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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Nootka Sound Controversy - A dissertation - -Author: William Ray Manning - -Release Date: December 12, 2016 [EBook #53719] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY *** - - - - -Produced by MWS, Bryan Ness and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: Footnotes in this book have been renumbered -sequentially for the convenience of this e-text. Some, though, refer -to other footnotes by the original book’s footnote marker and/or page -number. Where this happens, the current number has been added in square -brackets (e.g. “see preceding page, note b [15]”) to enable the reader -to find the reference. - - - - - The University of Chicago - FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER - - THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY - - A DISSERTATION - - SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS - AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE - OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY - - (DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY) - - BY - WILLIAM RAY MANNING - - INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY AT PURDUE UNIVERSITY; FELLOW OF - THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1902 TO 1904 - - WASHINGTON - GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 1905 - - - - -XVI.--THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY. - -By WILLIAM RAY MANNING, Ph. D. - -_Instructor in History at Purdue University; Fellow of the University -of Chicago, 1902 to 1904._ - -[The Justin Winsor prize of the American Historical Association was -awarded to the author of this monograph.] - - - - -THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY. - -By WILLIAM RAY MANNING, Ph. D. - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - Page. - - CHAPTER I. Introduction 283 - - II. The English plans for occupying Nootka Sound 286 - - III. The Spanish plans for occupying Nootka Sound--The - conflicting claims before 1789 300 - - IV. Martinez’s operations at Nootka before Colnett’s - arrival 312 - - V. The quarrel and the seizure 331 - - VI. The English prisoners in Mexico 344 - - VII. Attempts at peaceable settlement 362 - - VIII. Europe prepares for war 380 - - IX. England’s first demand granted 395 - - X. America’s relations to the controversy 412 - - XI. The national assembly and the family compact--Effect - on the negotiation 424 - - XII. English ultimatum--Spanish defiance 439 - - XIII. The Nootka Sound convention--Its reception and results 450 - - XIV. Subsequent negotiations and final settlement of the - Nootka Sound dispute 463 - - Bibliography 472 - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The French revolutionary period contains so much of greater importance -that historians have neglected the Nootka Sound incident. Of the -few writers who have discussed it, the majority have written from a -partisan standpoint, or, if impartial themselves, have drawn their -information from partisan pamphlets. The consequence is that many -errors regarding it have crept into the work of the best writers. The -purpose of this monograph is to give a more extended account, drawn -largely from unpublished sources, and to correct as many of the errors -as possible. - -Besides working over the documents that have been published and the -accounts that have been written, a thorough search has been made in -the archives of the Indies at Seville, in the national historical -archives at Madrid, and in the British Museum and the public record -office at London. A less thorough search has been made in the archives -of foreign affairs at Paris and the archives of the Department of State -at Washington. More than 500 pages of unpublished documents relating to -the dispute have been transcribed and used. The classified bibliography -at the close will make clear the sources of information and their -relative value. - -My acknowledgments are due to the following persons for valuable -assistance: To my wife, who worked with me continually for two and -a half months in the Spanish archives and the British Museum, and -who has criticised my manuscript and read the proof sheets; to Prof. -J. F. Jameson, whose untiring interest has been a constant source -of inspiration, and to whose aid and painstaking suggestions are -largely due any merits that the monograph may possess; to Prof. A. C. -McLaughlin, for research in the archives at Washington; to Prof. F. J. -Turner, for manuscripts and other material from his own collection. -Besides these, I wish to make special mention of the kindness and -assistance of Señor Pedro Torres-Lanzas, director of the archives -of the Indies at Seville, and of Señor Vicente Vignau y Ballester, -director of the national historical archives at Madrid. - -CHICAGO, _July, 1904_. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -INTRODUCTION. - - -Nootka Sound is a small inlet on the western shore of Vancouver Island. -It was christened and made known to the world by Captain Cook in 1778. -A few years afterwards a flourishing fur trade sprang up between the -Northwest Coast and China. Nootka became the center of this trade, -though it remained for several years without any settlement except an -Indian village. On account of its sudden and growing importance, the -Russians, English, and Spaniards all laid plans for occupying the port. -It happened that all planned to carry out the project in the year 1789, -a year that meant so much for the subsequent history of the world. -Though the Nootka incident can make no claim to rank in importance with -the great events of that year, yet it was destined to have an influence -on the movements then started and to be influenced in turn by them. - -The Russian plans were not acted upon, but the plans of the other two -were. An English expedition from India and a Spanish from Mexico each -sailed in the spring of 1789 to establish a colony at Nootka. The -promoters of neither knew anything of the other. The Spanish commander -arrived first and took possession. Nearly two months later the -Englishman came. A quarrel ensued. The Spaniard seized the Englishman, -imprisoned him, his officers and crew, and sent them to Mexico as a -prize. A consort vessel arrived a few days later and met the same -fate. Two other English vessels had been seized earlier. One of them -had been released on bond and the other had been confiscated without -adjudication. - -The Viceroy of Mexico, instead of acting on his own responsibility, -reported the matter to the Government at Madrid. The Spanish Court -complained to the British that subjects of the latter had violated the -territorial sovereignty of the former, and demanded that the offenders -be punished to prevent such enterprises in the future. The British -Cabinet rejected the Spanish claim to exclusive sovereignty over the -territory in question, and suspended all diplomatic relations until -Spain should have offered a satisfactory reparation for the insult -which His Britannic Majesty felt that his flag had suffered. Each Court -refused to grant the demand of the other and stood firmly on the ground -originally taken. To support their respective claims, both Governments -made the most extensive armaments. Each nation also called upon its -allies for assurances of support and entered negotiations for forming -new alliances. For a time it seemed that all Europe would be drawn -into war over what, on the face of it, appeared to be an insignificant -quarrel between two obscure sea captains. - -Speaking of the controversy Schoell says that a few huts built on an -inhospitable coast and a miserable fortification defended by rocks were -sufficient to excite a bloody war between two great European powers -and gave birth to a negotiation which for several months absorbed -the attention of all of the maritime powers of Europe.[1] Similar -statements were made by other writers within a few years after the -incident.[2] Most historians who have touched upon it have either -treated it from a partisan standpoint or have considered it of too -little importance to merit careful inquiry into the facts.[3] - -But far from being merely a dispute over a few captured vessels and a -comparatively unimportant trading post, it was the decisive conflict -between two great colonial principles, of which England and Spain -were, respectively, the exponents. Spain still clung to the antiquated -notion that the fact of the Pacific Ocean’s having been first seen by -a Spaniard gave his Government a right to all of the lands of the -continent which were washed by it. This fact, added to the gift of -the Pope, was sufficient to convince the Spanish mind that Spain had -a valid title to the whole of the western coast of both Americas. On -the other hand, England had long been acting on the now universally -accepted principle that mere discovery is an insufficient title, and -that land anywhere on the globe not controlled by any civilized nation -belongs to that nation which first occupies and develops it. - -The controversy is of further importance because of the fact that -it tested the triple alliance of 1788 between England, Prussia, and -the Netherlands. It also afforded the occasion for overthrowing the -Bourbon family compact of 1761. It marked the end of Spain’s new brief -period of national greatness, which had resulted from the wise reign -of Charles III. It was also the beginning of the collapse of Spain’s -colonial empire. Duro, one of the leading Spanish historians of the -present, says that it inaugurated a period of degradation disgraceful -to Spanish history, and began a series of pictures which cause anyone -to blush who contemplates them with love for the fatherland.[4] - -The settlement of the controversy determined the subsequent position -of England and Spain on the Northwest Coast. Later, after the United -States had bought the Spanish claim, the Nootka Sound affair became -a part of the Oregon controversy. For a time the dispute threatened -to change the course of the French Revolution.[5] It menaced the -existence, or at least the expansion, of the United States. It promised -to substitute English for Spanish influence in Latin America. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE ENGLISH PLANS FOR OCCUPYING NOOTKA SOUND. - - -As early as 1785 instructions were given looking toward the -establishment of an English trading post on Nootka Sound. In this -year an English commercial company instructed the commander of one -of its vessels to establish a post on the northwest coast of America -for “securing the trade of the continent and islands adjacent.” King -Georges [Nootka] Sound was suggested as being “in every respect -consistent with the intent of forming such establishment.”[6] - -The fur trade between the western coast of America and China was at the -time in its infancy, but the profits accruing from it soon made it of -great importance. Captain Cook, in his voyage of 1778, had brought the -possibility of the industry to the attention of English shipowners. -“By the accidental carrying away of a small collection of furs, whose -great value was learned in Siberia and China, he originated the great -fur trade which became the chief incentive of all later English -and American expeditions to these regions.”[7] He remained a month -in Nootka Sound. A number of English expeditions visited the place -between this date and 1789, as did also several Spanish, French, and -American. Only such of them will be discussed as have a direct bearing -on the Nootka Sound controversy, and these only at such places in the -narrative as their bearing becomes important. A sufficiently full -account of the others may be found in the first volume of Bancroft’s -“History of the Northwest Coast.” - -The first English expedition to claim serious attention is that of -1788. It was commanded by John Meares,[8] a retired lieutenant of the -royal navy. Two years before this he had been placed in charge of an -expedition to the same coast by some merchants under the protection of -the East India Company.[9] He had two vessels, the _Nootka_, commanded -by himself, and the _Sea Otter_, commanded by a subordinate. The latter -was lost at sea. The former spent the winter of 1786-87 in Prince -William Sound, on the Alaskan coast, where, according to Meares’s -account, the most terrible hardships were suffered, and so many of the -crew were lost that not enough remained to man the ship.[10] After -disposing of his cargo of furs in China[11] he made preparations for -the expedition of the following year, during which he set up the first -English establishment on the coast. It was this post which, rightly -or wrongly, furnished the chief basis for the stubborn persistence of -the English ministry in its demands on Spain in the controversy two -years later. The purpose of discussing this expedition is to study what -Meares did at Nootka and find just what rights, if any, were thereby -acquired for England. - -It was intended that this expedition should be preliminary to the -planting of an English commercial colony. In mentioning the fact that -one vessel was destined to remain out much longer than the other, -Meares says that she was to leave the coast of America at the close -of the year and go to the Sandwich Islands for the winter. The next -year she was “to return to America, in order to meet her consort from -China with a supply of necessary stores and refreshments sufficient for -establishing factories and extending the plan of commerce in which we -were engaged.”[12] Probably to prove the feasibility of constructing -such factories, Meares took with him on this preliminary trip the -material and workmen for building a small trading vessel, which would -necessitate the erection of some sort of establishment to protect -the workmen and tools during the process of construction. In the -instructions for the voyage no mention is made of the vessel to be -constructed or of any establishment, either temporary or permanent, -but plans were laid for a second expedition. Speaking of the proposed -meeting of the two vessels constituting the expedition, which meeting -was to be at Nootka at the close of the summer trading season of 1788 -previous to the sailing of one vessel to China with the furs collected, -the proprietors instructed Meares to appoint “a time and place of -rendezvous, that you may receive the instructions and refreshments we -may send you next season.”[13] - -The larger vessel, the _Felice_, was commanded by Meares and was to -proceed directly to Nootka, arriving as early as possible and remaining -the entire season at Nootka and in the neighborhood. During the summer -of 1788 it is this vessel and the operations of its commander that -furnish the center of interest. The second vessel, the _Iphigenia_, -commanded by Captain Douglas, subject to Meares’s orders, was to spend -most of the trading season on the coast of Alaska in Cooks River -and Prince William Sound. When trade should slacken she was to move -southward, endeavoring to reach Nootka Sound by September 1, where the -two vessels were to meet.[14] During the first season the voyage of -the _Iphigenia_ is unimportant, but on its return to Nootka from the -Sandwich Islands in 1789 it furnishes for a time the chief interest. - -It is well to notice at the outset the double instructions and the -double national character of the expedition, though the importance of -the fact will become more evident later. As far as the instructions to -Meares are concerned, or his repetition of them to Douglas, the ships -were purely English in character, Daniel Beale, of Canton, China, being -the ostensible agent. But later, when one of them came into conflict -with the Spaniards, it was just as purely Portuguese to all external -appearances. It was flying Portuguese colors and was commanded by a -Portuguese captain, with instructions in his own language, given by a -merchant of the same nationality living at Macao, China.[15] In these -papers the real commanders appeared as supercargoes. - -In Meares’s narrative of the voyage no mention is made of the -deception, but later, in his memorial to the British Government, -he said that it was “to evade the excessive high port charges -demanded by the Chinese from all other European nations excepting -the Portuguese.”[16] Dixon, in one of his pamphlets, says that the -principal motive in using the Portuguese colors was to evade the South -Sea Company’s license.[17] Bancroft mentions both of these motives and -suggests that the trick is not permissible unless directed against a -hostile nation in time of war.[18] It seems to have been expected that -it would enable them to avoid some anticipated danger or difficulty. -However, as will be seen, this very double nationality was the first -thing to arouse suspicion and get the _Iphigenia_ into trouble. - -The vessels sailed from China in the latter part of 1788. Besides the -regular crew, each carried a number of European artisans and Chinese -smiths and carpenters. The latter, Meares says, were shipped on this -occasion as an experiment because of their reputed hardiness, industry, -and ingenuity, and also because of their simple manner of life and the -low wages demanded. He observes that “during the whole of the voyage -there was every reason to be satisfied with their services,” and adds: -“If hereafter trading posts should be established on the American -coast, a colony of these men would be a very important acquisition.” Of -the 90 men on the two ships 50 were Chinese. In view of the importance -of the Chinese element in the population of the Western States, it is -a significant circumstance that they figured so largely in this very -first venture. And, considering the subsequent rush of these people -to the New World, it is worthy of notice that on this occasion “a -much greater number of Chinese solicited to enter into this service -than could be received,” and those who were refused “gave the most -unequivocal marks of mortification and disappointment.”[19] “On the -voyage the artisans were employed in preparing articles of trade for -the American market. … The carpenters were also at work in preparing -the molds and the models for a sloop of 50 tons that was designed to -be built immediately on our arrival in King Georges Sound, as such a -vessel would be of the utmost utility not only in collecting furs, -but in exploring the coast.” In speaking of the work necessary for -the enterprise, Meares says: “Our timber was standing in the forests -of America, the ironwork was as yet in rough bars on board, and the -cordage which was to be formed into ropes was yet a cable.”[20] On May -13, after a passage of three months and twenty-three days from China, -they “anchored in Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound, abreast of the -village of Nootka.”[21] - -The natives received them in a friendly manner, and operations were -soon begun to carry out their shipbuilding enterprise. Meares says: - - Maquilla [the Indian chief, sometimes called “Maquinna”] had not - only most readily consented to grant us a spot of ground in his - territory whereon a house might be built for the accommodation of - the people we intended to leave there, but had promised us also his - assistance in forwarding our works and his protection of the party - who were destined to remain at Nootka during our absence. In return - for this kindness, and to insure a continuance of it, the chief was - presented with a pair of pistols, which he had regarded with an eye - of solicitation ever since our arrival.[22] - -This is Meares’s account of the transaction to which he referred in -his memorial two years later as a purchase of land. It was by this -transaction that the English Government claimed to have acquired a -title not only to this spot, but to the whole of Nootka Sound.[23] -There is nothing in his narrative which indicates that at the time -Meares had any thought of acquiring a permanent title, either for -himself or for his Government. Neither is there any unmistakable -indication to the contrary. Under these circumstances any title to -sovereignty thus acquired would have to depend on subsequent operations. - -With the assistance of the natives, work on the house advanced -rapidly, and on May 28, fifteen days after their arrival, it was -completed. It had two stories. On the ground floor were a workshop -and storeroom and in the upper story were a dining room and chambers -for the party. “A strong breastwork was thrown up around the house, -enclosing a considerable area of ground, which, with one piece of -cannon, placed in such a manner as to command the cove and the village -of Nootka, formed a fortification sufficient to secure the party -from any intrusion. Without this breastwork was laid the keel of a -vessel of 40 or 50 tons, which was now to be built agreeable to our -former determination.”[24] While this was being done the ship had been -repaired and refitted for a trading cruise to the southward. All was -in readiness for departure on June 11. On the day previous the party -to be left at Nootka was landed with articles to continue the brisk -trade which had sprung up, and also supplies for the completion of -the new vessel and enough provisions to fit it for a voyage to China -should misfortune prevent the return of the _Felice_ or the arrival of -her consort, the _Iphigenia_. A formal visit was paid to the chief, -Maquilla, to acquaint him with the intended departure and to secure -his attention and friendship to the party to be left on shore. Meares -adds: “As a bribe to secure his attachment he was promised that when -we finally left the coast he should enter into full possession of the -house and all the goods and chattles thereunto belonging.”[25] This -statement is quoted by Greenhow as conclusive proof of the merely -temporary character of the establishment.[26] If the promise was made -in good faith, it would seem that the position was well taken, did not -the subsequent conduct of Meares indicate the contrary! On the occasion -of this visit other presents were made to the chief and members of his -family. The narrator continues: “Maquilla, who was glowing with delight -at the attentions we had paid him, readily granted every request that -we thought proper to make, and confirmed with the strongest assurances -of good faith the treaty of friendship which had already been entered -into between us.”[27] Nothing further is said of this treaty or of its -terms. If some more tangible evidence of it appeared, it might be a -valuable link. The mere statement that such was made is of interest as -indicating the policy of Meares, which, however, would have been the -same whether he expected to retain an establishment at Nootka or simply -to make subsequent visits for trading. It is possible, too, that the -treaty was only a temporary arrangement to last during the one visit. - -The _Felice_, with Meares and most of the crew, spent the next two -and a half months in a combined trading and exploring cruise to the -southward, returning to Nootka once during the time and remaining two -weeks. This trip has no direct bearing on the Nootka incident, but -throws some side lights on Meares’s policy and the national character -of the expedition. He tells of a treaty made at Port Cox and gives -something of its terms. It established trade relations with three -chiefs. Apparently it excluded all competitors, though this is not so -stated;[28] but on seeing a vessel pass Nootka, some two months later, -he at once set out for Port Cox lest the chief should be tempted “to -intrude upon the treaty he had made with us.”[29] On reaching the place -he found large quantities of furs, indicating that the treaty had been -kept. It may be, however, that no opportunity had been presented for -breaking it. The chief inquired earnestly concerning Meares’s return -next season.[30] - -In another place Meares says: “We took possession of the Straits of -Juan de Fuca in the name of the King of Britain, with the forms that -had been adopted by preceding navigators on similar occasions.”[31] -In mentioning this ceremony in his memorial he makes the additional -statement that he purchased a tract of land within the said straits. -A party sent to examine the straits was attacked by the natives -after a few days and abandoned the enterprise.[32] This subsidiary -expedition plays an important part in the controversial writings on the -conflicting claims to the Oregon country. On August 24 the _Felice_ -returned to Nootka. Three days later her consort, the _Iphigenia_, -arrived. - -In less than a month more the new vessel was completed. On September 20 -it was launched with what Meares considered very impressive ceremonies. -It was christened “the _North-West America_, as being the first -bottom ever built and launched in this part of the globe.” He says -that the British flag was displayed on the house and on board the new -vessel.[33] This statement regarding the use of the British flag should -be noticed, since Greenhow states, and Bancroft gives it a qualified -indorsement, that “there is no sufficient proof that any other [than -the Portuguese flag] was displayed by them during the expedition.”[34] -Statements are made by other men that the Portuguese flag was used at -Nootka during the summer.[35] In the engraving in Meares’s narrative -illustrating the launching, three British flags are represented.[36] -There is at least one other very plain indication of the use of the -British flag by the expedition. It is found in the instructions of -Meares to Funter, who was to command the _North-West America_. They are -dated Friendly Cove, Nootka Sound, September 10, 1788, and say: “You -are on no account to hoist any colors until such time as your employers -give you orders for this purpose, except on taking possession of any -newly discovered land; you will then do it, with the usual formality, -for the Crown of Great Britain.”[37] If these instructions were really -given, and the statement is true which is quoted above regarding taking -possession of the Straits of Juan de Fuca, it must be admitted that -Meares considered at the time that his expedition was English and that -whatever rights might be acquired by it for any nation were acquired -for England. - -Four days after the new vessel had been completed Meares departed -for China in the _Felice_, carrying with him the furs collected by -both vessels. The _North-West America_ was placed under the orders of -Douglas, the commander of the _Iphigenia_. Before departing, Meares had -given him extended orders regarding wintering at the Sandwich Islands, -and his conduct on the coast during the next season.[38] On October 27 -the two remaining vessels left Nootka for the winter.[39] - -In the instructions just mentioned nothing is said regarding any -settlement to be made at Nootka the succeeding year. There is a -statement, however, in the narrative that indicates unmistakably the -intention of planting a colony of some considerable extent. The writer -says that early in September, when the natives were leaving for the -winter settlement up the sound, “we made these chiefs sensible in -how many moons we should return to them, and that we should then be -accompanied by others of our countrymen, and build more houses and -endeavor to introduce our manners and mode of living to the practice -of our Nootka friends.” He speaks of their pleasure at hearing this -and of their promise of large quantities of furs; then narrates an -elaborate ceremony of coronation performed by the chief, Maquilla, and -his companions, which, he says, was intended as a recognition of his -superiority and sovereign power over them.[40] If Meares understood -that by this childish act of crowning he acquired for Great Britain -sovereign rights over the district, he makes no effort to emphasize -the fact. The statement, if true, is of more value as showing a -definite intention to establish a colony the following year. It is -not impossible, however, that both of these are cunningly contrived -and rather overdrawn fabrications of a later date to strengthen his -case before the Government or in the eyes of the public. Greenhow and -Bancroft both seem to draw a line between Meares’s narrative and his -memorial, considering the former more trustworthy since the latter -was written for the express purpose of convincing the cabinet of the -justice of his cause. If the narrative were the original log of the -vessel instead of a subsequent account simply using that log as its -basis, the reason for the distinction would be clear. But besides the -indications in the preface and the date, November 16, 1790, attached to -the preface, there are internal evidences that the narrative was not -written, at least not completed, until Meares knew of the operations of -the Spaniards at Nootka in 1789. Hence there is no reason why it should -not be influenced by the same partisanship and selfish interest.[41] - -But whether he really did or did not make the statement to the chiefs -in September, 1788, concerning planting a colony the next year, he -proceeded exactly as he would be expected to have proceeded had he made -it. The question as to what became of the house built in 1788, whether -it was given to the chief as promised, or whether it was torn down -by Douglas before leaving for the Sandwich Islands, according to the -testimony of the American captains, Gray and Ingraham,[42] does not -greatly affect the case, if the Englishmen really intended to continue -the occupation in 1789, as they unquestionably did. If there were -nothing else to consider, and if the title to sovereignty rested wholly -on actual occupation, whether that occupation be by persons of a public -or private character, then England had a better claim than Spain to -the sovereignty of Nootka Sound at the beginning of the year 1789. But -there are other things to consider. It remains to be seen whether or -not they outweigh this English advantage. - - * * * * * - -The next man to demand careful attention in studying the English -preparations for occupying Nootka is Capt. James Colnett, also a -lieutenant in the royal navy. He had been a midshipman with Captain -Cook and had served for several years on a man-of-war.[43] In the -autumn of 1786 he left England, in command of the ship _Prince of -Wales_, owned by Etches & Co., of London. This company held a license -from the South Sea Company good for five years after September 1, 1786, -for trading in the South Sea and other parts of America.[44] Colnett -went to the South Sea by way of Cape Horn. He reached the northwest -coast in 1787, collected a cargo, and continued his voyage to China, -where he disposed of it.[45] While in China he became identified with -Meares’s project for planting a colony at Nootka. The latter, after his -arrival in China in the autumn of 1788, had set about preparations for -the expedition of the succeeding year. While he was engaged in this, -Colnett reached Canton. Since the latter carried a license from the -South Sea Company, Meares saw an advantage to be gained by enlisting -his services, as this would give governmental sanction and protection -to the proposed establishment. Meares and his associates formed a -joint stock concern with Etches & Co., through the agency of John -Etches, who accompanied Colnett’s expedition as supercargo. As the -_Prince of Wales_ was to return to England, a new ship was purchased -and named the _Argonaut_, and Colnett was transferred to it. The small -ship, the _Princess Royal_, which had accompanied him on the former -voyage, continued with him on this. Besides having command of the -vessels, all of the concerns of the company on the American coast were -committed to his charge, including the proposed colony.[46] - -A clear notion of the character of the expedition thus placed under the -command of Colnett may best be obtained by a careful examination of the -instructions given to him before his departure from China. The copy of -these that was submitted with Meares’s Memorial is dated Macao, April -17, 1789, and signed “J. Meares, for Messrs. Etches, Cox & Co.”[47] -A Spanish translation of the same, copied from the papers that fell -into the hands of the Spaniards, is signed “Daniel Beale, for himself -and for Messrs. Etches, Cox & Co.”[48] While this discrepancy has no -importance in discovering the intent of the expedition, it casts a side -light on the veracity of Meares. The Spanish copy is preferably to be -trusted, since no motive is apparent for their changing the signature. -In these instructions strictly honorable dealings and careful attention -to their needs is enjoined in all his intercourse with other vessels, -whether English or foreign. Cruelty to the natives is to be prevented -under penalty of condign punishment for offenders. He was to form a -treaty, if possible, with the various chiefs, especially those near -Nootka. The purpose was to monopolize the trade of the district and -so conquer competitors honorably and creditably. They were so anxious -to form such treaties that he was authorized to protect allies from -insult from all persons.[49] The factory planned was to be a “solid -establishment, and not one that is to be abandoned at pleasure.” -Colnett was authorized to fix it at the most convenient place, so that -the colony would be protected from the least sinister accident.[50] It -was to receive the name “Fort Pitt.” R. Duffin was to be invested with -the superintendence of it. - -The object of the post was to attract the Indians for commercial -purposes and to furnish a place to build small vessels and to lay them -up for the winter season. During each winter some vessels were to be -sent to the Sandwich Islands for provisions, and natives of those -islands, both men and women, were to be encouraged to embark for the -American colony. When this settlement should have been effected trading -houses were to be established at other places along the coast where -they would be the most advantageous. Preparatory to this rewards were -to be offered the first season to men who would reside with different -Indian chiefs for the purpose of collecting furs and assuring the -natives of the return of the vessels, thus encouraging them to keep -back their furs from competitors. The _Iphigenia_, which went out -the preceding year under Meares’s command, and also the _North-West -America_, which he had built on the coast, were to be under the command -of Colnett. The rest of the instructions are of no interest to the -Nootka Sound Affair.[51] - -With these instructions and with provisions for three years the two -vessels sailed from China, the _Princess Royal_ in February and -the _Argonaut_ in April, 1789.[52] They carried, “in addition to -their crews, several artificers of different professions and near 70 -Chinese, who intended to become settlers on the American coast.”[53] -The plans are seen to have been large with hope for the future, and -there seems to have been every reasonable prospect for success. Should -they be successful it would mean not only a fortune for the merchant -adventurers and a worthy monument to the wisdom of the projectors, but -it would mean also the definite planting of the British flag on an -unoccupied coast and the extension to that coast of the sovereignty -of Great Britain. But while these plans were taking shape other plans -were being laid elsewhere, which, before the arrival of Colnett’s -expedition, had totally changed the appearance of things at Nootka. A -discussion of these will occupy the next two chapters. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -THE SPANISH PLANS FOR OCCUPYING NOOTKA SOUND--THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS -BEFORE 1789. - - -The Spanish name of most importance in connection with affairs at -Nootka is that of Estevan José Martinez. Besides playing the chief rôle -in the drama enacted there in 1789, which proved to be but the prelude -to a greater drama played in Europe the following year, it was he who -first suggested the planting of a Spanish colony at this point. This -is contrary to the notion prevalent in the minds of the diplomats when -the controversy was at its height, a notion which has been more or less -accepted ever since, viz, that one or more of the Governments concerned -had engaged in the enterprise with malice aforethought, having some -ulterior end in view. These suspicions will be discussed in their -proper place. At present it suffices to show, from documentary sources, -the actual genesis of the original Spanish expedition. - -On the return of Martinez, late in 1788, from a voyage to Alaska, -where he had gone under a royal commission to investigate the Russian -settlements on the coast, he reported to Florez, the Viceroy of Mexico, -as follows: - - Cusmich also told me that, as a result of his having informed - his Sovereign of the commerce which the English from Canton are - carrying on at Nootka, he was expecting four frigates from Siberia - to sail next year for the purpose of making an establishment at - Nootka, situated in latitude 49° 36´ north and in longitude 20° 15´ - west from San Blas. He assured me that his Sovereign has a better - right to that coast than any other power on account of its having - been discovered by the Russian commanders, Behring and Estericol - [Chirikov], under orders from the Russian Court in the year 1741. - For this reason it seems to me advisable that an attempt should be - made next year, 1789, with such forces as you may have at hand, to - occupy the said port and establish a garrison in it. According to - what is learned from the work of Cook and from what I saw on my - first expedition to that place (which I made in 1774), it possesses - qualifications which adapt it to this purpose. By accomplishing - this we shall gain possession of the coast from Nootka to the port - of San Francisco, a distance of 317 leagues, and authority over a - multitude of native tribes. [I say this, at the same time] offering - myself to carry out the project, and to prove the feasibility of it - I will sacrifice my last breath in the service of God and the King, - if you approve it.[54] - -This letter was written from the port of San Blas on December 5, 1788. -Only eighteen days later the Viceroy wrote from the City of Mexico to -the home Government that he had determined to occupy Nootka at once, -although the royal orders did not warrant him in so doing.[55] On -the same day Martinez was commissioned to carry out the enterprise, -and his instructions were sent to him.[56] In his letter to Madrid, -the Viceroy says “the essential object of this new expedition is no -other, as I have indicated, than the anticipation of the Russians in -taking possession of the port of San Lorenzo or Nootka.” Ten days -later, in justification of his action, he wrote that it was true he -was forbidden to incur expenses without special royal order, but since -this was an extraordinary case, demanding prompt action, he begged for -the royal approval.[57] This approval was granted, but not until April -14, 1789,[58] when Martinez was already well on his way to Nootka. It -could not have been known in America in time to affect the events at -Nootka. Far, then, from there being any ground for the suspicion that -the Spanish Government had ordered the seizure of English vessels, -which resulted from this undertaking, the Madrid Government did not -so much as know that the expedition was to be sent until long after -it had sailed. Further, even in the mind of the Viceroy, there was -not the slightest thought of any interference with the English, the -expedition being directed solely against the Russians. It is also seen -that whatever glory it promised for Spain, or whatever opprobrium -attached to Spain because of the unfortunate events connected with it, -must be placed largely to the credit of Martinez. But he was not wholly -responsible, since his plan was authorized by the Viceroy and later -approved by the home Government. - -It is a fact of some significance, as an indication of the political -sagacity of the Viceroy, that he apprehended much more danger to -Spanish dominion on this coast from the new United States than from -England or even Russia. While the English were only mentioned in -connection with the known plans of Russia, considerable space was -devoted to discussing a probable attempt of the American colonies to -obtain a foothold on the western coast. As proof he mentioned the -fact that an American ship, which had touched at the islands of Juan -Fernandez in the same year, had continued its voyage to the coast. He -expressed a suspicion that it had this end in view.[59] He told also -of an overland trip made in 1766-67 from the English colonies,[60] and -closed his observations on this point with the prophetic statement: “We -ought not to be surprised that the English colonies of America, being -now an independent Republic, should carry out the design of finding a -safe port on the Pacific and of attempting to sustain it by crossing -the immense country of the continent above our possessions of Texas, -New Mexico, and California.” He added: “Much more might be said of -an active nation which founds all of its hopes and its resources on -navigation and commerce,” and mentioned the immense value to them of -a colony on the west coast of America. He continued: “It is indeed an -enterprise for many years, but I firmly believe that from now on we -ought to employ tactics to forestall its results; and the more since -we see that the Russian projects and those which the English may make -from Botany Bay, which they have colonized, already menace us.” It was, -then, he said, to dissipate for the future the dormant possibilities -of the present that he was taking the extraordinary step of formally -occupying the port of Nootka without royal authorization.[61] - -After thus setting forth to the Government at Madrid the reasons for -his action, the Viceroy outlined the plans for the expedition. It was -to consist of the two vessels, the _Princesa_ and the _San Carlos_,[62] -which had constituted the expedition of 1788. They were also to retain -the same officers--Martinez as commander, and Haro subject to his -orders. They were to sail from San Blas early in February. A packet -boat would follow in March with supplies and reënforcements, and would -bring back an account of the occupation. Later, according to events, -explorations of the coast to the northward and southward would be made. -A land expedition was to follow, including a chief, a detachment of -troops, missionaries, colonists, and live stock.[63] - -Since the whole of the Nootka affair grew out of measures taken by -Martinez while on this trip, it is worth while to examine in detail -the instructions under which he was operating. After alluding to the -happy termination of Martinez’s voyage just ended, the Viceroy referred -to the Russian plans for occupying Nootka to anticipate the English, -and said “these designs of either nation are as pernicious to our -country as their claims are unfounded.” The Russian commanders failed -to explore the ports, Florez continued, and the English captain, Cook, -did not see Nootka until 1778, four years after the expedition of -Perez “on which you yourself went as second pilot. For these and many -other weighty reasons our just and superior right to occupy the coasts -discovered to the northward of California and to forbid colonies of -other nations is clear. These important objects, indeed, are embraced -in the delicate expedition which I now place in your charge.” - -The following are his instructions: - - 1. The two vessels and their commanders were named. - - 2. They were to have the same officers and sailors as on the last - voyage, with some increase of troops, and an armament corresponding - to the crew, and the crew were to be drilled in the use of that - armament. - - 3. The expedition should sail not later than February 15. - - 4. In March the _Aranzazu_ should follow with reënforcements and - supplies for Nootka, as well as other settlements of New California. - - 5. This vessel should bring back an account of what should - have happened and an estimate of the necessary supplies and - reënforcements which would be returned by it or by the _Concepcion_, - or both. - - 6. A plan of the port of Nootka, copied from Cook’s work, was to - serve as a guide. - - 7. Kindness, voluntary trade, and opportune gifts were to capture - the good will of the natives: in this endeavor the discretion of the - four missionaries was to be used. These were to begin at once to - propagate the gospel. - - 8. A formal establishment was to be set up for a meeting place to - treat with the Indians and for protection from the weather and from - enemies. - - 9. This would be a manifestation of Spanish sovereignty. Part of the - people were to be kept in this during the day, but returned to the - ship at night for greater security. - - 10. “If Russian or English vessels should arrive, you will receive - their commanders with the politeness and kind treatment which the - existing peace demands; but you will show the just ground for our - establishment at Nootka, the superior right which we have for - continuing such establishments on the whole coast, and the measures - which our superior Government is taking to carry this out, such as - sending by land expeditions of troops, colonists, and missionaries, - to attract and convert the Indians to the religion and the mild - dominion of our august Sovereign.” - - 11. “All this you ought to explain with prudent firmness, but - without being led into harsh expressions which may give serious - offense and cause a rupture; but if, in spite of the greatest - efforts, the foreigners should attempt to use force, you will repel - it to the extent that they employ it, endeavoring to prevent as far - as possible their intercourse and commerce with the natives.” - - 12. “For use with the Russians, you will keep in mind and avail - yourself of the well-founded political reasons for Spain’s being - in intimate friendship with their sovereign Empress, viz, that the - ships of that nation, both naval and merchant, are admitted to the - Spanish ports of the Mediterranean and given such assistance as - they may need, without which they could not subsist in those seas; - that consequently it would be a grave offense for the vessels of - His Catholic Majesty to suffer hostilities in America at the hands - of the Russians, furnishing just cause for a breach between two - friendly powers; and that in this case Spain would count on the - powerful support of her French ally, besides withdrawing from Russia - the privilege of obtaining supplies in the Mediterranean at a time - when she finds herself engaged in war with the Turks, with Sweden, - and possibly with Denmark.” - - 13. “To the English you will demonstrate clearly and with - established proofs that our discoveries anticipated those of Captain - Cook, since he reached Nootka, according to his own statement, in - March of the year 1778, where he purchased (as he relates in Chapter - I, book 4, page 45, of his work)[64] the two silver spoons which the - Indians stole from yourself in 1774.” - - 14. “You will have more weighty arguments to offer to vessels of - the Independent American Colonies, should they appear on the coasts - of northern California, which hitherto has not known their ships. - However, by a letter of the most excellent Señor Viceroy of Peru, - it is known that a frigate, which is said to belong to General - Washington,[65] sailed from Boston, in September of 1787, with the - intention of approaching the said coasts, that a storm obliged her - to stop in distress at the islands of Juan Fernandez, and that she - continued her course after being relieved.” - - 15. “In case you are able to encounter this Bostonian frigate or the - small boat which accompanied her, but was separated in the storm, - this will give you governmental authority to take such measures - as you may be able and such as appear proper, giving them to - understand, as all other foreigners, that our settlements are being - extended to beyond Prince Williams Sound, of which we have already - taken formal possession, as well as of the adjacent islands, viz. in - 1779.” - - 16. A plan of Prince Williams Sound was inclosed, for it was - intended that a careful survey of the entire coast should be made - between it and Nootka. - - 17. The _San Carlos_ was to make this expedition after the - establishment at Nootka should be completed. - - 18, 19. Instructions for the exploration. - - 20. The coast from San Francisco to Nootka was to be explored in - like manner, the latter port being the rendezvous. The Viceroy would - do all he could to contribute to the welfare of the enterprise thus - placed under Martinez’s charge. - - 21. Great care was enjoined in the treatment of the Indians and - of any establishments or vessels of foreign nations that might be - encountered. - - 22. The means to be employed to preserve health. - - 23. Good wishes for Divine favor and for the success of the voyage. - -As an argument for use with the English, in addition to what he had -given in section 13, the Viceroy added, in a postscript, reference to -the instructions given by the English Admiralty to Captain Cook, July -6, 1776. Cook, he said, was not to touch at any port in the Spanish -dominions on the west coast of America unless forced by unavoidable -accident, in which case he was not to remain longer than absolutely -necessary, and was to avoid giving the least cause for complaint to -any of the inhabitants of the country or to vessels of His Catholic -Majesty.[66] - -The vessels sailed from San Blas February 17, 1789.[67] These -instructions, as well as those given to the English expedition of the -same year, look toward a permanent establishment at Nootka, which -was to be used as a basis for future operations on the coast. Each -expedition was sent without any knowledge that the other was even -thought of. The instructions given to the commander of each were such -as to leave no doubt in his mind as to his perfect right to carry them -out. It was impossible for both to obey; hence a clash was inevitable. -Before studying the occurrences at Nootka a brief examination should -be made of the conflicting claims, with an attempt to discover the -respective rights in the spring of 1789 before either expedition -reached the common destination. - - * * * * * - -The first Englishman known to have visited Nootka Sound is Capt. James -Cook. In the spring of 1778 he spent the month of April in the sound, -which he explored and mapped carefully; and, being unable to learn that -any European had before visited this particular part of the coast, -he gave it the name of King Georges Sound, but later concluded that -it would be better to call it by the native name Nootka. He obtained -supplies of water, wood, fish, etc. The natives were friendly to him, -and he found among them several articles, including the two silver -spoons mentioned in the above instructions, which, together with the -conduct of the natives, indicated that Europeans had previously been -somewhere in the neighborhood, at least. No mention is made of his -having taken possession of the place for England.[68] It seems that -the Englishmen who were interested in the expedition of 1789 had -no knowledge that any European had visited the place earlier than -this visit of Captain Cook.[69] If they had such knowledge, they -intentionally ignored it. This was looked upon as a real discovery and -it was assumed that thereby England acquired such rights as discovery -can give. Although Sir Francis Drake’s landing on the California coast -in 1579 was mentioned,[70] yet it seems not to have been looked upon -as of very much value in establishing a claim, and, of course, was -not so far north. During the years subsequent to 1785 English trading -ships frequently visited Nootka. Although they were purely private -undertakings, this fact had considerable value in strengthening the -English claim, since they tended to develop the resources of the -country. The details of these voyages are not in place here.[71] These, -then, constitute the ground for the English claim up to the visit of -Meares in 1788 and his erection of a house and building of a ship, -which were treated in the last chapter. - -It was clearly brought out in the diplomatic contest of 1790 that a -Spanish expedition had examined with some care the whole coast up to -about 55°, and had spent some time in this very port of Nootka or its -immediate neighborhood four years before Captain Cook’s visit. After -the Spanish explorations of the sixteenth century, which had extended -some distance up the California coast, there was a long period of -inactivity in this part of the world due to the decay of the Government -at home. When the temporary revival of national life came under Charles -III there was also a revival of exploring enterprises on the western -coast of America. Word reached Madrid through the Spanish ambassador -at St. Petersburg that the Russians were making settlements on the -American coast north of California. In consequence of royal orders -issued the previous year, an expedition, under the command of Juan -Perez, was sent from Mexico in 1774 to investigate. He had orders to -examine the coast as high as 60°, but did not get beyond 55°. As he -was returning he anchored early in August in a port which he called -San Lorenzo, and which was later identified with Nootka Sound. Some -question was raised as to its identity, but there seems to be little -doubt. The latitude agrees very closely--too closely, Bancroft says. -The anchorage must have been in the immediate neighborhood.[72] -Revilla-Gigedo says it is believed that the commander took possession -of Nootka, but Bancroft, who examined the diaries, asserts that he did -not land anywhere to take possession for Spain. Martinez, who became -so important in the expedition of 1789, was second pilot on this -expedition of Perez. It was while at San Lorenzo in 1774 that the two -silver spoons were stolen from him by the Indians. They are frequently -mentioned in the Spanish manuscripts, and are accepted as proof -positive that this expedition was at Nootka, and as thereby proving the -superiority of the Spanish claim.[73] - -In 1775, the next year after Perez’s voyage, another was made by -Heceta [Ezeta] with Quadra accompanying in a small vessel. The former -approached the coast in the region of Nootka, but did not enter, -thereupon turning his course southward. Quadra, in the little vessel, -pressed onward to about the fifty-eighth degree. This expedition made -landings and took formal possession for Spain of at least three points -between 47° and 58°.[74] In 1779 a third expedition sailed from Mexico -to explore the coast still farther north. It reached the sixty-first -degree, Prince William Sound.[75] By these three expeditions the -Spanish Government considered that this entire coast from California -northward had been sufficiently explored and that formal possession had -been taken at enough places to establish thoroughly the Spanish claim. -So a royal order was given in 1780 that voyages for this purpose should -cease.[76] - -The first two of these Spanish voyages were earlier than that of -Captain Cook and included practically all that he explored, though they -did not examine it so thoroughly. Hence, as far as discovery alone is -concerned, these should have given Spain rights superior to any that -England could have acquired by Cook’s enterprise, not only to Nootka -Sound, but to the whole of the Northwest Coast. But, unfortunately -for the Spanish claim, there is a serious flaw in the title at this -point, arising from the fact-that the results of these voyages were -not published, except in brief accounts.[77] It is a serious question -whether a discovery which was not made known to the world could give a -claim superior to one gained by a subsequent voyage whose results were -made known. Reason and justice would seem to say it could not. But, -besides these explorations, Spain still clung in theory at least to her -ancient claim to sovereignty over the entire American continent west -of the line drawn by the treaty of Tordesillas (1494), and sanctioned -by Pope Alexander VI, who had drawn the arbitrary line the previous -year, dividing the world between Spain and Portugal. Only as a matter -of necessity had she gradually conceded the right of other nations to -occupy the eastern coast of North America, and for the same reason had -recently conceded the Russian control of the western coast down to -Prince William Sound. This is illustrated by the facts arising out of -the forced entrance of the American ship, _Columbia_, into a port of -the islands of Juan Fernandez in 1788, referred to in the instructions -of the Viceroy to Martinez above. - -The Spanish governor of the islands, Blas Gonzales, after relieving the -vessel’s distress, had allowed it to go on its way to the Northwest -Coast, knowing its destination.[78] For this act he had been summoned -before the captain-general of Chile and cashiered. The captain-general -was supported by the Viceroy of Peru and apparently by the home -Government.[79] This harsh treatment was based on a royal decree of -1692, ordering all viceroys, governors, etc., to prevent foreign ships -from navigating the south sea without permission from Spain,[80] since -no other nation had, or ought to have, any territories which it was -necessary for them to pass around Cape Horn to reach. It is needless -to say that this claim was not respected by other governments. The -Viceroy’s assertion of the right of Spain to occupy the coasts and -exclude colonies of other nations, quoted above from his instructions -to Martinez, is another evidence. It had long been conceded by other -nations that discovery alone, or even discovery with formal acts of -taking possession, can not give a valid title. It is essential that -some effort be made to use the land discovered and to develop its -resources; and, before the claim is fully established, actual and -continued possession must be taken. - -With discovery, exploration, and formal acts of possession Spanish -activity ceased, there being no serious effort to make any use of the -territory in the way of trade, and no steps being taken to occupy the -country until they were aroused to do so by reports coming from the -north in 1788 that the Russians were intending to occupy. In other -words, either from lack of enterprise or from policy, the Spanish -did not seem to care to develop the country or make any use of it -themselves, but did wish to prevent any other people from doing so. -Their reason for this policy of obstruction was probably an idle pride -in retaining a shadowy sovereignty over this vast territory; or, -possibly, a wish to retain it as a field for future enterprise; or, -more likely, the hope of being able to control the Pacific outlet of -any water passage to the Atlantic that might later be discovered along -this coast. In the face of modern national enterprise, something more -tangible was necessary in order to retain control. - -The English people, not from any fixed national policy, but from -individual initiative, were taking these necessary steps and the -Government was practically compelled to follow them up. As soon as -Captain Cook’s voyage of 1778 had made known to the English people the -possibilities of the fur trade in this region, shipowners immediately -turned their attention thither. Between 1785 and 1790 no fewer than -12 or 15 British vessels visited the coast to trade with the natives, -several of them making return voyages, and most of them making shorter -or longer stops at Nootka.