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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Latvia & Russia - One problem of the world-peace considered - -Author: Arveds Karlis Kristaps Bergs - -Release Date: February 18, 2017 [EBook #54189] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LATVIA & RUSSIA *** - - - - -Produced by Anita Hammond, Wayne Hammond and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - - - - -LATVIA AND RUSSIA - - - - - LATVIA & RUSSIA - - ONE PROBLEM OF THE - WORLD-PEACE CONSIDERED - - BY - ARVED BERG - (_Member of the National Council of Latvia_) - - [Illustration] - - - 1920 - LONDON AND TORONTO - J. M. DENT & SONS LTD. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - The World-Peace and the Civil War in Russia 9 - - The Paris Conference faced by the Russian Sphinx 10 - - The Representatives of Russia 11 - - Relations between Russia and the Borderland - Peoples 13 - - Proposal to postpone the Solution concerning “the - Borderland Peoples of Russia” 14 - - Practical Consequences of the Postponing of the - Question 16 - - It is doubtful whether the Russian People will soon be in a - Position to participate in the Solution of these Questions 18 - - Right of the Russian People to participate in the Solution - of the Lettish Question 23 - - A Definite and Immediate Solution of the Question of Latvia is - necessary 26 - - The Reconstitution of Russia 27 - - Project of an All-Russian Federation 28 - - Point of View of the Russian Groups in regard to the Federation - of Russia 29 - - Impossibility of a Russian Federation 33 - - Historical Impossibility of an All-Russian Federation 34 - - A Common Civilisation, indispensable to a Federation, does not - exist 36 - - The Economic Problem of a Federated Russia 40 - - The All-Russian Federation from the Point of View of - Constitutional Law 44 - - The Leaning of the Peoples of Russia towards Independence 49 - - Economic Disadvantage of Separation from Russia 50 - - Settlement of Accounts between Latvia and Russia 51 - - Economic Interests of Latvia 53 - - Aspirations of the Letts 55 - - Protests of the Russian Groups 58 - - Economic Interests of Russia 59 - - Strategical Interests of Russia 62 - - Guarantees of the World-Peace 70 - - Principle of Political Equilibrium 70 - - Russia as a Factor in Political Equilibrium 71 - - Internal Weakness of Russia 72 - - Political Leanings of Russia towards Germany 74 - - Russia as a Probable Destroyer of the World-Peace 77 - - Russia’s Policy in the Baltic 79 - - The Political Rôle of the New States 83 - - The Dominium maris Baltici 86 - - Line of Partition between Russia and Germany 87 - - Conclusion 90 - -[Illustration: MAP OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION OF LATVIA] - - - - -LATVIA AND RUSSIA - - - - -THE WORLD-PEACE AND THE CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA - - -No world-peace is possible before peace in Russia is re-established! -Indeed, how can we talk of universal peace when 180 million men are -still in the throes of a most disastrous and terrible war, a war which -leads, not to victory, but to annihilation? - -There will be no peace in the world if there is no peace in Russia, for -the boiling lava in eruption may well submerge the whole of Europe at -any moment. That is why the Paris Conference will remain powerless if -it cannot terminate the civil war in Russia. All that the Conference -has done and is doing at the present time will be brought to nothing -and will be a waste of time unless a normal and peaceful state of -things is established in Eastern Europe. Until the Peace Conference -has settled these questions, humanity will continue to be overshadowed -by the menace of such a catastrophe that the disasters of the four -years of war will appear in comparison as mere child’s play. - - - - -THE PARIS CONFERENCE FACED BY THE RUSSIAN SPHINX - - -The Peace Conference finds itself facing the Russian sphinx, whose -problems a mind of western culture can neither comprehend nor solve. - -The agglomeration of heterogeneous peoples in Russia leaves the -ragged Hapsburg empire far behind. In Russia you have the complicated -psychology of the Oriental, barely intelligible to his western brother. -You have also the tangled economic questions and the centuries-old -crimes of corrupt governments, the devastation of a world-war, and -still more the material and moral destruction brought about by the -awakening instincts of the half-barbaric masses which call themselves -Bolsheviki. And all this is intermingling and boiling over in an -indescribable chaos which even the liveliest imagination could not -conceive. - - - - -THE REPRESENTATIVES OF RUSSIA - - -There is no lack of amateurs ready to solve the riddle of the Russian -sphinx. Each government represented at the Peace Conference possesses -its own point of view on the Russian question; each political party, -each organ of the Press has its own remedy for saving Russia. Nor is -that all, for there are Orientals who have come to plead on behalf of -their Fatherland before the world’s Forum. Russia teems with people -and opinions, so each group of the crowd assembled in Paris brings -forward a programme of salvation. There is the RUSSIAN POLITICAL -CONFERENCE, consisting of Sazonoff, Tzarist ex-Minister of Foreign -Affairs; the prince Lvoff, ex-Premier; Tchaikovsky, President of -the NORTH RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT, and Maklakoff, ex-Ambassador -of Russia under the Provisional Government. This Conference has a -theorist, an ex-director of the Juridical Department of the Ministry -of Foreign Affairs of Russia under the Provisional Government, M. -André Mandelstam, who has published a series of pamphlets in which -he sets forth the theoretical and practical bases of the views of -the Russian Political Conference. Outside this Conference, Kerensky, -ex-Premier, is busying himself; and with him, Avksentieff, Zenzinoff, -Argounoff, Rogovsky, Minor, Sokoloff, Slonin, all members of the -All-Russian Constituent Assembly. We find also the PARIS SECTION -FOR THE REGENERATION OF RUSSIA and the RUSSIAN REPUBLICAN -LEAGUE. Add to these the representatives of the government of -Admiral Koltchak and of General Denikin. From the South of Russia comes -Schreider, ex-mayor of Petrograd, at present the president of the -“Committee of the South,” who was compelled to leave the four other -members of his delegation behind on the Prinkipo island. Finally, to -close the name-list, there is A. N. Briantchaninoff, “Chairman of -the Slav Congress in Moscow and of the Russian National Committee -in London.” In the _Pages Modernes_ are collaborating Savinkoff, L. -Andreeff, Strouve, etc. Briefly, the Russian chaos is completely enough -represented, and the plans of salvation are not lacking. - - - - -RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE BORDERLAND PEOPLES - - -The problems which the following pages deal with are somewhat more -modest in comparison with the Russian imbroglio. They are those -concerning the so-called “borderland peoples of Russia,” _i.e._, -nationalities which have for a long time suffered under the Russian -domination, which have been relegated to second and third class, and -which, quite tired of this intolerable position, are looking for a -better lot and greater possibility of development in an independent -national life, by means of separation from Russia. - -They have formed, for that purpose, a series of small independent -States desirous of getting their independence recognised by the Peace -Conference, which, in solving the riddle of the Russian sphinx, will -have to pronounce the decisive word on this question. Every one, be he -Russian or a representative of the nationalities, is trying to solve -this question in accordance with his point of view. The aim of the -following pages is to elucidate it from the point of view of Latvia.[1] - - - - -PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE THE SOLUTION CONCERNING “THE BORDERLAND -PEOPLES OF RUSSIA” - - -Let us first consider the proposals of the RUSSIAN POLITICAL -CONFERENCE:--“The question of the Russian borderland peoples must -be postponed until it can be decided with the co-operation of the -Russian people, for the questions relating to the future status of the -nationalities included within the borders of ancient Russia cannot be -solved outside the Russian people and without their consent.” That is -what the Russian Political Conference proposed in its note of the 6th -March, 1919--the solution of the problem must be postponed as long as -the Russian people is not in a position to make its will fully known -and to take part in the settlement of these questions. - -Evidently perceiving how impossible this proposal is, the Russian -Political Conference is considering a compromise, and proposes “to -apply in the meantime, before a definite settlement is arrived at, a -provisional régime in accordance with the present necessities” of the -States that have separated themselves from Russia, but “no definite -solution should intervene.” In other words, the Russian Political -Conference proposes to recognise the _de facto_ governments of the -States detached from Russia on the condition that, in an undetermined -future, the Russian people, expressing its will by the voice of -the Constituent Assembly or by other means, shall say the final and -decisive word. - - - - -PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSTPONING OF THE QUESTION - - -It is supremely clear that this compromise of the Russian Political -Conference would not give any practical solution, either at the present -time or in the near future. The proof of this is in Latvia’s desperate -struggles on two fronts--against the Bolsheviki who have thrown -themselves on her, and against the German army of occupation which has -no wish at all to surrender the territory. In such circumstances, of -what importance would be the recognition of the _de facto_ situation? -Moral help is indispensable; besides, it is necessary to have a solid -juridical basis, recognised by the Powers, in order to exact from the -Bolsheviki and the Germans, not another _de facto_ situation in the -place of the one they have caused, but the substitution of Right for -their illegal tyranny. Without this, the success of the struggle -against the Bolsheviki and the Germans would become impossible, or -at least more complicated. Consequently, arms and munitions become -indispensable. Were they supplied by the governments backing up the -Letts, means for the equipment and maintenance of the army would yet be -lacking. These means cannot be obtained if the country does not provide -its own finances, which in turn cannot be established until the State -is judicially recognised. Strong in such a recognition, the Lettish -army, for instance, would long since have occupied Riga and delivered -it from the Bolshevist tyranny, but it simply dared not do it because -of the lack of revictualling for the inhabitants. Assuredly, who -would risk delivering goods on credit without knowing who is legally -responsible for the debts? To be successful in the struggle it would -be indispensable to restore the means of transport, the communications -destroyed by the Bolsheviki, and to replace the rolling stock carried -away by the