and stay with the -remainder at Talavera, in order to support the Army of Estremadura -against any renewed attack by Victor and King Joseph[698]. The -English commander refused to divide his force--he had only 18,000 -effectives even after Craufurd had joined him, and such a small body -would not bear division. But he offered either to march against Soult -with his entire host, or to remain at Talavera if his colleague -preferred to set out for Plasencia with his main body. Cuesta chose -the former alternative, and on the morning of the third Wellesley -moved out with every available man, intending to attack the enemy -at the earliest opportunity. He was still under the impression that -he would have to deal with no more than a single French corps, -and was confident of the result. His only fear was that Victor -might descend upon Talavera in his absence, and that Cuesta might -evacuate the place on being attacked. If this should happen, the -English hospitals, in which there lay nearly 5,000 wounded, might -fall into the hands of the enemy. On halting at Oropesa he sent -back a note to O’Donoju, the chief of the staff of the Estremaduran -army, begging him to send off westward all the British wounded who -were in a condition to travel. He asked that country carts might be -requisitioned for their assistance, if no transport could be spared -by the Spanish troops[699]. - - [698] Wellesley’s letters in these critical days are full of - complaints as to his colleague’s impracticability: ‘I certainly - should get the better of everything,’ he writes to Castlereagh, - ‘if I could manage General Cuesta: but his temper and disposition - are so bad that this is impossible.’ _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. - p. 553. - - [699] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Oropesa, afternoon of Aug. 3. - -Wellesley was setting out with 18,000 men to attack not the mere -15,000 men that he believed to be in his front, but three whole -_corps d’armée_, with a strength of 50,000 sabres and bayonets. -In his long career there were many dangerous crises, but this was -perhaps the most perilous of all. If he had remained for a little -longer in ignorance of the real situation, he might have found -himself involved in a contest in which defeat was certain and -destruction highly probable. - -The real situation in his front was as follows. On receiving the -dispatch from Madrid which permitted him to execute his projected -march upon Plasencia, Soult had begun to concentrate his army [July -24]. Mortier and the 5th Corps were already in march for Salamanca -in pursuance of earlier orders: they arrived in its neighbourhood -the same day on which Foy brought the King’s orders to his chief. -The 2nd Corps was already massed upon the Tormes, and ready to move -the moment that it should receive the supply of artillery which had -been so long upon its way from Madrid. Ney and the 6th Corps from -Benavente and Astorga had far to come: they only reached Salamanca -on July 31; if we remember that the distance from Astorga to the -concentration point was no less than ninety miles we cease to wonder -at their tardy arrival. - -Soult had strict orders from the Emperor to march with his troops -well closed up, and not to risk the danger of being caught with his -corps strung out at distances which would permit of their being met -and defeated in detail[700]. He was therefore entirely justified in -refusing to move until the 6th Corps should be in supporting distance -of the rest of his army, and the 2nd Corps should have received the -cannon which were needed to replace the pieces that they had lost -in Portugal. For this reason we must regard as unfounded all the -vehement reproaches heaped upon him by Joseph and Jourdan during -the acrimonious correspondence that followed upon the end of the -campaign. It would have been wrong to start the 5th Corps upon its -way to Plasencia till the 2nd Corps was ready to follow, and the much -needed guns only came into Salamanca on the twenty-ninth, though -their approach had been reported on the preceding day. - - [700] Orders of Napoleon from Schönbrunn, June 12: ‘Les trois - corps doivent fournir 50 à 60 mille hommes. Si cette réunion a - lieu promptement les Anglais doivent être détruits; mais il faut - se réunir, _et ne pas marcher par petits paquets_. Cela est le - principe général pour tous les guerres, mais surtout pour un pays - où l’on ne peut pas avoir de communication.’ - -We cannot therefore blame Soult for sloth or slackness when we find -that he started Mortier upon his way on July 27, and followed him -with his own corps upon July 30, the day after the guns arrived, and -the day before Ney and his troops were due to reach Salamanca from -the north. - -The order of march was as follows: the vanguard was composed of -the whole corps of Mortier, nearly 17,000 strong[701], reinforced -by three brigades of dragoons under Lahoussaye and Lorges with a -strength of 2,000 sabres. The 2nd Corps followed; though it started -three days later than the 5th it was gradually gaining ground on -the vanguard all through the march, as it had no fighting to do or -reconnaissances to execute. Hence it was only twenty-four hours -behind Mortier in arriving at Plasencia. Its strength was 18,000 men, -even after it had detached the brigades of dragoons to strengthen -the vanguard, and placed five battalions at the disposal of General -Kellermann[702]. During its stay at Zamora and Toro it had picked up -a mass of convalescents and details, who had not taken part in its -Galician campaign. The rear was formed by Ney’s troops, which started -from Salamanca only one day behind the 2nd Corps. The infantry was -not complete, as a brigade of 3,000 men was left behind on the Douro, -to assist Kellermann in holding down the kingdom of Leon. Hence, even -including a brigade of Lorges’ dragoons, the 6th Corps had only some -12,500 men on the march. The whole army, therefore, as it will be -seen, was about 50,000 strong. - - [701] By the return of July 15, the 5th Corps had 16,916 men, the - attached brigades of dragoons, 1,853: the 2nd Corps had 18,740 - (deducting Lorges and Lahoussaye): the 6th Corps 15,700, of whom - one brigade of infantry (3,200 bayonets) was left behind. The - total then was 50,009. - - [702] The Marshal had dissolved one of his four divisions, that - of Mermet, making over the 122nd of the line, reduced to two - battalions, and the Swiss units to Kellermann, and distributing - the other regiments between Merle, Delaborde, and Heudelet. - -Just before he marched from Salamanca Soult had heard that -Beresford’s Portuguese were commencing to show themselves in force -in the direction of Almeida, while Del Parque’s small division at -Ciudad Rodrigo was beginning to be reinforced by troops descending -from the mountains of Galicia. Trusting that the danger from this -quarter might not prove imminent, the Marshal left in observation of -the allies only the remains of the force that Kellermann had brought -back from the Asturias--the 5th division of dragoons and a few -battalions of infantry, strengthened by the five battalions from the -2nd Corps and the one brigade detached from Ney. The whole did not -amount to more than 9,000 or 10,000 men, scattered along the whole -front from Astorga to Salamanca. It was clear that much was risked in -this direction, for Beresford and Del Parque could concentrate over -20,000 troops for an attack on any point that they might select. But -Soult was prepared to accept the chances of war in the Douro valley, -rightly thinking that if he could crush Wellesley’s army on the Tagus -any losses in the north could easily be repaired. It would matter -little if the Spaniards and Portuguese occupied Salamanca, or even -Valladolid, after the British had been destroyed. - -Mortier, starting on July 27, on the road by Fuente Roble and Los -Santos, made two marches without coming in touch with any enemy. It -was only on the third day that he met at La Calzada the vedettes -of the trifling force under the Marquis Del Reino which Cuesta had -sent to hold the Puerto de Baños. After chasing them through Bejar, -the Marshal came upon their supports drawn up in the pass [July -30]. Del Reino thought himself obliged to fight, though he had but -four battalions with a total of 2,500 or 3,000 bayonets[703]. He -was of course dislodged with ease by the overwhelming numbers which -Mortier turned against him--the first division of the 5th Corps alone -sufficed to drive him through the pass. Thereupon he retired down the -Alagon, and after sending news of his defeat to Cuesta fell back to -Almaraz, where he took up the bridge of boats and removed it to the -southern bank of the Tagus. - - [703] Cuesta, in a dispatch in the _Deposito de la Guerra_, - which seems unpublished, says that Del Reino fought with four - battalions. He had started with no more than two, so must have - rallied two others. I can find no trace of what they were, but - conclude that they must have been some of those battalions of - the Army of Estremadura which are not named in the _Ordre de - Bataille_ of the divisions present at Talavera. As I have shown - in my Talavera Appendix, there were eight regiments which had - belonged to Cuesta’s army in March but do not appear in the - divisional return of July. Most of these were in garrison at - Badajoz: but two or three may well have been sent to guard the - passes when the army advanced from the Guadiana in the end of - June. - -Having cleared the passes upon the thirtieth, the 5th Corps advanced -to Candelaria and Baños de Bejar upon the thirty-first, and entered -Plasencia on the first of August. Here Mortier captured 334 of -Wellesley’s sick, who had been left behind as being incapable of -removal. On the preceding day the town had been full of British -detachments: the place was the half-way house between Portugal -and Talavera, and many commissaries, isolated officers going to -or from the front, and details marching to join their corps, had -been collected there. Captain Pattison, the senior officer present, -withdrew to Zarza, with every man that could march, when he heard -of Mortier’s approach, taking with him a convoy which had recently -arrived from Abrantes. But he was obliged to leave behind him a -considerable amount of corn, just collected from the Vera, which had -been destined for Wellesley’s army. The whole civil population of -Plasencia fled to the hills, in obedience to an order of the local -Junta, and the British soldiers in the hospital were the only living -beings whom the French vanguard found in the city. The men of the 5th -Corps plundered the deserted houses, as was but natural, but behaved -with much humanity to the captured invalids[704]. - - [704] For details of Mortier’s march see the memoir of Naylies, - of Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, who was with the vanguard. According to - the _Diary_ of Fantin des Odoards, Soult pushed his kindness to - the British invalids so far as to leave with them a small supply - of muskets, with which to defend themselves against guerrillas. - -After seizing Plasencia Mortier halted for a day, in obedience to -Soult’s orders, that he might allow the 2nd Corps to close up before -he pressed in any further towards Wellesley. The Duke of Dalmatia -was determined to run no risks, when dealing with an adversary so -enterprising as his old enemy of Oporto. On August 2 he himself and the -leading divisions of his corps reached Plasencia: the rest were close -behind. On the same afternoon, therefore, the advance could be resumed, -and Mortier set out on the high road towards Almaraz and Talavera, -having eight regiments of horse--3,000 men--in his front. He slept that -night at Malpartida, seven miles in advance of Plasencia, and moved on -next morning to the line of the Tietar and the village of Toril. One of -his reconnoitring parties approached the bridge of Almaraz and found it -broken: another reached Navalmoral. He was now drawing very close to -Wellesley, who had encamped that day at Oropesa, and was only thirty -miles away: indeed the British and the French cavalry came in contact -that evening in front of Navalmoral. - -On August 3, by a curious coincidence, each Commander-in-chief was -at last informed of his adversary’s strength and intentions by a -captured dispatch. A Spanish messenger was arrested by Soult’s -cavalry, while bearing a letter from Wellesley to General Erskine -dated August 1. In this document there was an account of the battle -of Talavera, which had hitherto been unknown to Soult. But the most -important clause of it was a request to Erskine to find out whether -the rumours reporting the advance of 12,000 French towards the Puerto -de Baños were correct. The Duke of Dalmatia thus discovered that his -adversary, only two days before, was grossly underrating the numbers -of the army that was marching against his rear. He was led on to hope -that Wellesley would presently advance against him with inferior -numbers, and court destruction by attacking the united 2nd and 5th -Corps[705]. - - [705] See Le Noble, p. 320. - -This indeed might have come to pass had not the allies on the same -day become possessed of a French dispatch which revealed to them the -real situation of affairs. Some guerrillas in the neighbourhood of -Avila intercepted a friar, who was an agent of King Joseph, and was -bearing a letter from him to Soult. They brought the paper to Cuesta -on August 3: it contained not only an account of the King’s plans and -projects, but orders for the Marshal, which mentioned Ney and the 6th -Corps, and showed that the force marching on Plasencia was at least -double the strength that Wellesley had expected[706]. This letter -Cuesta sent on to his colleague with laudable promptness; it reached -the British commander in time to save him from taking the irreparable -step of marching from Oropesa to Navalmoral, where the vanguard of -Mortier’s cavalry had just been met by the vedettes of Cotton’s light -horse. Wellesley had actually written to Bassecourt to bid him halt -at Centinello till he himself should arrive, and then to join him -in an attack on the French[707], when he was handed the intercepted -letter which showed that Soult had at least 30,000 men in hand. - - [706] See Arteche, vi. 342, and _Wellington Dispatches_, iv. - 561; the letter itself is not published by Gurwood, but Lord - Londonderry, then on Wellesley’s staff, gives an analysis of it. - It contained, according to him, orders to Soult to hasten his - march, and to bring up Ney’s corps with all speed, while the king - himself undertook to threaten Talavera again with Victor’s forces - [Londonderry, i. p. 416]. - - [707] Wellesley to Bassecourt, from Oropesa, August 3. So - confident was the British commander at this moment, that he - wrote to Beresford on the same morning, telling him that Soult - when assailed would probably retire at once, either by the pass - of Perales or that of Baños. He wished his lieutenant to send - Portuguese troops to the outlets of those defiles, to intercept - the retreating enemy. - -This unpalatable news changed the whole prospect of affairs: it -would be mad to assail such an enemy with a force consisting of no -more than 18,000 British troops and Bassecourt’s 5,000 Spaniards. -Wellesley had therefore to reconsider the whole situation, and to -dictate a new plan of campaign at very short notice, since his -cavalry were actually in touch with the enemy at the distance of a -single day’s march from Oropesa. On the morrow he must either fight -or fly. The situation was made more complicated by the fact that -Cuesta, when forwarding the French dispatch, had sent information -to the effect that he considered his own situation at Talavera so -much compromised that he was about to retreat at once, with the -design of crossing the Tagus at Almaraz, and of taking up once more -his old line of communications, which ran by Truxillo to Badajoz. -It may be asked why the Captain-General did not adopt the simpler -course of crossing the Tagus at Talavera, and moving under cover of -the river, instead of executing the long flank march by Oropesa to -Almaraz on the exposed bank, where the French were known to be in -movement. The answer, however, is simple and conclusive: the paths -which lead southward from Talavera are impracticable for artillery -and wheeled vehicles. Infantry alone could have retreated by the -route which climbs up to the Puerto de San Vincente, the main pass -of this section of the Sierra de Guadalupe: nor was the track along -the edge of the river from Talavera to Arzobispo any better fitted -for the transport of a large army. It is this want of any adequate -communication with the south which makes Talavera such a dangerous -position: no retreat from it is possible save that by the road to -Oropesa, unless the retiring army is prepared to sacrifice all its -impedimenta. - -Cuesta has been criticized in the most savage style by many English -writers, from Lord Londonderry and Napier downwards, for his hasty -departure from Talavera. It is fair to state in his defence the fact -that if he had tarried any longer in his present position he might -have been cut off not merely from Almaraz--that passage was already -impracticable--but also from the bridge of Arzobispo, the only other -crossing of the Tagus by which artillery and heavy wagons can pass -southward. If he had started on the fourth instead of the third he -might have found Mortier and Soult interposed between him and this -last line of retreat. He would then have been forced to abandon all -his _matériel_, and to hurry back to Talavera, in order to take the -break-neck track to the Puerto de San Vincente. But there was every -reason to believe that Victor might arrive in front of Talavera on -the evening of the fourth or the morning of the fifth, so that this -last road to safety might have been already blocked. Thus the Spanish -army, if it had started on the fourth for Oropesa, might have found -itself caught between the two French corps, and vowed to inevitable -destruction. As a matter of fact Victor moved slowly and cautiously, -and only reached Talavera on the sixth--but this could not possibly -have been foreseen. We cannot therefore blame Cuesta’s precipitate -departure upon the night of August 3. - -His main body marched under cover of the darkness to Oropesa, where -they arrived, much wearied and in some disorder, on the following -morning. He left Zayas’s division and Albuquerque’s horse as a -rearguard, to hold Talavera till midday on the fourth, with orders -to make a semblance of resistance and to detain Victor for a few -hours if he should appear. But no hostile force showed itself: by -his unwise retreat to Santa Cruz the Marshal had drawn back so far -from the enemy that he could not take advantage of their retrograde -movement when it became known to him. Villatte’s division and -Beaumont’s cavalry only reached Talavera on the morning of the sixth. - -The departure of the Estremaduran army had one deplorable result. It -exposed the English hospitals at Talavera, with their 4,000 wounded, -to capture by the enemy. Wellesley, before he had marched off, had -given orders that all the men capable of being moved should be sent -off towards Plasencia and Portugal as soon as possible. But he had no -transport that could cope with the task of transferring such a mass -of invalids towards his base. He wrote from Oropesa begging Cuesta -to requisition carts from the country-side for this purpose[708]. -But it was notorious that carts were not to be had--all Wellesley’s -letters for the last three weeks were full of complaints to the -effect that he could not procure them by money or by force. When -the Spaniards were themselves departing, bag and baggage, it was an -inopportune moment at which to ask them to provide transport: yet -since the British wounded had been left to their care they were bound -in honour to do all that could be done to save them. It is said that -Cuesta made over[709] no more than seven ox-carts and a few mules to -Colonel Mackinnon, the officer charged with the task of evacuating -the hospitals. These and about forty vehicles of various kinds -belonging to the British themselves were all that could be procured -for the use of the wounded. They could only accommodate a tithe of -the serious cases: the men with hurts of less consequence were forced -to set out upon their feet. ‘The road to Oropesa,’ writes one of -their fellow sufferers, ‘was covered with our poor limping bloodless -soldiers. On crutches or sticks, with blankets thrown over them, they -hobbled woefully along. For the moment panic terror lent them a force -inconsistent with their debility and their fresh wounds. Some died -by the road, others, unable to get further than Oropesa, afterwards -fell into the hands of the enemy[710].’ The rest trailed onward to -the bridge of Arzobispo, where Wellesley provided transport for many -of them by unloading baggage-wagons, and ultimately reached Truxillo, -at which place the new hospitals were established. Of the whole 4,000 -about 1,500 had been left at Talavera as hopeless or dangerous cases, -and these became the captives of the French: 2,000 drifted in, at -various times, to Truxillo: the remaining 500 expired by the wayside -or were taken by the French in the villages where they had dropped -down[711]. - - [708] Wellesley to O’Donoju, Aug. 3, 1809. - - [709] I am bound to say that after reading the Spanish - narratives, I doubt whether Cuesta had at his disposal the large - amount of spare vehicles of which Londonderry and Napier speak. - - [710] Boothby, _A Prisoner of France_, p. 40. For the adventures - of two wounded officers on their weary way to Truxillo see the - _Diary_ of Hawker, and the narrative of Colonel Leslie. The - latter made a personal appeal to Cuesta, whose carriage he had - met by the roadside. The old general sent for the Alcalde, and - made him provide a mule--though it turned out to be a very bad - one--for the wounded officer. This small fact to his credit needs - recording, after the copious abuse heaped on him. - - [711] The invalids were admirably cared for by the enemy. See - Boothby. - -Long before Cuesta and his host had arrived at Oropesa, Wellesley -had made up his mind that the only course open to him was to abandon -the march towards Navalmoral and Almaraz, and to turn aside to the -bridge of Arzobispo. As the French were known to be at Navalmoral, -it would have been impossible to force a passage to Almaraz without -a battle. If the enemy were to be estimated at two corps, or 30,000 -men, according to the indications of the intercepted letter, they -would probably be able to detain the Anglo-Spanish army till Victor -should arrive from the rear. For, without accepting a pitched battle, -they would be strong enough to harass and check the allies, and to -prevent them from reaching Almaraz till the 1st Corps should come -upon the scene. ‘I was not certain,’ wrote Wellesley to Beresford -two days later, ‘that Ney was not with Soult: and I _was_ certain -that, if not with him, he was at no great distance. We should -therefore have had a battle to fight in order to gain the road to -Almaraz--Plasencia was then out of the question--and if Victor had -followed Cuesta, as he ought to have done, another battle, probably, -before the bridge could be re-established[712]. Then it was to be -considered that, Cuesta having left Talavera, the bridge of Arzobispo -would have been open to the enemy’s enterprise: if they had destroyed -it, while we had failed in forcing Soult at Navalmoral, we were -gone.’ - - [712] The Marquis del Reino (it will be remembered) had broken - the boat-bridge of Almaraz on August 2, after abandoning the - Puerto de Baños. - -It is impossible not to bow before Wellesley’s reasoning. The French -critics object that only Mortier was at Navalmoral on August 4, -Soult being twenty miles behind him at Bazagona on the Tietar, so -that it would have been possible for the British army to have driven -back the 19,000 men of the Duke of Treviso, and to have forced its -way to Almaraz[713]. But even if Wellesley had fought a successful -action with Mortier on August 4, Soult would certainly have joined -his colleague on the fifth, before the bridge could have been -repaired, or at any rate before the whole Anglo-Spanish army and all -its impedimenta could have crossed the Tagus. If attacked during -their passage by the 37,000 men of the 2nd and 5th Corps they would -have fared badly. Wellesley was perfectly correct in his decision; -indeed the only point in which he was deceived was that he believed -the enemy in his front to be Soult’s and Ney’s Corps, whereas -they were in reality those of Soult and Mortier. Ney only reached -Plasencia on August 4, and did not join the main body of the army -till two days later. - - [713] See for example, Le Noble, pp. 339-40. - -When Wellesley and Cuesta met at Oropesa, early on the morning -of August 4, they found themselves as usual engaged in a heated -controversy. The British general had directed his divisions to hold -themselves ready to march on the bridge of Arzobispo without further -delay. Cuesta on the other hand had been attacked by a recrudescence -of his old disease, the mania for fighting pitched battles[714]. He -proposed that the allied armies should remain on the north bank of -the Tagus, adopt a good defensive position, and defy Soult to attack -them. Wellesley would not listen for a moment to this project, and -finally declared that in spite of all arguments to the contrary, he -should cross the Tagus that day at the head of his army. The two -generals parted in wrath, and at six o’clock the British commenced -their march to Arzobispo, only nine miles distant; the whole force -crossed its bridge before evening, and established itself in bivouac -on the south side of the river. - - [714] ‘As usual, General Cuesta wanted to fight general actions,’ - writes Wellesley to Beresford, from Arzobispo, on the afternoon - of this same day. - -Cuesta remained at Oropesa for the whole day of August 4, and was -there joined both by Bassecourt, who had fallen back from Centinello, -and by Zayas and Albuquerque, who had evacuated Talavera at noon -and made a forced march to join their chief. He appeared disposed -to fight even though his ally had abandoned him. In the afternoon -Mortier’s cavalry pressed in against him. He turned fiercely upon -them, deployed a whole division of infantry and 1,200 horse in their -front, and drove them back towards their supports. This vigorous -action had a result that could not have been foreseen: Mortier jumped -to the conclusion that he was himself about to be attacked by the -whole Spanish army--perhaps by Wellesley also[715]. He halted the -5th Corps in advance of Navalmoral, and wrote to implore Soult to -come up to his aid without delay. The Duke of Dalmatia hurried up -with all speed, and on August 5 brought the 2nd Corps to Casatejada, -only six miles in the rear of his colleague. Ney, following with a -like promptness, advanced that day to Malpartida, a march behind the -position of Soult. - - [715] ‘M. le Maréchal duc de Trévise crut qu’il serait attaqué,’ - says Soult in his report of August 13. He therefore held back, - and sent for the 2nd Corps. Hence came Cuesta’s salvation. - -On the sixth, therefore, the whole army from the Douro was -practically concentrated, and Soult and Mortier advanced against -Cuesta with Ney close in their rear. They found that they were too -late: after remaining in battle order in front of the bridge of -Arzobispo during the whole of the fifth, courting the attack which -Mortier had been too cautious to deliver, the Captain-General had -crossed the Tagus that night, and had occupied its further bank. He -had left in front of the bridge only a small rearguard, which retired -after a skirmish with the advanced cavalry of the 5th Corps. For -once Cuesta had found luck upon his side; if Mortier had ventured to -assail him on the fifth, and had forced him to an engagement, in a -position from which retreat was difficult, and with the Tagus at his -back, his situation would have been most perilous. For even if he had -kept the 5th Corps at bay, he could not easily have withdrawn in face -of it, and Soult would have been upon him on the next morning. In -escaping across