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diff --git a/old/54225-0.txt b/old/54225-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1ccea45..0000000 --- a/old/54225-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32079 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Volume III, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume III - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 3) - -Author: Various - -Release Date: February 23, 2017 [EBook #54225] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOLUME III *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at www.pgdpcanada.net. - - - - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 - - [Illustration] - - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME III - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 1 December 1945 — 14 December 1945 - - - - - CONTENTS - - Tenth Day, Saturday, 1 December 1945, - Morning Session 1 - - Eleventh Day, Monday, 3 December 1945, - Morning Session 35 - Afternoon Session 64 - - Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 4 December 1945, - Morning Session 91 - Afternoon Session 120 - - Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 5 December 1945, - Morning Session 152 - Afternoon Session 178 - - Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 6 December 1945, - Morning Session 209 - Afternoon Session 241 - - Fifteenth Day, Friday, 7 December 1945, - Morning Session 272 - Afternoon Session 303 - - Sixteenth Day, Monday, 10 December 1945, - Morning Session 335 - Afternoon Session 367 - - Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 11 December 1945, - Morning Session 400 - Afternoon Session 402 - - Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 12 December 1945, - Morning Session 415 - Afternoon Session 447 - - Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 13 December 1945, - Morning Session 477 - Afternoon Session 512 - - Twentieth Day, Friday, 14 December 1945, - Morning Session 542 - Afternoon Session 571 - - - - - TENTH DAY - Saturday, 1 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I will begin the -session by reading the judgment of the Tribunal upon the application -made by counsel for the Defendant Hess. - -The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of counsel -for the defense of the Defendant Hess, and it had the advantage of -hearing full argument upon it both from the Defense and the Prosecution. -The Tribunal has also considered the very full medical reports, which -have been made on the condition of the Defendant Hess, and has come to -the conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination -to be ordered. - -After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in Court yesterday, -and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the -Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and -the motion of the Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the -Trial will proceed. - -Now the witness under examination should come back to the witness box. - -[_Erwin Lahousen resumed the stand._] - -MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe yesterday said he had no -questions to ask this witness. He has now requested me very shortly to -cross-examine this witness on one incident mentioned in the Indictment, -namely, the murder of 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft 3 -in March of 1944. - -THE PRESIDENT: You said to “cross-examine”? - -MR. ROBERTS: I realize that this is a matter which falls in the part of -the Indictment which is being dealt with by the prosecutors for the -U.S.S.R. My Lord, I have mentioned that matter to General Rudenko, who -with his usual courtesy and kindness, has said that he has no objection -to my asking some questions on that matter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Roberts. - -MR. ROBERTS: Much obliged. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Might I ask you this? Do you know anything -of the circumstances of the death of 50 R.A.F. officers in March 1944, -who had escaped from Stalag Luft 3 at Sagan and were recaptured? - -ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): No, I have nothing to say because at that time -I was on the Eastern front, as commander of my regiment, and no longer -had any contact with my former duties. - -MR. ROBERTS: Did you hear of the matter from any of your fellow -officers? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I heard nothing about it whatsoever. - -MR. ROBERTS: You can’t assist the Court at all with the matter? - -LAHOUSEN: No, not at all. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, you -stated yesterday that you were the intimate friend and collaborator of -Admiral Canaris. Since I can no longer address my question directly to -Admiral Canaris, I ask you to answer the following questions for me: Did -Admiral Canaris know of Defendant Von Papen’s attitude toward Hitler’s -war policies, and how did Admiral Canaris express himself to you on this -point? - -LAHOUSEN: First, I should like to make a slight correction on the -question addressed to me. I never asserted that I was the intimate -friend of Canaris. Pieckenbrock was a friend of Canaris, whereas I was -merely one of his confidants. From this relationship, however, I recall -that Von Papen’s and Canaris’ attitude toward the matter which the -Counsel has just brought up, was a negative one. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was this negative attitude only toward the war policy, or -was it also toward all the violent methods used in the execution of such -a policy? - -LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection I have to answer this question in -the affirmative, judging from a conversation between Admiral Canaris and -Von Papen, during the visit of the latter in Berlin at which I was -present. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know that Von Papen told Canaris that there could -be no resistance against Hitler’s aggressive policies from political -quarters, but that such resistance would have to be sought among the -ranks of the military? - -LAHOUSEN: In this connection, that is to say, in the direct connection -as it is now being presented, I personally cannot say anything. In other -words, I personally was not an ear witness at any conversation between -Canaris and Von Papen during which this matter was brought up, and I -cannot recall today whether Canaris ever told me anything regarding such -conversations with Von Papen. It is quite possible, however, but I -cannot recall it and consequently my oath as witness does not permit me -to make any statement other than the one I have made. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you conclude from this that Canaris believed -that Von Papen purposely continued to hold an exposed political office -in order to exercise a mitigating influence? - -LAHOUSEN: I believe so, though I have no tangible proof from any of his -statements. But that is my impression, from what I still recollect -today. - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): My client has requested -me to ask you the following questions: How long have you known Canaris -and Pieckenbrock? - -LAHOUSEN: I have known Canaris and Pieckenbrock since 1937 through my -previous activity in the Austrian Intelligence Department. - -DR. NELTE: At that time were there any relations of a military nature -between yourself and the Abwehr, which was being run by Admiral Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: Not only did such connections exist with the Austrian -intelligence, but the Austrian Federal Army and the German Wehrmacht -maintained it that time an absolutely legal and purely military exchange -of information—legal in the sense that this exchange and collaboration -of military intelligence was carried on with the knowledge of the -Austrian authorities. To state it clearly, this was a purely military -collaboration for exchanging intelligence on countries bordering upon -Austria. - -DR. NELTE: May I ask if this contact between you and Canaris was also of -a personal nature, in other words I want to determine how the Austrian -Army felt about the question of the Anschluss? - -LAHOUSEN: This and similar questions, that is to say, all questions of a -political nature, particularly the question of the Anschluss or the very -intense illegal Nazi activities, at that time, had to be and were -completely ignored. It was generally agreed between Count Marogna, the -official liaison man—he also was executed after the 20th of July—and -Canaris and Generaloberst Beck that this line should be taken. - -DR. NELTE: Do I understand you wish to imply that this personal contact -did not mean that the Austrian General Staff officers gave information -on everything regarding their attitude to the idea of the Anschluss, or -that they were willing or able to give this information? - -LAHOUSEN: This personal contact started on the day when I saw Canaris -for the first time, while I was still an Austrian officer. It was in the -offices of the Federal Ministry of Defense, where Canaris was with the -Chief of the Austrian General Staff. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you please repeat the question? - -DR. NELTE: I asked the witness to what extent a personal contact existed -between the officers of the German General Staff or the Abwehr and the -officers of the Intelligence Section or the Austrian General Staff for -the purpose of determining the feelings about the Anschluss. - -LAHOUSEN: First of all, there was no such personal contact in the sense -that the word is used here. The contact which actually did take -place—and there are witnesses in this room who can confirm this -statement: Von Papen must be informed thoroughly of this—took place on -a single day, during which I never spoke with Canaris alone, but always -in the presence of my superior officers. In any case, no questions -relating to the Anschluss and no political questions on Austrian -internal problems were discussed there. Naturally I myself did not raise -any, and Canaris expressly refrained from doing so. - -DR. NELTE: What was your job in the Abwehr Office II? - -LAHOUSEN: In the Abwehr Section II, which I took over at the beginning -of 1939—I described it yesterday, and I am willing to repeat it, if you -wish—this particular job had no special name. Actually my task was to -carry out various undertakings and actions, which I can define very -precisely: Nuisance activity, acts of sabotage, or prevention of -sabotage and nuisance activity, or in general those types of activities -that are carried out by Kommandos. All these activities were carried out -in agreement with, and conformed to, the military demands of the Armed -Forces Operations Staff or the General Staff. - -DR. NELTE: Who generally gave you your orders regarding co-ordinating -these activities with the military activities? - -LAHOUSEN: My immediate chief, Canaris, usually gave me orders concerning -the whole of my activity. - -DR. NELTE: I was referring to the office, whether they came from the OKH -or the OKW? - -LAHOUSEN: They did not come from the OKW as a rule. Usually they came by -way of the OKW represented by the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, or the chief -of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff; and when the General Staff or the Air -Force Operations Staff were interested in any undertaking, the orders, -as far as I can remember, were also transmitted by way of the Armed -Forces Operations Staff, and the representatives of the three Armed -Forces, that is, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, appointed to it. All -these orders came through the same channels to the Canaris Foreign -Intelligence Department (Ausland Abwehr) which transmitted those -concerning my activities to me for necessary action. - -DR. NELTE: Are you now describing the official channels through which -you received the orders? Were the orders issued by the Army or the Armed -Forces Operations Staff? Or did the Army give the orders for -transmission by way of the High Command of the Armed Forces? - -LAHOUSEN: Actually, speaking of myself, in questions of this kind, -regarding matters which concerned my department, I had dealings only -with my immediate superior, Canaris; and the superior of Canaris at that -time was the OKW under Keitel, and he was in touch with the gentlemen of -the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and now and then with the members of -the General Staff of the Army. I could mention specific cases from -memory. But in general the procedure was such as I described it. - -DR. NELTE: Is it true that Keitel, as the Chief of the OKW, at first -every year, and then from 1943 on, at regular and shorter intervals, -spoke to the office and department chiefs of the OKW; and on such -occasions made a point of telling them that anyone who believed that -something was being asked of him which his conscience would not allow -him to carry out should tell him, Keitel, about it personally? - -LAHOUSEN: It is true that the Chief of the OKW did several times address -the circle just mentioned. I cannot recall any exact words of his which -could be interpreted in such a way as to mean that one could take the -risk, in cases about which I testified yesterday, of speaking with him -so openly and frankly as myself and others, that is, witnesses still -alive, could speak to Canaris at any time. I definitely did not have -that impression, whatever the meaning might have been which was given to -his words at that time. - -DR. NELTE: Do I understand you correctly to mean that in principle you -do not wish to challenge the fact that Keitel actually said these words? - -LAHOUSEN: I can neither challenge it, nor can I add anything to it, -because I have no exact recollection of it. I do recall that these -addresses or conferences took place, and it is quite possible that the -Chief of the OKW at that time might have used those words. I can only -add what I have already said. - -DR. NELTE: Is it true that on several occasions, you, in the company of -Admiral Canaris, as well as alone, had audience with the Chief of the -OKW, in order to discuss with him plans or undertakings of a delicate -nature, which were in the purview of your official duties? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said a great deal about that yesterday; and I do not -feel I have the right to talk about such things unless I was there -personally. - -DR. NELTE: I had the impression yesterday that in many respects you were -acting as a mouthpiece for Admiral Canaris, who used you as a mentor for -the entries in his diary. Was that your testimony? - -LAHOUSEN: The impression is completely fallacious. I am not a -mouthpiece, and am now, as I was then, completely independent inwardly -in what I say. I have never allowed myself, nor shall I ever allow -myself, to become the mouthpiece for any conception, or to make any -statements that are contrary to my inner convictions and to my -conscience. - -DR. NELTE: You misunderstood me if you believe that I used the word -“mouthpiece” derogatorily. I simply wanted to bring out the fact that -yesterday you made frequent references to the remarks in Canaris’ diary, -that is to the remarks of Canaris quoted by you. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I did so in those cases where the matter discussed -affected Canaris. He himself cannot testify, since he is dead. Just -because I know a great deal about this, and because my information is -exact, I felt it my duty to say what I know. - -DR. NELTE: Did Keitel ever ask questions or order any inquiries to be -made about the political views of the officers in the Intelligence -Department? Did he ever ask whether there were any National Socialists -in the departments of the intelligence service? - -LAHOUSEN: At the afore-mentioned periodical meetings he asked this -question and others of this nature in an unmistakable way, and he left -no doubt that in an office such as the OKW he could not tolerate any -officers who did not believe in the idea of final victory, or who did -not give proof of unswerving loyalty to the Führer and much more -besides. - -DR. NELTE: Could these statements be taken to mean that he demanded -obedience in the military sense, or do you think he was speaking from a -political point of view? - -LAHOUSEN: Of course, he was speaking from a military point of view, but -no less clearly from the political aspect, for it was not admissible to -make any distinction between the two. The Wehrmacht was to form a single -whole—the National Socialistic Wehrmacht. Here he touched upon the root -problem. - -DR. NELTE: You believe, therefore, that the basic attitude was really -the military one, also in the OKW? - -LAHOUSEN: The basic attitude was, or should have been, National -Socialistic, and not military. In other words, first and foremost -National Socialistic, and everything else afterwards. - -DR. NELTE: You said “should have been.” - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, because it actually was not the case. - -DR. NELTE: Quite so. You mean, therefore, that in the first place it was -military and not National Socialistic. - -LAHOUSEN: It should have been a purely military one, according to our -conception, but according to the point of view put forward by the Chief -of the OKW at that time—whether he received an order in this sense I am -not in a position to say, as I was not there—the basic attitude should -be one of absolute obedience in a National Socialistic sense. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the attitude of the generals to -this problem? - -LAHOUSEN: Of course, I do, because immediately after such conferences, -as have been mentioned here, a lively exchange of opinions took place on -this subject and a large number of those who were present—I could name -them and some of them are present—resented that fact that the words -addressed to them had this strong political flavor, and were couched in -this “higher level language” (Sprachregelung von oben) as we used to -call it, and contained so little that was relevant and purely military, -let alone anything else. - -DR. NELTE: Yesterday, when discussing the meeting that took place in the -Führer’s train, on the 12th September of 1939, you said, regarding the -communication of the Chief of the OKW to you, that the Defendant Keitel -addressed himself to you, or rather to the gentlemen present; and said -that these measures had been determined between the Führer and Göring. -He, Keitel, had no influence on them. The Führer and Göring telephoned -frequently to one another. Sometimes he knew something about it; -sometimes he knew nothing. Is that what you said? - -LAHOUSEN: That is correct. I made a record of everything that was said -in my presence; and I repeated it here because it is true. - -DR. NELTE: May I ask whether the remark, “Sometimes I find out something -about it, sometimes I do not,” relates to a concrete, specific case, or -was that a general rule? - -LAHOUSEN: That was to be understood as a general statement, to the best -of my recollection. - -DR. NELTE: At this conference in the Führer’s train on the 12th of -September 1939, did you first of all speak about the transmission of the -political aims which, according to you, came from Ribbentrop. Did I -understand you correctly? - -LAHOUSEN: That is correct. - -DR. NELTE: And you said that the Defendant Keitel transmitted these aims -to those who were present. Now, what I am not clear about is whether -this referred to the order regarding the bombardment of Warsaw from the -air. Did I understand rightly? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, as regards the air bombardment of Warsaw, to the best of -my recollection and from what is recorded in the notes, I can only say -in this connection, the same as when the question of shootings in Poland -came up, that Canaris took the initiative by provoking a discussion on -this subject—I no longer remember how he did this—and then pointing -out the terrible political repercussions that this would have, -especially abroad. - -DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put the -question to you, whether, when this order for the bombing of Warsaw was -made known he did not stress the fact that this was to be put into -effect only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender after the demand -made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even then only after an -opportunity to evacuate the city had been given to the civilian -population and the diplomats. - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall the precise words he used but according to my -knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite possible, indeed -probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did make this remark. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know that the Commander-in-Chief of the army at that -time, Von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, before the -Polish War began, categorically objected to the use of Gestapo and SD -Kommandos, maintaining that these were unbearable in the Wehrmacht, and -in this connection asked for Hitler’s concurrence and received it? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that, and could not have known it because -of my subordinate position at that time. Please do not overrate the -importance of my position at that time. - -DR. NELTE: As we are also concerned here with taking cognizance of a -document, which, I take it, was transmitted to all departments and -sections of the OKW, I thought you might remember. They were the -so-called directives, were they not? And these directives, mentioned in -connection with the campaign against Poland, in contrast to what -happened later . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you were going a little bit too fast. - -DR. NELTE: I said that in connection with these military actions, the -decrees and directives were always transmitted to the various offices of -the OKW in the form of carbon copies—I mean the offices which were in -any way concerned. I thought, therefore . . . - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, but these were things which did not concern my particular -department, I stress the word “particular,” I did not even see them. - -DR. NELTE: As later on in the conversation you were drawn into the -discussion on these questions—it is true you did stress that you did -not know the actual wording of the orders . . . - -LAHOUSEN: Orders which I did not see and read. Of course, I knew a great -many things, because I came to hear of them. - -DR. NELTE: For that reason, I want to ask you whether you recall that -the Gestapo and SD had interfered behind the advance in connection with -Poland, contrary to the intentions expressed in the orders of the -military leaders? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall that today. I can only refer to what I heard -and what is recorded in the files on this matter, namely, the remark of -Hitler’s, which was passed down by Keitel, who was chief at that time, -and which was to the effect, that if the armed forces objected to these -measures, the armed forces as well as the high command—that is -apparently what you mean—would have to put up with it if the Gestapo -and the SS went ahead with these things. That is all I can tell you. I -know that because I was present at these discussions. - -DR. NELTE: During this conversation, were you not told that General -Blaskowitz—in other words, the Army—had made a complaint about the -methods of the SS and the SD? - -LAHOUSEN: Whether or not this question was brought up at this -conference, I cannot recall. I can hardly assume that it was brought up, -because otherwise this question would have been recorded in the notes of -that conference, particularly since the complaint came from General -Blaskowitz, whose attitude in such matters was quite clear and well -known. But apart from this conversation in the Führer’s train, I do -recall something about the matter just mentioned, that is, the -objections raised by Blaskowitz. I cannot say today how these objections -were made, whether in writing or by word of mouth, neither do I know the -occasion on which they were made. While I do remember the substance of -the matter, I cannot recall whether it came up for discussion at the -meeting where I was present. - -DR. NELTE: What appears to me to be important in this matter, is the -fact that the Wehrmacht, the troops, really did protest, or at least -refused . . . - -LAHOUSEN: That the Armed Forces did object, is, of course, quite -evident. - -DR. NELTE: That is what I wanted to know. Who gave the order . . . - -LAHOUSEN: One moment, please. When I say “the Armed Forces,” I mean the -masses of common soldiers, the ordinary simple men. Of course, there -were in these Armed Forces other men whom I wish to exclude. I do not -wish to be misunderstood. The concept “Armed Forces” does not include -everybody, but it does include the mass of simple men with natural -feelings. - -DR. NELTE: When using the term “Wehrmacht” I only wanted to bring out -the contrast between the broad masses of the soldiers and the SS and SD, -and I think we are agreed on this. - -LAHOUSEN: I think we have ample and fairly conclusive proof of this -contract in the conditions prevailing and the methods used at that time, -which in that form and scope were then for the first time shown openly -enough to become apparent to the broad masses of the Wehrmacht—quite -apart from anything I can say about it in this short, extremely short -exposition. - -DR. NELTE: Who gave the order regarding the collaboration with the -Ukrainian group? You spoke yesterday . . . - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have to go back somewhat farther. First of all I must -say that this group was composed of citizens from various countries, -that is, Hungarians, Czechs, and afterwards Polish citizens, who because -of their attitude of opposition, had emigrated or gone to Germany. I -cannot say who gave the order for the collaboration, because at the time -when these things happened—it was some time back, I remember quite -clearly it was in 1938 or even earlier—I was not even working in the -Amt Ausland Abwehr and was not in touch with the Department, which I did -not take over until the beginning of 1939. It was already on a firm -footing when I took it over. - -In this connection I must add, since it was also touched upon yesterday, -that these Ukrainians, at least the majority of them, had no ties -whatsoever with Germany. I can say definitely that a large proportion of -these people with whom the Amt Ausland Abwehr had contact at that time -were in German concentration camps, and that some of these people were -fighting for their country in Soviet partisan groups. That is a fact. - -DR. NELTE: Did Admiral Canaris not tell you that the Chief of the OKW, -Keitel, when informed by the SS of the demand for Polish uniforms and -military equipment, had given the clear order that the Abteilung Abwehr -should have nothing to do with this game? - -LAHOUSEN: As I stated yesterday, this matter was handled very -mysteriously and secretly also in our circle. Not only myself, but the -others also, knew absolutely nothing about the game which was being -played until after it actually happened. The War Diary of the Department -makes this very clear. It records that one day, quite suddenly, like a -bolt from the blue, a demand was received, by order of Canaris, for so -and so many uniforms for an undertaking known as “Himmler”. My amazement -and my enquiry as to how Himmler came to have anything to do with an -undertaking which required Polish uniforms is also recorded in the War -Diary, not by me, but by the officer who kept this diary. In reply I was -merely told that these articles of equipment would be picked up by a -certain person on a certain day, and no further explanation was given. -And there the matter ended. Of course, when the name of Himmler was -mentioned, besides being mysterious, the thing immediately began to -appear suspicious to us. By us, I mean everybody who had to do with it -in the course of his duty, right down to the ordinary sergeant, who, of -course, had to procure these uniforms by some means or other and deliver -them to a certain Hauptsturmführer SS—the name is recorded in the War -Diary. These people had their misgivings. That was a thing which could -not be forbidden. - -DR. NELTE: Yesterday you also made statements about the treatment of -prisoners of war. In what way was Abwehr II concerned with -prisoner-of-war questions? - -LAHOUSEN: That is quite simple. Abwehr II was naturally very interested -in an objective way that prisoners of war should be treated as well and -as decently as possible, and the same applies to any intelligence -service in the world. That was all. - -DR. NELTE: Do I understand you to mean that Abwehr II, as a department, -was not concerned with prisoner-of-war questions? - -LAHOUSEN: It had absolutely nothing to do with prisoner-of-war -questions. - -DR. NELTE: Yesterday you spoke about the problem of the treatment of -prisoners of war in connection with a conference that took place, if I -remember rightly, at the end of July 1941? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, at this conference I did not represent only my section, -but the whole Amt Ausland Abwehr, that is to say—for general questions -of international law and military political questions, that is, those -questions which to the greatest extent generally concerned foreign -countries, and the intelligence sections. Department III which dealt -with espionage was practically interested—because after all, the -officers affiliated with it were in the prisoner-of-war camps. -Naturally, from the point of view of my section it was important to be -informed about those matters—and that my section was only interested -within the frame of the entire problem, that people should not be killed -off, but treated decently, quite apart from any of the other -considerations which were mentioned. - -DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that the prisoner-of-war camps in the -operations zone of the Eastern sector were under the OKW. Is that -correct? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, what I said about prisoner-of-war camps yesterday I knew -from the conference with Reinecke, and not from any knowledge of the -orders themselves, which I had neither seen nor read. At this conference -I was able to obtain a clear idea of the prisoner-of-war question owing -to the presence of Reinecke, the chief of the prisoner-of-war -department, who represented his own department and the OKW, and I -repeated everything I remembered about this. - -DR. NELTE: What I was really asking was about the limitation of the -jurisdictions. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know that in the Army Operational Zone the army on -operations was responsible for the care of prisoners of war? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: And that the OKW became responsible for their care only when -the prisoners of war arrived in Germany? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I repeated what I knew about the matter at the time from -what I had heard. This was that the General Staff of the Army had made -all preparations to bring these people back, and Hitler then authorized -the OKW to hold this up, and the OKW was then held responsible by the -General Staff for the consequences. What happened after that I do not -know and have no right to judge. I can only repeat what I saw and heard. - -DR. NELTE: I thought that yesterday you expressed the conjecture that -the prisoners were not brought back owing to an order from Hitler. - -LAHOUSEN: I did not express a conjecture. I simply repeated what I heard -at the time and what I know. It might, of course, have been wrong. - -DR. NELTE: Heard from whom? - -LAHOUSEN: I heard this from the people with whom I was in daily contact, -that is, at the daily situation conferences, at which Canaris, the -department chiefs, and other people who came there to report were -present. I heard it there, and a great deal was said about this matter. -I have always made this clear since my first interrogation. I told -Reinecke to his face that what he himself said about this question at -the time . . . - -DR. NELTE: That has nothing to do with my question. - -LAHOUSEN: I understand your question perfectly. I only want to make it -quite clear how I came yesterday to say what I did—to examine how far -this applies according to the actual, organizational and other divisions -. . . - -DR. NELTE: But you know that in principle the OKW had charge of -prisoners of war only in Germany? - -LAHOUSEN: There is no question about that. - -DR. NELTE: How could it happen that the Abwehr office adopted the -attitude you defined yesterday regarding the question of enemy commando -activities? You were supposed to deal with these things from the German -side, but you—that is, your department—were not officially concerned -with the handling of these things? - -LAHOUSEN: No, not immediately concerned. The Amt Ausland had something -to do with these things because somehow it received intelligence of any -order that was under consideration, even before it was put into shape, -and certainly as soon as it was drawn up. The order in question had, of -course, a bearing on an essential point of international law, and the -Ausland section of the Abwehr department—or rather the “Sachbearbeiter” -(expert) as he was called—was naturally concerned with it. As a matter -of fact, my department was directly concerned with these things for -reasons which I have already explained, because it might turn out that -persons for whom I was responsible might be directly affected. - -DR. NELTE: Did the department which dealt with international law in the -Amt Ausland Abwehr ever put its official attitude in writing? - -LAHOUSEN: As I pointed out yesterday, I wrote a contribution on the -subject, from the point of view of my section, which was transmitted to -Canaris and was to be part of the long document. I only learned what use -was made of it from what Bürckner said at the time, and which was that -his department passed the thing on in this manner, either in writing or -verbally, as a protest or counter remonstrance, at any rate pointing out -the dangers. This happened a second time, and again I cannot say in what -form, whether verbally or in writing or _vice versa_—the first time in -writing and then verbally—after executions had already taken place, and -because I had again started to make myself heard because of the -executions that had already taken place. That was the logical -development. - -DR. NELTE: You also said something yesterday about putting a -distinguishing mark on Russian prisoners by branding. Did it become -known to you that such a scheme, as brought out in this question, was -cancelled by a telephoned order from the Chief of the OKW, who had gone -to the Führer’s headquarters for this purpose, and that it was only -because of a regrettable, a terrible misunderstanding, that a few copies -of this order were issued? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I do not know about this, because, generally speaking, I -only heard of the things which happened in the Amt Ausland Abwehr, that -is, from Canaris’ section downwards, if I was directly concerned with -them. What happened on the higher levels, that is, from Canaris upwards, -was and could only be known to me if I was in some way connected with -it. - -DR. NELTE: You yourself did not see the order? - -LAHOUSEN: Which order are you referring to? - -DR. NELTE: The one concerning the branding of Russian prisoners. - -LAHOUSEN: No. As in the case of the Commando Order and others, I -attended only the very lively discussion of this question, and with -regard to the branding of Russian prisoners I remember Canaris -mentioning that a doctor had furnished a written report on how this -could be done most efficiently. - -DR. NELTE: You stated yesterday that Admiral Canaris had said that the -Defendant Keitel had given the order to do away with General Weygand? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel denies that. He now asks whether you -ever saw any document or written proof of this order. He wants to know -the origin of any statement which concerned General Weygand. - -LAHOUSEN: This order was not given in writing, but it came to me because -I was supposed to put it into execution, that is, not I, but my -department. It came up through Canaris, in that circle which I have so -often described, and which means that it was known only to a few. I was -brought into the matter through a talk which Canaris gave at Keitel’s -office in the OKW and at which I was present. Keitel had already -addressed me on the matter. I recorded this in my personal notes and I -mentioned the date. After all, such a thing was not an everyday -occurrence, at least not to me. It was 23 December 1940. - -DR. NELTE: Do you not remember the actual wording of the question that -Defendant Keitel was supposed to have asked? - -LAHOUSEN: Of course I cannot remember the precise wording; the incident -happened too long ago. I remember the gist very well. What he meant was, -“What has been done in this matter? How do things stand?” - -DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that you gave an evasive answer. - -LAHOUSEN: I said yesterday that I could not remember exactly how I -worded my answer but I certainly did not say what I had said in the -presence of Canaris, namely, “I would not think of executing such a -murderous order; my section and my officers are not an organization of -murderers. Anything but that.” What I probably said to Keitel was -something about how difficult the matter was, or any evasive answer that -I may have thought of. - -DR. NELTE: If the Chief of the OKW had ordered such an action on his own -initiative or on higher orders, this would, because of the high rank of -General Weygand, have amounted to an act of state. You did not tell us -yesterday whether after December 23, 1940 anything transpired in this -matter, that is to say, whether the Chief of the OKW took up this -question again. - -LAHOUSEN: No, I did not say anything about that yesterday, but I -frequently mentioned during the interrogations that after that the Chief -of the OKW did nothing more about it. Canaris’ attitude made it obvious -that nothing further had been heard of it, for in the hierarchy of -commands which for me was authoritative, he would have had to transmit -orders to me. On the other hand, the information which I received in the -Giraud matter was authoritative. - -DR. NELTE: We shall come to that presently. It is extraordinary that if -an act of state, such as the murder of General Weygand, had been -ordered, nothing more should have been heard of it. Can you explain -this? - -LAHOUSEN: I can only explain it in the light of the construction which -not only I myself, but also the others, put on the matter at that time. -The situation at that time was very agitated; events followed each other -very rapidly and something happened all the time, and we assumed—I -shall come back to why we assumed it—that this matter and the -importance attached to it had been superseded by some more important -military or political event, and that it had receded into the -background. - -DR. NELTE: Do you wish to say anything else? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. I wish to state that what I am saying now has a certain -bearing on the inner development of the Giraud affair. We—that is, -Canaris, myself, and the others—who knew about this when the matter -started, had hoped that it would take the same course as the Weygand -affair; that is, that the matter would be dropped. Whether the order had -been given by Keitel, or Hitler or Himmler, it would have been shelved -when it came to Canaris and to me. In our circles it would have been -relatively easy to intercept it or to divert it. That was what we hoped -when the Giraud affair came up, as we had seen what actually had -happened in the Weygand affair. Whether that was right or wrong I cannot -judge. This is the explanation. - -DR. NELTE: For a less important matter your argument might be plausible, -but in such an important matter as the Weygand case it does not seem to -me to hold water. But even if it had been so, had the intention to do -away with Weygand existed in any quarters and for any reason, how do you -explain the fact that Weygand, who later was taken to Germany and housed -in a villa, lived undisturbed and honored and met with no harm? It would -have been understandable if the order to eliminate him had been -seriously expressed in any quarters, that it should have been carried -out on this occasion. - -LAHOUSEN: I can only answer to this that the attitude towards -personalities in public life, whether at home or abroad, varied a great -deal. There were high personalities who at one moment were in great -favor and thought of very highly, and at the next moment were to be -found in a concentration camp. - -DR. NELTE: Now regarding the Giraud case, you stated that Admiral -Canaris said in your presence and the presence of others that General -Giraud was to be done away with on orders from higher quarters. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. That it is so is borne out by the remark that -Pieckenbrock made, and which I remember very well, that Herr Keitel -should tell these things to Herr Hitler once and for all. - -DR. NELTE: So according to the communication made to you by Admiral -Canaris, it was not an order of Keitel’s but an order of Hitler’s. - -LAHOUSEN: As far as we knew in the Abwehr office, it was Keitel who gave -the order to Canaris. I can only assume this in view of an order Hitler -made to this effect I do not know who actually gave this order, because -I had no insight into the hierarchy of command beyond Canaris. It was, -as far as I was concerned, an order from Canaris—an order which I could -discuss immediately with him, in the same way as I can discuss it here. - -DR. NELTE: You yourself did not hear this order? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I personally did not hear it. I never said I did. - -DR. NELTE: But you mentioned that later Keitel spoke to you about this -matter? - -LAHOUSEN: The procedure was the same as in the case of Weygand. - -DR. NELTE: Do you remember whether any precise or positive expression -such as “killing,” “elimination,” or something similar was used on this -occasion? - -LAHOUSEN: The word generally used was “elimination” (umlegen). - -DR. NELTE: What I mean is whether in this connection such a word was -used by the Defendant Keitel in addressing you? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course—when I gave my report, the notes of which I -have, together with the date, just as in the Weygand case. For reasons -unknown to me, the Giraud affair was apparently carried further than the -Weygand affair, for Canaris and I could determine the different stages -in its development. - -DR. NELTE: You did not answer my question. What did the Defendant Keitel -say to you in this instance, when you were present at the occasion of a -report by Canaris and the question of Giraud was brought up? What did he -say? - -LAHOUSEN: The same thing: “How does the matter stand?” And by “matter” -he clearly meant Giraud’s elimination, and that was the very subject we -discussed under similar conditions in the Weygand affair. - -DR. NELTE: That is your opinion, but that is not the fact on which you -have to give evidence. I wish to find out from you what Keitel actually -said to you. When speaking to you or in your presence, did he use the -expression “dispose of” or “eliminate”? - -LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the expression he used, but it was perfectly -clear what it was all about. Whatever it was, it was not a question of -sparing Giraud’s life or imprisoning him. They had had the opportunity -to do that while he was in occupied territory. - -DR. NELTE: That is what I want to speak about now. You are familiar with -the fact that after Giraud’s flight and his return to Unoccupied France, -a conference took place in Occupied France. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that. - -DR. NELTE: Ambassador Abetz had a talk with General Giraud which dealt -with the question of his voluntary return to confinement. You know that? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that. - -DR. NELTE: Then you probably also know that at that time the local -military commander immediately called up the Führer’s headquarters by -way of Paris. It was believed that an important communication was to be -made; namely, that Giraud was in Occupied France and could be taken -prisoner? - -LAHOUSEN: I know about this in its broad outline. - -DR. NELTE: Then you know also that the OKW—that is to say in this case, -Keitel—then decided that this should not happen. - -LAHOUSEN: No, that I do not know. - -DR. NELTE: But you do know that General Giraud returned to Unoccupied -France without having been harmed? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I do know that. - -DR. NELTE: Well, in that case, the answer to my previous question is -self-apparent. - -LAHOUSEN: I speak the truth when I say I do not know. I could not have -known unless they had talked about it in my presence. - -DR. NELTE: Well, it is so, and the facts prove it to be so. Did you know -that General Giraud’s family lived in Occupied France? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that. - -DR. NELTE: I thought the Abwehr division was entrusted with surveillance -of this region? - -LAHOUSEN: No, you are mistaken—certainly not my department. I do not -know whether another department was in charge of that. - -DR. NELTE: The question was asked simply to prove that the family did -not suffer because General Giraud escaped and later refused to return to -captivity. I have one more question which you may be able to answer. - -LAHOUSEN: I beg your pardon. May I return, please, to the question of -Giraud? - -DR. NELTE: This question also has to do with General Giraud. - -LAHOUSEN: Very well. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know that one day your chief, Canaris, received by -special courier a letter from Giraud in which Giraud asked whether he -might return to France? Do you know that? - -LAHOUSEN: No. No, I do not know about it. Perhaps I was not in Berlin at -the time. I was not always in Berlin. - -DR. NELTE: I am aware of that. I thought it might be mentioned in the -diary. - -LAHOUSEN: No, I did not keep the diary. I simply made additions to it so -far as my particular department was concerned, but I was not familiar -with the diary in its entirety. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I would -like to make a motion in connection with the technical side of the -proceedings. In the course of the proceedings, many German witnesses -will be heard. It is important that the Tribunal should know exactly -what the witnesses say. During the hearing of this witness I have tried -to compare what the witness actually said with the English translation. -I think I can state that in many essential points the translation did -not entirely correspond to the statement of the witness. I would, -therefore, like to suggest that German stenographers take down directly -the statements of the witness in German so that Defense Counsel will -have an opportunity of comparing what the witness actually says with the -English translation and, if necessary, of making an application for the -correction of the translation. That is all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Justice Jackson. - -MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): -I just want to inform the Court and Counsel, in connection with the -observation that has just been made, that that has been anticipated and -that every statement of the witness is recorded in German, so that if -any question arises, if Counsel addresses a motion to it, the testimony -can be verified. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that German record available to Defendants’ Counsel? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t think it is. It is not, so far as I know. -It would not be available unless there were some occasion for it. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is transcribed, I suppose? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t know how far that process is carried. I -will consult the technicians and advise about it, but I know that it is -preserved. The extent of my knowledge now is that it is preserved in -such a form that, if a question does arise, it can be accurately -determined by the Tribunal, so that if they call attention to some -particular thing, either the witness can correct it or we can have the -record produced. It would not be practicable to make the recording -available without making reproducing machines available. While I am not -a technician in that field, I would not think it would be practicable to -place that at their disposal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be practicable to have a transcription made -of the shorthand notes in German and, within the course of one or two -days after the evidence has been given, place that transcription in the -Defendants’ Counsel room? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is being done. I think perhaps Colonel -Dostert can explain just what is being done better than I can, because -he is the technician in this field. I am sure that no difficulty need -arise over this matter of correct translations. - -COLONEL LEON DOSTERT (Chief of Interpreters): Your Honors, the reports -of the proceedings are taken down in all four languages and every word -spoken in German is taken down in German by German court stenographers. -The notes are then transcribed and can be made available to Defense -Counsel. Moreover, there is a mechanical recording device which -registers every single word spoken in any language in the courtroom, and -in case of doubt about the authenticity of the reporters’ notes, we have -the further verification of the mechanical recording, so that Defense -Counsel should have every opportunity to check the authenticity of the -translation. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am advised further by Colonel Dostert that 25 -copies of the German transcript are being delivered to the defendants -each day. - -FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was not informed that the -German testimony is being taken down in shorthand in German. I assumed -that the records handed over to us were translations. If German -shorthand notes are being taken in the court, I withdraw my motion. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we shall get on faster if the Defendants’ -Counsel, before making motions, inquire into the matters about which -they are making the motions. - -DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop): I would like to ask -a few questions of the witness. - -Witness, you previously stated that at some time an order was given, -according to which, Russian prisoners of war were to be marked in a -certain manner and that this order had been withdrawn by the Defendant -Keitel. You did say that, did you not? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said that I have knowledge that there was this purpose. - -DR. SAUTER: This is interesting from the point of view of the Defendant -Ribbentrop, and I would like to hear from you whether you know about -this matter. Ribbentrop maintains that when he heard about the order to -brand Russian prisoners of war, he, in his capacity as Reich Foreign -Minister, went immediately to the Führer’s headquarters to inform -General Field Marshal Keitel of this order, and pointed out to him that -he, Ribbentrop, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, as well as in his -capacity as the guarantor of international law, objected to such -treatment of Russian prisoners of war. - -I would be interested to know, Witness, whether in your circle something -was said as to who drew Keitel’s attention to this order and asked him -to retract it? - -LAHOUSEN: I was not informed of that and I only knew, as I said -yesterday, that there had been this intention, but it was not carried -out. - -DR. SAUTER: Then I have another question. - -Witness, you spoke yesterday about some remarks of the Defendant -Ribbentrop, especially one statement to the effect that an uprising -should be staged in Poland—not in Russia—and that all Polish farm -houses should go up in flames and all Jews should be killed. That, -roughly, was how the statement ran. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, later on, I believe, in answering a question of one of -the Russian prosecutors, you amplified your statement by mentioning an -order of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I would now like to know whether you -really meant to say that it was an order from Ribbentrop to a military -department? - -LAHOUSEN: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Just a minute please, so that you can answer both questions -together. - -I would also like to remind you that yesterday, when this matter was -first discussed, you spoke of a directive which, I believe, your -superior officer had, as you said, received from Ribbentrop? - -LAHOUSEN: No, the Chief of the OKW received it, not my superior officer, -who was Canaris. I would like to repeat it, in order to clarify this -matter. It was a matter that came up for discussion on the 12th of -September 1939 in the Führer’s train. These meetings took place in the -following sequence with respect to time and locality: At first a short -meeting took place between the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and -Canaris in his coach. - -DR. SAUTER: Were you present? - -LAHOUSEN: I was present at that meeting. General political questions -regarding Poland and the Ukrainians in Poland were discussed. I do not -know anything more about this meeting, which was the first. - -After that there was another meeting in the coach of Keitel, who was -then Chief of the OKW, and in the course of this meeting Keitel -summarized and commented on the general political directives issued by -Ribbentrop. He then mentioned several possible solutions for the -handling of the Polish problem from the point of view of foreign -policy—this can happen, or something else can happen; it is quite -possible. In this connection he said: - - “You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of the - Ukrainian organizations which are working with you and which - have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and the Jews.” - -And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at the end -of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and -Canaris was made in connection with this subject, after the intention -had been made quite clear. It was about how the uprising was to be -carried out and what was to happen. I remember this so well, because he -demanded that the farm houses must burn. Canaris discussed the matter -with me in detail later on and referred to this remark. - -That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the sequence: -Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then passed on by Keitel to -Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to Canaris in the form of a -remark which I remember so well because it contained the words about -farm houses in flames, which is rather an unusual thing to say. - -THE PRESIDENT: It would assist the Tribunal if one question at a time -were asked and if the witnesses would answer “yes” or “no” to the -question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards. But questions and -answers should be put as shortly as possible and only one question -should be asked at a time. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, witness, something else has struck me. - -THE PRESIDENT: You heard what I said did you? Do you understand it? - -DR. SAUTER: [_Continuing._] Yesterday you said that these remarks of -Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you correctly. - -LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection with -Canaris’ diary, by means of which I can make this remark. - -DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you as being -rather surprising. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also made some -striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that these statements -of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary. - -LAHOUSEN: No. - -DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me—and I would like you to answer this -question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Ribbentrop surprised you, -was it not entered in the diary? - -LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say—or rather—repeat the -following: - -I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in this -connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this subject -came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been entered in these -notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz matter was discussed at -a time when I was not there. I have only put down what I heard or what -Canaris told me to enter in the record. - -DR. SAUTER: But did you yourself hear that from Ribbentrop? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether one speaks of -extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms, they all amount to -terroristic measures. - -DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews? Are you sure -you remember that? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I definitely remember that, because Canaris talked not -only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this matter and called me -time and again as a witness. - -DR. SAUTER: You heard that too? - -LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of -Ribbentrop’s were frequently discussed. - -DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about murderous -designs on which you or your department or other officers were employed -or which you were charged to carry out. Did you report these to any -police station as the law required? May I point out that according to -German law failure to report intended crimes is punishable with -imprisonment or in serious cases with death. - -LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I -am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man. - -DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, that is also punishable according to -Austrian law. - -LAHOUSEN: At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was no longer -valid. - -DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended crime, -either as a private person or as an official? - -LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a great many reports—about 100,000 -projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. You can -read about them in the records—and about shootings and the like—of -which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted to know or not, -because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it. - -DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken place and -could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of intended murder at -a time when perhaps it could have been prevented. - -LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who received this order -at first hand not do the same thing? Why did he not denounce Hitler for -instance? - -DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht, should have asked -Hitler . . . - -LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had only been a -general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of January 1945, that -is, only for 4 months. At that time I was lieutenant colonel and later -colonel of the General Staff, not in the General Staff. - -DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, -you at once made a request to be taken into the German Wehrmacht by -Hitler. - -LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to do this. -Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my special services. I -was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the Austrian Government and -also, in a restricted sense, with the knowledge of the German -authorities (that is, of certain persons) I was working for the Austrian -Government in a matter which exclusively concerned things outside the -scope of Austrian internal policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as -well as with the Italian and Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of -the Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were -matters of politics which were not my domain. - -DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives you, because -immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you called on the General -Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a commission in the German -Wehrmacht, and you now deny this. You also filled in and signed a -questionnaire, in which you declared your complete allegiance to the -Greater German Reich and to Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you -took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler. - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who was in the -position of being transferred from one office and capacity to another. - -DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this appointment, and -I have information to the contrary: That you, in the company of two or -three other officers were the first to go to Berlin with the sole -purpose of asking the Chief of the German General Staff Beck to take you -into the German Army. - -LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject, because it -allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was not necessary for -me to make an application for my future position in the German -Wehrmacht. I was known because of my military activities, just as any -military attaché is known in the country where he is accredited. - -Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so rapid. I -have said that my activities and my co-operation with the Austrian -Military Intelligence Service, which were not determined by me but by my -superior Austrian office, were at that time directed against the -neighboring country of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country -that was next on the list after Austria. Therefore, it was natural that -my later chief, Canaris, who knew me from my former position, was very -interested in having me promoted in his department. He put in a word for -me, and so did Colonel General Beck, whom I was visiting. Other people -also know this; and I have now told everything that General Beck told me -at that time. - -DR. SAUTER: Then it is true, you did go to Berlin and apply to be -transferred into the German Wehrmacht, which you at first denied? - -LAHOUSEN: No, that is not true, I did not apply. Others made the -request. I can even say that I did not go there: I flew there. Canaris, -who knew me not only in my military capacity but also in regard to my -personal attitude (just as Marogna had known me and just as Colonel -General Beck, who was informed about me by Canaris), made the request -for me. I myself did not apply, but others applied for me, for reasons -which only later became clear to me, because they knew my personal -attitude, just as my Austrian comrades—they were necessarily few—knew -about this and about me. That is how things stood. - -DR. SAUTER: I have no other questions to ask this witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before the cross-examination I wish to announce that -there will be no public session of the Tribunal this afternoon. - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): I am counsel for the -Defendant Göring, and I would like to address a few questions to the -witness. - -Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said yesterday that it was -Canaris’ personal conviction that his failure to prevent the attack on -Poland would mean the end of Germany and a great misfortune for us. A -triumph of the system would mean an even greater disaster, and it was -the purpose of General Canaris to prevent this. Did I understand you -correctly? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, except for one point: Not that he had not been successful -in preventing it, but that it was not possible to prevent it. Canaris -had no way of knowing this . . . - -DR. STAHMER: Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, in the first years -of the war, had very active sabotage organizations behind the enemy -front and that he personally worked very hard for these organizations? - -LAHOUSEN: Naturally I knew about that, and I have fully informed the -American authorities who were interested in this subject. - -DR. STAHMER: But how is that possible? This would not be in conformity -with his inner political beliefs. - -LAHOUSEN: This is explained by the fact that in the circle in which he -was active he could never say what he really thought, and thousands of -others could not do so either—what I said is a truth without saying. -The essential thing is not what he said, or what he had to say in order -to follow a purpose; but what he did and how he did it. This I know and -others know it, too. - -DR. STAHMER: This is not a question of what he said, but of what he -actually did. He not only proposed such measures, but also applied -himself to their execution—is that true? - -LAHOUSEN: Ostensibly he had, of course, to remain within the limits of -his office, in order to keep his position. That was the important thing, -that he should remain in this position, to prevent in 1939 the thing -that actually happened in 1944: that Himmler should take things in hand. -I place before you these two men, one against the other: Canaris and -Himmler—and I think I need hardly tell you what Canaris was striving -for when he (Canaris) took part—ostensibly took part in these -activities. - -DR. STAHMER: You mentioned the name of Himmler, in this connection, I -would like to ask the following question: - -Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the -war, laid great stress on his good relations with the SS and the -necessity for close co-operation with the SS, so much so, that the -Defendant Göring had to advise him to be more independent of the SS in -his military functions? - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going too quickly and I do not think you are -observing what I said just now, that it will help the Tribunal if you -will ask one question at a time. - -DR. STAHMER: I will put my question briefly; did the witness know that -Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, had good connections -with the SS and recognized the necessity for close co-operation with the -formation, and never failed to stress this? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, this is known to me. I also know why. - -DR. STAHMER: And why? - -LAHOUSEN: So that he might be in a position to see and to know and keep -himself informed of everything these people were doing, and be able to -intervene wherever and whenever possible. - -DR. STAHMER: Was it the duty of your organization, or the duty of -Canaris’ department to pass on important enemy intelligence to the -military leadership in good time? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not understand what the office of Canaris has to do with -this? - -DR. STAHMER: Your section of the office of Canaris? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, the Department I. - -DR. STAHMER: Now, according to my information, your office did not pass -on to the military departments concerned information of the -Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Is that true? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not know. Please do not make me responsible for the -department. This is a question which could easily be answered by Colonel -Pieckenbrock, but not by me. - -DR. STAHMER: Regarding the Case “Rowehl,” you said yesterday that a -colonel of the Air Force, Rowehl, had formed a special squadron, which -had the tasks of making reconnaissance flights over Poland, England, and -the southeast sector prior to the Polish campaign. Is that true? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: You also said that Colonel Rowehl went to see Admiral -Canaris to report on the results of these flights and to submit -photographs. Is that true? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. How should I have known about it otherwise? I did not -invent it. - -DR. STAHMER: I did not say that. How did Colonel Rowehl come to report -to Admiral Canaris about this? - -LAHOUSEN: I believe I mentioned yesterday, that this was a function of -the Amt Ausland Abwehr, Abteilung I. - -DR. STAHMER: Have you yourself seen the photographs that were taken over -England? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have seen them. - -DR. STAHMER: When and where were these pictures shown to you? - -LAHOUSEN: In the office of Canaris they were shown to me. I had nothing -to do with them in an official way. I happened to be present at the -time. I was interested in seeing what was going on. - -DR. STAHMER: What did these photographs show? - -LAHOUSEN: I have forgotten the details. They were photographs taken from -airplanes. - -DR. STAHMER: The photographs were not shown to you officially? - -LAHOUSEN: No, the photographs were not shown to me officially, I was -merely an interested spectator on this occasion, as I have just told -you. - -DR. STAHMER: Did Rowehl give any written reports about these flights to -the Amt? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not know. - -DR. STAHMER: You do not know? You also said that Rowehl’s squadron made -flights from Budapest? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: Do you know that from your own experience or from some -other information? - -LAHOUSEN: I know it through personal investigation. The date is entered -in the War Diary kept by the section. At that time I was in Budapest, -and I was asked to attend the conferring of a citation in Budapest. - -DR. STAHMER: That was before the Polish campaign? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -DR. STAHMER: And why were these flights carried out from Budapest? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not know. I said that yesterday. A gentleman of the Air -Force would have to answer that. - -DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, do you know -Captain Strünck from the Abwehr? - -LAHOUSEN: I would like you to tell me something more than the name. The -name alone does not mean anything to me. Give me a few points that will -refresh my memory. - -DR. DIX: He is a lawyer who was a reserve officer with the Abwehr. I do -not know in which department, but I would say it was in the department -of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not know him I will not question you -any further. - -LAHOUSEN: If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him. I knew a few. -Is Strünck still alive? - -DR. DIX: No, he is no longer living. - -LAHOUSEN: Was he executed? - -DR. DIX: He suffered the same death as Canaris and Oster. For the -information of the Court, I should like to add that I asked this -question because I named Strünck as a witness and the Court has admitted -him as such. I wish to take this opportunity—but if you do not know him -I will not continue questioning you. - -LAHOUSEN: When I asked whether he is still alive, I seemed to recall -that this man, together with others whom I knew very well, might have -been killed, but I cannot be more definite on this point. - -DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): I would like to ask -the witness a few questions. - -Witness, do you know that the Defendant Fritzsche, when in May 1942 he -was transferred to the 6th Army as a soldier and there heard for the -first time of the existence of an order for executions, recommended to -the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, that he should have this -order suspended within the jurisdiction of his army and have this -decision made known by leaflets to be dropped over the Russian front? - -THE PRESIDENT: Be careful only to ask one question at a time. You have -just asked three or four questions at once. - -DR. FRITZ: Yes, Sir. Is it known to you that Fritzsche gave Paulus the -advice to rescind the order for his army sector? - -LAHOUSEN: That order had already been given to his army. Will you kindly -give me the approximate date? - -DR. FRITZ: That was during the Russian campaign, as I mentioned -yesterday. Most of these things occurred in May 1942. - -LAHOUSEN: No. I do not know anything about this in connection with -Fritzsche. In connection with the name Reichenau, which was mentioned -before, I do remember a conversation between Reichenau and Canaris at -which I was present. It made a great impression on me. During this -conversation, and in this circle, where there were several other -gentlemen present, Reichenau held quite different ideas and judged -things quite differently from what I had expected of him. Apart from -that, I do not know anything about this particular question. - -DR. FRITZ: Also nothing concerning the fact that Paulus had rescinded -the order within the sector of his army? - -LAHOUSEN: No, not in connection with the name Paulus, but in general I -believe, as I also stated yesterday, that several army commanders, whose -names are no longer in my memory today, or whose names have been -recorded, were mentioned by me. - -DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Do you know -Mr. Kaltenbrunner? - -LAHOUSEN: Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner only once in my life, and -that was on a day that will always remain in my memory. It was also the -first meeting between Canaris and Kaltenbrunner. It took place in Munich -in the Regina Hotel, and it was on the day when two young people, a -student and his sister, were arrested and executed. They had distributed -leaflets in the auditorium of the University of Munich. I read the -contents of the leaflets, and I remember, among other things, that they -contained an appeal to the Wehrmacht. - -I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I -saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of course, -Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was completely -shattered because of what had happened that day and was still under the -painful impression—and thank God there are still witnesses available -who can testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was -very much to the point, but at the same time he was quite cynical about -it. That is the only thing I can tell you about this matter. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner claims that Himmler retained full executive -powers for himself, while he was only in charge of the intelligence -service. Is this borne out by the conversation that you just mentioned? - -LAHOUSEN: I would like you to know what bearing that has on the -Kaltenbrunner-Himmler matter—the struggle for power which was taking -place in the SS. I have merely described this event. I can give you the -names of the people present, who like myself were very much impressed -for the reasons which I have mentioned. - -HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): You were asked yesterday whether -the orders regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war were known -to the leaders of the SA and other organizations, and your answer was -that these orders must have been known to them. I would now like to ask -you who these leaders were at the time and what were their names? - -LAHOUSEN: Who they were and what their names were, I do not know. I also -stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They must have been known to -them and to a large circle through the execution of these orders, and, -of course, through the return of the wounded. The German people must -have learned about them. - -HERR BÖHM: In other words, it was only an opinion of yours, but in no -way a fact-based on personal observation? - -LAHOUSEN: No, it was not. I personally never had anything to do with any -SA leader. I never had anything to do with them, and I do not think any -one of them knows me well. - -HERR BÖHM: Could you make a statement on this, that is, whether the -orders which were mentioned yesterday were given to the formations of -the SA? - -LAHOUSEN: Would you kindly formulate that question again? - -HERR BÖHM: Could you make another statement as to whether the contents -of these orders, which were discussed yesterday, were sent to the -formations of the SA through official channels? - -LAHOUSEN: No, not through official channels, but in the way I have -previously indicated; in other words, members of the SA who were also in -the Wehrmacht could see actually what happened out there, and when they -came back they spoke about it, the same as anyone else. It was only in -this connection . . . - -HERR BÖHM: Is it known to you whether members of the SA had anything at -all to do with the handling of prisoners of war? - -LAHOUSEN: When members of the SA were in the Wehrmacht, yes. - -HERR BÖHM: Did you make any personal observations in this connection? - -LAHOUSEN: No, I never said that. I said I had already talked about the -SA. - -HERR BÖHM: I asked you which leaders of the SA formations knew about -them, and you answered that they should have known about them. - -LAHOUSEN: I said the leaders of these organizations came to know about -them in this way. - -HERR BÖHM: And today I ask you whether the individual formations of the -SA had received these orders. - -LAHOUSEN: I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think I was -very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders were issued. -I myself did not read these orders, but I know the effects they had. - -HERR BÖHM: I can imagine myself how this happened, but I asked you -whether you know anything about how these orders reached the SA? - -LAHOUSEN: No. - -HERR BÖHM: You do not know? Do you know anything from your own personal -observations about members of the SA being employed for the supervision -of prisoner-of-war camps? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes, because from my personal observations, once when I was on -my way to the Army Group North, I caught an SA man who was kicking a -Russian prisoner of war and I pulled him up about it. I think that is -mentioned somewhere in my records, and also an episode about an -Arbeitsdienst man. - -HERR BÖHM: Did you report any of these incidents through the proper -channels? Did you see to it that the leaders of this organization were -informed about them? - -LAHOUSEN: I reported it to my superior officer, or it was mentioned in -my report on my visit either orally or in writing. There were -discussions on this and similar incidents. - -HERR BÖHM: Have you got anything in your records? - -LAHOUSEN: Yes. - -HERR BÖHM: Will you please submit it? - -LAHOUSEN: I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst man, this -document. - -HERR BÖHM: It is not about the SA man? - -LAHOUSEN: No. - -HERR BÖHM: Then you cannot submit anything in answer to my question? - -LAHOUSEN: I do not have it here. I would have to look it up. - -HERR BÖHM: Do you think you might find some records? - -LAHOUSEN: I would have to have an opportunity of going through the whole -of the material which is in the hands of the American authorities to -find this one. - -HERR BÖHM: I will ask the Court that you be given this opportunity. - -I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to observe that -members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed on supervisory -duties, ever took any measures which were in line with the orders -against Soviet soldiers. - -LAHOUSEN: No, not personally. - -HERR BÖHM: Thank you. - -DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling on -whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask the witness -questions. According to the German text of the Charter, Paragraph 16, I -believe this is permissible. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and -will let you know later. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would desire to be -heard, I am sure, if there were any probability of that view being taken -by the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now, Mr. Justice Jackson. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these -provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the right to -conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly -this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that -sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility -that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct -their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the -privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privileges of -counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person. - -DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16 (e), -according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view. It -says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his -counsel, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is -clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness -called by the Prosecution. According to the German text there reference -can be made only to the defendant—with respect to terms as well as to -the contents. In my opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the -right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant’s counsel, wish -to cross-examine the witness? - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I would only like -to point out that in the written forms given to us by the Court, the -defendant, as well as his counsel can make a motion. A place is left for -two signatures on the questionnaire. I conclude, therefore, that the -defendant himself has the right to speak on the floor. - -THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendant’s counsel -wished to cross-examine the witness. - -[_Herr Böhm approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please, -unless you understand English. What is it you want to ask now? You have -already cross-examined the witness. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given me to -understand that he made a report about an incident which occurred during -one of his visits of inspection, and that he has some written notes. As -I am not yet able to release the witness, I should like to move that the -Prosecution allow to be placed at the disposal of the witness any -available notes or reports on the observations made by him at the time, -so that he may find the evidence he wants. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross-examination now. - -HERR BÖHM: Certainly. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make -any further application with reference to this witness, that you should -make it in writing later. - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant’s counsel wishes to -cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose -of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a -defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his own counsel. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised -by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by -counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the -right to be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at -the end of the Trial. - -Do the Prosecutors wish to ask any questions of this witness in -re-examination? - -COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United -States): Just one question, your Lordship. - -THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here. - -THE MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): He was taken away. - -THE PRESIDENT: Taken away? - -THE MARSHAL: That’s right. He was taken away by some captain who brought -him here for the Trial. They have sent after him now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken away? - -THE MARSHAL: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of -sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for -him to be recalled on Monday? - -COL. AMEN: I don’t believe so, Your Lordship. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be -understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is -under examination, from the precincts of this Court except on the orders -of the Tribunal. - -COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship, I understood -he was still here. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - ELEVENTH DAY - Monday, 3 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I call on the prosecutor for the United States. - -SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May -it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might -be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur -within the next week or two weeks in this Trial. - -I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to present the -story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps be able to -conclude that today. - -Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked that he -be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on -Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the -understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that. - -Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the -aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England -into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed with the -expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and -Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia -and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British -prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved -and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions. - -That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under Count Two -and will probably take the rest of this week. - -Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to come -back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not been covered, -specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation -in occupied territories, the High Command, and other alleged criminal -organizations, particularly evidence dealing with individual -responsibility of individual defendants. - -Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the following -week—two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate. - -Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening statement -and will present the evidence as to Crimes against Humanity and War -Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to Western Occupied countries. - -Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his opening -statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding War Crimes -and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries. - -That, in very rough outline, is what we have in mind to present. - -I turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological -presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against -Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in -Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the -printed English text of the Indictment. - -This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts: - -(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault -both on Austria and Czechoslovakia. - -(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March -1938. - -(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia; April 1938 to -March 1939. - -On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents on the -execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered -together in a document book which was handed to the Tribunal at the -beginning of the Austrian presentation. - -The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia have -been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the -Tribunal and which is marked “Document Book 0.” - -The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the defendants -had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give the Third Reich -military strength and political bargaining power to be used against -other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they -had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned -out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their -frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place -them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they -could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of -aggression. - -At the moment—in the early spring of 1938—when the Nazi conspirators -began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had -reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program. - -The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancellery on -November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler had set forth -the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hossbach minutes, you -will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS as United States Exhibit -Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a -week ago today. - -“The question for Germany,” the Führer had informed his military -commanders at that meeting, “is where the greatest possible conquest can -be made at the lowest cost.” - -At the top of his agenda stood two countries, Austria and -Czechoslovakia. - -On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the -following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a -redefinition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little -more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met -to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak -State. - -Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the Tribunal in -my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of the crime of -aggressive war was the account of this meeting on 21 April 1938. This -account is Item 2 in our Document Number 388-PS, as United States -Exhibit Number 26. - -The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretext -which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and -overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of -diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an -excuse for war. In the alternative—and this alternative they found to -be preferable—they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result -of an incident of their own creation. - -Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the document -proved, was given to the assassination of the German Minister at Prague -to create the requisite incident. - -The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in -Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of -transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all -Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a -_fait accompli_ and forestalling outside interventions. - -Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer -Czechoslovakia had already readied the stage of practical planning. - -Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a background -of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against -that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to -destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government -were bound by a treaty of arbitration and assurances freely given, to -observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at -Locarno on 16 October 1925—Document TC-14, which will be introduced by -the British prosecutor—Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain -exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court -of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so -refer: - - “All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia - with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their - respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle - amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy.” - -And the preamble to this treaty stated: - - “The President of the German Reich and the President of the - Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace between - Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement - of differences, which might arise between the two countries; - declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or - resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory for - international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights - of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and - considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful - settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, - without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause - of divisions between states, have decided to embody in a treaty - their common intention in this respect.” - -That ends the quotation. - -Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards -Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as -March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the annexation of -Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia -not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant Göring assured Masaryk, the -Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that -German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in -Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards -Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Göring -accompanied his assurance with the statement, “Ich gebe Ihnen mein -Ehrenwort (I give you my word of honor).” - -At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling German -foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured Masaryk, on -behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still -considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925. - -These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of the series -of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British -prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment. - -Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded -with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the -preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German -policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In -both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist -by propaganda and by Fifth Column activities, while the actual military -preparations were being developed. - -The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and -strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. -Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to “Fall Grün” (Case -Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against -Czechoslovakia. - -The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as -early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified -preparation of the Armed Forces for war—signed by Von Blomberg on June -24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year -beginning July 1, 1937,—included, as a probable war-like eventuality -for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, “War on two -fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast.” - -This document—our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69—was introduced in -evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon -copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original section of this -directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia—it was -later revised—opens with this supposition. I read _from the bottom_ of -Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the -heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed “Suppositions”: - - “The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation - against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of - a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify - such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law - must be created beforehand.” - -After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such -action, the directive continues as follows: - - “(2) _The task of the German Armed Forces_”—and that much is - underscored—“is to make their preparations in such a way that - the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by - surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the - minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack. - - - - “The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed - Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for - the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the - rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian - Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base - in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy - armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.” - -The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding -principles the following statement—and I now read from Page 1 of the -English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1: - - “Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does - not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness - for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:”—and then—“(a) - to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military - exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they - occur.” - -This directive ordered further work on the plan for “mobilization -without public announcement.” I quote: - - “. . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able - to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in - regard to both strength and time of attack.” - -This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of -the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which -resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in -another setting. - -Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during -the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this -planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and -support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 -November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes, to which I have -frequently heretofore referred. - -In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the -Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the -information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to -Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for -General Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference -with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an -interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the -original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit -USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said: - - “I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should - discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, - the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed - about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me - briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect. - With best regards and Heil Hitler.” - -At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which -I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS, -Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed -for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and -summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case -Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and communications were carefully filed -at Hitler’s headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the -Führer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a -cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is -preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit -Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as “Big Schmundt”—a large -file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any -narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an -unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the -Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning -Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I -shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without -reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt -file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl’s office of the -OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn’t intended to read them in full, unless that may be -necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision. - -MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to -the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, “Short Survey of -Armament of the Czech Army,” dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialed -“Z” for Zeitzler, and Item 13, “Questions of the Führer,” dated Berlin, -9 June 1938, and classified “Most Secret.” I should like to read four of -the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as -shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24, -25, and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS. - -Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czech Army. I don’t think -it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving -information in response to these questions posed by Hitler. - - “Question 2: How many battalions, _et cetera_, are employed in - the West for the construction of emplacements? - - - - “Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still - occupied in unreduced strength? - - - - “Question. 4: Frontier protection in the West.” - -As I say, those questions were answered in detail by the OKW and -initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff. - -As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on -Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the -preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in -Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a -telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I -quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file, -Page 12 of Document 388-PS: “Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and -General Keitel.” And then, skipping a paragraph: “The Führer repeatedly -emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification -work in the West.” - -In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and -his political and military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series -of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It -was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should -be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the -Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives. - -On 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal advisors. At -this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow -conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler -later publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the notice of the -Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of -31 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day, -reported in this newspaper, reading now from Document 2360-PS, Hitler -spoke as follows: - - “On account of this intolerable provocation which had been - aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of - our Germans there, I have determined to solve once and for all, - and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On 28 May - I ordered first: That preparation should be made for military - action against this state by 2 October. I ordered second: The - immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the - West.” - -Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the -revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in -the Big Schmundt file, Document 388-PS. It is entitled, “Two-front War, -with Main Effort in the Southeast,” and this directive replaced the -corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the previous quote, -“Directive for Unified Preparation for War,” which had been promulgated -by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in -evidence as our Document C-175, United States Exhibit Number 69. This -revised directive represented a further development of the ideas for -political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their -conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of the rough draft submitted -by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item -5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were -made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant -Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for -the Navy, and to Defendant Göring for the Luftwaffe. In his covering -memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured—I quote: “As -from 1 October 1938 at the latest.” I now read from this document, which -is the basic directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its -planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation from the first page -of Item 11, Page 16 of the English version: - - “1. Political prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision to - smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It - is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the - politically and militarily suitable moment. - - - - “An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia - or other political events in Europe, creating a surprisingly - favorable opportunity and one which may never come again, may - cause me to take early action. - - - - “The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a - favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly - the preparations are to be made at once. - - - - “2. Political possibilities for the commencement of the action. - The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended - invasion: - - - - “a. Suitable obvious cause and with it, b. sufficient political - justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will - find him prepared in the least possible degree. - - - - “From a military as well as a political standpoint the most - favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an - incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way - for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral - justification of military action. - - - - “But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, - must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must have the - elements of surprise as regards time and extent, before the - enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be - surpassed. - - - - “3. Conclusions for the preparation of Fall Grün. - - - - “a. For the ‘armed war’ it is essential that the surprise - element, as the most important factor contributing to success, - be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already - in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. - Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first 2 or - 3 days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations, eager to - intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military - situation and which, at the same time, will give nations with - territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene - immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention - by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, - especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of - Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war - by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give - military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are - to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the - land operations within the first few days, a European crisis - will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of - all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action. - - - - “b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate - Czechoslovakia by threats and wear down her power of resistance; - on the other hand issue directions to national groups for - support in the ‘armed war’ and influence the neutrals into our - way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination - of the date. - - - - “4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces preparations are to - be made on the following basis: - - - - “a. The mass of all forces must be employed against - Czechoslovakia. - - - - “b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear - cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East - against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the - southern frontiers to be watched. - - - - “c. The sections of the Army which can be rapidly employed must - force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and - must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the - certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with - the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed - in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly - employed cross the frontier at the appointed time, at the same - time as the penetration by the Air Force, before the enemy can - become aware of our mobilization. For this, a timetable between - Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW - and submitted to me for approval. - - - - “5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces. - - - - “a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against - Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of the - Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for - transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it - is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault - columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise - attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition - of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed - with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their - proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special - measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts - to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at - numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to - achieve a break-through, or to break them down from the rear. - For the success of this operation, co-operation with the - Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the - Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and - with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The - bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian - plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from - escaping . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the -transcript. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you -pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page 15, which -introduces it and which gives the date of it. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated: - - “Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme Commander - of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only through officer; - written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distributed to C-in-C - Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force. - - - - “By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, - Section II, of the directive on the unified preparations for war - of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)”—with some - symbols, including “Chefsache” (top secret)—“(two-front war - with main effort on the Southeast—strategic concentration - Green) is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution - must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest. - Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected - during the next week. - - - - “By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, - signed, Keitel. - - - - “Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General - Staff.” - -In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit the -detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and -by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive, -which will be found on Page 19 of the English version: - - “In war economy it is essential that in the field of the - armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made - possible through increased supplies. In the course of - operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of - the total war—economic strength—by rapidly reconnoitering and - restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of - Czechoslovakian industrial and factory installations, insofar as - military operations permit, can be of decisive importance to - us.” - -In other words, the Nazi conspirators, 4 months before the date of their -planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution which -the Czech industrial plant would make to further Nazi war efforts and -economy. - -And the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19: - - “All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by - OKW. They will be made, in agreement with, and according to, the - requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their - effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force as - to time and locality. - - - - “Signed Adolf Hitler. - - - - “Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General - Staff.” - -Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was -prepared and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages -27 to 32 of the Big Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 May -directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the -English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29: - - “The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own - free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political - intentions. I am determined as from 1 October 1938 to use to the - full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.” - -Then skipping a paragraph: - - “However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia - only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation - of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that - France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.” - -And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page: - - “The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself - will be issued by me from time to time.” - - - - “K”—initial of Keitel, and—“Z”—initial of Zeitzler. - -The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions -for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of -the possibility that during the execution of the Fall Grün (or Case -Green) France or England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of -complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not -been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15 -in the Schmundt file, give a timetable of specific measures for the -preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated -action. - -Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in General -Jodl’s diary, our Document Number 1780-PS and United States Exhibit -Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian -presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in -the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to -have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and -here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation: - - “Later undated entry: - - - - “After annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there is - no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria had to be - digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will - have to be carried out energetically. They will have to be newly - prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because - of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see - Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Führer on 21 - April. - - - - “The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem as - yet will be changed because of the Czech strategic troop - concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat - and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany’s - self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of prestige for - the Führer, which he is not willing to take once more. - Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May.” - -And then the entry, 23 May: - - “Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. . . . Further - conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the - Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High - Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June,—see inclosures (War - Diary).” - -Then the entry of 30 May: - - “The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final - decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates - military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions - of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an - immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on - D-Day”—X-Tag—“combined with aerial penetration by the Air - Force. - - - - “Further details are derived from directive for strategic - concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once - more between the Führer’s intuition that we must do it this - year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, - as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are - not as yet equal to them.” - -During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in -planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further -expansion of the Reich. - -I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as United States Exhibit 82. -This is a top-secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Group -Command 3, and entitled “Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and -Combat, ‘Case Red.’” - -“Case Red” is the code name for action against the Western Powers if -need be. Twenty-eight copies of this document were made, of which this -is number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and -employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given -significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning -for the attack on Czechoslovakia. - -I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation, -referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may -occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a -German-Czech conflict. - - “France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the - Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of Case Green, or (b) - start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia. (c) It is - possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while - Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.” - -And then, reading down lower on the page under the heading “Intention”: - - “Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of Case - Green or whether she makes the opening move of the war - simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the - German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, - first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.” - -By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being -carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the -Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attaché in Prague reconnoitered -the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for -suitable landing grounds. - -I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA-83, a report of the -Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938. -This was a top-secret document for general officers only, of which only -two copies were made. - -Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the German -Attaché in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four -paragraphs of the enclosure: - - “I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to - reconnoiter the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf - . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. “. . . for landing possibilities. - - “For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal - with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in - Prague. - - - - “I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me - to Macholdt, particularly about my official position. - - - - “I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to - Freudenthal taking precautions against being observed.” - -By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the -issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum, -entitled “Extended Case Green”; in other words, an estimate of possible -action by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia. - -I now offer this document in evidence, Number 375-PS as Exhibit USA-84. -This is a top-secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the -Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the -assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany -during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and -air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date -for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is -under the heading “Initial Political Situation”: - - “The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the - Case Green. It is presumed that France will decide upon war only - if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely - assured.” - -Now, knowledge of the pending or impending action against Czechoslovakia -was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and -the Nazi Party. During the summer Germany’s allies, Italy and Hungary, -were apprised by one means or another of the plans of the Nazi -conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA-85. -This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a -confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador -Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note -headed “For the Reichsminister only”, and the Reichsminister was the -Defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the -third and fourth paragraphs: - - “Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the - Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He - also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take - perhaps a 2 months’ holiday now which he could not do later on. - - - - “Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments, Attolico - mentioned that the Romanian Government had refused to grant - application for leave to its Berlin Minister.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for 10 -minutes? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a -message to Berlin asking that he be told the date on which Case Green -would take place. I offer in evidence Document Number 2791-PS as Exhibit -USA-86, a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador -Attolico. This note is signed “R” for Ribbentrop and dated 23 August -1938. I now read two paragraphs from this memorandum: - - “On the voyage of the _Patria_ Ambassador Attolico explained to - me that he had instructions to request the notification of a - contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from - the German Government. - - - - “In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against - Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in 6 - months, or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him that - the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the - situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would - notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. - In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who - will receive such a notification.” - -THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you? - -MR. ALDERMAN: The initial “R” for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August -1938. - -Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the -pending attack. I offer Document Number 2792-PS as Exhibit -USA-87—another German Foreign Office memorandum, and from that document -I read three paragraphs under the heading “R. M. 251.” - - “Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to - communicate the following: - - - - “He had received another written instruction from Mussolini - asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of - action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such - notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able - to take in due time the necessary measures on the French - frontier.’ Berlin, 27 August 1938; ‘R’”—for Ribbentrop, and - then: - - - - “N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former - démarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that, - however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be - informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938.” - -Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the -first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will -recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had -exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi -plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August -1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join -in the attack. - -From August 21 to 26 Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers visited -Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovak question. -I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit USA-88. This is a captured -German Foreign Office account signed by Von Weizsäcker of the -conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and a Hungarian Delegation -consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 -August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian -attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested -that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. - -The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the -Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit -themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement and said -that whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the -cooking as well. I now quote from this document the first two -paragraphs: - - “While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Führer and the - Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the - Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Von - Ribbentrop. Von Weizsäcker also attended the conference. - - - - “Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1, the - negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2, the - Czechoslovakian problem.” - -Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph: - - “Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the - Führer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech - provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two - kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured - if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east; - moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one - to two more years time for its development should be allowed. - - - - “Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the - Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the - pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would therefore not - move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England - would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly - acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the - above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted - since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop - repeated that, ‘Whoever desires revision must exploit the good - opportunity and participate.’ - - - - “The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the - question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the desired - General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was - brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory - of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. - The clear political basis for such a conflict—the time of a - Hungarian intervention—was not obtained. - - - - “In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy - in his talk with the Führer. He wished not to hide his doubts - with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put on - record Hungary’s intention to participate. The Hungarian - Ministers were, and remained even later, more skeptical since - they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary - with its unprotected flanks. - - - - “When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Führer in the - afternoon he was very relieved when the Führer explained to him - that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing - of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted - to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as - well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he - would have no objections.” - -I think perhaps that sentence, “Whoever wanted to join the meal would -have to participate in the cooking as well,” is perhaps as cynical a -statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of. - -By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that, -in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently -armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer in evidence Document -Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another captured German Foreign Office -memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August -1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the -date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the -last paragraph from that document, or the last two: - - “Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a - German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that - his country would need a period of one to two years in order to - develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. - - - - “During today’s conversation Von Kanya corrected this remark and - said that Hungary’s military situation was much better. His - country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to - take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year.”—Signed - with an illegible signature which probably is that of - Weizsäcker. - -The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its -corroboration in General Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, from -which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21 -to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the document reads as -follows: - - “Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the - Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the War - Minister Von Raatz. - - - - “They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war - after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old - State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with the - understanding that we have neither demands from them nor claims - against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second - provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If - they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them. - - - - “Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator - between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe - that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would be - indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.” - -The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff -conference on 6 September. - -I quote again from Jodl’s diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at -the end of that same page: - - “Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a - conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer. - Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the - Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact - moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stülpnagel.” - -It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a -briefing on such political matters. - -Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1 -October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase -in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. -Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under -way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical -details, the timing of “X-days,” questions of mobilization, questions of -transport and supplies. - -On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, “Timing -of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.” This is Item 17 at -Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on Case -Green, our Number 388-PS. - -I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this -memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of -the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of -an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, -the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that -Germany was preparing to launch. - -I ask leave to read this document in full: - - “Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff - officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin, 24 - August 1938; access only through officer; 1 copy. - - - - “Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures. - - - - “The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by - surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to - oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand - that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 - to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to - Czechoslovakia on that day. - - - - “The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It - intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus - 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid - working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands - that the X-Order be given to the Army not later than 1400 on X - minus 1. - - - - “To this the following must be said: - - - - “‘Operation Green’”—or Aktion Grün—“will be set in motion by - means of an ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany - provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact - time for this incident is of the utmost importance.”—I call - special attention to that sentence—“The fixing of the exact - time for this incident is of the utmost importance. - - - - “It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological - conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into - action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of - it”—news of this prepared incident—“to reach us on the - afternoon of X minus 1. - - - - “It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the - X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1. - - - - “On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely receive - an advance warning. - - - - “If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all - further discussion is superfluous. - - - - “For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for - which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise - appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely - essential advance measures must be given in good time and - camouflaged with the help of numerous maneuvers and exercises. - - - - “Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether - all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy - territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure - from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. - - - - “Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is - impossible before the first air attack, although the - consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming - victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives - of friendly or confirmed neutral powers). - - - - “If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be - considered desirable for the incident, then the following day - cannot be X-Day, but it must be the day after that. - - - - “In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be - done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and - that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the - incident (X-Fall). - - - - “It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great - interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be - informed of the Führer’s intentions in good time—insofar as the - Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the - incident. - - - - “I request that the Führer’s decision be obtained on these - points.”—Signed—“J”—(Jodl). - -In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are the -notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal -that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler -agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 -August. There follows Jodl’s initials once more. - -On 3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the -Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be -found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document Number 388-PS. I -shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes: - - “Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time of - the transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘Grün’. Field - units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will then be - ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field units carry out - exercises in opposite directions. - - - - “Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march - away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.”—Then there is - a question mark.—“OKH must know when X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27 - September.” - -You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops would be -transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 September and would -then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when -X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September. - -During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the -strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech -defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, -“of drawing in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still -troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence -from Page 40 of the English transcript: - - “The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western - fortifications: Improvement of advance positions around Aachen - and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery positions - (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.” - -Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for written -assurance that the OKH would be informed 5 days in advance about the -impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals -about the co-ordination of ground and air operations at the start of the -attack. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, Page 5 -of the English translation of Document 1780-PS. - - “General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the - Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if the plan - is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all - meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only - for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be - changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)”—or as the German - puts it—“X-2 Tag.” - - - - “General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders - whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. - It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere - decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer would stick to - his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. - It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that . . . - Italy is reserved.” - -Now, this is Jodl talking: - - “I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the change - of opinion about political and military potentialities, - according to directives of 24 June ’37, 5 November ’37, 7 - December ’37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In spite of - that, one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will - do everything they can to apply pressure on us. We must pass - this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the - art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only - possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of - officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it - circulate through anterooms as heretofore. - - - - “1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High Command - of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force. - (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg, and - myself). We agree about the promulgation of the X-Day - order”—X-Befehl—“(X-1, 4 o’clock) and pre-announcement to the - Air Force (X-Day minus 1”—X minus 1 day—“7 o’clock). The ‘Y’ - time has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach - flight of one hour.” - -Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with -Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nuremberg. -Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which -lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. -Schmundt’s minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt -file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS. - -In this meeting General Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of -the German armies being committed to the attack, the 2d, the 10th, the -12th and the 14th German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for -military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic -considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack -developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the -summary of General Von Brauchitsch’s remarks, on the bottom of Page 42: - - “General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: ‘Employment of motorized - divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria - and the difficulties in getting other divs’”—that is for - divisions—“‘ready to march into the area at the right time. In - the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September, - if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by - relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army - Command II.’ - - - - “The Führer: ‘Does not see why workers have to return home as - early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on - mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand around - unnecessarily later on.’ - - - - “General Keitel: ‘Workers are not under the jurisdiction of - district commands in the West. Trains must be assembled.’ - - - - “Von Brauchitsch: ‘235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be - drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in - the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.’” - -From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the -intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11 -September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the -Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of -international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I read the 11 -September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the English translation -of 1780-PS: - - “In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke, for - the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent - common tasks. These joint preparations for - refutation”—Widerlegung—“of our own violations of - international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the - enemy, were considered particularly important.” - -This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, -that is, Jodl’s section of the OKW. - -I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which is a -carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this -captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and -distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and -the Foreign Office. - -In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international law in -connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and -counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. It -is a highly interesting top-secret document and with a glance at the -original you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated -violations of international law and propagandists refutations thereof -were set out. - -The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the anticipated -instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand -column. In the second column are given specific examples of the -incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken -toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in -violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth. - -The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank, was -reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. -I first quote from the covering letter: - - “Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the - violations of international law which may be expected on the - part of fighting troops. - - - - “Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, Columns - c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the time - being. - - - - “The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an - opinion so that a final version may be drawn up. - - - - “The same is requested of the Foreign Office. - - - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - - - - “By order”—signed—“Bürckner.” - -I am sorry that I perhaps cannot take the time to read extensively from -this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first 10 -hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the -second column, Column b of the table: - - “First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is - destroyed. - - - - “Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed. - - - - “Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague. - - - - “Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, - the firing of gas projectiles is ordered. - - - - “Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are - caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important - bridge, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered - looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot. - - - - “Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed - to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth. - - - - “Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition - billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a - result, the latter suffer from want. - - - - “Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily - evacuated to the rear area. - - - - “Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations. - - - - “Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over - Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with - Czech aircraft.” - -From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing -the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW. This -top-secret order . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with reference to gas? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident. “On account of a -report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is -ordered.” Under the column, “Attitude of International Law Group”: - - “According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 - states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison - gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances - is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the - reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas - warfare.” - -Then, under the column headed “Justification by the Laws of War”: - - “If the assertion, that the opponent—in this case the - Czechs—used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by - the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, - the firing of gas projectiles is justified, and it must be given - out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first - to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly - important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded - or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented - only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the - same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this - case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must - also be proved.” - -From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an order bringing -the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service) under the OKW . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be -material. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document. - -THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was, “In course of their duty, German aircraft -fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with -Czech aircraft.” - -Under the heading, “Attitude of the International Law Group”: - - “According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18 - October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be - violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory - is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have - declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes - fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of - international law, provided that this action is not expressly - permitted.” - -Now, under the heading, “Justification by the Laws of War,” is this: - - “An attempt at denials should first be made; if this is - unsuccessful a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds - of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Government and - compensation for damage guaranteed.” - -I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September 1938 from -Nuremberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This -top-secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the -Schmundt file, Page 44. I will read that order: - - “1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the - Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September. - - - - “2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this - organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader - (Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to - the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Where - questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final - decision in accordance with my instructions. - - - - “3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to - the departments and personnel immediately concerned. - - - - “Signed, Adolf Hitler.” - -Four days later, on 14 September, Defendant Keitel issued detailed -instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is -Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at Page 45 in the English translation. I -do not think I need read the order. - -There is another order issued by the Defendant Jodl on 16 September, -Item 24, at Page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the -heading or title of that: - - “Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for maneuvers with - Wehrmacht. Effective 15 September the following units will be - trained militarily under direction of the Commander-in-Chief of - the Army.” - -Two further entries in the Defendant Jodl’s diary give further -indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, -just 2 weeks before the anticipated X-Day. - -I now read the answers for the 15th and 16th September, at Pages 5 and 6 -of the English translation of the Jodl diary. - - “15 September: In the morning, conference with Chief of Army - High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Force, - the question was discussed as to what could be done if the - Führer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid - development of the situation. - - - - “16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 - hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference - between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next conference will - take place on the 20th or 21st in Godesberg. - - - - “With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening - by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Army High Command, and - to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the v.G.a.D. along the - Czech border.”—That I understand to have reference to the - reinforced border guard. - - - - “In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have - empty rolling stock kept in readiness, clandestinely; for the - strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be - transported starting 28 September.” - -The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available, to which -General Jodl referred, appears as Item 22, at Page 47 of the Schmundt -file. In this order the Defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready -by 28 September but to continue work on the Western fortifications even -after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four -paragraphs of this order: - - “The Reichsbahn (the railroads) must provide trains of empty - trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of - mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all - others. - - - - “Therefore the trainloads for the limes job”—I understand the - “limes job” to have reference to defense fortification in the - West—“will have to be cut down after September 17 and those - goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20. - - - - “The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army - General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with - the authorities concerned. - - - - “However, in accordance with the Führer’s directive, every - effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as - large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and - this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue - the important work on the limes.” - -The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From -that date until the 28th a series of orders was issued advancing -preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt -file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read -all of it. - -On the 18th the commitment scheduled for the five participating Armies, -the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the -Schmundt file at Page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the -secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German -rear during Case Green, and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at -Page 13—I beg your pardon, it is Page 55, I had a misprint. I might -refer to that. It is a “most-secret” order, Berlin, 27 September 1938, -1920 hours; 45 copies of which this is the 16th: - - “The Führer has approved the mobilization, without warning, of - the five regular West divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 33d, and - 35th). The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has - expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment - in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by the - workers of the Todt organization. - - - - “It is left to the OKH to assemble as far as possible, first of - all the sections ready to march and, subsequently, the remaining - sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the - Western fortifications.”—Signed—“Jodl.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn. - -We will meet again at 2 o’clock. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my attention has been called -to the fact that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which -I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of the Schmundt minutes. I read -the name “Jodl” as being the signature on that item. I should have read -Keitel. - -In the course of presenting details of the documents which are being -offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and -recall the setting in which these facts took place. The world will never -forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which led to it. As -this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, and frantic -efforts were being made by the statesmen of the world to preserve the -peace of the world, little did they know of the evil plans and designs -in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators. - -What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story, in -their own words, underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to -spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and -deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in achieving for their own -ends, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression. -One cannot think back without living again through the dread of war, the -fear of war, the fear of world disaster, which seized all peace-loving -persons. The hope for peace which came with the Munich Pact was, we now -see, a snare and a deceit—a trap, carefully set by the defendants on -trial. The evil character of these men who were fabricating this scheme -for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents. - -Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about -the time of day at which the attack should be launched. Conference notes -initialed by the Defendant Jodl, dated 27 September, reveal the -difference in views. These notes are Item 54, at Page 90 in the -translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these first three -paragraphs as follows: The heading is: - - “Most secret; for chiefs only; only through officers. - - - - “Conference notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4 copies, first - copy. To be filed Grün. - - - - “Co-ordinated Time of Attack by Army and Air Force on X-Day. - - - - “As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a - co-ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on 1 X-Day. - - - - “The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It also - wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, - which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. - - - - “Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These - could change the time of attack and also limit the area of - operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, - would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to - low ceiling in Bavaria.” - -Then I’ll skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91: - - “Thus it is proposed: - - - - “Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the Air - Force—at the time desired by the Army (0615), and permission - for limited operations to take place before then; however, only - to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. - - - - “The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.” - -The initial at the end of that order is “J” meaning, I think clearly, -Jodl. - -On the same date, 27 September, the Defendant Keitel sent a most-secret -memorandum to the Defendant Hess, and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler, for -the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is Item 32 in the -Schmundt files at Page 56 of the English translation. I read the first -four paragraphs of this message. - - “As a result of the political situation the Führer and - Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed - Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by - issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words. - - - - “Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is - necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to - the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are - connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, - the advance measures or special code names. - - - - “The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be - met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) - immediately and without being referred to higher authority. - - - - “OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate - instructions to this effect, so that the mobilization of the - Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” - -Then I skip to the last paragraph: - - “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that - all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken - by Party organizations or Police units, as a result of the - political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of - time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can - it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in - practice. - - - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel.” - -Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl’s diary reveal the extent -to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for -an attack, even during the period of negotiations which culminated in -the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers in the Jodl diary for 26 and -27 September, from Page 7 of the translation of Document 1780-PS. 26 -September . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits of Mr. -Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Perhaps you can -give it later on. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the 29th of -September, and this answer then was 3 days before the Pact, the 26th of -September: - - “Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army - High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the - advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet - necessary and because the Führer does not intend to march in - before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech - frontier need be given on the 27th only. - - - - “Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at - the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and - Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda - transmissions. - - - - “Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave - and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High - Command: ‘Yes.’ - - - - “1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs - General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations - and about the Führer’s opinion. In no case will X-Day be before - the 30th. - - - - “It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn - into military engagements because of false reports, before - Prague replies. - - - - “A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that on - account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of - the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the - dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent - early fogs. - - - - “The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the - Commanders-in-Chief is to have priority. - - - - “The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has - to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about - commitment against Prague. - - - - “2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an - important speech at the Sportpalast.” - -Then the entry on 27 September: - - “1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack - being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the - assembly area by 30 September.” - -The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the faithful -Schmundt, which appears as Item 33 at Page 57 of the file. I’ll read it -in its entirety. It is the order which brought the Nazi Army to a -jumping-off point for the unprovoked and brutal aggression: - - “28.9.38.; most secret; memorandum. - - - - “At 1300 hours 27 September the Führer and Supreme Commander of - the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from - their exercise areas to their jumping-off points. - - - - “The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or seven - divisions) must be ready to begin the action against Grün on 30 - September, the decision having been made 1 day previously by - 1200 noon. - - - - “This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major - Schmundt”—pencil note by Schmundt. - -At this point, with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position around -the borders of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to -examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparations -for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out _in vacuo_. - -They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to -promote civil disobedience in the Czechoslovak State. Using the -techniques they had already developed in other uncontested ventures -underhandedly, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, -propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the -Nazis focused their attention on the persons of German descent living in -the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the -northwest and south. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to -Document Number 998-PS and offer it in evidence as an exhibit. - -This exhibit is entitled, “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” and is -the Czechoslovak Government’s official report for the prosecution and -trial of the German major war criminals. I believe that this report is -clearly included within the provisions of Article 21, of the Charter, as -a document of which the Court will take judicial notice. Article 21 -provides: - - “The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common - knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also - take judicial notice of official governmental documents and - reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and - documents of the committees set up in the various Allied - countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records - and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United - Nations.” - -Since, under that provision, the Court will take judicial notice of this -governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with the leave of -the Tribunal, merely summarize Pages 9 to 12 of this report to show the -background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue within Czechoslovakia. - -Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the -Nazi Party. In the years following the first World War, a German -National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact -with Hitler’s NSDAP, was activated in the Sudetenland. In 1932, -ringleaders of the Sudeten Volkssport, an organization corresponding to -the Nazi SA or Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s -program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a -greater Germany. Soon thereafter, they were charged with planning armed -rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy -against the Czech Republic. - -Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled -its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of its chiefs -escaped across the border into Germany. For a year thereafter, Nazi -activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. - -On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi -conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein, established -the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which, the following -spring became the Sudeten German Party (SDP). Profiting from the -experiences of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any -connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism and -professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to honest -democracy and to the Czech State. His party, nonetheless, was built on -the basis of the Nazi Führerprinzip, and he became its Führer. - -By 1937, when the powers of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest, -Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, -demanding without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy”. The SDP laid -proposals before the Czech Parliament which would in substance, have -created a state within a state. - -After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, the -Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, -intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda -started in the Henlein press. - -The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the -Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm-troop organization, -patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS was established, -known as the FS, Freiwilliger Selbstschutz (or Voluntary Vigilantes). - -On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, -Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad Program. In -this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted -the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess German political philosophy -which, it was clear, meant National Socialism. - -As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of -the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in Pages 12 to 16 of the Czech -Government official report, these techniques included: - -(a) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and -by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech -defenses were mapped and information on Czech troop movements was -furnished to the German authorities. - -(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The -Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German -population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural centers -regularly underwent “Gleichschaltung”, that is purification, by the SDP. -Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sports -societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral -societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating -as many business institutions as possible and bringing over to their -side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and -the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or -direction, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and -technical staffs of the institutions. - -(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained -permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct -operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which -Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity, were -camouflaged by being held in conjunction with “Sänger Feste” (or choral -festivals), gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings -such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed -incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to -supply them. - -(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at -Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. -Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the -false report of Russian troops and airplanes centered in Prague. Under -direction from the Reich, the Henleinists maintained whispering -propaganda in the Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension -and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled -from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein -press, more or less openly, espoused Nazi ideology before the German -population in the Sudetenland. - -(e) Murder and terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, -and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke -incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes, -customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was -established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. - -The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and the Nazi -Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens -across the border into Germany. In several cases, political foes of the -Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor -Theodor Lessing in 1933, and engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were -anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and -had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. - -Sometime afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and -deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the -mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence -Document Number 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lecture by Konrad Henlein -quoted in the book _Four Fighting Years_, a publication of the -Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and I quote from Page 29. This -book has been marked for identification Exhibit USA-92, but without -offering it in evidence, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of -it. I shall read from Page 29. This lecture was delivered by Henlein on -4 March 1941, in the auditorium of the University of Vienna, under the -auspices of the Wiener Verwaltungsakademie. During a thorough search of -libraries in Vienna and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of -the German text. This text, this volume that I have here, is an English -version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only summaries -of the lecture. This English version, however, is an official -publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circumstances, the -best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein speech. - -In this lecture on “The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens” -Henlein said: - - “National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our - struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. - Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of - course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution - in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for - Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle - could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National - Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Führer, - whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the - leader of the national group in its final struggle. When in the - autumn of 1933, the leader of the NSDAP asked me to take over - the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a - difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party - continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in - the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and - in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle - under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to - the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second - alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our - national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier - to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the - heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism - and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than - doubtful whether, by this means, we could have fulfilled the - political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the - alliance against the German Reich.” - -The account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia which I have just -presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had -been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this summer. -Since then, captured documents and other information made available to -us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively -demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of -the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the Sudetenland. - -I offer in evidence Document Number 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93. This is the -original, handwritten draft of a telegram sent from the German Legation -in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Minister in Berlin. It is -presumably written by the German Minister Eisenlohr. It proves -conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument, a puppet of -the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein party, it appears from this document, -was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It -could have no policy of its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to -be co-ordinated with the German authorities. - -I will read this telegram: - - “Prague, 16 March 1938. - - - - “Foreign (Office), Berlin; (cipher cable—secret); No. 57 of 16 - March. - - - - “With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March. - - - - “Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out - matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with - Frank separately and received following promises: - - - - “1. The line of German foreign policy as transmitted by the - German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics - of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied - with implicitly. - - - - “2. Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly - with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_”—_Time_—“is to - be improved. - - - - “3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line, - which in the end might lead to political complications, and - adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. - The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation - and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the - protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and territorial - autonomy are no longer to be stressed. - - - - “4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or - desired before Henlein issues important statements on his - program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the - Legation. - - - - “5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German - agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation. - - - - “6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will - come to Prague at any time if requested. - - - - “I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, - as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in - the interest of foreign policy. Please inform Ministries - concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) - and request them to support this uniform direction of the - Sudeten German Party.” - -The initials are illegible. - -The dressing down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired -effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein -addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal -conversation. - -I offer in evidence Document Number 2789-PS as Exhibit USA-94. This is -the letter from Konrad Henlein to Defendant Ribbentrop, captured in the -German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938. - - “Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs: - - - “In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in - Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all - those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our - Führer. - - - - “I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the - sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith. - - - - “We shall show our appreciation to the Führer by doubled efforts - in the service of the Greater German policy. - - - - “The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten - German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the - opportunity of a very early personal talk. - - - - “In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have - postponed the nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled - for 26th and 27th of March 1938, for 4 weeks. - - - - “I would appreciate it if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two - of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the - requested talks. - - “Heil Hitler. Loyally yours”—signed—“Konrad Henlein.” - -You will note that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria -made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czechoslovakia. You -will also note that he was already in close enough contact with -Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel free to suggest -early personal talks. - -Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The -conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in -Berlin on the 29th of March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred -with Hitler himself. - -I offer in evidence Document Number 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95, captured -German Foreign Office notes of the conference on the 29th of March. I -read the first two paragraphs: - - “In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed - list participated. - - - - “The Reich Minister started out by emphasizing the necessity to - keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret. - He then explained, in view of the directives which the Führer - himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday - afternoon, that there were two questions which were of - outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten - German Party.” - -I will omit the discussion of the claims of the Sudeten Germans and -resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last paragraph -of the first page of the English translation, with the sentence -beginning, “The aim of the negotiations.” - - “The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten - German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally - this: To avoid entry into the Government by the extension and - gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be - emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German - Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the - Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet. The Reich - Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the government in - Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or pacemaker - of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite - that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak - Government the Sudeten Germans should be firmly controlled by - Konrad Henlein, should maintain quiet and discipline, and should - avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad - Henlein in this connection were satisfactory. - - - - “Following these general explanations of the Reichsminister, the - demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak - Government, as contained in the enclosure, were discussed and - approved in principle. For further co-operation, Konrad Henlein - was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the - Reichsminister and the head of the Central Office for Racial - Germans, as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local - representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German - Minister in Prague would be to support the demand of the Sudeten - German Party as reasonable—not officially, but in more private - talks with the Czechoslovak politicians, without exerting any - direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party. - - - - “In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be - useful if the Sudeten German Party would co-operate with other - minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The - Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the - discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if - the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear - appropriate. - - - - “Berlin, 29 March 1938, - - - - “R”—for Ribbentrop. - -Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of -those who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl Hermann -Frank; and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor -Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz -represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (the Central Office for -Racial Germans). The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of -eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and -did most of the talking; Von Mackensen; Weizsäcker and Minister -Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. - -In May, Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi -conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, for the attack on -the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein -was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months. - -I again quote from General Jodl’s diary, Document 1780-PS, the entry for -22 May 1938: “Fundamental conference between the Führer and K. Henlein -(see enclosure).” The enclosure unfortunately is missing from Jodl’s -diary. - -The Tribunal will recall that in his speech in Vienna Henlein had -admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall -of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans. -The documents I have just read show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s -mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even -his speeches, were controlled by Berlin. - -I will now show that from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party was -secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer in evidence -Document 3059-PS as Exhibit USA-96, another secret memorandum captured -in the German Foreign Office file. - -This memorandum, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938, -was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds. -I read from that document: - - “The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign - Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of - a monthly payment of 15,000 marks; 12,000 marks of this are - transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement and 3,000 - marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the Party - (Bureau Bürger). In the course of the last few months the tasks - assigned to the Bureau Bürger have increased considerably due to - the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number - of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has - risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; - the expense accounts have increased especially because due to - the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for - trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of - travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown - considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Bürger - is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of - 3,000 marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore Herr - Bürger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount - from 3,000 marks to 5,500 marks monthly. In view of the - considerable increase in the business transacted by the bureau, - and of the importance which marks the activity of the bureau in - regard to the co-operation with the Foreign Office, this desire - deserves the strongest support. - - - - “Herewith submitted to the personnel department with a request - for approval. Increase of payments with retroactive effect from - 1 August is requested.”—signed—“Woermann.” - -Under this signature is a footnote: - - “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle”—Central Office for Racial - Germans—“will be informed by the Political - Department”—handwritten marginal note. - -We may only conjecture what financial support the Henlein movement -received from other agencies of the German Government. - -As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in -the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made good use of -Henlein and his followers. About the 1st of August, the Air Attaché in -the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions -from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German leader -in Freudenthal. With his assistance and in the company of the local -leader of the FS, the Henlein equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the -surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German -use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform -of the Czech Army, a fact which, as the Attaché noted, served as -excellent camouflage. - -I now read from the enclosure to Document 1536-PS, which I offered in -evidence earlier and which bears United States Exhibit Number 83. I have -already read the first four paragraphs of the enclosure: - - “The manufacturer M. is the head of the Sudeten German Glider - Pilots in Fr.”—that’s Freudenthal—“and said to be absolutely - reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully - confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, - although I had the impression that M. knew who I was. - - - - “At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. - travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s - private car for the trip. - - - - “As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently - well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech - reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on - leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage, I was - entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so. - - - - “As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I - photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said. ‘Aha, so - you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that - in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their - airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had - the intention of looking over the country from that point of - view.” - -In the latter part of the Air Attaché’s report, reference is made to the -presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called “V-Leute” -(V-people), apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein party in this -area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the “Abwehr -Stelle” (the Intelligence Office) in Breslau. - -In September, when the Nazi propaganda campaign was reaching its height, -the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands -for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On the 19th of -September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent a telegram to the German -Legation in Prague. I offer the document in evidence, Number 2858-PS, -Exhibit USA-97, another captured German Foreign Office document—a -telegram: - - “Please inform Deputy Kundt that Konrad Henlein requests to get - in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their - demands for autonomy tomorrow.”