Germans. But who would concern himself with that and -invest his capital in such an enterprise if there is no one judicially -responsible, and if one does not know to whom the country is to belong -and who is to rule it in the future? - -The recognition of the present situation would in no way help the -Lettish people to hasten its resurrection, so that it represents no -progress towards the practical solution of the question in dispute. - - - - -IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL SOON BE IN A -POSITION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS - - -Of necessity, one could come to an agreement on this point if it were -possible to foresee that such a situation would not last too long, -but would soon disappear in the presence of durable and well-defined -juridical relations. But this cannot be foreseen by anybody if the -Lettish question is made dependent on the Russian people. Who would -venture to affirm that the Russian people will soon be in a position -to manifest freely its will and share in the settlement of these -questions? - -Admiral Koltchak, for instance, has obtained, on certain conditions -accepted by him, the promise of support from the Allied and Associated -Powers, and he is backed up by the Russian Political Conference. But -he is as yet only in Siberia; much time will elapse before he reaches -the Volga, and from there Moscow is yet far; but after all Moscow is -not the whole of Russia. Meanwhile, in the South, the Bolsheviki have -decided, it appears, to give final battle to Admiral Koltchak. Even -supposing that Admiral Koltchak wins the most brilliant of victories, -much time will pass before tranquillity returns to the country, before -he succeeds in re-establishing the administrative machinery, and a -Constituent Assembly is elected in which the “Russian people will be in -a position to make its will known freely.” - -Even leaving these arguments aside, can one be sure that the government -of Admiral Koltchak and the Constituent Assembly convened by him will -be recognised as authoritative and as the expression of the free -will of the Russian people? It is evident that in no case will this -happen without the hottest opposition. Kerensky and his above-named -colleagues, the Paris Section of the Union for Russian Regeneration, -and the Russian Republican League in their declaration (_Humanité_, -21st May, 1919) say, evidently aiming at the party of Koltchak, “It is -necessary that the governments of the free peoples declare openly that -they will never recognise, in Russia, any government whatsoever which -is a dictatorship of one man or of a group and does not acknowledge -the principle of popular sovereignty nor take the essential measures -for its realisation.” In another direction, the Russian National and -Democratic Union (_Bloc_), comprising the various leagues set up for -the regeneration of Russia, protests violently against the conditions -imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers on Admiral Koltchak and -accepted by him (_Patrie_, 15th June, 1919). So the future opposition -to the future Russian government is already there, and even makes an -appeal for support to all the free peoples. But who can say definitely -that with this support either Kerensky or Koltchak will be in a -position to get the upper hand? - -And again, should the government of Lvov-Kerensky, or simply that of -the latter alone, be recognised as enjoying legal continuity? - -It is doubtful that the Russian Political Conference and Admiral -Koltchak are agreed. M. A. N. Briantchaninoff, the Chairman of the -Slav Congress in Moscow and of the Russian National Committee in -London, talks openly of the unheard-of inability of the Lvov-Kerensky -and Co. government (_Daily Telegraph_, 24th May, 1919). And the -All-Russian Constituent Assembly of the 5th January, 1918, under the -famous presidency of M. V. Tchernoff, which included Messrs. Lenin -and Trotsky? But M. Gregory Schreider proves that the members of the -Constituent Assembly of 5th January, 1918, were shot by order of -Admiral Koltchak (_Daily Telegraph_, 28th May, 1919). Koltchak would -perhaps like to continue in the same way. In any case, before taking -up the case of Latvia, the Constituent Assembly would have to decide -the question of summoning Admiral Koltchak to judgment; and that might -take up much time, considering the complexity of the question and the -bias of the representatives of the Russian people, entailing debates -of indefinite length. Consequently, whoever the candidate may be whose -power will be recognised as expressing the free will of the Russian -people, one may be quite confident that a violent struggle will ensue -against him. For, to talk of free expression of the will of the people, -either with or without the assistance of a foreign commission, in a -country devastated by war and corrupted by Bolshevism, is naturally -inadmissible until the most elementary order is established and the -billows of political passion have subsided. And thus years will pass -by, during which the question of the countries detached from Russia -will remain without solution. - - - - -RIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION OF THE -LETTISH QUESTION - - -Outside the purely practical reasons, there is a matter of principle; -and looking more closely at the proposal of the Russian Political -Conference, one cannot but be amazed by it. By what right do they claim -that the question of the Lettish people “cannot be solved without -Russian knowledge and consent”? Who made the Lettish people Slaves of -the Russians? Who made the Russians guardians of the Letts? President -Wilson has declared the equality of nations and their equal right to -dispose of themselves. The second paragraph of President Wilson’s -message of the 22nd January, 1917, says: “The equality of nations on -which peace must be founded in order to be durable, must imply the -equality of rights; the exchanged guarantees must neither recognise nor -imply a difference between the big nations and the small, between those -that are powerful and those that are weak.” In the speech delivered on -the 27th September, 1918, Wilson declares: “The impartial justice we -want should not make any difference between those in regard to whom we -are willing to be just and those in regard to whom we are not willing -to be just. It should be a justice not knowing any favouritism, but -only the equal rights of the different peoples.” Then, after such clear -declarations on the part of President Wilson, can one who declares -himself in agreement with this theory and expresses (like the note -of the Russian Political Conference) his sympathy with the peoples -detached from Russia, can he require the other nations to wait and not -proceed with the restoration of their affairs until the Russian people -has had the leisure to manifest its opinion? And, after the Lettish -people have got rid of Bolshevism at the price of inconceivable efforts -and have, with the assistance of the Allies, liberated Latvia from the -German armies of occupation, and when they have finally succeeded in -restoring their economic and intellectual life, by what right would -the Russians, recovering themselves and facing a problematical future, -arrogate to themselves the authority to possess and rule a people -for the regeneration of which they have not moved a finger? Granted -the right of the nations to dispose of themselves, how could the -Russian Constituent Assembly or the government of Admiral Koltchak be -competent to decide the fate of the Lettish people and yet the Lettish -Constituent Assembly or the Peace Conference be incompetent--the latter -having already decided the destiny of many races? - -To all these painful questions there is only one possible answer: -Would not the Russian Political Conference admit that at the bottom -of its proposition there shows itself all too clearly a point of view -habitual to the old Tzarist régime, according to which the borderland -peoples have no other right than to be the object of the dominant -nation’s rights? But with such opinions, borrowed from the old Tzarist -régime’s domestic habits or home-policy, it would simply not be safe -to appear before the Peace Conference, which has proclaimed a just and -happy future for all peoples, inaugurating a new era of international -justice. Undoubtedly, the Russian Political Conference is cruelly -deceived, both in regarding their proposition as “a practical way out -of the present situation,” and even in thinking they have given “a real -proof of the new spirit of Russia.” In point of fact, there is neither -a new spirit nor a practical solution of the question. - - - - -A DEFINITE AND IMMEDIATE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF LATVIA IS -NECESSARY - - -The question of the formation of a State for the Lettish people must -be settled definitely and as soon as possible. The Lettish people can -claim it as a right, for it finds itself in the first rank of the -peoples who have suffered from the war. The interests of the other -nations also require it, for they will feel the greater security the -fewer undecided questions there are, the fewer centres of trouble and -disorder. - -The definite solution can be arrived at in two ways: either by the -reconstitution of Russia in her former boundaries, excluding perhaps -Poland, which would find its ethnographic frontiers again, and that is -the proposal of the Russian Political Conference, of M. A. Mandelstam, -and other people and institutions pretending to represent the Russian -people; or by the absolute recognition of the independence of the -peoples which have separated themselves from Russia, and that is what -their representatives are working for. - - - - -THE RECONSTITUTION OF RUSSIA - - -However, M. A. Mandelstam, the literary idealist of the Russian -Political Conference, declares, in his _Memorandum on the Delimitation -of the Rights of States and Nations_ (Paris, 1919), that the interests -of the countries detached from Russia, their right to free development -of their economic and intellectual culture, will be guaranteed and -can only be guaranteed by their reunion with Russia. This reunion, he -adds, is necessary not only in the interests of Russia, but also in the -interests of these same countries. - - - - -PROJECT OF AN ALL-RUSSIAN FEDERATION - - -It is certain that they do not propose the reconstitution of the -old Tzarist régime, which, according to M. A. Mandelstam, is no -less detested by the Russian people than by those of the border -countries; their aim is rather to form a new Russia built on a quite -different foundation and distinguished by a perfect justice towards -all the peoples inhabiting her territory. “Russia, emerging from the -Revolution,” says the Russian Political Conference, “and definitely -divorced from the centralising tendencies of the old régime, is largely -disposed to satisfy the legitimate wish of these nationalities to -organise their national life. The new Russia does not conceive her -reconstitution otherwise than in a free co-existence of the peoples -forming part of her, on the principles of autonomy and federalism.” And -M. A. Mandelstam, forgetting that it is very difficult for him, not -being of Russian origin himself, to speak