the narrow bridge of Arzobispo his losses must have -been terrible: indeed the greater part of his army might have been -destroyed. - -Finding, on the evening of August 6, that both the British and the -Estremaduran armies were now covered by the Tagus, whose line they -appeared determined to defend, Soult was forced to think out a new -plan of campaign. His original design of taking the allies in the -rear and cutting off their retreat had miscarried: he must now either -halt and recognize that his march had failed in its main purpose, or -else deliver a frontal attack upon the line of the Tagus. The bridge -of Almaraz was broken, and troops (the detachment of the Marquis -Del Reino) were visible behind it. The bridge of Arzobispo was not -destroyed, but the Spaniards were obviously ready to defend it. It -was barricaded, the mediaeval towers in its midst were manned by -a detachment of infantry, and a battery for twelve guns had been -placed in an earthwork erected on a knoll thirty yards in its -rear, so as to sweep all the approaches. Considerable forces both -of cavalry and of infantry were visible on the hillsides and in the -villages of the southern bank. Cuesta, in fact, while proposing -to fall back with his main body to Meza de Ibor and Deleytosa, in -order to recover his communication with his base at Badajoz, had -left behind a strong rearguard, consisting of Bassecourt’s infantry -division and Albuquerque’s six regiments of cavalry, a force of 5,000 -bayonets and nearly 3,000 sabres. They were ordered to defend the -bridge and the neighbouring ford of Azutan till further orders should -reach them. The ground was very strong; indeed the ford was the one -perilous point, and as that passage was narrow and hard to find, -Cuesta trusted that it might be maintained even against very superior -numbers. So formidable did the defence appear that Soult halted -during the whole day of August 7, while he took stock of the Spanish -positions, and sought up-stream and down-stream for means of passage -other than the bridge. He was not at first aware of the existence -of the ford: it was only revealed to him by the imprudence of the -Spanish cavalry, who rode their horses far into the stream when -watering them, thus showing that there were long shallows projecting -from the southern bank. By a careful search at night the French -intelligence-officers discovered that the river was only deep for -a few yards under their own bank[716]: for the rest of its breadth -there were only two or three feet of water. Having found the point, -not far from the bridge, where the more dangerous part of the channel -was fordable, they advised the Marshal that the passage of the -river would present no insurmountable difficulties. Soult resolved -to deliver an assault both on the bridge and on the ford upon the -morning of August 8. Nor was it only at Arzobispo that he determined -to force the line of the Tagus. He directed Ney, who was bringing up -his rear at the head of the 6th Corps, to turn aside to the broken -bridge of Almaraz, and to endeavour to cross the river by aid of a -ford which was said to exist in that neighbourhood. Sketch-maps were -sent to the Marshal in order to enable him to locate the exact point -of passage--it would seem that they must have been very faulty. - - [716] General Arteche, who has examined the ford, notes that the - main channel, narrow but with a rocky bottom, is close under the - northern, i.e. the French, bank. The remaining two-thirds of the - breadth of the river has a hard sandy bottom and is in August - extremely shallow. If once, therefore, the deep water under the - nearer bank was crossed, the French had no difficulties before - them. - -Meanwhile Wellesley had passed the Tagus four days and Cuesta three -days before the Marshal’s attack was ready, and both had been granted -time to proceed far upon their way. It was fortunate that they were -not hurried, for the road from Arzobispo to Meza de Ibor and thence -to Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, though passable for guns and wheeled -vehicles, was steep and in a deplorable condition of disrepair. -It took Wellesley two days to march from the bridge to Meza de -Ibor, a distance of only seventeen miles, because of the endless -trouble caused by his artillery. There were places where he had -practically to remake the roadway, and others where whole companies -of infantry had to be turned on to haul the cannon up slopes where -the half-starved horses could make no headway. These exertions were -all the more exhausting because the men were falling into a state of -great bodily weakness from insufficient supplies. Even at Talavera -they had on many days received no more than half rations: but after -passing Oropesa regular distributions of food ceased altogether for -some time: there were still a few slaughter-oxen with the army, but -bread or biscuit was unobtainable, and the troops had to maintain -themselves on what they could scrape up from the thinly peopled and -rugged country-side. A diet of overripe _garbanzos_, parched to the -hardness of bullets, was all that many could obtain. Better foragers -eked them out with honeycomb stolen from the peasants’ hives, and -pork got by shooting the half-wild pigs which roam in troops among -the woods on the mountain side. Many, in the ravenous eagerness -of hunger, ate the meat warm and raw, and contracted choleraic -complaints from their unwholesome feeding[717]. - - [717] For details of these privations see the diary of Leach of - the 95th, p. 92. - -Divining that Soult would probably make a dash at Almaraz as well as -at Arzobispo, Wellesley sent on ahead of his main body the brigade -of Robert Craufurd, to which he attached Donkin’s much depleted -regiments, in order to make up a small division. As they were -unhampered by guns or baggage this detachment reached Almaraz on the -sixth, after a fifteen hours’ forced march on the preceding day. They -took over charge of the broken bridge and the ford from the Spanish -troops of the Marquis Del Reino, and proceeded to entrench themselves -in the excellent positions overlooking the point where the river -was passable. Thus Ney, when he reached Almaraz on the following -day, found the enemy already established opposite him, and ready to -dispute the crossing. About 4,000 British troops and 1,500 Spanish -troops were holding the river bank: immediately at their backs -was the narrow and eminently defensible defile of Mirabete, which -completely commands the road to Truxillo: it was an even stronger -position than that which covered the ford and the ruined bridge. - -On August 7 therefore Wellesley considered himself in a comparatively -satisfactory situation. The passage at Almaraz was held by a -vanguard consisting of the best troops in the army. Two divisions, -the cavalry, and all the guns had traversed the worst part of the -road, and had reached Deleytosa, only nine miles behind Craufurd’s -position. If the French should attack on the following day, the -main body could reinforce the light brigade in a few hours. One -division, in the rear, was holding the position of Meza de Ibor, -which Wellesley did not wish to evacuate until the Spanish army was -ready to occupy it. He had discovered that there were points between -Arzobispo and Almaraz where the passage of the Tagus was not wholly -impracticable for small bodies of infantry[718], and dreaded that the -enemy might throw a detachment across the stream to make a dash for -the Meza. If this position had been lost the communication between -the two armies would have been broken. - - [718] Wellesley to O’Donoju, from Deleytosa, Aug. 7. - -Cuesta, meanwhile, was engaged in the steep and stony mountain road -over which Wellesley had toiled on the 5th and the 6th of August. -His vanguard was now close to Meza de Ibor: the rest of the army was -strung out between that point and Val de la Casa: the Captain-General -himself had his head quarters on the night of the seventh at Peraleda -de Garbin, ten miles west of Arzobispo. Bassecourt and Albuquerque -were still covering the rear, with Mortier’s corps now plainly -visible in their front. On their steadiness depended the safety -of the whole army, for Cuesta had more baggage and more guns[719] -than Wellesley, and therefore the road over the hills was even -more trying to him than to his colleague. There was a congestion -of wheeled transport at certain spots on the road which created -hopeless confusion, and barred the march of the cavalry and even -of the infantry divisions. It was only removed by setting whole -battalions to work to drag the wagons out of the way. Cuesta’s -ultimate destination was the Meza de Ibor, a position of unparalleled -strength, which could be held even after the enemy had crossed the -Tagus. That they would ultimately win their way over the river was -certain, for already news had arrived that Victor, after reaching -Talavera on Aug. 6, had pushed infantry over its bridge on the road -to Herencia and Aldea Nueva. Troops coming from this direction would -outflank the Arzobispo position, and compel Albuquerque to abandon -it. Even without cavalry or guns this detachment of the 1st Corps -would be strong enough to dislodge the guard of the bridge, by -falling upon its rear, while Mortier was attacking it in front. As -the cavalry of Victor and Soult had met, half way between Oropesa and -Talavera, upon the afternoon of the seventh, the two marshals were -now in full communication, and able to concert any plans that they -might please for joint operations. - - [719] Beside his own thirty guns he had the seventeen captured - French pieces which had been won at Talavera. Wellesley, it will - be remembered (p. 543), had handed them over to him. - -The Duke of Dalmatia, however, preferred to win all the credit for -himself, and attacked without allowing his colleague’s troops time -to approach the Spanish position. It was fortunate for Albuquerque -that the rivalry of the two hostile commanders saved him from the -joint assault, which would have been far more ruinous to him than the -actual combat of Aug. 8 was destined to prove. - -Having full knowledge of the existence and the locality of the ford -of Azutan, Soult had resolved to launch his main attack upon this -point, while directing only a subsidiary attack upon the fortified -bridge. This last was only to be pushed home in case the troops sent -against the ford should succeed in making good their footing upon the -further bank. A careful observation of the Spanish lines showed that -both Albuquerque and Bassecourt were holding back the main body of -their divisions at some distance from the water’s edge, in the groves -around the three villages of Pedrosa, Burgillo, and Azutan. There -was only a single regiment of cavalry watching the river bank, and -two or three battalions of infantry manning the towers of the bridge -of Arzobispo and the redoubt in its rear. The Spaniards showed every -sign of a blind confidence in the strength of their position behind -the broad but shallow Tagus. - -Knowing their habits, Soult selected for the moment of his attack -the hour of the _siesta_. It was between one and two o’clock in the -afternoon when he bade his columns, which had been drawn up under -cover, and at some distance from the water’s edge, to advance to -force the passage. For the assault upon the ford he had collected the -whole of his cavalry, no less than twelve regiments. Lahoussaye’s -dragoons formed the van, then came Lorges’ brigade, then the -division of light horse belonging to the 2nd Corps, in the rear the -corps-cavalry of Mortier. This mass of 4,000 horsemen was to be -followed by the first brigade of Girard’s infantry division of the -5th Corps, while its second brigade was to assault the bridge, when -Lahoussaye and Lorges should have won the passage of the ford and -have established themselves on the flank of the Spanish defences. -Gazan’s division, the second of the 5th Corps, was to support -Girard, while the masses of the infantry of the 2nd Corps remained -in reserve. All the light artillery of the army was to gallop down -to the water’s edge at various selected points, when the attacking -columns were first put in movement, and to distract the attention of -the enemy’s guns so far as lay in their power. - -At about 1.30 P.M. Caulaincourt’s brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, -a force of about 600 sabres, sallied out from its cover behind -the village of Arzobispo, and moved down to the ford at a sharp -trot. It plunged into the water, had passed the deeper part of the -channel almost before the Spaniards had guessed its intention, and -soon reached the shallows on the opposite bank. The only hostile -force ready to meet it was a single regiment (the 1st Estremaduran -Hussars) which was watching the ford, and a battalion of infantry -which Bassecourt sent down in haste from the redoubt behind the -bridge. A fierce charge of Caulaincourt’s dragoons dispersed and -routed the Spanish horse; after they had been driven off the victors -turned upon the battalion, which tried to form square on their -approach, but was late in finishing its manœuvre. It was assailed -before the rear side had been formed, broken up, and cut to pieces. - -Soult had thus gained a precious half-hour, during which the -remainder of his cavalry, squadron after squadron, came pouring over -the ford, and began to form up on the southern bank. When several -regiments had passed he also let loose the infantry brigade which -was to attack the bridge. So narrow was the approach that only a -single battalion (the 1st of the 40th of the line) could deliver the -assault. But the _tirailleur_ companies of several other battalions, -and two batteries of horse artillery, opened a lateral fire from -various points of the northern bank, to distract the Spaniards -from the frontal attack. The fraction of Bassecourt’s division -which was in position at the bridge and the redoubt had already -been completely cowed by seeing Lahoussaye’s cavalry forming up in -their flank and rear. If they waited to resist the infantry attack, -it was clear that they would be cut off from their sole line of -retreat by the dragoons. They abandoned their positions after firing -a couple of scattering volleys, and fled eastward along the river -bank towards the village of Azutan. The heavy guns in the redoubt -were left behind, and fell into the hands of Caulaincourt. Girard’s -infantry was therefore able to cross the river almost without loss, -two regiments at the bridge, two at the ford which the cavalry had -already utilized. A few men were drowned in the second column, having -strayed into deep water by swerving to the right or left of the -proper route. - -Meanwhile Albuquerque’s horse and Bassecourt’s second brigade, -roused from their ill-timed siesta, were pouring out of the villages -which had sheltered them from the noontide heat. The infantry--four -battalions apparently--drew up beside a wood, on the slope a mile -above the bridge, and waited to be attacked. The cavalry, however, -came on in one great mass, and charged down upon Lahoussaye’s -division, which was covering the deployment of the rest of the French -horse. Albuquerque’s only thought was to engage the enemy before he -had succeeded in passing the whole of his squadrons over the ford. -Vainly hoping to atone for his previous slackness by haste that came -too late, he had hurried his five regiments forward as soon as the -men could saddle and bridle their horses. Fractions of the different -corps were mixed together, and no proper first or second line had -been formed. The whole mass--some 2,500 sabres--in great disorder, -galloped down upon the two brigades of Lahoussaye, and engaged them -for a short time. But Lorges’ dragoons and part of Soult’s light -horse were now at hand to aid the leading division; the Spaniards -were beset in flank as well as in front, and broke after the first -shock. Albuquerque, who showed plenty of useless personal courage, -tried in vain to rally them on the 2nd Estremaduran Hussars, the only -regiment which remained intact. It was borne away by the backrush -of the rest, and scattering over the hillsides the whole body fled -westward and northward, some towards Peraleda de Garbin, others -towards Pedrosa. Bassecourt’s infantry went off to the rear as soon -as they saw their comrades routed, and took to the hills. By keeping -to rocky ground they suffered comparatively little loss. - -The French urged the pursuit of Albuquerque’s fugitive horsemen for -many miles, chasing them as far as the defile of La Estrella in the -Sierra de Guadalupe in one direction, and beyond Val de la Casa in -the other. On the latter road the chase only ceased when the dragoons -came upon the divisions of Henestrosa and Zayas, from Cuesta’s main -army, drawn up across their path. The losses of the Spaniards were -very considerable--600 men and 400 horses were captured, and over 800 -killed and wounded. One flag was taken, that of the regiment cut to -pieces by Lahoussaye’s dragoons at the commencement of the fighting. -The pieces in the redoubt, and the divisional battery of Albuquerque, -16 guns in all, were lost. By an additional mischance the French also -recovered fourteen of their own seventeen guns that had been taken at -Talavera. Cuesta had not been able to utilize these pieces for want -of gunners: they were trailing along in the rear of his army, very -indifferently horsed, when the French dragoons swept along the road -to Peraleda. On the approach of the pursuers they were abandoned by -the wayside. This capture enabled Soult to assert that he had taken -in all 30 cannon, and emboldened Sebastiani, a few weeks later, to -declare that he had never lost his guns at Talavera[720]. Having -recovered them he could exhibit them--all save two or three--in -evidence of his mendacious statement. - - [720] The fact that these guns were actually French explains - Le Noble’s statement that the captured pieces were largely ‘de - modèle français.’ Napier has a strange statement, whose source - I cannot discover, to the effect that ‘Cuesta on his march to - Meza d’Ibor left fifteen guns upon the road, which Albuquerque’s - flight uncovered. A trumpeter attending an English flag of truce - treacherously or foolishly made known the fact to the French, who - immediately sent cavalry to fetch them off.’ Napier, ii. 189. - -Soult declared in his official report that his cavalry had lost only -28 killed and 83 wounded, his artillery 4 wounded, his infantry -hardly a man, save some few drowned at the ford. - -The rout of the Spanish rearguard and the capture of the bridge of -Arzobispo gave Soult a foothold on the southern bank of the Tagus, -but little more. The road by which he could now advance against -the allies was detestable--we have already seen how its cliffs and -ravines had tried the British and the Estremaduran armies. To reach -Cuesta’s new position on the Meza de Ibor the Duke of Dalmatia would -have had to make a two days’ march through these defiles, dragging -his guns with him. His cavalry he would have been forced to leave -behind him, as there would have been no means of employing it in the -mountains. Meanwhile Wellesley had established himself in the ground -which he had selected behind the broken bridge of Almaraz, and Cuesta -had got the whole of his infantry and half his artillery over the -Ibor stream and arrayed them on the Meza, where the rocky slopes are -impregnable against a frontal attack, if the defending army shows -ordinary determination[721]. All through the ninth and the morning -of the tenth the Spaniards were dragging the rest of their guns and -their baggage up the steep zigzag path between the river and the -summit of the plateau, and it was not till the end of the latter day -that everything was in position. It is probable therefore that if -Soult had pressed his pursuit with all possible speed, he might have -captured some of the Spanish _impedimenta_ on the morning of the -tenth. But there were defiles between Peraleda and the Ibor river -where Cuesta’s rearguard might possibly have detained him till the -guns and baggage were in safety[722]. - - [721] It will he remembered that on March 17, Victor turned Del - Parque’s division out of the Meza de Ibor position. But the - latter had only 5,000 men, not enough to man the whole line, - while the Duke of Belluno had two divisions for the frontal - attack, and turned the Meza with another, that of Villatte. - Cuesta had 30,000 men and more, quite sufficient to hold the - entire position. - - [722] Wellesley went to visit his allies on the Meza upon the - morning of Aug. 10, and found that half the guns and baggage had - been dragged up on the ninth, but that there was still a great - accumulation at the foot of the steep slope, between the Ibor - river and the lower edge of the plateau. He was in great distress - at the notion that the French might come up at any moment, drive - in the rearguard, and capture the rear sections of the Spanish - train; see _Wellington Dispatches_, v. 22, to Lord Wellesley, - from Deleytosa, Aug. 10. - -The Duke of Dalmatia, however, paused at the bridge of Arzobispo -before committing himself to a second advance against the allies. He -was averse to making an isolated attack upon the admirable position -now occupied by the Estremaduran army, and wished to combine it with -a simultaneous assault upon the British. It will be remembered that -he had detached Ney’s corps from the rear of his line of march, and -ordered it to attempt the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, by the -ford which he knew to exist close to the ruined bridge. He also wrote -to Victor to desire him to push forward the two infantry divisions -which had crossed the river at Talavera, and to direct them on -Mohedas and Alia, so as to turn Cuesta’s flank by a long circuitous -march among the rugged summits of the Sierra de Guadalupe. - -Neither of these subsidiary movements was carried out. One division -of Ney’s corps, and Fournier’s brigade of dragoons reached Almaraz on -Aug. 8: the other division and the light cavalry had followed the 2nd -Corps so closely that it had passed Navalmoral on its way eastward, -and had to make a long counter-march. It was not till the ninth or -tenth therefore that the Duke of Elchingen would have been in a -position to attempt the passage of the Tagus. Craufurd’s detachment -had been established at Mirabete, behind the broken bridge, since -Aug. 6, and two days later the main body of the British army had -reached Deleytosa, where it was within a few hours’ march of the -vanguard, and perfectly ready to support it. If Ney had endeavoured -to pass the Tagus on the ninth or tenth with his 12,500 men, it is -clear that the head of his column must have been destroyed, for -the ford was narrow and difficult, and indeed barely passable for -infantry even in the middle of August[723]. But the Marshal did not -even attempt the passage, for the simple reason that his intelligence -officers failed to discover the ford, and reported to him that none -existed. He sent word to Soult that the scheme was impracticable, and -drawing back from the water’s edge concentrated his whole corps at -Navalmoral [Aug. 9]. - - [723] From Soult’s dispatch of Aug. 13, it appears that a Colonel - Ornano, with a regiment of dragoons, was detailed to examine the - banks of the Tagus in search of the ford, but failed to find - it. The cause is not hard to seek, for it crosses the river - diagonally on a narrow shelf of rock with deep water on either - side. It is not less than four feet deep, and Leach of the 95th, - who was on guard at its southern end, describes it as ‘not - exactly practicable for infantry even at the driest season of - the year’ (p. 94). The English, knowing its exact course, were - established in positions from which they could concentrate upon - it in a few minutes. We may rationally suppose, therefore, that - Ney would have found the Tagus not less difficult to pass on Aug. - 9, than the Oitaben had been on June 8. - -Victor, at the other end of the French line, showed no desire to -adventure his infantry among the defiles of the Sierra de Guadalupe, -without guns or cavalry, and refused to move up into the mountains in -order to turn Cuesta’s right flank. Thus the whole plan concerted by -the Duke of Dalmatia for a general attack on the allies came to an -ignominious conclusion. - -It would appear, indeed, that his chance of inflicting a serious -blow on the enemy had passed away long ere he brought the 2nd and -5th Corps down to the bridge of Arzobispo. It was on the fifth, when -Mortier refused to close with Cuesta and allowed him to withdraw -across the Tagus, that Soult had lost his best opportunity. On that -day the Spaniards were still on the wrong side of the river, and the -British vanguard had not yet reached the broken bridge of Almaraz. -If Mortier had engaged the army of Cuesta, and Ney had found and -attacked the ford at Almaraz before Craufurd’s arrival, the position -of the allies would have been forlorn indeed. But on the fifth Soult -had not yet discovered the real position of affairs; and the head of -Ney’s corps was only just debouching from Plasencia, two long marches -from Almaraz. In short ‘the fog of war,’ as a modern writer has -happily called it, was still lying thick about the combatants, and -Soult’s best chance was gone before he was even aware of it. - -On August 9, matters looked far less promising, even though the -bridge of Arzobispo had been won. Since Ney sent word that he could -not cross at Almaraz, while Victor declined to commit himself to any -schemes for an advance into the eastern mountains, Soult saw that -he must construct another scheme of operations. His own preference -was for a march into Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco. -Such an attack upon Wellesley’s base, made by the 50,000 men of -the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, would compel the British to abandon -Almaraz, to give up their connexion with Cuesta, and to march in -haste by Truxillo, Caceres, and Portalegre on Abrantes, in order to -cover Lisbon. It was even possible that, if the invading army made -great haste, it might reach Abrantes before the British: in that -case Wellesley would be forced to keep to the southern bank of the -Tagus and cross it at Santarem, comparatively close to the capital. -Thus all Central Portugal might be won without a battle, and Lisbon -itself might fall ere the campaign ended, since the 20,000 men of the -British general, even when aided by the local levies, could not (as -Soult supposed) hold back three French _corps d’armée_[724]. There -was another alternative possible--to march not on Lisbon but on -Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and to invade Portugal by the northern -road. But this plan would take a longer time to execute, and promised -less decisive results. - - [724] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 9, from Arzobispo: ‘Je serai disposé - soit à marcher sur Lisbonne pour détruire les établissements - anglais avant que leur armée ne puisse y arriver, et à lui rendre - son embarquement difficile, soit à marcher sur Ciudad Rodrigo - pour en faire le siège.... Dans le cas du premier mouvement (qui - produira infailliblement de grands résultats) j’aurai l’honneur - de prier V. M. d’avoir la bonté de faire connaître à MM. les - maréchaux ducs de Trévise et d’Elchingen que telle est son - intention, afin que toute observation soit ainsi prévenue, et - qu’on ne puisse m’attribuer aucun sentiment d’amour-propre.’ - -But even before the combat of Arzobispo had taken place, Joseph and -Jourdan had determined that they would not permit Soult to carry -out any schemes of advance against Portugal. They could show very -good grounds for their decision. If the Duke of Dalmatia marched -off to attack Lisbon, he would leave the 1st and 4th Corps and the -King’s reserve,--less than 50,000 men in all, after the losses of -Talavera,--opposed to Cuesta, Wellesley, and Venegas, who between -them would have at least 75,000[725]. If the British army should -refuse to be drawn away towards Portugal, and should recross the -Tagus at Almaraz with Cuesta in its wake, the situation would be -deplorable. Victor would be exposed, just as he had been on July 22 -and 23, to a joint attack from the two armies. And on this occasion -Sebastiani and the King would not be able to bring him help, for they -were now closely engaged with Venegas near Aranjuez. If they moved -away from the front of the army of La Mancha, Madrid would be lost in -two days. If they did not so move, Wellesley and Cuesta might crush -Victor, or drive him away on some eccentric line of retreat which -would uncover the capital. Jourdan therefore, writing in the name of -Joseph, had informed Soult in a dispatch dated Aug. 8, that it was -impossible to permit him to march on Portugal, as his departure would -uncover Madrid and probably bring about a fatal disaster. He also -urged that the exhaustion of the troops rendered a halt necessary, -and that it would be impossible to feed them, if they advanced into -the stony wilderness on the borders of Portugal before they had -collected magazines. For the present the King would be contented to -keep the allies in check, without seeking to attack or disperse them, -until the weather began to grow cooler and the troops had rested from -their fatigues. - - [725] Joseph, exaggerating the enemy’s force, was under the - impression that they had fully 100,000 men: see his letter to - Napoleon of July 31. - -[Illustration: THE CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA - JULY-AUGUST 1809] - -As if intending to put it out of Soult’s power to undertake his -projected expedition into Portugal, Jourdan and Joseph now -proceeded to deprive him of the control of one of his three army -corps. They authorized Ney to recross the mountains and to return to -Salamanca, in order to protect the plains of Leon from the incursions -of the Spaniards of Galicia. Deprived of such a large section of his -army, Soult would be unable to march against Abrantes, as he so much -desired to do. There were good military reasons, too, for sending -off Ney in this direction: Kellermann kept reporting that La Romana -was on the move, and that unless promptly succoured he should find -himself obliged to abandon Benavente and Zamora and to fall back on -Valladolid. The Spaniards from Ciudad Rodrigo had already taken the -offensive, and Del Parque’s advanced guard had even seized Salamanca. - -Ney accepted with alacrity the chance of withdrawing himself from the -immediate control of his old enemy Soult; he received his permission -to return to Leon on Aug. 9: on the tenth his whole corps was on -the move, and on the eleventh he had retired to Plasencia. On the -following day he plunged into the passes and made for Salamanca with -all possible speed[726]. - - [726] Ney has been accused of deserting Soult, and retiring - from Almaraz and Navalmoral on his own responsibility, and - contrary to the orders of his immediate superior. But Jourdan’s - dispatch of Aug. 9 to the Minister of War shows that the Duke - of Elchingen was obeying directions sent to him from the royal - head quarters. ‘Le roi a pensé,’ he writes, ‘qu’on ne devait - pas, quant à présent, chercher à pénétrer ni en Andalousie ni en - Portugal.... Le duc de Dalmatie renverra promptement le 6me corps - sur Salamanque pour en chasser les ennemis, et couvrir la Vieille - Castille conjointement avec le Général Kellermann.’ Ney then was - strictly correct in stating in his dispatch of Aug. 18, that he - had acted in obedience to his orders. - -While the 6th Corps was dispatched to the north, the King directed -Soult to take up, with the rest of his troops, a defensive position -opposite the allied armies on the central Tagus. The 2nd Corps was -to occupy Plasencia, the 5th to watch the passages at Almaraz and -Arzobispo, while keeping a detachment at Talavera. Thus all Soult’s -plans for an active campaign were shattered, and he was told off to -act as a ‘containing force.’ Meanwhile Joseph drew Victor and the -1st Corps away from Talavera, towards Toledo and La Mancha, with -the intention of bringing them into play against Venegas. For just -as Soult had always ‘an eye on Portugal,’ so Joseph had always ‘an -eye on Madrid.’ He could not feel secure so long as a Spanish army -lay near Toledo or Aranjuez, only two marches from the gates of his -capital, and was determined to dislodge it from this threatening -position before taking any other operation in hand. He had accepted -as true rumours to the effect that part of Cuesta’s troops had -retired in the direction of Ocaña[727] to join the army of La Mancha, -and even that 6,000 British[728] had been detached in this same -direction. Thus he had persuaded himself that Venegas had 40,000 men, -and was desirous of drawing in Victor to his head quarters before -delivering his attack, thinking that Sebastiani and the central -reserve would be too weak for the task. - - [727] Joseph to Napoleon, from Valdemoro, August 7. - - [728] Jourdan to Belliard, from Bargas, August 8. - - - - -SECTION XVI: CHAPTER IX - -THE END OF THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN: ALMONACID - - -While King Joseph’s orders were being carried out, Wellesley and -Cuesta found themselves, to their great surprise, unmolested by any -hostile force. The army which had been in their front at Almaraz and -Arzobispo disappeared on August 10, leaving only small detachments -to watch the northern bank of the Tagus. It was soon reported to -Wellesley that Victor had passed away towards Toledo, and that -another corps--or perhaps two[729]--had retired to Plasencia. The -object of this move however had to be determined, before the British -general could take corresponding measures. Was Soult about to invade -Portugal by way of Coria and Castello Branco, or was he merely -taking up cantonments, from which he could observe the British and -Estremaduran armies, while the King and Victor moved off against -Venegas? On the whole Wellesley was inclined to believe that the -latter hypothesis was the correct one, and that the enemy was about -to ‘refuse’ his right wing, and to use his left for offensive action -against the army of La Mancha. As was generally the case, his -prescience was not at fault, and he had exactly divined the King’s -intentions[730]. He had nevertheless to guard against the possibility -that the other alternative might prove to be correct, and that -Central Portugal was in danger--as indeed it would have been if -Joseph had allowed Soult to carry out his original plan. - - [729] See Wellesley’s letter of Aug. 14 to Beresford, concerning - the departure of the French. Robert Craufurd estimated the force - that had marched on Plasencia at 15,000 men, Donkin at 25,000. If - the latter had judged the numbers correctly, Wellesley supposed - that both Ney and Soult must have gone by this road: this was - actually the case. - - [730] Wellesley to Villiers, Aug. 12: ‘The French having been - moving since the ninth towards Plasencia.... I can form no - decided opinion respecting their intentions. I think, however, - that if they meditated a serious attack on Portugal they would - not have moved off in daylight, in full sight of our troops. I - suspect these movements are intended only as a feint, to induce - us to separate ourselves from the Spaniards, in order to cover - Portugal.’ - -Wellesley resolved therefore to maintain his present position at -Jaraicejo and Mirabete till he should be certain as to the intentions -of the French. If they were really about to invade Portugal, he would -march at once for Abrantes. If not, he would keep his ground, for by -holding the passage at Almaraz he was threatening the French centre, -and detaining in his front troops who would otherwise be free to -attack the Spaniards either in La Mancha or in Leon. - -Meanwhile measures had to be taken to provide a detaining force in -front of Soult, lest an attack on Portugal should turn out to be in -progress. This force was provided by bringing down Beresford and the -Portuguese field army to Zarza and Alcantara, and sending up to their -aid the British reinforcements which had landed at Lisbon during the -month of July. Beresford, it will be remembered, had received orders -at the commencement of the campaign directing him to concentrate his -army behind Almeida, to link his operations with those of Del Parque -and the Spanish force at Ciudad Rodrigo, but at the same time to -be ready to transfer himself either northward or southward if his -presence should be required on the Douro or the Tagus. In accordance -with these instructions Beresford had collected thirty-two battalions -of regular infantry, with one more from the Lusitanian Legion, and -the University Volunteers of Coimbra, as also five squadrons from -various cavalry regiments, and four batteries of artillery--a force -of 18,000 men in all[731]. On July 31 he had crossed the Spanish -frontier, and lay at San Felices and Villa de Cervo, near Ciudad -Rodrigo. There he heard of Soult’s march from Salamanca towards -Plasencia, and very properly made up his mind to bring his army down -to Estremadura by a line parallel to that which the French had taken. -He crossed the Sierra de Gata by the rough pass of Perales, and on -August 12 fixed his head quarters at Moraleja, near Coria, on the -southern slope of the mountains. His cavalry held Coria, while his -right wing was in touch with the English brigades from Lisbon, which -had just reached Zarza la Mayor. These were the seven battalions of -Lightburne and Catlin Craufurd[732], which Wellesley had vainly hoped -to receive in time for Talavera. They numbered 4,500 bayonets, and -had with them one battery of British artillery. - - [731] These regiments were, Line infantry, nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, - 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, all (save no. 15) two battalions - strong, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Cazadores, with no. - 2 of the Lusitanian Legion, and the ‘Voluntarios Académicos’ of - Coimbra. - - [732] Viz. 2/5th, 2/11th, 2/28th, 2/34th, 2/42nd, 2/39th, 2/88th. - -Thus even before Soult reached Plasencia, there was an army of 18,000 -Portuguese and 4,500 British on the lower Tietar, ready to act as a -detaining force and to retard the Marshal’s advance, if he should -make a serious attempt to invade Portugal. On Aug. 15, by Wellesley’s -orders, Beresford left Moraleja and transferred his whole army to -Zarza, in order to be able to fall back with perfect security on -Castello Branco should circumstances so require. If he had remained -at Moraleja he might have been cut off from the high-road to Abrantes -by a sudden movement of the enemy on Coria[733]. - - [733] See Wellesley to Beresford, Aug. 14. - -Wellesley now felt comparatively safe, so far as matters strategical -were concerned. If the enemy, contrary to his expectation, should -march into Portugal, he could join Beresford at Abrantes, and stand -at bay with some 24,000 British and 18,000 Portuguese regulars, a -force sufficient to check the 30,000 men who was the utmost force -that Soult could bring against him after Ney’s departure. Meanwhile, -till the Marshal should move, he retained his old position at -Mirabete and Jaraicejo. Though the French showed no signs of activity -in his front, the weary fortnight during which the British army -lay in position behind the Tagus were perhaps the most trying time -that Wellesley spent during his first campaign in Spain. It was a -period of absolute starvation for man and beast, and the army was -going to pieces under his eyes. Ever since the British had arrived -in front of Talavera on July 22, rations as we have already seen had -been scanty and irregular. But the fourteen days spent at Deleytosa -and Jaraicejo were even worse than those which had preceded them. -The stores collected at Plasencia had been captured by the French: -those gathered at Abrantes were so far distant that they could not -be drawn upon, now that the high-road north of the Tagus had been -cut by the enemy. The army had to live miserably on what it could -wring out of the country-side, which Victor two months before had -stripped to the very bones. Wellesley had hoped to be fed by the -Spanish Government, when he threw up his line of communication with -Abrantes, and took up that with Badajoz. But the Spanish Government -was a broken reed on which to lean: if it fed its own armies most -imperfectly, it was hardly to be expected that it would deal -more liberally with its allies. The trifling stores brought from -Talavera had long been exhausted: the country-side had been eaten -bare: from the South very little could be procured. The Spanish -Commissary-General Lozano de Torres[734] occasionally sent up a -small consignment of flour from Caceres and Truxillo, but it did not -suffice to give the army even half-rations. It was to no purpose -that at Abrantes provisions abounded at this moment, for there was -no means of getting them forward from Portugal[735]. The enemy lay -between the army and its base dépôt, and there was no transport -available to bring up the food by the circuitous route of Villa Velha -and Portalegre. Even so early as August 8 Wellesley began to write -that ‘a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose -their discipline and their spirit. They plunder in the very presence -of their officers. The officers are discontented, and almost as bad -as the men. With the army that a fortnight ago beat double their -numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half that -strength.’ On the eleventh he wrote to warn Cuesta that unless he was -provided with food of some sort he should remain no longer in his -advanced position, but fall back towards Badajoz, whatever might be -the consequences. ‘It is impossible,’ he stated, ‘for me to remain -any longer in a country in which no arrangement has been made for the -supply of provisions to the troops, and in which all the provisions -that are either found in the country or are sent from Seville (as -I have been informed for the use of the British army) are applied -solely and exclusively to the use of the Spanish troops[736].’ - - [734] That this official did something, if not so much as - Wellesley required, is shown by the letter to Cuesta of Aug. - 11, in which it is said that ‘the British army has received no - provisions since it was at Deleytosa, excepting some sent from - Truxillo by Señor Lozano de Torres,’ while again on Aug. 8, - Wellesley says that ‘we have had nothing since the third, save - 4,000 lbs. of biscuit, and that was divided among 30,000 [say - 23,000] mouths.’ - - [735] On Aug. 12, Wellesley writes from Jaraicejo to say that the - dépôt at Abrantes is much too large, and that some of the flour - ought to be sent back to Santarem, or even to Lisbon, till only - 300,000 rations should be left. - - [736] Wellesley to his brother Lord Wellesley, at Seville, Aug. 8. - -The Junta sent Wellesley a letter of high-flown praise for his -doings at Talavera, a present of horses, and a commission as -Captain-General in their army. But food they did not send in any -sufficient quantities. All the convoys that came up from Andalusia -were made over to Cuesta’s army, and the Estremaduran districts which -were supposed to be allotted for the sustenance of the British had -little or nothing to give. When we remember that in June Victor had -described this same region as absolutely exhausted and incapable of -furnishing the 1st Corps with even five days’ supplies, we shall -not wonder that Wellesley’s troops starved there in August. It was -impossible however to convince the British general that the suffering -of his men were the result of Spanish penury rather than of Spanish -negligence and bad faith. There was much just foundation for his -complaints, for the Junta, after so many promises, had sent him -no train from Andalusia. Moreover detachments and marauding bands -from Cuesta’s army frequently intercepted the small supplies of -food which British foraging parties were able to procure[737]. When -taxed with their misdoings, Cuesta replied that Wellesley’s men had -not unfrequently seized and plundered his own convoys, which was -undoubtedly true[738], and that the British soldiers were enjoying -such abundance that he had been told that some of them were actually -selling their bread-ration to the Spaniards because they had no need -of it--which was most certainly false[739]. - - [737] See Wellesley to Cuesta from Jaraicejo, Aug. 11. - - [738] Lord Munster (p. 251) confesses that ‘so pressing were our - wants that one of our commissaries took from them (the Spaniards) - by force a hundred bullocks and a hundred mule loads of bread.’ - Cuesta needs no further justification. But it is clear that his - own men were doing things precisely similar. - - [739] See the above-quoted dispatch to Cuesta of Aug. 11. - -That Wellesley was using no exaggerated terms, when he declared -that his army was literally perishing for want of food, is proved -by the narratives of a score of British officers who were present -in the Talavera campaign[740]. That his ultimate retreat was caused -by nothing but the necessity of saving his men is perfectly clear. -The strategical advantage of maintaining the position behind the -Almaraz passage was so evident, and the political disadvantages of -withdrawing were so obvious, that a man of Wellesley’s keen insight -into the facts of war must have desired to hold on as long as was -possible. Unless Soult were actually attacking Portugal, Mirabete -and Jaraicejo afforded the best ground that could be selected for -‘containing’ and imposing upon the enemy. So long as the British -army lay there it was practically unassailable from the front, while -it was admirably placed for the purpose of making an irruption into -the midst of the enemy’s lines, if he should disperse his corps in -search of food, or detach large forces towards La Mancha or Leon. ‘If -I could only have fed,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘I could, after some time, -have struck a brilliant blow either upon Soult at Plasencia, or upon -Mortier in the centre[741]. It is clear that by a dash across the -Almaraz passage he could have fallen upon either of these forces, and -assailed it with good hope of success before it could be succoured -by the other. But such a venture was impossible to an army which -had lost one-third of its cavalry horses from starvation within -three weeks, and whose battalions were brought so low by physical -exhaustion that few of them could be relied upon to march ten miles -in a day. - - [740] See especially the remarks of Leach, George Napier, - Leith-Hay, Stothert, and Cooper. - - [741] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Truxillo, Aug. 21, 1809. - -Wellesley declared that, having once linked his fortunes to those -of the Spanish army of Estremadura, he had considered himself bound -to co-operate with it as long as was humanly speaking possible, -and implicit credit may be given to his assertion[742]. The limit -of physical endurance, however, was reached on August 20, the day -on which he was finally compelled to commence his retreat in the -direction of Truxillo and Badajoz. - - [742] In his dispatch to the Marquis Wellesley, from Merida, - Aug. 24, he observes that he had considered himself in honour - bound to continue his co-operation unless (1) Soult should invade - Portugal, or (2) the Spaniards should move off towards another - theatre of war, i.e. La Mancha, or (3) he should himself be - starved out, as actually happened. - -Before that day arrived one event occurred which seemed to make -useful co-operation between the two allied armies more feasible than -it had been at any date since the campaign began. On the night of -August 12-13 Cuesta, whose health had been steadily growing worse -since the injuries that he had received at Medellin, was disabled -by a paralytic stroke which deprived him of the use of one of his -legs. He resigned on the following day, and was succeeded by his -second-in-command Eguia, an officer whose conciliatory manners and -mild disposition promised to make communication between the head -quarters of the two allied armies comparatively friendly. Cuesta, -after receiving from the Central Junta a letter of recall couched -in the most flattering terms, retired to the baths of Alhama. When -he had somewhat recovered his strength, he turned his energies -to writing a long vindication of his whole conduct in 1809, and -then engaged in a furious controversy with Venegas, concerning -the latter’s disobedience of orders in July. Engaged in these -harmless pursuits he ceased to be a source of danger to his country. -Unfortunately his removal from the theatre of war was not of such -benefit to the common cause as might have been hoped. The Junta -found ere long a general just as rash and incapable, if not quite so -old, to whom to entrust the command of its largest army. Juan Carlos -Areizaga, the vanquished of Ocaña, was entirely worthy to be the -spiritual heir of Cuesta’s policy. - -But for the present General Eguia was for some weeks in charge of -the Army of Estremadura. His first idea was to persuade Wellesley -to postpone his departure, and to retain his advanced position. He -urged this request upon his colleague with more zeal than tact, and -to no good effect. By using in one of his dispatches the phrase that -other considerations besides the want of food must be determining -the movements of the British army[743], he roused Wellesley’s -wrath. The famine was so real that any insinuation that it was -a mere pretext for retreat was certainly calculated to wound the -general whose troops were perishing before his eyes. Expressing -deep indignation[744] Wellesley refused to listen to a proposal -that he should divide with the Estremadurans the stores of food at -Truxillo--which indeed were hopelessly inadequate for the sustenance -of two armies. Nor would he even accept an offer made him on August -20 by Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, who came in haste from the Central -Junta, to the effect that he might appropriate the whole of the -magazine at Truxillo, leaving the Spanish army to provide for itself -from other resources. The proposal was probably honest and genuine, -but Wellesley knew the dilatory habits of the Junta so well that he -was convinced that the dépôt made over to him would never be properly -replenished, and would soon run dry[745]. - - [743] Eguia’s unhappy phrase was ‘If notwithstanding this answer - [to the effect that the Truxillo magazines should be placed in - charge of a British commissary] your Excellency should persist - in marching your troops into Portugal, I shall be convinced - that other causes, and not only the want of subsistence, have - induced your Excellency to decide on taking such a step.’ [From - Deleytosa, Aug. 19.] - - [744] ‘I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency’s - letter of this day’s date, and I feel much concerned that - anything should have occurred to induce your Excellency to - express a doubt of the truth of what I have written to you. - As however your Excellency entertains that doubt, any further - correspondence between us appears unnecessary, and accordingly - this is the last letter which I shall have the honour of - addressing to you.’ Wellesley to Eguia, Aug. 19. - - [745] ‘It is said that Don L. de Calvo promised and engaged to - supply the British army, upon which I have only to observe that I - had already trusted too long to the promises of Spanish agents, - and I had particular reason for want of confidence in Don L. de - Calvo. At the moment when he was assuring me that the British - army should have all the food the country could afford, I had - in my possession an order from him directing the magistrates of - Guadalupe to send to the Spanish head quarters provisions which - a British commissary had prepared for the magazine at Truxillo.’ - Oct. 30, to Marquis Wellesley. - -Marching therefore by short stages, for the exhaustion of his troops -made rapid progress impossible[746], he started from Jaraicejo on -August 20, and moved by Truxillo and Miajadas to the valley of the -Guadiana, where he cantoned the army about Merida, Montijo, and -Badajoz. The British head quarters were fixed at the last-named place -from September 3 till December 27, 1809, and, excepting for some -small changes in detail, the army retained the position which it had -now taken up for nearly four months. In the fertile region along -the Guadiana the troops were fed without much trouble: but they did -not recover the health that they had lost in the time of starvation -among the barren hills behind Arzobispo and Mirabete. In spite of the -junction of reinforcements and the return of convalescents to the -ranks, the army could never show more than from 23,000 to 25,000 men -under arms during the autumn months. When the rainy season began, the -intermittent ague which was known to the British as ‘Guadiana fever’ -was never absent: it did not often kill, but it disabled men by the -thousand, and it was not till Wellesley moved back into Portugal at -midwinter that the regiments recovered their normal health. - - [746] ‘I have no provisions, no horses, no means of transport, I - am overloaded with sick; the horses of the cavalry are scarcely - able to march, or those of the artillery to draw their guns. The - officers and soldiers alike are worn down by want of food and - privations of every description.’ Wellesley to Marquis Wellesley, - Miajadas, Aug. 22. - -If he had been free to follow his personal inclination, it is -probable that Wellesley would have moved back into Portugal -in September. But strategical and political reasons made this -impossible. While based on Badajoz he still threatened the French -hold on the valley of the Tagus, and compelled the King to keep -two army corps at least in his front. Since it was always possible -that he might return to Almaraz and threaten Madrid, a containing -force had to be told off against him. He was also in a position from -which he could easily sally out to check raids upon Portugal: from -Badajoz he could either join Beresford in a few marches, or fall by -Alcantara upon the flank of any detachment that Soult might lead -forward in the direction of Castello Branco and Abrantes. He was -convinced that no such raids would be made, but their possibility -had to be taken into consideration, and while lying in his present -cantonments he was well placed for frustrating them. But political -considerations were even more powerful than military considerations -in chaining him to Badajoz. The Junta at Seville were most anxious -to keep the British army in their front: they were convinced that, -if it retired on Portugal, Joseph and Soult would at once organize -an invasion of Andalusia, and they were well aware that Eguia and -Venegas would not suffice to hold back the 70,000 men who might -then be directed against them. In the dispatches which the Marquis -Wellesley (who had superseded Frere at Seville on August 11) kept -sending to his brother, the main fact conveyed was the absolute -despair with which the Spanish Government viewed the prospect of -the removal of their allies towards Portugal. ‘Don Martin de Garay -[the secretary to the Junta] declared to me with expressions of the -deepest sorrow and terror’--wrote the Marquis on August 22--‘that if -your army should quit Spain, at this critical moment, inevitable and -immediate ruin must ensue to his government, to whatever provinces -remain under its authority, to the cause of Spain itself, and to -every interest connected with the alliance so happily established -between Great Britain and the Spanish nation.... No argument produced -the effect of diminishing the urgency of his entreaties, and I have -ascertained that his sensations are in no degree more powerful than -those of the Government and of every description of people within -this city and its vicinity.... Viewing the painful consequences -that would follow your retreat into Portugal, I feel it my duty -to submit to your consideration the possibility of adopting some -intermediate plan, which may have some of the advantages of retreat -into Portugal, without occasioning alarm in Spain, and so endangering -the foundations of the alliance between that country and Great -Britain[747].’ - - [747] Lord Wellesley to Sir Arthur Wellesley, Seville, Aug. 22. - -A stay at Badajoz was obviously the only ‘intermediate plan’ that was -worth taking into consideration; and considering the urgency of his -brother’s representations Wellesley could not refuse to halt within -the Spanish border. The military advantages of the position that he -had now taken up were not inconsiderable, and no profit that could -have been got by returning into Portugal could have counterbalanced -the loss of the Spanish alliance. In the valley of the Central -Guadiana, therefore, the British army remained cantoned. But no -arguments that the Junta could produce availed to persuade Wellesley -to engage in another campaign with a Spanish colleague at his side. -Not even when the tempting offer was made that Albuquerque should be -given command of half of the Estremaduran army, and placed under his -orders, would he consent to pledge himself to offensive operations. - -Meanwhile, dispatches had arrived from England, containing the -official news that the Austrian War was at an end: rumours to that -effect had already reached the British camps from French sources -before Wellesley left Oropesa[748]. The whole character of the -continental struggle was changed by the fact that the Emperor had -once more the power to send reinforcements to Spain, or even to go -there himself. The situation required further consideration, and the -British Government resolved to place upon Wellesley’s shoulders the -all-important task of deciding whether the struggle in the Peninsula -could still be maintained, and how (in the event of his giving an -affirmative answer) it could best be carried on[749]. He replied that -in the existing state of affairs, and considering the bad state of -the Spanish armies, neither 30,000 nor even 40,000 British troops -would suffice to maintain Andalusia against the unlimited numbers of -French whom the Emperor could now send across the Pyrenees. But he -held that Portugal might be defended with success, if the Portuguese -army and militia could be completed to their full strength, and -the country well organized for resistance. It was probable that the -borders of Portugal could not be maintained; ‘the whole country -is frontier, and it would be difficult to prevent the enemy from -penetrating by some point or other.’ He would have therefore ‘to -confine himself to preserving what is most important,--the capital.’ -But this he was prepared to undertake, and strongly advised the -ministry to make no attempt to defend both Andalusia and Portugal, -but to leave the Junta to their own vain devices, and to make sure of -Lisbon[750]. - - [748] The Armistice of Znaim was signed July 12. The Falmouth - packet with the news reached Lisbon only on Aug. 9. Yet Wellesley - had heard rumours of peace as early as Aug. 4 [_Well. Disp._ iv. - 560]. - - [749] Canning to Lord Wellesley, London, Aug. 12: ‘The question - which first arises is whether the state of things in Spain be - such as that a British army of 30,000 men, acting in co-operation - with the Spanish armies, could be reasonably expected either to - effect the deliverance of the whole Peninsula, or to make head - against the augmented force which Bonaparte may now be enabled to - direct against that country. Upon this question your Excellency - will receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley, to whom a copy of - this dispatch is transmitted. If the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley - shall be that, with so limited a force as 30,000 men, offensive - operations in Spain could not prudently be attempted, and if he - shall conceive that the utmost object to which such an army would - be adequate is the defence of Portugal, your Excellency will then - only have to state to the Spanish Government the nature of the - instructions under which Sir A. Wellesley now acts.... If on the - other hand Sir A. Wellesley shall entertain the opinion that with - an effective British army of 30,000, combined with the Spanish - and Portuguese armies, it might be possible either to expel the - French from Spain, or to resist even their augmented force with - a reasonable prospect of success ... your Excellency will then - also receive the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley as to the conditions - necessary to be obtained from the Spanish Government, as a - preliminary to entering on any concerted system of joint military - operations.’ - - [750] For Wellesley’s answer to Canning see his reply to his - brother on Sept. 5, containing his ‘Observation on Mr. Secretary - Canning’s Dispatch of Aug. 12,’ combined with the reference to - his own dispatch of Aug. 24, which (as he writes to Castlereagh - on Sept. 4) ‘gives the government my opinion upon all the points - referred to in Mr. Canning’s dispatches.’ The quotation above - comes from this last-named document of Aug. 24. - -Thus, in September 1809 Wellesley enunciated with great clearness the -policy that he was about to employ in the next year. The lines of -Torres Vedras are already hovering before his imagination, and after -a flying visit to Lisbon in October they took definite shape in his -‘Memorandum for Colonel Fletcher’ of the twentieth of that month. -In that document the whole project for defending the Portuguese -capital by a series of concentric fortifications is set forth, and -the modifications which it afterwards suffered were only in matters -of detail. In short the Lines which were to check Masséna had been -thought out in the British general’s provident mind exactly twelve -months before the French army appeared in front of them. - -In following the fortunes of Wellesley we have now got far beyond -the point to which we have conducted the general history of the -Talavera campaign. It is time to turn back to the movements of Soult -and King Joseph, and to explain the reasons which made it possible -for the British army to remain unmolested at Jaraicejo and Mirabete -till August 20, and then to retire to Merida and Badajoz without -imperilling the safety of their Estremaduran allies. - -The King, as we have already seen, had made up his mind that the -all-important point, at this stage of the campaign, was to make an -end of the army of Venegas, and to relieve Madrid from danger. He -had therefore called Victor towards Toledo, and directed Mortier -to relieve the divisions of the 1st Corps which lay at Talavera -with troops from the 5th Corps. The result of this movement was to -leave Soult too weak to undertake any important operations against -Portugal. For Mortier’s men, being strung out on the long line from -Talavera to Navalmoral, with both Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s armies -in their front, could not be relied upon to lend aid for an advance -on Castello Branco or Abrantes. The Duke of Dalmatia therefore, when -he had reached Plasencia, could dispose of nothing but his own 2nd -Corps and Lahoussaye’s four regiments of dragoons. He dared not march -on Portugal with no more than 20,000 men, when the allies had it in -their power to fall upon Mortier the moment that his back was turned. -Accordingly he waited at Plasencia, sending out cavalry to Coria and -Torejoncillo, but did nothing more. Meanwhile Beresford and the two -British brigades from Lisbon were drawing near him, and on August -16 the Portuguese cavalry, advancing from the pass of Perales and -Moraleja, drove out the two French squadrons which were occupying -Coria, and thus warned Soult that a new army was coming into play -against him. Two days later Beresford had transferred himself to -the Castello Branco road, and a force of 23,000 men had been thrown -between the 2nd Corps and the Portuguese frontier. - -Meanwhile the King had met with unexpected good fortune in his -attack on Venegas. On August 5 he had set out from Valdemoro with -the intention of attacking the army of La Mancha in its position -at Aranjuez. It seemed unlikely that he would find it there, for -Venegas had displayed such excessive caution in his advance from the -Sierra Morena to the Tagus, and had so tamely refused to take his -opportunity of pouncing upon Madrid, that it seemed probable that he -would retreat at the first sign of the King’s approach. But rushing -to the opposite extreme of conduct, the Spanish general was now -ready to court destruction. He had received on the preceding night, -that of August 4, Cuesta’s dispatch of the third, informing him -that Soult had crossed the mountains and that both the British and -the Estremaduran armies were quitting Talavera. The Captain-General -warned him that he might expect an attack from the King’s army, and -ordered him to avoid an action, and to fall back towards the Despeña -Perros if he were pressed. Serenely putting aside the orders of -Cuesta, Venegas refused to retreat, and announced that he should not -copy the conduct of a superior who had fled even before the enemy -was in sight. He announced his intention of fighting, and directed -his army to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. Of his -five divisions, three were holding that town when the French came in -sight; the other two were écheloned between Aranjuez and Tembleque, -apparently in order to watch the roads from Toledo and Añover. The -enemy might, as Venegas saw, turn his flank either by crossing the -bridges of the former place, or by passing the easy ford at the -latter. A detachment of 800 men had been left to watch the debouches -from Toledo, and a couple of battalions observed the ford of Añover. - -King Joseph meanwhile, marching with a force composed of Sebastiani’s -corps, the Central Reserve, and Milhaud’s division of dragoons, -arrived in front of Aranjuez on August 5. Sebastiani, whose troops -led the advance, drove in the Spanish outposts, who retired across -the Tagus and broke the town bridge behind them. But beyond the river -the greater part of the army of La Mancha was visible in battle -order, prepared to receive the attack: Venegas himself, however, -chanced to be absent at the moment, as he had ridden over that -morning to visit his left wing, and General Giron was in temporary -charge of the defence. Sebastiani risked an attack on the Spanish -position, which was accessible by means of two fords. But finding -that the enemy was in great force and stood firm, he drew off his men -after a sharp skirmish. - -King Joseph now determined not to press the attack on Aranjuez and -its fords, but to cross the Tagus at points where he could secure -a less difficult passage. He countermarched Sebastiani’s corps to -the bridge of Toledo, and gave Milhaud orders to force the ford of -Añover. This manœuvre cost him three days; it was only on the evening -of August 8 that he succeeded in concentrating his main body at -Toledo. On the following morning Sebastiani passed the bridges and -drove off the Spanish detachment that was observing them: it fell -back on a larger force, and the 4th Corps pressing its advance, came -into contact with a whole hostile division. - -Venegas had not failed to guess the plan which the King would adopt, -and had moved off from Aranjuez towards Toledo, by roads parallel -to those which the French had employed. His 5th division, 4,000 -bayonets, under Major-General Zerain, was in front, and thus was the -first to meet Sebastiani’s attack. It was driven in after a sharp -skirmish, and retired a few miles to the small town of Almonacid, on -the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. On the same evening Milhaud’s -dragoons assailed the ford of Añover, drove off the small force that -was guarding it, and fell into line on Sebastiani’s left flank. On -the next morning Venegas came up with his remaining four divisions, -those of Lacy, Vigodet, Giron, and Castejon, and joined Zerain at -Almonacid. Thus both sides were concentrated for battle, save that -Joseph and his reserves, owing to the delay caused by a defile over -the narrow bridge of Toledo, were some ten miles to the rear of -Sebastiani. The Spanish army, after the deduction of men in hospital -or detached, amounted to about 23,000 men, of whom nearly 3,000 were -horse: it had forty guns. The King and Sebastiani had some 21,000 -sabres and bayonets, but of these nearly 4,000 were cavalry, so that -the French army enjoyed its usual preponderance in that arm, in -numbers no less than in efficiency. Two of its infantry divisions, -those of Leval and Sebastiani, had suffered heavily at Talavera: -the rest of the infantry--Valence’s Poles and the King’s guards and -reserves--had not been engaged in that battle; all the cavalry was -equally intact[751]. - - [751] The French force at Almonacid stood as follows:--4th - Corps; Sebastiani’s division 6,000 men, Valence’s 4,000, Leval’s - 3,000, and corps-cavalry (Merlin) 1,000. Milhaud’s dragoons had - 2,200 men present; the King had brought up 600 horse and about - 4,800 foot of his guards and of Dessolles’ division. The total - therefore was about 3,800 cavalry and 17,800 foot. - -Both armies were prepared to fight: King Joseph had resolved that -Madrid would never be safe till the army of La Mancha had been -beaten. Venegas was eager to meet him: he had persuaded himself -that the French troops which had passed the bridge of Toledo did -not amount to more than 14,000 men, and hoped for an easy victory. -He held a council of war on the night of the tenth, and found his -subordinates as ready to fight as himself. They determined to attack -Sebastiani on the dawn of August 12, and the Commander-in-chief -exclaimed with exultation that, whatever other Spanish officers -might do, he at least would never earn the nickname of _El General -Retiradas_[752]. - - [752] This remark I find in the narrative of General Bouligni, - the commanding officer of engineers in the Army of La Mancha - [Arteche, vi. 370]. Venegas was aiming his sneer at Castaños and - at La Romana, who had got the nickname of ‘Marquis de la Romeria’ - from his perpetual strategical movements to the rear. - -The French, however, anticipated Venegas, for on the morning of -August 11, at half-past five o’clock, Sebastiani presented himself in -front of the Spanish position and opened a furious attack, without -waiting for the arrival of King Joseph and the reserve. The army of -La Mancha had therefore to fight a defensive engagement, and never -got the chance of carrying out the ambitious designs of its chief. - -The battle-field of Almonacid bears a strong resemblance to that of -Ucles, where Venegas six months before had made such a deplorable -début in the character of a ‘fighting general.’ As at Ucles, the -Spanish army was arrayed on a series of eminences on each side of a -small town, with a long array of infantry and guns in its centre, and -the cavalry on the wings. As if to emphasize the resemblance, Venegas -committed his old fault of keeping no adequate reserve in hand, and -distributed his whole force in one thin line, with no more than four -battalions and two cavalry regiments drawn up in support to the rear -of the centre! The only points in which there was a marked difference -between Ucles and Almonacid was that on the latter field the eminence -on the Spanish left--a hill called Los Cerrojones--was so much higher -than the rest of the ground that it formed the key of the position, -just as the Cerro de Medellin had done at Talavera. Moreover, there -was a long hill behind Almonacid--the Cerro del Castillo--which gave -an admirable rallying-point for the army if it should be forced out -of its first fighting-ground. - -The main line of the Spanish order of battle was formed, counting -from right to left, by the divisions of Vigodet (no. 2), Castejon -(no. 4), Zerain (no. 5), and Lacy (no. 1), with a brigade of the -division of Giron (no. 3) continuing the array on to the Cerrojones. -The second brigade of Giron formed the sole reserve; it was drawn up -on the Cerro del Castillo, where the ruins of the mediaeval fort that -gave the hill its name were turned to account as a place of strength. -It had two cavalry regiments in its rear: the rest of the troops of -that arm were distributed between the two flanks. - -When Sebastiani came upon the field he fell upon the Spanish line -without a moment’s hesitation. Apparently he thought that delay would -only give the enemy time to rearrange his troops and strengthen his -weak points. At any rate he did not wait for the arrival of the King -and the reserve, but attacked at once. It was the same fault that -Victor had committed at Talavera, but Sebastiani was not destined -to receive the condign punishment that befell the Duke of Belluno. -Noting that the steep hill on the Spanish left was the key of the -position, he resolved to storm it before attacking the rest of the -hostile line. Accordingly he threw out Milhaud’s dragoons and his -own French division to ‘contain’ the Spanish centre and right, while -Leval’s Germans and Valence’s Poles were directed to assail the -Cerrojones. The former division turned the flank of the hill, while -the latter attacked it in front. - -The Spanish brigade on the hill made a stubborn resistance, and -even held back the Poles till its flank was turned by the Germans. -Venegas sent to its aid his miserably inadequate reserve under Giron, -and some battalions drawn from the first division. But these troops -came too late, the Cerrojones were lost, and the reinforcements only -succeeded in checking the French advance behind the hill, on the -slopes between it and Almonacid. The key of the position was thus in -Sebastiani’s hands, and, seeing the Spanish centre outflanked, he let -loose upon it his French division, which drove in Lacy and Zerain, -and captured the town of Almonacid and three guns. Venegas was thus -forced to draw back his whole line, and re-formed it on the Cerro -del Castillo, which lay behind his original position. The troops -were much disordered by this retrograde movement, yet made a very -creditable effort to maintain their new ground. But King Joseph and -the reserve had now come on the field, and Dessolles’ troops were -thrown into the front line to aid the infantry of the 4th Corps. -After a stubborn fight the Spanish left and centre again broke, and -Venegas was only able to save them from complete destruction by -bringing up Vigodet’s division, which was almost intact, and throwing -it in the way of the advancing enemy. It held out long enough to -allow the main body to escape, and then followed its comrades in -retreat down the high-road to Mora and Madridejos. The French -cavalry was let loose in pursuit, but does not seem to have been so -successful in its work as had been the case at Ucles and Medellin. At -any rate the bulk of the Spaniards escaped in more or less order, and -only the stragglers were cut up. - -The losses of Venegas’s army would appear to have been about 800 -killed and 2,500 wounded[753], besides a considerable number of -prisoners--perhaps 2,000 in all, for Sebastiani’s dispatch giving -the figure of 4,000 cannot be trusted. The army of La Mancha had -also lost twenty-one of its forty guns, all its baggage and several -standards. Still the defeat was far less crushing than Medellin had -been, and the whole army was rallied at the passes with no great -difficulty. It had fought very creditably, as is sufficiently vouched -for by the fact that Sebastiani acknowledged a loss of 319 killed -and 2,075 wounded. The Polish division in especial had suffered very -severely while storming the Cerrojones at the opening of the combat. - - [753] But see General Arteche’s calculation in vi. 392 of his - _Guerra de la Independencia_. - -Thus ended the part taken by the Army of La Mancha in the Talavera -campaign. No words are too strong to use in condemnation of Venegas’s -conduct. After wrecking the plan of campaign drawn up by Wellesley -and Cuesta by his criminal slackness and timidity in July, he then -proceeded to the extreme of culpable rashness. He had ample time -to retire to the South, when his position was compromised by the -departure of the British and Estremaduran armies from Talavera. -Instead of doing so he remained behind, and courted an unnecessary -battle, in which his unskilful dispositions secured the defeat of -an army which tried to do its duty and defended itself far better -than could have been expected. He should have been court-martialled -and shot for his repeated and impudent disobedience of Cuesta’s -orders. But the Junta, conscious that they were themselves to blame -for giving him secret directions which clashed with those of the -Commander-in-chief, spared him, and only removed him from command -some weeks later, in order to replace him by Areizaga, an officer of -exactly the same level of merit and intelligence. - -After his--or rather Sebastiani’s--victory at Almonacid King Joseph -established the 4th Corps in cantonments around Toledo and Aranjuez, -and sent Victor and the 1st Corps into La Mancha to observe the -passes and to contain the wrecks of Venegas’s army. He returned -himself with his guards and the reserve to Madrid on August 15, -celebrated a _Te Deum_, and published an extravagant account of -his own achievements, in which he claimed to have discomfited the -attempt of 120,000 enemies (there were but 80,000 at the most liberal -estimate) with the aid of 40,000 invincible French troops. The -co-operation of Soult’s 50,000 men was consigned to oblivion in this -extraordinary document. - -The moment that he heard of the defeat of Venegas, Soult wrote to -the King, renewing the demand which he had made ten days before -for permission to invade Portugal. Now that the army of La Mancha -had been disposed of, he considered that Victor might come back to -Talavera and Almaraz, so as to set free Mortier and the 5th Corps -for the attack on Portugal. He also suggested that Ney, having put -things right at Salamanca, might now be recalled to the valley of the -Tagus, and rejoin the 2nd and 5th Corps. He supported his demands -by an unfounded assertion that Wellesley was on his march to unite -with Beresford by way of Alcantara, and asked for leave to attack the -latter before the main British army should have joined him. In a few -days more, he said, it would be too late to move, for Beresford and -Wellesley would have concentrated their forces, so that he would have -45,000 Anglo-Portuguese in his front[754]. - - [754] Soult to Joseph, Aug. 18, from Plasencia. - -Joseph refused to listen to these arguments, and had fair reasons to -show for his negative reply to the Marshal’s requests. Wellesley, as -he truly remarked, was not marching for Alcantara to join Beresford: -he was still at Jaraicejo in close touch with the Estremaduran army. -If Mortier were removed to the Portuguese border, Wellesley and Eguia -might descend upon Victor and crush him. It was impossible to leave -less than two corps to defend the Middle Tagus. As for Ney, he could -not quit Leon, for Del Parque and the Galicians were concentrating -in great force upon his front. Indeed, he had just written to -request that the 2nd Corps might be moved up to Salamanca to support -him[755]. It was not now the time to engage in further offensive -operations either against Portugal or against Andalusia. The troops -were exhausted; the hospital of Madrid contained at the moment 12,000 -sick and wounded, the cavalry was so distressed by incessant work -that few regiments could put 250 men in line. The transport was worn -out, and new horses and mules were impossible to procure, for the -King had no money with which to purchase them. Finally, and this was -the most conclusive point of all, orders had been received from the -Emperor countermanding all active operations till the hot season -should be over[756]. It was impossible to say what his intentions -might be, now that he was freed from the Austrian War. He might come -himself to Spain, or he might send large reinforcements to the King. -In any case it would be impossible to move till his will was known -and his mind made up[757]. - - [755] Ney to Jourdan, from Salamanca, Aug. 22. - - [756] See Joseph to Clarke, Aug. 22, and Napoleon to Clarke, - Sept. 7. - - [757] For a presentment of Joseph’s case see Chapter xii. of - Jourdan’s _Mémoires_. - -These arguments were conclusive, and Soult was forced to remain -quiescent: all that he could do was to push small parties to Zarza -and Coria when Beresford had evacuated those places. - -Thus the Talavera campaign came to an end. There was now a long -pause in the movements both of the allies and of the French. The -subsequent fighting in October belongs to a totally independent -series of operations. The combatants who had been engaged in July and -August rested in September: Soult was left at Plasencia, Mortier at -Talavera and Navalmoral, Ney at Salamanca; Victor’s head quarters -were at Daymiel in La Mancha, Sebastiani lay along the Tagus from -Aranjuez to Toledo. Of the allied troops Wellesley’s army was -cantoned about Badajoz and Merida. The Estremadurans under Eguia -covered the passages of the Tagus from Deleytosa, Jaraicejo, and -Truxillo: Venegas was reorganizing his depleted corps at his old -quarters in the passes by La Carolina. Beresford was observing Soult -from Castello Branco, and lastly, the Galicians were moving down by -divisions to join Del Parque’s forces at Ciudad Rodrigo, where a -formidable army was now beginning to be collected. - -The Talavera campaign, in short, had settled nothing. The attempt -of the allies to capture Madrid had failed, but the attempt of the -French to surround Wellesley and Cuesta by Soult’s flank march had -failed also. Looking to the net results of all the fighting since -May, it could be said that the balance of loss stood against the -French. They had abandoned Galicia and the Asturias, as well as -their precarious hold on Northern Portugal. They had gained nothing, -save that their forces were concentrated in a good central position, -instead of being scattered from Corunna and Oporto as far as Merida -and Manzanares. The next move was in the hands of the Emperor: it -remained to be seen how he would deal with the situation in the -Peninsula, now that he, at last, had time to study it in detail. - -Before passing on to the new series of operations which took place -in the late autumn, one minor side-issue of the Talavera campaign -remains to be narrated--the fate of the small roving column of -4,000 Spaniards and Portuguese under Sir Robert Wilson, which had -been threatening Madrid in the King’s absence, and which had caused -so many misgivings in the mind of Marshal Victor. Wilson’s doings -were to give one more proof of his extraordinary resourcefulness -and vigour, if any further evidence were needed after his masterly -handling of Lapisse in the spring. It will be remembered that on -August 4 he had slipped away from Escalona, on hearing from Wellesley -that Soult had descended upon Plasencia. He intended to join the -main army at Talavera, but on nearing that place discovered that -it had already been evacuated, and that both the British and the -Estremaduran armies had disappeared in the direction of Oropesa. -Accordingly he directed his steps to the westward, hoping to overtake -Wellesley on his march. On his way, however, he was caught up by -Villatte’s division of Victor’s corps, which had been vainly hunting -for him at Nombella and Escalona since the fifth. Thrown out of his -path by this force, Wilson turned up into the mountains, intending to -escape by the northern bank of the Tietar. He soon learnt, however, -from the peasantry that Soult had sent a brigade under Foy to look -for him in the Vera of Plasencia, and that Hugo, the governor of -Avila, had come down to hold against him the passes of Arenas and -Monbeltran. Thus ringed around with foes, he did not lose his nerve, -but turning up into the Sierra de Gredos, by a mule-path that leads -from Aldea Nueva to the upper valley of the Alagon, escaped in the -direction of Bejar. From thence he intended to strike across towards -Portugal. But a new enemy now came upon him: he had evaded Villatte -and Foy only to run into the arms of Ney, who on this day [August 12] -was preparing to cross the Puerto de Baños on his way to Salamanca. -There was still time to escape from the Marshal’s front and to retire -to Ciudad Rodrigo unmolested. But Wilson saw the rocky defile of -the Puerto in front of him, and could not resist the temptation of -holding it against the enemy, though he was well aware that with -a force of less than 4,000 men, destitute of artillery, he could -not seriously hope to repulse a whole army corps. Nevertheless he -offered battle in the pass, and fought a running fight for nine hours -against Ney’s vanguard, defending three successive positions, from -each of which he had to be expelled. In his last stand he held on too -long, and allowed the enemy to close. His four battalions were all -broken, and fled over the hills to Miranda de Castañar, where they -rallied on the next day. The Marshal acknowledged in his dispatch to -King Joseph a loss of five officers and thirty men killed, and ten -officers and 140 men wounded, which shows that he had been forced -to fight hard to clear the pass. He claimed to have ‘destroyed’ -Wilson’s detachment, and declared that 1,200 Spaniards and Portuguese -had fallen. But Wilson’s returns show that his total loss, killed, -wounded, and missing, was under 400, among whom there was not a -single field officer or captain. Having assuaged his thirst for a -fight by this gallant, if unnecessary, engagement, Wilson escaped to -the Pass of Perales, and finally reached Castello Branco on August -24, where he fell in with Beresford, and was at last in safety, after -his many wanderings among the summits of the Sierra de Gredos and -the Sierra de Gata. This hazardous march was his last achievement in -the Peninsula; after a bitter quarrel with Beresford concerning the -status of his Lusitanian Legion in the Portuguese army, he sailed for -England in October, and never returned to Portugal. - - - - -APPENDICES - - - - -I - -THE ‘ARMY OF THE CENTRE,’ JAN. 11, 1809 - -THE SPANISH ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF UCLES - -[N.B.