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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: America and the World War - - -Author: Theodore Roosevelt - - - -Release Date: December 2, 2016 [eBook #53651] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR*** - - -E-text prepared by Charlene Taylor, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images -generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/americaworldwar01roos - - - - - -AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR - - - * * * * * * - -BOOKS BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT - -PUBLISHED BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS - - - THROUGH THE BRAZILIAN WILDERNESS. - Illustrated. Large 8vo $3.50 _net_ - - LIFE-HISTORIES OF AFRICAN GAME ANIMALS. - With Edmund Heller. Illustrated. 2 vols. Large 8vo $10.00 _net_ - - AFRICAN GAME TRAILS. An account of the African - Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist. - Illustrated. Large 8vo $4.00 _net_ - - OUTDOOR PASTIMES OF AN AMERICAN HUNTER. - New Edition. Illustrated. 8vo $3.00 _net_ - - HISTORY AS LITERATURE and Other Essays. 12mo $1.50 _net_ - - OLIVER CROMWELL. Illustrated. 8vo $2.00 _net_ - - THE ROUGH RIDERS. Illustrated. 8vo $1.50 _net_ - - THE ROOSEVELT BOOK. Selections from the Writings - of Theodore Roosevelt. 16mo 50 cents _net_ - - AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR. 12mo 75 cents _net_ - - - THE ELKHORN EDITION. Complete Works of Theodore Roosevelt. 26 - volumes. Illustrated. 8vo. Sold by subscription. - - * * * * * * - - -AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR - -by - -THEODORE ROOSEVELT - - - - - - - -New York -Charles Scribner’S Sons -1915 - -Copyright, 1915, by -Charles Scribner’S Sons - -Published January, 1915 - - -[Illustration] - - - - -PRAYER FOR PEACE - - - Now these were visions in the night of war: - - I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer, - Sent down a grievous plague on humankind, - A black and tumorous plague that softly slew - Till nations and their armies were no more-- - And there was perfect peace ... - But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer. - - I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer, - Decreed the Truce of Life:--Wings in the sky - Fluttered and fell; the quick, bright ocean things - Sank to the ooze; the footprints in the woods - Vanished; the freed brute from the abattoir - Starved on green pastures; and within the blood - The death-work at the root of living ceased; - And men gnawed clods and stones, blasphemed and died-- - And there was perfect peace ... - But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer. - - I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer, - Bowed the free neck beneath a yoke of steel, - Dumbed the free voice that springs in lyric speech, - Killed the free art that glows on all mankind, - And made one iron nation lord of earth, - Which in the monstrous matrix of its will - Moulded a spawn of slaves. There was One Might-- - And there was perfect peace ... - But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer. - - I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer, - Palsied all flesh with bitter fear of death. - The shuddering slayers fled to town and field - Beset with carrion visions, foul decay. - And sickening taints of air that made the earth - One charnel of the shrivelled lines of war. - And through all flesh that omnipresent fear - Became the strangling fingers of a hand - That choked aspiring thought and brave belief - And love of loveliness and selfless deed - Till flesh was all, flesh wallowing, styed in fear, - In festering fear that stank beyond the stars-- - And there was perfect peace ... - But I awoke, wroth with high God and prayer. - - I prayed for peace; God, answering my prayer, - Spake very softly of forgotten things, - Spake very softly old remembered words - Sweet as young starlight. Rose to heaven again - The mystic challenge of the Nazarene, - That deathless affirmation:--Man in God - And God in man willing the God to be ... - And there was war and peace, and peace and war, - Full year and lean, joy, anguish, life and death, - Doing their work on the evolving soul, - The soul of man in God and God in man. - For death is nothing in the sum of things, - And life is nothing in the sum of things, - And flesh is nothing in the sum of things, - But man in God is all and God in man, - Will merged in will, love immanent in love, - Moving through visioned vistas to one goal-- - The goal of man in God and God in man, - And of all life in God and God in life-- - The far fruition of our earthly prayer, - “Thy will be done!” ... There is no other peace! - - WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON. - - - - -FOREWORD - - -In the New York _Evening Post_ for September 30, 1814, a correspondent -writes from Washington that on the ruins of the Capitol, which had -just been burned by a small British army, various disgusted patriots -had written sentences which included the following: “Fruits of war -without preparation” and “Mirror of democracy.” A century later, in -December, 1914, the same paper, ardently championing the policy of -national unpreparedness and claiming that democracy was incompatible -with preparedness against war, declared that it was moved to tears by -its pleasure in the similar championship of the same policy contained -in President Wilson’s just-published message to Congress. The message -is for the most part couched in terms of adroit and dexterous, and -usually indirect, suggestion, and carefully avoids downright, or indeed -straight-forward, statement of policy--the meaning being conveyed in -questions and hints, often so veiled and so obscure as to make it -possible to draw contradictory conclusions from the words used. There -are, however, fairly clear statements that we are “not to depend upon -a standing army nor yet upon a reserve army,” nor upon any efficient -system of universal training for our young men, but upon vague and -unformulated plans for encouraging volunteer aid for militia service -by making it “as attractive as possible”! The message contains such -sentences as that the President “hopes” that “some of the finer -passions” of the American people “are in his own heart”; that “dread -of the power of any other nation we are incapable of”; such sentences -as, shall we “be prepared to defend ourselves against attack? We -have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it -is necessary,” and “if asked, are you ready to defend yourself? we -reply, most assuredly, to the utmost.” It is difficult for a serious -and patriotic citizen to understand how the President could have -been willing to make such statements as these. Every student even of -elementary American history knows that in our last foreign war with a -formidable opponent, that of 1812, reliance on the principles President -Wilson now advocates brought us to the verge of national ruin and of -the break-up of the Union. The President must know that at that time we -had not “found means” even to defend the capital city in which he was -writing his message. He ought to know that at the present time, thanks -largely to his own actions, we are not “ready to defend ourselves” at -all, not to speak of defending ourselves “to the utmost.” In a state -paper subtle prettiness of phrase does not offset misteaching of the -vital facts of national history. - -In 1814 this nation was paying for its folly in having for fourteen -years conducted its foreign policy, and refused to prepare for defense -against possible foreign foes, in accordance with the views of the -ultrapacificists of that day. It behooves us now, in the presence of -a world war even vaster and more terrible than the world war of the -early nineteenth century, to beware of taking the advice of the equally -foolish pacificists of our own day. To follow their advice at the -present time might expose our democracy to far greater disaster than -was brought upon it by its disregard of Washington’s maxim, and its -failure to secure peace by preparing against war, a hundred years ago. - -In his message President Wilson has expressed his laudable desire that -this country, naturally through its President, may act as mediator to -bring peace among the great European powers. With this end in view -he, in his message, deprecates our taking any efficient steps to -prepare means for our own defense, lest such action might give a wrong -impression to the great warring powers. Furthermore, in his overanxiety -not to offend the powerful who have done wrong, he scrupulously -refrains from saying one word on behalf of the weak who have suffered -wrong. He makes no allusion to the violation of the Hague conventions -at Belgium’s expense, although this nation had solemnly undertaken to -be a guarantor of those conventions. He makes no protest against the -cruel wrongs Belgium has suffered. He says not one word about the need, -in the interests of true peace, of the only peace worth having, that -steps should be taken to prevent the repetition of such wrongs in the -future. - -This is not right. It is not just to the weaker nations of the earth. -It comes perilously near a betrayal of our own interests. In his -laudable anxiety to make himself acceptable as a mediator to England, -and especially to Germany, President Wilson loses sight of the fact -that his first duty is to the United States; and, moreover, desirable -though it is that his conduct should commend him to Germany, to -England, and to the other great contending powers, he should not for -this reason forget the interests of the small nations, and above all of -Belgium, whose gratitude can never mean anything tangible to him or to -us, but which has suffered a wrong that in any peace negotiations it -should be our first duty to see remedied. - -In the following chapters, substantially