and make promises in the name -of the Russian people, asserts: “The Russian people has never been -in agreement with the old Russian policy in regard to the borderland -peoples, and has always suffered with them from the same absence of -political rights. It will only wish to be allowed to work side by side -with its non-Russian brethren, mindful of their rights as it will be of -its own.... The common life could be organised on the basis of autonomy -or on that of the federative principle, or else on that of union. In -any case, the borderland peoples would no longer need to fear any -attacks on their personality on the part of New Russia.” - - - - -POINT OF VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN GROUPS IN REGARD TO THE FEDERATION OF -RUSSIA - - -No doubt, there are many good intentions and nice promises abroad; but -nevertheless we will allow ourselves slightly to doubt their perfect -sincerity, be it only in regard to some of the representatives of the -Russian groups. - -How, for instance, do they reconcile this crop of promises with the -following facts? When, at the beginning of the year 1917, _i.e._, -even before the Revolution, the Lettish deputies in the Imperial Douma -raised the question of self-government for Latvia, M. Miliukoff, -then the all-powerful genius of the Progressive Coalition (_Bloc_), -expressed a hostile opinion on this question, and underlined it with -the following words: “Then it will be necessary to grant autonomy -even to the Samoyedes!” When, the same year, but already after -the Revolution, under the régime of Kerensky, the law concerning -self-government for the Baltic provinces was in elaboration, and -the Lettish deputies pointed out the absolute necessity of fusion, -compact and with well-defined boundaries, of all the territories -inhabited by the Letts, in a unity of self-government without which the -development of the Lettish civilisation would become difficult, the -Russian Government replied with a refusal, based on the inconvenience -of altering the existing departmental boundaries. More recently, in -the _Pall Mall Gazette_ of May 6th, 1919, M. C. Nabokoff, emphasising -his status as a Russian diplomatic representative in London, puts the -Letts and Esthonians in the same rank as the negroes of Texas. Their -leaning towards autonomy is described by him as a “self-determination -in a nursery,” and he regards the Letts and Esthonians as “victims -of Teutonic propaganda,” to which he, M. C. Nabokoff, will never and -in no circumstances submit. Consequently, as regards the promises of -the Russian Political Conference and the assurances of M. Mandelstam, -we have testimonies of the representatives of the different Russian -political groups at different periods in their different situations, -before the Revolution, after the Revolution, and after the second -Revolution; testimonies, thoughtless perhaps, and ill-calculated, but -so much the more sincere. - -However, the “Russian diplomatic representative in London,” who, from -the service of the Tzarist government, has gone over, without much -effort, to that of the government represented by M. Mandelstam--after -having acquired a fuller knowledge of Texas, and even without this, -will be quite willing to change his views about the Letts and the -Esthonians in accordance with the views and intentions of his new -chiefs. No doubt M. Miliukoff, who has been able to master his -antipathy to Germany, will, for reasons of necessity, vanquish also his -aversion for the self-government of Latvia. But how can the Lettish -people, or the Peace Conference as it decides the fate of nations, be -assured that in the future and under new conditions, Messrs. Nabokoff -and Miliukoff will not reconvert M. Mandelstam, Admiral Koltchak, etc., -along with themselves and the Russian Political Conference? Can one -expect the Lettish people or the Peace Conference to have faith in -their word when the Russian groups themselves have not full confidence -in one another? - -Kerensky and his colleagues do not believe a bit in the promises of -Admiral Koltchak in regard to the convening of the Constituent Assembly -on a democratic basis. M. A. N. Briantchaninoff categorically rejects -M. Kerensky. M. Miliukoff, as it appears, professes no confidence in -the Constituent Assembly presided over by V. Tchernoff, and Admiral -Koltchak even shoots its members, which crime M. Schreider will never -forgive him. If there exists such a complete mistrust among the Russian -groups in regard to one another, if people who know the valuable -qualities of their fellow-countrymen release floods of accusations on -one another, what faith is it possible to have, I will not say in the -sincerity of their promises, but in the possibility of fulfilling them? - - - - -IMPOSSIBILITY OF A RUSSIAN FEDERATION - - -Besides personal confidence or mistrust, there are also much deeper -reasons of an objective kind which clearly show that the promises -of the Russian groups are, in spite of their good will, absolutely -unrealisable. One would need to be imbued with an absolute Bolshevist -disregard for the laws of historical continuity to admit that Russia, -by the mere force of a decree and solely by the good will of honest -people, will straightway pass from being a country subject to Tzarist -despotism and unaccustomed to the respect of rights, of personality, -and of nationalities, to a régime of equality of rights and justice -for all. There are no big jumps in History; and if they are attempted, -they are paid for grievously. The proof of this is afforded by the -happenings in Russia, which, it was boasted, had passed without -bloodshed from the autocratic régime of the Tzar to the “freest régime -in the world”--the Lvov-Kerensky régime; but streams of blood and -unheard-of cruelties have followed. Russia has fallen to ruins under -the despotic régime of Lenin and Trotsky. - - - - -HISTORICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ALL-RUSSIAN FEDERATION - - -The history of centuries, customs and habits, rooted usages and -popular psychology are much more effectual than the best intentions -and decrees, which in the most favourable circumstances can only bring -about an external change. But under the mask of the latter the Past -continues to exist. We have already shown that in the proposal itself -of the Russian Political Conference, under a new phraseology, there is -concealed at the bottom the psychology of the Tzarist bureaucracy, of -which the Russian Political Conference has not succeeded in freeing -itself. If the old psychology is so sturdy in the minds of the best -sons of Russia, who are accustomed to direct themselves according to -the best theoretical conceptions, and who have been brought up in -the atmosphere of European ideas, what then can be expected from the -over-excited instincts of ignorant masses reared in utter contempt of -another’s personality and rights? - -It is certain that the rebirth of Russia will coincide with an -extraordinary upheaval of the nationalist wave, a quite natural -upheaval after the humiliation of national dignity suffered by Russia, -an upheaval of which all that is foreign and non-Russian will be -the inevitable victim. This wave will clear the ground for Messrs. -Mandelstam, Sazonoff, Kerensky, Schreider, etc. M. C. Nabokoff will -incontestably allow himself to be carried away by that wave, and if -Admiral Koltchak and General Denikin do not, at least those that will -come after them, perhaps M. Briantchaninoff, will benefit by it. - - - - -A COMMON CIVILISATION, INDISPENSABLE TO A FEDERATION, DOES NOT -EXIST - - -What will be the effect of this Chauvinist wave on the All-Russian -Federation planned by the Russian groups, and composed of a series of -national States? In accordance with the laws of reaction, the Russian -nationalist upheaval will call forth a similar movement in the other -nationalities of the Russian Federation. Besides, these peoples are -even now in different stages of civilisation. They are being besought -from various directions, and the exasperation of the national feeling -in each of them will set up another and a still more sensitive -difference. There will not be that spiritual community without which a -free co-existence is inconceivable. This spiritual community did not -exist under the Tzarist régime, which however tried to create it by -enforced russification, going even so far as to prohibit the use of the -mother-alphabet and the public use of the mother-language, and ordering -that teaching in the elementary schools should be given in Russian to -children who did not understand a word of it. By such proceedings, a -kind of spiritual community among the peoples of Russia has indeed been -created; no one doubts it--there is unanimous opposition against such -means of furthering Russian civilisation. - -No harmony of civilisation could exist, even in the projected -All-Russian Federation. Within its limits there would be nations which, -owing to favourable geographical situation and greater activity, have -long led the intensive life of western civilisation; and there would -also be peoples which are as yet in the first stage of civilisation. - -For instance, what harmony is it possible to imagine as existing -between the Letts and the Samoyedes of M. Miliukoff, or between the -Esthonians and the Fetishists of Siberia? Russia is populated by -nations unable to understand one another, not only on account of the -difference of language, but also because of the contrasting customs -and habits, ideas, religious creeds, and popular psychology. No one of -these nationalities possesses such a strong preponderance in the matter -of numbers and civilisation, nor such powerful influence, that the -other peoples should submit to it of their own free will. - -M. Victoroff-Toporoff finds (_Pages Modernes_, No. 1, April, 1919, -p. 24) that there is something which unites all the nationalities -of Russia--“the great intellectual force of the people of Greater -Russia,” which through the medium of masterpieces of the famous -Russian teachers and writers, has spread broadcast among all the -peoples of Russia. It is certain that no one will try to minimise -the importance of Russian literature, nor dispute the place which is -its due among the literatures of the world. But Russian literature -by itself is not yet world-literature, and the literature of other -nations as well has exercised an enormous influence on the peoples of -Russia. For instance, the influence of the French masters on Lettish -culture is far stronger than that of Russian art. But apart from this, -each nationality detached from Russia has its national literature, -which we all admit does not perhaps possess great masterpieces like -Russian literature, but has nevertheless its individual character, and -consequently stands nearer and dearer to its people and is capable of -greater influence on it than all the masterpieces of foreign art. - -The All-Russian Federation has no common basis for its diverse members -in the field of civilisation. Consequently, there are two courses open -to it:--either to give to each people the liberty of development, in -which case the nationalities would very soon disperse intellectually in -all directions; or to revive the russifying centralist tendencies, the -likelihood of which is made evident by the expected rising of Russian -chauvinism. In both cases there remains nothing of the Federation. - - - - -THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF A FEDERATED RUSSIA - - -If between the peoples of Russia there are no interests in common as -regards intellectual culture, there is still less in common in the -economic relationships of the different parts of Russia. - -It is well known that Russia, since the ministries of Vishnegradsky -and Witte, leaned more and more consciously towards the protectionist -system; and having created the autonomous Customs tariff of 1893, -leaned towards the creation Of a self-supporting economic unit. This -policy was based on balancing the agricultural interests on the one -side and the industrial interests on the other. Industry was protected -at the expense of agriculture, but without exceeding the limits which -allowed the world’s markets to be preserved for Russian agricultural -products, for otherwise this would have led to the destruction of -Russia’s commercial equilibrium. This was a quite reasonable policy, -and indispensable from the point of view of a one and indivisible -Russia with an economic system completely centralised. And this policy, -supposing its necessity, must be reverted to in a reunited Russia. - -But it is also quite clear that to the interests of this policy, -indispensable to a self-sufficient economic unit, important interests -of the different parts of Russia have been sacrificed. For instance, -the corn-growing central provinces of Russia have lost the English -market, with difficulty retaining the much less profitable market in -Germany. - -On the other hand, Latvia, in no way interested in the export of -cereals, was obliged, in order to assist the Russian grain export, -and in virtue of the commercial treaties concluded between Russia and -Germany in 1894 and 1904, to submit to concessions in regard to German -industry which were incompatible with her own industrial interests. - -By the case of Finland, it is possible to form an idea of the results -of such an economic system. From the importation of Russian corn, -Finland passed to the importation of German and American flour; -instead of Russian sugar she used German. In return the products of -Russian industry have not been able to conquer the Finnish market, in -view of the impossibility of their competition with German products. -Finland, having Customs frontiers with Russia, was able to avoid the -too disadvantageous consequences for her of that Russian economic -policy which sacrificed local economic interests to a centralised -economic system for Russia. If there had not been Customs frontiers -between Finland and Russia, Finland would have had to pay much dearer -for her bread and to purchase industrial products at a much higher -price. The other parts of Russia, not enjoying economic autonomy, have -not been able to avoid the disastrous consequences of the Russian -policy as Finland has done. - -Consequently, the founders of Federated Russia will have to solve the -following question: Must we revert to a centralised policy and neglect -the local interests of the different parts of Russia, or must we grant -the right of an autonomous economic policy to the different members of -the Federation? In the former case, there would remain very little of -the “free co-existence of the peoples forming part of it on principles -of autonomy and federation.” From this point of view the nationalities -would be less favoured than Finland, which, as is well known, was far -from feeling outside the danger of Russian pretensions. If, on the -contrary, the founders of the Federated Republic of Russia propose to -give to the various States the right of an autonomous economic policy, -then the Federation will very soon fall to pieces, for the economic -interests of the different States tend in different directions, and -economic interests are much more powerful than historical memories. - -The economic problem will therefore be solved either to the -advantage of a Russia which supports herself, but is at the same -time centralised, or to the advantage of the independence of the -nationalities which have separated themselves from Russia. In either -case there is no place for federation! - - - - -THE ALL-RUSSIAN FEDERATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL -LAW - - -There still remains to be elucidated the project of an All-Russian -Federation from the point of view of constitutional law, _i.e._, the -possibility of creating, with the aid of the nationalities of Russia, a -durable State on the basis of federation. - -The definite and authorised answer to this question was given by the -late M. Kokoshkin, professor at the University of Moscow, in his -report (Summer, 1917) to the Congress of the Constitutional Democratic -Party on the subject of the desirable form for the future State of -Russia. He proved the utter impossibility, from the point of view of -constitutional law, of reconstructing Russia on a federative basis; and -the Congress of the Party entirely subscribed to his opinion. There -remains little to say after the view of Professor Kokoshkin. - -All federations of States can work on one condition only, viz., that -there is one among them which has the power, owing to its importance -and influence, to support and unite all the other members. Germany -gives us an instance of this law. First, in 1866, Bismarck was -compelled to exclude Austria by force from the German Confederation, -on account of her competition with Prussia, so that he could, in 1871, -gather round him the German Federation, in which Prussia, both by -her real force and in accordance with constitutional law, became the -predominant partner. And the Prussian spirit guided Germany. Prussia -was the cause of Germany’s extraordinary development, and also of her -unprecedented defeat. The contrary is instanced by Austria-Hungary, -which tottered in proportion as German Austria increasingly lost her -preponderance. - -Can one reckon on finding, among the nationalities of Russia, a member -of the projected Federation with enough authority, from the point of -view of constitutional law, to unite and support the other members -of the Federation? To this question Professor Kokoshkin has given a -negative and categorical reply, and we must abide by this opinion. - -Evidently, the section of the Great-Russians could, in the first place, -lay claim to such a part. But they count only 65 millions out of the -180 millions forming the population of Russia. Besides, this section is -far from having preponderant economic importance, and it has remained, -in the matter of civilisation, well behind the other members of the -projected All-Russian Federation. If the leading part is given to this -section--a majority of votes in the Council of the Federation, for -instance--it would be a great injustice to the other nationalities, -and they would never consent to it; an otherwise senseless injustice, -because the section of the Great-Russians will evidently never be in a -position to perform the part assigned to them, nor could they perform -it except by using physical force, _i.e._, by re-establishing the -policy of centralist absolutism, the policy which has sustained so -complete a defeat, and that not only by a mere historical chance. - -If there is no directing centre, it is clear that the All-Russian -Federation will fall to pieces on the morrow of its foundation on -paper, for there will be no power in a position to reconcile the -divergent interests of the various members of the Federation. Georgia, -for instance, will never consent to vote credits for the development -of Northern railway systems. Latvia will give no contribution for the -construction of Black Sea ports; and Ukraine will not send her sons to -defend the Baltic Sea. The combination of these interests, so different -and so scattered, would only result in a State-structure so weak that -it would fall to pieces at the first serious blow. - -Thus, from the point of view of constitutional law, we arrive at the -same conclusion to which the analysis of the tendencies of civilisation -and economic life led us--that the All-Russian Federation will -transform itself either into a centralised State maintained by force, -or it will divide itself into independent States. - -There is no place for a Federation in Russia! Neither the land nor -the men upon it were made for it; this is proved by History. The -history of Russia in her beginnings shows us a certain number of -principalities, independent of one another, and on the whole not -subject to any authority. Owing to the efforts of the more powerful -princes, and under the duress of the Tartar yoke, the principalities -united, not into a Federation, but into a centralised State; and each -principality, deprived of its independence, did not become a member of -a Federation, but passed into another State. - -The same course was followed in regard to the contiguous and -neighbouring countries conquered by Russia. - -Not only Finland and Poland, but also the Baltic, Ukraine, and Georgia -were united to Russia, and received from her at least the guarantee -of their special rights and of their separate position in the Russian -State; but Russia did not keep her word in regard to all these States, -but had them all subject to a centralised policy, after having -destroyed, or attempted to destroy, all the individuality of these -countries. And this is in no way by mere chance. The Russian plain, -having almost no natural divisions, is not a favourable field for the -creation of a Federation, and the Russian soul, understanding no _via -media_ between “all” and “nothing,” is not the cement with which it -would be possible to build a Federation always based on the limitation -of one will by other wills, and on a clever and experienced blend of -the different inclinations. - - - - -THE LEANING OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE - - -Not being able to put their trust in the All-Russian Federation and not -finding therein enough guarantee for their natural rights, the peoples -of Russia have separated themselves from her and are building up their -independent national life. This is what is rousing the opposition of -the representatives of the Russian groups. The grounds for it are -given by M. Mandelstam in several pamphlets published by the Russian -Political Conference. - - - - -ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE OF SEPARATION FROM RUSSIA - - -First of all, M. Mandelstam finds that the independence to which the -nationalities detached from Russia are aspiring is disadvantageous -to these peoples themselves: “So they would merely find in their -independence a satisfaction of their national vanity, too heavily paid -for by the loss of their economic prosperity.” (_Memorandum on the -Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_, p. 79.) Concerning -Latvia in particular, M. Mandelstam foresees that the commerce of her -ports will enormously suffer, for they will lose the benefit of the -Russian transit trade. Agriculture, which will lose the Russian market, -will equally suffer from it; her industry will be deprived of fuel -and raw materials (p. 60). Finally, Latvia will not be in a position -to guarantee “the reimbursement of the enormous amounts spent for the -development of her economic prosperity and for her defence” (p. 79). - - - - -SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA - - -Let us take the last point first, viz., the mutual settlement of -accounts between Latvia and Russia. - -It seems that here M. Mandelstam wishes either to frighten us or simply -to “overcharge” us. - -Now from the statements of the Ministry of Finance it is evident that -Latvia has given yearly to the State a surplus of revenue over and -above the expenditure, which is valued at about 30 million roubles, -after having paid out of her own revenues all the expenses of the State -within the boundaries of Latvia, including expenditure on numerous -institutions, on strong armies and frontier guards, etc. In how many -yearly instalments does M. Mandelstam intend to repay that surplus to -Latvia? - -It is absolutely impossible to understand of what expenses for the -defence of Latvia M. Mandelstam is speaking. Latvia’s share in the -State Budget, including army and navy, as we have already seen, is paid -off with a surplus for the Russian Budget. Of what other expenditure -then is M. Mandelstam speaking? Of war expenses for a defence which was -a failure and brought Latvia nothing but destruction and ruins? Who -would pay for a task so badly done? And if that is the expense referred -to, what is the cost M. Mandelstam puts on the senseless and aimless -devastation carried out in Latvia by Russian armies? They are very well -depicted in the exhaustive work by M. J. Sahlit, member of the Imperial -Douma.