[81] As has been stated, steps were taken -from the very first to establish a post at Nootka as a center for these -trading operations. A temporary one was actually set up by Meares -in 1788, and an expedition was sent out for the purpose of making -this permanent the following year. Thus, up to 1789, the English -were exercising more control over the region than the Spanish. Had -the English plans of this year not miscarried, and had the Spanish -expedition of the same year not been sent, the question as to the -respective rights, at least to Nootka and the immediate neighborhood, -would probably never seriously have been raised. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -MARTINEZ’S OPERATIONS AT NOOTKA BEFORE COLNETT’S ARRIVAL. - - -It was on the 5th[82] of May, 1789, that the Spanish ship anchored in -Friendly Cove of Nootka Sound bearing Martinez with his instructions -for occupying the port and planting a permanent colony that should be -a substantial proof of the Spanish claim and serve as a center for -spreading Spanish sovereignty over all the coast. Just ten days before -this[83] Colnett had sailed from China with instructions and equipment -to make it, an English port.[84] During the next two months, while -the Englishman was crossing the Pacific, the Spaniard was making good -use of the time. When the latter reached Nootka there seems to have -been no visible sign that the English had ever occupied the place or -even intended to occupy it. The only evidence of civilization was one -vessel under a Portuguese captain with Portuguese instructions and a -Portuguese flag. It soon became known that there was also an American -ship a few miles away up the sound. - -It has never been conclusively proved that the house which Meares -built the summer before had entirely disappeared. In a letter written -three years later to the Spanish commandant at that time the American -captains, who had spent the winter of 1788-89 at Nootka, declared that -when Martinez arrived there was no trace of Meares’s house in the cove; -that there had been a house, or rather a hut, when they arrived in the -fall, but that, prior to his sailing for the Sandwich Islands, Captain -Douglas had pulled it to pieces, had taken the boards on board the -_Iphigenia_, and had given the roof to Captain Kendrick, who had used -it as firewood.[85] - -While there is no proof that the statement of these gentlemen is not -true, yet they were too plainly prejudiced in favor of the Spanish -to permit their testimony to be taken for its full face value in the -absence of any corroborating evidence. There is, however, some indirect -evidence to support their statement, and its value is the greater -because of its being indirect, and still greater because it comes -from the side of the English to whose interest it would have been to -maintain the contrary. This appears in the extract which Meares quotes -from the journal of the _Iphigenia_. In the entry made two days after -his return from the Sandwich Islands and two weeks before the arrival -of Martinez the writer says: “[We] sent some sails on shore and erected -a tent to put our empty casks in.”[86] - -If their house had still been standing they would doubtless have -used it for this purpose instead of erecting the tent. Further, the -fact that no mention is made of the house in this journal is pretty -conclusive proof that it was not in existence on their arrival. -Meares’s narrative of the departure of the _Iphigenia_ in the preceding -autumn is silent on the subject. In fact, there is no statement made -even in Meares’s memorial that his house was still standing; but the -memorial is so written, doubtless intentionally, that the casual -reader would infer that the house was still there and that evidences -of English occupation were unquestionable. This is doubtless what has -led most historians who have touched upon the subject, among whom are -some of the best, into the error of implying or openly declaring that -there was a substantial English colony when the Spanish expedition -arrived.[87] - -It was also this failure of Meares to tell the whole truth that led -the British Parliament and ministry into the error of believing that -their rights to the place were unquestionable and that the conduct of -the Spanish commandant was little better than high-handed robbery.[88] -It is, then, pretty safe to assert that there was no indication -whatever of English occupation when Martinez arrived, and that he was -consequently perfectly justified in taking possession for Spain and in -maintaining his position by force if it should become necessary. The -question, therefore, is not, Was he justified in his first act? but, -Were his subsequent acts of violence necessary to maintain his position? - -Captain Kendrick, of the American ship _Columbia_, which Martinez found -at Nootka, and Captain Gray, of her consort, the _Lady Washington_, -which was out on a trading cruise at the time, were slightly involved -in the relations between the Spanish and English commanders. But the -vessel under Portuguese colors furnishes the center of interest for the -first month of Spanish occupation. - -This vessel was the _Iphigenia_, which had sailed from China in company -with the _Felice_, under Captain Meares, in the spring of 1788, but -which had separated from the latter vessel, had spent the summer in -trading on the coast of Alaska and had rejoined her consort in the -autumn at Nootka, where they again separated, the _Felice_, under -Meares, sailing for China with the furs collected by both vessels, and -the _Iphigenia_, under Douglas, accompanied by the small vessel, the -_Northwest America_, built at Nootka during the summer, going for the -winter to the Sandwich Islands.[89] Returning to the American coast in -the spring of 1789, the _Iphigenia_ had reached Nootka sixteen days -before the arrival of Martinez. Four days after her the little vessel, -her consort, arrived, and preparations were immediately made to send -the latter out on a trading cruise, that they might not be worsted -in competition by the American sloop, the _Lady Washington_, which -had just returned from a six weeks’ cruise to the southward and would -soon set out on a similar trip to the northward. In four days more the -necessary repairs were made, and on April 27 the _Northwest America_ -set out to trade with the natives to the northward,[90] not returning, -and consequently not being of any further interest for six weeks, at -the end of which time she assumes considerable importance. - -The double national character of the expedition to which the -_Iphigenia_ belonged has already been discussed.[91] When, on May 5, -the Spanish ship appeared, it was evidently thought better--for reasons -which are not disclosed--to present the appearance of a Portuguese -rather than an English ship. During the first few days all of the -commanders seem to have been on the best of terms. According to the -journal of the _Iphigenia_, Douglas was invited to dine on board the -Spanish ship on the day of Martinez’s arrival. Three days later the -officers of the _Iphigenia_ and of the Spanish vessel all went to -dine with Kendrick, the captain of the American ship, and the next -day the officers of the American and Spanish ships dined on board the -_Iphigenia_. - -Thus, up to the 9th of May the utmost harmony prevailed. Douglas had -acquainted Martinez with the distressed condition of his ship and the -latter had promised to relieve him as far as lay in his power. On the -8th the Portuguese instructions and passport of the _Iphigenia_ had -been presented to Martinez.[92] These seem to be what started the -difficulty. In his account to the Viceroy, Martinez says: - - On my arrival in it [the port of San Lorenzo de Nootka] I found a - packet boat, with its captain (flag) and passport of the Portuguese - nation, but its supercargo (who was really the captain), its pilot, - and the greater part of its crew English.[93] - -The passport was signed by the governor and captain-general of the port -of Macao, in China, and began: - - Be it known that from the port of this city is sailing for the - coasts of North America the sloop named the _Iphigenia Nubiana_. It - belongs to Juan Carvalho,[94] a subject of the same master of this - port, and is of 200 tons burden having artillery, powder, balls, - arms, and munitions necessary for its defense, and carrying as its - captain Francisco Josef Viana, also a subject of the same Crown, and - of competent ability.[95] - -The instructions were addressed to Viana, captain of the sloop -_Iphigenia Nubiana_, and signed by Juan Carvalho. Besides the -perplexity of the double nationality of the vessel, Martinez’s -suspicions were aroused by what he considered an obnoxious clause in -the instructions. It read: - - In case of your meeting on your voyage with any Russian, Spanish, - or English vessels, you will treat them with the greatest possible - friendship and permit them (if they demand it) to examine your - papers that they may see the object of your voyage, taking care at - the same time to avoid surprise, if they should attempt to divert - you from your voyage. In such case you will resist force by force - and protest against such violent and illegal proceedings before - a tribunal at the first port in which you arrive, giving also an - estimate of the value of the ships and cargoes. You will send to us - at Macao a copy of said protest, with a narrative of all that shall - have occurred, and another such to Francisco Josef Bandieras and - Geronimo Ribeiro Nores, our correspondents at Lisbon, and likewise - to the Portuguese ambassador, at the Court of the nation of the - aggressor, in order that our Sovereign may demand satisfaction. If, - perchance, in such conflict you should have the superiority, you - will take possession of the vessel and its cargo, conducting them, - with the officers, to Macao, in order that they may be condemned as - legal prize and the officers and crew punished as pirates.[96] - -Rightly or wrongly, Martinez thought that these instructions justified -him in demanding an explanation. Since this is the first of the vessels -seized, and in order to show that the Spanish commander considered that -he was acting under instructions and with full authority, the whole of -the first of a series of affidavits regarding the affair is here quoted: - - On board the frigate of His Majesty named _Our Lady of the Rosary_, - alias the _Princesa_, on the 13th[97] day of the month of May, - 1789, I, an ensign of the royal navy, Don Esteban José Martinez, - appointed commander in chief of this expedition by the most - excellent Señor Viceroy Don Manuel Antonio Florez for occupying and - taking possession of this port of San Lorenzo de Nootka, where I am - anchored, declare: That, in virtue of the Instructions and other - superior orders, dated the 23d of December of the year last passed, - 1788, and according to an order of His Majesty in Arto. 17, Tito. - 5, Trato. 6, of the royal orders for the navy, I ought to order - and leave ordered to appear before me Don Francisco Josef Viana, - an inhabitant of Lisbon and captain of the packet boat named the - _Iphigenia Nubiana_ coming from Macao, which I found on the 5th of - the present month anchored in this aforesaid port, and likewise that - he should be accompanied by the so-called supercargo, M. William - Douglas, in order that each one, in so far as he is involved, may - vindicate himself, in view of the charges which I have to make - against them, according to the cited article of the royal orders, - on account of sections 18 and 19 of the instructions which the said - captain presented to me on the 8th of the present month. - -This affidavit was signed by Martinez before the notary, Canizares. -Following it is one by the interpreter of the expedition saying that he -delivered the above order, and then comes a long one giving an account -of the interview that followed. - -Viana, the captain, Douglas, the supercargo, and Adamson, the first -pilot, immediately answered the summons, and repaired on board the -_Princesa_. Martinez began by demanding an explanation for their -having anchored in a port of the Spanish dominions without a license -from that Monarch. They replied that they were there in virtue of their -passport from the governor of Macao; that, as to this port’s belonging -to the Spanish dominions, they were ignorant of it, since the fact -had not been published at the European Courts; and that they were -informed by the first article of their instructions that this coast -had been discovered by the Portuguese Admiral Fonte in 1640.[98] To -this last Martinez responded that Portugal was at that time under the -dominion of Spain. He likewise charged them to tell who this Carvalho -was that had given such despotic instructions as the minister of a -sovereign would hardly have given; to which they answered that he was -the owner of the vessel. He then charged them with articles 18 and 19 -of their instructions (the objectionable clauses quoted above). They -replied that the articles in question had been misinterpreted; that -they ordered Viana, in case his crew mutinied and he met with the -vessel of a foreign nation, to appeal to that vessel for assistance -in imprisoning his own crew and conducting them to Macao, and that -the mutinous crew were the ones to be punished as pirates. Martinez -insisted that this was not the true import of the articles, but a -clumsy pretext. Considering their defense unsatisfactory, according to -the cited article of the orders for the royal navy, Martinez demanded -in the name of the King that they should surrender themselves as -prisoners of war. The affidavit giving account of this was signed by -Viana, Douglas, and Martinez before Canizares.[99] - -This is Martinez’s account of the arrest, written at the time or very -soon thereafter, since it bears the signature of Viana and Douglas, -and they would have been most unlikely to sign it if they had not been -compelled to do so while in captivity. It is very doubtful whether -Martinez was truthful in his report of the clumsy fabrication offered -by Viana and Douglas in defense of the objectionable clause. To have -offered such, expecting it to be believed, they would have had to be -either very stupid or absolutely certain that Martinez and all his -associates were entirely ignorant of the Portuguese language--a very -unlikely circumstance. This false defense may have been invented by -the Spanish commander to give more color to the justice of the arrest. -It would be more charitable and possibly more just to suppose that -owing to his imperfect understanding of the language that they used, -or its imperfect translation by his interpreter, he understood them -to say this when they really said something very different. It is -quite evident that his first translation of what he considered the -objectionable clause in their instructions was incorrect. For in his -rendering of it in the above account of the investigation he makes the -clause read that Viana was to treat with respect all English, Russian, -and Spanish vessels whose force was superior to his own, but, if he -had the superior force, he was to seize them and carry them to Macao, -where their crews should be tried as pirates. This is what he referred -to when he spoke of their being so despotic. It is impossible to -understand how, in a correct translation, he could have seen anything -so obnoxious as he claimed to see. If, however, this rendering had been -the correct one, it would have made the _Iphigenia_ virtually a pirate -ship, and Martinez would have been fully justified. But if his first -translation was faulty, his later one was correct, as will be seen -by comparing the quotation from it given above with the instructions -of the Merchant Proprietors to Meares, the English commander of the -expedition. They correspond almost word for word, differing only in the -details necessary to give the appearance of a Portuguese instead of an -English expedition.[100] - -This error of Martinez is brought out in Douglas’s account of the -investigation. He says: - - [Martinez] told me my papers were bad; that they mentioned I was to - take all English, Russian, and Spanish vessels that were of inferior - force to the _Iphigenia_, and send or carry their crews to Macao, - there to be tried for their lives as pirates. I told him they had - not interpreted the papers right; that though I did not understand - Portuguese I had seen a copy of them in English at Macao,[101] - which mentioned, if I was attacked by any of those three nations, - to defend myself, and, if I had the superiority, to send the - captain and crews to Macao to answer for the insult they offered. - The padries and the clerk read the papers over, and said they had - interpreted the papers right.[102] - -The American commanders say that the capture was due to a -misinterpretation.[103] If Martinez did make this mistake and later was -led to restore the vessel by the discovery of it, he remains entirely -silent regarding it, giving other reasons for the release, as will be -seen. - -Between May 13, when the _Iphigenia_ was seized, and May 25, when she -was released, part of her officers and crew were detained on board -Martinez’s ship, the _Princesa_, and part on the _San Carlos_, the -other Spanish ship, which had reached Nootka a week later than the -commander’s. Of the conduct of the Spanish during these twelve days -while they held the _Iphigenia_ prisoner there are the most divergent -accounts in the different sources. - -According to the account of Douglas, a deaf ear was turned to his plea -that he had been forced to enter the port because of the distress of -his vessel, which was such that, had he entered a port of the Spanish -dominions of South America he would have been allowed to repair his -damages and depart in peace, and that consequently to take him -prisoner in a port to which the King of Spain had never laid claim -was a piece of injustice that no nation had ever attempted before. -His offer to leave the port immediately in spite of his distress, if -permission should be granted, was refused; he and his crew were most -inhumanely treated, and their valuable personal effects and even their -very clothes were stolen; Spanish colors were hoisted on their vessel -and it was looted of its provisions and articles for trading with the -natives and anything else that the Spaniards fancied. When his vessel -was restored a very meager supply of provisions was sent on board, and -an account presented which listed five times the quantity actually -sent and charged five times their cost; he was compelled to sign a -paper saying that Martinez had found him in distress and in want of -everything, had supplied him with all necessary to take him to the -Sandwich Islands, and had not interfered with his navigation; another -paper was forced upon him by which he agreed that, if his papers should -be found to be bad, the vessel was to be delivered up at Macao, and -before he was allowed to sail a letter was demanded from him to Captain -Funter, of the _North-West America_, ordering the latter to sell the -schooner to Martinez; but, not having authority either to sell or to -order another to sell, he said nothing in the letter that he left -about selling the vessel, but advised Funter to act to the best of his -judgment for the benefit of his employers.[104] - -According to the account of the American captains, on the other hand, -the officers of the _Iphigenia_ “were treated with all imaginable -kindness, and every attention paid them.” - - The vessel while in the possession of the Spaniards, from being a - wreck was put in complete order for the sea, being calked, rigging - and sails repaired, anchors and cables sent from the _Princesa_, - etc. On the 20th Don Martinez supplied them with every kind of - provisions they were in need of, for which Captain Douglas gave him - bills on Cravalia, the before-mentioned merchant of Macao. On the - 31st the _Iphigenia_ sailed and was saluted by the Spanish fort, - and the commodore accompanied them out of the harbor, giving every - assistance with boats, etc. When Captain Douglas took his leave of - the commodore he declared he should ever entertain a sense of Don - Martinez’s kindness, deeming his conduct relative to the vessel - no more than his duty as a King’s officer. Upon the whole, we both - believe the _Iphigenia’s_ being detained was of infinite service to - those who were concerned in her.[105] - -Vancouver, in giving the substance of a letter written later by Viana -to Quadra, represents Viana as saying that he was imprisoned, was well -treated, and on being liberated his vessel and cargo were completely -restored and he was furnished what he needed.[106] - -It is plain that neither the account of Douglas nor that of the -American commanders can be accepted for its full value, but that the -truth lies between them. The fact that the former on his release turned -northward and spent a month trading, and later made a successful trip -to the Sandwich Islands and China, shows that his ship was not so -destitute of provisions as his journal would make it seem; and the -fact that he purchased a cargo of furs from the natives shows that he -had not been so nearly robbed of his articles of trade as he declared. -Further, knowing that this journal passed through Meares’s hands before -it was published, and knowing this gentleman’s tendency to distort the -truth, when there was a possibility of thereby strengthening his case, -one can not help suspecting that the journal was tampered with so that -it would exhibit Martinez’s treatment of the vessel in as unfavorable -a light as possible. But the testimony of the American commanders must -be discounted also, since their prejudice in favor of the Spaniards is -very conspicuous. This would be suspected because of their intimacy -with Martinez; but the extravagant statements of the letter itself show -a decided prejudice. It was written three years after the events which -it discusses, and errors in date indicate that it was produced merely -from memory. The statements from Viana’s letter are too indirect to be -of much value. - -In the series of affidavits which Martinez submitted to the Viceroy -concerning the arrest and detention of the vessel, there is what -appears to be a wholly unimpassioned account. These affidavits seem -to have been written and sworn to before the notary, each on the -day on which the event that it records occurred. The first one, in -which Martinez gives his reasons for calling to account the officers -of the _Iphigenia_, is quoted in full above. The second, in which -the interpreter says that he delivered Martinez’s orders, has been -referred to, and the substance has been given of the third which -recounts the investigation of Douglas and Viana and their arrest. The -fourth tells of the formal act of seizing the vessel, the replacing -of the Portuguese colors by the Spanish, and the imprisonment of the -crew. These four are dated May 13. A letter to Martinez, dated May 15, -written by Tovar, who had been placed in command of the captured ship, -tells of a bundle of papers which he had found belonging to Douglas. -In the fifth affidavit, dated May 16, Martinez says that in view of -this letter of Tovar he had ordered the papers of Douglas to be taken -in charge, and the sixth affidavit, of the same date, is signed by the -English interpreter and says that no suspicion attached to Douglas’s -papers.[107] - -On May 17, in the seventh affidavit, Martinez says that on account of -the difficulty of sending the captured vessel to San Blas, owing to the -scarcity of men to man her, he has concluded to release her, but has -ordered an inventory to be made, that he may bind the owner to pay the -value of the ship and cargo in case the Viceroy shall declare her to -have been good prize. The inventory was completed May 22, and signed on -board the _Iphigenia_ the same day by Tovar, the temporary commander, -and by Viana, the Portuguese captain, in whose presence it had been -made. The eighth affidavit, signed on May 25, declares that the -inventory should be embodied in the account. An itemized list follows, -covering five pages of manuscript and indicating that the _Iphigenia_ -was by no means destitute of general supplies, though there might have -been a lack of those necessary to man the ship. Immediately following -the inventory is the bond signed by Viana and Douglas, captain and -supercargo of the _Iphigenia_, for Juan Carvalho, the owner, and by -Kendrick and Ingraham, of the American ship, as witnesses, and finally -by Martinez, all in the presence of Canizares, the notary. This -obliges the owner to pay the value of the ship and cargo, as shown by -the attached inventory, in case the Viceroy should decide that the -vessel was good prize on account of having been found anchored in the -port of Nootka without having a passport, permission, or license from -His Catholic Majesty for navigating or anchoring in seas or ports -belonging to his dominion.[108] The ninth affidavit, signed May 26, -formally submits to the Viceroy the preceding account of the measures -taken in view of the instructions submitted by the captain of the -_Iphigenia_.[109] - -On May 31, after a dinner on board the Spanish commander’s ship, -at which the _Iphigenia’s_ officers and those of the American ship -were present, the _Iphigenia_ was accompanied out of the harbor by -the officers of the other two, and, after a farewell salute from the -Spanish guns, sailed away, ostensibly for Macao, by way of the Sandwich -Islands. At midnight Douglas gave orders to turn north for a trading -cruise, having, as he says, “no idea of running for Macao with only -between 60 and 70 sea-otter skins which I had on board.”[110] - - * * * * * - -The next occurrence of interest at Nootka was in connection with the -_North-West America_. Mention has been made of Martinez’s futile -attempt to get a letter from Douglas ordering Captain Funter to sell -the schooner to Martinez. It will be recalled that this vessel, on -returning from the Sandwich Islands, had reached Nootka four days -later than her consort, the _Iphigenia_, had been repaired as soon as -possible, and had set out on a trading trip before the arrival of the -Spanish commander. Having carried on a profitable trade for six weeks, -and being seriously in need of provisions, she returned to Nootka June -8 in hope of meeting there the vessel that was expected from Macao -with stores. For some reason not wholly plain Martinez took possession -of the schooner as soon as she arrived. Meares says that the Spanish -commander was angered when he learned that the letter which Douglas -had left for Funter was not the desired order for the latter to sell -his schooner, and gave vent to his anger by seizing the vessel.[111] -The American captains say that when Martinez learned later of the -bankruptcy of Carvalho, on whom he had accepted bills in payment for -supplies furnished to Douglas, he justified himself as holding the -schooner in security for the debt.[112] Martinez gives a partial -explanation in an affidavit of June 12. Learning, he said, that the -schooner belonged to Carvalho and was connected with the _Iphigenia_, -which he had seized on account of her instructions, he therefore took -possession of this vessel also, and submitted an inventory to the -Viceroy, together with that of the larger ship. He fails to explain -why he did not release her; but he doubtless considered explanation -unnecessary, since he had given as his only reason for not detaining -the larger vessel his inability to man her.[113] He would not have been -consistent in not detaining her unless he had released her also on -bond; and there was no need for doing that, since she required so few -men. Doubtless the other two motives suggested had their influence also. - -The English commanders give the same extravagant account of robbery -and barbaric treatment at the hands of the Spaniards that were given -in the case of the other vessel--the Spanish flag was hoisted; the -officers and men were imprisoned; the vessel was repaired, refitted, -rechristened the _Gertrudis_ and sent on a trading trip for the benefit -of the Spaniards, in which they bartered away the articles of trade -that they found on board; every possible effort was made by bribery and -intimidation to induce Funter and some of his men to man the vessel for -the Spaniards and show them where trade was good, but without avail; -the men were kept in confinement for a month and then shipped for -China on board one of the American vessels, which they were compelled -to assist in manning to keep from being wrecked.[114] It must be -admitted that at the best the provocation was sufficient to excuse some -exaggeration, which is the more to be expected when it is noticed that -the account was not written until several months after the occurrence -of the events recorded. But that the Spanish commander meant to show -a certain amount of justice and even generosity is evident from the -fact that he later transferred to another English vessel all of the -furs collected by the schooner except twelve, which were either lost -or detained by the Spaniard.[115] And still later, when Funter and -his men were sent to China on the American vessel, Martinez shipped -to their credit 96 skins to pay their wages besides the cost of their -passage.[116] He also transferred provisions from an English ship to -the American captain for the maintenance of Funter and his men.[117] -The purpose seems to have been to punish the owners, but to avoid -working immediate hardship to the officers and crew. - - * * * * * - -Another event of the Spanish operations is the taking formal possession -of the port, which occurred June 24.[118] In the seven weeks that had -intervened since the arrival of the Spanish expedition, besides the -seizure and disposition of the two vessels just discussed, a fort had -been constructed on the top of a high hill which commanded the entrance -to the port, and had been occupied by a garrison and a battery of ten -cannon. Three houses had also been built--a workshop, a bakery, and a -lodging house.[119] The ceremony had not been performed earlier because -they were awaiting the arrival of the _Aranzazu_, that it might be -given greater solemnity; but that ship not coming, it was decided to -delay no longer.[120] The instrument of possession is a long, very -formal, and high-sounding document. The right of Spain is based on the -discovery of Nootka in 1774 and the bull of Pope Alexander VI of May -4, 1493. The instrument bears the signatures of Martinez and Haro, -commanders of the two vessels; of Tovar, the first pilot; of the two -chaplains, and of the four missionaries, and is attested by Canizares, -the notary.[121] From the fort and the vessels a salute of 21 cannon -was fired in honor of the King, and at a splendid banquet on board the -commander’s ship all of the officers of the Spanish ships, and several -foreigners, drank to that sovereign’s health. - -These foreigners, Martinez says, were of the English nation and the -American Congress [Colonies], and the ceremony was performed without -any contradiction by them.[122] Through Kendrick and Ingraham, officers -of the American ship, he had made the Englishmen understand that the -Spaniards had been the first discoverers of the port. He had proved -this by having the Americans--since they also understood the Indian -dialect--talk with the natives, who had described the clothes of the -first comers. And as a further and more conclusive proof he laid before -the Indians the flags of various nations, including the old Spanish -flag,[123] and the last was recognized by the old chief as the one -borne by the first vessel.[124] - -One more occurrence should be noted before the arrival of the English -expedition under Colnett that gave rise to the most important event -of the summer. This occurrence is the coming of the _Princess Royal_, -commanded by Hudson, subject to the orders of Colnett. This vessel -left China earlier than her consort and reached Nootka on June 15[125], -where she remained a little more than two weeks. A letter written by -Hudson, a copy of which is in the Spanish archives, gives a detailed -account of his stay at Nootka on this occasion. On his approach in -the evening he was met by two launches. Being alarmed, he demanded -to know whether they were armed and received answer in English that -they were, but only with a bottle of brandy. Martinez, of the Spanish -ship, Kendrick, of the American, and Funter, of the captured English -schooner, came on board and remained all night. The next morning, -the 16th, they were towed into the harbor, and saluted by the guns -of the two Spanish ships and the fort. In the afternoon Hudson and -Martinez accompanied Kendrick up the sound 6 miles to his vessel, the -_Columbia_, where they remained that night. On the 11th Hudson returned -to his vessel, where he received a note from the Spanish commander -demanding his motive for anchoring in the sound, and informing him that -the port belonged to the King of Spain. On the 18th Hudson replied -that during his voyage of sixteen weeks and three days from Macao -in continual storms his ship had been badly damaged; this, with the -failure of wood and water, had caused him to anchor where he was, and -he hoped that Martinez would permit him to supply his losses, upon -which, with permission, he would depart. In a note of the same day -Martinez replied that Hudson’s explanation was perfectly satisfactory -and that he might supply his needs and depart when he wished. - -This shows that the utmost harmony and good will prevailed. Hudson’s -vessel was present when the Spaniards took formal possession of -the port, and he was doubtless one of the Englishmen who were at -Martinez’s sumptuous banquet and are mentioned as not disputing the -act of possession. This is the English vessel, also, to which Martinez -transferred the furs taken from the _North-West America_, as mentioned -above. - -On July 1, his ship being ready to leave, Hudson notified Martinez -that he intended to sail the next morning. The latter, after a little -hesitation, gave his consent, and also furnished Hudson with a circular -letter to all commanders of Spanish ships which he might encounter -ordering them to let him pass. The next morning, July 2, the launches -from the American ships towed the _Princess Royal_ out of the harbor; -and having had to wait all day for a breeze she sailed away at 10 -o’clock in the evening, returning eleven days later, at the close of -the important events to be discussed in the next chapter.[126] - -Comparing the actions of Martinez, which have been discussed in this -chapter, with his instructions given in the foregoing chapter, it is -seen that it would not be difficult for him to justify his seizure of -the _Iphigenia_ and the _North-West America_. The last clause of the -eleventh article orders him to endeavor, as far as possible, to prevent -intercourse and commerce with the natives. It is difficult to see how -he could have carried this out in any other way. Knowing the general -policy of Spain, which was to prevent all foreigners from trading with -the Spanish dominions, and feeling himself responsible for maintaining -that policy along this whole coast, he might easily have felt it his -duty to employ harsh means, being satisfied that nothing less would be -effectual. Having in mind the recent treatment accorded to the governor -of the islands of Juan Fernandez because he allowed a vessel that had -been in his power to continue its voyage to these very coasts, it is -not strange that he should be unwilling to incur similar disgrace -because of too great leniency.[127] It would seem, however, that he -was inconsistent in not seizing also the _Princess Royal_, unless, -indeed, he believed what he embodied in the circular letter which he -gave to Hudson for other Spanish commanders. In this he declared that -the purpose of the voyage was discovery; that he had seen Hudson’s -commission to that effect. Martinez may have known nothing to the -contrary at the time, and what he said was doubtless true; but it was -not the whole truth. But if he was too lenient this time, he did not -err in that direction on Hudson’s return, as will appear. - -If Martinez felt it necessary to treat the English ships with such -harshness, can his mild treatment of the American ships be justified? -These are the very ships that are referred to in articles 14 and 15 -of the above-mentioned instructions. It will be recalled that he was -there given authority, in case of his meeting with them, to deal -with them as appeared proper. The suspicion was mentioned in another -place that the purpose of these ships was to find a port in which to -establish a colony. On encountering them at Nootka, Martinez inspected -their papers and found that this was not their purpose. He says that -his interpreter found nothing in their papers derogatory to the rights -of Spain; that their purpose was to circumnavigate the globe; that -there seemed no reason for interfering with their course nor placing -them under bond, as he had done the packet boat from Macao; but that, -nevertheless, he had required them, in the name of his Sovereign, not -to return to these seas or coasts without bringing a passport and -special permit, since that Monarch had prohibited every foreign nation -from navigating the coasts of America.[128] His allowing the American -ships to trade unmolested for the two months hardly seems consistent, -unless his reason was what might be implied from the latter part of -the letter just referred to. He tells of the assistance afforded him -by the American commanders in his dealings with the English and the -Indians, since they conversed in both of those languages. He might -have considered it better to allow them for a time to violate the -letter of the strict Spanish regulations than to lose their services in -establishing himself in a position to prevent all such violations in -the future. His intimacy with the Americans was so noticeable that the -Englishmen frequently accused the latter of collusion with the schemes -of the Spaniard.[129] - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE QUARREL AND SEIZURE. - - -The English ship from China, the _Argonaut_, Captain Colnett, whose -equipment and instructions have already been discussed, arrived at -Nootka late in the evening of July 2, 1789. She had neared the coast -some distance north the previous evening. Sailing southward, she was -visited in the morning by some Indians, who told of five vessels in -Friendly Cove, but could not identify them. The officers conjectured -that the ships belonged to Mr. Etches, one of the merchants interested -in their proposed colony. They hastened to join them. As their vessel -approached the entrance they saw the sloop _Princess Royal_ pass out -and sail away. This increased their confidence, since she was their -consort. Shortly after they passed the sloop they saw two launches -approach in the growing darkness. A voice in Spanish asked permission -to come on board and was answered in the affirmative. The leader of the -party was the Spanish commander, Martinez. Two hours earlier he had -been notified from the port of the approach of a ship. Thinking it to -be the _Aranzazu_, which he had been anxiously expecting for some weeks -from San Blas with provisions, he had hastened to welcome her in. - -The events that follow this meeting of Martinez with Colnett, the -commander of the English expedition, are the real genesis of the Nootka -controversy. Had the vigorous measures of the Spanish commander stopped -with the seizure of the two vessels already discussed, the matter -would probably never have reached the cabinets of London and Madrid. -Since these events are so important, a detailed account is given. This -is drawn from five separate narratives, all written by men who were -present and took part in them. One is the letter of Martinez, written -at the close of the events, giving his official account to the Viceroy. -Another is a letter from Colnett to the same official, written some -three months later. These two are unpublished. The third is a second -account by Colnett, written nine years later, appearing as a footnote -to his published narrative of a subsequent voyage. The fourth is a -series of letters, written while the events were in progress, by -Duffin, second in command to Colnett, but really in control during most -of the time. The fifth is the letter, written three years later, by the -American captains, who were eyewitnesses of most of the events.[130] - -At the first meeting each commander was disappointed at finding the -other very different from the person whom he expected. Martinez -at once presented to Colnett a letter from Captain Hudson, of the -_Princess Royal_, saying that the bearer was commander of two ships of -His Catholic Majesty anchored in Friendly Cove; that the writer had -received all possible aid from him and had departed. The letter had -been written that very morning, and put Colnett somewhat at his ease. -He invited Martinez and his party, among whom were the officers of the -American ships, down into the cabin, where they drank freely together. -The Spaniard was very courteous, declared that the vessels under his -command were in great distress from the want of provisions and other -necessaries, and urged the English commander to go into port in order -to supply their needs, inviting him to stay for some time. Colnett, in -his letter to the Viceroy, says that he consented to stay, provided he -should be permitted to build a sloop, for which he had the materials on -board; but this being refused, he said that he could not stay longer -than the next day. - -On the other hand, Martinez says that Colnett claimed to have come -under authority from the King of England, with orders to take -possession of Nootka, construct a fort, establish a factory, and -plant a colony, for which he had brought 29 Chinese laborers; that -having learned this his interpreter made the Englishman understand -that Martinez had already taken possession of the port in the name and -under an order of the King of Spain; that thereupon the English captain -claimed the land for His Britannic Majesty on the ground of Cook’s -discovery, adding that his company had purchased the rights to the -place which were acquired the previous year by the Portuguese company, -their vessels, the _Iphigenia_ and the _North-West America_, being also -included in the purchase. To refute the Englishman’s arguments, the -Spaniard declared that a Spanish expedition had discovered the port -four years earlier than Cook;[131] that he himself had accompanied the -expedition, and from him the spoons had been stolen which Cook tells -of purchasing; that the Portuguese company had done wrong in selling -land which was not theirs but belonged to the King of Spain, not only -this port being the property of that Crown, but all the coast as far as -Prince Williams Sound. Colnett, the Spaniard continues, was unable to -reply to these well-founded arguments. The American captains say: - - Colnett asked if he would be prevented from building a house in the - port. The commodore, mistaking his meaning, answered him he was at - liberty to erect a tent, get wood and water, etc., after which he - was at liberty to depart when he pleased; but Captain Colnett said - that was not what he wanted, but to build a blockhouse, erect a - fort, and settle a colony for the Crown of Great Britain. This was - refused. - -Colnett, in his published account, says that he hesitated, being -uncertain whether to enter the port, but-- - - The Spaniard, observing my unwillingness to comply with his request, - assured me on his word and honor, in the name of the King of Spain, - whose servant he was, and of the Viceroy of Mexico, whose nephew he - declared himself to be, that if I would go into port and relieve his - wants I should be at liberty to sail whenever I pleased. - -Martinez’s plea of distress and his solemn promise, with Hudson’s -letter, the Englishman says, influenced him to enter the harbor, -and, as there was a calm, he allowed the Spanish boats to assist in -towing his vessel into the cove. Among the party that had come out in -the launches was the pilot of the captured English schooner. He told -Colnett of the situation in the cove--the Spanish war ships, the fort, -the formal possession, the seizure of the _Iphigenia_ and _North-West -America_, and the arrival and departure of Captain Hudson. He advised -Colnett to anchor outside the cove until morning, but the latter, -depending on the Spaniard’s honor, entered and brought up between the -Spanish ships at about midnight. - -The next morning, July 3, everything seems to have been harmonious. -Colnett visited the fort and other Spanish establishments, and on -invitation of Martinez took breakfast on board the Spanish vessel, -the Spanish commander returning the compliment by dining on board the -Englishman’s ship. The latter was urged to delay his departure for a -day, but being unwilling to do so it was arranged that the Spaniard -should send a launch in the afternoon to tow the English vessel out, -and on the return of the boat Colnett should send the supplies, a list -of which had already been agreed upon. The launch not coming as soon -as expected, a request was made that it be sent at once. Martinez -asked to see Colnett’s papers before the latter should depart. After -some hesitation the Englishman took them on board the Spanish ship. -The Spaniard was still in doubt whether he should allow the _Argonaut_ -to depart, sometimes saying that she could, at other times that she -could not. Finally he declared that she could not go that day. He -produced a book in which he showed what he said was an order from the -King of Spain to seize all English vessels found on the coast. Colnett -declared that he would sail at once, with or without permission, -unless the Spaniard fired on him, in which case he would haul down -his colors and surrender. Thinking it presumption for Colnett to talk -as if he were an agent of the English King, though he was really sent -only by a commercial company, Martinez declared himself the personal -representative of the King of Spain and commander in chief of the port. -Colnett replied that he had been in His Britannic Majesty’s service for -twenty years, and that he then carried a governmental license, which -he produced. He endeavoured to show the injustice of the Spaniard’s -conduct, reminding him of his promise on his word and honor, made -the evening before. Warm words followed, and each commander seems -completely to have lost his temper. Each tells of violence, either -threatened or inflicted, by the other. At Martinez’s order Colnett was -seized and made a prisoner. - -From the accounts it is impossible to decide which officer was the -more at fault in the quarrel. It was the unfortunate outcome of anger -on both sides, and doubtless was not premeditated by either. The real -explanation appears to be that given in the letter of Duffin. Eight -days after the quarrel he wrote: “I have every reason to suspect there -was a misunderstanding between the two parties, for the linguist -spoke English very imperfectly, and in all likelihood interpreted as -many words wrong as right.” It seems, then, to have been a faulty -translation that caused the quarrel which later threw two continents -into a feverish excitement in anticipation of war. - -After the seizure had been made, however, a plausible excuse was not -wanting to the Spaniard. He says that he imprisoned Colnett because the -latter would likely have gone elsewhere on the coast and established a -post from which it would have been impossible to dislodge the English -without the force of arms. This is doubtless exactly what would have -happened, and in view of Martinez’s instructions and of what he knew to -be the policy of his country with regard to the coast, he was entirely -justified, from the Spanish standpoint, in preventing by force what -he could not have prevented otherwise. Indeed, had he allowed the -English expedition to depart unmolested, and had the English colony -been established elsewhere, he probably would have been seriously -taken to task for not attempting to prevent it. Martinez’s account -to the Viceroy was such as to make it seem that he at no time had -any intention whatever of allowing Colnett to leave. He says nothing -of his promise and pledge to that effect which the English commander -says that he made. But though the Spaniard concealed the fact from his -superiors, the other accounts indicate unmistakably that he really -intended, at first, to allow the _Argonaut_ to depart, and that his -promise to her commander was made in good faith. Possibly he had begun -to doubt whether the Viceroy would approve his proceedings respecting -the two vessels already seized, and did not wish to involve himself -further until he had that official’s decision. In view of this he may -have concluded to let all other vessels pass without scrutinizing them -too closely. His treatment of the _Princess Royal_ indicates such -intent, and his promise to Colnett was consistent with it. After a -day’s consideration, he may have concluded to go through the form of an -investigation, at least, that he might make a plausible report of it, -but with the deliberate intention of closing his eyes to anything that -might prove derogatory to Spain. However the fact may be accounted for, -it is clear that Martinez was wavering between two opinions and that -the quarrel forced his decision. Duffin, in his letter of July 12 [11], -which seems to be the fairest of all the accounts, speaking of events -after the seizure, says: - - The commodore’s passion now began to abate a little, and he sent - for me from the _San Carlos_, where I was imprisoned. When I came - to him, he seemed to profess a very great friendship for me, and - appeared to be exceedingly sorry for what, he said, his officers - compelled him to do. He declared to me that he had given Colnett - permission to depart, and would have assisted him all in his power - but that Captain Colnett insisted on erecting a fort opposite his. - -A little further on, after telling of Colnett’s turning over to him all -control of affairs, the same writer continues: - - I have endeavored to convince the Spaniards, had we known this place - had been taken possession by the King of Spain, we would not, on any - consideration, have come near it; I have likewise wished to persuade - him to peruse the South Sea Company’s grant and our instructions, - which he refuses, and tells me it would avail nothing now to do it, - as his officers insist on his going on with what he acknowledges he - too rashly and hastily began, and without deliberating what might - hereafter be the consequence. - -That the English captain was somewhat to blame for what had occurred is -clear from his own behavior, as related in Duffin’s letter of July 14 -[13]. The writer, speaking of Colnett, says: - - I have endeavored to persuade him to draw out every particular - concerning our being captured, to send to his employers, which he - refuses. His objection is that he has involved himself and everyone - else in difficulties that he is not able to extricate himself from, - and therefore declares to me that he will have no more concern with - the charge of the vessel. - -This refusal to give the particulars of his arrest occurred after his -recovery from what Duffin spoke of at the time as insanity, but what -Colnett himself refers to as delirium. Meares’s publication of Duffin’s -statement concerning the commander’s insanity caused some hard feeling -when Colnett learned of it; and the statement was publicly denied later -by Meares.[132] Whatever it may be called, the immediate cause was his -capture. The malady lasted for ten days. As a result of it, the whole -control was left in the hands of Duffin, the second in command. The -latter’s statement concerning the captain is as follows: - - Captain Colnett has been in such a state of insanity ever since the - vessel has been captured by the Spaniards that we are obliged to - confine him to his cabin. Yesterday morning he jumped out of the - cabin window, and it was with great difficulty his life was saved. - His constant cry is that he is condemned to be hanged. I sincerely - hope for his speedy recovery, but am apprehensive he never will - recover his former senses again. I understand from the boy, Russell, - that it is a family disorder and that they all have symptoms of - madness more or less. - -The next day he wrote: “Captain Colnett is much better to-day, and, in -general, discourses very rationally.” It was at this time that Duffin -made his vain attempt to draw out the particulars of the capture. -Duffin seems to blame Colnett. - -On the afternoon of July 3, immediately after seizing Colnett, Martinez -had taken possession of the _Argonaut_, had run up the Spanish flag, -and had imprisoned all of the officers and crew, removed them from -their own ship, and confined them on board the two Spanish vessels. Of -the events that followed during the next ten days, while preparations -were being made to send the vessel to San Blas for the Viceroy to -decide whether she was good prize, there are greatly divergent -accounts, as in the case of the other captured ships. It is significant -that the further the writing was removed from the event the blacker is -the picture drawn in the English accounts of the Spaniard’s cruelty. -Doubtless the most authentic is the one first written--the letters of -Duffin, already referred to. - -After a little time Colnett and Duffin, with two other officers, -were allowed to return to their own ship. On the 11th Duffin wrote: -“I am at present in possession of my cabin, as are also the rest of -us, and the commodore behaves with great civility, by obliging us -in every liberty that can be expected as prisoners.” This is pretty -strong evidence that there was nothing very barbaric about Martinez’s -treatment, since Duffin had no motive for concealing the truth. What he -wrote had to be by stealth, he says, and was taken by Mr. Barnett, an -Englishman of the crew of the _North-West America_, who was going to -China on board the American ship. Under these circumstances he would -probably not have represented the Spaniard’s conduct more favorably -than it deserved. Many of the supplies and stores on board the English -ship were appropriated by the Spaniards; but not without arrangement -for compensation, as would be inferred from later English accounts. -Speaking of their appropriation, Duffin says: - - They have taken of our stores to themselves all our pitch, tar, - canvas, twine, some provisions of all kinds, guns, ammunition, - the chief of our copper, and many other articles that we were not - acquainted with, all the officers being prisoners, some on board one - vessel and some on board the other. We have great expectations that - the vessel will be delivered up at San Blas. The commodore promises - me, if she is, everything that he has taken to himself shall be - replaced at that port; but there has been a number of things taken - out of the vessel by theft that he knows nothing of. Nevertheless, - if any, and the vessel is returned, they must undoubtedly make it - good. - -According to the same writer, Martinez tried to buy all of the copper -on board, offering to give bills for the same, but it was refused on -the ground that if his orders allowed him to capture the vessel they -would undoubtedly allow him to capture the cargo also. The Spaniard, he -says, wanted the copper to trade for furs, which he shipped to Macao -by Captain Kendrick [of the American ship _Columbia_], who traded for -him on shares. This is the way in which the man in command at the time -spoke of what later accounts designate as plundering by the Spaniards. - -That the promise of compensation was made in good faith is proved by -the documents which Martinez submitted to the Viceroy. One is dated at -San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 5, 1789, and is a “List of the provisions -and other stores which have been taken at the expense of the royal -treasury from the captured English packet boat _Argonaut_, for my -subsistence in this port; all of which are to be restored to Capt. -James Colnett from the royal treasure of the department of San Blas, -in case the Most Excellent Señor Viceroy of New Spain releases the -vessel.” An itemized statement carefully describing each article is -given. Another document dated July 13 is a “List of the artillery, -balls, and other armament found on board the captured English ship -_Argonaut_, belonging to the free commercial company of London, which -remain in my possession at the disposal of his excellency, awaiting his -superior determination.” Inclosed with these is a “List of the names -of the captain, officers, crew, and passengers which the _Argonaut_ -carried.” Among the officers there were 12 Englishmen and 1 Spaniard; -of the sailors, 4 were English, 7 Portuguese, and 3 Filipinos; the -passengers were 29 Chinese; to these were added Colnett’s servant, who -was a Sandwich Islander, and Duffin’s, who was a Bengalese. In all, -there were 58 persons. Another list includes only the 16 Englishmen, -and states that they are to be sent to San Blas on board the captured -ship _Argonaut_. Still another list includes the Portuguese, the -Filipinos, the Chinese, and the two servants, who were to be sent on -the _Aranzazu_ and the other vessels that might come from San Blas. The -one Spaniard had entered the service of Martinez.[133] - - * * * * * - -On July 13, after the above documents relating to the capture of the -_Argonaut_ were sealed up and the vessel was ready to be sent as a -prize to San Bias, the _Princess Royal_, which had left ten days -before, returned and was seized by Martinez. He says that his motive -for the seizure was his wish to prevent her from carrying news of the -capture of the other vessel to the company, and thus to forestall their -taking measures against him before he could be reënforced.[134] This -seems a poor excuse since the Englishmen shipped on board the American -vessel could carry the news just as well. - -Hudson’s letter to the Viceroy gives his account of the seizure. On -leaving Nootka on July 2 he had intended to sail northward, but a -storm had driven him southward and he had been unable to return for -several days. On July 13 he had succeeded in getting back opposite the -entrance to Nootka Sound, and being anxious to know whether Colnett had -arrived, and, if he had, wishing to get from him some needed supplies -and instructions for his future conduct, he determined to enter in his -launch, leaving his vessel in the open. He had no fears of maltreatment -since Martinez had dealt so liberally with him before. He was met by -a Spanish launch, was told that Colnett was there and was sick and in -trouble, was requested by Martinez to enter the port, and was invited -on board the Spanish launch. He found it completely armed. His own -pistol was taken from him and his launch was taken into possession. -When he reached the _Princesa_ Martinez informed him that he was a -prisoner, as was also Colnett, and that the fault was all the latter’s. -Hudson was urged to give orders for his ship to come in, but refused, -and the Spaniards prepared to take her by force. Seeing the futility of -resisting, he advised his lieutenant to surrender. The vessel was taken -at midnight and brought in the next morning. Captain Hudson does not -mention here his brutal treatment at the hands of the Spaniards, which -is related in other English accounts.