reproduced from articles -contributed to the Wheeler Syndicate and also to _The Outlook_, _The -Independent_, and _Everybody’s_, the attempt is made to draw from the -present lamentable contest certain lessons which it would be well for -our people to learn. Among them are the following: - -We, a people akin to and yet different from all the peoples of Europe, -should be equally friendly to all these peoples while they behave well, -should be courteous to and considerate of the rights of each of them, -but should not hesitate to judge each and all of them by their conduct. - -The kind of “neutrality” which seeks to preserve “peace” by timidly -refusing to live up to our plighted word and to denounce and take -action against such wrong as that committed in the case of Belgium, is -unworthy of an honorable and powerful people. Dante reserved a special -place of infamy in the inferno for those base angels who dared side -neither with evil nor with good. Peace is ardently to be desired, but -only as the handmaid of righteousness. The only peace of permanent -value is the peace of righteousness. There can be no such peace until -well-behaved, highly civilized small nations are protected from -oppression and subjugation. - -National promises, made in treaties, in Hague conventions, and the like -are like the promises of individuals. The sole value of the promise -comes in the performance. Recklessness in making promises is in -practice almost or quite as mischievous and dishonest as indifference -to keeping promises; and this as much in the case of nations as in the -case of individuals. Upright men make few promises, and keep those they -make. - -All the actions of the ultrapacificists for a generation past, all -their peace congresses and peace conventions, have amounted to -precisely and exactly nothing in advancing the cause of peace. The -peace societies of the ordinary pacificist type have in the aggregate -failed to accomplish even the smallest amount of good, have done -nothing whatever for peace, and the very small effect they have had -on their own nations has been, on the whole, slightly detrimental. -Although usually they have been too futile to be even detrimental, -their unfortunate tendency has so far been to make good men weak and -to make virtue a matter of derision to strong men. All-inclusive -arbitration treaties of the kind hitherto proposed and enacted are -utterly worthless, are hostile to righteousness and detrimental to -peace. The Americans, within and without Congress, who have opposed the -fortifying of the Panama Canal and the upbuilding of the American navy -have been false to the honor and the interest of the nation and should -be condemned by every high-minded citizen. - -In every serious crisis the present Hague conventions and the peace -and arbitration and neutrality treaties of the existing type have -proved not to be worth the paper on which they were written. This -is because no method was provided of securing their enforcement, -of putting force behind the pledge. Peace treaties and arbitration -treaties unbacked by force are not merely useless but mischievous in -any serious crisis. - -Treaties must never be recklessly made; improper treaties should be -repudiated long before the need for action under them arises; and all -treaties not thus repudiated in advance should be scrupulously kept. - -From the international standpoint the essential thing to do is -effectively to put the combined power of civilization back of the -collective purpose of civilization to secure justice. This can be -achieved only by a world league for the peace of righteousness, which -would guarantee to enforce by the combined strength of all the nations -the decrees of a competent and impartial court against any recalcitrant -and offending nation. Only in this way will treaties become serious -documents. - -Such a world league for peace is not now in sight. Until it is created -the prime necessity for each free and liberty-loving nation is to keep -itself in such a state of efficient preparedness as to be able to -defend by its own strength both its honor and its vital interest. The -most important lesson for the United States to learn from the present -war is the vital need that it shall at once take steps thus to prepare. - -Preparedness against war does not always avert war or disaster in -war any more than the existence of a fire department, that is, of -preparedness against fire, always averts fire. But it is the only -insurance against war and the only insurance against overwhelming -disgrace and disaster in war. Preparedness usually averts war and -usually prevents disaster in war; and always prevents disgrace in war. -Preparedness, so far from encouraging nations to go to war, has a -marked tendency to diminish the chance of war occurring. Unpreparedness -has not the slightest effect in averting war. Its only effect is -immensely to increase the likelihood of disgrace and disaster in -war. The United States should immediately strengthen its navy and -provide for its steady training in purely military functions; it -should similarly strengthen the regular army and provide a reserve; -and, furthermore, it should provide for all the young men of the -nation military training of the kind practised by the free democracy -of Switzerland. Switzerland is the least “militaristic” and most -democratic of republics, and the best prepared against war. If we -follow her example we will be carrying out the precepts of Washington. - -We feel no hostility toward any nation engaged in the present -tremendous struggle. We feel an infinite sadness because of the black -abyss of war into which all these nations have been plunged. We admire -the heroism they have shown. We act in a spirit of warm friendliness -toward all of them, even when obliged to protest against the -wrong-doing of any one of them. - -Our country should not shirk its duty to mankind. It can perform this -duty only if it is true to itself. It can be true to itself only by -definitely resolving to take the position of the just man armed; for a -proud and self-respecting nation of freemen must scorn to do wrong to -others and must also scorn tamely to submit to wrong done by others. - - THEODORE ROOSEVELT. - - SAGAMORE HILL, - January 1, 1915. - - - - -CONTENTS - - PAGE - FOREWORD vii - - CHAPTER - I. THE DUTY OF SELF-DEFENSE AND OF GOOD CONDUCT TOWARD - OTHERS 1 - - II. THE BELGIAN TRAGEDY 15 - - III. UNWISE PEACE TREATIES A MENACE TO RIGHTEOUSNESS 44 - - IV. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 60 - - V. HOW TO STRIVE FOR WORLD PEACE 74 - - VI. THE PEACE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS 88 - - VII. AN INTERNATIONAL POSSE COMITATUS 104 - - VIII. SELF-DEFENSE WITHOUT MILITARISM 128 - - IX. OUR PEACEMAKER, THE NAVY 156 - - X. PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR 174 - - XI. UTOPIA OR HELL? 220 - - XII. SUMMING UP 244 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE DUTY OF SELF-DEFENSE AND OF GOOD CONDUCT TOWARD OTHERS - - -In this country we are both shocked and stunned by the awful cataclysm -which has engulfed civilized Europe. By only a few men was the -possibility of such a wide-spread and hideous disaster even admitted. -Most persons, even after it occurred, felt as if it was unbelievable. -They felt that in what it pleased enthusiasts to speak of as “this age -of enlightenment” it was impossible that primal passion, working hand -in hand with the most modern scientific organization, should loose upon -the world these forces of dread destruction. - -In the last week in July the men and women of the populous civilized -countries of Europe were leading their usual ordered lives, busy and -yet soft, lives carried on with comfort and luxury, with appliances -for ease and pleasure such as never before were known, lives led in -a routine which to most people seemed part of the natural order of -things, something which could not be disturbed by shocks such as the -world knew of old. A fortnight later hell yawned under the feet of -these hard-working or pleasure-seeking men and women, and woe smote -them as it smote the peoples we read of in the Old Testament or in the -histories of the Middle Ages. Through the rents in our smiling surface -of civilization the volcanic fires beneath gleamed red in the gloom. - -What occurred in Europe is on a giant scale like the disaster to the -_Titanic_. One moment the great ship was speeding across the ocean, -equipped with every device for comfort, safety, and luxury. The men -in her stoke-hold and steerage were more comfortable than the most -luxurious travellers of a century ago. The people in her first-class -cabins enjoyed every luxury that a luxurious city life could demand -and were screened not only from danger but from the least discomfort -or annoyance. Suddenly, in one awful and shattering moment, death -smote the floating host, so busy with work and play. They were in that -moment shot back through immeasurable ages. At one stroke they were -hurled from a life of effortless ease back into elemental disaster; -to disaster in which baseness showed naked, and heroism burned like a -flame of light. - -In the face of a calamity so world-wide as the present war, it behooves -us all to keep our heads clear and to read aright the lessons taught -us; for we ourselves may suffer dreadful penalties if we read these -lessons wrong. The temptation always is only to half-learn such a -lesson, for a half-truth is always simple, whereas the whole truth is -very, very difficult. Unfortunately, a half-truth, if applied, may turn -out to be the most dangerous type of falsehood. - -Now, our business here in America in the face of this cataclysm is -twofold. In the first place it is imperative that we shall take the -steps necessary in order, by our own strength and wisdom, to safeguard -ourselves against such disaster as