[2] - -Another indiscreet question: At what rate of exchange does M. -Mandelstam suggest paying the mass of Russian credit-notes with which -Latvia was deluged, and against which the Russian Government has -received goods of a fixed weight and at a fixed price? - -If a reckoning is set up--for conscience’ sake, naturally--Latvia will -have to receive from Russia amounts which will be a considerable -balance in the establishment of her own finances. - - - - -ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF LATVIA - - -Concerning the economic interests of Latvia, it is scarcely probable -that M. Mandelstam need defend them against the Letts themselves. This -time M. Mandelstam has evidently gone to unnecessary trouble. If the -economic interests of Latvia so weightily necessitate her reunion with -Russia, the Letts, being accustomed to calculate quite dispassionately, -will soon see their advantage and will be anxious to adhere to the -All-Russian Federation projected by M. Mandelstam of their own free -will. Consequently, why does M. Mandelstam insist on establishing -Latvia’s happiness by force and compulsion? Is it possible he has -forgotten that he who tries to prove too much proves nothing? - -Besides, M. Mandelstam appears to be ill-informed on the economic -life of Latvia. It is not true that Latvia needs the Russian market -for her agricultural products. It will not be difficult for her to -find a more profitable market in the West. It is equally not true -that Latvia will be deprived of the transit trade of Russia, for her -ports are the most convenient transit points for Russia; and Latvia, -for the purpose of increasing and developing this transit trade, will -do her best to further her own interests. M. Mandelstam is equally -mistaken as regards Lettish industry. Fuel, in the shape of coal, has -been supplied to her up to the present not by Russia, but principally -by England, and Russian iron ore could easily be replaced by Swedish. -Generally speaking, one may say that Latvia, being in a better economic -situation than Russia, can rightly hope that the latter will look for -normal economic relations with Latvia, and it would have been more -comprehensive and more natural if M. Mandelstam had only taken up the -defence of Russia’s economic interests. - - - - -ASPIRATIONS OF THE LETTS - - -M. Mandelstam may unhesitatingly leave the defence of Lettish interests -to the Letts themselves. They have studied them and understand them -well. Lettish aspirations were born neither to-day nor yesterday. The -birth of the Lettish movement took place in 1860. Since that time it -has been under the double oppression of the Baltic barons and the -Russian bureaucracy. But it has courageously borne this double yoke, -and has proved its vitality and activity. It has thrived and developed; -it has taken deep root in the soul of the people whence it cannot be -eradicated again. It is certain that the Lettish people possesses what -President Wilson calls “well-defined national aspirations.” These have -clearly appeared in the sharp and closely-followed line maintained -by the Lettish people during the whole war in perfect unanimity. The -Letts have fought with all their might against Germany to defend -their aspirations against Teutonic tendencies. The National Council -of Latvia, in the fatal period of the Russian flight and the German -occupation of a considerable portion of Latvia, was able to centre in -itself the whole social activity and political thought of the Lettish -people. In its first session, from 16th to 19th November, 1917, it -asked for the Lettish nation the right to dispose of themselves. In -the second, from 15th to 19th January, 1918, it very categorically -stated that “Latvia asks to be recognised as a sovereign, independent -and indivisible State.” The National Council informed Russia of its -decision in the speech of its representative, J. Goldman, in the -Constituent Assembly of Russia, on the 5th January, 1918. The National -Council, in spite of the personal danger to its members, in a protest -note addressed on the 4th April, 1918, to the German Chancellor, Count -Hertling, explicitly opposed the German inclination to unite Latvia -to Germany. Already in July, 1918, the National Council had addressed -itself to the Allied Governments and the opinion of the whole world, -protesting against the peace of Brest-Litovsk and revealing the clumsy -deceit of the German occupation authority in proclaiming as the will -of the Lettish people the decisions of the Landesrath, a usurping body -composed of German barons and their servants; and the National Council -emphasised the unbending decision of the Lettish people to attain the -realisation of its natural rights to independence. The National Council -of Latvia considered it a great honour that its aspirations were -crowned with success. It was recognised as an independent body by the -Governments of England and Japan. - -Having suffered long at the hands of both Russia and Germany, the -Lettish people has come to the conclusion that it would find its -interests guaranteed only by independence. It is not a passing mood, -but a firm conviction, for which the Lettish people has suffered -and which it will never and in no case surrender. And it awaits the -realisation of its aspirations and the solemn proclamation of its -rights. - - - - -PROTESTS OF THE RUSSIAN GROUPS - - -However, the Russian groups protest in the name of the interests of -the Russian people, who, they say, will oppose the separation of -an independent Latvia. One might briefly reply that the one-sided -interests of the Russian people would not solve this question, and -that an exclusive solution in favour of the interests of the Russian -people would be in opposition to the principle of international -relations proclaimed by the Allies. In his speech delivered on the -4th July, 1918, President Wilson declared: “The settlement of any one -of the questions concerning either territories, national sovereignty, -economic or political relations, must be made on the basis of the free -acceptation of such a settlement by the peoples directly concerned, and -not on the basis of material interest or advantage of any other nation -or people.” And in the message of September 27th, 1918, President -Wilson said: “No individual or special interest of a nation or a group -of nations shall be able so to inspire a part of the arrangement that -it would not be in agreement with the united interests of all.” - -It would seem that these declarations leave nothing to be desired -from the point of view of clearness and conciseness, and they were -pronounced in the most solemn manner and adopted both by the Allies and -their adversaries as a basis on which future international relations -might be established. It would seem also that these declarations do -not leave any doubt about the fact that the question of Latvia and her -fate should be solved on the basis of the aspirations and wishes of the -Lettish people, and not in accordance with the interests of Russia. -However, to complete the picture, we might as well discuss the question -of those Russian interests which, we are told, would suffer by the -separation of Latvia. - - - - -ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF RUSSIA - - -The Russian groups and their ideologists put forward the economic -interests of Russia, which, they say, do not in any way permit -the separation of Latvia. “Russian foreign trade,” says Mandelstam -(_Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_), -“was principally sea-borne; from this point of view the Baltic -ports were of the highest importance to it” (p. 58). “The complete -separation of the Baltic provinces from Russia would put this latter -in an extremely difficult and grave situation, by depriving her of her -outlets in the Baltic, which are not only the most important but also -the only practicable ones in the winter” (p. 60). - -The fact in itself is certainly correct. Before the war almost half of -the imports and more than two-fifths of the exports of European Russia -by sea passed through the great ports of Latvia: Riga, Libau, Windau. -But who would suppose that Latvia will close her ports to the transit -trade of Russia? On the contrary, Latvia understands quite well that -she is the natural intermediary between East and West, and will, in -her own interests, do her best by every means to encourage trade with -Russia. The natural destiny of Latvia is to be a storehouse for goods -coming from the West to Russia and _vice versa_. And everything makes -us believe that Latvia will be in a position to perform that rôle -better than Russia herself. - -The chief conditions required by commerce are the following: Suitable -technical establishments, simple and precise juridical relations, and -lastly, order and tranquillity. Russia has not been able to provide -these conditions. To be satisfied of this, one has but to remember -the wretched equipment of the ports, so disproportionate to their -world-importance, the miserable state of the railways, the lack of -means of transport, the abuses and disorder. Judicial relations were -regulated by laws dating almost from the Flood, the same for the -Russian villages as for the towns of universal importance, laws which -would much better have suited the former alone. The proceedings at the -courts of law were of fabulous duration; the code of laws affecting -commercial houses and companies was out of date; conditions of credit -were of the worst; and, in consequence, Germany, which enjoys -the ability to accommodate herself to all the Russian conditions, -increasingly invaded the economic life of the Baltic Sea, dispersing -the competition of others. No, it was neither Russian firms nor capital -which prevailed there, but those of Germany, and the watchword came -not from Petrograd but from Berlin. Russia would not have succeeded as -quickly as Latvia in freeing herself from the preponderating influence -on the shores of the Baltic. That is why Russia’s interests will in -no way suffer if the intermediary’s rôle is played neither by her nor -Germany, but by those who are familiar with the Baltic, whom nature has -attached to it, and who consequently have natural rights to it. - - - - -STRATEGICAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA - - -The Russian groups lay great stress on the strategical interests of -Russia. The separation of Latvia, they say, would greatly prejudice -these. The frontiers of Russia, after Latvia’s separation, would -strategically be so disadvantageous that it would be difficult to -defend them successfully. The former frontiers, with Latvia included, -were on the contrary very favourable. Yet Russia did not and could -not defend them. There is no doubt that if, in 1914, the Germans had, -instead of throwing themselves on France, directed their forces to -the East, they would have occupied without much difficulty the whole -territory of Latvia; and Russia would have been deprived anyhow of -the advantages of strategical frontiers and bases for her fleet. This -hypothesis has been fully proved by the events that followed. In the -spring of 1915, the German forces, relatively weak, easily succeeded in -seizing the South of Courland, with the very important base for their -navy at Libau, and took up positions on the River Venta. An attempt -was then made to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand -Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, to the necessity of a vigorous defence of -Courland in view of her military, political and economic importance. -It was then that the Grand Duke, not sharing the opinion of the -Russian groups on the strategical importance of Latvia, made his -famous retort, “I don’t give a damn for your Courland!”--words which -to-day still resound in the ears of every Lett. And in the summer of -1915, a few German detachments were seen occupying, almost without any -resistance on the part of the Russians, the greater part of Courland. -It is easy to believe in the little importance of the German forces -and in Courland’s weak defence when one learns that mere patrols of -cavalry took possession of whole towns almost without firing a shot. -Seeing this, two sections of Lettish reservists who had been ordered to -retreat, begged to be allowed to defend Mitau, and the permission was -granted to them. These heroic soldiers offered to the Germans such a -violent and unexpected resistance that the latter hesitated for a long -time before coming nearer to the town. - -In the autumn of 1915, the front was established on the line of the -River Daugava (Dwina). The Russian Political Conference will perhaps -say that this is precisely the strategic line which they contemplate. -If that is so, it is fresh proof that in the hands of Russia -strategical advantages have no importance. We know from the words -publicly pronounced by the commander of an army on the Riga front, -Radko-Dmitrieff, that Riga would have fallen in the autumn of 1915 -but for the bravery of the Lettish troops, raised, as it is known, by -Lettish patriots, after heated argument with the Russian bureaucracy. -In the main, it was not the Russians so much as the Letts who defended -the Riga front. It is enough to recollect the long siege which they -sustained without respite on the “island of death,” near Ixküle, and -the famous breach made by them in the German front near Mangoul, a -breach which unfortunately led to nothing, owing to the lack of Russian -troops to support them. Let us quote the characteristic and significant -words spoken by the Kaiser after an inspection of the Riga front: -“Riga will fall into my hands like a ripe fruit when eight stars have -died out on that front.” He meant by this the eight detachments of the -Lettish army. - -The 2nd September, 1917, the Germans broke through the Riga front, and -at least two Russian divisions would have been made prisoners if it -had not been for the stubborn resistance of certain Lettish regiments, -which were then annihilated. After this struggle they existed only in -name, a glorious name with which the Bolsheviki continued to frighten -their Russian adversaries.[3] - -By this we can see that favourable strategical positions, in unskilful -hands, become rather a snare than an advantage. The fact is that you -cannot get immediate advantage out of a favourable strategical line -if you have not the wish, the will, and the capacity to profit by it. -Russia lacked both the goodwill and the capacity; they were absent in -the Commander-in-Chief as well as in that moujik deserter from Riazan -who replied to all exhortations: “Why should I fight? I’m not going to -fish in that sea.” - -The world-war has proved that patriotic spirit in an army and an -understanding of duty are no less indispensable than the technique, -favourable positions, etc. Will Russia be able to make her Grand Dukes -and moujiks believe that their feeling of duty must extend to the -strategic frontiers of the Baltic Sea, in a foreign land? We doubt it. -Therefore, Russia’s defence will not be prejudiced if the strategical -points aimed towards the West fall into stronger and surer hands than -hers. - -And the question of Russia’s defence must be examined from another -point of view. Against whom is Russia preparing her defence in the -West? Against Latvia? It would be a grave insult to Russia to pretend -that Latvia, with her two million and a half inhabitants, could -dream of an aggressive act against Russia, which, counting only the -Great-Russians, possesses 65 million inhabitants. Against Esthonia -then, with her million and a half inhabitants? Against Lithuania, with -her six million inhabitants? To put these questions is to answer them. -Against Poland or Ukraine? But in that case the strategical positions -of the Baltic Sea have nothing to do with it. Against a coalition -of all these States? This is questionable, for strong and adequate -as a defensive coalition of all these States might be regarded, an -offensive coalition on their part against Russia is obviously unlikely -and futile, for in the latter case there could be neither community of -interest nor a common object in aggression. - -There remains the hypothesis of M. Mandelstam (_Memorandum on the -Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_, p. 57), that -the territory of Latvia may serve as a very favourable point of -disembarkation for armies attacking Russia. If M. Mandelstam has -Germany in view as a potential adversary, one can set him at ease by -telling him that all the interests of Latvia are directed against -Germany, and to suspect her of a future alliance with Germany is simply -inadmissible. In the case of an aggressive tendency on the part of -Germany, Latvia will have to defend herself, and one can suppose that -she will do it more successfully than Russia, which could not thus be -other than much obliged to her, in view of Latvia’s carrying out for -her a task which had proved beyond Russia’s power. - -Russia’s defence will thus in no way be prejudiced by the shores of -the Baltic not being guarded by herself but by a more watchful sentry, -of whom one could not expect any aggressive tendency, but who would -nevertheless oppose himself, in the name of his own interests, to any -aggression coming either from the West or East. - -The Lettish people claims the realisation of its natural right to an -independent existence and free development. Within the boundaries of -Russia this was and will be impossible. Consequently, the Lettish -people is right in demanding its constitution as an independent State, -and this all the more because the interests of the Russian people will -not suffer by it. - - - - -GUARANTEES OF THE WORLD-PEACE - - -It would be possible to end here if the question was merely one of -tracing a line of delimitation between the interests of the Russian -people and those of the Lettish people. But that is not so--one could -not lose sight of a more universal interest. What will be the result of -the limits traced between the Lettish people and the Russian people, -in the matter of other nations’ interests? A new international dawn -will rise when the Paris Conference has established guarantees for the -maintenance of peace. Everything must be done to avoid the disasters of -a future war. - -And precisely from this point of view, voices are heard proclaiming -that in the interests of political equilibrium, a strong Russia must be -rebuilt, as far as possible within her former frontiers. They even say -that if no Russia existed, one must be invented. - - - - -PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM - - -Certainly, it is possible to make a primary reply to this opinion by -saying that political equilibrium is incriminated, and that in its -place will come the League of Nations guaranteeing peace and justice -for all. The reply is valid. But we are also disposed to agree with -those who say that the League of Nations will be formed only in the -future and at present it is incapable of fulfilling all the tasks which -we await from it. For this reason, if only as a subsidiary factor, one -must not lose sight of the problems of political equilibrium. - - - - -RUSSIA AS A FACTOR IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM - - -This equilibrium does not establish the necessity of re-creating -Russia as she was before the war, for Russia was in no way a factor -powerful enough to support that equilibrium. Knowing Russia’s internal -weakness, Germany had no fear in launching the world-war. And during -the war Russia’s forces proved insufficient to weigh down the scales of -victory on the Allies’ side. On the contrary, during all the time the -hostilities lasted, Russia was strategically, as well as politically -and economically, the weakest point of the Allies. Finally she left -them to the grace of God after having made them a present of the pest -of Bolshevism. It is clear that, even in the case of reconstruction in -her former boundaries, Russia will not for a long time be in a position -to perform the part of an ally and help to maintain the European -equilibrium. Russia is ruined; ruined not only by the war, but also, -and much more, by Bolshevism; ruined physically, economically and -much more morally and intellectually. More than a generation will be -required before Russia can count as a factor in European policy. And -who will maintain the equilibrium in the meantime? - - - - -INTERNAL WEAKNESS OF RUSSIA - - -But even after a long rest and complete external reconstruction, -Russia, in the case of serious aggression, will always prove internally -to be a considerably weaker factor than it would be possible to -judge of from the outside. That was the case during the Japanese war -in 1904-5. And so she was also during the war which has just ended. -Russia’s external strength has always been imaginary, for she has -always been weak internally. And this is not an accidental, momentary -or passing