—signed—“Altenburg.” - -Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague. - -As the harassed Czech Government sought to stem the disorders in the -Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic -tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two -countries. I offer in evidence Documents 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and -2856-PS, as United States Exhibits respectively 98, 99, 100, and 101. -Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in -Prague were dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938. They -are self-explanatory. The first is dated 16 September. - - “Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were - arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of - Sudeten Germans since the Führer’s speech of 12 September. I - request you to ascertain as soon as possible the number of - Sudeten Germans arrested since 12 September as far as possible. - The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively - at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.” - -A handwritten note follows: - - “Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already - communicated to the chargé d’affaires.” - -The second telegram is dated September 17: - - “Most urgent. - - - - “I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the - following: - - - - “The Reich Government has decided that: - - - - “(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, - Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as - Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning - of the week; (b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed - pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an - equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.” - -The third telegram was sent on 24 September. I read it: - - “According to information received here, Czechs have arrested - two German frontier policemen, seven customs officials, and 30 - railway officials. As counter measure all the Czech staff in - Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the - arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please - approach Government there and wire result.” - -On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched, and I read the last -paragraph: - - “‘Confidential’. Yielding of Czech hostages arrested here for - the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by - military courts against Sudeten Germans is, of course, out of - question.” - -In the latter half of September, Henlein devoted himself and his -followers wholeheartedly to the preparations for the coming German -attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nuremberg speech -in which he accused Beneš of torturing and planning the extermination of -the Sudeten Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his -principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech -Government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful Reichsender -radio station his determination to lead the Sudeten Germans home to the -Reich and denounced what he called the Hussites-Bolshevist criminals of -Prague. From his headquarters in a castle at Donndorf, outside Bayreuth, -he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including -Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began -the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military -organization. You will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak -official government report, 998-PS, which has already been offered as -Exhibit USA-91. - -Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of -the German Nazi leaders. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling was assigned to -Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free -Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of September 17, -Köchling received far-reaching military powers. - -At this conference, the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly -stated—the maintenance of disorder and clashes. I read from Item 25, a -handwritten note labelled “most secret,” on Page 49 of the Schmundt -file, Document 388-PS: - - “Most secret. Last night conference took place between Führer - and Lieutenant Colonel Köchling. Duration of conference 7 - minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling remains directly - responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an - advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary - powers from the Führer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains - responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the - Sudeten Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The - Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with - Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as - possible.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good place to break off for 10 minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, General Jodl’s diary again -gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At -this time, the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the -Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired -manner. I quote from the entries in the Jodl diary, for the 19th and -20th September 1938, at Page 6 of the Document 1780-PS, which is Exhibit -USA-72. - - “19 September: Order is given to the Army High Command to take - care of the Sudeten German Free Corps. - - - - “20 September: England and France have handed over their demands - in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The - activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that - they may bring about, and already have brought about, - consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring - rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the - border.) By checking with Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, I attempt - to lead these activities into normal channels. - - - - “Toward the evening the Führer also takes a hand and gives - permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the - approval of the corps headquarters.” - -A report from Henlein’s staff, which was found in Hitler’s headquarters, -boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps. It is Item 30 of -the Schmundt file, Page 54 of Document 388-PS. I read the last two -paragraphs: - - “Since 19 September, in more than 300 missions, the Free Corps - has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack,”—now, - that word “attack” was changed by superimposition to - “defense”—“and with a willingness often reaching a degree of - unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its - activities: More than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s”—which I suppose - means machine guns—“and a large amount of other weapons and - equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded - suffered by the enemy.”—And there was superimposed in place of - “enemy”, “the Czech terrorists.” - -In his headquarters in the castle at Donndorf, Henlein was in close -touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and -with the SS and the SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein -was Oberführer Gottlob Berger (SS). - -I now offer in evidence Document 3036-PS as Exhibit USA-102, which is an -affidavit executed by Gottlob Berger; and in connection with that -affidavit, I wish to submit to the Tribunal that it presents, we think, -quite a different question of proof from the Schuschnigg affidavits -which were not admitted in evidence by the Court. Schuschnigg, of -course, was a neutral and non-Nazi Austrian. He was not a member of this -conspiracy, and I can well understand that the Court rejected his -affidavit for these reasons. - -This man was a Nazi. He was serving in this conspiracy. He has made this -affidavit. We think the affidavit has probative value and should be -admitted by the Tribunal under the pertinent provision of the Charter, -which says that you will accept in evidence any evidence having -probative value. We think it would be unfair to require us to bring here -as a witness a man who would certainly be a hostile witness, who is to -us a member of this conspiracy, and it seems to us that the affidavit -should be admitted with leave to the defendants, if they wish, to call -the author of the affidavit as their witness. I should have added that -this man was a prominent member of the SS which is charged before you as -being a criminal organization, and we think the document is perfectly -competent in evidence as an admission against interest by a prominent -member of the SS organization. - -DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, the Defense objects to the use of this -document. This document was drawn up as late as 22 November 1945, here -in Nuremberg, and the witness Berger could, therefore, be brought to -Court without any difficulty. We must insist that he be heard here on -the subjects on which the Prosecution wishes to introduce his testimony. -That would be the only way in which the Defense could have an -opportunity of cross-examining the witness and thereby contribute to -obtaining objective truth. - - [_Pause in the proceedings while the Tribunal consulted._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection and will not hear this -affidavit. It is open to either the Prosecution or the defendants, of -course, to call the man who made the affidavit. That is all I have to -say. We have upheld your objection. - -MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I had another affidavit by one -Alfred Helmut Naujocks which, I take it, will be excluded under this -same ruling, and which, therefore, I shall not offer. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the circumstances are the same. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, I might merely refer to it for identification because -it is in your document books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ALDERMAN: It is Document 3029-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That also will be rejected as evidence. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Offensive operations along the Czechoslovakian border -were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two -SS-Totenkopf (Deathhead) battalions were operating across the border in -Czech territory near Asch. - -I quote now from Item 36 in the Schmundt file, an OKW most-secret order, -signed by Jodl, and dated 28 September. This appears at Page 61 Of the -Schmundt file: - - “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Berlin, 28 September 1938; - 45 copies, 16th copy; most secret. - - - - “Subject: Four SS-Totenkopf battalions subordinate to the - Commander-in-Chief Army. - - - - “To: Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police (SS Central - Office) (36th copy). - - - - “By order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces the - following battalions of the SS Deathhead organization will be - under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with - immediate effect. - - - - “Second and Third Battalions of the 2d SS-Totenkopf Regiment - Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia). - - - - “First and Second Battalions of the 3d SS-Totenkopf Regiment - Thuringia, at present in Radebeul and Kötzschenbroda near - Dresden. - - - - “Commander-in-Chief of the Army is requested to deploy these - battalions for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Führer’s - instructions. - - - - “These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory - (I and II Battalions of the SS-Totenkopf Regiment Oberbayern) - will come under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army only when - they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses - the German-Czech frontier. - - - - “It is requested that all further arrangements be made between - Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Reichsführer SS (SS Central - Office). - - - - “For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, - Jodl.” - -According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary, these -SS-Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders -from Hitler. As the time X-Day approached, the disposition of the Free -Corps became a matter of dispute. - -On 26 September Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff of the -Sudeten German Free Corps, directing that the Free Corps come under -control of the Reichsführer SS in the event of German invasion of -Czechoslovakia. This document is Item 37 in the Schmundt file, on Page -62. - -On 28 September Defendant Keitel directed that as soon as the German -Army crosses the Czech border, the Free Corps will take orders from the -OKH. In this most-secret order of the OKW, Keitel discloses that -Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory. - -I read now from Item 34 of the Schmundt file on Page 58, the last three -paragraphs of this most-secret order: - - “For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to it the - principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct - from the Führer and that they carry out their operations only in - conjunction with the competent corps headquarters. The advance - units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local - commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the - frontier. - - - - “Those units remaining forward of the frontier should, in their - own interests, get into communication with the frontier guard as - often as possible. - - - - “As soon as the Army crosses the Czechoslovak border the Henlein - Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be - expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps, even now, which - can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” - -On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich Settlement would -result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, the Defendant Keitel -ordered that the Free Corps Henlein, in its present composition, be -placed under the command of Himmler. - -I read from Item 38, at Page 63, of the Schmundt file: - - “1. Attachment of the Henlein Free Corps. The Supreme Commander - of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps - in its present composition be placed under command of - Reichsführer SS and the Chief of German Police. It is therefore - not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the - invasion, but is to be later drawn in, like the rest of the - police forces, for police duties in agreement with the - Reichsführer SS.” - -I have been able, if the Tribunal please, to ascertain the dates the -Tribunal asked about before the recess. - -The first visit of Chamberlain to Germany in connection with this matter -was 15 September 1938. Chamberlain flew to Munich and arrived at 12:30 -o’clock on 15 September. He went by train from Munich to Berchtesgaden, -arriving at 1600 hours, by car to Berghof, arriving about at 1650, for -three talks with Hitler. On 16 September Chamberlain returned by air to -London. - -The second visit was on 22 September. Chamberlain met with Hitler at Bad -Godesberg at 1700 hours for a 3-hour discussion, and it was a deadlock. -On 23 September discussions were resumed at 2230 hours. On 24 September -Chamberlain returned to London. - -The third visit was on 29 September. Chamberlain flew to Munich and the -meeting of Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier, and Hitler took place at -the Brown House at 1330 and continued until 0230 hours on 30 September -1938, a Friday, when the Munich Agreement was signed. Under the threat -of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be -launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded the Munich Pact with -Germany and Italy at that early morning hour of 30 September 1938. This -Treaty will be presented by the British prosecutor. It is sufficient for -me to say of it at this point that it was the cession of the Sudetenland -by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. - -The Munich Pact will be TC-23 of the British documents. - -On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland. -During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully -deployed for the attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the -assault. - -With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 -September the Defendant Keitel promulgated Directive Number 1 on -occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia. This is Item 39 -at Page 64 of the Schmundt file. This directive contained a timetable -for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 -October and specified the tasks of the German Armed Forces. - -I read now the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that document: - - “2. The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be - maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order - for the rescinding of measures taken, is held over. - - - - “The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be - converted into operation Grün.” - -It contains one other important provision about the Henlein forces, and -I quote from the list under the heading “a. Army”: - - “Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the - Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” - -The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives -giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland. I think I -need not read them, as they are not essential to the proof of our case. -They merely indicate the scope of the preparations of the OKW. - -Directives specifying the occupational area of the Army, the units under -its command, arranging for communication facilities, supply, and -propaganda, and giving instructions to the various departments of the -Government were issued over Defendant Keitel’s signature on 30 -September. These are Items 40, 41, and 42 in the Schmundt file. I think -it is sufficient to read the caption and the signature. - -THE PRESIDENT: What page? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Page 66 of the English version. This is the Supreme -Commander of the Armed Forces, most secret: - - “Special Orders Number 1 to Directive Number 1. Subject: - Occupation of Territory Ceded by - Czechoslovakia.”—Signature—“Keitel.” - -Item 41 is on Page 70 of the Schmundt file. - - “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; most secret IV a. Most - secret; subject: Occupation of Sudeten-German - Territory.”—Signed—“Keitel.” - -Item 42 in the Schmundt file is on Page 75, again most secret. - - “Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German - Area.”—Signed—“Keitel.” - -By 10 October Von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German -troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the -occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested -Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the -occupied area, and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the -Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. These are Items 46, 47, and 48 in -the Schmundt file. - -Item 46, which appears at Page 77, is a letter from Berlin, dated -October 10, 1938, signed by Von Brauchitsch: - - “My Führer: - - - - “I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation - line as ordered, by this evening. Insofar as further military - operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the - country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The - guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the - reinforced frontier supervision service in the next few days. - - - - “It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the - administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops - of the Army under the control of one person. - - - - “I therefore ask you, my Führer, to relieve me, with effect from - 15 October 1938, of the charge assigned to me: That of - exercising executive powers in Sudeten-German Territory. - - - - “Heil, my Führer, Von Brauchitsch.” - -Item 47 of the Schmundt file, appearing on Page 78, is a secret telegram -from the OKW to the Führer’s train, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt: - - “If evening report shows that occupation of Zone 5 has been - completed without incident, OKW intends to order further - demobilization. - - - - “Principle: 1) To suspend operation Grün but maintain a - sufficient state of preparedness on part of Army and Luftwaffe - to make intervention possible if necessary. 2) All units not - needed to be withdrawn from the occupied area and reduced to - peacetime status, as population of occupied area is heavily - burdened by the massing of troops.” - -Skipping to below the OKW signature, this appears, at the left: - - “Führer’s decision: - - - - “1. Agreed. - - - - “2. Suggestion to be made on the 13 October in Essen by General - Keitel. Decision will then be reached.” - -On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the -Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Defendant Keitel. Three days later -the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD (Labor -Corps) from the control of the Armed Forces. These are Items 52 and 53 -in the Schmundt file. - -As the German forces entered the Sudetenland, Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche -Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to -Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, -were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the -Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still -free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National -Socialistic German Worker Party in Czechoslovakia, NSDAP in -Czechoslovakia, under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s -deputies. - -The Tribunal will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak -official report, Document 998-PS. - -The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators, -the plan for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. With the -occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of German-speaking -Czechs within the Greater Reich, it might have been expected that the -Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in their program of -aggression the defendants had used as a pretext for their conquests the -union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the -Reich. Now, after Munich, the Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia have been -substantially all returned to German rule. - -On 26 September, at the Sportpalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke to the -world. I now refer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to the -_Völkischer Beobachter_, Munich edition, special edition for 27 -September 1938, in which this speech is quoted. I read from Page 2, -Column 1, quoting from Hitler: - - “And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be - solved and will be solved. It is the last territorial claim” - . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in our documents? - -MR. ALDERMAN: No. I am asking the Court to take judicial notice of that. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. ALDERMAN: It is a well-known German publication. - - “It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in - Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve and which - I will satisfy, God willing.” (Document Number 2358-PS.) - -And further: - - “I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for - all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people - want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot - go back beyond the limits of our patience.” - -This is Page 2, Column 1. - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the - moment, when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems—that is - to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their - other minorities peacefully and without oppression—I will no - longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I - am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs!” - -The major portion of the passage I have quoted will be contained in -Document TC-28, which I think, will be offered by the British -prosecutor. - -Yet two weeks later Hitler and Defendant Keitel were preparing estimates -of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in -Bohemia and Moravia. - -I now read from Item 48, at Page 82, of the Schmundt file. This is a -top-secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 -October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to -the OKW. I think it is sufficient merely to read the questions which -Hitler had propounded: - - “Question 1. What reinforcements are necessary in the situation - to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia? - - - - “Question 2. How much time is requested for the regrouping or - moving up of new forces? - - - - “Question 3. How much time will be required for the same purpose - if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return - measures? - - - - “Question 4. How much time would be required to achieve the - state of readiness of 1 October?” - -On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the -Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive -outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was -signed by Hitler and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. - -I now offer in evidence Document C-136 as Exhibit USA-104, a top-secret -order of which 10 copies were made, this being the first copy, signed in -ink by Keitel. - -In this order, issued only 3 weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, -the Nazi conspirators are already looking forward to new conquests. I -quote the first part of the body of the document: - - “The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for - the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down - by me in a later directive. Until this directive comes into - force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the - following eventualities: - - - - “1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection - against surprise air attacks. - - - - “2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. - - - - “3) The occupation of the Memel.” - -And then proceeding, the statement following Number 2: - - “Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: It must be - possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if - her policy should become hostile towards Germany. - - - - “The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this - contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those - for Grün; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and - considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned - mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The - organization, order of battle, and state of readiness of the - units earmarked for that purpose are in peacetime to be so - arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will - be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The - object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the - cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such that at - the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’”—the measures of frontier - defense in the West—“can be carried out. - - - - “The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows: - - - - “a. Army: The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia - and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a - surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the - forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success - must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack - must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness - in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing - the frontiers or sent after the attack army. - - - - “b. Air Force: The quick advance of the German Army is to be - assured by early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For this - purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases - has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger - forces may be required can be determined from the development of - the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the - same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the - offensive forces against the West must be prepared.” - -And then Part 3 goes on under the heading, “Annexation of the Memel -District.” - -It is signed by Adolf Hitler and authenticated by Defendant Keitel. It -was distributed to the OKH, to Defendant Göring’s Luftwaffe, and to -Defendant Raeder at Navy headquarters. - -Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Defendant Keitel issued an -appendix to the original order, stating that by command of the Führer -preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. - -I offer in evidence Document C-138 as Exhibit USA-105, and other -captured OKW documents classified top secret. - -Distribution of this order was the same as for the 21 October order. I -shall read the body of this order. - - “Corollary to Directive of 21. 10. 38. - - - - “Reference: ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia.’ The - Führer has given the following additional order: - - - - “The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the - assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be - expected. - - - - “To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is - merely an action of pacification, and not a warlike undertaking. - - - - “The action must therefore be carried out by the peacetime Armed - Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The - necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the - most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by - adjustment within the units. - - - - “Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, - as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night - prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously - form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary - for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and - will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if - any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to - the troop training areas situated near the frontier, must have - the approval of the Führer. - - - - “The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar - general directives. - - - - “For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the - Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly - occupied territory and only for a short - period.”—Signed—“Keitel.” - -I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this particular -copy of this order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the -one sent to the OKM, the German Naval headquarters. It bears the -initials of Fricke, head of the Operation Division of the naval war -staff; Schniewind, Chief of Staff; and of Defendant Raeder. - -As the Wehrmacht moved forward, with plans for what it clearly -considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. -In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the -Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin on 31 January 1939, -Defendant Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech Government a quick reduction -in the size of the Czech Army. I offer in evidence Document 2795-PS as -Exhibit USA-106, captured German Foreign Office notes of this -discussion. I will read only the footnote, which is in Ribbentrop’s -handwriting: - - “I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in - the Czech Army would be decisive in our judgment.” - -Does the Court propose sitting beyond 4:30? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I think not. The Tribunal will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TWELFTH DAY - Tuesday, 4 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I will call on the Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain and -Northern Ireland. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, on an occasion to which reference has and will be -made, Hitler, the leader of the Nazi conspirators who are now on trial -before you, is reported as having said, in reference to their warlike -plans: - - “I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never - mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked - later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and - making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory—the - strongest has the right.” - -The British Empire with its Allies has twice, within the space of 25 -years, been victorious in wars which have been forced upon it, but it is -precisely because we realize that victory is not enough, that might is -not necessarily right, that lasting peace and the rule of international -law is not to be secured by the strong arm alone, that the British -nation is taking part in this Trial. There are those who would perhaps -say that these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily -without trial by “executive action”; that their power for evil broken, -they should have been swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate -and careful investigation into the part which they played in bringing -this war about: _Vae Victis!_ Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But -that was not the view of the British Government. Not so would the rule -of law be raised and strengthened on the international as well as upon -the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that right -is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the world -be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a dangerous -venture but a criminal one. - -Human memory is very short. Apologists for defeated nations are -sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of their -victors, so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded, become -obscured and forgotten. One has only to recall the circumstances -following upon the last World War to see the dangers to which, in the -absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement, a tolerant or a -credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the former tend to -discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the stories of -aggression and atrocity that may be handed down; and the latter, the -credulous, misled by perhaps fanatical and perhaps dishonest -propagandists, come to believe that it was not they but their opponents -who were guilty of that which they would themselves condemn. And so we -believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we know it will act -notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious powers, with complete -and judicial objectivity, will provide a contemporary touchstone and an -authoritative and impartial record to which future historians may turn -for truth, and future politicians for warning. From this record shall -future generations know not only what our generation suffered, but also -that our suffering was the result of crimes, crimes against the laws of -peoples which the peoples of the world upheld and will continue in the -future to uphold—to uphold by international co-operation, not based -merely on military alliances, but grounded, and firmly grounded, in the -rule of law. - -Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be -novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution -we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved and -showed to be, the nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose in -addressing the Tribunal to show, sought to make aggressive war an -international crime, and although previous tradition has sought to -punish states rather than individuals, it is both logical and right -that, if the act of waging war is itself an offense against -international law, those individuals who shared personal responsibility -for bringing such wars about should answer personally for the course -into which they led their states. Again, individual war crimes have long -been recognized by international law as triable by the courts of those -states whose nationals have been outraged, at least so long as a state -of war persists. It would be illogical in the extreme if those who, -although they may not with their own hands have committed individual -crimes, were responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war -affecting the nationals of many states should escape for that reason. So -also in regard to Crimes against Humanity. The rights of humanitarian -intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in -a manner shocking the sense of mankind, has long been considered to form -part of the recognized law of nations. Here too, the Charter merely -develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, rapine, and robbery are -indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our countries, shall -those who differ from the common criminal only by the extent and -systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation? - -It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these -matters, this Tribunal will be applying to individuals, not the law of -the victor, but the accepted principles of international usage in a way -which will, if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of -international law and safeguard the future peace and security of this -war-stricken world. - -By agreement between the chief prosecutors, it is my task, on behalf of -the British Government and of the other states associated in this -Prosecution, to present the case on Count Two of the Indictment and to -show how these defendants, in conspiracy with each other, and with -persons not now before this Tribunal, planned and waged a war of -aggression in breach of the treaty obligations by which, under -international law, Germany, as other states, has thought to make such -wars impossible. - -The task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature -and the basis of the Crime against Peace, which is constituted under the -Charter of this Tribunal, by waging wars of aggression and in violation -of treaties; and the second is to establish beyond all possibility of -doubt that such wars were waged by these defendants. - -As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient just to say this. It is -not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and -wars in violation of international treaties are, or ought to be, -international crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that -they are crimes and that the Charter is the statute and the law of this -Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the -jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be discharging -our task in the abiding interest of international justice and morality -unless we showed to the Tribunal, and indeed to the world, the position -of this provision of the Charter against the general perspective of -international law. For, just as in the experience of our country, some -old English statutes were merely declaratory of the common law, so today -this Charter merely declares and creates a jurisdiction in respect of -what was already the law of nations. - -Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter, lest there -may be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be -warped by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense -of justice towards these defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by -such criticisms as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime; -that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the -sovereign state; even that this Charter, in constituting wars of -aggression a crime, has imitated one of the most obnoxious, doctrines of -National Socialist jurisprudence, namely _post factum_ legislation—that -the Charter is in this respect reminiscent of bills of attainder—and -that these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly -concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the victor wreaks -upon the vanquished. These things may sound plausible—yet they are not -true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the -Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty. -But it is our submission and our conviction, which we affirm before this -Tribunal and the world, that fundamentally the provision of the Charter -which constitutes wars, such wars as these defendants joined in waging -and in planning a crime, is not in any way an innovation. This provision -of the Charter does no more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for -the punishment of what not only the enlightened conscience of mankind -but the law of nations itself had constituted an international crime -before this Tribunal was established and this Charter became part of the -public law of the world. - -So first let this be said: - -Whilst it may be quite true that there is no body of international rules -amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule imposed by a sovereign -upon a subject obliged to obey it under some definite sanction; yet for -50 years or more the people of the world, striving perhaps after that -ideal of which the poet speaks: - - “When the war drums throb no longer - And the battle flags are furled, - In the parliament of man, - The federation of the world”— - -sought to create an operative system of rules based upon the consent of -nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking place -at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The first -treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific -Settlement of International Disputes. That Convention was, indeed, of no -more than precatory effect, and we attach no weight to it for the -purposes of this case, but it did establish agreement that, in the event -of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would as -far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in -1907 by another convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what -had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell, indeed, very -far short of outlawing war, or of creating any binding obligation to -arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask the Tribunal to say any crime was -committed by disregarding those conventions. - -But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted the -general principle that, if at all possible, war should be resorted to -only if mediation failed. - -Although these conventions are mentioned in this Indictment, I am not -relying on them save to show the historical development of the law, and -it is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their precise effect, for -the place which they once occupied has been taken by far more effective -instruments. I mention them now merely for this, that they were the -first steps towards that body of rules of law which we are seeking here -to enforce. - -There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular -states, agreements which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual -countries, as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were -inadequate, in the absence of any real will to comply with them, to -prevent the first World War in 1914. - -Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe, the nations of Europe, -not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the world, came to the -conclusion that, in the interests of all alike, a permanent organization -of the nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the -Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of -Nations. - -Now, I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various -provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some -of them perhaps justly criticized, and they were certainly made the -subject of much bellicose propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary -to inquire into the merits of the matter, for, however unjust one might -for this purpose assume the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to -have been, they contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to -secure an alteration in their terms. Not only was that treaty a -settlement, by agreement, of all the difficult territorial questions -which had been left outstanding by the war itself, but it established -the League of Nations which, if it had been loyally supported, could so -well have resolved those international differences which might otherwise -have led, as indeed they eventually did lead, to war. It set up in the -Council of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of -International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement of -international disputes, but also for the frank ventilation of all -international questions by open and free discussion. At that time, in -those years after the last war, the hopes of the world stood high. -Millions of men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany itself—had -laid down their lives in what they hoped and believed was a war to end -war. Germany herself entered the League of Nations and was given a -permanent seat on the Council; and on that Council, as in the assembly -of the League, German governments which preceded that of the Defendant -Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from 1919 to that -time in 1932, despite some comparatively minor incidents in the heated -atmosphere which followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of -the League continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which -gave ground, and good ground, for hope that at long last the rule of law -would replace anarchy in the international field. - -The statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of -aggression an international crime. These are no new terms invented by -the victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured, and they have -figured prominently, in numerous treaties, in governmental -pronouncements, and in the declarations of statesmen in the period -preceding the second World War. In treaties concluded between the Union -of Soviet Socialist Republics and other states, such as Persia in 1927, -France in 1935, China in 1937, the contracting parties undertook to -refrain from any act of aggression whatever against the other party. In -1933 the Soviet Union became a party to a large number of treaties -containing a detailed definition of aggression, and the same definition -appeared in the same year in the authoritative report of the Committee -on Questions of Security set up in connection with the Conference for -the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. But at this time states were -going beyond commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to -assist states which were victims of aggression. They were condemning -aggression in unmistakable terms. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of -Non-Aggression and Conciliation, which was signed on the 10th of October -1933, by a number of American states, subsequently joined by practically -all the states of the American continents and a number of European -countries as well, the contracting parties solemnly declared that “they -condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those of -other states.” And that treaty was fully incorporated into the Buenos -Aires convention of December 1936, signed and ratified by a large number -of American countries, including, of course, the United States. And -previously, in 1928, the 6th Pan-American Conference had adopted a -resolution declaring that, as “war of aggression constitutes a crime -against the human species . . . all aggression is illicit and as such is -declared prohibited.” A year earlier, as long ago as September 1927, the -Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the -conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a means of -settling international disputes and is, in consequence, an international -crime” and going on to declare that “all wars of aggression are, and -shall always be prohibited.” - -The first article of the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of 1923 read -in these terms: - - “The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war is - an international crime, undertake the solemn engagement not to - make themselves guilty of this crime against any other nation.” - -In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it was stated that -“offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and an -international crime.” These instruments that I have just last mentioned -remained, it is true, unratified for various reasons, but they are not -without significance or value. - -These repeated declarations, these repeated condemnations of wars of -aggression testified to the fact that with the establishment of the -League of Nations, with the legal developments which followed it, the -place of war in international law had undergone a profound change. War -was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerogative of sovereign states. The -Covenant of the League of Nations did not totally abolish the right of -war. It left, perhaps, certain gaps which were possibly larger in theory -than in practice. But in effect it surrounded the right of war by -procedural and substantive checks and delays, which, if the Covenant had -been faithfully observed, would have amounted to an elimination of war, -not only between members of the League, but also, by reason of certain -provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-members as well. And -thus the Covenant of the League restored the position as it existed at -the dawn of international law, at the time when Grotius was laying down -the foundations of the modern law of nations and established the -distinction, a distinction accompanied by profound legal consequences in -the sphere, for instance, of neutrality, between a just war and an -unjust war. - -Nor was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant of -the League. The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of -treaties, numbering—it is an astonishing figure but it is right—nearly -a thousand, of arbitration and conciliation embracing practically all -the nations of the world. The so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of -the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the clause -which conferred upon the Court compulsory jurisdiction in regard to the -most comprehensive categories of disputes, and which constituted in -effect by far the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the -postwar period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed -it in 1927 and her signature was renewed, and renewed for a period of 5 -years by the Nazi government in July of 1933. (Significantly, that -ratification was not again renewed on the expiration of its 5 years’ -validity in March of 1938 by Germany). Since 1928 a considerable number -of states signed and ratified the General Act for the Pacific Settlement -of International Disputes which was designed to fill the gaps left by -the Optional Clause and by the existing treaties of arbitration and -conciliation. - -And all this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified -to the growing conviction throughout the civilized world that war was -ceasing to be the normal or the legitimate means of settling -international disputes. The express condemnation of wars of aggression, -which I have already mentioned, supplies the same testimony. But there -was, of course, more direct evidence pointing in the same direction. The -Treaty of Locarno of the 16th October 1925, to which I shall have -occasion to refer presently, and to which Germany was a party, was more -than a treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties -undertook definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of -disputes which might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly -specified exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more -general undertaking in which the parties to it agreed that “they would -in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each -other.” And that constituted a general renunciation of war, and it was -so considered to be in the eyes of international jurists and in the -public opinion of the world. The Locarno Treaty was not just another of -the great number of arbitration treaties which were being concluded at -this time. It was regarded as a kind of cornerstone in the European -settlement and in the new legal order in Europe in partial, just, and -indeed, generous substitution for the rigors of the Treaty of -Versailles. And with that treaty, the term “outlawry of war” left the -province of mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings -on international law and in the official pronouncements of governments. -No one could any longer say, after the Locarno Treaty—no one could any -longer associate himself with the plausible assertion that at all -events, as between the parties to that treaty, war remained an -unrestricted right of sovereign states. - -But, although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the -parties to it, it had wider influence in paving the way towards that -most fundamental, that truly revolutionary enactment in modern -international law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of -War of 27 August 1928, the Pact of Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact. That -treaty, a most deliberate and carefully prepared piece of international -legislation, was binding in 1939 on more than 60 nations, including -Germany. It was, and it has remained, the most widely signed and -ratified international instrument. It contained no provision for its -termination, and it was conceived, as I said, as the cornerstone of any -future international order worthy of the name. It is fully part of -international law as it stands today, and it has in no way been modified -or replaced by the Charter of the United Nations. It is right, in this -solemn hour in the history of the world, when the responsible leaders of -a state stand accused of a premeditated breach of this great treaty -which was, which remains, a source of hope and of faith for mankind, to -set out in detail its two operative articles and its Preamble. Let me -read them to the Tribunal—first the Preamble, and it starts like this: - - “The President of the German Reich”—and the other states - associated . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Shall we find it among the documents? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: It will be put in. I don’t think you have it at -the moment. - - “The President of the German Reich . . . deeply sensitive of - their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; persuaded - that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an - instrument of international policy should be made to the end - that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between - their peoples may be perpetuated; convinced that all changes in - their relations with one another should be sought only by - pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly - progress, and that any signatory power which shall hereafter - seek to promote its national interests by resort to war, should - be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty; hopeful that, - encouraged by their example, all the other nations of the world - will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present - treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within - the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting civilized - nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an - instrument of their national policy . . . .” - -Then, Article I: - - “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of - their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for - the solution of international controversies and renounce it as - an instrument of national policy in their relations with one - another.” - -And Article II: - - “The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or - solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of - whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall - never be sought except by pacific means.” - -In that treaty, that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, -practically the whole civilized world abolished war as a legally -permissible means of enforcing the law or of changing it. The right of -war was no longer of the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the position -may have been at the time of the Hague Convention, whatever the position -may have been in 1914, whatever it may have been in 1918—and it is not -necessary to discuss it—no international lawyer of repute, no -responsible statesman, no soldier concerned with the legal use of armed -forces, no economist or industrialist concerned in his country’s war -economy could doubt that with the Pact of Paris on the statute book a -war of aggression was contrary to international law. Nor have the -repeated violations of the Pact by the Axis Powers in any way affected -its validity. Let this be firmly and clearly stated. Those very -breaches, except perhaps to the cynic and the malevolent, have added to -the strength of the treaty; they provoked the sustained wrath of peoples -angered by the contemptuous disregard of this great statute and -determined to vindicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is the law of -nations. This Tribunal will declare it. The world must enforce it. - -Let this also be said, that the Pact of Paris was not a clumsy -instrument likely to become a kind of signpost for the guilty. It did -not enable Germany to go to war against Poland and yet rely, as against -Great Britain and France, on any immunity from warlike action because of -the very provisions of the pact. For the pact laid down expressly in its -preamble that no state guilty of a violation of its provisions might -invoke its benefits. And when, on the outbreak of the second World War, -Great Britain and France communicated to the League of Nations that a -state of war existed between them and Germany as from the 3rd of -September 1939, they declared that by committing an act of aggression -against Poland, Germany had violated her obligations assumed not only -towards Poland but also towards the other signatories of the pact. A -violation of the pact in relation to one signatory was an attack upon -all the other signatories and they were entitled to treat it as such. I -emphasize that point lest any of these defendants should seize upon the -letter of the particulars of Count Two of the Indictment and seek to -suggest that it was not Germany who initiated war with the United -Kingdom and France on 3 September 1939. The declaration of war came from -the United Kingdom and from France; the act of war and its commencement -came from Germany in violation of the fundamental enactment to which she -was a party. - -The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, this great -constitutional instrument of an international society awakened to the -deadly dangers of another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated effort -soon to be forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international crises. -It became, in conjunction with the Covenant of the League of Nations or -independently of it, the starting point for a new orientation of -governments in matters of peace, war, and neutrality. It is of -importance, I think, to quote just one or two of the statements which -were being made by governments at that time in relation to the effect of -the pact. In 1929 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom said, -in connection with the question of conferring upon the Permanent Court -of International Justice jurisdiction with regard to the exercise of -belligerent rights in relation to neutral states—and it illustrates the -profound change which was being accepted as having taken place as a -result of the Pact of Paris in international law: - - “But the whole situation . . . . rests, and international law on - the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption that - there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an instrument - of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, that the - position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent of the - circumstances of any war which may be in progress. Before the - acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of the law of neutrality - was that the rights and obligations of neutrals were identical - as regards both belligerents, and were entirely independent of - the rights and wrongs of the dispute which had led to the war, - or the respective position of the belligerents at the bar of - world opinion.” - -Then the Government went on: - - “Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer valid as - regards states which are members of the League of Nations and - parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those instruments, - taken together, is to deprive nations of the right to employ war - as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid the states - which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an offender.” - -This was being said in 1929, when there was no war upon the horizon. - - “As between such states, there has been in consequence a - fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and - neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty’s present - Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative government) - is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations - under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being - so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a - war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and - duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old - rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of - the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and - by the Pact.” - -The Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America referred in his -opening speech before this Tribunal to the weighty pronouncement of Mr. -Stimson, the Secretary of War, in which, in 1932, he gave expression to -the drastic change brought about in international law by the Pact of -Paris, and it is perhaps convenient to quote the relevant passage in -full: - - “War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the - Kellogg-Briand Pact. This means that it has become illegal - throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be - the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the - principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights - of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter, when two - nations engage in armed conflict, either one or both of them - must be wrongdoers—violators of this general treaty law. We no - longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the - punctilios of the duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as - law-breakers.” - -And nearly 10 years later, when numerous independent states lay -prostrate, shattered or menaced in their very existence before the -impact of the war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney General of the -United States, subsequently a distinguished member of the highest -Tribunal of that great country, gave significant expression to the -change which had been effected in the law as the result of the Pact of -Paris in a speech for which the freedom-loving peoples of the world will -always be grateful. On the 27th of March 1941—and I mention it now not -as merely being the speech of a statesman, although it was certainly -that, but as being the considered opinion of a distinguished lawyer,—he -said this: - - “The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy and - Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations, to - renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the - outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept - of neutral obligations. - - - - “The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine - Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of war - as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered - unlawful wars undertaken in violation of these provisions. In - consequence these treaties destroyed the historical and - juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as - an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive - wars . . . . - - - - “It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation of - its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from - other states, unless treaty obligations require different - handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality. - - - - “In flagrant cases of aggression where the facts speak so - unambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the - equivalent of judicial notice, we may not stymie international - law and allow these great treaties to become dead letters. The - intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to - be vocal, and the action of the American States, has made a - determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in the - wars today, which is an appropriate basis in the present state - of international organizations for our policy.” - -Thus, there is no doubt that by the time the National Socialist State of -Germany had embarked upon the preparation of the war of aggression -against the civilized world and by the time it had accomplished that -design, aggressive war had become, in virtue of the Pact of Paris and -the other treaties and declarations to which I have referred, illegal -and a crime beyond all uncertainty and doubt. And it is on that -proposition, and fundamentally on that universal treaty, the -Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Count Two of this Indictment is principally -based. - -The Prosecution has deemed it necessary—indeed, imperative—to -establish beyond all possibility of question, at what I am afraid may -appear to be excessive length, that only superficial learning or -culpable sentimentality can assert that there is any significant element -of retroactivity in the determination of the authors of this Charter to -treat aggressive war as conduct which international law has prohibited -and stigmatized as criminal. We have traced the progressive limitation -of the rights of war, the renunciation and condemnation of wars of -aggression, and above all, the total prohibition and condemnation of all -wars conceived as an instrument of national policy. What statesman or -politician in charge of the affairs of nations could doubt, from 1928 -onwards, that aggressive war, or that all war, except in self-defense or -for the collective enforcement of the law, or against a state which had -itself violated the Pact of Paris, was unlawful and outlawed? What -statesman or politician embarking upon such a war could reasonably and -justifiably count upon an immunity other than that of a successful -outcome of the criminal venture? What more decisive evidence of a -prohibition laid down by positive international law could any lawyer -desire than that which has been adduced before this Tribunal? - -There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the very -existence of any international law; and indeed, as I have said, the -rules of the law of nations may not satisfy the Austinian test of being -imposed by a sovereign. But the legal regulation of international -relations rests upon quite different juridical foundations. It depends -upon consent, but upon a consent which, once given, cannot be withdrawn -by unilateral action. In the international field the source of law is -not the command of a sovereign but the treaty agreement binding upon -every state which has adhered to it. And it is indeed true, and the -recognition of its truth today by all the great powers of the world is -vital to our future peace—it is indeed true that, as M. Litvinov once -said, and as Great Britain fully accepts: - - “Absolute sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong - to such states as have not undertaken international obligations. - Immediately a state accepts international obligations it limits - its sovereignty.” - -In that way and that way alone lies the future peace of the world. Yet -it may be argued that although war itself was outlawed and forbidden, it -was not criminally outlawed and criminally forbidden. International law, -it may be said, does not attribute criminality to states and still less -to individuals. But can it really be said on behalf of these defendants -that the offense of these aggressive wars, which plunged millions of -people to their death, which by dint of War Crimes and Crimes against -Humanity brought about the torture and extermination of countless -thousands of innocent civilians, which devastated cities, which -destroyed the amenities—nay, the most rudimentary necessities of -civilization in many countries—which has brought the world to the brink -of ruin from which it will take generations to recover—will it -seriously be said by these defendants that such a war is only an -offense, only an illegality, only a matter of condemnation perhaps -sounding in damages, but not a crime justiciable by any Tribunal? No law -worthy of the name can allow itself to be reduced to an absurdity in -that way, and certainly the great powers responsible for this Charter -were not prepared to admit it. They draw the inescapable conclusion from -the renunciation, the prohibition, the condemnation of war which had -become part of the law of nations, and they refuse to reduce justice to -impotence by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that a sovereign state -can commit no crime and that no crime can be committed on behalf of the -sovereign state by individuals acting in its behalf. They refuse to -stultify themselves, and their refusal and their decision has decisively -shaped the law for this Tribunal. - -If this be an innovation, it is an innovation long overdue—a desirable -and beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice, fully -consistent with common sense and with the abiding purposes of the law of -nations. But is it indeed an innovation? Or is it no more than the -logical development of the law? There was indeed a time when -international lawyers used to maintain that the liability of the state, -because of its sovereignty, was limited to a contractual responsibility. -International tribunals have not accepted that view. They have -repeatedly affirmed that a state can commit a tort; that it may be -guilty of trespass, of nuisance, and of negligence. And they have gone -further. They have held that a state may be bound to pay what are in -effect penal damages. In a recent case decided in 1935 between the -United States and Canada, an arbitral tribunal, with the concurrence of -its American member, decided that the United States were bound to pay -what amounted to penal damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty. -And on a wider plane, the Covenant of the League of Nations, in -providing for sanctions, recognized the principle of enforcement of the -law against collective units, such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a -penal character. And so there is not anything startlingly new in the -adoption of the principle that the state as such is responsible for its -criminal acts. In fact, save for reliance on the unconvincing argument -of sovereignty, there is in law no reason why a state should not be -answerable for crimes committed on its behalf. A hundred years ago Dr. -Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge, refused to admit that a -state could not be a pirate. History—very recent history—does not -warrant the view that a state cannot be a criminal. On the other hand, -the immeasurable potentialities for evil, inherent in the state in this -age of science and organization would seem to demand, quite -imperatively, means of repression of criminal conduct even more drastic -and more effective than in the case of individuals. And insofar, -therefore, as this Charter has put on record the principle of the -criminal responsibility of the state, it must be applauded as a wise and -far-seeing measure of international legislation. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: [_Continuing._] I was saying before the recess -that there could be no doubt about the principle of criminal -responsibility on the part of the state which engaged in aggressive war. - -Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigors of collective -punishment, which may fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike, -although, it may be noted, most of these innocent victims would not have -hesitated to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been -successful. Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any -injustice in collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be -obviated by making the punishment fall upon the individuals who were -themselves directly responsible for the criminal conduct of their state. -It is here that the powers who framed this Charter took a step which -justice, sound legal sense, and an enlightened appreciation of the good -of mankind must acclaim without cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down -expressly that there shall be individual responsibility for the crimes, -including the crimes against the peace, committed on behalf of the -state. The state is not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties are -the rights and duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men. It is -a salutary principle, a principle of law, that politicians who embark -upon a particular policy—as here—of aggressive war should not be able -to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state. It is a -salutary legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law, plunge -their own and other countries into an aggressive war should do so with a -halter around their necks. - -To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are -themselves criminals, is a commonplace in our own municipal law. Nor is -the principle of individual international responsibility for offenses -against the law of nations altogether new. It has been applied not only -to pirates. The entire law relating to war crimes, as distinct from the -crime of war, is based upon the principle of individual responsibility. -The future of international law, and indeed, of the world itself, -depends on its application in a much wider sphere, in particular, in -that of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged -not only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human -rights, but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human -duties, and of these none is more vital, none is more fundamental, than -the duty not to vex the peace of nations in violation of the clearest -legal prohibitions and undertakings. If this be an innovation, it is an -innovation which we are prepared to defend and to justify, but it is not -an innovation which creates a new crime. International law had already, -before the Charter was adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal -act. - -There is thus no substantial retroactivity in the provisions of the -Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a crime already clearly -established as such by positive law upon its actual perpetrators. It -fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There is all the -difference between saying to a man, “You will now be punished for what -was not a crime at all at the time you committed it,” and in saying to -him, “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was contrary to law -and a crime when you executed it, although, owing to the imperfection of -the international machinery, there was at that time no court competent -to pronounce judgment against you.” It is that latter course which we -adopt, and if that be retroactivity, we proclaim it to be most fully -consistent with that higher justice which, in the practice of civilized -states, has set a definite limit to the retroactive operation of laws. -Let the defendants and their protagonists complain that the Charter is -in this matter an _ex parte fiat_ of the victors. These victors, -composing, as they do, the overwhelming majority of the nations of the -world, represent also the world’s sense of justice, which would be -outraged if the crime of war, after this second world conflict, were to -remain unpunished. In thus interpreting, declaring, and supplementing -the existing law, these states are content to be judged by the verdict -of history. _Securus judicat orbis terrarum._ Insofar as the Charter of -this Tribunal introduces new law, its authors have established a -precedent for the future—a precedent operative against all, including -themselves, but in essence that law, rendering recourse to aggressive -war an international crime, had been well established when the Charter -was adopted. It is only by way of corruption of language that it can be -described as a retroactive law. - -There remains the question, with which I shall not detain the Tribunal -for long, whether these wars which were launched by Germany and her -leaders in violation of treaties or agreements or assurances were also -wars of aggression. A war of aggression is a war which is resorted to in -violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war, -or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, which is resorted to -in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific settlement -which a state has bound itself to observe. There was, as a matter of -fact, in the period between the two world wars, a divergence of opinion -among jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in -advance a legal definition of aggression, or to leave to the states -concerned and to the collective organs of the international community -freedom of appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that -might arise. Those holding the latter view argued that a rigid -definition might be abused by an unscrupulous state to fit in with its -aggressive design; they feared, and the British Government was for a -time among those who took this view, that an automatic definition of -aggression might become “a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the -guilty.” Others held that in the interest of certainty and security a -definition of aggression, like a definition of any crime in municipal -law, was proper and useful. They urged that the competent international -organs, political and judicial, could be trusted to avoid in any -particular case a definition of aggression which might lead to -obstruction or to an absurdity. In May of 1933 the Committee on Security -Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a definition of -aggression on these lines: - - “The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to - the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be - considered to be that state which is the first to commit any of - the following actions: - - - - “(1) Declaration of war upon another state; - - - - “(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration - of war, of the territory of another state; - - - - “(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a - declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of - another state; - - - - “(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; - - - - “(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory - which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal; - notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its - own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those - bands of all assistance or protection.” - -The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist -Republics and other states followed closely that definition. So did the -draft convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government to the -Disarmament Conference. - -However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem -or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself -to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court -what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal -controversy as to what is the nature of a war of aggression, for there -is no definition of aggression, general or particular, which does not -cover and cover abundantly and irresistibly in every detail, the -premeditated onslaught by Germany on the territorial integrity and -political independence of so many sovereign states. - -This, then, being the law as we submit it to be to this Tribunal—that -the peoples of the world by the Pact of Paris had finally outlawed war -and made it criminal—I turn now to the facts to see how these -defendants under their leader and with their associates destroyed the -high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to international anarchy. -First, let this be said, for it will be established beyond doubt by the -documents which you will see, from the moment Hitler became Chancellor -in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as Reich Chancellor, and with the -Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign Minister, the whole atmosphere of -the world darkened. The hopes of the people began to recede. Treaties -seemed no longer matters of solemn obligation but were entered into with -complete cynicism as a means for deceiving other states of Germany’s -warlike intentions. International conferences were no longer to be used -as a means for securing pacific settlements but as occasions for -obtaining by blackmail demands which were eventually to be enlarged by -war. The world came to know the “war of nerves”, the diplomacy of the -_fait accompli_, of blackmail and bullying. - -In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament -Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be -necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the -question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the -League”. On the 21st of October 1933 Germany did so, and by so doing -struck a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up -on the basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of -their foreign policy became one of complete disregard of international -obligations, and indeed not least of those solemnly concluded by -themselves. Hitler himself expressly avowed to his confederates, -“Agreements are kept only so long as they serve a certain purpose.” He -might have added that again and again that purpose was only to lull an -intended victim into a false sense of security. So patent, indeed, did -this eventually become that to be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to -enter a non-aggression pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany -intended to attack the state concerned. Nor was it only the formal -treaty which they used and violated as circumstances seemed to make -expedient. These defendants are charged, too, with breaches of the less -formal assurances which, in accordance with diplomatic usage, Germany -gave to neighboring states. You will hear the importance which Hitler -himself publicly attached to assurances of that kind. Today, with the -advance of science, the world has been afforded means of communication -and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly -recognized in his public utterances, international relations no longer -depend upon treaties alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The leader -of one nation can speak directly to the government and peoples of -another, and that course was not infrequently adopted by the Nazi -conspirators. But, although the methods change, the principles of good -faith and honesty, established as the fundamentals of civilized society, -both in the national and international spheres, remain unaltered. It is -a long time since it was said that we are part one of another, and if -today the different states are more closely connected and thus form part -of a world society more than ever before, so also, more than before, is -there that need for good faith and honesty between them. - -Let us see how these defendants, ministers and high officers of the Nazi -Government, individually and collectively comported themselves in these -matters. - -On the 1st of September 1939 in the early hours of the morning under -manufactured and, in any event, inadequate pretexts, the Armed Forces of -the German Reich invaded Poland along the whole length of her frontiers -and thus launched the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars -of our civilization. - -It was a breach of the Hague Conventions. It was a breach of the Treaty -of Versailles which had established the frontiers between Germany and -Poland. And however much Germany disliked that treaty—although Hitler -had expressly stated that he would respect its territorial -provisions—however much she disliked it, she was not free to break it -by unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between -Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on the 16th of October 1925. By -that treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters of -dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to -the decision of an arbitral tribunal or of the Permanent Court of -International Justice. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. But that is -not all. It was also a breach of a more recent and, in view of the -repeated emphasis laid upon it by Hitler himself, in some ways a more -important engagement into which Nazi Germany had entered with Poland. -After the Nazi Government came into power, on the 26th of January 1934 -the German and Polish Governments had signed a 10 year pact of -non-aggression. It was, as the signatories themselves stated, to -introduce a new era into the political relations between Poland and -Germany. It was said in the text of the pact itself that “the -maintenance and guarantee of lasting peace between the two countries is -an essential prerequisite for the general peace of Europe.” The two -governments therefore agreed to base their mutual relations on the -principles laid down in the Pact of Paris, and they solemnly declared -that: - - “In no circumstances . . . will they proceed to the application - of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such - disputes.” - -That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least 10 -years and thereafter it was to remain valid unless it was denounced by -either Government 6 months before the expiration of the 10 years, or -subsequently by 6 months’ notice. Both at the time of its signature and -during the following 4 years Hitler spoke of the German-Polish agreement -publicly as though it were a cornerstone of his foreign policy. By -entering into it, he persuaded many people that his intentions were -genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence of a new Poland and an -independent Poland after the war had cost Germany much territory and had -separated East Prussia from the Reich. And that Hitler should, of his -own accord, enter into friendly relations with Poland—that in his -speeches on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland -and of her right to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans -and Poles to live side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world -to be convincing proof that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would -threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious to put -an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his -professions were, as embodied in the treaty and as contained in these -declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal of the “Drang nach -Osten”, as it had been called, and was thereby going to contribute to -the peace and stability of Europe. That was what the people were led to -think. We shall have occasion enough to see how little truth these -pacific professions in fact contained. - -The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows quite clearly -that the Germans used this treaty, as they used other treaties, merely -as an instrument of policy for furthering their aggressive aims. It is -clear from the documents which will be presented to the Tribunal that -these 5 years fall into two distinct phases in the realization of the -aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. There was first -the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of -1937. That was the preparatory period. During that time there occurred -the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish -rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the -reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other -necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American -colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal. - -During that period—the preparatory period—Germany was lulling Poland -into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant -Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the -non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was saying that, “The pact was not -planned for a period of 10 years but forever; there need not be the -slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though Germany was -steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe had ever -known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was -so strong and so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it -involved, Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains, -at the same time, to say—and again I quote—that: - - “By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions - and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the - European atmosphere. I merely recall the agreement with Poland - which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.” - -And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home, -“guns before butter.” - -In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved -from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for -the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two -documents in particular which mark that change. - -The first of these was called “Directive for Unified Preparation for -War”; issued in June 1937—June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister for War, -who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That -document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the -appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the -revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it. - - “The general political position”—Von Blomberg stated, and I am - quoting from the document—“justifies the supposition that - Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for - this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost - all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies - in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia - in particular.” - -It is true, he added, “The intention of unleashing a European war is -held just as little by Germany.” And it may be that that phrase was -carefully chosen because, as the documents will show, Germany hoped to -conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the world in detail; to fight on one -front at a time, against one power at a time, and not to unleash a -general European conflict. - -But Von Blomberg went on: - - “The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude - surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war - of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any - time”—yet he had just said that there was no fear of any - attack—and “(b)”—and I invite the Tribunal again to notice - this phrase—“to enable the military exploitation of politically - favorable opportunities, should they occur.” - -That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggressive war. -It reveals the continued adherence of the German military leaders to the -doctrine that military might, and if necessary war, should be an -instrument of policy—the doctrine which had been explicitly condemned -by the Kellogg Pact, which was renounced by the pact with Poland, and by -innumerable other treaties. - -The document goes on to set out the general preparations necessary for a -possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938. It is evidence at -least for this, that the leaders of the German Armed Forces had it in -mind to use the military strength which they were building up for -aggressive purposes. No reason, they say, to anticipate attack from any -side—there is a lack of desire for war. Yet they prepare to exploit -militarily favorable opportunities. - -Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression -is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the Reich -Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at which Von Blomberg, Reich -Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; -Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; Raeder, the -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von Neurath, then the Foreign -Minister, were present. The minutes of that conference have already been -put in evidence. I refer to them now only to emphasize those passages -which make apparent the ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war. -You will remember that the burden of Hitler’s argument at that -conference was that Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria -and Czechoslovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that -the process of conquering those two countries might well bring into -operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He was -prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage: - - “The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has - proved that every space expansion can be effected only by - breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are - unavoidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found - without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the - proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest - possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost.” - -In the course of that conference Hitler had foreseen and discussed the -likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive expansionist -aims which he put forward brought about a general European war in the -course of their realization by the Nazi State. And when, therefore, on -that very day on which that conference was taking place, Hitler assured -the Polish Ambassador of the great value of the 1934 Pact with Poland, -it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes was that -of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a territorial -and strategic position that Poland was no longer a danger. - -That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of -February of 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to -active aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution -of Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for -Blomberg as head of the OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of -Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938 and the forcible -absorption of Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan for the -destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed in the way which -you heard yesterday—the plan partially foiled, or final consummation at -least delayed, by the Munich Agreement. - -With those aspects, those developments of Nazi aggression, my American -colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of -these two countries, their resources in manpower, their resources in the -production of munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of -Germany as against Poland. And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising -that, just as the Defendant Göring assured the Czechoslovak Minister in -Berlin, at the time of the Nazi invasion of Austria, that Hitler -recognized the validity of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of -1925, and that Germany had no designs against Czechoslovakia -herself—you remember, “I give you my word of honor,” the Defendant -Göring said—just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps -surprising that continued assurances should have been given during 1938 -to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the Nazi -aggression on Poland’s neighbors. - -Thus, on the 20th of February of 1938, on the eve of his invasion of -Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact, -permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag—and I quote: - - “. . . and so a way to a friendly understanding has been - successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with - Danzig, has today in spite of the attempt of some mischief - makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the - relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into - a sincere friendly co-operation . . . Relying on her - friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save - that ideal which provides the foundation for the task ahead of - us—peace.” - -Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial references to Poland in -Hitler’s speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of September -1938. He then said: - - “The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that - of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and - Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted - to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been - successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For - these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the - most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no - democracy, but a man. And with him I succeeded, in precisely 12 - months, in coming to an agreement which, for 10 years in the - first instance, removed in principle the danger of a conflict. - We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting - pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must - live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A - people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the - sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will - be further extended. But the main fact is that the two - governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among - the two peoples within the two countries, possess the firm will - and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work - of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of - Nations palace at Geneva.” - -And so flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed -flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia. -The realities behind these outward expressions of good will are clearly -revealed in the documents relating to the Fall Grün, which are already -before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was a -risk of Poland, England, and France being involved in war to prevent the -German annexation of Czechoslovakia and that this risk, although it was -realized, was also accepted. On 25 August of 1938 top-secret orders to -the German Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against -England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the -French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the event of -an “unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and -England, and I suppose for their legal advisors to decide whether -legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and consequently a -Blitzkrieg, accomplishing its aims before there could be any effective -intervention by France or England, was the object to be aimed at. - -On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was -issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the Baltic States, -Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown as part of Germany, -and preparations for expanding the Air Force, and I quote, “as the Reich -grows in area,” as well as dispositions for a two-front war against -France and Russia, were discussed. And on the following day Von -Ribbentrop was being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the -Czechoslovak problem. I quote: “The fact that after the liquidation of -the Czechoslovakian question it will be generally assumed that Poland -will be next in turn is not to be denied,” is recognized, but it is -stated, “The later this assumption sinks in, the better.” - -I will pause for a moment at the date of the Munich Agreement and ask -the Tribunal to remind itself of what the evidence of documents and -historical facts shows up to that day. It has made undeniable both the -fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and actual aggression. Not -only does that conference of 1937 show Hitler and his associates -deliberately considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, -if necessary by war, but the first of the operations had been carried -through in March of 1938; and a large part of the second, under threat -of war—a threat which as we now see was much more than a bluff—a -threat of actual and real war, although without the actual need for its -initiation, secured, as I said, a large part of the second objective in -September of 1938. And, more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his -adherence to the old doctrines of _Mein Kampf_—those essentially -aggressive doctrines to the exposition of which in _Mein Kampf_, long -regarded as the Bible of the Nazi Party, we shall draw attention in -certain particular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly not only -to his associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in -pursuit of Lebensraum and that he means to secure it by threat of force, -or if threat of force fails, by actual force—by aggressive war. - -So far actual warfare had been avoided because of the love of peace, the -lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice—call it what you -will—of the democratic powers; but after Munich the question which -filled the minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was “where -will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as he declared himself to -be? Or is his pursuit of Lebensraum going to lead to future aggressions, -even if he has to embark on open, aggressive war to secure it?” - -It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that -the answer to these questions was to be given. So far, up to the time of -the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate threat to Poland had been -made. The two documents from which I have just quoted, show of course, -that high officers of the Defendant Göring’s air staff already regarded -the expansion of the Reich and, it would seem, the destruction and -absorption of Poland, as a foregone conclusion. They were already -anticipating, indeed, the last stage of Hitler’s policy as expounded in -_Mein Kampf_—war to destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in Russia. -And the writer of the minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted -that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more -impressive than those two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at -the conference of 5 November 1937, war with Poland, if she should dare -to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been quite -coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders were ready to take -the risk. So also had the risk of war with England and France under the -same circumstances been considered and accepted. As I indicated, such a -war would, of course, have been aggressive war on Germany’s part, and -they were contemplating aggressive warfare. For to force one state to -take up arms to defend another state against aggression, in other words, -to fulfill its treaty obligations is undoubtedly to initiate aggressive -warfare against the first state. But in spite of those plans, in spite -of these intentions behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich -the decision for direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by -aggressive war had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his -associates. It is to the transition from the intention and preparation -of initiating aggressive war, evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to -the actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that I -now pass. That transition occupies the 11 months from the 1st of October -1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of September 1939. - -Within 6 months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi -leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that -Agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On the 14th -of March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the “rump” of -Czechoslovakia, Hacha and his Foreign Minister were summoned to Berlin. -At a meeting held between 1 o’clock and 2:15 in the small hours of the -15th of March in the presence of Hitler, of the Defendants Ribbentrop, -Göring, and Keitel, they were bullied and threatened and even bluntly -told that Hitler “had issued the orders for the German troops to move -into Czechoslovakia and for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the -German Reich.” - -It was made quite clear to them that resistance would be useless and -would be crushed “by force of arms with all available means,” and it was -thus that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that -Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though nominally -independent state. By their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had -no shadow of validity, without discussion with the governments of any -other country, without mediation, and in direct contradiction of the -sense and spirit of the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for -themselves that for which they had been planning in September of the -previous year, and indeed much earlier, but which at that time they had -felt themselves unable completely to secure without too patent an -exhibition of their aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted -the appetite for aggression to come. There were protests. England and -France sent diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis -had clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the -outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich -persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now for the first -time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German -territory and non-German people had been seized. This acquisition of the -whole of Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of -Memel on the 22d of March 1939, resulted in an immense strengthening of -the German positions, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had -anticipated it would, when he discussed the matter at that conference in -November of 1937. - -But long before the consummation by the Nazi leaders of their aggression -against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make demands upon Poland. The -Munich settlement achieved on the 25th of October 1938, that is to say -within less than a month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland to -which I have already referred, and within, of course, a month of the -Munich Agreement, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported -to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at -Berchtesgaden the day before, namely, on the 24th of October 1938, the -Defendant Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig -with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor road -and railway line across Pomorze, the province which the Germans called -“The Corridor”. From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had -made it plain, as they did during a visit of the Defendant Ribbentrop to -Warsaw in January 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig -to German sovereignty, negotiations on these German demands continued. -And even after Ribbentrop’s return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler -thought it worthwhile, in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January -1939, to say: - - “We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion - of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be - any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace - as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself - what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which - brought such relief, had not been entered into 5 years ago. In - signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his - people just as great a service as the leaders of the National - Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled - months of the past year, the friendship between Germany and - Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political - life of Europe.” - -But that utterance was the last friendly word from Germany to Poland, -and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the -German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence -fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final -absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place and Germany had also -occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two -conversations which he and the Defendant Ribbentrop held on the 21st of -March and the 26th of March, respectively, with the Polish Ambassador, -German demands upon Poland were renewed and were further pressed. And in -view of the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in view of the -grave deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany, it is -not surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at the -developments. Nor were they alone. The events of March 1939 had at last -convinced both the English and the French Governments that the Nazi -designs of aggression were not limited to men of German race, and that -the specter of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi -Germany had not, after all, been exorcised by the Munich Agreement. - -As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland and of England and of -France at the events in Czechoslovakia, and at the newly applied -pressure on Poland, conversations between the English and Polish -Governments had been taking place, and, on the 31st of March 1939, Mr. -Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His -Majesty’s Government had given an assurance to help Poland in the event -of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the -Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist. On the 6th -of April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communiqué stated that the two countries -were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal -character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance -given by His Majesty’s Government. - -The justification for that concern on the part of the democratic powers -is not difficult to find. With the evidence which we now have of what -was happening within the councils of the German Reich and its Armed -Forces during these months, it is manifest that the German Government -were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, that Danzig—as Hitler himself -was to say in time, a month later—“was not the subject of the dispute -at all.” The Nazi Government was intent upon aggression and the demands -and negotiations in respect to Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for -further domination. - -Would that be a convenient point to stop? - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his opening -statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state what they propose to do as to -time of sitting for the immediate future. We think it will be more -convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from 10:00 o’clock in the morning -until 1:00 o’clock, with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of the -morning; and that the Tribunal shall sit in the afternoon from 2:00 -o’clock until 5:00 o’clock with a break for 10 minutes in the middle of -the afternoon; and that there shall be no open sitting of the Tribunal -on Saturday morning, as the Tribunal has a very large number of -applications by the defendants’ counsel for witnesses and documents and -other matters of that sort which it has to consider. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when we broke off I -had been saying that the Nazi Government was intent upon aggression, and -all that had been taking place in regard to Danzig—the negotiations, -the demands that were being made—were really no more than a cover, a -pretext and excuse for further domination. - -As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against Poland, -England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was -telling the world that the German people wanted peace, and that having -solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial -problems in Europe, the staffs of his Armed Forces were already -preparing their plans. On the 26th of September 1938 he had stated: - - “We have given guarantees to the states in the West. We have - assured all our immediate neighbors of the integrity of their - territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere - phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a - breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples.” - -And the world was entitled to rely on those assurances. International -co-operation is utterly impossible unless one can assume good faith in -the leaders of the various states and honesty in the public utterances -that they make. But, in fact, within 2 months of that solemn and -apparently considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were -preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To recognize those assurances, -those pledges, those diplomatic moves as the empty frauds that they -were, one must go back to inquire what was happening within the inner -councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement. - -Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file on the -reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading - -“Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England,” this is -stated: - - “1. If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to - acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only - sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval - communications and secure access to the ocean. - - - - “2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to - Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world - powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful - means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, - forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding - preparations for war. - - - - “3. War against England means at the same time war against the - Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a - large number of countries overseas, in fact, against one-third - to one-half of the world. - - - - “It can only be justified and have a chance of success”—and it - was not moral justification which was being looked for in this - document—“It can only be justified and have a chance of success - if it is prepared economically as well as politically and - militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an - outlet to the ocean.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at what stage you -propose to put the documents, which you are citing, in evidence. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, Sir, my colleagues, my American and my -British colleagues, were proposing to follow up my own address by -putting these documents in. The first series of documents, which will be -put in by my noted colleague, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, will be the -treaties. - -THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to be read again. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations as far as I -possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish it to be quoted -again, so as to get it on the record when the document is actually put -into evidence. But I think it will appear, when the documents themselves -are produced, that there will be a good deal more in most of them than I -am actually citing now. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well. - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare against England is -something which is both significant and new. Until this date the -documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against -Poland, England, and France, purporting on the face of them at least to -be defensive measures to ward off attacks which might result from the -intervention of those states in the preparatory German aggressions in -Central Europe. Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England, and -France has been contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, in this -document for the first time, we find a war of conquest by Germany -against France and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least -of the German Navy. - -On 24 November 1938 an appendix was issued by Keitel to a previous order -of the Führer. In that appendix were set out the future tasks for the -Armed Forces and the preparation for the conduct of the war which would -result from those tasks. - - “The Führer has ordered”—I quote—“that besides the three - eventualities mentioned in the previous directive . . . - preparations are also to be made for the surprise occupation by - German troops of the Free State of Danzig. - - - - “For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in - mind.”—This is the common pattern of aggression—“The primary - assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a - favorable political situation, and not war with Poland. Troops - which are going to be used for this purpose must not be held at - the same time for the seizure of Memel, so that both operations - can take place simultaneously, should such necessity arise.” - -Thereafter, as the evidence which is already before the Tribunal has -shown, final preparations were taking place for the invasion of Poland. -On the 3rd of April 1939, 3 days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish -communiqué, the Defendant Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed -Forces a directive in which it was stated that the directive for the -uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces in 1939-40, was being -re-issued and that part relating to Danzig would be out in April. The -basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous directive. -Attached to this document were the orders Fall Weiss, the code name for -the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparation for that invasion was to be -made, it was stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any -time from the 1st of September 1939 onwards. - -On the 11th of April Hitler issued his directive for the uniform -preparation of the war by the Armed Forces, 1939-40, and in it he said: - - “I shall lay down in a later directive future tasks of the Armed - Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these - for the conduct of war. Until that directive comes into force - the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following - eventualities: - - - - “1. Safeguarding of the frontiers . . . - - - - “2. Fall Weiss, - - - - “3. The annexation of Danzig.” - -Then, in an annex to that document which bore the heading “Political -Hypotheses and Aims,” it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be -avoided. But should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening -attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, -notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be -incorporated in the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. -The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered -possible at that time with the internal crises in France and resulting -British restraint. - -The wording of that document—and the Tribunal will study the whole of -it—does not directly involve the intention of immediate aggression. It -is a plan of attack “if Poland changes her policy and adopts a -threatening attitude.” But the picture of Poland, with her wholly -inadequate armaments, threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is -ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the -sentence—and I quote: “The aim is then to destroy Polish military -strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the -requirements of defense”—a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs -of any magnitude. But even at that stage, the evidence does not suffice -to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had -yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the -necessary action was being proceeded with, in case that decision should -be reached. - -It was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last document that Hitler -addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he -repeated the demands which had already been made upon Poland, and -proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving -aside, for the moment, the warlike preparations for aggression, which -Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to -consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in -the past, Hitler had attached such importance. - -In the first place, of course, Hitler’s denunciation was _per se_ -ineffectual. The text of the agreement made no provision for its -denunciation by either party until a period of 10 years had come to an -end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of -1943, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, rather more than 5 -years too soon. - -In the second place, Hitler’s actual attack upon Poland, when it came on -1 September was made before the expiration of the 6 months’ period after -denunciation required by the agreement before any denunciation could be -operative. And in the third place, the grounds for the denunciation -stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag were entirely specious. -However one reads its terms, it is impossible to take the view that the -Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could -render the German-Polish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to -suggest. If that had been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances, -then certainly the pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler -himself with Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty -with Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of -course, that the text of the English-Polish communiqué, the text of the -assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention that the -German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with. - -One asks: Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to -denounce his own pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible -answer but this: - -That the agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he chose -for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany -with some kind of justification—at least for the German people—for the -aggression on which the German leaders were intent. - -And, of course, Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some -apparently decent excuse, since nothing had happened, and nothing seemed -likely to happen, from the Polish side, to provide him with any kind of -pretext for invading Poland. So far he had made demands upon his treaty -partner which Poland, as a sovereign state, had every right to refuse. -If dissatisfied with that refusal, Hitler was bound, under the terms of -the agreement itself, “To seek a settlement”—I am reading the words of -the pact: - - “To seek a settlement through other peaceful means, without - prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of - procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a - case in the other agreements between them that are in force.” - -And that presumably was a reference to the German-Polish Arbitration -Treaty, signed at Locarno in 1925. - -The very facts, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leaders cannot get -what they want but are not entitled to from Poland by merely asking for -it and that, on their side, they made no further attempt to settle the -dispute “by peaceful means”—in accordance with the terms of the -agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the agreement pledged both -parties—in themselves constitute a strong presumption of aggressive -intentions against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a -certainty when the documents to which I am about to call the attention -of the Tribunal are studied. - -On the 10th of May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic -installations in Poland. On the 16th of May the Defendant Raeder, as -Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the -Führer’s instructions to prepare for the operation Fall Weiss at any -time from the 1st of September. - -But the decisive document is the record of the conference held by Hitler -on the 23rd of May 1939, in conference with many high-ranking officers, -including the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and Keitel. The details of the -whole document will have to be read to the Tribunal later and I am -merely summarizing the substantial effect of this part of it now. Hitler -stated that the solution of the economic problems with which Germany was -beset at first, could not be found without invasion of foreign states -and attacks on foreign property. “Danzig”—and I am quoting: - - “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a - question of expanding our living space in the East. There is, - therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with - the decision to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We - cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be - fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this - isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter - of skillful politics.” - -So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility that -war with England and France might result, but a two-front war was to be -avoided if possible. Yet England was recognized—and I say it with -pride—as the most dangerous enemy which Germany had. “England,” he -said, I quote, “England is the driving force against Germany . . . the -aim will always be to force England to her knees.” More than once he -repeated that the war with England and France would be a life and death -struggle. “But all the same,” he concluded, “Germany will not be forced -into war but she would not be able to avoid it.” - -On the 14th of June 1939 General Blaskowitz, then Commander-in-Chief of -the 3rd Army group, issued a detailed battle plan for the Fall Weiss. -The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was -stated that the object of the impending operation was to destroy the -Polish Armed Forces. “High policy demands,” he said, “High policy -demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to -achieve quick results.” The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d of -June the Defendant Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the -operation, which Hitler seems to have approved, and suggested that the -scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged, “in order not to disquiet the -population.” On the 3rd of July, Brauchitsch wrote to the Defendant -Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should be abandoned, -in order not to prejudice the surprise of the attack. On the 12th and -13th of August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference with Ciano, the -Italian Foreign Minister. - -It was a conference to which the Tribunal will have to have regard from -several points of view. I summarize now only one aspect of the matter: -At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of -the German position, of Germany’s Western and Eastern Fortifications, -and of the strategic and other advantages they held in comparison with -those of England, France, and Poland. Now I quote from the captured -document itself. Hitler said this: - - “Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear - that, in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would stand - on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick - liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for - the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a - hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only - would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also - further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This - would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.” - -Then this: - - “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to - liquidate the false neutrals one after the other. This process - could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one - partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with - an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a - neutral of that kind.” - -Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready. She -believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general -European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western -Democracies was inevitable, but he was making plans for a period 2 or 3 -years ahead. But the Führer said that the Danzig question must be -disposed of, one way or the other, by the end of August. I quote: “He -had, therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next political -provocation which has the form of an ultimatum . . . .” - -On the 22d of August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together and -gave the order for the attack. In the course of what he said he made it -clear that the decision to attack had, in fact, been made not later than -the previous spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the -war. And at that time the attack was timed to take place in the early -hours of the 26th of August. On the day before, on the 25th of August, -the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be reluctant -to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal treaty -would impress him more than the informal assurances which had been given -previously, entered into an agreement, an express agreement for mutual -assistance with Poland, embodying the previous assurances that had been -given earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound -by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the Guarantee Pact signed at -Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland’s favor in case of aggression. -And for a moment Hitler hesitated. The Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, -in the interrogations which you will see, have agreed that it was the -Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to call off, or rather postpone, the -attack which was timed for the 26th. Perhaps he hoped that after all -there was still some chance of repeating what he had called the Czech -affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived. On the 27th of August Hitler -accepted Mussolini’s decision not at once to come into the war; but he -asked for propaganda support and for a display of military activity on -the part of Italy, so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the -Allies. Ribbentrop on the same day said that the armies were marching. - -In the meantime, and, of course, particularly during the last month, -desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers to avert war. -You will have details of them in evidence, of the intervention of the -Pope, of President Roosevelt’s message, of the offer by the British -Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the conditions in which all -matters in issue could be the subject of free negotiations, and to -guarantee the resultant decisions. But this and all the other efforts of -honest men to avoid the horror of a European conflict were predestined -to failure. The Germans were determined that the day for war had come. -On the 31st of August Hitler issued a top-secret order for the attack to -commence in the early hours of the 1st of September. - -The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps, for -that, that the Defendant Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply -Heydrich with Polish uniforms? And so without a declaration of war, -without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of seeing -Germany’s final demands—and you will hear the evidence of the -extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one can call them such, that -took place in Berlin—without giving the Poles any opportunity at all of -negotiating or arbitrating on the demands which Nazi Germany was making, -the Nazi troops invaded Poland. - -On the 3rd of September Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him -for his intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and -that the most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation. -And so Hitler and his confederates now before this Tribunal began the -first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared so long -and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few weeks -Poland was overrun. - -On the 23rd of November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his -military commanders and in the course of what he said he made this -observation: - - “One year later Austria came; this step was also considered - doubtful. It brought about an essential reinforcement of the - Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step - also was not possible to accomplish in one move. First of all - the Western Fortifications had to be finished . . . . Then - followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that the - basis for action against Poland was laid. But I was not quite - clear at the time whether I should start first against the East - and then in the West, or vice versa . . . . The compulsion to - fight with Poland came first. One might accuse me of wanting to - fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all - beings.” - -He was not sure where to attack first. But that sooner or later he would -attack, whether it were in the East or in the West, was never in doubt. -And he had been warned, not only by the British and French Prime -Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini, that an attack on -Poland would bring England and France into the war. He chose what he -thought was the opportune moment, and he struck. - -Under these circumstances the intent to wage war against England and -France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be -denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations. Here -was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked -and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic -resistance of all civilized peoples, but which, before it was finished, -was to tear down much of the structure of our civilization. - -Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the -domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government proceeded -to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be -attacked, actually to be invaded, after the attack upon Poland, were -Denmark and Norway. - -On the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and -Denmark without any warning, without any declaration of war. It was a -breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the -Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and -Denmark on 2 June 1926. It was, of course, a breach of the -Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. It was a violation of the Non-Aggression -Treaty between Germany and Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it -was a breach of the most explicit assurances which had been given. After -his annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, -Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian states. On the 28th of -April 1939 he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of them -which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independence. On the -31st of May 1939 he signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark. - -On the 2d of September 1939, the day after he had invaded Poland and -occupied Danzig, he again expressed his determination, so he said, to -observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway in an _aide-mémoire_, -which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German -Minister in Oslo on that day. - -A month later, in a public speech on the 6th of October 1939, he said: - - “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points - of controversy with the northern states, neither has she any - today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression - pacts by Germany, and have both refused them, solely because - they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” - -When the invasion of Denmark and Norway was already begun in the early -morning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was handed to the -governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action. -Various allegations against the governments of the invaded countries -were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of -neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of -her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and -France were themselves making plans to invade and occupy Norway and that -the Government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such an event. - -I do not propose to argue the question whether or not these allegations -were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issues before -this Court. Even if the allegations were true—and they were patently -false—they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of -invading without warning, without declaration of war, without any -attempt at mediation or conciliation. - -Aggressive war is none the less aggressive war because the state which -wages it believes that other states might, in the future, take similar -action. The rape of a nation is not justified because it is thought she -may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense are warlike measures -justified except after all means of mediation have been tried and failed -and force is actually being exercised against the state concerned. - -But the matter is irrelevant because, in actual fact, with the evidence -which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the invasion of these -two countries was undertaken for quite different purposes. It had been -planned long before any question of breach of neutrality or occupation -of Norway by England could ever have occurred. And it is equally clear -that the assurances repeated again and again throughout 1939 were made -for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in these countries, and to -prevent them taking steps to resist the attack against them which was -all along in active preparation. - -For some years the Defendant Rosenberg, in his capacity as Chief of the -Foreign Affairs Bureau—APA—of the NSDAP, had interested himself in the -promotion of Fifth Column activities in Norway and he had established -close relationship with the Nasjonal Samling, a political group headed -by the now notorious traitor, Vidkun Quisling. During the winter of -1938-39, APA was in contact with Quisling, and later Quisling conferred -with Hitler and with the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939 -a special 14-day course was held at the school of the Office of Foreign -Relations in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to -attend. The plan was to send a number of selected and “reliable” men to -Germany for a brief military training in an isolated camp. These -“reliable men” were to be the area and language specialists to German -special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to undertake -political action in Norway. The object was a _coup_ in which Quisling -would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and -prevent all military resistance from the beginning. Simultaneously with -those Fifth Column activities Germany was making her military -preparations. On the 2d of September 1939, as I said, Hitler had assured -Norway of his intention to respect her neutrality. On 6 October he said -that the Scandinavian states were not menaced in any way. Yet on the 3rd -October the Defendant Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of -bases, if necessary by force, would greatly improve the German strategic -position. On the 9th of October Dönitz was recommending Trondheim as the -main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The -Defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the possibility -of a _coup d’état_ by Quisling, immediately supported by German military -and naval forces. On the 12th of December 1939 the Defendant Raeder -advised Hitler, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, that -if Hitler was favorably impressed by Quisling, the OKW should prepare -for the occupation of Norway, if possible with Quisling’s assistance, -but if necessary, entirely by force. Hitler agreed, but there was a -doubt whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or -against Scandinavia first. Weather conditions delayed the march on the -Low Countries. In January 1940 instructions were given to the German -Navy for the attack on Norway. On the 1st of March a directive for the -occupation was issued by Hitler. The general object was not said to be -to prevent occupation by English forces but, in vague and general terms, -to prevent British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic and “to -guarantee our ore bases in Sweden and to give our Navy and Air Force a -wider start line against Britain.” But the directive went on (and here -is the common pattern): - - “. . . on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation - appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the - military protection of the Scandinavian states . . . . It is - important that the Scandinavian states as well as the western - opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures . . . . In - case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept - secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with - fictitious objectives.” - -The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours -of the 9th of April, seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and a number of -torpedo boats and other small craft carried advance elements of six -divisions, totalling about 10,000 men, forced an entry and landed troops -in the outer Oslo Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and -Narvik. A small force of troops was also landed at Arendal and Egersund -on the southern coast. In addition, airborne troops were landed near -Oslo and Stavanger in airplanes. The German attack came as a complete -surprise. All the invaded towns along the coast were captured according -to plan and with only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the King -and Parliament failed. But brave as was the resistance, which was -hurriedly organized throughout the country—nothing could be done in the -face of the long-planned surprise attack—and on the 10th of June -military resistance ceased. So another act of aggression was brought to -completion. - -Almost exactly a month after the attack, on Norway, on the 10th of May -1940, the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years -before, streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg according -to plan—a plan that is, of invading without warning and without any -declaration of war. - -What was done was, of course, a breach of the Hague Convention, and is -so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement of 1925, which -the Nazi Government affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it a -couple of years later. By that agreement all questions incapable of -settlement by ordinary diplomatic means were to be referred to -arbitration. You will see the comprehensive terms of all those treaties. -It was a breach of the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation signed -between Germany and the Netherlands on the 20th of May 1926. It was a -breach of a similar treaty with Luxembourg of 11 September 1929. It was -a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But those treaties, perhaps, had -not derived in the minds of the Nazi rulers of Germany any added -sanctity from the fact that they had been solemnly concluded by the -governments of pre-Nazi Germany. Let us then consider the specific -assurances and undertakings which the Nazi rulers themselves gave to -these states which lay in the way of their plans against France and -England and which they had always intended to attack. Not once, not -twice, but 11 times the clearest possible assurances were given to -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances, solemnly -given and formally expressed, these countries were entitled to rely and -did rely. In respect of the breach of those assurances these defendants -are charged. On the 30th of January 1937, for instance, Hitler had said: - - “As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and - the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations - with our neighbors. Germany has, and here I repeat this - solemnly, given the assurance time and time again that, for - instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly - conceivable points of controversy. The German Government has - further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is - prepared to recognize and to guarantee the inviolability and - neutrality of these territories.” - -After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the -Locarno Pact, England and France sought to re-establish the position of -security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. And they, -therefore, gave to Belgium on the 24th of April 1937 a specific -guarantee that they would maintain, in respect of Belgium, the -undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with her both -under the Locarno Pact and under the Covenant of the League. On the 13th -of October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring -Belgium of its intention to recognize the integrity of that country. - -It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we -review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and -intentions of the German Government prior to their actual invasion of -Belgium on the 10th of May 1940. - -As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also -here the dates speak for themselves. - -As early as August of 1938 steps were being taken to utilize the Low -Countries as bases for decisive action in the West in the event of -France and England opposing Germany in the aggressive plan which was on -foot at that time against Czechoslovakia. - -In an Air Force letter dated the 25th of August 1938 which deals with -the action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the -operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated: - - “It is not expected for the moment that other states will - intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area - assumes in this connection much more importance for the conduct - of war in Western Europe than during the World War, mainly as - advance base for the air war.” - -In the last paragraph of that order it is stated: - - “Belgium and the Netherlands, when in German hands, represent an - extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war - against Great Britain as well as against France . . .” - -That was in August 1938. Eight months later, on the 28th of April 1939, -Hitler is declaring again: - - “I was pleased that a number of European states availed - themselves of this declaration by the German Government to - express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.” - -A month later, on the 23rd of May 1939, Hitler held that conference in -the Reich Chancellery, to which I already referred. The minutes of that -meeting report Hitler as saying: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - forces. Declarations of neutrality cannot be considered of any - value. If England and France want a general conflict on the - occasion of the war between Germany and Poland they will support - Holland and Belgium in their neutrality . . . . Therefore, if - England intends to intervene at the occasion of the Polish war, - we must attack Holland with lightning speed. It is desirable to - secure a defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.” - -Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would -observe the neutrality of these countries. On the 26th of August 1939, -when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax, -on the very day he had picked for the invasion of Poland, declarations -assuring the governments concerned of the intention to respect their -neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the -Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the -Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army -Hitler was saying: - - “If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, a - successful war against England will be secured.” - -On the 1st of September Poland was invaded, and 2 days later England and -France came into the war against Germany, in pursuance of the treaty -obligations already referred to. On the 6th of October Hitler renewed -his assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland, but on the 9th of -October, before any kind of accusation had been made by the German -Government of breaches of neutrality, Hitler issued a directive for the -conduct of the war. And he said this: - - “1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England and - France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the - war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without - letting much time elapse. - - - - “2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending of - Belgian and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality to the advantage of - the Western Powers, but also strengthens the military power of - our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the - neutrals in final German victory to wane, and does not help to - bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms. - - - - “3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further - conduct of military operations: - - - - “(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the - northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of - Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried - out as soon and as forcefully as possible. - - - - “(b) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong - sections of the French fighting army as possible, and her ally - and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as - great an area of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as - possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging - aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample - coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.” - -Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind -the invasion of these three countries than that document expresses it. - -On the 15th of October 1939 the Defendant Keitel wrote a most-secret -letter concerning “Fall Gelb” which was the name given to the operation -against the Low Countries. In it he said that: - - “The protection of the Ruhr area by moving aircraft reporting - service and the air defense as far forward as possible in the - area of Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war. - The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective can the - defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must - determine the choice of objectives of the Army, even if the Army - and Navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain. - It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to - occupy, on receipt of a special order, the territory of Holland, - in the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Maas line. It - will depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch, - as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether - objectives can and must be further extended.” - -The Fall Gelb operation had apparently been planned to take place at the -beginning of November 1939. We have in our possession a series of 17 -letters, dated from 7th November until the 9th May postponing almost -from day to day the D-Day of the operation, so that by the beginning of -November all the major plans and preparations had in fact been made. - -On the 10th of January 1940 a German airplane force-landed in Belgium. -In it was found the remains of an operation order which the pilot had -attempted to burn; setting out considerable details of the Belgian -landing grounds that were to be captured by the Air Force. Many other -documents have been found which illustrate the planning and preparation -for this invasion in the latter half of 1939 and early 1940, but they -carry the matter no further, and they show no more clearly than the -evidence to which I have already referred, the plans and intention of -the German Government and its Armed Forces. - -On the 10th of May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning, the German -invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began. - -And so once more the forces of aggression moved on. Treaties, -assurances, the rights of sovereign states meant nothing. Brutal force, -covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure, -was to seize that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal -blow against England, the main enemy. The only fault of these three -unhappy countries was that they stood in the path of the German invader, -in his designs against England and France. That was enough, and they -were invaded. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: On the 6th of April 1941 German Armed Forces -invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. Again the blow was struck without warning -and with the cowardice and deceit which the world now fully expected -from the self-styled “Herrenvolk”. It was a breach of the Hague -Convention. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. It was a breach of a -specific assurance given by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939. - -He had then said this: - - “Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss, I informed - Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country will - also be an unalterable one and that we desire only to live in - peace and friendship with her.” - -But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in -hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the -Ukraine and the Soviet territories, security of the southern flank and -the lines of communication had already been considered by the Germans. - -The history of the events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by -Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock in the morning of the 28th of -October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian -Government to the Greek Government, and the presentation of that -ultimatum was immediately followed by the aerial bombardment of Greek -provincial towns and the advance of Italian troops into Greek territory. -The Greeks were not prepared. They were at first forced to withdraw. But -later the Italian advance was at first checked, then driven towards the -Albanian frontier, and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered -severe reverses at Greek hands. - -Of the German position in the matter there is, of course, the evidence -of what occurred when, on the 12th of August 1939, Hitler had this -meeting with Ciano. - -You will remember that Hitler said then: - - “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to - liquidate false neutrals one after the other. This process could - be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one partner of - the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an - uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a - neutral of this kind.” - -Then the conference went on and it met again on the 13th of August, and -in the course of lengthy discussions, Hitler said this: - - “In general, however, on success by one of the Axis partners, - not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the - other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy - carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, - Spain, and Albania, and each time against the wishes of the - democratic entente. These individual actions have not only - strengthened Italian local interests, but have also . . . - reinforced her general position. The same was the case with - German action in Austria and Czechoslovakia . . . . The - strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of - the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the - Western Powers.” - -And so once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting -had taken place on the 12th and the 13th of August of 1939. Less than 2 -months later, Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany -only desired to live in peace and friendship with her, with the state, -the liquidation of which by his Axis partner, he had himself so recently -suggested. - -Then came the Italian ultimatum to Greece and war against Greece and the -Italian reverse. - -We have found, amongst the captured documents, an undated letter from -Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about the time of the -Italian aggression against Greece: - - “Permit me”—Hitler said—“at the beginning of this letter to - assure you that within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts - have been more than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of - my determination to do everything on your behalf which might - ease the present situation for you. When I asked you to receive - me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able - to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening - conflict with Greece, about which I had received only general - information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the - action, if at all possible, until a more favorable time of the - year, at all events until after the American presidential - election. But in any case, however, I wanted to request you, - Duce, not to undertake this action without a previous - lightning-like occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also - wanted to submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to - the employment of a German parachute division and a further - airborne division . . . Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if - possible, however, from our point of view, interested in - co-operating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without - assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful - operation in the Balkans . . . Unfortunately, I must stress the - fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is - impossible. Hence it would also serve to make any threatening - influence upon Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian - General Staff is well aware of the fact that no practical action - could follow such a threat before March. Hence, Yugoslavia must, - if at all possible, be won over by other means and in other - ways.” - -On the 12th of November 1939, in his top-secret order, Hitler ordered -the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria, if -necessary. Apparently 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent -Turkish intervention. I think I said 1939; it should, of course, have -been the 12th of November 1940. And to shorten the time, the German -divisions in Romania were to be increased. - -On the 13th of December Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM, -and the General Staff on the operation Marita, as the invasion of Greece -was to be called. In that order it was stated that the invasion of -Greece was planned and was to commence as soon as the weather was -advantageous. A further order was issued on the 11th of January of 1941. - -On the 28th of January of 1941 Hitler saw Mussolini. The Defendants -Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop were present at the meeting. We know about -it from Jodl’s notes of what took place. We know that Hitler stated that -one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Romania was for -use in the plan Marita against Greece. - -On the 1st of March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved -towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on -Greece by German as well as Italian forces, British troops were landed -in Greece on the 3rd of March, in accordance with the declaration which -had been given by the British Government on the 13th of April 1939; that -Britain would feel bound to give Greece and Romania, respectively, all -the support in her power in the event of either country becoming the -victim of aggression and resisting such aggression. Already, of course, -the Italian operations had made that pledge operative. - -On the 25th of March of 1941, Yugoslavia, partly won over by the “other -means and in other ways” to which Hitler had referred, joined the Three -Power Pact which had already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. -The preamble of the pact stated that the three powers would stand side -by side and work together. - -On the same day the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav -Prime Minister assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the -sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was just -another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have -already seen the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s -attempts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We -have seen, in January, his own orders for preparations to invade -Yugoslavia and then Greece. And now, on the 25th of March, he is signing -a pact with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances -of respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity. - -As a result of the signing of that pact, the anti-Nazi element in -Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a _coup d’état_ and established a -new government. And thereupon, no longer prepared to respect the -territorial integrity and sovereignty of her ally, Germany immediately -took the decision to invade. On the 27th of March, 2 days after the -Three Power Pact had been signed, Hitler issued instructions that -Yugoslavia was to be invaded and used as a base for the continuance of -the combined German and Italian operation against Greece. - -Following that, further deployment and instructions for the action -Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th of March 1941. - -It was said—and I quote: - - “The orders issued with regard to the operation against Greece - remain valid so far as not affected by this order . . . . On the - 5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack - troops in Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the - 12th Army begins against both Yugoslavia and Greece.” - -And as we now know, the invasion actually commenced in the early hours -of the 6th of April. - -Treaties, pacts, assurances, obligations of any kind, are brushed aside -and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned. - -I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe—my American -colleagues will deal with the position in relation to Japan—I turn now -to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi -conspirators are charged, the attack upon Russia. - -In August of 1939 Germany, although undoubtedly intending to attack -Russia at some convenient opportunity, concluded a treaty of -non-aggression with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When -Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June -of 1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and -economic support of the United States of America—was left alone in the -field as the sole representative of democracy in the face of the forces -of aggression. At that moment only the British Empire stood between -Germany and the achievement of her aim to dominate the Western World. -Only the British Empire—and England as its citadel. But it was enough. -The first, and possibly the decisive, military defeat which the enemy -sustained was in the campaign against England; and that defeat had a -profound influence on the future course of the war. - -On the 16th of July of 1940 Hitler issued to the Defendants Keitel and -Jodl a directive—which they found themselves unable to obey—for the -invasion of England. It started off—and Englishmen will forever be -proud of it—by saying that: - - “Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows - no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to - prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to - carry it out. The aim is . . . to eliminate the English homeland - as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany . . . . - Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by - mid-August.” - -But the first essential condition for that plan was, I quote: - - “. . . the British Air Force must morally and actually be so far - overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable - aggressive force against the German attack.” - -The Defendant Göring and his Air Force, no doubt, made the most -strenuous efforts to realize that condition, but, in one of the most -splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And although -the bombardment of England’s towns and villages was continued throughout -that dark winter of 1940-41, the enemy decided in the end that England -was not to be subjugated by these means, and, accordingly, Germany -turned back to the East, the first major aim unachieved. - -On the 22d of June 1941 German Armed Forces invaded Russia, without -warning, without declaration of war. It was, of course, a breach of the -usual series of treaties; they meant no more in this case than they had -meant in the other cases. It was a violation of the Pact of Paris; it -was a flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of Non-Aggression which -Germany and Russia had signed on the 23rd of August a year before. - -Hitler himself said, in referring to that agreement, that “agreements -were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose.” - -The Defendant Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the -Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on the 23rd of February 1941, he made it -clear that the object of the agreement had merely been, so far as -Germany was concerned, to avoid a two-front war. - -In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop and the rest of them were -planning within the secret councils of Germany, we know what they were -saying to the rest of the world. - -On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag: - - “In these circumstances”—he said—“I considered it proper to - negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest - with Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what - Germany believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to - safeguard her future and, on the other hand, what Russia - considers important for her existence. From this clear - delineation of the sphere of interest there followed the new - regulation of Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at - the end of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension - could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which would - lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But - England’s hope to achieve an amelioration of her own position - through the engineering of some new European crisis, is, insofar - as it is concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion. - - “English statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they - too will learn to understand this in the course of time.” - -The whole statement was, of course, a tissue of lies. It was not many -months after it had been made that the arrangements for attacking Russia -were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder gives us the probable -reason for the decision in a note which he sent to Admiral Assmann: - - “The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn - of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the - Führer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who - were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on - England (our own losses), surely caused the Führer, as far back - as August and September”—this was August and September of - 1940—“to consider whether, even prior to victory in the West, - an Eastern campaign would be feasible, with the object of first - eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent . . . . - The Führer did not openly express this fear, however, until well - into September.” - -He may not have spoken to the Navy of his intentions until later in -September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly told -the Defendant Jodl about them. - -Dated the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive of the OKW signed -by the Defendant Jodl, and I quote: - - “Directions are given for the occupation forces in the East to - be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons”—and - I quote—“this should not create the impression in Russia that - Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive.” - -Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertaining to -the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service, and I -quote: - - “The respective strength of the German troops in the East is to - be camouflaged by . . . frequent changes in this area . . . . - The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops is - in the south of the Government General and that the occupation - in the North is relatively small.” - -And so we see the beginning of the operations. - -On the 12th of November 1940 Hitler issued a directive, signed by the -Defendant Jodl, in which it was stated that the political task to -determine the attitude of Russia had begun, but that without reference -to the result of preparations against the East, which had been ordered -orally. - -It is not to be supposed that the U.S.S.R. would have taken part in any -conversations at that time if it had been realized that on the very day -orders were being given for preparations to be made for the invasion of -Russia, and that the order for the operation, which was called “Plan -Barbarossa”, was in active preparation. On the 18th of December the -order was issued, and I quote: - - “The German Armed Forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet - Russia in a swift campaign before the end of the war against - Great Britain.” - -And later, in the same instruction—and I quote again: - - “All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in - accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such - terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case - Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.” - -Germany kept up the pretense of friendliness and, on the 10th of January -1941, well after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been -decided upon, Germany signed the German-Russian Frontier Treaty. Less -than a month later, on the 3rd of February of 1941, Hitler held a -conference, attended by the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, at which it was -provided that the whole operation against Russia was to be camouflaged -as if it was part of the preparation for the “Plan Seelöwe”, as the plan -for the invasion of England was described. - -By March of 1941 plans were sufficiently advanced to include provision -for dividing the Russian territory into nine separate states to be -administered under Reich Commissars, under the general control of the -Defendant Rosenberg; and at the same time detailed plans for the -economic exploitation of the country were made under the supervision of -the Defendant Göring, to whom the responsibility in this matter—and it -is a serious one—had been delegated by Hitler. - -You will hear something of the details of these plans. I remind you of -one document which has already been referred to in this connection. - -It is significant that on the 2d of May of 1941 a conference of State -Secretaries took place in regard to the Plan Barbarossa, and in the -course of that it was noted: - - “1. The war can be continued only if all Armed Forces are fed - out of Russia in the third year of the war. - - - - “2. There is no doubt that, as a result, many millions of people - will be starved to death if we take out of the country the - things necessary for us.” - -But that apparently caused no concern. The “Plan Oldenbourg”, as the -scheme for the economic organization and exploitation of Russia was -called, went on. By the 1st of May 1941, the D-Day of the operation had -been fixed. By the 1st of June preparations were virtually complete and -an elaborate timetable was issued. It was estimated that, although there -would be heavy frontier battles, lasting perhaps 4 weeks, after that no -serious opposition was to be expected. - -On the 22d of June, at 3:30 in the morning, the German armies marched -again. As Hitler said in his proclamation to them, “I have decided to -give the fate of the German people and of the Reich and of Europe again -into the hands of our soldiers.” - -The usual false pretexts were, of course, given. Ribbentrop stated on -the 28th of June that the step was taken because of the threatening of -the German frontiers by the Red Army. It was a lie, and the Defendant -Ribbentrop knew it was a lie. - -On the 7th of June 1941 Ribbentrop’s own Ambassador in Moscow was -reporting to him, and I quote, that, “All observations show that Stalin -and Molotov, who are alone responsible for Russian foreign policy, are -doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany.” The staff records -which you will see make it clear that the Russians were making no -military preparations and that they were continuing their deliveries -under the Trade Agreement to the very last day. The truth is, of course, -that the elimination of Russia as a political opponent and the -incorporation of the Soviet territory in the German Lebensraum had been -one of the cardinal features of Nazi policy for a very long time, -subordinated latterly for what the Defendant Jodl called diplomatic -reasons. - -And so, on the 22d of June, the Nazi armies were flung against the power -with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship, and Germany embarked -upon that last act of aggression in Europe, which, after long and bitter -fighting, was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse. - -That, then, is the case against these defendants, as amongst the rulers -of Germany, under Count Two of this Indictment. - -It may be said that many of the documents which have been referred to -were in Hitler’s name, and that the orders were Hitler’s orders, and -that these men were mere instruments of Hitler’s will. But they were the -instruments without which Hitler’s will could not be carried out; and -they were more than that. These men were no mere willing tools, although -they would be guilty enough if that had been their role. They are the -men whose support had built Hitler up into the position of power he -occupied; these are the men whose initiative and planning often -conceived and certainly made possible the acts of aggression done in -Hitler’s name; and these are the men who enabled Hitler to build up the -Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the war economy, the political -philosophy, by which these treacherous attacks were carried out, and by -which he was able to lead his fanatical followers into peaceful -countries to murder, to loot, and to destroy. They are the men whose -cooperation and support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible. - -The government of a totalitarian country may be carried on without -representatives of the people, but it cannot be carried on without any -assistance at all. It is no use having a leader unless there are also -people willing and ready to serve their personal greed and ambition by -helping and following him. The dictator who is set up in control of the -destinies of his country does not depend on himself alone either in -acquiring power or in maintaining it. He depends upon the support and -the backing which lesser men, themselves lusting to share in dictatorial -power, anxious to bask in the adulation of their leader, are prepared to -give. - -In the criminal courts of our countries, when men are put on their trial -for breaches of the municipal laws, it not infrequently happens that of -a gang indicted together in the dock, one has the master mind, the -leading personality. But it is no excuse for the common thief to say, “I -stole because I was told to steal”, for the murderer to plead, “I killed -because I was asked to kill.” And these men are in no different -position, for all that it was nations they sought to rob, and whole -peoples which they tried to kill. “The warrant of no man excuseth the -doing of an illegal act.” Political loyalty, military obedience are -excellent things, but they neither require nor do they justify the -commission of patently wicked acts. There comes a point where a man must -refuse to answer to his leader if he is also to answer to his -conscience. Even the common soldier, serving in the ranks of his army, -is not called upon to obey illegal orders. But these men were no common -soldiers: They were the men whose skill and cunning, whose labor and -activity made it possible for the German Reich to tear up existing -treaties, to enter into new ones and to flout them, to reduce -international negotiations and diplomacy to a hollow mockery, to destroy -all respect for and effect in international law and, finally, to march -against the peoples of the world to secure that domination in which, as -arrogant members of their self-styled master race, they professed to -believe. - -If these crimes were in one sense the crimes of Nazi Germany, they also -are guilty as the individuals who aided, abetted, counselled, procured, -and made possible the commission of what was done. - -The total sum of the crime these men have committed—so awful in its -comprehension—has many aspects. Their lust and sadism, their deliberate -slaughter and degradation of so many millions of their fellow creatures -that the imagination reels, are but one side of this matter. Now that an -end has been put to this nightmare, and we come to consider how the -future is to be lived, perhaps their guilt as murderers and robbers is -of less importance and of less effect to future generations of mankind -than their crime of fraud—the fraud by which they placed themselves in -a position to do their murder and their robbery. That is the other -aspect of their guilt. The story of their “diplomacy”, founded upon -cunning, hypocrisy, and bad faith, is a story less gruesome no doubt, -but no less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as a precedent -of behavior in the conduct of international relations, its consequences -to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of civilized society. - -Without trust and confidence between nations, without the faith that -what is said is meant and that what is undertaken will be observed, all -hope of peace and security is dead. The Governments of the United -Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the United States of America, -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of France, backed by and -on behalf of every other peace-loving nation of the world, have -therefore joined to bring the inventors and perpetrators of this Nazi -conception of international relationship before the bar of this -Tribunal. They do so, so that these defendants may be punished for their -crimes. They do so, also, that their conduct may be exposed in all its -naked wickedness and they do so in the hope that the conscience and good -sense of all the world will see the consequences of such conduct and the -end to which inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore -sanity and with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each -other. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Attorney, would it be convenient to the prosecutors -from Great Britain to continue? - -SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: The proposal was that my friend, Mr. Sidney -Alderman, should continue with the presentation of the case with regard -to the final acts of aggression against Czechoslovakia and that that -being done, my British colleagues would continue with the presentation -of the British case. As the Tribunal will appreciate, Counts One and Two -are in many respects complementary, and my American colleagues and -ourselves are working in closest cooperation in presenting the evidence -affecting those counts. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, would it be convenient for you to go on -until 5 o’clock? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. May it please the Tribunal, it is quite convenient -for me to proceed. I can but feel that it will be quite anticlimactic -after the address which you just heard. - -When the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just completed an -outline of the plans laid by the Nazi conspirators in the weeks -immediately following the Munich Agreement. These plans called for what -the German officials called “the liquidation of the remainder of -Czechoslovakia.” You will recall that 3 weeks after Munich, on 21 -October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was -handed over to the civilian authorities, Hitler and Keitel had issued an -order to the Armed Forces. This document is C-136, Exhibit USA-104. - -In this order Hitler and Keitel ordered the beginning of preparations by -the Armed Forces for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. -You will also recall that 2 months later, on 17 December, the Defendant -Keitel issued an appendix to the original order directing the -continuation of these preparations. This document is C-138, Exhibit -USA-105, and both these documents have already been introduced. - -Proceeding on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning was to -be expected, this order emphasized that the attack on Czechoslovakia was -to be well camouflaged so that it would not appear to be a warlike -action. “To the outside world,” it said, and I quote, “it must appear -obvious that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike -undertaking.” - -Thus, in the beginning of 1939 the basic planning for military action -against the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic had already been carried out -by the German High Command. - -I turn now to the underhand and criminal methods used by the Nazi -conspirators to ensure that no resistance worth mentioning would, in -fact, be met by the German Army. As in the case of Austria and the -Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the -Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated objective of liquidating -Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, -they could no longer use the cry, “Home to the Reich.” One sizable -minority, the Slovaks, still remained within the Czechoslovak state. - -I should mention at this point that the Czechoslovak Government had made -every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the -cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with -an autonomous Cabinet and Parliament at Bratislava. Nevertheless, -despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators -found fertile ground for their tactics. The picture which I shall now -draw of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak -official Government Report, Document Number 998-PS, already admitted in -evidence as Exhibit USA-91, and of which the Court has already taken -judicial notice. - -Nazi propaganda and research groups had long been interested in -maintaining close connection with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When -Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of -Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence -established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups -within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with the -Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more -profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic People’s Party -of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the -Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and -agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their -respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the -September agitation when at the proper moment the Foreign Office in -Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to -start their demands for autonomy. - -This telegram, our Document Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA-97, has already -been introduced in evidence and read. - -By this time—midsummer 1938—the Nazis were in direct contact with -figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the -higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render -impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the -Slovak parties in the government at Prague. - -Hans Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenführer, had been appointed -Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak -autonomy while actually on the Nazi payroll. On 22 November the Nazis -indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation -in Prague, and I offer in evidence Document 2859-PS as Exhibit USA-107, -captured from the German Foreign Office files. I read this telegram -which was sent from the German Legation at Prague to Pressburg: - - “Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin he would - appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being - kept for him at the treasury of the Embassy.”—signed—“Hencke.” - -Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. Although it is -out of its chronological place in my discussion, I should like now to -offer in evidence Document 2794-PS, a captured memorandum of the German -Foreign Office which I offer as Exhibit USA-108, dated Berlin, 29 -November 1939. - -This document, dated 8 months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, -throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign -Office, and I now read from this memorandum: - - “On the question of payments to Karmasin. - - - - “Karmasin receives 30,000 marks monthly from the VDA”—Peoples’ - League for Germans Abroad—“until 1 April 1940; from then on - 15,000 marks monthly. - - - - “Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial - Germans”—Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle—“has deposited 300,000 - marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in - Bratislava”—Pressburg—“on which he could fall back in an - emergency. - - - - “Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister - Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to - determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the - payments still continue. - - - - “Therefore, it appears that Karmasin has been provided with - sufficient money; thus one could wait to determine whether he - would put up new demands himself. - - - - “Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign - Minister.”—signed—“Woermann.” - -This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the -subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows -that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their -undercover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds, even -after the declaration of the so-called Independent State of Slovakia. - -Sometime in the winter of 1938-39, the Defendant Göring conferred with -Durkansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were -accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Göring of their desire for -what they called independence, with strong political, economic, and -military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be -solved as it had been solved in Germany; that the Communist Party would -be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Göring considered -that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, but -as the document will show, his motives were scarcely altruistic. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2801-PS as Exhibit USA-109, undated -minutes of a conversation between Göring and Durkansky. This document -was captured among the files of the German Foreign Office. - -I now read these minutes, which are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic -style. To begin with: - - “Durkansky (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. - Contents: Friendship for the Führer; gratitude, that through the - Führer, autonomy has become possible for the Slovaks: The - Slovaks never want to belong to Hungary. The Slovaks want full - independence with strongest political, economic, and military - ties to Germany. Bratislava to be the capital. The execution of - the plan only possible if the army and police are Slovak. - - - - “An independent Slovakia to be proclaimed at the meeting of the - first Slovak Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority - would favor a separation from Prague. Jews will vote for - Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the March, where - a large Slovak population lives. - - - - “The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany. - The Communist Party to be prohibited. - - - - “The Germans in Slovakia do not want to belong to Hungary but - wish to stay in Slovakia. - - - - “The German influence with the Slovak Government considerable; - the appointment of a German Minister (member of the Cabinet) has - been promised. - - - - “At present negotiations with Hungary are being conducted by the - Slovaks. The Czechs are more yielding towards the Hungarians - than the Slovaks. - - - - “The Field Marshal”—that is Field Marshal Göring—“considers - that the Slovak negotiations towards independence are to be - supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia - is still more at our mercy. - - - - “Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German - Air Force for use against the East.” - -On 12 February a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of -Tuka, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and -Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. -They conferred with Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop in the Reich -Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2790-PS as Exhibit USA-110, the -captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting: - - “After a brief welcome Tuka thanks the Führer for granting this - meeting. He addresses the Führer with ‘My Führer’ and he voices - the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might - well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and - prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states - that the Führer had not only opened the Slovak question but that - he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the - Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the - leadership of the Führer for the maintenance of European - civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had - become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as - an economic point of view.” - -Then skipping to the last sentence: “‘I entrust the fate of my people to -your care.’”