has occurred in Europe. Events have -shown that peace treaties, arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, -Hague treaties, and the like as at present existing, offer not even -the smallest protection against such disasters. The prime duty of the -moment is therefore to keep Uncle Sam in such a position that by his -own stout heart and ready hand he can defend the vital honor and vital -interest of the American people. - -But this is not our only duty, even although it is the only duty we -can immediately perform. The horror of what has occurred in Europe, -which has drawn into the maelstrom of war large parts of Asia, Africa, -Australasia, and even America, is altogether too great to permit us to -rest supine without endeavoring to prevent its repetition. We are not -to be excused if we do not make a resolute and intelligent effort to -devise some scheme which will minimize the chance for a recurrence of -such horror in the future and which will at least limit and alleviate -it if it should occur. In other words, it is our duty to try to devise -some efficient plan for securing the peace of righteousness throughout -the world. - -That any plan will surely and automatically bring peace we cannot -promise. Nevertheless, I think a plan can be devised which will render -it far more difficult than at present to plunge us into a world war -and far more easy than at present to find workable and practical -substitutes even for ordinary war. In order to do this, however, it -is necessary that we shall fearlessly look facts in the face. We -cannot devise methods for securing peace which will actually work -unless we are in good faith willing to face the fact that the present -all-inclusive arbitration treaties, peace conferences, and the like, -upon which our well-meaning pacificists have pinned so much hope, have -proved utterly worthless under serious strain. We must face this fact -and clearly understand the reason for it before we can advance an -adequate remedy. - -It is even more important not to pay heed to the pathetic infatuation -of the well-meaning persons who declare that this is “the last great -war.” During the last century such assertions have been made again and -again after the close of every great war. They represent nothing but -an amiable fatuity. The strong men of the United States must protect -the feeble; but they must not trust for guidance to the feeble. - -In these chapters I desire to ask my fellow countrymen and countrywomen -to consider the various lessons which are being writ in letters of -blood and steel before our eyes. I wish to ask their consideration, -first, of the immediate need that we shall realize the utter -hopelessness under actually existing conditions of our trusting for -our safety merely to the good-will of other powers or to treaties or -other “bits of paper” or to anything except our own steadfast courage -and preparedness. Second, I wish to point out what a complicated and -difficult thing it is to work for peace and how difficult it may be -to combine doing one’s duty in the endeavor to bring peace for others -without failing in one’s duty to secure peace for one’s self; and -therefore I wish to point out how unwise it is to make foolish promises -which under great strain it would be impossible to keep. - -Third, I wish to try to give practical expression to what I know is the -hope of the great body of our people. We should endeavor to devise some -method of action, in common with other nations, whereby there shall -be at least a reasonable chance of securing world peace and, in any -event, of narrowing the sphere of possible war and its horrors. To do -this it is equally necessary unflinchingly to antagonize the position -of the men who believe in nothing but brute force exercised without -regard to the rights of other nations, and unhesitatingly to condemn -the well-meaning but unwise persons who seek to mislead our people into -the belief that treaties, mere bits of paper, when unbacked by force -and when there is no one responsible for their enforcement, can be of -the slightest use in a serious crisis. Force unbacked by righteousness -is abhorrent. The effort to substitute for it vague declamation for -righteousness unbacked by force is silly. The policeman must be put -back of the judge in international law just as he is back of the judge -in municipal law. The effective power of civilization must be put back -of civilization’s collective purpose to secure reasonable justice -between nation and nation. - -First, consider the lessons taught by this war as to the absolute -need under existing conditions of our being willing, ready, and able -to defend ourselves from unjust attack. What has befallen Belgium and -Luxembourg--not to speak of China--during the past five months shows -the utter hopelessness of trusting to any treaties, no matter how -well meant, unless back of them lies power sufficient to secure their -enforcement. - -At the outset let me explain with all possible emphasis that in what -I am about to say at this time I am not criticising nor taking sides -with any one of the chief combatants in either group of warring -powers, so far as the relations between and among these chief powers -themselves are concerned. The causes for the present contest stretch -into the immemorial past. As far as the present generations of Germans, -Frenchmen, Russians, Austrians, and Servians are concerned, their -actions have been determined by deeds done and left undone by many -generations in the past. Not only the sovereigns but the peoples -engaged on each side believe sincerely in the justice of their several -causes. This is convincingly shown by the action of the Socialists in -Germany, France, and Belgium. Of all latter-day political parties the -Socialist is the one in which international brotherhood is most dwelt -upon, while international obligations are placed on a par with national -obligations. Yet the Socialists in Germany and the Socialists in France -and Belgium have all alike thrown themselves into this contest with -the same enthusiasm and, indeed, the same bitterness as the rest of -their countrymen. I am not at this moment primarily concerned with -passing judgment upon any of the powers. I am merely instancing certain -things that have occurred, because of the vital importance that we as a -people should take to heart the lessons taught by these occurrences. - -At the end of July Belgium and Luxembourg were independent nations. By -treaties executed in 1832 and 1867 their neutrality had been guaranteed -by the great nations round about them--Germany, France, and England. -Their neutrality was thus guaranteed with the express purpose of -keeping them at peace and preventing any invasion of their territory -during war. Luxembourg built no fortifications and raised no army, -trusting entirely to the pledged faith of her neighbors. Belgium, an -extremely thrifty, progressive, and prosperous industrial country, -whose people are exceptionally hard-working and law-abiding, raised -an army and built forts for purely defensive purposes. Neither nation -committed the smallest act of hostility or aggression against any -one of its neighbors. Each behaved with absolute propriety. Each was -absolutely innocent of the slightest wrong-doing. Neither has the very -smallest responsibility for the disaster that has overwhelmed her. -Nevertheless as soon as the war broke out the territories of both were -overrun. - -Luxembourg made no resistance. It is now practically incorporated in -Germany. Other nations have almost forgotten its existence and not the -slightest attention has been paid to its fate simply because it did -not fight, simply because it trusted solely to peaceful measures and -to the treaties which were supposed to guarantee it against harm. The -eyes of the world, however, are on Belgium because the Belgians have -fought hard and gallantly for all that makes life best worth having -to honorable men and women. In consequence, Belgium has been trampled -under foot. At this moment not only her men but her women and children -are enduring misery so dreadful that it is hard for us who live at -peace to visualize it to ourselves. - -The fate of Luxembourg and of Belgium offers an instructive commentary -on the folly of the well-meaning people who a few years ago insisted -that the Panama Canal should not be fortified and that we should trust -to international treaties to protect it. After what has occurred in -Europe no sane man has any excuse for believing that such treaties -would avail us in our hour of need any more than they have availed -Belgium and Luxembourg--and, for that matter, Korea and China--in their -hours of need. - -If a great world war should arise or if a great world-power were at -war with us under conditions that made it desirable for other nations -not to be drawn into the quarrel, any step that the hostile nation’s -real or fancied need demanded would unquestionably be taken, and any -treaty that stood in the way would be treated as so much waste paper -except so far as we could back it by force. If under such circumstances -Panama is retained and controlled by us, it will be because our forts -and garrison and our fleets on the ocean make it unsafe to meddle with -the canal and the canal zone. Were it only protected by a treaty--that -is, unless behind the treaty lay both force and the readiness to use -force--the canal would not be safe for twenty-four hours. Moreover, in -such case, the real blame would lie at our own doors. We would not be -helped at all, we would merely make ourselves objects of derision, if -under these circumstances we screamed and clamored about the iniquity -of those who violated the treaty and took possession of Panama. The -blame would rightly be placed by the world upon our own supine folly, -upon our own timidity and weakness, and we would be adjudged unfit