weakness, but a weakness dependent on Russia’s composition -and her home-policy. We have already shown that Russia is composed -of a series of regions which by their population, history, culture -and economic interests are not bound together, but tend in different -directions, and are merely held together by perpetual compulsion. -By reason of this there will always be a centralised home-policy in -Russia, and, consequently, a lot of unsolved and insoluble problems -therein; a policy the principal means of which will always be force -and compulsion. And as soon as compulsion relaxes, the problems and -anomalies artificially kept under come again to the surface and -paralyse all the forces of Russia. The history of Russia shows that -precisely on account of her internal weakness and under the threat of -revolution, she has been unable to end with success any one of the last -wars. - - - - -POLITICAL LEANINGS OF RUSSIA TOWARDS GERMANY - - -But besides that, as concerns Russia, it will never be possible to tell -in which direction she will turn. At the beginning of the last century, -allied to Prussia and Austria, she fought against France, and became -the inspirer of the Holy Alliance which was directed, in full accord -with the character of Russia’s home-policy, against all the rights -of peoples. In the middle of the last century, she fought against -England, France, and Sardinia, after having secured the neutrality of -Austria and Prussia. In 1870, her friendly neutrality gave Prussia -the opportunity to crush France. There is something fateful in her -traditional friendship with Germany. Behind the back of France, though -allied to her, it was towards Germany that Nicholas II. felt himself -attracted (see his correspondence with William II., published in -Bourtzeff’s paper _L’Avenir_, 1917), as well as his ministers Sturmer -and Protopopoff, unmasked in the speech of P. Miliukoff in the Imperial -Douma, in February, 1917; M. Miliukoff himself (_Pages Modernes_, April -number, 1919, page 6); and the Tzar’s General Skoropadsky; and Lenin -and Trotsky who signed peace with Germany of the Kaiser and wanted -an alliance with Germany of Scheidemann at any cost. At heart, M. -Mandelstam also is not too remote from this fatal leaning. He threatens -war if the Paris Conference shows itself disposed to recognise the -independence of the States detached from Russia (_Some Reflections on -the Question of a Great Poland and the Shores of the Baltic_, p. 10; -_Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations_, -p. 81). With what war and in alliance with whom does M. Mandelstam -threaten us? - -It is evident that the Russian Political Conference is not free from -that fatal inclination. Its representative, M. Sazonoff, former -Minister, is revealed by Prince Lichnovsky as ready to abandon France, -“Russia’s cherished ally,” to Germany for plunder, on condition -that the latter consents to give Russia a free hand in regard to -Austria-Hungary. - -It is also very interesting to notice that the crusade against the -independent States of the Baltic, preached by M. Mandelstam in Paris, -is put into execution in Latvia by the armies of General von der -Goltz which have upset the legal Government of Latvia recognised by -England and Japan. The hand of M. Mandelstam, seeking allies for the -crusade against Latvia, has not remained in the air; von der Goltz -has grasped it enthusiastically. Future Russia and bygone Germany -have met in a common intrigue against independent Latvia. Finland, -Esthonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and independent Poland are specks in the -eyes of both; and who can guarantee that the points of contact will not -increase with the lapse of time? - - - - -RUSSIA AS A PROBABLE DESTROYER OF THE WORLD-PEACE - - -Russia has been and will be an ally too unsteady to count as a factor -of equilibrium in European politics. Moreover, she is a troublesome -factor, and likely to become directly or indirectly the instigator of a -European war. In 1904, Russia got herself involved in war with Japan, -which exhausted all her forces. During a sequence of years, Germany -had her hands completely free in the East, and it was certainly not -Russia’s balancing forces, but considerations of a quite different -nature, which then prevented Germany from falling upon France. On -three occasions during the last century Russia’s leanings towards -complete possession of the Black Sea have served as causes of war; -and in that just ended, Russia’s interests in the Balkans were the -motives for aggression on the part of Austria and Germany. With -Russia’s reconstitution her leanings towards possession of the Black -Sea and particularly the Straits will necessarily revive; this has -already been announced by the “Chairman of the Slav Congress in Moscow -and of the Russian Conference in London,” M. Briantchaninoff, with -the idea that the mandate of guardianship over the Dardanelles and -Constantinople should in all justice be entrusted to nobody but Russia. - -M. Briantchaninoff’s opinion is not a mere accident; we have no reason -to regard it as such. There is no doubt that, in a reconstituted -Russia, by a natural reaction from the humiliations and outrages -suffered by the country, the nationalist wave will rise very high. -This nationalism will have as its aims those of militant Slavism. -One of these aims has always been the orthodox Cross towering over -“Haghia-Sophia.” And the Straits were promised to Russia. M. Sazonoff -spoke of that in the Imperial Douma amidst a storm of applause. This -long-pursued object has escaped from Russian hands thanks only to the -microbes which made their way into M. Lenin’s sealed-up carriage. It -was almost reached, and it can be reached. It is necessary to try to -reach it. Lenin is already no more. M. Briantchaninoff will be heard -with thundering voice; M. Miliukoff will not be able to refuse his -help, having shown interest in the Dardanelles during his whole life. -M. Sazonoff has in his hands the Allies’ promises, which only for a -time fell into the hands of “Comrade” Tchitcherin. Thus the watchword: -“To Constantinople!” And that means: “To Belgrade! To Athens! To -Bucharest!” and also “To Paris! To London! To Washington!” - - - - -RUSSIA’S POLICY IN THE BALTIC - - -From the direction of the Baltic Sea, reconstituted Russia threatens -us with another political danger. This danger comes from the strange -policy Russia has pursued in the Baltic countries, a policy whose -repetition is revealed by many signs. Feeling instinctively her -administrative incapacity, Russia thus distinctly shows the effects of -the influence of German elements in the staff of her administrators. -During all the time of her domination over these countries, she left -full power in the hands of the Baltic barons who--except in some -accidental and temporary cases--have been the administrators and the -real masters of the land. They took great advantage of this situation, -endeavouring to give the country a German character. Further, they -organised systematic German colonisation, for the realisation of which -Berlin put large sums at their disposal. This colonisation took on -such vast proportions and was carried on so openly that it finally -attracted the attention of the Russian Government itself, which, in -order to paralyse its effects, set up Russian colonisation in its turn. -The latter, however, led to no results, the Russian peasant not being -prepared for the intensive agricultural methods adopted in the country. -The feelings and leanings of the Baltic nobility have clearly shown -themselves during the war. It is enough to remember that they offered -to General Hindenburg a third part of their lands for the purpose of -colonisation. Their leanings were in perfect accord with the aims of -the Pan-Germans, of whom many were emigrants from the Baltic, and -who, like Professor Schiemann and P. Rohrbach, have not been playing -an unimportant part. It is extremely interesting to observe that these -tendencies have not ceased with the defeat of Germany. It is known that -the Germans have promised to Latvia energetic assistance against the -Bolsheviki if a right to the land is granted to all the combatants. - -It is certain that after the war there will be a surplus of population -in Germany, and it is not for nothing that Count Brokdorff-Rantzau -complains in one of his notes that it will be difficult to find room -for this surplus of inhabitants, as it is probable that the principal -States will close their doors to them. There is no doubt whatever that -a large part of this excess of population will go over to the Baltic, -where they will find land ready for them and will be received with open -arms by the Baltic barons of Pan-German mind. The Russian Government, -as past experience has proved, will be unable to oppose this fresh -_Drang nach Osten_, and if the Lettish people do not possess enough -freedom of action, that is to say, if there is no independent Latvia, -one can be supremely sure that German influence will be very great. On -the other hand, the resolution of the various Landestags, Landesrats, -and Regentschaftsrats, which have asked for the closest _rapprochement_ -with Germany, militarily and economically, and have offered the ducal -crown to the Hohenzollern dynasty, leaves no doubt about the direction -in which the sympathies of the Baltic Germans will go. The Baltic is, -in the hands of Russia, a borderland with predominant German interests, -a land to which Germany stretches out her hand, a land always ready, at -a moment favourable to Pan-Germanism, to detach itself from Russia and -pass over to the side of her adversaries. Thus, to be logical in the -matter of the Baltic States, one must decide, not between Russia and -Latvia, but between the latter and Germany. - -And thus the argument of political motives leads to a conclusion which -is not at all to the advantage of Russia’s reconstitution. For the -re-establishment of equilibrium in European politics, Russia is of no -value. She is not, to that end, something which should be invented if -she did not exist.