—addressing that to the Führer! - -During the meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in -planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. I refer to -the final sentence of the document, which I have just read, the sentence -spoken by Tuka, “I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” - -It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis -had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them -drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal -attention of such men as Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and -subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools -in the hands of the Nazi conspirators. - -In addition to Slovaks, the conspirators made use of the few Germans -still remaining within the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic. Kundt, -Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, -created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. -Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from -Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and -to make it a center of aggressive Nazism. - -With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of -Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried -out, and the Henleinists gave full co-operation to Gestapo agents from -the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi political activity was -designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands -from Germany. - -In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and -propaganda levels, the Czech Government was unable to take adequate -measures against these trespassers upon its sovereignty. - -I am using as the basis of my remarks the Czechoslovak official -Government report, Document Number 998-PS. - -In early March, with the date for the final march into Czechoslovakia -already close at hand, Fifth Column activity moved into its final phase. -In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in -touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork of -the events of 14 and 15 March. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2826-PS as Exhibit USA-111. This is an -article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in the -publication _Böhmen and Mähren_, the official periodical of the Reich -Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition May 1941, Page 179. - -This is an article written by one of the Nazi leaders in Czechoslovakia -at the moment of Germany’s greatest military successes. It is a boastful -article and reveals with a frankness rarely found in the Nazi press both -the functions which the FS and the SS served and the pride the Nazi -conspirators took in the activities of these organizations. It is a long -quotation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr. Alderman? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day? - -MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half. - -THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British prosecutors will go on? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - THIRTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 5 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose -yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence Document 2826-PS, -Exhibit USA-111. This was an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann -Frank, published in _Böhmen und Mähren_ (or _Bohemia and Moravia_), the -official periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the -issue of March 1941, at Page 79. It is an article which reveals with -considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS had, and shows -the pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these -organizations. I read from that article, under the heading “The SS on -March 15, 1939”: - - “A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable - without political troops. To these are allotted the special task - of being the advance guard of the political will and the - guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German - folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. - Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized - its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes”—or, in German, - “Freiwilliger Selbstschutz”, called FS for short.—“This troop - was trained especially in accordance with the principles of the - SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. - The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of - protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well - in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall - crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, - arms in hand. - - - - “After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau the tasks of the FS - were transferred essentially to the German student organizations - as compact troop formations in Prague and Brünn, aside from the - isolated German communities which remained in the Second - Republic. This was also natural because many active students - from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student - organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other - Germans, during, the crisis of March 1939 . . . . - - - - “In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announcement - of the planned entry of German troops, German men had to act in - some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, - either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in - Brünn, or by corresponding instructions of the police president. - In some Czech offices men had likewise, in the early hours of - the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of - political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in - order to prevent foolish destruction . . . . How significant the - many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the - competent German agencies follows from the fact that many of the - men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were - admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even - through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through SS Group - Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were - thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS - . . . . - - - - “Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had - marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had - assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here - placed themselves at once at their further disposition and - became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators.” - -I now ask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21 of the -Charter of three official documents. These are identified by us as -Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in evidence, -respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit USA-113; and -2943-PS, which is the _French Official Yellow Book_, at Pages 66 and 67, -as Exhibit USA-114. - -The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches, properly -certified to by the British Government, which gave the background of -intrigue in Slovakia—German intrigue in Slovakia. The third document, -2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of excerpts from the _French Yellow -Book_, principally excerpts from dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the -French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and -18 March 1939. I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely -in the further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take -judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore, it -may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript. In -Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the -Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet -who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Foreign -Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this -act of the Czechoslovak Government as an excuse for intervention. On the -following day, March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the -Slovak capital. I quote from Document D-571, which is USA-112. That is -the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British Government. - - “Herr Bürckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals came - at about 10 o’clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of - March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava and told - the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence - of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime Minister, showed - hesitation, Herr Bürckel took him on one side and explained that - Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czechoslovakia - definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her - independence, because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest - himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Bürckel for this - information, but said that he must discuss the situation with - the Government at Prague.” - -A very strange situation that he should have to discuss such a matter -with his own Government, before obeying instructions of Herr Hitler -delivered by five German generals and Herr Bürckel and Herr -Seyss-Inquart. - -Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the dismissed -ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities -of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and -ammunition were brought from German offices in Engerau across the Danube -into Slovakia, where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to -create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an -excuse for military action. The German press and radio launched a -violent campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, -significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. -Tiso, the dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an -audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. - -At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what -the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were -progressing with what to them must have been very satisfying smoothness. -The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi -conspirators was moving in close co-ordination. All during the process -of the Fall Grün (or Case Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi -conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in this new attack. -Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, was again greatly flattered by -this invitation. - -I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This is a -letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which, -incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and which -we captured in the German Foreign Office files. - - “Your Excellency, my sincere thanks. - - - - “I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater - region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the - life of Hungary.”—I suppose he needed some headwaters for the - non-existent navy of which he was admiral. - - - - “In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for - only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager - enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On - Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take - place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.”—He - doesn’t like to use big words; “big blow” is sufficient. - - - - “I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your - Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times. - Your devoted friend, Horthy.” - -From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished Admiral -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian Ambassador at -Berlin? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the President -please. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look like a -Hungarian name. - -MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand it, the letter -was addressed to Adolf Hitler. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was—it ended with the . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indicates that? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the Berlin Foreign -Office, and the wording of the letter and the address “Your Excellency.” -We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was addressed; but it was -found in the Berlin Foreign Office. - -From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the Nazi -conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government of their -plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned -out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would draw the inference that -His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his devoted friend Horthy of this -change in good time. - -On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite active. On 13 -March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a -cautionary telegram to the German Minister in Prague outlining the -course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic -pressure. I offer in evidence Document 2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This -is the telegram sent by Ribbentrop to the German Legation in Prague on -13 March. - - “Berlin, 13 March 1939. - - - - “Prague. Telegram in secret code. - - - - “With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. - In case you should get any written communication from President - Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take - any other action on them, but pass them on here by cipher - telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the - legation to make a point of not being available if the Czech - Government wants to communicate with you during the next few - days.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.” - -On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky -and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in -response to the summons from Hitler to which I have heretofore referred. -Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the -Reich Chancellery and presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were -given him: Either declare the independence of Slovakia, or be left -without German assistance to what were referred to as the emergence of -Poland and Hungary. This decision Hitler said was not a question of -days, but of hours. I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit -USA-117—again a document captured in the German Foreign Office—German -Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 -March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top paragraph on -Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph I shall read is a -summary of Hitler’s remark. You will note that in the inducements he -held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for the -truth. I quote: - - “Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to - make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no - interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to - him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia - wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for - anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people, or even - a single soldier, to something which was not in any way desired - by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation - as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that - reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving - something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a - liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this - connection unrest was only an outward indication of interior - instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason - permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not - a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time - that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would - support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by - his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished - for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve - the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of - Slovakia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer - responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German - interests, and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. - Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged - to Germany. - - - - “The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant - Ribbentrop—“if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign - Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in - this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He - showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported - Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer - read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope - that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.” - -A most extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in Slovakia; -Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was invited there. And this -is what happened: Those present at that meeting included the Defendant -Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State -Secretary Keppler, the German Minister of State Meissner. I invite the -attention of the Tribunal to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on -this occasion, as on so many other occasions, where purely political -measures in furtherance of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and -where apparently there was no need for technical military advice. - -While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the Defendant -Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop very -solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak language, of -the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of the -13th a German plane was conveniently placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry -him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, -the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With -Slovak extremeness acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the -Czechoslovak Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move -against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of the -German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the Czechoslovak -Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. -The atmosphere in which they found themselves might be described as -somewhat hostile. Since the preceding weekend, the Nazi press had -accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks, and especially -against the members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. -Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in -danger. Such a situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as -quickly as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in -the heart of Europe.—These peacemakers! - -After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and -Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found there -Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel and other -high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document 2798-PS as Exhibit -USA-118. This document is the captured German Foreign Office account of -this infamous meeting. It is a long document. Parts of it are so -revealing and give so clear a picture of Nazi behavior and tactics that -I should like to read them in full. - -It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference on the -night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of course it must be -read as an account biased by its source, or as counsel for the -defendants said last week “a tendentious account”. Nevertheless, even -without too much discounting of the report on account of its source, it -constitutes a complete condemnation of the Nazis, who by pure and simple -international banditry forced the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I -interpolate to suggest that international banditry has been a crime -against international law for centuries. - -I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English -mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an -incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215: - - “Conversation between the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the - President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich - Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian - Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15 - March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours.” - -Others present were General Field Marshal Göring, General Keitel, -Secretary of the State Von Weizsäcker, Minister of the State Meissner, -Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation Hewel. Hacha -opened the conference. He was conciliatory—even humble, though the -President of a sovereign state. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and -he said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Führer’s -hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask -Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the -President. Hacha was then, I believe, in his seventies. But this -journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his -country because, and I quote, “It was only a matter of hours until -Germany would intervene.” I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the -English translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are -rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said: - - “Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had - kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation to - Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation - now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the - Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not want to draw the final - consequences in the autumn. . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don’t you think you ought to read the last -sentence on Page 2? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from the preceding page -was: - - “For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means - to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really - stand up for Czechoslovakia. - - - - “Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him.” - -Then I had read down to: - - “But even at that time and also later in his conversations with - Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this - State if Beneš’ tendencies were not completely revised. - Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Führer to have - patience.”—He often bragged of his patience.—“The Führer saw - this point of view, but the months went by without any change. - The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one - psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth-to-mouth - propaganda, dismissals of Germans, and many other things which, - to him, were a symbol of the total perspective. - - - - “At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to - him he drew his consequences because, had the development - continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would - in a few years have become the same as 6 months ago. Why did - Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its Army to a reasonable - size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state, - because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political - mission of the state. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a - foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He - enumerated several examples which proved to him that the spirit - in the Army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the - Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the - future. Added to this were the inevitable development of - economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national - groups which could no longer endure life as it was.” - -I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance of -that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed sovereign -state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence General Field -Marshal Göring, the Commander of the Air Force, and General Keitel. And -continuing to quote: - - “Thus it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday.”—This is - still the language of Hitler.—“I sent for the Hungarian - minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this - country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the - order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to - incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to - give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a - larger extent than she had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule. - Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined - tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and depends on the - attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian - military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the - Government. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness - of Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government will be - able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had - already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance - was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had - given in at the deployment of heavy artillery. - - - - “At 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army would invade - Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force would - occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The - first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would - lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by - all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the - invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that - case, it would be easy for the Führer to give Czechoslovakia in - the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, - autonomy, and a certain national liberty. - - - - “We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He - would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He also - did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to protect - Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not - have yielded”—I suppose that is a bad translation for “had not - yielded”—“the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody - could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that - the Czech people should live a full national life and he - believed firmly that a way could be found which would make - far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting - should break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in - counter-pressure. One would annihilate another and it would then - not be possible any more for him to give the promised - alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any - more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would - result in a hatred which would force him”—that is, - Hitler—“because of his instinct of self-preservation, not to - grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He - felt pity for the Czech people when he was reading the foreign - press. It would leave the impression on him which could be - summarized in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the - Moor may go.’ - - - - “That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in - Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and - wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would be - conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which - corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions. - - - - “That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This - invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the - Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed would - also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps - prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a - form of construction which would be so far-reaching for - Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old - Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for - the German people. - - - - “The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He - was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to - each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but - planned with all generosity. He would advise him”—that is, - Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha—“now to retire with - Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should be done.” - -In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German -minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He -expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to -the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the German Army -crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to -disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated that might possibly be -arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final; that it was well -known what a decision of the Führer meant. He turned to the circle of -Nazi conspirators surrounding him, for their support, and you will -remember that the Defendants Göring, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all -present. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, -was by the intervention of the German Army. - -I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of the -German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the last -paragraph on Page 4. - - “The Führer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was - well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He did not see - any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other - gentlemen”—that is, including Göring, Ribbentrop, and - Keitel—“whether they shared his opinion, which was answered in - the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech Army - was by the German Army.” - -At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2861-PS, an excerpt from the official -_British War Blue Book_, at Page 24, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-119. -This is an official document of the British Government, of which the -Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions of Article 21 of -the Charter. The part from which I read is a dispatch from the British -Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, describing a conversation with the -Defendant Göring, in which the events of this early morning meeting are -set forth. - - “Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, Berlin, May 28, 1939. - - - - “My Lord: I paid a short visit to Field Marshal Göring at - Karinhall yesterday.” - -Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with Paragraph 4. I am -sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs: - - “Field Marshal Göring, who had obviously just been talking to - someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the - attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything - German and, particularly, in respect of the gold held there on - behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. Before, however, - I had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his - return did not revert to this specific question. He complained, - instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and - economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he - described as the war party in England. . . . - - - - “I told the Field Marshal that before speaking of British - hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of - feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew - quite well, the basis of all the discussions between Mr. - Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect - that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany - would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere - with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite - assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of - the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his ‘wild men’ - and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had - not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed - the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich - Agreement rested. - - - - “At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a - description of President Hacha’s visit to Berlin. I told Field - Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will - when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard - Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign. The - Field Marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point - had arisen. According to him, Doctor Hacha had from the first - been prepared to sign everything but had said that - constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to - Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic communication - with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed, - while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech - battalion at least would not fire on German troops. It was, he - said, only at that stage that he had warned Doctor Hacha that, - if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The Field - Marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the - story that the advance occupation of Vitkovice had been effected - solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known - to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first - opportunity.” - -I also invite the attention of the Tribunal and the judicial notice of -the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number 77, in the _French Official Yellow -Book_, at Page 96 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS, -appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask that it be -given an identifying number, Exhibit USA-114. This is a dispatch from M. -Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives another well-informed -version of this same midnight meeting. The account, which I shall -present to the Court, of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from -these two sources, the _British Blue Book_ and the _French Yellow Book_. -I think the Court may be interested to read somewhat further at large, -in those two books, which furnish a great deal of the background of all -of these matters. - -When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reich Chancellery, -he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention -from a physician who was conveniently on hand for that purpose, a German -physician. When the two Czechs returned to the room, the Nazi -conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the -Wehrmacht. They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon! - -MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on. - -MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning, -the German Army would cross the border. The Defendant Göring boasted of -what the Wehrmacht would do if the Czech forces dared to resist the -invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Defendant Göring said, his -Luftwaffe would blaze half of Prague into ruins in 2 hours and that, -Göring said, would be only the beginning. - -Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the -aged President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 o’clock in the morning, signed -the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him and which -they had already had prepared. This Document is TC-49, the declaration -of 15 March 1939, one of the series of documents which will be presented -by the British prosecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption -that it will subsequently be introduced. - - “The President of the Czechoslovakian State . . . entrusts with - entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech - country to the hands of the Führer of the German Reich”—really - a rendezvous with destiny. - -While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the -representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas -already crossed the Czech border. - -I offer in evidence Document 2860-PS, another excerpt from the _British -Blue Book_, of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice. This is a -speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from -which I quote one passage: - - “It is to be observed”—and the fact is surely not without - significance—“that the towns of Mährisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice - were actually occupied by German SS detachments on the evening - of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister - of Czechoslovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before - any discussion had taken place.” - -At dawn on March 15, German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all -sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a -proclamation to the German people, which stated distinctly, -“Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” - -On the following day, in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of -Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German -Reich under the name of “The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” The -decree is Document TC-51, another of the documents which the British -Delegation will present to the Tribunal later in this week. It was -signed in Prague on 16 March 1939, by Hitler, Lammers, and the -Defendants Frick and Von Ribbentrop. - -I should like to quote the first sentence of this decree, “The Bohemian -and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the -Lebensraum”—living space—“of the German people.” The remainder of the -decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia -henceforth was subjected to Germany. A German Protector was to be -appointed by the German Führer for the so-called “Protectorate”—the -Defendant Von Neurath. God deliver us from such protectors! The German -Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs -and of their excises. It was specified that German garrisons and -military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the -same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi -insistence, had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that -the independence of their week-old state was itself, in effect, -qualified. - -I offer in evidence Document 1439-PS as Exhibit USA—I need not offer -that. I think it is a decree in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, of which I ask -the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is identified as our -Document 1439-PS. It appears at Page 606, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part II. - -The covering declaration is signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, Minister -of Foreign Affairs, and then there is a heading: - - “Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the - State of Slovakia.” - - - - “The German Government and the Slovakian Government have agreed, - after the Slovakian State has placed itself under the protection - of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences - resulting from this fact. For this purpose, the undersigned - representatives of the two governments have agreed on the - following provisions: - - - - “Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political - independence of the State of Slovakia and integrity of its - territory. - - - - “Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection - undertaken by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall - have the right, at all times, to construct military - installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they - deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side, by the - frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a - line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the - White Carpathians, and the Javornik Mountains.”—Then I skip— - - - - “The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in - close agreement with the German Armed Forces.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t that be a convenient time to break off? I -understand, too, that it would be for the convenience of the Defense -Counsel if the Tribunal adjourn for an hour and a quarter rather than -for an hour at midday, and accordingly, the Tribunal will retire at -12:45 and sit again at 2:00. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, this secret protocol between -Germany and Slovakia provided for close economic and financial -collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and -subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German Government. - -I offer in evidence Document 2793-PS, Exhibit USA-120, and from it I -read Paragraph 3: - - “Investigation, development, and utilization of the Slovak - natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that, - insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own - requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s - disposal. The entire soil research”—“Bodenforschung” is the - German word—“will be placed under the Reich Agency for soil - research.”—that is the Reichsstelle für Bodenforschung—“The - Government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation - to determine whether the present owners of concessions and - privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed - by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases - where these duties have been neglected.” - -In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant -evidence that they considered Slovakia a mere puppet state—in effect a -German possession. - -I offer in evidence Document R-100 as Exhibit USA-121. This document is -a memorandum of information given by Hitler to Von Brauchitsch on 25 -March 1939. Much of it deals with problems arising from recently -occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. I quote, beginning at the -sixth paragraph: - - “Colonel General Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via - Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison - armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border - formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new - Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed. - - - - “Slovakia shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to - us, against payment, any arms we want and which are still kept - in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made - between Army and Czech troops. For this payment those millions - should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia. - - - - “Czech Protectorate: - - - - “H. Gr.”—the translator’s note indicates that that probably - means army groups, but I can’t vouch for it—“shall be asked - again whether the request shall be repeated again for the - delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the - threat of severe penalties. - - - - “We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without - paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February, - though, shall be paid for . . . . Bohemia and Moravia have to - make annual contributions to the German Treasury. Their amount - shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly - for the Czech Army.” - -The German conquest of Czechoslovakia, in direct contravention of the -Munich Agreement, was the occasion for the formal protest by the British -and French Governments. These documents, Numbers TC-52 and TC-53, dated -17 March 1939, will be presented to the Tribunal by the British -prosecutor. - -On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the -United States Government issued a statement, which I will offer in -evidence and I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the entire -volume, Document 2862-PS as Exhibit USA-122, which is an excerpt from -the official volume entitled _Peace and War: United States Foreign -Policy, 1931-1941_ issued under the seal of the Department of State of -the United States of America. Incidentally, this volume which happens to -be my own copy—and I hope I can get another one—I am placing in -evidence, because I am quite certain that in its study of the background -of this whole case, the Court will be very much interested in this -volume, which is a detailed chronological history of all the diplomatic -events leading up to and through the second World War of 1941. But what -I am actually offering in evidence at the moment appears on Pages 454 -and 455 of the volume, a statement by the Acting Secretary of State -Welles, dated 17 March 1939: - - “The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions - stated its conviction that only through international support of - a program of order based upon law can world peace be assured. - - - - “This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles - of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making - known this country’s condemnation of the acts which have - resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a - free and independent people with whom, from the day when the - Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people - of the United States have maintained specially close and - friendly relations. - - - - “The position of the Government of the United States has been - made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect - for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for - non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other - nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its - condemnation of a policy of military aggression. - - - - “It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary - force are threatening the world peace and the very structure of - modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of - the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly - demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during - the past 3 days.” - -With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had -accomplished the program they had set themselves in the meeting in -Berlin on 5 November 1937. You will recall that this program of conquest -was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial -and food reserves, and to place them in a position, both industrially -and strategically, from which they could launch more ambitious and more -devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this -program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi -leaders, and at that point I would again invite the Court’s attention to -the large chart on the wall. I think it is no mere figure of speech to -make reference to the wolf’s head, what is known in Anglo-American law -as _caput lupinum_. - -The lower jaw formed near Austria was taken—the red part on the first -chart—12 March 1938. Czechoslovakia thereby was encircled, and the next -step was the absorption of the mountainous part, the Sudetenland, -indicated on the second chart in red. On 1 October 1938 Czechoslovakia -was further encircled and its defenses weakened, and then the jaws -clamped in, or the pincers, as I believe General Keitel or General Jodl -called them—I believe it was General Jodl’s diary—and you see what -they did to Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939 the borders were shortened, -new bases were acquired, and then Czechoslovakia was destroyed. Bohemia -and Moravia are in black and Slovakia in what might be called light tan. -But I have read to you the documents which showed in what condition -Slovakia was left; and with the German military installations in -Slovakia, you see how completely the southern border of Poland was -flanked, as well as the western border, the stage being set for the next -aggression, which the British prosecutor will describe to you. - -Of all the Nazi conspirators the Defendant Göring was the most aware of -the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the -possession by Germany of Czechoslovakia. - -I now offer in evidence Document 1301-PS, which is a rather large file, -and we offer particularly Item 10 of the document, at Page 25 of the -English translation. I offer it as Exhibit USA-123; Page 25 of the -English translation contained the top-secret minutes of a conference -with Göring in the Luftwaffe Ministry (the Air Ministry). The meeting -which was held on 14 October 1938, just 2 weeks after the occupation of -the Sudetenland, was devoted to the discussion of economic problems. As -of that date, the Defendant Göring’s remarks were somewhat prophetic. I -quote from the third paragraph, from the bottom of Page 26 of the -English translation: - - “The Sudetenland has to be exploited by every means. General - Field Marshal Göring counts upon a complete industrial - assimilation of Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German - dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The - Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore - have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary - Keppler.” - -In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia -into the German Reich, Defendant Göring again revealed the great -interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czech economic potential. - -I offer in evidence Document R-133 as Exhibit USA-124. This document is -the minutes, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, signed by Müller, of a -conference between Göring and a group of officials from the OKW and from -other agencies of the German Government concerned with war production. -This meeting had been held 2 days previously, on 25 July. I read the -first part of the account of this meeting. - - “In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the - incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had - taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war - potential, by exploitation of the industry there. Directives, - such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics (S 10 - 402/39 of 10 July 1939) as well as a letter with similar meaning - to the Junkers firm, which might possibly lower the kind and - extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate are contrary - to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, - this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he - insists,”—that is Defendant Göring insists—“in agreement with - the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the - Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full - and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible.” - -In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for the -following wars of aggression, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided -the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of -aggression, the attack on Poland. - -You will recall the minutes of the conference between Göring and a -pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-1939. Those minutes are -Document 2801-PS, which I introduced into evidence earlier, as Exhibit -USA-109. You will recall the last sentence of those minutes, a statement -of Defendant Göring’s conclusions. I quote this sentence again, “Air -bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for -use against the East.” - -I now offer in evidence Document 1874-PS, as Exhibit USA-125. This -document is the German minutes of a conference which Defendant Göring -held with Mussolini and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the -conquest of Czechoslovakia. - -In this conference, Göring told his junior partners in the Axis of the -progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of -Germany with the strength of England and France. Not unnaturally, he -mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in this connection. I -read two paragraphs of these thoughts, on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the -German minutes. - - “However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any - case, how dangerous this could have been, even after Munich, in - the event of a serious conflict. Because of German action, the - situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated—among other - reasons—because of the economic possibilities which resulted - from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity of - Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable - strengthening of the Axis against the Western Powers. - - - - “Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division - for protection against that country in case of bigger conflict. - This, too, is an advantage by which both Axis countries will, in - the last analysis, benefit.” - -Then on Page 5, Paragraph 2, of the German version: - - “The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed - as an advantage for the Axis in case Poland should finally join - the enemies of the Axis powers. Germany could then attack this - country from two flanks and would be within only 25 minutes - flying distance from the new Polish industrial center, which had - been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to - the other Polish industrial districts because of its proximity - to the border. Now, by the turn of events, it is located again - in the proximity of the border.” - -And that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on the four-segment -chart. - -I think the chart itself demonstrates, better than any oral argument, -the logic and cold calculation, the deliberation of each step to this -point of the German aggression. More than that, it demonstrates what I -might call the master fight of the aggressive war case, that is, that -each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned, as a -stepping stone to new and more ambitious aggression. - -You will recall the words of Hitler, at the conference in the Reich -Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, -Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. I quote from it: - - “The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims.” - -It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In -his lecture in Munich on 7 November 1943, the Defendant Jodl spoke as -follows, and I quote from Page 5 of Document L-172, already received in -evidence as Exhibit USA-34—on Page 8 of the German text: - - “The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of - 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded - off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now - became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of - more or less favorable strategic premises.” - -In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler -described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the -Reich. This is our Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23. I quote one passage -from the second paragraph: - - “The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step also - was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, - the Western fortifications had to be finished. It was not - possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me - from the first moment, that I could not be satisfied with the - Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The - decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the - erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the - action against Poland was laid. . . .” - -Before I leave the subject of the aggression against Czechoslovakia, I -should like to submit to the Court a document which became available to -us too late to be included in our document book. It reached me Saturday, -late in the afternoon or late at night. This is an official document, -again from the Czechoslovakian Government, a supplement to the -Czechoslovakian report, which I had previously offered in evidence. I -now offer it, identified as Document 3061-PS, as Exhibit USA-126. - -The document was furnished us, if the Court please, in the German text -with an English translation, which didn’t seem to us quite adequate and -we have had it re-translated into English and the translation has just -been passed up, I believe, to the Tribunal. That mimeographed -translation should be appended to our Document Book O. - -I shall not read the report; it is about 12 pages long. The Court will -take judicial notice of it, under the provisions of the Charter. I -merely summarize. This document gives confirmation and corroboration to -the other evidence which I presented to the Tribunal. In particular, it -offers support to the following allegations: - -First, the close working relationship between Henlein and the SDP, on -the one hand, and Hitler and Defendants Hess and Ribbentrop, on the -other; - -Second, the use of the German Legation in Prague to direct the German -Fifth Column activities; - -Third, the financing of the Henlein movement by agencies of the German -Government, including the German diplomatic representatives at Prague; - -Fourth, the use of the Henlein movement to conduct espionage on direct -orders from the Reich. - -In addition, this document gives further details of the circumstances of -the visit of President Hacha to Berlin on the night of 14 March. It -substantiates the fact that President Hacha required the medical -attention of Hitler’s physician and it supports the threat which the -Defendant Göring made to the Czech Delegation. - -Now, if it please the Tribunal, that concludes my presentation of what, -to me, has always seemed one of the saddest chapters in human history, -the rape and destruction of the frail little nation of Czechoslovakia. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -May it please the Tribunal, before I tender the evidence which I desire -to place before the Tribunal, it might be convenient if I explained how -the British case is to be divided up and who will present the different -parts. - -I shall deal with the general treaties. After that, my learned friend, -Colonel Griffith-Jones, will deal with Poland. Thirdly, Major Elwyn -Jones will deal with Norway and Denmark. Fourthly, Mr. Roberts will deal -with Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Fifthly, Colonel Phillimore will -deal with Greece and Yugoslavia. After that, my friend, Mr. Alderman, of -the American Delegation, will deal on behalf of both delegations with -the aggression against the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. - -May I also, with the Tribunal’s permission, say one word about the -arrangements that we have made as to documents. Each of the defendants’ -counsel will have a copy of the document book—of the different document -books—in English. In fact, 30 copies of the first four of our document -books have already been placed in the defendants’ Information Center. We -hope that the last document book, dealing with Greece and Yugoslavia, -will have the 30 copies placed there today. - -In addition, the defendants’ counsel have at least six copies in German -of every document. - -With regard to my own part of the case, the first section on general -treaties, all the documents on this phase are in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ -or _Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which 10 copies have been -made available to the defendants’ counsel, so that with regard to the -portion with which the Tribunal is immediately concerned, the -defendants’ counsel will have at least 16 copies in German of every -document referred to. - -Finally, there is a copy of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and _Die Dokumente_ -available for the Tribunal, other copies if they so desire, but one is -placed ready for the Tribunal if any member wishes to refer to a German -text. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you propose to call any oral witnesses? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, no oral witnesses. - -If the Tribunal please, before I come to the first treaty I want to make -three quotations to deal with a point which was mentioned in the speech -of my learned friend, the Attorney General, yesterday. - -It might be thought from the melancholy story of broken treaties and -violated assurances, which the Tribunal has already heard, that Hitler -and the Nazi Government did not even profess it necessary or desirable -to keep the pledged word. Outwardly, however, the professions were very -different. With regard to treaties, on the 18th of October 1933, Hitler -said, “Whatever we have signed we will fulfill to the best of our -ability.” - -The Tribunal will note the reservation, “Whatever we have signed.” - -But on the 21st of May 1935 Hitler said, “The German Government will -scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it -was concluded before their accession to power and office.” - -On assurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same speech, the -Reichstag Speech on May 21, 1935, Hitler accepted assurances as being of -equal obligation, and the world at that time could not know that that -meant of no obligation at all. What he actually said was: - - “And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that - such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of sincerity - is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr. - Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of an - assurance in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign - treaties with the mental reservations that one will reconsider - one’s attitude at the decisive hour than to declare before an - entire nation and with full opportunity one’s adherence to a - policy which serves the course of peace because it rejects - anything which leads to war.” - -And then he proceeds with the illustration of his assurance to France. - -Never having seen the importance which Hitler wished the world to -believe he attached to treaties, I shall ask the Tribunal in my part of -the case to look at 15 only of the treaties which he and the Nazis -broke. The remainder of the 69 broken treaties shown on the chart and -occurring between 1933 and 1941 will be dealt with by my learned -friends. - -There is one final point as to the position of a treaty in German law, -as I understand it. The appearance of a treaty in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ makes it part of the statute law of Germany, and -that is by no means an uninteresting aspect of the breaches which I -shall put before the Tribunal. - -The first treaty to be dealt with is the Convention for the Pacific -Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 29th of -July 1899. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the -Convention, and for convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-1 the British -Document TC-1. The German reference is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for -1901, Number 44, Sections 401 to 404, and 482 and 483. The Tribunal will -find the relevant charge in Appendix C as Charge 1. - -As the Attorney General said yesterday, these Hague Conventions are only -the first gropings towards the rejection of the inevitability of war. -They do not render the making of aggressive war a crime, but their -milder terms were as readily broken as the more severe agreements. - -On 19 July 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations signed a -convention. Germany ratified the convention on 4 September 1900, Serbia -on 11 May 1901, and Greece on 4 April 1901. - -By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated -Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the St. -Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom succeeded to all -the old Serbian treaties, and later, as the Tribunal knows, changed its -name to Yugoslavia. - -I think it is sufficient, unless the Tribunal wish otherwise, for me to -read the first two articles only: - - “Article 1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse - to force in the relations between states, the signatory powers - agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement - of international differences. - - - - “Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before - an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse, - as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation - of one or more friendly powers.” - -After that the Convention deals with machinery, and I don’t think, -subject to any wish of the Tribunal, that it is necessary for me to deal -with it in detail. - -The second treaty is the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 18th of October 1907. -Again I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this, and for -convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-2 the Final Act of the Conference at -The Hague, which contains British Documents TC-2, 3, and 4. The -reference to this Convention in German is to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ for -1910, Number 52, Sections 22 to 25; and the relevant charge is Charge 2. - -This Convention, was signed at The Hague by 44 nations, and it is in -effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and 3 adherents. For our -purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium, -Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan, -Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia. - -By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention as -between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are parties to -the 1899 Convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Convention is in -effect with regard to them, and that explains the division of countries -in Appendix C. - -Again I only desire that the Tribunal should look at the first two -articles: - - “1. With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to - force in the relations between states, the contracting powers - agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement - of international differences.” - -Then I don’t think I need trouble to read 2. It is the same article as -to mediation, and again, there are a number of machinery provisions. - -The third treaty is the Hague Convention relative to the opening of -hostilities, signed at the same time. It is contained in the exhibit -which I put in. Again I ask that judicial notice be taken of it. The -British Document is TC-3. The German reference is the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ for 1910, Number 2, Sections 82 to 102, and the -reference in Appendix C to Charge 3. - -This Convention applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, -the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to a procedural step -in notifying one’s prospective opponent before opening hostilities -against him. It appears to have had its immediate origin in the -Russo-Japanese war, 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without any -previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix any particular -lapse of time between the giving of notice and the commencement of -hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an absolutely minimum standard -of international decency before the outbreak of war. - -Again, if I might refer the Tribunal to the first article: - - “The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them - must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the - form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an - ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.” - -Then there are a number again of machinery provisions, with which I -shall not trouble the Tribunal. - -The fourth treaty is the Hague Convention 5, respecting the rights and -duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, signed at -the same time. That is British Document TC-4, and the German reference -is _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1910, Number 2, Sections 168 and 176. Reference -in Appendix C is to Charge 4. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give the German reference? If it is -necessary for defendants’ counsel, all right, but if not it need not be -done. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I may omit them it will save some time. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If any of the defendants’ counsel want any -specific reference perhaps they will be good enough to ask me. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was an original signatory to the -Convention, and the Treaty is in force as a result of ratification or -adherence between Germany and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the -Netherlands, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. - -I call the attention of the Tribunal to the short contents of Article 1, -“The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” - -A point does arise, however, on this Convention. I want to make this -clear at once. Under Article 20, the provisions of the present -Convention do not apply except between the contracting powers, and then -only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention. - -As Great Britain and France entered the war within 2 days of the -outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of these powers -had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its provisions did -not apply to the second World War. - -I do not want the time of the Tribunal to be occupied by an argument on -that point when there are so many more important treaties to be -considered. Therefore, I do not press that as a charge of a breach of -treaty. I merely call the attention of the Tribunal to the terms of -Article 1 as showing the state of international opinion at that time and -as an element in the aggressive character of the war which we are -considering. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As the Tribunal adjourned I had come to the -fifth treaty, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated -Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles the 28th of June 1919. I again -ask the Tribunal to take judicial cognizance of this treaty, and I again -hand in for convenience Exhibit GB-3, which is a copy of the treaty, -including the British documents TC-5 to TC-10 inclusive. The reference -in Appendix C is to Charge 5. - -Before I deal with the relevant portions, may I explain very briefly the -layout of the treaty. - -Part I contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, and Part II sets -the boundaries of Germany in Europe. These boundaries are described in -detail but Part II makes no provision for guaranteeing these boundaries. - -Part III, Articles 31 to 117, with which the Tribunal is concerned, -contains the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees -certain territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, -Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, and so forth. - -It might be convenient for the Tribunal to note, at the moment, the -interweaving of this treaty with the next, which is the Treaty for the -Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States and Germany. - -Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in the -United States treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV -are all repeated verbatim in the United States treaty from the Treaty of -Versailles. - -The Tribunal is concerned with Part V—the military, naval, and air -clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in the United States -treaty. - -I don’t think there is any reason to explain what the parts are, but if -the Tribunal wishes to know about any specific part, I shall be very -happy to explain it. - -The first part that the Tribunal is concerned with is that contained in -the British Document TC-5, and consists of Articles 42 to 44 dealing -with the Rhineland. These are very short, and as they are repeated in -the Locarno Treaty, perhaps I had better read them once, just so that -the Tribunal will have them in mind. - - “Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any - fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the - right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east - of the Rhine. - - - - “Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the - assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and - military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all - permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. - - - - “Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the - provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as - committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the - present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the - world.” - -I am not going to put in evidence, but I simply draw the Tribunal’s -attention to a document of which they can take judicial notice, as it -has been published by the German State, the memorandum of March 7, 1936, -giving their account of the breach. The matters regarding the breach -have been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman, and I don’t propose to -go over the ground again. - -The next part of the treaty is in the British Document TC-6, dealing -with Austria: - - “Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the - independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed - in a treaty between that state and the Principal Allied and - Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be - inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the - League of Nations.” - -Again in the same way, the proclamation of Hitler dealing with Austria, -the background of which has been dealt with by my friend, Mr. Alderman, -is attached as TC-47. I do not intend to read it because the Tribunal -can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation. - -Next is Document TC-8, dealing with Memel: - - “Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and - Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territories - included between the Baltic, the northeastern frontier of East - Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II, (Boundaries of - Germany) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between - Germany and Russia. - - - - “Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the - Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these - territories, particularly insofar as concerns the nationality of - inhabitants.” - -I don’t think that the Tribunal has had any reference to the formal -document of incorporation of Memel, of which again the Tribunal can take -judicial notice; and I put in, for convenience, a copy as GB-4. It is -British Document TC-53A, and it appears in our book. It is very short, -so perhaps the Tribunal will bear with me while I read it: - - “The Transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, Gauleiter - und Oberpräsident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April during a - conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the Memel - territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East Prussia - and into the state administration of the East Prussian - Regierungsbezirk of Gumbinnen . . . .” - -Then, next we come to TC-9, which is the article relating to Danzig, -Article 100, and I shall read only the first sentence, because the -remainder consists of geographical boundaries; - - “Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and - Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory - comprised within the following limits . . . .” - -—And then the limits are set out and are described in a German map -attached to the treaty. - -Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, who will deal with this part of the -case, will formally prove the documents relating to the occupation of -Danzig, and I shall not trouble the Tribunal with them now. - -So if the Tribunal would go on to British Document TC-7—that is Article -81, dealing with the Czechoslovak State: - - “Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the - Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete - independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include the - autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of the - Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this - state as determined by the Principal Allied and Associated - Powers and other interested states.” - -Mr. Alderman has dealt with this matter only this morning, and he has -already put in an exhibit giving in detail the conference between Hitler -and President Hacha, and the Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky, at which the -Defendants Göring and Keitel were present. Therefore, I am not going to -put in to the Tribunal the British translation of the captured Foreign -Office minutes, which occurs in TC-48; but I put in formally, as Mr. -Alderman asked me to this morning, as GB-6, the Document TC-49, which is -the agreement signed by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop for Germany -and Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia. It is an agreement -of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice. I am afraid I can’t -quite remember whether Mr. Alderman read it this morning; it is Document -TC-49. He certainly referred to it. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then perhaps I might read it. Text of the: - - “Agreement between the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler - and the President of the Czechoslovak State Dr. Hacha . . . . - - - - “The Führer and Reich Chancellor today received in Berlin, at - their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr. - Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkowsky, - in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of - the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had - arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia, owing to - the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open - examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both - sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure - quiet, order, and peace in this part of Central Europe. The - President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in order to - serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently - placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the - hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted - this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the - Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the - autonomous development of their national life, in accordance - with their special characteristics. In witness whereof this - document is signed in duplicate.” - -The signatures I mentioned appear. - -The Tribunal will understand that it is not my province to make any -comment; that has been done by Mr. Alderman. And I am not putting -forward any of the documents I read as having my support; they are -merely put forward factually as part of the case. - -The next document, which I put in as GB-7, is the British Document -TC-50. That is Hitler’s proclamation to the German people, dated the -15th of March 1939. Again, I don’t think that Mr. Alderman read that -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall read it: - - “Proclamation of the Führer to the German people, 15 March 1939. - - - - “To the German People: - - - - “Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her - fellow countrymen, living in well-defined settlements, against - the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the - last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever-increasing - scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs - within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities. - - - - “These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks - against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the - Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist. - - - - “Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out, - amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the - number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is - increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking - inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by - German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal - belongings are streaming into the Reich. - - - - “Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the - destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which - Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over 1,000 - years it formed a part of the German Reich. - - - - “In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to - create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living - space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march - into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and - the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the - lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations - for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will - be in accordance with the 1,000-year-old history and will - satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech - peoples.”—Signed—“Adolf Hitler, Berlin, 15 March 1939.” - -Then there is a footnote, an order of the Führer to the German Armed -Forces of the same date, in which the substance is that they are told to -march in, to safeguard lives and property of all inhabitants, and not to -conduct themselves as enemies, but as an instrument for carrying out the -German Reich Government’s decision. - -I put in, as GB-8, the decrees establishing the Protectorate, which is -TC-51. - -I think again, as these are public decrees, the Tribunal can take -judicial knowledge of them. Their substance has been fully explained by -Mr. Alderman. With the permission of the Tribunal, I won’t read them in -full now. - -Then again, as Mr. Alderman requested, I put in, as GB-9, British -Document TC-52, the British protest. If I might just read that to the -Tribunal—it is from Lord Halifax to Sir Neville Henderson, our -Ambassador in Berlin: - - “Foreign Office, March 17, 1939. - - - - “Please inform the German Government that His Majesty’s - Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but - regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation - of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the - negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to co-operate for - a peaceful settlement. - - - - “His Majesty’s Government must also take this occasion to - protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German - military action, which are in their view, devoid of any basis of - legality.” - -And again at Mr. Alderman’s request, I put in as GB-10 the Document -TC-53, which is the French protest of the same date, and if I might read -the third paragraph: - - “The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the Minister for - Foreign Affairs of the Reich, of the formal protest made by the - Government of the French Republic against the measures which the - communication of Count de Welczeck records. - - - - “The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in face - of the action directed by the German Government against - Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of - the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich on - September 29, 1938. - - - - “The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 has been - imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not, in - the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize the - situation registered in that agreement. - - - - “The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excellency, - the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the - Government of the Republic cannot recognize under these - conditions the legality of the new situation created in - Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich.” - -I now come to Part 5 of the Versailles Treaty, and the relevant matters -are contained in the British Document TC-10. As considerable discussion -is centered around them, I read the introductory words: - - “Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses: In order to render - possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments - of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the - military, naval, and air clauses which follow. - - - - “Section 1. Military Clauses. Chapter I. Effectives and Cadres - of the German Army. - - - - “Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized - and reduced as prescribed hereinafter. - - - - “Article 160. (1) By a date which must not be later than March - 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven - divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. - - - - “After that date, the total number of effectives in the Army of - the states constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men, - including officers and establishments of depots. The Army shall - be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the - territory and to the control of the frontiers. - - - - “The total effective strength of officers, including the - personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed - 4,000. - - - - “(2) Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be - organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to this - Section. The number and strength of the units of infantry, - artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in - the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be - exceeded.” - -Then there is a description of units that can have their own depots and -the grouping of divisions under corps headquarters, and then the next -two provisions are of some importance: - - “The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or - of other organizations for the command of troops or for - preparation for war is forbidden. - - - - “The great German General Staff and all similar organizations - shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.” - -I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with Article 161, which deals -with administrative services. - -Article 163 provides the steps by which the reduction will take place, -and then we come to Chapter 2, dealing with armament, and that provides -that up till the time at which Germany is admitted as a member of the -League of Nations, armaments shall not be greater than the amounts fixed -in Table Number 11. - -If the Tribunal will note the second part, Germany agrees that after she -has become a member of the League of Nations, the armaments fixed in the -said table shall remain in force until they are modified by the Council -of the League. Furthermore, she hereby agrees strictly to observe the -decisions of the Council of the League on this subject. - -Then, 165 deals with guns and machine guns, and so forth, and 167 deals -with notification of guns, and 168, the first part, says: - - “The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material shall - only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which - shall be communicated to and approved by the governments of the - Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which - they retain the right to restrict.” - -Article 169 deals with the surrender of material. Number 170 prohibits -importation; 171 prohibits gas, and 172 provides for disclosure. Then -173, under the heading, “Recruiting and Military Training” deals with -one matter, the breach of which is of great importance: - - “Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in - Germany. The German Army may only be constituted and recruited - by means of voluntary enlistment.” - -Then the succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment in order -to prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted for a short -time. - -I think that all I need do is to draw the attention of the Tribunal to -the completeness and detail with which all these points are covered in -Articles 174 to 179. - -Then, passing to TC-10, Article 180. That contains the prohibition of -fortress works beyond a certain limit and in the Rhineland. The first -sentence is: - - “All fortified works, fortresses, and field works situated in - German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to - the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.” - -I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the tables which show the amounts. - -Then we come to the naval clauses. If the Tribunal will be good enough -to go on four pages, they will come to Article 181, and I will just read -that to show the way in which the naval limitations are imposed and -refer briefly to the others. - -Article 181 says: - - “After the expiration of a period of 2 months from the coming - into force of the present treaty the German naval forces in - commission must not exceed: - - - - “Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, six - light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal - number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in - Article 190. - - - - “No submarines are to be included. - - - - “All other warships, except where there is provision to the - contrary in the present treaty, must be placed in reserve or - devoted to commercial purposes.” - -Then 182 simply deals with the mine sweeping necessary to clear up the -mines, and 183 limits the personnel to 15,000, including officers and -men of all grades and corps, and 184 deals with surface ships not in -German ports, and the succeeding clauses deal with various details, and -I pass at once to Article 191, which says: - - “The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for - commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.” - -Article 194 makes corresponding obligations of voluntary engagements for -longer service, and 196 and 197 deal with naval fortifications and -wireless stations. - -Then, if the Tribunal please, would they pass to Article 198, the first -of the air clauses. The essential and important sentence is the first: - - “The Armed Forces of Germany must not include any military or - naval air forces.” - -I don’t think that I need trouble the Tribunal with the detailed -provisions which occur in the next four clauses, which are all -consequential. - -Then, the next document, which for convenience is put next to that, is -the British Document TC-44. For convenience I put in a copy as GB-11, -but this again is merely ancillary to Mr. Alderman’s argument. It is the -report of the formal statement made at the German Air Ministry about the -restarting of the Air Corps, and I respectfully submit that the Tribunal -can take judicial notice of that. - -Similarly, without proving formally the long Document, TC-45, the -Tribunal can again take judicial notice of the public proclamation, -which is a well-known public document in Germany, the proclamation of -compulsory military service. Mr. Alderman has again dealt with this -fully in his address. - -I now come to the sixth treaty, which is the treaty between the United -States and Germany restoring friendly relations, and I put in a copy as -Exhibit GB-12. It is Document TC-11, and the Tribunal will find it as -the second last document in the document book. The purpose of this -treaty was to complete official cessation of hostilities between the -United States of America and Germany, and I have already explained to -the Tribunal that it incorporated certain parts of the Treaty of -Versailles. The relevant portion for the consideration of the Tribunal -is Part V, and I have just concluded going through the clauses of the -Treaty of Versailles which are repeated verbatim in this treaty. I -therefore, with the approval of the Tribunal, will not read them again, -but at Page 11 of my copy, they will see the clauses are repeated in -exactly the same way. - -Then I pass to the seventh treaty, which is the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, -negotiated at Locarno, October 16, 1925. I ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of that, and I put in as Exhibit GB-13, the British -Document TC-12. - -I was dealing with the Treaty of Locarno, and it might be convenient if -I just reminded the Tribunal of the treaties that were negotiated at -Locarno, because they do all go together and are to a certain extent -mutually dependent. - -At Locarno, Germany negotiated five treaties: - -(A) The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, -Great Britain, and Italy; (B) the Arbitration Convention between Germany -and France; (C) the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium; -(D) the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland; and (E) an -Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia. - -Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee provided that it should -come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at Geneva, in -the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as Germany became a -member of the League of Nations. The ratifications were deposited on the -14th September 1926 and Germany became a member of the League of Nations -on the 10th of September 1926. - -The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties which I -mentioned provide that they shall enter into force under the same -conditions as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. That is Article 21 of the -Arbitration Conventions and Article 22 of the Arbitration Treaties. - -The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee. One of its purposes was to establish in perpetuity the -borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. It contains -no provision for denunciation or withdrawal therefrom and provides that -it shall remain in force until the Council of the League of Nations -decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the -parties to the treaty—an event which never happened—in which case the -Treaty of Mutual Guarantee shall expire 1 year later. - -The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that Article 1 -provides that the parties guarantee three things: - -The border between Germany and France, the border between Germany and -Belgium, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. - -Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium, -agree that they will not attack or invade each other with certain -inapplicable exceptions, and Article 3 provides that Germany and France, -and Germany and Belgium, agree to settle all disputes between them by -peaceful means. - -The Tribunal will remember, because this point was made by my friend, -Mr. Alderman, that the first important violation of the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee appears to have been the entry of German troops into the -Rhineland on 7 March 1936. The day after, France and Belgium asked the -League of Nations Council to consider the question of the German -re-occupation of the Rhineland and the purported repudiation of the -treaty, and on the 12th of March, after a protest from the British -Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy -recognized unanimously that the re-occupation was a violation of this -treaty, and on the 14th of March, the League Council duly and properly -decided that it was not permissible and that the Rhineland clauses of -the pact were not voidable by Germany because of the alleged violation -by France in the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact. - -That is the background to the treaty with the international -organizations that were then in force, and if I might suggest them to -the Tribunal without adding to the summary which I have given, the -relevant articles are 1, 2, and 3, which I have mentioned, and 4, which -provides for the bringing of violations before the Council of the -League, as was done, and 5 I ask the Tribunal to note, because it deals -with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which I have already -mentioned. It says: - - “The provisions of Article 3 of the present treaty are placed - under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided - by the following stipulations: - - - - “If one of the powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit - a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral - or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the - present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of - Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present treaty - shall apply.” - -That is the procedure of going to the League or in the case of a -flagrant breach, of taking more stringent action. - -I remind the Tribunal of this provision because of the quotations from -Hitler which I mentioned earlier, when he said that the German -Government will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, -even though they were concluded before their accession to power and -office. Whatever may be said of the Treaty of Versailles, whatever may -be argued and has been argued, no one has ever argued for a moment, to -the best of my knowledge, that Herr Stresemann was in any way acting -involuntarily when he signed, along with the other representatives, the -Locarno pact on behalf of Germany. It was signed not only by Herr -Stresemann, but by Herr Hans Luther, so that there you have a treaty -freely entered into, which repeats the Rhineland provisions of -Versailles and binds Germany in that regard. I simply call the attention -of the Tribunal to Article 8, which deals with the remaining in force of -the treaty. I might perhaps read it because as I told the Tribunal all -the other treaties have the same lasting qualities, the same provisions -as to the time they will last, as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It -says: - - “Article 8. The present treaty shall be registered at the League - of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It - shall remain in force until the Council, acting on a request by - one or other of the High Contracting Parties notified to the - other signatory powers 3 months in advance, and voting at least - by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations - ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; - the treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a - period of 1 year from such decision.” - -That is, that in signing this treaty, the German representatives clearly -placed the question of repudiation or avoidance of the treaty in hands -other than their own. They were at the time, of course, a member of the -League, and a member of the Council of the League, but they left the -repudiation and avoidance to the decision of the League. - -Then the next treaty on my list is the Arbitration Treaty between -Germany and Czechoslovakia, which was one of the Locarno group and to -which I have already referred, but for convenience I have put in Exhibit -GB-14, which is British Document TC-14. As a breach of this treaty, as -charged in Charge 8, of Appendix C, I mentioned the background of the -treaty, and I shall not go into it again but I think the only clauses -that the Tribunal need look at, are Article 1, which is the governing -clause, and says as follows (Document TC-14): - - “All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia - with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their - respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle - amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted - for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Permanent - Court of International Justice as laid down hereafter. It is - agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in - particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the - League of Nations. - - - - “This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events - prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past. - - - - “Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is - laid down in other conventions in force between the High - Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with the - provisions of these conventions.” - -Articles 2 to 21 of the machinery. In Article 22 the second sentence -says it—that’s the present treaty—shall enter into and remain in force -under the same conditions as the said treaty, which is the Treaty of -Mutual Guarantee. - -Now that, I think, is all I need mention about that treaty. I think I am -right that my friend, Mr. Alderman, referred to it. It is certainly the -treaty to which President Beneš unsuccessfully appealed during the -crisis in the autumn of 1938. Now the ninth treaty which I should deal -with is not in this document book, and I merely am putting it in -formally, because my friend, Mr. Roberts, will deal with it and read the -appropriate parts—if the Tribunal will be good enough to note it -because it is mentioned in Charge 9 of Appendix C. It is the Arbitration -Convention between Germany and Belgium also done at Locarno, of which I -hand in a copy for convenience as GB-15. In fact, I can tell the -Tribunal all these arbitration conventions are in the same form, and I -am not going to deal with it because it is essentially part of the case -concerned with Belgium, the Low Countries, and Luxembourg, which my -friend, Mr. Roberts, will present. Therefore, I only ask the Tribunal to -accept the formal document for the moment. And the same applies to the -tenth treaty, which is mentioned in Charge 10 of Appendix C. That is the -Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, of which I ask the -Tribunal to take notice, and I hand in as GB-16. That again will be -dealt with by my friend, Colonel Griffith-Jones, when he is dealing with -the Polish case. - -I therefore can take the Tribunal straight to a matter which is not a -treaty, but is a solemn declaration, and that is TC-18, which I now put -in as Exhibit GB-17, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of, as -a Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The importance -is the date which was the 24th of September 1927. The Tribunal may -remember that I asked them to take judicial notice of the fact that -Germany had become a member of the League of Nations on 10 September -1926, a year before. - -The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect in -international law, to which my learned friend, the Attorney General, -referred, but the fact that it was unanimously adopted by the Assembly -of the League, of which Germany was a free, and let me say at once, an -active member at the time. I think that all I need read of TC-18 is, if -the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, the speech which begins -“M. Sokal of Poland (Rapporteur),” and then the translation after the -Rapporteur had dealt with the formalities, that this had gone to the -third committee and been unanimously adopted, and he had been asked to -act as Rapporteur, he says—the second paragraph: - - “The committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture, a - solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that wars of - aggression must never be employed as a means of settling - disputes between states, and that such wars constitute an - international crime, would have a salutary effect on public - opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to the - League’s future work in the matter of security and disarmament. - - - - “While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute - a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself - and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the - Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and - educative value.” - -Then he asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, and I will -read simply the terms of the resolution, which shows what so many -nations, including Germany, put forward at that time: - - “The Assembly, recognizing the solidarity which unites the - community of nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the - maintenance of general peace, being convinced that a war of - aggression can never serve as a means of settling international - disputes, and is in consequence an international crime; - considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression - would tend to create an atmosphere of general confidence - calculated to facilitate the progress of the work undertaken - . . . with a view to disarmament: - - - - “Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always - be prohibited: 2. That every pacific means must be employed to - settle disputes of every description, which may arise between - states. - - - - “The Assembly declares that the states, members of the League, - are under an obligation to conform to these principles.” - -After a solemn vote taken in the form of roll call the President -announced—which you will see at the end of the extract: - - “All the delegations having pronounced in favor of the - declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it - unanimously adopted.” - -The last general treaty which I have to place before the Tribunal is the -Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact of Paris of 1928, which my learned friend, -the Attorney General, in opening this part of the case read _in extenso_ -and commented on fully, I hand in as Exhibit GB-18—the British Document -TC-19, which is a copy of that pact. I did not intend, unless the -Tribunal desired otherwise, that I should read it again, as the Attorney -General yesterday read it in full, but of course I am at the service of -the Tribunal and therefore I leave that document before the Tribunal in -that way. - -Now all that remains for me to do is to place before the Tribunal -certain documents which Mr. Alderman mentioned in the course of his -address, and left to me. I am afraid that I haven’t placed them in a -special order, because they don’t really relate to the treaties I have -dealt with, but to Mr. Alderman’s argument. The first of these I hand in -as Exhibit GB-19. It is British Document TC-26, and comes just after -that resolution of the League of Nations to which the Tribunal had just -been giving attention—TC-26. It is the assurance contained in Hitler’s -speech on 21 May 1935, and it is very short, and unless the Tribunal has -it in mind from Mr. Alderman’s speech, I will read it again; I am not -sure of his reading it: - - “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic - affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country - to her. The German people and the German Government have, - however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the - simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, - that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not - only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere. I - myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the - people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can - exist permanently.” - -The next document which is TC-22, and which is on the next page, I now -hand in as Exhibit GB-20. It is the copy of the official proclamation of -the agreement between the German Government and the Government of the -Federal State of Austria on 11 July 1936, and I am almost certain that -Mr. Alderman did read this document, but I refer the Tribunal to -Paragraph 1 of the agreement to remind them of the essential content: - - “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the - Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of - the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st of May 1935.” - -I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to hand in with -regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC-27, which the Tribunal will -find two documents further on from the one of Austria, to which I have -just been referring. That is the German assurance to Czechoslovakia, and -what I am handing in as GB-21 is the letter from M. Masaryk, Jan -Masaryk’s son, to Lord Halifax, dated the 12th of March 1938. Again I -think that if Mr. Alderman did not read this, he certainly quoted the -statement made by the Defendant Göring, which appears in the third -paragraph. In the first statement the Field Marshal used the expression, -“ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort,” which I understand means, “I give you -my word of honor,” and if you will look down three paragraphs, after the -Defendant Göring had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the -Czechoslovak Army, the communication continues: - - “M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding - assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron Von - Neurath—that is the Defendant Von Neurath—who, among other - things assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still - considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration - Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.” - -So there I remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Herr Stresemann was speaking -on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there -been the slightest doubt of that, here is the Defendant Von Neurath -giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considers -herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention on 12 -March 1938, 6 months before Dr. Beneš made a hopeless appeal to it, -before the crisis in the autumn of 1938. Of course the difficult -position of the Czechoslovak Government is set out in the last -paragraph, but M. Masaryk says—and the Tribunal may think with great -force—in his last sentence: - - “They cannot however fail to view with great apprehension the - sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral - agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and - yesterday, 11 March 1938.” - -I refrain from comment, but I venture to say that is one of the most -pregnant sentences relating to this period. - -Now the next document which is on the next page is the British Document -TC-28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB-22. And that is an assurance of the -26th of September 1938, which Hitler gave to Czechoslovakia, and -again—the Tribunal will check my memory—I don’t think that Mr. -Alderman read this but . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I think if he did not, the Tribunal ought -to have it before them, because it gives very important point as to the -alleged governing principle of getting Germans back to the Reich, which -the Nazi conspirators purported to ask for a considerable time, while it -suited them. It says: - - “I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for - all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people - want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot - go back beyond the limits of our patience.” - -The Tribunal will remember this is between the Godesberg visit and the -Munich Pact: - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the - moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to - say, when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other - minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no longer - be interested in the Czech State, and that, as far as I am - concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs. But I - must also declare before the German people that in the - Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an - offer to Herr Beneš which was no more than the realization of - what he had already promised. He has now peace or war in his - hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the - Germans their freedom, or we shall get this freedom for - ourselves.” - -Less than 6 months before the 15th of March Hitler was saying in the -most violent terms that “he didn’t want any Czechs.” The Tribunal has -heard the sequel from my friend, Mr. Alderman, this morning. The last -document which I have been asked to put in, and which I now ask the -Tribunal to take notice of, and hand in, is Exhibit GB-23, which is the -British Document TC-23 and a copy of the Munich Agreement of September -29, 1938. That was signed by Hitler, the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, -M. Daladier, and Mussolini, and it is largely a procedural agreement by -which the entry of German troops into the Sudeten-Deutsche territory is -regulated. That is shown by the preliminary clause: - - “Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into - consideration the agreement which has been already reached in - principle, for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German - territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions - governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, - and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for - the steps necessary to secure fulfillment.” - -Then I don’t think, unless the Tribunal want me, I need go through the -steps. In Article 4, it said that “The occupation by stages of the -predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1 -October.” The four territories are marked on a map. And by Article 6, -“The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the -international commission.” And it provides also for rights of option and -release from the forces—the Czech forces of Sudeten Germans. - -That is what Hitler was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage -which I have just read out, and it will be observed that there is an -annex to the agreement which is most significant. - - “Annex to the Agreement: - - - - “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French - Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis - that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the - Anglo-French Proposals of the 19th September, relating to an - international guarantee of the new boundaries of the - Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. - - - - “When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in - Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their - part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.” - -The Polish and Hungarian minorities, not the question of Slovakia which -the Tribunal heard this morning. That is why Mr. Alderman submitted—and -I respectfully joined him in his submission—that the action of the 15th -of March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that -agreement. - -That, My Lord, is the part of the case which I desired to present. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases. Thank you. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the -United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, Count Two of the Indictment -charges these defendants with participating in the planning, the -preparation, the initiation, and waging of various wars of aggression, -and it charges that those wars are also in breach of international -treaty. It is our purpose now to present to the Tribunal the evidence in -respect of those aggressive wars against Poland and against the United -Kingdom and France. - -Under Paragraph (B) of the particulars to Count Two, reference is made -to Count One in the Indictment for the allegations charging that those -wars were wars of aggression, and Count One also sets out the -particulars of the preparations and planning for those wars, and in -particular those allegations will be found in Paragraph (F) 4. But, My -Lord, with the Tribunal’s approval I would propose first to deal with -the allegations of breach of treaties which are mentioned in Paragraph -(C) of the particulars, and of which the details are set out in Appendix -C. My Lord, those sections of Appendix C which relate to the war against -Poland are Section 2, which charges a violation of the Hague Convention -in respect of the pacific settlement of international disputes, on which -Sir David has already addressed the Court, and I do not propose, with -the Court’s approval, to say more than that. - -Section 3 of Appendix C and Section 4 charge breaches of the other Hague -Conventions of 1907. Section 5, Sub-section 4, charges a breach of the -Versailles Treaty in respect of the Free City of Danzig, and Section 13, -a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. - -All those have already been dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and it -remains, therefore, only for me to deal with two other sections of -Appendix C: Section 10, which charges a breach of the Arbitration Treaty -between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno on the 16th of October -1925; and Section 15 of Appendix C which charges a violation of the -Declaration of Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and -Poland on the 26th of January 1934. - -If the Tribunal would take Part I of the British Document Book Number 2, -I will describe in a moment how the remaining parts are divided. The -document book is divided into six parts. If the Tribunal will look at -Part I for the moment—the document books which have been handed to the -Counsel for the Defense are in exactly the same order, except that they -are bound in one and not in six separate covers, in which the Tribunal’s -documents are bound for convenience. - -The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty, the subject matter of Section 10 -of Appendix C, is Document TC-15 and appears the one but end document in -the book. It has already been put in under the Number GB-16. - -My Lord, I would quote the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 from that -treaty: - - “The President of the German Empire and the President of the - Polish Republic: - - - - “Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland - by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might - arise between the two countries; - - - - “Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or - resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for - international tribunals; - - - - “Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be - modified save with its consent; - - - - “And considering that sincere observance of the methods of - peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of - resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become - the cause of division between states; - - - - “Have decided. . . .” - -Then, go on to Article 1: - - “All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with - regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their - respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle - amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted - for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent - Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter.” - -I go straight to Article 2: - - “Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the - Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by - agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a view to - amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, - styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in - accordance with the present treaty.” - -My Lord, thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for -arbitration and for conciliation. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the arbitration -treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and Germany and Belgium? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well—yes, it is, My Lord, both signed at -Locarno. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The words of the charge in Section 10, will be -noted particularly in that Germany did, on or about the 1st of September -1939, unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted -to settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means. - -The only other treaty to which I refer, the German-Polish Declaration of -the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last document in Part I -of the Tribunal’s document book, which is the subject of Section 10 of -Appendix C: - - “The German Government and the Polish Government consider that - the time has come to introduce a new era in the political - relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding - between the states. They have therefore decided to establish by - the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those - relations. - - - - “The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance - of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential - condition for general peace in Europe.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to read all this? We are -taking judicial notice of it. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged; I am only too anxious -to shorten this, if I can. - -In view of what is later alleged by the Nazi Government, I would -particularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that declaration. - - “The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years - counting from the day of exchange of instruments of - ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two - governments 6 months before the expiration of that period of - time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by - either Government at any time 6 months in advance.” - -My Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to present to the Court -the evidence upon the planning and preparation of these wars and in -support of the allegations that they were wars of aggression. For -convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided into separate -parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the total index to -their document, which is a separate book, on the front page it will be -seen how these documents have been divided. Part I is the “Treaties”; -Part II is entitled “Evidence of German Intentions prior to March 1939.” -It might perhaps be more accurately described as “pre-March 1939 -evidence,” and it will be with that part that I would now deal. - -My Lord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against -Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation -for further aggression, and I now—dealing with the early history of -this matter—wish to draw the Court’s particular attention only to those -parts of the evidence which show that even at that time, before the -Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly -prepared to fight England, Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve -those preliminary aims; that they appreciated the whole time that they -might well have to do so. And, what is more, although not until after -March 1939 did they commence upon their immediate and specific -preparations for war against Poland, nevertheless, they had for a -considerable time before had it in mind specifically to attack Poland -once Czechoslovakia was completely theirs. - -During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of -the Nazi regime in Germany—during this period, as afterwards, while -they are making their preparations and carrying out their plans, they -are giving to the outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull -them out of any suspicion of their real object. - -The dates, I think—as the learned Attorney General said in addressing -you yesterday—the dates in this case, almost more than the documents, -speak for themselves. The documents in this book are arranged in the -order in which I will refer to them, and the first that I would refer to -is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25. - -It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement with -Poland when it was signed in January 1934: - - “When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the - relations between the two countries seemed to me more than - unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing - differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the - Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom, - would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which, if - persisted in, might only too easily acquire the character of a - dangerous traditional enmity.” - -I go down to the one but last paragraph. - - “In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing - and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with - Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable - suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation. - It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this - same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been - enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with - its Polish neighbor.” - -That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January, -speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said—this is Document PS-2368, which -will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible repeating -passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech the other day. -The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the Tribunal. It is a short -paragraph but perhaps I might read it now, but I will—dealing with this -evidence—so far as possible avoid repetition: - - “By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension - and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the - European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland - which has worked out to the advantage of both sides . . . . True - statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. - The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The - German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to - my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and - the Polish State have also become a reality.” - -That was on the 30th of January 1937. - -On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175, which has -already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order issued by the -Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, -signed “Von Blomberg.” It has at the top, “Written by an officer . . . . -Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it -. . . are to be written by an officer.” So it is obviously highly -secret. And with it is enclosed a directive for the unified preparation -for war of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August -1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, “General -Guiding Principles”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike Eventualities”; Part 3, -“Special Preparations.” - -The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted the opening -passages: - - “The general political position justifies the supposition that - Germany need not consider an attack from any side.” - -It goes on—the second paragraph: - - “The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little - by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, - which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a - continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces to - counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military - exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they - occur.” - -It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made, and I -would particularly draw the Tribunal’s attention to Paragraph 2b: - - “The further working on mobilization without public announcement - in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war - suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.” - -On the next page, under Paragraph 4: - - “Special preparations are to be made for the following - eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike - entanglements with Red Spain.” - -And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that time -that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve -them in war: - - “England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us.” - -If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive, Page 5 of -that document: - - “For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities - (concentrations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders - are to be considered as basic: - - - - “1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West. - - - - “Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may - side with France, either at once or later, or not at all. It is - also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if - the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of - Luxembourg.” - -I pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit, and I -particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading -“Special Case—Extension Red-Green”. It will be remembered that Red was -Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia. - - “The military political starting point used as a basis for - concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either - England, Poland, or Lithuania . . . join the side of our - opponents. Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to - an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership - will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, - above all England and Poland.” - -Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis for the -discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted: June -1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the Nazi Government -appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability, of fighting England, -and Poland, and France, and were perfectly prepared to do so, if they -had to. On the 5th of November 1937—the Tribunal will remember—Hitler -held his conference in the Reich Chancellery, the minutes of which have -been referred to as the Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines -of that document to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler -said in respect to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that -Exhibit, the middle of the page: - - “The Führer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the - security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. - This is consequently a problem of space.’” - -He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described -“participation in world economy,” and at the bottom of Page 2 he said: - - “The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the - securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times - has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of - nations.” - -And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3: - - “The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has - proved that every space expansion can be effected only by - breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are - unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been found - without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the - proprietor.” - -My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] It has been read already. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My object was only to try to collect, so far as -England and Poland were concerned, the evidence that had been given. I -would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal thought that it was -unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity to . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has -been read already. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I would pass then to the next document in that -part of your document book. I put that document in. It was referred to -by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on -the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communiqué was -being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador’s audience with -Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it -was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with -difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I -put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: That hasn’t been read before, has it? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his -opening. - -THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person -wrote a memorandum for the Führer. This document was one of the German -Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied -troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, “Very -confidential—personal only,” and is called, “Deductions on the Report, -German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German -Relations”: - - “With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a - _status quo_ in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a - military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an - agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British - politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that - has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will - Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate - camps and will they march once more against each other one day? - To answer this question, one must realize the following: - - - - “A change of the _status quo_ in the East in the German sense - can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that - England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid - France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for - her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible, - and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies - then even if England does not want war. England, believing she - must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in - automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between - England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who - could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way - of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore, - that war between Germany and England on account of France can be - prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s - forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common - victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby - France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French - coalition would never tolerate. - - - - “This position would arise for instance if England, through - insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by - a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany, Italy, - Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, - would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in - Europe.” - -The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong -partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation -to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas. - -Paragraph 5: - - “Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us. - - - - “1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to - the protection of the interests of our friends. - - - - “2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted - tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a - tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the - winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours - directly or indirectly. - - - - “Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the - three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we - confront England, be it in a settlement or in war. England is - going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of - diplomacy. - - - - “The particular question whether, in the event of a war by - Germany in Central Europe . . .”—I am afraid the translation of - this is not very good—“The particular question whether, in the - event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France, and thereby - England, would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the - time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military - considerations which cannot be gone into here.” - -And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on a fairly -high level, because he concludes by saying: - - “I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view - verbally:” - -That document is GB-28. - -Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into your -books in the wrong order. If you would refer to 2357-PS which is the one -following our L-43—it will be remembered that document to the Führer -which I have just read was dated the 2d of January 1938. - -On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. - -THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon—February 1938. That is -2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said: - - “In the fifth year following the first great foreign political - agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification - to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with - which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has - there been a _détente_, but in the course of these years there - has been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, - which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has - stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations - finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and - appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new - commissioner, the most dangerous spot from this point of view of - European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The - Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and - both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And - so the way to friendly understanding has been successfully - paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, - in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded - in finally taking the poison out of the relations between - Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, - friendly co-operation. - - - - “To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone - unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for - the task which is ahead of us—peace.” - -I turn back to the next—to the document which was in your document -books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29. This is a -document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated -the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled “Organizational Study of 1930.” It -comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the -General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be: - - “The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly - conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization - of the Air Force. The result gained is termed ‘Distant - Objective.’ From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in - the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This will be - called ‘Final Objective 1942.’ This in turn yields what is - considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of - the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air - divisions, _et cetera_.” - -The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various -sections, and Section I is entitled “Assumptions.” If the Tribunal will -turn over to the next page one finds the assumption under the heading -“Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1.” - -The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it will be -seen that on the 2d of May 1938, the Air Force were envisaging Estonia, -Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all -coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original map is here attached -to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it -will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the -greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass of charts attached as -appendices. - -I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the Tribunal’s -copy of the translation: - - “Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of - the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I: - - - - 1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, - Russia.” - -And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed -against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of the -Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that by -making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down -to the last corner. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think perhaps you -should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with group commands -at Warsaw and Königsberg. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph -“Assumptions,” Sub-heading 2, “Organization of the Air Force in -Peacetime,” seven group commands: - -1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4-Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw, and -7-Königsberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in -connection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal’s translation, -the last paragraph: - - “The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air Force - grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have - locally bound commands . . . .” - -I emphasize only the opening, “The more the Reich grows in area, and the -more the Air Force grows in strength . . .” Now I would say one word on -that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who -is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don’t want to -overemphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is -submitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff -of the Air Force were thinking at that date. - -The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant -Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have another -document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August -1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed -to him as “the Reich Minister via the State Secretary.” It is a -comparatively short document and one that I will read in whole: - - “The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, - might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with the - Entente.”—TC-76 becomes GB-31—“Neither France nor England is - looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps - leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct - foreign interference and through internal signs of - disintegration due to her own faults, suffer the fate she - deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step - by step, and would have to lead to a loss of power in the - remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite and an annexation - of territory. - - - - “The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any - immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and - not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. - Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit could be - plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the - desired developments.” - -I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the -intervening lines, Paragraph 5. - -THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph, “For this purpose -. . .”? - - LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “For this purpose the slogan emanating - from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten - Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to - be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the - choice of nationality is being withheld from these Germans will - do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical - process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may - not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate - of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet - be clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely - sealed. - - - - “This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be - recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is - unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of - boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and - northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is”—I put in an - “is” because I think it is obviously left out of the copy that I - have in front of me.— - - - - “The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question, - it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in - turn. - - - - “But the later this assumption sinks in in international - politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, - it is important for the time being, to carry on the German - policy, under the well-known and proved slogans of ‘the right to - autonomy’ and ‘racial unity.’ Anything else might be interpreted - as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance by the - Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than our - forces could stand up to.” - -That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was -leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather a day or -two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. -On the 26th of September he said—I think Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe has -just read this document to the Tribunal. I’ll refer to only two lines of -it: - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems - for Germany in Europe.” - -And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from -that same speech, I will not read to the Tribunal unless the Tribunal -desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in full in his address -yesterday. These two documents are already in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29, -which is the second extraction of that same speech, as GB-32. - -My Lord, I would refer the Tribunal to one more document under this part -which has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now -USA-49, and which appears before TC-28 in your document book. The -particular passage of that exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter -from Admiral Carls, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It -is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled, -“Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.’ There is -full agreement with the main theme of the study.” Again, the Attorney -General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the -Tribunal will remember. - - “If, according to the Führer’s decision, Germany is to acquire a - position of security as a world power she needs not only - sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval - communications and secure access to the ocean.” - -That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement in -September 1938. - -The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government -had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they were not prepared -straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or -elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this morning, when Mr. Alderman -dealt in his closing remarks with the advantages that were gained by the -seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent -occasions, that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the attack -on Poland. It is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed -had taken the decision to proceed against Poland as soon as -Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler -said in talking to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal -will remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never -intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to have the -whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in -full force against Poland after September 1938, they did at once begin -to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig. Until—as the Tribunal -will see—until the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March, no -pressure was put on; but immediately after the Sudetenland had been -occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, -which would and was to lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called -justification for their attack on that country. - -If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until 10 o’clock -tomorrow morning. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FOURTEENTH DAY - Thursday, 6 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the -defendants’ counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at Christmas for -a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which -must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and, as -the Trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal -considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and -their counsel but of every one concerned in the Trial that there should -be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas -rather than at a later date when the Prosecution’s case has been -completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and -over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday, -the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of -January. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the -American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will -return to Part III of that document book in which I included the -documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and -Polish Governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the -Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich -crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious -and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had -finally been seized in March of the following year. - -I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part, TC-73, -Number 44. That is a document taken from the official _Polish White -Book_, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an account of a -luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 24th -of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador to -Germany: - - “In a conversation of the 24th of October, over a luncheon at - the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, - Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement - of issues between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion - of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the - retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would - agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and a - railway line across Pomorze (northern part of the corridor). In - exchange Von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an - extension of the Polish-German Agreement to 25 years and a - guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.” - -I do not think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one -paragraph: - - “Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no - possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free - City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the - substance of this conversation to you.” - -I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this part of -the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, indeed, as -Hitler has himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as -an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig, but -for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it -starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more -apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming -at—only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would -provide some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland. - -I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the -_Polish White Book_, TC-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b). TC-73 -will be the _Polish White Book_, which I shall put in later. That -document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign -Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply -to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24th -of October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German -relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect of Danzig -are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph -6: - - “In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish - Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: The - right of the German population of the city and the surrounding - villages to freedom of life and development, and the fact that - in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is - connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the - majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely - bound up with Poland.” - -It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing statute, -and I pass to Paragraph 7: - - “Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and - desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a - friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, - the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of - Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bilateral - Polish-German agreement. This agreement should guarantee the - existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of - national and cultural life to its German majority, and also - should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the - complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government - must state that any other solution, and in particular any - attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must - inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form - of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of - Polish-German understanding in all its aspects.” - -And then finally in Paragraph 8: - - “In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am - ready to have final conversations personally with the governing - circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you - should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that - my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would - be dangerous for the future.” - -The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from -the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of -the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would -have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable, and the Polish Government -had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to -enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which is exactly what -the German Government had hoped. They had not agreed to the return of -Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been -accomplished. - -Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place, after the -Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German -Government, we find another top-secret order, issued by the Supreme -Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the Defendant Keitel. It goes to -the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed, “The First Supplement to the -Instruction Dated the 21st of October 1938”: - - “The Führer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies - mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938, - preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of - Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise . . . . - - - - “The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition - is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a - politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.” - -We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of -Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not ready to -go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government -answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C-137 and will -become GB-33. - -On the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It -is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the -next in the Tribunal’s book, TC-73, Number 48, which will become GB-34. -In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an -account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always -followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the -Danzig question and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or -later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph of that -page: - - “Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult - problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not - see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish - opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest - spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this - matter. - - - - “In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this - problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite - new, some new form, for which he used the term Körperschaft, - which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the - German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In - addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be - quite at ease, there would be no _faits accomplis_ in Danzig, - and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of - the Polish Government.” - -The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we looked at, -on the 24th of November, orders had already been received, or issued, -for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise; -yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be -no _fait accompli_ and he can be quite at his ease. - -I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will become -GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on the day after -the one to which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last -conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I did not. As I -say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact -does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the -_White Book_ itself. - - “Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas - previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German - statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today, for the first - time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the - Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw - no possibility whatever of agreement.” - -I emphasize this last paragraph: - - “In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not - seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards - Poland was still a desire for the further building up of - friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of - clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and - interests of the two parties concerned.” - -The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one -expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, -some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw and made another -speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become -GB-36: - - “In accordance with the resolute will of the German national - leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly - relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing - agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German - foreign policy. The political foresight and the principles - worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take - the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all - other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of - events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard - to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of - both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the - future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual - relations.” - -And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still anxious that the -Poles were beginning to sit up—Your Lordship will remember the -expression “sit up” used in the note to the Führer—and to assume they -would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January Hitler again -spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further -assurances of their good faith. - -That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General in his -address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is -TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37. - -That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the remainder of -Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia. - -If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that -document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler -and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the seizure of -the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr. -Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday morning, dealt very fully -with that matter showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure -and showing on the chart that he had on the wall the immense -strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave -that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal -should wish to refer to them, they are found in their correct order in -the story in that document book. - -As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week of marching -into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning to be turned on -against Poland. - -If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about half way -through that document book—it follows after Jodl’s lecture, which is a -long document—TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: “Official Documents -concerning Polish-German Relations.” This will be GB-38. - -On the 21st of March Mr. Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the nature of -the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been -held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden: - - “I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to - call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their - entirety. - - - - “He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students’ - demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.” - -I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences -with “further”: - - “Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at - Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler - put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in - exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig into - the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations - between you and him in Warsaw”—that is, between him, of course, - and Mr. Beck—“He said that there had been further conversations - between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had - pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these - suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an - unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had - received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his - suggestions. Ribbentrop had talked to the Chancellor, only - yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favor of - good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a - thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual - relations. Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression - that difficulties arising between us were also due to some - misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The problem needed to - be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States - were dependent on each other.” - -I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly, -Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig should return -to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page: - - “I stated”—that is Mr. Lipski—“I stated that now, during the - settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no - understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already - hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our - disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But - in regard to Slovakia, the position was far worse. I emphasized - our community of race, language, and religion, and mentioned the - help we had given in their achievement of independence. I - pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that - the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich - had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being - directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question - was a serious blow to our relations. - - - - “Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that this - could be discussed. - - - - “I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation - between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might - go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the matter over. - He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the - Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was - rejecting all his offers. - - - - “Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his - conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. Ribbentrop - answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter’s - return from Rome, and that they had discussed the Memel - question, which called for a solution.” - -That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not very long -before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day -German Armed Forces marched in. - -If the Tribunal would turn over—I think the next document is -unnecessary—turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39. - -As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable anxiety was -growing both in the government of Great Britain and the Polish -Government, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking -conversations with each other. - -On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the -House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations -that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments—I -quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement: - - “As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding - with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the - position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime, before - those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the - House that during that period, in the event of any action which - clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish - Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their - national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves - bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their - power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to - this effect. - - - - “I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make - it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as - do His Majesty’s Government.” - -On the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communiqué was issued by the -Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister -had given a week before and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her -support should she, Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all. -In fact, I need not read any of it. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18. -I put it in as GB-40. - -The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain -were feeling at that time appear to have been well justified. During the -same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next -document an order signed by Keitel. It emanates from the High Command of -the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is: -“Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40”: - - “‘Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed - Forces for 1939-40’ is being reissued. - - - - “Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued - in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged. - - - - “Part II, Case White”—which is the code name for the operation - against Poland—“Part II, Case White, is attached herewith. The - signature of the Führer will be appended later. - - - - “The Führer has added the following directives to Case White: - - - - “1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation - can be carried out at any time from 1st of September 1939 - onwards.”—This is in April, the beginning of April. - - - - “2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to - draw up a precise timetable for Case White and to arrange by - conferences the synchronized timings among the three branches of - the Armed Forces. - - - - “3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the - details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the - 1st of May.” - -That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page under the -heading “Distribution”, went to the OKH, OKM, OKW. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are -they just notes? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing for war. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The -document starts from under the words “Translation of a document signed -by Keitel.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being “top-secret.” - -If the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after -“Distribution”, it will be seen that there follows a translation of -another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is signed -by Hitler: - - “I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the - Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with - these for the conduct of the war.”—No question about - war—“conduct of the war.” - - - - “Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be - prepared for the following eventualities: - - - - “I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and - protection against surprise air attacks; - - - - “II. Case White; - - - - “III. The Annexation of Danzig. - - - - “Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military - authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike - development.” Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW. - -On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation of Annex -I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German -Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under “Special Orders”: - - “Legal Basis. It should be anticipated that a state of defense - or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the - 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and - demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be - based on the laws valid in peacetime.” - -My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some -other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological order. - -The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by -the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the -Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were -developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland. - -On the 28th of April the German Government issued a memorandum in which -they alleged that the Anglo-Polish Declaration was incompatible with the -1934 agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of -entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had -unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. - -I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages, from -that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. Some of these -passages are worth quoting, if only to show the complete dishonesty of -the whole document on the face of it: - - “The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British - declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations - recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According - to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish - Government and the British Government a temporary understanding, - to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement, which will - provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great - Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two - states being directly or indirectly threatened.” - -Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs the -history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last -paragraph, Paragraph 5, on that page: - - “The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish - Government with the British Government is in such obvious - contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago - that the German Government can take note only with surprise and - astonishment of such a violent and fundamental reversal of - Polish policy. - - - - “Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may - be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement - is intended as a regular pact of alliance which, by reason of - its general sense and of the present state of political - relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. From the - obligation now accepted by the Polish Government, it appears - that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active - part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of - aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect - Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against - the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 - declaration.” - -I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7: - - “The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to - accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to - be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third - power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. - In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude - that the Polish Government do not at present attach any - importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by - means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government. - The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path, traced out - in 1934, to the shaping of German-Polish relations.” - -All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that -orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed -Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. - -The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and -discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the German -Government had made; the return of Danzig, the Autobahn, the railway, -the promise by Germany of the 25 years’ guarantee, and I go down to the -last but one paragraph on Page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1): - - “The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the - opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just - settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of - Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent - strengthening of the friendly, neighborly relations between the - two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German - proposals made with this object. - - - - “At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to - another state, political obligations which are not compatible - either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text of the - German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934. Thereby, - the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this - declaration null and void.” - -In the last paragraph the German Government says that, nevertheless, -they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. - -On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made a speech in -the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of -the memorandum. This is Document TC-72, Number 13, which becomes GB-43. -I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter part of the second page of -the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that -Germany made in March, and he goes on to say that the Polish Government -have rejected his offer and lastly: - - “I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the - Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The - worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, - believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, - that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has - not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in - any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very - regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was - really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. - This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a - question which intimately affects the German people by a truly - unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both - countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving - party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, - because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never - become Polish. The intention to attack, on the part of Germany, - which was merely invented by the international press, led, as - you know, to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation - on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance - . . . .” - -It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say, -how completely dishonest was everything that the German Government was -saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the -orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke, saying that the -intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention of the international -press. - -In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish Government -issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set out in the next -exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44. It is unnecessary to -read more than . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5th of May, not the 28th of April. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May. - -It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from that -reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objects -of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and to carry on -friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve difficulties -by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government -appreciate that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been -ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part in the -recent discussions, and I turn to the second page of the document, the -one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go back a little to the top -of that page, the first half of that page. The Polish Government allege -that they wrote, as indeed they did, to the German Government on the -26th of March giving their point of view, that they then proposed joint -guarantees by the Polish and German Governments of the City of Danzig -based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal -affairs. They said they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a -motor road and railway facilities and that they received no reply to -those proposals: - - “It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates - demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands - unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration - of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and - dignity of Poland.” - -Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the Polish -point of view. And thereafter they reject the German accusation that the -Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish -agreement. They state that Germany herself has entered into similar -agreements with other nations and lastly, on the next page, they too say -that they are still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should -Germany wish to do so. - -If the Tribunal would turn back to the Document C-120, to the first two -letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it becoming GB-41. -On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614, on the first page of -that exhibit, “Directives from Hitler and Keitel Preparing for War and -the Invasion of Poland”. I would refer to Page 6 of that particular -exhibit. The page number will be found at the bottom of the page, in the -center. It is a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, -signed by Hitler and dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM, -various branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed -“Instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own -Economy.” I only mention it now to show better that throughout this time -preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing. That document -will still be part of the same exhibit. - -Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(1), I am afraid -this is a précis only, not a full translation and therefore, perhaps, I -will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the “Directives for the -War against the Enemy Economy and Measures of Protection for Our Own -Economy.” - -As we will see later, not only were the military preparations being -carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every -other kind of preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. - -I think this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939, finishes -really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich Chancellery -on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has already heard. It was -L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was referred to, I think, and has -been known as the “Schmundt minutes.” It is the last document which is -in the Tribunal’s document book of this part and I do not propose to -read anything of it. It has been read already and the Tribunal will -remember that it was the speech in which Hitler was crying out for -Lebensraum and said that Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a -question of expanding their living space in the East, where he said that -the decision had been taken to attack Poland. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your Lordship will -remember that Göring, Raeder, and Keitel, among many others, were -present. It has three particular lines of which I want to remind the -Tribunal, where he said: - - “If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia - against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained to - attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The - Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with - England.” - -So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack -Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France, -also. - -I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final -preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at the -beginning of September—Part V of the Tribunal’s document book. If the -Tribunal will glance at the index to the document book, they will find I -have, for convenience, divided the evidence up under four subheadings: - -Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation; the famous -Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic preparations -urging on the crisis and the justification for the invasion of Poland. - -I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, dealing with -the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an exhibit -containing various documents, and I refer particularly to the second -document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document C-126, which will -become GB-45. - -It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called for. Now, -here it is: - - “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the - Führer and Supreme Commander, a ‘preliminary timetable’ for Case - White based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, - Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the - attack and the start of the attack were not included in this - timetable. - - - - “The Führer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement - with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and made - the following comments on individual points: - - - - “1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up - reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers - scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, - employers or other private persons who make inquiries should be - told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and - for the exercise units it is intended to form for these - maneuvers. - - - - “It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to - subordinate establishments.” - -All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we find the -German Government making allegations of mobilization on the part of the -Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June—they are mobilizing, only -doing so secretly: - - “2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the - area of the frontier must not be carried out.” - -If the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it will be -seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel. I think it is -unnecessary to read any further from that document. There is—which -perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it rather out of date -now—the first document on that front page of that exhibit, a short -letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an extract, I am afraid, as it -appears in the translation: - - “Attached are operational directions for the employment of - U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of - precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case - White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing in his - operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations staff - of the Navy.” - -One must assume that the Defendant Dönitz knew that his U-boats were to -go out into the Atlantic “by way of precaution in the event of the -intention to carry out Case White remaining unchanged.” - -I turn to the next document in the Tribunal’s book, C-30, which becomes -GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains orders for -the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German Free City of -Danzig: - - “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has - ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the - Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy Danzig Free - State immediately in order to protect the German population. - There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long - as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.” - -It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this again -becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action of the last -few days before the war, when Germany was purporting to make specious -offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful means. I would -like to offer this as evidence that the decision had been taken and -nothing was going to move him from that decision. That document, as set -out, says that, “There will be no hostile intention on the part of -Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.” -Nevertheless, that was not the only condition upon which the occupation -was to take place and we find that during July, right up to the time of -the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to -prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. - -I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes GB-47, -where there are set out a few only of the reports which were coming back -almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd, the Consul-General in -Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The sum total of those reports -can be found in the _British Blue Book_. I now would refer to only two -of them as examples of the kind of thing that was happening. - -I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of July -1939. - - “Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived - here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig Heimwehr. - All approaches to hills and dismantled forts, which constitute a - popular public promenade on the western fringe of the city, have - been closed with barbed wire and ‘verboten’ notices. The walls - surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades keep your - mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’ - - - - “Master of British steamer _High Commissioner Wood_, while he - was roving Königsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of June, - observed considerable military activity, including extensive - shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material, by - small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four medium-sized - steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, and so - forth, left Königsberg ostensibly returning to Hamburg after - maneuvers, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers - . . . .” - -And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the next page of -the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states: - - “The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me - that on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 military - lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, - where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. - There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in position, which - he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three - six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There were about - 500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place is - extensively fortified with barbed wire.” - -I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal’s time in reading -more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number of others that -can be found in the _British Blue Book_, which sets out the arming and -preparation of the Free City of Danzig. - -On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations were -practically complete—and it will be remembered that they had to be -complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September—we find -Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing their intentions -to their allies, the Italians. - -One of the passages in Hitler’s speech of the 23rd of May, it will be -remembered—I will not quote it now because the document has been read -before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in regard to his -proposed attack on Poland, had said, “Our object must be kept secret -even from the Italians and the Japanese.” - -Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his intentions to -his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will join him. - -The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to read -more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized generally by -saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the Italians to -come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano, rather, is most -surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency of the matter; and -they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying to dissuade Hitler from -starting off so soon until the Duce can have had a little more time to -prepare himself. - -The value—perhaps the greatest value—of the minutes of that meeting is -that they show quite clearly the German intention to attack England and -France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same time as Poland. - -I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is trying -to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning the war; and, -therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in: - - “At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements - in prospect.”—I quote from the top of the second page.—“Some - time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction - could be taken into service. As far as the land army was - concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had - been called to the colors.” - -I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack -England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here his -thoughts are turned entirely towards England: - - “If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she - could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and - one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber - squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of - war, the German Air Force would at once attack England and the - English fighters would be urgently needed for the defense of - their own country. - - - - “With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in - the event of a general war, after the destruction of - Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a - position to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and - France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available - forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and - elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death - struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that - the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian - fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano - showed signs of extreme doubt.”