to -hold what we had shown ourselves too soft and too short-sighted to -retain. - -The most obvious lesson taught by what has occurred is the utter -worthlessness of treaties unless backed by force. It is evident that -as things are now, all-inclusive arbitration treaties, neutrality -treaties, treaties of alliance, and the like do not serve one particle -of good in protecting a peaceful nation when some great military power -deems its vital needs at stake, unless the rights of this peaceful -nation are backed by force. The devastation of Belgium, the burning of -Louvain, the holding of Brussels to heavy ransom, the killing of women -and children, the wrecking of houses in Antwerp by bombs from air-ships -have excited genuine sympathy among neutral nations. But no neutral -nation has protested; and while unquestionably a neutral nation like -the United States ought to have protested, yet the only certain way to -make such a protest effective would be to put force back of it. Let our -people remember that what has been done to Belgium would unquestionably -be done to us by any great military power with which we were drawn into -war, no matter how just our cause. Moreover, it would be done without -any more protest on the part of neutral nations than we have ourselves -made in the case of Belgium. - -If, as an aftermath of this war, some great Old-World power or -combination of powers made war on us because we objected to their -taking and fortifying Magdalena Bay or St. Thomas, our chance of -securing justice would rest exclusively on the efficiency of our -fleet and army, especially the fleet. No arbitration treaties, or -peace treaties, of the kind recently negotiated at Washington by the -bushelful, and no tepid good-will of neutral powers, would help us in -even the smallest degree. If our fleet were conquered, New York and -San Francisco would be seized and probably each would be destroyed as -Louvain was destroyed unless it were put to ransom as Brussels has -been put to ransom. Under such circumstances outside powers would -undoubtedly remain neutral exactly as we have remained neutral as -regards Belgium. - -Under such conditions my own view is very strongly that the national -interest would be best served by refusing the payment of all ransom -and accepting the destruction of the cities and then continuing the -war until by our own strength and indomitable will we had exacted -ample atonement from our foes. This would be a terrible price to pay -for unpreparedness; and those responsible for the unpreparedness would -thereby be proved guilty of a crime against the nation. Upon them would -rest the guilt of all the blood and misery. The innocent would have -to atone for their folly and strong men would have to undo and offset -it by submitting to the destruction of our cities rather than consent -to save them by paying money which would be used to prosecute the war -against the rest of the country. If our people are wise and far-sighted -and if they still have in their blood the iron of the men who fought -under Grant and Lee, they will, in the event of such a war, insist upon -this price being paid, upon this course being followed. They will -then in the end exact, from the nation which assails us, atonement for -the misery and redress for the wrong done. They will not rely upon the -ineffective good-will of neutral outsiders. They will show a temper -that will make our foes think twice before meddling with us again. - -The great danger to peace so far as this country is concerned arises -from such pacificists as those who have made and applauded our recent -all-inclusive arbitration treaties, who advocate the abandonment of -our policy of building battle-ships and the refusal to fortify the -Panama Canal. It is always possible that these persons may succeed in -impressing foreign nations with the belief that they represent our -people. If they ever do succeed in creating this conviction in the -minds of other nations, the fate of the United States will speedily be -that of China and Luxembourg, or else it will be saved therefrom only -by long-drawn war, accompanied by incredible bloodshed and disaster. - -It is those among us who would go to the front in such event--as I -and my four sons would go--who are the really far-sighted and earnest -friends of peace. We desire measures taken in the real interest of -peace because we, who at need would fight, but who earnestly hope -never to be forced to fight, have most at stake in keeping peace. We -object to the actions of those who do most talking about the necessity -of peace because we think they are really a menace to the just and -honorable peace which alone this country will in the long run support. -We object to their actions because we believe they represent a course -of conduct which may at any time produce a war in which we and not they -would labor and suffer. - -In such a war the prime fact to be remembered is that the men really -responsible for it would not be those who would pay the penalty. The -ultrapacificists are rarely men who go to battle. Their fault or their -folly would be expiated by the blood of countless thousands of plain -and decent American citizens of the stamp of those, North and South -alike, who in the Civil War laid down all they had, including life -itself, in battling for the right as it was given to them to see the -right. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE BELGIAN TRAGEDY - - -Peace is worthless unless it serves the cause of righteousness. Peace -which consecrates militarism is of small service. Peace obtained -by crushing the liberty and life of just and unoffending peoples -is as cruel as the most cruel war. It should ever be our honorable -effort to serve one of the world’s most vital needs by doing all in -our power to bring about conditions which will give some effective -protection to weak or small nations which themselves keep order and -act with justice toward the rest of mankind. There can be no higher -international duty than to safeguard the existence and independence of -industrious, orderly states, with a high personal and national standard -of conduct, but without the military force of the great powers; states, -for instance, such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian -countries, Uruguay, and others. A peace which left Belgium’s wrongs -unredressed and which did not provide against the recurrence of such -wrongs as those from which she has suffered would not be a real peace. - -As regards the actions of most of the combatants in the hideous -world-wide war now raging it is possible sincerely to take and defend -either of the opposite views concerning their actions. The causes of -any such great and terrible contest almost always lie far back in the -past, and the seeming immediate cause is usually itself in major part -merely an effect of many preceding causes. The assassination of the -heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was partly or largely due to the -existence of political and often murderous secret societies in Servia -which the Servian government did not suppress; and it did not suppress -them because the “bondage” of the men and women of the Servian race in -Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria was such a source of ever-present -irritation to the Servians that their own government was powerless to -restrain them. Strong arguments can be advanced on both the Austrian -and the Servian sides as regards this initial cause of the present -world-wide war. - -Again, when once the war was started between Austria and Servia, it can -well be argued that it was impossible for Russia not to take part. Had -she not done so, she would have forfeited her claims to the leadership -of the smaller Slav peoples; and the leading Russian liberals -enthusiastically support the Russian government in this matter, -asserting that Russia’s triumph in this particular struggle means a -check to militarism, a stride toward greater freedom, and an advance -in justice toward the Pole, the Jew, the Finn, and the people of the -Caucasus. - -When Russia took part it may well be argued that it was impossible -for Germany not to come to the defense of Austria, and that disaster -would surely have attended her arms had she not followed the course -she actually did follow as regards her opponents on her western -frontier. As for her wonderful efficiency--her equipment, the foresight -and decision of her General Staff, her instantaneous action, her -indomitable persistence--there can be nothing but the praise and -admiration due a stern, virile, and masterful people, a people entitled -to hearty respect for their patriotism and far-seeing self-devotion. - -Yet again, it is utterly impossible to see how France could have acted -otherwise than as she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the -crisis, even although it be admitted that in the end she was certain -to side with Russia. War was not declared by her, but against her, -and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in the past, -and by willingness to pursue in the future, a course which would have -left her as helpless as Luxembourg--and Luxembourg’s fate shows that -helplessness does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace. - -When once Belgium was invaded, every circumstance of national honor -and interest forced England to act precisely as she did act. She could -not have held up her head among nations had she acted otherwise. In -particular, she is entitled to the praise of all true lovers of peace, -for it is only by action such as she took that neutrality treaties -and treaties guaranteeing the rights of small powers will ever be -given any value. The actions of Sir Edward Grey as he guided Britain’s -foreign policy showed adherence to lofty standards of right combined -with firmness of courage under great strain. The British