[135] He says that he was allowed -to go on board his own ship or anywhere else in the port that he chose. - - * * * * * - -The two English vessels left Nootka for San Blas, where they were to -await the disposition of the Viceroy. The _Argonaut_ sailed July 13, in -charge of Tovar as prize captain. In Colnett’s letter to the Viceroy he -tells of the hardships that he suffered on the voyage. His belongings -had been transferred to the mate’s cabin, a very small room. Each night -at 8 o’clock he was locked in this, and the door was not opened until -morning. He was not allowed to have any intercourse with his officers -except in the daytime. The commandant at Nootka had either asked or -taken all of his chickens and other fresh provisions, so that he had a -slight attack of scurvy. His mouth, he said, ulcerated, and the captain -of the prize refused to allow him to have his bread toasted for fear -of destroying his teeth! Whenever there was a storm the hatchways were -closed, and he almost smothered. The heat increased each day. One night -he asked repeatedly for a glass of water, but it was too great a favor, -and he had to wait until morning. His own condition was bad enough, -but when he got to San Blas he learned that the men of his crew had -suffered much more than he. They had been closely confined in irons for -many days, though there were only 8 of them and four times as many to -guard them.[136] Their chests had been broken into, and most of their -clothes and personal belongings had been taken. Colnett had lost many -articles that he valued very highly. After their arrival at San Blas, -August 15, they received better treatment.[137] The _Princess Royal_ -arrived at San Blas on August 27, just a month after she had left -Nootka. She carried 12 English and 2 Portuguese prisoners.[138] - -On August 29, Hanson, second pilot of the _Argonaut_, committed -suicide. The only known cause was melancholy, according to the -statement of the Viceroy drawn from a detailed account sent to him by -the commandant of San Blas.[139] In Colnett’s published account he -says that it was because of Hanson’s despair at the treatment which he -had received. The same writer states that several others became sick -and died.[140] Colnett may have exaggerated somewhat the hardships -of the voyage, but the letter seems to be a truthful account. Their -condition, at the best, was a bad one, and they were probably confined -more closely than was necessary and their wants not attended to as they -might have been. It is likely, however, that most of the harsh measures -taken by the prize crew were the result of excessive caution rather -than wanton cruelty. - -Martinez’s operations at Nootka after sending his prizes to San -Blas are of minor interest. He carried on some explorations in the -neighborhood, studied the customs of the natives, and made, in his -diary, a full report of the country and its inhabitants. On December 6 -he reached San Blas, having returned in consequence of an order from -Florez dated February 25, 1789.[141] This date shows that the events at -Nootka during the summer had nothing to do with his recall, since the -order was given shortly after the expedition had sailed. - -When Martinez reached San Blas he had with him an American ship and -schooner which he had captured just as he was leaving Nootka. He had -hesitated for some time, uncertain whether he should set them free, -but had finally decided to take them to San Blas to be acted on by the -Viceroy. Revilla-Gigedo, who had succeeded Florez in the viceroyalty, -set them free, on the ground that the Americans had not molested the -Spanish settlements.[142] The names of the vessels do not appear in -this letter. They were doubtless the _Eleanora_ and the _Fair America_, -under Captain Metcalf.[143] - -Martinez also brought with him the 29 Chinese that he had taken from -the _Argonaut_. To save the expense of keeping them the Viceroy said -that he had decided to have them brought to Mexico, liberated, and -given employment; or, if they preferred, they would be sent to the -colonies and mission settlements of California.[144] Meares, in his -memorial, declared that these Chinese laborers were detained at Nootka -by Martinez and put to work in the mines that had been opened on the -land belonging to Meares. Nothing appears in the Spanish documents -concerning any such mines. It has been stated elsewhere that Meares -gave 70 as the number of Chinese taken to Nootka by Colnett. This is -probably an exaggeration, since the number 29 is repeated several times -in the Spanish documents, and in two places a complete list of their -names is given.[145] From what will be stated later, it seems that -the Viceroy’s scheme for liberating them in Mexico was not carried -out.[146] - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE ENGLISH PRISONERS IN MEXICO.[147] - - -Florez, the Viceroy, who had sent the Nootka expedition, had no news -from Martinez until late in the summer. Shortly after the arrival -at San Blas of the first prize, the _Argonaut_, the commandant of -that port dispatched a special messenger to Mexico. This messenger -arrived August 26, bearing Martinez’s letters and the papers from the -captured ships. The Viceroy’s anxiety was far from being relieved -when he found himself involved, not with the Russians, but with the -English. The question now was what should be done with the prizes -sent for his adjudication. He was embarrassed by the fact that he -was to retire from the viceroyalty within a few weeks, and whatever -measures he might determine upon would have to be carried out by -his successor. He decided to take no decisive step without the new -Viceroy’s concurrence. Within a day after the messenger’s arrival the -more important documents had been copied and Florez had written his -report. They were hurried off to the Government at Madrid. In this -report he told briefly of Martinez’s voyage to Nootka, of his taking -formal possession of the port and fortifying it, of his finding the -American vessels and allowing them to continue their voyage, and of his -seizing the _Iphigenia_ and the _Argonaut_, releasing the former on -bond and sending the latter as a prize. To this account he added some -reflections concerning the importance of retaining the port of Nootka. -He would send reënforcements and supplies to Martinez at once. The -question as to whether the vessels were good prize he would leave to -his successor.[148] - -Two days after sending this account to the home Government, Florez -sent orders to the commandant and commissary at San Blas for the -temporary disposition of the prize. The officers and men were to be -kindly treated and supplied with lodgings and other accommodations -according to their rank. Fresh food was to be furnished at public -expense, an account being kept of the cost. All of their clothing was -to be turned over to them, but no arms. They were to be given complete -liberty within the port, but were to be closely watched to see that no -one abused his privileges. A complete inventory should be made in the -presence and with the help of the English captain. The latter should -sign it and receive a copy for his security and protection, whatever -the fate of his vessel. The perishable part of the cargo was to be -sold and the rest deposited separately in the royal storehouses. The -ship, after being unloaded, was to be examined, cleaned, and repaired -at governmental expense, with the approval of the English commander, -who should have a copy of the account.[149] The fact is not stated in -this order, but in a letter to Madrid it appears that the ship, when -repaired, was to be used in collecting supplies and reënforcements for -Martinez at Nootka.[150] From Colnett’s published account, it seems -that the Englishmen were induced to do the work on the ship in the -false hope of an early release. He says: - - Under a promise that our detention could not be long, they persuaded - us to heave down and repair the _Argonaut_, new copper her bottom, - and fit new rigging. The idea of release stimulated us to work on - the ship with great alacrity. So much so that our exertions threw - several into fevers; and on the vessel being nearly ready, the - Government threw off the mask, informing us she was to be employed - for their use, and laughed again at our credulity.[151] - -After receiving news of the arrival at San Blas of the second English -prize, the _Princess Royal_, Viceroy Florez wrote again to the -Madrid Government. This letter was dated September 26, and told of -the steps taken with regard to the captured ships since his account -written a month before. He had considered the matter carefully, and, -although he had decided to leave the disposition of the prizes to his -successor, yet he gave his own conclusions. He knew of no precedent -for the capture except the conduct of the Viceroy of Peru toward the -governor of Juan Fernandez, on account of the latter’s not having -detained the American ship _Columbia_ when he found she was bound -for California.[152] This, he said, was based on the royal order of -1692, a copy of which he inclosed.[153] He added that conditions had -changed in a century. However, he would not disapprove the conduct of -Martinez, since, he said: “Article 11 of my instructions, ‘to repel -force by force and to prevent hostile ships from making establishments -and trading with the Indians of our coasts,’[154] could not have been -enforced without detaining the vessels.” He concluded: “For the sake of -economizing expenses and avoiding hard feelings between our court and -that of London, it seems to me best to allow both vessels to return to -Macao, placing their commanders under bond, as Martinez did the captain -of the _Iphigenia_.” Everything taken from the vessels he would restore -or pay for, deducting the cost of keeping the men and the expense for -repairing the ship. He had not time to attend to this, but would leave -it to his successor, if that official approved.[155] - -On August 27, the day that Florez had written his first hurried -account to the home Government, he had also written an account to -Revilla-Gigedo, who was soon to succeed him in the viceroyalty. The -correspondence that followed is valuable as showing the divided -opinion in official circles regarding the justice of the seizures, -and as illustrating the evolution of the new Viceroy’s final decision -regarding the prizes. In the first letter Florez explained briefly -that, as a result of the last expedition ordered by the King, he had, -without loss of time, sent Martinez to take possession of Nootka. He -then recounted the grave consequences, which made it necessary to take -most prudent measures, and added: - - For my part I have not ventured to enter upon them, in view of - the fact that I am so soon to surrender the government to your - excellency. I look upon this business as more important than any - other, and if you rank it the same I hope you will hasten your - coming.[156] - -Three days later the new Viceroy, who was attending to some public -business at Veracruz, replied that he came fully instructed from the -higher authorities of all the steps taken by Florez in the Nootka -matter, of their approval by the junta of state, and the consequent -royal order. In view of the attempt to represent the English expedition -as a governmental enterprise, he especially commended Florez for -having inserted in Martinez’s instructions the order of the English -Admiralty office to Cook telling the latter not to touch at Spanish -ports except in case of necessity and then to leave as soon as -possible. He thought that that wise council would not now have sent an -expedition with such contrary instructions. He believed it had come -simply from Botany Bay or some establishment in India. He said that it -did not appear necessary for Florez to await his coming to take steps -regarding the captured ships, since Florez was so well informed. As to -the possibility of another English expedition being sent to dislodge -Martinez, he thought there was no danger. England was too remote, and -the Spanish could supply reënforcements when necessary. The English -Cabinet would not undertake anything so likely to fail. In the end the -unhappy affair would be settled between the Spanish and English Courts. -However, he would not delay his coming to Mexico a moment longer than -necessary.[157] - -On September 2, the same day that Florez received the letter just -reviewed, he answered it. In his answer there is a tone of impatience -which seems to be partly because Revilla-Gigedo had not dropped -everything else to attend to the prizes, and partly because the -latter’s approval was not enthusiastic. The new Viceroy had suggested, -that since the English expedition did not appear to have been sent -by the Government it would have been better if Martinez had told the -captains to return when they chose to the parts from whence they had -come. Florez retorted: “I explained to your excellency that, according -to the documents which Martinez sent to me, these prizes have been -made with good cause, and I think your excellency will indorse my -opinion when you have given careful attention to their contents.” -He inclosed copies of them, and called attention to the positive -representations of the English captain. He continued: “Whether the -English Court had any part in the plan for occupying Nootka, or whether -it did not, we have often seen them lay claim to ports and territories -occupied by the merchants or subjects of their nation; and there is -no doubt but that they have ready naval forces incomparably greater -than those which we can send from San Blas.” He enlarged on the -insufficiency of vessels in that port for present needs, and told of -the preparations that he was making to use the captured ships to convey -reënforcements and supplies to Martinez. In closing he said: “But since -your excellency can not give it the preferential attention asked I have -suspended my orders relative to Nootka affairs until your excellency -gives me your final decision concerning the liberating or retention of -the English ships.”[158] - -The loyalty with which Florez supported Martinez, and his resentment -when he found Revilla-Gigedo inclined to disavow the seizures, may have -arisen from a personal relation, since, as stated above, Colnett says -that Martinez represented himself as the nephew of Florez.[159] - -After having read the copies of Martinez’s letters and documents, -which Florez had sent, Revilla-Gigedo replied, September 9, that he -was pleased to find that his opinion of the unofficial character of -the English expedition was confirmed; that Colnett had been sent, -not as a governor, but as a merchant; that he was not to establish a -fortification but a factory, which was to be located not necessarily -at Nootka, but wherever it might be with convenience, and that Fort -Pitt was simply the name to be given to the factory. Had the English -expedition taken any sort of possession of Nootka, he said that it -would doubtless have afforded some subsequent claim. But since it had -not succeeded, and since the English captain had asked permission -to sail, all such fears ought to have vanished. There was the more -reason for this, since not only had England been prevented from taking -possession, but Spain actually possessed it. Since Florez had already -referred the matter to the Spanish Court, it seemed to him that they -could take no further step until the decision of His Majesty should -arrive. He agreed that in the meantime the captured ships should be -used to convey supplies to Martinez if no others were available. He had -read with pleasure the timely and prudent orders of Florez for caring -for the captured ships and prisoners. The weakened forces at San Blas -were being strengthened and the necessary ships could be constructed. -A new commandant of that port with reënforcements had set out from -Veracruz the preceding day.[160] - -In this Revilla-Gigedo maintained his former position that Martinez -had insufficient ground for making the captures. He seems not to have -considered what would have been the consequences if the English ships -had not been seized and had established a colony elsewhere on the -coast. He gave a qualified approval of the steps taken by Florez while -awaiting an answer from the home Government, but he did not definitely -commit himself on the question to which Florez had tried to elicit an -answer--that is, whether he would declare the ships good prize. - -On September 16 Florez replied that he had decided to continue his -preparations for sending supplies and reënforcements to Nootka, -since Revilla-Gigedo had approved using the captured ships for that -purpose.[161] - -The new Viceroy took control of the government October 18.[162] A few -days later he wrote to the home Government concerning Nootka affairs: - - When my predecessor, Don Manuel Antonio Florez, surrendered this - government to me we had many extended conferences, but either - because of forgetfulness or on account of preference for other - weighty affairs, he did not mention the matter of the English ships - captured at Nootka. He ought to have done it, since he left the - business for me to settle. … My verdict has always been opposed to - the seizure of the vessels, but since my predecessor has seen fit - to refer the matter to the home Government, I have concluded that I - ought to do nothing further until I have received the decision of - the King. Since there were no others available at San Blas, he had - made use of the captured ships, he said, to bring arms from Acapulco - to that port. After their return from this trip he would send them - in January with supplies and reënforcements for Nootka. By the time - these operations should be completed the King’s orders for detention - or release would have come.[163] - -About the time that the new Viceroy took possession of the government, -letters arrived from the captains of the captured English vessels. -Mention has been made of the letter which Florez wrote to the -commandant and commissary at San Blas immediately after receiving news -of the arrival of the first prize. Besides this letter giving orders -for the care of the prisoners, the repairing of the vessels, and making -an inventory of the cargo, he seems to have given instructions for -obtaining a full statement of their case from the English commanders. -Their letters were addressed to Florez. These are the accounts -of Colnett and Hudson to which frequent reference has been made -above.[164] In closing, Colnett said: - - Your excellency will pardon me for venturing to write such a long - letter, in which I have dwelt on affairs of such little importance. - But if I have done so, it has been at the instance of the commandant - of this port, who has told me that it was your excellency’s wish. - As reflecting the treatment received at San Blas [he said], I beg - permission to add that all of the bad treatment which I received - at Nootka and the cruelty which was practiced on me in my passage - from thence hither has been entirely wiped out by the attentions - and humanity of the official whom I find here in the position of - commandant, Don José Comancho.[165] - -This letter bears no date, but that of Hudson which accompanied it is -dated September 18.[166] Inclosed with these letters was a copy of an -inventory giving the original cost of each article. It was signed by -Colnett and Duffin, and apparently included the cargo of the _Argonaut_ -only. On October 1 Colnett wrote another letter, in concluding which he -said: - - The climate of San Blas has proved to be very bad for me and my - officers and crew. We should consider it a great favor if you would - permit us to make a journey on horseback some miles inland, or allow - part of us to pass a few days at some distance from the port.[167] - -It fell to the lot of Revilla-Gigedo to answer the letters. On October -21 he wrote to Colnett: - - I have read the representations which you and Captain Hudson made - to my predecessor, the Most Excellent Señor Don Manuel Antonio - Florez. He has turned over to me all of your complaints against the - proceedings of the commandant of Nootka, Don Estevan José Martinez. - My dealings shall be based on the laws of reason, equity, and - justice. This is all that I can or should say at present. I assure - you and Captain Hudson that yourselves and all the people of your - vessels shall be treated with such attention as is demanded by the - friendship and harmony existing between our Sovereigns.[168] - -Having thus temporarily disposed of the question of the captured ships, -the Viceroy busied himself about carrying out a “royal order of the -14th of last April for sustaining with vigor our new establishment -at Nootka.” He wrote to his superior at Madrid how he had planned to -send, in the following January, a new expedition of three vessels -with complete equipment, supplies, and reënforcements. It was to -be commanded by a military official. He was to succeed Martinez as -commandant of Nootka, and was to receive from Martinez complete -instruction regarding the country and its inhabitants. This would -contribute the greatest possible security to the establishment in that -port. But the plan had been completely overthrown by the return of -Martinez with all of his ships to San Blas December 6.[169] At first -this had caused the Viceroy great inquietude, but soon he had modified -his plan and was again pushing it to completion. The new commandant was -to be Eliza, and Martinez should accompany him in the office of pilot. -The Spanish possession of Nootka was to be vigorously maintained if any -foreign power should attempt to dispute it. One of the three ships was -to be the captured _Princess Royal_. The _Argonaut_ had already gone -to Acapulco and returned to San Blas loaded with artillery to furnish -armament for the expedition.[170] This new enterprise may be dismissed -for the present to follow the fate of the English prisoners. - -Before turning to the dealings of the Viceroy with the Englishmen it is -interesting, though not essential to the narrative, to notice the final -exit of Martinez from the stage that his rashness had brought into -prominence. In a letter of February 26, 1790, the Viceroy mentioned a -royal order of October 13, 1789, “informing me that at the instance of -Doña Gertrudis Gonzales, wife of Don Estevan José Martinez, ensign of -the navy, the King had resolved that I should arrange to transfer this -official to those dominions [Spain], or that in case his continuance at -San Blas was necessary to the service that I should withhold a third -part of his salary, to be applied to the support of his wife and of one -daughter 17 years old.”[171] Thus it appears that while Martinez was -getting himself and his Government into trouble in America his family -in Spain was in trouble because he had neglected their support. The -Viceroy gave orders at once for Martinez’s return from Nootka on the -first vessel coming to San Blas, in order that he might go to Spain and -rejoin his family. His services were no longer necessary, it was said, -there being enough officials without him. It should be noticed that -this order was given more than two months before news reached Spain of -Martinez’s operations at Nootka. So that could have had no influence on -his recall. - -The request for a change of climate made by Colnett in his second -letter to the Viceroy, mentioned above, was granted. In Colnett’s -published account he says: “We were removed 60 miles up the country; -here we were allowed great liberty and better treatment,”[172] and -permitted to remain “the six latter months of our captivity.”[173] This -was at a place called Tepic. Not only was this favor granted, but the -English commanders were allowed to go in person and plead their case -before the Viceroy. Speaking of Bodega y Quadra, the new commandant of -San Blas, Colnett says: - - To this officer I am greatly indebted for his kind attention and - obtaining permission for me to go to Mexico to claim redress for our - past treatment.[174] - -In Revilla-Gigedo’s first account of the matter to the home government -he had mentioned the English captain’s complaint of the bad faith and -worse treatment of Martinez. He said he had offered to give them a -hearing in court, but it would be impossible to do this without giving -Martinez a hearing at the same time.[175] When writing this he supposed -that Martinez was at Nootka and would remain until relieved of his -command. But although Martinez returned to Mexico shortly thereafter, -still the trial was not held, since he had to go again to Nootka as -pilot of the expedition under Eliza. The Viceroy, in his published -“Informe,” tells of the promised trial and why it was not held: - - The captain of the _Argonaut_, James Colnett, and that of the - _Princess Royal_, Thomas Hudson, his subaltern, asked and I gave - them permission to come to this capital. They produced their - complaints against Martinez and I ordered the case to be drawn up. - But it could not be continued, because the defendant and some of the - witnesses were necessarily employed in the royal service and the - plaintiffs wished to be set free as soon as possible.[176] - -Speaking of his stay at the capital, Colnett says: - - On my arrival at Mexico and during my residence there I was treated - by the Viceroy, Don Revilla-Gigedo, with greater politeness and - humanity, and, indeed, by all ranks of people in that city.[174] - -The time of the arrival of the English captains at Mexico seems to have -been about the first of the year. They received no definite answer -to the question whether their ships should be condemned or released -until late in April. The Viceroy was waiting for an answer from the -home Government to the first account of the seizures which Florez -had written the previous August. This account had not reached the -Government until December 30.[177] Florez’s second account was received -three days later.[178] Thus by the second day of the new year the -Government had a full account of the seizures and copies of all of the -documents. No reply was made until January 26. When this reply reached -the Viceroy, greatly to his surprise and disappointment, it gave him -no advice, but instead it asked for his determinations concerning the -question whether the ships were good prize. - -Revilla-Gigedo resolved to wait no longer for advice, and so took the -responsibility upon himself. In answer to the request from Madrid, he -wrote, on May 1, 1790, his conclusions, as follows: - - They have been to liberate the English prisoners on the conditions - shown by inclosed letters. Colnett, who came to Mexico with my - consent to present his complaints, will now return to San Blas, - where he will receive his ship, the _Argonaut_. Embarking there - with all of the English and Chinese,[179] he will return to - Macao or wherever he wishes. At Nootka he will receive from the - commandant, Don Francisco Eliza, the sloop _Princess Royal_, which - will be turned over to her master, Thomas Hudson. These foreigners - are warned not to delay, trade, nor establish themselves on our - Spanish coasts under threat of punishment for violation. I have - felt compelled to release them, considering that I ought not to - hold as good prize a few little vessels found on a distant and - deserted coast of our colonies of California; and considering the - uselessness of burdening the royal treasury with some 60 men, whose - scanty sustenance has to be provided for in the feeble and expensive - establishment of San Blas in order that the just sentiments of - humanity might not be violated, and that the plans of my predecessor - might be carried out.[180] - -This action of Revilla-Gigedo and the grounds here given for the -release of the English ships are consistent with the position taken -by him as soon as he heard of the affair, namely, that the vessels -ought never to have been seized. It will be interesting to notice the -subsequent change in his position. - -Colnett had been informed of the decision of the Viceroy on April -27.[181] On the same day orders were sent to San Blas for carrying it -out. The commandant, Bodega y Quadra, was to surrender the _Argonaut_ -to Colnett in good condition, and was to give orders to Eliza at Nootka -to surrender the _Princess Royal_ to Hudson in the same condition. -The small schooner, since it could not be taken apart to be put on the -larger vessel, was to be paid for. All belongings were to be returned -to the prisoners. The supplies deposited in the royal storehouses were -to be given back, an equivalent was to be given for everything applied -to the royal service, and whatever had been lost was to be paid for. -All this was to be done in such a manner as to avoid complaint.[182] -Besides having all of their belongings restored, the commissary was to -pay wages to all, extending from the day of their capture until they -were released. Colnett was to be paid as a lieutenant of the navy, and -all others according to their rank as regulated by the scale of wages -for the South Sea. A general account was to be made of all expenses -occasioned by the captured ships.[183] The Viceroy argued, in a letter -to the home Government, that the English South Sea Company, under whose -license Colnett was navigating, should repay to the royal treasury of -Spain all expenses occasioned by the captured ships. His reason was -that their agents made the seizure necessary by coming to the coast of -California, where they could neither establish themselves nor enjoy -commercial advantages by right.[184] - -In the packet which Revilla-Gigedo sent on May 1 he inclosed a letter -from Colnett to the British ambassador at Madrid, presenting his -complaints against Martinez.[185] The Viceroy added that he hoped these -would be considered when Martinez reached Spain. - -The Viceroy considered that he was treating Colnett very liberally, -and it does seem that he had allowed about all that could be expected -if his orders should be faithfully carried out. Colnett, however, was -not fully satisfied and presented a number of formal requests. He -enumerated a list of things which he requested should be sent from -Mexico to fit out his ships. These were granted. He asked that all of -the wages of both crews be paid to him as commander, which was granted -also. He demanded payment for himself as commandant of an expedition, -but he was allowed pay only for a lieutenant, which was less than half -as much. He demanded the return of the schooner which he had brought in -the _Argonaut_, but which Martinez had taken. He was to have pay for -it. He wished the _Princess Royal_ to return to San Blas for her crew, -but he was compelled to wait until he should get to Nootka for her. He -demanded a money payment of not more than £3,000 to reimburse himself -for personal valuables and nautical instruments lost. The Viceroy -refused this, since he had ordered that all of these should be returned -or paid for at San Blas. He asked for a special interpreter to be -appointed for him, but this was refused as unnecessary. His request for -the return of his servant, a Sandwich Islander, was at first refused, -but later granted. The Viceroy was attempting to keep this man, who was -said to be chief of one of the islands, ostensibly that he might be -converted to the Catholic religion; but probably the real reason was to -use him in getting an opening for a Spanish settlement on the Sandwich -Islands. He had flattered the vanity of the savage by promising to send -him to see the King of Spain. Colnett’s persuasion prevailed. The most -important request was that for a passport which should allow greater -privileges than the Viceroy’s order for his release had granted.[186] - -The Viceroy had forbidden the Englishmen to make any establishment, -to trade, or even to tarry on the coast; and in his first reply to -Colnett’s demands he repeated the prohibition. Three days later -Colnett wrote again, using very plain language. He called attention -to the instructions under which he had sailed with a license from the -British Government. Those instructions required him to trade with the -Indians and to form an establishment for that purpose. The Viceroy’s -instructions had ordered him to sail directly to Macao, without -stopping on the coast. He pointed out the inconsistent position in -which he was placed. The right of Spain to the coast was a point to be -settled--he hoped, in a friendly manner[187]--between the Cabinets of -Madrid and St. James. It was clear that the right was not recognized -by the English, as was shown by the patent and instructions which he -bore. That same year the privilege granted to his company would expire. -Let Spain see, in a friendly manner, that it should not be renewed, but -the Viceroy should not oppose the pacific execution of a commercial -undertaking attempted in good faith and at so great an expense. He -demanded a passport with only one prohibition, namely, to trade with -Spanish ports.[188] - -Colnett’s arguments had the desired effect. On May 11 the Viceroy sent -him a passport with only the one prohibition and expressly stating that -he might carry on his operations in places not actually under Spanish -dominion.[189] In the letter inclosing the passport he trusts that they -will not think of making an establishment on the coast or of trading to -the prejudice of the Spanish nation.[190] - -It is noteworthy that in this passport the Viceroy reversed his -decision of ten days before and declared that Martinez’s seizure of -the vessels was well founded. He cited laws and royal orders which he -said not only absolutely forbade the navigation, establishment, and -trade of foreign nations on the American coasts of the South Sea, but -ordered them to be looked upon and treated as enemies. His reason for -freeing the English ships, he now said, was to preserve harmony and a -good understanding between the subjects of His Catholic Majesty and the -King of Great Britain. The change in his mental attitude seems to have -been brought about by the stubborn persistence with which Colnett urged -his demands in the meantime. By the latter part of May, when he wrote -again to the home Government, the Viceroy had formulated his decision. -He declared: - - The coasts north of California are truly and justly the dominions of - our Sovereign. According to the royal order of November 25, 1692, - of which my predecessor sent a copy, and according to the treaty, - to which it refers, of 1670, ratified and confirmed by article 2 of - that of 1783, all of the vessels which Don Estevan José Martinez, - ensign of the royal navy, found in Nootka were legitimate prizes. - The release of the packet boat _Argonaut_ and the sloop _Princess - Royal_ has been the result of pure generosity.[191] - -This is a complete reversal of his decision quoted above from his -letter of twenty-six days earlier. In his “Informe” of three years -later the Viceroy cited in addition as grounds for his decision an -article of the orders of the royal navy, and also a royal order of -October 18, 1776, “to detain, seize, and prosecute any foreign ship -which arrives in our ports of the South Sea.”[192] - -A royal order had been finally given, March 23, definitely instructing -the Viceroy to liberate the captured ships. In a letter of June -26 Revilla-Gigedo said that the royal order of March 23 had been -completely satisfied by his accounts of May 1 and 27. He was pleased -that he had conformed so happily to the decisions of the King.[193] - -According to Colnett’s published account, he found on his return to -San Blas that the _Argonaut_ was in a bad condition on account of the -treatment she had received. He says that the Viceroy’s liberality in -allowing wages was counterbalanced by the charges for maintenance, -traveling expenses, medical assistance, and an allowance of eight -months’ provisions. He says also that before he was allowed to sail he -was compelled to sign a paper expressing his complete satisfaction with -their usage.[194] That paper was signed July 8, 1790, and is as follows: - - I have the honor of informing your excellency that to-day I have - been dispatched from San Blas; and I also have the satisfaction of - adding that I have reason to be content with the treatment of the - commandant and commissary of this department. - - With all proper submission, I ask permission of your excellency to - add that the money which I have received here is little more than - the amount of my individual loss, and is not the fifth part of the - damages by the most moderate calculation. Since I shall have to - turn matters over to the company which employs me, I hope that - your excellency will have consideration in keeping with your known - generosity, and will not allow them to suffer such losses.[195] - -This, if true, indicates that Colnett’s apprehensions of illiberal -treatment at San Blas were well founded. On his arrival at Nootka -the _Princess Royal_ was not there. June 11 of the next year she was -dispatched from San Blas to be surrendered to Colnett or some other -representative of the company in China.[196] Colnett fell in with her -and she was handed over at the Sandwich Islands.[197] - -This closes the Nootka affair as far as events on the American -continent are concerned. Before the Viceroy had finally decided to -liberate the prisoners, the matter had been taken up by the home -Governments, and all Europe was ablaze with excitement over an expected -war. The center of interest now shifts to the diplomatic controversy, -which is the most important phase of the Nootka incident.[198] - -What has been discussed so far might be briefly summarized as follows: -As far as discoveries and explorations, which could give definite -claims, are concerned, the Spanish were the earlier; but the English -were made in ignorance of the Spanish, and the results of the English -were published first. Spain could claim a prescriptive title from the -fact that she had maintained for so long an undisputed claim, and from -the additional fact that the land was contiguous to her settled Mexican -dominions; but the English were the first to attempt to develop the -country by exploiting the fur trade. The first actual establishment -was made by the English, and, although it was temporarily abandoned in -the autumn, it was with the evident intention of renewing, enlarging, -and making it permanent in the spring; but unfortunately for what -was, in the autumn of 1789, an unquestionably superior claim, it was -counterbalanced by the arrival of a Spanish expedition in the spring -of 1790, a few days before the English returned to resume their -occupation, and when there were no signs of previous or intended -occupation. The fact that the Spanish expedition was public while the -English was private, favored the former. From these recapitulations it -is plain that there was abundant ground for disputing the respective -rights. - -As to the justice or injustice of the seizures at Nootka, there is also -room for dispute. The _Iphigenia_, by pretending to be a Portuguese -when she was really an English ship, aroused a just suspicion, and what -was probably a harmless trick, meant solely to deceive the Celestials, -assumed a grave appearance when the added suspicion of piracy was -aroused. But this suspicion of piracy was based on a mistake made by -the Spaniard in translating the ship’s instructions. Having seized her -on the ground of this double suspicion, for the sake of consistency -and to hide his blunder, Martinez justified his rash act on a totally -different ground, but one which was plausible from the Spanish view. -When the _Argonaut_ arrived her captain made the mistake of rashly -declaring his purpose before he knew his opponent’s strength, and -of manifesting too much impatience to get out of the power of a man -who would probably have allowed him to depart in peace had he been -patient. Then a quarrel, caused largely by the mistakes of a blundering -interpreter, ended in the Spaniard’s making another rash seizure, this -one without so much as having had the Englishman’s papers translated. - -When the matter was transferred to the officials in Mexico, the -outgoing Viceroy, instead of shouldering the responsibility and acting -at once, attempted to shift it to his successor. The failure of the -two to agree led to an awkward delay of several months. Then after the -new Viceroy finally declared that the vessels were not good prize, a -quarrel with the liberated Englishman led him to reverse his decision, -so far as the principle was concerned, though his change did not affect -the fact of the Englishman’s freedom. - -The whole episode to this point seems to have been a series of -blunders, and would not merit careful consideration had not the -consequences been so serious for the home Governments. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -ATTEMPTS AT PEACEABLE SETTLEMENT. - - -The Spanish name of greatest importance in the diplomatic contest -with England in 1790 is that of Count Floridablanca. He was of humble -origin. His ability as a diplomatist was established while ambassador -to the Papal Court, especially in the suppression of the Jesuit order. -“This result [says Tratchevsky] was due in great measure to the skill -and energy of the Spanish ambassador at Rome, Don José Moñino. As a -recompense, Charles III conferred on him the title Count Floridablanca, -and soon made him prime minister (1777).”[199] He retained this -position fifteen years. “His integrity and love of labor won for him -the entire confidence of Charles III, who found in him the industrious -and respectful servant whom he sought.[200] He was a great worker, -of clean morals, beneficent, but very proud.”[201] He was a devoted -servant of monarchy and an enthusiastic adherent to the principle of -aristocracy. But on account of his recent elevation to the rank of a -noble he did not enjoy the favor of the upper classes. Zinovief, the -Russian ambassador, wrote: “The nobles and the soldiery despise him, -and he, in turn, takes no pains to hide his aversion to them. No one -of the great nobles enjoys any considerable importance at Court or in -the confidence of the King. Floridablanca seems intentionally to push -everyone else aside that he alone may enjoy the Sovereign’s favor. Even -the King’s confessor, who, it seems, should have nothing to fear, has -to yield to him. … Everybody trembles before him.”[202] - -This enviable position was enjoyed by the great minister until the -death of Charles III (1788). He was retained by Charles IV, but it was -not long before his position began to be undermined by court intrigues. -Baumgarten says: - - The Queen sought occasions to cast reproaches upon him over a - multitude of trifles, and, according to the testimony of Sandoz, - this mighty man was more busily engaged in these bagatelles than - in the weighty affairs of state.[203] … The Queen found willing - accomplices among the Count’s associates in the cabinet. By 1790 his - power was greatly diminished, so that he entered the contest with - England considerably handicapped.[204] - -The controversy between England and Spain did not seem so one-sided at -that time as it does when viewed in the light of the subsequent history -of the two countries. The thirty years’ reign of Charles III, which had -just closed, is the most glorious period of Spanish history, with the -single exception of her period of preeminence in the sixteenth century. -Desdevises du Dezert says: “In Charles III Spain had a real King, the -only one she had had since Philip II.”[205] Speaking of his position in -Europe, the same author says: - - His foreign policy was wise. He rightly considered England as the - true enemy of Spain. He feared for the Indies; he beheld them - invaded by English merchants and adventurers, by English merchandise - and ideas. To protect the colonies he hurled upon them a new current - of Spanish emigration, and decreed liberty of commerce between the - Peninsula and America. He allied himself with France in order to - combat England; and, notwithstanding some reverses, the war was - closed to the advantage of Spain, which country in 1783 again took - her place as a great European power.[206] - -When the conflict came, in 1790, although nearly two years of the reign -of Charles IV had passed, little was known of the weakness of the -King, the corrupting influence of the Queen, and the intrigues in the -ministry. Europe of the time saw in Spain a country rapidly forging -to the front, with a rejuvenated kingship, and a minister second -only to Pitt.[207] Led by this minister, Spain had less than a decade -before been largely instrumental in humiliating England; and since -then she had persistently refused to make any commercial concessions -to her vanquished antagonist. The same minister now dared to intervene -between the Czar and the Porte. He was also negotiating for an alliance -between Spain, France, Austria, and Russia.[208] If this quadruple -alliance should prove successful the outlook for England would be dark, -notwithstanding her triple alliance with Prussia and Holland. - -Such, briefly, was the political condition of Spain, internally and -externally, when news arrived of the occurrences at Nootka Sound which -have been discussed in the foregoing chapters. - -As stated above, it was at the very beginning of the year that the -intelligence was received which was soon to throw all Europe into a war -fever. On January 2, 1790, Valdez[209] sent to Floridablanca the second -installment of letters and documents concerning the occurrences at -Nootka. Three days earlier he had sent the first bundle.[210] These two -packages contained a complete account of the affair, with copies of all -the documents. Valdez asked for His Majesty’s pleasure concerning the -matter. - -On January 4, Anthony Merry, the English chargé d’affaires at Madrid -wrote to the Duke of Leeds, British secretary for foreign affairs, -giving a very confused account based on rumors. Word had just arrived -from Mexico, he said, that a small Spanish ship of war had captured an -English vessel in the port of Nootka. There were conflicting accounts -of the event. Some said “that the Viceroy of Mexico, having had notice -that the English were forming an establishment at the above-mentioned -place, ordered a ship there to take possession of it.” Others said that -the Spanish ship was there simply to reconnoiter the coast. There were -also conflicting accounts of what was done with Russian, Portuguese, -and American ships found in the same port, some stating that all were -allowed to go free except the English; others, that all were seized and -only the American released, Merry had not yet been able to learn the -name of the English vessel or her master. All accounts agreed that she -had come for the purpose of forming a settlement, that other vessels -were to follow, and that the captured ship had been manned with Spanish -seamen and sent to Mexico.[211] - -This was the first account to reach London.[212] It is not strange that -mistaken notions were formed. Fired by hatred for the Spaniards, it was -natural that the English should consider the act much more atrocious -than it was. The indefiniteness and inconsistency of the accounts gave -room for full play of the imagination. The Spanish Court, which had -complete accounts, either did not study them carefully enough to get -at the whole truth, or intentionally kept the British Court in the -dark. No English account arrived for nearly four months. Such a period -of uncertainty and suspense prepared a fertile field in which the -exaggerated accounts then arriving produced a fruitful crop of error. - -Three days after sending the above confused account Merry inclosed an -extract from a letter written in Mexico, which he had seen. This letter -seems to have been unofficial. Respecting the genesis and purpose of -the Spanish expedition it is true to the facts. It tells briefly of -the expedition of 1788 to investigate the Russian settlements, of the -discovery that the Russians intended to occupy Nootka, and of the -Viceroy’s prompt action to anticipate them. But respecting the events -at Nootka little is told except the seizure of an English vessel and -its arrival in Mexico as a prize.[213] On January 15 the British -chargé wrote of a conference with Floridablanca on the subject. “The -Count avoided explaining to him the particulars of the transaction, -or avowing clearly the seizure of the vessels; neither did he enter -upon the question of our right to trade or to form an establishment in -that part of the continent of America.” He said that he would direct -the Marquis del Campo, the Spanish ambassador at London, to impart the -circumstances to the Duke of Leeds.[214] - -In virtue of this promise Floridablanca instructed Campo, January -20, regarding the communication which he was to make to Leeds. This -communication will be studied presently.[215] A week after sending -his harsh instructions the Count attempted to smooth matters over in -another conference with Merry. He wished to see the present harmony -between the two courts preserved and improved, and “hoped that no -event might happen which might cause Great Britain to deviate from her -present pacific system.”[216] - -The first three letters from Merry had reached London before February -2. On that day the Duke of Leeds wrote cautioning him to be extremely -guarded in what he should say, until definite instructions could -be sent after Campo’s communication should have been received. He -declared that England undoubtedly had a complete “right to visit for -the purposes of trade, or to make a settlement in, the district in -question.”[217] When this positive declaration by the British Cabinet -at the very first is compared with the demand of the Spanish Court, -received a few days later, it is seen that a conflict was inevitable -unless one side should yield. - -The expected communication from Campo was received by Leeds February -11. Since it was this note that started the diplomatic controversy, and -since it has not before been made public, it is worth while to quote it -in full. It is dated “Manchester Square, February 10, 1790,” and is as -follows: - - MY LORD: Continuing the frequent expeditions which the King, my - master, has ordered to be made to the northern coasts of California, - the Viceroy of Mexico sent two ships, under the orders of Don - Estevan José Martinez, ensign of the navy, to make a permanent - settlement in the port of San Lorenzo, situated about the fiftieth - degree of latitude, and named by foreigners “Nootka,” or “Nioka,” of - which possession had formerly been taken. He arrived there the 24th - of last June. In giving his account to the Viceroy, M. Martinez said - that he found there an American frigate and sloop, which had sailed - from Boston to make a tour of the world. He also found a packet - boat and another vessel belonging to a Portuguese established at - Macao, whence they had sailed with a passport from the governor of - that port. He announced also that on the 2d of July there arrived - another packet boat from Macao. This was English, and came to take - possession of Nootka in the name of the British King. She carried a - sloop in pieces on board. - - This simple recital will have convinced your excellency of the - necessity in which the Court of Madrid finds itself of asking - His Britannic Majesty to punish such undertakings in a manner to - restrain his subjects from continuing them on these lands which - have been occupied and frequented by the Spaniards for so many - years. I say this to your excellency as an established fact, and - as a further argument against those who attribute to Captain Cook - the discovery of the said port of San Lorenzo, I add that the same - Martinez in charge of the last expedition was there under commission - in August of 1774. This was almost four years before the appearance - of Cook. This same Martinez left in the hands of the Indians two - silver spoons, some shells, and some other articles which Cook - found. The Indians still keep them, and these facts, with the - testimony of the Indians, served M. Martinez to convince the English - captain. - - The English prisoners have been liberated through the consideration - which the King has for His Britannic Majesty, and which he has - carefully enjoined upon his viceroys to govern their actions in - unforeseen events. His Majesty flatters himself that the Court of - St. James will certainly not fail to give the strictest orders to - prevent such attempts in the future, and, in general, everything - that could trouble the good harmony happily existing between the two - Crowns. Spain on her side engages to do the same with respect to her - subjects. - - I have the honor to be, etc., - - THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO. - - His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[218] - -One who has read the foregoing chapters will recognize many misleading -statements in this letter. The first sentence falsely gives the -impression, though it does not make the positive statement, that the -King of Spain had ordered the occupation of Nootka. Hence there was -some ground for suspecting that the Spanish Government had ordered -Martinez’s violent proceedings. Martinez arrived at Nootka almost two -months earlier than the date given in the note. June 21 was the date -of the formal act of possession. This error seems to have been due -to carelessness, since no motive is apparent, and the correct date -is given in the documents which Floridablanca had at hand. The note -does not mention the fact, clearly stated in the same documents, that -the first packet boat and the other vessel accompanying it from Macao -were really English, though nominally Portuguese; and the impression -is given that they were allowed to go absolutely free as were the -American vessels. No mention whatever is made of the _Princess Royal_ -which was also sent as a prize to Mexico, though this is plainly -stated in the documents. Instead of telling that four English ships -were captured, the impression is given that there was only one. The -gravest misstatement is that the English prisoners had been liberated. -As pointed out above, this was probably inferred from the statement -in the second letter of Florez that he thought that they ought to be -liberated, but would leave his successor to do it--a very insufficient -ground for such a positive assertion. As a matter of fact, they were -not liberated for more than three months after Floridablanca wrote the -instructions which this note embodied.[219] - -But the gravity of the note did not lie in its errors or -prevarications. The serious part of it was the demand that the English -King should punish his subjects for doing what Leeds had declared to -Merry only a few days before they had a perfect right to do, namely, to -trade and make settlements on the Northwest Coast. The further request -that the English Government should give strict orders to prevent such -enterprises in the future was virtually demanding that England should -forever refrain from exercising this right. Such demands could only be -acquiesced in when made upon a weak government by a strong one. English -pride could not brook them. - -The narrative which was prepared in the foreign office and published by -the Government[220] says: - - His Majesty’s ministers conceiving the circumstance of seizing a - British ship in time of peace to be an offense against the law of - nations and an insult to His Majesty, lost no time in taking the - only step in their powers.[221] - -A fortnight after receiving the Spanish note Leeds replied in a tone -equally imperious. After reviewing the facts as given by Campo and -referring to the demands of the Spanish Court, he said: - - As yet no precise information has been received relative to the - events mentioned in your excellency’s letter, but while awaiting - such I have His Majesty’s orders to inform your excellency that the - act of violence spoken of in your letter as having been committed - by M. Martinez, in seizing a British vessel under the circumstances - reported, makes it necessary henceforth to suspend all discussion of - the pretensions set forth in that letter until a just and adequate - satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding so injurious to - Great Britain. - - In the first place it is indispensable that the vessel in question - shall be restored. To determine the details of the ultimate - satisfaction which may be found necessary more ample information - must be awaited concerning all the circumstances of the affair.[222] - -This haughty tone surprised the Spanish ambassador. In his note to -Floridablanca inclosing Leeds’s answer, he said: - - The reply which this ministry has finally given to my letter will - surprise your excellency as it has surprised me. I refrain from - comments on it. At first I thought of going to the Duke of Leeds to - express my astonishment, but after considering the matter carefully - I have concluded that I ought to refrain, fearing lest in the heat - of conversation something might be said which might exasperate. - Since it is a formal reply and in writing I could not have obtained - its withdrawal. Besides, anything which I may say in reply will be - better if it comes from there (Madrid), which is the source.[223] - -This quotation is a postscript to a letter which had been written -after delivering the Spanish note to Leeds, but evidently before -receiving the answer. In the letter he had said that Leeds listened to -him calmly, but avoided any discussion of the matter. He had tarried -a little time and then withdrawn to write his account and urge anew -that orders be sent disavowing the seizure. He was not convinced that, -as might be suspected, the English expedition had been ordered by -the Court. He believed it to have been an enterprise of some remote -officials.[224] - -It should be noticed in connection with this reply to the Spanish Court -that Pitt was at this very time listening to the schemes of Colonel -Miranda, the famous South American agitator. It is quite possible that -this had much to do with the imperious tone assumed by the British -Cabinet. As previously stated, the Spanish note was received February -11. On February 14 Miranda met Pitt, on the latter’s invitation. He -had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the advantage of England -in connection with South America, and that plan was considered at -this meeting. Miranda explained the new form of government to be -introduced and discussed the existing situation. The plan was admitted -to be beneficial, but was to be put into execution only in case of a -war with Spain. Pitt asked him to write down the substance of what he -had said, adding a statement of all the products of South America, the -exports and imports, and the population, and the military and naval -forces of both South America and Spain. Miranda did so with as much -accuracy and detail as possible, and submitted his statement to Pitt on -March 5.[225] In the meantime, on February 25, Leeds’s reply had been -delivered to Campo. It will be interesting to watch the progress of -these conferences between Pitt and Miranda and note the coincidence of -some of them with the critical periods of the Spanish negotiation. - - * * * * * - -While awaiting the reply from London, nothing out of the ordinary seems -to have occurred at the Spanish capital. When Leeds cautioned Merry to -be guarded in what he might say, he also asked the chargé for all the -information he could obtain concerning recent Spanish naval movements. -Merry’s replies indicated a pacific attitude, externally at least, on -the part of the Spanish Court. March 1 he wrote: - - Count Floridablanca gave me no hint of his having any intention of - arming; and, notwithstanding the reports which have continued to - prevail here with regard to the naval preparations in the Spanish - ports, I can not, on the most diligent inquiry, find that any are - yet commenced, except for the equipping of 3 ships of the line, 6 - frigates, and 3 sloops of war for the purpose of forming a fleet of - exercise. [On March 15 he wrote:] The King of Spain has given orders - to grant free license to Prince Edward to pass and repass from - Gibraltar to Spain, and to pay him the same honors as to an Infante - de Castilla.[226] - -After the English reply reached Madrid, Merry’s reports were very -different. March 22 he wrote that Floridablanca was much dissatisfied -with the English reply, but still seemed anxious that peace should -be preserved. Merry thought that the Count’s ill humor was caused by -the fear lest Great Britain should use the matter as a ground for a -quarrel.