--From the Tables in Arteche, vol. v.] - -The Battalions which fought at Ucles are indicated by a star *. - - -Vanguard Division, Major-General Duke of Albuquerque: - Corona (1st and 3rd batts.) 415, *Murcia 652, *Cantabria - (1st batt.) 315, *Provincial of Jaen 342, *Provincial of - Chinchilla 354, *Voluntarios Catalanes 499, *Cazadores de - Barbastro 221, *Campomayor 465, Tiradores de Castilla 666 = 3,929 - -1st Division, Lieut.-General Marquis de Coupigny: - Reyna (1st and 3rd batts.) 494, *Africa (1st and 3rd batts.) - 771, *Burgos (1st and 3rd batts.) 519, 1st of Seville 193, - *3rd of Seville 106, Provincial of Granada 176, Provincial - of Bujalance 101, *Provincial of Cuenca 626, Provincial of - Ciudad Real 268, Provincial of Plasencia 180, Voluntarios - de Valencia 327, *Navas de Tolosa 542, *Tiradores de Cadiz - 818 = 5,121 - -2nd Division, Major-General Conde de Orgaz: - *Ordenes Militares (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.) 848, *4th of - Seville 224, 5th of Seville 304, 1st Voluntarios de Madrid - 688, Provincial de Leon 484, Provincial de Logroño 265, - *Provincial de Toro 265, Provincial de Valladolid 378, - *Baylen 472, Tiradores de España 407, *Voluntarios de - Carmona 456, Voluntarios de Ledesma 497 = 5,288 - -Reserve, Lieut.-General La Peña: - Spanish Guards (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,217, *Walloon Guards - (1st batt.) 425, *Granaderos Provinciales de Andalucia 522, - *Irlanda (1st batt.) 377, Granaderos del General 324, - Provincial de Cordova 622, Provincial de Guadix 391, - Provincial de Lorca 417 = 4,295 - - -CAVALRY. - - *Reyna 276, *Principe 141, *Borbon 119, *España 342, - *Santiago 74, *Tejas 131, *Pavia 428, *Lusitania 158, - *Dragones de Castilla 125, Farnesio ?, Montesa ?, - Calatrava ?, Sagunto ?, Alcantara ? = 1,814 - -Estimating the 5 regiments without returns at 1,000 sabres, we get -2,814 in all. - -ARTILLERY 386. - -*SAPPERS 383. - -Total of the Army, 21,216. - -Of these the following, with a strength of 11,500 men, were present -at Ucles, - - Of the Vanguard 2,848 - ” 1st Division 2,804 - ” 2nd ” 1,917 - ” Reserve 1,634 - ” Cavalry 1,814 - ” Sappers 383 - ” Artillery 100 - ------ - Total 11,500 - -There is a discrepancy between this total and the numbers borne -in the battalions above. It is caused by the fact that Irlanda, -Ordenes Militares, and Tiradores de Cadiz were not complete on the -battle-morning, but had companies detached. - - - - -II - -THE GARRISON OF SARAGOSSA - -[From the return of Jan. 1, 1809, given by Ibieca, corrected by -reference to Arteche iv. 550-1, and the Conde de Clonard, ii. 284-93.] - -INFANTRY. - -1st DIVISION, Brigadier-General F. BUTRON: - - _Present - _Gross under - Total._ arms._ - Walloon Guards 530 450 - Estremadura 610 390 - Granaderos de Palafox 1,005 752 - Fusileros del Reyno 1,571 1,291 - Don Carlos 1,014 534 - Batallon del Carmen 771 661 - Batallon del Portillo 834 594 - Batallon de Torrero 720 485 - Batallon de Calatayud 967 881 - 1st Ligero de Zaragoza 680 566 - 2nd Ligero de Zaragoza 666 546 - 1st Cazadores Catalanes 625 465 - 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon 1,200 1,060 - ------ ----- - Divisional Total 11,193 8,675 - - 2nd Division, Brigadier-General D. FIBALLER: - - Spanish Guards 898 676 - 2nd of Valencia 954 726 - 1st Volunteers of Aragon 1,183 970 - Cazadores de Fernando - VII (Aragonese) 545 345 - ----- ----- - Divisional Total 3,580 2,717 - - 3rd Division, Brigadier-General JOSÉ MANSO: - - Peñas de San Pedro 594 241 - 1st of Huesca 1,274 973 - Florida Blanca 352 229 - 1st Tiradores de Murcia 750 343 - 1st of Murcia 1,272 631 - 2nd of Murcia 1,159 477 - 3rd of Murcia 1,098 438 - Suizos de Aragon 496 361 - ----- ----- - Divisional Total 6,995 3,693 - - 4th Division, Major-General F. ST. MARCH: - - Voluntarios de Borbon 436 317 - Voluntarios de Castilla 542 292 - Voluntarios de Chelva 789 529 - Voluntarios de Turia 903 483 - Cazadores de Fernando - VII (Valencians) 304 190 - Segorbe 412 313 - Soria [Militia] 172 130 - 1st of Alicante 730 309 - 5th of Murcia 1,040 423 - 2nd Tiradores de Murcia 131 91 - ----- ----- - Divisional Total 5,459 3,077 - - ROCA’S DIVISION of the ‘Army of the Centre’: - - 1st of Savoia 347 105 - Orihuela 731 315 - 1st Cazadores de Valencia 505 275 - Murcia [Militia] 633 426 - America ? 148 - Avila [Militia] ? 277 - ----- ----- - Total 2,216 1,546 - - Details from Regiments of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions of the - ‘Army of the Centre’: viz.:-- - - Carmona, Guadix [Militia], Voluntarios de Madrid, Ordenes - Militares, Toro (Militia) Africa, Burgos [Militia] Navas - de Tolosa, Baylen, 5th of Seville, Campomayor, Cadiz, - Cuenca, Tiradores de Cartagena, 1st of Valencia--all small - fragments of regiments which had fought at Tudela in the - left wing, but had taken refuge in Saragossa: the numbers - vary from 200 to ten men Total, perhaps 1,200 - - -CAVALRY. - - Rey, Numancia, Fuensanta, Husares de Palafox, Cazadores de - Fernando VII, Husares de Aragon. With fragments of the - following regiments of the ‘Army of the Centre’: Borbon, - Lusitania, Olivenza, Pavia, Reyna, Santiago, Tejas - Gross Total sabres, about 2,000 - -ARTILLERY about 1,800 - - -ENGINEERS. - - Zapadores de Aragon, ditto de Valencia, ditto de Calatayud 800 - -TOTALS. - - _Effectives - _Gross._ Present._ - Infantry of the four Aragonese Divisions 27,227 18,162 - Cavalry 2,000 1,600 - Artillery 1,800 1,600 - Engineers 800 700 - Details of the Army of the Centre 4,191 2,746 - ------ ------ - 36,018 24,808 - -All these are regularly organized corps. It is impossible to state the -figures of the irregulars with any certainty. - -N.B.--Ibieca errs in including Doyle, La Reunion, Fieles Zaragozanos -and 3rd of Valencia in the Garrison, they were detached in Aragon, the -first at Jaca, the two next with the Marquis of Lazan. See the tables -on pp. 284-293 of vol. vi. of the Conde de Clonard’s great work. - - - - -III - -STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN, - -FEBRUARY 1, 1809 - -N.B.--This return includes effective men, _présents sous les armes_, -only, not sick or detached. - -1st Corps, Marshal VICTOR: - - 1st Division, Ruffin [9th Léger, 24th and 96th Line (three - batts. each)] 5,429 - 2nd Division, Lapisse [16th Léger, 8th, 45th, and 54th Line - (three batts. each)] 7,692 - 3rd Division, Villatte [27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, and 95th Line - (three batts. each)] 6,376 - Corps-Cavalry, Beaumont [2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs] 1,386 - Westphalian Chevaux-Légers 487 - Artillery [with 48 guns] 1,523 - État Major 33 - ------ - Total 22,926 - -2nd Corps, Marshal SOULT: - - 1st Division, Merle [2nd and 4th Léger, 15th (four batts. - each) and 36th Line (three batts.)] 6,498 - 2nd Division, Mermet [31st Léger (four batts.), 47th Line - (four batts.), 122nd (four batts.), 2nd, 3rd, 4th Swiss - (one batt. each)] 5,459 - 3rd Division, Delaborde [17th, 70th, 86th Line (three batts. - each)] 4,954 - 4th Division, Heudelet [26th Line (two batts.), 66th Line - (two batts.), 15th Léger (one batt.), 32nd Léger (one - batt.), 82nd Line (one batt.), _Légion du Midi_ (one - batt.), Hanoverian Legion (one batt.), _Garde de Paris_ - (one batt.)] 3,158 - Corps-Cavalry, Franceschi [1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd - Chasseurs, Hanoverian Chevaux-Légers] 1,340 - Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 54 guns - État Major 43 - ------ - Total 21,452 - -N.B.--Lahoussaye’s Dragoons, and one brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons, were -also present with the corps, with a strength of 2,000 sabres. - -3rd Corps, General JUNOT: - - 1st Division, Grandjean [14th Line (three batts.), 44th - Line (three batts.), 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula (two - batts. each)] 5,866 - 2nd Division, Musnier [114th and 115th Line (three batts. - each), 1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 2nd Legion of - Reserve] 3,544 - 3rd Division, Morlot [5th Léger (one batt.), 116th and - 117th Line (four batts. each), 121st Line (four batts.)] 2,637 - Corps-Cavalry, Wathier [13th Cuirassiers, 4th Hussars, - Polish Lancers, Provisional regiments] 1,652 - Engineers and Sappers (for siege of Saragossa) 2,336 - Artillery (the men included under divisional totals), 40 guns - État Major 36 - ------ - Total 16,071 - -4th Corps, General SEBASTIANI: - - 1st Division, Sebastiani [28th, 32nd, 58th, 75th Line - (three batts. each)] 5,660 - 2nd Division, Leval [Holland, Nassau, Baden, Hesse (two - batts. each), Frankfort (one batt.)] 3,127 - 3rd Division, Valence [4th, 7th, 9th Polish (two batts. - each)] 3,915 - Corps-Cavalry [5th Dragoons, 3rd Dutch Hussars, Polish - Lancers] 1,781 - Artillery (with 30 guns) 894 - État Major 22 - ------ - Total 15,399 - -5th Corps, Marshal MORTIER: - - 1st Division, Suchet [17th Léger, 40th, 64th, 88th Line - (three batts. each), 34th Line (four batts.)] 8,477 - 2nd Division, Gazan [21st, 28th, 100th, 103rd Line (three - batts. each)] 7,110 - Corps-Cavalry, Delaage [10th Hussars, 21st Chasseurs] 926 - Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,420 - État Major 26 - ------ - Total 17,959 - -6th Corps, Marshal NEY: - - 1st Division, Marchand [6th, 39th, 69th, 76th Line (three - batts. each)] 6,853 - 2nd Division, Maurice Mathieu [25th Léger, 27th, 50th, - 59th (three batts. each)] 6,917 - Corps-Cavalry, Lorcet [3rd Hussars, 15th Chasseurs] 840 - Artillery (with 30 guns) 1,534 - État Major 32 - ------ - Total 16,176 - -N.B.--One brigade of Lorges’ Dragoons was also present with the corps. - -7th Corps, General GOUVION ST. CYR: - - 1st Division, Souham [1st Léger (three batts.), 3rd Léger - (one batt.), 7th Line (two batts.), 42nd Line (three - batts.), 67th Line (one batt.)] 6,220 - 2nd Division, Chabran [2nd, 10th, 37th, 56th, 93rd Line, - and 2nd Swiss (one batt. each)] 4,037 - 3rd Division, Chabot [Chasseurs des Montagnes (one batt.), - 2nd Neapolitans (two batts.)] 1,633 - 4th Division, Reille [2nd Line (one batt.), 32nd Léger - (one batt.), 113th Line (two batts.), 16th and 56th Line - (one batt. each), Valais (one batt.)] 3,980 - 5th Division, Pino [Italian 1st and 2nd Léger, 4th and 6th - Line (three batts. each), 7th Line (one batt.)] 8,008 - 6th Division, Lecchi [Italian 2nd, 4th, 5th Line, Velites - (one batt. each), 1st Neapolitans (two batts.)] 3,941 - German Division, Morio [2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 1st Light of - Westphalia] 5,321 - Cavalry, French [24th Dragoons, 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers, - 3rd ditto Chasseurs] 1,730 - Cavalry, Italian [Dragoons of Napoleon, Royal Chasseurs, - Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, Neapolitan Chasseurs] 1,862 - Artillery, French 2,050 - Artillery, Italian 585 - Artillery, German 48 - ------ - Total 39,415 - -RESERVE CAVALRY. - - 1st Division of Dragoons, Latour-Maubourg: - 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 2,527 - 2nd Division of Dragoons, Milhaud: - 12th, 16th, 20th, 21st Dragoons 2,125 - 3rd Division of Dragoons, Lahoussaye: - 17th, 18th, 19th, 27th Dragoons 1,335 - 4th Division of Dragoons, Lorges: - 13th, 15th, 22nd, 25th Dragoons 1,228 - 5th Division of Dragoons, Millet: - 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th Dragoons 1,470 - Light-Cavalry Division of Lasalle: - 10th, 26th Chasseurs, 8th Dragoons 1,495 - Artillery, batteries attached to the Cavalry Divisions: 712 - ------ - Total 10,892 - -RESERVE AT MADRID: - - Division Dessolles [12th Léger, 43rd, 51st, 55th Line - (each three batts.), 8,507; Royal Guards, 2,200; 27th - Chasseurs, 500] 11,207 - -GARRISONS OF THE NORTH (Marshal BESSIÈRES): - - In Biscay, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Santander, Old Castile, - and Leon 19,902 - -GRAND PARK OF ARTILLERY 2,579 - -GRAND TOTAL OF ‘_Présents sous les armes_,’ 193,978. - -At the same time there were Sick 56,404, Detached 36,326, Prisoners -1,843. - -GROSS TOTAL of the whole army in Spain, 288,551. - - - - -IV - -THE SPANISH ARMY AT MEDELLIN - - -Cuesta’s army at Medellin was composed of the following regiments. -It is, unfortunately, impossible to say how they were brigaded -at the moment, as the only return available is that of April 4, -when the original distribution of the army had been broken up, -and the Andalusian division distributed among the other four. The -Estremaduran battalions were very strong, some few of them ranging up -to 1,100 and even 1,400 bayonets, though others had but 500 or 700. - -(1) Troops of Belvedere’s old army of Estremadura: - - *Spanish Guards (4th batt.); *Walloon Guards (4th batt.); *2nd - of Majorca; *2nd Light of Catalonia; †Provincial of Badajoz; - †Provincial Grenadiers; ‡Badajoz (two batts.); ‡Zafra; ‡Truxillo; - ‡Merida; ‡Plasencia; ‡La Serena; ‡Leales de Ferdinando VII (two - batts.) - - Total. Fifteen batts. - -(2) Troops of San Juan’s old ‘Army of Reserve of Madrid’: - - Walloon Guards (2nd batt.); *Jaen (two batts.); *Irlanda (two - batts.); †Provincial of Toledo; †Provincial of Burgos; ‡2nd - Volunteers of Madrid; ‡3rd of Seville - - Total. Nine batts. - -(3) Troops under Albuquerque, from the Army of the Centre: - - *Campomayor; †Provincial of Guadix; †Provincial of Cordova; - ‡Osuna (two batts.); ‡Granaderos del General; ‡Tiradores de Cadiz - - Total. Seven batts. - -N.B.--Of these troops, Plasencia, Zafra, Truxillo, and the ‘Leales -de Ferdinando VII’ (two batts.) were in garrison at Badajoz and not -present in the field. - -The probable strength of the infantry engaged at Medellin was about -20,000 bayonets. - - -CAVALRY. - -(1) Old troops of the Army of Estremadura: - - *4th Hussars (‘Volunteers of Spain’); *1st Hussars of Estremadura - [late Maria Luisa]. - -(2) Old troops of La Romana’s army, from Denmark: - - *Rey; *Infante; *Almanza. - -(3) New Levies: - - ‡Cazadores de Llerena; ‡Imperial de Toledo. - -There was also present one regiment from Andalusia, which had joined -with Albuquerque, apparently *Reyna. - -Eight regiments in all, with an odd squadron of Carabineros Reales -in addition. Effectives very low. Total about 3,000 or 3,200 sabres. -Several regiments had a squadron detached in Andalusia, in search of -remounts. - - -ARTILLERY. - -Thirty guns, about 650 men; Sappers, two companies, about 200 men. -Total, about 24,000 men. - - - - -V - -ORGANIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY IN 1809 - -The numbers are from the first complete return available, that of -Sept. 15 in the Record Office. - - -INFANTRY OF THE LINE. - -N.B.--Each regiment consisted of two battalions of seven companies -each, which should have numbered 770 officers and men, the regiment -totalling 1,550, with staff. - - _Strength._ - 1st Regt. (1st of Lisbon or La Lippe) 1,330 - 2nd Regt. (Lagos or Algarve) 1,301 - 3rd Regt. (1st of Olivenza[758]) 679 - 4th Regt. (Freire) 1,477 - 5th Regt. (1st of Elvas) 759 - 6th Regt. (1st of Oporto) 1,082 - 7th Regt. (Setubal) 1,312 - 8th Regt. (Evora) 369 - 9th Regt. (Viana) 1,511 - 10th Regt. (2nd of Lisbon) 1,370 - 11th Regt. (1st of Almeida) 1,498 - 12th Regt. (Chaves) 1,491 - 13th Regt. (Peniche) 1,361 - 14th Regt. (Tavira) 1,239 - 15th Regt. (2nd of Olivenza[758]) 577 - 16th Regt. (Viera Telles) 696 - 17th Regt. (2nd of Elvas) 1,218 - 18th Regt. (2nd of Oporto) 1,371 - 19th Regt. (Cascaes) 1,519 - 20th Regt. (Campomayor) 1,218 - 21st Regt. (Valenza) 193 - 22nd Regt. (Serpa) 1,479 - 23rd Regt. (2nd of Almeida) 1,521 - 24th Regt. (Braganza) 505 - ------ - Total 27,076 - - [758] Though named from Olivenza these regiments were actually - raised in Northern Beira, with head quarters at Lamego, Olivenza - having been ceded to Spain in 1801 at the treaty of Badajoz. - - -CAZADORES. - -N.B.--These were single-battalion corps with a proper effective of -770 men. - - _Strength._ - 1st (Castello de Vide) 620 - 2nd (Moura) 425 - 3rd (Villa Real) 607 - 4th (Vizeu) 619 - 5th (Campomayor) 321 - 6th (Oporto) 560 - ----- - Total 3,152 - -The 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores were formed later, out of the three -battalions of the Lusitanian Legion. The 10th, 11th, and 12th were -raised in the year 1811. - -The brigading of the Portuguese regular infantry was practically -permanent, very few changes having been made after 1810, when the -greater part of the regiments were attached in pairs to the British -divisions. The arrangement was as follows, 1811-14:-- - - 1st Brigade 1st (Lisbon) and 16th (Viera Telles) [attached to 1st - Division]. - 2nd ” 2nd (Lagos) and 14th (Tavira). - 3rd ” 3rd (1st of Olivenza) and 15th (2nd of Olivenza) - [attached to 5th Division]. - 4th ” 4th (Freire) and 10th (2nd of Lisbon) [attached - to 2nd Division]. - 5th ” 5th (1st of Elvas) and 17th (2nd of Elvas). - 6th ” 6th (Oporto) and 18th (2nd of Oporto). - 7th ” 7th (Setubal) and 19th (Cascaes) [attached to 7th - Division]. - 8th ” 8th (Evora) and 12th (Chaves) [attached to 6th - Division]. - 9th ” 9th (Viana) and 21st (Valenza) [attached to 3rd - Division]. - 10th ” 11th (1st of Almeida) and 23rd (2nd of Almeida) - [attached to 4th Division]. - 11th ” 13th (Peniche) and 24th (Braganza). - The 20th (Campomayor) and 22nd (Serpa) were never brigaded. - The 1st and 3rd Cazadores were attached to the Light Division. - The 2nd was attached to the 7th Portuguese Brigade, in the 7th Division. - The 4th was attached to the 1st Portuguese Brigade, in the 1st Division. - The 6th was attached to the 6th Portuguese Brigade. - - -CAVALRY. - -N.B.--Each regiment should have had 594 men, in four strong squadrons. - - _Strength._ - 1st (Alcantara Dragoons) 559 - 2nd (Moura) 400 - 3rd (Olivenza) 394 - 4th (Duke of Mecklenburg, Lisbon) 559 - 5th (Evora) 581 - 6th (Braganza) 578 - 7th (Lisbon) 564 - 8th (Elvas) 287 - 9th (Chaves) 572 - 10th (Santarem) 475 - 11th (Almeida) 482 - 12th (Miranda) 589 - ----- - Total 6,040 - - -ARTILLERY. - -Four regiments with head quarters respectively at (1) Lisbon, (2) Faro -in Algarve, (3) Estremoz in Alemtejo, (4) Oporto. The total strength -was 4,472 officers and men. - -There were also a few garrison companies, largely composed of invalids, -which were mainly stationed in the forts round Lisbon. Their force is -not given in Beresford’s _General State_ of the Regular Army. - - -THE LUSITANIAN LEGION. - -This abnormal force, under Sir Robert Wilson, comprehended in 1809-10 -three battalions of infantry, with an establishment of ten companies -and 1,000 men each, one regiment of cavalry of three squadrons, which -never seems to have been complete, and one battery of field artillery. -Its total force was about 3,500 men. In 1811 the three battalions were -taken into the regular army as the 7th, 8th, and 9th Cazadores. - - -ENGINEERS. - -There were a few officers of the old army, who were engaged in raising -new companies of sappers, which were not yet ready when Beresford’s -report was drawn up. No figures are there given. - - -It would appear then that the total Regular force of Portugal in 1809 -amounted to about 33,000 foot, 6,300 horse, and 5,000 artillery. - - -MILITIA. - -The Portuguese Militia was raised by conscription, on a local basis, -the kingdom being divided into forty-eight regions, each of which -was to supply a regiment. These districts were combined into three -divisions, called the North, South, and Centre, each of which gave -sixteen regiments. The unit was a two-battalion corps, with nominally -1,500 men in twelve companies: this number was in practice seldom -reached. It was usual to keep the battalions under arms alternately, -for periods of two, three, or six months: it was seldom that the -whole regiment was embodied at once. In 1809 the whole force was but -in process of organization, many corps had not even been officered -or armed, and the majority had not commenced to raise their second -battalion. The local distribution was as follows:-- - -1ST DIVISION: ‘THE SOUTH.’ Comprising Algarve, Alemtejo, and Beira -Alta. - - Regiments of Lagos, Tavira, Beja, Evora, Villaviciosa, - Portalegre, Castello Branco, Idanha, Vizeu, Guarda, Trancoso, - Arouca, Tondella, Arganil, Covilhão, Lamego. - -2ND DIVISION: ‘THE CENTRE.’ Comprising Estremadura and Beira Baixa. - - Four Lisbon regiments, and one each from Torres Vedras, Santarem, - Thomar, Leyria, Soure, Lousão, Alcazar do Sul, Setubal, Coimbra, - Figueira, Aveiro, and Oliveira de Azemis. - -3RD DIVISION: ‘THE NORTH.’ Comprising Tras-os-Montes and -Entre-Douro-e-Minho. - - Regiments of Oporto, Villa de Conde, Braga, Viana, Barcelos, - Guimaraens, Penafiel, Arcos, Feira, Barca, Baltar, Mayo, Chaves, - Villa Real, Miranda and Braganza. - - - - -VI - -PAPERS RELATING TO THE INTRIGUES AT OPORTO, APRIL-MAY 1809 - - -I. GENERAL RICARD’S CIRCULAR. - -_Le général Ricard, chef d’état-major du 2e corps d’armée en Espagne, -à M. le général de division Quesnel._ - - - Oporto, le 19 avril 1809. - - Mon général, - -Son Excellence M. le maréchal duc de Dalmatie m’a chargé de vous écrire -pour vous faire connaître les dispositions que la grande majorité des -habitants de la province du Minho manifestent. - -La ville de Braga, qui une des premières s’était portée à -l’insurrection, a été aussi la première a se prononcer pour un -changement de système, qui assurât à l’avenir le repos et la -tranquillité des familles, et l’indépendance du Portugal. Le corrégidor -que son Excellence avait nommé s’était retiré à Oporto lors du départ -des troupes françaises, dans la crainte que les nombreux émissaires que -Sylveira envoyait n’excitassent de nouveaux troubles, et n’attentassent -à sa vie. Les habitants ont alors manifesté le vœu que ce digne -magistrat leur fût renvoyé, et une députation de douze membres a été -à cet effet envoyée près de Son Excellence. Pendant ce temps les -émissaires de Sylveira étaient arrêtés et emprisonnés. - -A Oporto, et à Barcelos, les habitants ont aussi manifesté les mêmes -sentiments, et tous sentent la nécessité d’avoir un appui auquel les -citoyens bien intentionnés puissent se rallier pour la défense et -le salut de la patrie, et pour la conservation des propriétés. A ce -sujet de nouvelles députations se sont présentées à Son Excellence, -pour la supplier d’approuver que le peuple de la province du Minho -manifestât authentiquement le vœu de déchéance du trône de la maison -de Bragance, et qu’en même temps S. M. l’Empereur et roi fût suppliée -de désigner un prince de sa maison, ou de son choix, pour régner en -Portugal, mais qu’en attendant que l’Empereur ait pu faire connaître -à ce sujet ses intentions, Son Excellence le duc de Dalmatie serait -prié de prendre les rênes du gouvernement, de représenter le souverain, -et de se revêtir de toutes les attributions de l’autorité suprême: le -peuple promettant et jurant de lui être fidèle, de le soutenir et de le -défendre aux dépens de la vie et de la fortune contre tout opposant, -et envers même les insurgés des autres provinces, jusqu’à l’entière -soumission du royaume. - -Le maréchal a accueilli ces propositions, et il a autorisé les -corrégidors des Comarques à faire assembler les Chambres, à y appeler -des députés de tous les ordres, des corporations, et du peuple dans -les campagnes, pour dresser l’acte qui doit être fait, et y apposer -les signatures de l’universalité des citoyens. Il m’a ordonné de vous -faire part de ces dispositions, pour que, dans l’arrondissement où -vous commandez, vous en favorisiez l’exécution, et qu’ensuite vous en -propagiez l’effet sur tous les points du royaume, où vous pourrez en -faire parvenir la nouvelle. - -M. le Maréchal ne s’est pas dissimulé qu’un évènement d’aussi grande -importance étonnera beaucoup de monde et doit produire des impressions -diverses; mais il n’a pas cru devoir s’arrêter à ces considérations: -son âme est trop pure pour qu’il puisse penser qu’on lui attribue aucun -projet ambitieux. Dans tout ce qu’il fait il ne voit que la gloire des -armes de Sa Majesté, le succès de l’expédition qui lui est confiée, et -le bien-être d’une nation intéressante, qui, malgré ses égarements, -est toujours digne de notre estime. Il se sent fort de l’affection de -l’armée, et il brûle du désir de la présenter à l’Empereur, glorieuse -et triomphante, ayant rempli l’engagement que Sa Majesté a elle-même -pris, de planter l’aigle impériale sur les forts de Lisbonne, après une -expédition aussi difficile que périlleuse, où tous les jours nous avons -été dans la nécessité de vaincre. - -Son Excellence ne s’est pas dissimulé non plus que depuis Burgos -l’armée a eu des combats continuels à soutenir; elle a réfléchi -sur les moyens d’éviter à l’avenir les maux que cet état de guerre -occasionne, et elle n’en a pas trouvé de plus propre que celui qui lui -est offert par la grande majorité des habitants des principales villes -du Minho, d’autant plus qu’elle a l’espoir de voir propager dans les -autres provinces cet exemple, et qu’ainsi ce beau pays sera préservé -de nouvelles calamités. Les intentions de Sa Majesté seront plus tôt -et plus glorieusement remplies, et notre présence en Portugal, qui -d’abord avait été un sujet d’effroi pour les habitants, y sera vue avec -plaisir, en même temps qu’elle contribuera à neutraliser les efforts -des ennemis de l’Empereur sur cette partie du continent. - -La tâche que M. le Maréchal s’impose dans cette circonstance est -immense, mais il a le courage de l’embrasser, et il croit la remplir -même avec succès, si vous voulez bien l’aider dans son exécution. Il -désire que vous propagiez les idées que je viens de vous communiquer, -que vous fassiez protéger d’une manière particulière les autorités ou -citoyens quelconques qui embrasseront le nouveau système, en mettant -les uns et les autres dans le cas de se prononcer et d’agir à l’avenir -en conséquence. Vous veillerez plus soigneusement que jamais à la -conduite de votre troupe, l’empêcherez de commettre aucun dégât ou -insulte qui pourrait irriter les habitants, et vous aurez la bonté, -monsieur le général, d’instruire fréquemment Son Excellence de l’esprit -des habitants et du résultat que vous aurez obtenu. - -J’ai l’honneur de vous prier d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect et de -mon sincère attachement. - - _Le général chef de l’état-major général_ - _Signé_: RICARD. - -Pour copie conforme à l’original resté dans les mains du général de -division Quesnel. - -Paris, le 11 juillet 1809. - - _Le ministre de la guerre_ - Comte d’Hunebourg. - - -II. WELLESLEY’S ACCOUNT OF ARGENTON’S PLOT. - -‘To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State. - - ‘Villa Nova, 15th May, 1809. - - ‘My Lord, - -‘In my secret dispatch, of the 27th ultimo, I apprised your Lordship -that I had had certain communications with an Officer of the French -army, in respect to the discontent which prevailed against Marshal -Soult. I have since had further communications with the same Officer, -with the details of which I proceed to acquaint your Lordship. - -‘Captain Argenton met me within the posts of the British army, between -Coimbra and Aveiro on the night of the 6th instant, accompanied by -Mons. Viana, in the presence of Lieut.