position, and -incidentally the German position, are tersely stated in the following -extract from the report of Sir Edward Goschen, who at the outset of the -war was British ambassador in Berlin. The report, in speaking of the -interview between the ambassador and the German imperial chancellor, -Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, says: - - The chancellor [spoke] about twenty minutes. He said the step - taken by Great Britain was terrible to a degree. Just for a - word, “neutrality,” a word which in war time had been so often - disregarded, just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was - going to make war on a kindred nation. What we had done was - unthinkable. It was like striking a man from behind while he was - fighting for his life against two assailants. - - I protested strongly against this statement, and said that in - the same way as he wished me to understand that for strategical - reasons it was a matter of life or death to Germany to advance - through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would - wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life - or death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her - solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality - if attacked. A solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what - confidence could any one have in England’s engagement in the - future? - -There is one nation, however, as to which there is no room for -difference of opinion, whether we consider her wrongs or the justice -of her actions. It seems to me impossible that any man can fail to -feel the deepest sympathy with a nation which is absolutely guiltless -of any wrong-doing, which has given proof of high valor, and yet which -has suffered terribly, and which, if there is any meaning in the words -“right” and “wrong,” has suffered wrongfully. Belgium is not in the -smallest degree responsible for any of the conditions that during the -last half century have been at work to impress a certain fatalistic -stamp upon those actions of Austria, Russia, Germany, and France which -have rendered this war inevitable. No European nation has had anything -whatever to fear from Belgium. There was not the smallest danger of -her making any aggressive movement, not even the slightest aggressive -movement, against any one of her neighbors. Her population was mainly -industrial and was absorbed in peaceful business. Her people were -thrifty, hard-working, highly civilized, and in no way aggressive. -She owed her national existence to the desire to create an absolutely -neutral state. Her neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed by the great -powers, including Germany as well as England and France. - -Suddenly, and out of a clear sky, her territory was invaded by an -overwhelming German army. According to the newspaper reports, it -was admitted in the Reichstag by German members that this act was -“wrongful.” Of course, if there is any meaning to the words “right” -and “wrong” in international matters, the act was wrong. The men who -shape German policy take the ground that in matters of vital national -moment there are no such things as abstract right and wrong, and that -when a great nation is struggling for its existence it can no more -consider the rights of neutral powers than it can consider the rights -of its own citizens as these rights are construed in times of peace, -and that everything must bend before the supreme law of national -self-preservation. Whatever we may think of the morality of this plea, -it is certain that almost all great nations have in time past again and -again acted in accordance with it. England’s conduct toward Denmark in -the Napoleonic wars, and the conduct of both England and France toward -us during those same wars, admit only of this species of justification; -and with less excuse the same is true of our conduct toward Spain in -Florida nearly a century ago. Nevertheless we had hoped by the action -taken at The Hague to mark an advance in international morality in such -matters. The action taken by Germany toward Belgium, and the failure by -the United States in any way to protest against such action, shows that -there has been no advance. I wish to point out just what was done, and -to emphasize Belgium’s absolute innocence and the horrible suffering -and disaster that have overwhelmed her in spite of such innocence. And -I wish to do this so that we as a nation may learn aright the lessons -taught by the dreadful Belgian tragedy. - -Germany’s attack on Belgium was not due to any sudden impulse. It had -been carefully planned for a score of years, on the assumption that -the treaty of neutrality was, as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg observed, -nothing but “paper,” and that the question of breaking or keeping -it was to be considered solely from the standpoint of Germany’s -interest. The German railways up to the Belgian border are for the -most part military roads, which have been double-tracked with a view -to precisely the overwhelming attack that has just been delivered into -and through Belgium. The great German military text-books, such as that -of Bernhardi, in discussing and studying possible German campaigns -against Russia and France, have treated advances through Belgium or -Switzerland exactly as they have treated possible advances through -German territory, it being assumed by the writers and by all for whom -they wrote that no efficient rulers or military men would for a second -consider a neutrality treaty or any other kind of treaty if it became -to the self-interest of a party to break it. It must be remembered -that the German system in no way limits its disregard of conventions -to disregard of neutrality treaties. For example, in General von -Bernhardi’s book, in speaking of naval warfare, he lays down the -following rule: “Sometimes in peace even, if there is no other means -of defending one’s self against a superior force, it will be advisable -to attack the enemy by torpedo and submarine boats, and to inflict -upon him unexpected losses.... War upon the enemy’s trade must also be -conducted as ruthlessly as possible, since only then, in addition to -the material damage inflicted upon the enemy, the necessary terror is -spread among the merchant marine, which is even more important than -the capture of actual prizes. A certain amount of terrorism must be -practised on the sea, making peaceful tradesmen stay in safe harbors.” - -Belgium has felt the full effect of the practical application of these -principles, and Germany has profited by them exactly as her statesmen -and soldiers believed she would profit. They have believed that the -material gain of trampling on Belgium would more than offset any -material opposition which the act would arouse, and they treat with the -utter and contemptuous derision which it deserves the mere pacificist -clamor against wrong which is unaccompanied by the intention and effort -to redress wrong by force. - -The Belgians, when invaded, valiantly defended themselves. They -acted precisely as Andreas Hofer and his Tyrolese, and Koerner and -the leaders of the North German Tugendbund acted in their day; and -their fate has been the fate of Andreas Hofer, who was shot after his -capture, and of Koerner, who was shot in battle. They fought valiantly, -and they were overcome. They were then stamped under foot. Probably it -is physically impossible for our people, living softly and at ease, to -visualize to themselves the dreadful woe that has come upon the people -of Belgium, and especially upon the poor people. Let each man think of -his neighbors--of the carpenter, the station agent, the day-laborer, -the farmer, the grocer--who are round about him, and think of these -men deprived of their all, their homes destroyed, their sons dead or -prisoners, their wives and children half starved, overcome with fatigue -and horror, stumbling their way to some city of refuge, and when they -have reached it, finding air-ships wrecking the houses with bombs and -destroying women and children. The King shared the toil and danger of -the fighting men; the Queen and her children suffered as other mothers -and children suffered. - -Unquestionably what has been done in Belgium has been done in -accordance with what the Germans sincerely believe to be the course -of conduct necessitated by Germany’s struggle for life. But Germany’s -need to struggle for her life does not make it any easier for the -Belgians to suffer death. The Germans are in Belgium from no fault -of the Belgians but purely because the Germans deemed it to their -vital interest to violate Belgium’s rights. Therefore the ultimate -responsibility for what has occurred at Louvain and what has occurred -and is occurring in Brussels rests upon Germany and in no way upon -Belgium. The invasion could have been averted by no action of Belgium -that was consistent with her honor and self-respect. The Belgians would -have been less than men had they not defended themselves and their -country. For this, and for this only, they are suffering, somewhat as -my own German ancestors suffered when Turenne ravaged the Palatinate, -somewhat as my Irish ancestors suffered in the struggles that attended -the conquests and reconquests of Ireland in the days of Cromwell -and William. The suffering is by no means as great, but it is very -great, and it is altogether too nearly akin to what occurred in the -seventeenth century for us of the twentieth century to feel overmuch -pleased with the amount of advance that has been made. It is neither -necessary nor at the present time possible to sift from the charges, -countercharges, and denials the exact facts as to the acts alleged -to have been committed in various places. The prime fact as regards -Belgium is that Belgium was an entirely peaceful and genuinely neutral -power which had been