—Doubts which, perhaps, in view - of the subsequent performances, were well justified. - - - - “The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few - parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less - value. Poland was very weak in antitank and antiaircraft defense - and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in - this respect.” - -What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland formed -such a threat to Germany on Germany’s eastern frontier. - - “If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers - over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German - superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the - fanatics of Warsaw and Kraków, the population of their areas is - indifferent. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the - position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one - and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, - and approximately nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles - were much less in number than the total population and, as - already said, their striking power was to be valued variably. In - these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by - Germany in the shortest time. - - - - “Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it - clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would - stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick - liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for - the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a - hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only - would the 11 East Prussian divisions be tied down; but also - further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This - would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.” - -The argument goes on on those lines. - -I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page: - - “Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said to Count - Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now. He had made - an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from - South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care - to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal - could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he - had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly - and northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and - northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been - Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, - as the Mediterranean had been the appropriate sphere for Italy. - For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and - timber from these eastern regions.” - -Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of German -minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons, the need -for foodstuffs and timber from Poland: - - “In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, - although the city had the greatest harbor in the Baltic—the - transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that of Hamburg—but - Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city - awaking sentimental feelings for every German, and the Führer - was bound to take account of this psychological element in - public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano - should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a - large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav - soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long - remain quiet over anything of this kind. - - - - “Count Ciano, in replying to the Führer’s statement, first - expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the - completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in - the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during - his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the German side, - that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the - contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that in his - opinion the Danzig question would be settled in the course of - time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that - a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed - that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made - plans for a period of 2 or 3 years. If immediate conflict was - unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly - stand on the German side; but for various reasons he would - welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later - time.” - -No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict; the -only concern of anybody is as to time. - - “Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy - in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict - with Poland would not be limited to that country but would - develop into a general European war.” - -Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade Hitler -from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argument at the -top of Page 5 of the exhibit: - - “For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should - make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful - intentions of Italy and Germany.” - -Then we get the Führer’s answer to those arguments, half-way down Page -5: - - “The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem - no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, - the more difficult would military operations in eastern Europe - become. From the middle of September weather conditions made air - operations hardly possible in these areas, while the conditions - of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the - autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for - motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great - marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. - Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in October . . . and - Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they - obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.” - -They couldn’t possibly bombard or destroy any place where there happened -to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England, London—I wonder -whether any sentiments of that kind were held in consideration in regard -to those places. - - “Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer’s view, the - Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this - settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. - To the question of Ciano as to what solution the Führer - proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political - control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would - obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must - contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted - whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to - the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Führer - had made this proposal personally to Beck, at his visit to - Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return - for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete - guarantee of Polish interests, and the establishment of a - connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would - have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship, - and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck - had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to - examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of - English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen - clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, - and even proposed to advance to Berlin . . . .”—That was - something quite different. - -The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following -day. - -On Page 7, in the middle of the page, it will be seen: - - “The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) - in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately - attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her - political intention, she must be forced to do so.” - -I go to the last line on that page: - - “As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist - further in the world through the lack of space; not only was - there no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded - by its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps - of gold and deluded themselves about their riches . . . . The - Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the - world and would not regard Germany and Italy as in their class. - This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst - thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a - life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet - more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. - - - - “The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for - which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself . . . - had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy, - because of its geographic location, was already the dominant - power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said - that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that - this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that - Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in - the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . . had recognized it and had said - as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The interests of - Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there - never could be a conflict between them. - - - - “The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two problems - mentioned in yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and - Germany would have their backs free for work against the West. - The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so that for 10 - years”—there appears to have been a query raised in the - translation—“for so many years long she would have been - incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could - be settled. - - - - “Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of - the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would - give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite - information on one point, in order that the Duce might have all - the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no - decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with - Poland could be localized. On the basis of long experience - he”—Ciano—“quite saw that so far the Führer had always been - right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini - had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of - precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following - question: - - - - “The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would - take Poland: (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, - and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The - first of these conditions did not depend on the decision of the - Führer, and German reaction would follow in a moment. The second - condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore - asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied - Germany about her political condition. He realized that this - date depended upon climatic conditions. - - - - “The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made - clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the - decisive part of military operations against Poland could be - carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final - liquidation would need another . . . 4 weeks, it could be - finished at the end of September or the beginning of October. - These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, - that the last date on which he could begin to take action was - the end of August. - - - - “Finally, the Führer reassured Ciano that since his youth he had - favored German-Italian co-operation, and that no other view was - expressed in his publications. He had always thought that - Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since - there were no conflicts of interest between them. He was - personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from - himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great - and unique in history; that he could be this man’s friend was - for him a matter of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour - of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of - the Duce for better or for worse.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never actually put -that last document that I was referring to in as an exhibit. It is -Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48. - -Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that the -military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand and -nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the Defendant -Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had not been idle. It -is a letter dated the 26th of August 1939, in which Funk is writing to -his Führer. He says: - - “My Führer! I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most - friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How - happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted - the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and - world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of - these days. - - - - “The information given to me by Field Marshal Göring, that you, - my Führer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures - prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the - relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through - emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to - you, with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of - precautions taken during the last few months in making the Reich - Bank internally so strong and externally so unassailable that - even the most serious shocks in the international money and - credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime, I - have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of - the Reich Bank and of the whole of the German economy abroad on - which it was possible to lay hands. Under the proposals I have - prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is - not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public - works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be - in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy - without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the - general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to make - this report and solemn promise to you, my Führer. Heil my - Führer”—signed—“Walter Funk.” - -That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49. - -It is difficult in view of that letter to see how the Defendant Funk can -say that he did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of -the German Government to wage war. - -I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August at -Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third week of -August, preparations were complete. That speech has already been read to -the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the Tribunal’s patience if I quoted -literally half a dozen lines so as to carry the story on in sequence. - -On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth line: - - “Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were - determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.” - -The second paragraph: - - “Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the - elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. - Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of - Poland shall be the primary objective.” - -Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph: - - “I shall give a propagandists cause for starting the war, never - mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be - asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and - making a war, not the right is what matters but victory.” - -We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause, -which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax. - -I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph: - - “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come - sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, - but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few - years, and only afterwards against the East.” - -I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the intention -of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but ultimately, in -any event, to wage aggressive war against the Western Democracies. - -I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and more -significant as we continue the story of the last few days: I quote from -the fourth paragraph: - - “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us - with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which - demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute - some ‘Schweinehund’ will make a proposal for mediation. - - - - “The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made for - the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the - soldier, after I have made the political preparations.” - -And, again, the very last line becomes significant later: - - “Göring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that - the Armed Forces will do their duty.” - -We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhortations to -his generals to see how he was developing the position in the diplomatic -and political field. - -On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby -Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the Free City of -Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute setting up the -constitution of the Free City. I put in the next document, which is -taken from the _British Blue Book_, only as evidence of that event, an -event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the feeling in the Free -City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62, which becomes GB-50. - -At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi -Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has already heard the -evidence of General Lahousen the other day in which he referred to the -provision of Polish uniforms to the SS forces for these purposes, so -that dead Poles could be found lying about the German side of the -frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to three short reports which -corroborate the evidence that that gentleman came and gave before you, -and they are found in the _British Blue Book_. They are reports from the -British Ambassador in Warsaw. - -The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is dated 26th -of August. - - “A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German - frontier. - - - - “Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from the - East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish - patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned. - - - - “German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, - twice near Rybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and - attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and - hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin. - - - - “_Gazeta Polska_, in an inspired lead article today, says these - are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of - aggression of para-military disciplined detachments, supplied - with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army - detachment. Attacks more or less continuous. - - - - “These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong - attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of - aggression came from German side. This was the best answer to - the ravings of German press. - - - - “Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment - has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded another.” - -I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes GB-52. It is -dated the same date, the 26th of August. - - “Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted - by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were recently - killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. The story is without any - foundation whatever.” - -And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report of the -next day, the 27th of August. - - “So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment - of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, - if not complete falsification. - - - - “2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by - Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain, - the rest of Poland is still completely calm. - - - - “3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods - regarding Czechoslovakia last year. - - - - “4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German - provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since - March”—since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was - seized and they were ready to go against Poland—“that has since - March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I - suppose this has been done with the object: - - - - “(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public - opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent - aggression in Poland. - - - - “5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter - objects. - - - - “6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr - Hitler. - - - - “7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is - apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of - Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more - than 10 per cent of the population in any commune. - - - - “8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if - Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of - destroying Polish independence. - - “9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for - Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove - that Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.” - -And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General Lahousen’s -evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured, of a conversation -between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it becomes GB-54. That -conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the -memorandum I quote the first paragraph: - - “I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he - would not pay any attention to this action, as the Führer had - not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to - furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct - the General Staff. He says he does not think much of actions of - this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they - have been ordered by the Führer; that he could not ask the - Führer how he had planned the execution of this special action. - In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action would be - executed only by the Army.” - -That then, My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week in -August—I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22d of -August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and -we have heard in Hitler’s speech of that date to his commanders-in-chief -how it had gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the -orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that -treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the -25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of -the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment. - -Oh the same day—the 23rd of August—that the German-Russian agreement -was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed. And -of course the significance of it from a military point of view as to -Germany, particularly in the present circumstances, was obvious; and the -British Government immediately made their position clear in one last -hope—and that one last hope was that if they did so the German -Government might possibly think better of it. And I refer to Document -TC-72, Number 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part -of the Tribunal document book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to -Hitler. That document becomes GB-55: - - “Your Excellency: - - “Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures - taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press - and on the wireless this evening. - - - - “These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, - been rendered necessary by the military movements which have - been reported from Germany and by the fact that apparently the - announcement of a German-Soviet agreement is taken in some - quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great - Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need - be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may - prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot - alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His Majesty’s - Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and - which they are determined to fulfill. - - - - “It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made - their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would - have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that - allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this - occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding. - - - - “If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to - employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it is - impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It - would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once starts, - it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the - several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been - secured.” - -Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government to try and -resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force; and he -suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions -between the two Governments, the Polish and German Governments, might -take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain’s language: - - “At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a - catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the - grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the action - of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with - the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put - before you.” - -On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime -Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and it -becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always wanted -England’s friendship, and has always done everything to get it; on the -other hand, she has some essential interests which it is impossible for -Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph: - - “Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of - the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a - proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation which - is disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization - against Poland”—we see here the complete dishonesty of the - whole business—“the assertion of aggressive designs towards - Romania, Hungary, and so forth as well as the so-called - guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had, - however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of - this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also. - - - - “The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland, that - she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances - regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, - could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement - thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave - of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German - inhabitants living in Poland.” - -Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British Ambassador, to -which I just referred: - - “The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that - country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for a great - power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a - passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty - of numerous breaches of her obligations towards the Free City of - Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has - initiated a process of economic strangulation.” - -It goes on to say that “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the -persecution” and the fact that there is a British guarantee to Poland -makes no difference to her determination to end this state of affairs. I -quote from Paragraph 7: - - “The German Reich Government has received information to the - effect that the British Government has the intention to carry - out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements - contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against - Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since - Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures - other than those of a defensive character against England or - France and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, - and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France, - it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime - Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated - act of menace directed against the Reich. I, therefore, inform - your Excellency that in the event of these military - announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate - mobilization of the German forces.” - -If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful, if they -really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lies; -these lies saying that they had never intended to attack England or -France, carried out no mobilization, statements which, in view of what -we now have, we know to be lies? What can have been their object if -their intention had always been for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig -question only? Then I quote again from the last paragraph: - - “The question of the treatment of European problems on a - peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but - primarily on those who since the crime committed by the - Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any - peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the part - of the responsible powers can there be any real change in the - relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life - fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by - British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however, - convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be - any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be - happier than I.” - -On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of mutual -assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read the document. -The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents where both Governments -undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression -against either by any third power. I point to Document TC-73; it is -Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall refer to the fact of its signing -again in a moment but perhaps it is convenient while we are dealing with -a letter between the British Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to -a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the -French Prime Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because -it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set -about their pattern of aggression. “The French Ambassador in Berlin has -informed me of your personal communication,” written on the 26th of -August: - - “In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility - which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon - themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great - nations who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to - you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of - peace still rests in your hands alone. - - - - “You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany, - nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman - has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations - not only peace but also sincere co-operation in their own - interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. - Unless you credit the French people with a lower sense of honor - than I credit to the German nation, you cannot doubt that France - loyally fulfills her obligations toward other powers, such as - Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace - with Germany. These two convictions are fully compatible. - - - - “Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution - of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for all - nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides. - - - - “Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all - her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s - readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual - application of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined - between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the - clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differences - which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question - of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such - a method with a purpose of reaching a peaceful and just - solution. - - - - “Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in - France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, - which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my - country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not - prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state - of mind. - - - - “In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded - human being could understand it if a war of destruction were - started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful - settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace - could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any prejudice - to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French - and the German people, and who am, on the other hand, bound to - Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as - head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man - can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion. - - - - “You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I - do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war - have left in the conscience of the people without any regard to - its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your - outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road - of peace, toward the fulfillment of its task in the common work - of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion. - - - - “If French and German blood should be shed again as it was shed - 25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war, then each - of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But - the most certain victors will be destruction and barbarity.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for the United -States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Lieutenant -Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement to the Defense -Counsel. - -At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion -pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown -for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30. - -DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the Defense -that they do not consider it necessary that the films be shown to them -before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice. We fully and with -gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness to facilitate our work; -but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of our cases -and by the necessary consultations with our clients. - -The question of films is on a level different from that of documents. -Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously or later; but -since we can hear and take note of the testimony of witnesses only -during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an even greater -degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted with the films -submitted as evidence only during the proceedings. We believe the -Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing every film to us on -some evening before it is shown again in the proceedings. We hope this -will not be construed as, shall I say, a sort of demonstration in some -respect, for the reason really is that our time is so fully taken up by -our preparations that all superfluous work might well be spared both the -Prosecution and us. I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully -appreciate the Prosecution’s manifest readiness to facilitate our work, -and I ask that my words be understood in this light. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for -the defendants’ counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them -before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying? - -DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said. - -THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr. -Dix began his observation; but I understand that what he says is that in -view of the amount of preparation which the defendants’ counsel have to -undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these -films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he -wishes to express his gratification at the co-operation of the Counsel -for the Prosecution. - -COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It’s all right with us. We were doing it -for their benefit. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I -had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler, of the 26th of -August. On the 27th of August Hitler replied to that letter, and I think -it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same -as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the -letter that he had received earlier in the week. - -Those two letters are taken from the _German White Book_ which I put in -evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those -letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could say that the -German Government could be in any doubt as to the position that was to -be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of a -German aggression against Poland. - -But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August -President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the Polish -Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter: - - “In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated - that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it - in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that - impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, - with goodwill on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive - solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world - was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe - appears to be very near at hand indeed. - - - - “To the message which I sent you last April I have received no - reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world - peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all - other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with - the hope that the war which impends, and the consequent disaster - to all peoples, may yet be averted. - - - - “I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging - the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of - Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any - positive act of hostility for a reasonable, stipulated period; - and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the - controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three - following methods: - - - - “First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of - these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they - can both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution - of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation.” - -I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As I have -already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to -his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning. - -That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes GB-59. - -I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126, GB-60, -which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish -Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any -of the peaceful methods suggested. - -On the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the German -Government, President Roosevelt wrote again: - - “I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply - to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency and to him - last night.” - -The text of the Polish reply is then set out. - - “Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims - and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable. - - - - “In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it - plain that the Polish Government are willing, upon the basis set - forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has - arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by - direct negotiation or the process of conciliation. - - - - “Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still be - restored that the nations of the modern world may even now - construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier - relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will - agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the - Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, - will accept.” - -But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept the appeals -by the Pope which appear in the next document. - -I am sorry—the President of Poland’s reply, TC-72 becomes Number 127, -GB-61. - -They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay heed to the -Pope’s appeal, which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same date, the 24th of -August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it is necessary to read -that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further -appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC-72, Number 14, which -becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I -think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal’s translation: - - “The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations - may lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole world - continues to pray for.” - -I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had -realized that those negotiations to which he referred as the “pending -negotiations” in the last days of August, which we are about to deal -with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus insofar as Germany -was concerned, and put forward, as indeed they were—and as I hope to -illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment—simply as an endeavor to -dissuade England either by threat or by bribe from meeting her -obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the -trouble in ever addressing that last appeal. - -It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to which I -now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all; that -there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, -negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with -Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and -conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the -obligations that they had undertaken. - -Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize in a word -those last negotiations. - -On the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact was -signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies to march -the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news -apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish -Governments had actually signed a formal pact of non-aggression and of -mutual assistance. Until that time, it will be remembered, the position -was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a -joint communiqué had been issued—I think on the 6th of April—that they -would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but no formal -agreement had been signed. - -Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given by him, the -news came that such a formal document had been signed; and the invasion -was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep -England and France out of the war—not to end the war, not to cancel the -war, but to keep them out. - -And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the invasion, -Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Henderson which, as the -Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat with which he hoped -to persuade England to keep out. - -On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British -Government’s reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply stressed -that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The British -Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed and, -indeed, any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers, -which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the -German Reich. - -As I say, one really need not consider what would have been acceptable -and not acceptable because once it had been made clear—as indeed it was -in that British Government’s reply of the 28th of August—that England -would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, -the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but -were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and -to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the -appeals to reason that were being put forward. - -On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to Sir -Nevile Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British -Government’s reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is -quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something -which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct -conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands -that those conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the -Reich and also of the whole of the Corridor. - -It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that Poland -had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his -demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrangement for an -extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to -East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now -demands the whole of the Corridor; no question of an Autobahn or -railway. The whole thing must become German. - -Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not be -accepted, he says: - - “. . . on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion; - but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a - plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to - be here in Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939.” - -This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer -had to be transmitted first to London, and from London to Warsaw; and -from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their -Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible to get -authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. -It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at -all. As Sir Nevile Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an -ultimatum. - -At midnight on the 30th of August at the time by which the Polish -Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Nevile Henderson saw -Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in -which Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to Ribbentrop in -reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening, -and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two- or three-page document -which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the -discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out -quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British -Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So -that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having -before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and -magnanimously offering to discuss. - -On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and -could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. -When he did not—when he said he did not come with full powers, -Ribbentrop said that he would put the position before the Führer. But, -in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Führer -by that time, because on the 31st of August—I am afraid I am unable to -give you the exact time—but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already -issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in which he -laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the -1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August at 9 o’clock -the German radio broadcast the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out -to Sir Nevile Henderson the night before, saying that these were the -proposals which had been made for discussion but that, as no Polish -Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the German Government -assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o’clock on the -evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever -heard of the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British -Government or their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other -than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused -to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th. - -After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its -course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile Henderson, -for the first time. - -Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the Tribunal, the -timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to -refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. I first -put in evidence an extract from the interrogation of the Defendant -Göring, which was taken on the 29th of August 1945. - -DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Göring, I object to -the use of this document which is an extract from testimony given by the -Defendant Göring. Since the defendant is present here in court, he can -at any time be called to the stand and give direct evidence on this -subject before the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection? - -DR. STAHMER: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your -objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b) and (c) of the -Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prosecutors shall -undertake, among others, the duty of “the preliminary examination of all -necessary witnesses and of the defendants”; and Article 16 provides -that: - - “In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following - procedure shall be followed: . . . (b) During any preliminary - examination . . . of a defendant he shall have the right to give - any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; (c) A - preliminary examination of a defendant . . . shall be conducted - in, or translated into, a language which the defendant - understands.” - -Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show -that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations -may be put in evidence. - -DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is possible to call -a witness, direct examination in court is preferable, since the evidence -thus obtained is more concrete. - -THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the -defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has -nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation—his -preliminary examination. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put in as GB-64. -I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th -line. The Defendant Göring says there: - - “On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, - the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that he had - stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether - this was just temporary or for good. He said ‘No, I will have to - see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the answer? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question: - - “When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London - brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or - the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a - peaceful solution was impossible?”—answer—“Yes, it seemed - impossible after my conviction”—I think that must be a bad - translation—“according to my conviction.” - - - - THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - - - LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Continuing._] “. . . but not - according to the convictions of the Führer. When it was - mentioned to the Führer that England had given her guarantee to - Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but - then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and - this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At - this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The - guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of - the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to - Poland, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me that - he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then - whether this was just temporary, or for good. He said, ‘No, I - will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’ - So, then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any - different within 4 or 5 days?’ At this same time—I do not know - whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in communication - with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular - diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England. - After the guarantee, I held an English declaration of war - inevitable. I already told him in the spring of 1939, after - occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on, if he - tried to solve the Polish question, he would have to count on - the enmity of England—1939, that is, after the Protectorate. - - - - “Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign - against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed - by the end of August 1939?’ - - - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - - - “Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the - campaign against Poland came sometime between the 15th and 20th - of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty with Soviet - Russia?’”—The dates obviously are wrong there. - - - - “Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’ - - - - “Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign - was ordered for the 25th of August but on the 24th of August in - the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order - to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the - English Ambassador?’ - - - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” - -My only comment upon that document is in respect to the second paragraph -where Göring is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will -remember how it was Göring, after the famous speech of the 22d of August -to his commanders-in-chief, who got up and thanked the Führer for his -exhortation and assured him that the Armed Forces would play their part. - -I omit the next document in the document book, which carries the matter -a little further, and we go on to Hitler’s verbal communiqué, as it is -called in the _British Blue Book_, that he handed to Sir Nevile -Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of -the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting -her obligations. He states in the first paragraph, after hearing the -British Ambassador, that he is anxious to make one more effort to save -war. In the second paragraph, he asserts again that Poland’s -provocations were unbearable; and I quote Paragraph 2: - - “Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these - Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, - to do so in the interests of quiet and order and also in the - interests of European peace. - - - - “The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The - British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the - least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At - the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and - incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would - be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last - war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts.”—One - sees the threats, veiled threats, appearing in this - paragraph—“Agreement with Russia was unconditional and - signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would - last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take - up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements - reached with Russia would also render Germany secure - economically for the longest possible period of war. - - - - “The Führer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War - between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to - Germany, but none at all to England.” - -Then we come to the bribe: - - “The Führer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved - and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined, - after the solution of this problem, to approach England once - more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great - decisions; and in this case also, he will be capable of being - great in his action.”—and then, magnanimously—“He accepts the - British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its - continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich - at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which - are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means . . . . His - obligations to Italy remain untouched.” - -Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into war with -Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs: - - “If the British Government would consider these ideas, a - blessing for Germany . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of Paragraph 3? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it—Paragraph 3: - - “He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of - Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs: - - “If the British Government would consider these ideas, a - blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might - result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war. In no - case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. - The Führer repeats that he himself is a man of far-reaching - decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer - . . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the matter can be -investigated. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer from -Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72, Number 68, and which -becomes GB-65. - -The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real object -that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value and -desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th of -August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They -agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote -from Paragraph 4: - - “In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a reasonable - solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and - should be effected by agreement between the two countries on - lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential - interests; and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of - April, the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these - interests to Poland. - - “But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the - German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty’s Government - consider it essential for the success of the discussions, which - would precede the agreement, that it should be understood - beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by - other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready, if - desired, to make their contribution to the effective operation - of such a guarantee.” - -I go to the last paragraph on that page, Paragraph 6: - - “His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own - attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between - Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will - not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous - concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to - use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution - which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.” - -That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head. They had failed -by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her -obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of -their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much -as possible. The last document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir -Nevile Henderson’s account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which -becomes GB-67. - -During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir Nevile -Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that they were -determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One -paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters -that were to follow, paragraph 10: - - “In the end I asked him two straight questions: ‘Was he willing - to negotiate directly with the Poles?’ and ‘Was he ready to - discuss the question of an exchange of population?’ He replied - in the affirmative as regards the latter, although there I have - no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a - rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, he said he - could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply - of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such - a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop - and said, ‘We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it - with him.’” - -Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finally repeated -to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so far as -he was concerned. - -I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which becomes -GB-68. - -The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir Nevile -Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the -suggestion submitted by the British Government in their previous note; -and it goes on to say that the German Government are prepared to enter -into discussion on the basis that the whole of the Corridor, as well as -Danzig, are returned to the Reich. I quote particularly the next to the -last paragraph on the first page of that document: - - “The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the - revision of the Versailles Treaty, which has always been - recognized as being necessary, in regard to this territory, - namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the - safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in - the territories remaining to Poland.” - -It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has been -recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands consisted only -of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway. - -The Tribunal will remember the position which he is trying to get out of -now. He is trying to manufacture justification by putting forth -proposals which under no possible circumstances could either Poland or -Great Britain accept. But, as I said before, he wanted to make doubly -certain. - -I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph: - - “The British Government attach importance to two considerations: - (1) That the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be - eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation; and (2) - that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it - would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded - in the economic and political sphere by means of international - guarantees. - - - - “On this subject the German Government make the following - declaration: - - - - “Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, - they are, nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal - and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already - been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made - upon them by the written statement received from the British - Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in - accordance with the general lines indicated to the British - Ambassador.” - -And then, to the last but one paragraph: - - “For the rest, in making these proposals, the German Government - have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital - interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish - State.” - -These letters really sound like the letters of some common swindler -rather than of the government of a great nation. - - “The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances - agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good - offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary - with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on - Wednesday, the 30th August 1939. - - - - “The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a - solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place - these at the disposal of the British Government before the - arrival of the Polish negotiator.” - -That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and as I have -explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish Emissary -there by midnight the following night. That document was GB-68. - -The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson’s account of the interval, -summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly Paragraph 4: - - “I remarked that this phrase”—that is the passage about the - Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following - night—“sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks - both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was - only intended to stress the urgency of the moment when the two - fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.” - -That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The last -document becomes GB-69. - -Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson handed -this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of the 30th -of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not -read at length. The British Government reciprocate the desire for -improved relations. They stress again that they cannot sacrifice the -interest of other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the -situation. They understand, they say, that the German Government accept -the condition that the settlement should be subject to international -guarantee. They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans -put forward in their last letter and they are informing the Polish -Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German -Government are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72, Number 89, -will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we go to the next -document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-72, Number 92, which becomes GB-71. -It is not a very long document. It is perhaps worth reading in full: - - “I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s - Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Government to - accept the procedure adumbrated in the German reply and - suggested that he should adopt the normal contact, i.e. that - when German proposals were ready, to invite the Polish - Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to - his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. - I added that if this basis afforded prospect of settlement, His - Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in - Warsaw to temporize negotiations. - - - - “Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he - read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that he would - eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow too - closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though I - cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points were - . . . .”—and I need not read out the main points. - -I go to Paragraph 3: - - “When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in - accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he - asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had - not arrived in Berlin by midnight. - - - - “I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that the - request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on the - 30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite of - what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he - denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my - imagination. Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the normal - procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and ask the - Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had summoned me - a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to the - Polish Government? In the most violent terms Ribbentrop said - that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted - that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might - be different. I said that I would, naturally, inform my - Government so at once. Whereupon he said, while those were his - personal views, he would bring all that I had said to Hitler’s - notice. It was for the Chancellor to decide. - - - - “We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von - Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping - Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the - Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly - surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler - himself had admitted to me yesterday.” - -Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time that -Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days -before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30 in the evening, -Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. -This document, the next Document TC-73, Number 112, becomes GB-72, and -is a short account in a report to Mr. Beck: - - “I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had - special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I - said, ‘No’. He then asked whether I had been informed that on - London’s suggestion the German Government had expressed their - readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish - Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to - have arrived on the preceding day, the 30th of August. I replied - that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion, - Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to - negotiate. He would communicate my _démarche_ to the - Chancellor.” - -As I have indicated already, it was too late. The orders had already -been given on that day to the German Army to invade. - -I turn to C-126. It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it were -put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page, for the order -(most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described as his -“Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War,” dated 31st of August -1939. Paragraph 1: - - “(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by - peaceful means of a situation on the eastern frontier, which is - intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined on a - solution by force. - - - - “(2) The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance - with the preparations made for Case White with the alterations - which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it - has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions. - - - - “Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged. - - - - “The date of attack: 1st of September 1939; time of attack: - 4:45”—inserted in red pencil—“this time also applies to the - operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge. - - - - “(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the - opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England - and France. At first, purely local action should be taken - against insignificant frontier violations.” - -There it sets out the details of the order which, for the purpose of -this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o’clock the -German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which -they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish -Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered -that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish Government -nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and -it is indeed a document which is tempting to read—or to read extracts -of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy. I refer -to the second paragraph Document TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39: - - “Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able - to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding - available to the British Government by the time the Polish - negotiator arrived in Berlin.” - -Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say -that: - - “Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized - Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich - received of their readiness for an understanding was the news of - the Polish mobilization; and only toward 12 o’clock on the night - of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a somewhat general - assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement - of negotiations. - - - - “Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the - Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary - conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views - of the German Government as regards a possible basis for - negotiation, since His Majesty’s Government themselves had - pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the - German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop gave the British - Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last - British note, precise information as to the text of the German - proposals which will be regarded as a basis of negotiation in - the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary.” - -And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their -version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days. - -I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal’s book, TC-54, which -becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his armies were already -crossing the frontier and the whole of the frontier, he issued this -proclamation to his Armed Forces: - - “The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly - relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue by way of - arms. - - - - “The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror - and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation, - which cannot be tolerated by a great power, show that Poland is - no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an - end to these mad acts, I can see no other way but from now - onwards to meet force with force. - - - - “The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up - the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the - resuscitated German people. - - - - “I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of - the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the - last. - - - - “Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the - representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany. - - - - “Long live our people and the Reich.” - -And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He -had afforded them their propagandistic justification; and at that time, -anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. “The -victor shall not be asked later on, whether he told the truth or not.” -Might is what counts—or victory is what counts and not right. - -On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this violation of -Polish ground, the British Government in accordance with their treaty -obligations sent an ultimatum to the German Government in which they -stated—I quote from the last paragraph: - - “I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the - German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government - satisfactory assurances that the German Government have - suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared - promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His - Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without - hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.” - -By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and so at 9 -o’clock—the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just referred to will -be GB-74—at 9 o’clock on the 3rd of September, a final ultimatum was -handed to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. I quote from the third -paragraph: - - “Although this communication was made more than 24 hours ago, no - reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been - continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honor to - inform you that, unless not later than 11 o’clock British summer - time today, the 3rd of September, satisfactory assurances to the - above effect have been given by the German Government and have - reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will - exist between the two countries as from that hour.” - -And so it was that at 11 o’clock on the 3rd of September a state of war -existed between Germany and England and between Germany and France. All -the appeals to peace, all the appeals to reason we now see completely -stillborn; stillborn when they were made. Plans, preparations, -intentions, determination to carry out this assault upon Poland, had -been going on for months, for years before. It mattered not what anybody -but the German Government had in mind or whatever rights anybody else -but the German nation thought they had; and, if there is any doubt left -at all after what we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more -documents. - -If you would look at the last document first of all, in your document -book—1831-PS, which becomes GB-75. Even now on the 3rd of September, -Mussolini offers some chance of peace. - -We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I am afraid I am -unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or evening; but it is -dated the 3rd of September, and I quote: - - “The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the - Duce’s order the following copy for the Führer and Reich - Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs: - - - - “‘Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every - decision to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a - conference with France, England, and Poland on the following - basis: - - - - “‘1. An armistice which would leave the army corps where they - are at present’”—and it will be remembered that on the 3rd of - September they had advanced a considerable way over the - frontier—“‘2. calling a conference within 2 or 3 days;—“‘3. - solution of the Polish-German controversy would be certainly - favorable for Germany as matters stand today. - - - - “‘This idea, which originated from the Duce, has its foremost - exponent in France. - - - - “‘Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already - securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany - has had already her “moral satisfaction.” If she would accept - the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at - the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect - of being universal and of extremely long duration.’” - -But, My Lord, perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all -Germany’s aims were; and, of course, the offer was turned down in the -illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply. I refer you back -to the document before that. It is still part of the same Exhibit GB-75. - -THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the “GB” references you give are not -on the documents at all; they are the exhibit numbers themselves, which -are to be put on the document after they have been put in. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will be put in by -the Court, of course. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you try to make clear the references which are on -the document so that the Tribunal could find the document itself? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. The last document was 1831-PS, and it is -the very last one in the document book. That is the one I have just -referred to—the telegram from Mussolini. The document to which I am -about to refer is the one before last in the Tribunal’s book but it has -the same number on it as the last because it forms part of the same -exhibit. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would just explain the system in which the -exhibits are numbered, it would help us. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the present moment -before they are put in evidence with a variety of serial numbers, such -as “PS”, “TC”, “L” and other letters. There is no significance attached -to that at all. It depends on whom they have been found by and what -files they have come from. When the documents are put in as exhibits, -they are marked by the Court with a court number. The documents put in -by the United States representatives were all prefixed with the letters -“USA.” The documents which have been put in by the British prosecutors -have all been prefixed with the letters “GB.” If it would be of any -assistance to members of the Tribunal, I will have their document books -marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been put -upon them by the Court officials, during the course of the day. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will talk about that later. - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If there is any document missing from any of -these books, I have a copy. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 1831-PS? - -LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that is GB-75. - - “Duce: - - - - “I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation, - I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition that - there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that - the conference would be successful. Because for the last 2 days - the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid - advance in Poland, it would have been impossible to devaluate - the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. - Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found if - England would not have been determined to wage war under all - circumstances. I have not given in to the English because, Duce, - I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more - than one-half a year or a year. Under these circumstances I - thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was - better for resistance. At present the superiority of the German - Armed Forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all the fields that - the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt - whether this fast success could have been achieved in 1 or 2 - years. England and France would have armed their allies to such - an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German - Armed Forces could not have become so apparent any more. I am - aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter is one for life and - death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am - also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and - that one has to choose, after cold deliberation, the moment for - resistance in such a way that the probability of success is - guaranteed; and I believe in this success, Duce, with the - firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind - assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few - fields. I acknowledge this in advance, with sincere thanks. But - I believe also—even if we march now over different roads—that - fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany - were destroyed by the Western Democracies, the Fascist Italy - would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always - aware of this community of the future of our two governments and - I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in - Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, - of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man - on unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of - great operational considerations. The northern Polish Army, - which is in the Corridor, has already been completely encircled - by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. - Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily - achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The - superiority of our Air Force is complete, although scarcely - one-third of it is in Poland. In the West, I will be on the - defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the - moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with - the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all - your assistance which you have given to me in the past; and I - ask you not to deny it to me in the future.” - -That completes the evidence which I propose to offer upon this part of -the case in respect of the war of aggression against Poland, England, -and France, which is charged in Count Two. - -MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, in the early hours of the morning of the 9th of -April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. It is my duty to -present to the Tribunal the Prosecution’s evidence which has been -prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Major Hinely, with -regard to these brutal wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances. With -the Court’s permission I would like, first of all, to deal with the -treaties and agreements and assurances that were in fact violated by -these two invasions of Norway and Denmark. - -The invasions were, of course, in the first instance violations of the -Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. My learned friend, Sir -David Maxwell-Fyfe, has already dealt with those matters in the course -of his presentation of the evidence. In addition to these general -treaties, there were specific agreements between Germany and Norway and -Denmark. In the first instance there was the Treaty of Arbitration and -Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on -2 June 1926. The Court will find that treaty, TC-17, on the first page -of British Document Book Number 3; and to that exhibit it may be -convenient to give the Number GB-76. I am proposing to read only the -first article of that treaty, which is in these terms: - - “The contracting parties undertake to submit to the procedure of - arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present - treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise - between Germany and Denmark, and which it has not been possible - to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring - with the consent of both parties, before the Permanent Court of - International Justice. - - - - “Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been - laid down in other conventions in force between the contracting - parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of - such conventions.” - -Then there follows in the remaining articles the establishment of the -machinery for arbitration. - -I would next refer to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and -Denmark, which was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 31st of May -1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was 10 weeks after the Nazi -seizure of Czechoslovakia. The Court will find that as Document TC-24 in -the document book and it will now bear the Exhibit Number GB-77. - -With the Court’s permission, in view of the identity of the signatory of -that treaty, I would like to read the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2. - - “The Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the King of - Denmark and Iceland, being firmly resolved to maintain peace - between Denmark and Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to - confirm this resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as - their Plenipotentiaries: The Chancellor of the German Reich - . . . and His Majesty, the King of Denmark and Iceland . . . .” - -Article 1 reads as follows: - - “The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark shall in no case - resort to war or to any other use of force, one against the - other. - - - - “Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken - by a third power against one of the contracting parties, the - other contracting party shall not support such action in any - way.” - -Then Article 2 deals with the ratification of the treaty, and the second -paragraph states: - - “The treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the - instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a - period of 10 years from that date . . . .” - -As the Tribunal will observe, the treaty is dated the 31st of May 1939. -At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of the Defendant -Ribbentrop. The Tribunal will shortly see that less than a year after -the signature of this treaty the invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces -was to show the utter worthlessness of treaties to which the Defendant -Ribbentrop put his signature. - -With regard to Norway, the Defendant Ribbentrop and the Nazi -conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. In the first instance I -would refer to Document TC-30, which is the next document in the British -Document Book 3 and which will bear the Exhibit Number GB-78. The -Tribunal will observe that that is an assurance given to Denmark, -Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939. That, of -course, was after the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the -confidence of the world; and this was presumably an attempt, now -submitted by the Prosecution to be a dishonest attempt, to try to -reassure the Scandinavian States. The assurance is in a speech by Hitler -and reads: - - “. . . I have given binding declarations to a large number of - states. None of these states can complain that even a trace of a - demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. - None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend - that a request has ever been put to them by the German - Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible - with the sovereignty and integrity of their state. - - - - “I was pleased that a number of European states availed - themselves of these declarations by the German Government to - express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. - This applies to the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, - _et cetera_.” - -A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on the 2d of -September 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the day after -the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the next document in -British Document Book 3 is the Document TC-31, which will be Exhibit -GB-79. That is an _aide-mémoire_ that was handed to the Norwegian -Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on the 2d of September -1939. It reads: - - “The German Reich Government are determined, in view of the - friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under - no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of - Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In - making this declaration, the Reich Government naturally expect - on their side that Norway will observe an unimpeachable - neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches - of Norwegian neutrality by any third party. Should the attitude - of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any - such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich - Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the - interest of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation - might dictate.” - -There follows, finally, the further German assurance to Norway, which -appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which will be Exhibit -GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939; and if the -Court will observe Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, the extract from -the speech reads as follows: - - “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points - of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any - today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression - pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they - did not feel themselves threatened in any way.” - -Those are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave. The Court -will see that violation of those assurances is charged in Paragraph XXII -of Appendix C of the Indictment at Page 43. The Court will notice that -there is a minor typographical error in the date of the first assurance -which is alleged in the Indictment to have been given on the 3rd of -September 1939. The Court will see from Document TC-31, which is Exhibit -GB-79, that the assurance was in fact given on the 2d of September 1939. - -Now those treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the -brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and the evidence which the -Prosecution will now place before the Court will in my submission -establish beyond reasonable doubt that these assurances were simply -given to lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi -aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For we now know -that as early as October 1939 these conspirators and their confederates -were plotting the invasion of Norway, and the evidence will indicate -that the most active conspirators in that plot were the Defendants -Raeder and Rosenberg. - -The Norwegian invasion is, in one respect, not a typical Nazi aggression -in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief -instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he -thought Norway strategically important and because he coveted glory for -his Navy, Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway which -he sought to develop. - -As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling the -Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent, the -very personification of perfidy. - -The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade -Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder wrote on the 10th -of January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official German naval historian. - -I put in this letter, the document C-66, which will be Exhibit GB-81, -and which the Court will find further on in this book of documents. I -should explain that in this book of documents the documents are inserted -in the numerical order of the series to which they belong and not in the -order of their submission to the Court. I am trusting that that will be -a more convenient form of bundling them together than to set them down -in the order of presentation. - -THE PRESIDENT: 66? - -MAJOR JONES: C-66. It is headed, “Memorandum to Admiral Assmann; for his -own information; not to be used for publication.” - -The Court will observe that the first page deals with Barbarossa. If the -Tribunal turns to the next page headed “(b) Weserübung,” the Tribunal -will find from documents which I shall shortly be submitting to the -Court that Weserübung was the code name for the invasion of Norway and -Denmark. - -I will omit the first sentence. The document which, as I have said, is a -communication from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann reads as follows: - - “During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October - 1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a - detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an - occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this - letter on to C/SKL”—which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval - War Staff—“for their information and prepared some notes based - on this letter . . . for my report to the Führer, which I made - on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was absolutely - identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that time SKL was - more dubious about the matter. In these notes I stressed the - disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would - have for us: Control of the approaches to the Baltic, - outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on - Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for - us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast: Outlet to the North - Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the - years 1917-18. Naturally, at the time, only the coast and bases - were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the - course of our correspondence, thought that Narvik could be - excluded . . . . The Führer saw at once the significance of the - Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated - that he wished to consider the question himself.” - -I will pause in the reading of that document at that point and return to -it later so that the story may be revealed to the Court in a -chronological order. - -That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the whole evolution -of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good example of the -participation of the German High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to -attack inoffensive neighbors. - -This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has revealed that -Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October 1939 . . . - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report? - -MAJOR JONES: The report, C-66, was made in January 1944 by the Defendant -Raeder to Assmann, who was the German naval historian, and so, -presumably, was for the purposes of history. - -Before Raeder’s report of 10 October 1939 was made to the Führer, Raeder -got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On the 3rd of October -Raeder made out the questionnaire to which I now invite the Court’s -attention. It is Document C-122 and the Court will find it next but one -to C-66 in the document book. That will now be Exhibit GB-82. - -That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed “Gaining of Bases in -Norway (extract from War Diary)” and bears the date of the 3rd of -October 1939. It reads: - - “The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff”—who was the Defendant - Raeder—“considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as - soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Operations Staff - on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the - north. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain - bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and - Germany, with the basic aim of improving our strategic and - operational position. The following questions must be given - consideration: - - - - “(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases? - - - - “(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will - if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting? - - - - “(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation? - - - - “(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases - or have they already decisive advantages suitable for supply - position?” - -Then there follows in parenthesis: - - “The Commander of the U-boat Fleet”—which is a reference, of - course, to the Defendant Dönitz—”. . . considers such harbors - already extremely useful as equipment and supply bases at which - Atlantic U-boats can call temporarily.” - -And then Question (e): - - “What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war - at sea in gaining bases in north Denmark, e.g. Skagen?” - -There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will be -necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the first of -the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83. - -This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Dönitz on Norwegian bases. -It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the Defendant Raeder -which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at about that time. The -document is headed, “Commander of the U-boat Fleet; Operations -Division,” and is marked “most secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.” - -Then there are set out “suppositions,” “advantages and disadvantages,” -and, over one page, “conclusions”. I am proposing to read the last -paragraph, III: - - “The following is therefore proposed: - - - - “(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including: - - “a) Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, - provisions; - - - - “b) Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an - encounter; - - - - “c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews; - - - - “d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and M/S - units. - - - - “(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in - Narvik as an alternative.” - -That is a Dönitz memorandum. - -Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann, in October -1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not -yet committed himself to it, although, as the Tribunal will see very -shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to any suggestions of aggression -against the territory of another country. - -The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered in pressing -his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a -powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg. - -The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a -political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but should -proof be required of that statement it is found in the remarkable -document which I now invite the Court to consider. I refer to Document -007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in the document book. That -will be Exhibit GB-84. - -That is headed on Page 1, “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign -Affairs Bureau of the Party”—Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP—“from -1933 to 1943.” It reads: - - “When the Foreign Affairs Bureau”—Aussenpolitisches Amt—“was - established on the 1st of April 1933, the Führer directed that - it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency; but - should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and - suggestions. - - - - “Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted - by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the - newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to - internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the - effects of world Bolshevism, primarily in other European - countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated - groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting - Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and states - bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand those nations and - states constituted an insulating ring encircling the Bolshevist - neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of German - living space and took up a flanking position towards the Western - Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired - influence by one means or another”—and the Court will shortly - see the significance of that phrase—“the bureau was compelled - to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the - completely different living conditions, the ties of blood and - intellect, and historical dependence of the movements observed - by the bureau in those countries. - - - - “In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon - attitude based on economic considerations had become more - dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the bureau put - the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations - with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic - Society in Lübeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of - this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, - especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely - political co-operation in Sweden and Denmark, an association - based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very - close relations, which led to further consequences, were - established with its founder.” - -If the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the statement -which is 4 pages forward—in the intervening pages, I may say, there is -an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s bureau in various parts of -Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not proposing to call the -Tribunal’s attention to at this stage—but if the Tribunal will look at -the last paragraph of the main body of the report which bears the -signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, the last two sentences read: - - “With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task - as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections - in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.” - -If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document, which is on the -next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what “exploitation of personal -connections” involved. - -Annex I to the document is headed, “Brief Report on Activities of the -Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” It is -headed, “The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway -during the War Years 1939-40,” and it reads: - - “As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in - Scandinavia only Nasjonal Samling, led in Norway by the former - Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved - serious political attention. This was a fighting political group - possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community. Naturally - all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent by any - means its success among the population. The bureau maintained - constant relation with Quisling and attentively observed the - attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, - which had been taken in tow by the English. From the beginning - it appeared probable that without revolutionary events which - would stir the population from their former attitude no - successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. - During the winter 1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a - member of the bureau. When the political situation in Europe - came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the - convention of the Nordic Society in Lübeck in June. He expounded - his conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning - Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically - decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and to - the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the - Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German - Reich and Great Britain. - - - - “Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to - the Marshal of the Reich, Göring, for aero-strategical reasons, - Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the bureau. - The Staff Director of the bureau handed the Chief of the Reich - Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Führer . . . .” - -In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later stage of -my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will see how -Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution’s submission -with regard to this document is that it is another illustration of the -close interweaving between the political and the military leadership of -the Nazi State, of the close link between the professional soldiers and -the professional thugs. - -The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his -collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite the Court’s attention -once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit GB-81. In the page headed -“Weserübung,” the second paragraph of the Raeder report reads as -follows: - - “In the further developments, I was supported by Commander - Schreiber, Naval Attaché in Oslo, and the M-Chief personally—in - conjunction with the Rosenberg organization. Thus we got in - touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in the - beginning of December and were taken to the Führer by me—with - the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg . . . .” - -I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the developments in -December. - -The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did make contact -personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the -Court’s attention to the Document C-65, which precedes . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph? - -MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship’s permission, I would like to revert to -that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence. - -In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a report of -Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness -for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was -reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder. - -Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have already dealt -with in reading Rosenberg’s statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will -look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85, C-65, it reads as -follows: - - “The reasons for a _coup_, on which Quisling made a report, - would be provided by the fact that the Storthing”—that is to - say the Norwegian parliament—“had, in defiance of the - constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which - is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains - in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister - of War the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed - me the original of a letter which he had received only a short - time previously from the commanding officer in Narvik, Colonel - Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the - fact that if things went on as they were going at present, - Norway was finished.” - -If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, the last two -paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the -government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in collaboration -with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to the Court. - - “A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of - a _coup_ and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians - to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a - purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and provided with - experienced and die-hard National Socialists who are practiced - in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with - all speed to Norway where details would then require to be - further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to - be taken over forthwith, and at the same time, the German Fleet - together with suitable contingents of the German Army would go - into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian - Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. - Quisling has no doubts that such a _coup_, having been carried - out with instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the - approval of those sections of the army with which he at present - has connections; and thus it goes without saying that he has - never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the King - is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an - accomplished fact.” - -How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of course, by -subsequent developments. The last sentence reads: - - “Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required - which accord with German calculations.” - -The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole vocabulary -of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated? - -MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o’clock._] - - - - - FIFTEENTH DAY - Friday, 7 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the -Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy -against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and -Rosenberg converged. And the Court will remember that I submitted in -evidence Document C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg -to Raeder regarding Quisling and ending with the infamous words, -“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which -accord with German calculations.” - -The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read material -parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral -Assmann which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder -did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin. - -I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for the purpose -of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will observe that that -is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the -12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants -Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to -Hitler. - -The report is headed “Norwegian Question,” and the first sentence reads: - - “Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—who of course was the Defendant - Raeder—“has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the - impression of being reliable.” - -And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of -Quisling’s views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because -of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but I draw the -Court’s attention to the fourth paragraph in Document C-64, beginning: - - “The Führer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that - he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg - once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a - long while. Commander-in-Chief, Navy”—that is, of course, - Raeder—“suggests that if the Führer forms a favorable - impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with - Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation: - (a) By peaceful means—that is to say, German forces summoned by - Norway; (b) to agree to do so by force.” - -That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder made this -report to Hitler. - -If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder’s record of -these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court will observe, -in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 -headed “(b) Weserübung,” these words: - - “. . . thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came - to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken to the - Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” - -And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page: - - “At the crucial moment R”—presumably Rosenberg—“hurt his foot, - so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th - December.” - -That is, of course, Raeder’s note; and it indicates the extent of his -contact in this conspiracy. The report continues: - - “On the grounds of the Führer’s discussion with Quisling and - Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the - Führer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian - operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces. - - - - “Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no part - in the development of the Norwegian question and continued to be - somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations which were - undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme Command of the - Armed Forces were founded, however, on a memorandum of the naval - war staff.” - -The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder referring -to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because the Court will see -that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that -preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme -Command of the Armed Forces. - -If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further on in -the document book and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg’s -report on the activities of his organization—it is after the “D” -documents—if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from the bottom of -the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the Court will see that -there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in -December; and I am going to read now the section beginning: - - “As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal - audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once more - on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the - Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a - completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of - Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and - to draw still other nations into the conflict.” - -As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case, -here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler -to induce him to take part in these operations. - -The report continues: - - “Should the enemy attempt”—there is a mis-translation here—“to - extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further - throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he - would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. - In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, - the Führer promised Quisling financial support of this movement, - which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military - exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the - special military staff which transmitted special missions to - Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political - exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the - Ministry for Foreign Affairs”—that is to say, by Ribbentrop’s - organization—“the Minister for Foreign Affairs”—that is to - say, Ribbentrop—“being kept continuously informed by the - Foreign Affairs Bureau”—which, of course, was Rosenberg’s - organization. - - - - “Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison - with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was - assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given - that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.” - -Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi -politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. - -The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of -January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of -the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the -Court to consider a letter of Keitel’s, Document C-63, which for the -purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-87. The Court will observe -that that is an order—a memorandum—signed by the Defendant Keitel -dated the 27th of January 1940. It is marked “Most secret, five copies; -reference, Study ‘N’;”—which was another code name for the Weserübung -preparations—“access only through an officer.” It is indicated that -“C-in-C of the Navy”—that is to say, the Defendant Raeder—“has a -report on this.” The document reads: - - “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes - that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and - personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the - general war policy. For these reasons the Führer has - commissioned me to take over the direction of further - preparations. - - - - “A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the - Armed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this represents - at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.” - -Then, at the end of the memorandum: - - “All further plans will be made under the cover name - Weserübung.” - -I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the -importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to -the date of this important decision. - -Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the -various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined -to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of -the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation. The issuance -of this directive of Keitel’s on the 27th January 1940 was the signal -that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had -accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this -Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German -military machine to the task of producing practical and co-ordinated -plans for the Norwegian operation. - -The Court will observe that from January onward the operational planning -for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal -channels. - -And now I would refer the Court to some entries in the diary of the -Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Document -Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the record Exhibit -GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the -document book. - -There is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are set -out in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries which -will be dealt with in another part of the case. - -I invite the Court’s attention to Page 3 of these extracts from Jodl’s -diary beginning at the bottom February the 6th. The entry under the date -line of February the 6th 1940 starts, “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser -Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of -the war.” - -I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so. “New -idea: Carry out ‘H’ and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium’s -neutrality for the duration of the war.” - -The next entry to which I invite the Court’s attention is the entry of -the 21st of February. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to “carry out ‘H’”? - -MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another code word, “Hartmut,” which -the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document. That is another -code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation. - -The entry of February 21st in Jodl’s diary reads: - - “Führer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges him - with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly. - Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces.” - -Then the next entry, on the next page . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: “Weser Exercise”—is that Norway too? - -MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of -“Weserübung.” - -The entry on the next page, under the date of February the 28th: - - “I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer that - Case Yellow”—which as the Court knows is the code name for the - invasion of the Netherlands—“and Weser Exercise”—the invasion - of Norway and Denmark—“must be prepared in such a way that they - will be independent of one another as regards both time and - forces employed. The Führer completely agrees, if this is in any - way possible.” - -So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February the 6th -that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been abandoned by -February the 28th. - -The next entry is of February the 29th—I am not troubling the Court -with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces -to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark. February 29th, the -second paragraph: - - “Führer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen - and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual coastal - batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chief - of Land Defense, instructed to make out immediately the order of - the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief ‘WZ’ to make out a - similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff.” - -And there for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl’s diary and -refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for the purposes of -the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will see from that document -that it is Hitler’s operation order to complete the preparations for the -invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March -1940, and it is headed, “The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed -Forces; most secret.” Then, “Directive for Case Weserübung”: - - “The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the - making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and - Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—Weser Exercise. - This operation should prevent British encroachment on - Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore - base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start - line against Britain.” - -The second part of Paragraph 1 reads: - - “In view of our military and political power in comparison with - that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the - Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The numerical - weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise - execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the - operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which - is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian - States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the - governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, - demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the - necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be - met with, all military means will be used to crush it.” - -There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page: - - “I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the - operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding general of - the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst.” - -Paragraph 3: - - “The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway - must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations - must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy - seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply - immediately our own counter measures. - - - - “It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as - the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our - measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and - of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops, must be - made with this factor in mind. - - - - “In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept - secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with - fictitious objectives.” - -Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, “The Occupation of Denmark,” which is -given the code name of “Weserübung Süd”: - - “The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of - Fünen immediately after occupation of Zealand. - - - - “Added to this, having secured the most important places, the - group will break through as quickly as possible from Fünen to - Skagen and to the east coast.” - -Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation. -Paragraph 5: - - “Occupation of Norway, ‘Weserübung Nord’”: - - - - “The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most - important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations. - - - - “The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the - transport by sea of the landing troops.” - -And there follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and I would -like particularly to draw the Court’s attention to that reference. This -is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler’s directive: - - “The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will - ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for air - warfare against Britain.” - -I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be referring -to it in connection with a later document. - -Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the final -decision of Hitler . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant by whom it -was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document. - -MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different person -altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty and has -no connection with the defendant who is before the Tribunal. - -As I was saying, My Lord, while these decisions were being made reports -were coming in through Rosenberg’s organization from Quisling; and if -the Court will again turn for the last time to Document 007-PS, which is -Rosenberg’s report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information -which Rosenberg’s organization was supplying at this time. The third -paragraph, “Quisling’s reports”—that is in Annex I in Rosenberg’s -report, the section dealing with Norway, Page 6 on my copy—referring to -the second page of the annex, the paragraph beginning with: - - “Quisling’s reports transmitted to his representative in - Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of - intervention by the Western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent - of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January. - These increasingly better substantiated communications were in - sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo - which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian - Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced of that government’s - intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in - Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany - maintained closest relations with him; he therefore succeeded in - gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the - Nygardsvold Cabinet and in listening to the Cabinet members’ - true views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the - bureau”—Rosenberg’s bureau—“which conveyed the news to the - Führer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the - 16th to 17th February English destroyers attacked the German - steamer _Altmark_ in Jössingfjord.” - -The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action by the -British destroyer _Cossack_ against the German naval auxiliary vessel -_Altmark_ which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured on the high -seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of -the British Delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that -was being made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in -fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality and the action -taken by _H.M.S. Cossack_ which was restricted to rescuing the 300 -British prisoners on board—no attempt being made to destroy the -_Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board of her—was fully -justified under international law. - -Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that statement of -the British view on the _Altmark_ episode—the Rosenberg report -continues: - - “The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted - the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived - at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such - assumption was confirmed by reports of Chief of Section Scheidt, - who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. - But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo - championed the opposite view and went on record as believing in - the good intentions of the Norwegians.” - -And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred the -reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German -diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of -reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and -Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion -are again found in Jodl’s diary, which is the last document in the -document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March. - - “The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a - swift entry into N”—which is Norway—“with strong forces. - - - - “No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid - acceleration of the attack necessary.” - -Then the last entry on March the 3rd: - - “Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow - with a few days interval.” - -So that the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the -German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the -fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low -Countries; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that -by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a -Norwegian aggression. - -The next entry in Jodl’s diary of the 5th of March: - - “Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about Weser - Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till - now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all - preparations so far made are worthless. - - - - “Result: - - - - “(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the - ports (_Hipper_ or _Lützow_ in Trondheim); (c) Christiansand can - be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway; - (e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also.” - -Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court’s attention is -the entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think is one of the -most remarkable in the whole documentation of this case: - - “Führer does not give order yet for ‘W.’”—Weser Exercise— - - - - “He is still looking for justification.” - -The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar -pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for this -flagrant aggression. It reads: - - “English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 submarines; - doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent - operations by Germans. Führer has not yet decided what reason to - give for Weser Exercise.” - -And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of -March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the -bottom of Page 6: - -“Misgivings of Task Force 21 . . .” - -The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task -Force 21 was Falkenhorst’s force, which was detailed to conduct this -invasion. - - “Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between - taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of - diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations - as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If - resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political - plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and - even exaggerate them.” - -Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, if the -Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence: - - “Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the - Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the - other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none - of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than - advantages. - - - - “In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly - declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the - Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will - have to remain occupied by naval forces.” - -There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful -collaborator of Hitler. - -Then April the 2d: - - “1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with - the Führer. All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders - carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th.” - -Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April: - - “Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of - Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks - with Quisling in Copenhagen.” - -Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active. - -The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders -that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and -Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court’s attention to two of them -to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and the deception that was used -by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that -aggression. I would now draw the Court’s attention to Document C-115, -which for the purpose of the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all -I will draw the Court’s attention to the second paragraph, “General -Orders,” with a date, “4th of April 1940”: - - “The barrage-breaking vessels”—Sperrbrecher—“will penetrate - inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as - merchant steamers. - - - - “Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to be - answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. - I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the - operation before zero hour.” - -Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated the 24th -of March 1940, “Behavior during entrance into the harbor.” The third -paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court’s attention: - - “The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as - possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be - answered in English. In answer to questions a text with - something like the following content will be chosen: - - - - “‘Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.’ - - - - “Challenges to be answered, with names of British warships: - - - - “_Köln_—_H.M.S. Cairo; Königsberg-_-_H.M.S. Calcutta; - Bremse_—_H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters_—_H.M.S. Halcyon; - Leopard_—British destroyer; _Wolf_—British destroyer; - S-boats—British motor torpedo boats. - - - - “Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be - illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke screen.” - -And then finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940, Annex 3, -“From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret.” Next page, page -two: - - “Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our - own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of - passing craft. To challenge in case of the _Köln_—‘_H.M.S. - Cairo_’; then to order to stop—‘(1) Please repeat last signal, - (2) Impossible to understand your signal’; in case of a warning - shot—‘Stop firing, British ship, good friend’; in case of an - inquiry as to destination and purpose—‘Going Bergen, chasing - German steamers.’” - -Then I would draw the Court’s attention to Document C-151, which for the -purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which is a Dönitz order in -connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed: - - “Top secret, Operation Order—‘Hartmut.’ Occupation of Denmark - and Norway. - - - - “This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut. With its - coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking - part lose their validity. - - - - “The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-Hour, - and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise. - - - - “The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective the - rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously - Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land - side.” - -And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution by Dönitz -to this process of deception: - - “The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British - flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at - Narvik.” - -The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the 9th of April -1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of -Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a -German memorandum was handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark -attempting to justify the German action; and I would like to draw the -Court’s attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92. That is at the -beginning of the book of documents—the sixth document of the book. I am -not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum; I have no doubt the -defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant -to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England -and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of -international law and that Britain and France were making plans -themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that the Government of Norway -was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. - -The memorandum states—and I would now draw the Court’s attention to -Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just below the middle of the -page beginning “The German Troops”: - - “The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian soil - as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use - of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations - against England as long as it is not forced to do so by measures - taken by England and France; German military operations aim much - more exclusively at protecting the north against proposed - occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.” - -In connection with that statement I would remind the Court that in his -operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then given orders to the -Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against -Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is the memorandum which was -produced as an excuse on the 9th of April. The last two paragraphs of -the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a -classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat. -They read: - - “The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian - Government and the Norwegian people will respond with - understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to - them. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all - possible means by the German forces employed, and would - therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal - Norwegian Government are therefore requested to take all - measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of - the German troops can take place without friction and - difficulty. In the spirit, of the good German-Norwegian - relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declare - to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention - of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and - political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the - future.” - -What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of Norway was -shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now refer the Court to -Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93, which is a report by the -Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning -of the document book, the last of the TC documents. - -I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report. If the -Tribunal will turn to the second page: - - “The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and - the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity - of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to - paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their - country and at the same time to prevent Allied intervention, it - was planned to capture all the more important towns along the - coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament - and other military and civilian people occupying important - positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could - be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new - government with Quisling as its head.” - -The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney General in -his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph but one: - - “The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns - along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight - losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser _Blücher_, - carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, - technical staffs, and specialists who were to take over the - control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and - members of the Government and Parliament failed. In spite of the - surprise of the attack resistance was organized throughout the - country.” - -That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway. - -What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the -Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand in as Exhibit GB-94 and -an extract from which is in Document D-628, which follows the C -documents. - - “Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude - towards Denmark”—before and during the occupation—“prepared by - the Royal Danish Government. - - - - “On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours”—in the morning that - is—“the German Minister appeared at the private residence of - the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air - Attaché of the Legation. The appointment had been made by a - telephone call from the German Legation to the Secretary General - of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4 o’clock the same - morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had positive - proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in Denmark and - Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark against this. For this - reason German soldiers were now crossing the frontier and - landing at various points in Zealand, including the port of - Copenhagen; in a short time German bombers would be over - Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb until further notice. - It was now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any - resistance would have the most terrible consequences. Germany - would guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political - independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal - government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the - neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of the - German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the war . . . . - - - - “The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the - allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was - completely without foundation; there was no possibility of - anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested - against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which, according - to the German Minister’s statement, was in progress. The - Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not - give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the - King and the Prime Minister, and further observed that the - German Minister knew as everybody else that the Danish Armed - Forces had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality - so that fighting presumably had already taken place. In reply - the German Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, - not least to avoid air bombardment.” - -What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British -Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary, which the -Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding the one which I have -just read. That document, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-95. -That dispatch reads: - - “The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by - members of my staff, from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable - information subsequently received and are given below. Early in - the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports - steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor while a number of - airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery guarding the - harbor approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was - seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this the - Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels - fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these - airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the - population to keep calm and co-operate with the Germans. I - enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a - bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of - detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers - landed with full equipment and marched to Kastellet, the old - fortress of Copenhagen and now barracks. The door was locked so - the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded - up all the Danish soldiers within together with the womenfolk - employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and it - appears that they were taken completely by surprise. One officer - tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur was shot - before they could get away. He died in hospital 2 days later. - After seizing the barracks a detachment was sent to Amalienborg, - the King’s palace, where they engaged the Danish sentries on - guard wounding three, one of them fatally . . . . Meanwhile a - large fleet of bombers flew over the city at low altitude.” - -Then, the last paragraph of the dispatch reads: - - “It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in - Jutland . . . . It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded - Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th of April and were at - first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties - . . . . The chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to - which the forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The - chief permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, - motored into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th of April and - drove blithely past a sentry who challenged him in blissful - ignorance that this was not one of his own men. It took a - bullet, which passed through the lapels of his coat, to - disillusion him.” - -The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish Governments spoke of -the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political -independence of those two small countries. - -I will close by drawing the Court’s attention to two documents which -indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political independence -the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. -I will first draw the Court’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s diary, -which is the last document in the book, on the last page of the book, -the entry dated 19th April: - - “Renewed crisis. Envoy Brauer”—that is the German Minister to - Norway—“is recalled. Since Norway is at war with us, the task - of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Führer’s opinion force - has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter Terboven will be given - a post. Field Marshal”—which, as the Court will see from the - other entries, is presumably a reference to the Defendant - Göring—“is moving in the same direction. He criticizes as - defect that we did not take sufficiently energetic measures - against the civilian population, that we could have seized - electrical plant, that the Navy did not supply enough troops. - The Air Force cannot do everything.” - -The Court will see from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter -Terboven that already by the 19th of April rule by Gauleiter had -replaced rule by Norwegians. - -The final document is Document C-41, which will be Exhibit GB-96, which -is a memorandum dated the 3rd of June 1940 signed by Fricke, who, of -course, has no connection with the Defendant Frick. Fricke was at that -date the head of the operations division of the German naval war staff, -a key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations. -That is why, as the Tribunal noticed, he came to be initialing the -important naval documents. - -That memorandum is as I have said, dated 3rd June 1940 and relates to -questions of territorial expansion and bases: - - “These problems are pre-eminently of a political character and - comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it - is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially - affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in - which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and - operation of the Navy. - - - - “It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s - present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in - the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of states and - under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of - Greater Germany. If over and above this one extends these - strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not - continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural - geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other - an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the - war. - - - - “The solution could perhaps be found among the following - possibilities: - - - - “1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France - acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied - and organized that they can in the future be considered as - German possessions. - - - - “This solution will recommend itself for areas where the - severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy - and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears - practicable. - - - - “2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct - connection with Germany’s main body and which, like the Russian - solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an enclave in the - hostile state. Such areas might be considered possible around - Brest and Trondheim . . . . - - - - “3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired - in this war should result in the existing population of these - areas feeling themselves and being politically, economically, - and militarily completely dependent on Germany. If the following - results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on a scale I - shall describe later) by means of the military measures for - occupation taken during the war, that French powers of - resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, armed - forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of - the question, that the smaller states such as the Netherlands, - Denmark, and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which - will enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to - occupy these countries again—then in practice the same, but - psychologically much more, will be achieved.” - -Then Fricke recommends: - - “The solution given in 3), therefore, appears to be the proper - one—that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium and part of - northern and eastern France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark, - and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above.” - -Then, the culminating paragraph of this report of Fricke reads as -follows: - - “Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will - make an extension of these demands possible.” - -The submission of the Prosecution is that that and other documents which -have been submitted to the Court tear apart the veil of the Nazi -pretenses. These documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of -Göring; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show -the reality behind the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in -treason like Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid -the professional status of Keitel and of Raeder. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present that -part of Count Two which relates to the allegations with regard to -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In Charges II, III, IV, IX, -XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, and XXIII there are charges of violating -certain treaties and conventions and violating certain assurances. So -far as the treaties are concerned, some of them have been put in -evidence already, and I will indicate that when I come to them. May I, -before I come to the detail, remind the Tribunal of the history of these -unfortunate countries, the Netherlands and Belgium; especially Belgium, -which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe. - -The independence of Belgium was guaranteed as the Tribunal will -remember, in 1839 by the great European powers. That guarantee was -observed for 75 years until it was shamelessly broken in 1914 by the -Germans, who brought all the horrors of war to Belgium and all the even -greater horrors of a German occupation of Belgium. History was to repeat -itself in a still more shocking fashion some 25 years after in 1940 as -the Tribunal already knows. - -The first treaty which was mentioned in these charges is the Hague -Convention of 1907. That has been put in by my learned friend, Sir -David, and I think I need say nothing about it. - -The second treaty is the Locarno Convention, the Arbitration and -Conciliation Convention of 1925. My Lord, that was between Germany and -Belgium. That was put in by Sir David. It is GB-15, and I think I need -say nothing more about that. - -Belgium’s independence and neutrality was guaranteed by Germany in that -document. - -My Lords, the next treaty is the Hague Arbitration Convention of May -1926 between Germany and the Netherlands. That Document I ought formally -to put in. It is in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which perhaps I may call -RGB in the future for brevity; and it, no doubt, will be treated as a -public document. But in my bundle of documents, which goes in the order -in which I propose to refer to them, I think it is more convenient for -the presentation of my case. That is the second or third document, -TC-16. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is Book 4, is it? - -MR. ROBERTS: It is Book 4, My Lord. This is the Convention of -Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands signed -at The Hague in May 1926. Your Lordships have the document; perhaps I -need read only Article I: - - “The contracting parties”—those are the Netherlands and the - German Reich—“undertake to submit all disputes of any nature - whatever which may arise between them which it has not been - possible to settle by diplomacy and which have not been referred - to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be dealt with - by arbitration or conciliation as provided.” - -And then, My Lords, there follow all the clauses which deal merely with -the machinery of conciliation, which are unnecessary for me to read. May -I just draw attention to the last article, Article 21, which provides -that the Convention shall be valid for 10 years, and then shall remain -in force for successive periods of 5 years until denounced by either -party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all. - -I put that document in as Document TC-16, which will be Exhibit GB-97; -and a certified copy is put in and a translation for the Court. - -As the Tribunal already knows, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact was made -at Paris, by which all the powers renounced recourse to war. That is put -in as GB-18, and I need not, I think, put it in or refer to it again. - -Then the last treaty—all of which, of course, belong to the days of the -Weimar Republic—is the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Luxembourg executed in 1929. That is Document TC-20 in the bundle. It is -two documents further on than the one the Tribunal has last referred to. -That is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and -Luxembourg signed at Geneva in 1929. May I just read the first few words -of Article 1, which are familiar: - - “The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means - in accordance with the present treaty all disputes of any nature - whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be - possible to settle by diplomacy.” - -And then there follow the clauses dealing with the machinery for -peaceful settlement of disputes, which follow the common form. - -My Lord, those were the treaty obligations. May I put in that last -treaty, TC-20, which will be Exhibit GB-98. - -My Lord, those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium -at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933; and as you have -heard from my learned friend, Hitler adopted and ratified the -obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with regard to the -treaties which had been entered into. My Lord, nothing more occurred to -alter the position of Belgium until in March 1936. Germany reoccupied -the Rhineland, announced, of course, the resumption of conscription, and -so on. And Hitler on the 7th of March 1936 purported in a speech to -repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno -Pact; the reason given being the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of -1935. Sir David has dealt with that and has pointed out that there was -no legal foundation for this claim to be entitled to renounce -obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was, of course, left in -the air in the sense that it had entered itself into various obligations -under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations -acknowledged; and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of -Germany to observe the pact, had been renounced. - -And so My Lord, on the 30th of January 1937, perhaps because Hitler -realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler, in the -next document in the bundle, TC-33 and 35, which I hand in and which -will be Exhibit GB-99, gave the solemn assurance—he used the word -“solemn”—to Belgium and to the Netherlands. That has already been read -by the Attorney General and so I don’t want to read it again. But the -Tribunal will see that it is a full guarantee. In April of 1937 in a -document which is not before the Court, France and England released -Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. It is a matter of -history and it does occur in an exhibit, but it hasn’t been copied. -Belgium, of course, gave guarantees of strict independence and -neutrality; and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should -Belgium be attacked. And it was because of that that Germany on the 13th -of October 1937—in the next document—gave a very clear and -unconditional guarantee to Belgium—Document TC-34, which I offer in -evidence as Exhibit GB-100—the German declaration of the 13th of -October 1937, which shows the minutes: - - “I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the - following communication to Your Excellency: - - - - “The German Government have taken cognizance with particular - interest of the public declaration in which the Belgian - Government define the international position of Belgium. For - their part they have repeatedly given expression, especially - through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in - his speech of the 30th of January 1937, to their own point of - view. The German Government have also taken cognizance of the - declaration made by the British and French Governments on the - 24th of April 1937.” - -That is a document to which I have previously referred. - - “Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of - Locarno may still take some time and being desirous of - strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the - German Government regard it as appropriate to define now their - own attitude towards Belgium. To this end they make the - following declaration: - - - - “First: The German Government have taken note of the views which - the Belgian Government have thought fit to express. That is to - say, (a) of the policy of independence which they intend to - exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of their determination to - defend the frontiers of Belgium with all their forces against - any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from - being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a - passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the - air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient - manner to this purpose. - - - - “Second: The German Government consider that the inviolability - and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western - Powers. They confirm their determination that in no - circumstances will they impair this inviolability and integrity, - and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory - except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a - military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in - which Germany is involved. - - - - “Third: The German Government, like the British and French - Governments, are prepared to assist Belgium should she be - subjected to an attack or to invasion.” - -And then, on the following page: - - “The Belgian Government have taken note with great satisfaction - of the declaration communicated to them this day by the German - Government. They thank the German Government warmly for this - communication.” - -My Lord, may I pause there to emphasize that document. There in October -of 1937 is Germany giving a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its -peaceful aspiration towards her and its assertion that the integrity of -the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and -the other Western Powers. - -You have before you to try the leaders of the German Government and the -leaders of the German Armed Forces. One doesn’t have to prove, does one, -that every one of those accused must have known perfectly well of that -solemn undertaking given by his government? Every one of these accused -in their various spheres of activity—some more actively than the -others—were party to the shameless breaking of that treaty two and a -half years afterwards, and I submit that on the ordinary laws of -inference and justice all those men must be fixed as active -participators in that disgraceful breach of faith which brought misery -and death to so many millions. - -Presumably it will be contended on the part, for instance, of Keitel and -Jodl that they were merely honorable soldiers carrying out their duty. -This Tribunal, no doubt, will inquire what code of honor they observe -which permits them to violate the pledged word of their country. - -That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders -and to the High Command of Germany can be seen by the next document, -which is Document PS-375 in the bundle. It is already an exhibit, -USA-84, and has been referred to many times already. May I just -refer—or remind the Tribunal—to one sentence or two. The document -comes into existence on the 25th of August 1938 at the time when the -Czechoslovakian drama was unfolding, and it was uncertain at that time -whether there would be war with the Western Powers. It is top secret, -prepared by the 5th section of the General Staff of the German Air -Force. The subject: “Extended Case Green—Estimate of the Situation.” -Probably the more correct words would be: “Appreciation of the Situation -with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some staff officer -had been asked to prepare this appreciation. In view of the fact that it -has been read before, I think I need only read the last paragraph which -is Paragraph H and it comes at the bottom of Page 6, the last page but -one of the document. Now H, “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, -Army and Navy”. This, you see, was an appreciation addressed by an Air -Force staff officer. So these are requests to the Army and Navy. And -then if one turns over the page, Number 4: - - “Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent - an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war - against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is - held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the - conditions under which an occupation of this area could be - carried out and how long it would take. And in this case it - would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great - Britain.” - -The point that the Prosecution desires to make on that document is that -it is apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this, and -assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the -High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that -Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. They are -recommending it as a militarily advantageous thing to do, strong in the -knowledge that if the commanders and the Führer agree with that view -treaties are to be completely ignored. Such, I repeat, was the honor of -the German Government and of their leaders. - -Now in March of 1939 as has been proved, the remainder of Czechoslovakia -was peacefully annexed; and then came the time for further guarantees in -the next document, the assurances—TC-35 and 39—which were given to -Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939. - -Those have been read by my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones. They bear -the number GB-78. I need not read them again. - -There is also a guarantee to Luxembourg, which is on the next page, -TC-42 (a). That was given in the same speech by Hitler in the Reichstag -where Hitler was dealing with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt who was -feeling a little uneasy on the other side of the Atlantic as to Hitler’s -intentions. May I, before I read this document, say that I believe the -Tribunal will be seeing a film of the delivery by Hitler of this part of -this speech; and you will have the privilege of seeing Hitler in one of -his jocular moods, because this was greeted and was delivered in a -jocular vein. And you will see in the film that the Defendant Göring who -sits above Hitler in the Reichstag appreciates very much the joke, the -joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany -could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors—and that was the -point of the joke that everybody appears to have appreciated very much. - -Now, if I may read this document: - - “Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an - assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the - territory or possessions of the following independent nations - and above all that they will not march into them. And he goes on - to name the following as the countries in question: - - - - “Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, - Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, - Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, - Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, - Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran. - - - - “Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the - case of the countries listed firstly, whether they feel - themselves threatened and secondly, and particularly, whether - this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result - of a démarche by them or at least with their consent. - - - - “The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the - form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-question of - mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations - listed, since they are not at present in possession of their - liberty (as for instance Syria) but are occupied by the military - forces of democratic states and therefore deprived of all their - rights. - - - - “Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany - have received much more binding assurances and above all much - more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his - peculiar telegram.” - -You will see that although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is -suggesting in the presence, certainly, of the accused Göring as being -quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against her -neighbors. But the hollow falsity of that and the preceding guarantee is -shown by the next document. May I put this document, TC-42 (a) in as -Exhibit GB-101. - -The next document (L-79) which is Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May -has been referred to many times and is Exhibit USA-27. Therefore I need -only very shortly remind the Tribunal of two passages. First of all, on -the first page it is interesting to see who was present: The Führer, -Göring, Admiral Raeder, Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, and various -others who are not accused. Colonel Warlimont was there. He, I -understand, was Jodl’s deputy. - -Well now, the purpose of the conference was an analysis of the -situation. Then may I refer to the third page down at the bottom. The -stencil number is 819: - - “What will this struggle be like?” - -And then these words: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.” - -Then, at the bottom: - - “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, - we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at - securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee.” - -There is that decision made, “Declarations of neutrality must be -ignored,” and there is the Grand Admiral present, and there is the Air -Minister and Chief of the German Air Force, and there is General Keitel -present. They all appear, and all their subsequent actions show that -they acquiesced in that: Give your word and then break it. That is their -code of honor. And you will see that at the end of the meeting, the very -last page—the stencil number is 823—Field Marshal Göring asked one or -two questions. - -There was the decision of the 23rd of May. Is it overstating the matter -to submit that any syllable of guarantee, any assurance given after that -is just purely hypocrisy, is just the action—apart from the -multiplicity of the crimes here—of the common criminal? - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, I think we would like you so far as possible -to confine yourself to the document. - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord, then we go to the 22d of August, 798-PS. That -has already been put in and is Exhibit USA-29. My Lord, that was -Hitler’s speech of the 22d of August. It has been read and re-read. I, -My Lord, refer only to one passage, and that is at the bottom of the -second page: - - “Attack from the west from the Maginot Line: I consider this - impossible. - - - - “Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and - Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well - as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available - means.” - -My Lord, I desire to emphasize the next sentence: - - “England and France will not violate the neutrality of these - countries.” - -Then I desire to comment: I ask Your Lordship to bear that sentence in -mind, that correct prophecy, when remembering the excuses given for the -subsequent invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands. - -My Lord, the next documents are TC-36, 40, and 42. Those are three -assurances. Number 36 is by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian -Government: - - “In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am - expressly instructed by the head of the German Reich to transmit - to Your Majesty the following communication: - - - - “Though the German Government are at present doing everything in - their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at - issue between the Reich and Poland, they nevertheless desire to - define clearly here and now the attitude which they propose to - adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become - inevitable. - - - - “The German Government are firmly determined to abide by the - terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October - 13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no - circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium - and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The German - Government renew this undertaking, however, in the expectation - that the Belgian Government for their part will observe an - attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no - violations on the part of a third power, but that on the - contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her - disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Government - were to adopt a different attitude the German Government would - naturally be compelled to defend their interests in conformity - with the new situation thus created.” - -My Lord, may I make one short comment on the last part of that document? -I submit it is clear that the decision having been made to violate the -neutrality, as we know, those last words were put in to afford some -excuse in the future. - -That document will be Exhibit GB-102. - -My Lord, TC-40, the next document, is a similar document communicated to -Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, the 26th of -August 1939. Subject to the Tribunal’s direction, I don’t think I need -read it. It is a public document in the German document book, and it has -exactly the same features. - -That will be Exhibit GB-103. - -Then My Lords, TC-42, the next document (Exhibit GB-104) is a similar -document relating to Luxembourg. That is dated the 26th of August, the -same day. I am not certain; it has two dates. I think it is the 26th of -August. My Lords, that is in the same terms a complete guarantee with -the sting in the tail as in the other two documents. Perhaps I need not -read it. - -My Lords, as the Tribunal knows, Poland was occupied by means of the -lightning victory; and in October German Armed Forces were free for -other tasks. The first step that was taken so far as the Netherlands and -Belgium are concerned is shown by the next document, which is, I think, -in as GB-80; but the two central portions refer to Belgium and the -Netherlands. It is the next document in Your Lordships’ bundle: Number -4. - -THE PRESIDENT: TC-32? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It begins with TC-32, and then if you go to the next -one, My Lords will see TC-37 on the same page—and then TC-41; both 37 -and 41 refer to this matter. Now, this is a German assurance on the 6th -of October 1939: - - “Belgium. - - “Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I - tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any - revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any - demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in - Belgium as a threat.” - -My Lord, there is a similar assurance to the Netherlands—the next part -of the document: - - “The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional - friendship with the Netherlands. It has not taken over any - existing differences between the two countries and has not - created any new ones.” - -I submit it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of those -assurances of Germany’s good faith. - -My Lord, the value of that good faith is shown by the next document -which is of the very next day, the 7th of October. Those two guarantees -were the 6th of October. Now we come to Document 2329-PS dated the 7th -of October. It is from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von -Brauchitsch, and it is addressed to his Army groups. He said, third -paragraph: - - “The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only. - - - - “At the same time Army Group B has to make all preparations - according to special orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and - Belgian territory if the political situation so demands.” - -“If the political situation so demands”—the day after the guarantee! - -It is quite clear from the next document. I put in the last document; -that bears an original typewritten signature of Von Brauchitsch, and it -will be Exhibit GB-105. - -My Lord, the next document is in two parts. Both are numbered C-62. The -first part is dated the 9th of October 1939, 2 days after the document I -have read. My Lord, that was all read by the Attorney General in opening -down to the bottom of Paragraph (b). Therefore, I won’t read it again. -May I remind the Tribunal just of one sentence. - - “Preparations should be made for offensive action on the - northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of - Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must be - carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.” - -In the next paragraph, may I just read six words: - - “The object of this attack is . . . to acquire as great an area - of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as possible.” - -That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the three -accused: The Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and -Air Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Göring. That appears -from the distribution. - -I will hold that document over and will put that other one in with it. - -My Lord, the next document is the 15th of October 1939. It is from the -Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It is signed by Keitel in what is -to some of us his familiar red pencil signature, and it is again -addressed to Raeder and Göring and to the General Staff of the Army. - -Now that also has been read by the Attorney General; may I just remind -the Tribunal that at the bottom of the page: - - “It must be the object of the Army’s preparations to occupy—on - receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland in the - first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas”—or Meuse—“line”. - -The second paragraph deals with taking possession of the West Frisian -Islands. - -It is clear, in my submission, beyond discussion that from that moment -the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been -made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the -weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that -Germany’s word was about to be broken again. Otherwise these small -countries might have had some chance of combining among themselves and -with their neighbors. - -It will be Exhibit GB-106. - -Well, the next document is a Keitel directive. It is Document 440-PS -(Exhibit GB-107). It, again, is sent to the Supreme Command of the Army, -the Navy, and the Air Force; and it gives details of how the attack is -to be carried out. I want to read only a very few selected passages. -Paragraph 2 on the first page: - - “Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended - against Holland may be carried out without a special order when - the general attack will start. - - - - “The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be anticipated - ahead of time.” - -And then may I comment here: Would Your Lordship note this as a German -concession? - - “Wherever there is no resistance the entry should carry the - character of a peaceful occupation.” - -Then Paragraph (b) of the next paragraph: - - “At first the Dutch area including the West Frisian Islands - . . . is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.” - -The next two paragraphs, I need not read them, deal with action against -the Belgian harbor; and in Paragraph 5): - - “The 7th Airborne Division”—they were parachutists—“will be - committed for the airborne operation after the possession of - bridges across the Albert Canal”—which is in Belgium as the - Court knows—“is assured.” - -And then in Paragraph 6) (b) Luxembourg is mentioned. It is mentioned in -Paragraph 5) as well. The signature is “Keitel,” but that is typed. It -is authenticated by a staff officer. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that document in? - -MR. ROBERTS: GB-107, My Lord. - -Then the next document is C-10 (Exhibit GB-108) and it is dated the 28th -of November 1939. That is a signature of Keitel in his red pencil and it -is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It deals with the fact -that if a quick break-through should fail north of Liége—I think, My -Lord, only machinery for carrying out the attack. - -Paragraph 2) shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It -speaks of “the occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing,” and -the “taking of one or more of the Meuse crossings between Namur and -Dinant.” - -That will be 108. - -My Lord, the documents show that from November until March of 1940 the -High Command and the Führer were waiting for favorable weather before -A-Day, as they called it. That was the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium, -and the Netherlands. - -My Lord, the next document, C-72, consists of 18 documents which range -in date from the 7th of November until the 9th of May 1940. They are -certified photostats I put in and they are all signed either by Keitel -personally or by Jodl personally, and I don’t think it is necessary for -me to read them. The Defense, I think, have all had copies of them, but -they show that successively A-Day is being postponed for about a week, -having regard to the weather reports. That will be Exhibit GB-109. - -My Lord, on the 10th of January 1940, as the Attorney General informed -the Tribunal, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. The -occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in -possession, but they were only partially successful. And the next -document I offer is Document TC-58 (a); it will be Exhibit GB-110. The -original is a photostat certified by the Belgian Government which, of -course, came into possession of the original. - -My Lord, I can summarize it. They are orders to the Commander of the 2d -Air Force Fleet (Luftflotte) clearly for offensive action against -France, Holland, and Belgium. One looks at the bottom of the first page. -It deals with the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army -covers the Liége-Antwerp Line with its main force, its lighter forces in -front of the Meuse-Schelde Canal. Then it deals with the disposition of -the Dutch Army; and then if you turn over the page Number 3, you see -that the German western army directs its attack between the North Sea -and the Moselle with the strongest possible airforce support through the -Belgian-Luxembourg region. - -My Lord, I think I need read no more. The rest are operational details -as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. - -My Lord, the next document I think is rather out of place for my -purpose. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, put in Jodl’s diary, -which is GB-88, and I desire to refer very, very briefly to some -extracts which are printed first in bundle Number 4. - -If one looks at the entry for the 1st of February 1940 and then some -lines down . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: 1809-PS? - -MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that’s right, My Lord, and GB-88. - -THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got the GB numbers on the documents. - -MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry, My Lord, it’s my mistake. - -If Your Lordship will look about eight lines down it says, “1700 hours -General Jeschonnek”—and then: - - “1) Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have - to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute - force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town. - - - - “2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent - action against the Dutch Air Force.” - -My Lord, I think the rest I need not read; it is operational detail. - -“2d February”—I refer again to Jodl’s entry under “a” as to “landings -can be made in the center of The Hague.” - -If Your Lordship will turn over the page—I omit February the 5th—you -come to 26th February: - - “Führer raises the question whether it is better to undertake - the Weser Exercise before or after Case Yellow.” - -And then on the 3rd of March, the last sentence: - - “Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case Yellow - with a few days’ interval.” - -And then My Lord, there is an entry to which I desire to call Your -Lordship’s attention, on May the 8th, that is, 2 days before the -invasion—the top of the page: - - “Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, - evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures. According - to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked - for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” - -My Lord, may I make two short comments on that? The first is that the -Germans are rather objecting because the Dutch are actually making some -preparations to resist their invasion: “Alarming news” as they wrote. -The second point is that Jodl is there recording that the Dutch -according to their intelligence reports are still adhering properly to -their neutrality. But I need not read any more of the diary extracts. - -My Lord, that is the story except for the documents which were presented -to Holland and to Belgium and to Luxembourg after the invasion was a -_fait accompli_, because as history now knows at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th -of May these three small countries were violently invaded with all the -fury of modern warfare. No warning was given to them by Germany and no -complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of any neutrality before -this action was taken. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient place to break off -until 2 o’clock. - -MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship pleases. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court adjourned I had -just come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of May 1940 when the -Germans invaded these three small countries without any warning—a -violation which, the Prosecution submits, it is clear from the documents -had been planned and decided upon months before. - -My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three -documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place at -4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German -Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments some -hours later and handed in a document which was similar in each case and -which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum. My Lord, an account -of what happened in Belgium is set out in our Document TC-58, which is -about five documents from the end of the bundle. It is headed, “Extract -from Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940,” and I -hand in an original copy, certified by the Belgian Government, which is -Exhibit GB-111. - -My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third paragraph: - - “From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no shadow of - doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the - east. At 5 o’clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands’ - airdromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of - German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the - Jemelle station.” - -My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down: - - “At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of - Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began - to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak”—that is the Belgian - Minister—“stopped him: ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I - will speak first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the - Belgian Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army - has just attacked our country. This is the second time in 25 - years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a - neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps - even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no - note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the - Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium - has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by - her on October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the - beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany - for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock - the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held - responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. - Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished.’” - -Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: “The Ambassador read the -note . . . .” And in the last paragraph: - - “In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by his - side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador: ‘Hand me - the document,’ he said. ‘I should like to spare you so painful a - task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to - pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had - just made.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what the Ambassador -read. - -MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document I was going -to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page: - - “The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: - - - - “‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to - make the following declaration: - - - - “‘In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and - Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making - preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the - Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three - countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose the - Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the - greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be useless. - The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium’s European and - colonial territory as well as her dynasty on condition that no - resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium - will risk the destruction of her country and the loss of her - independence. It is, therefore, in the interests of Belgium that - the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that - the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make - contact with the German Military Command.’” - -My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after the invasion -had started is Document TC-57, which is the last document but three in -the bundle. It is the document I handed in and it becomes Exhibit -GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and I will read to the Tribunal -such parts as the Tribunal thinks advisable: - - “The Reich Government”—it begins—“have for a long time had no - doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and French war - policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other - countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and - mercenary troops for England and France. - - - - “The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy - Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new - front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last - minute action which upset this project. Germany has furnished - documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world. - - - - “Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia - miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war - expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the - retreat . . . from Norway was still going on, the English Prime - Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in - Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead - with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the - Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on - the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center - of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over - the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before - their own people and before the world, and partly to make it - appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of - war against Germany. - - - - “In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the - Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another - purpose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style - to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next - English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long - been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully - prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the - West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region - of the Ruhr. - - - - “Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of - Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these - two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England - and France would maintain the strictest neutrality. - - - - “Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to read this in -full? - -MR. ROBERTS: No, I don’t. I was going to summarize these charges. If -your Lordship would be good enough to look at the bottom of the first -page, you will see the so-called ultimatum complaining of the hostile -expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands press; and then, My Lord, in -the second paragraph over the page there is an allegation of the -attempts of the British Intelligence to bring a revolution in Germany -with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. - -Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military preparation -of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed out that Belgium -has fortified the Belgian-German frontier. - -A complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that British -aircraft have flown over the Netherlands’ country. - -There are, My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality of these -two countries although no instances are given. I don’t think I need -refer to anything on Page 3 of the document. - -Page 4, My Lord—I would like, if I might, to read the middle paragraph: - - “In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people - by England and France, the Reich Government are not disposed to - await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow - them to carry the war over Belgium and the other Netherlands - into German territory.” - -And, My Lord, I just emphasize this sentence and then I read no further: - - “They have, therefore, now issued the command to German troops - to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military - means at the disposal of the Reich.” - -My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the falsity -of that statement. The world now knows that for months preparations had -been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This -document is saying the orders to do so have now been issued. - -My Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was handed to -the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My Lord, TC-60—that -will be GB-113, which is the last document but one in the bundle. My -Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed -with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and -the Netherlands. - -My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of TC-60: - - “In defense against the imminent attack the German troops have - now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two - countries . . . .” - -My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in, that is -GB-111. - -My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government against -the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those are the facts -supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and assurances -against these three countries and supporting the allegation of the -making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord, in the respectful -submission of the Prosecution here the story is a very plain, a very -simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and shame. - -COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it -please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the evidence on the wars -of aggression and wars in breach of treaties against Greece and -Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put in to the Tribunal has been -prepared in collaboration with my American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel -Krucker. - -The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took place -in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April 1941, constituted -direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific -Settlement of International Disputes and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of -1928. Those breaches are charged, respectively, at Paragraphs I and XIII -of Appendix C of the Indictment. Both have already been put in by my -learned friend, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the -obligation of the German Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and -Greece under those pacts. - -In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a breach of -an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at Paragraph XXVI of -Appendix C. This assurance was originally given in a German Foreign -Office release made in Berlin on the 28th of April 1938 but was -subsequently repeated by Hitler himself on the 6th of October 1939 in a -speech he made in the Reichstag, and it is in respect of this last -occasion that the assurance is specifically pleaded in the Indictment. - -May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the document -book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is 2719-PS, which is -part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-58. -This is the text of the German Foreign Office release on the 28th of -April 1938, and I would read the beginning and then the last paragraph -but one on the page: - - “Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the - German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives. - - - - “As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich we - have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, - Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as - final and inviolable. On this point the following special - declarations have been made . . . .” - -And then to the last paragraph: - - “3. Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed by - authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims - beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case - remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on the 3rd of April - of that year the Führer and Chancellor stated that in regard to - the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the - same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there - which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military - protection for them.” - -Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book, TC-92, -and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a speech made -by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince Regent of -Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the extract in full: - - “The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a - spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of - the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier then - learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. - I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual - respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural, and - economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’ - present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and - at the same time, on that account we derive from it the hope - that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop - in the future and to grow ever closer. - - - - “In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also - perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange - of views which—and of this I am convinced—in this sense can - only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this - all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship - of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events - we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all - time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two - peoples and countries but can also represent an element of calm - to our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who - are disposed to perform really constructive work.” - -As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already -decided upon the European war. I think I am right in saying it was a -week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known as the Schmundt note, -to which the Tribunal has been referred more than once. The reference to -“nerve-racked continent” might perhaps be attributed to the war of -nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many months. - -Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Paragraph XXVI -as the assurance breached; it is the next document in the bundle, -TC-43—German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of October 1939. It is -part of the document which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-80. -This is an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_: - - “Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed - Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would - also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in - peace and friendship with her.” - -Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899 and the -Kellogg-Briand Pact and under the assurances which I have read, the fate -of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know, been sealed ever -since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Ciano -at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of August 1939. - -We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77. That -document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages to which I -would draw Your Lordship’s attention already have been quoted, I think, -by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those passages are on Page 2 -in the last paragraph from “Generally speaking . . .” until “. . . -neutral of this kind,” and then again on Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted -by the Attorney General and emphasized particularly by Colonel -Griffith-Jones at the foot of Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, -the words beginning “In general, however, success by one of the Axis -partners . . .” to “. . . Italy and Germany would have their backs free -for work against the West.” - -Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might sum up -the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as a whole, it -shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only 2 months after the -dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade the Italians to make -war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Germany commences hostilities -against Poland, as Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. -Ciano, while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as -to the desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to -secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general -European war. - -Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop -exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi conspirators to -reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in fact Italy -maintained her position and did not enter the war when the Germans -invaded Poland, while the Germans themselves were not yet ready to -strike in the Balkans. It was just for this reason that on the 6th of -October through Hitler’s speech they repeated the assurance they had -given in April 1938. It is, of course, a matter of history that after -the defeat of the Allied armies in May and June 1940 the Italian -Government declared war on France and that subsequently at 3 o’clock in -the morning of the 28th October 1940 the Italian Minister at Athens -presented the Greek Government with a 3 hours’ ultimatum upon the expiry -of which Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece. - -If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty’s Minister -reported that event, “The President of the Council has assured himself -an outstanding . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not in any of my documents. It is merely carrying -the story to the next document: - - “The President of the Council has assured himself an outstanding - place in Greek history, and whatever the future may bring, his - foresight in quietly preparing his country for war, and his - courage in resisting without demur the Italian ultimatum when - delivered in the small hours of that October morning will surely - obtain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. - He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated, and this - reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.” - -I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS, a letter -from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although not dated, -I think it is clear from the contents that it was written shortly after -the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in full by the -Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal if I read -just the last two paragraphs of the extract: - - “Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however, from - our point of view interested in co-operating in the liquidation - of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is - useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans. - - - - “Unfortunately I must stress the fact that waging a war in the - Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore any threatening - move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the impossibility - of a materialization of such threats before March is well known - to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugoslavia must, if at - all possible, be won over by other means and other ways.” - -You may think the reference in the first two lines to his -thoughts—having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days—probably -indicates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly -after the Italian attack. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Italian attack? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeeding document, -it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive -in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the -north. This letter shows that it was an integral part of those plans -that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate in them or at least to -maintain a disinterested attitude toward the liquidation of the other -Balkan states. - -I pass now to the next document in the bundle, 444-PS, which becomes -Exhibit GB-116. It is a top-secret directive issued from the Führer’s -headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defendant Jodl, and -dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first two lines and -then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page: - - “Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme - Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future - are to be made along the following lines . . .” - -Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar and an -offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the third page: - - “Balkans . . . The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make - preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the - Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus - make possible the use of German Air Force units against targets - in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those - English air bases which are threatening the Romanian oil area. - - - - “In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep - Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate - strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and - the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count - on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving these - forces into position. - - - - “So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, - preparations will be made for an early increase in the German - Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be submitted - to me. - - - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations - for the use of German Air Force units in the southeast Balkans - and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria - in accordance with the intended ground operations.” - -I don’t think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next -document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit -GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on Greece. Before -reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized the position of the -Italian invading forces at that time as this is one of the factors -mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put it very shortly. I again -use the words in which His Majesty’s Minister reported: - - “The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the - highest, and our own naval and land successes at Taranto and in - the western desert have done much to maintain it. - - - - “With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and - modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior - Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the - bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not - unworthy of the ancient traditions of their country and that - they, like their distant forefathers, are prepared to fight - against odds to maintain their freedom.” - -In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that -Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued on 13 -December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the Operation -Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Commander of the Navy, -that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder; one to the Commander of -the Air Force, which would be the Defendant Göring; one to the Supreme -Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which -I take it, would be the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two -paragraphs and then summarize the next two, if I may: - - “The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive. - Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly - necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under - the protection of a Balkan front—which would be dangerous above - all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields—be foiled. - - - - “My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task - force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after the - setting in of favorable weather—probably in March—to send this - task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way - of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the entire Greek - mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be - expected.” - -The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and Paragraph 4 -deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states: - - “The military preparations which will produce exceptional - political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all - the necessary measures by the High Command. The transport - through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be reported step - by step by the High Command of the Armed Forces and are to be - explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission - in Romania. Consultations with the Romanians or the Bulgarians - which may point to our intentions as well as notification of the - Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending of - scouting missions and advanced parties.” - -I think I need not trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next -document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, is again a -top-secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with -decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces in -Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the -paragraph at the foot of the page. - - “The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations - demands German assistance for strategical, political, and - psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces by - England against our allies.” - -And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be transferred to -Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the German forces will -be: - - “a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an - emergency case should new crises arise there. - - - - “b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later - attacking with the aim: - - - - “To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a - far-reaching operation. - - - - “To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order - to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s army.” - -That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the original -which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant Keitel and -the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went to the Defendant -Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign intelligence would -probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop. - -I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes Exhibit -GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the 19th and 20th -of January between the Defendant Keitel and the Italian General Guzzoni -and which was followed by a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at -which the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. - -I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Italians, but -if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is a paragraph there -in the speech, which the Führer made, which is perhaps just worth -reading—the speech by the Führer on the 20th of January 1941, in the -middle of Page 3. It sets out that the speech was made after the -conference with the Italians and then shows who was present. - -On the German side I would call your attention to the presence of the -Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the -Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff. That -is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel and Jodl; and on the -Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then three generals. It is the last -paragraph that I would wish to read: - - “The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold purpose: - - - - “a. An operation against Greece; - - - - “b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey; - - - - “c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania. - - - - “Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces; - altogether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far - from our base requires a long time. - - - - “Desirable that this deployment is completed without - interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late - as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the - last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest - possible moment.” - -I pass to the next document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120. That -document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a -conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the 8th of -February. The second part and the third part deal with later events, and -I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate time. I would read -the first and the last paragraphs on the first page of this document: - - “Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of - the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High - Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the - possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their - commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she - should involve herself in the war.” - -And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being concerted -with the Bulgarians—Paragraph 3: - - “The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all - measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the - operations and to assure in this way the most favorable - conditions for the execution of the German operations as - planned. - - “The representatives of the two general staffs consider it - suitable to inform their governments that it will be advisable - of necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration - when the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to - assure the success of the military operations.” - -I pass then to the next document, C-59. I offer that as Exhibit GB-121. -It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February. I need -not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the date for -the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the Danube is -to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed on the 2d of -March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of February at the -latest. - -It is perhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put in, the -actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant Keitel. - -It is perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at this -moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the 1st of March -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What year? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of German troops -into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan Marita and the -directives to which I have referred the Tribunal. - -The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in -accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His -Majesty’s Government may have accelerated the movement of the German -forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of Greece had -been planned long beforehand and was already in progress at this time. - -I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which I put in as -GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy, but the original -which I have put in shows that both the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were -present at the interview with Hitler which this extract records. It is a -short extract from a report by the Defendant Raeder on an interview with -Hitler in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps -interesting as showing the ruthless nature of the German intention. - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation that - the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event - of a peaceful settlement. - - - - “Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any - settlement.” - -The above document . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at 1600 hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows, it is submitted, -that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their principle of -liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinterested had made every -preparation by the end of January and were at this date in the process -of moving the necessary troops to ensure the final liquidation of -Greece, which was already at war with and getting the better of their -Italian allies. - -They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia towards which -their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting -victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with this policy, the -adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact was secured. This -adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February 1941 by the Yugoslav -Premier Cvetković and the Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markovic to the -Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and subsequently to Hitler at -Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers were induced to sign the Pact -at Vienna on the 25th of March. On this occasion the Defendant -Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance, which are set out in the -next document in the bundle, 2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123. If I -might read from half-way down the page: - - “Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade. - - - - “At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia - to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the Governments of the Axis - Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following - identical notes: - - - - “‘Mr. Prime Minister: - - - - “‘In the name of the German Government and at their behest I - have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following: - - - - “‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the - Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their - determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial - integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’” - -That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you will -remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when he and -Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia. In fact it -was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans did invade -Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that they issued the -necessary order. - -If I might read the second letter: - - “Mr. Prime Minister: - - “With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection - with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have - the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of - the Reich Cabinet”—Reichsregierung—“that in the agreement - between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government the - Governments of the Axis Powers during this war will not direct a - demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of - troops through Yugoslavian national territory.” - -The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore, that -German troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek -frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter -to Mussolini, “become disinterested” in the cleaning-up of the Greek -question. - -The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact -appears very clearly from the next document in the bundle, 2765-PS, -which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from the minutes of a meeting -between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might just read the first paragraph: - - “The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s - joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her - position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed - military action against Greece, for if one considers that for - 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication - through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav - border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia - an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an - extremely foolhardy venture.” - -Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of March, -when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic -and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_; and -Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March ready to defend, -if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people had found themselves. - -The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapidity, and -the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. - -I ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as GB-120, to -the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting of a record of a -conference of Hitler and the German High Command on the situation in -Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941. - -It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Marshal, that -is of course, the Defendant Göring; Chief, OKW, that is the Defendant -Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that is the Defendant Jodl. -Then over the page—“later on the following persons were added.” I call -the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that those who came in later -included the Defendant Ribbentrop. - -If I might read the part of Hitler’s statement set out on Page 4: - - “The Führer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup - d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in - regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to - the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were - never pro-Germans.” - -I think I can pass on to the second paragraph: - - “The present moment is for political and military reasons - favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the - country and the country’s attitude towards us. For if the - overthrow of the government would have happened during the - Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have - been considerably more serious.” - -And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw the -Tribunal’s attention: - - “The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty - declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in - order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. - No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. - Assurances of the Yugoslav Government which cannot be trusted - anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will - start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready. - - - - “It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. - An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate - in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia - is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of - Bulgaria too. Romania’s main task is the protection against - Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Ministers have already - been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed - to the Duce. - - - - “Politically it is especially important that the blow against - Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the - military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In - this way Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the - campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a - favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to - our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment - (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against - Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and - Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to - these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the Banat for - Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria. - - - - “This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all - preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav - collapse will take place within the shortest time.” - -Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third -paragraph—2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances -given—because there has been a _coup d’état_ and it is just possible -that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction of -Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the trouble to -ascertain the views of the new government. - -Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the -document, which I would like to read: - - “5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as - possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force - ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in - attacks by waves . . . .” - -I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruthlessly this -bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade were bombed at 7 -o’clock on the following Sunday morning, the morning of the 6th. - -THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April? - -COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April. - -Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V at -Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant Jodl and -I would read one small paragraph at the top of the following page, Page -6: - - “In the event that the political development requires an armed - intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to - attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to - destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national - territory.” - -I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the Defendant -Jodl. - -Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put that in as -Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued after the meeting -from the minutes of which I have just read, that is the meeting of the -27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part II. It is worth reading the -first paragraph: - - “The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political - situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her - protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an - enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.” - -I pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence as GB-126. -It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler to Mussolini -forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome by Hitler and the -Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise Mussolini of the course -decided on and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce is -given his orders. If I might read the first five paragraphs: - - “Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest - means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which - may result from it. - - - - “(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the most - dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from - the purely military point of view, German intervention in the - war in Thrace would not be at all justified as long as the - attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and she could threaten - the left flank of the advancing columns on our enormous front. - - - - “(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have - endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together - by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet - with success, or they were begun too late to produce any - definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the - imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. - - - - “(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but - nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any - mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole - position. - - - - “(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary - measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary - military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has - been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request - you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in - the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that - you should cover and screen the most important passes from - Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces. - - - - “These measures should not be considered as designed for a long - period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent - for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising. - - - - “I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce - your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available - means and with utmost speed. - - - - “(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which - we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only - personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything - about them. These measures will completely lose their value - should they become known . . . .” - -Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy. - -I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in as -Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the Attorney -General. It is an operational order signed by General Von Brauchitsch -which is merely passing to the armies the orders contained in Directive -Number 25, which was the Document C-127, an extract of which I put in as -Exhibit GB-125. I won’t trouble the Tribunal with reading it. - -I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as GB-114. The -invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this morning, the 6th of -April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation from which this passage -is an extract: - - “From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s - steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theater of war. British - diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, - succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her - and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes. - - - - “The documents published today afford”—that refers to the - _German White Book_ which they published of all the documents - leading up to the invasion—“The documents published today - afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with very old - British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others to fight - and bleed for British interests. - - - - “In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The - German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but that - (2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power - establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a - given time, of being able to advance thence from the southeast - into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free - of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in - the south.” - -Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal’s particular -attention: - - “In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has - been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above - all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have - consciously put out of mind everything that once took place - between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian - people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made - efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all - difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and - various nations allied to Germany.” - -One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must -momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August of 1939 and -the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the others on 27th March a -few days earlier. - -I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which has -already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34. It is a -record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on 7th November -1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets out his views two -and a half years later on the action taken in April 1941. I refer to -Paragraph 11 on Page 4: - - “What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of - affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in - consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece. - The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from - Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all - agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part - which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become - necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on - Greece from the north was not executed merely as an operation in - aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from - gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Romanian oil - area from that country.” - -If I might summarize the story: - -The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as December or -November 1940 and planned for the end of March or the beginning of April -1941. No consideration was at any time given to any obligations under -treaties or conventions which might make such invasion a breach of -international law. Care was taken to conceal the preparations so that -the German forces might have an unsuspecting victim. - -In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, -was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to -secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or at least to -ensure that she would abstain from any interference. - -The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then -decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had any -hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, -Yugoslavia must be liquidated. - -It was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugoslavia’s -intentions when it would be so little trouble now that the German troops -were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a national unit. -Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning, the 6th of April, -German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece -simultaneously with the formality of handing a note to the Greek -Minister in Berlin informing him that the German forces were entering -Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in -replying to information of the invasion from the German Embassy, replied -that history was repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by -Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same -reply as in the preceding October. - -That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia. But as -I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like, if the -Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly indeed, -to one common factor which runs through the whole of this aggression. I -can do it, I think, in 5 minutes. - -It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which was -used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis themselves but also -by their Italian friends. Their technique was essentially based upon -securing the maximum advantage from surprise even though only a few -hours of unopposed military advance into the country of the unsuspecting -victim could thus be secured. Thus there was, of course, no declaration -of war in the case of Poland. - -The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the -night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a military operation before -the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the Danish -Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the morning of the 9th and to the -Norwegian Minister between half past 4 and 5 on that morning. - -The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than 5 -o’clock, in most cases earlier in the small hours of the 10th of May, -while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case with the diplomatic -excuses and explanations was not presented until afterwards. - -In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the -morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already been bombed -that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Kleffens. In the case of -Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the German Minister did not see M. -Spaak until 8. - -The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when the German -Minister asked to see M. Beck. - -Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of the -28th of October in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a 3-hour -ultimatum to General Metaxas. - -The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both began in -the small hours of April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no -diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a proclamation -was issued by Hitler—a proclamation from which I read an extract—at 5 -o’clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours before Belgrade was bombed. - -In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5 that M. -Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek territory. - -The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is -in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and treacherous -character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning at night to secure -an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons afterwards. Their -method of procedure is clearly the method of the barbarian, of the state -which has no respect for its own pledged word nor for the rights of any -people but its own. - -One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved by the -honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant Ribbentrop. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on after a short -adjournment? That’s what you were intending to do? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We’ll adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding with the -presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression against the -Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two further -documents relating to the aggression against Austria. - -These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book, supplement to -Document Book N. Both documents are correspondence of the British -Foreign Office. They have been made available to us through the courtesy -of our British colleagues. - -First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127. This is -in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from Ambassador -Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to Lord Halifax. It -reads: - - “My Lord: - - “With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th, I have - the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a - letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in accordance with - the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on - the same evening. - - - - “The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron Von - Neurath at the same time.” - -The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to -Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows: - - “Dear Reich Minister: - - “My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was - delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding, _inter alia_, the - resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the - Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of - the members were to be National Socialists and the readmission - of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping - order in Vienna. - - - - “I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to - the German Government that if this report is correct His - Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to - register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of - coercion backed by force against an independent state in order - to create a situation incompatible with its national - independence. - - - - “As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been - informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest - reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.” - -I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128. This consists -of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to the British -Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath’s letter of response dated 12 -March 1938. The letter is identified in the document with the letter -“L”. - -First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the British -Government were undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s -independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his letter: - - “In the name of the German Government I must point out here that - the Royal British Government have no right to assume the role of - a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of - diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German - Government never left any doubt with the Royal British - Government that the formation of relations between Germany and - Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern - of the German people and that it did not affect a third power.” - -Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von -Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events. I quote -the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the English translation I -start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter: - - “Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the - evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary - resolution decided on by himself to hold an election within a - few days which, under the prevailing circumstances and - especially according to the details provided for the execution - of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of - oppressing politically the predominant majority of the - population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this - procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of - Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s - internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the - then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for - an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore a - crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of - March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and - in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich - used forceful pressure to bring about this development. - Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former - Chancellor that the German Government had presented the Federal - President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; - according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed - candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the - proposals of the German Government otherwise the invasion of - Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the - matter is that the question of sending military or police forces - from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed - Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the - press, to the German Government urgently asking for the dispatch - of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace - and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately - threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German - Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to - it. - - - - “This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the - attitude of the German Government as asserted in your letter - could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture of - the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at - noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the - German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take - place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise - its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate - aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in - Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of - self-government of the German people.” - -That ends the quotation. - -Now in the light of the evidence which has already been presented to the -Tribunal, this version of the events given by the Defendant Von Neurath -is a hollow mockery of the truth. - -We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit -Number USA-72, Jodl’s diary, the entry for March 10, 1938, the fact that -Von Neurath was taking over the duties of the Foreign Office while -Ribbentrop was detained in London, that the Führer wished to send an -ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet, that he had dispatched a letter to -Mussolini of his reasons for taking action, and that army mobilization -orders were given. - -We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two different -documents. I refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61, report of Gauleiter -Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July 1939, which was -transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on 22 August 1939. The -portions reporting on the events of March 11 have already been read to -the Tribunal. - -I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts of -Göring’s telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I have -already read to the Tribunal. - -These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable clarity, that -the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the Austrian Government -that they would send troops across the border if Schuschnigg did not -resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were not appointed Chancellor. - -These documents also show that the impetus of the famous telegram came -from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Göring composed the telegram and -Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but merely said “agreed.” - -The transcript of Göring’s telephone call to Ribbentrop is indicated as -Part W of that document. In it the formula was developed and recited for -English consumption that there had been no ultimatum and that the German -troops crossed the border in response only to the telegram. - -And now in this document from which I have just read we find the same -bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant Von Neurath. He was -at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of which we have the Hossbach -minutes, Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew very well the firmly held Nazi -ideas with respect to Austria and Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period -after March 10, 1938 when he was handling the foreign affairs for this -conspiracy and particularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out -his part in making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. -Mastny regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the -document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27, Exhibit -GB-21. - -And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although using the -letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit shows, reciting -this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian situation, a story -also encountered by us in the transcript of the Göring-Ribbentrop -telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims of what we call the -conspiracy. - -Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and appropriate -for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan and the attack on -the United States on this December 7, 1945, the fourth anniversary of -the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our plan was to proceed -chronologically so that part of the case must wait its turn for the -presentation next week. - -We now come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of aggression, -perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history, when Hitler’s -intuition led him and his associates to launch an aggressive war against -the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. - -In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account of the -aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our British -colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formulation of the -plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initiation of actual -aggressive war. In addition they have laid before the Tribunal the story -of the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression involving -the planning and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and -the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the -British Prosecution has marshalled and presented to the Court various -international treaties, agreements, and assurances, and the evidence -establishing the breaching of those treaties and assurances. - -I should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the last but -one of the defendants’ acts of aggression, the invasion of the U.S.S.R. -The section of the Indictment in which this crime is charged is Count -One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion on 22 June 1941 of the -U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August -1939. The first sentence of this paragraph is the one with which we -shall be concerned today. It reads: - - “On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the - Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without - any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby - beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.” - -The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are contained -in document book marked “P,” which we now hand to the Court. - -First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a point of -departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet Union, I should -like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date just a week before -the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to enter -into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. which is referred to -in this section of the Indictment which I have just quoted. This treaty, -Document Number TC-25, will be introduced in evidence by our British -colleagues, but it contains two articles which I should like to bring to -the attention of the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows: - - “The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act - of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one - another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.” - -Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between the -contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two -parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by friendly -exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration commissions. - -It is well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course of the -story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the German -Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announcement came as -somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared to constitute a -reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The explanation -for this about-face has been provided, however, by no less eminent a -witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself in a discussion which he -had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A -report of that conference was forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German -diplomats in the field for their strictly confidential and purely -personal information. This report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I -offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document. - -On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima the reason -for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the German: - - “Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compromise - with Russia—as a necessity for avoiding a two-front war.” - -In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis in -entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggression, it -is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they did all -treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it was -expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is evidenced -by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was still in -progress they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of -aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -In a speech to Reichs- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943, which -is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted—and I shall read from Page 7 of the -English translation, which is at Page 15 of the original German text: - - “Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily - growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the - Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little - perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had - deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has - always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as - during the Western campaign had informed me of his fundamental - decision to take steps against this danger the moment our - military position made it at all possible.” - -At the time this decision was made, however, the Western campaign was -still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily had to be -postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the -Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the campaign in the -West with the exception of the war against Britain came to an end. The -view that Germany’s key to political and economic domination lay in the -elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor and in the acquisition -of Lebensraum at her expense had long been basic in Nazi ideology. As we -have seen, this idea had never been completely forgotten even while the -war in the West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of -their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat -Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the -Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving their -traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. - -The situation in which Germany now found herself made such action appear -both desirable and practical. As early as August of 1940 General Thomas -received a hint from the Defendant Göring that planning for a campaign -against the Soviet Union was already under way. Thomas at that time was -the Chief of the “Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt” of the OKW. - -I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred to in -the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü. - -General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Göring in his -draft of a work entitled _Basic Facts for a History of German War and -Armament Economy_, which he prepared during the summer of 1944. This -book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been admitted into evidence -as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was marked that for identification -purposes. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-35. - -On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-German Trade -Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets were delivering -quickly and well under this agreement and were requesting war materials -in return, there was much pressure in Germany until early in 1940 for -increased delivery on the part of the Germans. However, at Page 315 he -has the following to say about the change of heart expressed by the -German leaders in August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English -translation: - - “On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt during a - conference with Reich Marshal Göring, was informed that the - Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until - spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further interest in - completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved - the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to give priority to - matters concerning Russian war economy.” - -I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the -preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected -to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which will -show that in November of 1940 Göring informed Thomas that a campaign was -planned against the U.S.S.R. - -Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet -Union necessarily entailed even these many months in advance of the date -of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction -projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be -expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet Intelligence Service. -Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. - -In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued to the -counter-intelligence service abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures -were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the captured German -document. This directive pointed out that the activity in the East must -not be permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an -offensive was being prepared, and outlined the line for the -counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact. The text of -the directive indicates by implication the extent of the preparations -already under way, and I should like to read it to the Tribunal: - - “The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to - come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map - is supposed to be reached. - - “These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that - we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, - Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops - are stationed in the Government General, in the Eastern - Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw the - conclusion that we can at any time protect our - interests—especially in the Balkans—with strong forces against - Russian seizure. - - - - “For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the - answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service, the - following directives apply: - - - - “1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the - East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a - frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be - explained by movements into training camps, regroupings, _et - cetera_. - - - - “2) The impression is to be created that the center of the - massing of troops is in the southern part of the Government, in - the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in the - north is relatively unimportant. - - - - “3) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, - especially of the armored divisions, things are to be - exaggerated, if necessary. - - - - “4) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the - antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased - considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that - it continues to be increased with captured French material on - all important targets. - - - - “5) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes, _et - cetera_, it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal - limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won eastern - territories, and serves primarily economical traffic. - - - - “The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent - correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of - garrisons, _et cetera_, will be made available to the defense - for purposes of counter espionage. - - - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order - of”—signed—“Jodl.” - -Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and -called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more -definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a -general outline of the Army’s operational plan. This order was contained -in a top-secret directive from the Führer’s headquarters, Number 18, -dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl. It is -Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already in evidence as -Exhibit Number GB-116. - -The directive begins by saying: - - “The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the - prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along - the following lines . . . .” - -It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding -relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.—and I -read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the English translation: - - “Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of - clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of - the results of these discussions all preparations for the East - which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. - - - - “Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline - of the Army’s operational plans have been submitted to, and - approved by me.” - -On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, -at that time General Halder, reported to the Führer concerning the -progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A -report of this conference with Hitler is contained in captured Document -Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing many documents all labeled -annexes and all bearing on Fall Barbarossa, the plan against the -U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in the War Diary of the -Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently an enclosure to that diary. - -The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is dated -December 1940. - -I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United States Exhibit -Number 131. I should also like to read into the record a few sentences -from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate the state of the -planning for this act of aggression six and a half months before it -occurred. - - “Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940. - - - - “The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported about - the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the - geographical fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are - in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.” - -Then skipping: - - “The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed - operational plans and adds the following: - - - - “The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from - withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should be - combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to attack - the territory of the German Reich and on the other hand the - German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy - Russian war industrial territory. In this way we should be able - to achieve the annihilation of the Russian Army and to prevent - its regeneration. The first commitment of the forces should take - place in such a way as to make the annihilation of strong enemy - units possible.” - -Then, skipping again: - - “It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions - in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as planned - for the entire operation is sufficient.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomorrow. We will -sit again on Monday at 10 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SIXTEENTH DAY - Monday, 10 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from Dr. Dix on behalf -of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that the Tribunal wishes the -defendants’ counsel to know that they will be permitted to make one -speech only in accordance with Article 24 (h) of the Charter, and this -speech will be at the conclusion of all the evidence. - -At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the defendants’ -counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they -propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of the -witnesses and the matters to which their evidence will be relevant, and -this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is that clear? In -case there should be any misunderstanding, what I have just said will be -posted up on the board in the defendants’ Counsel Room so that you can -study it there. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal rose Friday, -I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggression against the -U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at an end, the Nazi -conspirators had begun the development of their plans to attack the -Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning and action was in -progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November that more detailed -and definite instructions would be issued. These would be issued as soon -as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans had been -submitted to him and approved by him. We had thus reached the point in -the story indicated on the outline submitted last Friday as Part 3 of -the Plan Barbarossa. - -By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army’s -operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical -directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force for -Barbarossa—Directive Number 21—was issued. This directive, which for -the first time marks the plan to invade the Soviet Union, was -specifically referred to in an order although the order was classified -top secret. It also marked the first use of the code word Barbarossa to -denote this operation. - -The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in the -course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it was fully -discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now merely to -recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant sentences in -that document. Most of these sentences appear on Page 1 of the English -translation. One of the most significant, I believe, is this sentence -with which the order begins: - - “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia - in a quick campaign even before the end of the war with - England.” - -On the same page it is stated: - - “Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not - yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 - May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the intention - of the attack will not be recognized.” - -The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the intended -invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various services (Army, -Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and calls for oral reports to -Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing as follows: - - “V.”—that is on Page 2—“I am expecting the reports of the - commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter - of instructions. - - - - “The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces - are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in - regard to their time.” - -Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one -illegible name. - -It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well -as from its history, which I have outlined, that this directive was no -mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to prepare for an -act of aggression, which was intended to occur and which actually did -occur. - -The various services which received the order certainly understood it as -an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as a hypothetical -staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation -which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general -scheme set forth in this basic directive. - -So we come to the military planning and preparation for the -implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for 13 January -1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of -Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in preparation to be reported -to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in -the War Diary is Document C-35 in our numbered series, and I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-132. - -This document contains a substantial amount of technical information -concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in -which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel, however, that it -will be sufficient for the establishment of our point that the Navy was -actively preparing for the attack at this early date, to read only a -small portion of the entry into the record, beginning on Page 1 of the -English translation, which is Page 401 of the Diary itself. The entry -reads: - - “30 January 1941. - - - - “7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the - Barbarossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed - Forces.” - -I should note that “Ia” is in this case the abbreviation for a deputy -chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives -in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks for the Navy are -listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to give the Tribunal an -idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation: - - “II. Objectives of War Against Russia . . . . - - - - “d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: 1) - Lightning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force - units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, - Black Sea, and Polar Sea.” - -The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it indicates -the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to -implement Barbarossa almost six months before the operation actually got -under way. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which -demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet -Union was one of the most cold-bloodedly premeditated attacks on a -neighboring power in the history of the world. Similarly the Naval War -Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to -the planning and preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such -references are contained in Document C-33, which I am now offering in -evidence as Exhibit USA-133. - -I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical the -entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the English -translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself. - - “In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which all - S-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only be - considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.” - -On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to assess the -progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa. The conference -also discussed the plans for “Sonnenblume,” which was the code name for -the North African operation—“Sunflower.” Attending this conference -were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the -Armed Forces, the Defendant Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces -Operations Staff, the Defendant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the -Army, Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well -as several others, including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant. - -A report of this conference is contained in our Document Number 872-PS, -which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134. - -During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army General Staff -gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with their own -strength and the general overall operational plans for the invasion. -This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the -Führer. - -At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan, which is at -Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting extract, which, -although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least sufficiently clear to -inform us that elaborate timetables had already been set out for the -deployment of troops as well as for industrial operations. I quote: - - “The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First - Deployment Echelon”—Aufmarschstaffel—“now being transferred, - Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from the middle - of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West, but - Army groups and Army High Commands are withdrawn from the West. - In the East there are already considerable reinforcements though - still in the rear area. From now on, ‘Attila’”—I might state - here parenthetically that this was the code word for the - operation for the occupation of unoccupied France—“Attila can - be carried out only with difficulty. Economic traffic is - hampered by transport movements. From the beginning of April, - Hungary will be approached about the march-through. Third - Deployment Echelon, from the middle of April. ‘Felix’ is now no - longer possible, as the main part of the artillery has been - shipped.”—Felix was the name for the proposed operation against - Gibraltar.—“In industry the full capacity timetable is in - force. No more camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25. - IV to 15. V, withdraws considerable forces from the West - (‘Seelöwe’ can no longer be carried out).”—“Seelöwe” (or Sea - Lion) was a code word for the planned operation against England, - and “Marita,” which we shall see a little later in the - quotation, was the code word for the action against - Greece.—“The concentration of troops in the East is clearly - apparent. The full capacity timetable is maintained. The - complete picture of the disposition of forces on the map shows 8 - Marita divisions. - - - - “Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have to - assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them ready - as reserves for commander in the West. - - - - “Führer: ‘When Barbarossa commences the world will hold its - breath and make no comment.’” - -This much, I believe, when read with the conference conclusions, which I -shall read in a moment, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as -the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and were far along -with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost 5 months -prior to 22 June, the date the attack was actually launched. The -conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar -as they affected Barbarossa, as follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of -the English translation, which is on Page 7 of the German: - - “Conclusions: - - - - “1. Barbarossa. - - - - “a. The Führer on the whole is in agreement with the operational - plan. When it is being carried out it must be remembered that - the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and - Leningrad. - - - - “b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of - the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as possible. - - - - “c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part may - not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for - camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to reinforcing - the Moldau. - - - - “d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila. (With - the means available.) - - - - “e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as a - feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita.” - -On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational directive -to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form of “Directives -for Special Areas.” This detailed operational order is Number 447-PS in -our numbered series, and I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-135. - -This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of the attack -indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the -operation. Section I of the directive is headed, “Area of Operations and -Executive Power,” and outlines who was to be in control of what and -where. It states that while the campaign is in progress in territory -through which the Army is advancing, the Supreme Commander of the Army -has the executive power. During this period, however, the Reichsführer -SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in -Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation and -reads as follows: - - “b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer SS - is, on behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks for - the preparation of the political administration—tasks which - result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two - opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks the - Reichsführer SS shall act independently and under his own - responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme - Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him - shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the - Reichsführer SS that through the execution of his tasks military - operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged - directly through the OKH with the Reichsführer SS.” - -The order then states that in time political administration will be set -up under Commissioners of the Reich, and discusses the relationship of -these officials to the Army. This is contained in Paragraph 2c and -Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read: - - “c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient - depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied - territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given - its own political administration. For the present it is to be - divided on the basis of nationality and according to the - positions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries), - Center (White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories - the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners - of the Reich who receive their orders from the Führer. - - - - “3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas - under the political administration in the rear of the area of - operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the - Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. - - - - “The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the - Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the - military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial - commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander or a - commanding general. In this capacity he is responsible primarily - for the following tasks: - - - - “a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich in - order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation of - the country and securing its economic values for use by German - industry.” - -The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of -economy in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop more fully -later in my presentation. This provision is also in Section I, Paragraph -4, which I shall read: - - “4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the - administration of economy in the area of operations and in the - territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal, - who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rü Amt’ with the - execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the - OKW/Wi Rü Amt.” - -The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time who these -people are? Who is the Reich Marshal? - -MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Göring. - -THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS at that time? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler. - -THE PRESIDENT: Himmler? - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and -communication traffic, and I shall not read it here. - -Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain other -countries, and states in part as follows—I am reading from Page 3 of -the English translation: - - “III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and - Finland. - - - - “9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be - made by the OKW together with the Foreign Office and according - to the wish of the respective high commands. In case it should - become necessary during the course of the operations to grant - special rights, applications for this purpose are to be - submitted to the OKW.” - -The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is also on -Page 3 of the English Translation: - - “IV. Directives regarding Sweden. - - - - “12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for troops, - no special authority is to be granted to the commander of the - German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure - the immediate protection of railroad transports against sabotage - and attacks. - - - - “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,”—signed— - - - - “Keitel.” - -As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Number 21, -which I discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated that the -attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, -however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign -in the Balkans, and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. -Evidence of this postponement is found in a document, which bears our -Number C-170. This document has been identified by the Defendant Raeder -as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War -Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the -Admiralty files, and contains file references to the papers which were -the basis for each entry. - -I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136. - -Although I shall refer to this document again later, I should like at -present to read only an item which appears in the second paragraph of -Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and which is in the text -in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original. This item is dated 3 -April 1941, and reads as follows: - - “Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks. All - measures which can be construed as offensive actions are to be - stopped according to the Führer’s order.” - -By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out -to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of June—more -than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our series is a top-secret -report of a conference with the Chief of the Section -“Landesverteidigung” of the “Wehrmacht Führungsstab” on April 30, 1941. -I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-137. - -I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of this -report: - - “1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided: - - - - “Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop - movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations - the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. - - - - “2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa: - - - - “Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of the - same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority; Sector - South, Russian superiority.” - -Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations for the -attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to -issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and -missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. - -This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and I offer it in -evidence now as Exhibit USA-138. - -This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered here was -the third copy which was given to the High Command of the Navy; Page 1 -is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as follows: - - “Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; Nr. 44842/41 - top military secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer’s headquarters; - for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies; I Op. - 00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures. - - - - “The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a - foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If - alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces must be informed. - - - - “Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces”—signed— - “Keitel.” - -I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which indicates -where the 21 copies went. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribunal does not think it necessary -that you should read all those preliminary matters at the head of these -documents, “top secret,” “only through officer,” and then the various -reference numbers and file information when you give identification of a -document. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir. - -The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text outlining -the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The outline is in -six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: -General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army, Navy, Air Force, and -Camouflage. - -I think it unnecessary to read into the record any of this textual -material. The remainder of the paper is in tabular form with seven -columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date, Serial -number, Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most interesting among the -items appearing on this chart . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first paragraph, for that -seems to be important. There are two lines there. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: The heading “General” on Page 2. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir. - - “1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of troops in - the East will be put into operation on the 22d of May.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing on this chart, -in my opinion, are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10. These are at Page -8 of the German version. At the bottom of Page 9 it is provided in the -columns for Army, Navy, and Air Force—and I quote: - - “Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be - cancelled.” - -Under the column headed OKW appears the note that—and again I quote: - - “Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of - start of attack by code word ‘Dortmund’.” - -In the Remarks column appears the statement that: - - “Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of - main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be - reckoned with.” - -The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June, under -Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the -Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides as follows, under the -heading: - - “Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the Army - and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330 hours.” - -In the Remarks column, it states that: - - “Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on the - part of the Air Force owing to weather.” - -The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and -give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and -missions of the various components of the Armed Forces. - -On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports on -Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just 8 days -before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, and -is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer it in evidence now -as Exhibit USA-139. - -I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading “Conference Barbarossa”: - - “1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has - ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of Army groups, - armies, and naval and air commanders of equal rank. - - - - “2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the - Reich Chancellery, Berlin. - - - - “3. Timetable: - - - - “a) 1100 hours, “Silver Fox”; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army - Group South; c) 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all - participants in conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army - Group North, Army Group Center, in this order.” - -It is signed by Schmundt. - -There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they -will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however, a large -number of the members of the Defendant High Command and General Staff -group as of that date. Among those to participate were, of course, the -Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. - -I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted from are -more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premeditation and -cold-blooded calculation which marked the military preparations for the -invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost a full year before the -commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared -every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with -all of that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be -associated with the German character. Although several of these -defendants played specific parts in this military phase of the planning -and preparation for the attack, it is natural enough that the leading -roles were performed, as we have seen, by the military figures: the -Defendants Göring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. - -Next, preparation for plunder—plans for the economic exploitation and -spoliation of the Soviet Union. - -Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely -military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning and -preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to ensure that their -aggression would prove economically profitable. - -A little later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal the -motives which led these conspirators to attack, without provocation, a -neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the crime was -motivated by both political and economic considerations. The economic -basis, however, may be simply summarized at this point as the greed of -the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies -which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as -needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To these defendants -such a need was translated indubitably as a right, and they early began -planning and preparing with typical care and detail to ensure that every -bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of -their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit. - -I have already put into the record evidence showing that as early as -August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group Army, received a -hint from the Defendant Göring about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R. -which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. I also -said at that time that I would later introduce evidence that in November -1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by -Göring of the planned operation in the East and preliminary preparations -were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be -occupied in the course of such operation. Göring, of course, played the -overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the -head of the Four Year Plan. - -Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning at -Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS introduced earlier -as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at Pages 10 and 11 of the -English translation: - - “In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries - of State Körner, Neumann, Backe, and General Von Hanneken were - informed by the Reich Marshal of the action planned in the East. - - - - “By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for - the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at - the end of 1940. - - - - “The preliminary preparations for the action in the East - included first of all the following tasks: - - - - “1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament - industry, its location, its capacity, and its associate - industries. - - - - - “2. Investigation of the capacities of the different big - armament centers and their dependency one on the other. - - - - “3. Determining the power and transport system for the industry - of the Soviet Union. - - “4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum - (crude oil). - - - - “5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament - industries in the Soviet Union. - - - - “These points were concentrated in one big compilation, ‘War - Economy of the Soviet Union,’ and illustrated with detailed - maps.”—I am still quoting.—“Furthermore a card index was made - containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia and a - lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of - the German war economy organization. - - - - “For the processing of these problems a task staff, ‘Russia,’ - was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and - later on in charge of Major General Schubert. The work was - carried out according to the directives from the chief of the - office, respectively”—I suppose—“by the group of departments - for foreign territories”—Ausland—“with the co-operation of all - departments, economy offices, and any other persons possessing - information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative - activities an excellent collection of material was made which - proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the - operations and for administering the territories.” - -That ends the quotation. - -By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a -point where a broader plan of organization was needed, and so General -Thomas held a conference with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to -call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference, classified top -secret and dated 1 March 1941, was captured, and is our Document -1317-PS. I now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this -memorandum reads as follows: - - “The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be - drafted for the Reich Marshal. - - - - “Essential Points: - - - - “1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich - Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the - Four Year Plan. - - - - “2. The organization must include everything concerning war - economy, excepting only food which is said to be made already a - special mission of State Secretary Backe. - - - - “3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent - of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination, - but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin. - - - - “4. Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a) - Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front - lines in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to - secure the removal of important goods; b) Administration of the - occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically - complementary districts.” - -And then, on the bottom of Page 1: - - “5. In view of the extended field of activity the term ‘war - economy inspection’ is to be used in preference to armament - inspection. - - - - “6. In view of the great field of activity the organization must - be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly - numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of - seizing raw materials and taking over all important - exploitations. For the latter mission reliable persons from - German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, - since successful operation from the beginning can only be - performed by the aid of their experience. (For example: lignite, - ore, chemistry, petroleum). - - - - “After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel - Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an - organization within a week. - - - - “Close co-operation with the individual sections in the building - is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi and - Rü with whom the operational staff can remain in constant - contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lieutenant Colonel - Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia. - - - - “Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the - second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are - ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to - report to the office chief at the end of the - week.—Signed—Hamann.” - -Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending as a -captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presumably it fell -naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the conference. - -The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was -organizing at the direction of Göring was clearly recognized by Keitel -in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is Number 447-PS, -and I have already offered it in evidence earlier as Exhibit USA-135. At -that time I quoted the paragraph in the order in which it was stated -that the Führer had entrusted the uniform direction of the -administration of economy in the areas of operation and political -administration to the Reich Marshal who in turn had delegated his -authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt. - -The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on -28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a -conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain -the organizational set-up of the Economic Staff “Oldenburg.” Oldenburg -was the code name given to this economic counterpart of Plan Barbarossa. -A report of this conference is captured Document Number 1157-PS, and I -now offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this -memorandum deals with the general organization of Economic Staff -Oldenburg as it had developed by this time, and I should like to read -most of that section into the record. The report begins: - - “Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours - on Tuesday, 29th April 1941. - - - - “1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the - organizational structure of the economic section of the - undertaking Barbarossa-Oldenburg. - - - - “As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous procedure, - has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand - of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal - with the overall direction of the economic administration in the - area of operations and in the areas under political - administration. - - - - “The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Economic - General Staff working under the director of the Economic - Armament Office (Chief, Wi Rü Amt). - - - - “Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff the - supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is - the”—and then a heading—“Economic Staff Oldenburg for special - duties under the command of Lieutenant General Schubert. His - subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided, are: 5 - economic inspectorates, 23 economic commands, and 12 district - offices which are distributed among important places within the - area of the economic command. - - - - “These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea is - that in the territory of each army group an economic - inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander - of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will - supervise the economic exploitation of the territory. - - - - “A distinction must be made between the military rear area and - the battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area of the - army on the other hand. In the latter, economic matters are - dealt with by the Group IV Economy”—IV Wi—“of the Army - Headquarters Command, that is, the liaison officer of the - Economic Armament Office within the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces assigned to the Army Headquarters Command. For the battle - area he has attached to him technical battalions, reconnaissance - and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural - machinery, in particular, tractors and means of production. - - - - “In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle and - the military rear area, Group IV Economy with the various field - commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of - the Economic Armament Office for the support of the specialists - of the Army Headquarters Command, who are responsible for - supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for - preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation. - - - - “While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, - economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in - the locality. - - - - “The new feature inherent in the organization under the command - of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal - with military industry but comprises the entire economic field. - Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated as - offices of the military industries or armaments but quite - generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, _et - cetera_. - - - - “This also corresponds with the internal organization of the - individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down - to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into - three large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with troop - requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization; - Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of feeding and - agriculture, and Group W, which is in charge of the entire field - of trade and industry, including raw materials and supplies; - further, questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy - property, commerce and exchange of commodities, and manpower - allocation. - - - - “Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and - Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within - the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General Von - Hanneken.” - -The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel -and planning problems, and similar details, which I think it unnecessary -to put into the record. - -These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method with which -those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended -victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage a -wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had pledged security, but they -also intended to strip that neighbor of his food, his factories, and all -his means of livelihood. - -As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question of -motivation, these men made their plans for plunder being fully aware -that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for -millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. - -THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been informed by the -interpreters that I have been speaking at a great speed this morning, so -I shall try to temper the speed. - -Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political phase -of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall develop -more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic and -political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in invading -the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of the planning -and preparations for the economic side of the aggression. Equally -elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in by the conspirators -to ensure the effectuation of the political aims of their aggression. It -is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe that political aim -as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a -powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition of Lebensraum. - -For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators selected as -their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the 2d of April 1941 -Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R. -This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the -U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part -of that country. This memorandum then considers what the political goal -of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. - -The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer it in -evidence now as Exhibit USA-142. - -Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject -“U.S.S.R.”; - - “A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an - extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large - section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action - on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse - of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present - not so many military as administrative and economic - difficulties. Thus arises the first question: - - - - “Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or - economic needs respectively, or is the laying of political - foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor - in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, - it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to - be attained, for it will without doubt also have an effect on - military operations. - - - - “If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak - condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of - military operations, one may conclude that: - - - - “1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions. - - - - “2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sections - of territory should, in regard to administration as well as - economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are - striving to attain. - - - - “3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas - such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for - the continuation of war against England, the maintenance of - production which this necessitates, and the great directives for - the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all - together in one place. - - - - “It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the - arguments which follow only hold good, of course, once the - supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to - Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been - assured. - - - - “Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia’s population - the following national or geographical units: - - - - “(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White - Russia, with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia, - Latvia, and Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with Kiev - as its center; (e) The Don area, with Rostov as its capital; (f) - The area of the Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia or Russian - Turkestan.” - -The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or -geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages. At -the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts and -briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into the -record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation under -the heading “Summary”: - - “The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from - the points briefly outlined here: - - - - “(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied areas - of the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time. Working - in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it - would be the task of this department: - - - - “(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate - administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at - the time and the goal which is to be achieved; - - - - “(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from - all the occupied areas; - - - - “(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out - in main outline of, the primarily important questions for all - areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport, - and the production of oil, coal, and food. - - - - “(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the - separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by - reason of political economy for the carrying out of the totally - dissimilar tasks assigned to them. - - - - “As against this, an administrative department regulating - matters in principle and to be set up on a purely economic - basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be - inadequate and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would - be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, - dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede - the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being - run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent - it. - - - - “The question therefore arises whether the opinions which have - been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be - taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing - the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. - In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of - administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of - the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally - different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of - the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which - has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed? - -MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosenberg’s -handwriting? - -MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate that he wrote -it? - -MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by Rosenberg or under -his authority. We captured the whole set of Rosenberg files, which -constitutes really a large library. - -It is evident that the “presently envisaged administration operating on -a purely economic basis” to which this memorandum objects was the -Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already described as having been -set up under Göring and General Thomas. - -Rosenberg’s statement—if this be his statement—of the political -purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it -apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated 20 April -1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central control of -questions connected with the east European region. This order is part of -the correspondence regarding Rosenberg’s appointment, which has been -given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask that this file, all -relating to the same subject and consisting of four letters, all of -which I shall read or refer to, be admitted in evidence as Exhibit -USA-143. - -The order itself reads as follows—it is the first item on the English -translation of 865-PS: - - “I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner for the - central control of questions connected with the east European - region. An office, which is to be furnished in accordance with - his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the - carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. The - necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich - Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum. - - - - “Führer’s headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed, - Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery, - signed, Dr. Lammers.” - -This particular copy of the Führer’s order was enclosed in a letter -which Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting his -co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a deputy to -work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows—it is on the -stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery, -Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation: - - “Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer’s decree of the - 20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter - Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central control - connected with the east European region. In this capacity - Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for - the probable emergency with all speed. The Führer wishes that - Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the - closest co-operation of the highest Reich authorities, receive - information from them, and summon the representatives of the - highest Reich authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee - the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be - undertaken, for the time being, only those of the highest Reich - authorities should be informed on whose co-operation - Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: The - Commissioner for the Four Year Plan”—that is Göring—“the Reich - Minister of Economics, and you yourself”—that is - Keitel—“Therefore, may I ask you in accordance with the - Führer’s wishes to place your co-operation at the disposal of - Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out of the task imposed - upon him. It is recommended in the interests of secrecy that you - name a representative in your office with whom the office of the - Reichsleiter can communicate and who, in addition to your usual - deputy, should be the only one to whom you should communicate - the contents of this letter. - - - - “I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of - this letter. - - “Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers.” - -In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt of his -letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel also -writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now, the letter -to Dr. Lammers—I shall read the text: - - “Dear Reich Minister: - - “I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer’s decree in - which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his - commissioner for the central control of questions connected with - the east European region. I have named General of the Artillery - Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my - permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as his deputy to - Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” - -And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date: - - “The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the - Führer’s decree, by which he has appointed you his commissioner - for the central control of questions connected with the east - European region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, - head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his deputy, - Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these questions as - far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now - I ask you, as far as your office is concerned, to deal with them - only.” - -Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg began -building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, -issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and -preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although -Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with -documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, -I believe that the citation of a small number which are typical should -be sufficient for the Tribunal and the record. All of those I shall now -discuss were found in the Defendant Rosenberg’s files. - -Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May 1941, -entitled, “General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners in the -Occupied Eastern Territories.” I offer that in evidence as Exhibit -USA-144. - -In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines the -political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third -paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of the -German, the following remarks appear: - - “The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free - the German Reich from the ‘grossrussisch’ pressure for centuries - to come. This does not only correspond with German interests but - also with historical justice, for Russian imperialism was in a - position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression - almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. - Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign - against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the - reconstruction of a great Russian empire, no matter of what - kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various - nationalities against Moscow and Leningrad have to be - scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has - been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to - correspond to the Leader’s political testament as laid down in - his book, that now the military and political threat in the East - shall be eliminated forever. - - - - “Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its - historical and racial conditions into Reich commissions each of - which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich - Commission Eastland”—Ostland—“including White Ruthenia, will - have the task to prepare, by way of development into a - Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with - Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in - alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous northern - territories a federal state with a German plenipotentiary. - Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. - These general viewpoints are explained in the following - instructions for each Reich commissioner. Beyond that there are - still a few general considerations which possess validity for - all Reich commissioners.” - -The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the German, -presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated robbery. It -reads: - - “The German people have achieved, in the course of centuries, - tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European area. Nearly - all its land and houses were confiscated without - indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the - Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic - territories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work - during the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the - principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories - the former German assets are the property of the people of - Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former - individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve the - right (assuming that it has not already been done during - resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of - compensation and restitution of this national property will be - subject to different treatment by each Reich commission.” - -Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an “Instruction for a Reich -Commissioner Ostland.” It is typical of the type of instruction which -was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or Kommissars), and -is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the Nazi conspirators -toward the country they intended to occupy in the course of their -aggression. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit USA-145. I -should like to read into the record the first three paragraphs. It -begins: - - “All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly been - in close relationship with the German people. A 700-year-old - history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the - races living there in a European direction and has in spite of - all Russian threats added this region to the living space of - Greater Germany. - - - - “The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, - and White Ruthenia”—last words added in pencil—“must be to - strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate and then - transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by - germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic - races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must - become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater - Germany. - - - - “For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a - land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor to - make this surplus once more available to the German people and, - if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of - germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are strongly - germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish, German, and - Swedish blood, and can be considered as a kindred nation. In - Latvia the section capable of being assimilated is considerably - smaller than in Estonia. In this country stronger resistance - will have to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale - will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be - reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the immigration of - racial Germans is called for in order to promote very extensive - germanization (on the East Prussian border).” - -Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting and reads -as follows: - - “The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in - Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. - A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights, - built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant - influx of German blood together with Swedish elements was a - predominantly germanized land, is to be established as a mighty - German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are - available everywhere; and the German Reich will be able to - guarantee the right to a later settlement to all those who have - distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of - those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who - fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought - on in the hour of despair, and delivered Baltic civilization - from Bolshevism. For the rest the solution of the colonization - problem is not a Baltic question but one which concerns Greater - Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.” - -These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot to -show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation for this -phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it was hoped -would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941, less than a week -after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full report of his -activities since his appointment on the 20th of April. One might almost -think he had so meticulously recorded his activities in order to be of -assistance to this prosecution. - -This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence as -Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this report are -its disclosures concerning the number of these defendants who worked -with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and preparation for this -phase of the aggression and the extent to which practically all of the -ministries and offices of both state and Party are shown to have been -involved in this operation. The report was found in the Defendant -Rosenberg’s files; and although it is rather long, it is of sufficient -importance in implicating persons, groups, and organizations, that it -must, I believe, be read in full in order that it may be made part of -the record. It is headed, “Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern -European Territories”: - - “Immediately after the notification of individual supreme Reich - offices regarding the Führer’s Decree of 20.4.41 a conference - with the Chief of the OKW”—Armed Forces High Command—“took - place”—That is the Defendant Keitel—“After presentation of the - various political aims in the proposed Reich commissions and - presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of - the OKW explained that reservation”—UK-Stellung—“would be too - complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried - out best by direct assignment”—Abkommandierung—“by command of - the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then issued - an appropriate command which established the basis for the - coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer - General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The negotiations which - then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern - territory including personal needs”—relative to, I suppose it - is—“were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in - collaboration with officials of my office. - - - - “A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that - under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no - way deal with any representatives of the people of the east - European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military - intelligence required it and then to name persons to me who - could count as political personalities, over and above the - military intelligence, in order to arrange for their eventual - commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my - wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants - would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed - in accordance with my indications. - - - - “Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and - Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political - conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we - agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme - Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief Quartermaster, - and to the Army groups for questions relative to political - configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has - been done. - - - - “Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of - Economics”—Reichswirtschaftsminister—“Funk”—the Defendant - Funk—“who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerial - Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then - held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic - intentions of the Economic Operational Staff East. In this - connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State - Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director - Riecke, General Schubert, and others. - - - - “Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as - regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few - problems regarding the general relationship of the proposed - Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open and will - be subject, after submission, to the decision of the Führer. In - principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an - economic department in my office; economics would rather be - handled substantially and practically by the Reich - Marshal”—that is the Defendant Göring—“and the persons - appointed by him. However, the two responsible department heads, - namely, Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial - economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economy, would - be placed in my office as permanent liaison men to co-ordinate - here political aims with the economic necessities in a - department which would still have to unite with other persons - for such co-ordinating work, depending on labor conditions as - they may arise later on (political leadership of labor unions, - construction, _et cetera_). - - - - “After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter - appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my - office. For the requested representation in the political - department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. - Leibbrandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General Dr. - Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, - and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which if necessary - will be placed before the Führer, are under way with the Foreign - Office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its - representatives to the future Reich commissioners (or - Kommissars). - - - - “The Propaganda Ministry”—that is Goebbels—“appointed State - Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete - agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all - political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, _et - cetera_, would be made in my office; a great number of - substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the - papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modified - here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda - will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry of Public - Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of closer - co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet another person - directly under my department, ‘Enlightenment and Press,’ and in - addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these - activities have been going on for some time, and without - attracting attention to my office in any way this co-ordination - on contents and terminology takes place continually every day. - - - - “Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohnesorge - concerning future transmission of communication and setting up - of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; - with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with - Reich Minister Frick”—that is the Defendant Frick—“(State - Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of - numerous necessary officials for the commissions. According to - the present estimate there will be four Reich commissions as - approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for - political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of - general commissions (24), main commissions (about 80), and - regional commissions (over 900). A general commission would - correspond to a former general government; a main commission to - a main government. - - - - “A regional commission contains three or four - districts”—Kreise—“In view of the huge spaces that is the - minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil - government or administration. A portion of the officials has - already been requested on the basis of the above-named command - of the Chief of the OKW.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don’t understand why -it is necessary to read this document in full. You have already shown -that there was a plan for dividing Russia up into a number of -commissions. - -MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out two of three -other individual defendants who are referred to in this document and as -to whom the document shows that they were in immediate complicity with -this whole scheme. The first of those, about three paragraphs further -down, the Reich Youth Leader—that is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach. -Then of course Gruppenführer SS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant. - -MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the Tribunal -please, charged as a criminal organization. - -In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director Fritzsche, who -worked under Goebbels. - -Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize the -individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual -defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are -Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and -Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the -following: - -OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, Reich -Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of -Communications, the Reich Physicians’ Union, Ministry of Munitions and -Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership, Reich Organization Leadership, German -Labor Front, the SS, the SA, and the Reich Press Chief. - -At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should like -to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which I have -just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the extent that -it involves these individuals. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in evidence. - -MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other connections, -evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in which all of this -planning and preparation for the elimination of the Union of Soviet -Socialist Republics as a political factor was actually carried out. The -planned execution of intelligentsia and other Russian leaders was, for -example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy -the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection -as a European power. - -Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the -Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans; -and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the -U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world Hitler issued a -proclamation on the day of the attack. The text of this statement has -already been brought to the Tribunal’s attention by my British -colleagues, and I should like merely to refer to it in passing here by -quoting therefrom this one sentence, “I have therefore today decided to -give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.” - -This announcement told the world that the die had been cast—the plans -darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously -developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. These -conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this -war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it. - -That brings us to the consideration of the motives for the attack. -Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point out -that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not to attack the -U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the -invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with -Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward territories of the -German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of -“Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy,” -which is our Document Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier -as Exhibit USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of -11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries -thereunder up to the very end. - -Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made -quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being thus -delivered were considered essential to the German economy, efforts were -made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the -campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about complying with their -obligations under that agreement. At Page 315 of his book Thomas says, -and I read from Page 9 of the English translation: - - “Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as - preparations for the campaign in the East were already under - way.” - -By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as to -what the Russians delivered. - - “The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right up - to the start of the attack; even during the last few days - transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed by - express transit trains.” - -Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more forcefully -when he states—and I shall read the first paragraph on Page 14 of the -English translation: - - “In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the - negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of - attention. - - - - “The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage - German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany - must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only - made grain deliveries when the Germans delivered orders placed - by the Russians and since, in the case of the individual firms, - these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill - orders for the German Armed Forces, it was necessary for the Wi - Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with - German firms in order to co-ordinate Russian orders with those - of the Germans from the standpoint of priority. In accordance - with the wishes of the Foreign Office German industry was - instructed to accept all Russian orders even if it were - impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for - manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large - deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed - to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance - Commission, then however, to make such a detour during its - transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered - over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.” - -Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations with -Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive intentions -toward any German territory. Our Document Number C-170, which is in -evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previously stated, a file on -Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command -covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack. The entries in -this file demonstrate conclusively the point I have just stated. It -will, I think, be sufficient to read to the Tribunal a few entries which -include reports from the German Ambassador in Moscow as late as June -1941. I shall read the first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English -translation; that is 4 June: - - “Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia; - Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian - Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict - with Germany.” - -In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says: - - “6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . . . Russia will only - fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow - much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have - been made quietly—as far as can be recognized, only defensive. - Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best - possible relationship to Germany.” - -The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June: - - “From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow . . . all - observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are - responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to - avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the - Government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports - all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, - support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty - with Germany proves the same thing.” - -Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you. - -The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union -could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth, no doubt, -as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning -and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the -Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of -them, however, appear to blend into one grand motive of Nazi policy. The -pattern into which these various reasons impelling the decision to -attack may be said to fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for -expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version -of an earlier imperial imperative—the “Drang nach Osten” (or the drive -to the East)—had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost -since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and -economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination -of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat to -German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the economic -side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast -quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond -any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for -military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of the German war economy for -food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness on the -economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was -experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators -the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a -political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent. - -As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein -Kampf_ where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the Houghton -Mifflin English edition, as follows: - - “There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special - examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here perhaps - we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German - foreign affairs; and (2) this question is also the touchstone - for the political capacity of the young National Socialist - movement to think clearly and to act correctly.” - -And again at Page 654 of the same edition: - - “And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath - the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up - where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the endless German - movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the - land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and - commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil - policy of the future. - - - - “If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in - mind only Russia and her vassal border states.” - -The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly reflected in -the stated purposes of the organization which the Defendant Rosenberg -set up to administer the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have already -discussed this material and need not repeat it now. In a speech, -however, which he delivered 2 days before the attack to the people most -interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual -somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its -inter-relationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short -extract from that speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I -now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9 -of the German text: - - “The job of feeding the German people stands this year, without - a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims in the East; - and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will - have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. - We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to - feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus - territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any - feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without - any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard - years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to - determine to what extent industries can still be maintained - there (wagon factories, _et cetera_). The consideration and - execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the - German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means - negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh - necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion - of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires - the strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be - approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a 100 - years.” - -As I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat -Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief of -the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European -factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of -Europe. - -The economic motive for the aggression was brought out clearly in our -discussion of the organization set up under Göring and General Thomas to -carry out the economic exploitation of the territories they occupied. -The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable; and if -any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion -was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine -regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that -doubt is dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and -which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit -USA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans -would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing -them of their food. - -Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote a -memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him -Hitler’s present conception of the German economic policy concerning raw -material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievably heartless theory -that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw -materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such -raw materials. This is our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in -evidence as Exhibit USA-148. I should like to read the first two -paragraphs. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in -court. Will you stand up, please? - -[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner rose in the dock._] - -THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, you must -now plead either guilty or not guilty. - -ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe that I have -made myself guilty. - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put in evidence our -Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read from that document on -Page 17: - - “The following is a new conception of the Führer, which Minister - Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on - by Field Marshal Keitel: - - - - “I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our - autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture - everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures. - For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy - to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these - autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of manpower, and - it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another - way. What one does not have but needs, one must conquer. The - commitment of men which is necessary for one single action will - not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the - running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must - therefore be to secure all territories which are of special - interest to us for the war economy by conquering them. - - - - “At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a - statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarkical - economy is impossible for us because the need of men will be too - great. My solution, however, has always been directed to - securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks by concluding - economic agreements which would guarantee delivery even in - wartime.” - -On this macabre note I come to the end of the story of this aggression. -We have seen these conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally -initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry -on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this -war of aggression and the countless crimes they committed in its wake. -When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression, the base and -sinister motives involved, the months of secret planning and -preparation, and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and -deliberately wrought—when I consider all of this, I feel fully -justified in saying that never before—and, God help us, never again—in -the history of relations between sovereign nations has a blacker chapter -been written than the one which tells of this unprovoked invasion of the -territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible—and they are here -before you, the defendants in this case—it might be just to let the -punishment fit the crime. - -I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the -aggressive-war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy and -Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant -portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under Section -IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the printed English -text of the Indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance -of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive war against the United -States have been gathered together in a document book, marked with the -letter “Q,” which I now submit to the Tribunal. - -Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite collaboration, -I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the -significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by -the British and American Prosecution in the past several days, we have -seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly -controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The -elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to discuss project the Nazi -plan upon a universal screen, involving the older world of Asia and the -new world of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of -aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers -of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender -ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay -of Tokyo. - -The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese -Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November -1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities -of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy -on 6 November 1937. - -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state -documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The German text -of these treaties—the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact and -the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy—is to be found in Volumes -4 and 5 of the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, respectively. The -English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 -November 1936 is contained in our Document 2508-PS; the English -translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is -contained in our Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included -in the document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal. - -It is an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence I -shall submit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop’s active participation -in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the -Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at that time, -November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister but simply -Hitler’s special Ambassador Plenipotentiary. - -On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was -signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, -Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin, a -10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the Defendant -Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign -Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese -and Italian texts together with an English translation, is contained in -our Document 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal -of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer in evidence -Document 2643-PS as Exhibit USA-149. - -The Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and -collaboration with, one another in the establishment of a New Order in -Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of -this far-reaching agreement: - - “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a - condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the - world be given its own proper place. They have, therefore, - decided to stand together and to co-operate with one another in - their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, - wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a - new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and - welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of - the three Governments to extend this co-operation to such - nations in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to - their endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that - their aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may - thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, - Italy, and Japan have agreed as follows: - - - - “Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of - Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe. - - - - “Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the - leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in - Greater East Asia. - - - - “Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in - their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to - assist one another with all political, economic, and military - means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a - power at present not involved in the European war or in the - Chinese-Japanese conflict.” - -I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6. - - “The present pact shall come into force immediately upon - signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of its - coming into force.” - -The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to -the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had -cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination and to -establish a New Order presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in -1931, the ruthless Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi -overflow into Austria early in 1938. I might also comment that this fact -introduces the Führerprinzip into world politics. - -I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell Hull, -Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the signing of -this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official United -States publication, _Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, -1931-1941_, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit USA-122. -Mr. Hull’s statement is Number 184 therein. It is also our Document -Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation -thereof are included in the document books. I now quote a statement by -the Secretary of State, 27 September 1940: - - “The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the - Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation - which has existed for several years. Announcement of the - alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long - existed in effect, and to which this Government have repeatedly - called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of - conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has - been fully taken into account by the Government of the United - States, in the determining of this country’s policies.” - -That ends the quotation. - -I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations -leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. I shall note, -however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship -existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the -record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and -General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by -the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This -document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document Number -2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-150. I now quote the file -memorandum: - - “Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over - the following subjects: - - - - “1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, especially - because it has been spiritually well founded in every respect. - - - - “2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the - triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also - told me that, together with German - counter-espionage”—Abwehr—“he was undertaking long-range - projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating - from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization - was to become effective only in case of war. - - - - “3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10 - Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These - Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional - Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the - frontier.” - -Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the fascist -triplice, the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic -alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to -aggression against those nations with whom they were at war and those -with whom they contemplated war. In this the conspirators pursued a -course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with -the other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of -her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back” -by declaring war against France and Great Britain. These Nazi -conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other -side of the world. - -As I shall show, the nations against whom the German-Japanese -collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Commonwealth -of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United -States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order -named. - -At least as early as 23 February 1941—on the basis of documents -available to us—these conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance -with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British -Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribbentrop appears. On -that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, -the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese -open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as -possible. - -The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already been -offered in connection with the presentation of the case on aggression -against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of it has already -been read into the record and I now intend to read other portions. I -shall again come back to this document when dealing with the -German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States. - -As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation, Ribbentrop -on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to -his various ambassadors and ministers for their strictly confidential -and purely personal information with the further note that—and I quote: - - “These statements are of fundamental significance for - orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in - early spring 1941.” - -I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English translation of -1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip -to the last three sentences of the second paragraph: - - “Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign - Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941. - - - - “After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM (Reich - Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been - proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in - the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in - the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the - RAM)”—that is Ribbentrop—“regretted that the alliance between - Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the - ambassador for many years already, had come into being only - after various detours; but public opinion in Japan had not been - ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are - together now.” - -Then, skipping: - - “Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded, - Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the - Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of - its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the - situation in this respect?” - -Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the -argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining -the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against England, he -said—and I now quote the last two sentences in Paragraph 4, on Page 2, -of the English translation: - - “Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape - overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, - however, depends on various factors, above all on weather - conditions.” - -And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph on Page 3 -of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribbentrop again: - - “The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her. - Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a - combined English-American air force at any time. The number of - pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our - airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned, - ours always has been superior to the English—to say nothing - about the American—and we are on the way to enlarge even this - lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense, too, - will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been supplied far - beyond its requirements and enormous reserves have been piled - up—the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the - immense stock of material—production now will be concentrated - on submarines, airplanes, and antiaircraft guns. - - - - “Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won - today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have the - desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to sue for - peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully convinced - of victory, and determined to bring the war as quickly as - possible to a victorious close. To this end the cooperation with - Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in her own interest, - should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s - key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would - thus secure her position in the Far East, a position which she - could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for - quick action: - - - - “1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the - center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser warfare, - _et cetera_). The effect upon the morale of the British people - would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick - ending of the war. - - - - “2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep America - out of the war. America, which at present is not yet armed and - would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks west of - Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If Japan would otherwise - respect the American interests, there would not even be the - possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige - to make war plausible to the Americans. It is very unlikely that - America would declare war if she then would have to stand by - helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America - being able to do anything about it. - - - - “3) In view of the coming New World Order it seems to be in the - interest of Japan also to secure for herself, even during the - war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time - of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely with this - line of thought and said that he would do everything to carry - through this policy.” - -I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop’s -argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already -practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he suggested that the -war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and -that the moment was propitious for Japan’s entry. Then referring to the -spoils of the conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to -pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying -that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent -of that statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that “those who -wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.” - -Continuing Ribbentrop’s argument to show the real nature of the -German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on -Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was - Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the - Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had - been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of - influence in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has - brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great - advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the - Far East (Indo-China). England, too, was considerably weakened; - Japan had been able to close unsteadily on Singapore. Thus, - Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the - future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical - situation, we should have to carry the main burden of the final - battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia - should arise, we should have to carry the main burden also in - this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find - herself confronted by a world coalition within a short time. We - would all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be - determined for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. - The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A - defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese - imperialistic idea. - - - - “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and - emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep her - imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the - great problems which would arise after the war for the parties - of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in - Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a - bold solution. Thereby no over-centralization should take place; - but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, - particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich - Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of - trade should take place between the two spheres of influence on - a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the - leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East Asian sphere of - interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for - example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements - directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere - as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and - make trade agreements with the independent countries within the - Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China, - _et cetera_. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, - each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with - regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with - this thought.” - -In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the instigation to -war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall -return to him again in this connection. - -I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called military -representatives in the encouragement and provocation of further wars of -aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document Number C-75 as -Exhibit USA-151. - -This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant Keitel as -Chief of the OKW and entitled, “Basic Order Number 24 regarding -Collaboration with Japan.” It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a -half after Ribbentrop’s conference with Oshima that I have just -discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of -the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. We have -turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten -notations, presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have -introduced, is copy Number 2 of the order distributed to the naval war -staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy -number 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff -of the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this Operations -Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was found in the OKW files -at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by -the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not -burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies -of the same order. - -Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration -with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some -two pages of English translation: - - “The Führer has issued the following order regarding - collaboration with Japan: - - - - “1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three - Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, _to take active - measures in the Far East_”—The underscoring is in the original - document—“Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and - the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of - America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she - intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for - Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on - the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will - create particularly favorable political and military - prerequisites for this.” - -Then there is a marginal note, “Slightly exaggerated.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put -in? - -MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of -the order. - -THE PRESIDENT: By whom? - -MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order, -which was the naval war staff. - - “2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to - strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means - available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of - the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous - manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German - war and combat experience, and for assistance in military - economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable, - but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. - Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests - which would have the most immediate application in waging war. - In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself. - - - - “3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties - is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be - subject to the following guiding principles: - - - - “a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as - forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the - United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no - political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which - would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese - intentions. - - - - “b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile - warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong - Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every - opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be - exploited. - - - - “c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that - Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it - needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United - States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even - after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital - importance to Germany. - - - - “d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the - Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of - war of the three powers. - - - - “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval - power—extending to those of American naval power only if the - entry of the United States into the war cannot be - prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power - in that region and also, just like the attack on sea - communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds - (Australia). A date for the beginning of operational discussions - cannot yet be fixed. - - - - “4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with - the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with - as equally concern the three participating powers. These will - include primarily the problems of economic warfare. The working - out of the details is the responsibility of the main commission - with the co-operation of the Armed Forces High Command. - - - - “5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the - Barbarossa operations.” - -It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command. - -If the Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see that -it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces High Command: -Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and to the chief of -foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office. - -It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis’ cardinal -operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as March -1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other -British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the moment, other -references to the United States in Basic Order Number 24 and take up -that point later. - -I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which has already been -introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit GB-122. This document -is the top-secret record of a meeting on 18 March 1941, about 2 weeks -after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24; a meeting attended by -Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant -Jodl. We are concerned only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where -Raeder, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote: - - “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, - since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up - of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war - against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet in - comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making - preparations for this action; but according to all declarations - made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany - proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, - concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act - immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic - questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved - (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). - - - - “Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She - can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as - possible.” - -The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff -conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the -activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge -their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence -in that paragraph: - - “Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but - according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she - will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England.” - -Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to -eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the -contract. - -I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to induce the -Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of -March 1941 he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was -then in Berlin. A report of their conversations found in the German -Foreign Office archives is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I -now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-152. - -Relevant portions of this document have been translated into English. I -shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English translation: - - “The RAM”—that is Ribbentrop—“resumed, where they had left - off, the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s - impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He expressed the - opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole - situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too - far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing - was certain, however, namely that Germany would strike - immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to - give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push - forward to the south on Singapore without fear of possible - complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army - was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully - prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however, - believed that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to - war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia, - the U.S.S.R. would be finished off within a few months. In this - case Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid - than ever, if she wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, - she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of - possible fears of Russia. - - - - “He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would - develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify - his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) - wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case that a conflict with - Russia was at least within the realm of possibility. In any - case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon - his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was - impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a - conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be - considered possible.” - -I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly with the -English translation: - - “Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view - of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by - submarines based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of - the British Mediterranean and home fleets, he had again - discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder. The latter had - stated that the British Navy during this year would have its - hands so full in the English home waters and in the - Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single - ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the - United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother - about them at all. - - - - “Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very - low estimate of the threat from the British Navy. It also held - the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it - would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it - was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with - their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might - perhaps be dragged out to 5 years. This possibility caused - considerable worry in Japan. - - - - “The RAM replied that America could not do anything against - Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this - reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on - active measures against Japan. For while on the one hand he - could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand - there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; - for the American President, of course, this would mean a - considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate - rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss. - - - - “In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing - everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as - if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of - England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his - attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words - and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He - assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, - but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American - elements in Japan just so long, until one day he would suddenly - open the attack on Singapore. - - - - “In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based - on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against - Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. - (‘Nothing succeeds like success,’ the RAM remarked.) He followed - here the example expressed in the words of a famous Japanese - statesman addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the - Russo-Japanese war: ‘You open fire, then the nation will be - united.’ The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, - as an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come, - whether you wanted it or not.” - -I then skip again in the German text, and continue with what appears in -the English translation: - - “Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in - the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to - him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written - promise of assistance. - - - - “The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions - with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of - Singapore in order that the Führer—who probably must be - considered the greatest expert on military questions at the - present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack - against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would - be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their - European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of - dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British - Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to - disappear from Singapore immediately. - - - - “Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the - British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications. - - “The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed new - methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, - such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could - make available to the Japanese. - - - - “Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger - expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, - were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces would need 3 - months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign - Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could - stave off any danger which threatened from America for 6 months. - If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time - and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, - the situation with America would become extremely critical; and - he did not know as yet how to meet it. - - - - “If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East - Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on - this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They could be - brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years. - - - - “The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the - Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of - Singapore.” - -On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from whose -minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with Matsuoka and again -pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The -notes of this conference, which were also found in the German Foreign -Office archives, are contained in our Document 1882-PS, which I now -offer as Exhibit USA-153. I shall read a few brief extracts from these -notes, starting with the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English -translation: - - “In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakened - and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action - quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich - Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to - accept a risk in this connection just as the Führer had done - successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the - proclamation of sovereignty of armament and with the resignation - from the League of Nations.” - -I now skip several pages of the German text and continue on with the -English translation. - - “The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich - would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient - traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which - in its time was the only dominant power on the European - continent. - - - - “In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized - the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him - from his trips: - - - - “1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year, - the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede - it, if she had not collapsed before then, and America would also - have to resign herself to this fact. - - - - “2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and - Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the - long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far - East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa. - - - - “3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it - would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry - into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than - in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity, which - would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national - objectives of Japan—a chance which would make it possible for - her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” - -Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pursuing the -same track I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for -all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. -But Japan had better get the positions she wants during the war. - -I also invite the Tribunal’s attention to Ribbentrop’s assurances, -expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that Japan -likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the -conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United States, -scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also an ingredient -in this brew which was being so carefully prepared and brought to a -boil. - -I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the case -dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggression -against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document 1538-PS, which I -now offer as Exhibit USA-154. This document is a top-secret report, -dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo to the -Intelligence Division of the OKW. I wish merely to call attention, at -this point, to the last sentence in the paragraph numbered 1, wherein it -is stated—I quote: “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila -stand.” - -I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however, the -fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the German -military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans -against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered. - -Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against the -U.S.S.R. - -I invite the Tribunal’s attention, at this point, to the language of the -Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote, beginning with -the eighth line from the top of the page: - - “The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would - weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and - those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi - conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a ‘new order of things’.” - -The evidence I have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations with -particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn -to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a “stab in the back” -on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again the Defendant -Ribbentrop appears as the central figure. - -For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24 regarding -collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been preparing Fall -Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order Number -24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation -of the Barbarossa operation.” - -In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on 29 -March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order Number 24, -Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this -conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit -USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal’s -attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation -of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of -the German Army was on the eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared -to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he -believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to -war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not -probable, would have to be considered possible. - -Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in -April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed -their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of -Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941 Ribbentrop -dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo. The -telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit -USA-155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is -the first paragraph of the English translation: - - “Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign - Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese - Ambassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep on - receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I should - like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the - Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; first of - all because the present Japanese Government would really act - inexcusably toward the future of their nation if they would not - take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as - well as to secure for all time its expansion to the south and - settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the - Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse—a - report which coincides with our own observations as far as we - are able to judge the present war situation—it is simply - impossible that Japan should not settle the matter of - Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military - preparations are completed.” - -Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1 of the -English translation—the sentence beginning “However . . .”: - - “However, I ask you to employ all available means in further - insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the - earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note - to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better. The - natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on - the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts. After the - collapse of Russia, however, the position of the - Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that - the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of - the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America - totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced - with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the - British Empire which are important for the Three-Power-Pact - countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that a carrying - through of the New Order as desired by us will be a matter of - course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the - countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and - encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I - ask you to report in the near future, as often as possible and - in detail, on the political situation there.” - -We have Ott’s reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This is our -Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-156. -After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on Page 3 -of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English -translation: - - “Telegram; secret cipher system”—Sent 14 July from Tokyo; - arrived 14 July 1941—“As fast as possible. - - - - “I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into - the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially using - arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram - cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the - Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists, and friendly - businessmen. I believe that according to military preparations, - Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest - obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the disunity - within the activist group which, without unified command, - follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the - changed situation.” - -On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce -the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall present three -documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first -is our Document 2911-PS which contains notes of a discussion between -Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As -a matter of background I note that at this time German armies were -sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastopol had just -been announced. - -I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and I quote the -relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof: - - “He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at - this time, when the situation was as described, because now a - question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint - conduct of the war. If Japan felt herself sufficiently strong - militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably - now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at - this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral collapse; - at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In - any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as - existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian - colossus in eastern Asia. - - - - “He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the Führer - was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize one point - right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt - sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no - circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be - allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to - urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our -Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This is a record of a -conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943. - -I note again for background that the strategic military situation in the -broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. - -In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had completely -defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe -losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large -areas from the hands of the invader. Combined United States and British -forces had already landed in North Africa. - -You will remark as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop’s argument at this -time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese -refrain of “So sorry, please,” likewise appears to have crept in. - -I note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also seen the -end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal. - -I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the discussion -between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appear in the -English translation in the document book: - - “Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from - Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the - Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion - of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a - common conference between the Japanese Government and the - Imperial headquarters during which the question was discussed in - detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: - The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which - threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of - their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war - against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese - Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into - the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in - the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On - the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard - the Russian question. - - - - “The Japanese Government have the intention to become aggressive - again in the future on other fronts. - - - - “The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the - Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in - Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war against the common - enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly - behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that - all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their - forces not only to defeat England and America, but also Russia. - It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot - overstrain the German national strength. He was inwardly - concerned about certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the - opinion, and propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could - emerge from the battle victoriously and that Japan should - proceed to consolidate her forces before she should further - exert herself to the fullest extent.” - -I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the quotation: - - “Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on - Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight on - the Burma front as well as in the south is actually more of a - maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in China at - best very few ground forces are stationed. Therefore the attack - on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if - the necessary forces for that would be available.” - -Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about -3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes of this conference -are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit -USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence: - - “The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again - that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favorable - opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had - sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, - which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at the - moment.” - -I now wish to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is in a large -measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in -uniform all over the world. - -The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the -United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his -opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the -Nazis themselves for an attack from across the Atlantic, and the other -of fomenting war in the Pacific. - -In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the -Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I -have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to -the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their -relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in -the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the -U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when -the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared -aggressive war against the United States. - -Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these -documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the -direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the universal -aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. -Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus -of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. -That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the -United States was intimated by the Defendant Göring in a speech on 8 -July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria -and were perfecting their plans against Czechoslovakia. - -This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry, -and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret -memorandum from Göring’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in -charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in -our Document R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-160. - -I invite the Tribunal’s attention to the statement in the covering -memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the -conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which Göring -called for increased aircraft production and pointed to the necessity -for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote -just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German text and Page -11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on -Page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence -from the end of the paragraph: - - “I still lack these rocket-motors which could make such flights - possible. I completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip - flights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be extremely - happy to possess such a bomber which would at last stuff the - mouth of arrogance across the sea.” - -Göring’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that -time, either technically or in the fact of the Nazi conspirators’ -schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several -days. - -During the period of their preparation for and the waging of aggressive -war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., -it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not -disposed to involve the United States in war at that time. Nevertheless, -even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United -States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is -clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL, -the German Air Force files. It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as -Exhibit Number USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked -“Chefsache,” the German designation for top secret, from a Major Von -Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general. - -Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that time the -Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which -was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he -characterizes as a “brief résumé on the military questions current -here,” is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I -shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of -the first page of the English translation and carries over to the -reverse side of the one-sheet document: - - “5) The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the - occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the - prosecution of a war against America at a later date. - Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. - Essential conditions are at the present: - - - - “(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neutrality; - (c) support of France and Spain. - - - - “A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding - air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the - GAF.”—or the German Air Force. - -The Nazis’ military interest in the United States is further indicated -by Paragraph 7 which I read: - - “General Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially in - his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that in - his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American - aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The - matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I - pointed out that the matter was specifically a GAF one but have - taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own - merits.” - -Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from -early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed an -order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United -States. This top-secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is -our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-162. I read from the -first paragraph of that text just preceding the paragraph numbered (1): - - “By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Number 32, - for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the following - principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material - supplies: - - - - “(1) In general: - - - - “The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia - will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced - in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army - will allow, the armored units will be greatly increased. - - - - “Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have - a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England - and, should the case arise, against America. - - - - “The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, - which must be greatly increased in strength.” - -From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making -at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The -Nazis’ over-all plan with regard to the United States was, however, a -complex one involving, in addition, collaboration with the Japanese. In -the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to -undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far -East, they again considered war against the United States. - -I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collaboration with -Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as Exhibit -USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal -will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941, -the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3) (a) as “forcing England -to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the -war.” - -Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated, within the -framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States’ entry -into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating. -This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United -States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British -Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of involvement of the -United States were also discussed. This Basic Order Number 24 -stated—and I am referring to Subparagraph (3) (c), on the top of Page 2 -of the Document C-75: - - “(c) The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that - Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it - needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United - States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even - after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital - importance to Germany.” - -The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately below -Subparagraph (3) (d): - - “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval - power—extending to those of American naval power only if the - entry of the United States into the war cannot be - prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power - in that region and also, just like the attack on sea - communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds - (Australia).” - -In these passages there is a clear envisagement of United States -involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to -United States interests, if Japan were to capture Singapore, was also -envisaged by the Defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with -Hitler and the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained -in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit GB-122. -I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of -that conference, contained on Page 1 of the English translation. I am -quoting the Defendant Raeder: - - “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, - since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (tie-up - of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of the U.S.A. for war - against Japan, inferiority of the United States Fleet in - comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making - preparations for this action, but according to all declarations - made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out only if Germany - proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, - concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act - immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic - questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved - (Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies). - - - - “Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She - can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as - possible.” - -The Defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of United -States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was -urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February 1941 -with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in -our Document 1834-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-129. - -The Tribunal will recall that in a passage I have already read, -Subparagraph (2) near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation, -Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise by Japan was bound to keep -the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not -risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as -the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later Ribbentrop -practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be -involved. I quote here from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3 -of the English translation: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that if America - should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this - would mean that America had the intention to enter the war - sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to - avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be - by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of - the countries of the Three Power Pact. The Foreign Minister - further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the - British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be - canceled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to - all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to - send their navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far - East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries - of the Three Power Pact to bring the war to an end with the - greatest rapidity. He—the Foreign Minister—is convinced that - the Japanese Fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador - Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the - Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his - fleet in Japanese waters.” - -In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already been read into -the record, Ribbentrop again stressed the mutual inter-dependence of the -Tripartite Pact powers and suggested co-ordinated action. - -I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit -of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar. - - “The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, - explicitly designated as theoretical, that the contracting - powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the - U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy - were fundamentally determined on this. After signing of the - Three Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion arises, - also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes - of the people in the United States, and under certain conditions - swing public opinion towards isolation. Naturally a situation - had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the - wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be - exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, - was in no way acute at the time.” - -Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the -Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible involvement -of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our -Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced as Exhibit USA-152; -and I have read it into the record. The relevant statements appear in -the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1 and the first full paragraph on Page -2 of the English translation. I shall not take the Tribunal’s time to -read them again. - -I should like to refer to one more document to show that the Nazi -conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese -to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States -and could lead to the United States’ involvement in the contemplated Far -Eastern conflict. This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference -between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 -April 1941. I have already offered, in my opening statement to the -Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document 1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at -that time a considerable portion of it into the record. Unless the Court -prefers that I do not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to -re-read a few brief passages. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence. - -MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I -read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read at this point show -not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States -in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a -knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually -preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, we have a -document that shows the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war -plans were. - -I now refer again to Document Number 1538-PS, which has been offered in -evidence as Exhibit USA-154, the secret telegram from the German -Military Attaché in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941. He talks about the -conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event -Germany should become involved in war with the United States. - -In the paragraph numbered 1 this sentence also appears—I quote the last -sentence in numbered Paragraph Number 1, “Preparations for attack on -Singapore and Manila stand.” - -May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the United -States at this time, the spring of 1941. In view of their pressing -commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R. -set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was -naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in the war -at that time. Nevertheless, they had been considering their own -preliminary plan against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic -island document which I offered. - -They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the -British Commonwealth just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R. -soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They -were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in -the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. -Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many -words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of -the move against Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and -Navy were preparing operation plans against the U.S. They knew at least -part of those plans. - -The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things; they accepted the -risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and -pushed their eastern allies still further along that course. - -In April 1941 Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the -event Japan would have become involved in the war with the United -States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike -without delay. - -I refer to our Document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka -conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941, which has already been introduced -as Exhibit Number USA-33. I refer particularly to the first four -paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation. I think that has been -read to you at least twice, and I perhaps need not repeat it. - -Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging Matsuoka -in his decision to strike against the United States; and I invite your -attention to the fourth paragraph on Page 2, which you have heard -several times and which I shall not re-read. - -Here in those passages were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by -the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April -1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end -there. - -I now offer our Document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163. This is -another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding his -conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It is dated the 30th of -November 1941, exactly 1 week before Pearl Harbor. I will read from the -first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the German text, which is the first -paragraph of the English translation; and this passage, I am sure, has -not been read to the Tribunal. No part of this document has been read. - - “The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint - that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is - very great. The Japanese Government, since they sent Ambassador - Kurusu, have taken a firm stand as he told me. He is convinced - that this position is in our favor, and makes the United States - think that her entry into the European war would be risky - business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great - divergencies in the viewpoints of the two nations. These - differences of opinion concern, for example, the further - treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest”—and then the - German text has the legend “one group missing,” indicating that - one group of the secret code was garbled on transmission. It - would appear from the text that the missing words are - “difference of opinion”—“The biggest (one group missing), - however, resulted from the United States attempt to make the - three-power agreement ineffective. The United States suggested - to Japan that she conclude treaties of non-aggression with the - United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and other - countries in order to prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the - side of the Axis Powers. Japan, however, insisted upon - maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason American - demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting - Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing concessions - promised by the United States and merely mentioned that grave - decisions were at stake. - - - - “The United States is seriously preparing for war and is about - to operate a considerable part of its navy from southern Pacific - bases. The Japanese Government are busy working out an answer in - order to clarify their viewpoint. But he has no particulars at - that moment. He thinks the American proposals as a whole - unacceptable. - - - - “Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she - hopes that if occasion arises Germany and Italy, according to - the Three Power Pact, would stand at her side. I answered that - there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The - Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood - from my words that Germany, in such a case, would consider her - relationship to Japan as that of a union by fate. I answered, - according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready to have - mutual agreement between the two countries over this situation. - - - - “The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible - that he would come back to this point soon. The conversation - with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression - that the United States note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory - even for the compromise-seeking politicians here. For these - circles America’s position, especially in the China question, is - very disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as - being the main obstacle between successful Japanese-United - States negotiations seems to point to the fact that the Japanese - Government are becoming aware of the necessity of close - co-operation with the Axis Powers.” - -The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy. I offer our -Document 2987-PS as Exhibit USA-166. This document consists of extracts -from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo Ciano during the period 3 -December to 8 December 1941. It consists of notes he jotted down in the -course of his daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The Italian -has been translated into both English and German, and copies of both the -English and the German are in the document books. - -I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3 December, Wednesday: - - “Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience - with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of - the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion - that they have reached a dead end. Then invoking the appropriate - clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on - America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and - proposes the signing of an agreement not to conclude a separate - peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling - like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the - right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was - pleased with the communication and said, ‘We are now on the - brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as - September 1939.’ What does this new event mean? In any case it - means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he - could not enter the war immediately and directly, he entered it - indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, - this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming - further and further removed and that it is now easy—much too - easy—to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out - longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be - considered. Berlin’s answer will be somewhat delayed because - Hitler has gone to the southern Front to see General Kleist, - whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an - unexpected Soviet offensive.” - -And then December 4, Thursday—that is 3 days before Pearl Harbor: - - “Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. - Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but - the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans - less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about - it.” - -And December 5, Friday: - - “A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After - delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the - Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my - house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to - Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate - peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and - the latter was very glad I had not.” - -It appears from the last entry I have read, that of December 5, that -some sort of an agreement was reached. - -On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan, without previous warning or -declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United States at -Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the -Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, 4 days after the -Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on -the United States, committing the last act of aggression which was to -seal their doom. This declaration of war is contained in Volume IX of -the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, of which I now ask the Tribunal -to take judicial notice as Exhibit USA-164. An English translation is -contained in our document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal -is Number 2507-PS. - -The same day, 11 December, the fourth anniversary of which is tomorrow, -the Congress of the United States resolved: - - “That the state of war between the United States and the - Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United - States, is hereby formally declared.” - -This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official -publication _Peace and War_, of which the Tribunal has already taken -judicial notice as Exhibit USA-122. The declaration itself has been -reproduced for the document books as our Document 2945-PS. - -It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and -declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in -their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force -reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While -maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in -war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, -even probability, of such involvement as a result of the action they -were encouraging. They were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans -for attack against the United States, and they accepted the consequences -by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United -States should a United States-Japanese conflict result. - -In dealing with captured documents of the enemy the completeness of the -plan is necessarily obscured, but those documents which have been -discovered and offered in evidence before this Tribunal show that the -Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their -collaboration policy and that their exhortations and encouragement of -the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself -had been mentioned. - -I should like to read the Ciano diary entry for 8 December, the day -after Pearl Harbor: - - “A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed about - the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I - am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final - advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain, that - America will enter the conflict and that the conflict will be so - long that she will be able to realize all her potential forces. - This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about - the event. He ended by admitting that, in the long run, I may be - right. Mussolini was happy, too. For a long time he has favored - a definite clarification of relations between America and the - Axis.” - -The final document consists of the top-secret notes of a conference -between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from -1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister -Ribbentrop. It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit -USA-165. The immediate subject matter is the Pearl Harbor attack, but -the expressions therein typify Nazi technique. I quote from the second -paragraph of the English translation which has not been previously read: - - “First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand - Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With - cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of - German-Japanese co-operation, which has now obtained its - culmination in a close brotherhood of arms. - - - - “General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and - emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now - come about between Germany and Japan. - - - - “The Führer continues: ‘You gave the right declaration of war.’ - This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly - and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as - long as possible. But if one sees the other is interested only - in putting one off, in shamming and humiliating one, and is not - willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike as hard - as possible, indeed, and not waste time declaring war. It was - heart-warming to him to hear of the first operations of the - Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, - for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then - realized that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he - struck suddenly and without formality. He would continue to go - on this way in the future.” - -If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various phases -of aggressive warfare charged as Crimes against Peace in Count One of -the Indictment. As I conclude this phase I hope the Tribunal will allow -me to express my deep sense of obligation to Commander Sidney J. Kaplan, -section chief, and to the members of his staff, who did the yeoman work -necessary to assemble and prepare these materials that I have presented. -These members of that staff, in the order in which the materials were -presented, are: Major Joseph Dainow, Lieutenant Commander Harold -Leventhal, Lieutenant John M. Woolsey, Lieutenant James A. Gorrell, -Lieutenant Roy H. Steyer. - -Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the famous -motto of his branch of the armed services, the United States Coast -Guard, “Semper Paratus” (Always Prepared). - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - SEVENTEENTH DAY - Tuesday, 11 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the United States next offers in -evidence some captured moving pictures through Commander Donovan, who -had charge of taking them. - -COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, the United States now offers in -evidence Document Number 3054-PS, United States Exhibit Number 167, the -motion picture entitled _The Nazi Plan_. This document contains several -affidavits with exhibits, copies of which have been furnished to Defense -Counsel. I ask the Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary that -I formally read the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures -themselves will be presented to the Tribunal and thereafter be in its -permanent record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived. - -In the past 3 weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal a -vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi conspiracy and -what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching, and waging of -wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of documentary and some -oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did more than leave behind such -normal types of evidence. German proficiency in photography has been -traditional. Its use as a propaganda instrument was especially well -known to these defendants, and as a result the United States in 1945 -captured an almost complete chronicle of the rise and fall of National -Socialism as documented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is -from excerpts of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture -now presented, entitled _The Nazi Plan_, which in broad outline sums up -the case thus far presented under Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This morning we -first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, respectively entitled “The -Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933,” and “Acquiring Totalitarian Control of -Germany, 1933 to 1935.” These will be concluded by 11:20, at which time -we assume the Tribunal will order its customary morning adjournment. At -11:30 we shall present Part 3, entitled “Preparation for Wars of -Aggression, 1935 to 1939.” This will be concluded shortly before 1 -o’clock. At 2 p.m. we will offer Part 4, “Wars of Aggression, 1939 to -1944,” and this will be concluded by 3 p.m. - -Parts 1 and 2 now to be presented, enable us to re-live those years in -which the Nazis fought for and obtained the power to rule all life in -Germany. We see the early days of terrorism and propaganda bearing final -fruit in Hitler’s accession to the Chancellery in 1933, then the -consolidation of power within Germany, climaxed by the Parteitag of -1934, in which the Nazis proclaimed to the nation their plans for -totalitarian control. It is in simple and dramatic form the story of how -a nation forsook its liberty. - -I wish again to emphasize that all film now presented to the Tribunal, -including, for example, pictures of early Nazi newspapers, is the -original German film, to which we have added only the title in English. -And now, if it please the Tribunal, we shall present Parts 1 and 2 of -_The Nazi Plan_. - -THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for the United States Prosecutor to -know that the Tribunal propose to rise this afternoon at 4 o’clock -instead of 5. - - [_The film, The Nazi Plan, was then shown in the court room until 1125 - hours, at which time a recess was taken._] - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, in the films which have -just been shown to the Tribunal we have watched the Nazi rise to power. -In Part 3 of our documentary motion picture now to be presented, we see -the use they made of that power and how the German nation was led by -militaristic regimentation to preparation for aggressive war as an -instrument of national policy. Part 3, “Preparation for Wars of -Aggression, 1935-1939; 1935—Von Schirach urges Hitler Youth to follow -principles of _Mein Kampf_.” - - [_The showing of the film then continued and at the end a recess was - taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: This morning we presented photographic evidence of -the history of National Socialism from 1921 to September 1939. We saw -the dignity of the individual in Germany destroyed by men dedicated to -perverted nationalism, men who set forth certain objectives and then -preached to a regimented people the accomplishment of those objectives -by any necessary means, including aggressive war. - -In September 1939 the Nazis launched the first of a series of -catastrophic wars, terminated only by the military collapse of Germany. -It is this final chapter in the history of National Socialism that the -Prosecution now presents. - -May I again remind the Tribunal that all film presented and all German -narration heard is in the original form as filmed by the Nazis. - - [_The showing of the film, part 4, then continued._] - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: The Prosecution has concluded its presentation of the -photographic summation entitled _The Nazi Plan_. We shall deliver for -the permanent records of the Tribunal, as soon as possible, the original -films projected today. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, just a brief announcement about the -presentation that shall follow. The rest of the week will be consumed in -the presentation of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, starting -with exploitation of forced labor, concentration camps, persecution of -the Jews, and Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries. We -should like to call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that many of -these crimes will be crimes attributed to the criminal organizations -which will follow. The program following will be the criminal -organizations, beginning with the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, -the Reich Cabinet, the SA, the SS, and finally, the SD and Gestapo. - -Mr. Dodd will now present “Exploitation of Forced Labor.” - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): May -it please the Tribunal, we propose to submit during the next several -days, as Colonel Storey has said a moment ago, evidence concerning the -conspirators’ criminal deportation and enslavement of foreign labor, -their illegal use of prisoners of war, their infamous concentration -camps, and their relentless persecution of the Jews. We shall present -evidence regarding the general aspects of these programs, and our French -and Soviet colleagues will present evidence of the specific application -of these programs in the West and the East respectively. - -These crimes were committed both before and after Nazi Germany had -launched her series of aggressions. They were committed within Germany -and in foreign countries as well. Although separated in time and space, -these crimes had, of course, an inter-relationship which resulted from -their having a common source in Nazi ideology; for we shall show that -within Germany the conspirators had made hatred and destruction of the -Jews an official philosophy and a public duty, that they had preached -the concept of the master race with its corollary of slavery for others, -that they had denied and destroyed the dignity and the rights of the -individual human being. They had organized force, brutality, and terror -into instruments of political power and had made them commonplaces of -daily existence. We propose to prove that they had placed the -concentration camp and a vast apparatus of force behind their racial and -political myths, their laws, and their policies. As every German Cabinet -minister or high official knew, behind the laws and decrees in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ was not the agreement of the people or their -representatives but the terror of the concentration camps and the police -state. The conspirators had preached that war was a noble activity and -that force was the appropriate means of resolving international -differences; and having mobilized all aspects of German life for war, -they plunged Germany and the world into war. - -We say this system of hatred, savagery, and denial of individual rights, -which the conspirators erected into a philosophy of government within -Germany or into what we may call the Nazi constitution, followed the -Nazi armies as they swept over Europe. For the Jews of the occupied -countries suffered the same fate as the Jews of Germany, and foreign -laborers became the serfs of the “master race,” and they were deported -and enslaved by the million. Many of the deported and enslaved laborers -joined the victims of the concentration camps, where they were literally -worked to death in the course of the Nazi program of extermination -through work. We propose to show that this Nazi combination of the -assembly line, the torture chamber, and the executioner’s rack in a -single institution has a horrible repugnance to the twentieth century -mind. - -We say that it is plain that the program of the concentration camp, the -anti-Jewish program, and the forced labor program are all parts of a -larger pattern, and this will become even more plain as we examine the -evidence regarding these programs, and then test their legality by -applying the relevant principles of international law. - -The evidence relating to the Nazi slave labor program has been assembled -in a document book bearing the letter “R”; and in addition, there is an -appendix to the document book consisting of certain photographs -contained in a manila folder. Your Honors will observe that on some of -the books we have placed some tabs, so that it would be easier for the -Tribunal to locate the documents. Unfortunately, we did not have a -sufficient number of tabs to do the work completely, and that would -account for tabs which are missing on some of the document books. - -It may illuminate the specific items of evidence which will be offered -later if we first describe in rather general terms the elements of the -Nazi foreign labor policy. It was a policy of mass deportation and mass -enslavement, as I said a minute ago, and it was also carried out by -force, by fraud, by terror, by arson, by means unrestrained by the laws -of war and laws of humanity, or the considerations of mercy. This labor -policy was a policy as well of underfeeding and overworking foreign -laborers, of subjecting them to every form of degradation, brutality, -and inhumanity. It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and -prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other -operations of war directed against their own countries. It was a policy, -as we propose to establish, which constituted a flagrant violation of -the laws of war and of the laws of humanity. - -We shall show that the Defendants Sauckel and Speer are principally -responsible for the formulation of the policy and for its execution: -that the Defendant Sauckel, the Nazis’ Plenipotentiary General for -Manpower, directed the recruitment, deportation, and the allocation of -foreign civilian labor, that he sanctioned and directed the use of force -as the instrument of recruitment, and that he was responsible for the -care and the treatment of the enslaved millions; that the Defendant -Speer, as Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions, Director of the -Organization Todt, and member of the Central Planning Board, bears -responsibility for the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves -required by the German war machine, was responsible for the decision to -recruit by force and for the use under brutal, inhumane, and degrading -conditions of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture -of armaments and munitions, the construction of fortifications, and in -active military operations. - -We shall also show in this presentation that the Defendant Göring, as -Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is responsible for all -of the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor program. Finally, we -propose to show that the Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Defendant Frank, as Governor of -the Government General of Poland, and the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, as -Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands, and the Defendant Keitel, -as Chief of the OKW, share responsibility for the recruitment by force -and terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the -areas overrun or subjugated by the Wehrmacht. - -The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany -went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging -aggressive war. On May 23, 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at -the Reich Chancellery. Present were the Defendants Göring, Raeder, and -Keitel. - -I now refer to Document L-79, which has already been entered in evidence -as Exhibit USA-27. The document presents the minutes of this meeting at -which Hitler stated, as Your Honors will recall, that he intended to -attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity; but I wish to quote -from Page 2 of the English text starting with the 13th paragraph as -follows. In the German text, by the way, the passage appears at Page 4, -Paragraphs 6 and 7. Quoting directly from the English text: - - “If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession - of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be - able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war than - in peace. - - - - “The population of non-German areas will perform no military - service and will be available as a source of labor.” - -We say the slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators was designed to -achieve two purposes, both of which were criminal. The primary purpose, -of course, was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine -by compelling these foreign workers, in effect, to make war against -their own countries and their allies. The secondary purpose was to -destroy or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists or -deemed potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy. - -These purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves. - -I wish to refer at this point and to offer in evidence Document 016-PS, -which is Exhibit USA-168. This document was sent by the Defendant -Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg on the 20th of April 1942, and it -describes Sauckel’s labor mobilization program. I wish to quote now from -Page 2 of the English text, starting with the sixth paragraph; and in -the German text, again, it appears at Page 2 of the second paragraph. -Quoting from the text directly: - - “The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all - the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by - our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, - for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition - of the homeland. The raw materials as well as the fertility of - the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be - used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and - her allies.” - -The theory of the master race underlay the conspirators’ labor policy in -the East as well. - -I now refer to Document Number 1130-PS, which is marked Exhibit USA-169. -This document consists of a statement made by one Erich Koch, Reich -Commissar for the Ukraine, on the 5th day of March 1943 at a meeting of -the National Socialist Party in Kiev. I quote from the first page of the -English text, starting with the first paragraph—and in the German text -it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly again from the -English text Koch said: - - “1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just . . . . - - - - “2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not - come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Führer. The - population must work, work, and work again . . . for some people - are getting excited that the population may not get enough to - eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember - what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad . . . . We - definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come - here to create the basis for victory. - - - - “3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest - German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more - valuable than the population here.” - -At this point I should like to offer in evidence Document Number -1919-PS, which is Exhibit USA-170. This is a document which contains a -speech delivered by Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, to a group of SS -Generals on the 4th day of October 1943 at Posen; and I am referring to -the first page of the English text, starting with the third paragraph. -For the benefit of the interpreters, in the German text it appears at -Page 23 in the first paragraph. Quoting directly again from this -document on the first page, starting with the third paragraph: - - “What happens to the Russians, to the Czechs, does not interest - me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of - good blood of our type we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping - their children and raising them here with us. Whether the other - nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only - insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it - is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall - down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch or not - interests me only insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is - finished.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is the author of that document? - -MR. DODD: The author of that quotation is the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich -Himmler. - -The next document to which I make reference is Number 031-PS, which is -Exhibit USA-71. This document is a top-secret memorandum prepared for -the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories on the 12th of June -1944 and approved by the Defendant Rosenberg; and from it I wish to -quote, from the English text starting with the first paragraph, and in -the German text it appears at the first paragraph of Page 2. Quoting -directly: - - “The Army group center has the intention to apprehend - 40,000-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army - territory and to transport them to the Reich.” - -I wish to pass now to line 21 of Paragraph 1. Quoting directly I read as -follows: - - “It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German - trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2 - years’ training. This is to be arranged through the Organization - Todt which is especially equipped for such a task by means of - its technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly - welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive - measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices.” - -Passing a little further on in that document, I wish to call to the -attention of the Tribunal Paragraph 1 on Page 2, and to quote it -directly: - - “This action is aimed not only at preventing a direct - reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength but also at a - reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the - perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only - by the Reichsführer SS but also by the Führer. Corresponding - orders were given during last year’s withdrawals in the southern - sector . . . .” - -I call to Your Honor’s attention particularly that the approval of the -Defendant Rosenberg is noted on Page 3 of the document. It is a note in -ink on the original. I quote it: - - “Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memorandum on - June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now has approved - the action.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, did you mean to leave out the sentence at the -bottom of Page 1? - -MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I did not, but I did not want to refer to it -at this time. I will refer to it a little later on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t it really a part of what follows at the top of Page -2, which you did read, “Following are the arguments . . .” - -MR. DODD: Yes, I did omit that. I thought you were referring to the -sentence above. I’m sorry. - - “Following are the arguments against this decision of the - minister.”—and then quoting—“This action is not only aimed at - preventing direct reinforcement of any military . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes and you were telling us how you showed that the -Defendant Rosenberg was implicated. - -MR. DODD: Yes. On the last page of that document, the original bears a -note in ink, and in the mimeographed copy it is typewritten: - - “Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memorandum on - June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now has approved - the action.” - -One page back on that same document, from the first paragraph, four -sentences down, the sentence begins: - - “The Minister has approved the execution of the ‘Hay Action’ in - the Army territories under the conditions and provisions arrived - at in talks with Army group center.” - -The purposes of the slave labor program which we have just been -describing, namely the strengthening of the Nazi war machine and the -destruction or the weakening of peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi -conspirators, were achieved, we repeat, by the impressment and the -deportation of millions of persons into Germany for forced labor. It -involved the separation of husbands from their wives, and children from -their parents, and the imposition of conditions unfit for human -existence, with the result that countless numbers were killed. - -Poland was the first victim. The Defendant Frank, as Governor of the -Government General of Poland, announced that under his program 1 million -workers were to be sent to Germany; and he recommended that police -surround Polish villages and seize the inhabitants for deportation. - -I wish to refer to Document Number 1375-PS, which is Exhibit USA-172. -This document is a letter from the Defendant Frank to the Defendant -Göring and it is dated the 25th day of January 1940; and I wish to quote -from the first page of the English text, starting with the first -paragraph, and in the German text, again, it appears at Page 1 of the -first paragraph. Quoting directly: - - “1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the - defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to - carry on a long-term economic policy in the Government General. - Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of the - Government General that it will, in the shortest possible time, - accomplish results representing the maximum that can be secured - out of the economic strength of the Government General for the - immediate strengthening of our capacity for defense. - - - - “2. In particular the following performances are expected of the - total economy of the Government General . . . .” - -I wish to pass on a little bit in this text to the second page and -particularly to Paragraph g in the English text. In the German text, the -same passage appears on Page 3 in Paragraph g. I am quoting directly -again: - - “Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and female - agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among them at - least 750,000 agricultural workers of which at least 50 percent - must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural production in - the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers lacking in - the Reich.” - -The methods by which these workers were to be supplied were considered -by the Defendant Frank, as revealed in another document to which we now -refer. - -It is an entry in the Defendant Frank’s own diary, to which we have -assigned our Document Number 2233(a)-PS and which we offer as Exhibit -USA-173. The portion which I shall read is the entry for Friday, the -10th of May 1940. It appears in the document book as 2233(a)-PS, on the -third page in the center of the page. Just above it are the words “Page -23, Paragraph 1” to the left: - - “Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the - compulsory labor service of the Poles. Upon the pressure from - the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be - exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not - voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This - compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female - Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had - developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading - very much and might produce difficulties everywhere. General - Field Marshal Göring some time ago pointed out, in his long - speech, the necessity to deport into the Reich a million - workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great - difficulties had to be overcome here. Therefore it would be - advisable to co-operate with the district and town chiefs in the - execution of the compulsion, so that one could be sure from the - start that this action would be reasonably expedient. The arrest - of young Poles when leaving church service or the cinema would - bring about an ever increasing nervousness of the Poles. - Generally speaking, he had no objections at all to the rubbish, - capable of work yet often loitering about, being snatched from - the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the - organization of a raid; and it would be absolutely justifiable - to stop a Pole in the street and to question him as to what he - was doing, where he was working, _et cetera_.” - -I should like to refer to another entry in the diary of the Defendant -Frank, and I offer in evidence an extract from the entry made on the -16th day of March 1940, which appears in the document book as -2233(b)-PS, and it is Exhibit USA-174. I wish particularly to quote from -the third page of the English text: - - “The Governor General remarks that he had long negotiations in - Berlin with the representatives of the Reich Ministry for - Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. Urgent demands have - been made there that Polish farm workers should be sent to the - Reich in greater numbers. He has made the statement in Berlin - that he, if it is demanded from him, could of course exercise - force in some such manner: he could have the police surround a - village and get the men and women in question out by force, and - then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently, - besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment - compensation of these workers in question.” - -The instruments of force and terror used to carry out this program -reached into many phases of Polish life. German labor authorities raided -churches and theaters, seized those present, and shipped them back to -Germany. And this appears in a memorandum to Himmler, which we offer in -evidence as Document Number 2220-PS, and it bears Exhibit Number -USA-175. This memorandum is dated the 17th day of April 1943; and it was -written by Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, and deals -with the situation in the Government General of Poland. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to -the fact that the last three documents, which have just been read, were -not made available to me beforehand. They do not appear on the original -list of documents, nor have I been able to find them on the later list. - -I therefore request that the reading of these documents be held in -abeyance until I have had an opportunity to read them and to discuss -them with my client. - -Perhaps I may, at the same time, lodge an additional complaint. I -received some interrogation records in English the day before yesterday. -I consulted my client about them and he told me that they are not the -actual transcripts of his words in the interrogation, because he was -interrogated in German; an interpreter translated his statements into -English, and then they were taken down. - -These documents cannot have any evidential value since they were not -presented to the defendant for certification; he did not sign them, nor -were they read to him. They are transcripts in English, a language of -which the defendant understands little or nothing. - -I also discovered that another interrogation record on the Defendant -Speer contains statements which incriminate my client but which are -apparently also incorrect, as I established in consultation with the -Defendant Speer. - -I should like to have an opportunity of discussing the matter with the -representative of the Prosecution and of clearing up these -differences—to decide to what extent I can agree to the use of these -documents. They were to be presented by the Prosecution today or -tomorrow at the latest, but for the time being I must object to their -use. - -THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, you said to us that the last three -documents were not available to you and that they were not in the -original list. Is that right? - -DR. SERVATIUS: Not up to now. I want to have an opportunity of reading -these documents in advance. They are being read here without my having -seen them. - -THE PRESIDENT: And then you went on to deal with the interrogations -which have not been put into evidence. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I wanted to take the opportunity of saying that I -wished to discuss these documents with the Prosecution before they are -submitted to the Tribunal tomorrow, or probably even today. Meanwhile I -must object to their being used as evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you know what the circumstances are about -these three documents which have not been supplied? - -MR. DODD: I do not, Your Honor. They have been placed in the defendants’ -Information Center and they partly have been in the information list. It -may be that through some oversight these entries of this diary were -neglected. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have these documents before me now; they are not -numbered; the document concerning Sauckel begins on Page 10—question -and answer on Pages 11 and 12. The record is not continuous; it consists -of fragments of a transcript, which I want to trace to its origin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Prosecution will supply you with these -documents at the adjournment this afternoon. With reference to the -interrogation, if they propose to use any interrogation in the Trial -tomorrow, they can also supply you with any documents which are material -to that interrogation. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you. - -MR. DODD: I believe I was referring to Document Number 2220-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is right. You have not begun to read it yet. - -MR. DODD: I propose to read from the fourth page of the English text, -Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, particularly the last two sentences -of the paragraph; and in the German text the passage is found in Page -10, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly, it is as follows: - - “As things were, the recruiting of manpower had to be - accomplished by means of more or less forceful methods, such as - the instances when certain groups appointed by the labor offices - caught church and movie-goers indiscriminately and transported - them into the Reich. That such methods only undermine the - people’s willingness to work and the people’s confidence to such - a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as - clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of - the political resistance movement.” - -That is the end of the quotation. We say that Polish farmland was -confiscated with the aid of the SS and was distributed to German -inhabitants or held in trust for the German community, and the farm -owners were employed as laborers or transported to Germany against their -will. We refer to Document Number 1352-PS, which bears Exhibit Number -USA-176. This document is a report of the SS, and it bears the title -“Achievement of Confiscations of Polish Agricultural Enterprises with -the Purpose of Transferring the Poles to the Old Reich and Employing -them as Agricultural Workers.” - -I wish to read from the first page of the English text beginning with -the fifth paragraph; and in the German text it appears on Page 9, -Paragraph 1 on that page. Quoting: - - “It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the - confiscation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages - in which larger agricultural enterprises have been already - confiscated and are under the management of the East German - Corporation for Agricultural Development.” - -And then passing down three sentences, there is this statement which I -quote: - - “The former owners of Polish farms together with their families - will be transferred to the Old Reich by the employment offices - for employment as farm workers. In this way many hundreds of - Polish agricultural workers can be placed at the disposal of - agriculture in the Old Reich in the shortest and simplest - manner. In this way, to begin with, the most pressing shortage - now felt in a very disagreeable manner, especially in the - root-crop districts, will be quickly removed.” - -Pursuant to the directions of the Defendant Sauckel, his agents and the -SS men deported Polish men to Germany without their families, thereby -accomplishing one of the basic purposes of the program, the supplying of -labor for the German war effort, and at the same time, weakening the -reproductive potential of the Polish people. - -I wish to refer directly to Document L-61, which bears Exhibit Number -USA-177. This document is a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to the -presidents of the land labor offices. It is dated the 26th day of -November 1942, and I want to read from the first paragraph of that -letter which states as follows: - - “In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, - these Jews who are still in employment are also, from now on, to - be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be - replaced by Poles, who are being evacuated from the Government - General.” - -And passing to the third paragraph of that same letter, we find this -statement. Quoting: - - “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure - will be put into concentration camps and put to work, insofar as - they are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, so - far as they are suitable for labor, will be transported—without - family—into the Reich, particularly to Berlin, where they will - be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work - in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be - replaced.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Chief of the Security Police, mentioned in the -second paragraph? - -MR. DODD: The Chief of the Security Police was Heinrich Himmler. He was -also the Reichsführer of the SS. - -DR. SERVATIUS: May I say something with regard to this document. The -Defendant Sauckel denies knowledge of it and says that the place of -dispatch, not mentioned during the reading of this document, is of -importance. The document, according to its letterhead, was written at 96 -Saarland Strasse, which was not the office of the Defendant Sauckel. The -second point is that this document, contrary to the statement in the -document list classifying it as an original letter of Sauckel, was not -signed by him. Moreover the certification of the signature, customary on -all documents, is missing. May I ask the prosecutor to read this into -the record, so that I can come back to it later. - -THE PRESIDENT: If the procedure which the Tribunal has laid down has -been carried out, either the original document or a photostat copy will -be in your Information Center; and you can then compare or show to your -client either the photostat or the original. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I have done that and only object now to the fact that -from the reading of this document parts which I consider important are -being omitted. If this letter is being read here it must be read in its -entirety, including the parts which I consider important, namely, the -letterhead and the type of signature. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I am asking that if it is to be used as evidence, the -letter should be read in its entirety, including its complete heading -and the signature as it appears, namely, “signed Sauckel.” The -certification of the signature is missing, a fact from which my client -draws certain conclusions in his favor. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will have an opportunity after adjournment of seeing -this document; and you have been told already that you can refer, when -your turn comes to present your defense, to the whole of any document. -It is inconvenient to the Tribunal to have many interruptions of this -sort; and if you wish to refer to the whole document, you will be able -to do so at a later stage. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I must assume then, Mr. President, that it is admissible -to read parts of a document instead of the whole. Did I understand -correctly? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You can put in a part or the whole of the -document when your turn comes. We will adjourn now; but, Mr. Dodd, you -will satisfy this counsel for the Defense as to the reason why he had -not got these documents. - -DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I understand, Mr. President. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I will. - -THE PRESIDENT: And you will make them available to him and insure that -he has an opportunity of seeing the original of this document so that he -can check the signature. - -MR. DODD: We will, and I will see that the original is available to him. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right, we will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - EIGHTEENTH DAY - Wednesday, 12 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this morning at 12:30 for a -closed session and sit again at 2:00 o’clock. - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to report to the -Tribunal this morning with reference to the questions which arose -yesterday afternoon concerning three documents. - -After adjournment we found that Document 2220-PS was in the defendants’ -Information Center in photostatic form, and that the two other -documents, being respectively two entries from the Frank diary, were -also there but in a different form. The Frank diary consists of some -40-odd volumes which we, of course, were not able to photostat, so we -had placed instead in the defendants’ room the excerpts. As a matter of -fact, we had placed the entire document book there. - -DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendant Frank): Yesterday the -Prosecution submitted documents concerning the Defendant Frank; the -numbers are 2233(a)-PS and 2233(b)-PS, which were presented as Exhibits -USA-173 and USA-174. These are not ordinary documents, but excerpts from -the diary of Frank. Six weeks ago I applied in writing to have this -diary, which consists of 42 heavy, thick volumes, submitted to me. I -made this request for the first time on the 2d of September, the second -time on the 16th of November, the third time on the 18th of November, -and the fourth time on the 3rd of December. - -Unfortunately, I have not so far received this diary, and I should like -to ask the Tribunal that it be submitted to me as soon as possible, not -least because this material was surrendered by the Defendant Frank -himself to the officers who arrested him and was to be used as evidence -for his defense. - -I am of course not in a position to work through all this material in a -few days, and I should like to ask the Tribunal that this diary be put -at my disposal without delay. - -In this connection I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal -to another matter. The Tribunal has already approved that the four long -speeches which the Defendant Frank delivered in Germany in 1942 and -which led to his dismissal by Hitler from all his offices should be put -at my disposal as evidence. The General Secretary of the Tribunal -informed me of this on the 4th of December, but unfortunately I have not -so far received copies of these speeches. I should be very grateful, -therefore, if the Tribunal will ensure that its decisions are carried -out and that the documents are submitted to me without delay. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will look into these matters with the -General Secretary of the Tribunal, and doubtless it will be able to -arrange that you should have these documents submitted to you in the -defendants’ counsel Information Center. - -DR. SEIDL: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Dodd. - -MR. DODD: May I refer briefly to the discussion that we were engaged in -yesterday in order to take up the train of thought. - -I wish to remind the Tribunal that we were discussing or had just -completed a discussion of Document L-61, which had to do with a letter -written by the Defendant Sauckel to the presidents of the “Länder” labor -offices. I had read two excerpts from that letter. - -Referring to the letter, we say that the Nazi campaign of force and -terror and abduction was described in another letter to the Defendant -Frank, which we wish to refer to as Document Number 1526-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from that, Mr. Dodd, has either the -original or the photostatic copy been shown to Sauckel’s counsel? - -MR. DODD: Oh, yes, Sir. A photostatic copy was in the defendants’ -Information Center, and after adjournment yesterday we got the original -and handed it to him here in this room. - -THE PRESIDENT: And he saw it? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: This document, Number 1526-PS, USA-178, is a letter written by -the chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee at Kraków in February 1943. -I wish to read from the third page of the English text, beginning with -the second paragraph; the same passage in the German text at Page 2, -Paragraph 5. I quote: - - “The general nervousness is still further increased by the wrong - methods of labor mobilization which have been used more and more - frequently in recent months. - - - - “The wild and ruthless manhunt as practiced everywhere in towns - and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, as - well as at night in homes, has shaken the feeling of security of - the inhabitants. Every man is exposed to the danger of being - seized suddenly and unexpectedly, anywhere and at any time, by - the police, and brought into an assembly camp. None of his - relatives knows what has happened to him, and only weeks or - months later one or another gives news of his fate by a - postcard.” - -I wish to turn to Enclosure 5 on Page 8 of this document, which I quote: - - “In November of last year an inspection of all males of the - age-classes born 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of - Zaleszczyti (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared - for inspection, all those who were selected were arrested at - once, loaded into trains, and sent to the Reich. Similar - recruitment of laborers for the Reich also took place in other - areas of this district. Following some interventions, the action - was then stopped.” - -The resistance of the Polish people to this enslavement program and the -necessity for increased force were described by the Defendant Sauckel’s -deputy, one Timm, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, which was, -by the way, Hitler’s wartime planning agency. It was made up of the -Defendant Speer, Field Marshal Milch, and State Secretary Körner. The -Central Planning Board was the highest level economic planning agency, -exercising production controls by allocating raw materials and labor to -industrial users. - -Now, Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179. This document consists of excerpts -from minutes of the meetings of this Central Planning Board and minutes -of conferences between the Defendant Speer and Hitler. Only the -excerpts, of course, from these minutes upon which we rely are being -offered in evidence. I would say to the Tribunal, however, that the -balance of the minutes are available—can be made available—if the -Tribunal so desires. - -This deputy of Sauckel, his name being Timm, made a statement at the -36th conference of the Central Planning Board; and it appears on Page -14, Paragraph 2 of the English text of Document R-124, and on Page 10, -Paragraph 2 of the German text: - - “Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is - extraordinarily serious. It is known that violent battles have - occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against - the administration established by us is very strong. Quite a - number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers; and - just in the last 2 or 3 weeks some of them have been shot dead, - for example, the head of the Labor Office of Warsaw, who was - shot in his office 14 days ago, and yesterday another man again. - This is how matters stand at present; and the recruiting itself - even if done with the best will, remains extremely difficult - unless police reinforcements are at hand.” - -Deportation and enslavement of civilians reached unprecedented levels in -the so-called Eastern Occupied Territories. These wholesale deportations -resulted directly from labor demands made by the Defendant Sauckel on -the Defendant Rosenberg, who was the Reich Minister for the Eastern -Occupied Territories, and his subordinates, and also on the Armed -Forces—a demand made directly on the Armed Forces by the Defendant -Sauckel. - -On the 5th of October 1942, for example, the Defendant Sauckel wrote to -the Defendant Rosenberg, stating that 2 million foreign laborers were -required and that the majority of these would have to be drafted from -the recently occupied Eastern territories and especially from the -Ukraine. - -I wish to refer at this point to Document 017-PS, which bears Exhibit -Number USA-180. This letter from the Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant -Rosenberg I wish to quote in full. It begins by saying: - - “The Führer has worked out new and most urgent plans for - armament which require the quick mobilization of two million - more foreign workers. The Führer therefore has granted me, for - the execution of his decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for my - new duties, and has especially authorized me to take whatever - measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the Protectorate, - the Government General, as well as in the occupied territories, - in order to assure, at all costs, an orderly mobilization of - labor for the German armament industry. - - - - “The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted, - for the most part, from the recently occupied Eastern - Territories, especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. - Therefore, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish 225,000 - workers by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 more by 1 May 1942. - - - - “I ask you to inform Reich Commissioner, Gauleiter, Party Member - Koch at once about the new situation and requirements and - especially to see that he supports personally in every possible - way the execution of this new order. - - - - “I intend to visit Party Member Koch shortly and I would be - grateful if he could inform me as to where and when I could meet - him for a personal discussion. Just now though, I ask that the - recruiting be taken up at once with all energy and the use of - every factor, especially the experts of the labor offices. All - directives which temporarily limited the procurement of Eastern - Workers are annulled. The Reich procurement for the next months - must be given priority over all other measures . . . . - - - - “I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution - of this new order, but I am convinced that with the ruthless use - of all resources and with the full co-operation of all concerned - the execution of the new demands can be accomplished by the date - fixed. I have already communicated the new demands directly to - the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine by teletype. In reference - to our phone-call of today, I will send you the text of the - Führer’s decree at the beginning of next week.” - -I should like to remind the Tribunal that we have referred previously, -yesterday afternoon, to this Reichskommissar, Gauleiter, Party Member -Koch; and we quoted him as stating, the Tribunal will recall, “We are -the master race. We must be hard,” and so forth. - -On the 17th day of March 1943, the Defendant Sauckel wrote again to the -Defendant Rosenberg; and on this occasion he demanded the importation of -another 1 million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the -following 4 months. I wish to refer at this point to Document Number -019-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-181. Quoting that letter in full: - - “After a protracted illness, my deputy for labor allocation in - the Occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peuckert, is - going there to regulate the allocation of labor both for Germany - and the territories themselves. - - - - “I ask you sincerely, dear Party Member Rosenberg, to assist him - to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peuckert’s - mission. I may thank you already at this moment for the good - reception accorded to Peuckert up to this time. He himself has - been charged by me to co-operate fully and unreservedly with all - bureaus of the Eastern Territories. - - - - “Especially the labor allocation for German agriculture and - likewise the most urgent armament production programs ordered by - the Führer, make the fastest importation of approximately 1 - million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the - next 4 months, a necessity. Starting 15 March the daily shipment - must reach 5,000 female or male workers, while from the - beginning of April this number has to be stepped up to 10,000, - if the most urgent programs and the spring tillage and other - agricultural tasks are not to suffer to the detriment of food - and of the Armed Forces. - - - - “I have provided for the allotment of the draft quotas for the - individual territories, in agreement with your experts for labor - supply, as follows: - - - - “Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: From General kommissariat, - White Ruthenia—500 people; Economic Inspection, Center—500 - people; Reichskommissariat, Ukraine—3,000 people; Economic - Inspection, South—1,000 people; total—5,000 people. - - - - “Starting 1 April 1943, the daily quota is to be doubled - corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota. I hope to - visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of the - month, and ask you once more for your kind support.” - -The Defendant Sauckel did travel to the East. He travelled to Kovno in -Lithuania to press his demands. We offer in evidence Document Number -204-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-182. This document is a synopsis -of a report of the City Commissioner of Kovno and minutes of a meeting -in which the Defendant Sauckel participated. I wish to read from the -second page of the English text, beginning with the first paragraph. The -same passage appears in the German text at Page 5, Paragraph 2. Quoting -directly as follows: - - “In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary General for the - Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, gave on 18 July 1943 in - Kovno, and in an official conference following it between - Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissioner, the precarious - labor situation in the Reich was again urgently presented for - discussion. Gauleiter Sauckel again demanded that Lithuanian - labor be furnished in greater volume for the purposes of the - Reich.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Who was the General Commissar? Rosenberg? - -MR. DODD: The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz? - -THE PRESIDENT: No, the General Commissar. - -MR. DODD: His name is not known to us. He was apparently a local -functionary in the Party. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: The Defendant Sauckel also visited Riga, in Latvia, to assert -his demands; and the purpose of this visit is described in Document -Number 2280-PS, bearing Exhibit Number USA-183. This document is a -letter from the Reich Commissar for the Ostland to the Commissioner -General in Riga, and it is dated the 3rd of May 1943. I wish to read -from Page 1 of the English text, beginning with the first paragraph: - - “Following the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General - for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of - his visit to Riga on the 21st of April 1943, it was decided, in - view of the critical situation and in disregard of all adverse - considerations, that a total of 183,000 workers would have to be - supplied from the Ostland to the Reich territory. This task - absolutely must be accomplished within the next 4 months and at - the latest must be completed by the end of August.” - -Here again we are not informed as to the name and identity of the Reich -Commissar for the Ostland. - -Sauckel asked the German Army for assistance in the recruitment and -deportation of civilian labor from the Eastern Territories. We refer now -to Document Number 3010-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-184. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you saying that it was not known from whom -that document emanated? - -MR. DODD: No, Sir. We say it is a letter from the Reichskommissar for -the Ostland to the Commissioner General in Riga, but we don’t know their -names specifically at the time of the writing of the letter. - -THE PRESIDENT: You don’t know who the Reichskommissar of the Eastern -Territories was? - -MR. DODD: We don’t know him by that title, “The Reichskommissar for the -Ostland.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: Lohse, I am now informed, was his name. I understood that we -did not know it. - -THE PRESIDENT: All right. - -MR. DODD: Referring to this Document 3010-PS, this document is a secret -operational order of the Army Group South dated the 17th day of August -1943. I wish to read from the first page of the English text, the first -two paragraphs, as follows: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, in Decree - Az. VI A 5780.28, a copy of which is enclosed (Enclosure 1), has - ordered the mustering and calling-up of two complete age classes - for the whole newly occupied Eastern Territory. The Reich - Minister for Armament and Munitions has approved this order. - - - - “According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor”—GBA—“you have to recruit and to transport - to the Reich immediately all labor forces in your territory born - during 1926 and 1927. The decree of 6 February 1943 relative to - labor duty and labor employment in the theater of operations of - the newly occupied Eastern Territory and the executive orders - issued on this subject are the authority for the execution of - this measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 September 43 at - the latest.” - -We say it is clear that the demands made by the Defendant Sauckel -resulted in the deportation of civilians from the Occupied Eastern -Territories. The Defendant Speer has recorded conferences with Hitler on -10, 11, and 12 August 1942; and this record is contained in Document -R-124, which is already in as Exhibit USA-179. I now wish to quote from -Page 34 of that same document in Paragraph 1 of the English text. In the -German text it appears at Page 23, Paragraph 2. Quoting directly: - - “Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for - the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports that, - if required, he will supply a further million Russian laborers - for the German armament industry up to and including October - 1942. So far he has already supplied 1,000,000 for industry and - 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the Führer states - that the problem of providing labor can be solved in all cases - and to any extent. He authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel to take all - necessary measures. He would agree to any compulsory measures in - the East as well as in the Occupied Western Territories if this - question could not be solved on a voluntary basis.” - -In order to meet these demands of 1,700,000—100,000 here and there—the -Nazi conspirators made terror and violence and arson, as we said -yesterday, fundamental instruments of their labor enslavement policy. -Twenty days after the Defendant Sauckel’s demands of the 5th of October -1942, a top official in the Defendant Rosenberg’s Ministry described the -measures taken to meet these demands. I wish to refer now to Document -Number 294-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-185. This document is a -top-secret memorandum, dated the 25th of October 1942, signed by one -Bräutigam. I wish to quote from Page 4 of the English text starting with -the last paragraph, as follows—in the German text it appears at Page 8, -Paragraph 2—quoting directly: - - “We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit, - precipitately, millions of laborers from the Occupied Eastern - Territories, after prisoners of war had died of hunger like - flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within - Germany. Now suddenly the food question no longer existed. In - the customary limitless disregard for the Slavic people, - ‘recruiting’ methods were used which probably have their - precedent only in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A - regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health - or age, the people were shipped to Germany where it turned out - immediately that more than 100,000 had to be sent back because - of serious illness and other incapability for work.” - -The Defendant Rosenberg wrote, himself, concerning these brutalities, to -the instigator of them, the Defendant Sauckel; and we refer now to -Document Number 018-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-186. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, from where did that top-secret document come? - -MR. DODD: It came from the files of the Defendant Rosenberg. - -This document, 018-PS, is a letter from the Defendant Rosenberg to the -Defendant Sauckel; and it is dated the 21st day of December 1942, with -attachments. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, starting -at the middle of the second paragraph which reads as follows: - - “The reports I have received show that the increase of the - guerilla bands in the Occupied Eastern Territories is largely - due to the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers in - these regions are felt to be forced measures of mass - deportations, so that the endangered persons prefer to escape - their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going to the - guerilla bands.” - -Passing now to Page 4 of the same English text, there is an attachment -to Rosenberg’s letter consisting of parts excerpted from letters of -residents of the Occupied Eastern Territories—excerpted by Nazi censors -apparently. In the German text it appears at Page 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2. -Starting the quotation: - - “At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken - to Germany. On October 5 some people from the Kowkuski district - were scheduled to go, but they did not want to and the village - was set on fire. They threatened to do the same thing in - Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to - go. Thereupon three truckloads of Germans arrived and set fire - to their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3 - houses were burned. - - - - “On October 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. Of - what happened, I will describe the most important to you. You - cannot imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what we - were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At - that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as - incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one - reported. All had fled. Then the German police came and began to - ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire burned - furiously, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the - grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what took - place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to - extinguish the flames, were beaten and arrested, so that six - homesteads were burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited - other houses. The people fall on their knees and kiss their - hands, but the policemen beat them with rubber truncheons and - threaten to burn down the whole village. I do not know how this - would have ended if Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised - that there would be laborers by the next morning. During the - fire the police went through the adjoining villages, seized the - laborers, and brought them under arrest. Wherever they did not - find any laborers, they detained the parents until the children - appeared. That is how they raged throughout the night in - Bielosersk . . . . - - - - “The workers who had not yet appeared by then were to be shot. - All schools were closed and the married teachers were sent to - work here, while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. They - are now catching humans as the dogcatchers used to catch dogs. - They are already hunting for 1 week and have not yet enough. The - imprisoned workers are locked in the schoolhouse. They cannot - even go to perform their natural functions, but have to do it - like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on a - certain day to a pilgrimage to the Poczajów Monastery. They were - all arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among them - there are lame, blind, and aged people.” - -Despite the fact that the Defendant Rosenberg wrote this letter with -this attachment, we say he nevertheless countenanced the use of force in -order to furnish slave labor to Germany and admitted his responsibility -for the “unusual and hard measures” that were employed. I refer to -excerpts from the transcript of an interrogation under oath of the -Defendant Rosenberg on the 6th of October 1945, which is Exhibit -USA-187, and I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text starting -with the ninth paragraph. - -THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t given us the PS number. - -MR. DODD: It has no PS number. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Has a copy of it been given to -Rosenberg’s counsel? - -MR. DODD: Yes, it has been. It is at the end of the document book, if -Your Honors please, the document book the Tribunal has. - -DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg): In the name of -my client, I object to the reading of this document for the following -reasons: - -In the preliminary hearings my client was questioned several times on -the subject of employment of labor from the eastern European nations. He -stated: that the Defendant Sauckel, by virtue of the authority he -received from the Führer and by order of the Delegate for the Four Year -Plan, had the right to give him instructions; that he (the Defendant -Rosenberg) nevertheless demanded that recruiting of labor be conducted -on a voluntary basis; that this was in fact carried out; and that -Sauckel agreed, provided that the quota could be met. Rosenberg further -stated that on several occasions in the course of joint discussions his -Ministry demanded that the quota be reduced and that in part it was, in -fact, reduced. - -This document which is now going to be presented does not mention all -these statements, it only contains fragments of them. In order to make -it possible both for the Tribunal and the Defense to obtain a complete -picture, I ask the Tribunal that the Prosecution be requested to present -the entire records of the statements and, before submitting the document -officially, to discuss the retranslation with the Defense so as to avoid -misunderstandings. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I understand your objection. You say, -as I understood it, that Sauckel had authority from Hitler. Is that -right? - -DR. THOMA: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that Rosenberg was carrying out that authority. - -DR. THOMA: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: But all that counsel for the Prosecution is attempting to -do at the moment is to put in evidence an interrogation of Rosenberg. -With reference to that, you ask that he should put in the whole -interrogation? - -DR. THOMA: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don’t know yet whether he intends to put in the -whole interrogation or a part of it. - -DR. THOMA: I know only one thing: I already have in my hand the document -which the Prosecution wishes to submit and I can see from it that it -contains only fragments of the whole interrogation. What in particular -it does not contain is the fact that Rosenberg always insisted on -voluntary recruiting only and that he continually demanded a reduction -of the quota. That is not contained in the document to be submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: If counsel for the Prosecution reads a part of the -interrogation, and you wish to refer to another part of the -interrogation in order that the part he has read should not be -misleading, you will be at liberty to do so when he has read his part of -the interrogation. Is that clear? - -DR. THOMA: Yes. But then I request the Tribunal to ask counsel for the -Prosecution if the document which he intends to submit contains the -whole of Rosenberg’s statement. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to put in the whole of -Rosenberg’s interrogation? - -MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I was not prepared to put in the whole of -Rosenberg’s interrogation, but only certain parts of it. These parts are -available, and have been for some time, to counsel. The whole of the -Rosenberg interrogation in English was given to Sauckel’s counsel, -however, and he has the entire text of it, the only available copy that -we have. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has counsel for Rosenberg not got the entire document? - -MR. DODD: He has only the excerpt that we propose to read into the -record here at this time. - -DR. THOMA: May I say something? - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal considers that if you propose to -put in a part of the interrogation, the whole interrogation ought to be -submitted to the defendant’s counsel, that then you may read what part -you like of the interrogation, and then defendant’s counsel may refer to -any other part of the interrogation directly if it is necessary for the -purpose of explaining the part which has been read by counsel for the -Prosecution. So before you use this interrogation, Rosenberg’s counsel -must have a copy of the whole interrogation. - -MR. DODD: I might say, Your Honor, that we turned over the whole -interrogation to counsel for the Defendant Sauckel; and we understood -that he would make it available to all other counsel for the Defense. -Apparently, that did not happen. - -DR. THOMA: Thank you, Mr. President. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I received these documents from the Prosecution last -night. They were in English; that is sufficient for me, but counsel for -the other defendants are not all in a position to follow the English -text, so that certain difficulties arise, and I must find time to -interpret the document to my colleagues. But it would be desirable if -the Prosecution could give us the German text, for the interrogation -took place in German and was translated into English, so that the -original German text should be available. - -Those are the difficulties, and I would like to suggest that the German -text be also handed to us as soon as possible. - -MR. DODD: With reference to the so-called German text, the original is -an English text. These interrogations were made through an interpreter -and they were transcribed in English so that the original text is an -English text, and that is what was turned over to the attorney for the -Defendant Sauckel with the understanding that it would be made available -to all other counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: But of course that doesn’t quite meet their difficulties -because they don’t all of them speak English, or are not all able to -read English, so I am afraid you must wait until Rosenberg’s counsel has -got a copy of the entire interrogation in his own language. - -MR. DODD: Very well. - -Passing on beyond the document to which we have just referred—which we -now withdraw in view of the ruling—and which we will offer at a later -date after we have complied with the ruling of the Court, we have a -letter dated the 21st of December 1942, which is Document 018-PS, and -which bears Exhibit Number USA-186—which, by the way, is a letter from -the Defendant Rosenberg to the Defendant Sauckel—and I wish to quote -from Page 1, Paragraph 3 of the English text. In the German text it -appears at Page 3, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly: - - “Even if I in no way deny that the numbers demanded by the Reich - Minister for Armament and Munitions as well as by the - agricultural economy justify unusual and severe measures, I - must, because I am answerable for the Occupied Eastern - Territories, emphatically request that, in filling the quota - demanded, measures be excluded the consequences and our - toleration of which will some day be held against me and my - collaborators.” - -In the Ukraine area, arson was indeed used as a terror instrument to -enforce these conscription measures; and we refer now to Document Number -254-PS, which is Exhibit USA-188. This document is from an official of -the Rosenberg Ministry and was also found in the Rosenberg file. It is -dated June 29, 1944 and encloses a copy of a letter from one Paul Raab, -a district commissioner in the territory of Wassilkov, to the Defendant -Rosenberg. I wish to quote from Raab’s letter, Page 1, starting with -Paragraph 1 of the English text which reads as follows: - - “According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the Army, I - burned down several houses . . . in the territory of Wassilkov, - Ukraine, belonging to insubordinate people ordered to labor - service—this accusation is true.” - -Passing now to the third paragraph: - - “During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was - accomplished nearly exclusively by way of propaganda. Only - rarely was force necessary. But in August 1942, measures had to - be taken against two families in the villages of Glevenka and - Soliony-Shatior, each of which were to supply one person for - labor. Both had been requested in June for the first time but - had not obeyed, although requested repeatedly. They had to be - brought in by force, but succeeded twice in escaping from the - collecting camp in Kiev or while in transit. Before the second - arrest, the fathers of both of the workers were taken into - custody as hostages to be released only when their sons - appeared. When, after the second escape, the re-arrest of both - the young men and the fathers was ordered, the police patrols - detailed to do this, found the houses empty.” - -Passing to Paragraph 4, it is stated, and I quote directly: - - “At that time I decided at last to take measures to show the - increasingly rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to - be followed. I ordered the burning of the houses of the two - fugitives.” - -Would Your Honor like to have the rest of that paragraph? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next few lines. - - MR. DODD: “The result was that in the future people obeyed, - willingly, orders concerning labor obligations. However, the - practice of burning houses has not become known for the first - time by my actions, but was suggested in a secret letter from - the Reich Commissioner for Allocation of Labor specifically as a - coercive measure in case other measures should fail. This harsh - punishment was acceptable to the local population . . .” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The Commissioner for Labor, Mr. Dodd—you -just said, “an order from the Commissioner of Labor.” Who was that? - -MR. DODD: Well, we have discussed this matter previously to our -appearance here today. The document does not identify him by name. We -are not sure. The Defendant Sauckel was called Plenipotentiary General -for Labor, and we think we can’t go much further, and say we don’t know. -It just does not appear. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Thank you. - -MR. DODD: Reading that last sentence again: - - “This harsh punishment was acceptable to the local population - because previous to this step both families had ridiculed on - every hand the duty-conscious people who sent their children - partly voluntarily to the labor allocation.” - -Turning to Paragraph 2 on Page 2, beginning about two-thirds of the way -through the paragraph, I wish to read as follows—in the German text it -appears at Page 3, Paragraph 1: - - “After initial successes, a passive resistance of the population - started, which finally forced me to turn again to arrests, - confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a whole - transport of conscripted laborers overcame the police at the - railroad station in Wassilkov and escaped, I saw again the - necessity for strict measures. A few ring-leaders, who of course - had long since escaped, were located in Plissezkoje and in - Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them, their - houses were burned down.” - -And finally, I wish to pass to the last paragraph on Page 3 of that same -document. In the German text it appears at Page 5, Paragraph 7. Quoting -from that last paragraph on the third page: - - “My actions toward fugitive labor draftees were always reported - to District Commissioner Döhrer, of the Wassilkov office, and to - the Commissioner General in Kiev. Both of them knew the - circumstances and agreed with my measures because of their - success.” - -That is the end of that part of the quotation. - -That Generalkommissar in Kiev, as we indicated yesterday and again this -morning, was the man Koch—we quoted his statement about the master -race. - -Another document confirms arson as an instrument of enforcing this labor -program in the village of Bielosersk in the Ukraine in cases of -resistance to forced labor recruitment. Atrocities committed in this -village are related in Document Number 018-PS, which is already in -evidence as Exhibit USA-186. But in addition there is Document Number -290-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-189. This document consists of -correspondence originating within the Rosenberg ministry, which was, of -course, the office headquarters of the Defendant Rosenberg; and it is -dated the 12th day of November 1943. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the -English text, starting with the last line, as follows: - - “But even if Müller had been present at the burning of houses in - connection with the Reich conscription in Bielosersk, this - should by no means lead to the removal of Müller from office. It - is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner - General in Luck, of 21 September 1942, referring to the extreme - urgency of national conscription, that farms of those who refuse - to work are to be burned and their relatives are to be arrested - as hostages and brought to forced labor camps.” - -The SS troops were directed to participate in the abduction of these -forced laborers and also in the raids on villages, burning of villages, -and were directed to turn the entire population over for slave labor in -Germany. - -We refer to Document Number 3012-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-190. -This document is a secret SS order and it is dated the 19th day of March -1943. I wish to quote from Page 3 of the English text starting with the -third paragraph. In the German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3. -It says, and I quote it: - - “The activity of the labor offices, that is, of recruiting - commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. - It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. - During a conference with the chief of the labor allocation - staffs, it was agreed that whatever prisoners could be released - should be put at the disposal of the commissioner of the labor - office. When searching villages or when it becomes necessary to - burn down villages, the whole population will be put at the - disposal of the commissioner by force.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn’t you read Number 4 which follows it? - -MR. DODD: Number 4 says: - - “As a rule, no more children will be shot.” - -I might say to Your Honor that parts of these documents are going to be -relied on for other purposes later and it sometimes may appear to the -Tribunal that we are overlooking some of these excerpts, but -nevertheless I am grateful to have them called to our attention because -they are most pertinent to these allegations as well. - -From the community of Zhitomir where the Defendant Sauckel appealed for -more workers for the Reich, the Commissioner General reported on the -brutality of the conspirator’s program, which he described as a program -of coercion and slavery. And I now refer to Document Number 265-PS, -which is Exhibit USA-191. This document is a secret report of a -conference between the Commissioner General of Zhitomir and the -Defendant Rosenberg in the community of Vinnitza on the 17th of June -1943. The report itself is dated the 30th of June 1943 and is signed by -Leyser. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, beginning with -the last paragraph; and in the German text it appears at Page 2, -Paragraph 3. Quoting it directly: - - “The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no - doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his - own observations. Therefore I shall not repeat them. It is - certain that a recruitment of labor in the true sense of the - word can hardly be spoken of. In most cases it is nowadays a - matter of actual conscription by force.” - -Passing now to Page 2 of that same document, and to Paragraph 1, line -11—in the German text it appears at Page 3, Paragraph 2—it says; and I -quote it directly: - - “But as the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor - explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no - alternative. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of - the areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the - imposed quota. That a lowering of morale is coupled with this - needs no further proof. It is nevertheless essential to win the - war on this front too. The problem of labor mobilization cannot - be handled with gloves.” - -The recruitment measures which we have been discussing enslaved so many -citizens of occupied countries that whole areas were depopulated. - -I now wish to refer to our Document Number 3000-PS, which is Exhibit -USA-192. This document is a partial translation of a report from the -chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk, and it is dated -the 28th day of June 1943. It was sent to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, -who was a top official in the Rosenberg Ministry. I wish to read from -Page 1 of the English text, starting with the second paragraph, as -follows: - - “Thus recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had - disastrous effects, for the recruitment measures in the last - months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an - irreparable political and economic effect . . . . From . . . - White Ruthenia approximately 50,000 people have been obtained - for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be taken. - Considering the 2,400,000 total population . . . the fulfillment - of these quotas is impossible. . . . Owing to the sweeping - drives of the SS and police in November 1942, about 115,000 - hectares of farmland . . . are not used, as the population is - not there and the villages have been razed. . . .” - -We have already referred to the conspirators’ objective of permanently -weakening the enemy through the enslavement of labor and the breaking up -of families; and we invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document 031-PS, -which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-171, for we desire to emphasize that -the policy was applied in the Eastern Occupied Territories with the -Defendant Rosenberg’s approval of a plan for the apprehension and -deportation of 40,000 to 50,000 youths of the ages of 10 to 14. Now the -stated purpose of this plan was to prevent a reinforcement of the -enemy’s military strength and to reduce the enemy’s biological -potentialities. We have already quoted from Page 3 of the English text -of that document to establish that the Defendant Rosenberg approved that -plan, the so-called Hay Action plan. We referred to it yesterday -afternoon. - -Further evidence of the conspirators’ plan to weaken their enemies, in -utter disregard of the rules of international law, is contained in -Document Number 1702-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-193. This -document is a secret order, issued by a rear area military commandant to -the district commissar at Kasatin, dated the 25th of December 1943. I -quote from Page 3 of the English text at Paragraph 1. In the German text -it appears at Page 12, Paragraph 1. - - “The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age - and the live stock are to be shipped back from the district east - of the line Belilovka-Berditchev-Zhitomir (exclusive of these - places).” - -This program, which we have been describing, and the brutal measures -that it employed were not limited to Poland and the Occupied Eastern -Territories but covered and cursed Western Europe as well. Frenchmen, -Dutchmen, Belgians, Italians, all came to know the yoke of slavery and -the brutality of their slavemasters. - -In France these slavemasters intensified their program in the early part -of 1943, pursuant to instructions which the Defendant Speer telephoned -to the Defendant Sauckel at 8 o’clock in the evening on the 4th day of -January 1943 from Hitler’s headquarters. I now refer to Document Number -556(13)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-194. This document, incidentally, is a -note for his own files, signed by the Defendant Sauckel, dated the 5th -of January 1943. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, -Paragraph 1 as follows: - - “On 4 January 1943 at 8 p.m. Minister Speer telephones from the - Führer’s headquarters and communicates that on the basis of the - Führer’s decision, it is no longer necessary to give special - consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of - specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed - with vigor and with sharpened measures.” - -To overcome resistance to his slave labor program, the Defendant Sauckel -improvised new impressment measures which were applied to both France -and Italy by his own agents and which he himself labelled as grotesque. -I now refer to Document Number R-124, which is Exhibit USA-179, and -particularly Page 2 and Paragraph 2 of the English text; in the German -text it appears at Page 8, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly from that page -and that paragraph a statement made by Sauckel on 1 March 1944 at a -meeting of the Central Planning Board: - - “The most abominable point against which I have to fight is the - claim that there is no organization in these districts properly - to recruit Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch - them to work. So I have even proceeded to employ and train a - whole staff of French and Italian agents of both sexes who for - good pay, just as was done in olden times for ‘shanghaiing,’ go - hunting for men and dupe them, using liquor as well as - persuasion in order to dispatch them to Germany. - - - - “Moreover, I have charged several capable men with founding a - special labor allocation organization of our own, and this by - training and arming, under the aegis of the Higher SS and Police - Führer, a number of indigenous units; but I still have to ask - the munitions ministry for arms for these men. For during the - last year alone several dozens of high-ranking labor allocation - officials of great ability have been shot. All these means must - be used, grotesque as it may sound, to refute the allegation - that there is no organization to bring labor to Germany from - these countries.” - -This same slave labor hunt proceeded in Holland, as it did in France, -with terror and abduction. I now refer to Document Number 1726-PS, which -is Exhibit USA-195. This document is entitled, “Statement of the -Netherlands Government in View of the Prosecution and Punishment of the -German Major War Criminals.” I wish to quote from enclosure “h,” -entitled “Central Bureau for Statistics—The Deportation of Netherlands’ -Workmen to Germany.” It is Page 1 of the English text, starting with the -first paragraph; and in the German text it appears at Page 1, also -Paragraph 1. Quoting it directly, it reads as follows: - - “Many big and medium-size large business concerns, especially in - the metal industry, were visited by German commissions who - selected workmen for deportation. This combing-out was called - the ‘Sauckel action,’ so named after its leader, who was charged - with the procurement, of foreign workmen for Germany. - - - - “The employers had to cancel the contracts with the selected - workmen; and the latter were forced to register at the labor - offices, which then took charge of the deportation under - supervision of German ‘Fachberater.’ - - - - “Workmen who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the - Sicherheitsdienst—the SD. If captured by this service, they - were mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous - prisoners’ camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work - in Germany. - - - - “In these prosecutions the Sicherheitsdienst was supported by - the German police service, which was connected with the labor - offices and was composed of members of the NSB and the like. - - - - “At the end of April 1942 the deportation of workers started on - a grand scale. Consequently, in the months of May and June, the - number of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000 and 24,000 - respectively, of which many were metal workers. - - - - “After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 - another peak was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the - smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their - personnel. . . . - - - - “This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a - ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the labor offices. - Without warning they lined off whole quarters of the towns, - seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them. - - - - “In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids took place on 10 - and 11 November, the number of people thus deported was - estimated at 50,000 and 5,000, respectively. - - - - “In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers - were much lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The - exact figures are not known as they have never been published by - the occupants. - - - - “The people thus seized were put to work partly in the - Netherlands, partly in Germany.” - -A document found in the OKH files furnishes further evidence of the -seizure of workers in Holland; and I refer to Document Number 3003-PS, -which is Exhibit USA-196. This document is a partial translation of the -text of a lecture, delivered by one Lieutenant Haupt of the German -Wehrmacht, concerning the situation of the war economy in the -Netherlands. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, starting -with the fourth line of Paragraph 1—quoting that directly, which reads -as follows: - - “There had been some difficulties with the Arbeitseinsatz, that - is, during the man-catching action, which became very noticeable - because it was unorganized and unprepared. People were arrested - in the streets and taken out of their homes. It has been - impossible to carry out a uniform exemption procedure in - advance, because for security reasons the time for the action - had not been previously announced. Certificates of exemption, - furthermore, were to some extent not recognized by the officials - who carried out the action. Not only workers who had become - available through the stoppage of industry, but also those who - were employed in our installations producing things for our - immediate need were apprehended or did not dare to go into the - streets. In any case it proved to be a great loss to us.” - -I might say to the Tribunal, that the hordes of people displaced in -Germany today indicate, to a very considerable extent, the length to -which the conspirators’ labor program succeeded. The best available -Allied and German data reveal that, as of January 1945, approximately -4,795,000 foreign civilian workers had been put to work for the German -war effort in the Old Reich; and among them were forced laborers of more -than 14 different nationalities. I now refer to Document Number 2520-PS, -Exhibit USA-197, which is an affidavit executed by Edward L. Deuss, an -economic analyst. - -At the top of the first page there are tables setting forth the -nationality and then the numbers of the various nationals and other -groupings or prisoners of war and politicals, so-called. The workers -alone total, according to Mr. Deuss who is an expert in the field, the -4,795,000 figure to which I have just referred. In the second paragraph -of this statement of Deuss, I should like to read for the record and -quote directly: - - “I, Edward L. Deuss, for 3 years employed by the Foreign - Economic Administration, Washington, as an economic analyst in - London, Paris, and Germany, specializing in labor and population - problems of Germany during the war, do hereby certify that the - figures of foreign labor employed in the Old Reich have been - compiled on the basis of the best available German and Allied - sources of material. The accompanying table represents a - combination of German official estimates of foreigners working - in Germany in January 1945, and of American, British, and French - figures of the number of foreigners actually discovered in the - Old Reich since 10 May 1945.” - -Only a very small proportion of these imported laborers came to Germany -on a voluntary basis. At the March 1, 1944 meeting of this same Central -Planning Board, to which we have made reference before, the Defendant -Sauckel himself made clear the vast scale on which free men had been -forced into this labor slavery. He made the statement, and I quote from -Document Number R-124, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-179 and from -which I have quoted earlier this morning. I wish to refer to Page 11 of -that document, the middle paragraph, Paragraph 3. In the German text it -appears at Page 4, Paragraph 2—the Defendant Sauckel speaking—and I -quote directly from that document: - - “Out of 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not - even 200,000 came voluntarily.” - -The Nazi conspirators were not satisfied just to tear 5 million odd -persons from their children, from their homes, from their native land. -But in addition, these defendants, who sit today in this courtroom, -insisted that this vast number of wretched human beings who were in the -so-called Old Reich as forced laborers must be starved, given less than -sufficient to eat, often beaten and maltreated, and permitted to die -wholesale for want of food, for want of even the fundamental -requirements of decent clothing, for the want of adequate shelter or -indeed sometimes just because they produced too little. - -Now these conditions of deportation are vividly described in Document -Number 054-PS, which is a report made to the Defendant Rosenberg -concerning the treatment of Ukrainian labor. I wish to refer to Document -Number 054-PS, which bears the Exhibit Number USA-198. Before quoting -from it directly—according to this report the plight of these hapless -victims was aggravated because many were dragged off without opportunity -to collect their possessions. Indeed, men and women were snatched from -bed and lodged in cellars pending deportation. Some arrived in night -clothing. Brutal guards beat them. They were locked in railroad cars for -long periods without any toilet facilities at all, without food, without -water, without heat. The women were subjected to physical and moral -indignities and indecencies during medical examinations. - -I refer how specifically to this Document Number 054-PS, which consists -of a covering letter to the Defendant Rosenberg, first of all, and is -signed by one Theurer, a 1st lieutenant in the Wehrmacht, to which is -attached a copy of a report by the commandant of the collecting center -for Ukrainian specialists at Kharkov; and it also consists of a letter -written by one of the specialists in the Rosenberg office—no, by one of -the workers, not in the Rosenberg office, but one of the specialists -they were recruiting, by the name of Grigori. I wish to quote from the -report at Page 2, starting at Paragraph 4 of the English text—and in -the German text it appears at Page 3, Paragraph 4. Quoting directly from -that page of the English text: - - “The _starosts_, that is village elders, are frequently - corruptible; they continue to have the skilled workers, whom - they drafted, dragged from their beds at night to be locked up - in cellars until they are shipped. Since the male and female - workers often are not given any time to pick up their luggage - and so forth, many skilled workers arrive at the collecting - center for skilled workers with equipment entirely insufficient - (without shoes or change of clothing, no eating and drinking - utensils, no blankets, _et cetera_). In particularly extreme - cases, therefore, new arrivals have to be sent back again - immediately to get the things most necessary for them. If people - do not come along at once, threatening and beating of skilled - workers by the above-mentioned local militia become a daily - occurrence and are reported from most of the communities. In - some cases women were beaten until they could no longer march. - One bad case in particular was reported by me to the commander - of the civil police here (Colonel Samek) for severe punishment - (village of Sozolinkov, district of Dergatchi). The - encroachments of the _starosts_ and the militia are of a - particularly grave nature because they usually justify - themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of the - German Armed Forces. In reality, the latter have conducted - themselves throughout in a highly understanding manner toward - the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same, - however, cannot be said of some of the administrative agencies. - To illustrate this, be it mentioned that a woman once arrived - dressed with barely more than a shirt.” - -Passing now to Page 4 of this same document, starting with the 10th line -of the third paragraph, and in the German text it appears at Page 5, -Paragraph 2. Quoting directly again: - - “On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be called to - the fact that it is inexcusable to keep workers locked in the - cars for many hours, so that they cannot even take care of the - calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a transport - must be given an opportunity from time to time, to get drinking - water, to wash, and to relieve themselves. Cars have been shown - in which people had made holes so that they could attend to the - calls of nature. When nearing bigger stations, persons should, - if possible, relieve themselves far from these stations.” - -Turning to Page 5 of the same document, Paragraph 12—in the German text -it appears at Page 6, Paragraph 1: - - “The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations: - - - - “In the women’s and girls’ shower rooms, services were partly - performed by men, or men would mingle around or even help with - the soaping, and vice versa there were female personnel in the - men’s shower rooms. Men also for some time were taking - photographs in the women’s shower rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian - peasants were transported in the last months, as far as the - female portion of these are concerned, they were mostly of a - high moral standard and used to strict modesty; they must have - considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The - above-mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge, - settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The - reports of the photographing were made from Halle; the reports - about the former were made from Kiwerce. Such incidents, - altogether unworthy of the dignity and prestige of the Greater - German Reich may still occur here or there.” - -Sick and infirm people of the occupied countries were taken -indiscriminately with the rest. Those who managed to survive the trip -into Germany but who arrived too sick to work were returned like cattle -together with those who fell ill at work, because they were of no -further use to the Germans. The return trip took place under the same -terrible conditions as the initial journey, and without any kind of -medical supervision. Death came to many and their corpses were -unceremoniously dumped out of the cars, with no provision for burial. - -I quote from Page 3, Paragraph 3 of Document Number 054-PS. In the -German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3. Quoting directly: - - “Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and the - population is the effect of those persons shipped back from - Germany who had become disabled or had been unfit for employment - from the very beginning. - - - - “Several times already transports of skilled workers on their - way to Germany have crossed returning transports of such - disabled persons and have stood on the tracks alongside of each - other for a long period of time. These returning transports are - insufficiently cared for. Nothing but sick, injured, or weak - people, mostly 50 to 60 in a car usually escorted by 3 to 4 men. - There is neither sufficient care nor food. The returnees made - frequently unfavorable—if also surely exaggerated—statements - relative to their treatment in Germany and on the way. As a - result of all this and of what the people could see with their - own eyes, a psychosis of fear was evoked among the skilled - workers, that is, the whole transport to Germany. Several - transport leaders, of the 62d and 63d transports, in particular, - reported on it in detail. In one case the leader of the - transport of skilled workers observed with his own eyes how a - person who had died of hunger was unloaded from a returning - transport on the side track (1st Lieutenant Hofmann of the 63rd - Transport Station, Darniza). Another time it was reported that - three dead had to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the - way and had to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also - regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here without any - identification. From the reports of the transport commanders, - one gets the impression that these unemployable persons are - assembled, penned into the wagons, and sent off provided only by - a few men escorts and without special care for food and medical - or other attendance. The labor office at the place of arrival as - well as the transport commanders confirm this impression.” - -Incredible as it may seem, mothers in the throes of childbirth shared -cars with those infected with tuberculosis or venereal diseases. Babies, -when born, were hurled out of these car windows; and dying persons lay -on the bare floors of freight cars without even the small comfort of -straw. - -I refer to Document Number 084-PS, which is Exhibit USA-199. This -document is an interdepartmental report, prepared by Dr. Gutkelch, in -the Defendant Rosenberg’s Ministry, and it is dated the 30th of -September 1942. I wish to quote from Page 10 of the English text, -starting with the fourth line from the top of the page. In the German -text it appears at Page 22, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly from that -paragraph: - - “How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that - this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place - where a train with newly recruited Eastern Workers had stopped. - Because of the corpses in the trainload of returning laborers, a - catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for the - mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to - babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey, - people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases rode in the - same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and - one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same - must have occurred in other returning transports.” - -Some aspects of the Nazi transport were described by the Defendant -Sauckel himself in a decree which he issued on the 20th of July 1942; -and I refer specifically to Document Number 2241(2)-PS, which is Exhibit -USA-200. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the original -decree, which is published in Section BIa, at Page 48e of a book -entitled _Die Beschäftigung von ausländischen Arbeitskräften in -Deutschland_. I quote from Page 1, Paragraph 2, of the English text; and -I am quoting directly: - - “According to reports of transportation - commanders”—Transportleiter—“presented to me, the special - trains provided by the German railway have frequently been in a - really broken-down condition. Numerous window panes have been - missing in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories - have been partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an - emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the coaches - were not heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became - unusable because the water system was frozen and the flushing - apparatus was therefore without water.” - -The Tribunal will unquestionably have noticed or observed that a number -of the documents which we have referred to—and which we have -offered—consist of complaints by functionaries of the Defendant -Rosenberg’s Ministry, or by others, concerning the conditions under -which foreign workers were recruited and lived. I think it is -appropriate to say that these documents have been presented by the -Prosecution really for two purposes, or for a dual purpose; to -establish, first, the facts recited therein, of course, but also to show -that these conspirators had knowledge of these conditions and that -notwithstanding their knowledge of these conditions, these conspirators -continued to countenance and assist in this enslavement program of a -vast number of citizens of occupied countries. - -Once within Germany, slave laborers were subjected to almost -unbelievable brutality and degradation by their captors; and the -character of this treatment was in part made plain by the conspirators’ -own statements, as in Document Number 016-PS, which is in evidence as -Exhibit USA-168; and I refer to Page 12, Paragraph 2 of the English -text. In the German text it appears at Page 17, Paragraph 4. Quoting -directly: - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way - that they produce to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degree of expenditure.” - -Force and brutality as instruments of production found a ready adherent -in the Defendant Speer who, in the presence of the Defendant Sauckel, -said at a meeting of the Central Planning Board—and I refer to Document -Number R-124, which is already in evidence and which has been referred -to previously. It bears the Exhibit Number USA-179. I refer particularly -to Page 42 of that Document R-124, and Paragraph 2 of that Page 42. The -Defendant Speer, speaking at that meeting, stated: - - “We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the - side list decreased at once to one-fourth or one-fifth in - factories where doctors are on the staff who examine the sick - men. There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking - drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into - concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen - several times and the news will soon go around.” - -At a later meeting of the Central Planning Board, Field Marshal Milch -agreed that so far as workers were concerned—and again I refer to -Document Number R-124 and to Page 26, Paragraph 2, in the English text, -and in the German text at Page 17, Paragraph 1. Field Marshal Milch, -speaking at a meeting of the Central Planning Board when the Defendant -Speer was present, stated; and I am quoting directly: - - “The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler - . . . .” - -Milch made particular reference to foreign workers again in this -Document Number R-124 at Page 26, Paragraph 3—in the German text it -appears at Page 18, Paragraph 3—when he said; and I am quoting him -directly: - - “It is therefore not possible to exploit fully all the - foreigners unless we compel them by piece-work wages and have - the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are - not doing their bit.” - -The policy as actually executed was even more fearful than the policy as -expressed by the conspirators. Indeed, these impressed workers were -underfed and overworked; and they were forced to live in grossly -overcrowded camps where they were held as virtual prisoners, and were -otherwise denied adequate shelter, adequate clothing, adequate medical -care and treatment. As a consequence, they suffered from many diseases -and ailments. They were generally forced to work long hours, up to and -beyond the point of exhaustion. They were beaten and subjected to all -manner of inhuman indignities. - -An example of this maltreatment is found in the conditions which -prevailed in the Krupp factories. Foreign laborers at the Krupp works -were given insufficient food to enable them to perform the work required -of them. - -I refer to Document Number D-316, which is Exhibit USA-201. This -document was found in the Krupp files. It is a memorandum upon the Krupp -stationery to a Herr Hupe, a director of the Krupp locomotive factory in -Essen, Germany, dated the 14th of March 1942. I wish to refer to Page 1 -of the English text, starting with Paragraph 1, as follows; and I am -quoting directly: - - “During the last few days we established that the food for the - Russians employed here is so miserable that the people are - getting weaker from day to day. - - - - “Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to - place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance, - because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist - in all other places of work where Russians are employed.” - -The condition of foreign workers in Krupp workers’ camps is described in -detail in an affidavit executed in Essen, Germany, by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger, -who was the senior camp doctor. It is Document Number D-288, which is -Exhibit USA-202. - - “I, Dr. Wilhelm Jäger, am a general practitioner in Essen, - Germany, and its surroundings. I was born in Germany on 2 - December 1888 and now live at Kettwig, Sengenholz 6, Germany. - - - - “I make the following statement of my own free will. I have not - been threatened in any way and I have not been promised any sort - of reward. - - - - “On the 1st of October 1942, I became senior camp doctor in the - Krupp’s workers’ camps for foreigners and was generally charged - with the medical supervision of all Krupp’s workers’ camps in - Essen. In the course of my duties it was my responsibility to - report upon the sanitary and health conditions of the workers’ - camps to my superiors in the Krupp works. - - - - “It was a part of my task to visit every Krupp camp which housed - foreign civilian workers, and I am therefore able to make this - statement on the basis of my personal knowledge. - - - - “My first official act as senior camp doctor was to make a - thorough inspection of the various camps. At that time, in - October 1942, I found the following conditions: - - - - “The Eastern Workers and Poles who worked in the Krupp works at - Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, - Spenlestrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, - Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Krämerplatz.”—When - the term “Eastern Workers” is hereinafter used, it is to be - taken as including Poles.—“All of the camps were surrounded by - barbed wire and were closely guarded. - - - - “Conditions in all of these camps were extremely bad. The camps - were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice as many - people in a barrack as health conditions permitted. - - - - “At Krämerplatz the inhabitants slept in treble-tiered bunks, - and in the other camps they slept in double-tiered bunks. The - health authorities prescribed a minimum space between beds of 50 - centimeters, but the bunks in these camps were separated by a - maximum of 20 to 30 centimeters. - - - - “The diet prescribed for the Eastern Workers was altogether - insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the - minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German - workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000 calories a - day, the Eastern Workers with comparable jobs received only - 2,000 calories. The Eastern Workers were given only two meals a - day and their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of - a thin, watery soup. I had no assurance that the Eastern - Workers, in fact, received the minimum which was prescribed. - Subsequently, in 1943, I undertook to inspect the food prepared - by the cooks; I discovered a number of instances in which food - was withheld from the workers. - - - - “The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of - meat per week. Only inferior meats rejected by the veterinary, - such as horse meat or tuberculin-infested, was permitted for - this purpose. This meat was usually cooked into a soup . . . . - - - - “The percentage of Eastern Workers who were ill was twice as - great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly - widespread among the Eastern Workers. The tuberculosis rate - among them was four times the normal rate (Eastern Workers, 2 - percent; German, 0.5 percent). At Dechenschule approximately 2.5 - percent of the workers suffered from open tuberculosis. The - Tartars and Kirghises suffered most; as soon as they were - overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The cause - was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of - food, overwork, and insufficient rest. - - - - “These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice, - the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, - bugs, and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these camps. - As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all - Eastern Workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage - of food also caused many cases of Hunger-Oedema, Nephritis and - Shiga-Kruse. - - - - “It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to - work unless a camp doctor had certified that they were unfit for - work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, - Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule there was no daily sick - call. At these camps the doctors did not appear for 2 or 3 days. - As a consequence workers were forced to go to work despite - illness. - - - - “I undertook to improve conditions as much as I could. I - insisted upon the erection of some new barracks in order to - relieve the overcrowded conditions of the camps. Despite this, - the camps were still greatly overcrowded but not as much as - before. I tried to alleviate the poor sanitary conditions in - Krämerplatz and Dechenschule by having some emergency toilets - installed; but the number was insufficient, and the situation - was not materially altered . . . . - - - - “With the onset of heavy air raids in March 1943, conditions in - the camps greatly deteriorated. The problem of housing, feeding, - and medical attention became more acute than ever. The workers - lived in the ruins of their former barracks. Medical supplies - which were used up, lost, or destroyed were difficult to - replace. At times the water supply at the camps was completely - shut off for periods of 8 to 14 days. We installed a few - emergency toilets in the camps, but there were far too few of - them to cope with the situation. - - - - “During the period immediately following the March 1943 raids - many foreign workers were made to sleep at the Krupp factories - in the same rooms in which they worked. The day workers slept - there at night, and the night workers slept there during the - day, despite the noise which constantly prevailed. I believe - that this condition continued until the entrance of American - troops into Essen. - - - - “As the pace of air raids was stepped up, conditions became - progressively worse. On 28 July 1944 I reported to my superiors - that: - - - - “‘The sick barracks in camp Rabenhorst are in such a bad - condition one cannot speak of a sick barracks any more. The rain - leaks through in every corner. The housing of the sick is - therefore impossible. The necessary labor for production is in - danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover.’ - - - - “At the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944—I am not - completely sure of the exact date—I obtained permission for the - first time to visit the prisoner-of-war camps. My inspection - revealed that conditions at these camps were worse than those I - had found at the camps of the Eastern Workers in 1942. Medical - supplies at such camps were virtually non-existent. In an effort - to cure this intolerable situation, I contacted the Wehrmacht - authorities whose duty it was to provide medical care for the - prisoners of war. My persistent efforts came to nothing. After - remonstrating with them over a period of 2 weeks, I was given a - total of 100 aspirin tablets for over 3,000 prisoners of war. - - - - “The French prisoner-of-war camp in Nöggerathstrasse had been - destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were kept - for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in old - bakehouses. The dog kennels were 3 feet high, 9 feet long, and 6 - feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The prisoners had to - crawl into these kennels on all fours. The camp contained no - tables, chairs, or cupboards. The supply of blankets was - inadequate. There was no water in the camp. Such medical - treatment as there was, was given in the open. Many of these - conditions were reported to me in a report by Dr. Stinnesbeck, - dated 12 June 1944, in which he said: - - - - “‘. . . There are still 315 prisoners in the camp. One hundred - seventy of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel in - Grunertstrasse under the Essen-Mülheim railway line. This tunnel - is damp and is not suitable for continued accommodation of human - beings. The rest of the prisoners are accommodated in 10 - different factories in the Krupp works. The medical attention is - given by a French military doctor who takes great pains with his - fellow countrymen. Sick people from Krupp factories must be - brought to sick call. This inspection is held in the lavatory of - a burned-out public house outside the camp. The sleeping - accommodation of the four French orderlies is in what was the - men’s room. In the sick bay there is a double-tier wooden bed. - In general the treatment takes place in the open. In rainy - weather it is held in the above-mentioned small room. These are - insufferable conditions. There are no chairs, tables, cupboards, - or water. The keeping of a register of sick people is - impossible. Bandages and medical supplies are very scarce, - although the badly wounded from the factory are very often - brought here for first aid and have to be bandaged here before - being transported to the hospital. There are many loud and - lively complaints about food which the guard personnel confirms - as being justified. Illness and loss of manpower must be - reckoned with under these conditions . . . .’ - - - - “In my report to my superiors at Krupps, dated 2 September 1944, - I stated . . . . - - - - “Camp Humboldtstrasse has been inhabited by Italian military - internees. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the - Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald - concentration camp were brought to work at the Krupp factories. - Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldtstrasse, I found these - persons suffering from open festering wounds and other ailments. - - - - “I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight. - There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were no - medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about - in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a - sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. - The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS - guards. - - - - “The amount of food in the camp was extremely meager and of very - poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the - ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against - rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors - that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one - could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20, and up to - 50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the - camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this - camp with Mr. Gröne on two occasions and both times we left the - camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of the - fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this - attack by insects of this camp I got large boils on my arms and - the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to - undertake the necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put - an end to this unbearable vermin-infested condition. Despite - this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary - conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later. - - - - “When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were - completely disabled, they were returned to the labor exchange in - Essen and from there they were sent to a camp at Friedrichsfeld. - Among persons who were returned to the labor exchange were - aggravated cases of tuberculosis, malaria, neurosis, cancer - which could not be treated by operation, old age, and general - feebleness. I know nothing about conditions at this camp because - I have never visited it. I only know that it was a place to - which workers were sent who were no longer of any use to Krupp. - - - - “My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to - Mr. Ihn, director of Friedrich Krupp AG.; Dr. Wiele, personal - physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach; senior camp - leader Kupke; and sometimes to the Essen health department. - Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personally visited the - camps.”—signed—“Dr. Wilhelm Jäger.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we had just completed the reading -of the affidavit executed by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger at the noon recess. The -conditions which were described in this affidavit were not confined to -the Krupp factories alone but existed throughout Germany; and we turn to -a report of the Polish Main Committee made to the Administration of the -General Government of Poland, Document Number R-103, Exhibit Number -USA-204. This document is dated the 17th of May 1944 and describes the -situation of the Polish workers in Germany, and I wish to refer -particularly to Page 2 of the English translation, starting with -Paragraph 2; in the German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 2 also. -In quoting from the document, it reads: - - “The state of cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is - contrary to the most elementary requirements. Often there is no - opportunity to obtain warm water for washing; therefore, the - cleanest parents are unable to maintain even the most primitive - standard of hygiene for their children or often even to wash - their only set of underclothing. A consequence of this is the - spreading of scabies which cannot be eradicated . . . . - - - - “We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern Workers - and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity - and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called - class 4—is absolutely insufficient to compensate the energy - spent in heavy work. Three and one half kilograms of bread - weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with kohlrabi or - other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition - of potatoes now and then, is a starvation ration for a heavy - worker. - - - - “When, on top of that, starvation is sometimes inflicted as - punishment—for refusal to wear the badge ‘East’, for - example—the result is that workers faint at their work - (Klosterteich Camp, Grünheim, Saxony). The consequence is - complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and - tuberculosis. The spreading of tuberculosis among the Polish - factory workers is due to the deficient food rations meted out - in the community camps which are insufficient to restore the - energy spent in heavy work . . . . - - - - “The call for help which reaches us brings to light privation - and hunger, severe stomach and intestinal trouble, especially in - the case of children, resulting from the insufficiency of food - which does not take into consideration the needs of children. - Proper medical treatment or care for the sick is not available - in the mass camps.” - -We now refer to Page 3 of this same document and particularly to the -first paragraph. In the German text it appears at Page 5, Paragraph 1: - - “In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of - systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of - children which affects the life of prolific families in the - camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or - religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness - in rough surroundings may and will create undesirable results in - these children . . . . An indication of what these awful - conditions may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps - for Eastern Workers (‘Waldlust,’ Lauf, post office, Pegnitz) - there are cases of 8-year-old, delicate, and undernourished - children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment - . . . . - - - - “The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state - of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many - cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from - the Reich to the General Government as unfit for work. Their - state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the - question. The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting - from overwork and a starvation diet is not recognized as an - ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and - fainting spells. - - - - “Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a - precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may - no longer be expected (Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the - incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to - alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and medicines. - There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not - be hopeless and men in their prime who, if sent home in time to - their families in rural districts, might still be able to - recover . . . . No less suffering is caused by the separation of - families when wives and mothers of small children are away from - their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.” - -And finally, from Page 4 of the same document, starting with the first -paragraph—in the German text it appears at Page 7, Paragraph 4: - - “If, under these conditions, there is no moral support such as - is normally based on regular family life, then at least such - moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish - population require should be maintained and increased. The - elimination of religious services, religious practices, and - religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the - prohibition of church attendance when there is a religious - service for other people, and other measures show a certain - contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and - opinions of the workers.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us who the Polish Central Committee -were—or, I mean, how they were founded? - -MR. DODD: Well, insofar as we are aware, it was a committee apparently -set up by the Nazi State when it occupied Poland to work in some sort of -co-operation with it during the days of the occupation. We don’t know -the names of the members, and we haven’t any more specific information. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it a captured document? - -MR. DODD: It is a captured document, yes, Sir. All of the documents that -I am presenting in connection with this case are, excepting the -Netherlands Government’s report and one or two other official reports, -the Deuss affidavit and such other matters, are captured documents. That -particular document, it has just been called to my attention, was -captured by the United States 3rd Army. - -Particularly harsh and brutal treatment was reserved for workers -imported from the conquered Eastern territories. As we have illustrated, -they did indeed live in bondage, and they were subjected to almost every -form of degradation, quartered in stables with animals, denied the right -of free worship and the ordinary pleasures of human society. - -Illustrative of this treatment is Document EC-68, bearing Exhibit Number -USA-205. This document, EC-68, bears the title, “Directives on the -Treatment of Foreign Farm Workers of Polish Nationality,” issued by the -Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden, Germany, on the 6th of March -1941. And we don’t know his name, nor have we been able to ascertain it. - -Quoting from the English text of this document from the beginning: - - “The agencies of the Baden State Peasant Association of the - Reich Food Administration, have received the result of the - negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Führer in Stuttgart - on 14 February 1941 with great satisfaction. Appropriate - memoranda have already been turned over to the District Peasants - Associations. Below I promulgate the individual regulations as - they have been laid down during the conference and the manner in - which they are now to be applied: - - - - “1. On principle, farm workers of Polish nationality are no - longer granted the right to complain, and thus no complaints may - be accepted by any official agency. - - - - “2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave - the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew - from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours and - from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours. - - - - “3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are - possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a - relative of the employer or the employer himself is present. - - - - “4. The visit to churches, regardless of faith, is strictly - prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. - Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is - permitted. - - - - “5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures, or other cultural - entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish - nationality. - - - - “6. The visit to restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm - workers of Polish nationality, except for one restaurant in the - village, which will be selected by the Regional Commissioner’s - Office”—Landratsamt—“and then only 1 day per week. The day - which is allowed for visiting the restaurant will also be - determined by the Landratsamt. This regulation does not change - the curfew regulation mentioned above under ‘2’. - - - - “7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly - prohibited; and wherever it is discovered, it must be reported. - - “8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work - is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or - in the living quarters of the Poles. - - - - “9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by - farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited. - - - - “10. Permits to leave the village may be granted only in very - exceptional cases by the local police authority (mayor’s - office). However, in no case may it be granted if a Pole wishes - to visit a public agency on his own authority, whether it is a - labor office or the District Peasants Association, or if he - wants to change his place of employment. - - - - “11. Unauthorized change of employment is strictly prohibited. - The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily as - long as it is to the interests of the enterprise and is demanded - by the employer. There are no limits to the working hours. - - - - “12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to - farm workers of Polish nationality if persuasion and reprimand - fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case - by an official agency. - - - - “13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be - removed from the household; and they can be quartered in stables - _et cetera_. No consideration whatever should restrict such - action. - - - - “14. Report to the authorities of all crimes committed by farm - workers of Polish nationality which sabotage industry or slow - down work—for instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent - behavior—is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who - loses a Pole sentenced to a long prison sentence because of such - a compulsory report will upon request, have preference for the - assignment of another Pole from the competent labor office. - - - - “15. In all other cases, only the State Police is still - competent. For the employer himself, severe punishment is - provided if it is established that the necessary distance has - not been kept from farm workers of Polish nationality. The same - applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly - prohibited. Noncompliance with the Reich tariffs for farm - workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent - labor office by the taking away of the workers.” - -The women of the conquered territories were led away against their will -to serve as domestics, and the Defendant Sauckel described this program -in his own words, which appear in Document Number 016-PS, already -offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-168, 016-PS, and particularly Page 7, -fourth paragraph of the English text. In the German text it appears on -Page 10, Paragraph 1, and I quote directly: - - “In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, - especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy - farmwoman, and in order to avoid any further danger to their - health, the Führer also has charged me with the procurement of - 400,000 to 500,000 selected, healthy, and strong girls from the - territories of the East for Germany.” - -Once captured, once forced to become laborers in Germany, or workers in -Germany, these Eastern women, by order of the slavemaster, Defendant -Sauckel, were bound to the household to which they were assigned, -permitted at the most 3 hours of freedom a week, and denied the right to -return to their homes. - -I now refer to Document Number 3044(b)-PS. That is Exhibit Number -USA-206. The document is a decree issued by the Defendant Sauckel -containing instructions for housewives concerning Eastern household -workers; and I ask that the Court take judicial notice of the original -decree which appears on Pages 592 and 593 of the second volume of a -publication of the Zentralverlag of the NSDAP, entitled _Verfügungen, -Anordnungen und Bekanntgaben_, and I quote from the first paragraph of -the English translation of a portion of the decree as follows: - - “There is no claim for free time. Female domestic workers from - the East may, on principle, leave the household only to take - care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work, however, they - may be given the opportunity to stay outside the home without - work for 3 hours once a week. This leave must end with the onset - of darkness, at the latest at 2000 hours. It is prohibited to - enter restaurants, movies or other theaters, and similar - establishments provided for German or foreign workers. Attending - church is also prohibited. Special events may be arranged for - Eastern domestics in urban homes by the German Workers’ Front, - for Eastern domestics in rural homes by the Reich Food - Administration in cooperation with the German Women’s League. - Outside the home, the Eastern domestic must always carry her - work card as a personal pass. - - - - “Vacations and return to homes are not granted as yet. The - recruiting of Eastern domestics is for an indefinite period.” - -Always over these enslaved workers was the shadow of the Gestapo and the -concentration camps. Like other major programs of the Nazi conspirators, -the guards of the SS and Himmler’s methods of dealing with people were -the instruments employed for enforcement. - -On the subject of the slave laborers, a secret order dated 20 February -1942 issued by Reichsführer SS Himmler to SD and Security Police -officers concerning Eastern Workers spells out the violence which was -applied against them. It is our Document 3040-PS, which is Exhibit -Number USA-207, and I ask this Court to take judicial notice of the -original order, which is published in the _Allgemeine Erlass-Sammlung_ -Part II, Section 2-A, III, f, Pages 15 to 24. I wish to quote from Page -3 of the English text, starting with Paragraph III—in the German text -it appears in Section 2-A, III, f, at Page 19 of the publication—as -follows: - - “III. Combatting violations against discipline. (1) In keeping - with the equal status of laborers from the original Soviet - Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline - must be maintained in quarters and in workshops. Violations - against discipline, including refusal to work and loafing at - work, will be dealt with exclusively by the secret state police. - The less serious cases will be settled by the leader of the - guard according to instructions from the state police - headquarters with measures as provided for in the appendix. To - break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use - also physical compulsion against the laborers. But this may be - done only for a cogent reason. The laborers should always be - informed that they will be treated decently when conducting - themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work. In - serious cases, that is, in such cases where the measures at the - disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state - police is to step in. In such instances, as a rule, severe - measures will be taken, that is, transfer to a concentration - camp or special treatment. The transfer to a concentration camp - is made in the usual manner. In especially serious cases special - treatment is to be recommended at the Reich Security Main - Office; personal data and the exact facts must be given. Special - treatment is hanging. It should not take place in the immediate - vicinity of the camp. A certain number of laborers from the - original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special - treatment; at that time they are to be advised of the - circumstances which lead to this special treatment. Should - special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional - reasons of camp discipline, this must be applied for.” - -And I turn now to Page 4 of the text, Paragraph VI; in the German text -it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, on Page 20: - - “VI. Sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is forbidden to - laborers of the original Soviet Russian territory. Owing to - their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it - . . . For every case of sexual intercourse with German men or - women application for special treatment is to be made for male - labor from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a - concentration camp for female labor.” - -And finally from Page 5 of the same document, Paragraph VIII; and in the -German text it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, at Page 21: - - “VIII. Search. Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian - territory are to be announced on principle in the German search - book. Furthermore, search measures are to be decreed locally. - When caught the fugitive must in principle be proposed for - special treatment.” - -We have said to this Tribunal more than once that the primary purpose of -the entire slave labor program was, of course, to compel the people of -the occupied countries to work for the German war economy. The decree by -which Defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the -Allocation of Labor reveals that the purpose of the appointment was to -facilitate acquisition of the manpower required for German war -industries, and in particular the armaments industry, by centralizing -under Sauckel responsibility for the recruitment and allocation of -foreign labor and prisoners of war in these industries. I refer to the -document bearing our Number 1666-PS—Exhibit USA-208. This document is a -decree signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel—and it is -dated 21 March 1942—appointing the Defendant Sauckel the -Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I ask that the -Court take judicial notice of the original decree, which is published at -Page 179, Part I, of the 1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_; referring to the -English text starting at Paragraph 1, as follows, and quoting directly: - - “In order to secure the manpower requisite for war industries as - a whole and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the - utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers - recruited abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a - uniform control directed in a manner appropriate to the - requirements of war industry, and further that all still - incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater German Reich, - including the Protectorate as well as in the Government General - and in the Occupied Territories, should be mobilized. - Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out - this task within the framework of the Four Year Plan, as - Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. In that - capacity he will be directly responsible to the Delegate for the - Four Year Plan. Section III (Wages) and Section V (Utilization - of Labor) of the Reich Labor Ministry together with their - subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the - Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.” - -Sauckel’s success can be measured from a letter which he himself wrote -to Hitler on 15 April 1943 and which contained his report on 1 year of -his activities. We refer to the Document as Number 407(VI)-PS, which -bears Exhibit Number USA-209. I wish to quote from Paragraphs 6 and 9 on -Page 1 of the English text; in the German text it appears at Page 2, -Paragraphs 1 and 2: - - “After 1 year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation - of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were - given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 - March of this year . . . . - - - - “The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches of - the German war economy: Armament, 1,568,801 . . . .” - -Still further evidence of this steady use of enslaved foreign labor is -found again in a report of the Central Planning Board, to which we have -referred so many times this morning and yesterday. Another meeting of -this Central Planning Board was held on the 16th day of February 1944; -and I refer to our Document Number R-124, which contains the minutes of -this meeting of the Central Planning Board and which has been offered in -evidence already as Exhibit Number USA-179. And I want, to refer -particularly to Page 26, Paragraph 1 of the English text of Document -Number R-124. It is at Page 16, in Paragraph 2, of the German text: - - “The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large - extent; according to the latest figures—40 percent.” - -Moreover, our Document Number 2520-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit -Number USA-197, records that, according to Speer Ministry tabulations, -as of 31 December 1944, approximately 2 million civilian foreign workers -were employed directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions -(finished products or parts). That, the bulk of these workers had been -forced to come to Germany against their will is made clear by Sauckel’s -statement, which I previously quoted from Paragraph 3 of Page 11 of -Document Number R-124. We quoted it this morning, the statement being -that of 5 million foreign workers only 200,000, or less than 200,000, -came voluntarily. - -The Defendants Sauckel, Speer, and Keitel succeeded in forcing foreign -labor to construct military fortifications. Thus, citizens of France, -Holland, and Belgium were compelled against their will to engage in the -construction of the “Atlantic Wall”; and we refer to our Document Number -556(2)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-194. This is a Hitler order dated -the 8th of September 1942, and it is initialled by the Defendant Keitel. -Quoting the order directly: - - “The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be - erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in - the occupied territory all available workers be assigned and - give the fullest extent of their productive capacities to this - task. The previous allotment of workers originating from these - countries is insufficient. In order to increase it I order the - introduction of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing - the place of employment without permission of the authorities in - the occupied territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food - and clothing ration cards to those subject to labor draft should - in the future depend on the possession of a certificate of - employment. Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as - leaving the place of work without the consent of the authorities - in charge, will result in the withdrawal of the food and - clothing ration cards. The GBA”—Deputy General for - Arbeitseinsatz—“in agreement with the military commander, as - well as the Reich Commissioner, will issue the appropriate - decrees.” - -Indeed, the Defendant Sauckel boasted to Hitler concerning the -contribution of the forced labor program to the construction of the -Atlantic Wall by the Defendant Speer’s Organization Todt. And we refer -to Document 407(VIII)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-210. This document -is a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler, dated the 17th day of -May 1943. And I refer to the second and last paragraph: - - “In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy - by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt - was supplied with new labor continually . . . . Thus the - Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the - completion of the Atlantic Wall.” - -Similarly, Russian civilians were forced into labor battalions and -compelled to build fortifications to be used against their own -countrymen. In Document 031-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-171, -which is a memorandum of the Rosenberg Ministry, it is stated in -Paragraph 1 at Page 1 of that document: - - “The men and women in the theaters of operations have been and - will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the - construction of fortifications.” - -In addition, the conspirators compelled prisoners of war to engage in -operations of war against their own country and its allies. At a meeting -of the Central Planning Board, again held on February 19, 1943, attended -by the Defendant Speer and the Defendant Sauckel and Field Marshal -Milch, the following conversation occurred and is recorded in our -Document R-124, at Page 32, Paragraph 5, of the English text. It is Page -20, the last paragraph, of the German text. And I quote it, the -Defendant Sauckel speaking: - - “Sauckel: ‘If any prisoners are taken, they will be needed - there.’ - - - - “Milch: ‘We have made a request for an order that a certain - percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be - Russians. Fifty thousand will be taken altogether, thirty - thousand are already employed as gunners. It is an amusing thing - that Russians must work the guns.’” - -We refer now to Documents Numbers 3027-PS and 3028-PS. They are, -respectively, Exhibit USA-211 for 3027 and USA-212 for 3028. They will -be found at the very back, I believe, of the document book, in a -separate manila folder. They are official German Army photographs; and, -if Your Honors will examine Document 3027-PS, the caption states that -Russian prisoners of war are acting as ammunition bearers during the -attack upon Tschedowo. Document 3028-PS consists of a series of official -German Army photographs taken in July and August 1941 showing Russian -prisoners of war in Latvia and the Ukraine being compelled to load and -unload ammunition trains and trucks and being required to stack -ammunition, all, we say, in flagrant disregard of the rules of -international law, particularly Article 6 of the regulations annexed to -the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907, which provides that the tasks of -prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations of war. -The use of prisoners of war in the German armament industry was as -widespread and as extensive almost as the use of the forced foreign -civilian labor. We refer to Document Number 3005-PS, which is Exhibit -USA-213. This document is a secret letter from the Reich Minister of -Labor to the presidents of the regional labor exchange offices, which -refers to an order of the Defendant Göring to the effect that—I quote -now from Paragraph 1 of that document—I am quoting it directly: - - “Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be - taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet employed in - armament industry and are to be assigned to the armament - industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting - therefrom will be filled by Soviet prisoners of war. The - transfer of the above-named French prisoners of war is to be - accomplished by 1 October.” - -The Reich Marshal referred to in that quotation is of course the -Defendant Göring. - -A similar policy was followed with respect to Russian prisoners of war. -The Defendant Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use -prisoners of war in the German war economy. And I now make reference to -our Document EC-194, which has Exhibit Number USA-214. This document is -also a secret memorandum, according to its label, issued from Hitler’s -headquarters on the 31st of October 1941; and I read from Page 1, -Paragraphs 1 and 2, quoting it directly as follows: - - “The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous - hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The - expected relief through releases from the Armed Forces is - uncertain as to the extent and date; its probable extent will by - no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of - the great demand. - - - - “The Führer has now ordered that even the manpower of the - Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent by - large-scale assignments for the requirements of the war - industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate - nourishment. Also very small wages to provide a few every-day - necessities must be offered with additional premiums for special - effort, as the case may be.” - -And quoting now from the same document, Paragraph 2, II and III—I am -quoting directly: - - “II. Construction and armament industry. - - - - “(a) Work units for construction of all kinds, particularly for - the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, - unloading units for essential war plants). - - - - “(b) Suitable armament factories which are to be selected in - such a way that their personnel will consist in the majority of - prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (upon withdrawal - and other employment of the German workers). - - - - “III. Other war industries. - - - - “(a) Mining as under II (b). - - - - “(b) Railroad construction units for building tracks, _et - cetera_. - - - - “(c) Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization - of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of - the above examples: - - - - “To I. The Armed Forces. - - - - “To II. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions and the - Inspector General for the German Road System in agreement with - the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed - Forces (Economic Armament Office). Deputies of the Reich - Minister for Armament and Munitions are to be admitted to the - prisoner-of-war camps to assist in the selection of skilled - workers.” - -The Defendant Göring, at a conference at the Air Ministry on the 7th day -of November 1941, also discussed the use of prisoners of war in the -armament industry. And we refer now to our Document Number 1206-PS, -which bears Exhibit Number USA-215. This document consists of top-secret -notes on Göring’s instructions as to the employment and treatment of -prisoners of war in many phases of the German war industry. And I wish -to quote from Paragraph 1 of Page 1 and Paragraph 4 of Page 2 of the -English text and from Paragraph 1, Page 1, and Paragraph 1, Page 3 of -the German text, as follows: - - “The Führer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war - in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 - million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.” - -And on Page 2: - - “In the interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if - entire factories could be manned by Russian prisoners of war - except the employees necessary for directing. For employment in - the interior and the Protectorate the following are to have - priority: - - - - “(a) At the top, the coal mining industry. Order by the Führer - to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of - Russians, in some instances manning the entire plant with - Russian laborers. - - - - “(b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, - repair shops, _et cetera_). Railroad-repair and factory workers - are to be sought out from the prisoners of war. Rail is the most - important means of transportation in the East. - - - - “(c) Armament industries. Preferably factories of armor and - guns. Possibly also construction of parts for aircraft engines. - Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively - by Russians if possible. For the remainder, employment in - groups. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm - tractors, generators, _et cetera_. In emergency, erect in some - places barracks for casual workers who are used in unloading - units and for similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior - through communal authorities.) - - - - “OKW/AWA is competent for procuring Russian prisoners of war. - Employment through Planning Board for employment of all - prisoners of war. If necessary, offices of Reich commissariats. - - - - “No employment where danger to men or supply exists, that is, - factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, _et - cetera_. No contact with German population, especially no - ‘solidarity.’ German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. - - - - “Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Procurement of special - food (cats, horses, _et cetera_). - - - - “Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where - part of the people live in caves. - - - - “Supply of shoes for Russians; as a rule wooden shoes, if - necessary install Russian shoe repair shops. - - - - “Examination of physical fitness in order to avoid importation - of diseases. - - “Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians; if possible by - selected Russian engineer troops.” - -The Defendant Göring was not the only one of these defendants who -sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in the -armament industry. The Defendant Speer also sponsored and applied this -same policy of using prisoners of war in the armament industry. And we -refer to the document bearing our Number 1435-PS, which also carries -Exhibit Number USA-216. This document is a speech to the Nazi Gauleiter -delivered by the Defendant Speer on the 24th day of February of 1942, -and I wish to read from Paragraph 2 of that document, and I quote as -follows: - - “I therefore proposed to the Führer at the end of December that - all my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass - employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining prisoners of - war, about 10,000, were put at the disposal of the armament - industry by me.” - -He also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning Board, held -on the 22d day of April 1943, that only 30 percent of the Russian -prisoners of war were engaged in the armament industry. This the -Defendant Speer found unsatisfactory. And referring again to Document -R-124, the minutes of the Central Planning Board, and particularly to -Page 17 of that document, Paragraph 10 of the English text, and Page 14, -Paragraph 7 of the German text, we find this statement by the Defendant -Speer, quoting directly: - - “There is a detailed statement showing in what sectors the - Russian prisoners of war have been distributed. This statement - is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry - received only 30 percent. I constantly complained about this.” - -And at Page 20 of the same document, R-124—Paragraph 1 on Page 20 of -the English text and Page 14, the last paragraph of the German text—the -Defendant Speer stated, and I quote from the paragraph directly: - - “The 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of - the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.” - -The Defendant Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the -utilization of labor for the express purpose, among others, of -integrating prisoners of war into the German war industry, made it plain -that prisoners of war were to be compelled to serve the German armament -industry. His labor mobilization program, which is Document 016-PS, -already marked Exhibit USA-168, contains this statement on Page 6, -Paragraph 10 of the English text and Page 9, Paragraph 1, of the German -text: - - “All prisoners of war now in Germany, from the territories of - the West as well as of the East, must be completely incorporated - into the German armament and food industries. Their production - must be brought to the highest possible level.” - -I wish to turn now from the exploitation of foreign labor in general to -a rather special point of the Nazi program which appears to us to have -combined the brutality and the purposes of the slave labor program with -those of the concentration camp. The Nazis placed all Allied nationals -in concentration camps and forced them, along with the other inmates of -the concentration camps, to work under conditions which were set -actually to exterminate them. This was what we call the Nazi program of -extermination through work. - -In the spring of 1942 these conspirators turned to the concentration -camps as a further source of slave labor for the armament industry. I -refer to a new Document Number R-129, bearing Exhibit Number USA-217. -This document is a letter to Himmler, the Reichsführer SS—and it is -dated the 30th day of April 1942—from one of his subordinates, an -individual named Pohl, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the -Waffen-SS; and I wish to quote from the first page of that document. -Quoting directly: - - “Today I report about the present situation of the concentration - camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of - the 3rd of March 1942.” - -Then moving on from paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3 on Page 2 of the -English text and at Page 1 of the German text, I quote as follows: - - “1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure - of the concentration camps and has changed their duties - fundamentally with regard to the employment of the prisoners. - The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, - education, or as a preventive measure is no longer the main - consideration. The importance now lies in the economic side. The - mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of the war - (increase of armament) now, and for purposes of construction in - the forthcoming peace, is coming more and more to the - foreground. - - - - “2. From this knowledge necessary measures result which require - a gradual transformation of the concentration camps from their - former one-sided political character into an organization - adapted to economic tasks. - - - - “3. For this reason I called together all the leaders of the - former inspectorate of concentration camps, all camp commanders, - and all managers and supervisors of work, on the 23rd and 24th - of April 1942 and explained personally to them this new - development. I have compiled, in the order attached, the - essential points which have to be brought into effect with the - utmost urgency if the commencement of work for the purposes of - the armament industry is not to be delayed.” - -Now the order referred to in that third paragraph set the framework for -a program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as follows—and -I now refer to the enclosure appended to the quoted letter which is also -a part of Document R-129, found at Page 3, Paragraphs numbered 4, 5, and -6 of the English text, and Page 3 of the German text: - - “4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the utilization - of the manpower available. This utilization must be, in the true - meaning of the word, complete, in order to obtain the greatest - measure of performance. Work is allotted only centrally and by - the Chief of the Department D. The camp commanders themselves - may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third - parties and may not negotiate about it. - - - - “5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends - on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind - of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone. - - - - “6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of - working hours (for example, meals, roll-calls, _et cetera_), - have therefore to be restricted to an irreducible minimum. - Time-wasting walks and noon intervals, only for the purpose of - taking meals, are forbidden.” - -The armament production program we have just described was not merely a -scheme for mobilizing the manpower potential of the camps. It actually -was integrated directly into the larger Nazi program of extermination; -and I wish to refer, at this point, to our document bearing Number -654-PS and Exhibit Number USA-218. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it will be convenient to break off now for a -few minutes? - -MR. DODD: Very well. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. DODD: At the recess time I had made reference to Document Number -654-PS, which has the Exhibit Number USA-218. This document is a -memorandum of an agreement between Himmler, Reichsführer SS, and the -Minister of Justice, Thierack. It is dated the 18th of September 1942. -The concept of extermination to which I referred shortly before the -recess was embodied in this document and I wish to quote from Page 1, -Paragraph 2: - - “2. Transfer of asocial elements from prison to the Reichsführer - SS for extermination through work. To be transferred without - exception are persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, - Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, - Czechs, and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according - to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all - the worst asocial elements amongst those just mentioned are to - be handed over. I shall inform the Führer of this through - Reichsleiter Bormann.” - -Now this agreement further provided, in Paragraph 12 on Page 2 of the -English text and Page 3, Paragraph 14, of the German text, as follows: - - “14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of - the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in - the future, Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians are - no longer to be tried by the ordinary courts, so far as - punishable offenses are concerned; but are to be dealt with by - the Reichsführer SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor - to Poles whose names are reported or entered in the German - racial lists.” - -Now, in September of 1942, the Defendant Speer made arrangements to -bring this new source of labor within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced -Hitler that significant production could be obtained only if the -concentration camp prisoners were employed in factories under the -technical control of the Speer Ministry instead of the control in the -camps. In fact, without Defendant Speer’s cooperation, we say it would -have been most difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale for -war production, since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine tools -and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the -prisoners were to be exploited in factories under the Defendant Speer’s -control. To compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to -Speer, the Defendant Speer proposed and Hitler agreed, that Himmler -would receive a share of the armaments output, fixed in relation to the -man-hours contributed by his prisoners. In the minutes of the Defendant -Speer’s conference with Hitler on the 20th, 21st, and the 22d September -1942—Document Number R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179—I wish to -refer particularly to Page 34 of the English text. These are the -Defendant Speer’s minutes on this conference. I am quoting from Page 34, -Paragraph 36, beginning at the middle of the page; and it is at the top -of Page 26 in the German text: - - “I pointed out to the Führer that, apart from an insignificant - amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament - production in the concentration camps, because: (1) the machine - tools required are missing; (2) there are no suitable premises. - Both these assets would be available in the armament industry, - if use could be made of them by a second shift. - - - - “The Führer agrees to my proposal that the numerous factories - set up outside towns for reasons of air raid protection should - release their workers to supplement the second shift in town - factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the - concentration camps—also two shifts. - - - - “I pointed out to the Führer the difficulties which I expect to - encounter if Reichsführer SS Himmler should be able, as he - requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these - factories. The Führer, too, does not consider such an influence - necessary. - - - - “The Führer, however, agrees that Reichsführer SS Himmler should - derive advantage from making his prisoners available; he should - get equipment for his division. - - - - “I suggest giving him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio - to the man-hours contributed by his prisoners. A 3 to 5 percent - share is being discussed, the equipment also being calculated - according to man-hours. The Führer would agree to such a - solution. - - - - “The Führer is prepared to order the additional allocation of - this equipment and weapons to the SS, upon submission of a - list.” - -After a demand for concentration-camp labor had been created and after a -mechanism had been set up by the Defendant Speer for exploiting this -labor in armament factories, measures were evolved for increasing the -supply of victims for extermination through work. A steady flow was -assured by an agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice -mentioned above, which was implemented by such programs as the -following—and I refer to Document L-61, Exhibit Number USA-177; and I -wish to quote from Paragraph 3. That document, the Tribunal will recall, -is the Defendant Sauckel’s letter, dated the 26th of November 1942, to -the presidents of the Länder employment offices; and I wish to quote -from Paragraph 3 of that letter: - - “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure - will be put into concentration camps and put to work insofar as - they are criminal or asocial elements.” - -General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who -would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. - -THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you read that this morning? - -MR. DODD: Yes, I did, Your Honor. I was reading it again with particular -reference to this feature of the proof. - -For example, for “reasons of war necessity” Himmler ordered that at -least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred to -concentration camps. I now offer in evidence Document Number 1063(d)-PS, -which is Exhibit Number USA-219. This document is a Himmler order dated -the 17th of December 1942. The order provides, and I quote in part, -beginning with the first paragraph of that document: - - “For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, - the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, on the 14th - of December 1942, has ordered that by the end of January 1943 at - least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to the - concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the - following measures are required: - - - - “(1) As of now, to begin with, until 1 February 1943, all - Eastern Workers or foreign workers who have been fugitives or - who have broken contracts and who do not belong to allied, - friendly, or neutral states . . . are to be brought by the - quickest means to the nearest concentration camps . . . . - - - - “(2) The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police - and the Security Service, and the chiefs of the state police - headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and - strict rule: (a) the prisons, and (b) the labor reformatory - camps. - - - - “All prisoners fit for work, if it is practically and humanly - possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration - camp, according to the following instructions, even for example, - those who are about to be brought to trial. Only such prisoners - can be left there who, in the interest of further - investigations, are to remain absolutely in solitary - confinement. - - - - “Every single laborer counts!” - -Measures were also adopted to insure that this extermination through -work was practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration -camps were established near important war plants. The Defendant Speer -has admitted that he personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites -for concentration camps near various munitions factories in the area. I -am about to refer to the transcript of an interrogation under oath of -the Defendant Albert Speer. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you understand the last document you read, -1063-PS, to refer to prisoners of war, or prisoners in ordinary prisons, -or what? - -MR. DODD: We understood it to refer to prisoners in ordinary prisons. - -In view of the Tribunal’s ruling this morning, I think I should state -that, with respect to this interrogation of Defendant Speer, we had -provided the defendants’ counsel with the entire text in German. It -happens to be a brief interrogation, and so we were able to complete -that translation, and it has been placed in their Information Center. - -DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): In reference to the -transcript of the interrogation, the reading of which the prosecutor has -just announced, I should like to say the following: - -It is true that we have received the German transcript of the English -protocol, if one may call it a protocol. A comparison of the English -text with the German transcript shows that there are, both in the -English text and in the German transcript, mistakes which change the -meaning and which I believe are to be attributed to misunderstandings on -the part of the certifying interpreter. I believe, therefore, that the -so-called protocol and the English text do not actually give the -contents of what Defendant Speer tried to express during the -interrogation. It would, therefore, not further the establishment of the -truth should this protocol ever be used. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, when was the German translation given to -counsel for the defendant? - -MR. DODD: About 4 days ago, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, is there any certification by the interrogator -as to the English translation? - -MR. DODD: There is, Your Honor. There is a certification at the end of -the interrogation by the interrogator and by the interpreter and by the -reporter as well. There are three certifications. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the best course will be, in these circumstances, -to receive the interrogation now. You will have an opportunity, by -calling the defendant, to show in what way he alleges, or you allege, -that the interrogation is inaccurately translated. - -DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you, Sir. - -MR. DODD: May I respectfully refer, Your Honor, to the last document in -the document book, 4 pages from the end? - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page do you refer to? - -MR. DODD: I refer to the page bearing the Number 16 of the English text -of the transcript of the interrogation and Page 21 of the German text. -The answer quoted is: - - “The fact was that we were anxious to use workers from - concentration camps in factories and to establish small - concentration camps near factories, in order to use the manpower - that was then available there. But it did not come up only in - connection with this trip . . . .” - -That is, Speer’s trip to Austria. (Exhibit USA-220) - -THE PRESIDENT: I think I ought to say to defendant’s counsel that if he -had waited until he heard that piece of evidence read, he would have -seen that it was quite unnecessary to make any objection. - -MR. DODD: Defendant Göring endorsed this use of concentration camp labor -and asked for more. We refer to our Document 1584-PS, Part 1, which is -Exhibit Number USA-221. This document is a teletype message from Göring -to Himmler, dated 14th of February 1944. I quote from the document -beginning with the second sentence: - - “At the same time, I ask you to put at my disposal as great a - number of KZ”—concentration-camp—“convicts as possible for air - armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful - according to previous experience. The situation of the air war - makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of - this kind KZ convicts can be especially well concentrated at - work and in the camp.” - -Defendant Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program; -and Hitler promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program -could not be obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be -brought in by the SS. - -Speer recorded his conferences with Hitler on April 6 and April 7, 1944 -in Document R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179, already in evidence. -I quote from Page 36 of the English text, Page 29 of the German text as -follows: - - “Suggested to the Führer that, due to lack of builders and - equipment, the second big building project should not be set up - in German territory but in close vicinity to the border on a - suitable site (preferably on gravel base and with transport - facilities) in French, Belgian, or Dutch territory. The Führer - agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a - fortified zone. The strongest argument for setting up this plant - in French territory is the fact that it would be much easier to - procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Führer asks - that an attempt be made to set up the second factory in a safer - area, namely the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible - there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Führer - himself will contact the Reichsführer SS and will give an order - that the required 100,000 men are to be made available by - bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that in the - case of the Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien the building - organization was a failure, the Führer demands that these works - must be built by the OT exclusively, and that the workers should - be made available by the Reichsführer SS. He wants to hold a - meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men - concerned.” - -The unspeakably brutal, inhumane, and degrading treatment inflicted on -Allied nationals and other victims of concentration camps, while they -were indeed being literally worked to death, is described in Document -L-159, which is not in the document book. It is an official report -prepared by a U.S. Congressional committee, U.S. Senate Document Number -47. This Congressional committee had inspected the liberated camps at -the request of General Eisenhower. It bears Exhibit Number USA-222. I -would like to quote from the document briefly, first from Page 14, the -last paragraph, and from Page 15, the first two paragraphs, of the -English text: - - “The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the concentration - camps was generally as follows: They were herded together in - some wooden barracks not large enough for one-tenth of their - number. They were forced to sleep on wooden frames covered with - wooden boards in tiers of two, three, and even four, sometimes - with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty rags serving - both as pallet and coverlet. - - - - “Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound of - black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and - night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers crowded - into a small space and to the lack of adequate sustenance, lice - and vermin multiplied, disease became rampant, and those who did - not soon die of disease or torture began the long, slow process - of starvation. Notwithstanding the deliberate starvation program - inflicted upon these prisoners by lack of adequate food, we - found no evidence that the people of Germany, as a whole, were - suffering from any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The - contrast was so striking that the only conclusion which we could - reach was that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was - deliberate. - - - - “Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to work - either at an adjoining war factory or were placed ‘in commando’ - on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned each night to - their stall in the barracks. Generally a German criminal was - placed in charge of each ‘block’ or shed in which the prisoners - slept. Periodically he would choose the one prisoner of his - block who seemed the most alert or intelligent or showed most - leadership qualities. These would report to the guards’ room and - would never be heard from again. The generally accepted belief - of the prisoners was that these were shot or gassed or hanged - and then cremated. A refusal to work or an infraction of the - rules usually meant flogging and other types of torture, such as - having the fingernails pulled out, and in each case usually - ended in death after extensive suffering. The policies herein - described constituted a calculated and diabolical program of - planned torture and extermination on the part of those who were - in control of the German Government . . . .” - -I quote next from Page 11 of the English text beginning with the second -sentence of Paragraph 2, a description of Camp Dora at Nordhausen, Page -12, Paragraph 1 of the German text, quoting as follows: - - “On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated and - administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald had been - operated and managed. When the efficiency of the workers - decreased as a result of the conditions under which they were - required to live, their rations were decreased as punishment. - This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became - weaker and were ultimately exterminated.” - -Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation, and death for -concentration-camp labor—labor which the Defendant Göring, while -requesting that more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved -very useful; labor which the Defendant Speer was “anxious” to use in the -factories under his control. - -The policy underlying this program, the manner in which it was executed, -and the responsibility of the conspirators in connection with it has -been dwelt upon at length. Therefore, we should like, at this point, to -discuss the special responsibility of the Defendant Sauckel. - -The Defendant Sauckel’s appointment as Plenipotentiary General for -manpower is explained probably first of all by his having been an old -and trusted Nazi. He certified in Document 2974-PS, dated 17 November -1945, which is already in evidence before this Tribunal as Exhibit -Number USA-15, that he held the following positions: - -Starting with his membership in the NSDAP, he was thereafter a member of -the Reichstag; he was Gauleiter of Thuringia; he was a member of the -Thuringian legislature; he was Minister of Interior and head of the -Thuringian State Ministry; he was Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia; he -was an SA Obergruppenführer; he was SS Obergruppenführer; he was -administrator for the Berlin-Suhler Waffen and Fahrzeugwerke in 1935; he -was head of the Gustloff Werke Nationalsozialistische -Industrie-Stiftung, 1936, and the honorary head of the Foundation. And -from the 21st of March 1942 until 1945, he was the Plenipotentiary -General for Labor Allocation. - -Sauckel’s official responsibilities are borne out by evidence. His -appointment as Plenipotentiary General for manpower was effected by a -decree of the 21st of March 1942, which we have read and which was -signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel. And by that decree -Sauckel was given authority, as well as responsibility, subordinate only -to that of Hitler and Göring, who was the head of the Four Year -Plan—subordinate only to those two for all matters relating to -recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign and domestic manpower. - -The Defendant Göring, to whom Sauckel was directly responsible, -abolished the recruitment and allocation agencies of his Four Year Plan -and delegated their powers to the Defendant Sauckel and placed his -far-reaching authority as deputy for the Four Year Plan at Sauckel’s -disposal. - -In Document 1666-PS, a second 1666-PS but of another date, the 27th of -March 1942—I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this original -decree, which is published in the 1942 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, at -Page 180: - - “In pursuance of the Führer’s decree of 21st of March 1942, I - decree as follows: - - - - “1. My manpower sections are hereby abolished (circular letter - of 22d of October 1936). Their duties (recruitment and - allocation of manpower, regulation of labor conditions) are - taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of - Labor, who is directly under me. - - - - “2. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor will be - responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) - employed in the Reich territory, having regard to the - requirements of labor allocation. - - - - “3. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor is part - of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is - required or existing laws need to be modified; he will submit - appropriate proposals to me. - - - - “4. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor will - have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right - delegated to me by the Führer for issuing instructions to the - highest Reich authorities and their subordinate offices, as well - as the Party offices and their sections and their affiliated - organizations, also to the Reich Protector, the Governor - General, the military commanders, and heads of the civil - administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of - fundamental importance, a report is to be submitted to me in - advance.” - -Document Number 1903-PS is a Hitler decree of the 30th of September 1942 -giving the Defendant Sauckel extraordinary powers over the civil and -military authority of the territories occupied by Germany. We ask that -judicial notice be taken by this Tribunal of the original decree, which -is published in Volume II, Page 510, of the _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, -und Bekanntgaben_, published by the Party Chancellery. This decree -states as follows: - - “I herewith authorize the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation - of Labor, Reich Governor and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel to take all - necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree of 21 March - 1942, concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of - Labor (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, Page 179), according to his own - judgment, in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and - in the Government General, as well as in the Occupied - Territories—measures which will safeguard under all - circumstances the regulated deployment of labor for the German - war economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners to - the bureaus of the military and civilian administration. These - are responsible directly to the Plenipotentiary General for - Allocation of Labor. In order to carry out their tasks, they are - entitled to issue directives to the competent military and - civilian authorities in charge of labor allocation and of wage - policy. - - - - “More detailed directives will be issued by the Plenipotentiary - General for Allocation of Labor. - - - - “Führer headquarters, 30 September 1942. The - Führer,”—signed—“Adolf Hitler.” - -Within 1 month after his appointment, the Defendant Sauckel sent -Defendant Rosenberg his “Labor Mobilization Program”. This program, -Document Number 016-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit USA-168, -envisaged a recruitment by force and the maximum exploitation of the -entire labor resources of the conquered areas and of prisoners of war in -the interests of the Nazi war machine at the lowest conceivable degree -of expenditure to the German State. - -The Defendant Sauckel states—and I refer now to the bottom of Page 6 of -the English text of that document. It is Page 9, Paragraph 2, of the -German text, and I quote as follows: - - “It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous - number of foreign laborers has to be found for the Reich. The - greatest pool for that purpose is the occupied territories of - the East. Consequently, it is an imperative necessity to use the - human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest - extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount - of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute - conscription of forced labor. - - - - “Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied - territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or - unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from - the age of 15 up, for the German allocation of labor.” - -Passing to Page 11 of the English text, first paragraph and Page 17, -Paragraph 4, of the German text, I quote, as follows directly: - - “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the - use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men - and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution - of the problem of the allocation of labor in this war.” - -The Defendant Sauckel proceeded to implement this plan, which he -submitted, with certain basic directives. He provided that if voluntary -recruitment of foreign workers was unsuccessful compulsory service -should be instituted. - -Document Number 3044-PS is the Defendant Sauckel’s Regulation Number 4, -dated the 7th of May 1942. And we ask that the Tribunal take judicial -notice of the original regulation published in Volume II, Pages 516 to -527 of the _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und Bekanntgaben_, to which I have -previously referred. Reading from Page 1, Paragraph 3, of the English -text: - - “The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on principle on a - volunteer basis. Where, however, in the occupied territories the - appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and - drafting must, under all circumstances, be resorted to. This is - an indisputable requirement of our labor situation.” - -Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the order -of its importance to the Nazi war machine. We refer to Document Number -3044(a)-PS, which is the Defendant Sauckel’s Regulation Number 10, and -ask that the Court take judicial notice of the original regulation, -published in Volume II, _Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und Bekanntgaben_, at -Pages 531 to 533. Paragraph 3 of this regulation I quote as follows: - - “The resources of manpower that are available in the occupied - territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the - requirements of importance for the war in Germany itself. In - allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories, - the following order of priority will be observed: - - - - “(a) Labor required for the troops, the occupation authorities, - and the civil authorities; - - - - “(b) Labor required for German armament; - - - - “(c) Labor required for food and agriculture; - - - - “(d) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of - Germany, other than armaments; - - - - “(e) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of the - population of the territory in question.” - -The Defendant Sauckel, and agencies subordinate to him, exercised -exclusive authority over the recruitment of workers from every area in -Europe occupied by, controlled by, or friendly to, the German nation. He -affirmed, himself—the Defendant Sauckel did—this authority in a -decree, Document Number 3044-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit Number -USA-206. I refer to Paragraph 5 on Page 1 of the English text of that -document, and I am quoting it directly: - - “The recruitment of labor in the areas occupied by Germany will - be carried out exclusively by the labor allocation offices of - the German military or civil administration in these areas.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t you read that already? - -MR. DODD: No, I have not, if Your Honor pleases. We have referred to -that decree before, but we have not referred to this portion of it. - -I am passing to Paragraph II, 1-a on Page 2, and quoting again directly: - - “For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly, or - neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely - responsible.” - -In addition, the following defendants, who were informed by Sauckel of -the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collaborated with -Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas: The Defendant Keitel, -Chief of the OKW—which was the Supreme Command—who collaborated with -Sauckel. - -We refer to Document Number 3012(1)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-190. -This document is the record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of -the Economic Staff East of the German Army, and it is dated March 11, -1943. I wish to quote from the first two paragraphs of the document as -follows: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter - Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype that the - allocation of labor in German agriculture, as well as all the - most urgent armament programs ordered by the Führer, make the - most rapid procurement of approximately 1 million women and men - from the newly occupied Eastern Territories within the next 4 - months an imperative necessity. For this purpose, Gauleiter - Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers daily beginning 15 - March; 10,000 workers, male and female, beginning 1 April, from - the newly occupied Eastern Territories.” - -I am passing down to the next paragraph: - - “In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers which - occurred in German war industry because of the developments of - the past months, it is now necessary that the recruiting of - workers be taken up again everywhere with all vigor. The - tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit - and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program, is absolutely - not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter - Sauckel, who is informed about these events, because of this - applied directly to General Field Marshal Keitel on 10 March - 1943, in a teletype, and emphasized on this occasion that, as in - all other occupied territories, where all other methods fail, a - certain pressure must be used, by order of the Führer.” - -At this point we were prepared to offer a transcript of an interrogation -under oath of the Defendant Sauckel. Only the English of the transcript -of the interrogation has been seen by the Counsel for the Defendant -Sauckel. He has had it, however, for some time; and the excerpts on -which we intended to rely were furnished to him as well in German. - -If I understood the ruling of the Tribunal correctly, it would be -necessary for us to have furnished the entire record in German. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you might use this interrogation, as the excerpts -have been submitted in German. - -MR. DODD: Yes, they have, Your Honor, and the entire English text as, -well. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: I refer to a transcript of an interrogation under oath of the -Defendant Sauckel, held on the morning of the 5th of October 1945 -(Exhibit USA-224). That is the very last document in the document book. -I wish to quote from the bottom of Page 1 of the English text and Page -1, Paragraph 11, of the German text, as follows: - - “Q: ‘Was it necessary, in order to accomplish the completion of - the quotas given, to have liaison with the OKW?’ - - - - “A: ‘I remember that the Führer had given directives to Marshal - Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one; and - I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions - with the Führer, when I asked him for his support.’ - - - - “Q: ‘It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the - military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying but - their assigned mission, was it not?’ - - - - “A: ‘Yes, the Führer had told me that he would inform the Chief - of the OKW and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery as to these - matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.’” - -We are also prepared to offer the transcript of an interrogation of the -Defendant Alfred Rosenberg. There is this distinction insofar as this -record is concerned. While we have supplied the counsel with the German -translation of those parts of it which we propose to use, we have not -had an opportunity to supply the whole text to counsel. However, they -have been supplied with the German of the parts which we propose to use -and to offer to this Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are prepared to do it hereafter, I suppose? - -MR. DODD: Yes, we will, Your Honor, as soon as we can get these papers -down to the Information Center. - -THE PRESIDENT: Good. - -MR. DODD: The next document is rather lengthy, and I wonder what the -Tribunal’s pleasure is. Do I understand that I may proceed with the -interrogation? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: I wish to refer to the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich -Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories, as one who also collaborated -with the Defendant Sauckel, and specifically, to refer to a transcript -of an interrogation under oath of the Defendant Rosenberg, on the -afternoon of the 6th of October 1945 (Exhibit USA-187). That record may -be found about the third from the last of the interrogation records in -the document book, and I wish to read from Page 1 of the transcript: - - “Q: ‘Isn’t it a fact that Sauckel would allocate to the various - areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be - obtained for labor purposes?’ - - - - “A: ‘Yes.’ - - - - “Q: ‘And that thereafter your agents would obtain that labor in - order to meet the quota which had been given. Is that right?’ - - - - “A: ‘Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one - could not fulfil unless one looked very closely into the - matter.’ - - - - “Q: ‘Never mind about Sauckel’s desires being far-reaching or - not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were - given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and - it was up to you to meet that quota?’ - - - - “A: ‘Yes. It was the responsibility of the administrative - officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments - over the districts in such a way, according to number and - according to the age groups, that they would be most reasonably - met.’ - - - - “Q: ‘These administrative officials were part of your - organization, isn’t that right?’ - - “A: ‘They were functionaries or officials of the Reich - Commissioner for the Ukraine; but, as such, they were placed in - their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied - Territories.’ - - - - “Q: ‘You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel - could not be filled by voluntary labor; and you did not - disapprove of the impressment of forced labor. Isn’t that - right?’ - - - - “A: ‘I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that - they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary - recruitments, and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced - impressment.’” - -Then, passing a little further down on that page: - - “Q: ‘The letters that we have already seen between you and - Sauckel do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part - with the principle of recruiting workers against their will? - They indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the - treatment that was later accorded these workers, but you did not - oppose their initial impressment.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think you ought to read the next two answers -in fairness to the Defendant Rosenberg, after the one where he said he -submitted to the necessity of forced impressment. - -MR. DODD: Very well, I shall read those, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: “‘Did you ever argue with Sauckel . . .’” - -MR. DODD: Yes. - - “Q: ‘Did you ever argue with Sauckel that perhaps in view of the - fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the - labor recruiting program be abandoned, except for what recruits - could be voluntarily enrolled?’ - - - - “A: ‘I could not do that because the numbers or allotments that - Sauckel had received from the Führer to meet were absolutely - binding for him, and I couldn’t do anything about that.’” - -And then, referring again to the question which I had just read, the -answer is as follows: - - “‘That is right. In those matters I mostly discussed the - possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the - matter, whereas in no way did I place myself in opposition to - the orders that he was carrying out for the Führer.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal might adjourn now. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - NINETEENTH DAY - Thursday, 13 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, at the close of yesterday’s -session we were discussing and had just completed reading the excerpts -from the interrogation of 6 October 1945, wherein the Defendant Alfred -Rosenberg was questioned. - -There have already been introduced Documents 017-PS and 019-PS and I -have read excerpts from them. The Tribunal will recall that they are -letters written by the Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg -requesting the assistance of the Defendant Rosenberg in the recruitment -of additional foreign laborers. I refer to them in passing, by way of -recapitulation, with respect to the Defendant Sauckel’s participation in -this slave-labor program and also the assistance of the Defendant -Rosenberg. Also the Defendant Sauckel received help from the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart who was the Reich Commissioner for the occupied -Netherlands. - -I refer again to the transcript of the interrogation under oath of the -Defendant Sauckel, which was read from yesterday; and I now refer to -another part of it. The transcript of this interrogation will be found -in the rear of the document book. It is the very last document and I -wish to quote particularly from it. It is the first question: - - “Q: For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is - my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland - were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reich - Commissioner Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct? - - - - “A: Yes, that is correct. - - - - “Q: After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his - mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was - it not? - - - - “A: Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the - same applied to other countries.” - -And the Defendant Hans Frank, who was the Governor General of the -Government General of Poland, also participated in the filling of -Defendant Sauckel’s quota requirements. - -I refer again to the interrogation of the Defendant Sauckel and to Page -1 of the excerpts from the transcript of this interrogation as it -appears in the document book: - - “Q: Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating - quotas in the Government General of Poland? - - - - “A: Yes. I have principally to repeat that the only possibility - I had in carrying through these missions was to get in touch - with the highest German military authority in the respective - country and to transfer to them the orders of the Führer and ask - them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these - orders. - - - - “Q: Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the - Governor General Frank? - - - - “A: Yes. I spent a morning and an afternoon in Kraków twice or - three times and I personally spoke to Governor General Frank. - Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebbels.” - -The SS, as in most matters involving the use of force and brutality, -also extended its assistance. We refer to Document Number 1292-PS, which -is Exhibit USA-225. This Document, 1292-PS, is the report of the chief -of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, of a conference with Hitler, which -was attended by, among others, the Defendant Sauckel, the Defendant -Speer, and Himmler, the Reichsführer SS. I turn to Page 2 of the -document, beginning with the third line from the top of the page of the -English text; and it is Page 4, Paragraph 2 of the German text. The -quotation reads as follows: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, - declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to - obtain these workers. Until now he has always kept his promises - as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of - intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for - 1944. He will do everything in his power to furnish the - requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends - primarily on what German executive agents will be made - available. His project cannot be carried out with indigenous - executive agents.” - -There are additional quotations, as the Tribunal may observe, in this -very part from which I have been reading, but I intend to refer to them -again a little further on. - -The Defendant Sauckel participated in the formulation of the over-all -labor requirements for Germany and passed out quotas to be filled by and -with the assistance of the individuals and agencies referred to, in the -certain knowledge that force and brutality were the only means whereby -his demands could be met. Turning to Document 1292-PS again, and quoting -from Page 1: - - “1. A conference took place with the Führer today which was - attended by: - - - - “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, - Gauleiter Sauckel; the Secretary for Armament and War - Production, Speer; the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, - General Field Marshal Keitel; General Field Marshal Milch; the - acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary - Backe; the Minister of the Interior, Reichsführer of the SS, - Himmler; and myself. (The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the - Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be - permitted to participate prior to the conference, but the Führer - did not wish their attendance.)” - -Continuing the quotation: - - “The Führer declared in his introductory remarks: - - - - “‘I want a clear picture: - - - - “‘(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of - German war economy? - - - - “‘(a) For the maintenance of present output? - - - - - “‘(b) To increase its output? - - - - - “‘(2) How many workers can be obtained from occupied countries, - or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means - (increased output)? For one thing, it is a matter of making up - for losses of labor by death, infirmity, the constant - fluctuation of workers, and so forth; and further it is a matter - of procuring additional workers.’ - - - - “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, - Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present amount - of workers he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 - million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall - off. - - - - “Reich Minister Speer declared that he needed an additional - 1,300,000 laborers. However, this would depend on whether it - will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this - not be possible, he would need no additional workers. - Procurement of additional workers from occupied territory would, - however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not - be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already - working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of - these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for - instance, who are already working in France in industries - mentioned above must be protected against being sent to work in - Germany by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of - Labor. - - - - “The Führer agreed with the opinions of Reich Minister Speer and - emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary - General for the Allocation of Labor should create no - circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from - armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied - territories, because such a shifting of workers would only cause - disturbance of production in occupied countries. - - - - “The Führer further called attention to the fact that at least - 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air - attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna - alone 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary - General for the Allocation of Labor will need at least 4 million - workers considering that he requires 2½ million workers for - maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer - needs 1,300,000 additional workers, and that the above-mentioned - preparations for security measures against air attacks call for - 250,000 laborers.” - -Referring again to Page 2, the first full paragraph of the English text -of this document, and Page 5, Paragraph 1, of the German text: - - “The Reichsführer SS explained that the executive agents put at - his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping - the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working - them harder. The Reichsführer SS made immediately available - 2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid - preparations in Vienna.” - -Passing the next paragraph of this document and continuing with the -paragraph entitled “Results of the Conference” and quoting it directly -after the small figure 1: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor shall - procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied - territories.” - -Moreover, as Document 3012-PS, which has already been offered as Exhibit -USA-190, revealed, the Defendant Sauckel, in requesting the assistance -of the Army for the recruitment of 1 million men and women from the -Occupied Eastern Territories, informed the Defendant Keitel that prompt -action was required and that, as in all other occupied countries, -pressure had to be used if other measures were not successful. Again, as -revealed by Document 018-PS, which has been offered and from which -excerpts have been read, the Defendant Sauckel was informed by the -Defendant Rosenberg that the enslavement of foreign labor was achieved -by force and brutality. Notwithstanding his knowledge of these -conditions, the Defendant Sauckel continued to request greater supplies -of manpower from the areas in which the most ruthless methods had been -applied. Indeed, when German field commanders on the Eastern Front -attempted to resist or restrain the Defendant Sauckel’s demands, because -forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the partisans and making -the Army’s task more difficult, Sauckel sent a telegram to Hitler, in -which he implored him, Hitler, to intervene. - -I make reference to Document Number 407(II)-PS, which bears Exhibit -Number USA-226. This document is a telegram from the Defendant Sauckel -to Hitler dated 10 March 1943. It is a rather long message, but I wish -to call particularly to the attention of the Tribunal the last paragraph -on Page 1 of the English text. It is Page 2, Paragraph 5 of the German -text. Quoting the last paragraph of the English text: - - “Therefore, my Führer, I ask you to abolish all orders which - oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and kindly to - report to me whether my conception of the mission presented here - is still right.” - -Turning to Paragraph 5 on the first page of this English text, we find -these words, quoting them directly: - - “If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of - workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German - war industries and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the - full extent.” - -The next paragraph: - - “I myself have the opinion that our Army leaders should not give - credence, under any circumstances, to the atrocity and - defamatory propaganda campaign of the partisans. The generals - themselves are greatly interested that the support for the - troops is made possible in time. I should like to point out that - hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field - as soldiers now cannot possibly be replaced by German women not - used to work, even if they are trying to do their best. - Therefore, I have to use the people of the Eastern Territories.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next paragraph. - - MR. DODD: “I myself report to you that the workers belonging to - all foreign nations are treated humanely, and correctly, and - cleanly; are fed and housed well and are even clothed. On the - basis of my own services with foreign nations I go as far as to - state that never before in the world were foreign workers - treated as correctly as they are now, in the hardest of all - wars, by the German people.” - -In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign civilian -labor by force, Defendant Sauckel was responsible for the conditions -under which foreign workers were deported to Germany and for the -treatment to which they were subjected within Germany. - -We have already referred to the conditions under which these imported -persons were transported to Germany and we have read from Document -2241(3)-PS to show that Sauckel knew of these conditions. Yesterday we -referred at length to the brutal, degrading, and inhumane conditions -under which these laborers worked and lived within Germany. We again -invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document 3044-PS, already -offered as Exhibit USA-206. It is Regulation Number 4 of 7 May 1942, -issued by Sauckel as the Plenipotentiary General for the mobilization of -labor, concerning recruitment, care, lodging, feeding, and treatment of -foreign workers of both sexes. By this decree Defendant Sauckel -expressly directed that the assembly and operation of rail transports -and the supplying of food therefor was the responsibility of his agents -until the transports arrived in Germany. By the same regulation -Defendant Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of foreign -industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor Front and -that the care of foreign agricultural workers was to be carried out by -the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the regulation, Sauckel -reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for all aspects of care, -treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign workers while in transit to -and within Germany. - -I refer particularly to the English text of this Document 3044-PS, -Exhibit USA-206; and the part of it that I make reference to is at the -bottom of Page 1 in the English text, and it appears at Page 518 of the -volume in the German text. Quoting directly from the English text: - - “The care of foreign labor will be carried out: - - - - “(a) Up to the Reich border by my commissioners or, in the - occupied areas, by competent military or civil labor allocation - agencies; care of the workers will be carried out in - co-operation with the respective, competent foreign - organization; - - - - “(b) Within the area of the Reich (1) by the German Labor Front - in the cases of non-agricultural workers, (2) by the Reich Food - Administration in the case of agricultural workers. - - - - “The German Labor Front and the German Food Administration are - bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of - caring for the workers. - - - - “The administrative agencies for the Allocation of Labor are to - give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the - German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned - tasks. - - - - “My competence for the execution of the care for foreign labor - is not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to the German - Labor Front and the Reich Food Administration.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you think that that sort of passage is -the sort of passage which might be summarized and not read, because all -that it is really stating is that Sauckel, his department and -commissioners, were responsible and that is what he is saying. - -MR. DODD: Yes, indeed, Your Honor, we spelled it out, thinking that -perhaps under the rule of getting it into the record it must be read -fully. I quite agree. - -THE PRESIDENT: A summary will be quite sufficient, I think. - -MR. DODD: In the same document, I should like to make reference to the -data on Page 3, Paragraph III, of the English text, which indicate, -under the title of “Composition and Operation of the Transports” that -this function is the obligation of the representatives of the Defendant -Sauckel; and in Paragraph “c,” on Page 5 of the English text, under the -title of “Supply for the Transport,” after setting out some -responsibility for the Office of the German Workers Front, the Defendant -Sauckel states that for the rest his offices effect the supply for the -transport. - -The Defendant Sauckel had an agreement with the head of the German Labor -Front, Dr. Robert Ley, and in this agreement the Defendant Sauckel -emphasized his ultimate responsibility by creating a central -inspectorate charged with examining the working and living conditions of -foreign workers. We refer to Document 1913-PS, Exhibit USA-227. This -agreement between the Defendant Sauckel and the then Chief of the German -Labor Front is published in the 1943 edition of the -_Reichsarbeitsblatt_, Part I, at Page 588. It is a rather lengthy -agreement; and I shall not read it all or any great part of it except -such part as will indicate the basic agreements between the Defendant -Sauckel and Ley with respect to the foreign workers and their living -conditions and working conditions. - -On the first page of the English text: - - “The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, in - collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the - Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a - ‘Central Inspection’ for the continuous supervision of all - measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned - under 1. This will have the designation: Central Inspection for - Care of Foreign Workers.” - -Paragraph 4 marked with the Roman numeral IV, in the same text, states: - - “The offices for the administration of the Allocation of Labor - will be constantly informed by the ‘Central Inspection for the - Care of Foreign Workers’ of its observations, in particular, - immediately in each case in which action of state organizations - seems to be necessary.” - -I should also like to call the attention of the Tribunal to this -paragraph, which is quoted on the same page. It is the fourth paragraph -down after the small number 2 and it begins with the words: - - “The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation - of Labor to empower the members of his staff and the presidents - of the state employment offices to get direct information on the - conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the - factories and camps will remain untouched.” - -We have already offered to the Court proof that the Defendant Sauckel -was responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied countries, -against their will, to manufacture arms and munitions and to construct -military fortifications for use in war operations against their own -country and its allies. He was, moreover, responsible for having -compelled prisoners of war to produce arms and munitions for use against -their own countries and their actively resisting allies. - -The decree appointing Sauckel indicates that he was appointed -Plenipotentiary General for manpower for the express purpose, among -others, of integrating prisoners of war into the German war industry; -and in a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how successful -he had been in carrying out that program. One such report states that in -a single year the Defendant Sauckel had incorporated 1,622,829 prisoners -of war into the German economy. - -I refer to Document Number 407(V)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-228. It is a -letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler on the 14th of April 1943. -Although the figures in the document have been contained in another -document, this is the first introduction of this particular document. -Quoting from Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the English text, it begins: - - “My Führer: - - - - “. . . after having been active as Plenipotentiary for the - Allocation of Labor for one year, I have the honor to report to - you that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the - German war economy between April 1st of the last year and March - 31st of this year.” - -Passing on a little bit, with particular reference to the prisoners of -war, we find this statement: - - “Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829 - prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” - -A later report states that 846,511 additional foreign laborers and -prisoners of war were incorporated into the German war industry; and -quoting from Document 407(IX)-PS, Exhibit USA-229, which is also a -letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler, I read in part from Page 1, -Paragraphs 1 and 2: - - “My Führer: - - - - “I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the - Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943. For the first - time the following number of new foreign laborers and prisoners - of war were employed in the German war industry . . . Total: - 846,511.” - -This use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of armaments allocated -by the Defendant Sauckel was confirmed by the Defendant Speer, who -stated that 40 percent of all prisoners of war were employed in the -production of weapons and munitions and in subsidiary industries. I wish -to refer briefly to Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 on Page 15 of the English -text of an interrogation of the Defendant Speer, on the 18th of October -1945, which was offered and referred to yesterday and has the Exhibit -Number USA-220. Quoting from Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 on Page 15—Paragraph -1 on Page 19 of the German text—there are two questions which will -establish the background for this answer: - - “Q: Let me understand; when you wanted labor from prisoners of - war did you requisition prisoners of war separately, or did you - ask for a total number of workers? - - - - “A: Only Schmelter can answer that directly. As far as the - commitment of prisoners of war for labor goes, it was effected - through employment officers of the Stalags. I tried several - times to increase the total number of prisoners of war that were - occupied in production, at the expense of the other demands. - - - - “Q: Will you explain that a little more? - - - - “A: In the last phase of production, that is, in the year 1944 - when everything collapsed, I had 40 percent of all prisoners of - war employed in production. I wanted to have this percentage - increased. - - - - “Q: And when you say ‘employed in production’, you mean in these - subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in the - production of weapons and munitions, is that right? - - - - “A: Yes. That was the total extent of my task.” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What do you mean by “subsidiary industries,” -Mr. Dodd? Is that war industries? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; war industries, as we understand it. It was referred -to many times by these defendants as the component parts of the plans. - -I also would like to call the attention of the Tribunal again to the -“Minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central. Planning Board,” Document -R-124, from which we read a number of excerpts yesterday, and remind the -Tribunal that in the report of the minutes of that meeting the Defendant -Speer stated that, “Ninety thousand Russian prisoners of war employed in -the whole of the armament industry are for the greater part skilled -men.” - -We should like, at this point, to turn to the special responsibility of -the Defendant Speer and to discuss the evidence of the various crimes -committed by Defendant Speer in planning and participating in the vast -program of forcible deportation of the citizens of occupied countries. -He was the Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and Chief of the -Organization Todt, both of which positions he acquired on the 15th of -February 1942; and by virtue of his later acquisition of control over -the armament offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the -production offices of the Ministry of Economics, the Defendant Speer was -responsible for the entire war production of the Reich as well as for -the construction of fortifications and installations for the Wehrmacht. -Proof of the positions held by the Defendant Speer is supplied in his -own statement as contained in Document 2980-PS, which has already been -offered to the Tribunal and which bears Exhibit Number USA-18. - -The industries under the Defendant Speer’s control were really the most -important users of manpower in Germany; and thus, according to the -Defendant Sauckel, Speer’s labor requirements received unconditional -priority over all other demands for labor. We refer to the transcript of -the interrogation of the Defendant Sauckel on the 22d of September 1945. -It is Exhibit USA-230. It is next to the last document in the document -book. I wish to refer to Page 1 of that document, Paragraph 4. It is a -brief reference, the last answer on the page. The question was asked of -the Defendant Sauckel: - - “Q: Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in - general for the whole field; but in Speer’s work you would get - them allocated by industry, and so on—is that right? - - - - “A: The others only got whatever was left. Because Speer told me - once in the presence of the Führer that I am here to work for - Speer and that, mainly, I am his man.” - -The Defendant Speer has admitted under oath that he participated in the -discussions during which the decision to use foreign forced labor was -made. He has also said that he concurred in the decision and that it was -the basis for the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by -compulsion. I make reference to the interrogation of the Defendant Speer -of the 18th of October 1945. It bears the Exhibit Number USA-220. We -have already read from it; and I particularly refer to the bottom of -Page 12 and the top of Page 13 of the English text: - - “Q: But is it clear to you, Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the - decisions were being made concerning the use of forced foreign - labor, that you participated in the discussions yourself? - - - - “A: Yes. - - - - “Q: So that I take it that the execution of the program of - bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under - Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been made with - your agreement? - - - - “A: Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the - manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to - me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments - that demanded them.” - -This admission is confirmed by the minutes of Speer’s conferences with -Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 in Document R-124, which has been -offered here and from which excerpts have been read. Page 34 of that -document, Paragraph 1 of the English text, has already been quoted, and -those excerpts have been read before the Tribunal yesterday. The -Tribunal will recall that the Defendant Speer related the outcome of his -negotiations concerning the forcible recruitment of 1 million Russian -laborers for the German armaments industry; and this use of force was -again discussed by Hitler and Defendant Speer on the 4th of January 1943 -as shown by the excerpts read from the Document 556(13)-PS, where it was -decided that stronger measures were to be used to accelerate the -conscription of French civilian workers. - -We say the Defendant Speer demanded foreign workers for the industries -under his control and used those workers with the knowledge that they -had been deported by force and were being compelled to work. Speer has -stated under oath in his interrogation of 18 October 1945, Page 5, -Paragraph 9, of the English text, quoting it directly: - - “I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the - fact that I demanded manpower and foreign labor from Sauckel - very energetically.” - -He has admitted that he knew he was obtaining foreign labor, a large -part of which was forced labor; and referring again to that same -interrogation of the 18th of October 1945, and to Pages 8 and 9 of the -English text and Page 10 of the German text: - - “Q: So that during the period when you were asking for labor, it - seems clear, does it not, that you knew you were obtaining - foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response to your - requests and that a large part of the foreign labor was forced - labor? - - - - “A: Yes. - - - - “Q: So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on - January 1, 1944 you require 50,000 workers for a given purpose; - would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that - in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers? - - - - “A: Yes.” - -The Defendant Speer has also stated under oath that he knew at least as -early as September of 1942 that workers from the Ukraine were being -forcibly deported for labor into Germany. Likewise he knew that the -great majority of the workers of the western occupied countries were -slave laborers forced against their will to come to Germany; and again -referring to his interrogation of this 18th day of October 1945, and -beginning with the fourth Paragraph from the bottom of Page 5 of the -English text, Paragraph 10 on Page 6 of the German text, we find this -series of questions and answers: - - “Q: When did you first find out then that some of the manpower - from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily? - - - - “A: It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name - a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that - at some particular point of time the manpower from the Ukraine - did not come voluntarily. - - - - “Q: And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied - countries; that is, did there come a time when you knew that - they were not coming voluntarily? - - - - “A: Yes. - - - - “Q: When, in general, would you say that time was without - placing a particular month of the year? - - - - “A: As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they - did not come voluntarily any more after a few months, because - immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should - say offhand that this time was either in July, August, or - September of 1942.” - -Turning to Paragraph 11 on Page 6 of the English text of this same -interrogation and Page 7 and Paragraph 8 of the German text, we find -this series of questions and answers—quoting: - - “Q: But many workers actually did come from the west to Germany, - did they not? - - - - “A: Yes. - - - - “Q: That means then, that the great majority of the workers that - came from the western countries—the western occupied - countries—came against their will to Germany? - - - - “A: Yes.” - -These admissions are borne out, of course, by other evidence, for as -Document R-124 shows and as we have shown by the readings from it, in -all countries conscription for work in Germany could be carried out only -with the active assistance of the police; and the prevailing methods of -recruitment had provoked such violence that many German recruiting -agents had been killed. - -And again, at a meeting with Hitler to discuss the manpower requirements -for 1944, which is reported in Document 1292-PS, Speer was informed by -the Defendant Sauckel that the requirements—including Speer’s -requirement for 1,300,000 additional laborers—could be met only if -German enforcement agents were furnished to carry out the enslavement -program in the occupied countries. - -Now we say that notwithstanding this knowledge that these workers were -conscripted and deported to Germany against their will, Speer -nevertheless continued to formulate requirements for the foreign workers -and requested their allocation to these industries which were subject to -his control. This is borne out by the minutes of the Central Planning -Board as contained in Document R-124, and particularly Page 13, -Paragraph 4 of the English text; and that is Page 6 and Paragraph 4 of -the German text. Speer speaking: - - “Now the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still - possible to transfer some from the western territories. Only - recently the Führer stated he wishes to dissolve these foreign - volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups were - carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we - cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a - meeting with the Führer to clear up the whole coal situation. - Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to - determine the number of Russians from the rear army territories - who must be sent to us. However, I see another possibility: We - might organize another drive to pick out workers for the mines - from the Russian prisoners of war in the Reich. But this - possibility is none too promising.” - -At another meeting of the Central Planning Board the Defendant Speer -rejected a suggestion that labor for industries under his control be -furnished from German sources instead of from foreign sources. And again -in this Document R-124, on Page 16, Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the -English text, and Page 12, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the German text—I -quote the Defendant Speer: - - “We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor - necessary to complete the coal-and-iron plan and communicates - the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a conference at - the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an answer from Sauckel - should have arrived by then. The question of recruitment for the - armaments industry will be solved together with Weger.” - -Kehrl speaking: - - “I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not be - made dependent on the possibility of recruitment of men abroad. - We were completely frustrated these last 3 months because this - principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of - 25,000 and we never get replacements. The number must be made up - by men from Germany. - - - - “Speer: ‘No, nothing doing.’” - -We say also that, the Defendant Speer is guilty of advocating terror and -brutality as a means of maximizing, production by slave laborers. And -again I refer to this Document R-124. At Page 42 there is a discussion -concerning the supply and exploitation of labor. That excerpt has been -read to the Tribunal before, and I simply refer to it in passing. It is -the excerpt wherein Speer said it would be a good thing; the effect of -it was that nothing could be said against the SS and the police taking a -hand and making these men work and produce more. - -We say he is also guilty of compelling allied nationals and prisoners of -war to engage in the production of armaments and munitions and in direct -military operations against their own country. - -We say that as Chief of the Organization Todt he is accountable for its -policies, which were in direct conflict with the laws of war; for the -Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war, impressed allied -nationals into its service. - -Document L-191, Exhibit USA-231, is an International Labor Office study -of the exploitation of foreign labor by Germany. We have only one copy -of this document, this International Labor Office study, printed at -Montreal, Canada, in 1945. We ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice -of it as an official publication of the International Labor Office. - -I might say to the Tribunal, with some apology, that this arrived at a -time when we were not able even to have the excerpt mimeographed and -printed to place in your document book, so this is the one document -which is missing from the document book which is in your hands. However, -I should like to quote from Page 73, Paragraph 2, of this study by the -International Labor Office. It is not long; it is very brief. I am -quoting directly. It says: - - “The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who - were destined for employment in the Organization did not greatly - differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners - for deportation to Germany.” - -“The Organization,” by the way, is the Organization Todt. Going on with -the quotation: - - “The main difference was that, since the principal activities of - the Organization lay outside the frontiers of Germany, - foreigners were not transported to Germany but had either to - work in their own country or in some other occupied country. - - - - “In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the - Organization, methods of compulsion as well as methods of - persuasion were used, the latter usually with very little - result.” - -Moreover, conscripted allied nationals were compelled by this same -Organization Todt actually to engage in operations of war against their -country. - -Document 407(VIII)-PS discloses that the foreign workers who were -impressed into the Organization Todt through the efforts of the -Defendant Sauckel did participate in the building of the Atlantic Wall -fortifications. - -As chief of German war production, this Defendant Speer sponsored and -approved the use of these prisoners of war in the production of -armaments and munitions. This has been made plain by the evidence -already discussed. - -To sum it up briefly finally we say that it shows first that after Speer -assumed the responsibility for the armament production, his concern, in -his discussions with his co-conspirators, was to secure a larger -allocation of prisoners of war for his armament factories. That has been -shown by the quotations from the excerpts of Document R-124, the minutes -of the meeting of the Central Planning Board; and in this same meeting -the Tribunal will recall that Speer complained because only 30 percent -of the Russian prisoners of war were engaged in the armaments industry. - -We referred to a speech of Speer, Document 1435-PS—we quoted from -it—in which he said that 10,000 prisoners of war were put at the -disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders. - -And finally, Speer advocated the returning of escaped prisoners of war -to factories as convicts. That is shown again by Document R-124, Page -13, Paragraph 5, of the English text, where the Defendant Speer says -that he has come to an arrangement . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you think that we have really got this -sufficiently now? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; I just . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: We have Speer’s own admission and any number of documents -which prove the way in which these prisoners of war and other laborers -were brought into Germany. - -MR. DODD: Well I just wanted to refer briefly to that passage in that -document, R-124, as showing that this defendant advocated having escaped -prisoners of war returned to the munitions factories. - -THE PRESIDENT: What page? - -MR. DODD: Thirteen. I don’t want to labor this responsibility of the -Defendant Speer. I was anxious—or perhaps I should say we are all -overanxious—to have the documents in the record, and before the -Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which is the passage you want to refer to on Page 13? - -MR. DODD: I just referred in passing to the statement which begins with -the words, “We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsführer SS.” -And in the next to the last sentence it says: “The men should be put -into the factories as convicts.” - -Finally, with reference to the Defendant Speer, I should like to say to -the Tribunal that he visited the concentration camp at Mauthausen and he -also visited factories such as those conducted by the Krupp industries, -where concentration camp labor was exploited under degrading conditions. -Despite this first-hand knowledge of these conditions, both in -Mauthausen and in the places where these forced laborers were at work in -factories, he continued to direct the use of this type of labor in -factories under his own jurisdiction. - -THE PRESIDENT: How do you intend to prove it as to these concentration -camps? - -MR. DODD: I was going to refer the Tribunal to Page 9 of the -interrogation of the 18th of October 1945; and I refer to Page 11, -Paragraph 5, of the German text and Page 9, beginning with Paragraph 9, -of the English text: - - “Q: But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was - known to you and approved by you as a source of labor? - - - - “A: Yes. - - - - “Q: And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the - concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners? - - - - “A: I didn’t think about it at that time. - - - - “Q: As a matter of fact, you visited the Austrian concentration - camp personally, did you not? - - - - “A: I did not—well, I was in Mauthausen once, but at that time - I was not told just to what categories the inmates of the - concentration camps belonged. - - - - “Q: But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners - who were taken away by the Gestapo or arrested by the Gestapo, - as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration - camps? - - - - “A: Of course, yes. I didn’t mean to imply anything like that.” - -And on Page 15 of this same interrogation, beginning with the 13th -Paragraph of the English text and Page 20 in the German text, we find -this question: - - “Q: Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp - for foreign labor? - - - - “A: It is certain that it was reported to me what lack Krupp had - in foreign workers. - - - - “Q: Did you ever, discuss it with any of the members of the - Krupp firm? - - - - “A: I cannot say that exactly; but during the time of my - activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is - certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.” - -Before closing I should like to take 2 minutes of the time of the -Tribunal to refer to what we consider to be some of the applicable laws -of the case for the assistance of the Tribunal in considering these -documents which we have offered. - -We refer, of course, first of all, to Sections 6 (b) and 6 (c) of the -Charter of this Tribunal. We also say that the acts of the conspirators -constituted a flagrant violation of Articles 46 and 52 of the -Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907. - -Article 46 seeks to safeguard the family honor, the rights and the lives -of persons in areas under belligerent occupation. - -Article 52 provides in part that: - - “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from - municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army - of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of - the country.” - -We say that these conspirators violated this article because the labor -which they conscripted was not used to satisfy the needs of the army of -occupation, but on the contrary, was forcibly removed from the occupied -areas and exploited in the interest of the German war effort. - -Finally, we say that these conspirators—and particularly the Defendants -Sauckel and Speer—by virtue of their planning, of their execution, and -of their approval of this program, which we have been describing -yesterday and today, the enslavement and the misuse of the forced labor -of prisoners of war—that for this they bear a special responsibility -for their Crimes against Humanity and their War Crimes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you finishing, Mr. Dodd? - -MR. DODD: Yes, I have concluded. - -THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask you why you have not read Document -3057-PS, which is Sauckel’s statement. - -MR. DODD: Yes. We had intended to offer that document. Counsel for the -Defendant Sauckel informed me a day or two ago that his client -maintained that he had been coerced into making the statement. Because -we had not ample time to ascertain the facts of the matter, we preferred -to withhold it, rather than to offer it to the Tribunal under any -question of doubt. - -THE PRESIDENT: He objects to it, and therefore you have not put it in? - -MR. DODD: No, we did not offer it while there was any question about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -MR. DODD: Might I suggest to the Tribunal that a recess be taken at this -time? I am sorry to have to say that I am due to be before the Tribunal -for a little while—that is, I am sorry for the Tribunal—with the -matters on the concentration camps. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean a recess now? - -MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes; 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we propose to offer additional -evidence at this time concerning the use of Nazi concentration camps -against the people of Germany and allied nationals. We propose to -examine the purposes and the role of the concentration camp in the -larger Nazi scheme of things. We propose to show that the concentration -camp was one of the fundamental institutions of the Nazi regime, that it -was a pillar of the system of terror by which the Nazis consolidated -their power over Germany and imposed their ideology upon the German -people, that it was really a primary weapon in the battle against the -Jews, against the Christian church, against labor, against those who -wanted peace, against opposition or non-conformity of any kind. We say -it involved the systematic use of terror to achieve the cohesion within -Germany which was necessary for the execution of the conspirators’ plans -for aggression. - -We propose to show that a concentration camp was one of the principal -instruments used by the conspirators for the commission, on an enormous -scale, of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes; that it was the final -link in a chain of terror and repression which involved the SS and the -Gestapo and which resulted in the apprehension of victims and their -confinement without trial, often without charges, generally with no -indication of the length of their detention. - -My colleagues will present full evidence concerning the criminal role of -the SS and the Gestapo in this phase of Nazi terrorism, the -concentration camp; but at this point I wish simply to point out that -the SS, through its espionage system, tracked down the victims, that the -criminal police and the Gestapo seized them and brought them to the -camps, and that the concentration camps were administered by the SS. - -This Tribunal, we feel, is already aware of the sickening evidence of -the brutality of the concentration camp from the showing of the moving -picture. More than that, individual prosecutions are going on, going -forward before other courts which will record these outrages in detail. -Therefore, we do not propose to present a catalogue of individual -brutalities but, rather, to submit evidence showing the fundamental -purposes for which, the camps were used, the techniques of terror which -were employed, the large number of victims, and the death and the -anguish which they caused. - -The evidence relating to concentration camps has been assembled in a -document book bearing the letter “S.” I might say that the documents in -this book have been arranged in the order of presentation, rather than, -as we have been doing, numerically. In this book we have put them in as -they occur in the presentation. One document in this book, 2309-PS, is -cited several times, so we have marked it with a tab with a view to -facilitating reference back to it. It will be referred to more than -once. - -The Nazis realized early that without the most drastic repression of -actual and potential opposition they could not consolidate their power -over the German people. We have seen that, immediately after Hitler -became Chancellor, the conspirators promptly destroyed civil liberties -by issuing the Presidential Emergency Decree of February 28, 1933. It is -Document 1390-PS of the document book; and it sets forth that decree -which has already been introduced in evidence before the Tribunal and is -included in USA Exhibit B. It was this decree, which was the basis for -the so-called “Schutzhaft,” that is, protective custody—the terrible -power to imprison people without judicial proceedings. This is made -clear by Document Number 2499-PS, which is a typical order for -protective custody. We offer it for that purpose, as a typical order for -protective custody which has come into the possession of the -Prosecution. It bears Exhibit Number USA-232. I should like to quote -from the body of that order: - - “Order of Protective Custody. - - - - “Based on Article 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for the - Protection of People and State of 28 February 1933 - (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, Page 83), you are taken into protective - custody in the interest of public security and order. - - - - “Reason: Suspicion of activities inimical toward the State.” - -The Defendant Göring in a book entitled _Aufbau einer Nation_, published -in 1934, sought to give the impression, it appears, that the camps were -originally directed at those whom the Nazis considered Communists and -Social Democrats. We refer to Document 2324-PS, Exhibit USA-233. This -document is an excerpt from Page 89 of the German book. We refer to the -third and fourth paragraphs of the document, which I read as follows: - - “We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State. It - must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of - power, over 6 million people officially voted for communism and - about 8 million for Marxism in the Reichstag elections in March. - - - - “Thus the concentration camps were created to which we had to - send first thousands of functionaries of the Communist and - Social Democratic Parties.” - -In practical operation the power to order confinement in these camps was -almost without limit. The Defendant Frick, in an order which he issued -on the 25th day of January 1938 as Minister of the Interior, made this -quite clear. An extract from this order is set forth in Document -1723-PS, to which we make reference. It bears Exhibit Number USA-206. I -wish to read Article 1, beginning at the bottom of Page 5 of the English -translation of this order: - - “Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the - Secret State Police to counter all hostile efforts of persons - who endanger the existence and security of the people and the - State through their attitude.” - -I wish also to read into the record the first two paragraphs of that -order, which are found at the top of Page 1 of the English translation: - - “In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the - co-operation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the - following and ordain: - - - - “1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Führer - to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the - National State, as well as all disintegrating forces of all - kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this - mission forms one of the most essential prerequisites for the - unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in - its extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and - assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP.” - -The conspirators then were directing their apparatus of terror against -the “enemies of the State,” against “disintegrating forces,” against -those people who endangered the State “through their attitude.” Whom did -they consider as belonging in these broad categories? Well, first, there -were the men in Germany who wanted peace. We refer to Document L-83 -(Exhibit USA-234). - -THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that document that you have been -referring to, Number 1723-PS? - -MR. DODD: January 25, 1938. It has already been introduced and is -included in USA Exhibit B. This document consists of an affidavit of -Gerhart H. Seger, and I wish only to read from Page 1, Paragraph 2 of -that affidavit: - - “2. During the period after World War I, until I was committed - to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg Concentration Camp, in the - spring of 1933 following the Nazi accession to power in January - of that year, my business and political affiliations exposed me - to the full impact of the Nazi theories and practice of violent - regimentation and terroristic tactics. My conflict with the - Nazis by virtue of my identification with the peace movement and - as duly elected member of the Reichstag representing a political - faith (Social Democratic Party) hostile to National Socialism, - clearly demonstrated that even in the period prior to 1933 the - Nazis considered crimes and terrorism a necessary and desirable - weapon in overcoming democratic opposition.” - -Passing to Page 5 of the same document and the paragraph marked “(e)”: - - “That the Nazis had already conceived the device of the - concentration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting - opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention - during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wilhelm - Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was chairman of the - Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of which I was a - member. When I gave an emphatic answer to Frick concerning the - particular matter discussed, he replied, ‘Don’t worry, when we - are in power we shall put all of you guys into concentration - camps.’ When the Nazis came into power, Frick was appointed - Reich Minister of Interior and promptly carried out his threat - in collaboration with Göring, as Chief of the Prussian State - Police, and Himmler.” - -This paragraph shows that even before the Nazis had seized power in -Germany they had conceived the plan to repress any potential oppositions -by terror, and Frick’s statement to Seger is completely consistent with -an earlier statement which he made on the 18th of October 1929. We refer -to Document Number 2513-PS (Exhibit USA-235), which has also been -received in evidence and has been included in USA Exhibit B. We refer to -the first page of the English translation, Page 48 of the German text. -On Page 1 the quotation begins: - - “This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the ballot; - but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history has taught us - that in a battle blood must be shed and iron broken. The ballot - is the beginning of the fateful struggle. We are determined to - promulgate by force that which we preach. Just as Mussolini - exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also succeed in - accomplishing the same through dictatorship and terror.” - -THE PRESIDENT: This is the defendant, is it? - -MR. DODD: Yes, the Defendant Frick. - -There are many additional cases of the use of the concentration camp -against the men who wanted peace. There was, for example, a group called -the Bibelforscher, that is, Bible research workers, most of whom were -known as Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were pacifists, and so the -conspirators provided not only for their prosecution in the regular -courts but also for their confinement in concentration camps after they -had served the judicial sentences; and we refer to Document Number D-84, -Exhibit USA-236. - -This document is dated the 5th day of August 1937; and it is an order by -the Secret State Police at Berlin, and I refer particularly to the first -and last paragraphs of this order, as follows: - - “The Reich Minister of Justice had informed me that he does not - share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various - occasions according to which the arrest of the Bibelforscher - after they have served a sentence is supposed to jeopardize the - authority of the law courts. He is fully aware of the necessity - for measures by the State Police after the sentence has been - served. He asks, however, not to bring the Bibelforscher into - protective custody under circumstances detrimental to the - respect of the law courts.” - -And then, the Paragraph numbered “(2)”: - - “If information regarding the impending release of a - Bibelforscher from arrest is received from the authorities - carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of - measures by the State Police will be asked for without delay in - accordance with my circular decree dated 22. 4. 37, so that - transfer to a concentration camp can take place immediately - after the sentence has been served. Should a transfer into - concentration camp immediately after the serving of the sentence - not be possible, Bibelforscher will be detained in police - prisons.” - -The labor unions, of which I think it is safe to say the majority are -traditionally opposed to wars of aggression, also felt the full force of -Nazi terror. A member of the American staff, Major Wallis, has already -submitted evidence before this Tribunal concerning the conspirators’ -campaign against the trade unions. But the concentration camp was an -important weapon in this campaign; and the Tribunal will recall that in -Document Number 2324-PS, to which I made reference this morning, the -Defendant Göring made it plain that members of the Social Democratic -Party were to be confined in concentration camps. Now labor leaders were -very largely members of that party, and they soon learned the horrors of -protective custody. We refer to Document Number 2330-PS (Exhibit -USA-237), which has already been received as part of USA Exhibit G, -which consists of an order that one Joseph Simon should be placed in -protective custody. We refer to the middle of the first page of the -English translation of that order, beginning with the material under the -word “reasons.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the sentence before that—the two -lines before it. The words are, “The arrestee has no right to appeal -against the decree of protective custody.” - -MR. DODD: “The arrestee has no right to appeal against the application -of protective custody.” Then comes a title: “Reasons”: - - “Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and - temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From - 1907 to 1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist Party; from - 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor (Stadtrat) in - Nuremberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in - the international trade unions and in regard to his connection - with international Marxist leaders and central agencies, which - he continued after the national recovery, he was placed under - protective custody on the 3rd day of May 1933 and was kept, - until 25 January 1934, in the Dachau Concentration Camp. Simon - is under the grave suspicion that even after this date he played - an active part in the illegal continuation of the Socialist - Party. He took part in meetings which aimed at the illegal - continuation of the Socialist Party and propagation of illegal - Marxist printed matter in Germany. Through this radical - attitude, which is hostile to the State, Simon directly - endangers public security and order.” - -We do not wish to burden these proceedings with a multiplication of such -instances, but we refer the Tribunal to documents which have already -been offered in connection with the presentation of the evidence -concerning the destruction of the trade unions. In particular, we wish -to refer to Document Number 2334-PS and Document Number 2928-PS, -(Exhibits USA-238 and 239) both of which are included within USA Exhibit -G. - -Thousands of Jews, as the world so well knows, were, of course, confined -in these concentration camps. The evidence on this point will be -developed in a later presentation by another member of the prosecuting -staff of the United States. But among the wealth of evidence available -on this point showing the confinement of Germans only because they were -Jews, we wish to offer a document, Number 3051-PS, which bears Exhibit -Number USA-240. This is a copy of a teletype from SS Gruppenführer -Heydrich, and it is dated the 10th of November 1938. It was sent to all -headquarters of the State Police and all districts and subdistricts of -the SD. We refer to Paragraph 5 of this teletype. Paragraph 5 is found -on Page 3 of the English translation. It begins at the bottom of Page 2 -and runs over to Page 3. Quoting from Paragraph 5: - - “As soon as the course of events of this night allows the use of - the officials employed for this purpose, as many Jews, - especially rich ones, as can be accommodated in the existing - prisons are to be arrested in all districts. For the time being - only healthy men, not too old, are to be arrested. Upon their - arrest, the appropriate concentration camps should be contacted - immediately, in order to confine them in these camps as fast as - possible. - - - - “Special care should be taken that the Jews arrested in - accordance with these instructions are not ill-treated.” - -Himmler in 1943 indicated that use of the concentration camp against the -Jews had been motivated not simply by Nazi racialism. Himmler indicated -that this policy had been motivated by a fear that the Jews might have -been an obstacle to aggression. There is no necessity to consider -whether this fear was justified. The important consideration is that the -fear existed; and with reference to it we refer to Document 1919-PS, -which bears Exhibit Number USA-170. The document is a speech delivered -by Himmler at the meeting of the SS major generals at Posen on 4 October -1943, in the course of which he sought to justify the Nazi anti-Jewish -policy. We refer to a portion of this document or this speech, which is -found on Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the English translation, starting with -the words, “I mean the clearing out of the Jews”: - - “I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the - Jewish race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about. - ‘The Jewish race is being exterminated’, says one Party member, - ‘that’s quite clear; it’s in our program; elimination of the - Jews, and we’re doing it, exterminating them.’ And then there - come 80 million worthy Germans and each one has his decent Jew. - Of course, the others are vermin, but this one is an A-l Jew. - Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it, not one - of them has been through it. Most of you must know what it means - when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To - have stuck it out and at the same time—apart from exceptions - caused by human weakness—to have remained decent fellows, that - is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history - which has never been written and is never to be written, for we - know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves, - if—with bombing raids, the burden and deprivations of war—we - still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, - agitators, and trouble-mongers.” - -It is clear, we say, from the foregoing that prior to the launching of -the aggression, the concentration camp had been one of the principal -weapons by which the conspirators achieved the social cohesion which was -needed for the execution of their plans for aggression. After they -launched their aggression and their armies swept over Europe, they -brought the concentration camp to occupied countries; and they also -brought the citizens of the occupied countries to Germany and subjected -them to the whole apparatus of Nazi brutality. - -Document Number R-91 is Exhibit USA-241. This document consists of a -communication dated the 16th day of December 1942 sent by Müller to -Himmler, for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and deals with the -seizure of Polish Jews for deportation to concentration camps in -Germany. I am beginning with the first paragraph. It says, quoting -directly: - - “In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the - concentration camps ordered to be completed by 30 January 1943, - the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish section: - - - - “1. Total number: 45,000 Jews. - - - - “2. Start of transportation: 11 January 1943. End of - transportation: 31 January 1943. (The Reich railroads are unable - to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period - from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the - increased traffic of Armed Forces leave trains.) - - - - “3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews - from the district of Bialystok; 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto of - Theresienstadt, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who - heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the - ghetto and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working, - also Jews over 60-years old.” - -And passing the next sentence: - - “As heretofore only such Jews would be taken for the evacuation - who do not have any particular connections and who are not in - possession of any high decorations. Three thousand Jews from the - occupied Dutch territories, 2,000 Jews from Berlin—45,000. The - figure of 45,000 includes those unfit for work (old Jews and - children). By use of a practical standard, the screening of the - arriving Jews in Auschwitz should yield at least 10,000 to - 15,000 people fit for work.” - -The Jews of Hungary suffered the same tragic fate. Between 19 March 1944 -and the 1st of August 1944, more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were -rounded up. Many of these were put in wagons and sent to extermination -camps, and we refer to Document Number 2605-PS, Exhibit USA-242. This -document is an affidavit made in London by Dr. Rudolph Kastner, a former -official of the Hungarian Zionist Organization. We refer to Page 3 of -the document, the third full paragraph. In March 1944, quoting: - - “Together with the German military occupation, there arrived in - Budapest a ‘Special Section Commando’ of the German Secret - Police with the sole object of liquidating the Hungarian Jews. - It was headed by Adolf Aichmann, SS Obersturmbannführer, Chief - of Section IV B of the Reich Security Head Office. His immediate - collaborators were: SS Obersturmbannführer Hermann Krumey, - Hauptsturmführer Wisliczeny, Hunsche, Novak, Dr. Seidl, and - later Danegger, Wrtok. They arrested and later deported to - Mauthausen all the leaders of Jewish political and business life - and journalists, together with, the Hungarian democratic and - anti-fascist politicians; taking advantage of the ‘interregnum’ - following upon the German occupation lasting 4 days, they have - placed their Quislings in the Ministry of the Interior.” - -On Page 7 of that same document, the 8th paragraph, beginning with the -words “Commanders of the death camps” and quoting: - - “Commanders of the death camps gassed only on direct or indirect - instructions of Aichmann. The particular officer of IV B who - directed the deportations from some particular country had the - authority to indicate whether the train should go to a death - camp or not and what should happen to the passengers. The - instructions were usually carried by the SS non-commissioned - officers escorting the train. The letters ‘A’ or ‘M’”—capital - letters “A” or “M”—“on the escorting instruction documents - indicated Auschwitz (Oswieczim) or Majdanek; it meant that the - passengers were to be gassed.” - -And passing over the next sentence, we come to these words: - - “Regarding Hungarian Jews the following general ruling was laid - down in Auschwitz: Children up to the age of 12 or 14, older - people over 50, as well as the sick, or people with criminal - records (who were transported in specially marked wagons) were - taken immediately on their arrival to the gas chambers. - - - - “The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight, indicated - who was fit for work and who was not. Those unfit were sent to - the gas chambers, while the others were distributed in various - labor camps.” - -In the so-called “Eastern Territories” these victims were apprehended -for extermination . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don’t you want Page 5 for the numbers which you -have stated “up to the 27th of June 1944”? You haven’t yet given us any -authority for the numbers that you have stated. - -MR. DODD: Oh, yes. On Page 5 of that same document, 2605-PS, quoting: -“Up to the 27th of June 1944, 475,000 Jews were deported.” - -In the so-called “Eastern Territories” these victims were apprehended -for extermination in concentration camps without any charges having been -made against them. In the western occupied territories charges seemed to -have been made against some of the victims. Some of the charges which -the Nazi conspirators considered sufficient basis for confinement to the -concentration camps are shown by reference to Document Number L-215, -which bears Exhibit Number USA-243. This document is the summary of the -file, the dossier, of 25 persons arrested in Luxembourg for commitment -to various concentration camps and sets forth the charges made against -each person. Beginning with the paragraph after the name “Henricy,” at -the bottom of the first page, and quoting: - - “Name: Henricy; charge: . . . by associating with members of - illegal resistance movements and making money for them, - violating legal foreign exchange rates, by harming the interests - of the Reich and being expected in the future to disobey - official administrative regulations and act as an enemy of the - Reich; place of confinement—Natzweiler.” - -Next comes the name of “Krier” and the charge: - - “. . . by being responsible for continuous sabotage of labor and - causing fear because of his political and criminal past—freedom - would only further his anti-social urge; place of - confinement—Buchenwald.” - -Passing to the middle of Page 2, after the name “Monti”: - - “Charge:. . . by being strongly suspected of aiding desertion; - place of confinement—Sachsenhausen.” - -Next, after the name “Junker”: - - “Charge:. . . because as a relative of a deserter he is expected - to endanger the interests of the Greater German Reich if allowed - to go free; place of confinement—Sachsenhausen.” - -“Jaeger” is the next name and the charge against Jaeger, quoting: - - “. . . because as a relative of a deserter he is expected, to - take advantage of every occasion to harm the Greater German - Reich if allowed to go free; place of - confinement—Sachsenhausen.” - -And down to the name “Ludwig” and the charge against Ludwig: - - “. . . for being strongly suspected of aiding desertion; place - of confinement—Dachau.” - -Not only civilians of the occupied countries but also prisoners of war -were subjected to the horrors and the brutality of the concentration -camps; and we refer to Document Number 1165-PS, which bears Exhibit -Number USA-244. This document is a memorandum to all officers of the -State Police signed by Müller, the Chief of the Gestapo, dated the 9th -of November 1941. The memorandum has the revealing title of—and I -quote—“Transportation of Russian Prisoners of War, destined for -Execution, into the Concentration Camps.” - -I wish to quote also from the body of this memorandum, which is found on -Page 2 of the English translation, and I quote directly: - - “The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that - 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution - are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the - impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such - prisoners in this way. - - - - “It was particularly noted that when marching, for example, from - the railroad station to the camp a rather large number of PW’s - collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead, - and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy. - - - - “It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of - these occurrences. - - - - “Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care - of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this - situation to the SS. - - - - “In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the - future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet - Russians declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by - death (for example with hunger-typhus) and therefore not able to - withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot shall in - the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded from the - transport into the concentration camps for execution.” - -More evidence of the confinement of Russian prisoners of war in -concentration camps is found in an official report of the investigation -of the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp by the Headquarters of the United -States Third Army, the Judge Advocate Section, and particularly the War -Crimes Branch, under the date of the 21st day of June 1945. It is our -Document Number 2309-PS and bears Exhibit Number USA-245. At the bottom -of Page 2 of the English text the last two sentences of that last -paragraph say, and I quote: - - “In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg - camp to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. Of these 2,000 prisoners - only 102 survived.” - -Soviet prisoners of war found their allies in the concentration camps -too; and at Page 4 of this same Document Number 2309-PS, it will show, -particularly Paragraph 5 on Page 4, and I quote it: - - “The victims of Flossenbürg included among them: Russian - civilians and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians, - Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, British, and American - prisoners of war. No practical means was available to complete a - list of victims of this camp; however, since the foundation of - the camp in 1938 until the day of liberation, it is estimated - that more than 29,000 inmates died.” - -Escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps by the -conspirators, and these camps were specially set up as extermination -centers; and we refer to Document Number 1650-PS, bearing Exhibit Number -USA-246. This document is a communication from the Secret State Police -of Cologne and it is dated the 4th day of March 1944. At the very top of -the English text it says, “To be transmitted in secret—to be handled as -a secret Government matter.” - -In the third paragraph, quoting: - - “Concerns: Measures to be taken against captured escaped - prisoners of war who are officers or non-working noncommissioned - officers, except British and American prisoners of war. The - Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows: - - - - “1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or - a non-working noncommissioned officer, except British and - American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of - the Security Police and of the Security Service under the - classification Step III regardless of whether the escape - occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape, or an - individual one. - - - - “2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the Security - Police and Security Service may not become officially known to - the outside under any circumstances, other prisoners of war may - by no means be informed of the capture. The captured prisoners - are to be reported to the Army Information Bureau as ‘escaped - and not captured.’ Their mail is to be handled accordingly. - Inquiries of representatives of the protective power, of the - International Red Cross, and of other aid societies will be - given the same answer.” - -The same communication carried a copy of an order of SS General Müller, -acting for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, directing the -Gestapo to transport escaped prisoners directly to Mauthausen; and I -quote the first two paragraphs of Müller’s order, which begins on the -bottom of Page 1 and runs over to Page 2 of the English text. Quoting: - - “The State Police directorates will accept the captured escaped - officer prisoners of war from the prisoner-of-war camp - commandants and will transport them to the Concentration Camp - Mauthausen following the procedure previously used, unless the - circumstances render a special transport imperative. The - prisoners of war are to be put in irons on the transport—not on - the way to the station if it is subject to view by the public. - The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the - transfer occurs within the scope of the action ‘Kugel.’ The - State Police directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on - these transfers giving merely the figures, the first report - being due on 5 July 1944.” - -Passing the next three sentences, we come to this line: - - “For the sake of secrecy the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - has been requested to inform the prisoner-of-war camps to turn - the captured prisoners over to the local State Police office - concerned and not to send them directly to Mauthausen.” - -It is no coincidence that the literal translation for the German word -“Kugel” is the English word “bullet,” since Mauthausen, where the -escaped prisoners were sent, was an extermination center. - -Nazi conquest was marked by the establishment of concentration camps -over all of Europe. In this connection we refer to Document Number -R-129. It is a report on the location of concentration camps signed by -Pohl, who was an SS general who was in charge of concentration camp -labor policies. Document Number R-129 bears our Exhibit Number USA-217. - -I wish to refer particularly to Section 1, Paragraphs numbered 1 and 2 -of this document, which are found on Page 1 of the English translation. -It is addressed to the Reichsführer SS and bears the stamp “secret”: - - “Reichsführer: - - “Today I report about the present situation of the concentration - camps and about measures I have taken in order to carry out your - order of 3 March 1942: - - - - “1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following - concentration camps: - - - - “a. Dachau—1939, 4,000 prisoners; today, 8,000. - - - - “b. Sachsenhausen—1939, 6,500 prisoners; today, 10,000. - - - - “c. Buchenwald—1939, 5,300 prisoners; today, 9,000. - - - - “d. Mauthausen—1939, 1,500 prisoners; today, 5,500. - - - - “e. Flossenbürg—1939, 1,600 prisoners; today, 4,700. - - - - “f. Ravensbrück—1939, 2,500 prisoners; today, 7,500.” - -And then it goes on to say in Paragraph Number 2, quoting: - - “In the years 1940 and 1942 nine additional camps were erected: - - - - “a. Auschwitz, b. Neuengamme, c. Gusen, d. Natzweiler, e. - Gross-Rosen, f. Lublin, g. Niederhagen, h. Stutthof, i. - Arbeitsdorf.” - -In addition to the camps in the occupied territory mentioned in this -Document R-129, from which I have just read these names and figures, -there were many, many others. I refer to the official report by the -United States Third Army Headquarters, to which we have already made -reference, Document Number 2309-PS, on Page 2 in the English text, -Section IV, Paragraph 4, quoting: - - “Concentration Camp Flossenbürg was founded in 1938 as a camp - for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the camp - in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport - of prisoners was received. From this time on prisoners began to - flow steadily into the camp. (Exhibit B-1.) Flossenbürg was the - mother camp and under its direct control and jurisdiction were - 47 satellite camps or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27 - camps for female workers. To these outer-commandos were supplied - the necessary prisoners for the various work projects - undertaken. - - - - “Of all these outer-commandos, Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in - Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the - Danube, were considered to be the worst.” - -I do not wish to take the time of the Tribunal to discuss each of the -Nazi concentration camps which dotted the map of Europe. We feel that -the widespread use of these camps is commonly known and notorious. We -do, however, wish to invite the Tribunal’s attention to a chart which we -have had prepared. The solid black line marks the boundary of Germany -after the Anschluss, and we call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact -that the majority of the camps shown on the chart are located within the -territorial limits of Germany itself. They are the red spots, of course, -on the map. In the center of Germany there is the Buchenwald camp -located near the city of Weimar, and at the extreme bottom of the chart -there is Dachau, several miles outside of Munich. At the top of the -chart are Neuengamme and Bergen-Belsen, located near Hamburg. To the -left is the Niederhagen camp in the Ruhr Valley. In the upper right -there are a number of camps near Berlin, one named Sachsenhausen -(formerly Oranienburg, which was one of the first camps established -after the Nazis came into power). Near to that is the camp of -Ravensbrück which was used exclusively for women. Some of the most -notorious camps were located indeed outside of Germany. Mauthausen was -in Austria. In Poland was the infamous Auschwitz; and to the left of the -chart is a camp called Hertogenbosch and this one was located in -Holland, as the chart shows; and below it is Natzweiler, located in -France. - -The camps were established in networks; and it may be observed that -surrounding each of the major camps—the larger red dots—is a group of -satellite camps; and the names of the principal camps, the most -notorious camps, at least, are above the map and below it on the chart; -and those names, for most people, symbolize the Nazi system of -concentration camps as they have become known to the world since May or -a little later in 1945. - -I should like to direct your attention briefly to the treatment which -was meted out in these camps. The motion picture to which I have made -reference a short time ago and which was shown to the members of this -High Tribunal has disclosed the terrible and savage treatment which was -inflicted upon these Allied nationals, prisoners of war, and other -victims of Nazi terror. Because the moving picture has so well shown the -situation, as of the time of its taking at least, I shall confine myself -to a very brief discussion of the subject. - -The conditions which existed inside these camps were, of course, we say, -directly related to the objectives which these Nazi conspirators sought -to achieve outside of the camps through their employment of terror. - -It is truly remarkable, it seems to us, how easily the words -“concentration camps” rolled off the lips of these men. How simple all -problems became when they could turn to the terror institution of the -concentration camps. I refer to Document Number R-124, which is already -before the Tribunal as Exhibit USA-179. It is again that document -covering the minutes of the Central Planning Committee on which the -Defendant Speer sat and where the high strategy of the high Nazi -armament production was formulated. I do not intend to read from the -document again, because I read from it this morning to illustrate -another point; but the Tribunal will recall that it was at this meeting -that the Defendant Speer and others were discussing the so-called -slackers, and the conversation had to do with having drastic steps taken -against these workers who were not putting out sufficient work to please -their masters. Speer suggested that, “There is nothing to be said -against the SS and Police taking steps and putting those known as -slackers into concentration camp industries,” and he used the words -“concentration camp industries.” And he said, “Let it happen several -times and the news will soon get around.” - -Words spoken in this fashion, we say, sealed the fate of many victims. -As for getting the news around as suggested by the Defendant Speer, this -was not left to chance, as we shall presently show. - -The deterrent effect of the concentration camps upon the public was a -carefully planned thing. To heighten the atmosphere of terror, these -camps were shrouded in secrecy. What went on in the barbed wire -enclosures was a matter of fearful conjecture in Germany and countries -under Nazi control; and this was the policy from the very beginning, -when the Nazis first came into power and set up this system of -concentration camps. We refer now to Document Number 778-PS, which bears -Exhibit Number USA-247. This document is an order issued on the 1st of -October 1933 by the camp commander of Dachau. The document prescribed a -program of floggings, solitary confinement, and executions for the -inmates for infractions of the rules. - -Among the rules were those prescribing a rigid censorship concerning -conditions within the camp; and I refer to the first page of the English -text, paragraph numbered Article 11, and quoting: - - “By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following - offenders considered as agitators, will be hanged: - - - - “Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following in - the camp, at work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and - workshops, toilets and places of rest: holds political or - inciting speeches and meetings, forms cliques, loiters around - with others; who, for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of - the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false - information about the concentration camp and its institution, - receives such information, buries it, talks about it to others, - smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors - or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on - in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are - placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles, - throws stones and other objects over the camp wall containing - such information, or produces secret documents; who, for the - purpose of agitating, climbs on barracks roofs and trees, seeks - contact with the outside by giving light or other signals, or - induces others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advice to - that effect or supports such undertakings in any way - whatsoever.” - -The censorship about the camps themselves was complemented by an -officially inspired rumor campaign outside the camps. Concentration -camps were spoken of in whispers, and the whispers were spread by agents -of the Secret Police. When the Defendant Speer said that if the threat -of the concentration camp were used, the news would get around soon -enough, he knew whereof he spoke. - -We refer to Document 1531-PS. With reference to this document, I wish to -submit a word of explanation. The original German text, the original -German document, the captured document, was here in the document room -and was translated into English as our translation shows. Yesterday we -were advised that it has either been lost or misplaced, the original -German text; and unfortunately no photostatic copy was available here in -Nuremberg. A certified copy is, however, being sent to the office here -from Frankfurt, and it is on its way today; and I ask the Tribunal’s -permission to offer the English translation of the German original, -which is certified to be accurate by the translator, into evidence, -subject to a motion to strike it if the certified copy of the original -German document does not arrive. - -I now refer to the Document Number 1531-PS. It bears our Exhibit Number -USA-248. This document is marked “top secret” and it is addressed to all -State Police district offices and to the Gestapo office and for the -information of the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD. It is -an order relating to concentration camps, issued by the head of the -Gestapo; and I read from the English text, beginning with the second -paragraph, and quoting directly: - - “In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following - must, in the future, be observed in each individual case: - - - - “3. The length of the period of custody must in no case be made - known, even if the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German - Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has - already fixed it. - - - - “The term of commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly - announced as ‘until further notice.’ - - - - “In most serious cases there is no objection to increasing the - deterrent effect by the spreading of cleverly carried out rumor - propaganda, more or less to the effect that, according to - hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested - man will not be released for 2 or 3 years. - - - - “4. In certain cases the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German - Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a - concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future, - also be transmitted to the State Police district office - concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading - the rumor of this increased punishment as laid down in Section - 3, Paragraph 3, insofar as this appears suitable to add to the - deterrent effect. - - - - “5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to - be chosen for the spreading of such news.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal think that they will take judicial -notice of that United States Document, Number 2309-PS; and for the -convenience of the Defense Counsel, the Tribunal having sat until 1 will -not sit again until 2:15. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. - - [_A recess was taken until 1415 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, the deterrent effect of the -concentration camps was based on the promise of brutal treatment. Once -in the custody of the SS guards, the victim was beaten, tortured, -starved, and often murdered through the so-called “extermination through -work” program which I described the other day or through the mass -execution gas chambers and furnaces of the camps, which were shown -several days ago on the moving picture screen in this courtroom. - -The reports of official government investigations furnish additional -evidence of the conditions within the concentration camps. - -Document 2309-PS, which has already been referred to and of which the -Tribunal has taken judicial notice, I now refer to again, particularly -to the second page of the English text, beginning with the second -sentence of the second paragraph: - - “The work at these camps mainly consisted of underground labor, - the purpose being the construction of large underground - factories, storage rooms, _et cetera_. This labor was performed - completely underground and as a result of the brutal treatment, - working and living conditions, a daily average of 100 prisoners - died. To the one camp Oberstaubling 700 prisoners were - transported in February 1945, and on the 15th of April 1945 only - 405 of these men were living. During the 12 months preceding the - liberation, Flossenbürg and the branch camps under its control - accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women. - These figures represent the deaths as obtained from the - available records in the camp. However, they are in no way - complete, as many secret mass executions and deaths took place. - In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg camp - to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000 prisoners only - 102 survived. - - - - “Flossenbürg Concentration Camp can best be described as a - factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the - primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor, another - of its primary objectives was the elimination of human lives by - the methods employed in handling the prisoners. - - - - “Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities, - inadequate clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings, - hangings, freezing, forced hand hanging, forced suicides, - shooting, all played a major role in obtaining their objective. - Prisoners were murdered at random; spite killings against Jews - were common. Injections of poison and shooting in the neck were - everyday occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and spotted fever were - permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating prisoners. - Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common thing, - so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate - ones.” - -Passing to the next to the last sentence of this same paragraph, quoting -directly . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What are those exhibits that are referred to? - -MR. DODD: They are in evidence with the affidavit. They are attached to -it. - -THE PRESIDENT: They are not, I suppose, mimeographed in our copy? - -MR. DODD: No, we have not had an opportunity to mimeograph each one of -them. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they documents or photographs or what? - -MR. DODD: They are principally documents. There are some few plans and -photographs, and so on. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are they affidavits or what? There seem to be instances -of . . . - -MR. DODD: Well, some of them are in the form of affidavits taken at the -time of the liberation of the camp from persons who were there, and -others are pictures of writings that were found there and of the plans -and so on—such sort of thing. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well the Tribunal will take judicial notice of those -exhibits as well. - -MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. - -Reading from the last sentence of this same paragraph on the same page -and quoting: - - “On Christmas, 1944, a number of prisoners were hanged at one - time. The prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the - side of the gallows was a decorated Christmas tree; and as - expressed by one prisoner, ‘It was a terrible sight, that - combination of prisoners hanging in the air and the glistening - Christmas tree.’” - - - - “In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were - hanged. They had been delivered to this camp some time before - and had been captured while trying to blow up bridges.” - -We will not burden the Tribunal with a recital of all of these reports. -We wish, however, to make reference to the Concentration Camp -Mauthausen, one of the most notorious extermination centers; and I refer -particularly to Document Number 2176-PS, which I have already placed in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-249. This is also an official report of -the office of the Judge Advocate General of the United States 3rd Army, -dated 17 June 1945. I wish to refer to the conclusions on Page 3 of the -English text, at paragraph numbered Roman V, beginning with the second -sentence as follows: - - “V. Conclusions. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the basis - for long-term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone - fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks. - Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction, had - facilities for a large garrison of officers and men and had - large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was - conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any - so-called prisoner who entered within its walls. The so-called - branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the SS - officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative - facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen. - The other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most - notorious and largest branches, were not exclusively used for - extermination; but prisoners were used as tools in construction - and production until they were beaten or starved into - uselessness, whereupon they were customarily sent to Mauthausen - for final disposal.” - -Both from the showing of the moving picture and from these careful -reports, which were made by the 3rd Army of the United States on their -arrival at those centers, we say it is clear that the conditions in -those concentration camps over Germany—and in a few instances outside -of the actual borders of the Old Reich—followed the same general -pattern. The wide-spread incidence of these conditions makes it clear -that they were not the result of sporadic excesses on the part of -individual jailers, but were the result of policies deliberately imposed -from above. The crimes committed in these camps were on so vast a scale -that individual atrocities pale into insignificance. - -We have had turned over to us two exhibits which we are prepared to show -to this Tribunal only because they illustrate the depths to which the -administration of these camps had sunk shortly before, at least, the -time that they were liberated by the Allied Army. The Tribunal will -recall that in the showing of the moving picture, with respect to one of -the camps, there was a showing of sections of human skin taken from -human bodies in the Buchenwald Concentration Camp and preserved as -ornaments. They were selected, these particular hapless victims, because -of the tattooing which appeared on the skin. This exhibit, which we have -here, is Exhibit Number USA-252. Attached to the exhibit is an extract -of an official United States Army report describing the circumstances -under which this exhibit was obtained; and that extract is set forth in -Document 3420-PS, which I refer to in part. It is entitled: - - “Mobile Field Interrogation Unit Number 2; PW Intelligence - Bulletin; 13. Concentration Camp, Buchenwald. - - - - “Preamble. The author of this account is PW Andreas - Pfaffenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschützen Bn., 43 years old and of - limited education. He is a butcher by trade. The substantial - agreement of the details of his story with those found in PWIB - (H) /LF/36 establishes the validity of his testimony. PW has not - been questioned on statements which, in the light of what is - known, are apparently erroneous in certain details, nor has any - effort been made to alter the subjective character of the PW’s - account, which he wrote without being told anything of the - intelligence already known. The results of interrogation on - personalities at Buchenwald have already been published (PWIB - Number 2/12, item 31.). - - - - “‘In 1939 all prisoners with tattooing on them were ordered to - report to the dispensary.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this what Pfaffenberger said? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. - - “‘No one knew what the purpose was; but after the tattooed - prisoners had been examined, the ones with the best and most - artistic specimens were kept in the dispensary and then killed - by injections administered by Karl Beigs, a criminal prisoner. - The corpses were then turned over to the pathological department - where the desired pieces of tattooed skin were detached from the - bodies and treated. The finished products were turned over to SS - Standartenführer Koch’s wife, who had them fashioned into lamp - shades and other ornamental household articles. I myself saw - such tattooed skins with various designs and legends on them, - such as “Hänsel and Gretel,” which one prisoner had on his knee, - and designs of ships from prisoners’ chests. This work was done - by a prisoner named Wernerbach.” - -I also refer to Document 3421-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-253. - - “I, George C. Demas, Lieutenant, USNR, associated with the - United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis - Criminality, hereby certify that the attached exhibit, - consisting of parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes - Section, Judge Advocate General, United States Army, to me in my - above capacity, in the usual course of business, as an exhibit - found in Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces under - the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary - Forces.” - -And the last paragraph of Document 3423-PS (Exhibit USA-252) is a -conclusion reached in a United States Army report, and I quote it: - - “Based on the findings in Paragraph 2, all three specimens are - tattooed human skin.” - -This document is also attached to this exhibit on the board. We do not -wish to dwell on this pathological phase of the Nazi culture; but we do -feel compelled to offer one additional exhibit, which we offer as -Exhibit Number USA-254. This exhibit, which is on the table, is a human -head with the skull bone removed, shrunken, stuffed, and preserved. The -Nazis had one of their many victims decapitated, after having had him -hanged, apparently for fraternizing with a German woman, and fashioned -this terrible ornament from his head. - -The last paragraph of the official United States Army report from which -I have just read deals with the manner in which this exhibit was -acquired. It reads as follows: - - “There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles who had - been hanged for having relations with German girls. The heads - were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks of the rope - were still there.” - -Another certificate by Lieutenant Demas is set forth in Document 3422-PS -(Exhibit USA-254) and is similar to the one which I have read a few -minutes ago with relation to the human skin, excepting that it applies -to this second exhibit. We have no accurate estimate of how many persons -died in these concentration camps and perhaps none will ever be made; -but as the evidence already introduced before this Tribunal indicates, -the Nazi conspirators were generally meticulous record keepers. But the -records which they kept about concentration camps appear to have been -quite incomplete. Perhaps the character of the records resulted from the -indifference which the Nazis felt for the lives of their victims. But -occasionally we find a death book or a set of index cards. For the most -part, nevertheless, the victims apparently faded into an unrecorded -death. Reference to a set of death books suggests at once the scale of -the concentration camp operations, and we refer now and offer Document -Number 493-PS as Exhibit Number USA-251. This exhibit is a set of seven -books, the death ledger of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Each book -has on its cover the word “Totenbuch” (or Death Book)—Mauthausen. - -In these books were recorded the names of some of the inmates who died -or were murdered in this camp, and the books cover the period from -January of 1939 to April of 1945. They give the name, the place of -birth, the assigned cause of death, and time of death of each individual -recorded. In addition each corpse is assigned a serial number, and -adding up the total serial numbers for the 5-year period one arrives at -the figure of 35,318. - -An examination of the books is very revealing insofar as the camp’s -routine of death is concerned; and I invite the attention of the -Tribunal to Volume 5 from Pages 568 to 582, a photostatic copy of which -has been passed to the Tribunal. These pages cover death entries made -for the 19th day of March 1945 between 15 minutes past 1 in the morning -until 2 o’clock in the afternoon. In this space of 12 and three-quarter -hours, on these records, 203 persons are reported as having died. They -were assigned serial numbers running from 8390 to 8593. The names of the -dead are listed. And interestingly enough the victims are all recorded -as having died of the same ailment—heart trouble. They died at brief -intervals. They died in alphabetical order. The first who died was a man -named Ackermann, who died at 1:15 a.m., and the last was a man named -Zynger, who died at 2 o’clock in the afternoon. - -At 20 minutes past 2 o’clock of that same afternoon, according to these -records, on the 19th of March 1945, the fatal roll call began again and -continued until 4:30 p.m. In a space of 2 hours 75 more persons died, -and once again they died all from heart failure and in alphabetical -order. We find the entries recorded in the same volume, from Pages 582 -through 586. - -There was another death book found at Camp Mauthausen. It is our -Document Number 495-PS and bears Exhibit Number USA-250. This is a -single volume, and again has on its cover the words “Death -Book—Prisoners of War.” And I invite the attention of the Tribunal in -particular to Pages 234 through 246. Here the entries record the names -of 208 prisoners of war, apparently Russians, who at 15 minutes past -midnight on the 10th day of May 1942 were executed at the same time. The -book notes that the execution was directed by the chief of the SD and -the Sipo, at that time Heydrich. - -It was called to my attention as late as this morning—a publication of -a New York newspaper published in the United States, part of which is -made up of three or more pages consisting of advertisements from the -families, the relatives of people who once resided in Germany or in -Europe, asking for some advice about them. Most of the advertisements -refer to one of these concentration camps or another. The paper is -called _Der Aufbau_. It is a German-language newspaper in New York City, -published on the 23rd day—this particular issue—on the 23rd day of -November 1945. I do not propose to burden the record of this Tribunal -with the list of the names of all of these unfortunate individuals; but -we refer to it as a publication in the City of New York, a -German-language newspaper of recent date which illustrates the horrible -extent of this terrible tragedy which has affected so many people as a -result of this concentration-camp institution. We feel that no argument, -no particular argument, is necessary to support our statement that the -Nazi conspirators used these concentration camps and the related -instruments of terror in them to commit Crimes against Humanity and to -commit War Crimes. - -More about concentration camps will of necessity be involved in the -presentation concerning the persecution of the Jews, but this concludes -our presentation with respect to the concentration camps as a specific -entity of proof. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, speaking for myself, I should like to know what -these headings mean. - -MR. DODD: Yes, I have them here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Document 495-PS? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Document 495-PS. Column 1 is the serial number assigned -to the prisoners in the order of their deaths. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Column 2, prisoners-of-war serial number. Column 3 is the last -name, Column 4 is the first name. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MR. DODD: Column 5 is the date of birth. Column 6, the place of birth. -Column 7, cause of death. In these cases their cause of death is stated -as follows: “Execution pursuant to order of the Chief of the Sipo and SD -dated 30th April 1942,” and the ditto marks beneath indicate that the -same cause of death was assigned to the names which come beneath it. In -the eighth column is the date of death and the hour of death. The first -one being 9.5.42 at 2335 hours. In the ninth column there is a space -which says it is reserved for comments. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are numbers there too—M1681 is the first one. - -MR. DODD: Well, the German word, I am told, means that it confirms the -death with that number. Apparently the number of the . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you said the number of the corpse. - -MR. DODD: The number of the corpse, I think that is what it is as -distinguished from the number of the prisoner. Each corpse was given a -number as well after the individual died. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next phase of War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity, the Persecution of the Jews, will be presented -by Major Walsh. - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh. - -MAJOR WILLIAM F. WALSH (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): -If the Tribunal please, on behalf of the United States Counsel, I now -present to this august Tribunal the evidence to establish certain phases -of the Indictment alleged in Count One under War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity, and by agreement between the prosecutors the -allegations in Count Four, Paragraph X(B), Crimes against Humanity. The -topical title of this presentation is “The Persecution of the Jews.” - -At this time I offer in evidence a Document Book of translations, -lettered “T.” These documents contained in the books are arranged -according to the D-, L-, PS-, and R-series; and under the series the -translations are listed numerically. This title, “The Persecution of the -Jews,” is singularly inappropriate when weighed in the light of the -evidence to follow. Academically, I am told, to persecute is to afflict, -harass, and annoy. The term used does not convey, and indeed I cannot -conjure a term that does convey the ultimate aim, the avowed purpose to -obliterate the Jewish race. - -This presentation is not intended to be a complete recital of all the -crimes committed against the Jews. The extent and the scope of the -crimes was so great that it permeated the entire German nation, its -people and its organizations. - -I am informed that others to follow me will offer additional evidence -under other phases of the Prosecution’s case. Evidence relating to the -Party organizations and state organizations, whose criminality the -Prosecution will seek to establish, will disclose and emphasize the part -that these organizations played in the pattern and plan for -annihilation. - -The French and the Soviet Prosecutors, too, have a volume of evidence -all related to this subject, which will be submitted in the course of -the Trial. - -Before I begin a recital of the overt acts leading to the elimination of -the Jews, I am prepared to show that these acts and policies within -Germany from the year 1933 to the end of the war related to the -planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of aggressive wars, thus -falling within the definition of Crimes against Humanity as defined in -Article 6(c) of the Charter. - -It had long been a German theory that the first World War ended in -Germany’s defeat because of a collapse in the zone of the interior. In -planning for future wars it was determined that the home front must be -secure to prevent a repetition of this 1918 debacle. Unification of the -German people was essential to successful planning and waging of war, -and the Nazi political premise must be established—“One race, one -state, one Führer.” - -Free trade unions must be abolished, political parties (other than the -National Socialist Party) must be outlawed, civil liberties must be -suspended, and opposition of every kind must be swept away. Loyalty to -God, church, and scientific truth was declared to be incompatible with -the Nazi regime. The anti-Jewish policy was part of this plan for -unification because it was the conviction of the Nazis that the Jews -would not contribute to Germany’s military program, but on the contrary -would hamper it. The Jew must therefore be eliminated. - -This view is clearly borne out by a statement contained in Document -1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170. This document is a transcript of a Himmler -speech at a meeting of the SS major generals on 4 October 1943, and from -Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the translation before the Court, I read a very -short passage: - - “We know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves if - with the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of war, we - still had Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, - agitators, and trouble mongers; we would now probably have - reached the 1916-17 stage when the Jews were still in the German - national body.” - -The treatment of the Jews within Germany was therefore as much of a plan -for aggressive war as was the building of armaments and the conscription -of manpower. It falls within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal as an -integral part of the planning and preparation to wage a war of -aggression. - -It is obvious that the persecution and murder of Jews throughout the -conquered territories of Europe following 1939 are War Crimes as defined -by Article 6(b) of the Charter. It further violates Article 46 of the -Regulations of the Hague Convention of 1907, to which Germany was a -signatory. I quote Article 46 and ask the Court to take judicial notice -thereof: - - “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private - property, as well as religious convictions and practices, must - be respected.” - -I know of no crime in the history of mankind more horrible in its -details than the treatment of the Jews. It is intended to establish that -the Nazi Party precepts, later incorporated within the policies of the -German State, often expressed by the defendants at bar, were to -annihilate the Jewish people. I shall seek to avoid the temptation to -editorialize or to draw inferences from the documents, however great the -provocation; rather I shall let the documentary evidence speak for -itself—its stark realism will be unvarnished. Blood lust may have -played some part in these savage crimes, but the underlying purpose and -objective to annihilate the Jewish race was one of the fundamental -principles of the Nazi plan to prepare for and to wage aggressive war. I -shall from this point limit my proof to the overt acts committed; but I -dare to request the Court’s indulgence, if it is necessary in weaving -the pattern of evidence, to make reference to certain documents and -evidence previously submitted. - -Now this ultimate objective, that is, the elimination and extermination -of the Jews, could not be accomplished without preliminary steps and -measures. The German State must first be seized by the Nazi Party, the -force of world opinion must be faced, and even the regimented German -people must be indoctrinated with hatred against the Jews. - -The first clear-cut evidence of the Party policies concerning the Jews -was expressed in the Party program in February 1920. I offer in evidence -Document 1708-PS, “Program of the National Socialist Party,” Exhibit -USA-255. With the Court’s permission, I would like to quote the relevant -part of that program, Paragraph (4): - - “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the - race can only be one who is of German blood without - consideration of confession. . . .” - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): May I interrupt a minute. It is a little hard -to know where these exhibits are or what volume you are now quoting -from. - -MAJOR WALSH: This, Sir, is 1708-PS. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Volume 2? - -MAJOR WALSH: Volume 2. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what page of that exhibit? - -MAJOR WALSH: That is Paragraph (4) and Paragraph (6), Sir, on the first -page. - -Paragraph (4): - - “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the - race can only be one who is of German blood, without - consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a - member of the race.” - -And again, in Paragraph (6): - - “The right to determine matters concerning administration and - law belongs only to the citizen; therefore, we demand that every - public office of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the - county, or municipality, be filled only by citizens.” - -I now offer Document 2662-PS, _Mein Kampf_, Exhibit Number USA-256. On -Pages 724-725, Hitler, in this book, speaking of the Jew, said that if -the National Socialist movement was to fulfill its task—and I quote: - - “It must open the eyes of the people with regard to foreign - nations and must remind them again and again of the true enemy - of our present-day world. In the place of hate against - Aryans—from whom we may be separated by almost everything but - to whom, however, we are tied by common blood or the great tie - of a common culture—it must dedicate to the general anger the - evil enemy of mankind as the true cause of all suffering. - - - - “It must see to it, however, that at least in our country he be - recognized as the most mortal enemy and that the struggle - against him may show, like a flaming beacon of a better era, to - other nations, too, the road to salvation for a struggling Aryan - mankind.” - -A flood of abusive literature of all types and for all age groups was -published and circulated throughout Germany. Illustrative of this type -of publication is the book entitled _Der Giftpilz_. I offer in evidence -Document 1778-PS, Exhibit Number USA-257. This book brands the Jew as a -persecutor of the labor class, as a race defiler, devil in human form, a -poisonous mushroom, and a murderer. This particular book instructed -school children to recognize the Jew by caricature of his physical -features, shown on Pages 6 and 7; taught them that the Jew abuses little -boys and girls, on Page 30; and that the Jewish Bible permits all -crimes, Pages 13-17. The Defendant Streicher’s periodical _Der Stürmer_, -Number 14, April 1937, in particular, went to such extremes as to -publish the statement that Jews at the ritual celebration of their -Passover slaughtered Christians. - -I offer Document 2699-PS, Exhibit Number USA-258. On Page 2, Column 1, -Paragraphs 6 to 9, I quote: - - “Also the numerous confessions made by the Jews show that the - execution of ritual murders is a law of the Talmud Jew. The - former chief Rabbi (and later monk) Teofiti declares that the - ritual murders take place especially on the Jewish Purim (in - memory of the Persian murders) and Passover (in memory of the - murder of Christ). The rules are as follows: - - - - “The blood of the victims is to be tapped by force. On Passover - it is to be used in wine and matzos. Thus a small part of the - blood is to be poured into the dough of the matzos and into the - wine. The mixing is done by the head of the Jewish family. - - - - “The procedure is as follows: The family head empties a few - drops of the fresh and powdered blood into a glass, wets the - fingers of the left hand with it and sprays (blesses) with it - everything on the table. The head of the family then says, ‘Thus - we ask God to send the 10 plagues to all enemies of the Jewish - faith.’ Then they eat, and at the end the head of the family - exclaims, ‘May all Gentiles perish, as the child whose blood is - contained in the bread and wine.’ - - - - “The fresh (or dried and powdered) blood of the slaughtered is - further used by young married Jewish couples, by pregnant - Jewesses, for circumcision and so on. Ritual murder is - recognized by all Talmud Jews. The Jew believes he absolves - himself thus of his sins.” - -It is difficult for our minds to grasp that falsehoods such as these -could fall on fertile soil, that a literate nation could read, digest, -or believe these doctrines. We must realize, however, that with a -rigidly controlled press which precluded an exposé of such lying -propaganda, some of the ignorant and gullible would be led to believe. - -I now offer in evidence Document 2697-PS, a copy of _Der Stürmer_, -Exhibit Number USA-259. This publication, _Der Stürmer_, was published -by the Defendant Streicher’s publishing firm. In this publication, -Streicher, speaking of the Jewish faith, said, “The Holy Scripture is a -horrible criminal romance abounding with murder, incest, fraud, and -indecency.” - -And again he said, “The Talmud is the great Jewish book of criminal -instructions that the Jew practices in his daily life.” This is -contained in Document 2698-PS, _Der Stürmer_, which I now offer in -evidence, Exhibit Number USA-260. - -This propaganda campaign of hate was too widespread and notorious to -require further elaboration. Within the documents offered in evidence in -this and in other phases of the case will be found similar and even more -scurrilous statements, many by the defendants themselves and others by -their accomplices. - -When the Nazi Party gained control of the German State, a new and -terrible weapon against the Jews was placed within their grasp, the -power to apply the force of the state against them. This was done by the -issuance of decrees. - -Jewish immigrants were denaturalized: 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 480, signed by Defendants Frick and Neurath. - -Native Jews were precluded from citizenship: 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, Page 1146, signed by Defendant Frick. - -Jews were forbidden to live in marriage or to have extramarital -relations with persons of German blood: 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, Page 1146, signed by Frick and Hess. - -Jews were denied the right to vote: 1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 133, signed by Defendant Frick. - -Jews were denied the right to hold public office or civil service -positions: _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, Part I, Page 277, signed by -Defendant Frick. - -It was determined to relegate the Jews to an inferior status by denying -them common privileges and freedoms. Thus, they were denied access to -certain city areas, sidewalks, transportation, places, of amusement, -restaurants: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1676. - -Progressively more and still more stringent measures were applied, even -to the denial of private pursuits. They were excluded from the practice -of dentistry: 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 47, signed by -Defendant Hess. - -The practice of law was denied: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page -1403, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess. - -The practice of medicine was denied: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 969, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess. - -They were denied employment by press and radio: 1933 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 661. - -From stock exchanges and stock brokerage: 1934 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, Page 169. - -And even from farming: 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 685. - -In 1938 they were excluded from business in general and from the -economic life of Germany: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 1580, -signed by the Defendant Göring. - -The Jews were forced to pay discriminatory taxes and huge atonement -fines. Their homes, bank accounts, real estate, and intangibles were -expropriated. - -To digress for a moment from a recital of decrees and to refer -specifically to the atonement fines, I wish to offer Document 1816-PS, -Exhibit Number USA-261. This exhibit is a stenographic report of a -conference under the chairmanship of the Defendant Göring, attended by -the Defendant Funk among others, held at 11 o’clock on 12 November 1938 -at the Reich Ministry for Air. From Pages 8 and 9 of Section 7, I quote -the Defendant Göring: - - “One more question, gentlemen, what would you think the - situation would be if I announced today that Jewry shall have to - contribute this 1,000,000,000 as a punishment.” - -And then the last paragraph on Page 22 of the translation before the -Court—I quote: - - “I shall choose the wording this way—that German Jewry shall, - as punishment for their abominable crimes, _et cetera, et - cetera_, have to make a contribution of 1,000,000,000. That will - work. The pigs won’t commit another murder in a hurry. I should - like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.” - -It was whimsical remarks such as these that originated decrees, for -following this meeting a decree was issued placing upon the German Jews -the burden of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark fine: 1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, Page 1579, date 12 November 1938, signed by the Defendant -Göring. - -Similar decrees are contained in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page -282, signed by Defendant Göring, and 1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -Page 722, signed by Defendants Frick and Bormann. - -Finally, in the year 1943, the Jews were placed beyond the protection of -any judicial process by a decree signed by the Defendants Bormann and -Frick and others; and the police became the sole arbiters of punishment -and death: 1943 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 372, signed by Frick -and Bormann. - -I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ -decrees cited. - -Side by side with the passage of these decrees and their execution went -still another weapon, wielded by the Party and the Party-controlled -state. These were the openly sponsored and official anti-Jewish boycotts -against Jews. I now offer Document 2409-PS, the published diary of -Joseph Goebbels, Exhibit Number USA-262, and I invite the Court’s -attention to Page 290 where, under date of 29 March 1933—the Court will -find the quotation on the top of Page 1 of the translation of -2409-PS—“The boycott appeal is approved by the entire Cabinet.” And -again on the 31st of March 1933 he wrote, on Page 1, first sentence of -Paragraph 2, “We are having a last discussion among a very small circle -and decide that the boycott is to start tomorrow with all severity.” - -The Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Frank, together with Himmler, -Ley, and others, were members of a central committee who conducted the -1933 boycott against the Jews. Their names are listed in Document -2156-PS, _National Socialist Party Correspondence_, 29 March 1933, -Exhibit Number USA-263. - -As early as 1933 violence against the Jews was undertaken. Raids were -conducted, by uniformed Nazis, on services within synagogues. Attending -members of the synagogues were assaulted and religious insignia and -emblems were desecrated. A report of such an occurrence is contained in -the official dispatch from the American Consul General in Leipzig, dated -5 April 1933. - -I offer in evidence Document 2709-PS . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What do you refer to 2156 for? - -MAJOR. WALSH: Only, Sir, to show the names of the Defendants Streicher -and Frank as members of the boycott committee. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. - -MAJOR WALSH: Document 2709 has been given Exhibit Number USA-265. From -Paragraph 1 of Page 1, I quote: - - “In Dresden, several weeks ago, uniformed Nazis raided the - Jewish prayer house, interrupted the evening religious service, - arrested 25 worshippers, and tore the holy insignia or emblems - from their headcovering worn while praying.” - -At a meeting here in Nuremberg, before the representatives of the German -press, the Defendant Streicher and Mayor Liebel of Nuremberg revealed in -advance to the gathered members of the press that the Nuremberg -synagogue was to be destroyed. - -I offer in evidence Document 1724-PS, Exhibit Number USA-266, which is -minutes of this meeting, dated 4 August 1938. From Page 1, Paragraph 4 -of the original, I quote the translation before the Court: - - “The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be - secret). On August 10, 1938, at 10 o’clock a.m., the breakup of - the synagogue will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will - personally set the crane into motion with which the Jewish - symbols, Star of David, _et cetera_, will be torn down. This - should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are still - unknown.” - -The Defendant Streicher himself supervised the demolition. - -In support of this, I offer Document 2711-PS, a newspaper account of 11 -August 1938, Exhibit Number USA-267, Paragraph 1 of the translation -before the Court: - - “In Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished; Julius - Streicher himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting more - than an hour and a half. By his order then—so to speak as a - prelude of the demolition—the tremendous Star of David came off - the cupola.” - -These accounts of violence were not localized anti-Semitic -demonstrations but were directed and ordered from a centralized -headquarters in Berlin. This is established by a series of teletype -messages sent by the Berlin Secret State Police headquarters to chiefs -of police throughout Germany on 10 November 1938, which contained -instructions pertaining to the pre-arranged demonstration. - -I now refer to Document 3051-PS, previously offered in evidence as -Exhibit Number USA-240. I shall quote the relevant part of one of these -confidential orders signed by Heydrich, the translation before the -Court, the last half on Page 2: - - “Because of the attempt on the life of the Secretary of the - Legation, Von Rath, in Paris tonight, 9-10 November 1938, - demonstrations against Jews are to be expected throughout the - Reich. The following instructions are given on how to treat - these events: - - - - “1) The Chiefs of the State Police or their deputies must get in - telephonic contact with the political leaders who have - jurisdiction over their districts and must arrange a joint - meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Order - Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations. At - these discussions the political leaders have to be informed that - the German Police has received from the Reichsführer SS and - Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in - accordance with which the political leaders should adjust their - own measures. - - - - “a) Only such measures should be taken which do not involve - danger to German life or property. (For instance synagogues are - to be burned down only when there is no danger of fire to the - surroundings.) - - - - “b) Business and private apartments of Jews may be destroyed but - not looted. The police is instructed to supervise the execution - of this order and to arrest looters.” - -To this point we have found a gradual and a mounting emphasis in the -campaign against the Jews, one of the basic tenets of the Nazi Party and -of the state. The flame of prejudice has now been lighted and fanned. -The German people have been to a large degree indoctrinated, and the -seeds of hatred have been sown. The German State is now armed and is -prepared for conquest and the force of world opinion can now safely be -ignored. Already they have forced out of Germany 200,000 of its original -500,000 Jews. The Nazi-controlled German State is therefore emboldened; -and Hitler, in anticipation of the aggressive wars already planned, -casts about for a “whipping boy” upon whose shoulders can be placed the -blame for the world catastrophe yet to come. The speech before the -Reichstag on 30 January 1939 is set forth in Document Number 2663-PS, -which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-268. I quote: - - “If the international Jewish financiers within and without - Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world - war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the world and - the victory of Jewry, but the obliteration of the Jewish race in - Europe.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, it would, I think, assist the Tribunal if -you were careful to state the PS number which we have rather more -clearly and slowly. You see, the United States Exhibit number we do not -have and I do not know whether it would be better to state the United -States Exhibit number first and then give us the PS number; I am not -sure it would. Anyhow, if you would go a little more slowly and make -certain we get the PS number, it would be helpful. - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Your Honor. - -The Chief Editor of the official organ of the SS, the _Schwarze Korps_, -expressed similar sentiments on August 8, 1940. - -I offer in evidence Document 2668-PS; this is Exhibit Number USA-269, -Page 2 of the original and the full excerpt before the Court in -translation, as follows: - - “Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only - when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe - should also realize that the German peace which awaits it must - be a peace without Jews.” - -These were not the only officials of the Party and of the State to voice -the same views. The Defendant Rosenberg wrote for the publication _World -Struggle_. I offer in evidence Document 2665-PS, Exhibit Number USA-270. -This publication, Volumes 1 and 2, April and September 1941, Page 71 of -the original, reads, “The Jewish question will be solved only when the -last Jew has left the European continent.” - -The Court will recall Mr. Justice Jackson’s reference to the apologetic -note contained in the diary of Hans Frank when he wrote, and I quote -from Document 2233(c)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-271, bottom of Page 1 of -the translation: - - “Of course, I could neither eliminate all lice nor all Jews in - only 1 year’s time. But in the course of time and, above all, if - you will help me, this end will be attained.