[227] - -On the same day that Merry wrote the last-mentioned letter an important -session of the supreme junta of state was being held. The question -considered was as to the reply that should be made to England. The -matter had been discussed in the preceding junta. At this meeting of -March 22 Valdez, the minister for marine, presented in writing his -version of the proper reply. Though it is not given, its import may -be divined from the report which accompanied it. He told of abundant -military preparations at the principal places in the Indies, of what -was needed to complete their equipment, and the orders that could be -given to insure their security. He also reported on the state of the -Spanish navy, telling of the ships at the three naval stations Cadiz, -Ferrol, and Carthagena. There were 45 ships of the line and 32 frigates -ready to be armed at once; and in addition 24 of the former and 7 of -the latter could be prepared in a short time. The chief of the council -for the Indies, Porlier, also presented his opinion in writing. Others -gave oral advice, and it was left to Floridablanca to formulate the -reply to the English Court. Valdez received royal orders to collect a -squadron at Cadiz to be ready for emergencies, and to take the steps -necessary to put Honduras, Trinidad, and Porto Rico in a state of -defense.[228] - -On March 24 an order was sent to the Viceroy of New Spain to liberate -the English ship in case this had not already been done.[229] As stated -in the preceding chapter, the vessels had not been released at this -time, but were liberated before this order reached the Viceroy. - -Merry had another conference with Floridablanca on March 27. He -reported to his Government that the Count had concluded from Leeds’s -reply that the British Court intended to use the matter as a ground -for quarreling. The Spanish minister lamented the fact and hoped that -the necessity for Spain’s coming to an understanding with other courts -might be avoided. He said that he would endeavor to soften his reply to -the British Court. Merry thought that in view of the condition of Spain -Floridablanca would not suffer the matter to come to extremities.[230] - -At the next junta, which was March 29, the minister for marine -presented another report. This was dated March 28 and was embodied in -the minutes of the session of the following day. In it Valdez says -that in consequence of the reply which the junta of one week before -had agreed should be sent to the Court of London by Floridablanca, and -in compliance with the precautionary measures which the department of -marine was ordered to take in the Indies and in Spain, he had proceeded -promptly, with His Majesty’s approval, to execute the orders which -follow in the report. Vessels were to be armed at once in Ferrol, -Carthagena, and Cadiz, and, the real purpose being kept as secret as -possible, a sufficient number were to be collected at the last-named -port to form a respectable squadron for use in case later occurrences -should make it necessary. The vessels that needed it were to be -cleaned and repaired as rapidly as possible. Those out of port were to -be detained under arms at Cadiz when they returned. Provisions were -being collected. The officials of Havana, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico, -and Trinidad were ordered to strengthen their positions. At the same -session Floridablanca read the reply which Campo, the ambassador at -London, was to present to the English Ministry.[231] The contents of -this reply will be examined presently. - -This glimpse into the inner workings of the Spanish Cabinet reveals -a warlike activity. But externally every possible effort was made to -maintain a peaceable demeanor. Floridablanca made especial efforts -to keep the British chargé in the dark and quiet any alarm which -the warlike rumors might arouse. According to the dispatches of the -Prussian ambassador, Sandoz, to his Government at Berlin, the Count-- - - confided to Merry in the greatest secrecy the intelligence that - French emissaries had scattered seditious pamphlets in Mexico and - Havana, and thereby had stirred up the greatest possible ferment, - which threatened an outbreak every moment. The King had concluded - that the most efficacious measures must be taken with the greatest - haste in order that these first dangerous agitations might be nipped - in the bud, and consequently he had decided to employ his whole - force against it if necessary. To make this seem more probable, he - indulged in a tirade against the French Revolution.[232] - -In dispatches of April 5 and 6 Merry told of the alarm in Spain and -of the naval activity, but he still thought Floridablanca desirous of -avoiding war if possible. The fleet of exercise which he had mentioned -before was assembling at Carthagena.[233] April 12 he reported that -the fleet of exercise had been ordered to Cadiz. Other ships were -being armed in that port and the other two naval stations.[234] Three -days later he reported as being fitted for immediate service at Cadiz -14 ships of the line, 10 frigates, and 2 sloops. He told of three -treasure ships that had recently arrived from Spanish America with some -5,000,000 Spanish dollars on board.[235] On April 22 he wrote of still -larger armaments. Twenty ships of the line were reported ready for -service.[236] - -Such was the tenor of the dispatches from Madrid arriving at London -when, on April 20, Campo presented the second formal note from the -Spanish Court on the Nootka Sound controversy. This embodied the reply -agreed upon in the sessions of the Spanish junta of March 22 and 29. It -is as follows:[237] - - MY LORD: Having given an account to my Court of the reply which - your excellency was pleased to make on the 26th of last February - to my memoir on the detention in the port of Nootka of an English - packet boat named the _Prince of Wales_,[238] in consequence I have - received an order to inform the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty as - follows: In spite of the incontestable rights of Spain to exclusive - sovereignty, navigation, and commerce, founded on the most solemn - treaties, on the discovery of the Indies and the islands and the - continent of the South Sea, on ancient laws, and on immemorial - possession, which rights this Crown has continually exercised over - the territories, coasts, and seas above mentioned, including the - right always exercised of capturing transgressors--[in spite of all - this] the Viceroy of Mexico, as appears from the latest information, - has already liberated the above-mentioned English vessel and crew. - He did this because he was convinced that nothing but ignorance - of the rights of Spain could have encouraged the individuals of - any nation to resort to those places with the idea of establishing - themselves or of carrying on commerce there. The Viceroy also had at - hand positive orders which had been given to him instructing him to - have all possible regard for the British nation and to avoid even - the least act that could disturb the good harmony and friendship - which happily subsists between the two Courts. For these reasons, - and in order to give a further proof of the King’s desire to - preserve and strengthen this friendship, His Majesty understands and - considers this affair as closed, without entering into disputes or - discussions over the indubitable rights of his Crown. His Catholic - Majesty flatters himself that the British King will order all of - his subjects to respect these rights, as I had the honor of setting - forth and recommending to your excellency formerly. - - It is with the most respectful sentiments and the most constant - attachments that I have the honor, etc., - - THE MARQUIS DEL CAMPO. - - His Excellency M. the DUKE OF LEEDS.[239] - -The tone of this letter explains the feverish preparations for war -which the Spanish Court began as soon as the reply was decided upon. -It ignored the demand for satisfaction, the granting of which the -English reply of February 26 had made the indispensable condition -of further negotiation. It assumed that Spain was right and England -wrong. It distinctly avowed the seizure and made the release an act -of pure generosity. As justification, it asserted the most extensive -claims to exclusive dominion. It renewed the former demand that England -prevent her subjects from infringing upon that dominion. To support the -positive position taken, Spain was making extensive preparations for -war. If granting the first Spanish demand would have been incompatible -with British pride, yielding to the second would have been inconsistent -with British honor. Only one answer could have been expected from the -British Court. - -Shortly after the presentation of the above Spanish memorial an event -occurred which greatly influenced the British Cabinet and made them -urge their demands more vigorously. This was the arrival of Meares. -He came just at the opportune moment. The blood of the English -ministers was already up. In the absence of any authentic account to -the contrary, they accepted the exaggerated statements of Meares. The -foreign office “Narrative” says: - - From him a more full and probably a more authentic account of this - transaction was obtained than had already been in possession of - Government.[240] - - His Majesty’s ministers, who till now had proceeded with that - caution which the uncertain nature of the intelligence they had - received rendered essentially necessary, no longer having room to - doubt of the insult offered to the British flag, and the injury - sustained by British subjects from the unwarrantable and unprovoked - hostility of the Spanish commander, lost no time in taking those - measures which were best calculated to vindicate the honor of His - Majesty and the British nation.[241] - -This event with the arrival of the reports from Merry, mentioned above, -caused the British Government to turn its most serious attention to the -Nootka business. - -At a cabinet meeting held in the night of April 30 the following -recommendations to the King were agreed upon, and submitted by -Grenville to George III the next day: - - Upon consideration of the information which has been received from - Mr. Meares of the detention and capture of several British vessels - at Nootka Sound, on the coast of America, and of the circumstances - of that transaction, as also of the papers which here have been - delivered by Monsieur del Campo relative thereto, Your Majesty’s - servants have agreed humbly to submit to Your Majesty their opinion - that Your Majesty’s minister at the Court of Madrid should be - instructed to present a memorial demanding an immediate and adequate - satisfaction for the outrages committed by Monsieur de Martinez; and - that it would be proper, in order to support that demand and to be - prepared for such events as may arise, that Your Majesty should give - orders for fitting out a squadron of ships of the line.[242] - -In a note of May 1 the King asked whether a press would be necessary -for equipping the proposed squadron. The next day Grenville replied -that the Cabinet thought a press necessary and that it should take -place Tuesday night, May 4, between 12 and 3 o’clock, as that time -would create least observation. The same day that Grenville’s note was -written the King answered it requesting a privy council for the next -day, May 3, to consider the arrangements for the press. The council -was to be composed of the cabinet ministers, as the more secret -the business could be kept the more possibility there would be of -collecting some seamen in the first attempt.[243] - -After these days of martial activity in the British Cabinet Leeds -replied to Campo’s letter of April 20. He informed the Marquis, May 5, -that the unsatisfactory answer which the latter had been instructed to -make to the English demand for satisfaction made it necessary for His -Majesty to direct his minister at Madrid to renew the representations. -Owing to this change in the seat of negotiations, Leeds said it was -impossible for him to enter into the particulars of Campo’s letter. He -concluded: - - I can therefore at present only observe in general to your - excellency that although on cases properly stated it will be His - Majesty’s desire--which he has manifested in repeated instances--to - take any measures necessary for preventing his subjects’ interfering - with the just and acknowledged rights of Spain, he can never in any - shape accede to those claims of exclusive sovereignty, commerce, - and navigation to which your excellency’s representations appear - principally to refer; and particularly that His Majesty will - consider it his indispensable duty to protect his subjects in the - enjoyment of the right of carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific - Ocean.[244] - -Each nation stood firmly on the ground originally taken. Each had -made its first demand apparently expecting immediate compliance. -When such was stubbornly refused each suspected that the other had -some ulterior end in view and was using the matter in hand only as -a pretext. The misunderstanding arose over the fact that neither -the Briton nor the Spaniard could understand the mental attitude of -the other regarding the matter in dispute. The Spanish mind had for -centuries been accustomed to think of the American continent as the -exclusive possession of Spain. The accident that had given a portion to -Portugal, when the Pope drew his arbitrary line between the dominions -of the two maritime nations, was accepted without question by the -abnormally religious mind of the Spaniard. That Spain had yielded the -bleak northern shore of the Atlantic was of little consequence, since -she retained the sunny southern portion, where, alone, the Spaniard -could feel at home. With the exception of Portugal’s comparatively -insignificant holding, Spain still possessed practically the whole of -both Americas south of the northern line of Florida and west of the -Mississippi River. That Russia had recently settled on the icebound -coast of the far-away northwest was hardly known and less to be -regretted. Being accustomed to think of America thus, the Spaniard -could not conceive that anyone else would dare to infringe on his -right. Little was known in Spain of the colonial development of England -and the new principles on which it was based, namely, that unoccupied -land anywhere on the globe was the legitimate possession of any nation -that would occupy and develop it, and that no other nation could resist -such occupation by the mere assertion of an ancient shadowy claim that -had never been made good by actual settlement. The Briton was too -accustomed to this view to believe that anyone would still advance in -good faith the antiquated notion that any real right could be conferred -by the gift of a Pope, who, he believed, had no more authority to make -such gifts than any other individual, or that a claim not made good by -occupying and developing would be seriously urged. It was impossible to -reach a harmonious agreement. One party would have to yield. - -From this time onward negotiations were conducted at Madrid instead -of at London as hitherto. The British minister to the Court of -Spain, Alleyne Fitzherbert, had not yet gone to take charge of his -post. Affairs were in the hands of the chargé, Merry. Fitzherbert -was now dispatched to Madrid.[245] No communication of importance -passed between the two Courts until his arrival. In the meantime -each Government was putting forth its utmost efforts to raise its -naval force to the highest possible efficiency. During the same -time the diplomacy of each country was directed toward strengthening -its European position by calling on its allies for assurances of -support. The outcome of these efforts influenced, considerably, the -course of the main negotiation. Besides this influence much of the -interest and importance of the controversy lies in the effect of these -by-negotiations on France, the country chiefly involved in them. They -will be studied in the next chapter. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -EUROPE PREPARES FOR WAR. - - -Until the first week in May the negotiations regarding the Nootka Sound -dispute were conducted with the greatest secrecy in both countries. The -public, especially in England, did not so much as know that there was -any serious question pending between the two Crowns. There were general -rejoicings over the prospect of a long period of untroubled peace. The -consternation that ensued may be imagined when, on the morning of May -5, England awoke to the fact that in the darkness of the preceding -night sailors had been seized in every port and were being pressed into -the navy for immediate service. The excitement in London is reflected -by the following extracts from a diary. The writer was an ex-governor -of Canada, and was living in retirement at London. According to his -entry for May 5, a note just received informed him that “during last -night all the sailors on the Thames had been pressed, and that war was -on the point of being declared against Spain, which had seized five -of our ships near Cooks River; and the funds had fallen 3 per cent.” -This indicates that the financial pulse was decidedly unsteady. The -depression seems to have continued for at least ten days. At the end -of that time the same writer entered in his diary: “Opinions are still -divided as to whether there will be a war or not. The funds begin to -rise.” On this day he had invested $3,000 in bonds.[246] - -On the day following the press a message from the King was read in -both Houses of Parliament. This explained why the Government had taken -such an extraordinary step. The King declared that two vessels whose -nationality had not been fully ascertained and two others known to -be British had been captured at Nootka Sound by an officer commanding -two Spanish ships of war. He told how the cargoes had been seized and -the officers sent as prisoners to a Spanish port. He related briefly -the correspondence with the Spanish Court, then told how that Court -had refused the satisfaction demanded and had asserted a claim “to -the exclusive rights of sovereignty, navigation, and commerce in the -territories, coasts, and seas in that part of the world.” His minister -at Madrid was to renew the demand for satisfaction. Having learned of -considerable armaments in Spain, he had judged it necessary to arm in -turn “in support of the honor of his Crown and the interests of his -people.” He appealed to the Commons for the necessary support. He hoped -that the affair might be terminated peaceably, and in such a manner as -to remove grounds for misunderstandings in the future.[247] - -The next day, May 6, the matter was discussed in Parliament. Pitt -opened the debate in the lower House by moving an address of thanks -for the King’s message. He recited the facts briefly, asserted -England’s right to fisheries and commerce in the districts in question, -and showed that Spain’s extravagant claims would entirely exclude -England from that ocean, if they were allowed. The settlement of this -dispute would establish a precedent for all the future. The insult -to the British flag lay in two facts--first, the seizure had been -made in time of profound peace; secondly, goods had been confiscated -without condemnation.[248] Government hoped yet to settle the dispute -peaceably, but it was necessary to increase the armaments in order to -treat with Spain on an equal footing. The opposition led by Fox agreed -that the address should be voted and the armaments approved; but they -criticised the ministry for having so recently held out hopes for -continued peace when a matter of such importance was pending. This -reference was to statements made by Pitt in his budget speech of April -19. The minister answered that the facts were not all known at that -time; and besides, he had made no promise of the continuance of peace, -but had said that the existing prosperity was due to the happy interval -of peace and that if peace should continue prosperity would increase. - -From the facts presented in the preceding chapter it is known that -the criticism was unjust. Until April 21 the ministry had had no -communication from Spain except the note of February 10. Only one -ship was known to have been captured, and that only through the -information furnished by the Spanish Court in that note. Merry had -reported rumors of Spanish naval preparations, but had at the same -time given quieting assurances. Shortly after the budget speech came -the Spanish memorial of April 20, distinctly avowing the seizures and -asserting the Spanish pretensions; then came exact information from -Merry of extensive Spanish armaments; and last and most important came -Meares with his exaggerated stories of Spanish cruelty and injustice, -revealing the true number of seizures and overrating the losses. It was -urged more properly that the English Government was unjust in demanding -the restoration of the ships and satisfaction for the insult before -discussing the respective rights. This, it was said, was begging the -question. - -Notwithstanding these criticisms the address was carried unanimously. -The measures taken by the Government were confirmed, the armament -was approved, and the support of the Commons was assured. After a -similar debate in the Lords on the same day the ministry was supported -with the same enthusiasm.[249] The entry in the diary of Gouverneur -Morris, who was then in London as the semiofficial agent of the United -States Government, tells of the animated debate in the Commons, of -the enthusiastic support accorded to the ministry, and of the avowed -determination to obtain from the Spanish Court an acknowledgment -that Spain is entitled to no part of America except such as she -occupies.[250] The assurance of the Commons was followed up on June -10 by a vote of credit for £1,000,000 “to enable His Majesty to act -as the exigency of affairs might require.”[251] Orders were at once -given for the equipment of a fleet to consist of 14 ships of the -line, besides smaller vessels. This was soon increased. The press was -prosecuted vigorously and with success in all ports.[252] Vancouver’s -work speaks of “the uncommon celerity and the unparalleled dispatch -which attended the equipment of one of the noblest fleets that Great -Britain ever saw.”[253] Public excitement was wrought to the highest -pitch. Pamphlets were issued in the form of addresses to the King, -setting forth the extravagance of the Spanish claim to exercise -control over the whole Pacific Ocean, and enlarging on the magnitude -and promise of the frustrated English enterprise. All the forces -of national pride, prejudice, and patriotism were united to arouse -hatred for the Spaniard. Indignant orators dwelt on memories of Papal -anathemas, the Holy Inquisition, and the Invincible Armada.[254] - -At this juncture it is interesting to note again the relations between -Pitt and the South American agitator, Miranda. Attention was called -above to conferences between them shortly after the Spanish note of -February 10 was delivered to the British Court. Nothing seems to -have passed between them after that time until the second Spanish -note arrived. At 9 o’clock on the evening of May 6, the day of the -debate in Parliament just studied, Miranda again met Pitt on the -latter’s invitation. Grenville was present also. They had a long -conference “upon the subject of a war with Spain, in consequence of the -occurrences at Nootka Sound, the disposition of the people in South -America toward joining the English for their independency against the -Spaniards,” etc. Pitt thanked Miranda for the papers which he had sent, -and showed them to him. The minister was taking them to a meeting of -the Cabinet. New assurances were given of the execution of Miranda’s -plans in case of war. Various interviews took place between them -during the time that the great armament and the Spanish negotiations -were in progress.[255] The fact that Pitt was taking Miranda’s papers -to a cabinet meeting just at this time is unmistakable evidence that -his plans were being seriously considered. - -There were attempts on the part of the opposition to censure the -ministry for their conduct of the Spanish business. On May 10, in -debating the motion for the vote of credit, Fox called for the date -of the first communication from Spain on the affair. This was not -revealed.[256] On the next day there was an attempt to learn whether -the proposed settlement at Nootka was “undertaken under the sanction -and authority of Government, or merely as an enterprise of private -persons.” The motion was defeated, but Pitt declared that licenses to -trade at Nootka Sound had been granted; and whether this particular -undertaking was or was not a public enterprise it was incumbent on -the honor of the country to demand satisfaction. He said that the -“Memorial” of Captain Meares would put the House in possession of -all that Government knew on the subject.[257] On May 12 there was -a spirited debate on a motion calling for the papers relative to -the dispute, but the demand was successfully resisted.[258] On the -following day a motion by the opposition, calling for information -regarding the appointment of ambassadors to Spain since the peace -of 1783, was not resisted by the ministry.[259] A week later the -information obtained was discussed. During the seven years there had -been a resident ambassador at Madrid only thirteen months, though there -had been four appointments and upward of £35,000 had been appropriated -for their support. It was explained that these conditions were mostly -due to Spanish delays and etiquette; that although an ambassador had -not been present yet a chargé had been there all the time, and British -interests had not suffered. The motion was for an address asking the -King to provide for the performance in the future of the duties of -ambassadors to foreign courts. It was defeated.[260] There was no -further Parliamentary activity of importance on the matter before the -session closed on June 10.[261] - -While England was making these vigorous preparations at home she was -calling for support in every place from which she had a right to -expect aid. At the same time she was taking steps to put every portion -of her wide dominions in a state of defense. Ireland was called upon -to restrain shipments of provisions to Spain, and also to recruit -forces for the West Indies. The lord lieutenant agreed, with some -qualifications, to carry out both measures.[262] The commander at -Gibraltar was warned of his danger. The governor of that port, who was -visiting in England, was ordered to return to his post. A regiment of -foot was to embark immediately to reënforce the garrison.[263] Notices -were sent to the governors of Barbados, St. Vincent, the Leeward and -Bahama Islands, Dominica, Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia. They were -ordered to expedite works of defense, to report on their forces, and to -keep a watch on Spanish and French movements. Four regiments of foot -and two ships of war were ordered to the West Indies.[264] Three ships -of war, with reënforcements and provisions, were sent to India, with -instructions to prepare an expedition to seize Manila or the west coast -of America should orders come to that effect.[265] The governor of -Canada, about to return to England, was ordered to remain and prepare -the forces of Canada for any exigency that might arise. He was to -cultivate the friendship of the United States and to adopt every means -in his power for influencing the Americans in favor of Great Britain -and preventing their union with Spain.[266] These interesting Canadian -overtures will be fully discussed later. It was suggested to the King -that he use his Hanoverian troops to augment the garrison at Gibraltar. -He favored the measure, and took steps for carrying it out.[267] - -Besides this aid from her dependencies, England also claimed the -support of her allies under the triple alliance of 1788. Since the war -promised to be almost wholly naval, the friendship of the Netherlands -with her fleet would be of great value. On May 4, the day before the -English preparations were made public, Leeds wrote to Lord Auckland, -the British ambassador at The Hague, asking him to communicate the -matter to the Dutch Government. His Britannic Majesty relied on the -justice of his cause, and had no doubt that the Dutch Republic would -approve, and, if it should become necessary, furnish him support under -the treaty.[268] In a private letter of the same date Leeds asked that -before demanding aid under the treaty Auckland ascertain whether the -Dutch Government would fit out a number of vessels and furnish them -to England at English expense.[269] In less than ten days an answer -had arrived, saying that Holland was ready to support England and that -any or all of the Dutch ships of the line might be put at the disposal -of Great Britain at British expense.[270] On May 15 Auckland sent a -statement of the terms on which these vessels would be furnished.[271] -Three days later Leeds replied that the terms were so favorable that -Auckland was authorized to accept them at once and promote with the -utmost expedition the equipment of 10 sail of the line.[272] Still -further assurances of Dutch friendship and generosity were given. On -May 31 the States General passed resolutions refusing to accept the -English subsidies, and taking upon themselves the entire expense.[273] -Everything being in readiness and the English Government having -requested the movement, the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Kinsbergen, left -the Texel on June 17 and joined the English fleet at Portsmouth three -weeks later.[274] - -The third member of the triple alliance, Prussia, was at the same time -called upon for support. On May 20 Hertzberg, the Prussian minister, -handed an answer to Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin. The -Prussian King approved the measures of England and pledged himself to -fulfill his engagements in case the contest with Spain should render -it necessary. Hertzberg suggested that it was impossible to suppose -that Spain would think of embarking on a war with such disadvantage -without having a motive other than that alleged. He said that there -were positive indications that an alliance was being negotiated between -Spain, Russia, and Austria to which Denmark was to be asked to accede. -These indications made it necessary for the three allies to be in -perfect accord. He referred to Prussia’s very grave discussions with -the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg and claimed English support in -case it should be needed in that business.[275] Thus the Nootka Sound -dispute was drawn into the general current of European politics and -was destined to have an indirect influence on the Polish and Turkish -questions. More will be said later regarding these matters. - - * * * * * - -While England was meeting with such decided success in her demands on -her allies, Spain was also looking for support outside her own borders. -Her chief reliance was on France. For nearly thirty years the two -countries had been intimately united under the family compact. This -was concluded in 1761, during the Seven Years’ war, when France was -fighting a losing battle. The farsighted Charles III, who had then -recently ascended the Spanish Throne, saw in a close union between the -Bourbon Monarchies a prospect for ultimate gain to his Kingdom in spite -of the fact that he could hope for little at the time. He hastened -nobly to the rescue and generously shared the defeats and losses of -France. When Louis XVI entered the contest in behalf of the American -colonies in their struggle against the mother country, Charles III, -true to the family compact, followed his ally into the war which ended -in the glorious peace of 1783. When in 1790 Spain was threatened by -war with England, she naturally turned to France, whom she had twice -assisted against this same foe. But the advances were made with -serious misgivings on account of the turbulence in France, which was -threatening to overturn the monarchy. - -For a year the utmost confusion had prevailed in Paris and throughout -the country. The oppressions of the feudal régime, wasteful methods -of taxation, and financial mismanagement had combined to reduce the -Government to a state of bankruptcy. Finally, Louis XVI had yielded to -the universal clamor and called the States-General. In May, 1789, after -a recess of a hundred and seventy-five years, they had assembled at -Versailles. After a deadlock of nearly two months the privileged orders -had been compelled to yield to the demand of the third estate and meet -in a common body--the National Assembly. In the middle of July, the -Parisian mob had razed the Bastille, which they looked upon as the -symbol of arbitrary government. A little more than a fortnight later -the nobles in the National Assembly had bowed before the coming storm -and voluntarily laid down their feudal privileges. Rightly interpreting -these events as an acknowledgment of impotence on the part of the old -régime; the proletariat in the cities and the peasants in the country -had arisen everywhere, murdered the governmental officials, and burned -and pillaged the castles of the nobles. As a result of the frightful -events of the early days of October, the mob had carried the royal -family in triumph to Paris, and the National Assembly had followed -shortly after. Both were thenceforward virtually the prisoners of the -Parisian populace. The power of the Monarchy had ended. Under the spell -of Jacobin orators the Assembly was wasting its time in the fruitless -discussion of constitutional principles, and leaving the country to -ruin and anarchy. This was the condition of France in the summer of -1790. - -As early as January 20, the day on which Floridablanca wrote his -instructions to Campo in London--which instructions the latter -embodied in his drastic note of February 10 to the British Court--the -Spanish minister had also written to Montmorin, the French minister -for foreign affairs. In this letter he made no mention of the Nootka -Sound episode nor of the haughty demands which he was making on England -the same day. But he expressed pity for France and her King, and -complained that in the existing circumstances that country was not in -a condition to unite with Spain as she should. He feared that their -enemies would take advantage of the embarrassing position.[276] Though -he said nothing about it, Floridablanca was evidently thinking of the -possible consequences of his harsh demand. After the warlike sessions -of the junta of state, mentioned in the previous chapter, and after -the second note to the British Court had been sent, Floridablanca made -indirect overtures to France for assurances of support. This was in a -letter of April 6 to Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He -suggested that in the absence of French support it would be necessary -for Spain to look to other powers. Russia he thought most likely to -furnish aid.[277] No formal demand was made in this communication, -but it seems that the Spanish ambassador made some advances to the -French Court. On May 11 Fernan Nuñez wrote of a conference which he had -had with Montmorin. The latter had promised to propose an armament. -Luzerne, the French minister for marine, had told of the number of -vessels available. Montmorin had suggested that in case of war the -allies should disembark 50,000 men in England and should revolutionize -Holland. The French minister had asked for information concerning the -origin and progress of the dispute with England.[278] - -In the conversation just referred to Montmorin had told the Spanish -ambassador that the Constitutional party in France suspected Vauguyon, -the French ambassador at Madrid. They thought that he had induced -the Spanish Government to stir up the quarrel with England in order -to involve France as the ally of Spain. They suspected that this was -being done in the hope of strengthening the French royal power, and so -bringing about a counter revolution. This suspicion grew so strong that -Montmorin, as a concession to the radical element, recalled Vauguyon. -The Spanish King refused to grant him a letter of dismissal or to -recognize anyone as his successor.[279] - -As Montmorin had promised the Spanish ambassador in the above-mentioned -conversation, the French Government immediately took steps toward an -armament. On May 14 a letter from Montmorin to the president of the -National Assembly informed that body that the King had given orders -for the armament of 14 ships of the line. Assurance was given that -it was only a precautionary measure in view of the English armament. -The King would do all that he could to promote a friendly adjustment -between the Courts of London and Madrid. He hoped that France would not -be involved in war. The English Court had made friendly declarations -and had stated that the only cause for armament was the dispute with -Spain.[280] It was not wise, however, to remain disarmed under such -circumstances. France ought to show to Europe that her constitution was -not an obstacle to the development of her forces.[281] - -Montmorin’s message precipitated the famous discussion as to whether -the right to make peace and war should rest with the King or the -people. This discussion is probably better known than the Nootka Sound -dispute which occasioned it. The consideration of the message was made -the order of the day for May 15, the day following its presentation. -Biron, the first speaker, declared that the prosperity of France was -closely bound up with that of Spain. Spain had been a generous ally of -France in the past. The representatives of the people ought to respect -the obligations of the nation. “Let it not be said,” he declared, “that -the efforts of a free people are less than those of a despotism.” After -a brief enthusiastic speech he moved a decree approving the measures -taken by the King. Alexander Lameth declared, amid great applause, that -the first question to be considered was whether the sovereign nation -ought to concede to the King the right to make peace and war. There was -an attempt to postpone this question, but Barnave declared that when -it should be demonstrated that effects ought to precede their causes -then it would be proved that the question proposed by Lameth should be -considered last. Robespierre said that the time to judge of a right was -when they were deliberating on the exercise of it. Baron Menou said -that the right of making peace and war should be determined first, -then they ought to learn which nation was in the wrong. If Spain, she -ought to be persuaded to yield; if England, then France should arm not -merely 14 vessels, but all of the forces on land and sea, and compel -submission. - -Mirabeau declared that it was unreasonable and irrelevant thus to elude -the question. The message, he continued, had nothing in common with a -declaration of war. Jurisdiction in times of danger ought always to be -in the King’s hands. The vessels were to be armed only because England -was arming. The armament was not dangerous, and to deny it would cause -commercial discontent. The only question, he said, was whether the -funds asked were necessary. He declared that they were, and called for -the immediate consideration of the message. He proposed to approve the -measures of the King and to order by the same decree that to-morrow -they take up the discussion of the constitutional question, Shall the -nation delegate to the King the exercise of the right of peace and war? -His proposition was adopted almost unanimously.[282] - -Thus after some hesitation over the theoretical consequences the -armament was approved as enthusiastically as Spain could expect or -desire. The debate in the Assembly has no further importance for the -Nootka question. It would be of little interest and less value to -follow the metaphysical discussions of the constitutional question. -The final decision is of some interest. The debate occupied nearly -the whole of each morning session for six days. In the end Mirabeau -prevailed again. He had taken a middle ground. It was decreed that -the right of peace and war belonged to the nation; that war could be -declared only by a decree of the legislative body, but that this step -could be taken only on a formal proposal by the King, and must be -sanctioned by the King subsequently.[283] - -A few days after the Assembly had approved the armament Montmorin -wrote to Floridablanca. He hoped that the armament would recall -England to a proper tone and that the difficulty might be settled -amicably. Referring to Floridablanca’s letter of January 20, in which -the latter had complained of the inability of France to support Spain -as she should, the French minister said that its statements were as -forceful as they were true. The Spanish Government could count on the -most sincere desire on the part of the French King to fulfill his -engagements with Spain, but the will of the Assembly could not be -depended on. If war should be decided upon, the difficulties would be -incalculable. Peace, then, he concluded, ought to be the end of all -their efforts.[284] - -Subsequently, Luzerne, the minister for marine, made two reports on the -extent of the armament and the increased cost. On June 13 the Assembly -appropriated 3,000,000 livres to support it.[285] Up to the present -point the attitude of France appeared to be all that Spain could wish, -as far as could be judged from external appearances. But this armament -was distinctly French. There was no assurance that the fleet or any -part of it would be turned over to Spain if she should call for it -under the treaty. But this seems not yet to have been asked. - -On June 4 Spain attempted to set herself right in the eyes of all -Europe by issuing a circular letter and sending it to all the Courts. -This recounted briefly the origin of the dispute and the course of the -negotiations, and attempted to show the unreasonableness of the English -demands and their inconsistency with her treaty obligations. It set -forth the Spanish claim in the most favorable light possible, basing it -on treaties and the consent of nations.[286] - -The formal demand from Spain for French assistance was made June 16. On -that date the Spanish ambassador at Paris handed to Montmorin extracts -from all the correspondence between Spain and England up to date. He -inclosed with them an extended argument in support of the Spanish -case. After elaborating the arguments he demanded French assistance -under the family compact, and added that if it were not offered Spain -would have to seek alliances elsewhere in Europe.[287] Ten days later -Montmorin replied that the matter had been laid before the King, but -in view of the decree of the Assembly relative to peace and war the -Spanish demand would have to be submitted to that body. As soon as -it had been acted upon a positive response would be given.[288] This -reply had been delayed so long that the Spanish ambassador had become -impatient. On the preceding day he had written again to the French -minister demanding an early reply. Fitzherbert, the British ambassador, -had already arrived at Madrid, he said, and it was necessary for the -negotiation that Spain be assured of French supported.[289] To this -Montmorin answered that the King had not for a moment lost sight of the -importance of the matter. Louis XVI had written to Charles IV regarding -it.[290] - -Notwithstanding the urgency of the Spanish ambassador and the -willingness of the French King and his foreign minister, the Spanish -demand was not laid before the Assembly for more than six weeks after -it was presented. During all this time Spain was kept in uncertainty -as to whether she would receive from France the aid which she had a -right to expect. Before the expiration of this time the diplomacy of -Floridablanca and Fitzherbert had taken an important turn, though the -dispute was still far from settled. The next chapter will follow the -course of the main negotiation through this preliminary settlement. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -ENGLAND’S FIRST DEMAND GRANTED. - - -While England and Spain were preparing for war at home and calling -on their allies for support, their diplomatic representatives were -endeavoring to reach an understanding. As stated above, the British -Court had concluded to make no further effort to get satisfaction -through the Spanish ambassador at London, but had sent its own -ambassador, Fitzherbert, to treat directly with the Spanish Court. This -step was decided upon during the exciting days immediately following -the 1st of May. It was nearly the middle of June before Fitzherbert -reached Madrid. In the meantime the British chargé, Merry, had been -instructed to open the renewed negotiation by presenting to the Spanish -Court a memorial setting forth at length the English contention. Leeds -sent instructions for this on May 4.[291] - -Having received this communication from Leeds, Merry obtained an -interview with Floridablanca May 16. The Spanish minister was milder -than usual, but still suspected that England meant to use the matter -as a ground for quarreling. In an endeavor to remove this suspicion, -Merry, read to the Count his own secret and confidential instructions. -Floridablanca observed that if England was really not attempting to -force a quarrel the business might be amicably settled. In the evening, -after the interview, Merry sent to the Spanish minister a copy of the -memorial.[292] In a brief note accompanying it, he expressed great -anxiety to quiet the alarm, and suggested dispatching to London at once -a courier with pacific assurances from Floridablanca, if the Count felt -like giving such.[293] - -The British memorial declared that the last Spanish communication[294] -was unsatisfactory even as the transaction had been stated in the -former Spanish note.[295] No satisfaction had been offered for the -insult to the British flag, and the ground stated for releasing the -vessels was not justice, from the English standpoint, but ignorance -on the part of the English commanders and general regard for England -on the part of the Spanish officials. Neither could Great Britain -admit the Spanish claim to exclusive rights of sovereignty, commerce, -and navigation. Besides these reasons, additional information had -arrived[296] telling of more than one captured vessel. It also appeared -that the soil at Nootka had been purchased by a British subject and the -British flag hoisted thereon. Merry was-- - - to represent in the strongest manner to the Court of Spain that - His Majesty has every reason to expect from the justice and wisdom - of His Catholic Majesty not only the full and entire restitution - of all the said vessels, with their property and crews (or of as - many of them as shall, on fair examination of what can he alleged - on both sides, be found to have been British vessels, entitled as - such to His Majesty’s protection), but also an indemnification to - the individuals concerned in the said vessels for the losses which - they have sustained by their unjust detention and capture, and, - above all, an adequate reparation to His Majesty for an injury done - by an officer commanding His Catholic Majesty’s vessels of war to - British subjects trading under the protection of the British flag - in those parts of the world where the subjects of His Majesty have - an unquestionable right to a free and undisturbed enjoyment of the - benefits of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and also to the - possession of such establishments as they may form, with the consent - of the natives, in places unoccupied by other European nations. - -Assurances were given of pacific wishes on the part of England, but a -speedy and explicit answer was demanded.[297] - -In this memorial England renewed her demand for satisfaction for the -insult to her flag, and added a demand that Spain indemnify the owners -of the captured vessels. She also rejected absolutely the Spanish claim -to exclusive sovereignty by asserting England’s unquestionable right -to unoccupied portions of the coast in question. Incidentally it is -valuable as a declaration of Great Britain’s position on the question -of the rights of colonization. - -Two days after receiving this memorial Floridablanca answered -Merry’s note which accompanied it. He gave the pacific assurances -that the British agent had asked, but in general terms. In keeping -with his peaceful professions he proposed a mutual and proportionate -disarmament. He asserted that His Catholic Majesty knew of the capture -of only one vessel; and it had been trading illicitly, at the time, in -a place occupied by the Spanish.[298] - -On the following day Merry replied, expressing his satisfaction with -the pacific intentions of the Spanish Court. He said that he would -gladly dispatch one of the English messengers with the Count’s peaceful -assurances.[299] Fearing lest Floridablanca meant this informal note -as a reply to the British memorial of May 16, he gave the Spanish -minister to understand that he still expected a formal reply.[300] -The British messenger bearing the peaceful assurances left Madrid May -21[301] and arrived in London June 1. Since the reply contained nothing -indicating that Spain would grant the English demands, the armaments -were continued.[302] Another messenger from Merry arrived in London -ten days later with less pacific news. Floridablanca’s language to the -foreign ministers at Aranjuez showed that he still thought that England -was determined to break with Spain. He looked on the English King’s -message to Parliament as almost equivalent to a declaration of war. -England’s advices to all settlements abroad increased his conviction. -Her tone toward Spain he thought insufferable. He still desired peace, -but feared that Spain would be driven to the necessity of defending -herself. Not only had Floridablanca expressed himself thus to the -foreign ministers, but he had made an appeal for money, and the bankers -of Madrid had agreed to furnish some £4,000,000.[303] - -Floridablanca’s formal reply to the British memorial reached London -June 15. Merry had received it from the Spanish Court on the 4th of -the same month.[304] It declared that His Catholic Majesty would claim -nothing but what he could base on treaty rights, on the consent of -nations, and on immemorial possession. The discussions with the new -ambassador would turn on these points. If Spanish subjects had gone -beyond these rights they would be punished, and the injured parties -would be indemnified. Spain did not mean to carry her claim to all of -the South Sea, but only to “the Indian continent, islands, and seas, -which by discovery, treaties, or immemorial possession have belonged -and do belong to her by the acknowledgment of all nations.” The Spanish -King denied that Spain’s not having settled any particular spot was -a proof that it did not belong to her. Were this admitted, the Count -argued, any nation might establish herself on the dominions of any -other nation wherever there was not an actual establishment. This, he -said, would be absurd to think of. Satisfaction and indemnification -should rest on the question of right, which was to be settled by the -negotiation.[305] - -This review of the essential points of the two memorials shows that the -Courts were as far apart as ever. The conflicting colonial principles -were clearly stated, and each nation stubbornly persisted in its own -view. In his remarks on this communication Merry conceived that there -was little or no room left to expect that any change would occur in -the sentiments of the Spanish Court. He thought that the Spanish delay -had probably been occasioned by the fluctuating advices from France. -He could attribute the conduct of Spain to no other motive than a hope -that her being attacked by England might put France under the necessity -of engaging in the war.[306] - -Fitzherbert conducted the English negotiations from this point. His -record as a diplomat was already established. He had negotiated the -treaty of peace with France and Spain in 1783. The next four years he -had been envoy extraordinary to Russia. After that he had been for some -time chief secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland. He had also -been made a member of the privy council. He left London May 9[307] and -went to Paris, where he tarried for some time. His delay at this place -was due partly to sickness, partly to his being engaged in making some -representations to the French Court in connection with Fitzgerald,[308] -and partly to his awaiting written instructions from London to govern -him in his negotiations with Spain.[309] He reached Madrid June 9.[310] -The next day he wrote a note to Floridablanca, who, with the whole -Spanish Court, had gone to Aranjuez. This note announced his presence -and his intention of reaching Aranjuez the same evening. It also -inclosed his credentials signed by the English King.[311] - -The following day he had an interview with Floridablanca. Two days -later, June 13, he received his formal introduction to the King and -Queen.[312] - -In their interview of June 11 Fitzherbert and Floridablanca exchanged -views on the question in dispute. The former, conceiving that the -memorial given to Merry on June 4 must fall short of His Britannic -Majesty’s just expectations, urged the latter to give him a more -favorable communication. The latter insisted that the paper in question -contained the utmost that Spain ought to grant. He declared that -compliance with the British demand for satisfaction would invalidate -the Spanish claims to sovereignty, rendering further discussion -useless. Therefore the British demand and the Spanish claim, he -maintained, ought to be discussed at the same time. He asked that -Fitzherbert’s statements should be presented in writing. Consequently, -two days later the British ambassador sent a brief memorial presenting -the British demand in language which makes it seem plausible. -Stripped of its verbiage it declares that England desires a peaceable -settlement, but that there can be no further negotiation until Spain -shall have fulfilled three conditions: First, restored the vessels; -secondly, indemnified the injured parties; thirdly, given satisfaction -to the British sovereign for the insult offered to his flag. A -declaration that the Spanish King would grant these demands would be -accepted as ground for the negotiation.[313] - -After this first exchange of views with the Spanish minister, -Fitzherbert reported his observations to the British Cabinet. He -thought that Spain was bent on war, and was refusing satisfaction in -hope of inducing England to make reprisals which would serve as a -pretext for demanding French aid. As to her motive, he thought that -she certainly could not hope to regain Gibraltar or her West Indian -possessions; and it could not be to counteract French revolutionary -infection, for everything was quiet in Spain. He believed the real -cause to be Floridablanca’s suspicion that England had designs on -the Spanish colonies. The Spanish minister seemed to count little on -French aid, but to expect substantial help from the United States. Some -advances had been made to that power, and Carmichael, the American -chargé, was much caressed at Court. The American agent thought that his -Government would not be favorable.[314] A few days later, Fitzherbert -expressed his confidence that no encouraging communication had been -received from America. On the contrary, there had recently been marked -symptoms of coldness.[315] - -In answer to the British ambassador’s communication of June 13, -Floridablanca replied five days later that he could not consent to -the principles which it laid down. However, for the sake of peace, -he offered to make the declaration proposed, provided one of three -explanations be added: First, the question of insult and satisfaction -should be decided by the arbitration of a king of Europe, to be chosen -by England; or, second, no facts should be admitted in the subsequent -negotiation unless fully established by Great Britain; or, third, the -satisfaction should not prejudice the rights of Spain nor prevent her -from exacting equivalent satisfaction from Great Britain if it should -be found that she had a right to do so.[316] In spite of the evident -fairness of these proposals, they were not accepted. In reporting -them to the British Court, Fitzherbert suggested that he considered -them inadmissible. The English Cabinet seems to have agreed with him. -This makes it appear that England was afraid to submit her case to -the judgment of a third party, even though she had the privilege of -selecting the judge. Further, she seemed unwilling to confine the -negotiation to established facts, or to suffer the consequences in case -the negotiation should show her to have been in the wrong. It appears -that the English Court had decided to force from Spain once and for all -an acknowledgment of the British principle of colonization. Nothing -less would be accepted. It was this, and not simply justice, that she -demanded. - -For some time after this the British ambassador received no -communication from the Spanish minister. This was partially accounted -for by accident. On the same day that Floridablanca had written the -document last studied an attempt was made to assassinate him. He was -stabbed by a fanatical Frenchman. The wound was not serious. In letters -of June 24 and 28 Fitzherbert reported that the Count still refused to -see him on the pretense of indisposition, though he was transacting -other business. The Spanish Court had assumed a more pacific attitude -and seemed sincerely desirous of an accommodation. The delay was -continued in hope that a reply would soon be received from London to -the Spanish memorial presented to Merry June 4.[317] - -The pacific intentions of the Spanish Court were further shown by the -fact that orders had been given to the commanders of various ports to -treat British war ships, which were hovering in the neighborhood, as -they would be treated in a period of profound peace. Furthermore, in -an informal interview of July 1, Floridablanca said that he had been -busying himself on a plan for an ulterior arrangement which he thought -would entirely fulfill the views and objects of both parties.[318] At -a conference on July 10 the Count presented his plan. The essential -points were: First, Spain should retain exclusive possession of the -Northwest Coast up to and including Nootka; second, from Nootka to -the sixty-first degree the two Crowns should have common rights, -except that south of the fifty-sixth degree British influence should -not extend beyond a certain distance inland; third, Great Britain -should have the right of fishing in the South Sea and of landing and -erecting temporary buildings in unoccupied places, though no English -vessels should approach a Spanish settlement; and fourth, the mutual -rights should not be discussed and the mutual demands for satisfaction -should be waived, in which case Spain would pay the losses on ships -taken at Nootka. Fitzherbert declared the plan inadmissible, but said -that it might possibly be modified to make it acceptable.