guilty of no offence whatever. What has befallen -her is due to the further fact that a great, highly civilized military -power deemed that its own vital interests rendered imperative the -infliction of this suffering on an inoffensive although valiant and -patriotic little nation. - -I admire and respect the German people. I am proud of the German blood -in my veins. But the sympathy and support of the American people should -go out unreservedly to Belgium, and we should learn the lesson taught -by Belgium’s fall. What has occurred to Belgium is precisely what would -occur under similar conditions to us, unless we were able to show that -the action would be dangerous. - -The rights and wrongs of these cases where nations violate the rules -of morality in order to meet their own supposed needs can be precisely -determined only when all the facts are known and when men’s blood is -cool. Nevertheless, it is imperative, in the interest of civilization, -to create international conditions which shall neither require nor -permit such action in the future. Moreover, we should understand -clearly just what these actions are and just what lessons we of the -United States should learn from them so far as our own future is -concerned. - -There are several such lessons. One is how complicated instead of how -simple it is to decide what course we ought to follow as regards any -given action supposed to be in the interest of peace. Of course I am -speaking of the thing and not the name when I speak of peace. The -ultrapacificists are capable of taking any position, yet I suppose -that few among them now hold that there was value in the “peace” which -was obtained by the concert of European powers when they prevented -interference with Turkey while the Turks butchered some hundreds of -thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. In the same way I do -not suppose that even the ultrapacificists really feel that “peace” -is triumphant in Belgium at the present moment. President Wilson has -been much applauded by all the professional pacificists because he -has announced that our desire for peace must make us secure it for -ourselves by a neutrality so strict as to forbid our even whispering a -protest against wrong-doing, lest such whispers might cause disturbance -to our ease and well-being. We pay the penalty of this action--or, -rather, supine inaction--on behalf of peace for ourselves, by -forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians -in the present. We can maintain our neutrality only by refusal to do -anything to aid unoffending weak powers which are dragged into the gulf -of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own. It is a grim -comment on the professional pacificist theories as hitherto developed -that, according to their view, our duty to preserve peace for ourselves -necessarily means the abandonment of all effective effort to secure -peace for other unoffending nations which through no fault of their own -are trampled down by war. - -The next lesson we should learn is of far more immediate consequence -to us than speculations about peace in the abstract. Our people -should wake up to the fact that it is a poor thing to live in a -fool’s paradise. What has occurred in this war ought to bring home -to everybody what has of course long been known to all really -well-informed men who were willing to face the truth and not try to -dodge it. Until some method is devised of putting effective force -behind arbitration and neutrality treaties neither these treaties nor -the vague and elastic body of custom which is misleadingly termed -international law will have any real effect in any serious crisis -between us and any save perhaps one or two of the great powers. The -average great military power looks at these matters purely from the -standpoint of its own interests. Several months ago, for instance, -Japan declared war on Germany. She has paid scrupulous regard to -our own rights and feelings in the matter. The contention that she -is acting in a spirit of mere disinterested altruism need not be -considered. She believes that she has wrongs to redress and strong -national interests to preserve. Nineteen years ago Germany joined -with Russia to check Japan’s progress after her victorious war with -China, and has since then itself built up a German colonial possession -on Chinese soil. Doubtless the Japanese have never for one moment -forgotten this act of Germany. Doubtless they also regard the presence -of a strong European military power in China so near to Korea and -Manchuria as a menace to Japan’s national life. With businesslike -coolness the soldierly statesmen of Nippon have taken the chance which -offered itself of at little cost retaliating for the injury inflicted -upon them in the past and removing an obstacle to their future -dominance in eastern Asia. Korea is absolutely Japan’s. To be sure, by -treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. -But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of -the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its -own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly -unable to do for themselves. Moreover, the treaty rested on the false -assumption that Korea could govern herself well. It had already been -shown that she could not in any real sense govern herself at all. Japan -could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign power. -She regarded her duty to her children and her children’s children as -overriding her treaty obligations. Therefore, when Japan thought the -right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea, with -the polite and businesslike efficiency it had already shown in dealing -with Russia, and was afterward to show in dealing with Germany. The -treaty, when tested, proved as utterly worthless as our own recent -all-inclusive arbitration treaties--and worthlessness can go no further. - -Hysteria does not tend toward edification; and in this country hysteria -is unfortunately too often the earmark of the ultrapacificist. Surely -at this time there is more reason than ever to remember Professor -Lounsbury’s remark concerning the “infinite capacity of the human brain -to withstand the introduction of knowledge.” The comments of some -doubtless well-meaning citizens of our own country upon the lessons -taught by this terrible cataclysm of war are really inexplicable to -any man who forgets the truth that Professor Lounsbury thus set forth. -A writer of articles for a newspaper syndicate the other day stated -that Germany was being opposed by the rest of the world because it had -“inspired fear.” This thesis can, of course, be sustained. But Belgium -has inspired no fear. Yet it has suffered infinitely more than Germany. -Luxembourg inspired no fear. Yet it has been quietly taken possession -of by Germany. The writer in question would find it puzzling to point -out the particulars in which Belgium and Luxembourg--not to speak of -China and Korea--are at this moment better off than Germany. Of course -they are worse off; and this because Germany _has_ “inspired fear,” -and they have not. Nevertheless, this writer drew the conclusion that -“fear” was the only emotion which ought not to be inspired; and he -advocated our abandonment of battle-ships and other means of defense, -so that we might never inspire “fear” in any one. He forgot that, -while it is a bad thing to inspire fear, it is a much worse thing to -inspire contempt. Another newspaper writer pointed out that on the -frontier between us and Canada there were no forts, and yet peace -obtained; and drew the conclusion that forts and armed forces were -inimical to national safety. This worthy soul evidently did not know -that Luxembourg had no forts or armed forces, and therefore succumbed -without a protest of any kind. If he does not admire the heroism of the -Belgians and prefer it to the tame submission of the Luxembourgers, -then this writer is himself unfit to live as a free man in a free -country. The crown of ineptitude, however, was reached by an editor -who announced, in praising the recent all-inclusive peace treaties, -that “had their like been in existence between some of the European -nations two weeks ago, the world might have been spared the great war.” -It is rather hard to deal seriously with such a supposition. At this -very moment the utter worthlessness, under great pressure, of even the -rational treaties drawn to protect Belgium and Luxembourg has been -shown. To suppose that under such conditions a bundle of bits of paper -representing mere verbiage, with no guarantee, would count for anything -whatever in a serious crisis is to show ourselves unfit to control the -destinies of a great, just, and self-respecting people. - -These writers wish us to abandon all means of defending ourselves. -Some of them advocate our abandoning the building of an efficient -fleet. Yet at this moment Great Britain owes it that she is not in -worse plight than Belgium solely to the fact that with far-sighted -wisdom her statesmen have maintained her navy at the highest point of -efficiency. At this moment the Japanese are at war with the Germans, -and hostilities have been taking place in what but twenty years ago -was Chinese territory, and what by treaty is unquestionably Chinese -territory to-day. China has protested against the Japanese violation of -Chinese neutrality in their operations against the Germans, but no heed -has been paid to the protest, for China cannot back the protest by the -use of armed force. Moreover, as China is reported to have pointed out -to Germany, the latter power had violated Chinese neutrality just as -Japan had done. - -Very possibly the writers above alluded to were sincere in their belief -that they were advocating what was patriotic and wise when they urged -that the United States make itself utterly defenseless so as to avoid -giving