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I forgot to say, Major Walsh, it would help us too, when -you do not begin at the beginning of a paragraph, if you would indicate -about where it is. - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I shall do that. - -While this presentation is not necessarily intended to be a -chronological narrative of events in the treatment of the Jewish people, -it would appear at this point that we should pause to examine the record -to date. We find that the Nazi Party and the Nazi-dominated State have, -by writings and by utterances, by decrees and by official acts, clearly -expressed their intent: the Jew must be eliminated. - -How do they now progress to the accomplishment of this purpose? The -first requirement was a complete registration of all Jews; and inasmuch -as the policy relating to the Jews followed on the heels of German -aggression, such registration was required not only within the Reich but -successively within the conquered territories. For example, within -Germany registration was required by decree (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, 1938, Page 922, 23 July, signed by the Defendant Frick); within -Austria (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume 1, 1940, Page 694, 29 April); -within Poland (Kurjer Krakowski, 5 October 1939); in France (_Journal -Officiel_ Number 9, Page 92, 30 September 1940); in Holland -(_Verordnungsblatt_, Number 6, 10 January 1941, signed by the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart). - -The second step was to segregate and concentrate the Jews within -restricted areas called ghettos. This policy was carefully worked out, -and perhaps the confidential statement taken from the files of the -Defendant Rosenberg will best serve as an illustration. - -I offer in evidence a copy of a memorandum from Defendant Rosenberg’s -file entitled, “Directions for Handling of the Jewish Question,” -Document 212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. I quote from the top of Page 2 -of the translation before the Court: - - “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict - segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. The - presupposition of this is, first of all, the registration of the - Jewish population by the introduction of a compulsory - registration order and similar appropriate measures. . . .” - -And then, in the second sentence, in the second paragraph, on Page 2, I -continue: - - “. . . all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They - are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be - separated according to sexes. The presence of many more or less - closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine - makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen - which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower as a - consequence of present labor programs. These ghettos can be - placed under the supervision of a Jewish self-government with - Jewish officials. The guarding of the boundaries between the - ghettos and the outer world is, however, the duty of the police. - - - - “Also, in the case in which a ghetto could not yet be - established, care is to be taken through strict prohibition and - similar suitable measures that a further intermingling of blood - of the Jews and the rest of the populace does not continue.” - -In May 1941 Rosenberg, as the Reich Minister for the Eastern regions, -issued directions confining the Jews to ghettos in the Ukraine. - -I offer in evidence Document 1028-PS, Exhibit Number USA-273, and from -the first sentence of the translation before the Court, I read: - - “After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, - the Jewish question will have to be solved conclusively through - the institution of ghettos.” - -The policies expressed in the quoted Rosenberg memoranda were not -isolated instances nor the acts of one individual. It was the expressed -state policy. Defendant Von Schirach played his part in the program of -“ghettoization.” I offer in evidence Document 3048-PS, Exhibit Number -USA-274. Before the Court is a full translation of that which I wish to -quote. The Defendant Von Schirach spoke before the European Youth -Congress held in Vienna on 14 September 1942, and from Page 2, Column 2, -of the Vienna edition of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 15 September, I -quote: - - “Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to - European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven - from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, - tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto - of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, ‘I see in this an - action contributing to European culture.’” - -One of the largest ghettos was within the City of Warsaw. The original -report made by SS Major General Stroop concerning this ghetto is -entitled, “The Warsaw Ghetto is no more.” I now offer this in evidence -at this time, if the Court please, and request leave to refer to it -later on in this presentation—Exhibit Number USA-275, 1061-PS, top of -Page 3 of the translation, Document 1061-PS: - - “The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about - 400,000 Jews. - - - - “It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of two and a - half rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by - partitions and other walls and by walling-up of thoroughfares, - windows, doors, open spaces, _et cetera_.” - -Some idea of the conditions within this ghetto can be gathered from the -fact that an average of six persons lived in every room. Himmler -received a report from the SS Brigadeführer Group A, dated 15 October -1941 which further illustrates the establishment and operation of the -ghettos. I offer Document L-180 in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-276. -The translation, if the Tribunal please, is from the second paragraph -from the bottom of Page 9: - - “Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution, - the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once - during the first days of operations. This was especially urgent - in Kovno because there were 30,000 Jews in a total population of - 152,400.” - -And from the last paragraph on Page 9 continuing to page 10 I quote: - - “In Riga the so-called ‘Moscow suburb’ was designated as a - ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now - mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the - ghetto district proved rather difficult because the Latvian - dwellings in that district had to be evacuated and residential - space in Riga is very crowded. Of the 28,000 Jews living in Riga - 24,000 have been transferred into the ghetto so far. In creating - the ghetto the Security Police restricted themselves to mere - policing duties, while the establishment and administration of - the ghetto as well as the regulation of the food supply for the - inmates of the ghetto was left to civil administration; the - Labor Offices were left in charge of labor allocation. In the - other towns with a larger Jewish population ghettos shall be - established likewise.” - -Jews were also forced into ghettos in the Polish Province of Galicia. No -words in my vocabulary could describe quite so adequately the conditions -as those contained in the report from Katzmann, Lieutenant General of -Police, to Krüger, General of the Police East, dated 3 June 1943, -entitled “Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia.” I offer Document L-18 -in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-277. From the translation, if the -Court please, we will begin with the last three sentences on Page 11, -that is, the last three sentences prior to the word “nothing” which is -there on that page: “Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in -the ghettos of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn.” - - “The Jews of Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had concealed - those who suffered from spotted fever in underground holes. When - evacuation was to start it was found that 3,000 Jews suffering - from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto. In order to destroy - this center of pestilence at once, every police officer - inoculated against spotted fever was called into action. Thus we - succeeded in destroying this plague-boil, losing thereby only - one officer. Almost the same conditions were found in Rohatyn.” - -On Page 19 of this same document, L-18, the last paragraph, I wish to -quote further. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - - MAJOR WALSH: “Since we received more and more alarming reports - on the Jews becoming armed in an ever-increasing manner, we - started, during the last fortnight in June 1943, an action - throughout the whole of the District of Galicia with the intent - to use strongest measures to destroy the Jewish gangsterdom. - Special measures were found necessary during the action to - dissolve the living quarters in Lvov where the dug-out mentioned - above had been established. Here we had to act brutally from the - beginning in order to avoid losses on our side; we had to blow - up or to burn down several houses. On this occasion the - surprising fact arose that we were able to catch about 20,000 - Jews instead of 12,000 Jews who had registered. We had to pull - at least 3,000 Jewish corpses out of every kind of hiding place; - they had committed suicide by taking poison.” - -On Page 20 of this document, the third paragraph I read: - - “Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single SS - and Police member during these actions, the mood and spirit of - the men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the - first to the last day.” - -These acts and actions of removal and slaughter were not entirely -without profit. The author of this report, on the ninth page of this -translated copy stated, and I quote the last paragraph: - - “Together with the evacuation action we executed the - confiscation of Jewish property. Very high values were - confiscated and handed over to the Special Staff ‘Reinhard.’ - Apart from furniture and many textile goods, the following - amounts were confiscated and turned over to Special Staff - ‘Reinhard.’” - -I would like to read a few of the many and assorted items listed under -this confiscation: - - “20.952 kilograms of golden wedding rings; 7 stamp collections, - complete; 1 suitcase with pocket knives; 1 basket of fountain - pens and propelling pencils; 3 bags filled with rings—not - genuine; 35 wagons of furs.” - -I will not burden the Court with the detailed lists of objects of value -and of the money confiscated; but the foregoing is cited to illustrate -the thoroughness of the looting of a defenseless people, even to the -11.73 kilograms of gold teeth and inlays. - -By the end of 1942 Jews in the Government General of Poland had been -crowded into 55 localities whereas before the German invasion there had -been approximately 1,000 Jewish settlements within this same area. This -is reported in the 1942 official gazette for the Government General, -Number 94, Page 665, 1 November 1942. - -The Jews having been registered and confined within the ghettos, they -now furnished a reservoir for slave labor. It is believed pertinent at -this time to point out the difference between the slave labor and labor -duty. The latter group were entitled to reasonable compensation, stated -work hours, medical care and attention, and other social security -measures, while the former were granted none of these advantages, being -in fact on a level below a slave. - -Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied -Territories, set up within his organization a department which, among -other things, was to seek a solution for the Jewish problem by means of -forced labor. His plans are contained in another document, 1024-PS, -which I now offer in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-278. - -I quote the first part of Paragraph 3 of Page 1 of the document -entitled, “General Organization and Tasks of Our Office for the General -Handling of Problems in the Eastern Territory.” This is dated 29 April -1941. This brief excerpt reads as follows: - - “A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for - which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced - labor for the Jews, creation of ghettos, _et cetera_).” - -Thereafter he issued instructions that Jewish forced labor should be -effected and utilized for every manual labor; and I refer to Document -212-PS, already in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-272. From Page 3 of this -document, Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 7, I quote Paragraph 5: - - “The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the - complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of age - in the reconstruction of the Eastern Occupied Territories.” - -And from Paragraph 7 of the same page I read: - - “Violations of German measures, especially evasions of the - forced labor regulations, are to be punished by death in the - case of the Jews.” - -From the ghettos Jewish labor was selected and sent to a concentration -area. Here the usable Jews were screened from those considered -worthless. For example, a contingent of 45,000 Jews would be expected to -yield 10,000 to 15,000 usable laborers. My authority for this statement -is contained in a RSHA telegram to Himmler, marked “urgent” and -“secret,” dated 16 December 1942. - -I offer this document, 1472-PS, in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-279; and -from the translation before the Court I read the last four lines: - - “In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped and - others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for - this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be - available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.” - -From Document L-18, a report from the Lieutenant General of the Police, -Katzmann, to General of the Police East, Krüger, already in evidence, -Exhibit Number USA-277, we find the clearly outlined nature of the -forced labor situation for the Jews. On Page 2 of the translation, -starting with Paragraph 6, I read: - - “The best remedy consisted in the formation of forced labor - camps by the SS and Police Leader. The best opportunity for - labor was offered by the necessity to complete the ‘Dg. 4’ road - which was extremely important and necessary for the whole of the - southern part of the front and which was in a catastrophically - bad condition. On October 15, 1941, the establishment of camps - along the road was commenced; and despite considerable - difficulties there existed, after a few weeks only, seven camps - containing 4,000 Jews.” - -From Page 2, Paragraph 7, I read: - - “Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a very - short time the completion of 15 camps of this kind could be - reported to the superior leader of SS and police. In the course - of time about 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps. - Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties arising from this - problem I can report today that about 160 kilometers of the road - are completed.” - -And from Page 2, Paragraph 8, I read: - - “At the same time all other Jews fit for work were registered - and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies.” - -And on Page 5, last part of Paragraph 1 . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you want the remainder of that paragraph on Page 2? - -MAJOR WALSH: It is such a lengthy document, I hesitated to burden the -record with so much of it, and had extracted certain portions therefrom, -but I shall be very glad to read it into the record. - - THE PRESIDENT: “Then, for instance, the Municipal Administration - at Lvov had no success in their attempts to house the Jews - within a closed district which would be inhabited only by Jews. - This question, too, was solved quickly by the SS and Police - Leader through his subordinate officials.” - -MAJOR WALSH: With the Court’s permission, I add that to the record. - -Reading the last paragraph of Page 2: - - “When the Jews were marked by the Star of David, as well as when - they were registered by the labor agencies, the first symptoms - appeared in their attempts to dodge the order of the - authorities. The measures which were introduced thereupon led to - thousands of arrests. It became more and more apparent that the - civil administration was not in a position to solve the Jewish - problem in an approximately satisfactory manner. Then, for - instance, the municipal administration at Lvov had no success in - their attempts to house the Jews within a closed district which - would be inhabited only by Jews. This question, too, was solved - quickly by the SS and Police Leader through his subordinate - officials. This measure became the more urgent as in the winter - of 1941 big centers of spotted fever were noted in many parts of - the town . . . .” - -And on Page 5 of this document, L-18, last half of Paragraph 1, I read: - - “During the removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the - town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy and - asocial Jewish rabble were caught during the screening and - treated in a special way. Owing to the peculiar fact that almost - 90 percent of artisans working in Galicia were Jews, the task to - be solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since an - immediate evacuation would not have served the interest of war - economy.” - -And again, on Page 5, Paragraph 2, the latter part, beginning with -“cases were discovered”: - - “Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any - certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages but even paid - money themselves. Moreover, the organizing of Jews for the - benefit of their employers grew to such catastrophical extent - that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic - manner for the benefit of the German name. - - - - “Since the administration was not in a position and showed - itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police leader - simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The - Jewish labor agencies, which were manned by hundreds of Jews, - were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms or - administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards - given to the Jews by the labor agencies were validated by the - police offices by stamping them. In the course of this action, - again, thousands of Jews were caught who were in possession of - forged certificates or who had obtained, surreptitiously, - certificates of labor by all kinds of pretexts. These Jews also - were exposed to special treatment.” - -If the Court please, at this time I would like to arrange for the -showing of a very short motion picture, perhaps one of the most unusual -exhibits that will be presented during the Trial. With the Court’s -permission I would like to call upon Commander Donovan to assist. - -THE PRESIDENT: Need we adjourn for it or not? - -MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir. The movie itself is very, very short, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, the United States now -offers in evidence Document Number 3052-PS, Exhibit Number USA-280, -entitled “Original German 8-millimeter Film of Atrocities against Jews.” - -This is a strip of motion pictures taken, we believe, by a member of the -SS and captured by the United States military forces in an SS barracks -near Augsburg, Germany, as described in the affidavits now before the -Tribunal. - -We have not been able to establish beyond doubt in which area these -films were made, but we believe that to be immaterial. - -The film offers undeniable evidence, made by Germans themselves, of -almost incredible brutality to Jewish people in the custody of the -Nazis, including German military units. - -It is believed by the Prosecution that the scene is the extermination of -a ghetto by Gestapo agents, assisted by military units. And, as the -other evidence to be presented by the Prosecution will indicate, the -scene presented to the Tribunal is probably one which occurred a -thousand times all over Europe under the Nazi rule of terror. - -This film was made on an 8-millimeter home camera. We have not wished -even to reprint it, and so shall present the original, untouched film -captured by our troops. The pictures obviously were taken by an amateur -photographer. Because of this, because of the fact that part of it is -burned, because of the fact that it runs for only 1½ minutes, and -because of the confusion on every hand shown on this film, we do not -believe that the Tribunal can properly view the evidence if it is shown -only once. We therefore ask the Tribunal’s permission to project the -film twice as we did before the Defense Counsel. - -This is a silent film. The film has been made available to all Defense -Counsel, and they have a copy of the supporting affidavits, duly -translated. - - [_The film was shown._] - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: [_Continuing._] May it please the Tribunal, while the -film is being rewound I wish to say that attached to the affidavits -offered in evidence is a description of every picture shown in this -film. And, with the Tribunal’s permission, I wish to read a few -selections from that at this time, before again projecting the film, in -order to direct the Tribunal’s attention to certain of the scenes: - -Scene 2—A naked girl running across the courtyard. - -Scene 3—An older woman being pushed past the camera, and a man in SS -uniform standing at the right of the scene. - -Scene 5—A man with a skullcap and a woman are manhandled. - -Number 14—A half-naked woman runs through the crowd. - -Number 15—Another half-naked woman runs out of the house. - -Number 16—Two men drag an old man out. - -Number 18—A man in German military uniform, with his back to the -camera, watches. - -Number 24—A general shot of the street, showing fallen bodies and naked -women running. - -Number 32—A shot of the street, showing five fallen bodies. - -Number 37—A man with a bleeding head is hit again. - -Number 39—A soldier in German military uniform, with a rifle, stands by -as a crowd centers on a man coming out of the house. - -Number 44—A soldier with a rifle, in German military uniform, walks -past a woman clinging to a torn blouse. - -Number 45—A woman is dragged by her hair across the street. - - [_The film was shown again._] - -COMMANDER DONOVAN: [_Continuing._] We submit to the Tribunal for its -permanent records this strip of 8-millimeter film. - -MAJOR WALSH: It is difficult from this point to follow the thread of -chronological order or a topical outline. So numerous are the documents -and so appalling the contents that in this brief recital the Prosecution -will make no effort to itemize the criminal acts. Selected documents, -however, will unfold the crimes in full detail. - -Before launching a discussion of the means utilized to accomplish the -ultimate aim, that is the extermination of the Jewish people, I now turn -to that fertile source of evidence, the diary of Hans Frank, then -Governor General of occupied Poland. In a cabinet session on Tuesday, 16 -December 1941, in the government building at Kraków, the Defendant Frank -made a closing address to the session. I offer now in evidence that part -of the document, Number 2233(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-281, identified -CV 1941, October to December, and from Page 76, line 10, to Page 77, -line 33, of the original and of the entire translation before the Court. -I quote: - - “As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite - frankly that they must be done away with in one way or another. - The Führer said once: ‘Should united Jewry again succeed in - provoking a world war, the blood of not only the nations which - have been forced into the war by them will be shed, but the Jew - will have found his end in Europe.’ I know that many of the - measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich at present - are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally, as is - obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty, - harshness, _et cetera_. Before I continue, I would beg you to - agree with me on the following formula: We will principally have - pity on the German people only and nobody else in the whole - world. The others, too, had no pity on us. As an old National - Socialist I must also say: This war would be only a partial - success if the whole lot of Jewry would survive it, while we - would have shed our best blood in order to save Europe. My - attitude towards the Jews will, therefore, be based only on the - expectation that they must disappear. They must be done away - with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported to the - East. A large conference concerning that question, to which I am - going to delegate the State Secretary Dr. Bühler, will take - place in Berlin in January. That discussion is to take place in - the Reich Security Main Office with SS Lieutenant General - Heydrich. A great Jewish migration will begin, in any case. “But - what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be - settled down in the ‘Ostland’ in villages? This is what we were - told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing with them - either in the ‘Ostland’ or in the ‘Reichskommissariat.’ So - liquidate them yourselves. - - - - “Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against all feeling - of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and - wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the - structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be - achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief - Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made - responsible for it because of the limitations of the frame work - of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to - such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate a way - which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that - direction. - - - - “The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant - gluttons. We have now approximately, 2,500,000 of them in the - Government General, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and - everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or - poison those 3,500,000 Jews; but we shall nevertheless be able - to take measures which will lead, somehow, to their - annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures - to be determined in discussions with the Reich. The Government - General must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where - and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which - we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be - brought to your attention in due course.” - -This, if the Tribunal please, is not the planning and scheming of an -individual, but is the expression of the official of the German State, -the appointed Governor General of occupied Poland. The methods used to -accomplish the annihilation of the Jewish people were varied and, -although not subtle, were highly successful. - -I have from time to time made reference to certain utterances and -actions of the Defendant Rosenberg as one of the leaders and policy -makers of the Nazi Party and German State. It is perhaps reasonable to -assume that the Defendant Rosenberg will claim for many of his actions -that he pursued them pursuant to superior orders. I have before me, -however, a captured document, Number 001-PS, marked “secret,” dated 18 -December 1941, entitled “Documentary Memorandum for the -Führer—Concerning Jewish Possessions in France,” Exhibit Number -USA-282. I dare say that no document before this Tribunal will more -clearly evidence the Defendant Rosenberg’s personal attitude, his -temperament, and convictions toward the Jews more strongly than this -memorandum, wherein he, in his own initiative, urges plundering and -death. I offer in evidence Document Number 001-PS. The body of the -memorandum reads as follows: - - “In compliance with the order of the Führer for protection of - Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwellings - remained unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings have - disappeared because a guard could, naturally, not be posted. In - the whole East the administration has found terrible conditions - of living quarters, and the chances of procurement are so - limited that it is not possible to procure any more. Therefore, - I beg the Führer to permit the seizure of all Jewish home - furnishings of Jews in Paris who have fled or will leave shortly - and those of Jews living in all parts of the occupied West to - relieve the shortage of furnishings in the administration in the - East. - - - - “2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short - examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives - of members of the Forces have not stopped; on the contrary they - continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the - German-French co-operation, to force Germany to retaliate and, - with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against - Germany. I suggest to the Führer that, instead of executing 100 - Frenchmen, we shoot in their place 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, - _et cetera_. It is the Jews in London and New York who incite - the French Communists to commit acts of violence, and it seems - only fair that the members of this race should pay for this. It - is not the little Jews but the leading Jews in France who should - be held responsible. That would tend to awaken the anti-Jewish - sentiment.”—Sighed—“A. Rosenberg.” - - [_Dr. Thoma approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you to speak slowly so that your application -will come to me through the earphones correctly. - -DR. THOMA: Since the Prosecutor is now dealing with the case against my -client, Rosenberg, may I be permitted to voice an objection to Document -212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. The Prosecutor claims that this document -was a directive issued by the Minister for the East. It begins with the -words . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: None of that has come through on the earphones. I don’t -understand you. You had better begin again. - -DR. THOMA: The Prosecutor presented earlier today Document Number -212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272, claiming that its content was a -directive issued by the Minister for the East on the treatment of Jews. -In this document he is said to have given instructions that violations -of German regulations by Jews, especially violations of the compulsory -labor laws, could only be punished by death. This document does not -originate with the Defendant Rosenberg; nor did it by mistake . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: More slowly, please. - -DR. THOMA: This document does not originate with the Defendant -Rosenberg. It bears neither a date nor an address, nor his signature. I, -therefore, object to the assertion that this document originated with -the Defendant Rosenberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I don’t think that Counsel for the -Prosecution said that, that Document 212-PS emanated from Rosenberg. I -didn’t so understand him. - -DR. THOMA: I understood him to say that it was a directive issued by the -Minister for the East; and if I am not mistaken, he also said it was -dated April 1941. At that time there was no Ministry for the East. -Rosenberg was only named Minister for the East in July 1941. - -THE PRESIDENT: I will ask the Counsel for the Prosecution. - -MAJOR WALSH: It is my understanding, Sir, that that document, 212-PS, -was taken from the captured files of Rosenberg. - -DR. THOMA: That is true, it was found among the papers of the Defendant -Rosenberg; the Defendant Rosenberg claims, however, that he has never -seen this document, that he knows nothing about it, and that it has -never passed through his hands. - -THE PRESIDENT: Rosenberg, when he is called as a witness or when you -appear to speak for him, will be able to say that he has never seen the -document before. All that Counsel, for the Prosecution has said—and it -appears to be true—is that the document was found in Rosenberg’s file. -You can say or prove by Rosenberg’s evidence when you call Rosenberg—if -you do call him—that he never saw the document. Do you understand? - -DR. THOMA: Yes, thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now, so we will adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TWENTIETH DAY - Friday, 14 December 1945 - - - _Morning Session_ - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I bring up two points with regard to yesterday’s and -all future presentation of evidence on the section dealing with Crimes -against Humanity. - -Firstly, I request that the affidavit of the witness Pfaffenberger, -which was submitted yesterday, be stricken from the record. The witness -himself will later have to be cross-examined, since his affidavit is -fragmentary in most important points. In many cases it does not appear -whether his statements are based on personal observations or on hearsay, -and therefore it is too easy to draw false conclusions. The witness did -not mention that the Camp Commander Koch and his inhuman wife were -condemned to death by an SS court, among other things, on account of -these occurrences. It is, of course, possible to ascertain the complete -facts by questioning the witness at a later stage of the Trial. But -until then the Tribunal and all members of the Prosecution and the -Defense must be continually influenced by such dreadful testimony. - -The contents of this testimony are so horrifying and so degrading to the -human mind that one would like to avert one’s eyes and ears. In the -meantime such statements make their way into the press of the whole -world, and civilization is justly indignant. The consequences of such -prejudiced statements are incalculable. The Prosecutor clearly -recognized the significance of this testimony and exposed the sorry -documents in yesterday’s proceedings. - -If weeks or months pass before such testimony is rectified, its initial -effect can never be wholly eliminated; but truth suffers and justice is -endangered thereby. Surely, Article 19 of the Charter does not envisage -bringing about such a state of affairs. - -Secondly, I should, therefore, like to suggest that at the present stage -of the Trial the testimony of witnesses who live in Germany and whose -appearance here in court is possible should not be read in the -proceedings. For at this stage of the Trial the charges being made are -even more terrible than those referring to wars of aggression, since the -tortured lives and deaths of human beings are involved. - -At the beginning of the Trial the Tribunal refused to admit testimony of -the witness Schuschnigg, and it is my opinion that what was valid then -should be all the more valid at this stage of the Trial. - -I should like to emphasize my suggestion particularly with regard to the -Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner himself, since it was not until the spring -of 1943 that he became Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and -since, in the opinion of the Defense, many, if not all, of his -signatures were forged and the entire executive function attached to the -concentration camps and the things connected with them lay exclusively -in Himmler’s hands. That I hope to prove at a later date. I mentioned it -now in order to justify my suggestion. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear counsel for the Chief -Prosecutor of the United States. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd, who had -charge of the matter which is under discussion, left for the United -States yesterday; and I shall have to substitute for him as best I can. - -This Tribunal sits under a Charter which recognized the impossibility of -covering a decade of time, a continent of space, a million acts, by -ordinary rules of proof, and at the same time finishing this case within -the lives of living men. We do not want to have a trial here that, like -the trial of Warren Hastings, lasted 7 years. Therefore the Charter sets -up only two standards by which any evidence, I submit, may be rejected. -The first is that evidence must be relevant to the issue. The second is -it must have some probative value. That was made mandatory upon this -Tribunal in Article 19 because of the difficulty of ever trying this -case if we used the technical rules of Common Law proof. - -One of the reasons this was a military tribunal, instead of an ordinary -court of law, was in order to avoid the precedent-creating effect of -what is done here on our own law and the precedent control which would -exist if this were an ordinary judicial body. - -Article 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical -rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible -extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and shall admit any -evidence which it deems to have probative value. That was made -mandatory, that it shall admit any evidence which it deems to have -probative value. The purpose of that provision, Your Honors, I may say, -was this: That the whole controversy in this case—and we have no doubt -that there is room for controversy—should be centered upon the value of -evidence and not on its admissibility. - -We have no jury. There is no occasion for applying jury rules. -Therefore, when a piece of evidence is offered, there are two questions -which arise: Does it have probative value? If it has no probative value, -then it should not encumber the records, of course. The second is, does -it have relevancy? If it has not, of course it should not come in. - -The evidence in question has relevance; no one questions that. No one -can say that an affidavit, duly sworn, does not have some probative -value. What probative value it has, the weight of it, should be -determined on the submission of the case. That is to say, if a witness -has made a statement in an affidavit, and it is denied by Mr. -Kaltenbrunner, and you believe that the denial has weight and -credibility, of course, the affidavit should not be considered in the -final consideration of the case. But we are dealing here with events -that took place over great periods of time and great distances. We are -dealing with witnesses widely scattered and a situation where -communications are almost at a standstill. - -If this affidavit stands at the end of this case undenied, unchallenged, -it is not, then, beyond belief that you would give it value and weight. -An affidavit might bear internal evidence that it lacked credibility, -such as evidence where the witness was talking of something of which he -had no personal knowledge. I do not say that every affidavit that comes -along has probative value just because it is sworn to. But it seems to -me that if we are to make progress with this case, this simple system -envisioned by this Charter, which was the subject of long consideration, -must be followed; that if, when a piece of evidence is presented, even -though it does not comply with technical rules governing judicial -procedures, it is something which has probative value in the ordinary -daily concerns of life, it should be admitted. If it stands undenied at -the close of the case, as many of these things will, then, of course, -there is no issue about it; and it saves the calling of witnesses, which -will take an indefinite period of time as we have already seen. I may -say that the testimony of the witness Lahousen, which took nearly 2 -days, could have been put in, in this Court, in 15 minutes in affidavit -form, and all that was essential to it could have been placed before us; -and if it were to be denied you could then have determined its weight. - -We want to adhere to this Charter. I submit it is no reason for -deviating from the Charter that an affidavit recites horrors. I should -have thought that the world could not be more shocked by recitals of -horrors in affidavits than it has been in the documents that have -proceeded from sources of the enemy itself. There is no reason in that -for departing from the plain principles of the Charter. - -I think the question of orderly procedure and the question of time are -both involved in this. I think that the Tribunal should receive -affidavits, and we have prepared them—we hope carefully, we hope -fairly—to present a great many things that would take days and days of -proof. I may say that this ruling is more important in subsequent stages -of this case than it is on this particular affidavit. - -There is another reason, perhaps. We have some situations in which a -member of an accused organization, who is directly hostile to our -position because the accusation would reach him within the accused -class, has made an affidavit or affidavits which constitute admissions -against interest; but on some other issue he makes statements which we -believe are untrue and incredible; and we do not wish to vouch for his -general credibility by calling him as a witness, but we wish to avail -ourselves of his admission. Those things we think since we have to make -our proof largely from enemy sources. All this proof and every witness 8 -months ago were in the hands of the enemy. We have to make our proof -from them. God alone knows how much proof there is in this world that we -have not been able to reach. We submit that the orderly procedure here -is to abide by this Charter and admit these affidavits. If they stand -unquestioned at the end of the case, there is no issue about them. If -they are questioned, then the weight is a matter which you would -determine on final submission. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I have three questions I should like -to ask you. The first is: Where is Pfaffenberger? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I cannot answer at the moment, but I will get -an answer as quickly as I can. It is unknown to us at the moment. If we -are able to ascertain, I will inform you at the conclusion of the noon -recess. - -THE PRESIDENT: The second point to which I wish to draw your attention -is Article 16(e) of the Charter, which contemplates cross-examination of -witnesses by the defendants. The only reason why it is thought that -witnesses who are available should not give evidence by affidavit is -because it denies to the Defense the opportunity of cross-examining -them. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that this provision means just exactly what -it says. If we call a witness, they have the right of cross-examination. -If he is not called, they have the right to call him, if he is -available, as their witness; but not, of course, the right of -cross-examination. The provision itself, if Your Honor notices, reads -that they have the right to cross-examine any witness called by the -Prosecution; but that does not abrogate or affect Article 19, that we -may obtain and produce any probative evidence in such manner as will -expedite the Trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the next point to which I wish to draw your -attention is Article 17(a). As I understood it, you were arguing that it -was mandatory upon the Tribunal to consider any evidence which was -relevant. Therefore, I draw your attention to Article 17(a) which gives -the Tribunal power to summon witnesses to the Trial. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. I think there is no conflict in that -whatever. The power of the Tribunal to summon witnesses and to put -questions to them was introduced into this Charter through the -continental systems of jurisprudence. Usually there are not Tribunal -witnesses in our procedure in the States. Witnesses are called only by -one of the parties; but it was suggested by the continental scholars -that in this kind of case, since we were utilizing a mixture of the two -procedures, the Tribunal itself should have the right to do several -things. One is to summon witnesses, to require their attendance, and to -put questions to them. I submit that this witness, whose affidavit has -been received, can be called, if we can find him, by the Tribunal and -questioned. - -The next provision—and it bears, on the spirit of this—of Article 17 -is that the Tribunal has the right to interrogate any defendant. Of -course, under our system of jurisprudence the Tribunal would have no -such right, because the defendant has the unqualified right to refrain -from being a witness; but in deference again to the continental system, -the Tribunal was given the right to interrogate any defendant, and his -immunities, which he would have under the Constitution of the United -States, if he were being tried under our system, were taken away. - -I submit that the perfect consistency in those provisions empowers the -Tribunal on its own motion (Article 17) to summon witnesses, to -supplement anything that is offered, to put any questions to witnesses -and to any defendant. - -If any witness is called, the right of cross-examination cannot be -denied; but that does not abrogate Article 19, which was intended to -enable us to put our case before the Tribunal so that the issue would -then be drawn by the defendants and the weight of what we offer -determined on final submission. - -THE PRESIDENT: Lastly, there is Article 17(e), which I suppose, in your -submission, would entitle the Tribunal, if they thought right, after -receiving the affidavit, to take the evidence of Pfaffenberger on -commission. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I think it would, Your Honor. I may say, in -reference to that section—what, perhaps, may be surprising to those -accustomed to our system of jurisprudence—that it was one of the most -controversial issues we had in the framing of this Charter. We had in -mind the authorization of what we call “masters” to go into various -localities, perhaps, and take testimony, not knowing what might be -necessary. Our practice, however, of sending “masters in equity” to take -testimony and make recommendations was not acceptable to the continental -system, and we finally compromised on this provision which authorizes -the taking of testimony by commissions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Your Honors, -I have come forward after my colleague, Mr. Jackson, to make my own -statement, inasmuch as I think that the petition of the Defense is -fundamentally wrong and should not be complied with. - -We are submitting our objections for the Tribunal’s consideration. I -fully share the viewpoint held by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.A., -Mr. Jackson, and in addition should like to point out the following; The -Defense Counsel, in his petition, raises the question of whether the -Prosecution should refer to, or make public, documents containing -affidavits of persons residing in Germany. A statement of this sort is -completely out of order since, as is known, the defendants committed the -greater part of their atrocities in all countries of Europe and it will -be readily understood that the witnesses of these atrocities live in -different parts of these countries; it is essential that the Prosecution -have recourse to the testimony of such persons, whether it be written or -oral. Your Honors, we have entered a phase of the Trial in which we have -to set forth the atrocities connected with so-called War Crimes and -Crimes against Humanity, atrocities which were committed by the -defendants over extensive areas. We shall submit as evidence documents -originating from the defendants themselves or from persons who suffered -at the hands of the war criminals; it would be impossible to summon all -these witnesses to the Trial so that they could give their evidence -orally. It is absolutely necessary to have affidavits and written -testimonies from these witnesses. - -As His Honor the President has already remarked, Article 17 provides for -the right of summoning witnesses to the Trial. That is correct; but it -is impossible to summon all the witnesses who could depose affidavits on -the crimes committed by the defendants. I therefore refer to Article 19 -of the Charter which reads: - - “The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. - It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent - expeditious”—and I emphasize, Your Honor, _expeditious_—“and - non-technical procedure and shall admit any evidence which it - deems to have probative value.” - -I would ask the Tribunal to proceed according to this article which -definitely admits written affidavits of witnesses as evidence. That is -what I wished to say by way of a supplement to the statement of Mr. -Jackson. - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, as far as the British -Delegation is concerned, they desire to support what the American Chief -Prosecutor has said, and we do not feel we can usefully add anything. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To M. Faure of the French Delegation._] Do you wish to -add anything? - -M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President, I wish simply to inform the Court that the French Prosecution -is entirely in accord with the remarks of the American and Soviet -Prosecutors. - -I think, as the representative of the American Prosecution said, it is -impossible to settle the question of evidence in this Trial solely by -hearing oral testimony in the courtroom, for under those circumstances -it might be opportune to call to the witness stand all the inhabitants -of the territories involved, which is obviously impossible. The Defense -will have every opportunity of discussing the documents which have been -presented by the Prosecution, including the written testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that Counsel for Kaltenbrunner was -suggesting that every witness must be called but that witnesses who were -in Germany and available should be called and that their evidence should -not be given by affidavit. - -M. FAURE: The Defense has the right of calling them as witnesses if it -so desires. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add a few more words to this important question? -The replies which have just been given illustrate that one of the main -principles of the proceedings is that the Trial should proceed speedily. -That is also expressed in Article 19 of the Charter, and no one can hope -more than we that this principle be followed; but it is nevertheless my -opinion that another principle, the highest known to mankind, the -principle of truth, should not thereby suffer. If there is a fear that -truth will suffer through an over-hasty trial, then formal methods of -procedure must take a secondary place. There are human principles which -remain unspoken, which need not be spoken. - -This spirit of truth is certainly contained in and governs Article 19; -and the objections I raised to the testimony of this witness seem to me -justified to such a degree that the important principle of speeding up -the Trial should give way to the principle of truth. Humanity itself is -in question here. We want to establish the truth for our own generation -and for that of our children. But if such testimony remains untold for -months, then a part of mankind might well despair of all humanity and -the German people, in particular, would suffer. - -DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for the Defendant Bormann): May it please -the Tribunal, I should like to bring up one other point, which appears -to me important, because it was apparently the real source of this -discussion. According to our legal system it is the duty of the -Prosecution to produce not only the incriminating evidence but also -evidence for the defense of the accused. I can well understand that my -colleague, Dr. Kauffmann, protests the Prosecution’s failure to mention -a very important point, namely, that the German authorities indicted -this inhuman SS leader and his wife and condemned them to death. It is -highly probable that the Prosecution knew of this and that these -horrible exhibits of perverted human nature, which were presented to us, -were found in the files of the German Court. - -I believe the whole discussion would not have arisen if the Prosecution -had mentioned, as part of the ghastly evidence, the fact that the German -authorities themselves passed judgment on this inhuman man and condemned -him to death. - -We find ourselves in difficulties because, in contrast to our own -procedure, the Prosecution for the most part simply presents -incriminating evidence but omits to present the exculpating evidence -which may form part of any document or part of the testimony of a -witness. If the German procedure had been followed in the present case -and if the Prosecution had stated that this man was condemned to death, -then in the first place, the evidence against the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner would not have appeared so weighty and secondly, public -opinion would, on the whole, have been left with a different impression. -My colleague Kauffmann could then have limited himself to proving at a -later stage of the Trial that Kaltenbrunner had, in fact, nothing at all -to do with this affair; and the inhuman character of the proceedings and -the dreadful impression which it made on us would have been avoided. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you explain the part of the German law to which you -were referring, where you say it is the duty of the Prosecution not only -to produce evidence for the Prosecution but also to produce evidence for -the Defense. - -DR. BERGOLD: That is a general principle of German jurisprudence, -established in Paragraph 160 of the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. It is -one of the basic principles of law in Germany to . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Give me that reference again. - -DR. BERGOLD: Paragraph 160. German law incorporates this principle in -order to enable an accused person to . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: 160 of what? - -DR. BERGOLD: Of the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. The same is true of -Austria. In the Austrian Code of Penal Procedure there is a similar -paragraph with which, however, I am not quite familiar. This principle -is established to permit the whole truth of a case to be brought to -light, since a defendant in custody is frequently not in a position to -produce all the evidence in his favor. Therefore, under German law it is -the Prosecution’s duty to present the exculpating as well as the -incriminating evidence in a particular case. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question arising out of Pfaffenberger’s evidence does -not specifically concern the Defendant Von Papen, because that part of -the Indictment does not apply to his case. I am therefore speaking only -of the principle behind it. I believe that in practice the effect of the -different opinions expressed by the Prosecution and the Defense cannot -be of very great importance. Justice Jackson agrees with us that every -witness whose affidavit is presented can, if available, be called to the -stand by the Defense. Thus, in all cases in which the Defense holds that -an affidavit is evidence of secondary value and as such insufficient and -that direct examination of the witness is necessary—in all such cases -there would be duplication of evidence, namely, the reading of the -affidavit and then the examination and cross-examination of the witness. -This would undoubtedly delay the proceedings of the Trial; and to -prevent that the Tribunal would, in all such cases, rule against the -reading, of the affidavit. Consequently, it is futile for the -Prosecution to present affidavits of witnesses who can be expected to -appear in person later in the proceedings. - -I do not think that the Prosecution should be worried about this. It is -a matter of course that we—and we assume the same is true of the -Prosecution—that we, the members of the Defense, want the Trial to be -as speedy as possible but also want it to proceed cautiously to -establish the full truth. But, it is obvious, if evidence is introduced -which is a potential cause of completely unjust findings, that such -evidence will have to be clarified in a more complicated and -time-consuming way when the witness is called in person. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the objection that has been -raised when the Court adjourns. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I have one word? - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, it is unusual to hear counsel who -opposes an objection a second time. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I merely want to give you the answer to the -question which you asked me as to the whereabouts of Pfaffenberger. My -information is that these affidavits were taken by the American Army at -the time it liberated the people in these concentration camps, at the -same time the films were taken and the whole evidence that was available -gathered. This witness was present at the concentration camp, and at -that time his statements were taken. We do not know his present -whereabouts, and I see no reasonable likelihood that we will be able to -locate him within any short time. We will make an effort. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, might I endeavor to assist? I -think I have now obtained the German order to which the Defense Counsel -referred, Paragraph 160. It is, My Lord, of course, in German. Perhaps I -might hand it up, and the court translators will no doubt deal with the -paragraph. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think one bit of additional information should be -furnished in view of the statements made here that we have information -that we are withholding. Kaltenbrunner has been interrogated. At no time -has he made such a claim, so I am advised by our interrogators; and -under the Charter our duty is to present the case for the Prosecution. I -do not, in any instance, serve two masters. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, I call upon Major Walsh. Major Walsh, did you give a -lettering to the document book with which you are dealing? - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes. If Your Honor please, it is the letter “T.” May it -please the Tribunal, during the last session the Prosecution presented -briefly the preliminary steps leading to the ultimate objective of the -Nazi Party and the Nazi-controlled State, that is, the extermination of -the Jews. Propaganda, decrees, the infamous Nuremberg Laws, boycotts, -registration, and “ghettoization” were the initial measures in the -program. I shall, with the Court’s permission, continue with a -discussion of the methods utilized for the annihilation of the Jewish -people. - -I would like first to discuss starvation. Policies were designed and -adopted to deprive the Jews of the most elemental necessities of life. -Again the Defendant Hans Frank, then Governor General of Poland, wrote -in his diary that hunger rations were introduced in the Warsaw ghetto; -and referring to the new food regulations in August 1942, he callously, -and perhaps casually, noted that by these food regulations he virtually -condemned more than 1 million Jews to death. I offer in evidence that -part of Document 2233(e)-PS, diary of Hans Frank, “Conference Volume,” -24 August 1942, Exhibit USA-283. And I quote: - - “That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be - noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that should the - Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result in a speeding - up of the anti-Jewish measures.” - -Frank’s diary was not the only guide to the deliberate policy of -starvation of the Jews. They were prohibited from pursuing agricultural -activities in order to cut them off from access to the source of food. I -offer Document 1138-PS in evidence, Exhibit USA-284. I refer the Court -to Page 4 of the translation, marked with the Roman numeral V, -Paragraphs a and b. The document is entitled “Provisional Directive on -the Treatment of Jews . . .” and it was issued by the Reich Commissioner -for the Ostland. I read: - - “Jews must be cleaned out from the countryside. The Jews are to - be removed from all trades, especially from trade with - agricultural products and other foodstuffs.” - -Jews were excluded from the purchase of basic food, such as wheat -products, meat, eggs, and milk. - -I offer in evidence Document 1347-PS, Exhibit USA-285, and I quote from -Paragraph 2 on the first page of the translation before the Court. This -is an original decree, dated 18 September 1942, from the Ministry of -Agriculture. I quote: - - “Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning with - the 42d distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat - products, eggs, wheat products, (cake, white bread, wheat rolls, - wheat flour, _et cetera_), whole milk, fresh skimmed milk, as - well as such food distributed not on food ration cards issued - uniformly throughout the Reich but on local supply certificates - or by special announcement of the nutrition office on extra - coupons of the food cards. Jewish children and young people over - 10 years of age will receive the bread ration of the normal - consumer.” - -The sick, the old, and the pregnant mothers were excluded from the -special food concessions allotted to non-Jews. Seizure by the State -Police of food shipments to Jews from abroad was authorized, and the -Jewish ration cards were distinctly marked with “Jew,” in color, across -the face of the cards, so that the storekeepers could readily identify -and discriminate against Jewish purchasers. - -The Czechoslovakian Government published in 1943 an official document -entitled “Czechoslovakia Fights Back.” I offer this book in evidence, -Document 1689-PS, Exhibit USA-286. To summarize the contents of Page -110, it states that the Jewish food purchases were confined to certain -areas and to certain days and hours. As might be expected, the period -permitted for the purchases was during the time when food stocks were -likely to be exhausted. - -By Special Order Number 44 for the Eastern Occupied Territories, dated 4 -November 1941, the Jews were limited to rations as low as only one-half -of the lowest basic category of other people; and the Ministry of -Agriculture was empowered to exclude Jews entirely or partially from -obtaining food, thus exposing the Jewish community to death by -starvation. - -I now offer in evidence Document L-165. - -THE PRESIDENT: Did you read anything from 1689-PS? - -MAJOR WALSH: Just to summarize, Sir, the contents of Page 110. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. Now you are offering L. . . - -MAJOR WALSH: L-165, Your Honor, Exhibit USA-287. I refer the Court to -the last half of the first paragraph of the translation. This is a press -bulletin issued by the Polish Ministry of Information, dated 15 November -1942. The Polish Ministry concludes that, upon the basis of the nature -of the separate rationing and the amount of food available to Jews in -the Warsaw and Kraków ghettos, the system was designed to bring about -starvation; and from the quotation I read: - - “In regard to food supplies they are brought under a completely - separate system, which is obviously aimed at depriving them of - the most elemental necessities of life.” - -I would now like to discuss annihilation within the ghettos. Justice -Jackson in his opening address to the Tribunal made reference to -Document 1061-PS, “The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More,” marked Exhibit -USA-275. - -This finest example of ornate German craftsmanship, leather bound, -profusely illustrated, typed on heavy bond paper, is the almost -unbelievable recital of a proud accomplishment by Major General of the -Police Stroop, who signed the report with a bold hand. General Stroop in -this report first pays tribute to the bravery and heroism of the German -forces who participated in the ruthless and merciless action against a -helpless, defenseless group of Jews, numbering, to be exact, 56,065, -including, of course, the infants and the women. In this document he -proceeds to relate the day-by-day account of the ultimate accomplishment -of his mission—to destroy and to obliterate the Warsaw ghetto. - -According to this report, the ghetto, which was established in Warsaw in -November 1940, was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews; and prior to the -action for the destruction of this ghetto, some 316,000 had already been -deported. The Court will note that this report is approximately 75 pages -in length, and the Prosecution believes that the contents are of such -striking evidentiary value that no part should be omitted from the -permanent records of the Tribunal and that the Tribunal should consider -the entire report in judging the guilt of these defendants. - -The defendants were furnished with several photostatic copies of the -entire document at least 20 days ago and have had ample time, I am sure, -to scrutinize it in detail. If the Court, in the exercise of its -judgment, determines that the entire report may be accepted _in toto_, -the Prosecution believes that the reading of a portion of the summary, -together with brief excerpts from the daily teletype reports, will -suffice for the oral record. I would like the Court to examine it; and I -present it to the Court, together with the duplicate original thereof, -and ask that the Court rule that the entire document may be accepted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, the Court will take that course, provided -that the Prosecution supplies as soon as possible, both to the Soviet -and to the French members of the Tribunal, copies in Russian and French -of the whole document. - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; may I consult with . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not say present immediately, but present as soon as -possible. - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read the passages that you think -necessary? - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes. From Page 6 of the translation before the Court of -Document 1061-PS I would like to read the boastful but nonetheless vivid -account of some of this ruthless action within the Warsaw ghetto. I -quote, second paragraph, Page 6: - - “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken - only by the relentless and energetic use of our shock-troops by - day and night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsführer SS issued - through the Higher SS and Police Leader East at Kraków his order - to complete the combing out of the Warsaw ghetto with the - greatest severity and relentless tenacity. I therefore decided - to destroy the entire Jewish residential area by setting every - block on fire, including the blocks of residential buildings - near the armament works. One building after the other was - systematically evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The - Jews then emerged from their hiding places and dugouts in almost - every case. Not infrequently the Jews stayed in the burning - buildings until, because of the heat and the fear of being - burned alive, they preferred to jump down from the upper stories - after having thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles - into the street from the burning buildings. With their bones - broken they still tried to crawl across the street into blocks - of buildings which had not yet been set on fire or were only - partially in flames. Often the Jews changed their hiding places - during the night by moving into the ruins of burnt-out - buildings, taking refuge there until they were found by our - patrols. Their stay in the sewers also ceased to be pleasant - after the first week. Frequently from the street we could hear - loud voices coming through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the - Waffen-SS, the Police, or the Wehrmacht Engineers courageously - climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not - infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already dead or were - shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive - out the Jews. Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes - and at a fixed time lowered smoke candles into them, with the - result that the bandits fled from what they believed to be gas - into the center of the former ghetto, where they could then be - pulled out of the sewer holes there. A great number of Jews who - could not be counted were exterminated by blowing up sewers and - dugouts. - - - - “The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the - Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became. They fulfilled their - duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as - models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted - from early morning until late at night. At night search patrols, - with rags wound around their feet, remained at the heels of the - Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and - killed Jews who used the night hours for supplementing their - stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting neighboring - groups or exchanging news with them. - - - - “Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS - had only been trained for 3 to 4 weeks before being assigned to - this action, high credit should be given to the pluck, courage, - and devotion to duty which they showed. It must be stated that - the Wehrmacht Engineers, too, executed the blowing up of - dugouts, sewers, and concrete buildings with indefatigability - and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of the Police, a - large part of whom had already been at the front, again excelled - by their dashing spirit. - - - - “Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved - did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose - extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number - of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires but whose - number could not be ascertained.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, in the section that you are just upon now, -ought you not to read the opening paragraphs of this document, which set -out the amount of the losses of the German troops? - -MAJOR WALSH: I will do so, Sir. On Page 1 of the translation, I quote. -The title: “The Warsaw Ghetto is no more.” - - “For the Führer and their country the following fell in the - battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former - Jewish residential area of Warsaw.”—Fifteen names are - thereafter listed. - - - - “Furthermore, the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielenski, born - 13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat, fell on 19 April 1943 while - fulfilling his duty. They gave their utmost, their life. We - shall never forget them. - - - - “The following were wounded. . . .” - -Then follow the names of 60 Waffen-SS personnel, 11 watchmen from -training camps (probably Lithuanians), 12 Security Police officers in SS -units, 5 men of the Polish Police, and 2 soldiers of the Wehrmacht -Engineers. - -Permit me to read some brief excerpts of the daily teletype reports. -Page 13 of the translation, from the teletype message of 22 April 1943, -I read: - - “Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course - of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find - despite all our search operations left their hideouts under the - roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere and appeared on the outside - of the building, trying to escape the flames anyhow. Masses of - them—entire families—were already aflame and jumped from the - windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets - tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these - Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once.” - -And from Page 28 of the translation, the last part of the first -paragraph, I read: - - “When the blocks of buildings mentioned above were destroyed, - 120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they - jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape - the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were - destroyed when the dugouts and sewer entrances were blown up.” - -And on Page 30, second half of the second paragraph, I read: - - “Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were - about to collapse did a considerable number of Jews emerge, - forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and again the - Jews tried to escape even through burning buildings. Innumerable - Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the conflagration perished - in the flames. Others emerged from the upper stories in the last - possible moment and were only able to escape death from the - flames by jumping down. Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews of - whom 204 were shot; and innumerable Jews were destroyed in - dugouts and in the flames.” - -And from Page 34, the second paragraph, I read, beginning the second -line: - - “The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air, - since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dugouts - owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the - raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these - statements it was to be inferred that a considerable number of - Jews are still underground in the ghetto. Today we blew up a - concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire. - In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building - is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of - explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews - therefore still remains the setting of fires.” - -And from Page 35, the last part of the second paragraph, I read: - - “Some depositions speak of three to four thousand Jews still - remaining in underground holes, sewers, and dugouts. The - undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale - operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.” - -And from the teletype message of 15 May 1943 on Page 44, we gather that -the operation is in its last stage. I read the end of the first -paragraph on Page 44: - - “A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings, - which was still intact, in the ghetto and subsequently destroyed - it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings - in the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.” - -On 24 May 1943 the final figures have been compiled by Major General -Stroop. He reports on Page 45, last paragraph: - - “Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in - the former Jewish residential area during large-scale - operations; 6,929 Jews were destroyed by transporting them to T. - II”—which we believe to be Treblinka, Camp Number 2, which will - later be referred to—“the sum total of Jews destroyed is - therefore 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated - number of 5,000 to 6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up - or by perishing in the flames.” - -The Court has noted within the report 1061-PS a number of photographs; -and with the Court’s permission I should like to show a few of these -photographs, still pictures, on the screen, unless the Court believes -that reference to the original text will be sufficient for the Court’s -purpose. - -THE PRESIDENT: No; if you want to put them on the screen, you may do so. -Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn now and you can put them on -the screen afterwards. - - [_A recess was taken._] - - [_Still pictures were projected on the screen in the courtroom._] - -MAJOR WALSH: This first picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] -is shown on Page 27 of the photographs in Document 1061-PS. It is -entitled “The Destruction of a Block of Buildings.” The Court will -recall those portions of the teletype messages that referred to the -setting of fires for the purpose of driving out the Jews. This picture, -taken from the record, portrays such a scene. - -This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 21 of -the photographs contained in the exhibit, and the caption is “Smoking -out of the Jews and Bandits.” Excerpts from the teletype messages read -in the record relate to the use of smoke as a means of forcing Jews out -of the hiding places. - -This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 36 of -the photographs in the exhibit and it is called “Fighting a Nest of -Resistance.” It is obviously a picture of an explosive blast being used -to destroy one of the buildings, and the Court may recall the message of -7 May 1943 that related to the blowing up of buildings as a lengthy -process requiring an enormous amount of explosive. The same message -reported that the best method for destroying the Jews was the setting of -fires. - -This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is taken from Page -36 of the photographs. The Court’s attention is invited to the figure of -a man in mid-air who appears in the picture about halfway between the -center and the upper right-hand corner. He has jumped from one of the -upper floors of the burning building. A close examination of this -picture by the Court in the original photograph will disclose other -figures, in the upper floor windows, who apparently are about to follow -him. The teletype message of 22 April reported that entire families -jumped from burning buildings and were liquidated at once. - -This picture [_pointing to a picture on the screen_] is from Page 39 of -the photographs. It is entitled “The Leader of the Large-scale Action.” -The Nazi-appointed commander of this action was SS Major General Stroop, -who probably is the central figure in this picture. I cannot refrain -from commenting at this point on the smiling faces of the group shown -there, in the midst of the violence and destruction. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now? - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell the Tribunal where the document was found? - -MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir. I do not have the history, -but I shall be very pleased to submit the background and history to the -Court at the beginning of the afternoon session. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, I think, would like to know where it was -found and to whom it was submitted. - -MAJOR WALSH: I have that. I believe that is contained in the document. -The teletype messages, Sir, that are contained in this exhibit were all -addressed to the Higher SS and Police Führer, SS Obergruppenführer and -General of the Police Krüger or his deputy. - -It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, first to place the -Jews within the ghettos to effect the elimination. In the Baltic States -a more direct course of action was followed. I refer to Document L-180, -now in evidence, which is Exhibit USA-276. This is a report by SS -Brigade Führer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 1941, entitled -“Action Group A,” found in Himmler’s private files. He reported that -135,567 persons, nearly all Jews, were murdered in accordance with basic -orders directing the complete annihilation of the Jews. This voluminous -document provides me with the following statement by the same SS Brigade -Führer, and from the translation at the bottom of Page 6, the second -sentence of the last paragraph, I read: - - “To our surprise it was not easy, at first, to set in motion an - extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the - partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this purpose - primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice - given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in Kovno and - in such a way that no German order or German instigation was - noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night - from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans did away with more - than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several synagogues or - destroying them by other means and burning down a Jewish - dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the - following nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way.” - -From the last part of Paragraph 3, Page 7, I read: - - “It was possible, though, through similar influences on the - Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against the Jews - also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed - and about 400 Jews were killed.” - -Nazi ingenuity reached a new high mark with the construction and -operation of the gas van as a means of mass annihilation of the Jews. A -description of these vehicles of horror and death and the operation of -them is fully set forth in a captured top-secret document, dated 16 May -1942, addressed to SS Obersturmbannführer Rauff, 8 -Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, from Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmführer. I -offer this document, 501-PS, Exhibit USA-288. I quote: - - “The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While - the vans in the first series can also be put into action if the - weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (Saurer) - stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance - for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply - skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is - a question now of whether the van can be used only when it - stands at the place of execution. First the van has to be - brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. - The place of execution is usually 10 to 15 kilometers away from - the highway and is difficult of access because of its location; - in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the - persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then - they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, - which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way - left: to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to - the spot. - - - - “I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as - house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each - side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, - such as one often sees on farm houses in the country. The vans - became so well-known that not only the authorities but also the - civilian population called the van ‘death van’ as soon as one of - the vehicles appeared. It is my opinion the van cannot be kept - secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.” - -And then I read the fourth paragraph on this page: - - “Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and - highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course - of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should not be - brought to Berlin for repairs. Transportation to Berlin would be - much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to - save these expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks - soldered and, if that should no longer be possible, to notify - Berlin immediately by radio, that License Number . . . is out of - order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all - the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, - so that they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas - which eventually would escape. I should like to take this - opportunity to bring the following to your attention: Several - commands have had the unloading, after the application of gas, - done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the - commanders of these special detachments concerned the immense - psychological injury and damage to their health which that work - can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later - on. The men complained to me about headaches which appeared - after each unloading. Nevertheless they don’t want to change the - orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work - could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from - such damage, I request orders be issued accordingly. The - application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order - to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the - accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to - be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by - dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by - correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the - prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and - excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed. - - - - “Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be - reached with further news. Signed, Doctor Becker, SS - Untersturmführer.” - -On Page 3 in Document 501-PS we find a letter signed by Hauptsturmführer -Trühess on the subject of S-Vans, addressed to the Reich Security Main -Office, Room II-D-3-A, Berlin, marked “top secret.” This letter -establishes that the vans were used for the annihilation of the Jews. I -read this top-secret message; subject, “S-Vans”: - - “A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, - arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security - Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia. - - - - “The three S-vans which are there are not sufficient for that - purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5 tons). At the - same time I request the shipment of 20 gas hoses for the three - S-vans on hand (two Diamond, one Saurer), since the ones on hand - are leaky already.”—Signed—“the Commandant of the Security - Police and the Security Service, Ostland.” - -It would appear from the documentary evidence that a certain amount of -discord existed between the officials of the German Government as to the -proper means and methods used in connection with the program of -extermination. A secret report dated 18 June 1943, addressed to -Defendant Rosenberg, complained that 5,000 Jews killed by the police and -SS might have been used for forced labor and chided them for failing to -bury the bodies of those liquidated. I offer in evidence this file, -Document Number R-135, Exhibit USA-289. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it in these volumes, Major Walsh? - -MAJOR WALSH: I think, Sir, that will be found in the assembly of the -document book in our case; that has been placed in front of R-124. I -quote from the letter referred to, addressed to the Reich Minister for -the Occupied Eastern Territories, the first paragraph of the -translation: - - “The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no - further discussion. However, it appears hardly believable that - this was done in the way described in the report of the General - Commissioner of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against that? Imagine - only that these occurrences might become known to the other side - and be exploited by them! Most likely such propaganda would have - no effect, only because people who hear and read about it simply - would not be ready to believe it.” - -The last part of Paragraph 3 on this page reads: - - “To lock men, women, and children into barns and to set fire to - them does not appear to be a suitable method for combatting - bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This - method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our - reputation severely.” - -Günther, the prison warden at Minsk, in a letter dated 31 May 1943, -addressed to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia, subject: -“Action against Jews,” was critical by implication. With the Court’s -permission I would like to read this entire letter, part of Document -R-135, Page 5, subject: “Action Against Jews”: - - “On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel - Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, née Rosenthal, were - committed to the court prison by the Security Service . . . . - Since that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over - to us had their gold bridgework, crowns, and fillings pulled or - broken out. This happens always 1 to 2 hours before the - respective action. - - - - “Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been - finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation gold was - taken only in two actions—on 14 April 1943, from 172, and on 27 - April 1943, from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the Jews had gold - teeth, bridgework, or fillings. Hauptscharführer Rübe of the - Security Service was always personally present, and he took the - gold along, too. - - - - “Before 13 April 1943 this was not done. Signed, Günther, Prison - Warden.” - -This letter was forwarded to the Defendant Rosenberg as Reich Minister -for the Occupied Eastern Territories on 1 June 1943. I will read the -covering letter, part of Document R-135, Page 4, to the Reich Minister -of the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin, through the Reich -Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga; Subject, “Actions against Jews in -the Prison of Minsk”: - - “The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in - Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich - Commissioner for Information.”—Signed—“the General - Commissioner in Minsk.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Does “respective action,” as indicated in the letter -dated the 31st of May 1943, mean execution? - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; we so interpret it. The Court will recall that -the ridding of the Jews via gas vans ties in very closely with the -second letter of the transport of Jews arriving for that purpose. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was this document found in Rosenberg’s file? - -MAJOR WALSH: I am so informed, Sir. A further complaint is contained in -a secret letter addressed to General of the Infantry Thomas, chief of -the industrial armament department, dated 2 December 1941. It might be -noted with interest that the apprehensive writer of this letter stated -that he did not forward the communication through official channels. I -offer in evidence captured Document 3257-PS; and I quote from the first -paragraph. This is Exhibit USA-290: - - “For the personal information of the chief of the industrial - armament department, I am forwarding a total account of the - present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the - difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems - which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable - clarity. - - - - “Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report - through official channels or from making it known to other - departments interested in it because I do not expect any results - that way, but on the contrary am apprehensive that the - difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might - only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.” - - - - “Jewish problem”—Paragraph c, Page 1: - - - - “Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a - difficult problem because the Jews constituted a large part of - the urban population. We therefore have to deal—just as in the - Government General—with a mass problem of policy concerning the - population. Many cities had a percentage of Jews exceeding 50 - percent. Only the rich Jews had fled from the German troops. The - majority of Jews remained under German administration. The - latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that - these Jews represented almost entire trade and even a part of - the manpower in small and medium industries, besides business, - which had in part become superfluous as a direct or indirect - result of the war. The elimination therefore necessarily had - far-reaching economic consequences and even direct consequences - for the armament industry (production for supplying the - troops).” - -Paragraph 1 on Page 2: - - “The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious—obliging - from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might - displease the German administration. That they hated the German - administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot - be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole - or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage - . . . . Surely there were some terrorists or saboteurs among - them, just as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that - the Jews as such represented a danger to the German Armed - Forces. The output produced by Jews who, of course, were - prompted by nothing but the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to - the troops and the German administration. - - - - “The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly - after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later, - specially detached formations of police executed a planned - shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded from east to - west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the - Ukrainian militia; and unfortunately, in many instances also - with members of the Armed Forces taking part voluntarily. The - way these actions, which included men and old men, women, and - children of all ages, were carried out was horrible. The great - masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar - measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000 - to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the - Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat; no consideration - was given to the interests of economy. - - - - “Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the - Jewish problem applied to the Ukraine, which obviously was based - on the ideological theories as a matter of principle, had the - following results: - - - - “(a) Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the - cities; - - - - “(b) Elimination of a part of the population which undoubtedly - hated us; - - - - “(c) Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many - instances indispensable even in the interests of the Armed - Forces; - - - - “(d) Consequences as to foreign policy propaganda which are - obvious; - - - - “(e) Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect - contact with the execution; - - - - “(f) Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the - execution—regular police.” - -Lest the Court be persuaded to the belief that these conditions related, -existed only in the East, I invite attention to the official Netherlands -Government report by the Commissioner for Repatriation as indicative of -the treatment of the Jews in the West. - -This document is a recital of the German measures taken in the -Netherlands against the Dutch Jews. The decrees, the anti-Semitic -demonstrations, the burning of synagogues, the purging of Jews from the -economic life of their country, the food restrictions against them, -forced labor, concentration camp confinement, deportation, and -death—all follow the same pattern that was effected throughout -Nazi-occupied Europe. - -I how refer to Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, already in evidence. -It is not intended to read this document in evidence, but it is deemed -important to invite the Court’s attention to that portion of the report -relating to the deportation of Dutch Jews shown on Page 5 of the -translation. There the Court will note that full Jews being liable to -deportation number 140,000. The Court will also note that the total -number of deportees was 117,000, representing more than 83 percent of -all the Jews in the Netherlands. Of these 115,000 were deported to -Poland for slave labor, according to the Netherlands report, and after -departure all trace of them was lost. Regardless of victory or defeat to -Germany, the Jew was doomed. It was the expressed intent of the Nazi -State that, whatever the German fate might be, the Jew would not -survive. - -I offer in evidence Document L-53, stamped “top secret,” Exhibit -USA-291. This message is from the Commandant of the Sipo and SD for the -Radom District, addressed to SS Hauptsturmführer Thiel on the subject, -“Clearance of Prisons.” I read the body of this message: - - “I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the Sipo - and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present - situation, particularly, those suspects handed over by the civil - police need only be subjected to a short formal interrogation - provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are - then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp - should no court-martial proceeding be necessary or should there - be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of - discharges very low. Should the situation at the front - necessitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total - clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly in - such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners, the - prison inmates are to be eliminated and their bodies disposed of - as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building, _et - cetera_). If necessary, Jews still employed in the armament - industry or on other work are to be dealt with in the same way. - - - - “The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy—be it the WB - or the Red Army—must be avoided under all circumstances, nor - may they fall into their hands alive.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the WB? - -MAJOR WALSH: I have inquired about the WB, Your Honor, from several -sources and have not found an understanding or a statement of it. -Perhaps before the afternoon session I may be able to enlighten the -Court. I have not yet been able to find out. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where was the document found? - -MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does it relate to prisoners of war, did you say? - -MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir; including therein, of course, prisoners of war as -well as all Jews. The history of the document, Sir, I will try to gather -for the Court’s information. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Did you tell us what the Sipo were? - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I furnished the Court with that; that is the -Security Police, Sir. - -This presentation, if the Court please, would be incomplete without -incorporating herein reference to the concentration camps insofar as -they relate to the hundreds of thousands—millions—of Jews who died by -mass shooting, gas, poison, starvation, and other means. The subject of -concentration camps and all its horrors was shown to this Tribunal not -only in the motion picture film but by the most able presentation of Mr. -Dodd yesterday; and it is not intended, at this time, to refer to the -camps—only insofar as they relate to the part they played in the -annihilation of the Jewish people. For example, in the camp at Auschwitz -during July 1944 Jews were killed at the rate of 12,000 daily. This -information is contained in Document L-161, Exhibit USA-292. The -Document L-161 is an official Polish report on Auschwitz Concentration -Camp. It is dated 31 May 1945. I have taken a short excerpt from this -report on the original marked . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you made a mistake, did you not? It is not a -Polish report; it is a British report. - -MAJOR WALSH: I understand, Sir, it was compiled originally by the Polish -Government and perhaps distributed from London. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well. - -MAJOR WALSH: I quote: - - “During July 1944 Hungarian Jews were being liquidated at the - rate of 12,000 daily; and as the crematoria could not deal with - such numbers, many bodies were thrown into large pits and - covered with quicklime.” - -I offer in evidence Document 3311-PS, Exhibit USA-293. This is an -official Polish Government Commission report on the investigation of -German crimes in Poland. The document describes the concentration camp -at Treblinka; and from Page 1, Paragraph 3 and 4, I read as follows: - - “In March 1942 the Germans began to erect another camp, - Treblinka B, in the neighborhood of Treblinka A, intended to - become a place of torment for Jews. - - - - “The erection of this camp was closely connected with the German - plans aimed at a complete destruction of the Jewish population - in Poland, which necessitated the creation of a machinery by - means of which the Polish Jews could be killed in large numbers. - Late in April 1942 erection was completed of the first chambers - in which these general massacres were to be performed by means - of steam. Somewhat later the erection of the real death - building, which contains 10 death chambers, was finished. It was - opened for wholesale murders early in autumn 1942.” - -And on Page 3 of this report, beginning with the second paragraph, the -Polish Commission describes graphically the procedure for the -extermination within the camp: - - “The average number of Jews dealt with at the camp in the summer - of 1942 was about two railway transports daily, but there were - days of much higher efficiency. From autumn 1942 this number was - falling. - - - - “After unloading in the siding, all victims were assembled in - one place, where men were separated from women and children. In - the first days of the existence of the camp the victims were - made to believe that after a short stay in the camp, necessary - for bathing and disinfection, they would be sent farther east - for work. Explanations of this sort were given by SS men who - assisted at the unloading of the transports, and further - explanations could be read in notices stuck up on the walls of - the barracks. But later, when more transports had to be dealt - with, the Germans dropped all pretenses and only tried to - accelerate the procedure. - - - - “All victims had to strip off their clothes and shoes, which - were collected afterwards, whereupon all victims, women and - children first, were driven into the death chambers. Those too - slow or too weak to move quickly were driven in by rifle butts, - by whipping and kicking, often by Sauer himself. Many slipped - and fell; the next victims pressed forward and stumbled over - them. Small children were simply thrown inside. After being - filled up to capacity, the chambers were hermetically closed and - steam was let in. In a few minutes all was over. The Jewish - menial workers had to remove the bodies from the platform and to - bury them in mass graves. By and by, as new transports arrived, - the cemetery grew, extending in an easterly direction. - - - - “From reports received it may be assumed that several hundred - thousands of Jews have been exterminated in Treblinka.” - -I now offer in evidence the document identified by Number L-22, Exhibit -USA-294. This is an official United States Government report issued by -the Executive Office of the President of the United States, War Refugee -Board, on the German camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau, dated 1944. On -Page 33 of this report is set forth the number of Jews gassed in -Birkenau in the 2-year period between April 1942 and April 1944. I have -been assured that the figure printed in this report is not a -typographical error. The number shown is 1,765,000. - -I would now like to turn to the German bookkeeping and statistics for -enlightenment on the extermination of Jews in Poland. Referring again to -the diary of Hans Frank already in evidence, Document 2233-PS, Exhibit -USA-281, I read briefly from the beginning of the fourth paragraph on -Page 1: - - “For us the Jews also represent extraordinarily malignant - gluttons. - - - - “We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the Government - General . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, you have read this already yourself. - -MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir, that is true. I just want to make reference to it -again, Sir, for comparison with other figures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - MAJOR WALSH: “. . . perhaps with the Jewish mixtures, and - everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews.” - -Now this figure, if the Court please, was as of 16 December 1941. I now -wish to turn to 25 January 1944, 3 years and 1 month later, and make -reference to another excerpt from Frank’s diary, 2233-PS, loose-leaf -volume Exhibit USA-295. This volume covers the period from 1 January -1944 to 28 February 1944, and Page 5 of the original reads: - - “At the present time we still have in the Government General - perhaps 100,000 Jews.” - -In this period of 3 years, according to the records of the then Governor -General of Occupied Poland, between 2,400,000 and 3,400,000 Jews had -been eliminated. - -The Prosecution could offer this Tribunal a wealth of evidence on the -total number of Jews who died by Nazi hands, but it is believed that -cumulative evidence would not vary the guilt of these defendants. - -I do wish, however, to offer one document, a statement, to establish the -deaths of 4 million Jews in camps and deaths of 2 million Jews by the -State Police in the East, making a total of 6 million—Document 2738-PS, -Exhibit USA-296. This is a statement—of Adolf Eichmann, Chief of the -Jewish Section of the Gestapo, and the source of the figures -quoted—made by Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, Deputy Group Leader of the foreign -section of the Security Service, Amt VI of the RSHA. Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, -in affidavit form, made the following statement; and I quote from Page -2: - - “Approximately 4 million Jews had been killed in the various - concentration camps, while an additional 2 million met death in - other ways, the major part of which were shot by operational - squads of the Security Police during the campaign against - Russia.” - -May I, in conclusion, emphasize that the captured documents in evidence -are, almost without exception, from the official sources of the Nazi -Party. - -THE PRESIDENT: You only read that one statement, but where does the -person who made the affidavit get his information from? - -MAJOR WALSH: I shall be pleased to read that in there, Sir. I made a -statement that Eichmann has been the source of the information given to -Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, one of his assistants, and on Page 1 it says: - - “According to my knowledge Eichmann was at that time a section - leader in the Amt IV (Gestapo) of RSHA; and in addition he had - been ordered by Himmler to get hold of the Jews in all the - European countries and to transport them to Germany. Eichmann - was then very much impressed with the fact that Romania had - withdrawn from the war in those days. Therefore, he had come to - me to get information about the military situation, which I - received daily from the Hungarian . . . Ministry of War and from - the Commander of the Waffen-SS in Hungary. He expressed his - conviction that Germany had lost the war and that he personally - had no further chance. He knew that he would be considered one - of the main war criminals by the United Nations, since he had - millions of Jewish lives on his conscience. I asked him how many - that was, to which he answered that although the number was a - great Reich secret, he would tell me since I, as a historian - too, would be interested and that probably he would not return - anyhow from his command in Romania. He had, shortly before that, - made a report to Himmler, as the latter wanted to know the exact - number of Jews who had been killed.” - -It was on that basis of this information, Sir, that I read the following -quotation. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -THE PRESIDENT: The motion that was made this morning on behalf of the -Defendant Kaltenbrunner is denied, and the affidavit is admitted and -will not be stricken from the record. But the Tribunal wished me to say -that it is open to the Defendants’ Counsel, in accordance with the -Charter and the Rules, to make a motion, in writing, if they wish to do -so, for the attendance of Pfaffenberger for cross-examination and to -state in that motion the reasons therefor. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now bring up a question similar, though in some -respects different, from that of Pfaffenberger? I request that the -evidence of Dr. Hoettl, which was read into the record this morning be -stricken out again for the following two reasons. As far as I know, Dr. -Hoettl is here in Nuremberg . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Do you understand that the Tribunal has just -denied the motion that you made this morning? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I understood that perfectly. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your motion now? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to ask that the evidence of Dr. Hoettl be -stricken from the record. My reasons for this request are rather -different from those given this morning in the Pfaffenberger case. - -As can be seen from the affidavit, Dr. Hoettl was interrogated on the -26th of November hardly 3 weeks ago. Moreover I gather that Dr. Hoettl -is kept in custody here in Nuremberg. No delay would therefore be -involved if this witness were called to the stand. - -This man held a significant position in the SS and for that reason I -have already applied in writing that he be called as a witness. I am -convinced that there is a large amount of important evidence which he -can reveal to the Court. Dr. Hoettl’s deposition is infinitely -important. The death of millions of people is involved here. His -affidavit is based largely on inferences, on hearsay; I believe that the -facts are very different, and I would not like to apply later, after -weeks or months, for the witness to be brought into Court. - -MAJOR WALSH: If the Court please, excerpts from the affidavit of Dr. -Wilhelm Hoettl were read into the record this morning for the purpose -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Wait—what was the number? - -MAJOR WALSH: Document 2738-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on. - -MAJOR WALSH: Dr. Hoettl’s affidavit 2738 was in part read into the -record this morning for the sole purpose of showing the approximate -number of Jews, according to his estimates, that had met death at the -hands of the German State. No other portion of his testimony was -referred to and the evidence offered was only for the sole purpose of -establishing his estimate of the number. His position in the Party and -in the state, as well as the position of Adolf Eichmann, the source of -his information, was also stated into the record. - -I believe that Dr. Hoettl, if he is desired for any other purpose by the -Defense, may be called by the Defense, but the Prosecution had no other -purpose in utilizing his evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more? - -MAJOR WALSH: That is all, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the same ruling in this case as in the -case of Pfaffenberger, namely, that the affidavit is admitted in -evidence but that it is open to Defendants’ Counsel to make a motion, in -writing, for the attendance of the witness for cross-examination and to -state in that motion the reasons for it. - -MAJOR WALSH: During the morning session the Court requested certain -information concerning documents that had been offered and accepted in -evidence. I refer to Document 1061-PS, the report “The Warsaw Ghetto Is -No More.” This report, I am told, was prepared for presentation at a -meeting of the SS Police leaders to be held on 18 May 1943. That is -indicated on Page 45 of the translation before the Court. - -This document was captured by the 7th United States Army and delivered -by them to the G-2 of the United States Forces in the European Theater. -In turn they were delivered to Colonel Storey of the United States -prosecutors’ staff, some months ago. The Court also ignored . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, I think the Tribunal also wished to know -whether you could tell us to whom the report had been made? - -MAJOR WALSH: The report, Sir, according to the teletypes—the daily -teletypes, Sir—was addressed to the Higher SS and Police Leader East, -SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger, or his deputy. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -MAJOR WALSH: The Court further inquired about Document L-53 and I have -obtained some information concerning this document. This document was -captured by T-Force of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment Number -220, found among the German records at Weimar, Germany, sometime prior -to 10 May 1945. - -The Court further inquired, concerning this document, the meaning of the -letters “WB.” I regret that I have been unable to obtain definite -information as to the meaning of “WB” but it has been suggested to me -that it might mean Westbund or Western Ally because it is used in -connection with the capture—the destruction of all prisoners before -capture by either the WB or the Red Armies, and I presume that it may -mean Westbund. - -The slaughter of the Jews in Europe cannot be expressed in figures -alone, for the impact of this slaughter is even more tragic to the -future of the Jewish people and mankind. Ancient Jewish communities with -their own rich spiritual, cultural, and economic life, bound up for -centuries with the life of the nations in which they flourished, have -been completely obliterated. The contribution of the Jewish people to -civilization, the arts, the sciences, industry, and culture, need not, I -am sure, be elaborated upon before this Tribunal. Their destruction, -carried out continuously, deliberately, intentionally, and methodically -by the Nazis, represents a loss to civilization of special qualities and -abilities that cannot possibly be recouped. - -I have not attempted to recount the multitudinous and diabolical crimes -committed against the Jewish people by the state which these defendants -ruled, because, with sober regard for contemporary and historical truth, -a detailed description of some of these crimes would transcend the -utmost reaches of the human faculty of expression. The mind already -recoils and shrinks from the acceptance of the incredible facts already -related. Rather, it is my purpose to elucidate the pattern, the -successful and successive stages, the sequence and concurrence of the -crimes committed, the pre-determined means to a pre-ordained end. - -Yet, these cold, stark, brutal facts and figures, drawn largely from the -defendants’ own sources and submitted in evidence before this Tribunal, -defy rebuttal. - -From conception to execution, from the Party program of 1920 to the -gloating declarations of Himmler and the Defendant Frank in 1943 and -1944, the annihilation of the Jewish people in Europe was man-made—made -by the very men, sitting in the defendants’ box, brought to judgment -before this Tribunal. - -Before closing may I acknowledge with appreciation the untiring services -of the group of the staff of the United States’ Prosecution, through -whose painstaking search, analysis, and study, this presentation of -evidence was made possible: Captain Seymour Krieger, Lieutenant Brady -Bryson, Lieutenant Frederick Felton, Sergeant Isaac Stone, and Mr. Hans -Nathan. - -COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation, concerning -Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries, will be presented by -Captain Sam Harris. - -CAPTAIN SAMUEL HARRIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): -May the Tribunal please, documents relating to the Nazi program of -Germanization and spoliation have been assembled in a document book -bearing the letter “U.” These document books are now being distributed -for the use of the members of the Tribunal. I ask Your Honors to note -that the tabs on the side of the document book are numbered 1 to 30. The -index sheet at the front of the book keys these numbers to the EC, PS, -and R numbers of our exhibits. - -For Your Honors’ convenience we have also numbered the pages of each -exhibit in pencil at the upper right-hand corner of each exhibit. - -The documents which we shall introduce were collected by Lieutenant -Kenyon, who sits at my right, and by Doctors Derenberg and Jacoby. -Without their untiring efforts, this presentation would not have been -possible. - -Evidence has already been introduced by Mr. Alderman to prove that the -defendants conspired to wage aggressive war. It has also been proved -that the desire for Lebensraum was one of the chief forces motivating -the conspirators to plan, launch, and wage their wars of aggression. We -propose at this time to present evidence disclosing what the -conspirators intended to do with conquered territories, called by them -Lebensraum, after they had succeeded in overpowering the victims of -their aggressions. - -We have broadly divided this subject into two categories: Germanization -and spoliation. When we speak of plans to germanize, we mean plans to -assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally, socially, and -economically into the German Reich. Germanization, we shall demonstrate, -meant the obliteration of the former national character of the conquered -territories and the extermination of all elements which could not be -reconciled with the Nazi ideology. By spoliation, we mean the plunder of -public and private property and, in general, the exploitation of the -people and the natural resources of occupied countries. - -We propose, with the permission of Your Honors, to introduce at this -time 30 documents in all. These documents lay bare some of the secret -plans of the conspirators to germanize, to plunder, to despoil, and to -destroy. They do not, of course, tell the whole story of all the -conspirators’ plans in this field. In some instances proof of the plan -is derived from the acts committed by the conspirators. But these few -documents are particularly illuminating with respect to the -conspirators’ plans for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia; and they -indicate the outlines of carefully conceived plans for the rest of -Europe. Others who follow will fill in this outline by showing a series -of outrages committed on so vast a scale that no doubts will exist that -they were committed according to plan. - -Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators’ -theories upon Lebensraum; and I turn to that country first. - -The four western provinces of Poland were purportedly incorporated into -Germany by an order of 8 October 1939. This order, which was signed by -Hitler, Lammers, and Defendants Göring, Frick, and Hess, is set forth in -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, Page 2042; and we ask the Tribunal to -take judicial notice thereof. These areas of Poland are frequently -referred to in correspondence among the conspirators as “incorporated -Eastern Territories.” The remainder of Poland, which was seized by the -Nazi invaders, was established as the Government General of Poland by an -order of Hitler dated 12 October 1939. By that same order Defendant Hans -Frank was named Governor General of the newly created Government -General; and Defendant Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy Governor General. -This order is set forth in _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1939, Part I, Page 2077; -and we ask the Tribunal also to take judicial notice of it. - -The plans with respect to Poland were rather complicated; and I believe -that the significance of specific items of proof may be more readily -apparent if, in advance of the introduction of the documents, I am -permitted briefly to indicate the broad pattern of these plans. - -We submit that the documents we are about to introduce on Poland show -the following: - -First: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people and -material resources of the Government General of Poland in order to -strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the Government General, -and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later stage plans were -formulated for creating islands of German settlements in the more -fertile regions of the Government General in order to engulf the native -Polish population and accelerate the process of Germanization. - -Second: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to be a part -of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly germanized. To that end, the -conspirators planned: - -(a) To permit the retention of the productive facilities in the -incorporated area, all of which, of course, would be dedicated to the -Nazi war machine. - -(b) They planned to deport to the Government General many hundreds of -thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia, and other -non-compliant elements. We shall show that the Jews who were deported to -the Government General were doomed to speedy annihilation. Moreover, -since the conspirators felt that members of the Polish intelligentsia -could not be germanized and might serve as a center of resistance -against their New Order, they too were to be eliminated. - -(c) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to Germany for -work in the Nazi war machine. This served the twofold purpose of helping -to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine and preventing -the propagation of a new generation of Poles. Mr. Dodd has already -produced abundant proof on this topic, and I shall do no more than refer -to it. - -(d) They planned to mould all persons in the incorporated area who were -deemed to possess German blood into German subjects who would -religiously adhere to the principles of National Socialism. To that end -the conspirators set up an elaborate racial register. Those who resisted -or refused to co-operate in this program were sent to concentration -camps. - -(e) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into the -incorporated area for purposes of settlement. - -(f) And finally, they planned to confiscate the property—particularly -the farms—of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements. The -confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the conspirators’ -larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confiscation likewise -served three additional purposes: (1) It provided land for the new -German settlers and enabled the conspirators to reward their adherents; -(2) dispossessed Polish property owners could be shipped to Germany for -work in the production of implements of war; and (3) the separation of -Polish farmers from their wives furthered the plan to prevent the growth -of a new generation of Poles. - -We turn now to the specific items of proof. - -I first offer in evidence Document Number EC-344 (16), which is Exhibit -Number USA-297. This document is a report of an interview with Defendant -Frank on 3 October 1939 and was found among the files of the OKW, which -were assembled in bulk at the Fechenheim document center. This -particular document was included in a large report prepared in the OKW -by one Captain Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then chief of -the military economic staff of the OKW. I quote from the first 19 lines -of Page 3 of the English text. The German text appears on Page 29, lines -25-36, and Page 30, lines 1-6. The report states, and I quote: - - “In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division - and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper - East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently Governor - General) had with Reich Minister Frank on 3 October 1939 in - Posen, Frank explained the instruction which had been entrusted - to him by the Führer and the economic political directives - according to which he intended to administer Poland. According - to these directives, Poland could be administered only by - utilizing the country by means of ruthless exploitation; removal - of all supplies—raw materials, machines, factory installations, - _et cetera_—which are important for the German war economy; - availability of all workers for work within Germany; reduction - of the entire Polish economy to the absolute minimum necessary - for the bare existence of the population; closing of all - institutions, especially technical schools and colleges in order - to prevent the growth of a new Polish intelligentsia. - Poland”—Defendant Frank stated—and this is an exact - quotation—“Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall - be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire.” - -I should like also to quote from the last six lines of the English text -of this Exhibit. In the German text it is lines 18 to 23 of Page 30. -Defendant Frank further stated, and I quote: - - “By destroying Polish industry its subsequent reconstruction - after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so - that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an - agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for - importation of industrial products.” - -As further proof of the defendant’s plan to plunder and despoil the -Government General of Poland, I next offer in evidence Document Number -EC-410, which is Exhibit Number USA-298. In addition to the proof of the -defendant’s plans to plunder and despoil the Government General, this -document demonstrates the difference in treatment which the conspirators -planned for the incorporated area of Poland and the Government General. -It is a copy of a directive issued and signed by Defendant Göring on 19 -October 1939 and was likewise found among the captured OKW files. I -quote from lines 1 to 19 on Page 1 of the English text. In the German -text it is all of Page 1 and the first line of Page 2. Defendant -Göring’s directive states, and I quote: - - “In the meeting of October 13th I have given detailed - instructions for the economical administration of the occupied - territories. I will repeat them here in short: - - - - “1. The task for the economic treatment of the various - administrative regions is different, depending on whether a - country which will be incorporated politically into the German - Reich is involved or whether we deal with the Government - General, which in all probability, will not be made a part of - Germany, - - - - “In the first-mentioned territories the reconstruction and - expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their - production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as - a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system - at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be - removed from the territories of the Government General all raw - materials, scrap materials, machines, _et cetera_ which are of - use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not - absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked - existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, - unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period - of time and would make it more practical to exploit those - enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their - present location.” - -Once the Government General had been stripped of its industrial -potential, the defendants planned to leave the country desolate. Not -even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear import of the -documents previously introduced and is likewise made clear by Document -Number EC-411, which is Exhibit Number USA-299. I offer this document in -evidence. This document is a copy of an order dated 20 November 1939, by -Defendant Hess, in his capacity as Deputy Führer. This document was also -found in the captured OKW files. I quote the English and German texts in -their entirety. Defendant Hess stated, and I quote: - - “I hear from Party members who came from the Government General - that various agencies, as for instance, the Military Economic - Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, _et cetera_, intend to - reconstruct certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However, - in accordance with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank approved by - the Führer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention - of the Führer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the - Government General.” - -Turning from the defendants’ program of economic spoliation in the -Government General to their program of deportation and resettlement, I -next offer in evidence Document Number 661-PS, which is Exhibit Number -USA-300. This is a secret report, prepared by the Academy of German Law -in January 1940, upon plans for the mass migration of Poles and Jews -from incorporated areas of Poland to the Government General and for the -forcible deportation of able-bodied Poles to Germany. This document was -obtained from the ministerial collecting center at Kassel, Germany. The -date does not appear in the English translation, but it is clearly set -forth on the cover page of the original document as January 1940. Before -quoting from this document, I ask first that the Tribunal take judicial -notice of the decree of 11 July 1934, embodied in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 605, 11 July 1934, which provided that -the Academy of German Law would be a public corporation of the Reich -under the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice and the -Interior, and that its task would be: - - “To promote the reconstruction of German legal life and to - realize, in constant close collaboration with the competent - legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in the - entire sphere of the law.” - -Second, before quoting from the afore-mentioned report of the Academy of -German Law, I should like to offer in evidence Document Number 2749-PS, -which is Exhibit Number USA-301. This is the title page of the -publication of the Academy of German Law for 1940. It is offered for the -purpose of showing that defendant Frank was the President of the Academy -of German Law during the period that the above-mentioned secret report -of the Academy was made. The document specifically states, and I quote: - - “Reich Minister Dr. Hans Frank, President of the Academy for - German Law, 7th year 1940.” - -Now, if I may ask Your Honors to turn to Document Number 661-PS, I -should first like to quote Page 1, lines 6 to 24, of the English text. -In the German text these extracts appear at Page 6, lines 6 to 10; and -line 22, Page 6, to line 4, Page 7. I quote: - - “In the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the - increase of agricultural production, the Government General can, - at the most, absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is - already over-populated in many cases. . . . By further - absorption of 1.6 million resettlers the 1925 Reich census - figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached, - which practically, because of already existing rural - over-population and lack of industry, would result in a double - over-pressure. - - - - “This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice for deportations - from the Reich: - - “The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000); groups of the - remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany - proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether - over 1 million).” - -Continuing the quotation, the report goes on with respect to transfers -from the Reich, and I continue to quote: - - “The Polish intelligentsia, who have been branded as - politicians, and potential political leaders; the leading - economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates, - industrialists and businessmen, _et cetera_; the peasant - population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry - out, by strips of German settlements, the encirclement of Polish - territories in the East.” - -Next I quote the last paragraph on Page 1 of the English text. The -German text is at Page 8, lines 3-10: - - “In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the - Government General as well as in the liberated East, one should - temporarily remove cheap labor by the hundreds of thousands, - employ them for a few years in the Old Reich, and thereby hamper - their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into - the Old Reich must be prevented.)” - -Finally, I quote from the last paragraph of Page 2 of the English text. -In the German text it is the last 5 lines on Page 40: - - “Strictest care is to be taken that secret documents, memoranda, - and official correspondence which contain instructions - detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key, - so that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in - Paris or the U.S.A.” - -Your Honors will recall, from your own experiences, the vicious -propaganda campaigns conducted by Nazi Germany to discredit the Polish -books when they made their appearance in countries friendly to Poland. -The last paragraph of this document which I have just read gives the lie -to that whole Nazi propaganda campaign. - -The plans for the deportation of thousands of innocent people, which are -set forth in the document from which I have just quoted, were not mere -theories spun by lawyers. They represented, as the next three documents -to be offered in evidence will show, a program which was, in fact, -ruthlessly executed. - -I next offer in evidence Document Number 2233(g)-PS, the Frank diaries, -1939, from 25 October to 15 December, which is Exhibit Number USA-302. -This document was obtained from the 7th Army document center at -Heidelberg. I quote from the last paragraph of Page 1, carrying over to -the first two lines of Page 2 of the English text. In the German text -the statements appear at Page 19, lines 19 to 28. Defendant Frank -stated, and I quote: - - “The Reichsführer SS”—meaning Himmler—“wishes that all Jews be - evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to - February approximately 1 million people are to be brought in - this way into the Government General. The families of good - racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory - (approximately 4 million people) should be transferred into the - Reich and individually housed, thereby being uprooted as a - people.” - -I next offer in evidence Document Number EC-305, which is Exhibit Number -USA-303. This exhibit is the top-secret minutes of a meeting held on 12 -February 1940, under the chairmanship of Defendant Göring, on “Questions -Concerning the East.” The document was found in the captured OKW files. -Himmler and Defendant Frank likewise were present at this meeting. - -I initially quote from Page 1, lines 15 to 17, of the English text. -These extracts are found in the front page, lines 1 to 8, of the German -text. The minutes state, and I quote: - - “By way of introduction the General Field Marshal”—meaning - Defendant Göring—“explained that the strengthening of the war - potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to - be taken in the East.” - -I next quote the first two lines of the last paragraph on Page 1 of the -English text. The German text appears at Page 2, lines 2 to 4. - - “Agriculture: The task consists of obtaining the greatest - possible agricultural production from the new eastern Gaue, - disregarding questions of ownership.” - -I next quote from the second paragraph of Page 2 of the English text. -This is at Page 3, lines 22-24, of the German text: - - “Special questions concerning the Government General. . . . The - Government General will have to receive the Jews who are ordered - to emigrate from Germany and the new eastern Gaue.” - -Finally, I quote the paragraph numbered 2 under Roman numeral II of Page -2 of the English text. These statements appear in the German text at -Page 4, lines 3-19: - - “The following reported on the situation in the Eastern - territories. . . . - - - - “2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster”—who said—“‘The - population of the Danzig-West Prussia Gau (newly acquired - territories) is 1.5 million, of whom 240,000 are Germans, - 850,000 well-established Poles, and 300,000 immigrant Poles, - Jews, and asocials (1,800 Jews). There have been evacuated - 87,000 persons, 40,000 of these from Gdynia. From there also the - numerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare, will - have to be deported to the Government General. Therefore an - evacuation of 20,000 additional persons can be counted on for - the current year.’” - -Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiter at the meeting. The -figures that were quoted, it may be noted, were only as of February -1940. The forcible deportations, which are reported in the exhibits from -which I have just read, did not involve merely ordering the unfortunate -victims to leave their homes and to take up new residences elsewhere. -These deportations were accomplished according to plan in an utterly -brutal and inhuman manner. Document Number 1918-PS, which is Exhibit -Number USA-304, affords striking proof of this fact; and I offer it in -evidence. This is a speech delivered by Himmler to officers of the SS on -a day commemorating the presentation of the Nazi flag. It is contained -in a compilation of speeches delivered by Himmler, and was captured by -the Counter-Intelligence branch of the United States Army. The exact -date of the speech does not appear in the exhibit, but its contents -plainly show that it was delivered sometime after Poland had been -overrun. I quote from the second to the eighth lines of Page 1 of the -English text. In the German text this quotation appears on Page 52, -lines 2 to 10. In this speech Himmler said, and I quote: - - “Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the - deportation of these people here. These thoughts came to me - today when watching the very difficult work out there performed - by the Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a - great deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland in weather - 40 degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, ten - thousands, a hundred thousand; where we had to have the - toughness—you should hear this but also forget it again—to - shoot thousands of leading Poles.” - -I repeat the latter statement: - - “Where we had to have the toughness . . . to shoot thousands of - leading Poles.” - -Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive the journey -to the Government General could look forward, at best, to extreme -hardship and exposure to every form of degradation and brutality. Your -Honors will recall Defendant Frank’s statement contained in Document -Number EC-344(16), now Exhibit Number USA-297, which was introduced a -short while ago, that the Polish economy would be reduced to the -absolute minimum necessary for the bare existence of the population. - -Your Honors Will also recall Defendant Göring’s directive in Document -Number EC-410, now Exhibit Number USA-298, also introduced a few moments -ago, that all industrial enterprises in the Government General not -absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the naked existence of the -Polish population must be removed to Germany. A bare and naked -existence, by the precepts of the conspirators, meant virtual -starvation. - -For the Jews who were forcibly deported to the Government General there -was, of course, absolutely no hope. They were, in effect, deported to -their graves. The Defendant Frank, by his own admissions, had dedicated -himself to their complete annihilation. I refer Your Honors to the Frank -diaries, conference volume, 1941, October to December, which is Document -Number 2233(d)-PS, which was introduced by Major Walsh earlier as -Exhibit Number USA-281. The particular statement that I want to quote -appears on Page 4, Your Honor, of Document Number 2233-PS. I believe it -appears at Page 77, lines 9 and 10 of the German text. I quote—this is -what Defendant Frank stated, “We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we -find them, and wherever it is possible. . . .” - -I turn next to that aspect of the conspirators’ program which involved -the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated area who were -deemed to possess German blood. I refer you now, Your Honors, to the -incorporated area, to persons who were deemed to possess German blood. -Such persons, the evidence will show, were given the choice of the -concentration camp or submission to Germanization. Himmler was the chief -executioner of this program; and initially I should like to introduce a -few documents which disclose the powers bestowed upon him and his -conception of his task. - -First, I offer in evidence Document Number 686-PS. This is Exhibit -Number USA-305. This is a copy of a secret decree signed by Hitler and -Defendants Göring and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939, entrusting Himmler -with the task of executing the conspirators’ Germanization program. This -particular document came from the ministerial collection center at -Kassel, Germany. I quote from Page 1, lines 9 to 21 of the English text. -In the German text these extracts appear at Page 1, lines 13 to 25: - - “The Reichsführer SS”—that was Himmler—“has the obligation in - accordance, with my directives: - - - - “1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German - nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries. - - - - “2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of - the population which represent a danger to the Reich and the - German folk community. - - - - “3. The forming of new German settlements by resettling and, in - particular, by settling the returning German citizens and racial - Germans from abroad. - - - - “The Reichsführer SS is authorized to take all necessary general - and administrative measures for the execution of his - obligation.” - -Himmler’s conception of his task under this decree is plainly stated in -the foreword which he wrote for the _Deutsche Arbeit_ issue of June-July -1942. The foreword is contained in Document Number 2915-PS, now Exhibit -Number USA-306. I quote from the first four lines of the English text. -The German text appears at Page 157: - - “It is our task”—Himmler wrote—“to germanize the East, not in - the old sense—that is, to teach the people there the German - language and German law—but to see to it that only people of - purely German, Germanic blood live in the East. Signed, - Himmler.” - -I next offer in evidence Document Number 2916-PS, which is Exhibit -Number USA-307. This document contains various materials taken out of -_Der Menscheneinsatz_ of 1940, a confidential publication issued by -Himmler’s office for the consolidation of German nationhood. I quote -initially from Page 1, lines 7 to 11. In the German text these extracts -appear at Page 51, first four lines under the letter “D.” I quote: - - “The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern - Territories is one of the most essential goals to be - accomplished in the German East. This is the chief national - political task, which has to be executed in the incorporated - Eastern Territories by the Reichsführer SS, Reich Commissioner - for the Preservation of German Nationality.” - -I next quote from lines 33 to 39 of Page 1 of the English text. In the -German text these extracts appear on Page 52, lines 14 to 20. I quote: - - “There are the following two primary reasons which make the - regaining of this lost German blood an urgent necessity: - - - - “1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish - intelligentsia through families of German descent, even if they - are Polonized. - - - - “2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable for - the German nation and the acquisition of ethno-biologically - unobjectionable forces for the German reconstruction of - agriculture and industry.” - -Further light is thrown upon the goals which the conspirators had set -for their Germanization program in conquered Eastern areas by a speech -delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This speech was published by -the National Socialist leadership staff of the OKW. The document came to -us through the Document Section, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division. Excerpts -from this speech are set forth in L-70, which is Exhibit Number USA-308. -I quote all of the English text; and in the German text these excerpts -appear at Page 23, lines 6 to 11, 12 to 15, 20 to 23, and Page 30, lines -7 to 16. Himmler said, and I quote: - - “Therefore, I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign - country, especially some Slav nationality, we must not start - from German points of view, we must not endow these people with - decent German thoughts and logical conclusions of which they are - not capable, but we must take them as they really are. - - - - “Obviously in such a mixture of peoples there will always be - some racially good types. Therefore I think that it is our duty - to take their children with us, to remove them from their - environment, if necessary, by robbing or stealing them. Either - we win over the good blood that we can use for ourselves and - give it a place in our people or . . . we destroy that blood.” - -Continuing the German text on Page 30, lines 7 to 16, which is a -continuation of the English text, I believe, Your Honor—Himmler stated -and I quote: - - “For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East, - the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or that . . . the - fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that - still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million - Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole and - decisive power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able - to tackle the peace, during which we shall be willing for the - first 20 years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns, - and that we shall push the borders of our German race 500 - kilometers farther to the East.” - -In furtherance of the unlawful plans disclosed by the last four -exhibits, which have been offered in evidence, the conspirators -contrived a racial register in the incorporated area of Poland. The -racial register was, in effect, an elaborate classification of persons -deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions setting forth -some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons in each -classification. Persons were classified into four groups: - -(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause; - -(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi struggle, but -had retained their German nationality; - -(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously connected with -the Polish nation, were willing to submit to Germanization; - -(4) Persons of German descent, who had been “politically absorbed by the -Polish nation,” and who would be resistant to Germanization. - -The racial register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 September 1940 -issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of German -nationhood, and this is contained in Document Number 2916-PS, previously -introduced in evidence. That is Exhibit Number USA-307. I quote from -Page 4 of the English text, lines 14 to 46. In the German text these -extracts appear at Page 92, lines 29 to the end of the page, and lines 1 -to 9 of Page 93. I quote: - - “For inter-office use the list of racial Germans will be divided - into four groups: - - - - “1. Racial Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle. - Besides the membership of a German organization, every other - deliberated activity in favor of the Germans against a foreign - nationality will be considered an active manifestation. - - - - “2. Racial Germans who did not actively intervene in favor of - the German nationality but had preserved their traceable German - nationality. - - - - “3. Persons of German descent who became connected with the - Polish nation in the course of the years but have, on account of - their attitude, the pre-requisites to become full-fledged - members of the German national community. To this group belong - also persons of non-German descent who live in a people’s mixed - marriage with an ethnic German in which the German spouse has - prevailed. Persons of Masurian, Kushubian, Slonzak, or Upper - Silesian descent, who are to be recognized as racial Germans - usually belong to this group 3. - - - - “4. Persons of German descent politically absorbed by the Polish - nation (renegades). Persons not included on the list of radial - Germans are Poles or other foreign nationals. Their treatment is - regulated by B II. . . . - - - - “Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full Germans, - that is, they have to be re-germanized in the course of time - through an intensive educational training in Old Germany. - - - - “The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based on the - doctrine that German blood must not be utilized in the interest - of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Germanization, - Security Police measures are to be taken. . . .” - -The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of German -extraction was later incorporated in a decree of 4 March 1941 signed by -Himmler and the Defendants Frick and Hess. This decree is dated 4 March -1941; and is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1941, Part 1, Page -118. We ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice thereof. - -The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous execution -of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in Document Number -R-112, which is Exhibit Number USA-309, and I now offer it in evidence. -This exhibit contains directives issued by Himmler as the Reich -Commissioner for the consolidation of German nationhood. I quote first -from the last two paragraphs of the English text of the directives, 16 -February 1942, which is on Page 3 of this exhibit. In the German text -this provision appears on Page 1 of the first decree, dated 16 February -1942, Paragraph 1 and 2. The directive provided, and I now quote: - - “I. Where racial Germans have not applied for entry in the - German ethnical list you will instruct the subordinate agencies - to turn over their names to the local State Police (superior) - Office. Subsequently, you will report to me. - - - - “II. The local State Police (superior) Office will charge the - persons whose names are turned over to it to prove within 8 days - that they have applied for entry in the German ethnical list. - - - - “If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be - taken into protective custody for transfer to a concentration - camp.” - -The measures taken against persons in the fourth category—“Polonized -Germans” as the conspirators called them—were particularly harsh. These -persons were resistant to Germanization, and ruthless measures -calculated to break their resistance were prescribed. Where the -individual’s past history indicated that he could not be effectively -germanized, he was thrown into a concentration camp. - -Some of these measures are set forth in Subparagraph A of Paragraph II -on Page 5 of Document R-112, and I quote in full from the English text -of that particular paragraph. This passage is set forth in the German -text at Pages 2 and 3 of the second decree dated 16 February 1942 under -II. This is what the directive provides: - - “II. The re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presupposes - their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that - reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German ethnical - list are to be dealt with in the following manner: - - - - “A. They are to be resettled in Old Reich territory. - - - - “1. The Higher SS and Police Leaders are charged with evacuating - and resettling them in Old Reich territory according to - instructions which will follow later. - - - - “2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary - quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names - will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Leaders - (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the - competent State Police (superior) Office. The latter will - arrange for their transfer to a concentration camp. - - - - “3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be - included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be - given by the Higher SS and Police Leaders (Inspectors of - Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State - Police (superior) Office for transfer to a concentration camp. - - - - “The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in - Old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization - measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political - record and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her - name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police - (superior) Office with a view to transferring her to a - concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be - separated from their parents and dealt with according to III, - Paragraph 2 of this decree. - - - - “Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad - political record who have offended the German nation to a very - great degree (for example, those who participated in - persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, _et cetera_.)” - -Coincident with the program of germanizing persons of German extraction -in the incorporated areas, the conspirators, as previously indicated, -undertook to settle large numbers of Germans of proven Nazi convictions -in that area. This aspect of their program is clearly shown by an -article by SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Wilhelm Koppe, -who was one of Himmler’s trusted agents. - -Excerpts from this article are contained in Document Number 2915-PS, -which was earlier introduced as Exhibit Number USA-306. I quote from the -second paragraph of the English text of this exhibit. The German text -appears at the third line from the bottom of Page 170 and continues to -the first full paragraph of Page 171. I now quote Koppe’s statement: - - “The victory of German weapons in the East must, therefore, be - followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race, - if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Führer’s - will—shall henceforth remain for all time an essential - constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of - decisive importance to infiltrate German farmers, laborers, - civil servants, merchants, and artisans into the regained German - region so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German people - can be formed as a protective wall against foreign penetration - and possibly as a starting point for the racial infusion of the - territories farther east.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -CAPT. HARRIS: Up to this point we have been speaking of the -Germanization measures in the incorporated areas. I should like now -briefly to turn to the Germanization program in the Government General. - -In the Government General there were relatively few persons, at the -outset, who qualified as Germans according to the conspirators’ -standards. Hence little would be served by the introduction of a racial -register categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the -one instituted in the incorporated area; and to our knowledge, no such -racial register was prescribed in the Government General. Rather, the -plan seems to have been (a) to make the Government General a colony of -Germany, which—as Your Honors will recall from Document EC-344(16), -which has been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-297—was the objective -expressed by the Defendant Frank; and (b) to create so-called “German -island settlements” in the productive farming areas. These island -settlements were to be created by an influx of German persons who -faithfully adhered to the principles of National Socialism. - -In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number 910-PS. This is -Exhibit Number USA-310. These are secret notes bearing the date line, -“Department of the Interior, Kraków, 30 March 1942,” and they concerned -Himmler’s statements upon the planned Germanization of the Government -General. This document was obtained from the 3rd Army intelligence -center at Freising, Germany; and I now quote from Page 2 of the English -text, from line 3 to the end of the report. This appears in the German -text at Page 2, line 21, continuing to the end of the report. The -document states, and I quote: - - “The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“developed additional trains of - ideas to the effect that, in the first 5-year plan for - resettlement after the war, the new German Eastern territories - should first be filled; it is intended afterwards to provide the - Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German upper class at - least. Into the Government General, perhaps, further German - island settlements should be newly transplanted from European - nations. An exact decision in this respect, however, has not - been issued. In any case, it is wished that at first a heavy - colonization along the San and the Bug be achieved so that the - parts of Poland with alien populations are encircled. Hitherto, - it has been always proved that this kind of encircling leads - most quickly to the desired nationalization.” - -In this same connection, I offer in evidence Document Number 2233(h)-PS. -This is Defendant Frank’s diary, 1941, Volume II, Page 317. This is -Exhibit Number USA-311. I quote from the last sentence at the bottom of -our Page 3 of the English text of this exhibit. In the German text this -passage appears on Page 317, lines 25 to 28. Defendant Frank stated in -this diary, and I quote: - - “Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers this territory has - become German; and the time will come when the valley of the - Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as - German as the valley of the Rhine.” - -I now turn to another phase of the program that I mentioned earlier, -that is the conspirators’ plan to confiscate the property of Poles, -Jews, and dissident elements. As I previously mentioned, the evidence -will show that these plans were designed to accomplish a number of -objectives. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, they were part and -parcel of the conspirators’ overall program of extermination. -Confiscation was also a means of providing property for German settlers -and of rewarding those who had rendered faithful service to the Nazi -State. This phase of their program likewise made available dispossessed -Polish farmers for slave labor in Germany and operated to further the -conspirators’ objective of preventing the growth of another generation -of Poles. - -Proof of the fact that the conspirators confiscated the property of -Poles in furtherance of their Germanization and slave labor program is -contained in Document Number 1352-PS, previously introduced by Mr. Dodd -as Exhibit Number USA-176. This exhibit contains a number of reports by -one Kusche, who appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in -Poland. Mr. Dodd quoted from one of Kusche’s confidential reports, dated -22 May 1940, at our Page 4, Paragraph 5 of the English text. In the -German text it is at Page 9, lines 16 to 18. In this statement Kusche -pointed out that it was possible, without difficulty, to confiscate -small farms and that—and I now quote: - - “The former owners of Polish farms together with their families - will be transferred to the Old Reich by the labor offices for - employment as farm workers.” - -I now desire to quote from another report by Kusche contained in the -same exhibit and bearing the same date, 22 May 1940. I think the upper -right-hand corner numbers might simplify it. The report from which I now -quote is marked “secret” and is entitled, “. . . Details of the -Confiscation in the Bielsko Region.” Initially, I should like to quote -from the last paragraph at the bottom of Page 1 of this exhibit. This -exhibit, you will recall, is 1352-PS, last paragraph at the bottom of -Page 1. The German text is at Page 11, Paragraphs 1 and 2. Kusche -stated, and I quote: - - “Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being - built at Auschwitz called on Staff Leader Müller and requested - support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it - was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural - enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp, - since not only the fields but also in some cases the farm houses - of these border directly on the concentration camp. A local - inspection held on the 21st of this month revealed the - following: - - - - “There is no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises - bordering on the concentration camp must be confiscated at once. - In addition, the camp commandant requests that further plots of - farm land be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the - prisoners busy. This, too, can be done without difficulty since - enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of - the plots are all Poles.” - -I next quote from Page 2, lines 22 to 31, of the English text of this -same exhibit. The German text is at Page 12, Paragraph 2, continuing -through to line 22 from the top of the page. I quote: - - “I had the following discussion with the chief of the labor - office in Bielsko: - - - - “The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the Old - Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated - agricultural enterprises to the Reich as farm workers, together - with their entire families, is possible without any difficulty. - It is only necessary for the labor office to receive the lists - of the persons in time, in order to enable it to take the - necessary steps (collection of transportation; distribution over - the various regions in need of such labor).” - -Finally, I quote from Page 3 of this same exhibit, lines 6 to 13 of the -English text. The German text appears at Page 13, the last three lines, -continuing through to Page 14, line 9: - - “The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also - be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the - concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the - execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take - the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz”—and Auschwitz, Your Honors - will recall, is where the concentration camp was—“they should - be transferred to the empty castle at Zator. The liberated - Polish property is to be given to the needy racial German - farmers for their use.” - -In order to regularize the program of confiscation, Defendant Göring -issued a decree on September 17, 1940. This decree appears in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1940, Part I, Page 1270; and I ask the Tribunal to -take judicial notice of it. Under Section 2 of this decree sequestration -of movable and immovable property, stores, and other intangible -property, interests of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely -temporarily absent”, was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was -authorized under Section 2, Subsection 2, if the property was required -“for the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense -or the strengthening of German folkdom.” By Section 9 of this decree, -issued by Defendant Göring, confiscation of sequestrated property was -authorized “if the public welfare, particularly the defense of the -Reich, or the strengthening of German folkdom, so requires.” However, -Section 1, Subsection 2, of the decree provided that property of German -nationals was not subject to sequestration and confiscation; and Section -13 provided that sequestration would be suspended if the owner of the -property asserted that he was a German. The decree, on its face, -indicates very clearly a purpose to strip Poles, Jews, and dissident -elements of their property. It was, moreover, avowedly designed to -promote Germanism. - -We ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. It is in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_. - -Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree -required that a determination be made in each case, involving the -property of a Pole, that the property was required “for the public -welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the -strengthening of German folkdom.” The answer supplied by the -conspirators was firm and clear. In any case in which the property of a -Pole is involved, the “strengthening of German folkdom” required its -seizure. In this connection I offer in evidence document Number R-92, -which is Exhibit Number USA-312. This document, which is dated 15 April -1941, bears the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS, commissioner for the -consolidation of German nationhood, and is entitled, “Instruction for -Internal Use on the Application of the Law Concerning Property of the -Poles, of 17 September 1940.” This document was captured by the U.S. -Counter-Intelligence Corps. I quote from Page 2, lines 11 to 14 of the -English text. In the German text this statement appears at Page 3, -Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 2. I quote: - - “The objective conditions permitting seizure according to - Section II, Subsection 2(a), are to be assumed whenever, for - example, the property belongs to a Pole, for the Polish real - estate will be needed without exception for the preservation of - the German folkdom.” - -In the Government General Defendant Frank promulgated a decree on 24 -January 1940 authorizing sequestration for the “performance of tasks -serving the public interest” and liquidation of “anti-social or -financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the -_Verordnungsblatt_ of the Government General, Number 6, 27 January 1940, -Page 23; and we ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The -undefined criteria in this decree obviously empowered Nazi officials in -the Government General to engage in wholesale seizure of property. - -The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was -staggering. I ask Your Honors to turn to the chart on the sixth page of -Document Number R-92, which was introduced into evidence a moment ago as -Exhibit Number USA-312. - -This chart shows that as of 31 May 1943 the staggering total of 693,252 -estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been seized and 9,508 -estates, comprising 270,446 hectares, had been confiscated by the Estate -Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Posen, Ciechanów, and Silesia. This, it -will be noted, represented the seizure and confiscation of only four -offices. - -That, Your Honors, concludes our discussion on Poland; and I now turn to -Czechoslovakia. At this point of the proceedings we shall introduce only -one document upon Czechoslovakia. This one document, however, contains a -startling revelation of the conspirators’ plans to germanize Bohemia and -Moravia. It relates how three plans, each characterized by its severity, -were discussed; and finally how the Führer decided on plan (c), which -involved the assimilation of about one-half of the Czech population by -the Germans and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, the plan -envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to -the Führer was unquestioned. I offer this document in evidence. It is -Document Number 862-PS, and it is Exhibit Number USA-313. This is a -top-secret report, dated 15 October 1940, which was written by General -Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On -the face of the document, it appears that only four copies were made. -The document we offer in evidence is the original document, which was -found among the captured files of the OKW. This document bears the -handwritten letters “K” and “J” on the first page on the left-hand side, -and I am advised that the handwriting is unquestionably that of -Defendants Keitel and Jodl. I quote the document in its entirety: - - “On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector - held an official conference in which State Secretary SS - Gruppenführer R. H. Frank spoke about the following . . . .” - -SS Gruppenführer K. H. Frank, it may be noted, was Secretary of State -under Defendant Von Neurath, who at the date of this report was the -Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who did you say Frank was? - -CAPT. HARRIS: Frank was an SS Gruppenführer, and Secretary of State -under Defendant Von Neurath. He is not the Defendant Hans Frank. At the -date of this particular report Von Neurath, under whom K. H. Frank -served, was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Continuing the -quotation: - - “Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, - Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the - central authorities of Berlin, have considered a solution for - the Czech problem. - - - - “After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his - views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this three - ways of solution were indicated: - - - - “a) German infiltration of Moravia and confinement of the Czech - nationals to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered - unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in diminished - form, will continue to exist. - - - - “b) Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical - solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore, in - the memorandum it is concluded that it cannot be carried out - within a reasonable period of time. - - - - “c) Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about - half of the Czech nationals by the Germans insofar as these are - of racial or otherwise valuable importance. This will also be - caused, among other things, by increased employment of Czechs in - the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German - border districts), in other words, by dispersing the - concentrations of Czech nationals. - - - - “The other half of the Czech nationals must be deprived of their - power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts - of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid - part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter - can scarcely be converted and would become a burden by - constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech - classes and thus interfering with a possible rapid assimilation. - - - - “Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be - handled roughly and eliminated. - - - - “The above development naturally pre-supposes an increased - influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the - Protectorate. - - - - “Having been reported, the Führer has chosen solution (c) - (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech - problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the - Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be - carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich - Protector for years to come. - - - - “From the above no particular conclusions are to be drawn by the - Armed Forces. This is the line which has always been taken here. - In this connection I refer to my memorandum submitted to the - Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July - 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled ‘The Czech Problem’ - (attached as annex). - - - - “The Representative of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector - in Bohemia and Moravia.”—Signed—“Friderici, General of - Infantry.” - -With the permission of Your Honors, I should like to comment further -upon some parts of this memorandum. First, I invite your attention to -solution (a). This solution would have called for German infiltration -into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to -Bohemia. As Your Honors know, Moravia lies between Bohemia and Slovakia. -Thus solution (a) would have involved the erection of a German State -between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented effective -inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner, -the historic desire for unity of these two groups of peace-loving people -and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have -been frustrated. Solution (a), it may be noted, was rejected because the -surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia”, -would have remained to plague the conspirators. - -Solution (b) which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs was -rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic, but rather -because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired. - -Solution (c), as shown in the exhibit, was regarded as the most -desirable and was adopted. This solution first provided for the -assimilation of about one-half of the Czechs. This meant two things: a. -Enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially qualified and -b. deportation to slave labor in Germany for others. “Increased -employment of Czechs in the Reich territory” as stated in the exhibit -meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany. - -Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by -all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population, -particularly the intellectuals and those who did not meet the racial -standards of the conspirators. Intellectuals everywhere were an anathema -to the Nazi conspirators, and the Czech intellectuals were no exception. -Indeed, the Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well knew, had a -conspicuous record of gallantry, self-sacrifice, and resistance to the -Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exterminated. As will be -shown in other connections, that section of the top-secret report which -stated “elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be -handled roughly and eliminated” meant that intellectuals and other -dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or -immediately exterminated. - -In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical -application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s -speech, part of which we have quoted in L-70, already presented in -evidence as Exhibit Number USA-308. Himmler said that “either we win -over any good blood that we can use for ourselves . . . or we destroy -this blood.” - -I now turn briefly to the conspirators’ program of spoliation and -Germanization in the western occupied countries. Evidence which will be -presented at a later stage of this proceeding will show how the -conspirators sought to germanize the western occupied countries; how -they stripped the conquered countries in the West of food and raw -materials, leaving to them scarcely enough to maintain a bare existence; -how they compelled local industry and agriculture to satisfy the -insatiable wants of the German civilian population and the Wehrmacht; -and finally how the spoliation in the western occupied countries was -aided and abetted by excessive occupation charges, compulsory and -fraudulent clearing arrangements, and confiscation of their gold and -foreign exchange. The evidence concerning these matters which will be -presented in great detail by the Prosecutor for the Republic of France -is so overwhelming that the inference is inescapable that the -conspirators’ acts were committed according to plan. - -However, it will not be until after the Christmas recess that the -evidence concerning the execution of the conspirators’ plans in the West -will be presented to this Tribunal. Accordingly, by way of illustration, -and for the purpose of showing in this presentation that the -conspirators’ plans embraced the occupied Western countries as well as -the East, we now offer in evidence a single exhibit on this aspect of -the case, R-114, which is Exhibit Number USA-314. This document was -obtained from the U.S. Counter-Intelligence branch. This exhibit -consists of a memorandum dated 7 August 1942 and a memorandum dated 29 -August 1942 from Himmler’s personal files. The former memorandum deals -with a conference of SS officers and bears the title, “Directions for -the Treatment of Deported Alsatians.” The latter memorandum is marked -secret and is entitled, “Shifting of Alsatians into the Reich.” The -memoranda comprising this exhibit show that plans were made and -partially executed to remove all elements from Alsace which were hostile -to the conspirators and to germanize the province. I quote from Page 1, -lines 21 to 31, of the English text entitled, “Directions for the -Treatment of Deported Alsatians.” These extracts contained in the German -text at Page 1, the last 8 lines, and Page 2, lines 1 to 5. I now quote: - - “The first expulsion action was carried out in Alsace in the - period from July to December 1940; in the course of it 105,000 - persons were either expelled or prevented from returning. They - were in the main Jews, gypsies and other foreign racial - elements, criminals, asocial and incurably insane persons, and - in addition Frenchmen and Francophiles. The _patois_-speaking - population was combed out by this series of deportations in the - same way as the other Alsatians. - - - - “Referring to the permission the Führer had given him to cleanse - Alsace of all foreign, sick, or unreliable elements, Gauleiter - Wagner has recently pointed out the political necessity of a new - deportation”—zweite Aussiedlungsaktion—“which is to be - prepared as soon as possible.” - -I should like Your Honors to permit me to defer the remainder of this -presentation until Monday. Mr. Justice Jackson would like to make a few -remarks to the Tribunal. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I wish to bring to the -attention of the Tribunal and of the Defense Counsel some matters -concerning the case as it will take its course next week, in the belief -that it will result in expediting our procedure if, over the weekend, -our program can be considered. - -Captain Harris’ presentation will take a short time longer on Monday; -and when it has concluded, the presentation by the United States will -have reached that part of the Indictment which seeks a declaratory -judgment of this Tribunal that six of the organizations named therein -are criminal organizations. They effect such a finding only that they -may constitute such a basis for prosecution against individual members -in other courts than this, proceedings in which every defense will be -open to an accused individual, except that he may not deny the findings -made by this Tribunal as to the character of the organization of which -he was a member. - -The United States desires to offer this evidence under conditions which -will save the time of the Tribunal and advance the prosecution as -rapidly as possible so that United States personnel can be released. - -We also desire defendants’ counsel to have before them as much as -possible of our evidence against organizations before the Christmas -recess so that they may use that recess time to examine it and to -prepare their defenses and that we may be spared any further -applications for delay for that purpose. - -The substance of our proposal is that all of the ultimate questions on -this branch of the case be reserved for consideration after the evidence -is before the Tribunal. The real question, we submit, is not whether to -admit the evidence. The real question is its value and its legal -consequences under the provisions of this Charter. All of the evidence -which we will tender will be tendered in the belief that it cannot be -denied to have some probative value and that it is relevant to the -charges made in the Indictment. And those are the grounds upon which the -Charter authorizes a rejection of evidence. - -At the time we seek no advantage from this suggestion except the -advantage of saving time to the Tribunal and to ourselves to get as much -of the case as possible in the hands of the defendants before the -Christmas recess and to urge the ultimate issues only when they can be -intelligibly argued and understood on the basis of a real record instead -of on assumptions and hypothetical statements of fact. - -In offering this evidence as to the organizations, therefore, we propose -to stipulate as follows: - -Every objection of any character to any item of the evidence offered by -the United States, as against these organizations, may be deemed to be -reserved and fully available to Defense Counsel at any time before the -close of the United States case with the same effect as if the objection -had been made when the evidence was offered. All evidence on this -subject shall remain subject to a continuing power of the Tribunal, on -motion of any counsel or on its own motion, to strike, unprejudiced by -the absence of objection. Every question as to the effect of the -evidence shall be considered open and unprejudiced by the fact it has -been received without objection. - -Now we recognize the adherent controversial character of the issues -which may be raised concerning this branch of the case. What this -evidence proves, what organizations it is sufficient to condemn, and how -the Charter applies to it are questions capable of debate, which we are -quite ready to argue when it can be done in orderly and intelligible -fashion. We had expected to do it in final summation, but we will do it -at any time suggested by the Tribunal, after there is a record on which -to found the argument; and we are willing to do it either before or -after the defendants take up the case. But we do suggest that, if it is -done step by step as the evidence is produced and on questions of -admissibility, it will be disorderly and time-consuming. Piecemeal -argument will consume time by requiring counsel on both sides to recite -evidence that is either in the case, or to speculate as to evidence that -is not yet in, to resort to hypothetical cases, and to do it over and -over again to each separate objection. It will also be disorderly -because of our plan of presentation. - -Questions which relate to these organizations go to the very basis of -the proposal made by President Roosevelt to the Yalta Conference, -agreement upon which was the basis for this proceeding. The United -States would not have participated in this kind of determination of -question of guilt but for this or some equivalent plan of reaching -thousands of others, who, if less conspicuous, are just as guilty of -these crimes as the men in the dock. Because of participation in the -framing of the Charter and knowledge of the problem it was designed to -reach, I shall expect to reach the legal issues involved in these -questions. - -The evidence, however, will be presented by the lawyers who have -specialized in the search for the arrangement of evidence on a -particular and limited charge or indictment. Piecemeal argument, -therefore, would not be orderly, but would be repetitious, incomplete, -poorly organized, and of little help to the Tribunal. The issues deserve -careful, prepared presentation of the contentions on both sides. - -We will ask, therefore, upon these conditions, which we think protect -everybody’s rights and enable the Defense as well as ourselves to make a -better presentation of their questions because they will have time to -prepare them, to lay before the Tribunal, as rapidly as possible next -week and as uninterruptedly as possible, the evidence which bears upon -the accusations against the organizations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, have you yet communicated that to -the defendants’ counsel in writing or not? - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have not communicated it, unless it has been sent -to the Information Center since noon. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, it might be convenient that you should -state what you have stated to us as to objections to the evidence in -writing so they may thoroughly understand it. - -MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have prepared to do that and to supply sufficient -copies for members of the Tribunal and for all defense counsel. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -HERR BÖHM: I represent the members of the S.A. who have volunteered to -be questioned before the Tribunal. I understood the statement of Justice -Jackson only partially. As Defense Counsel I have no one who can supply -me with information and I cannot, under any circumstances, agree to give -my views on statements which I do not know or which are made known to me -in such a way that I am not in a position to get information. - -I should like to ask first that I be supplied with a German translation -of the statement which the Prosecution has made on the future course of -the Trial, so that I can express my views on it. I do not represent here -just one person but millions of people who will, after the Trial, come -forward with all sorts of accusations against me, possibly even -justified accusations. My own responsibility, as well as that of my -colleagues who represent the organizations, is immense. I should -therefore like to request, as a matter of principle, that anything which -is presented in this Trial at all be submitted to me in the German -language, because I am not in a position to have whole volumes of -documents translated into German from one day to the next—documents -which could quite easily be given to me in the German original. This is -a circumstance which makes it dreadfully hard for me, as well as for a -number of my colleagues, to follow the Trial at all. - -Of the incriminatory evidence against the organizations, I have -previously gathered little in the proceedings up to now. Since, -according to today’s statements, however, the evidence against the -organizations is to be presented shortly, I should like to ask -emphatically that, if we are to continue to represent the organizations, -the proceedings be conducted in such a way that, in a technical respect, -too, we shall be in a position to carry on the defense in a responsible -manner. - -THE PRESIDENT: As you know or have been told, only those parts of -documents which are read before the Tribunal are treated as being in -evidence and therefore you hear through your earphones everything that -is in evidence read to you in German. You know also that there are two -copies of the documents in your Information Center which are in German. -So much for that. That has been the procedure up to now. - -In order to meet the legitimate wishes of German counsel, the proposal -which Mr. Justice Jackson has just made is perfectly simple, as I -understand it, and it is this: - -That the question of the criminality of these organizations should not -be argued before the evidence is put in; that the United States counsel -should put in their evidence first, and that they hope to put the -majority of it in evidence before the Christmas recess, but that the -German counsel (defendants’ counsel) shall be at liberty at any time, up -to the time the United States case is finished, to make objection to any -part of the evidence on these criminal organizations. Is that not clear? - -HERR BÖHM: Yes, that is clear. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to that procedure? - -HERR BÖHM: Yes. The procedure as suggested is clear, but I think it is -highly inadequate. I have as yet had no opportunity to get into my hands -either of the two copies, which are said to be downstairs in Room 54, -maybe because two copies are not sufficient for the purposes of 25 -lawyers, especially if these copies are placed in Room 54 at 10:30 in -the morning, when the session starts at 10:00 o’clock. It would not even -suffice if these two copies for 25 of us were placed into our room on -the day before, since it is not possible for all of us to make -satisfactory use of these two copies in so short a time. Arrangements -should therefore be made—just how the Prosecution will make them, I -cannot say—to enable us to know at the proper time—and I emphasize -again, in the German language—what the Prosecution expects of us, so -that our work may be of avail to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: What you have just stated is a general objection to the -procedure which has been adopted up to now and has nothing to do with -the procedure which has been suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson with -reference to these criminal organizations. His suggestion was that -argument on the law of the criminal issue or the criminal nature of -these organizations should be postponed until the evidence was put in -and that the right of Counsel for the Defense should be to make -objection at any stage or, rather, to defer their objections until the -evidence had been put in; and it was hoped that the evidence would be -completed or nearly completed by the Christmas recess. What you say -about the general procedure may be considered by the Tribunal. - -So far as the particular question is concerned, namely, the question of -the procedure suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, have you any objection -to that? - -HERR BÖHM: I have objections to this procedure only—and in this respect -I reserve for myself all rights, for the sake of the great number of -people I represent—if it handicaps or hinders me in any way in -representing the interests of my many clients. - -THE PRESIDENT: We are aware of that fact, but that does not seem to be -material to the question whether the legal argument should be deferred -until after the evidence is presented. The fact that you have millions -of people to represent has nothing to do with the question whether the -legal argument shall take place before, or in the middle of, or at the -end of the presentation of the evidence. What I am asking you is: Have -you any objection to the legal argument taking place at the end of the -presentation of the evidence? - -HERR BÖHM: I have no objection to these suggestions if they do not -impair my defense in any way. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 December 1945 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document -depending on the author; however, American spellings are the rule, -hence, 'Defense' versus 'Defence'. Multiple occurrences of the following -spellings which differ and are found throughout this volume are as -follows: - - cooperation co-operation - Sudeten Gau Sudetengau - Sudeten-Deutsche territory Sudeten-German territory - Sudeten German(s) Sudeten-German(s) - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in -the trial(s). - -An attempt has been made to produce this ebook in a format as close as -possible to the original document's presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 3)_, -by Anonymous.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, VOLUME III *** - -***** This file should be named 54225-0.txt or 54225-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/2/2/54225/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at www.pgdpcanada.net. - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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