[319] This is -interesting as foreshadowing in some respects the final settlement. - -About the middle of July Fitzherbert received the English reply to the -Spanish memorials of June 4 and June 18. Extended instructions were -given to guide him in his communication to the Spanish Court. These had -been sent from London July 5[320]. In obedience to his instructions, -the British ambassador presented to the Spanish minister on July 17 a -new memorial defining the British views on the point of satisfaction. - -With the memorial he inclosed drafts of a proposed Spanish declaration -and a British counter declaration which would be acceptable to -His Britannic Majesty as affording the satisfaction demanded. The -memorial declared that the Spanish communications did not contain -the satisfaction demanded, nor was a plausible ground established -for refusing the demands. To justify these demands it was urged that -there had been no established possession of nor proved sovereignty -over the Nootka region which could have justified the seizure of -British vessels. For such justification there must have been actual -possession and exercise of jurisdiction which had been recognized by -other nations. From the representations of the Spanish Court itself, it -appeared that the Spaniards had undertaken the occupation only a few -days before the seizure of the vessels in question. English subjects -had for many years previously frequented the place and had traded with -the natives without interruption. Hence it was impossible for Spain to -maintain her claim to exclusive jurisdiction. The simple restoration -of the vessels was not sufficient. No reparation had been made for the -insult to the British flag. “In consequence, His majesty finds it -necessary to demand anew in terms most direct and least equivocal the -satisfaction already demanded, and which can not longer be deferred -without consequences which His Majesty desires ardently to avoid.” As -soon as this demand should be met England would be ready to treat with -reference to rights of territorial possessions, commerce, navigation, -and fisheries in that part of the world.[321] - -In his private instructions referred to above, Fitzherbert was told -that the giving of satisfaction must amount to an admission that Spain -was not in possession of an actual and known sovereignty at Nootka. -No discussion could take place on this point, it was declared, after -the satisfaction should be given. If Spain could prove her claim to -sovereignty, it must be done before the point of satisfaction should be -reached. If proved, it would remove the ground on which satisfaction -was demanded; but, it was added, no such proof could be adduced. Hence -satisfaction was insisted upon.[322] This was tantamount to saying that -the British Court would not be convinced, no matter what arguments the -Spanish Court might produce. Spain was just as confident that she did -possess sovereignty over Nootka as England was that Spain did not. The -Spanish Court had taken great care to collect evidence on this point. -A commission was sent to examine the archives of the Indies at Seville -for this purpose. Their report covered some 200 pages of manuscript. -It was a compilation of accounts of exploring expeditions, of royal -orders and decisions, of acts of the council of the Indies, and of -laws promulgated, all affecting that part of the world. Its purpose -was to show that Spain had always claimed and exercised the rights of -sovereignty over those regions and the right of excluding other nations -from her possessions in the South Sea.[323] The treaty of Utrecht was -repeatedly cited in the various memorials and letters as guaranteeing -Spain’s rights in the Indies as they had been in the time of Charles -II. The willingness of Spain to submit the matter to arbitration shows -that she had confidence in the justice of her cause. England’s refusal -to arbitrate indicates a lack of confidence. - -On July 22 Floridablanca replied to Fitzherbert’s communication of -five days before. He added little to what he had said in documents -already studied. He repeated the grounds on which Spain rested her -claim--grounds that were absolutely good from the Spanish standpoint. -He showed again the unreasonableness and absurdity, from the same -standpoint, of the English demands, and their contravention of -treaties. He assumed, not without cause, a tone of injured innocence, -and concluded that it was not worth while to extend further his -reflections on points so clear nor in demonstration of the rights of -Spain, since enough had been said already. The Spanish King had no -intention, he declared, of being dragged into a war over an academic -dispute. He agreed to give, first, such satisfaction as one of the -Kings of Europe, chosen by England as arbitrator, should think proper; -or, secondly, to give whatever satisfaction should be reciprocally -agreed upon, it being understood that such satisfaction should not -prejudice the rights of Spain to Nootka. He appealed to the honor and -justice of all nations to recognize the generosity of His Catholic -Majesty’s heart, since to avoid dragging Europe into war he would -sacrifice his own well-founded opinion, even though prepared to enforce -it by his superior armament.[324] Having led, or rather forced, the -Spanish minister to yield this much, Fitzherbert continued to press him -until he agreed to the declaration and counter-declaration, almost word -for word, as they had been dictated by the British Cabinet. They were -signed July 24, and are as follows:[325] - - DECLARATION. - - His Britannic Majesty having complained of the capture of certain - vessels belonging to his subjects in the port of Nootka, situated - on the Northwest Coast of America, by an officer in the service - of His Catholic Majesty, the undersigned counselor and principal - secretary of state to His Majesty, being thereto duly authorized, - declares in the name and by the order of His Majesty, that he is - willing to give satisfaction to His Britannic Majesty for the injury - of which he has complained, fully persuaded that His said Britannic - Majesty would act in the same manner toward His Catholic Majesty - under similar circumstances; and His Majesty further engages to make - full restitution of all the British vessels which were captured at - Nootka, and to indemnify the parties interested in those vessels - for the losses which they may have sustained, as soon as the amount - thereof shall have been ascertained. It being understood that this - declaration is not to prejudice the ulterior discussion of any right - which His Catholic Majesty claims to form an exclusive establishment - at Nootka. - - In witness whereof I have signed this declaration and sealed it with - the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790. - - COUNT FLORIDABLANCA. - - COUNTER DECLARATION. - - His Catholic Majesty having declared that he was willing to give - satisfaction for the injury done to the King by the capture of - certain vessels belonging to his subjects in the Bay of Nootka; and - Count Floridablanca having signed, in the name and by the order of - His Catholic Majesty, a declaration to this effect, and by which - His said Majesty likewise engages to make full restitution of the - vessels so captured and to indemnify the parties interested in - those vessels for the losses which they shall have sustained, the - undersigned ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of His - Majesty to the Catholic King, being thereto duly and expressly - authorized, accepts the said declaration in the name of the King; - and declares that His Majesty will consider this declaration, with - the performance of the engagements contained therein, as a full - and entire satisfaction for the injury of which His Majesty has - complained. - - The undersigned declares at the same time that it is to be - understood that neither the said declaration signed by Count - Floridablanca nor the acceptance thereof by the undersigned, in the - name of the King, is to preclude or prejudice, in any respect, the - rights which His Majesty may claim to any establishment which his - subjects may have formed, or may desire to form in the future, at - the said Bay of Nootka. - - In witness whereof I have signed this counter declaration and sealed - it with the seal of my arms at Madrid the 24th of July, 1790. - - ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT. - -The only difference of any importance between the drafts prepared -by the British Cabinet and the documents as finally signed is the -insertion in the Spanish declaration of the clause “fully persuaded -that His said Britannic Majesty would act in the same manner toward -His Catholic Majesty under similar circumstances.”[326] - -Fitzherbert wrote that on the first occasion of his paying his respects -to His Catholic Majesty after the declarations had been signed that -Monarch had deigned to converse freely concerning them, saying that -they had given him the sincerest pleasure, and that he considered -them “a happy earnest of the revival of that perfect harmony and good -understanding which it was his constant wish to maintain with the Crown -of Great Britain.” The ambassador reminded Leeds “that it is extremely -unusual for His Catholic Majesty to converse with foreign ministers -on any political topic, from which circumstance, joined to the known -sincerity of his character and the marked cordiality of air and manner -with which he accompanied this declaration, I can safely convey it to -your grace as the genuine expression of his feelings.”[327] - -These declarations settled merely the question of satisfaction which -England had demanded as the indispensable preliminary to a discussion -of the respective rights of the two Crowns on the Northwest Coast, -and particularly at Nootka. This simply repaired the insult which -England felt that she had suffered at the hands of Spain. They were -now ready to begin negotiations on a friendly basis for the settlement -of the present difficulty and the arrangement of a modus vivendi for -the future. News of the declarations reached London August 5, and -Grenville immediately notified the King, congratulating him on the -event, “which, as far as it goes, appears highly satisfactory and seems -to offer the most favorable prospect for such an ultimate termination -of the business as may correspond with Your Majesty’s wishes.”[328] In -a letter of the next day, Leeds praised Fitzherbert for the latter’s -success.[329] - -During the months of May, June, and July, while the negotiations that -have been studied in this chapter were in progress, both countries -continued their warlike preparations. Shortly after reaching Madrid -Fitzherbert reported a Spanish fleet of 30 sail of the line, though -poorly manned.[330] Baumgarten tells of the difficulty which the -Spanish Government experienced in getting sailors. He says that -they took refuge in the mountains to escape being pressed into the -navy.[331] On July 5 the British ambassador reported that the Spanish -fleet at Cadiz had been ordered to sea immediately, but he thought it -simply a show of vigor to inspire confidence.[332] Four days later he -received a note from Floridablanca explaining the movement. The King -of Spain, having learned that the English fleet had put to sea, gave -orders to his to move also, but to refrain from hostilities unless -attacked.[333] Two Spanish ships of war, with 1,000 soldiers, had been -sent to Porto Rico, since an attack was apprehended at that point.[334] -By the 20th of the same month Spain had 34 ships of the line and 16 -smaller craft at sea.[335] At the end of June an English fleet of 25 -vessels of the line had put to sea,[336] and had been joined early in -July by the Dutch fleet under Admiral Kinsbergen.[337] - -During all this time the armaments had been carried on in spite -of repeated offers and requests from Spain to disarm mutually. -As early as May 18, on receipt of the British memorial presented -two days before, Floridablanca had proposed to Merry mutual and -proportionate disarmament.[338] This was repeated in the Spanish -memorial of June 4.[339] The British Cabinet rejected the proposition. -In his instructions of July 5 Leeds cautioned Fitzherbert to be -particularly careful not to give the smallest encouragement to this -idea. His Majesty could not consent to discontinue preparations -until he should have secured freedom of commerce, navigation, and -fisheries in the districts in question.[340] After the declaration -and counter declaration had been signed, Floridablanca proposed -limiting the operations of the fleets to prevent the possibility of an -encounter.[341] On August 10 Campo, the Spanish ambassador in London, -repeated the proposals for disarming.[342] In reply, four days later, -Leeds gave assurance of England’s desire for peace, but declared that -Great Britain refused to disarm until the matter in question should -be settled for the future.[343] On the same day that Leeds gave this -decided answer to Campo in London, Floridablanca, in Madrid, had again -proposed to Fitzherbert a mutual disarmament. On September 10, Leeds -sent a formal reply, repeating what he had said to Campo on August -14.[344] - -Far from yielding to the Spanish proposals, Great Britain was -continuing her preparations and calling on her allies to do the same. -On the day that Leeds rejected Campo’s proposition to disarm, he -instructed Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, to ask that -Dutch preparations should not be relaxed. The national honor had been -satisfied, but the question of peace or war had not been settled. It -was requested that the Dutch fleet be ordered home for supplies and -reënforcements.[345] August 19 this request was granted, and England -was reassured of the support of Holland.[346] Baumgarten says that -early in September the English and Spanish fleets were both hovering -off Cape Finisterre, and were dangerously near to each other.[347] - -In his instructions to Auckland of August 14, referred to above, Leeds -had suggested that with a slight additional expense the Dutch and -English fleets could be used to give weight to the representations -already made by England for bringing about a pacification in the north -and east of Europe. The Dutch Government assented that the general -state of Europe, as well as the Spanish negotiations, warranted a -continuance of their armament. - -The relation between the Nootka Sound negotiations and the questions -uppermost in eastern and northern Europe is more than incidental. In -a dispatch of June 14 Theremin, the Prussian chargé at Madrid, wrote -his Government that in case of a breach between England and Spain the -latter would certainly join Russia and Austria.[348] The situation of -the powers was such that this would have been perfectly natural. Russia -and Austria were waging a common war against the Porte. The former -was also engaged in war with Sweden, and the latter had just been -deprived of her control in the Netherlands by the Belgian revolution. -England and the Netherlands were trying to quiet the storm and induce -all parties to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. -Prussia, the third member of the triple alliance, was not in harmony -with the other two in this matter. On the contrary, she was attempting -to increase the confusion in the hope of gaining something in the -turmoil. She was attempting to force Galicia from Austria that she -might restore it to Poland and receive as compensation Dantzig and -Thorn. She was fostering the Belgian revolution so that in the end she -might be able to return the Flemish provinces to Austria to compensate -that power for the loss of Galicia. She had actually made a treaty -with the Porte looking to this end, and had won the partial support of -Poland. If Prussia had succeeded in dragging the other two members of -the triple alliance with her into war and Spain had at the same time -broken with England on the Nootka question, it would inevitably have -thrown Spain into the arms of the imperial courts. The opponents, then, -would have been Prussia, England, the Netherlands, and Turkey, with -probably Poland and Sweden, against Russia, Austria, and Spain, with -possibly Denmark. France had for a time been thought of as a fourth -member of the proposed alliance between Spain and the imperial courts, -but the disturbances in that country had, for the present, made her -almost a negligible quantity. - -The conference at Reichenbach, which closed in August, affected -materially the state of Europe. The pacific efforts of England and the -Dutch Republic had already succeeded in curbing somewhat the warlike -passions of Prussia, and at this conference won a further triumph for -the peace principle by inducing Leopold of Austria to make peace with -Turkey. But Russia still persisted for a time in her war with the -Porte, and the English-Spanish dispute over Nootka Sound was almost as -far from settlement as ever.[349] - - - - -CHAPTER X. - -AMERICA’S RELATIONS TO THE CONTROVERSY. - - -Attention was called above to the repeated conferences between Pitt -and the South American agitator, Miranda. The fact was pointed out -that these conferences occurred at the critical periods of the -English-Spanish negotiations.[350] To repeat briefly: The first was on -February 14, just after the receipt of the first Spanish communication -on the Nootka affair, and before the British Court had formulated -its reply. Miranda had previously proposed his “grand plan” for the -advantage of England united with South America. At this conference -the plan was admitted to be beneficial. It was decided that it should -be put into execution in case of a war with Spain. In consequence of -Pitt’s request, Miranda presented, some three weeks later, a written -statement of the commercial and military resources of South America. -Again, on May 6, when the war excitement in London was at its highest, -the great minister and the South American had a conference on the same -subject. Pitt was on his way to a cabinet council and was taking with -him for consideration at the council the papers which Miranda had -presented. Grenville was present at the interview. The conversation was -on the prospect of war with Spain, and on the disposition of the people -of South America toward joining England in order to gain independence. -Various interviews took place at Pitt’s house while the Spanish -negotiations were in progress.[351] - -At some time during the year Miranda’s plan was presented in the form -of a draft of a constitution for the Spanish-American colonies after -they should have gained their independence. The proposed new empire -was to include all of South America, except Brazil and Guiana, and the -portion of North America west of the Mississippi River and south of the -forty-fifth parallel. Cuba was to be included as the key to the Gulf of -Mexico. The government was to be modeled in a general way on that of -Great Britain. The executive power was to be lodged in an inca, under -the title of “emperor,” with hereditary succession. The upper chamber -was to be composed of members nominated for life by the inca. Further -details of the government were worked out.[352] Miranda reminded Pitt -that the latter had seemed pleased with his ideas and had asked him to -leave the draft for further perusal. Plans for carrying on the war were -discussed, and the most favorable point for attack in South America was -considered. Means were devised for enlisting the interest of Jesuits -in Italy who were natives of South America and had been exiled by the -King of Spain. Accounts of recent insurrections in Spanish America were -given to show how ready the people were for emancipation. Later, a -detailed plan of attack was presented, with maps to illustrate it. At -Pitt’s request a plan of the defenses of Havana was left with him. - -This shows what extended plans the British Cabinet was considering. -It was to be expected that England would persist in her demands, for -if Spain would not yield there was much to expect from a war. Secret -agents at various places in America were collecting information -looking toward military operations to carry out these schemes. Besides -the overtures to the United States through Canada, to be discussed -presently, there were secret emissaries at Charleston and New York, and -information was being collected concerning New Orleans, the Floridas, -and the Mississippi country. The feasibility of marching troops from -New Orleans to Mexico was considered, and reports were made by men -who were familiar with the country. Some of the secret employees were -enthusiastic over the possibility of making a great English colony -out of the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley. Agents of the Creek -and Cherokee Indians were negotiating for a friendly connection with -England. The plan, as far as it had taken shape, seems to have been for -England to seize the heart of North America for herself and erect the -remainder of Spanish America into a client state.[353] - -As mentioned above, the British Cabinet sent instructions on May 6 to -Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada.[354] He had intended to visit -England during the summer, but was requested to remain and prepare for -the impending struggle. Besides strengthening his own dominions he was -to make friendly overtures to the United States.[355] In consequence -of these orders Lord Dorchester gave instructions on June 27 to Major -Beckwith, whom he had selected as the medium through which these -overtures should be made. Beckwith was given double instructions. The -one set was to guide his conversations in discussing public questions -in a general way. The other was secret and for his private guidance. -In the first he was instructed to say that the appearance of war with -Spain rendered it improbable that Dorchester would obtain his expected -leave of absence that season. He was to return hearty thanks for the -friendly approbation of Dorchester’s proposed trip through the United -States on his way to England. He was to express the hope that the -appearance of a war with Spain, or even its actual occurrence, would -not alter the friendly disposition of the United States toward Great -Britain. He was to mention the pretensions of Spain to absolute control -over navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and -discuss the evil effect on the United States if such control should -be conceded. These things he might say freely and publicly. But his -secret instructions were to guide him in conversing with those whom he -might select as proper persons in whom to confide. From them he was to -learn the disposition of the Government and the people toward England -if the affair with Spain were not considered. Then he was to discover -what difference a war with that country might make. He was to ascertain -whether in case war should occur they would be likely to join Spain, -and also to find what might induce them to join Great Britain in such -an event. In discussing the Mississippi question he was to be cautious, -but might suggest that England would probably assist in obtaining its -navigation. Naval and military movements should be watched.[356] - -Dorchester reported to the home office, on July 7, that Beckwith had -been hastily sent back to New York.[357] The latter did not have -to wait long to find the right man to converse with on the matter -contained in his secret instructions. On July 8, Hamilton, the -Secretary of the Treasury, made a memorandum giving the substance of a -communication from him. The major had spoken of the expected rupture -and had observed that all commercial nations must favor the views of -England. - - It was therefore presumed, should a war take place, that the United - States would find it to their interest to take part with Great - Britain rather than with Spain.[358] - -It seems that Hamilton communicated the matter to the President at -once, for in a letter reporting a later conversation with Beckwith he -says: - - I have made the proper use of what you said to me at our last - Interview [July 8].[359] - -Under date of July 12, Jefferson, the Secretary of State, prepared a -paper entitled, “Heads of a consideration on the conduct we are to -observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly -should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.” -As one would expect, Jefferson inclined toward Spain rather than -England. He brought out the danger to the United States if England -should get control of New Orleans and the neighboring territory. He -suggested the idea of joining Spain in guaranteeing the independence -of these countries instead of allowing Great Britain to take them. The -paper seems to have been prepared to serve as a guide in an approaching -interview with the Canadian agent, for he says, “As to England, say -to Beckwith,” etc.,[360] then gives the substance of what Hamilton -reported as having been said to that gentleman in an interview of July -22, at which Jefferson was present. - -In this interview the fact was brought to light that Beckwith was not -an authorized British agent, but that he had been sent by Dorchester -with the knowledge of the British Cabinet. Owing to his unofficial -character nothing of importance passed, but he was told that the United -States was ready to answer when it should be presented in an official -form. Hamilton had said that, at the time, he-- - - would not mean either to raise or repress expectations. … Something - was said respecting the probable course of military operations in - case of a war between Britain and Spain, which Mr. Beckwith supposed - would be directed toward South America, alleging, however, that this - was mere conjecture on his part. I hinted cautiously our dislike of - any attempt on New Orleans. - -Hamilton added in a note: - - The views of the Government were to discard suspicion that any - engagements with Spain or intentions hostile to Great Britain - existed; to leave the ground in other respects vague and open, so as - that in case of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain the United - States ought to be in the best situation to turn it to account in - reference to the disputes between them and Great Britain on the one - hand and Spain on the other.[361] - -Beckwith reported to Dorchester that Hamilton had said: - - We are perfectly unconnected with Spain, have even some points - unadjusted with that Court, and are prepared to go into a - consideration of the subject.[362] - -Scott, a member of the House of Representatives from western -Pennsylvania, told Beckwith that the prospect for a rupture made -most forcible impressions on all classes in the States. There was a -deep interest, he said, in the prospect of England’s possessing New -Orleans. The possible dismemberment of South America and the opening of -commerce with that continent was of interest, as well as the question -of navigation, commerce, and fisheries in the Pacific. He thought that -the moment was very favorable for England; and he saw no reason why the -United States should not assist her.[363] After news of the declaration -and counter declaration, signed at Madrid July 24, reached America, -Beckwith reported general dissatisfaction in the United States at the -prospect of pacification. Agricultural interests had expected that -the war would bring them high prices, and the shipping interests were -expecting a share in the English carrying trade and hoped for free -commerce with the Spanish West Indies. Friends of England thought that -she ought to take the opportunity for ruining the Spanish marine, which -they imagined to be an easy matter. British possession of New Orleans -was expected and desired, except by the Government which hoped to gain -from a neutral position when the settlement should come. At the same -time he reported another conversation with Hamilton. The Secretary had -said: - - We consider ourselves at perfect liberty to act with respect to - Spain in any way most conducive to our interests, even to the going - to war with that power, if we shall think it advisable to join - you.[364] - -These reports were doubtless colored by the desire of the Canadian -agent to send as favorable news as possible; but after allowing for -the exaggerations and the distortion of facts that would naturally be -expected, enough remains to show that the prospect of war was common -talk and that it was not altogether undesired. They also point to the -well-known fact that England had many friends in the United States and -some even in the highest official circles. - - * * * * * - -While Beckwith was holding these unofficial conferences with American -statesmen President Washington and his advisers were considering -what measures the Government should take in the event of hostilities -breaking out. Between the time of Beckwith’s first interview with -Hamilton and that of the more formal conference a fortnight later in -Jefferson’s presence the latter had written to Monroe concerning the -matter. He said that a war between England and Spain was probable. -Symptoms indicated a general design on Louisiana and the Floridas. -He spoke of the unpleasant position of the United States if England -should obtain them. Both England and Spain, he said, ought to know that -this country was in a condition for war.[365] Late in August President -Washington wrote concerning the matter to his chief advisers. He -thought that if Great Britain and Spain should come to arms New Orleans -and the Spanish posts on the Mississippi would be the first objective -point of the former. He asked what the answer to Lord Dorchester -should be in case he should request permission to march troops from -Detroit across the territory of the United States against the Spanish -posts, or in case it should be attempted without leave, which was most -probable.[366] - -On the day after that on which the President’s letter was written -Jefferson answered it. He thought that the United States should keep -out of the war as long as possible. If Lord Dorchester should make the -expected demand, it should either be silently ignored, or, if granted, -the same privilege ought to be offered to Spain. If the march should -be attempted without permission, the United States should allow it, -but protest against it, holding off from actual hostilities as long as -possible.[367] - -On the same day Chief Justice Jay answered the President’s question. -He considered, first, what the United States had a right to do from -the standpoint of international law, and, secondly, what was expedient -under the circumstances. Under the first head he concluded that, -except in cases of absolute necessity, or those in which it could be -shown that passage would be entirely innocent, the right of dominion -involved the right of excluding foreigners. Under the second head -he said that the probability of their being restrained by a refusal -ought to be considered. If they would probably proceed anyway, it -would be most prudent, he concluded, to consent. However, he added, -these remarks retain little force when applied to leading troops from -posts in the actual possession of England through territory under -English jurisdiction, though both the posts and the territory, of -right, belong to the United States. He admitted that it would militate -against the interests of the United States to have England occupy the -Spanish territories in question. The extent to which the principles of -the balance of power were applicable to the case in hand would merit -serious inquiry, he remarked, if the United States had only to consider -what might be right and just. But since the condition of the country -strongly recommended peace, and since it would be more prudent to allow -Great Britain to conquer and hold the Floridas than to engage in war to -prevent it, such inquiries would be premature.[368] - -On the second day after the President wrote, Vice-President Adams gave -his opinion. He said that the interests of the United States pointed to -neutrality as long as practicable. To preserve neutrality every wrong -must be avoided. Granting to England the privilege in question would -be an offense against Spain. Therefore, if asked, the answer should -be a refusal. If the measure should be undertaken without leave there -were two methods of procedure--the one was war; the other, negotiation. -Nations, he said, are not obliged to declare war for every injury -or even hostility; but tacit acquiescence would be misinterpreted. -Negotiation, then, was the only alternative. The fact that there had -been no exchange of ministers with England made this difficult. A -remonstrance might be made in either of two ways. It might be handed -by the American representative at Paris, Madrid, or The Hague to the -British ambassador at the same place, or a special messenger might be -sent to London to demand an audience, make remonstrance, and then take -his leave shortly if a minister were not sent to the United States.[369] - -Knox, the Secretary of War, sent his advice on the same day as the -Vice-President. He mentioned the danger to the United States if England -should get the Mississippi Valley. The true interests of the country -dictated neutrality. Spain, he said, would not enter the war unless -supported by France, and such support was not unexpected. If it should -be given, France would attempt to associate the United States with her -in the war. One of the parties might offer sufficient inducement to the -United States to enter the war, or they might be obliged to enter the -war on their own account to avert a greater evil.[370] - -More than two weeks later Hamilton sent a long discussion of the -question from the standpoint of national right and from the standpoint -of expediency. He concluded that if Great Britain should ask the -privilege, it would be best for the United States to agree to it and -then explain the matter to Spain. If troops should be marched across -without consent having been asked, it would be a cause of war and would -have to be resented or a great national humiliation borne. Hostilities, -he thought, should be delayed as long as possible.[371] - -While these precautionary measures were being considered by the -Government at New York, instructions were being sent to the American -diplomatic agents in Europe to guide them in case of a breach between -England and Spain. On August 11 Jefferson wrote instructions for Col. -David Humphreys, whom he was sending to Europe as a secret agent of -the United States. Humphreys was to go first to London, where he -should deliver instructions to Morris, the American informal agent at -that place. After delivering these he was to proceed by way of Lisbon -to Madrid, where he should deliver instructions to Carmichael, the -American chargé at the Spanish Court.[372] - -Morris had been watching the progress of the dispute between England -and Spain and had been in close touch and sympathy with French -representatives.[373] The letter which Humphreys carried instructed -Morris to intimate to the British Court in case of war that the United -States could not be indifferent to the prospect of England’s acquiring -territory in the adjoining Spanish possessions. The American Government -would contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. Due -balance on their borders was not less desirable to Americans than the -balance of power in Europe was to Englishmen. Jefferson wrote: “We wish -to be neutral, and we will be so if they will execute the treaty fairly -and attempt no conquests adjoining us.” Other dominions of Spain, he -declared, left them room for conquests. “If war takes place, we would -really wish to be quieted on these two points, offering in return an -honorable neutrality. More than this they are not to expect.” - -This was to be communicated only in the event of war having actually -taken place.[374] Without waiting for America to broach the subject, -the Duke of Leeds had sounded Morris on the American attitude toward -the extravagant claims of Spain. The latter answered carelessly without -giving any real information. He said that Spain was apprehensive of the -Americans and would sacrifice for their friendship. He intimated that -the navigation of the Mississippi might be offered.[375] A report was -current in London that Spain had actually made this concession to the -United States.[376] - -Jefferson was planning to use French mediation to secure from Spain the -opening of the Mississippi. He instructed Short, the American chargé at -Paris, to make advances for this purpose through Lafayette if war had -begun or whenever it should begin. France, he said, would be drawn into -the war only as an ally, hence she might reasonably insist that Spain -should do all in her power to keep the United States from the ranks of -the enemy.[377] - -In his instructions to Carmichael Jefferson suggested that, in case -of war, the people of Louisiana and Florida would favor England. He -also suggested that it would be best for both countries if Spain -would cede the Floridas and New Orleans to the United States in -return for a guaranty of the Spanish possessions on the west bank of -the Mississippi. These matters were being pressed warmly and firmly, -the Secretary said, under the idea that the war between Spain and -Great Britain would be begun before Carmichael could receive these -instructions, and such an opportunity must not be lost.[378] As stated -in the previous chapter, Fitzherbert believed that Spain had made -friendly overtures to the United States, but thought also that they -would not be cordially received. The Spanish representative at New York -presented a letter to President Washington on August 3 which doubtless -contained the overtures to which Fitzherbert referred.[379] Very late -in the negotiations Short thought that the Spanish ambassador at Paris -was about to offer through him a concession of territory to the United -States, but the conversation was interrupted before it reached the -vital point.[380] - -Humphreys delivered Jefferson’s instructions to Carmichael late in the -year. Carmichael thought that America might have obtained all of her -wishes if the Secretary’s letters had arrived early in the summer. At -that time-- - - The critical state of affairs induced the Comte de Floridablanca - to throw out those general assertions that we should have no - reason to complain of the conduct of this Court with respect to - the Mississippi, which gave rise to the report its navigation - was opened. That minister had intimations from del Campo of the - conferences between Mr. Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which - occasioned him to say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, “Now is the - time to make a treaty with England.” Fitzherbert availed himself of - these conferences to create apprehensions that the Americans would - aid his nation in case of war.[381] - -The circumstances studied in this chapter show that plans were being -formed which, if they had been carried out, would have profoundly -altered the subsequent development of the United States. They show -also that the attitude of the United States was looked upon as of -considerable importance, and influenced to a certain extent the -counsels of both of the contending parties. Incidentally it is seen -that the controversy afforded an opportunity for expressions of the -attitude of the American Government toward encroachment of European -nations on American soil. In the above quotations from Jefferson’s -letters may be found a very good statement of the principles that later -became known as The Monroe Doctrine. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - -THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE FAMILY COMPACT--EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATION. - - -The decree of the National Assembly, in May, ordering the armament of -14 vessels of the line has been studied in a former chapter. Attention -was there called to the fact that this step was taken before Spain had -made a formal demand for assistance under the family compact. It was -also noted that the formal demand was made in the middle of June, but -that the King, fearing the consequences, had delayed laying the matter -before the Assembly.[382] On August 2, more than six weeks later, a -letter from Montmorin informed the Assembly that Spain had demanded -in the most positive manner the execution of treaties in case the -negotiation with England did not turn out as desired. The King, hoping, -for a speedy settlement, had thought it wise to defer provoking a -discussion of the matter in the National Assembly; but in view of the -continued preparations of England he could delay no longer. Therefore -he had charged the writer to warn the Assembly and thought that it -would be prudent to increase the French armament. He laid before the -Assembly the letter of the Spanish ambassador of June 16, with copies -of the letters and documents accompanying it, recounting the history -of the dispute and the negotiations to the time when it was written. -The minister asked the Assembly to deliberate on the demand of the -Court of Madrid. All of the documents were referred to the diplomatic -committee.[383] - -On the next day, August 3, another letter from Montmorin notified the -Assembly that a courier from Madrid had brought news of the signature -of a declaration and counter declaration that gave hope of an amicable -settlement. Great applause greeted the announcement. The letter and -declarations were referred to the diplomatic committee. Dupont de -Nemours then announced that he had some observations to present on -the treaty with Spain known as the “family compact;” but to save the -valuable time of the Assembly he would bring them to the attention of -the Deputies by having them printed. Another Deputy announced that -he also would present some remarks on the Spanish demand in the same -manner. - -Dupont, in his observations on the treaty, first announced the -principles on which he proposed to examine it. It had been made, he -said, thirty years before, when political philosophy had made scarcely -any progress. It was antiquated and inconsistent in some respects, but -these defects did not prevent its being just and salutary in principle. -Some, he said, wished to break the treaty and abandon our allies, but -reason, common sense, and honor point to the contrary--that we should -confirm it. He declared that defensive and commercial arrangements -ought to be kept, but anything involving offensive warfare ought -to be struck out. He thought that it ought to be so modified that -instead of a family it would be a national compact. Wherever the word -“crown” occurred he would substitute the word “nation,” and instead of -“the Kings agree,” etc., he would have it read “the nations (through -their Kings).” He examined the treaty article by article and measured -each by these standards. Most of the stipulations he would preserve, -with slight modifications; a few he would strike out entirely. The -stipulation which provided that the mere requisition should be -sufficient to establish the obligation of the nation called upon to -furnish the aid was wholly untenable, he declared. The need should be -first established, and the nation called upon should have the right of -judging. Instead of limiting the alliance to the House of Bourbon, he -thought that all nations having similar sentiments ought to be admitted. - -The other Deputy, who presented the observations on the Spanish demand, -declared that Spain had been a faithful ally. She had taken up a -failing cause in 1761 and shared in the unhappy sacrifices of two years -later. She had aided in the American Revolution and had prepared to -assist in the trouble with the Netherlands in 1787. Gratitude would -command France to reciprocate; but he wished to appeal to reason and -not to sentiment. Spain and France were natural allies because of -common interests. The treaty of 1761, no longer a family but a national -compact, offered many advantages. Spain was still the most important -outlet for French commerce. France had profited more from the alliance -than Spain, hence was indebted to her. The financial embarrassment at -the time was serious, and a war would be dangerous, but even this ought -not to cause France to sacrifice honor. He thought that the armaments -ought to be continued and all the forces of France ought to be offered -to Spain. If this should be done, England would probably give way. The -war, if it should come, ought to have the support of all France and be -waged on new and noble principles.[384] - -It was more than three weeks before the diplomatic committee was ready -to report. The principal member of the committee was Mirabeau. He was -spokesman when the report was presented to the Assembly on August 25. -He began by saying that the peace was not likely to be disturbed; -that the territory in dispute between Spain and England belonged to -neither, but to the natives; that it was not worth the loss of blood -and treasure; that France, because of internal conditions, ought to -avoid war; and that there would soon be universal peace and no need of -allies. After giving these pacific assurances, he admitted that France -ought to change her political principles, but declared that this ought -not to be done suddenly. She could not remain isolated from the world. -The suspension of treaties would be perilous. All treaties made by -the King ought to be observed by the nation until they were annulled -or changed. He recited the history of Spain’s faithful observance of -the family compact; then asked whether it would be right for France -to annul such a solemn engagement at a time when Spain was threatened -by the same danger that she had three times warded off from France. -In view of the great English armament, self-interest obliged France -to strengthen her alliance with Spain. That would require a faithful -observance of the treaty. If England did not really desire war, but was -arming simply to conduct the negotiation more favorably, increasing -the French armament would doubtless delay the result. But if the -abandonment of French engagements should force Spain to make peace with -England more promptly, a great wrong would be done to French credit and -French commerce. If England desired war, then France ought to support -Spain with all her resources. For if England should force Spain to -succumb, France would be the next object of her ambition and vengeance. -It was not proposed, he said, to ratify the compact as a whole, but -only the defensive and commercial stipulations. He proposed to notify -the King of Spain that the alliance would be preserved, and at the same -time to refer the treaty to a committee for revision, after which it -should be renewed. - -The King of France was to open negotiations with the King of Spain at -once for this purpose. He also proposed that the fleet be raised to -30 ships of the line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels. -After a few short favorable addresses on the report the discussion was -postponed to the next day.[385] - -When the discussion was resumed on August 26 the report met with very -little opposition. There was a futile attempt, led by Pétion, to -postpone the decision until further information might be obtained. -L’Abbé Maury favored confirming the treaty as it stood, declaring, -rightly as events proved, that it would give England a great advantage -to leave the alliance so indefinite. Ricard considered 30 vessels too -small an armament and proposed increasing it to 45. Others favored his -idea and Mirabeau embodied it in his report. With this modification, -the decrees proposed were unanimously adopted by the Assembly. The -essential points were: First, defensive and commercial arrangements -with Spain were to be observed; secondly, negotiations were to be -opened with Spain for the purpose of renewing and perpetuating the -alliance; thirdly, the armament should be raised to 45 ships of the -line, with a proportionate number of smaller vessels.[386] - -On August 30 Montmorin informed the Assembly that the King had -sanctioned the decrees and would proceed at once to carry them out. -The minister for marine, he said, had already received orders for the -armament. Only 16 vessels would be fitted out at once, which, added -to the 14 already armed, would make 30. Preparations would be made to -complete the armament to 45 if that should become necessary.[387] On -September 1 Montmorin replied to Fernan Nuñez’s letter of June 16. He -told of the action of the Assembly and inclosed a copy of the decrees. -The King, he said, was taking steps to carry them out. The reason that -only 30 ships instead of 45 would be armed immediately was to avoid -the appearance of hostility to England. The French King hoped for a -peaceful settlement and reciprocal disarmament.[388] - -To one who did not scrutinize the decrees closely the action of the -Assembly seemed to be all that Spain could desire. If the support had -been tardy, yet it was enthusiastic. It seems that at heart most of the -Assembly really desired to support Spain and thought that they were -doing all that could be expected; but their irrepressible tendency to -theorize blinded them to the practical. Apparently they did not realize -that their proposal to modify the treaty at such a critical time -nullified it as far as any immediate assistance under it was concerned. -It seems possible that if Mirabeau had stood firmly for ratifying -the treaty as it was he might still have carried the Assembly with -him.[389] - -The French Government was anxious regarding the effect that the action -of the Assembly might have on England. The French view of England’s -conduct was well expressed in a letter from Montmorin to Luzerne, the -ambassador from France to the English Court. After remarking that -the British Court would probably be astonished at the decrees, he -explained that the step was necessary to sustain the honor of France. -It had not been taken precipitately, he said, but had been delayed -as long as possible, even provoking complaints from Spain. When it -was learned that Spain had given satisfaction to England, and still -the latter refused to disarm, the French Government was compelled to -suppose that the British Cabinet had some ulterior purpose and was not -certain that it did not concern France. Either England did not wish to -terminate the Nootka affair justly or she had other objects, for which -this was to furnish a stepping-stone. If it was a question of Spain, -France was interested in saving her ally; if the French themselves were -concerned, argument was unnecessary. Luzerne was to use these arguments -with Leeds and Pitt. He was also to use confidentially the fact that -the Assembly had decreed a larger armament than the Government had -asked. This, Montmorin remarked, ought to make an impression. Luzerne -might again suggest French intervention, but with much circumspection, -since it had been refused before.[390] On the day after writing the -above private instructions for the ambassador, Montmorin asked him to -assure the English King that the armaments were purely precautionary -and had no object except those designated by the Assembly. The French -King hoped for a peaceable settlement. He had been pleased with the -declaration and counter-declaration, but would have been more pleased -if a proportionate disarmament had followed, or at least an agreement -not to increase the armaments.[391] - -Gower, the British ambassador at Paris, had promptly expressed to -Montmorin his surprise at the action of the Assembly. He reported on -August 27 to his Government that Montmorin was surprised also, and had -told him that orders would be given to commission more ships, “but -that it would be done (this he said in the utmost confidence) avec -le plus grande lenteur.”[392] A dispatch of the next day hinted that -Spanish money might have influenced the Assembly.[393] On September 1 -instructions were sent from London telling Gower to renew the English -assurances of friendliness for France, but to observe that it would be -impossible for the harmony to continue if France should support Spain. -He was to represent that any aid or encouragement to Spain would be a -cause of umbrage to England, since it would make a just settlement more -difficult.[394] On September 4 Gower presented a memorial demanding -an explanation of the armament.[395] Montmorin’s letter to Luzerne of -August 28, referred to above, was presented to the English Court on -September 7.[396] On September 10, in reply to Gower’s of the 4th, -Montmorin referred the English Court to a letter written September 9 -to Luzerne, which the latter would present. For some reason Luzerne -delayed handing this to the British Court, and on September 21 Gower -was instructed to demand a formal reply to his memorial. When this -demand reached Paris, Montmorin was out of the city. Having returned, -he answered, October 4, that he did not understand Luzerne’s delay. He -declared that France had no wish to influence the negotiations, but in -case the matter could not be amicably settled she might be compelled -to support Spain. Before this reached London Gower had been instructed -to demand that the French fleet make no move to join the Spanish. On -October 14 Montmorin agreed that no movement should be made until -England should have received a reply from Spain to the ultimatum which -the British Court had sent a few days before.[397] Hugh Elliot was sent -secretly as a special English agent to argue with the French Court -against supporting Spain. He met members of the diplomatic committee -and thought, at least, that he had converted them to the English view. -W. A. Miles coöperated with Elliot in this undertaking. Only obscure -and mysterious references to their mission are extant, and many -curious speculations have been made concerning it.[398] - -Before news reached Madrid of the action of the National Assembly -negotiations had begun for a final settlement of the Nootka question. - -The declaration and counter declaration signed late in July had been -accepted by England as affording the satisfaction demanded. This had -opened the way for a pacific discussion of the respective rights to -Nootka and the neighboring coast.[399] On September 8 Fitzherbert -presented to Floridablanca the first projet of a treaty. It had been -formulated in London three weeks earlier and had been sent with -instructions to the British ambassador. These instructions declared -it to be the purpose of the British Government to avoid requiring -Spain to make any mortifying renunciation of rights, but at the same -time the stipulations were to be so worded that they would not imply -an admission of the Spanish claims by the British Government. It was -impossible for His Majesty to recognize them, either directly or -indirectly. They were merely a matter of pride with Spain, it was said, -and were really a source of weakness rather than of strength.[400] - -When Fitzherbert submitted the projet he inclosed with it extended -observations on each article. The preamble, as it had been worded by -the British ambassador, declared a desire to form a convention which -would settle the present differences and avoid such disputes for the -future. On this he observed that the Court of London thought that would -be the best means of settlement which, without formally pronouncing on -the opposing pretensions, should regulate the respective positions of -the two Crowns for the future. If British subjects could be assured -of the free exercise of their rights in the Pacific, the English King -would not be reluctant to establish all possible rules to prevent -illicit commerce with Spanish possessions. The Court of London was -persuaded that a Cabinet so wise as that of Spain could not seriously -have advanced such vast pretensions. - -The first article declared that British subjects should be replaced in -possession of the ships and lands of which they had been deprived at -Nootka by a Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789.[401] The -observations on this gave the English arguments against the claim of -Spain to exclusive dominion over the coasts in question. The English -Court could not admit the justice of an exclusive sovereignty over -so vast a coast, which since its discovery had without interruption -been frequented by British subjects and by those of other nations as -well. Spain claimed only as far as the sixty-first degree, conceding -to Russia the portion beyond. Fitzherbert insisted, with a good deal -of sagacity, that the very principle of this division demonstrated -the inadmissibility of the Spanish pretension. If Russia had acquired -rights to the coast beyond the sixty-first degree in virtue of the -establishments which her subjects had formed there, how, he asked, -could other nations be denied the opportunity of making establishments -in like manner on the parts of the coast situated below this degree and -not already occupied? As to the Spanish claim to priority of discovery, -he implied that it could be disproved, though he did not disprove it. -However, he insisted that discovery alone, without being followed up -by actual occupation, could not be admitted as furnishing a right to -possession which could operate to the exclusion of other nations. -England did not claim exclusive jurisdiction, he said. What she wished -was a reciprocal assurance of free access for both nations to the new -establishments formed or to be formed by the one or the other. - -The second article, in keeping with the statement just made, declared -that between certain limits, to be named later, the subjects of -both Crowns should exercise their commerce without hindrance in the -establishments of either. - -The third article declared that England would employ efficient means -to prevent such access being made a pretext for illicit commerce with -Spanish colonies. With this in view it was stipulated that between -certain limits, to be named later, British subjects should make no -establishments, and that they should not approach within a certain -distance of the coast between these limits. Fitzherbert observed -that the purpose of this was to assure to Spain the rights of domain -over all places in actual possession of her subjects. It was desired -to make this as favorable to the Spanish pretensions as possible. -He proposed as the northern limit of Spanish exclusive dominion the -thirty-first degree. This would have left to Spain not quite all of -Lower California. He suggested that the boundary should run east on -this degree to the Colorado River, follow that river to its source, and -then run northeast to the nearest point on the Missouri. Spain should -have exclusive dominion of the coast from the above-mentioned parallel -southward to within about 10° of Cape Horn. In his private instructions -Fitzherbert was authorized to yield a little if necessary. He might -accept as the northern limit the fortieth parallel from the Pacific to -the Missouri. He thought that the distance within which British ships -should not approach ought to be 5 leagues. On this point his private -instructions allowed him to yield to 8 or even 10 leagues. - -The fourth article provided that everywhere else in the Pacific the -subjects of both Crowns should enjoy freedom of navigation and fishery, -with the privilege of landing on the coasts to trade with the natives -or form establishments in unoccupied places. It was thought, he said, -that this would be the best way to prevent injurious competition in -making settlements. This principle was to be applied to the Nootka -settlement also, when that should have been returned to Great Britain. -On this, he said, no further observations were necessary. It was a -natural consequence of the foregoing stipulations. This would have -meant, had it been conceded, that England and Spain would have had -equal rights to all of the coast north of Lower California. The fifth -article referred to making establishments in South America, and was not -considered essential by the British Cabinet. The sixth referred to the -exchange of ratifications.