an excuse for aggression. Yet these writers ought to have known -that during their own lifetime China has been utterly defenseless and -yet has suffered from aggression after aggression. Large portions -of its territory are now in the possession of Russia, of Japan, of -Germany, of France, of England. The great war between Russia and Japan -was fought on what was nominally Chinese territory. At present, because -a few months ago Servian assassins murdered the heir to the Austrian -monarchy, Japan has fought Germany on Chinese territory. Luxembourg -has been absolutely powerless and defenseless, has had no soldiers and -no forts. It is off the map at this moment. Not only are none of the -belligerents thinking about its rights, but no neutral is thinking -about its rights, and this simply because Luxembourg could not defend -itself. It is our duty to be patient with every kind of folly, but it -is hard for a good American, for a man to whom his country is dear and -who reveres the memories of Washington and Lincoln, to be entirely -patient with the kind of folly that advocates reducing this country to -the position of China and Luxembourg. - -One of the main lessons to learn from this war is embodied in the -homely proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Persistently only -half of this proverb has been quoted in deriding the men who wish to -safeguard our national interest and honor. Persistently the effort has -been made to insist that those who advocate keeping our country able to -defend its rights are merely adopting “the policy of the big stick.” -In reality, we lay equal emphasis on the fact that it is necessary to -speak softly; in other words, that it is necessary to be respectful -toward all people and scrupulously to refrain from wronging them, -while at the same time keeping ourselves in condition to prevent wrong -being done to us. If a nation does not in this sense speak softly, -then sooner or later the policy of the big stick is certain to result -in war. But what befell Luxembourg five months ago, what has befallen -China again and again during the past quarter of a century, shows that -no amount of speaking softly will save any people which does not carry -a big stick. - -America should have a coherent policy of action toward foreign powers, -and this should primarily be based on the determination never to -give offense when it can be avoided, always to treat other nations -justly and courteously, and, as long as present conditions exist, to -be prepared to defend our own rights ourselves. No other nation will -defend them for us. No paper guarantee or treaty will be worth the -paper on which it is written if it becomes to the interest of some -other power to violate it, unless we have strength, and courage and -ability to use that strength, back of the treaty. Every public man, -every writer who speaks with wanton offensiveness of a foreign power or -of a foreign people, whether he attacks England or France or Germany, -whether he assails the Russians or the Japanese, is doing an injury to -the whole American body politic. We have plenty of shortcomings at home -to correct before we start out to criticise the shortcomings of others. -Now and then it becomes imperatively necessary in the interests of -humanity, or in our own vital interest, to act in a manner which will -cause offense to some other power. This is a lamentable necessity; but -when the necessity arises we must meet it and act as we are honorably -bound to act, no matter what offense is given. We must always weigh -well our duties in such a case, and consider the rights of others as -well as our own rights, in the interest of the world at large. If after -such consideration it is evident that we are bound to act along a -certain line of policy, then it is mere weakness to refrain from doing -so because offense is thereby given. But we must never act wantonly or -brutally, or without regard to the essentials of genuine morality--a -morality considering our interests as well as the interests of others, -and considering the interests of future generations as well as of the -present generation. We must so conduct ourselves that every big nation -and every little nation that behaves itself shall never have to think -of us with fear, and shall have confidence not only in our justice -but in our courtesy. Submission to wrong-doing on our part would be -mere weakness and would invite and insure disaster. We must not submit -to wrong done to our honor or to our vital national interests. But -we must be scrupulously careful always to speak with courtesy and -self-restraint to others, always to act decently to others, and to give -no nation any justification for believing that it has anything to fear -from us as long as it behaves with decency and uprightness. - -Above all, let us avoid the policy of peace with insult, the policy of -unpreparedness to defend our rights, with inability to restrain our -representatives from doing wrong to or publicly speaking ill of others. -The worst policy for the United States is to combine the unbridled -tongue with the unready hand. - -We in this country have of course come lamentably short of our ideals. -Nevertheless, in some ways our ideals have been high, and at times we -have measurably realized them. From the beginning we have recognized -what is taught in the words of Washington, and again in the great -crisis of our national life in the words of Lincoln, that in the -past free peoples have generally split and sunk on that great rock -of difficulty caused by the fact that a government which recognizes -the liberties of the people is not usually strong enough to preserve -the liberties of the people against outside aggression. Washington -and Lincoln believed that ours was a strong people and therefore fit -for a strong government. They believed that it was only weak peoples -that had to fear strong governments, and that to us it was given to -combine freedom and efficiency. They belonged among that line of -statesmen and public servants whose existence has been the negation of -the theory that goodness is always associated with weakness, and that -strength always finds its expression in violent wrong-doing. Edward -the Confessor represented exactly the type which treats weakness and -virtue as interchangeable terms. His reign was the prime cause of the -conquest of England. Godoy, the Spanish statesman, a century ago, by -the treaties he entered into and carried out, actually earned the title -of “Prince of Peace” instead of merely lecturing about it; and the -result of his peacefulness was the loss by Spain of the vast regions -which, she then held in our country west of the Mississippi, and -finally the overthrow of the Spanish national government, the setting -up in Madrid of a foreign king by a foreign conqueror, and a long-drawn -and incredibly destructive war. To statesmen of this kind Washington -and Lincoln stand in as sharp contrast as they stand on the other side -to the great absolutist chiefs such as Cæsar, Napoleon, Frederick the -Great, and Cromwell. What was true of the personality of Washington -and Lincoln was true of the policy they sought to impress upon our -nation. They were just as hostile to the theory that virtue was to -be confounded with weakness as to the theory that strength justified -wrong-doing. No abundance of the milder virtues will save a nation that -has lost the virile qualities; and, on the other hand, no admiration -of strength must make us deviate from the laws of righteousness. The -kind of “peace” advocated by the ultrapacificists of 1776 would have -meant that we never would have had a country; the kind of “peace” -advocated by the ultrapacificists in the early ’60’s would have meant -the absolute destruction of the country. It would have been criminal -weakness for Washington not to have fought for the independence of this -country, and for Lincoln not to have fought for the preservation of -the Union; just as in an infinitely smaller degree it would have been -criminal weakness for us if we had permitted wrong-doing in Cuba to go -on forever unchecked, or if we had failed to insist on the building -of the Panama Canal in exactly the fashion that we did insist; and, -above all, if we had failed to build up our navy as during the last -twenty years it has been built up. No alliance, no treaty, and no -easy good-will of other nations will save us if we are not true to -ourselves; and, on the other hand, if we wantonly give offense to -others, if we excite hatred and fear, then some day we will pay a heavy -penalty. - -The most important lesson, therefore, for us to learn from Belgium’s -fate is that, as things in the world now are, we must in any great -crisis trust for our national safety to our ability and willingness to -defend ourselves by our own trained strength and courage. We must not -wrong others; and for our own safety we must trust, not to worthless -bits of paper unbacked by power, and to treaties that are fundamentally -foolish, but to our own manliness and clear-sighted willingness to face -facts. - -There is, however, another lesson which this huge conflict may at least -possibly teach. There is at least a chance that from this calamity -a movement may come which will at once supplement and in the future -perhaps altogether supplant the need of the kind of action so plainly -indicated by the demands of the present. It is at least possible that -the conflict will result in a growth of democracy in Europe, in at -least a partial substitution of the rule of the people for the rule of -those who esteem it their God-given right to govern the people. This, -in its turn, would render it probably a little more unlikely that there -would be a repetition of such disastrous warfare. I do not think that -at present it would prevent the possibility of warfare. I think that -in the great countries engaged, the