-Colonel Bathurst. He informed me -that the discontent had increased, and that there were a larger number -of Officers who were determined to seize their General than when he -had last seen me. He said, however, that they were divided into two -parties, one discontented with Buonaparte himself, and determined to -carry matters to extremities against him: the other, consisting of -Loison, Laborde, and others (whom he had before mentioned as attached -to the cause of the Emperor,) were dissatisfied with Soult’s conduct, -particularly with an intention which he was supposed to entertain to -declare himself King of Portugal; and that they were determined, if -he should take that step, to seize him and to lead the army back into -France, where it was understood the Emperor wished to see it. - -‘Captain Argenton then urged me again to lose no time in pressing upon -Soult, as the mode most likely to induce the more violent of the two -parties to endeavour to accomplish their purpose. But he said that if -my attack was likely to be delayed, it was desirable that I should -endeavour to prevail upon some of the towns over which I was supposed -to have influence, such as Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., to follow the example -of Oporto, and petition Soult to take upon himself the government of -the kingdom, as King; and that I even should write to him to urge the -adoption of this measure. - -‘In answer to this, I told him, that I certainly should make my attack -as soon as it was in my power, but that I could not fix any day, nor -state to him the plan of my operations; and that in respect to his -propositions, regarding the measures to be adopted by me to induce -Soult to declare himself King of Portugal, they were quite out of the -question; that I could not risk the loss of the confidence of the -people of Portugal by doing what he desired in respect to the people of -Coimbra, Aveiro, &c., nor my own character by writing the letter which -he proposed I should. I told him at the same time that I considered -that, notwithstanding all that had passed between him and me, I had a -full right to take what steps I pleased, even if the Officers of the -French army should seize their General. - -‘He then went away, and Mons. Viana returned with me to Coimbra, and -confirmed all the statements which Captain Argenton had made of the -discontent of the Officers of the army. - -‘I heard no more of Captain Argenton till the 13th, the day after the -capture of Oporto, on which day the original orders for the arrest -and secret detention of Captain Argenton, Colonel Lafitte of the 18th -dragoons, and Colonel Donadieu of the 47th regiment of infantry, were -found among some papers sent to me by the police of the town; the order -for the arrest of the first bearing date the 9th, and of the last two -the 10th instant. - -‘In a few hours afterwards, on the same day, Captain Argenton came into -Oporto, and informed me that, on the night of the day he had returned -from his last interview with me, he had been arrested, and his papers -had been seized, among which had been found the three passports which -I had given him. He said that he attributed his arrest to the General -of Division Lefevre, a man of weak intellect, to whom he had formerly -been aide de camp, and on whom he had endeavored to prevail, as he -thought successfully, to join the party. General Lefevre had, however, -informed Soult of all the circumstances, requiring only his promise -that Argenton should not be injured, and should retain his commission -and his military pretensions. - -‘Soult examined him in presence of General Lefevre respecting his -accomplices, but he declined to name any, and he was sent back to -prison in charge of a Captain of Gendarmerie. This person prevailed -upon him, with promises of pardon and indemnity to all concerned, to -consent to tell Soult the names of his accomplices, which he did on the -following night, notwithstanding, as he says himself, similar promises -in his own favor, made to General Lefevre, had not been performed, and -that as soon as he had named Colonels Lafitte and Donadieu, immediate -orders were sent for their arrest and secret detention. They marched, -in confinement, with the army from Oporto on the 12th, and on the 13th, -at five o’clock in the morning, Captain Argenton made his escape, at -the desire of Colonel Lafitte, from the party of Gendarmes in whose -charge he was detained. He now declares that the conspiracy still -exists, and that sooner or later it must burst forth and fall heavily -upon the head of the usurper; and he talked of the war in Spain as -being odious to the army and to the whole nation. - -‘Captain Argenton expressed a desire to return secretly to France, and -to bring to England his wife and family, she having, as he says, some -property, to enable him to live in England till the arrival of better -times in France. - -‘I told him that I would send him to England when an opportunity should -offer to apply for permission to go to France; and I shall have the -honor of addressing him to your Lordship when the opportunity shall -occur of sending him. - - ‘I have the honor to be, &c., - ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY. - -‘VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.’ - - -III. RÉSUMÉ DE L’AFFAIRE ARGENTON. - -(This analysis of the documents in the French archives relating to the -Oporto conspiracy has been placed at my disposal by the great kindness -of Commandant Balagny.) - - -Le 8 mai 1809, dans la nuit, le capitaine Argenton était arrêté -à Oporto par ordre du maréchal Soult. Son arrestation avait été -provoquée par les déclarations que, dans cette même nuit du 8, le -général Lefebvre et son aide de camp Favre étaient venus faire au -maréchal. Argenton leur avait, disent-ils, fait à l’un et à l’autre, -dans la journée du 8, des confidences sur l’objet de deux voyages -successifs à Lisbonne et à Coïmbre, près des généraux anglais, et leur -avait développé le plan d’une vaste conspiration militaire, dont les -ramifications s’étendaient dans toutes les armées impériales et dans -plusieurs départements de la France. Malgré la promesse formelle qu’ils -avaient faite à Argenton de garder un secret absolu, après s’être -concertés à Richuza, ils vinrent, dans la nuit, à Oporto, et, après -avoir obtenu du maréchal une audience secrète (à 10 heures et demie du -soir), lui dévoilèrent ce que leur avait confié Argenton. Aux termes -de leurs déclarations, il aurait dit, à l’un et à l’autre séparément, -qu’il était l’agent d’un comité, composé des généraux Laborde, Loison, -Merle, Lorges, Lahoussaye, Debelle, et des colonels Donadieu, Mejean, -Lafitte, Girardin, Corsin, et dont le but était de renverser l’Empereur -pour mettre fin au régime de guerres continuelles et de perpétuelles -conscriptions, que la France était lasse de supporter pour servir -l’ambition de Napoléon. Pour réaliser ce projet, le comité devait -par son intermédiaire passer une convention avec l’armée anglaise en -Portugal. Aux termes de cette convention, l’armée française évacuerait -le Portugal, suivie de l’armée anglaise, qui l’escorterait jusqu’aux -Pyrénées, où cette dernière resterait en observation pour l’appuyer -et pour déterminer les départements du Midi à se déclarer pour le -nouvel état de choses. A la faveur de trois passe-ports, délivrés -par les généraux anglais, trois officiers français[759], dont lui, -Argenton, devaient se rendre, l’un aux armées d’Espagne, l’autre à -l’armée d’Autriche, un troisième en France, pour rallier à la cause de -l’entreprise les mécontents de l’intérieur et des armées. L’Angleterre -promettait d’appuyer de son argent le succès de l’entreprise, et -Wellesley aurait promis à Argenton 60,000 fr. pour les débuts. Le -général Moreau devait être ramené d’Amérique par un navire anglais, et -prendre, sous un titre non encore désigné, la place de Napoléon déchu. -Le maréchal Soult serait invité à se mettre à la tête du mouvement. Si -le maréchal refusait, on devait s’emparer de sa personne, de façon à ce -que son opposition ne nuisît en rien à la réussite de l’entreprise. - - [759] Ces passe-ports devaient être délivrés aux noms supposés - de _Dupont_ et _Garis_, d’après les déclarations d’Argenton - lui-même, du maréchal Soult, du général Ricard, &c. L’un de ces - passe-ports devait être utilisé par le capitaine Favre, aide de - camp du général Lefebvre, qui voulait rentrer en France pour - démissionner. L’autre devait servir à un officier supérieur - _qu’Argenton ne nomme pas_, qui devait aller rendre compte de la - situation à l’Empereur. - -En présence de pareilles révélations, le maréchal Soult fit arrêter -sur-le-champ et conduire chez lui le capitaine Argenton, qui, devant -le général Lefebvre et Favre, refit, dans les mêmes termes, la -narration du plan du Comité, insistant, paraît-il, à diverses reprises, -pour tenter de décider le maréchal à entrer dans ses vues, en lui -dépeignant, sous des couleurs séduisantes, la grandeur et la noblesse -de l’entreprise, dont le but principal était de rendre à la France et -à l’Europe entière une paix que tout le monde souhaitait ardemment, -et que la folle ambition de l’Empereur rendait seule impossible. Mais -ne pouvant obtenir du maréchal la promesse formelle qu’aucun des -officiers dont il citerait les noms ne serait inquiété, il se refusa -à désigner les membres du Comité qui l’avait fait agir. Plus tard, -dans ses interrogatoires en France, il déclara que devant ce refus -de sa part le maréchal s’emporta violemment, le menaça de le faire -fusiller sur-le-champ, et qu’il ne dut son salut qu’à l’intervention -généreuse du général Lefebvre, qui rappela durement au Duc de Dalmatie -la promesse solennelle qu’il lui avait faite (à lui, Lefebvre), sur -l’honneur, qu’Argenton ne serait point inquiété. Il fut réintégré -dans sa prison, à son grand étonnement, dit-il. Furieux de se voir -sous les verrous, malgré la promesse formelle que lui aurait faite le -maréchal, prétend-il, il s’obstina d’abord dans un mutisme absolu, -refusant, pendant toute la matinée du 9, de se prêter à aucun nouvel -interrogatoire. Cependant, sur les instances réitérées et pressantes du -lieutenant de gendarmerie Bernon, que le maréchal envoya, à plusieurs -reprises, le voir dans sa prison, et sous la foi de la promesse -solennelle que lui apporta ce dernier, de la part du Duc, que lui et -tous les officiers compromis auraient l’honneur et la vie saufs, et -qu’un voile épais serait jeté à jamais sur cette affaire, il se décida -dans la soirée à écrire au maréchal qu’il consentait à lui faire des -aveux complets. Mais se ravisant, il lui écrivit une deuxième lettre -où il mettait comme condition à ses aveux qu’il n’y aurait _qu’un seul -témoin_ présent à ses déclarations, et qu’il désirait que ce témoin fût -le général Lefebvre. Pour des raisons qui sont demeurées inconnues, -le maréchal substitua, comme témoin, au général Lefebvre, le général -Ricard et le lieutenant Bernon. Argenton accepta cependant de faire ses -aveux et fut introduit à 10 heures du soir dans le salon du maréchal. -Le lieutenant Bernon et le général Ricard firent, dès le 10 mai, une -déclaration écrite des révélations faites devant eux au maréchal par -Argenton dans l’entrevue du 9 mai. Leurs déclarations concordent -entièrement avec celles du général Lefebvre et du capitaine Favre, -et ce serait toujours le fameux projet de renversement de l’Empire -qu’Argenton aurait indiqué comme but du Comité. - -A la suite de ces aveux, Argenton est reconduit dans sa prison et le -maréchal, faussant sa promesse, fait arrêter le colonel Lafitte, qui -commandait le régiment ou servait Argenton. - -Mais cependant l’armée anglaise se portait en avant et, à la suite -de circonstances demeurées bien obscures, le maréchal Soult était -surpris dans Oporto et sur le point de ne pouvoir s’en échapper. -Argenton, confié à la garde du lieutenant Bernon et d’un détachement -d’infanterie, est emmené dans la retraite. Le second jour il s’évade -subitement, dans des circonstances tellement romanesques que, malgré -le rapport du lieutenant Bernon au Duc de Conégliano, on est quelque -peu porté à croire que sa fuite fut facilitée par le commandement. - -Le 14 mai, au soir, Argenton fugitif gagnait Oporto, et de là se -rendait à Lisbonne d’où l’amiral anglais le faisait conduire à Londres -sur un vaisseau anglais, avec des lettres de recommandation pour le -ministre de la marine. Bien accueilli par ce dernier, qui lui proposa -même, dit-il, de le pensionner, il séjourna quelque temps à Londres. -Mais pris bientôt de la nostalgie du pays natal et dévoré du désir de -venir rejoindre sa femme pour vivre en France ‘ignoré dans quelque coin -perdu,’ il avise aux moyens de passer la Manche. Il fabrique un faux -cartel d’échange au nom de ‘Dessort,’ sous la signature du général -Ricard, chef d’état-major du maréchal Soult, et sur les recommandations -de l’Amirauté anglaise il s’embarque à Deal et atterrit à Sangatte le -28 juin 1809. Malgré son faux nom, Argenton ne tarde pas en effet à -être arrêté. - -Dès son premier interrogatoire, il s’était décidé à reconnaître son -identité et, avouant son faux de cartel d’échange, il abandonne le -pseudonyme de ‘Dessort’ et redevient Argenton. Mais ici la scène -change: se prêtant volontiers aux interrogatoires, il ne fait aucune -difficulté pour expliquer ses voyages près des généraux anglais; -mais il leur donne un but tout autre et il assigne au Comité, dont -il se dit toujours avoir été l’agent, des intentions totalement -différentes de celles que, selon Lefebvre, Ricard, Favre, et Bernon, -il aurait indiquées à Oporto. Il n’est plus question de conspiration -contre l’Empereur, de projets de renversement dynastique. Bien au -contraire, le Comité, entièrement dévoué à Napoléon et à sa cause, -voulait lui ramener une armée dont le sort était gravement compromis -par la maladresse du maréchal Soult, qui ne rêvait rien moins que -de faire de cette armée la sienne propre, et de s’en servir pour la -réalisation de ses projets ambitieux. Devant ses projets ouvertement -affichés de se faire décerner la couronne de Portugal, un parti de -mécontents s’était formé pour déjouer ses vues et le mettre dans -l’impossibilité de commettre le crime de lèse-majesté qu’il méditait. -A la tête de ce parti, se trouvait, dit Argenton, un comité composé -des généraux Laborde et Loison, des colonels Lafitte et St. Géniéz et -d’un colonel aide-de-camp du général Loison. Le Comité devait, dès que -le maréchal aurait mis en exécution son projet, nullement déguisé, de -s’emparer de la couronne, se saisir de sa personne, et, à la suite -d’une convention passée avec les généraux anglais, ramener en France -l’armée restée fidèle à Napoléon, et sauvée par cette intervention -d’une perte infaillible. Mais pour mener à bonne fin l’exécution de ce -projet, il fallait obtenir des généraux anglais qu’ils consentissent -à retarder leur attaque, qui était imminente, et se faire délivrer -par eux des passe-ports pour les officiers qui devaient aller rendre -compte à l’Empereur de ce qui se passait en Portugal. Argenton accepta -la mission d’aller à l’armée anglaise soumettre les propositions du -Comité. On l’adressa, dit-il, au nommé Viana, à qui il fut présenté par -le colonel Donadieu qui logeait chez lui, et ce fut ce Viana qui lui -servit de guide et d’escorte jusqu’à l’armée anglaise. Il se rendit à -Lisbonne, où il obtint du général Wellesley trois passe-ports et la -promesse d’une suspension d’armes de quelques jours. Revenu à Oporto, -il y resta quatre jours chez Viana, qui lui remit, à destination du -Comité, un dialogue intitulé ‘Le Moineau et le Perroquet,’ qui n’était, -paraît-il, que le sommaire d’une longue conversation entre Viana et -le maréchal, où ce dernier aurait développé ses projets ambitieux et -exposé en détail la ligne de conduite qu’il comptait suivre. Porteur -de ce document, il va rendre compte de sa mission au Comité. Le -général Laborde étant malade, il rendit compte au colonel Lafitte et, -le général Loison survenant à ce moment, il y eut chez Laborde une -conférence entre ces deux généraux et Lafitte. Lui, Argenton, n’y -assista pas; mais à l’issue de cette conférence son colonel lui déclara -qu’il fallait retourner près des Anglais, et lui fit tenir une lettre -écrite par le général Loison au général Wellesley. Toujours accompagné -de Viana, il partit d’Oporto le 1er mai, et se rendit à Coïmbre, où -il eut, en présence de Viana, une conférence avec Wellesley et finit, -après quelques difficultés, par obtenir une nouvelle suspension -d’hostilités pendant quatre jours, à la condition que le Comité -tiendrait le général anglais au courant des faits et gestes du Duc de -Dalmatie. De retour à Oporto, le 8 mai, il était arrêté au moment où -il s’apprêtait à partir pour se rendre près du Comité.--Telle est la -thèse qu’Argenton ne cesse de soutenir avec la dernière énergie, depuis -son retour en France jusque devant le peloton d’exécution qui va le -fusiller. Il subit trois interrogatoires à Boulogne, trois autres au -Ministère de la Police, quatre devant la Commission militaire chargée -d’instruire sa cause. Toujours avec la même impassibilité et le calme -le plus absolu, il répète la même chose, ne variant que sur quelques -questions de détails. Quand on lui donne lecture des dépositions -accablantes des généraux Lefebvre et Ricard, du capitaine Favre et du -lieutenant Bernon, il leur oppose froidement les dénégations les plus -formelles. Il est confronté avec les colonels Donadieu et Lafitte, qui, -arrêtés par ordre du Ministre de la Guerre, prétendent n’avoir jamais -eu connaissance de l’existence d’un comité dans l’armée, et n’avoir -jamais servi d’intermédiaire entre Argenton et ce comité. Vis-à-vis -d’eux, le capitaine garde toujours la même attitude. Lui seul dit la -vérité, assure-t-il, et il s’étonne du peu de mémoire des colonels. - -Traduit devant un conseil de guerre le 21 décembre 1809, le capitaine -Argenton se retranche toujours derrière les mêmes moyens de défense -et produit les mêmes arguments. Il a agi par ordre (verbal, il est -vrai), et il a cru servir à la fois les intérêts de l’armée qu’il a -sauvée et ceux de l’Empereur. Malgré une plaidoirie très éloquente -et très habile de son défenseur Falconnet, qui, pour défendre son -client, n’épargne pas le duc de Dalmatie, Argenton est condamné à mort. -Jusqu’à la dernière heure, il proteste de la pureté de ses intentions, -et maintient qu’il a toujours dit la vérité et qu’il est victime de -l’égoïsme de ceux qui l’ont fait agir. Avec une calme résignation, il -commande lui-même son peloton d’exécution et tombe sous les balles avec -ce courage romanesque qui caractérisait en lui l’homme extraordinaire -qui, à Tarvis, fit _seul_ toute une compagnie prisonnière. - - - - -VII - -MORNING STATE OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN PORTUGAL, UNDER SIR ARTHUR -WELLESLEY, K.B. - -HEAD QUARTERS, COIMBRA, MAY 6, 1809. - - - TABLE LEGEND: - A = _Officers._ - B = _Present._ - C = _Sick._ - D = _On Command._ - E = _Total._ - F = _Total Efficients Present, Officers and Men._ - - -------------------------------+-----+---------------------++-------++---------- - | |_Sergeants, Drummers,|| || - | |Rank and File, &c._ || || - -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- - | | | | || || - | A | B | C | D || E || F - | | | | || || - -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- - CAVALRY. | | | | || || - | | | | || || - 1st Brigade [Stapleton Cotton] | | | | || || - 14th Light Dragoons | 27 | 628 | 21 | 73 || 749 || 655 - 16th ” ” | 37 | 673 | 20 | 35 || 765 || 710 - 20th ” ” [two squadrons]| 6 | 237 | 6 | 63 || 312 || 243 - 3rd Light Dragoons K.G.L. | | | | || || - [one squadron] | 3 | 57 | 2 | 77 || 139 || 60 - | | | | || || ----1,668 - | | | | || || - 2nd Brigade [Fane] | | | | || || - 3rd Dragoon Guards | 25 | 698 | 10 | -- || 733 || 723 - 4th Dragoons | 27 | 716 | 13 | -- || 756 || 743 - | | | | || || ----1,466 - | --- | ----- | -- | --- || ---- || --------- - Total Cavalry | 125 | 3,009 | 72 | 248 || 3,454 || 3,134 - | --- | ----- | -- | --- || ---- || --------- - INFANTRY. | | | | || || - | | | | || || - Brigade of Guards [H. Campbell]| | | | || || - Coldstream Guards, 1st batt. | 33 | 1,194 | 75 | 3 || 1,305 ||1,227 - 3rd Foot Guards, 1st batt. | 34 | 1,228 | 79 | 8 || 1,349 ||1,262 - 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 4 | -- || 67 || 63 - | | | | || || ----2,552 - | | | | || || - 1st Brigade [Hill] | | | | || || - 3rd Foot, 1st batt. | 28 | 719 | 104 | 50 || 901 || 747 - 48th ” 2nd ” | 32 | 721 | 52 | -- || 805 || 753 - 66th ” 2nd ” | 34 | 667 | 38 | 10 || 749 || 701 - 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 4 | -- || 67 || 63 - | | | | || || ----2,264 - | | | | || || - 2nd Brigade [Mackenzie] | | | | || || - 27th Foot, 3rd batt. | 28 | 726 | 134 | 2 || 890 || 754 - 31st ” 2nd ” | 27 | 765 | 99 | 6 || 897 || 792 - 45th ” 1st ” | 22 | 671 | 125 | 27 || 845 || 693 - | | | | || || ----2,239 - | | | | || || - 3rd Brigade [Tilson] | | | | || || - 5/60th Foot [5 companies] | 14 | 306 | 32 | 2 || 354 || 320 - 87th ” 2nd batt. | 32 | 669 | 88 | 1 || 790 || 701 - 88th ” 1st batt. | 30 | 608 | 143 | 28 || 809 || 638 - 1st Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - | | | | || || ----1,659 - 4th Brigade [Sontag] | | | | || || - 97th Foot | 22 | 572 | 74 | 20 || 688 || 594 - 2nd batt. of Detachments | 35 | 787 | 221 | 16 || 1,059 || 822 - 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 61 | 6 | -- || 69 || 63 - 16th Portuguese, 2nd batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - | | | | || || ----1,479 - 5th Brigade [A. Campbell] | | | | || || - 7th Foot, 2nd batt. | 26 | 559 | 50 | 3 || 638 || 585 - 53rd ” ” ” | 23 | 691 | 59 | 3 || 776 || 714 - 1 company 5/60th Foot | 4 | 64 | 11 | 1 || 80 || 68 - 10th Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - | | | | || || ----1,367 - 6th Brigade [R. Stewart] | | | | || || - 29th Foot | 26 | 596 | 85 | 7 || 714 || 622 - 1st batt. of Detachments | 27 | 803 | 169 | 24 || 1,023 || 830 - 16th Portuguese, 1st batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - | | | | || || ----1,452 - 7th Brigade [Cameron] | | | | || || - 9th Foot, 2nd batt. | 27 | 545 | 227 | 22 || 821 || 572 - 83rd ” ” ” | 39 | 833 | 73 | 23 || 968 || 872 - 1 company 5/60th Foot | 2 | 60 | 3 | 1 || 66 || 62 - 10th Portuguese, 2nd batt. | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - | | | | || || ----1,506 - King’s German Legion Brigade | | | | || || - [Murray] | | | | || || - 1st Line batt. K.G.L. | 34 | 767 | 125 | 9 || 935 || 801 - 2nd ” ” ” | 32 | 804 | 52 | 9 || 897 || 836 - 5th ” ” ” | 28 | 720 | 101 | 12 || 861 || 748 - 7th ” ” ” | 22 | 688 | 83 | 10 || 803 || 710 - | | | | || || ----3,095 - Unattached Troops (Lisbon) | | | | || || - 24th Foot, 2nd batt. | 18 | 750 | 26 | 3 || 797 || 768 - 30th ” ” ” | 15 | 447 | 49 | 197 || 708 || 462 - Independent Light Co. K.G.L. | 3 | 35 | 14 | 4 || 56 || 38 - | | | | || || ----1,268 - | --- |------ |-----| ---- || ------|| --------- - Total Infantry | 703 |18,178 |2,405| 501 || 21,787|| 18,881 - | | | | || || - ARTILLERY. | | | | || || - | | | | || || - British | 31 | 550 | 83 | 499 || 1,163 || 581 - King’s German Legion | 18 | 331 | 34 | 134 || 517 || 349 - Wagon Train attached | 3 | 61 | 18 | 83 || 165 || 64 - | -- | -- | -- | -- || -- || -- - Total Artillery | 52 | 942 | 135 | 716 || 1,845 || 994 - | | | | || || - ENGINEERS. | 12 | 27 | 1 | -- || 40 || 39 - | | | | || || - WAGON TRAIN. | 2 | 65 | 21 | 17 || 105 || 67 - -------------------------------+-----+-------+-----+-------++-------++---------- - General Total 894 22,221 2,634 1,482 27,231 23,115 - - - - -VIII - -SOULT’S REPORT ON GALICIA, - -JUNE 25, 1809. - -N.B.--The first half of this report, a lengthy narrative of the -Marshal’s march from Lugo to Puebla de Senabria, is omitted. - - -Je me permettrai, avant de terminer ce rapport, de présenter à Votre -Majesté quelques observations sur la situation actuelle de Galice. -Cette province est toujours en état de fermentation. Les menaces de -mort et d’incendie qu’employe La Romana; les nombreux agents qui -agissent en son nom; les exécutions qu’il fait; les dévastations qui -ont inévitablement lieu par les fréquents mouvements des troupes; -la ruine de la plupart des habitants; l’absence de toute autorité -qui représente Votre Majesté; l’influence des prêtres, qui sont -très-nombreux, et la grande majorité opposante; l’argent que les -Anglais répandent; la détresse des généraux français, qui, faute des -moyens, ne peuvent souvent payer les émissaires qu’ils employent: -toutes ces causes contribuent à augmenter de jour en jour le nombre des -ennemis, et à rendre la guerre qu’on fait dans ce pays très-meurtrière, -infiniment désagréable, et d’un résultat fort éloigné. On s’y battra -encore longtemps avant que Votre Majesté en retire quelque avantage, à -moins qu’elle n’adopte le système de faire fortifier sept à huit postes -importants, susceptibles de contenir chacun 5,000 à 6,000 hommes de -garnison, un hôpital, et des vivres pour quatre mois, pour maintenir la -population, fermer et garder les principaux débouchés dont l’ennemi ne -pourrait plus profiter, et aussi pour offrir aux colonnes qui agiraient -dans la province des appuis, quelque direction qu’elles suivissent. -Ainsi elles pourraient recevoir des secours et déposer leurs malades. -Cette dernière considération est très-puissante, et je ne dois pas -dissimuler à Votre Majesté qu’elle fait beaucoup sur le moral des -soldats, qui, dans l’état actuel des choses, sont exposés à périr de -misère, ou sous les coups des paysans, s’ils ont le malheur d’être -blessés, ou atteints de la fièvre, et de se trouver éloignés d’un lieu -sûr pour y chercher des secours. - -Je crois qu’avec une dépense d’un million on parviendrait à mettre -en état de défense la Galice, et certes jamais argent n’aurait été -mieux employé, d’autant plus que par la suite on pourrait diminuer -le nombre des troupes qui pour le moment y sont nécessaires; dans -cette persuasion j’ai engagé M. le Maréchal Ney à faire fortifier -Lugo, et à ordonner la construction de trois blocus sur la ligne de -Villa Franca; les places de Tuy, de Monterey, de Viana et de Puebla -de Sanabria, qui toutes peuvent contenir des canons, ont une enceinte -et un reste de fortification, pourraient aisément être rétablies et -rempliraient parfaitement cet objet; et, s’il le fallait, il est encore -d’autres postes qui par leur situation seraient à même de concourir à -la défense, sans que les frais fussent considérablement augmentés. Si -cette mesure, que je considère comme urgente et d’un résultat assuré, -n’est point adoptée, il deviendra nécessaire que des renforts soient -envoyés à M. le Maréchal Ney, ne fusse que pour remplacer ses pertes et -maintenir libres les communications, quoique aujourd’hui il puisse être -assez fort pour tenir tête au corps de La Romana et de Carrera réunis, -s’ils se présentaient en ligne. Mais leur système étant d’harceler sans -cesse et d’éviter une affaire générale, avec le temps ils auraient -l’avance la plus forte, et ils finiraient, même sans combattre, par -le détruire s’il n’était soutenu, et on ferait une perte d’hommes -incalculable sans obtenir le résultat qu’on se propose. - -Il est probable que je ne serai plus dans le cas d’entretenir Votre -Majesté au sujet de la Galice; ainsi, pour cette dernière fois, j’ai -cru de mon devoir de lui rendre compte des observations que mon séjour -dans cette partie de ses états et la connaissance que j’ai acquise -du caractère de ses habitants m’ont mis à même de faire. J’ai donc -l’honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner excuser cette digression -en faveur et en considération des motifs qui l’ont dictée. - - J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c., - MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE. - -Puebla de Senabria, 25 juin 1809. - - - - -IX - - -A - -SUCHET’S ARMY OF ARAGON [3rd CORPS], - -MAY 15, 1809. - -Total _présents sous les armes._ - - 1st Division, General LAVAL: - 14th Line (two batts.), 1,080; 44th Line (two batts.), - 1,069; 2nd of the Vistula (two batts.), 880; 3rd ditto, - 964 3,993 - - 2nd Division, General Musnier: - 114th Line (three batts.), 1,627; 115th Line (three batts.), - 1,732; 1st of the Vistula (two batts.), 1,039 4,398 - - 3rd Division, General MORLOT: - 116th and 117th Line (each three batts.), _absent in - Castile_; 121st Line, _three batts. absent in Navarre_, - one present in Aragon, 400; 5th Léger (one batt.), 890 - - Troops detached from 5th Corps: - 64th Line (one batt.), one voltigeur company of 40th Line 450 - - CAVALRY BRIGADE, General WATHIER: - 4th Hussars, 326; 13th Cuirassiers, 390; Polish Lancers - (one squadron), 80 796 - - ARTILLERY 450 - ------ - General Total 10,977 - -N.B.