[402] - -Soon after the presentation of this projet the action of the French -Assembly became known at Madrid, and its influence must next be -considered. - -A letter from Madrid of September 10 to the “Gazette de Leide” told -that a courier had just arrived from Paris with the news that a -decree had been rendered by the National Assembly for a provisional -maintenance of the family compact and for increasing the armament. -This had greatly decreased the inquietude over the English demands. -A rumor had arisen that these demands would overthrow many of the -long-established principles of Spain, for they were based on English -pretensions to a right of free navigation and commerce in the South Sea -and on the western coast of America. The expectation of such powerful -aid had produced an agreeable sensation.[403] This was the effect on -the popular mind. - -Its influence on Floridablanca was very different. In submitting to a -council of the principal ministers of state the English projet of a -treaty studied above, he said that it was advisable to consider first -the relations of Spain with the principal courts of Europe. He began -with France. In referring to the portion of the decree that limited the -treaty to “defensive and commercial arrangements,” he remarked that -this expression was capable of many interpretations and equivocations. -He noticed further that even the declaration for this partial -maintenance of the treaty was made subordinate to the expression -“taking all proper precautions to preserve the peace.” If, he declared, -the deciding on what were proper precautions be left to the Assembly, -composed of so many members and with such extraordinary ideas, there -was no hope that their decision would accord with Spain’s ideas of -preserving the peace. That body might not consider the Nootka dispute -a casus foederis. It might decide that Spain was to blame, or that she -had motives of aggression, or that she had not admitted all of the -means of conciliation proposed by England. The desire of the Assembly -to negotiate a new treaty on national lines was ominous, he said. -They, of course, wished to modify or explain the old. This new system -of the sovereignty of the nation might present difficulties. The body -asserting it, the National Assembly, was itself a usurper. Referring -to the provision for arming 45 ships of the line, he called attention -to the fact that the reason assigned was not that of supporting Spain. -The decree declared that the armament was in consideration of the -armaments of various nations of Europe, and was for the security of -French commerce and French colonial possessions. Finally, he declared, -even if the Assembly really wished to aid Spain it was doubtful whether -it could do so, on account of the lack of funds and on account of the -disorders of the country. If aid should be sent, the insubordination -of the French sailors would be in danger of contaminating the Spanish -and would impede their own usefulness. He concluded that there was very -little hope of aid. Only in case that England attacked France would -there be any reasonable hope of assistance. - -After discussing the unhappy relations with France, the minister took -up each of the other nations in turn. Prussia and the Netherlands -were allies of England, so must be counted as enemies. Of the small -States, the Courts of Lisbon, Naples, and Turin could be counted on as -friendly neutrals. All that could be hoped for from Turkey, Tripoli, -and Algiers was that they would not injure Spain; but not so with -Tunis and Morocco, which were actually threatening and were probably -being reckoned on by England. The Court of Vienna was not open to new -enterprises of war or new alliances. Sweden would not be a safe ally, -and besides would demand a subsidy. Denmark also would have to be -subsidized, and then would join only in case that Russia entered also. -The latter was already engaged in war with Sweden[404] and Turkey, and -was being menaced by England and Prussia. In the absence of money and -support she would have to yield. If Spain had a full treasury to open -to Russia and would enter a war against England, engaging her Baltic -fleet, there was no doubt that Catherine II would form an alliance. But -Spain had not the treasury and was not in a position to undertake a -war for the benefit of Russia. If, however, Spain could not honorably -avoid war and should be attacked, some arrangement with Russia for -reciprocal aid would be useful. Steps had been taken with that in view, -but nothing definite had been done. The United States would be useful -allies, since they could harass English commerce and threaten Canada. -They had been sounded and seemed not unfavorable. But they would desire -the navigation of the Mississippi, which would open to them a door for -contraband trade with Mexico. And besides this they might in the end be -enabled to insist on the boundary of Florida which they had unjustly -arranged with England, usurping a large part from Spain. - -After considering the foreign relations of Spain, Floridablanca -reminded the ministers that they ought also to reflect on internal -affairs--the army, the navy, the treasury, and economic conditions. The -army was weak, he said, but could soon be increased as much as would be -necessary in a maritime war. The navy was well equipped at the time, -but provision would have to be made for reënforcements and supplies. -All of this would occasion much expense, and the treasury was scarcely -sufficient for peace. It would be necessary to have recourse to credit. -Bad harvests and weak administration of justice, he said, had increased -the cost of provisions. New taxes could not be imposed without causing -resistance, especially in view of the evil example of France. - -These reflections on the conditions of Spain at home and abroad, the -Count said, would have to be kept in mind in considering the plan for -a convention which England had proposed. On the other hand, they must -not lose sight of the loss that would be caused to the rights of Spain -in the two Americas. They must remember the danger to Spanish commerce -and navigation and to the quietude of the colonial establishments. -They must also consider the evil example that would be given to other -nations by a concession to Great Britain, as well as “the incentive -to England to increase her pretensions and exact other condescensions -if we enter easily into the first.”[405] From these reflections it is -evident that Floridablanca had decided to yield to England, but with at -least a show of resistance. - -Such a communication from the prime minister to the Council of -State would lead one to infer that the Spanish Court was about to -desert the French alliance, and was willing to sacrifice something -for the friendship of England. But if this is only an inference the -communications with the English ambassador at about the same time leave -no doubt of the fact. At a conference on September 13 Floridablanca -declared to Fitzherbert that His Catholic Majesty regarded the National -Assembly with the utmost horror. He was extremely averse to adopting -the kind of treaty proposed by that body. He feared for the influence -on his own authority that a recognition of the French Assembly would -have. If, however, England should press too hardly in the present -conjuncture, the Count declared, Spain would be compelled to accept the -alliance of France on any condition. But if an accommodation could be -speedily arranged, His Catholic Majesty intended to reject the treaty -proposed by the French Assembly and to establish an intimate concert -and union with England. The Count informed the British ambassador that -he had submitted the latter’s projet and observations to the Council -of State. That body had decided that it would be necessary to send to -America in order to locate definitely the northern and southern limits -of the Spanish settlements as proposed. Since this would delay the -settlement of the Nootka affair, he suggested the immediate conclusion of -a preliminary agreement, which would secure to Great Britain by general, -but sufficient, stipulations, the objects that she had in view. This -would put a stop to the armaments, give time to arrange a system of union -between Spain and England, and allow His Catholic Majesty to disengage -himself entirely from France.[406] - -At this conference, on September 13, Floridablanca had said that -he would present a plan for the temporary settlement which he had -suggested. Fitzherbert had found it best in his dealings with the -Spanish Court to be first on the ground. Consequently on the following -day he sent to the Count a projet for the proposed temporary agreement. -On the same evening Floridablanca presented his plan in the form -of a counter-projet. The next day, September 15, they held another -conference to consider the plans. The English ambassador labored in -vain to induce the Spanish minister to admit some alterations in the -latter’s plan, so that it would be acceptable to the British Court. -The Count insisted that he had conceded all that his colleagues and -the King would allow him to grant. He earnestly requested Fitzherbert -to transmit it to the Duke of Leeds in its existing form. He felt -confident that the terms would be accepted by the Court of London. As -a means of shortening by some weeks the continuance of the present -expensive armaments, he would send instructions authorizing Campo, the -Spanish ambassador at London, to sign it in case His Britannic Majesty -should approve it.[407] Since neither of these plans was accepted, it -is not necessary to study their terms in detail. - -This shows the influence that the action of the French Assembly had on -the relations of the three countries. In view of it, Spain despaired -of getting any assistance from France, and, further, it promised to -be the occasion for a rearrangement of alliances, Spain breaking the -traditional union with France and arranging an intimate alliance with -England.[408] - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - -ENGLISH ULTIMATUM--SPANISH DEFIANCE. - - -In the middle of October the “Gazette de Leide” printed a letter from -Madrid, dated September 24, saying: - - We are assured that the negotiation with England is in a good way - and is about to terminate in a friendly manner.[409] - -This was written a few days after the Spanish Court had decided to -abandon the family compact and form an intimate alliance with England -as studied in the last chapter. The next issue of the same paper -printed a letter from London, dated October 12, which had a very -different tone: - - The warlike appearances have greatly increased in the last eight - days. The next dispatches from Fitzherbert, replying to the last - English demand, will probably decide for peace or war. On our side - all preparations for a rupture have already been made.[410] - -This was written a fortnight after news had reached London of -Spain’s proposed change. Instead of receiving the friendly advances -of the Spanish Court in the spirit in which Floridablanca hoped, -and apparently expected, the Court of St. James accepted them as an -announcement that the French alliance had failed, and an acknowledgment -that Spain was at the mercy of England. This is really what they -meant. Instead of following Spain’s example and giving up some of -her pretensions, England took advantage of Spanish helplessness and -gave Spain ten days to decide whether she would accept war in the -face of almost insurmountable difficulties, or peace with humiliating -concessions. Much discontent had arisen in England at the length -to which the negotiation was being drawn out. It was considered -inconsistent with the decisive tone at the beginning. The object to -be gained was thought to be hardly worth such an expensive armament -continued for so many months. The ministry was being severely -criticised, and felt the necessity of forcing a decision.[411] - -Although feeling keenly the criticism of the armament, yet the -Government was unwilling to disarm until Spain should have yielded. -On September 10, in consequence of the repeated requests from Spain -for a mutual disarmament, Leeds directed Fitzherbert to represent to -Floridablanca that, with every wish for an amicable adjustment, it did -not appear to the British Government expedient to disarm until such -adjustment should be secured.[412] For the same reason the ministry was -unwilling to accept any temporary arrangement, such as Floridablanca -had suggested, which would postpone the final settlement to a later -date. Consequently, on October 2 two drafts of a treaty were sent to -Fitzherbert. They contained substantially the same terms except that -one provided for the definite demarkation of the limits of Spanish -exclusive sovereignty, and the other did not. These embodied Great -Britain’s ultimatum. Fitzherbert was to give the Spanish Court ten days -in which to decide on an answer. If at the end of that time an answer -had not been received the ambassador was to quit Madrid. - -After sending the ultimatum the British Court redoubled its energies -in preparing for war. One is almost led to believe, from the vigor -displayed, that war was desired and that the ultimatum was prepared -with the deliberate intention of forcing a breach. In a letter of -October 22 Leeds asked Auckland, the British ambassador at The Hague, -to communicate to the Government of the Republic the probability -of a rupture. He expected in a few days to send copies of all the -correspondence relating to the discussion that Auckland might lay -them before the Dutch Government. Although it might happen, he said, -that England would be obliged to commence the hostilities, yet he had -no doubt that every circumstance would convince mankind that “Great -Britain was not the aggressor in the war which may, in a few days, -disturb the general tranquillity.” After speaking of the cordiality of -the Dutch Government, he continued: - - It will also, I trust, be understood in Holland how material it - is to enable us to act with vigor in the outset. I therefore hope - that there will be no difficulty in furnishing some naval succors - before the expiration of the two months stipulated. It would be to - be wished, if possible, that a detachment be sent immediately on the - news of hostilities, and that it should amount to 8 ships of the - line and 8 frigates. If, however, so much can not be obtained, even - a less number will be a material object.[413] - -A notion of the popular view of the impending war may be gleaned from a -letter written by Storer to Auckland on the same day that the secretary -for foreign affairs wrote the one just studied. Storer said that all -of the officers were in high spirits at the prospect of a voyage to -Mexico. He thought that the Nootka affair was merely a pretext for a -war that had been previously determined upon. He said: - - Pitt is tired of peace. He bullied France so effectually three years - ago[414] that he is determined to try the same thing with Spain. - -He thought that the negotiators themselves did not know what would -happen.[415] If the British ministers were not actually trying to force -a war, it is, at least, evident that they were willing to accept it -should it come; and that they were not willing to make any considerable -concessions to preserve peace. - -The ultimatum, with instructions for his private guidance, reached -Fitzherbert October 12. He was told that Floridablanca’s proposal for a -temporary agreement was not admissible since it would leave the matter -open to a subsequent discussion. It was important that it should be -settled at once. If Floridablanca’s proposal had not been accompanied -by assurances that indicated a sincere desire for accommodation with -England, it would have been doubtful, he was told, whether anything -could have been hoped from a further continuance of the negotiation. -The prospect for a speedy settlement and the chance for dissolving -the family compact compensated largely for the inconvenience of -further delay, but that delay could be only for a few days. The -Count’s committing himself on points of so much delicacy indicated -that the Spanish Court had determined to go a considerable length. -His language respecting France was consistent with his character. -The temporary arrangement proposed by him admitted the British claims -in general terms, but the indefiniteness of its terms would leave -ground for disputes. Fitzherbert was to remind the Count that he -had, in principle, admitted the justice of the British claims. The -present articles, he was told, did no more than to secure definitely -those rights. Their rejection would be considered as a proof either -that Spain was not sincerely desirous of an accommodation or that -she was unwilling to grant distinctly the security which the Spanish -minister had argued to be in fact contained in the articles which he -had suggested. The question as to security of navigation, commerce, -and fisheries in that part of the world depended on whether Spain -did or did not insist on her exclusive claim to the continent in -question and the seas adjacent. This could be decided as well at one -time as another. The question of restitution should depend on whether -Spain rested her case on her pretended exclusive sovereignty or prior -discovery, or whether she could prove that she had actual occupation -of Nootka prior to the time when lands were purchased and buildings -erected there by British subjects.[416] The only matter that could -afford an excuse for delay was the determination of limits. Such an -article would seem to be desirable to both sides, but His Britannic -Majesty would not object seriously to the omission of such demarkation. -The great expense of maintaining the armament ready for service and the -just expectations of the public could not admit of further delay in -coming to a decision on the question of peace or war. Fitzherbert was -to communicate this fact to Floridablanca in the least offensive but -the most explicit manner possible. Ten days was considered a sufficient -time for the Spanish answer. - -On the question of disarming in the event of an amicable settlement, -Leeds suggested that mutual confidence would be a stronger security -than any formal stipulations. England did not wish to reduce to a -peace establishment at once, on account of the French armament and -because of the fact that Russia seemed unwilling to adopt a moderate -policy toward Turkey. It was incumbent on the allies to prevent the -dismemberment of Turkey.[417] - -On October 13, the next day after receiving the above instructions -and the projets of a convention accompanying them, Fitzherbert had a -conference with the Spanish minister, at which the latter’s language -led the former to doubt the possibility of an amicable settlement. At -an interview on the following day the British minister presented parts -of the drafts of the ultimatum. The Count’s reception of these was so -unfavorable that Fitzherbert thought best to warn all of the British -consuls in Spain of the prospect of an immediate rupture. He wrote to -his home Government that it seemed impossible to obtain a convention -with a demarcation of limits. That no means of effecting a pacification -might be left untried, Fitzherbert delivered to Floridablanca on -October 15 a translation of the entire projet without the demarcation -of limits. The Count’s reply of the next day was still in terms -extremely wide of the English proposals, but it revived Fitzherbert’s -hopes of engaging the Spanish minister by degrees to accede to His -Britannic Majesty’s demands.[418] - -In this reply of October 16 Floridablanca said that there were -considerable difficulties in the way of agreeing to the English projet. -He submitted some observations justifying some small but substantial -changes which he had suggested. He remarked that the British projet, -in demanding that the buildings and lands should be restored to the -British subjects, assumed that they had once possessed them. He -declared that this assumption was untrue; that the British subjects -had only been attempting to make an establishment, from which the -Spanish commander had prevented them. If they had ever bought land, as -pretended, they had failed to take possession of it. - -Before examining Floridablanca’s observations further it may be well -to remark that this was the point of fact on which it was impossible -for the two Courts to agree. Each relied on the statements made by its -own subjects and these statements were conflicting. Meares told of his -purchase of land and his erection of a building thereon in 1788 in such -a manner as to lead the British Cabinet to believe that he had formed -a substantial English settlement, and that the establishment was still -there in the spring of 1789 when Martinez arrived. On the other hand, -Martinez’s account showed that when he arrived at Nootka there were no -evidences of any British establishment, but that the expedition under -Colnett, which arrived two months later, came to form an establishment. -Neither was wholly right nor wholly wrong.[419] - -Floridablanca said that it was very difficult and almost impossible for -Spain to consent that British subjects should land in unoccupied places -to trade with the natives and form establishments. Places without a -substantial Spanish occupation, he said, might be found almost anywhere -along the coast of America. This clause, he said, ought to be omitted -from the projet. Fitzherbert had proposed that British vessels should -not approach within 10 leagues of places occupied by Spain. The Count -insisted that the distance was too short. Instead of the expression, -“occupied by Spain,” he would substitute the expression, “belonging to -Spain.” With his observations the Spanish minister submitted a counter -projet which embodied them. In his letter accompanying these documents, -Floridablanca said that he had proposed a special junta to consider -the English propositions. However, if Fitzherbert would agree to the -Spanish counter projet, he would venture to propose it to the King -and see if the matter could not be settled before the meeting of the -junta.[420] - -The Spanish minister had decided that Spain would have to yield to -the English demands. He was directing his efforts toward an attempt -to induce the British ambassador to modify those demands so that they -would give as little offense as possible to Spanish pride. But other -Spanish officials were not so ready to yield as the prime minister was. - -Fitzherbert did not accept the count’s terms. He insisted on the -British projet as it stood. The special junta was summoned. It -was composed of eight of the principal ministers, not including -Floridablanca. The order naming the members was dated October 19. -The next day a note requested them to hasten, for the ambassador was -very urgent. Sessions were held on the 21st, 22d, 24th, and 25th. The -English projet was examined article by article. - -The findings of the junta furnish an excellent notion of the feeling -of Spaniards respecting the dispute. It was declared that Martinez’s -conduct at Nootka had not been contrary to international law nor an -insult to the English flag. What he had done was to prevent the forming -of an establishment in a place belonging to the Spanish dominions, in -which, by virtue of treaties made before all Europe and guaranteed -by England herself, no foreign disembarkation was permitted without -a just motive, and much less the forming of military or commercial -establishments. Even granting that the proceedings of Martinez had -been culpable, and, by a distortion of ideas, that the resistance to -a usurpation could be considered an insult, Spain had already given -England such satisfaction as was compatible with her dignity. The -increasing of the British pretensions while the Spanish were being -moderated showed that the Nootka affair was only a mask to cover -England’s hostile designs of taking advantage of the revolution in -France to attack the divided House of Bourbon. - -Referring to a clause in the British projet providing for the return -of any vessels that might have been seized since April, 1789, the -conclusions of the junta declared that this showed England’s design of -sending new expeditions. They would not limit themselves to fisheries -nor to trading with the natives. They intended to form fortified -establishments and construct vessels there to carry on trade with -all of New Spain. Their first aggressions would lead to others. The -weak and extended Spanish dominions afforded opportunities for their -activity. There were many places that Spain had not been able and -probably never would be able to people. The English pretension was -the more irritating since it extended also to all the coasts of South -America. If Spain should grant their demands she might expect in the -end to surrender to them all of the commerce of Peru and New Spain. - -The English offer of not allowing their subjects to approach within 10 -leagues of any place occupied by Spain was useless, the junta declared, -since they demanded the privilege of disembarking in all unoccupied -places. By this means they could approach insensibly to those that were -occupied. If the Spanish governors should attempt to prevent them, it -would lead to disputes and to new negotiations which would afford new -opportunities for aggressions. They would finally take all of these -countries from Spain. - -The English assumption of rights in South America was branded as an -infamous artifice. Although Spain had for three centuries been in -exclusive and peaceful possession of all South America, the English -were now pretending that they had equal rights to unoccupied places. -Appealing directly to the King, they said: - - Strange, astonishing, unheard-of it is, Señor, that England should - dare to pretend that Your Majesty should authorize and adopt a - stipulation which prohibits mutually the forming of establishments - there as long as the subjects of other powers shall not attempt to - do so; adding that the respective subjects shall have the right of - disembarking in those places and building huts and other temporary - structures for objects connected with their fisheries. … The English - pretend that all South America is open to all nations, and that its - territories shall belong to the first that desires to occupy them. - -England, they declared, was now exacting more than she had dared to -ask in 1763, when she had so great an advantage. She had forgotten -her guaranty in the treaty of Utrecht that Spain’s American dominions -should be restored as they had been in the reign of King Charles II, -and should remain in that condition. If Spain should grant these -privileges to England, other nations would claim them under the -“most-favored-nation clause” of the same treaty. - -The King was asked to consider how his father had resisted England when -there was much less at stake and when the Spanish army and navy were -in no better condition. In case of war England’s attention, they said, -would be directed not against the Peninsula, but against the colonies. -Havana Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Trinidad, -Caracas, Montevideo, and Buenos Ayres were considered likely points of -attack. All of these were declared ready to defend themselves because -of their superior garrisons and of climatic and strategic advantages. - -Floridablanca had inclosed with other papers for the junta a copy of -the observations on Spain’s relations to other powers, which he had -prepared early in September on receipt of the news of the decree of -the National Assembly.[421] Because of the frankness shown in other -matters the junta said that they were encouraged to volunteer their own -observations on this. Speaking of Prussia as England’s most powerful -ally, they said that her King was not in a position to dictate terms -to all of the northern powers, consequently he would have to consider -his own defense. In view of this and of the existing state of Turkish -affairs they concluded that England’s position was not an especially -strong one. As to possible support for Spain, they said that France -could not be blind to her interests and to her obligations under the -family compact. To avoid the evil effects on the Spanish fleet of -insubordination in the French navy the two could operate separately. -Spain could probably not get any aid from the United States. Neither -were they likely to join England. Portugal could not aid except by -remaining neutral. There was nothing to ask or expect from Sardinia, -Naples, Venice, or Turkey, and the African states ought to give little -concern. As to Russia they were more hopeful. They suggested that it -would not be impossible for Spain, by offering commercial advantages, -to enter an alliance with Russia, Sweden, and Denmark and secure their -help against England. They respectfully submitted to the King and his -prime minister the idea of a treaty with Russia defining territorial -limits on the western coast of America and guaranteeing each other -against English aggressions on that coast. - -The junta then offered several observations on the harshness of the -English demands. England was offering nothing, they said, in return -for the sacrifices demanded of Spain. She had turned a deaf ear to -Spain’s repeated requests for a reciprocal disarmament, hence there -was good reason to fear that she was trying to force a breach. It was -plain that she intended to form new establishments in the Spanish -dominions. She proposed to deprive Spain of the power of repelling the -intrusions which she meditated by allowing no recourse except a report -of the matter to the home governments and a new convention in each -case. This would mean subjection and a continual state of war. She was -inviting other nations to help her despoil Spain. She was insisting -on the establishment of a principle which would allow usurpations in -every uninhabited place. The whole Spanish dominions would shortly be -destroyed. Her demands were as injurious as could be made after the -most disgraceful war. If this cession should be made through fear in -a time of profound peace, it would encourage still greater claims. -Authorized by such a document other nations would form common cause, -and the vast continent of the Indies would be exposed to a general -occupation. Even in an unfortunate war Spain would only have to come -to an understanding with her enemies, and there would be hope for -favorable alliances and better terms with less sacrifices. - -Finally the junta gave their conclusions as to the answer that should -be made to England’s ultimatum. The concessions now demanded, they -said, would inevitably lead Spain into a war. She would then suffer -all that the King now wished to avoid, and England would certainly -accept no less afterwards. In case that this projet should be rejected -and war should ensue, what treaty, it was asked, could be concluded -more absolutely ruinous, even in the remote chance of complete -prostration, than the convention which was now proposed? Therefore the -junta could not in any manner accept the unjust terms contained in -the English ultimatum. They recognized that this would mean war. They -advised preparation at once to repel hostile attacks and an immediate -search for allies even before giving a final answer to the English -ambassador.[422] - -On October 25, the day of the last session of the junta, its -conclusions were hurried off to Floridablanca to be laid before the -King. Their reception and influence on the negotiation will be studied -in the next chapter.[423] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -THE NOOTKA SOUND CONVENTION--ITS RECEPTION AND RESULTS. - - -After submitting the English ultimatum to the extraordinary junta, as -studied in the last chapter, Floridablanca continued his conferences -with Fitzherbert. He made strenuous efforts to induce the British -ambassador to modify the English demands. In the first article, which -declared that the buildings and lands on the Northwest Coast should -be restored to the British subjects, the Count pressed earnestly for -the insertion of the clause, “notwithstanding the exclusive rights -which Spain has claimed.” This would have been almost tantamount to -a recognition of the Spanish claim. Fitzherbert would not consent to -it. But since the declarations of July had expressly reserved the -discussion of those rights, and since the Spanish minister would not be -content without some reference to them in the convention, the British -ambassador consented to mention them in the preamble. Consequently, he -proposed the insertion of the clause, “laying aside all retrospective -discussion of the rights and claims of the two parties.” He was very -careful to word it so that there would not be in it any admission of -the justice of the Spanish claim. After some hesitation the Count -accepted it. - -In the second article Fitzherbert consented to the omission of one -word. The projet had provided that “for all other acts of violence or -hostility,” etc., reparation should be made. The Count objected to the -word “other” as an unnecessary and invidious reference to the action -of Martinez at Nootka in 1789, in view of the fact that satisfactory -reparation for it had already been made. The British ambassador -consented to omit “other.” The Spanish minister attempted to limit this -reparation to offenses committed “on the said continent and the islands -adjacent.” Fitzherbert would not agree. This would not have included -the violence recently done to Captain Macdonald in the West Indies, -mentioned in the last chapter. England apprehended other similar -seizures, and such would not have been unnatural under the strained -relations existing between the two countries for so many months. - -The last clause of the third article, making the privilege of landing -anywhere on the coast subject to the restrictions contained in the -following articles, was not in the draft _without_ a demarkation of -limits which was made the basis of the treaty, but it was in the -draft _with_ a demarkation of limits. Fitzherbert compromised on this -point and combined the two drafts. He admitted a limitation of the -privilege without obtaining a definite demarkation of the boundaries of -Spanish exclusive sovereignty. If Floridablanca had not secured this -concession, it would have meant that the English could have landed and -established colonies in any unoccupied spot on the coast of California, -Mexico, Central or South America. This concession was not included -in the draft which was examined by the special junta. It was on this -point that they so violently opposed conceding the English demands and -advised war at all hazards instead. - -In the fourth article, regarding the limit of 10 leagues within -which English vessels should not approach Spanish establishments, -Floridablanca pressed very earnestly for extending the distance to -15 leagues. As a precedent for his contention, he cited the treaty -of 1763 between England and France, which fixed 15 leagues as the -distance within which French fishermen might not approach the coasts -of Cape Breton. He suggested the insertion of the words “in the said -seas,” which would confine this restriction to the Pacific. Fitzherbert -embodied the last mentioned suggestion, since he conceived that it -might be of advantage to the English fisheries on the Atlantic coasts -of Spanish America, but he would not admit the extension to 15 leagues. -His private instructions, as mentioned in the last chapter, had named -5 leagues as the distance to be first proposed, but had allowed him to -concede 8 or even 10. - -The fifth and sixth articles contained the stipulations upon which -there was the most difficulty in agreeing. In the course of their -discussion the negotiation was frequently on the point of being broken -off. Floridablanca would not consent to a convention that failed to -secure to Spain her exclusive intercourse with her establishments. -Neither would he consent to fix any precise line as the boundary of -the Spanish possessions, either on the north or the south. He pleaded -insufficient information. Fitzherbert wrote to the British Cabinet -that the language of the Spanish minister on both of these points was -so firm and decisive as to make it evident beyond a doubt that the -alternative of peace or war rested on finding or not finding a solution -of these difficulties. Neither of the two drafts of the English -ultimatum afforded a solution. The one provided that the subjects of -the two Crowns should have free access to all unoccupied places and -to all establishments formed since April, 1789, or to be formed north -of a fixed line on the Northwest Coast and south of a fixed line on -the South American coast. The other, omitting any reference to fixed -limits, provided that this privilege should extend to the whole Pacific -coast of North and South America. - -In order to solve this difficulty the English ambassador admitted the -restriction at the end of the third article, mentioned above. For the -same purpose he consented to insert in the fifth article the clause, -“situated to the north of the parts of the said coast already occupied -by Spain.” This preserved the Spanish exclusive dominion as far -northward as her most northern establishment. The provision in article -6 was materially changed. The draft of the ultimatum had provided that -the subjects of neither nation should make any establishment south -of a definite line to be fixed so long as no settlement should be -formed thereon by the subjects of any other power. Instead of fixing -a definite line the negotiators agreed to insert the clause, “in such -part of those coasts as are situated to the south of those parts of the -same coasts and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain.” -They added the provision that in such places the respective subjects -should have the right of landing and constructing temporary buildings -for purposes connected with their fisheries. The clause, “so long as -no establishments shall be formed thereon by the subjects of any other -power,” was omitted from the article. This had been objected to on the -ground that it would be virtually a public invitation to all nations -to make settlements there and so join England in despoiling Spain of -her dominions. In order to remove the Spanish objection to publicity -and still assure England that she would not be compelled to keep her -hands off while other nations should do the thing that she had bound -herself not to do, the stipulation was embodied in a secret article. -This secret clause provided that the stipulation in the sixth article -forbidding the subjects of Spain and England to make establishments -in such places should remain in force only so long as no settlements -should be formed there by the subjects of any other power.[424] - -These changes having been agreed to, Fitzherbert presented to -Floridablanca on October 23 a new projet embodying them. He said -that he had conformed to the ideas of Floridablanca as far as his -instructions would permit. In order to discuss the new draft before it -should be laid before the King, the British ambassador proposed to call -on the Count in the evening of the same day.[425] When their conference -closed, the Spanish minister said that he was still in doubt whether -the reply which he should give the next morning would be for peace or -war.[426] On the morning of October 24 Floridablanca said that the King -had agreed to Fitzherbert’s terms and had promised that the convention -should be signed with the usual formalities three or four days -later.[427] The British ambassador pressed for an immediate signature, -but the minister said that he could not consent to it. The Count was at -the time with the King at San Ildefonso, whither His Majesty had gone -on a hunting trip. Fitzherbert had gone to the same place to continue -his conferences with the Count. The latter said that if the convention -should be signed while there his enemies would charge him with having -taken advantage of the fact that he was almost alone with the King to -induce His Majesty to agree to a measure contrary to the interests -of his Crown. He said also that he wished, before signing, to send a -memorial to the junta to justify himself for signing the convention -contrary to their opinion. He pledged His Catholic Majesty’s word -that the convention should be signed “verbatim et literatim.”[428] The -exchange of full powers took place on October 26, and the wording of -the titles of the two negotiators to be inserted in the preamble was -arranged on October 27.[429] According to the agreement made four days -earlier, the following convention was signed on October 28: - - _The Nootka Sound convention._ - - Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties being desirous of - terminating, by a speedy and solid agreement, the differences - which have lately arisen between the two Crowns, have considered - that the best way of attaining this salutary object would be that - of an amicable arrangement which, setting aside all retrospective - discussions of the rights and pretensions of the two parties, - should regulate their respective positions for the future on bases - which would be conformable to their true interests as well as to - the mutual desires with which Their said Majesties are animated, - of establishing with each other, in everything and in all places, - the most perfect friendship, harmony, and good correspondence. - With this in view they have named and constituted for their - plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Britannic Majesty, - Alleyne Fitzherbert, of the privy council of His said Majesty in - Great Britain and Ireland, and his ambassador extraordinary and - minister plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and on the part - of His Catholic Majesty, Don Joseph Moñino, Count of Floridablanca, - Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Spanish Order of Charles III, - counselor of state to His said Majesty, and his principal secretary - of state and of the cabinet, who, after having communicated to each - other their full powers, have agreed on the following articles: - - ARTICLE I. - - It is agreed that the buildings and tracts of land situated on the - Northwest Coast of the continent of North America, or on islands - adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His Britannic - Majesty were dispossessed about the month of April, 1789, by a - Spanish officer, shall be restored to the said British subjects. - - ARTICLE II. - - Further, a just reparation shall be made, according to the nature of - the case, for every act of violence or hostility which may have been - committed since the said month of April, 1789, by the subjects of - either of the contending parties against the subjects of the other; - and in case any of the respective subjects shall, since the same - period, have been forcibly dispossessed of their lands, buildings, - vessels, merchandise, or any other objects of property on the said - continent or on the seas or islands adjacent, they shall be replaced - in possession of them or a just compensation shall be made to them - for the losses which they have sustained. - - ARTICLE III. - - And in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to preserve - in the future a perfect harmony and good understanding between the - two contracting parties, it is agreed that their respective subjects - shall not be disturbed or molested either in navigating or carrying - on their fisheries in the Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in - landing on the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied, - for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with the natives of - the country or of making establishments there; the whole subject, - nevertheless, to the restrictions and provisions which shall be - specified in the three following articles. - - ARTICLE IV. - - His Britannic Majesty engages to employ the most effective measures - to prevent the navigation and fishery of his subjects in the Pacific - Ocean or in the South Seas from being made a pretext for illicit - trade with the Spanish settlements; and with this in view it is - moreover expressly stipulated that British subjects shall not - navigate nor carry on their fishery in the said seas within the - distance of 10 maritime leagues from any part of the coast already - occupied by Spain. - - ARTICLE V. - - It is agreed that as well in the places which are to be restored - to British subjects by virtue of the first article as in all other - parts of the Northwest Coast of North America or of the islands - adjacent, situated to the north of the parts of the said coast - already occupied by Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the - two powers shall have made settlements since the month of April, - 1789, or shall hereafter make any, the subjects of the other - shall have free access and shall carry on their commerce without - disturbance or molestation. - - ARTICLE VI. - - It is further agreed with respect to the eastern and western coasts - of South America and the islands adjacent, that the respective - subjects shall not form in the future any establishment on the - parts of the coast situated to the south of the parts of the same - coast and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain; it - being understood that the said respective subjects shall retain the - liberty of landing on the coasts and island so situated for objects - connected with their fishery and of erecting thereon huts and other - temporary structures serving only those objects. - - ARTICLE VII. - - In all cases of complaint or infraction of the articles of the - present convention the officers of either party without previously - permitting themselves to commit any act of violence or assault - shall be bound to make an exact report of the affair and of its - circumstances to their respective Courts, who will terminate the - differences in an amicable manner. - - ARTICLE VIII. - - The present convention shall be ratified and confirmed within the - space of six weeks, to be counted from the day of its signature, or - sooner if possible. - - In witness whereof we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of their - Britannic and Catholic Majesties, have, in their names and by virtue - of our full powers, signed the present convention, and have affixed - thereto the seals of our arms. - - Done at the palace of San Lorenzo the 28th of October, 1790.[430] - - ALLEYNE FITZHERBERT. - THE COUNT OF FLORIDABLANCA. - - SECRET ARTICLE. - - Since by article 6 of the present convention it has been stipulated, - respecting the eastern and western coasts of South America, that the - respective subjects shall not in the future form any establishment - on the parts of these coasts situated to the south of the parts - of the said coasts actually occupied by Spain, it is agreed and - declared by the present article that this stipulation shall remain - in force only so long as no establishment shall have been formed - by the subjects of any other power on the coasts in question. This - secret article shall have the same force as if it were inserted in - the convention. - - In witness whereof, etc.[431] - -Ratifications were exchanged by Floridablanca and Fitzherbert on -November 22. - - * * * * * - -The fact that the convention was signed in opposition to the advice -of the special junta occasioned lively comment for several weeks in -Spanish official circles. It will be recalled from the last chapter -that the sittings of the junta were on October 21, 22, 24, and 25, -and that on the last date the junta hurried its conclusions off to -Floridablanca, advising war rather than compliance with the English -demands. From a statement in an earlier part of the present chapter, -it will be remembered that the convention was virtually concluded -between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert at their interview of October -23; and that on the next day the King pledged his word to sign the -convention as it then was. - -On October 27 a letter from Floridablanca informed Iriarte, the -secretary of the junta, that the conclusions of the junta had been -received on the 25th, had been laid before the King on the 26th, -and were being considered by the Council of State. He cautioned the -members of the junta to keep the proceedings of that body absolutely -secret.[432] The Count evidently hoped to keep concealed the fact that -the convention had already been agreed upon. He did not succeed long in -doing this. On October 28 Iriarte replied to the Count’s letter of the -day before, discussing at length the latter’s injunction to secrecy. -Notes in Iriarte’s hand on slips of paper inserted later in these two -letters show that he had learned of the fact of the convention’s having -been agreed upon before the conclusions of the junta had been received, -though it had not been signed until afterwards. In proof of the fact he -referred to a circular letter which the British ambassador had written -on October 26, telling all of the English consuls in Spain that the -dispute had been settled and that the convention would be formally -signed in a few days. Another brief note similarly inserted censured -the administration very severely for accepting the English terms. It -said: - - This convention of October 28, 1790, is the first treaty that - has been made during the reign of Charles IV, and in it has been - conceded to England what has always been resisted and refused to all - powers since the discovery of the Indies; and the concession means - much to us.[433] - -On November 21 Floridablanca expressed the King’s thanks to all of the -ministers that took part in the junta for their promptness and zeal. -His Majesty assured them that he would not have hesitated a moment to -carry out their recommendations if motives absolutely secret to himself -had not compelled him to order the convention signed. The Count -inclosed some reflections on the convention which His Majesty offered -in addition to the secret motives.[434] - -These reflections declared that the purpose of the Convention was to -avoid a war in the present unhappy circumstances, reserving it for a -more favorable time, if it should become necessary. It did not involve -an absolute renunciation in case Spain chose not to observe it. It -was shown that by a strict interpretation of some of its terms the -Convention could be made of little value to England and little loss to -Spain. In the stipulations that granted to English subjects privileges -of commerce and settlement north or south of places already occupied, -attention was called to the expression “already occupied.” The word -“occupied” did not mean nearly so much as “inhabited” or “peopled” -would have meant, and “already” did not mean “actually” or “now.” If -a place had been once occupied and then abandoned this expression -could be made to apply to it. The implication was that formal acts -of taking possession where there had been no thought of making an -actual settlement could be made to come under this head. Such acts had -been performed practically all along the coast. Such a construction -would have almost nullified the privileges granted to England. The -reflections said further that the English were not allowed to approach -Spanish settlements and Spain had equal rights with England anywhere on -the coast. It was thought that Russia’s fear of English encroachments -would be a safeguard against England. English trade and settlements -were limited to the part of the coast north of Nootka. It was insisted -that the treaty simply recognized existing conditions; that it conceded -nothing except what had been allowed, and on the other hand obtained -concessions by limiting the privileges. It was proposed to observe the -Convention only so long as it should be to the advantage of Spain to do -so. Whenever she felt strong enough to assert her ancient rights she -could still do it.[435] The purpose of these arguments was doubtless to -quiet adverse criticism of the Convention. It was partially successful -at the time. A few days later, after the letter of Floridablanca -and the reflections had been considered, all of the ministers of the -junta sent to the King their thanks for his confidence.[436] But this -success did not last long. Criticism of the Convention continued and -finally led to the overthrow of Floridablanca. In May, 1791, the -British ambassador wrote that the Spanish prime minister was very -anxious to have England take effectual measures for preventing British -vessels from touching at Spanish ports, that his enemies might not -find new reasons for attacking him.[437] Finally, in the latter part -of February, 1792, Floridablanca was dismissed from office. The Nootka -business was said to have been the principal cause of his fall.[438] - -News of the agreement to sign the convention reached London November -4. On that day Leeds wrote to Auckland that a messenger had just -arrived with a dispatch from Fitzherbert, dated October 24, saying -that the convention had been agreed upon and would be signed four days -later. A copy inclosed with this letter exactly corresponds to the -convention as signed.[439] An unofficial letter, written on the same -day by a clerk in the foreign office and accompanying this official -note, declared that the convention would speak for itself; that it -contained everything that England had demanded. The writer said that -the Spanish ministry had been decidedly for war rather than make the -sacrifice, but that Floridablanca had obtained the King’s consent while -on a hunting trip, and pledged his master’s word that the convention -would be signed on their return, that it might have the sanction of -his colleagues “pro forma.”[440] The signed convention reached London -five days later. Leeds immediately sent a copy of it to Auckland, -that the latter might lay it before the Dutch Government. The Duke -congratulated the ambassador on the happy termination of such a very -important negotiation.[441] On the day of its arrival, November 9, the -British Court ratified the convention, and hurried a messenger off to -Fitzherbert.[442] As stated above, the ratifications were exchanged at -Madrid on November 22. - -On November 12 Burges, under secretary for the foreign office, wrote to -Auckland: - - That you and our Dutch friends are satisfied with the conclusion of - the Spanish business, I am not surprised. Even the opposition here, - always ready enough to pick holes, as you know, whenever they can, - seem to be dumfounded, and to have nothing to say against us except - that we have asked and carried so much that it is impossible such a - peace can last long. - -Speaking of the credit given to Fitzherbert for his success in the -negotiation and of the honor conferred upon him by his being raised to -the peerage, the same letter continued: - - Fitzherbert of course gains much glory, as all good ministers should - who follow up their instructions, and I understand that he is - forthwith to receive the high reward of an Irish peerage.[443] - -These references are sufficient to show that the English ministry -was highly pleased with the success of the negotiation. On November -24 the mayor, the aldermen, and the commons of the city of London, -in common council assembled, assured the King of their gratitude for -the continuance of peace with Spain, and congratulated him on the -reconciliation.[444] On November 26 Parliament assembled. The King’s -speech mentioned the successful termination of the negotiation and laid -before the Houses copies of the declaration and counter declaration -and the convention.[445] On the same day the House of Lords accorded -enthusiastic thanks and congratulations.[446] Four days later the -Commons, after an extended debate and some criticisms from the -opposition, approved the address, and assured the King that provision -would be made for the expenses of the armament.[447] A general -discussion of the merits of the convention was made the order of the -day for December 13 in the House of Lords. The debate was extended, and -the criticism of the ministry by the opposition was very severe. The -friends of the Government seemed confident of the results and did not -exert themselves greatly to refute the arguments. The convention was -approved.[448] On the same day the Commons debated a motion calling for -all of the correspondence on the dispute. There were the same violent -attacks by the opposition and the same apparent indifference on the -part of the friends of the administration. The motion was defeated by -an overwhelming majority. On the next day, December 14, the merits of -the convention were discussed. The opposing sides manifested much the -same spirit, and in the end the convention was approved by a large -majority.[449] - -The logical results of the convention were interfered with by England’s -taking part in the war against France within a little more than -two years after its signature. This absorbed her attention almost -continuously for twenty-two years and prevented her, to a great extent, -from taking advantage of the concessions gained. Before the end of -that period the United States had entered the contest for controlling -the Northwest Coast, and in a few years more purchased the Spanish -claim. Thereby the whole matter was merged in the Oregon controversy. -The immediate result for England was that she obtained free access to -an extended coast, of which she has since come into full possession. -For Spain, it was the first external evidence of the weakness of the -reign of Charles IV, and was the beginning of the series of disasters -which Spain successively suffered under that incompetent Monarch and -his corrupt advisers. It was the first express renunciation of Spain’s -ancient claim to exclusive sovereignty over the American shores of -the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas. It marks the beginning of the -collapse of the Spanish colonial system.[450] - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE NOOTKA SOUND -DISPUTE. - - -Although the convention was concluded in 1790, yet the Nootka Sound -affair was still far from settled. The first article of the convention, -agreeing to restore to British subjects the buildings and lands -which had been taken from them at Nootka, had to be carried out. The -agreement of the Spanish declaration of July 24 to indemnify the -parties concerned in the ships captured at Nootka was also still to -be fulfilled. It required a long arbitration and two new conventions -to accomplish these results, and in the meantime an intimate treaty -of alliance had been entered into for mutual protection against the -excesses of the French Revolution. It was more than four years before -these matters were finally adjusted. The present chapter will review -them briefly. - -The English and Spanish Governments each appointed a commissioner to -go to Nootka and carry out the agreement of the first article of the -convention of October 28, 1790. The commissioners did not meet until -the summer of 1792. A brief statement should be made concerning the -establishment at Nootka between the events of 1789 and the meeting of -the commissioners three years later. Martinez’s abandonment of Nootka -in the fall of 1789 and his return to Mexico was discussed in a former -chapter. The plans of the Viceroy for sending a new expedition under -Eliza to reoccupy the post in the spring of 1790 were studied in the -same chapter.[451] The Viceroy feared that Nootka would be seized by -the English before his expedition could reach the place, or that an -English expedition might later attempt to wrest the post from the -Spanish.[452] His fears were not realized. The port was reoccupied -and held without opposition. During the three following seasons a -substantial Spanish settlement was formed, and, using this as a center, -exploring expeditions examined the neighboring coast.[453] - -The British commissioner for carrying out the convention was Captain -Vancouver. He left England in 1791 and was to reach the Northwest -Coast in the spring of the following year. His principal business -was to explore that coast. Additional instructions concerning the -transfer of Nootka were to be sent to him later.