[4] - - - - -THE POLITICAL RÔLE OF THE NEW STATES - - -In order to have an absolutely clear idea of the question, it is still -necessary to look at the other side; _i.e._, to represent to oneself -the probable policy of the States detached from Russia. We have -already shown that one cannot expect aggression from these States, -because of the relative external weakness of them individually. It is -equally unimaginable that they should form an aggressive alliance, -for one cannot realise a common aggressive aim for all these States. -Consequently one cannot expect a violation of peace from their side. - -But taking into account their relative weakness, will these States -not be subject to envy and aggression on the part of their stronger -neighbours, and will they not in this way, against their will, be the -cause of disturbing the peace? It is necessary to envisage this peril, -but it is possible to avert it. In this one may rightly rely on the -League of Nations in which the small nations put all their hope. - -Assuredly, the League of Nations is just now not strong enough; but, -in view of the general national exhaustion, one cannot expect, as soon -as peace is concluded, aggression against the States which have the -authority of the Peace Conference on their side. If aggressive forces -gather later, the League of Nations will have had time in the interval -to organise itself definitely and to command moral and material -strength sufficient to check aggression. - -There is another way, too, of guaranteeing the security of the new -States: an alliance between them, or at least between those of them -which have access to the Baltic Sea; viz., Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, -Lithuania, Poland, and probably White-Russia, an alliance with many -certain chances of development in one direction or another. Assuredly, -there are still ancient accounts to be settled between some of these -nations, but common and vital interests are so strong that History will -be no obstacle in the matter. All these nationalities have always had -continual relations with Western civilisation, and there would quickly -and easily be formed between them a community of intellectual and moral -interests. The economic intercourse between them is also capable of -vast development. For instance, Poland can supply all the other States -with her coal, and Lithuania can supply the corn which Finland needs. -Undoubtedly, there are common interests between all the above-named -States in the trade of the Baltic Sea. Each one of them has a natural -_Hinterland_, and, consequently, is vitally interested in the guarantee -of freedom of trade in the Baltic Sea. Besides, the mere political -interest of common defence is a strong enough basis for an alliance of -all the Baltic States, for they are under the double menace of Germany -on one side and Russia on the other. All these States have experienced -in fact the gravity of this menace, and so all will understand the -great value of this defensive alliance. - - - - -THE DOMINIUM MARIS BALTICI - - -(Command of the Baltic Sea) has been for centuries a bone of contention -between the Northern and Eastern States of Europe. For this the Teutons -have contended, and Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Denmark, Russia. -Germany had the same aim, and before the war had nearly reached it. -During the whole of history, every State which acquired strength and -authority in the North or East of Europe, evinced this inevitable -leaning towards possession of the Baltic Sea, and it was only in the -measure of its success in that direction that it could play its part as -a Great Power, a rôle which ceased the moment the State was deprived -of that DOMINIUM MARIS BALTICI. To give it again to one of -the coastwise States would mean a fresh menace to the peace of Europe; -but by putting it into the hands of those to whom it belongs by -natural right, that is to say, into the common possession of the States -surrounding that sea, one would remove one of the causes of probable -conflicts in the future of Europe. - - - - -LINE OF PARTITION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY - - -For yet another reason the Baltic States, or rather their alliance, -will have a great rôle to play--that of a boundary line of economic and -political culture between Russia and Germany. This partition--which -might be called a _cordon sanitaire_--is absolutely indispensable. -Germany’s direct influence on Russia, with no obstacle between them, is -a real danger. To the naïve and dreamy soul of the childlike Russian -villagers, the extreme sociological theories of the West, born from -a very complex economic situation, are a direct temptation and a -dangerous poison, as illustrated by M. Lenin’s sealed railway carriage. -The teachings of German Social Democracy have taken such root in -Russian soil and have produced such a harvest that it has caused much -merriment to the Teuton Field-Marshals; while to Russia it has brought -extreme abasement and almost irretrievable disaster. - -And this is likely to happen again, everywhere and always, whenever a -backward race, neighbour of another highly developed, would fain borrow -from the latter and put into immediate operation “the latest advances -of civilisation.” - -It is the same in regard to economic relations. Germany, deprived of -her colonies, and lacking sufficient resources in raw materials and -rich markets, will necessarily direct the surplus of her economic -energy towards Russia, which will easily become a German colony and -submit entirely to German influence. In this respect, Germany had -already arrived at considerable results before the war. She will -work in the same direction, and after the signing of peace with -still greater activity, which will assuredly lead to results hardly -desirable from the political point of view. A Russia invaded by capital -and technical forces from Germany, and a Germany with Russian raw -materials and Russia’s market at her disposal, will be such great -economic powers that each will separately appear a serious menace, and -all the more so if in alliance. - -But what is more clear and more important is the line of political -partition between Germany and Russia. The political security of Europe -used to be constantly under the menace of an alliance between Russia -and Germany, an alliance which would have radically destroyed the -balance of power. This menace was in no way artificial but perfectly -real, and might have been realised at any moment. As we have tried to -prove, it will inevitably reappear with the reconstitution of Russia. -The vanquished two of this great war will not at once submit to their -fate; both will be discontented and will cogitate ways of improving -their situation. This alone is a sufficient basis for a _rapprochement_ -or an alliance. Russia will not resist for long the temptation of an -alliance with Germany, of which the leaders beyond the Rhine are -already openly talking. Consequently, it is necessary to separate -Russia from Germany, that is, to prevent their direct union, and to -that end it would be impossible to find a more adequate and easy means -than the _cordon sanitaire_ of the States named. Truth to tell, it -would be necessary to invent this alliance if it did not force itself -into being. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -We have arrived at the end of this study and may now summarise. - -The question of the organisation of the Lettish people in an -independent State must be decided quickly and definitely. The -restoration of anything whatever of the _status quo ante_, whether -_de facto_, temporary or indefinite, would serve no purpose because -it would not give to the Lettish people the juridical basis necessary -to the reconstruction of a ruined life. This question must be solved -independently of the will of the Russian people, because, in -principle, the idea that the destiny of any people whatsoever depends -on the will of another people, is inadmissible; because also it is -impossible to foresee when the Russian people will be in a position -to make its will freely known. In definitely deciding the destiny -of Latvia, it is necessary to reject the project of an All-Russian -Federation. - -Such a federation is impossible. In accordance with the laws of -historical continuity, it is impossible to pass from a centralised -State to one of the most complicated and most delicate forms of State -organisation. Besides, the peoples of Russia have no such community -of intellectual, moral and economic interests as might become the -solid foundation of a free co-existence in one and the same State. The -All-Russian Federation will either divide itself into different States -or change itself into a centralised State in which the natural rights -of its different peoples will not be guaranteed. The only just solution -of the question of Latvia is the recognition of that country as an -independent State. - -This is not only the natural right of the Lettish people. It has long -been the object of its permanent and definite leanings, and these are -in harmony with its well-recognised interests. - -The interests of Russia will in no way suffer from the separation of -Latvia; neither economically, for Latvia will certainly be a better -intermediary between the West and the East than Russia was or would -be; nor strategically, for Latvia will be a much more conscientious -sentinel on the Baltic Sea than Russia was or would be. - -It is impossible for Russia to claim to re-enter her former boundaries -on the necessity of European balance of power, for, as a factor of -equilibrium, Russia has been found wanting, and one can foresee her -future complete submission to the economic and political influence of -Germany, as well as to her civilisation. - -On the other hand, the interests of a lasting peace demand the creation -of a series of independent national States for the peoples inhabiting -the shores of the Baltic Sea; and, between them, a defensive alliance -for which there are sufficient grounds in the shape of common -economic, political and intellectual interests. Such an alliance would -play at the same time the rôle of the necessary line of demarcation -between Russia and Germany. Moreover, it is the only natural solution -of the problem of the _Dominium maris Baltici_, which has been an -apple of discord for centuries and has often been the disturber of the -world’s peace. - - [Illustration: THE - TEMPLE PRESS - LETCHWORTH - ENGLAND] - - - - -Footnotes: - -[1] One of the published works of the Russian Political Conference -(from the pen of Mandelstam), specially devoted to the question of -Poland, has received a well-merited refutation in the brilliant -pamphlet of M. H. Grappin (_Memorandum on the Application of the -Nationalities Principle to the Russian Question_). - -M. Gaston Gaillard, in his book _The Pan-Russian Movement and the -Borderland Peoples_, Paris, 1919, gives a remarkable summary, with full -documentary evidence, of the aspirations of the borderland peoples of -Russia. - -[2] P. J. Sahlit, _Devastation of Latvia by the Russian Armies_, -Petrograd, 1917 (in Russian). - -[3] As fear has big eyes, even among fearless people like M. Savinkoff, -it is believed, for instance, that this latter gentleman has found in -the Bolshevik lines two divisions of Lettish Rifles, _i.e._, 60,000 men -(_Pages Modernes_, No. 1, page 7). If we take into account that many -Letts have fought from the beginning in the ranks of the Czeko-Slovaks, -in the army of Denikin and in that of the North, and remembering that -the Lettish regiments have suffered great losses during the war, -one can only ask with amazement where this great number of Lettish -youths comes from. No more than 3,500 Letts can be counted among the -Bolsheviki, all the rest are a vision inspired by fear. - -[4] Details on this point will be found in the pamphlet of Count Jean -Tarnovsky, _La Menace Allemande et le Péril Russe_, Imprimerie Moderne, -17, rue Duler, Biarritz, 1919. - - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Latvia & Russia, by Arveds Karlis Kristaps Bergs - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LATVIA & RUSSIA *** - -***** This file should be named 54189-0.txt or 54189-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/1/8/54189/ - -Produced by Anita Hammond, Wayne Hammond and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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