--Of the nine absent battalions the 116th and 117th with a strength -of somewhat over 3,000 men rejoined Suchet on the day of Maria (June -15), thus raising this available force to about 13,000 men. The 121st -never came up from Navarre. - - -B - -BLAKE’S ARMY OF ARAGON, - -JUNE 15, 1809. - -Total present under arms at Maria. - - Vanguard Brigade, Colonel J. CREAGH: - Almeria (two batts.), Cazadores de Valencia (one batt.) 2,298 - - 1st Division, Major-General P. ROCA: - 1st of Savoia (three batts.), Granada (one batt.), Avila - Militia, Tiradores de Cariñena (one batt.), Tercio of - Tortosa 4,888 - - 2nd Division, Lieut.-General Marquis of LAZAN: - 1st Volunteers of Saragossa (one batt.), 3rd Cazadores de - Valencia (one batt.), 1st of Valencia (three batts.), - America (two batts.) 5,837 - - Cavalry Brigade, Colonel J. O’DONNELL: - Olivenza (four squadrons), Santiago (one squadron) 698 - - Artillery (seventeen guns) 200 - - Sappers (three companies) 309 - ------ - Total present 14,230 - - - 3rd Division, Lieut.-General C. AREIZAGA (absent at Botorrita): - Fernando 7th (one batt.), Grenadiers (four companies), - 1st Volunteers of Aragon (one batt.), 2nd ditto (one - batt.), Volunteers of Valencia (one batt.), Cazadores - de Palafox (one batt.), Daroca (one batt.), Tiradores - de Doyle (one batt.), Tiradores de Murcia (one batt.) 5,842 - - Cavalry: Husares Españoles, Santiago (one squadron each) 368 - - Artillery (eight guns) 120 - - Sappers 103 - ------ - Total absent at Botorrita 6,433 - - - - -X - -APPENDICES RELATING TO THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN - - -1 - -THE BRITISH FORCE AT TALAVERA - -FROM THE MORNING STATE OF JULY 25, 1809 - -Present and fit for Duty. - -CAVALRY DIVISION (Lieut.-Gen. PAYNE). - - Fane’s Brigade: - 3rd Dragoon Guards 525 - 4th Dragoons 545 - - Cotton’s Brigade: - 14th Light Dragoons 464 - 16th ” ” 525 - - Anson’s Brigade: - 23rd Light Dragoons 459 - 1st ” ” K.G.L. 451 - ----- - Total Cavalry 2,969 - - -INFANTRY. - - 1st (SHERBROOKE’S) DIVISION. - - H. Campbell’s Brigade: - 1st batt. Coldstream Guards 970 - 1st batt. 3rd Guards 1,019 - One company 5/60th Foot 56 - ----- - 2,045 - - Cameron’s Brigade: - 1/61st Foot 778 - 2/83rd ” 535 - One company 5/60th Foot 51 - ----- - 1,364 - - Langwerth’s Brigade: - 1st Line batt. K.G.L. 604 - 2nd ” ” ” 678 - Light Companies K.G.L. 106 - ----- - 1,388 - - Low’s Brigade: - 5th Line batt. K.G.L. 610 - 7th ” ” ” 557 - ----- - 1,167 - - Total of the 1st Division 5,964 - - - 2nd (HILL’S) DIVISION. - - Tilson’s Brigade: - 1/3rd Foot 746 - 2/48th Foot 567 - 2/66th ” 526 - One company 5/60th 52 - ----- - 1,891 - - R. Stewart’s Brigade: - 29th Foot 598 - 1/48th Foot 807 - 1st batt. of Detachments 609 - ----- - 2,014 - - Total of the 2nd Division 3,905 - - - 3rd (MACKENZIE’S) DIVISION. - - Mackenzie’s Brigade: - 2/24th Foot 787 - 2/31st ” 733 - 1/45th ” 756 - ----- - 2,276 - Donkin’s Brigade: - 2/87th 599 - 1/88th 599 - Five companies 5/60th 273 - ----- - 1,471 - - Total of the 3rd Division 3,747 - - - 4th (CAMPBELL’S) DIVISION. - - A. Campbell’s Brigade: - 2/7th Foot 431 - 2/53rd Foot 537 - One company 5/60th 64 - ----- - 1,032 - - Kemmis’s Brigade: - 1/40th Foot 745 - 97th ” 502 - 2nd batt. of Detachments 625 - One company 5/60th Foot 56 - ----- - 1,928 - - Total of the 4th Division 2,960 - - -ARTILLERY. - - British: - Three batteries, Lawson, Sillery, - Elliot 681 - - German: - Two batteries, Rettberg and - Heyse 330 - - Total of Artillery 1,011 - - ENGINEERS. 22 - - STAFF CORPS. 63 - - Total Present 20,641 - -The Army had also sick left in Portugal, about 3,246: sick at Plasencia -and Talavera about 1,149: on detachment in Portugal about 1,396: on -detachment in Spain about 107. Total absent or non-effective 5,898. The -newly arrived regiments at Lisbon, and the troops on their way to the -front under R. Craufurd are, of course, left out of this return. - - -2 - -THE ARMY OF ESTREMADURA AT TALAVERA - -[From an unpublished document in the Deposito de la Guerra, Madrid.] - - General-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. Gregorio de la Cuesta. - Second in Command, Lieut.-Gen. Francisco de Eguia. - Major-General of Infantry, Major-Gen. J. M. de Alos. - ” ” of Cavalry, Major-Gen. R. de Villalba, Marques de - Malaspina. - Officer Commanding Artillery, Brigadier-Gen. G. Rodriguez. - ” ” Engineers, Brigadier-Gen. M. Zappino. - - -INFANTRY. - - Vanguard--Brigadier-Gen. José Zayas: - 2nd Voluntarios of Catalonia, Cazadores de Barbastro - (2nd batt.), Cazadores de Campomayor, Cazadores de - Valencia y Albuquerque, Cazadores Voluntarios de - Valencia (2nd batt.) five batts. - - 1st Division--Major-General Marques de Zayas: - Cantabria (three batts.), Granaderos Provinciales, - Canarias, Tiradores de Merida, Provincial de - Truxillo seven batts. - - 2nd Division--Major-General Vincente Iglesias: - 2nd of Majorca, Velez-Malaga (three batts.), Osuna - (two batts.), Voluntarios Estrangeros, Provincial - de Burgos eight batts. - - 3rd Division--Major-General Marques de Portago: - Badajoz (two batts.), 2nd of Antequera, Imperial de - Toledo, Provincial de Badajoz, Provincial de Guadix six batts. - - 4th Division--Major-General R. Manglano: - Irlanda (two batts.), Jaen (two batts.), 3rd of - Seville, Leales de Fernando VII (1st batt.), 2nd - Voluntarios de Madrid, Voluntarios de la Corona eight batts. - - 5th Division--Major-General L. A. Bassecourt: - Real Marina, 1st Regiment (two batts.), Africa (3rd - batt.), Murcia (two batts.), Reyna (1st batt.), - Provincial de Sigüenza seven batts. - - -CAVALRY. - - 1st Division, Lieut.-General J. de Henestrosa: - Rey, Calatrava, Voluntarios de España, Imperial de Toledo, - Cazadores de Sevilla, Reyna, Villaviciosa, Cazadores de Madrid. - - 2nd Division, Lieut.-Gen. Duque de Albuquerque: - Carabineros Reales (one squadron), Infante, Alcantara, Pavia, - Almanza, 1st and 2nd Hussars of Estremadura. - - Totals, inclusive of sick, and troops on detachment: - 35,000 Infantry, 7,000 Cavalry, 30 guns. - -It is most unfortunate that no regimental or divisional totals are -given, but only the gross total of the whole army. - -N.B.--There were _at least_ four battalions detached, viz. Merida and -3rd of Seville, with Sir R. Wilson, and two others (names not to be -ascertained, Cuesta does not give them) under Del Reino at the Puerto -de Baños. Another was apparently dropped at Almaraz to guard the -bridge. Allowing 3,000 for these troops, and 5,000 for sick and men ‘on -command,’ the Army of Estremadura marched to Talavera with about 28,000 -foot, more than 6,000 horse, and 800 artillery. - -The following troops which had all been with the Army of Estremadura in -April are not named in the above return. Most of them were in garrison -at Badajoz, but some were in the Northern Passes--Spanish Guards (one -batt.), Walloon Guards (one batt.), Zafra, Plasencia, La Serena, Leales -de Fernando VII (2nd batt.), Provincial de Cordova, Tiradores de Cadiz. - - -3 - -STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT TALAVERA - -(Figures of July 15, excluding sick and men detached.) - - 1st Corps, Marshal Victor: _Strength._ - État-Major 47 - 1st Division (Ruffin), 9th Léger, 24th and 96th of the - Line, three batts. each 5,286 - 2nd Division (Lapisse), 16th Léger, 8th, 45th, 54th of - the Line, three batts. each 6,862 - 3rd Division (Villatte), 27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, 95th of - the Line, three batts. each 6,135 - Corps-Cavalry (Beaumont), 2nd Hussars, 5th Chasseurs 980 - ------ - 19,310 - - 4th Corps, General SEBASTIANI: - État-Major 13 - 1st Division (Sebastiani), 28th, 32nd, 58th, 75th of - the Line, three batts. each 8,118 - 2nd Division (Valence), one regiment only, 4th Polish, - two batts. 1,600 - 3rd Division (Leval), Nassau, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, - Holland, two batts. each: Frankfort, one batt. 4,537 - Merlin’s Light Cavalry, 10th and 26th Chasseurs, Polish - Lancers, Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_ 1,188 - ------ - 15,456 - - Reserve Cavalry: - 1st Dragoon Division (Latour-Maubourg), 1st, 2nd, 4th, - 9th, 14th, 26th Dragoons 3,279 - 2nd Dragoon Division (Milhaud), 5th, 12th, 16th, 20th, - 21st Dragoons, and 3rd Dutch Hussars 2,356 - ------ - 5,635 - - From Madrid: - One Brigade of Dessolles’ Division, 12th Léger, 51st - Line, three batts. each 3,337 - King’s Guards, infantry 1,800 - ” ” cavalry 350 - 27th Chasseurs (two squadrons) 250 - ------ - 5,737 - The artillerymen are included in the divisional totals. - ------ - Total 46,138 - - -4 - -TALAVERA.--BRITISH LOSSES ON JULY 27 - - Table Legend: - A = _Officers._ - B = _Men._ - -(1) IN THE COMBAT OF CASA DE SALINAS. - - ----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++-------- - || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ || _Missing._ || - _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B ||_Total._ - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- - Cavalry: || | || | || | || - 14th Light Dragoons || -- | -- || -- | 1 || -- | -- || 1 - 1st ” ” K.G.L. || -- | 2 || 1 | 1 || -- | -- || 4 - 3rd DIVISION || | || | || | || - Mackenzie’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 2/24th Foot || -- | 1 || 1 | 6 || -- | 1 || 9 - 2/31st ” || 1 | 23 || 5 | 88 || -- | 2 || 119 - 1/45th ” || -- | 4 || 1 | 13 || -- | 7 || 25 - Donkin’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 5/60th Foot || -- | 3 || 1 | 4 || -- | 19 || 27 - 2/87th ” || 1 | 26 || 10 | 127 || -- | 34 || 198 - 1/88th ” || 2 | 7 || -- | 25 || -- | 30 || 64 - ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- - Total || 4 | 66 || 19 | 265 || -- | 93 || 447 - -(2) IN THE COMBAT IN FRONT OF TALAVERA AT 9 P.M. - - Staff || 1 | -- || -- | -- || -- | -- || 1 - 1st DIVISION || | || | || | || - H. Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1st Coldstream Guards || 1 | -- || -- | 2 || -- | -- || 3 - Cameron’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1/61st Foot || -- | 3 || 1 | 3 || -- | -- || 7 - Langwerth’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1st Line batt. K.G.L. || -- | 2 || -- | 7 || -- | -- || 9 - 2nd ” ” ” || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 - Light Companies, K.G.L. || -- | 4 || 2 | 25 || -- | 5 || 36 - Low’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 5th Line batt. K.G.L. || -- | 6 || -- | 34 || -- | 11 || 51 - 7th ” ” ” || -- | 19 || 1 | 49 || -- | 77 || 146 - 2nd DIVISION || | || | || | || - Tilson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 2/48th Foot || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 - R. Stewart’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 29th Foot || -- | 10 || 1 | 43 || -- | 1 || 55 - 1/48th Foot || -- | -- || -- | 8 || -- | -- || 8 - 1st batt. Detachments || 1 | 14 || -- | 40 || 2 | 13 || 70 - || | || | ||[760]| || - ARTILLERY || -- | -- || -- | 2 || -- | -- || 2 - ENGINEERS || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- - Total || 3 | 58 || 6 | 219 || 2 | 107 || 385 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++---+--------++-----+------++-------- - - [760] The official report gives _three_ missing officers here. - But one of them was not a prisoner but turned up at Oropesa next - morning, nominally sick. For this distressing story, see Leslie, - pp. 155-6. - - -5 - -BRITISH LOSSES AT TALAVERA - -SECOND DAY. JULY 28, 1809. - - Table Legend: - A = _Officers._ - B = _Men._ - - ----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++-------- - || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ || _Missing._ || - _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B ||_Total._ - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++-------- - Staff || 4 | -- || 9 | -- || -- | -- || 13 - CAVALRY. || | || | || | || - Fane’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 3rd Dragoon Guards || -- | -- || 1 | 1 || -- | 1 || 3 - 4th Dragoons || -- | 3 || -- | 9 || -- | -- || 12 - || | || | || | ||----15 - Cotton’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 14th Light Dragoons || -- | 3 || 6 | 6 || -- | -- || 15 - 16th ” ” || -- | 6 || 1 | 5 || -- | 2 || 14 - || | || | || | ||----29 - Anson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1st Light Dragoons K.G.L. || -- | 1 || 2 | 32 || -- | 2 || 37 - 23rd Light Dragoons || 2 | 47 || 4 | 46 || 3 | 105 || 207 - || | || | || | ||----244 - ----------------------------++-----+-----+------+------++-----+------++------- - INFANTRY. || | || | || | || - 1st DIVISION (General || | || | || | || - SHERBROOKE): || | || | || | || - H. Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1st Coldstream Guards || 1 | 33 || 8 | 251 || -- | -- || 293 - 1st 3rd Guards || 5 | 49 || 6 | 261 || -- | 1 || 322 - || | || | || | ||----615 - Cameron’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1/61st Foot || 3 | 43 || 10 | 193 || -- | 16 || 265 - 2/83rd ” || 4 | 38 || 11 | 202 || -- | 28 || 283 - || | || | || | ||----548 - Langwerth’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1st Line batt. K. G. L. || 2 | 37 || 10 | 241 || -- | 1 || 291 - 2nd ” ” ” || -- | 61 || 14 | 288 || -- | 24 || 387 - Light Companies, K. G. L. || -- | 6 || -- | 37 || -- | -- || 43 - || | || | || | ||----721 - Low’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 5th Line batt. K. G. L. || 3 | 27 || 6 | 118 || -- | 101 || 255 - 7th ” ” ” || -- | 17 || 4 | 35 || -- | 54 || 110 - || | || | || | ||----365 - 2nd DIVISION (General HILL):|| | || | || | || - Tilson’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1/3rd Foot || -- | 26 || 2 | 107 || -- | 7 || 142 - 2/48th ” || -- | 12 || 2 | 53 || 1 | -- || 68 - 2/66th ” || -- | 16 || 11 | 88 ||-- | 11 || 126 - || | || | || | ||----336 - R. Stewart’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 29th Foot || -- | 26 || 6 | 98 || -- | 2 || 132 - 1st batt. Detachments || -- | 26 || 9 | 166 || -- | 2 || 203 - 1/48th Foot || -- | 22 || 10 | 135 || -- | 1 || 168 - || | || | || | ||----503 - 3rd DIVISION (General || | || | || | || - MACKENZIE): || | || | || | || - Mackenzie’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 2/24th Foot || -- | 44 || 10 | 268 || -- | 21 || 343 - 2/31st ” || -- | 21 || 3 | 102 || -- | 5 || 131 - 1/45th ” || -- | 9 || 2 | 134 || 1 | 12 || 158 - || | || | || | ||----632 - Donkin’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 5/60th Foot || -- | 7 || 6 | 25 || -- | 12 || 50[761] - 2/87th ” || -- | 9 || 3 | 43 || -- | 5 || 60 - 1/88th ” || 1 | 12 || 3 | 69 || -- | -- || 85 - || | || | || | ||----195 - 4th DIVISION (General || | || | || | || - A. CAMPBELL): || | || | || | || - Campbell’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 2/7th Foot || 1 | 6 || 3 | 54 || -- | 1 || 65 - 2/53rd ” || -- | 6 || 2 | 30 || -- | 1 || 39 - || | || | || | ||----104 - Kemmis’s Brigade: || | || | || | || - 1/40th Foot || -- | 7 || 1 | 49 || -- | 1 || 58 - 97th ” || -- | 6 || -- | 25 || 1 | 21 || 53 - 2nd batt. Detachments || -- | 7 || -- | 13 || -- | 1 || 21 - || | || | || | ||----132 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++------- - ARTILLERY. || | || | || | || - British || 1 | 7 || 3 | 21 || -- | -- || 32 - German || -- | 3 || -- | 30 || -- | 1 || 34 - || | || | || | || - ENGINEERS || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 - STAFF CORPS || -- | -- || 2 | -- || -- | -- || 2 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++------- - Total || 27 | 643 || 171 |3,235 || 6 | 439 || 4,521 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++------- - -Total of the two days:--killed: 34 officers, 767 men; wounded: 196 -officers, 3,719 men; missing: 8 officers, 639 men. Grand Total, 5,363. - - [761] Many of the casualties of the 5/60th were in the companies - detached from the head quarters of the regiment, and not - serving in Donkin’s brigade. It is unfortunately impossible to - distinguish them, as all the regimental losses are given _en - bloc_ in the return. - - -6 - -TALAVERA.--THE FRENCH LOSSES - -N.B.--I owe these figures to the kindness of Commandant Balagny, who -has caused them to be copied in detail from the French Archives. - - Table Legend: - A = _Officers._ - B = _Men._ - - ----------------------------++-----------++------------++------------++--------- - || _Killed._ || _Wounded._ ||_Prisoners._|| - _Regiments._ || A | B || A | B || A | B || _Total._ - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- - 1st Corps (MARSHAL VICTOR): || | || | || | || - État-Major Général || -- | -- || 1 | -- || -- | -- || 1 - || | || | || | || - 1st Division (Ruffin): || | || | || | || - 9th Léger || 3 | 35 || 14 | 340 || -- | 65 || 457 - 24th Line || 1 | 92 || 17 | 456 || 1 | -- || 567 - 96th Line || 3 | 36 || 19 | 548 || -- | -- || 606 - État-Major || -- | -- || 2 | -- || -- | -- || 2 - || | || | || | ||----1,632 - 2nd DIVISION (Lapisse): || | || | || | || - 16th Léger || 8 | 49 || 8 | 342 || -- | -- || 407 - 8th Line || 3 | 41 || 17 | 376 || -- | -- || 437 - 45th Line || 3 | 43 || 12 | 328 || -- | 2 || 388 - 54th Line || 2 | 54 || 14 | 462 || -- | -- || 532 - État-Major || -- | -- || 3 | -- || -- | -- || 3 - || | || | || | ||----1,767 - 3rd DIVISION (Villatte): || | || | || | || - 27th Léger || 1 | 25 || 4 | 159 || -- | -- || 189 - 63rd Line || -- | 2 || 2 | 36 || -- | -- || 40 - 94th Line || 1 | 20 || 1 | 123 || -- | -- || 145 - 95th Line || -- | -- || -- | 27 || -- | -- || 27 - || | || | || | ||---- 401 - CORPS-CAVALRY (Beaumont): || | || | || | || - 2nd Hussars || -- | 3 || 2 | 11 || -- | -- || 16 - 5th Chasseurs || -- | 1 || 3 | 19 || -- | -- || 23 - || | || | || | ||---- 39 - ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS || 1 | 9 || 1 | 53 || -- | -- || 64 - ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++ ----- - Total of 1st Corps || 26 | 410 || 120 |3,280 || 1 | 67 || 3,904 - || | || | || | || - 4th CORPS (GENERAL || | || | || | || - SEBASTIANI): || | || | || | || - || | || | || | || - 1st DIVISION (Sebastiani): || | || | || | || - 28th, 32nd, 58th, || 13 | 187 || 67 |1,852 || -- | 61 || 2,180 - 75th Line || | || | || | || - || | || | || | || - 2nd DIVISION (Leval): || | || | || | || - Baden, Hesse, Nassau, || | || | || | || - Holland, Frankfort || 6 | 97 || 24 | 803 || -- | 77 || 1,007 - || | || | || | || - 3rd DIVISION (Valence): || | || | || | || - 4th Polish Regiment || -- | 3 || -- | 37 || -- | -- || 40 - ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- - Total of 4th Corps || 19 | 287 || 91 |2,692 || -- | 138 || 3,227 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- - || | || | || | || - CAVALRY DIVISIONS-- || | || | || | || - || | || | || | || - 1st DIVISION of Dragoons || | || | || | || - (Latour-Maubourg): || | || | || | || - 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, || | || | || | || - 14th, 26th Dragoons || -- | 13 || 9 | 61 || -- | -- || 83 - || | || | || | || - 2nd DIVISION of Dragoons || | || | || | || - (Milhaud): || | || | || | || - 5th, 12th, 16th, 20th, || | || | || | || - 21st Dragoons || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 - || | || | || | || - Milhaud’s Artillery || -- | -- || -- | 3 || -- | -- || 3 - || | || | || | || - Merlin’s Light Cavalry || | || | || | || - DIVISION: || | || | || | || - 10th, 26th Chasseurs, || | || | || | || - || | || | || | || - Polish Lancers, || | || | || | || - Westphalian || | || | || | || - Chevaux-Légers || -- | 6 || -- | 42 || -- | -- || 48 - ++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++ ---- - Total of Cavalry Divisions || -- | 19 || 9 | 109 || -- | -- || 137 - ----------------------------++-----+-----++-----+------++-----+------++--------- - - GENERAL TOTALS:--45 officers, 716 rank and file _killed_; - 220 officers, 6,081 rank and file _wounded_; - 1 officer, 205 rank and file _missing_ = 7,268. - -NOTE.--No distinction is made in the French returns between losses on -July 27 and July 28, which cannot therefore be ascertained separately. - -These ‘Missing’ do not include the French wounded who were left within -the British lines on the night of July 28, and became prisoners, but -were freed again on Aug. 6 when Victor reoccupied Talavera and captured -the British hospitals. They must have been numerous in the divisions -of Ruffin, Lapisse, and Sebastiani. The French returns are those made -up for the Emperor’s use, some weeks after the battle--those of the -4th Corps as late as Sept. 19. The men in question therefore appear as -‘wounded,’ but not as ‘prisoners.’ - - - - -XI - -THE BRITISH ROYAL ARTILLERY IN THE PENINSULA IN 1809 - -N.B.--I owe this Appendix to Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R.A., who has -been good enough to compile it for the volume. - - -STAFF. - -Brigadier-General E. Howorth arrived at Lisbon in April 1809, and took -over the command of the R.A. from Lieut.-Colonel W. Robe. - -Brigade-Major R.A., Captain A. Dickson until appointed to the -Portuguese Artillery in June, when Captain J. May took over that -position. - - -FIELD-OFFICERS IN PORTUGAL. - -Lieut.-Col. H. Framingham, Lieut.-Col. W. Robe, Lieut.-Col. G. B. -Fisher, Major Julius von Hartmann, K.G.L. - -Troops R.H.A. and Companies R.A. in Portugal in 1809:-- - -(_a_) Horse Artillery: _Strength._ - 1. Captain H. Ross’s ‘A’ Troop, landed at Lisbon, July 2, - or 3, 1809 162 - 2. Captain R. Bull’s ‘I’ Troop, landed at Lisbon, August - 21, 1809 162 - -(_b_) Foot Artillery: - 3. Captain C. D. Sillery’s[762] No. 6 company, 7th batt., - landed at Lisbon, March 7, 1809 120 - 4. Captain A. Bredin’s No. 1 company, 8th batt., landed - at Lisbon, August 1808 125 - 5. Captain J. May’s No. 2 company, 1st batt., landed at - Lisbon, March 1809 127 - 6. Captain F. Glubb’s No. 10 company, 5th batt., landed - at Lisbon, March 1809 93 - 7. Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt., landed - at Lisbon, August 1808 66 - - [762] On arrival in Portugal, No. 6 company, 7th batt., was under - 2nd Captain H. B. Lane; Captain C. D. Sillery joined shortly - after the occupation of Oporto. - -(_c_) K.G.L. Artillery: - 1. Captain Tieling’s Company (No. 2). - 2. Captain Heise’s Company (No. 4). - -On taking up the command, General Howorth, with Colonel Robe’s -assistance, equipped five brigades of guns to take the field with -the army, viz. one brigade of heavy six-pounders, three brigades of -light six-pounders, and one brigade of three-pounders. Captain Glubb’s -company was stationed in Fort St. Julian, Lisbon, and Captain Bredin’s -in the Forts at Cascaes. The other companies were with the field army. - - -BRIGADES R.A. AT OPORTO. - -Captain C. D. Sillery’s No. 6 company, 7th batt., under 2nd Captain H. -B. Lane. Light six-pounder guns. - -Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt. Three-pounder guns. - -Captain Tieling’s No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de Rettberg. -Heavy six-pounder guns. - -Captain Heise’s No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light six-pounder guns. - -[Captain May’s brigade was detached with Mackenzie’s force at Abrantes.] - - -BRIGADES R.A. AT TALAVERA. - -Captain C. D. Sillery’s No. 6 company, 7th batt. Light six-pounder guns. - -Captain J. May’s No. 2 company, 1st batt., under 2nd Captain W. G. -Elliott. Light six-pounder guns. - -Captain R. Lawson’s No. 7 company, 8th batt. Three-pounder guns. - -Captain Tieling’s No. 2 company, K.G.L., under 2nd Captain de Rettberg. -Heavy six-pounder guns. - -Captain Heise’s No. 4 company, K.G.L. Light six-pounder guns. - - -CASUALTIES AT TALAVERA. - -Killed: Lieut. H. Wyatt and seven men; wounded: Lieut.-Colonel H. -Framingham, 2nd Captain H. Baynes and J. Taylor and twenty-one men, R.A. - -K.G.L., killed: three men; wounded: thirty men. - - -In December 1809 the strength of the Royal Artillery under General -Howorth was as follows, viz.: - -R.H.A., 187 of all ranks, with 106 drivers attached. - -Foot Artillery, 627 of all ranks, with 545 drivers attached. - -K.G.L. 332 of all ranks with 160 drivers. - -There were 951 horses, and 132 mules with the Artillery. - - - -XII - -VENEGAS’S ARMY OF LA MANCHA - -FROM A RETURN OF JUNE 16, 1809. - - -1st Division, Brigadier-General PEDRO GIRON [afterwards -Brigadier-General T. LACY]: - - Burgos (two batts.), 1,085, Cuenca, 869, 1st of Loxa, - 703, Alcala, 629, 1st of España, 548, 1st of Seville, - 593 Total 4,427 - -2nd Division, Brigadier-General GASPAR VIGODET: - - Corona (two batts.), 1,130, Ronda, 1,096, Ordenes - Militares (two batts.), 836, Alcazar, 825, 1st of - Guadix, 522, Ciudad Real, 258 Total 4,667 - -3rd Division, Major-General PEDRO GRIMAREST [afterwards -Brigadier-General P. GIRON]: - - 2nd of Jaen, 985, Ecija, 902, 2nd of Cordova, 849, - Baylen (two batts.), 1,121, 1st Walloon Guards, 663, - Alpujarras, 579, Velez-Malaga, 445 Total 5,544 - -4th Division, Brigadier-General FRANCISCO CASTEJON: - - 5th of Seville, 535, 1st of Malaga, 743, 2nd Spanish - Guards, 953, Jerez, 650, 2nd of Loxa, 510, Bujalance, - 469, 3rd of Cordova, 422 Total 4,282 - -5th Division, Major-General T. ZERAIN: - - 2nd of España (two batts.), 1,064, 1st of Cordova - (three batts.), 2,044, Provincial of Seville, 887 Total 3,995 - -CAVALRY: - - Montesa, 349, Reina, 183, Granada, 322, España, 287, - Farnesio, 404, Santiago, 295, Alcantara, 343, - Principe, 324, Granaderos de Fernando VII, 527, - Dragones de la Reina, 180, Cazadores de Cordova, 169 Total 3,384 - -ARTILLERY: 35 guns; sappers, five companies, about 1,100 in all. - -Total, 27,399, including sick and men on detachment. - - - - -INDEX - - Albergaria Nova, combat of, 325 - - Albuquerque, Duke of, attacks Digeon at Mora, 145; - his quarrel with Cartaojal, 145; - sent to join Cuesta’s army, 145, 157; - at the battle of Medellin, 159-63; - his intrigues against Cuesta, 465; - at Talavera, 532, 545; - at Oropesa, 583; - routed by Soult at Arzobispo, 589-91. - - Alcañiz, battle of, 418-20. - - Alcantara, sacked by Lapisse, 261; - combat of, 440, 441. - - Almonacid, battle of, 614-6. - - Alorna, Marquis of, raises an ‘experimental legion’ in the Portuguese - army, 210. - - Alvarez, Julian, Governor of Gerona, his attempt to relieve Rosas, 51. - - Amarante, defended by Silveira, 267-71; - captured by Loison, 271; - Loison defeated at, 344, 345. - - Aranjuez, Venegas at, 568; - combat of, 612. - - Areizaga, Juan Carlos, general, at Alcañiz, 418; - his error at Maria, 431; - commands army of Andalusia, 605. - - Argenton, captain, his conspiracy against Soult, 279; - makes overtures to the English, 284; - his first interview with Wellesley, 315; - his second visit to Wellesley, 321; - his arrest and confession, 322-3; - his escape and death, 323. - - Arzobispo, combat of, 591. - - Astorga, Marquis of, elected President of the Central Junta, 21. - - Asturias, Junta and army of, their selfish policy, 370-1; - dissolution of the Junta by La Romana, 375, 376; - invaded by Ney and Kellermann, 379; - evacuated by the French, 387. - - Avé, passage of, by Soult, 239. - - - Badajoz, summoned to surrender by Victor, 168; - Wellington retires to, 607. - - Ballasteros, Francisco, general, in command at Colombres, 372; - escapes from the advancing French, 382; - his descent on Santander, 386; - driven out by Bonnet, 387. - - Barcelona, held by Duhesme against Vives, 41 - - Barrio, Manuel Garcia, Del, colonel sent by the Central Junta to lead - Galician insurgents against Vigo, 263. - - Bennett, captain, R. N. at the siege of Rosas, 50, 55, 56. - - Beresford, William Carr, general, appointed Commander-in-chief of the - Portuguese army, 216; - his reorganization of the army, 217, 218; - joins Wellesley with ten line regiments, 314; - commands flanking column at the advance on Oporto, 318; - at Amarante, 344, 345; - pursues Soult, 351, 360; - his march to Perales and Coria, 599; - retires to Castello Branco, 611. - - Blake, Joaquin, general, commands in Aragon, 414; - wins battle of Alcañiz, 418-20; - defeated at Maria, 423-7; - at Belchite, 429, 