[454] These reached -him during the summer of 1792 while he was engaged in exploring the -coast in the neighborhood of the island that later received his name. -He arrived at Nootka late in August. He found there Bodega y Quadra, -the Spanish commissioner. It would be of little value to follow in -detail the negotiations between them, since their mission accomplished -nothing. They could not agree, although, personally, a very strong -friendship sprang up between them. Vancouver expected that the entire -establishment would be transferred to England. Quadra, after careful -investigation, became convinced that the English had never purchased -nor taken possession of any land except the small plat of ground on -which Meares’s temporary house had stood in 1788. Consequently he -offered to transfer this, but no more. Vancouver refused to accept so -little and the whole matter was referred back to the Governments at -London and Madrid.[455] Having continued his survey of the coast for -two years longer, Vancouver returned to Nootka in the summer of 1794 -expecting that new instructions would be awaiting him regarding the -transfer. He was disappointed. He waited two months at Nootka for them, -then went to Monterey, where he waited nearly two months more. The -English instructions still did not come, but the Spanish commissioner -had received his orders, and Vancouver was informed that a special -British commissioner had been sent for the purpose. On December 1 he -sailed for England.[456] - -While the arrangements were being made to send the above commissioners -to Nootka to carry out the stipulations in the first article of the -convention, steps were also being taken to fulfill the agreement in the -declarations of July 24. The two Governments appointed commissioners -to decide on the amount of the indemnity which Spain should pay to -those interested in the ships captured at Nootka. Their negotiation -was conducted at London. The Spanish agent, Manuel de Las Heras, was -sent in May, 1791. Baron St. Helens [Fitzherbert] wrote on May 29 -introducing him to Lord Grenville, who had succeeded the Duke of Leeds -in the foreign office. Heras was also consul-general to England. St. -Helens said: - - He appears to me to be very sensible, well informed, and right - headed; so that I am persuaded that he will do his best in order to - execute the commission with which he is charged to the satisfaction - of both Courts.[457] - -When the Spanish commissioner reached London he either misunderstood -his instructions or was intentionally very reserved regarding them. On -August 26 Grenville wrote to St. Helens: - - The sending of M. Las Heras at last without any instructions is - really abominable, and would be reason enough, if we were so - disposed, to refuse to hear of alliance or anything else. - -He appealed to St. Helens to “make those slow Spaniards send -instructions and powers, and, above all, liberty to refer the matter -to arbitration, by which the ministers of both Courts will get it off -their hands.”[458] On receipt of this letter the British ambassador -called the attention of Floridablanca to the commissioner’s delay -in negotiating. The Spanish minister thought that the instructions -to Heras were clear and explicit; nevertheless, he sent additional -instructions on September 8 authorizing the commissioner to settle -and liquidate the damages, with the concurrence of Campo, the Spanish -ambassador. He was to give the British Court to understand that in -case of difference the Spanish King was willing to submit the matter -to arbitration. The Count had given St. Helens a copy of these -instructions and the latter sent them to Grenville, saying that they -seemed satisfactory except that the commissioner did not have authority -to settle finally without submitting the matter to the Spanish King. He -remarked that such would have been an unprecedented power and said that -His Catholic Majesty had promised to act on it immediately.[459] - -It seems that the commissioners failed to agree and that the matter -was referred to a court of arbitration, which sat at or near Madrid -in the early part of the next year. On May 14, 1792, St. Helens wrote -from Aranjuez that the Nootka arbitration business was “en bon train,” -and though it was going more slowly than expected he hoped to send -dispatches concerning it in a very few days.[460] A fortnight later the -business had taken a new turn. The British ambassador wrote: - - I can not but hope that the proposal which goes by this messenger - for settling what the Count of Aranda[461] calls the fastidious - business of the Nootka claims by the payment of a round sum of money - as a discharge in full will strike your fancy as much as it does his - and mine. - -The writer added that if the offer should be thought too small he was -confident that Spain would increase it ten, fifteen, or even twenty -thousand Spanish dollars. If Grenville should reject the offer and -wish the matter to revert to arbitration he said that Aranda would -facilitate it.[462] The amount offered was 200,000 Spanish dollars. -About two months later the Nootka claimants were called upon to decide -whether they wished to accept the offer or to have the matter referred -back to Madrid in hope of having the sum increased.[463] The claimants -apparently did not accept the offer. A month afterwards Dundas, the -home secretary, wrote: - - The Nootka business, I take it for granted, will get on, but it - hangs rather unaccountably. I suspect that both sides are in some - degree to blame.[464] - -After a delay of several months more, the Spanish Court increased the -offer by $10,000. On February 12, 1793, the following convention was -signed: - - _Nootka claims convention._ - - In virtue of the declarations exchanged at Madrid on the 24th of - July, 1790, and of the convention signed at the Escorial on the - 18th [28th] of the following October, Their Catholic and Britannic - Majesties, desiring to regulate and determine definitely everything - regarding the restitution of the British ships seized at Nootka, as - well as the indemnification of the parties interested in the ships, - have named for this purpose and constituted as their commissioners - and plenipotentiaries, to wit, on the part of His Catholic Majesty, - Don Manuel de Las Heras, commissary in His said Majesty’s armies, - and his agent and consul-general in the Kingdoms of Great Britain - and Ireland; and on the part of His Britannic Majesty, Mr. Ralph - Woodford, Knight Baronet of Great Britain; who, after having - communicated their full powers, have agreed upon the following - articles: - - ARTICLE I. - - His Catholic Majesty, besides having restored the ship _Argonaut_, - the restoration of which took place in the port of San Blas in - the year 1791 [1790], agrees to pay as indemnity to the parties - interested in it the amount of two hundred and ten thousand hard - dollars in specie, it being understood that this sum is to serve - as compensation and complete indemnification for all their losses, - whatever they may be, without any exception, and without leaving the - possibility of a future remonstrance on any pretext or motive. - - ARTICLE II. - - Said payment shall be made on the day on which the present - convention shall be signed by the commissioner of His Catholic - Majesty in the presence of the commissioner of His Britannic - Majesty, which latter shall give at the same time an acknowledgment - of payment consistent with the terms enunciated in the former - article and signed by the said commissioner for himself and in the - name and by the order of His Britannic Majesty and of the said - interested parties. And there shall be attached to the present - convention a copy of the said acknowledgment of payment, executed in - the proper form, and likewise of the respective full powers and of - the authorizations of the said interested parties. - - ARTICLE III. - - The ratifications of the present convention shall be exchanged in - this city of London within a period of six weeks from the date of - its signature, or before if possible. - - In witness whereof we, the undersigned commissioners and - plenipotentiaries of Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties, have - signed the present convention in their names and in virtue of our - respective full powers, affixing to it the seals of our arms. - - Done at Whitehall, February 12, 1793.[465] - - MANUEL DE LAS HERAS. - R. WOODFORD. - -During all of the time that the negotiations were in progress over -the liquidation of the Nootka claims, a treaty of alliance and -commerce between England and Spain was being discussed. The British -Court attempted to induce the Spanish Government to accept duties on -English manufactures, “instead,” as Grenville said, “of paying an -army not to prevent their being smuggled.” In the same connection he -remarked, “but that, I fear, is a trait of wisdom far beyond their -comprehension.”[466] The negotiation dragged through 1791 and 1792 and -into 1793. In the meantime Spain had twice changed prime ministers. On -the fall of Floridablanca, Aranda had succeeded him. After holding the -position for about a year Aranda was succeeded by the Duke of Alcudia, -the famous Godoy, known as the Prince of Peace, the paramour of the -corrupt Queen. The impulse that finally brought the negotiations to a -crisis was the murder of the French King by order of the Convention. -A shudder of horror passed over Europe. Four days after the death -of Louis XVI the British Cabinet decided to authorize St. Helens to -discuss a permanent alliance with the Court of Spain against the -excesses of the French Revolution. The alliance was to be commercial, -offensive, and defensive.[467] Such an alliance was concluded May -25, 1793, and ratified by the British Court on June 21 following. -Ratifications were exchanged July 5.[468] - -This alliance facilitated the settlement of the Nootka business. After -the failure of Vancouver and Quadra to agree in 1792 as to what should -be surrendered at Nootka, the Governments took up the matter again. -While the negotiations for this purpose were in progress a long letter -from Revilla-Gigedo, the Viceroy of Mexico, reached Madrid. This was -the informe of April 12, 1793, to which reference has frequently been -made. Godoy, the Spanish prime minister, wrote to the Viceroy that in -view of this and other letters from the same source he had concluded a -convention with St. Helens.[469] In this long letter the Viceroy, after -having given a brief history of the Spanish operations on the Northwest -Coast, and especially the Nootka expeditions, gave an extended -discussion, the purpose of which was to show that Nootka was not worth -retaining. He dwelt on the millions that had been spent during the -past twenty-five years in erecting and sustaining new establishments -in Upper California, and discouraged attempts to occupy more distant -places. He indorsed the idea of settling the Straits of Juan de Fuca -and southward, but he thought that settlements farther north would be -a cause of anxiety and fruitless expense and would afford occasions -for quarrels and misunderstandings with England. If England wished to -maintain possession of Nootka as a point of honor, he declared that -Spain ought to yield to her. He proposed a generous surrender of the -post to the English.[470] - -The convention to which Godoy referred as having been concluded by -himself with the British ambassador was signed at Madrid on January 11, -1794, and was as follows: - - _Convention for the mutual abandonment of Nootka._ - - Their Catholic and Britannic Majesties desiring to remove and - obviate all doubt and difficulty relative to the execution of - article 1 of the convention concluded between Their said Majesties - on the 28th of October, 1790, have resolved and agreed to order that - new instructions be sent to the officials who have been respectively - commissioned to carry out the said article, the tenor of which - instructions shall be as follows: - - That within the shortest time that may be possible after the arrival - of the said officials at Nootka they shall meet in the place, or - near, where the buildings stood which were formerly occupied by the - subjects of His Britannic Majesty, at which time and in which place - they shall exchange mutually the following declaration and counter - declaration: - - DECLARATION. - - “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His - Catholic Majesty, by means of these presents restore to - N---- N---- the buildings and districts of land situated - on the Northwest Coast of the continent of North America, - or the islands adjacent to that continent, of which the - subjects of His Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a - Spanish officer toward the month of April, 1789. In witness - whereof I have signed the present declaration, sealing it - with the seal of my arms. Done at Nootka on the ---- day of - ----, 179--.” - - COUNTER DECLARATION. - - “I, N---- N----, in the name and by the order of His - Britannic Majesty, by means of these presents declare - that the buildings and tracts of land on the Northwest - Coast of the continent of North America, or on the islands - adjacent to that continent, of which the subjects of His - Britannic Majesty were dispossessed by a Spanish officer - toward the month of April, 1789, have been restored to me - by N---- N----, which restoration I declare to be full and - satisfactory. In witness whereof I have signed the present - counter declaration, sealing it with the seal of my arms. - Done at Nootka on the ---- day of ----, 179--.” - - That then the British official shall unfurl the British flag - over the land so restored in sign of possession. And that after - these formalities the officials of the two Crowns shall withdraw, - respectively, their people from the said port of Nootka. - - Further, Their said Majesties have agreed that the subjects of - both nations shall have the liberty of frequenting the said port - whenever they wish and of constructing there temporary buildings - to accommodate them during their residence on such occasions. But - neither of the said parties shall form any permanent establishment - in the said port or claim any right of sovereignty or territorial - dominion there to the exclusion of the other. And Their said - Majesties will mutually aid each other to maintain for their - subjects free access to the port of Nootka against any other nation - which may attempt to establish there any sovereignty or dominion. - - In witness whereof we, the undersigned first secretary of state - and of the Cabinet of His Catholic Majesty, and the ambassador and - plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty, in the name and by the - express order of our respective sovereigns, have signed the present - agreement, sealing it with the seals of our arms. - - Done at Madrid, January 11, 1794.[471] - - THE DUKE OF ALCUDIA. - ST. HELENS. - -The two Courts proceeded to carry out this agreement. Godoy instructed -the Viceroy of Mexico to appoint some one as the commissioner for -Spain.[472] The British commissioner was appointed later, and sent -by way of Spain, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Mexico.[473] He arrived at -La Coruna about the middle of August, 1794.[474] On November 20 he -landed at Vera Cruz, and went by way of Mexico to San Blas.[475] From -this port both commissioners sailed for Nootka. The Englishman was Sir -Thomas Pierce; the Spaniard, Manuel de Alava. They met at Nootka and -on the appointed day, March 23, 1795, carried out the above agreement. -Alava had previously destroyed the buildings of the Spanish settlement. -After the prescribed ceremonies had been performed, both the Spanish -and the English deserted the place.[476] Neither nation ever reoccupied -it. Nootka is still inhabited by Indians. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Schoell, Histoire des Traités de Paix, IV, 112. - -[2] See Humboldt, Alex. von, Essai Politique, II, 460. - -[3] Oscar Browning, the writer of Chapter X, in Volume VIII, of the -Cambridge Modern History, recently published, gives the least prejudiced -and most accurate account. However, it is very brief. He introduces the -Incident as an important episode in the foreign policy of Pitt. He says: -“An event occurred on the other side of the world which nearly brought -about a European conflagration.” In preparing his brief discussion he -consulted the documents in the public record office. - -[4] See Duro, Armada Española, VIII, 8-16. - -[5] See Hassall, The French People, 341. - -[6] Richard Cadman Etches to Captain Portlock, London, September 3, -1785. (Meares, An Answer to Mr. Dixon, 10.) The instructions were not -carried out by this commander, but the same company was interested in the -expedition which reached Nootka for that purpose in 1789. Nootka Sound was -for a time called King Georges Sound by the English and San Lorenzo by the -Spanish. - -[7] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 172. - -[8] Sometimes written “Mears.” - -[9] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. - -[10] This condition and the terms on which relief was offered him by -Portlock and Dixon, who reached the place in the spring, led to a bitter -personal quarrel between Meares and Dixon, which produced several mutually -recriminating pamphlets. - -[11] Meares, Voyages. Introductory voyage, i-xl. In this Meares quotes the -letters which passed between him and Portlock in May, 1787, which gave -rise to the quarrel. - -[12] Id. 2. - -[13] The Merchant Proprietors to John Meares, esq., Commanding the -_Felice_ and _Iphigenia_, China, December 24, 1787. (Id., Appendix I.) - -[14] Id. - -[15] See Chapter IV below. - -[16] Meares, Memorial, Appendix to Voyages. He explains that this ruse -was at first successful, but was later discovered through the financial -failure of the Portuguese merchant who had allowed his name to be thus -used. - -[17] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 55. His hostility to -Meares prejudices any statement made by him. See above, p. 287, note b -[10]. - -[18] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, 1, 193. This author devotes some 10 pages -to a discussion of this expedition. - -Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172-178, attempts to prove that the -expedition was purely Portuguese. His account is too prejudiced to be of -much value. The chief purpose of his book was to prove that America had a -better claim to the Oregon country than England. If this expedition had -been purely Portuguese, England could have acquired no possible claim -through it. - -[19] Meares. Voyages, 2, 3. - -[20] Id., 88. - -[21] Id., 104. This date should probably be changed to May 12. When the -English and Spanish not at Nootka in 1789 their calendars were one day -apart. (See below, p. 312, note a [82].) Since there are no conflicting -dates given for the events at Nootka in 1788, those found in the journals -of the English commanders are followed. - -[22] Id., 114. - -[23] The purchase is confirmed in the information of William Graham, -London, May 5, 1790 (inclosure No. VI, with Meares’s Memorial, appendix -to Voyages). It was also confirmed by Duffin in conversation with -Vancouver in 1792. (Vancouver, Voyages, II, 370-372). Both of these have -strong English prejudices. The purchase is denied by Gray and Ingraham. -(Greenhow, Oregon and California, 414.) They strongly favored the Spanish. -They say that the Indians denied having sold land to the English. That -there was a purchase was practically conceded, however, even by the -Spaniards, since Quadra offered to Vancouver in 1792 the land on which -Meares’s house had stood in 1788. (See Vancouver, Voyages, II, 335 ff.) - -[24] Id., 115-116. - -[25] Id., 130. - -[26] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 175. - -[27] Meares, Voyages. 131. - -[28] Id., 146, and Memorial in appendix. - -[29] Id., 95. - -[30] Id., 204. - -[31] Meares, Voyages, 173, and Memorial in appendix. - -[32] Id., 173-179. - -[33] Id., 220. - -[34] Greenhow, Oregon and California, 172; and Bancroft, Northwest Coast, -I, 194. - -[35] Dixon, Further Remarks on Meares’s Voyages, 24. This writer, in his -controversial pamphlet, quotes from a letter of Captain Duncan, who had -met Meares near the entrance to Nootka Sound in 1788. This letter makes -the statement that Meares had “at that time a small vessel on the stocks -at Nootka, where, he told me, he had a fort, guns mounted, and Portuguese -colors flying.” It was written January 17, 1791, and can hardly be given -absolute credence, since Dixon was so prejudiced against Meares. Greenhow -is too partisan to be fair, and the Americans, Gray and Ingraham, and -Haswell, whom Bancroft quotes on the point, were very pro-Spanish. On the -other hand, Meares’s statements can not be taken for truth unless it is -very plain that there is no reason for his telling anything else. - -[36] Meares, Voyages, 220. It is doubtful whether this testimony can be -considered of any value. As to the truthfulness of the picture, it is -interesting to notice the Indian village in the background. He had said -that before this the entire village had been moved some 30 miles up the -sound for the winter. - -[37] Meares, Voyages, appendix, Memorial, VI. - -[38] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound, -September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V.) - -[39] Id., 334. - -[40] Meares to Douglas, _Felice_, Friendly Cove, in King Georges Sound, -September 20, 1788. (Meares, Voyages, Appendix V, p. 217.) - -[41] Note his reference to the killing of Callicum by the Spaniards in -1789. (Meares, Voyages, 118; also see 217, 218, referring to Colnett’s -expedition of 1789.) His preface would lead one to think that the writing -of his narrative was entirely an afterthought. He mentions as his motives -the wishes of friends, the political circumstances of the moment [the -diplomatic controversy with Spain], and public expectation. He says: “I -little thought it would be my future lot to give this part of my maritime -life to the world. If I had looked forward to the possibility of such -an event I should have enlarged my observations and been more minutely -attentive,” etc. But the fact that in his list of subscribers he gives -the names of a number of men living in China shows that before leaving -there, at least, he expected to publish his narrative. All of this tends -to depreciate the value of his statements where his interests are at stake. - -[42] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Greenhow, -Oregon and California, 414.) (Prejudiced.) - -[43] Colnett, Voyage, vii. - -[44] Spanish translation of an extract from the “License from the governor -and company of merchants of Great Britain for trading in the South Sea -and other parts of America, to Richard Cadman Etches and Company to trade -in the places where the South Sea Company has the privilege by an act of -Parliament.” (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) It was signed -by the secretary of the company and dated August 4, 1785. They were -forbidden to trade south of 45° on the northwest coast. (See Colnett to -the Viceroy, October 1, 1789; Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[45] Spanish translation of Colnett to the Viceroy, October 1, 1789. (Id.) - -[46] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. Also Colnett to the Viceroy, -October 1, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) The latter -represents Colnett as the chief promoter, while the former represents -Meares in that capacity. Colnett says that the _Prince of Wales_ had -broken her keel and was not in a condition to make another such a voyage, -so that the correspondents of his company offered him the _Argonaut_. It -seems that some difficulty had arisen over the fact that the license which -Colnett bore was for his use on the _Prince of Wales_. He told the Viceroy -that if he had apprehended any disadvantage arising from his change of -ships it would have been easy to have named the new ship the _Prince of -Wales_ also. He had not considered it necessary. - -[47] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. Inclosure II. - -[48] Translation of the instructions given by the owners of the English -ship _Argonaut_ to its captain, James Colnett, not dated. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[49] This policy of protecting allied chiefs against their enemies was -begun by Meares during the previous year. He loaned firearms and furnished -ammunition to the Nootka Indians for an expedition against a neighboring -tribe which had committed depredations on one of their villages. (See -Meares, Voyages, 196.) - -[50] Nootka was not especially mentioned, but the intention was so evident -that mention was unnecessary. The option as to the place in which it was -to be established probably did not refer to a possible choice between -Nootka Sound and some other part of the coast, but to the selection of the -most favorable spot on the sound. As showing Meares’s tendency to distort -facts, he says in his Memorial: “Colnett was directed to fix his residence -at Nootka Sound, and, with that in view, to erect a substantial house on -the spot which your memorialist had purchased the preceding year, as will -appear by a copy of his instructions hereto annexed.” - -[51] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages, Inclosure II; and MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, 90-3-18. - -[52] Meares, Voyages, 106. - -[53] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages, Inclosure II. It is seen -that a majority of the settlers for the proposed colony were Chinese, -conformably to the idea that Meares expresses in his narrative and to -which reference was made in the early part of this chapter. There is a -discrepancy in the statements concerning the number of Chinese. In several -Spanish manuscripts the statement is made that there were 29. The name of -each is given. (See MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[54] Martinez to Florez, San Blas, December 5, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) La Perouse, of a French scientific expedition, -had reported that Russian settlements were being made on the American -continent north of California. The Spanish expedition was sent under -a royal order of January 25, 1787. Martinez, of the _Princesa_, was -in command, and Lopez de Haro, of the _San Carlos_, was subordinate. -They reported six settlements, having in all about 500 inhabitants. An -autograph copy of Martinez’s diary of this expedition, containing 213 -pages, is in the same bundle as the above letter. It contains also the -diary of Mendosia, second pilot. Greenhow, Oregon and California, 185, -gives a short account of this voyage, which he says is based on a copy -of Martinez’s diary obtained from the hydrographical office at Madrid. -Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 184, also gives a brief account, likewise -taken from a copy of Martinez’s diary. - -[55] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[56] Florez to Martinez, December 23, 1788. (Id.) - -[57] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, January 2, 1789. (Id.) - -[58] Florez to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 2, 1789. (Id., 90-3-14.) -In this, mention is made of a royal order of April 14, giving approbation. - -[59] The ship was the _Columbia_. See the latter part of this chapter. - -[60] That of Jonathan Carver from Boston. - -[61] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[62] _San Carlos el Filipino_ seems to have been the full name. It is here -and often elsewhere in the documents spoken of simply as _El Filipino_. In -English writings it is usually called the _San Carlos_. - -[63] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, 90-3-18.) - -[64] This reference to Cook’s Voyages reads: “But what was most singular, -two silver tablespoons were purchased from them, which, from their -peculiar shape, we supposed to be of Spanish manufacture.” - -[65] An obvious error, since General Washington had nothing to do with it. -This was the _Columbia_. Her consort was the _Lady Washington_. Confusion -arising from the name of the latter perhaps caused the error. - -[66] Florez to Martinez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) In the above transcript of the instructions, -sections 10 to 15, inclusive, are quoted in full since they were intended -to guide Martinez in his intercourse with foreigners. It will be -interesting later to compare his actions with these instructions. Only the -substance of the other sections is given, since they have no important -bearing on the subject. - -[67] Instrumento de posesion, June 24, 1789. (Id.) Revilla-Gigedo in his -Informe gives the date February 19 for the departure from San Blas. (See -Bustamante [Cavo], Los Tres Siglos, III, 127.) - -[68] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 170-172; Greenhow, Oregon and -California, 151-153; Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 289. - -[69] Deposition of the officers and men of the _Northwest America_. -(Inclosure X, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) They say that -the sound was discovered by the late Capt. James Cook. Similar statements -are made elsewhere. - -[70] Instructions of the Merchant Proprietors to John Meares. (Meares, -Voyages, Appendix I.) - -[71] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 173-181, gives an account of the most -important. - -[72] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, -117-119. This gives a brief description of the voyage and the steps -leading to it. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 149-158, gives a description -based on the diaries of the voyage. Greenhow, Oregon and California, also -describes it. - -[73] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, December 23, 1788. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) See also above transcript of the Instructions -of Florez to Martinez. - -[74] Revilla-Gigedo, Informe, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, II, 199; -Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 158-166, gives a full account. - -[75] Id., 172. - -[76] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, -123; Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 172. - -[77] Cook, Voyages, II, 332, says: “Some account of a Spanish voyage to -this coast in 1774 or 1775 had reached England before I sailed, but the -foregoing circumstances sufficiently prove that these ships had not been -at Nootka.” - -[78] Blas Gonzales to Juan Kendrick, Isla de Juan Fernandez, June 3, 1789 -[1788]. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[79] Blas Gonzales later appealed to the Government of the United States -to intercede in his behalf, and Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took up -the matter. This will be referred to later. (See Jefferson to Carmichael, -April 11, 1790, Writings V, 155.) - -[80] Royal order of November 25, 1692. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, -90-3-14; Greenhow, Oregon and California, 184.) - -[81] See Razon de las Embarcaciones que han hecho Descubrimento al Norte -de California. Firmado abordo de la Fragata _Princesa_ en el Puerto de San -Lorenzo de Nutca á 13 de Julio de 1789, Estevan José Martinez. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18; Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, Chs. VI, -VII.) - -[82] This is the date according to the Spanish documents. The English give -May 6. This difference of one day between the English and Spanish dates -for the events at Nootka continues during the summer of 1789. For some -time no explanation appeared. But Prof. C. H. Hull suggested that it was -probably due to the fact that the English vessels came from Europe by way -of China, while the Spanish came from Mexico. Since the present custom of -dropping a day from or adding one to the calendar in mid-Pacific, or upon -crossing the international date line, was apparently not observed at that -time, the suggestion seems to be a plausible explanation. On the strength -of it the Spanish dates have been adopted instead of the English. Since -all previous writers in English have given the dates according to the -English documents, the dates given in this monograph will disagree with -those of all previous accounts. - -[83] Meares, Voyages, 106. - -[84] See Chapter II, ante. - -[85] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix -to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) Quadra was the Spanish commissioner -sent in 1792 to carry out the Nootka convention, and was collecting -evidence to strengthen the Spanish case. - -[86] Extract from the journal of the _Iphigenia_, entry for May 22. -(Inclosure XII, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[87] See Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, V, 206-207, who says: -“The Spaniards had never penetrated to it, but by virtue of a bull of -Alexander VI they claimed a sovereignty over all lands comprised between -Cape Horn and the sixtieth degree of north latitude; in other words, the -entire western coast of both South and North America, and when, after -a considerable interval, they discovered the existence of a British -settlement in these parts they determined to suppress it. Two Spanish -ships of war accordingly hastened to Nootka Sound, took possession of the -British settlement, hauled down the British flag, replaced it by the flag -of Spain, captured four English vessels, and treated their crews with -extreme harshness and indignity.” His failure to investigate the subject -is further shown by his statement in the next sentence: “These events took -place in April of 1789.” This error in date is doubtless derived from the -indefinite statement of the date in Article I of the Nootka convention of -October 28, 1790. - -Worthington C. Ford, United States and Spain in 1790, p. 18, is still -further in error. He says: “The Spaniards had laid claim to nearly the -whole of the western coast of America, from Cape Horn to the sixtieth -degree of north latitude, and had watched with a feeling of jealousy, -aggravated by a sense of injury, the establishment of a British settlement -in Nootka Sound, on Vancouvers Island. This inlet of the sea had been -first explored by Captain Cook in one of his voyages, and on the -establishment of the English in India became a trading station, colonized -by the English and recognized by grants of land from the natives. After -three years of undisturbed possession the little settlement was surprised -by the arrival of two Spanish ships of war from Mexico, which seized an -English merchant vessel, the _Iphigenia_, imprisoned her crew, looted the -vessel, and pulling down the British flag on the settlement raised that of -Spain, and subsequently treated all comers as intruders.” - -Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Revolution, -282, after speaking of the arrival of Martinez and his seizure of the -_Iphigenia_, says: “Martinez ergriff darauf Besitz von einer der kleinen -Inseln, erbaute auf derselben eine Batterie, bemaechtigte sich der -englischen Gebaeude, nahm die britische Flagge herunter and pflanzte die -spanische auf.” - -[88] See discussion of the negotiations of 1790 below. - -[89] See ante, Chapter II. - -[90] Extract from the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII, with -Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[91] See ante, Chapter II. - -[92] May 9, according to the English account. - -[93] Martinez to Florez. San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[94] Variously spelled in the documents--“Cavallo,” “Carvallo,” -“Caravallo,” “Caravalia,” and “Caravalho.” - -[95] Spanish translation of the passport of the _Iphigenia_, signed Macao, -October 17, 1787. (Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[96] Spanish translation of the Instructions of Carvalho to Viana, Macao, -October 23, 1788 [1787]. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[97] May 14, according to the English account, is the date usually given. - -[98] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 115-118, gives an account of the -supposed voyage of Fonte, which he thinks was never made. Nothing is said -of Fonte’s being a Portuguese, and the expedition is said to have been -under orders from Spain and the viceroys. - -[99] MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18. - -[100] Appendix I to Meares, Voyages. It is interesting to compare the -instructions of Meares, the English captain of the _Felice_ and commander -of both vessels, with the instructions of Viana, the pretended Portuguese -captain of the _Iphigenia_. These two correspond much more closely than -those of Viana and Douglas. The latter’s were subinstructions given -by Meares at sea. It may be that Juan de Mata Montero de Mendoza, the -pretended Portuguese captain of the _Felice_, bore subinstructions from -Viana similar to those of Douglas. The differences between Meares’s and -Viana’s instructions are more striking than their similarities. The former -is told that the coast was first discovered by Drake, in 1570; the latter -by Fonte, in 1640. The former is told to proceed alone to America if -he finds himself retarded by the slow progress of the _Iphigenia_; the -latter is to do the same if detained by the bad sailing of the _Felice_. -The former is instructed to direct Douglas to go to Prince Williams -Sound, then to Nootka; the latter is directed to make this voyage. In -the former’s instructions there is nothing corresponding to the latter’s -instructions to report to the Portuguese correspondents at Lisbon, and to -the ambassador at the court of the aggressor. There are other interesting -contrasts. The minute instructions regarding trade are common to the two. - -[101] This is not exactly an untruth, but it is a deception. It would -indicate that he had no instructions in English. His instructions are -quoted in full a few pages before this extract from the journal of the -_Iphigenia_ in Appendix II to Meares, Voyages. It is worthy of note that -they do not direct him to seize vessels at all, but only to guard against -surprise and repel force by force. It should be noted also that the -extract quoted by Meares in the appendix to his Memorial, V, purporting -to be from this letter to Douglas, does not agree with the full letter as -quoted, but that Meares has, in this extract, added two sentences from his -own instructions, which relate to his reporting the outrage if captured -and to his seizing his opponent should he have the superiority. - -[102] Extract of the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII with -Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[103] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix -to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) - -[104] Extract of the journal of the _Iphigenia_. (Inclosure XII, with -Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[105] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix -to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) The dates in this letter are not -accurate. The more important agree with the Spanish dates, but the rest -with neither Spanish nor English. - -[106] Vancouver, Voyages, II, 343. - -[107] See note a [101], p. 320, where it is pointed out that in the -instructions of Douglas nothing is said about carrying vessels to Macao. -In the journal of the _Iphigenia_ Douglas says that the interpreter told -Martinez in his presence that there was nothing objectionable in Douglas’s -papers. - -[108] An English translation of this bond is given by Meares. (Inclosure -IV, with Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[109] All the papers relating to the _Iphigenia_--her passport, -instructions, the inventory, the bond, and the affidavits--are inclosed -with Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[110] This is an interesting comment, showing Douglas’s inconsistency in -saying that the Spaniards had robbed the ship of everything of value. - -[111] Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages. - -[112] Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. (Appendix -to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) - -[113] Deposition of Martinez before Canizares, on board the _Princesa_, -June 12, 1789. (MSS., Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) With this -is an inventory of the vessel and cargo, and other affidavits telling -of the helpless condition of the vessel. An English translation of the -inventory is given on the last page of the appendix to Meares, Voyages. - -[114] Deposition of the officers and men of the schooner _North-West -America_, Canton, December 5, 1789, and information of William Graham, -London, May 5, 1790. (Inclosures VII and X, with Meares, Memorial, -appendix to Voyages.) The American vessel on which these men were shipped -was the _Columbia_. - -[115] Hudson’s receipt to Funter for 203 sea-otter skins, July 2, 1789. -(Inclosure VIII, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[116] Martinez’s certificate of 96 skins being shipped on board the -_Columbia_, Nootka, July 14, 1789. (Appendix to Meares, Voyages.) The -English ship to which the furs, taken from the schooner, were at first -transferred had been seized in the meantime, so that the furs again fell -into Martinez’s hand. This was the _Princess Royal_, to be discussed -presently. - -[117] John Kendrick’s receipt for provisions on board the _Columbia_, July -13, 1789. (Inclosure XI, with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -[118] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 216, says, incorrectly, that -possession had been taken before the departure of the _Iphigenia_. - -[119] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[120] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[121] Instrument of possession, San Lorenzo de Nootka, June 24, 1789. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[122] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[123] The Spanish flag had been changed by a royal decree of May 28, 1785. -The purpose was to remove the confusion due to the similarity between it -and those of the other Bourbon dynasties--France, Naples, Tuscany, and -Parma. Red and yellow were the colors adopted. (Fernandez Duro La Armada -Española, Madrid, 1901, VIII, 349.) - -[124] Martinez to [Florez], San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[125] June 14 is sometimes given as the date. This probably arises from -the indefinite statement in the Information of William Graham that she -arrived on or about June 14. (See Inclosure VII, with Meares, Memorial, -appendix to Voyages.) - -[126] Hudson to Florez, San Blas, September 18, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) With this letter are copies of the letters of -June 18 [17] and 19 [18] from Martinez to Hudson, and Hudson to Martinez -of the latter date, referred to above. - -[127] See latter part of foregoing chapter. - -[128] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) With this letter explaining his -dealings with the American ships, Martinez inclosed a copy of the passport -given to Kendrick by Blas Gonzales, governor of the islands of Juan -Fernandez. - -[129] Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 106, touches upon the -subject-matter of this chapter. - -[130] To save frequent repetition, one reference is given to all five of -these accounts. The particular source of the more important statements is -sufficiently clear from the text: - -First. Martinez to Flores, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -Second. Colnett to Flores [written at San Blas in September, 1789]. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -Third. Colnett, Voyages, 96-102, note. - -Fourth. Duffin to Meares, Nootka Sound, July 12 [11], 1789; same to same, -July 13 [12], 1789; same to same. July 14 [13], 1789. (Inclosure XIII, -with Meares, Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) - -Fifth. Gray and Ingraham to Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3, 1792. -(Appendix to Greenhow, Oregon and California.) - -The information of William Graham, London, May 5, 1790, and the deposition -of the officers and men of the _North-West America_, Canton, China, -December 5, 1789 (Inclosures VII and XI, with Meares, Memorial, appendix -to Voyages), give accounts, but add little of value to the others. - -[131] See previous discussion of the voyage of Perez, 1774, in Chapter -III, ante. - -[132] Meares, An Answer to Mr. George Dixon. - -[133] All of these are inclosed with Martinez’s account to the Viceroy, -referred to above. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[134] Martinez to Florez, San Lorenzo de Nootka, July 13, 1789. (1d.) This -letter is of the same date and appears in the same bundle as that referred -to above giving account of the _Argonaut_. - -[135] See information of William Graham. (Inclosure VII, with Meares, -Memorial, appendix to Voyages.) He says that Hudson was beaten and thrown -down the hatchway by the Spanish crew, who said: “Get down, you English -dog.” This and other such extravagant statements were probably invented -to produce the desired effect on the English mind. This document is -dated London, May 5, 1790, which was only a week before the Memorial was -presented, and was the time when the excitement was at its height. - -[136] There were also 8 officers on board. These with the 8 sailors were -all of the Englishmen that had come to Nootka on the _Argonaut_. The -Portuguese, Filipinos, Chinese, etc., were to be brought to San Blas later -on another vessel. - -[137] Colnett to the Viceroy, San Blas [September], 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[138] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, September 26, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[139] Id., Inclosing Comancho to Florez, San Blas, September 3, 1789. -Comancho was commandant of the port. - -[140] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[141] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-19.) There are several letters together of -the same date. This is No. 195. No. 194 states that a copy of Martinez’s -diary is inclosed, but a note on a small slip of paper inserted says that -the diary is not being sent on account of Martinez’s not having sent a -duplicate of it. The diary does not appear in the bundle and probably was -never sent. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 212, says: “I have not been able -to obtain the original diaries of the Spanish expedition of 1789, nor has -any preceding writer in English seen them.” - -[142] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (No. 198, MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-19.) - -[143] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 212. - -[144] Reference cited, note b [142] above, No. 195. - -[145] Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 211, repeats Meares’s statement that -there were 70 Chinese. - -[146] Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 107, treats briefly the seizure of -the _Argonaut_ and _Princess Royal_. - -[147] Previous accounts give scarcely anything on this subject. This -account is drawn almost wholly from manuscripts in the Spanish archives. - -[148] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) - -[149] [Florez] to the commandant and commissary at San Blas, Mexico, -August 29, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[150] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-18.) This is another letter of the same date and -found in the same bundle as the one referred to in note b [148] on the -preceding page. - -[151] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[152] See Chapter III, ante. - -[153] The King to the officials of New Spain, Madrid, November 25, 1692. -(MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) The Viceroy of Peru had -reported that an English vessel had been encountered in the Straits of -Magellan. This order directs officials to exclude all foreign vessels from -the South Sea unless they carry a special license from the King of Spain. - -[154] See his instructions in Chapter III, ante. - -[155] Florez to Valdez, Mexico, September 26, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[156] Florez to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, August 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[157] Revilla-Gigedo to Florez, Veracruz, August 30, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[158] [Florez] to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 2, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[159] See preceding chapter, p. 333. - -[160] Revilla-Gigedo to Florez, Veracruz, September 9, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-2-14.) - -[161] [Florez] to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, September 16, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-14.) - -[162] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, Bustamante [Cavo], Los Tres Siglos, III, -130. - -[163] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, October 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[164] Chapters IV and V. - -[165] Spanish translation of Colnett to Florez, San Blas [September 18], -1789. (MS. Arch. den. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[166] Spanish translation of Hudson to Florez, San Blas, September 18, -1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[167] Spanish translation of Colnett to the Viceroy, San Blas, October 1, -1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[168] [Revilla-Gigedo] to Colnett, Mexico, October 21, 1789. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[169] See last chapter. - -[170] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, December 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias. Seville, 90-3-19.) - -[171] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, February 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-26.) - -[172] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[173] Id., 105. - -[174] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[175] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, October 27, 1789. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[176] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante [Cavo], Los -Tres Siglos, III, 132.) - -[177] Valdez to Floridablanca, December 30, 1789. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[178] Valdez to Floridablanca, January 2, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[179] Florez’s plan, mentioned in the last chapter, for taking the Chinese -to Nootka and liberating them, had evidently not been carried out. - -[180] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[181] Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, April 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. -de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[182] Revilla-Gigedo to Bodega y Quadra, Mexico, April 27, 1790. (MS. -Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[183] Revilla-Gigedo to the commissary of San Blas, Mexico, April 27, -1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[184] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[185] Copies of this letter from Colnett to the British ambassador at -Madrid, one to Cadman, Etches & Co., one to Colnett’s mother, and one to -P. Stephens, of the Admiralty office at London, all dated May 1, 1790, are -in Madrid. (Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[186] Colnett to Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, May 3, 1790, and answer, -Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, May 4, 1790. (MSS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[187] Had Colnett and the Viceroy known of the feverish excitement in -Europe at this very time in expectation of a war over this quarrel between -sea captains this veiled threat would not have seemed so obscure. - -[188] Colnett to Revilla-Gigedo, May 7, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, -Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[189] Passport signed by Revilla-Gigedo, Mexico, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[190] Revilla-Gigedo to Colnett, Mexico, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[191] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, May 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[192] Informe of Revilla-Gigedo, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante (Cavo), Los -Tres Siglos, III, 132.) - -[193] Revilla-Gigedo to Valdez, Mexico, June 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, 90-3-21.) - -[194] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[195] Colnett to [Revilla-Gigedo]. San Blas, July 8, 1790. (Arch. Gen. de -Indias, Seville, Sec. Estado, Audiencia de Mexico, 1790.) - -[196] Revilla-Gigedo to Floridablanca, Mexico, December 30, 1791. (Arch. -Gen. de Indias, Seville, Sec. Estado, Audiencia de Mexico, 1791.) - -[197] Colnett, Voyage, 96-102, note. - -[198] The obscurity of the facts discussed in this chapter is illustrated -by the following quotations: - -“It has been generally supposed from later diplomatic correspondence that -the Viceroy in restoring the vessels acted on his own judgment; but it -appears from his own statement that he acted probably in accordance with -orders from Spain, dated January 26, 1790.” (Bancroft, Northwest Coast, -I, 223.) This author’s conclusion is exactly contrary to the fact, as has -been shown above. The Viceroy did act on his own authority, finally, as -has been shown; and this communication of January 26 gave no orders. The -Viceroy’s statement, to which Bancroft here refers, is the Informe of -Revilla-Gigedo, published by Bustamante, which is very brief and sometimes -misleading. Bancroft devotes a little more than one page to discussing the -subject-matter of this chapter. Besides this Informe he had the note in -Colnett’s Voyage. - -Greenhow, Oregon and California, p. 200, speaking of the restoration of -the English ships, says: “It was at length decided that … they should be -released, with the understanding, however, that they were not again to -enter any place on the Spanish-American coasts, either for the purpose of -settlement or of trade with the natives.” This was the Viceroy’s order at -first, but in the passport he gave permission to touch at places not under -Spanish control, as shown above. The same writer, speaking of Colnett’s -failure to get the _Princess Royal_ at Nootka, as promised, says: “On -arriving at the sound Colnett found the place deserted.” The sloop was not -there, but there was a substantial Spanish settlement, as will be shown -later. - -“La autoridad superior de Nueva España no sancionó el hecho [Martinez’s -seizure of the English vessels]; apenas llegó á su noticia, atendiendo á -las buenas relaciones en que estaban los Gobiernos de ambos Estados y á la -ignorancia en que suponia á las proprietarios de los bajeles, ordenó la -immediata soltura de estas con sus cargamentos.” (Duro, Armada Española, -VIII, 10.) This work was published in 1902, and is considered the best on -the Spanish navy. - -The error, which is a common one, of thinking that they were released by -the Viceroy immediately, doubtless arises from the Spanish minister’s -statement in his memorial of June 13, 1790, to the British ambassador, -published in the Annual Register, XXXII, 296. This states that the Viceroy -released the vessels without declaring them lawful prize, and allowed -them to return to Macao under bond as the _Iphigenia_ had been disposed -of. These two statements are exactly contrary to the fact. The Viceroy -did declare them lawful prize, and did not place them under bond. What -the Spanish minister said had been done was what Florez had said, in his -second account to the home Government that he thought ought to be done, -but which he left his successor, Revilla-Gigedo, to do. The Spanish -minister had inferred that the new Viceroy would do this, but that -official had not done it, as has been shown. - -Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 290, says more correctly -that they “were released by the Viceroy on the ground of the friendly -relations existing between the two nations, and the probability that the -traders were ignorant of Spanish rights.” - -[199] Tratchevsky, L’Espagne à l’Epoque de la Révolution française, Revue -Historique, XXXI, 5. - -[200] Desdevises du Dezert, L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime, II, 39. - -[201] Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française en Espagne pendant la Révolution, -7. - -[202] Quoted by Tratchevsky, work cited above, p. 5. The Russian -ambassador was thoroughly familiar, in an official way, with -Floridablanca. The former had been at the Court of Madrid before the -latter became prime minister and remained until after the latter’s -retirement. He was an ardent admirer of the great Spanish minister. -His dispatches in the archives at Moscow were the chief source for -Tratchevsky’s article. - -[203] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev., -268. Sandoz was the Prussian ambassador at Madrid. His dispatches sent to -Berlin furnish the chief basis for Baumgarten’s work. - -[204] Id., 268-276. In these pages the author discusses the internal -conditions of Spain, the court intrigues and ministerial complications. On -April 25, 1790, there was a reorganization of the ministry. The department -of justice, which Floridablanca had hitherto controlled, was taken from -him, and with it went an extensive appointing power that had contributed -much to his prestige. He was even given an associate in the department of -foreign affairs, who should act when sickness or absence incapacitated the -Count. - -[205] Desdevises du Dezert, L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime, II, 14. - -[206] Id., 18. - -[207] Grandmaison, L’Ambassade française en Espagne pendant la Rév., 8. -This quotes the following from Comte de Vaudreuil to Comte d’Artois, July -2, 1790, published in Pingaud, Correspondance Intime pendant l’Emigration, -I, 219: “C’est un homme loyal, qui pursuit toujours et sans se rebuter ce -qu’il a une fois entrepris. Soyez sûr que M. Floridablanca est (sans en -excepter même M. Pitt) une des meilleures têtes de tous les cabinets de -l’Europe.” - -[208] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev., -283. - -[209] The Viceroy’s letters were addressed to Valdez. He was minister of -marine and, before the reorganization of the ministry mentioned above, -also treasurer for the Indies. At that reorganization the finances of the -Indies were transferred to the regular department of finance, at the head -of which was the ungrateful Lerena, who was the leader of the ministerial -opposition to Floridablanca in spite of the fact that he owed his entire -political advancement, and even his position in the ministry, to the -Count. Valdez was the man who was made associate to Floridablanca in the -foreign office. He also retained the ministry of marine. (See Baumgarten, -Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev., 268-276.) - -[210] See Chapter VI, ante, for a complete discussion of the contents of -these letters from the Viceroy. The first was written August 27, 1789, -on receipt of the news of the arrival of the _Argonaut_ at San Blas, and -the second, September 26, after the arrival of the _Princess Royal_. The -letters from Valdez of December 30 and January 2 give both numbers and -dates of the letters from the Viceroy, showing that they contained full -accounts. - -[211] Merry to Leeds, Madrid, January 4, 1790. (A Narrative of the -Negotiations Occasioned by the Dispute Between England and Spain in the -Year 1790, 1.) - -This Narrative is a very rare book, and very valuable for the subject -in hand. No previous writer on the Nootka controversy has consulted it. -Probably only a few copies were printed. The King’s own copy is now in -the British Museum. That obtained for use in this study is the only other -copy that Messrs. Henry Stevens, Son & Stiles, antiquarian booksellers -of London, have noted during the whole of their business experience. -Neither date nor name of publisher nor author is given. The British Museum -catalogue gives 1791(?) as the date. It is evidently an official account -prepared in the foreign office especially for the King. In a letter from -J. B. Burges, under secretary for foreign affairs, to Lord Auckland, -dated Whitehall, November 12, 1790, found in B. M. Add. MSS. 34434, -f58, he mentions an “interesting Narrative, which, at leisure hours, I -have prepared for the King, of the whole of this business.” A careful -comparison of the printed Narrative with the documents in the public -record office reveals the identity of the printed Narrative with the -Narrative mentioned by Burges in this letter. The comparison also revealed -the fact that the printed account is full and faithful. It is necessarily -condensed, but nothing of importance is omitted. - -The British chargé is the same Merry who, later, as minister to the United -States, was connected with the Aaron Burr conspiracy. - -[212] This news reached London January 21. It is usually stated that the -British Court knew nothing of the matter before receiving the Spanish note -of February 10. - -[213] “Narrative” cited on foregoing page. - -[214] Id., 9. - -[215] That these instructions were written January 20 is stated in Campo -to Floridablanca, London, February 28, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) The date is significant when it is noticed -that on the same day he wrote a querulous letter to Montmorin, minister -for foreign affairs at Paris. He expressed pity for France and her King -and complained that in the present circumstances that country was not in -a condition to support Spain as she should. He made no mention of the -Nootka affair or of the sharp protest which he was sending to the British -Court the same day. But he evidently had it in mind and was thinking of -the complications to which it might lead. (See Floridablanca to Montmorin, -Aranjuez, January 20, 1790, MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, -4291.) The same is printed in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de -l’Amérique Latine, III, 104. - -[216] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain in 1790, 12. - -[217] Id., 8. - -[218] Translated from a manuscript copy in French found in the Archives -des Affaires Etrangères, Paris; Espagne 1790, 5 P^{ers} Mois, f. 96. The -contents of the note are partially reflected in published memoirs written -subsequently. (See Floridablanca to Fitzherbert, June 13, 1790, Annual -Register, XXXII, 296.) - -[219] See Chapters III and VI, ante, which show the falsity of these -statements. - -[220] See footnote a [211], p. 365. - -[221] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 12. - -[222] Leeds to Campo, Whitehall, February 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern -History, VIII, 290, says that the original of this reply, now in the -public record office, is in Pitt’s own hand. - -Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 108-109, gives briefly the substance of -the Spanish note of February 10 and the British reply of February 26. - -[223] Campo to Floridablanca, London, February 28, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[224] Id. - -[225] Miranda to Pitt, London, September 8, 1791. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII, -711, 712.) - -[226] Narrative of the Negotiations between Great Britain and Spain, 13, -14. - -[227] Id., 15. - -[228] Minutes of the supreme junta of state, March 22, 1790. (MS. Arch. -Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[229] Report of Valdez to the supreme junta of state, dated March 28, -presented March 29, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, -4291.) - -[230] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 17. - -[231] Minutes of the supreme junta of state, March 29, 1790. (MS. Arch. -Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) In these minutes is a Spanish -rendering of the instructions sent to Campo. They will be studied in the -form of a letter in French which Campo presented to Leeds. - -[232] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Rev., -287. This is based on a dispatch of April 19 from Sandoz. The author says -that not only Merry but even Sandoz, who knew Floridablanca’s character so -well, believed this. Shortly afterwards the Prussian ambassador considered -everything so peaceable that he left his post for a time, turning over the -business to his attaché, “a condition,” says the author, “to which is due -the fact that we are less exactly informed concerning the further progress -of these important negotiations.” - -[233] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 18-20. - -[234] Id., 36-38. - -[235] Id., 39. - -[236] Id., 69. - -[237] Not before published, though later memoirs give a partial account. - -[238] An error. Colnett’s license was for the _Prince of Wales_. (See -Chapter II.) - -[239] MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291. The same with -slight modifications is to be found in Narrative of the Negotiations -between England and Spain, 20. But this work is so rare that it is little -more accessible than the manuscripts. Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, -109, mentions this letter. - -[240] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 24. - -[241] Id., 35. - -[242] Grenville to George III, May 1, 1790, inclosing cabinet minute of -April 30, 1790. (Fortescue MSS. I, 579; Hist. MSS. Com. Report, 13, App. -3.) This gives the names of the seven cabinet members who were present. - -[243] George III to Grenville, May 1; Grenville to George III, May 2, and -George III to Grenville, May 2. (Fortescue MSS., I, 579, 580.) - -[244] Leeds to Campo, Whitehall, May 5, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) In English and apparently the original. -Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 110, reviews this reply briefly. - -[245] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 44. - -[246] Haldimand’s Diary, May 5 and May 14, 1790. (Canadian Archives, 1889, -p. 281 ff.) A letter from London of May 7 in Gazette de Leide, May 14, -1790, says: “Les fonds, depuis le message du Rol, ont continué de baisser.” - -[247] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 765; also Annual Register, XXXII, 285. The -latter work incorrectly gives the date May 25. This error is repeated in -many of the books that treat of the subject, since this work has been the -chief source. - -[248] This statement was true as far as the English knew or could know, -but there was at least an attempt to justify the procedure. Martinez took -goods from the captured ships and applied them to his own use, but made -provision for their restoration in Mexico. (See Chapter V.) A schooner had -been appropriated to the Spanish service with less show of justice. - -[249] Parl. Hist. XXVIII, 766-782. The address of the Lords with the -incorrect date, May 26, is given in the Annual Register, XXXII, 286. - -[250] Morris, Diary and Letters, 1, 325. - -[251] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 784. - -[252] Letter from London, May 7, in Gazette de Leide, May 14, 1790 - -[253] Vancouver, Voyages, I, 48. - -[254] See Dalrymple, The Spanish Pretensions fairly discussed, London, -1790; also [Etches]. An Authentic Account of all the Facts Relative to -Nootka Sound, etc., London, 1790. Meares’s Memorial was also made public. - -[255] Miranda to Pitt, September 18, 1791. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 712.) -Haldimand’s diary during May and June, 1790, confirms Miranda’s statements -of his intimacy with the governmental authorities. The writer makes -frequent mention of being with the King, with Grenville, and of being -consulted on Canadian affairs, showing that he was intimate in Court -circles. During the same months he speaks frequently of Miranda’s being -with him, dining with him, driving with him, etc. (See Can. Arch., 1889, -p. 281 ff.) - -[256] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 784. - -[257] Official Papers relative to the Dispute between the Courts of Great -Britain and Spain, 42. - -[258] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 805. - -[259] Id., 807. - -[260] Parl. Hist., 815-822 - -[261] Id., 875. - -[262] Grenville to Westmoreland, May 3, May 7, and May 9; and Westmoreland -to Grenville, May 10 and May 14. (Fortescue MSS., I, 580-584.) - -[263] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 56. These -orders were given May 6. - -[264] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 59-62. -These orders were given May 6 and May 22. - -[265] Id., 62-65. Orders dated May 12. - -[266] Id., 57. Orders dated May 6. See also Can. Arch., 1890, pp. 130-133. - -[267] Grenville to George III, May 25, and George III to Grenville, May -26. (Fortescue MSS., I, 586, 587.) - -[268] Leeds to Auckland, May 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 67.) - -[269] Leeds to Auckland, May 4, 1790 (private). (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, -f^o 81.) - -[270] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 70. - -[271] Auckland to Grenville, Hague, May 15, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., I, 585. -See also work last cited, 95-97.) - -[272] Leeds to Auckland, May 18, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 195. -See also Narrative cited above, 97.) - -[273] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 100 ff. - -[274] De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, V, 119-120. - -[275] Hertzberg to Ewart, Berlin, May 20, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, -f^o 205.) Stanhope’s Life of Pitt, II, 551, mentions the Prussian and -Dutch assurances of friendship. - -[276] Floridablanca to Montmorin, January 20, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) The same is published In Calvo, -Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 341. This author -quotes it from Cantillo, Collecion de Tratados de España. See p. 366 ante -note c [215]. - -[277] Floridablanca to Fernan Nuñez, April 6, 1790; Calvo, Recueil Complet -des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 342. - -[278] Fernan Nuñez to Floridablanca, Paris, May 11, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[279] This episode of the recall of Vauguyon is treated at length by -Grandmaison, L’Ambassade Française en Espagne pendant la Révolution, -21 ff. This author thinks that the suspicion originated with British -emissaries in Paris, who wished to produce an estrangement between the -Courts of France and Spain. This was, at least, its result. He quotes -several letters that passed between Louis XVI and Charles IV regarding -the matter. The Spanish King’s attitude unfortunately made it seem that -there was some ground for the suspicion of Vauguyon. The French Court was -considerably embarrassed thereby. There seems to be no doubt of the fact -that Vauguyon was innocent, at least in so far as any complicity with the -French Court was concerned. - -[280] On May 7 the British Court had given orders to Lord Robert -FitzGerald, chargé at Paris, to make this explanation to Montmorin. (See -Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 68) - -[281] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 510, session for May 14, 1790. - -[282] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 515-519 (May 14, 1790); Willert, P. -F., Mirabeau, 164-170; Loménie, Les Mirabeaus, V, 144-149; Stern, Das -Leben Mirabeaus, II, 151-164. - -[283] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 526-661 (May 16-22, 1790). Cambridge -Modern History, VIII, 188, discusses briefly the debate. - -[284] Montmorin to Floridablanca, Paris, May 21, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[285] Arch. Parl., first series, XV, 705 (May 28); Id., XVI, 185 (June -12); Id., XVI. 206 (June 13). - -[286] Annual Register, XXXII, 294. It is published under a wrong title and -date. - -[287] Id., 301. Same in Arch. Parl., first series, XVI. 503. - -[288] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, Paris, June 26, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[289] Fernan Nuñez to Montmorin, Paris, June 25, 1700. (Ibid.) - -[290] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, Paris, June 30, 1790. (Ibid.) - -[291] Leeds to Merry, May 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34431, f^o 75.) - -[292] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 106. - -[293] Merry to Floridablanca, May 16, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[294] That of Campo to Leeds of April 20. (See Chapter VII.) - -[295] Campo to Leeds, February 10. (Chapter VII.) - -[296] Evidently that of Meares. - -[297] British memorial of May 16, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, -Sec. Estado, 4291.) The reference cited in note b [292] on the preceding -page says that Merry sent with the memorial a copy of the original in -English for fear of mistakes in the translation. The memorial in French -and a copy in English are still to be found together in the archives. - -Apparently no previous writer on the Nootka affair has seen this memorial -nor any of the earlier documents. No reference is made to them except -such as is drawn from later documents which give brief reviews of the -earlier correspondence. Bancroft (History of the Northwest Coast, I, -229, note 46) says: “Up to this point the correspondence is not, so far -as I know, extant in its original form, but is only known from citations -and references in later documents.” For English and Spanish material the -documents in the Annual Register seem to have been the only source used to -any extent. In fact this work contains nearly all of the documents that -have been published on the diplomatic phase of the incident. Greenhow -has reprinted most of them in the appendix to his Oregon and California. -Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 111, mentions this memorial. - -[298] Floridablanca to Merry, May 18, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) Up to this time Floridablanca had evidently -not read carefully all of the papers which he had received from the -Viceroy five months before, or he would not have asserted that only one -vessel had been seized unless, indeed, he was intentionally prevaricating. -He seems to have become informed shortly after, for in his formal reply of -June 4 he mentioned the _Princess Royal_. - -[299] Merry to Floridablanca, May 19, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[300] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 111. - -[301] Letter from Madrid of May 25, Gazette de Leide, June 11, 1790. - -[302] Work cited, note c [300] above, 113. - -[303] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 113. - -[304] [Floridablanca] to Merry, June 4, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) This is a brief note unsigned, but in the -Count’s handwriting. It states that he is sending to Merry a reply to the -latter’s of May 16. - -[305] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 115-119. -The same is published in full in the Annual Register, XXXII, 292, under a -wrong title. On the same day Floridablanca issued his circular note to all -the Courts of Europe. (See Chapter VIII.) - -[306] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 119. - -[307] Id., 72. - -[308] Id., 83-90. In these pages is a discussion of the French attitude. -Montmorin gave friendly assurances to the English representatives. The -conflicting interests of the Government and the Assembly were discussed. -On May 21 Earl Gower was sent as ambassador extraordinary to Paris. -He was to reject mediation if offered. (See Id., pp. 91-94.) While in -Paris Fitzherbert attempted to induce Lafayette and the Liberal party to -support the English contention. He had failed to renew his acquaintance -with Lafayette, but understood that the latter still wished to see free -intercourse between the Spanish colonies and the nations of Europe, and -believed that he would not acquiesce in a war undertaken on principles -diametrically opposite. Fitzherbert to Pitt, Paris, May 20, 1790; (Smith -MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. Rpt., 12, appendix 9, p. 367.) - -[309] Id., 72-82. These instructions order the ambassador to be firm -in his demands, but express a desire, apparently sincere, to terminate -the difficulty amicably. In case of his hearing that Spain had forced a -breach, he was to proceed no further without new instructions. If after -reaching Madrid he should be ordered to quit the place, he was to go to -Lisbon. If Spain should declare war, but not order him to leave, he was to -await new instructions at Madrid. - -[310] Id., 121. - -[311] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, Madrid, June 10, 1790. (MS. Arch. -Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4245.) The credentials were dated -Whitehall, May 7, 1790. - -[312] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 121, 123. - -[313] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, June 13, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. -34431, f^o 402.) The same is published in the Annual Register, XXXII, 298. -The title to this, as well as to the two documents which precede it in the -same work, is wrong. - -The following comment on the unreasonableness of the English demand is to -the point: “Es war das in der That eine eigenthuemliche Methode, Gewalt -und Recht zu mischen, einer kuenstigen Eroerterung Alles vorzubehalten und -zugleich das Resultat dieser Eroerterung zu anticipiren.” (Baumgarten, -Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen Revolution, 289.) - -[314] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Aranjuez, June 16, 1790. (MS. from the public -record office, London, Chatham MSS., bdle. 341.) The substance of the -same, in Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 125. - -[315] Work cited in last note [314], 146. - -[316] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 129. - -[317] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 145-149. - -[318] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Aranjuez, July 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[319] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 152. - -[320] Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790 (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432, f^o -32-36): Fitzherbert to Leeds, Madrid, July 15, 1790 (MS. public record -office, Spain, XVIII, 159). - -[321] Memorial signed by Fitzherbert, July 17, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[322] Instructions cited in note d [309] on foregoing page. - -[323] Report submitted June 18, 1790, in consequence of a royal order of -June 7. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 2848.) - -[324] Spanish memorial of July 22, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[325] A French version is found in Narrative of the Negotiations between -England and Spain, 156-158. There is an English version in An. Reg., -XXXII, 300. A Spanish version is in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de -l’Amérique Latine, 347. Many other works have reproduced them. - -[326] Compare with draft of declaration and draft of counter declaration -inclosed with Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790 (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432, -f^o 42-44); the same, pp. 142, 143 of the Narrative, cited in last note -[325]. - -[327] Fitzherbert to Leeds, Madrid, July 29, 1790. (MS. public record -office, Spain, XVIII, 273.) - -[328] Grenville to George III, August 4-5, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., 1, 603.) - -[329] Leeds to Fitzherbert, August 6, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Sec. Estado, 4243.) Several writers on the subject seem to have made the -mistake of thinking that these declarations were intended as a final -settlement but were rejected. Calvo, in his Recueil, says that the -declaration was rejected by England and the armaments were continued. - -[330] Fitzherbert to Leeds, June 16, 1790. (MS. public record office, -London, Chatham MSS., bdle. 341.) Also Merry to Leeds, June 4, 1790. (MS. -public record office, London, vol. for Spain, 17.) - -[331] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen -Revolution, 292. - -[332] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 150. - -[333] Id., 151. Muriel, Historia de Carlos, IV, I, 112-121. This author -gives an extended discussion of the Spanish fleet, giving the size of each -vessel, its name, and the name of its commander. - -[334] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 154. - -[335] Id., 66. - -[336] Report to the National Assembly. (Arch. Parl., first series, XVI, -692.) - -[337] See last chapter. - -[338] [Floridablanca] to Merry, May 18, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[339] An. Reg., XXXII, 298. - -[340] Leeds to Fitzherbert, July 5, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34432, f^o 46.) - -[341] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain. 465. - -[342] Id., 194. - -[343] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 199. - -[344] Id., 240. - -[345] Id., 234. - -[346] Id., 236. - -[347] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzoesischen -Revolution, 294. - -[348] Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens sur Zeit der franzoesischen -Revolution, 292. - -[349] See Lecky, England In the Eighteenth Century, V, 232-264. A number -of letters between the King of Spain and the Queen of Portugal, running -through the year, show that the latter power was offering her mediation to -settle the quarrel with England; but this is a negligible influence. (See -Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4221.) - -[350] See Chapters VII and VIII. - -[351] Miranda to Pitt, London, September 8, 1781. (Am. Hist. Rev., VII, -711, 712.) This document and several others, which will be referred to -in this chapter, were collected and published by F. J. Turner. In this -letter Miranda recounts his relations with Pitt between February, 1790, -and September, 1791. It seems that Pitt had made repeated promises of -financial aid, but had delayed them from time to time, until the writer -had become impatient. A small sum had been paid, but much less than had -been promised. He tells of Russian offers of friendship and support. Later -correspondence indicates that he received money from time to time. - -[352] Am. Hist. Rev., VII. 711, note 4. - -[353] Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 716-735. - -[354] See Chapter VIII. - -[355] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 57. - -[356] Lord Dorchester to Major Beckwith, Quebec, June 27, 1790 (Can. -Arch., 1890, p. 143); and same to same on same day (Id., 144). Very little -is known of Beckwith besides his being sent on this mission. Douglas -Brymner, in his introduction to this volume of the Canadian Archives, p. -xl, gives a brief sketch. He says that the records at Washington reveal -nothing regarding Beckwith or his mission. - -[357] Dorchester to Grenville, Quebec, July 7, 1790. (Id., 145.) - -[358] Hamilton, Works, IV, 31. - -[359] Id., 32. Also Can. Arch., 1890, p. xxxvi - -[360] Jefferson, Works, IX, 409. - -[361] Hamilton, Works, IV, 32. Also Can. Arch., 1890, p. xxxvii. - -[362] Can. Arch., 1890; p. 145. Inclosure with Dorchester to Grenville, -September 25, 1790, marked “Supposed No. 7.” These inclosures and others -similar, sent at various times by Dorchester to the British Cabinet, are -designated as unofficial information. No names are given, but the speakers -are indicated by number. Keys were sent from time to time showing for whom -the numbers stood. A complete key is found in the introduction to this -volume (p. xii). The above information reached Dorchester August 5. - -[363] Id., 147, No. 14. The key shows this to have been Mr. Scott. - -[364] Id., 162, 163, No. 7. - -[365] Jefferson to Monroe, July 11, 1790. (Jefferson, Writings, V, 198.) - -[366] Washington to Jefferson, August 27, 1790. (Id., 238.) - -[367] Jefferson to Washington, August 28, 1790. (Id.) - -[368] Jay to Washington, August 28, 1790. (Ford, The United States and -Spain in 1790, 50.) - -[369] Adams to Washington, August 29, 1790. (Id., 45.) - -[370] Knox to Washington, August 29, 1790. (Id., 103.) - -[371] Hamilton to Washington, September 15, 1790. (Hamilton, Works, IV, -48.) - -[372] Jefferson to the United States secret agent, August 11, 1790. -(Writings.) - -[373] Morris, Diary and Letters, I, 325, 326, 329; Life and Writings, II, -113. - -[374] Jefferson to [Morris], August 12, 1790. (Works or Writings, under -date.) - -[375] Morris, Diary and Letters, I, 647; entry for September 15, 1790. - -[376] This rumor was traced to Miranda, who, it was reported, said that he -had seen it in a letter to Campo, the Spanish ambassador. (See Hamilton -to Washington, September 21, 1790, Hamilton, Works, IV, 71; see also -Humphreys to the Secretary of State, London, October 20, 1790; Ford, The -United States and Spain in 1790, 31.) - -[377] Jefferson to Short, August 10, 1790. (Jefferson, Writings, V, 218.) - -[378] Jefferson to Carmichael, August 2 and 22, 1790. (Id., 216 and 225.) - -[379] See Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 720. - -[380] Short to Jefferson, Paris, October 21, 1790. (MSS. Dept. of State, -Washington, Dispatches, France, Vol. II.) - -[381] Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Madrid, January 3, 1791. (Ford, -The United States and Spain in 1790, 32.) It seems that very little news -from Carmichael had been received, and that the Government at New York had -become impatient at his dilatory conduct. He must have received a severe -reprimand from Jefferson, if one can judge from his reply of January 24, -1791 (Id., 37). It begins: “SIR: Colonel Humphreys delivered to me your -letter of the 6th of August on the 15th of last month. Nothing could -equal my astonishment at finding that I have been employing my time in -a situation that has been for many years disagreeable--so little to my -own credit or to the satisfaction of my country.” The rest of the letter -indicates that his dispatches had miscarried. He attributed the fact to -personal enemies. He said that he was sending copies of some of his last -dispatches. - -This letter from Carmichael and that from Humphreys referred to above make -interesting comments on the court intrigues in Spain--the dominance of the -Queen’s corrupt influence and the decline of Floridablanca’s prestige. - -[382] See Chapter VIII. - -[383] Arch. Parl., August 2, 1790. (Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, I, 122, -mentions this letter of June 16.) - -[384] Arch. Parl., August 3, 1790. The observations of the two Deputies -are appended to the minutes of the session. The one who presented the -latter report was Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Deputy from Rouen. - -[385] Arch. Parl., August 25, 1790; Miles, W. A., Correspondence, I, 167. - -[386] Id., August 26, 1790. Muriel, Historia de Carlos IV, 123-126, -discusses Mirabeau’s report of August 25 and the decree of August 26. -Cambridge Modern History VIII, 189, 190, discusses the decree briefly. -The latter reference says, “It is stated on the authority of Miles that -Mirabeau received from the Spanish minister a thousand louis d’or for this -service.” See also Mémoires de Mirabeau, VIII, 36; Loménie, Les Mirabeau, -V, 269; and Correspondence Entre Mirabeau et La Marck, II, 147. - -[387] Montmorin to the president of the Assembly, August 30, 1790. (MS. -Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) On October 10 the -Assembly appropriated 5,000,000 livres to defray the expense of the -armament. (See Arch. Parl., October 10, 1790.) - -[388] Montmorin to Fernan Nuñez, September 1, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[389] Oscar Browning, Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 290, says that “On -June 23, 1790, he had notified the Court that if they wished to give -effect to the family compact they must get it altered in form, as the -nation would never support an agreement which was purely dynastic in -shape.” - -[390] Montmorin to Luzerne, August 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[391] Same to same, August 28, 1790. (Id.) - -[392] Gower, Despatches, 26. - -[393] Id., 28. - -[394] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 204. - -[395] Gower to the French Court, September 4, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4038.) - -[396] Narrative of the Negotiations between England and Spain, 218. - -[397] Id., 220, 221, 223, 226, 230, 232. - -[398] Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II, 56, 59; Hassal, The French People, -352; Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 291; Adams, E. D., The Influence of -Grenville on Pitt’s Foreign Policy, 8, 9; Miles, W. A., Correspondence on -the French Revolution, I, 170, 176, 178; and George III to Pitt, October -26, 1790. Smith MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com., report 12, appendix 9, p. 368.) The -last two are the sources. The last is quoted by Adams and by the Cambridge -Modern History. - -[399] See Chapter IX. Early in August, letters from Colnett had reached -London by way of Fitzherbert at Madrid. These told of his detention in -Mexico and of his release. Their influence on the negotiations was only -indirect. (See Narrative, 166.) - -In the instructions sent from London on August 17, Fitzherbert was -asked to take up with the Spanish Court the matter of the liberation -of the Chinese which were captured at Nootka. In the same instructions -negotiations concerning a dispute over regulations for governing British -subjects in the Honduras settlement were turned over to Fitzherbert. -These had been in progress between Campo and Leeds at London in February, -when the first Spanish note on the Nootka affair was handed to Leeds. The -British Court immediately suspended all other discussions until Spain -should have offered satisfaction for the insult which they felt that the -British flag had suffered. The declarations of July 24 had been accepted -as affording such, and consequently the usual diplomatic relations had -been resumed. (See Narrative, 201, 208.) - -[400] Narrative, 168 ff. - -[401] An error in the month, as pointed out formerly. Martinez did not -arrive at Nootka until May 5. (See Chapter IV, ante.) This error was -embodied in the final treaty. - -[402] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, inclosing projet with observations, -September 8, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) -The private instructions of Leeds to Fitzherbert are to be found in the -Narrative, 168-192. - -[403] Gazette de Leide, October 1, 1790. - -[404] Peace had been concluded between Sweden and Russia on August 15, -but the news had probably not reached Madrid when the Count prepared this -paper. See Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, V, 271. - -[405] Floridablanca to the principal ministers, September, 1790. (MS. -Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado. 4291.) The same is published -in Calvo, Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 350-355; -also in Cantillo, Tratados de Paz y Comercio, 630. - -[406] Narrative, 242-245. - -[407] Id., 247-256. A manuscript copy of Fitzherbert’s projet and -Floridablanca’s counter-projet is to be found in the Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291. - -[408] Cambridge Modern History, VIII, 189, says of the Spaniards: “Feeling -how vain it was to trust an ally of this kind, they preferred to make -terms with their enemy.” - -[409] Gazette de Leide, October 15, 1790. - -[410] Id., October 19. - -[411] Dundas to Grenville, September 27, 1790. (Fortescue MSS., I, 607.) - -[412] Leeds to Fitzherbert, September 10, 1790. (Narrative, 240.) - -[413] Leeds to Auckland, October 22, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34433, f^o -349.) - -[414] In detaching the Netherlands from the French alliance and uniting -them to England and Prussia by the triple alliance. - -[415] Storer to Auckland, October 22, 1790. (Auckland, Correspondence, II, -373.) - -[416] This shows that the British Ministry was resting the justice of -its cause on the purchase of land which Meares claimed that he had made -at Nootka on his arrival in 1788, and on the temporary hut which he had -erected to shelter workmen while they were building his little vessel, the -_North-West America_. (See Chapter II.) - -[417] Narrative, 257-285. Also, the two drafts are inclosed in Leeds to -Auckland, October 8, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34433 f^o 252.) - -With these instructions Fitzherbert was also given orders concerning -the case of Captain Macdonald. He was the captain of a vessel that had -recently been seized by a Spanish frigate in the West Indies on the ground -that she was carrying on contraband trade. Indemnity for this had to be -assured before the Nootka matter could be settled. It was easily adjusted. -(Narrative, 285.) - -[418] Id., 289-291. - -[419] For a full discussion of these facts, see Chapters II-V. - -[420] Floridablanca to Fitzherbert, October 16, 1790, inclosing notes -on the English projet, and a Spanish counter projet. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[421] See last chapter. - -[422] Conclusions of the junta of eight ministers, of October 21, 22, -24, and 25, 1790. (MSS. Arch. Hist. Nacional. Madrid, Sec. Estado, -4291; a copy is found also in bundle 2848 of the same section.) In the -former bundle are also copies of all of the more important papers that -had passed between Floridablanca and Fitzherbert since the signing of -the declarations on July 24. They were submitted to the junta. In the -latter bundle are also the following letters relating to the junta and -its sessions: Floridablanca to Iriarte, October 19 and 23; and Iriarte to -Floridablanca, October 21, 22, 24, and 25, 1790. Iriarte was secretary for -the junta and one of its eight members. He belonged to the council for the -Indies. - -[423] Duro, Armada Española, VII, 16, makes the mistake of saying that -a majority of the junta favored the convention, though it met with some -opposition. He had evidently not seen the conclusions of the junta, or had -not examined them carefully. - -[424] Narrative, 297-303. - -[425] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, October 23, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[426] Narrative, 303. - -[427] Id., 291. - -[428] Narrative, 304. - -[429] Fitzherbert to Floridablanca, October 20, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291), and same to same, October 27, 1790 -(Id.). - -[430] Narrative, 292; An. Reg., XXXII, 303.; Calvo, Recueil, III, 356. - -[431] Calvo adds the secret article, but it has not been published in any -other work. - -[432] Floridablanca to Iriarte, October 27, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 2848.) - -[433] Iriarte to Floridablanca, October 28, 1790 (Id.), inclosing notes -mentioned above, and Fitzherbert’s letter to the consuls of October 26. - -[434] Floridablanca to Iriarte, November 21, 1790. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Sec. Estado, 2848.) - -[435] Reflections submitted to the junta. (Id.) - -[436] Iriarte to Floridablanca, November 24 [29], 1790. (Id.) - -[437] St. Helens to Grenville, May 16, 1791. (Fortescue MSS., II, 74.) -Fitzherbert had been raised to the peerage as Baron St. Helens. Grenville -had succeeded Leeds in the foreign office. - -[438] St. Helens to Grenville, February 28, 1792 (id., 256), and inclosure -dated Madrid, March 21, 1792, in a letter of Auckland to Grenville, -January 19, 1793 (id., 368). - -[439] Leeds to Auckland, November 4, 1790. (Brit. Mus. MSS., 34434, f^o -14.) - -[440] Aust to Auckland, November 4, 1790. (Id., f^o 20.) - -[441] Leeds to Auckland, November 9, 1790. (Id., f^o 43.) - -[442] Narrative, 306. - -[443] Burges to Auckland, November 12, 1790. (Brit. Mus., MSS. 34434, -f^o 58.) This quotation taken with the sentence which follows shows that -Burges considered about as much of the success due to himself as to -Fitzherbert. Continuing, he said: “This has been a very fortunate business -for him, for though undoubtedly he has had some trouble, his instructions -were so full and so positive, that little more on his part was necessary -than a literal adherence to them. From the turn things have unexpectedly -taken, I am apprehensive you must for some time give me credit on this -head.” It was in this letter that Burges made the statement which assisted -in identifying him as the compiler of the anonymous Narrative of the -Negotiations between England and Spain, to which frequent reference has -been made. (See p. 365, antea, note a [211].) - -[444] An. Reg., XXXII, 305. - -[445] Parl. Hist., XXVIII, 891. - -[446] Id., 893. - -[447] Id., 899-906. - -[448] Id., 933-948. - -[449] Id., 949-1003. It would be interesting to discuss these long debates -in detail, but of little value. The arguments of the opposition are much -more extended than those of the supporters of the Government. This is -doubtless what has led many writers into making the misleading statement -that the treaty was unfavorably received. The statement is true only in so -far as it applies to the opposition. Such criticism would be expected from -them, no matter how favorable the treaty really was. - -[450] In bundle 2848, Sec. Estado, Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, is a -bunch of documents, about an inch thick, marked “Subsequent references -and notes on the convention concluded on October 28, 1790, regarding -fisheries, navigation, and commerce in the Pacific Ocean and the South -Seas.” They were collected by Iriarte and presented to the Prince of Peace -[Godoy]. They bear a variety of dates, some as late as 1797, and are -quotations from various European newspapers, reports of conversations, and -copies of letters. Their purpose seems to have been to show the injustice -of England in demanding such extravagant terms. - -[451] Chapter VI. - -[452] Instructions from Bodega y Quadra to Eliza, San Blas, January 28, -1790. (MS. Arch. Gen. de Indias, Seville, 90-3-26.) - -[453] Voyage of the Sutil y Mexicana in 1792, Introduction; México á -Través de Los Siglos, II, 879; Informe of Revilla-Gigedo of April 12, -1793, in Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 330; Pedro Feger, -Nouvelles Annales de Voyages, CI, 19. - -[454] Vancouver, Voyages, I, 47-49 and 58-75. - -[455] Id., 335 ff.; Bustamante (Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 133-140; -Greenhow, Oregon and California, 241-246. - -[456] Vancouver, Voyages, VI, 65-95, 117, 126. The commission was to him -first and to the special commissioner in Vancouver’s absence. (See Id. p. -118.) - -[457] St. Helens to Grenville, May 29, 1791; Fortescue MSS., II, 86. - -[458] Grenville to St. Helens, August 26, 1791. (Id., 176.) - -[459] St. Helens to Grenville, October 3, 1791. (Id., 203.) - -[460] Same to same, May 14, 1792. (Id., 268.) - -[461] The new prime minister, appointed on the fall of Floridablanca. - -[462] St. Helens to Grenville, May 29, 1792. (Fortescue MSS., II, 275.) - -[463] Grenville to Dundas, August 4, 1792. (Id., 297.) Dundas was home -secretary. - -[464] Dundas to Grenville, September 2, 1792. (Id., 307.) - -[465] Translated from the Spanish copy published in Calvo, Recueil Complet -des Traités de l’Amérique Latine, III, 364. - -[466] Grenville to St. Helens, August 26, 1791. (Fortescue MSS., II, 176.) - -[467] Cabinet minute, January 25, 1793. (Id., 373.) - -[468] Grenville to St. Helens, June 21, 1793. (Id., 398.) The documents -relating to the negotiation are found in bundle 4221, Sec. Estado, of the -Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid. - -[469] [Alcudia] to Revilla-Gigedo, January 29, 1794. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[470] Revilla-Gigedo to Alcudia, Mexico, April 12, 1793. (Bustamante -(Cavo), Los Tres Siglos, III, 112-164.) - -[471] Translated from a Spanish copy in Calvo, Recueil, III, 386. A -manuscript copy is in bundle 4291, Sec. Estado, Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid. - -[472] [Alcudia] to Revilla-Gigedo, January 29, 1794, inclosing -instructions to Bodega y Quadra, or the one whom the Viceroy should -appoint. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4291.) - -[473] Grenville to Dundas, February 22, 1794 (Fortescue MSS., II, 511), -concerning the appointment of a commissioner; and Jackson to Alcudia, -April 17 and 20, 1794 (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, -4287), both of which relate to the commissioner and the route which he -is to take. Jackson was at the time in charge of the British legation at -Madrid. - -[474] Jackson to Alcudia, August 16, 1794. (MS. Arch. Hist. Nacional, -Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4287.) This announces the British commissioner’s -arrival at La Coruna and requests a passport for him. - -[475] Mexico á Través de Los Siglos, II, 880. This work gives a very good -brief account of the transfer and abandonment. - -[476] Alava to Alcudia, San Blas, April 23, 1795. (MS. Arch. Hist. -Nacional, Madrid, Sec. Estado, 4287.) In this letter the Spanish -commissioner reports to Godoy the final ceremonies at Nootka. He gives as -the date of the ceremonies March 28; but since an error may have been made -in copying, and since other accounts agree on the above date, that has -been adopted. Bancroft, Northwest Coast, I, 301-303, discusses the final -settlement. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHY. - -THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR IMPORTANCE. - - -I. UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS. - -_Documents copied from the Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid, 169 -pages._--Letters and official papers that passed between the British -and Spanish negotiators; correspondence between Floridablanca and other -Spanish officials; negotiations between the Spanish and French Courts. - -_Documents copied from the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, 262 -pages._--Correspondence between Martinez and the Viceroy relating to -the occupation of Nootka and to the captured English vessels; also -accounts of the matter from the Viceroy to the Government at Madrid, -inclosing copies of all of the documents relating to it. - -_Documents copied from the British Museum, 37 pages._--Instructions -from the British Cabinet to Fitzherbert, and correspondence between the -Cabinet and the British ambassadors at Berlin and The Hague. - -_Documents copied from the public record office, London, 36 -pages._--Letters from Fitzherbert to the British Cabinet. - -_Documents copied from the Archives of the Department of State at -Washington, 35 pages._--Correspondence between Jefferson, the Secretary -of State, and Short, the United States chargé at Paris. Very little of -value. - - -II. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS. - -Meares, John: _Voyages made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from -China to the Northwest Coast of America_, etc. London: 1790.--The -appendix contains important documents relating to Meares’s temporary -establishment at Nootka in 1788, to the plans for planting a permanent -colony in 1789, and to the capture of the English vessels in 1790. -These documents, if taken at their face value, give a decided prejudice -in favor of England. They have hitherto been the principal source of -information for the events at Nootka. - -_The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and -Literature for the Year 1790._ London: 1793.--This contains copies -of a few of the more important documents relating to the diplomatic -controversy. They have been the principal source of information for -this phase of the subject. They also give a decided prejudice in favor -of England. The dates of some of the documents are incorrect, and some -have their titles interchanged. - -Greenhow, Robert: _The History of Oregon and California and the Other -Territories on the Northwest Coast of North America, Accompanied by -… a Number of Documents_, etc. Second edition. Boston and London: -1845.--The appendix of this copies the documents contained in the -_Annual Register_ and adds some others of importance, most of which -are favorable to Spain. The author makes the Spanish case as strong as -possible in order to strengthen the case of the United States in the -Oregon controversy. - ----- _Official Papers Relative to the Dispute Between the Courts -of Great Britain and Spain on the Subject of the Ships Captured in -Nootka Sound, and the Negotiation that Followed Thereon_, etc. London: -[1790].--All of the documents contained in this may be found in the -_Annual Register_, the _Parliamentary History_, and the _Archives -Parlementaires_. - -Calvo: _Recueil Complet des Traités de l’Amérique Latine_. Paris: -1862.--Volume III gives a brief account in Spanish, and publishes more -Spanish documents than any other work. - -Cantillo, Alej. de: _Tratados de Paz y Comercio_. Madrid: 1843.--Some -of the documents in the preceding are copied from this. It contains a -few others. - -Fortescue MSS., Volume I: _Historical Manuscripts Commission. -Thirteenth Report. Appendix, Part III. Report on the Manuscripts of J. -B. Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore, Volume I._ London: 1892. - -Fortescue MSS., Volume II: _Historical Manuscripts Commission, -Fourteenth Report. Appendix, Part V. Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. -Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore, Volume II._ London: 1895. - -Gower: _The Despatches of Earl Gower_, June, 1790 to August, 1792. -Edited by Oscar Browning. Cambridge, England: 1885.--Earl Gower was the -English representative at Paris. A few of his dispatches bear on the -subject, especially with reference to the influence of the dispute on -the relations between England and France. - -Auckland, William, Lord: _The Journal and Correspondence of, with a -Preface and Introduction by the Right Hon. and Right Rev. The Bishop -of Bath and Wells_. London: 1861.--Lord Auckland was the British -ambassador at The Hague; but his published correspondence contains very -little of value on the subject. His important letters on the Nootka -affair are unpublished. - -Martens, Geo. Fred. de: _Recueil de Traités d’Alliance, de Paix, … des -Puissances et Etats de l’Europe_, etc. Tome IV, 1785-1790. A Gottingue: -1818.--This contains the declaration and counter declaration and the -Nootka Sound convention. - -Turner, F. J., in _American Historical Review_, Volume VII, gives -documents relating to the conferences and correspondence between Pitt -and Miranda on the South American schemes, and others showing the -English designs on Louisiana and the Floridas. - -_Canadian Archives, 1890, Report on_, by Douglas Brymner (being an -appendix to report of the minister of agriculture). Ottawa: 1891.--This -contains important documents concerning Beckwith’s secret mission to -the United States. - -Ford, Worthington C.: _The United States and Spain in 1790_. Brooklyn: -1890.--This contains some valuable documents showing the precautions -taken by the Government of the United States in view of the dispute -between England and Spain. - -Jefferson: _Writings_. Edited by P. L. Ford. New York: -1892-1899.--Volume V contains some correspondence on the Nootka affair. - -Jefferson: _Works_. Congressional edition. Washington: -1853-1855.--Volume IX contains a few of the same as the last. - -Hamilton: _Works_. Edited by H. C. Lodge. New York: 1885-86.--Volume IV -contains a few documents on the subject. - -Smith MSS.: _Historical Manuscripts Commission_. Twelfth report. -Appendix, Part IX. London: 1891.--The manuscripts of Mr. Vernon Smith -contained in this volume are the papers of his grandfather, Mr. Joseph -Smith, Pitt’s private secretary. A few bear on the Nootka controversy. - -Miles, W. A.: _The Correspondence of, on the French Revolution_, Edited -by C. P. Miles. London: 1890.--Letters in Volume I make allusion to -the mission which had been intrusted to him. He and Hugh Elliot were -engaged on the same mysterious mission. - - -III. SECONDARY SOURCES. - -[Burges, Sir James Bland]: _Narrative of the Negotiations Occasioned -by the Dispute Between England and Spain in the Year 1790_. London: -[1791].--This almost deserves to be classed among the published -documents. It was prepared in the foreign office while the negotiations -were in progress. The author’s name is not given, and has hitherto -been unknown, but it may be safely asserted that it was compiled by -Sir James Bland Burges, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, -especially for the King. It was printed shortly afterwards as an -official document. It gives a full and faithful account of the British -negotiations, and is more valuable for this than anything else that has -ever been printed. Its extreme rarity makes it almost inaccessible, so -that no previous writer has used it, though both Greenhow and Bancroft -mention it. See note a [211], p. 365, antea, and note b [443], p. 460. - ----- _Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Recueil complet des -Débats Legislatifs et Politiques des Chambres Françaises_. Premiere -serie, Tome XV, Assemblée Nationale Constituante, du 21 April, 1790 -au 30 Mai, 1790. Paris: 1883.--This contains documents concerning the -arming of 14 ships of the line by France in May, 1790, and also the -debate on the question of the right to make peace and war which the -measure provoked. Volume 17 of this series contains discussions in the -National Assembly concerning Spain and the family compact; and volume -18 contains Mirabeau’s report of August 25 on the same subject and the -decrees of August 26. - ----- _The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period -to 1803_ … Volume XXVIII (1789-1791). London: 1816.--This gives the -debates in the British Houses of Parliament on the Nootka affair. - -Bancroft, Hubert Howe: _The Works of_, Volume XXVII; _History of the -Northwest Coast_, Volume I (1543-1800). San Francisco: 1884.--This is -the fullest and one of the most reliable accounts hitherto published. -The writer naturally pays more attention to the occurrences at Nootka -than to the diplomatic controversy. - -Baumgarten, Hermann: _Geschichte Spanien’s zur Zeit der franzoesischen -Revolution. Mit einen Einleitung ueber die innere Entwicklung Spanien’s -im achtzehnten Yahrhundert._ Berlin: 1861.--His chapter on Nootka -Sound is perhaps the fullest and best account with the exception of -Bancroft’s. He gives, also, a good view of the internal condition of -the Spanish Government. - ----- _The Cambridge Modern History_, planned by Lord Acton, edited by -Ward, Prothero, and Leathers. Volume VIII, The French Revolution. New -York and London: Macmillian’s, 1904.--Chapter X, on Pitt’s Foreign -Policy to the Outbreak of the War with France, written by Oscar -Browning, gives a brief account of the Nootka affair. It has avoided -some of the errors of previous treatments. This writer consulted -manuscripts in the public record office. - -Lecky, W. E. H.: _A History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, -Volume V. New York: Appleton’s, 1891.--This contains a brief, -inaccurate account strongly tinged with English prejudice. He probably -used few documents other than those published in Meares’s _Voyages_ and -the _Annual Register_, mentioned above. - -Twiss: _The Oregon Question Examined with Respect to the Facts and the -Law of Nations_. New York: 1846.--This was written from the English -standpoint to refute Greenhow’s book, referred to above. - -Schoell, F.: _Histoire Abréyée des Traités de Paix entre Les Puissances -de l’Europe depuis la Paix de Westphalia_, etc. Paris: 1815.--Volume IV -gives a brief historical statement concerning voyages to the Northwest -Coast, and describes the Nootka region and the natives. It is not -accurate on the negotiation. - -Muriel, D. Andrés: _Historia de Carlos IV_. Madrid: 1893.--This is the -fullest recent account in Spanish. The writer gives the details of the -Spanish armament. The work contains errors and is strongly prejudiced. - -Duro, Cesáreo Fernandez: _Armada Española desde la Union de las Reinos -de Castillo y de Aragon_. Madrid: 1902.--Volume VIII gives a brief -account. The author is one of the best Spanish historians of the -present, though his work is not without errors and prejudices. - -Bustamante, Carlos Maria de: _Historia de Los Tres Siglos de Mexico, -Durante el Gobierno Español_. Supplement by Andrés Cavo. Mexico: -1836.--Volume III quotes the long letter of April 12, 1793, from -Revilla-Gigedo, the Viceroy, to Godoy. It gives a brief history of -the Spanish operations on the Northwest Coast and particularly of the -Nootka expeditions. It advises the surrender of Nootka to England, -giving reasons. - ----- _Relacion del Viage Hecho por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana en el -Año de 1792 Para Reconocer el Estrecho de Fuca_. Madrid: 1802.--The -introduction contains a brief history of the Spanish voyages to the -coast before 1792. - ----- _Northwest American Water Boundary Arbitration. Case of England._ -British Blue Book series.--This quotes extensively from the work last -named. - -Gomez de Arteche, D. José: _Reinado de Carlos IV_. Printed as a part of -the _Historia General de España Escrita por Individuos de Numero de la -Real Academia de la Historia_. Madrid: 1890.--Volume I gives a brief -discussion. - ----- _Colleccion de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España_. -Madrid: 1849.--Volume XV contains a little on the subject. - ----- _Mexico A Través de Los Siglos, Historia General y Completa … -de Mexico Desde la Antigüedad más remota Hasta la Epoca Actual_. -Under the direction of D. Vicente Riva Palacio. Mexico and Barcelona: -[----].--Volume II of this gives a good brief discussion of the mutual -abandonment of Nootka. - -Vancouver, Capt. George: _A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific -Ocean and Round the World; in Which the Coast of North America has been -Carefully Examined and Accurately Surveyed, … Performed in the Years -1790, 1791, 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795_. London: 1801.--Volumes I and -VI give an account of the futile negotiations between Vancouver and -Quadra in 1792. - -Broughton, William Robert: _A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific -Ocean … Performed in His Majesty’s Ship Providence and her Tender_. -(1795-1798.) London: 1804.--This gives an account of the mutual -abandonment. - -Colnett, James: _Voyage to the South Atlantic and around Cape Horn into -the Pacific_. London: 1798.--The introduction and a note beginning on -page 96 give Colnett’s own account of his imprisonment, written several -years after his release. - -Mirabeau: _Mémoires Biographiques, Littéraires et Politiques, Ecrits -par Lui-même, par son Père, son Oncle et son Fils adoptif_. Second -edition. Paris: 1841.--Volumes VII and VIII contain documents and brief -discussions concerning Mirabeau’s efforts in the National Assembly in -behalf of the family compact. - ----- _Correspondance Entre le Comte de Mirabeau et le Comte de le -Marck_. Paris: 1851.--Volume II contains some material on the subject. - -Loménie, Louis de: _Les Mirabeau, Nouvelles Etudes sur la Société -Française au XVIII^e Siècle_. Paris: 1891.--Volume V refers to the -relations between France and Spain. - -Stern, Alfred: _Das Leben Mirabeaus_. Berlin: 1889.--This discusses -Mirabeau’s part in the discussion on the right to make peace and war -and also his influence on foreign affairs. - -Willert, P. F.: _Mirabeau_. London: 1898.--This discusses Mirabeau’s -efforts to strengthen the position of the Monarchy in the debate on the -right of making peace and war. - -Segur, le Comte de: _Politiques des Tous les Cabinets de L’Europe, -pendant les règnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI_. Paris: 1802.--Volume -II devotes some space to a discussion of the family compact in the -National Assembly. - -De Jonge, J. C.: _Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen_. -Haarlem: 1862.--Volume V discusses briefly the part taken by the Dutch -fleet in the English naval preparations. - -Clowes, William Laird: _The Royal Navy, a History from the Earliest -Times to the Present_. Boston and London: 1899.--Volume IV discusses -the Nootka armament. - ----- _Gazette de Leide, ou Nouvelles Extraordinaires de Divers -Endroits. Année 1790._--This gives newspaper comments on the dispute -and the negotiation; also statistics regarding the growth of the -armaments. - -Stanhope: _Life of the Right Honorable William Pitt_. London: -1861-62.--This mentions the mission of Hugh Elliot to France. - -Adams, E. D.: _The Influence of Grenville on Pitt’s Foreign Policy, -1787-1798_. Washington: 1904.--This discusses the mission of Miles and -Elliot. - -Desdevises du Dezert: _L’Espagne de l’Ancien Régime_. Paris: -1897.--This gives an excellent study of the Spanish Government and -institutions. - -Tratchevsky: _L’Espagne à l’Epoque de la Révolution Française_, -published in _Revue Historique_, XXXI.--This only mentions the dispute, -but is valuable as giving an insight into the workings of the Spanish -Government. - -Hassall, Arthur: _The French People_. New York: 1901.--This discusses -the influence of the dispute on the French Revolution. - -Stephens: _Revolutionary Europe_. London: 1897.--This makes very brief -mention of the affair. - -Humboldt, Alex. von: _Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la -Nouvelle-Espagne_. Paris: 1811.--This gives a discussion based on -documents found in the archives at Mexico. - -Dixon, George: _Remarks on the Voyages of John Meares, esq., -in a Letter to that Gentleman_. London: 1790. This points out -inconsistencies in Meares’s statements. - ----- _Further Remarks on the Voyages, etc. To Which is Added a Letter -from Captain Duncan Containing a Refutation of Several Assertions of -Mr. Meares, etc._ London: 1791. - -Meares, John: _An Answer to Mr. Dixon, In Which the Remarks on the -Voyages, etc., are Fully Considered and Refuted_. London: 1791. - -Cook, Capt. James: _A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, Undertaken by -Command of His Majesty … in His Majesty’s Ships Resolution and -Discovery_. (1777-1780.) London: 1785.--Volume II tells of the -discovery of Nootka and describes the country and the natives. - -Begg, Alex.: _History of British Columbia_. Toronto: 1894.--This gives -a brief discussion of the Nootka affair, drawn chiefly from Meares’s -accounts. - -Morris, Gouverneur: _Life of, With Selections from his Correspondence_, -by Jared Sparks. Boston: 1832. - ----- _The Diary and Letters of_, by Anne Cary Morris. New York: -1888.--This and the last contain a few references to the dispute. - -[Etches, John Cadman:] _An Authentic Statement of all the Facts -Relative to Nootka Sound_. London: 1790.--This is a violently partisan -pamphlet, written by one of the proprietors of the captured vessels. - -Dalrymple: _The Spanish Pretensions Fairly Discussed_. London: -1790.--This is similar to the last. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Nootka Sound Controversy, by -William Ray Manning - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE NOOTKA SOUND CONTROVERSY *** - -***** This file should be named 53719-0.txt or 53719-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/7/1/53719/ - -Produced by MWS, Bryan Ness and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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