430. - - Blanca, Florida, Marquis, President of the Junta, death of, 21. - - Bogiero, Padre Basilio, chaplain of Palafox, shot by the French, 139. - - Bonnet, general, his advance into Asturias, 382; - his pursuit of Ballasteros, 386-7. - - Botilho, general, commands Portuguese force on the Minho, 223; - opposes Soult’s advance, 237. - - Bouchard, captain, French engineer officer, his ingenious scheme for - crossing the Tamega at Amarante, 270-1. - - Bourke, colonel, sent by Wellesley to Cuesta, 437. - - Braga, battle of, 235. - - - Cadiz, British proposal to garrison, 25; - negatived by the Junta, 26; - refusal of Villel to allow the British troops to land at, 28; - tumults in, 29-31. - - Caldagues, Conde de, commands the Catalonian troops round - Barcelona, 38, 39; - repulses sortie of Duhesme, 68; - retreats on Molins de Rey, 68; - taken prisoner by St. Cyr, 71. - - Canning, George, proposes to garrison Cadiz, 25, 26; - his correspondence with Wellesley, 609. - - Cardadeu, battle of, 64-7. - - Carrera, Martin La, checks Maucune at Santiago, 385. - - Carrol, W. P., captain, his adventures in Asturias, 373, 380; - in Galicia, 396, 401. - - Cartaojal, general, takes command of the Army of the Centre, 33, 143; - his quarrel with Albuquerque, 145; - attacks Lasalle’s division at Yébenes, 146; - routed by Sebastiani at Ciudad Real, 147; - deprived of his command by the Junta, 148. - - Casa de Salinas, combat of, 503. - - Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, his confidence in Wellesley, 287. - - Castro, general, routed at Igualada, 79. - - Catalonia, army of, its composition, 33, 40; - campaigns of St. Cyr, Vives, and Reding in, 38, 89. - - Cavallero, colonel, his account of feeling in Saragossa, 99. - - Cazadores (riflemen), new battalions of, raised in the Portuguese - army, 212. - - Chalot, colonel, surrenders Vigo, 263, 264. - - Chaves, surrender of, to Soult, 225, 226; - reoccupied by Silveira, 264. - - Chinchon, revolt of, 7; - massacre in, by the French, 8. - - Cienfuegos, Captain-General of Asturias, 372. - - Ciudad Real, the rout of, 143-7. - - Ciudad Rodrigo, resists Lapisse, 260. - - Cochrane, Lord, his raids on the coast of Languedoc, 39; - his defence of Rosas, 48, 50-5. - - Colmenar, insurrection of, against the French, is put down by Victor, 8. - - Corunna, surrenders to Soult, 173; - evacuated by Ney, 398. - - Cotton, Stapleton, general, commands brigade at Albergaria Nova, 325. - - Cradock, Sir John, general, dispatches British troops to Cadiz and - Seville, 27, 206; - condition of his force in Portugal, 201, 202; - his timid policy, 203; - retires to Passo d’Arcos, 205; - at Lumiar, 206; - advises Sir R. Wilson to retreat, 256; - superseded by Wellesley, 207; - Governor of Gibraltar, 313. - - Craufurd, Robert, arrives with light brigade at Talavera, after the - battle, 560; - holds Almaraz against Ney, 586, 587. - - Cuesta, Gregorio, general, commands Estremaduran army, 24, 143; - his operations against Victor, 152-8; - defeated at Medellin, 159-66; - appointed Captain-General of the Estremaduran army, 167; - his correspondence with Wellesley about the advance into Spain, 445-8; - his jealousy of Wellesley, 464-7; - receives Wellesley at Almaraz, 470-2; - quarrel with Wellesley at Talavera, 489-92; - pursues Victor, 492, 493; - retreats on Talavera, 500; - at the battle of Talavera, 509-56; - retreats on Oropesa, 579, 580; - withstands Mortier, 583; - his final disputes with Wellesley, 603; - retires from command, 605. - - - Dalmatia, Duke of: _see_ Soult. - - Dantzig, Duke of: _see_ Lefebvre. - - Decken, von der, Hanoverian general sent to Oporto by the British - Government, 198; - his report on the Portuguese army, 213. - - Delaborde, general, opposed to Soult’s ambitions in Portugal, 279. - - Del Reino, Marquis, defends the Pass of Baños, 572; - breaks the bridge of Almaraz, 576. - - D’España, Carlos, raises troops at Ciudad Rodrigo, 258; - follows Lapisse, 260. - - Digeon, general, captures artillery of the Spanish Army of the Centre - at Tortola, 13; - surprised at Mora, 144. - - Donadieu, colonel, one of Argenton’s conspirators, 279, 281; - his arrest, 323. - - Douglas, major, receives Argenton, 284; - brings him to meet Wellesley at Lisbon, 315. - - Doyle, Charles, colonel, British agent at Tarragona, sends muskets to - Saragossa, 101; - his intrigues in favour of Infantado, 464. - - Duhesme, general, at Barcelona, 37, 41, 58, 59; - relieved by St. Cyr, 68. - - Dulong, major, his exploit at the Ponte Nova, 355; - and at the Saltador, 357. - - Eben, Baron, Prussian colonel, sent to Oporto by the British - Government, 198; - sent to Freire’s army with the 2nd batt. of the Lusitanian - Legion, 228; - takes command of the army on Freire’s flight, 232; - defeated at Braga, 235; - at the siege of Oporto, 241. - - Eguia, Francisco, general, succeeds Cuesta, 605; - his quarrel with Wellesley, 606. - - _Excellent_, the, at Rosas, 48-9. - - - Ferrol, surrenders to Soult, 175. - - Fleury, de, colonel, holds the tower of San Francisco at Saragossa, - and is killed, 133. - - Foy, general, routs a detachment of Silveira’s force, 224; - taken prisoner at Oporto, 243; - delivered by Soult, 249; - surprised by the English at Oporto, 337; - sent by Soult to Joseph, 496; - pursues Robert Wilson, 619. - - Franceschi, general, receives the surrender of Vigo and Tuy, 178; - routs La Romana’s rearguard, 194; - at Lanhozo, 231; - at Albergaria Nova, 325; - at Grijon, 329; - at Zamora, 402; - his captivity and death, 402. - - Freire, Bernardino, general, at Braga, 224, 228; - his timidity, 228; - his flight, 232; - and death, 233. - - Frere, John H., British ambassador, his negotiations regarding the - British garrison for Cadiz, 26-31; - correspondence with Wellesley, 290; - supports Albuquerque against Cuesta, 465; - urges Wellesley’s claims to be Commander-in-chief, 465, 466. - - - Galicia, Soult’s operations in, 170-95; - its insurrection, 367-401; - evacuated by Soult and Ney, 398-402. - - Galindo, Mariano, leads a sortie from Saragossa, 119. - - Galluzzo, general, defeated by Lefebvre at Almaraz, 4. - - Garay, Don Martin de, Secretary to the Central Junta, declines the - British proposal to garrison Cadiz, 26, 27, 29; - his dealings with Lord Wellesley, 608. - - Gazan, general, takes part in the siege of Saragossa, 104, 107, 109; - present at Arzobispo, 589. - - German Legion, the King’s, losses of, at Talavera, 510. - - Girard, general, storms the bridge of Arzobispo, 589. - - Giron, Pedro, general, commands at Aranjuez, 612; - at Almonacid, 615. - - Grijon, combat of, 328-30. - - - Henestrosa, Juan, general, commands cavalry of Cuesta’s army, checks - Lasalle at Berrocal and at Miajadas, 155; - at Medellin, 163. - - Heudelet, general, sent out by Soult to relieve Tuy and Vigo, 262; - relieves Tuy, 263; - evacuates Tuy and Valenza, 265. - - Hill, Sir Rowland, general, Wellesley’s appreciation of, 304, 305; - in the advance on Oporto, 326-8; - defends the Seminary, 338-9; - at Talavera, 503, 517, 524; - wounded, 525. - - - Igualada, combat of, 79. - - _Impérieuse_, the, frigate, commanded by Lord Cochrane at Rosas, 48. - - Infantado, Duke of, commands Army of the Centre, 5; - at Cuenca, 5; - his hesitation and delay, 6-8; - starts to join Venegas, 12; - his march to Chinchilla, 13; - joins Del Palacio on the Despeña Perros, 32; - removed from command by the Junta, 33; - his intrigues against the Junta, 464. - - - Jaca, surrender of, 408. - - Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, his position at Madrid, 2-8; - makes formal entry into the capital, 13; - his anxiety about Soult and Ney’s expedition, 377; - dispatches an expedition to Galicia, 378; - correspondence with Victor, 443, 444; - leads his Guards from Madrid to pursue Venegas, 458; - joins Victor, 499, 500; - at the battle of Talavera, 527-54; - his mendacious report to Napoleon, 565; - retreats toward Madrid, 568; - marches against Venegas, 569; - his orders to Soult, 596; - wins battle of Almonacid, 614. - - Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste, marshal, military adviser to King Joseph, his - controversy with Victor, 151; - his comments on the Spanish resistance, 167; - sends orders to Lapisse to go to Alcantara, 259; - at Talavera, 527-54; - his orders to Soult, 596. - - Junot, general, Duke of Abrantes, besieges Saragossa, 110-19; - superseded by Lannes, 119; - removed from his command, 410. - - Junta, the Central, flies from Aranjuez to Seville, 21; - its refusal to allow a British garrison in Cadiz, 26, 27, 29, 31; - refuses to appoint a single Commander-in-chief for Spanish troops, 35; - rejects the offers of negotiation of Sotelo, 169; - the plots against, 464; - its negotiations with Wellesley, 466; - its fears of Cuesta and intrigues with Venegas, 468-9; - endeavours to prevent Wellesley’s return to Portugal, 608. - - - Kellermann, François Christophe, general, commands expedition to - Galicia, 378; - forces the pass of Pajares, 382; - evacuates the Asturias, 388; - commands in Leon, 575, 597. - - - Lacoste, general, commands engineers at the siege of Saragossa, 104, - 109, 115; - killed, 126. - - Lafitte, colonel, one of Argenton’s conspiracy, 279; - his arrest, 323. - - Lamartinière, general, left by Soult at Tuy, 188; - relieved by Heudelet, 262. - - Lanhozo, combat of, 231, 232. - - Lannes, Jean, marshal, besieges and takes Saragossa, 1, 119-36. - - Lapisse, general, his instructions from Napoleon for the invasion of - Portugal, 253; - held in check by Wilson, 257, 258; - escapes from Wilson and sacks Alcantara, 260, 261; - joins Victor at Merida, 261; - at Talavera, 504, 516, 522; - killed, 543. - - Lasalle, general, commands cavalry in Victor’s army, 150; - at Berrocal, 155; - at Medellin, 161. - - Lazan, Marquis of, brings the Aragonese division to Gerona, 52; - pursues St. Cyr, 61; - fails to appear at the battle of Cardadeu, 67; - his success in the Ampurdam, 73, 74; - promises to succour Saragossa, 116, 120; - unites with Francisco Palafox, 131; - retreats before Lannes, 131; - at Alcañiz, 417; - at Maria, 424. - - Lefebvre, general, delates Argenton to Soult, 321-2. - - Lefebvre, marshal, Duke of Dantzig, defeats Galluzzo at Almaraz, 4; - disobeys Napoleon’s orders, sent back to France, 4. - - Leval, general, at Talavera, 530. - - Lima-Barreto, general, at the defence of Oporto, 241; - killed, 246. - - Lippe, Conde de La (Frederick of Lippe-Bückeburg), his reorganization - of the Portuguese regular army, 208, 211. - - Lisbon, disturbed condition of, 200-1; - Wellesley’s plans for defence of, 610. - - Loison, general, his disinclination to advance into Portugal, 192; - hatred of the people of Oporto for, 243; - sent out by Soult to the Tras-os-Montes, 262; - resisted by Silveira, 267; - attacks Amarante, 267; - his difficulties, 267-71; - occupies Amarante, 271; - and Villa Real, 272; - disapproves of Soult’s ambitious views, 279; - checked by the Portuguese and abandons Amarante, 344, 345; - retreat of, to Guimaraens, 346. - - Lusitanian Legion, the, raised by Sir R. Wilson, 168; - on the Portuguese frontier, 199, 202; - 2nd batt. of, sent under Eben to Braga, 228; - at battle of Braga, 234; - 1st batt. defends Alcantara, 441; - engaged in Wilson’s march to Escalona, 479-570. - - - Mackenzie, general, commands brigade sent to garrison Cadiz, 28; - returns to Lisbon, 32; - commands ‘containing force’ left by Wellesley on his advance to - Oporto, 317; - killed at Talavera, 541. - - Mackinley, captain, R.N., receives the surrender of French garrison - of Vigo, 264. - - Madrid, formal entry of Joseph into, 14. - - Mahy, Nicolas, general, is defeated by Franceschi at La Trepa, 194; - left in command of La Romana’s army, 375; - retreats before Ney, 380; - his descent on Lugo, 384. - Maria, battle of, 423-8. - - Maucune, general, defeated by Carrera near Santiago, 385. - - Mayne, William, lieut.-col. of the Lusitanian Legion, governor of - Almeida, 256-8; - occupies Alcantara, 318; - driven out by Victor, 440-1. - - Medellin, battle of, 158-66. - - Melgarejo, governor of Ferrol, surrenders to Soult, 175. - - Mequinenza, refuses to surrender to Mortier, 409. - - Meza de Ibor, combat of, 153; - Cuesta at, 586, 592. - - Miajadas, combat of, 155. - - Milans, Francisco, leader of _miqueletes_, driven back by St. Cyr, 63; - fails to come up at battle of Cardadeu, 67. - - Minho, Soult repulsed at the, 182. - - _Miqueletes_, the Catalonian, surround Barcelona, 38, 60. - - Misarella, passage of the, 357. - - Molins de Rey, battle of, 1, 70, 71. - - Moncey, Bon Adrien de, marshal, in charge of the siege of Saragossa, - 91, 103-10; - recalled to Madrid, 110. - - Moore, Sir John, his views on the defence of Portugal, 286. - - Morella, taken and abandoned by Grandjean, 410. - - Morillo, Pablo, leads Galicians against Vigo, 263; - at combat of Santiago, 385. - - Mortier, Edouard, marshal, Duke of Treviso, leads the 5th Corps to take - part in the siege of Saragossa, 103-12; - operations of, in Eastern Aragon, 409; - recalled to Castile by Napoleon, 410, 411; - leads the vanguard of Soult’s force to Plasencia, 574; - meets Cuesta’s force at Oropesa, 583; - movements of, in the Tagus valley, 589. - - Murray, George, general, fails to stop the retreating French at Oporto, - 340, 341; - his pursuit of Soult, 350-1. - - Napoleon, Emperor, his parting orders to Jourdan, 3; - at Valladolid, 15-6; - quits Spain, 18; - his plan for the next campaign, 16; - its impracticability, 18-21, 171; - his dispatch to Soult on the invasion of Portugal, 175; - receives news of Soult’s ambitious views, 276; - his estimate of Wellesley, 297; - his orders to Ney for the subjection of Galicia, 369; - of the Asturias, 388; - his criticism of Soult’s advance on Plasencia, 497; - his rebukes to Joseph and Jourdan, 537, 565; - orders the cessation of active operations, 618. - - Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, leaves Saragossa, 91; - joins Soult, 178; - his difficulties in Galicia, 191, 367-70; - captures Oviedo, 379-81; - his meeting with Soult at Lugo, 391; - repulsed by Noroña at the Oitaben, 396-7; - abandons Galicia, 398; - joins Soult in pursuit of Wellesley, 583; - fails at Almaraz, 594; - returns towards Salamanca, 597; - defeats Wilson at Baños, 620. - - - Noroña, Conde de, commands the ‘Division of the Minho,’ repulses - Ney at the Oitaben, 394-7. - - - O’Daly, Pedro, colonel, commands garrison of Rosas, 47, 50-6. - - O’Donoju, general, chief of Cuesta’s staff, 472. - - Oitaben, the, Ney repulsed by Noroña at, 395-7. - - Oporto, fortifications of, 240; - stormed by Soult, 241-8; - surprise and capture of, by Wellesley, 334-42. - - Oporto, the bishop of (Antonio de Castro), unwise zeal in rousing the - populace of Oporto, 198; - gathers an army for the defence of Oporto, 240, 241; - abandons the city, 242. - - _Ordenanza_, the Portuguese _levée en masse_, called out by the - Regency, 197; - its organization, 221, 222; - opposes Soult’s advance, 223-38. - - Orense, occupied by Soult, 189. - - Oviedo, captured and sacked by Ney, 381. - - - Paget, Edward, general, crosses the Douro at Oporto, 336. - - Palacio, Del, Marquis, escapes from Victor, 13; - commands Andalusian force, 25; - Captain-General of Catalonia, his slowness, 40; - recalled by the Central Junta, 41. - - Palafox, Francisco, escapes from Saragossa to seek help for the - garrison, 116; - arms the local levies, 119; - joins Lazan’s force, 131; - retreats before Lannes, 131; - intrigues against the Junta, 464. - - Palafox, Joseph, defends Saragossa, 92-136; - capitulates, 136-8; - taken prisoner to Vincennes, 139; - criticism of his defence, 140-2. - - Parque, Duke del, commands division of the Army of Estremadura at Meza - de Ibor, 153; - at Medellin, 161, 163; - commands at Ciudad Rodrigo, 574. - - Parreiras, general, takes part in the defence of Oporto, 241-6. - - Patrick, colonel, his gallant defence of the bridge of Amarante, 267. - - Peso de Regoa, combat of, 344. - - _Philadelphes_, the, secret society in France opposed to Napoleon, 279. - - Pino, general, at Cardadeu, 66; - at Valls, 87. - - Pizarro, Magelhaes, his futile attempt to defend Chaves, 225, 226. - - Ponte Nova, passage of the, 355-8. - - Portugal, condition of, in the spring of 1809, 196-208; - Soult’s and Wellesley’s campaign in March-May, 1809, 222-366. - - Portuguese army, its history and reorganization, 208-22. - - Puerto de Baños, combat of, 620. - - - Quiroga, Abbot of Casoyo, raises Galicians against Soult, 184. - - - Reding, Teodoro, general, sent by Vives against St. Cyr, 62, 63; - at Cardadeu, 64, 65, 66, 67; - joins Caldagues, at Molins de Rey, 69; - defeated by St. Cyr, 70, 71; - supersedes Vives as Captain-General of Catalonia, 73; - in Tarragona, 76, 77; - drives back Souham at Valls, 84; - defeated by St. Cyr, 86, 87; - wounded and dies, 89. - - Regency, the Portuguese, fails in organizing national defence after - Junot’s departure, 196, 197; - calls out the _Ordenanza_, 197; - asks for a British Commander-in-chief for the Portuguese army, 215; - its report on the Oporto campaign, 218; - attempts to mobilize the militia, 219. - - Reille, general, withdraws to Figueras, 37; - sufferings of his troops, 39; - besieges and takes Rosas, 48-57. - - Ricard, general, his circular letter on the subject of Soult’s election - as King of Portugal, 276. - - Roca, general, at Alcañiz, 417; - at Maria, 424. - - Rogniat, colonel, takes command of the French engineers at siege of - Saragossa, 126, 135. - - Romana, La, Marquis of, condition of his army, 23; - his wanderings, 179; retreats to Monterey, 180; - escapes from. Franceschi, 193-5; - captures Villafranca, 374-5; - his _coup d’état_ at Oviedo, 375, 376; - routed by Ney at the passage of the Nova, 381; - marches to Orense, 386; - his operations against Soult, 399-400. - - Rosas, siege of, 46-57. - - Ruffin, general, commands division guarding Madrid, 3, 7; - at battle of Ucles, 10, 11; - leads night-attack at Talavera, 516-8; - leads the second attack, 523, 525. - - - St. Cyr, Laurent Gouvion, general, commands French army in - Catalonia, 34; - his character, 43; - sends Reille to besiege Rosas, 46-57; - proceeds against Barcelona, 58-68; - wins battle of Cardadeu, 64-7; - of Molins de Rey, 70, 71; - routs Castro’s troops at Igualada, 79; - wins battle of Valls, 87, 88. - - St. March, general, takes part in the defence of Saragossa, 106; - receives military command of the city from Palafox, 136. - - Salamonde, combat of, 357-8. - - San Genis, colonel, fortifies Saragossa, 94; - killed on the ramparts, 117. - - Santander, Ballasteros’ descent on, 386; - retaken by Bonnet, 387. - - Santiago, combat near, 385. - - Saragossa, second siege of, 90-136; - its outworks stormed, 105-14, 123; - street-fighting in, 123-35; - capitulation of, 136; - condition of, after the siege, 139. - - Sass, Santiago, parish priest of Saragossa, shot by the French, 139. - - Sebastiani, Horace, general, succeeds to command of the 4th Corps, 5; - routs Cartaojal at Ciudad Real, 146, 147; - at Talavera, 522, 527, 529; - eludes Venegas, 566, 567; - wins battle of Almonacid, 614. - - Senra, general, joins Venegas before the battle of Ucles, 9. - - Silveira, Francisco, general, military governor of the - Tras-os-Montes, 223; - assembles his forces at Chaves, 223; - returns to San Pedro, 224, 225; - to Villa Pouca, 228; - recaptures Chaves, 266; - attacks Loison, 267; - defends Amarante, 267-71; - escapes across the Douro, 272, 318; - checks Loison at Peso de Regoa, 344; - pursues Soult, 352, 359, 360. - - Smith, Sir George, his endeavour to force a British garrison on - Cadiz, 27-9; - his death, 31. - - _Somatenes_, their good work in Catalonia, 35, 38. - - Sotelo, agent for Victor, tries to negotiate with the Governor of - Badajoz and Central Junta, 168, 169. - - Souham, general, repulsed by Reding at Valls, 84, 85. - - Soult, Nicolas, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, receives instructions from - Napoleon for the invasion of Portugal, 18; - their impracticability, 18, 170-2; - difficulties of his task, 173; - captures Ferrol, 174, 175; - his final orders from Napoleon, 175, 176; - starts his troops for Portugal, 178; - fails to cross the Minho, 182; - difficulties of his progress in Galicia, 184-9; - occupies Orense, 189, and Chaves, 226; - wins battle of Braga, 235, 236; - storms Oporto, 242-8; - his ambitious views, 273-276; - his dealings with the Argenton conspiracy, 322, 323; - surprised by Wellesley in Oporto, 332-41; - his retreat, 343-60; - meets Ney at Lugo, 390; - abandons Galicia, 398-402; - his justificatory letters, 403-5; - appointed commander of the united army, 460, 461; - advances on Plasencia to support Joseph, 497, 573; - pursues Wellesley, 577-580; - routs Albuquerque at Arzobispo, 589-91; - his desire to invade Portugal, 595, 617; - checked by King Joseph, 618. - - Stewart, Charles, general, - at combat of Grijon, 329; - at battle of Oporto, 340; - at conference of Mirabete, 470-1. - - Suchet, general, takes command of the 3rd Corps, 412; - defeated at Alcañiz, 418-20; - wins battle of Maria, 423-7; - and of Belchite, 429. - - - Tactics, the, of Wellesley, 300, 301. - - Talavera, Victor retires to, 490; - the allied armies at, 491-2; - battle of, 502-56. - - Tarragona, blockaded by St. Cyr, 89. - - Troncoso, Mauricio, Abbot of Couto, raises the Galician peasantry - against Soult, 184. - - Tuy, surrendered to Franceschi, 178; - occupied by Lamartinière, 188; - relieved by Heudelet, 262; - evacuated by the French, 264. - - - Ucles, battle of, 10-12; - town of, sacked by the French, 12. - - - Valls, battle of, 82-9. - - Vaughan, Sir Charles, his testimony to Palafox’s character, 142. - - Venegas, Francisco, general, attempts to surprise Tarancon, 6; - defeated by Victor at Ucles, 9-12; - supersedes Cartaojal in command of the Army of the Centre, 148; - advances to meet Sebastiani, 457; - fails to carry out Wellesley’s and Cuesta’s orders, 478; - at Toledo, 529; - allows the army of Sebastiani to escape him, 566, 567; - loses the opportunity of occupying Madrid, 568; - his blunders, 612; - defeated at Almonacid, 614. - - - Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, defeats Spaniards at - Ucles, 9-12; - marches to Almaraz, 143, 144; - his controversy with Jourdan, 151; - drives back the Duke del Parque at Meza de Ibor, 153; - wins battle of Medellin, 158-66; - remains stationary at Merida, 252; - joined by Lapisse, 261; - seizes Alcantara, 440-41; - misery of his army, 443-4; - retires from Talavera, 490; - joined by Joseph and Jourdan, 500; - at Talavera, 504-55; - his night-attack, 516-8; - his second attack, 522; - his great attack, 531-54; - retreats on Madrid, 570; - reoccupies Talavera, 580; - in La Mancha, 618. - - Vigo, surrenders to Franceschi, 178; - blockaded by Galicians, 263; - surrenders to Capt. Mackinley, R.N., 264. - - Villafranca, captured by La Romana, 374, 375. - - Villatte, general, at the battle of Ucles, 11; - at Talavera, 522, 531. - - Villel, Marquis of, special commissioner at Cadiz, opposes landing of - British troops, 28; - his eccentric legislation, 29, 30; - recalled by the Junta, 31. - - Villiers, Hon. John, British minister at Lisbon, opposes Cradock’s - timid policy, 205. - - Vittoria, general, at the defence of Oporto, 241, 245. - - Vives, appointed Captain-General of Catalonia, 41; - invests Barcelona, 41; - fails to send help to Rosas, 51; - sends _miqueletes_ against St. Cyr, 61; - defeated at Cardadeu, 66, 67; - at Molins de Rey, 71; - superseded by Reding, 73. - - - Waters, colonel, seizes barges for the crossing of the Douro, 334, 335. - - Wellesley, Sir Arthur, takes command of British troops in - Portugal, 207; - declines the post of commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, 216; - arrives in Lisbon, 283; - his opinions on the defence of Portugal, 287, 290, 293; - his character and abilities, 295-300; - his limitations, 302-11; - his tactics, 300, 301; - his interviews with Argenton, 315, 321; - advance on Oporto, 316-35; - attacks and takes Oporto, 335-42; - his pursuit of Soult, 354-66; - correspondence with Cuesta, 445-8; - reviews Cuesta’s troops at Almaraz, 470-2; - quarrel with Cuesta at Talavera, 491, 492; - his choice of the positions at Talavera, 503, 507; - wins battle of Talavera, 513-54; - marches on Plasencia, 573; - on Oropesa, 583; - holds the line of the Tagus, 600-1; - retires to Badajoz, 606; - his plans for the Defence of Portugal, 610. - - Wellesley, Richard, Marquis, his diplomacy at Seville, 608. - - West, captain, R. N., of the _Excellent_, at Rosas, 49, 50. - - Wilson, Sir Robert, commands the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, 168; - his differences with the bishop of Oporto, 199; - his character and record, 253, 254; - refuses to retreat as advised by Sir John Cradock, 256; - holds Lapisse in check, 257, 258; - joins Wellesley’s advance into Spain, 438; - threatens Victor’s flank after Talavera, 570; - his escape from Escalona, 619; - defeated by Ney at Baños, 620. - - Worster, lieut.-general, commands Asturian force, 372; - escapes from Ney, 383. - - -END OF VOL. II - - -Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press, by HORACE HART, M.A. - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. - - * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found. - - * To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and - documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names - follow: - - Alariz, now Allariz, - Albuquerque, now Alburquerque, - Alemtejo, now Alentejo, - Aljafferia, now Aljafería, - Almanza, now Almansa, - Arens de Mar, now Arenys de Mar, - Arzobispo, now El Puente del Arzobispo, - Ballasteros, now Ballesteros, - Baylen, now Bailén, - Busaco, now Buçaco, - Cacabellos, now Cacabelos, - Cangas de Oñis, now Cangas de Onís, - Campo Saucos, now Camposancos - Cardadeu, now Cardedeu, - Cascaes, now Cascais, - Cette, now Sète, - Cevolla, now Cebolla, - Compostella, now Compostela, - Cordova, now Córdoba, - Corunna, now La Coruña, - Deleytosa, now Deleitosa, - Despeña Perros, now Despeñaperros, - El Moral, now Moral de Calatrava, - Estremadura, now Extremadura (for Spain), - Estremadura (for Portugal), - Florida Blanca, now Floridablanca, - Fuentedueñas, now Fuentidueña de Tajo, - Giguela (river), now Gigüela, - Grijon, now Grijó, - Guimaraens, now Guimarães, - Huerba (river), now Huerva, - La Bispal, now La Bisbal, - La Gudina, now La Gudiña, - Lanhozo, now Lanhoso, - Loxa, now Loja, - Majorca, now Mallorca, - Meza de Ibor, now Mesas de Ibor, - Mondonedo, now Mondoñedo, - Monmalo, now Montmeló, - Monterey, now Monterrey, - Osoño, now Villardevós (Osoño), - Pampeluna, now Pamplona, - Passo d’Arcos, now Paço de Arcos - Pillar, now Pilar, - Riva de Sella, now Ribadesella, - San Boy, now Sant Boi de Llobregat, - San Culgat, now Sant Cugat del Vallés, - San Per, now Samper de Calanda, - Saragossa, now Zaragoza, - Sarreal, now Sarral, - Senabria, now Sanabria, - Tajuna, now Tajuña, - Tortola, now Valdetórtola, - Truxillo, now Trujillo, - Vierzo, now El Bierzo, - Villa de Cervo, now Villar de Ciervo, - Villaharta, now Villarta de San Juan, - Villa Nova de Famelicção, now Vila Nova de Famalicão, - Villanueva de Sitjas, now Sitges, - Villarodoña, now Villarrodona, - Vincente, now Vicente, - Vittoria, now Vitoria, - Zornoza, now Amorebieta-Echano. - - * Chapter headers and Table of contents have been made consistent. - - * Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote - is placed at the end of the paragraph that includes its anchor. - - * In the following pages, the anchor placement for the mentioned - footnote is conjectured; no anchor was found in the printed original: - p. 27, n. 35; p. 49, n. 57; p. 293, n. 353; p. 316, n. 390; p. 343, - n. 427; p. 372, n. 466; p. 420, n. 524. - - * In Appendix IV, the meaning of the marks preceding regiment names - seems to be those used in Volume I, App. VIII: “* marks an old - regiment of the regular army; † a militia regiment; ‡ a regiment of - new levies.” - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's A History of the Peninsula War, by Charles Oman - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULA WAR *** - -***** This file should be named 54279-0.txt or 54279-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/2/7/54279/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Ramon Pajares Box and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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