peoples as a whole have been behind -their sovereigns on both sides of this contest. Certainly the action of -the Socialists in Germany, France, and Belgium, and, so far as we know, -of the popular leaders in Russia, would tend to bear out the truth of -this statement. But the growth of the power of the people, while it -would not prevent war, would at least render it more possible than at -present to make appeals which might result in some cases in coming to -an accommodation based upon justice; for justice is what popular rule -must be permanently based upon and must permanently seek to obtain or -it will not itself be permanent. - -Moreover, the horror that right-thinking citizens feel over the awful -tragedies of this war can hardly fail to make sensible men take an -interest in genuine peace movements and try to shape them so that they -shall be more practical than at present. I most earnestly believe in -every rational movement for peace. My objection is only to movements -that do not in very fact tell in favor of peace or else that sacrifice -righteousness to peace. Of course this includes objection to all -treaties that make believe to do what, as a matter of fact, they -fail to do. Under existing conditions universal and all-inclusive -arbitration treaties have been utterly worthless, because where there -is no power to compel nations to arbitrate, and where it is perfectly -certain that some nations will pay no respect to such agreements unless -they can be forced to do so, it is mere folly for others to trust to -promises impossible of performance; and it is an act of positive bad -faith to make these promises when it is certain that the nation making -them would violate them. But this does not in the least mean that we -must abandon hope of taking action which will lessen the chance of -war and make it more possible to circumscribe the limits of war’s -devastation. - -For this result we must largely trust to sheer growth in morality and -intelligence among the nations themselves. For a hundred years peace -has obtained between us and Great Britain. No frontier in Europe is -as long as the frontier between Canada and ourselves, and yet there -is not a fort, nor an armed force worthy of being called such, upon -it. This does not result from any arbitration treaty or any other -treaty. Such treaties as those now existing are as a rule observed -only when they serve to make a record of conditions that already exist -and which they do not create. The fact simply is that there has been -such growth of good feeling and intelligence that war between us and -the British Empire is literally an impossibility, and there is no more -chance of military movements across the Canadian border than there -is of such movement between New York and New Hampshire or Quebec -and Ontario. Slowly but surely, I believe, such feelings will grow, -until war between the Englishman and the German, or the Russian, or -the Frenchman, or between any of them and the American, will be as -unthinkable as now between the Englishman or Canadian and the American. - -But something can be done to hasten this day by wise action. It may -not be possible at once to have this action as drastic as would be -ultimately necessary; but we should keep our purpose in view. The utter -weakness of the Hague court, and the worthlessness when strain is put -upon them of most treaties, spring from the fact that at present there -is no means of enforcing the carrying out of the treaty or enforcing -the decision of the court. Under such circumstances recommendations for -universal disarmament stand on an intellectual par with recommendations -to establish “peace” in New York City by doing away with the police. -Disarmament of the free and liberty-loving nations would merely mean -insuring the triumph of some barbarism or despotism, and if logically -applied would mean the extinction of liberty and of all that makes -civilization worth having throughout the world. But in view of what has -occurred in this war, surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations -to consider a great world agreement among all the civilized military -powers _to back righteousness by force_. Such an agreement would -establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -UNWISE PEACE TREATIES A MENACE TO RIGHTEOUSNESS - - -In studying certain lessons which should be taught the United States by -this terrible world war, it is not necessary for us to try exactly to -assess or apportion the blame. There are plenty of previous instances -of violation of treaties to be credited to almost all the nations -engaged on one side or the other. We need not try to puzzle out why -Italy and Japan seemingly construed similar treaties of alliance in -diametrically opposite ways; nor need we decide which was justified or -whether both were justified. It is quite immaterial to us, as regards -certain of the lessons taught, whether the treaties alleged to be -violated affect Luxembourg on the one hand or Bosnia on the other, -whether it is the neutrality of China or the neutrality of Belgium that -is violated. - -Yet again, we need always to keep in mind that, although it is culpable -to break a treaty, it may be even worse recklessly to make a treaty -which cannot be kept. Recklessness in making promises is the surest -way in which to secure the discredit attaching to the breaking of -promises. A treaty at present usually represents merely promise, not -performance; and it is wicked to promise what will not or cannot be -performed. Genuine good can even now be accomplished by narrowly -limited and defined arbitration treaties which are not all-inclusive, -if they deal with subjects on which arbitration can be accepted. This -nation has repeatedly acted in obedience to such treaties; and great -good has come from arbitrations in such cases as, for example, the -Dogger Bank incident, when the Russian fleet fired on British trawlers -during the Russo-Japanese war. But no good whatever has come from -treaties that represented a sham; and under existing conditions it is -hypocritical for a nation to announce that it will arbitrate questions -of honor or vital interest, and folly to think that opponents will -abide by such treaties. Bad although it is to negotiate such a treaty, -it would be worse to abide by it. - -Under these conditions it is mischievous to a degree for a nation to -trust to any treaty of the type now existing to protect it in great -crises. Take the case of China as a living and present-day example. -China has shown herself utterly impotent to defend her neutrality. -Again and again she made this evident in the past. Order was not -well kept at home and above all she was powerless to defend herself -from outside attack. She has not prepared for war. She has kept -utterly unprepared for war. Yet she has suffered more from war, in -our own time, than any military power in the world during the same -period. She has fulfilled exactly the conditions advocated by these -well-meaning persons who for the last five months have been saying -in speeches, editorials, articles for syndicates, and the like that -the United States ought not to keep up battle-ships and ought not to -trust to fortifications nor in any way to be ready or prepared to -defend herself against hostile attack, but should endeavor to secure -peace by being so inoffensive and helpless as not to arouse fear in -others. The well-meaning people who write these editorials and make -these speeches ought to understand that though it is a bad thing for -a nation to arouse fear it is an infinitely worse thing to excite -contempt; and every editor or writer or public man who tells us that we -ought not to have battle-ships and that we ought to trust entirely to -well-intentioned foolish all-inclusive arbitration treaties and abandon -fortifications and not keep prepared, is merely doing his best to bring -contempt upon the United States and to insure disaster in the future. - -Nor is China the only case in point. Luxembourg is a case in point. -Korea is a case in point. Korea was utterly inoffensive and helpless. -It neither took nor was capable of taking the smallest aggressive -action against any one. It had no forts, no war-ships, no army worthy -of the name. It excited no fear and no anger. But it did excite -measureless contempt, and therefore it invited aggression. - -The point I wish to make is, first, the extreme unwisdom and -impropriety of making promises that cannot be kept, and, second, the -utter futility of expecting that in any save exceptional cases a strong -power will keep a promise which it finds to its disadvantage, unless -there is some way of putting force back of the demand that the treaty -be observed. - -America has no claim whatever to superior virtue in this matter. We -have shown an appalling recklessness in making treaties, especially -all-inclusive arbitration treaties and the like, which in time of -stress would not and could not be observed. When such a treaty is not -observed the blame really rests upon the unwise persons who made the -treaty. Unfortunately, however, this apportionment of blame cannot be -made by outsiders. All they can say is that the country concerned--and -I speak of the United States--does not keep faith. The responsibility -for breaking an improper promise really rests with those who make it; -but the penalty is paid by the whole country. - -There are certain respects in which I think the United States can -fairly claim to stand ahead of most nations in its regard for -international morality. For example, last spring when we took Vera -Cruz, there were individuals within the city who fired at our troops in -exactly the same fashion as that which is alleged to have taken place -in Louvain. But it never for one moment entered the heads of our people -to destroy Vera Cruz. In the same way, when we promised freedom to -Cuba, we kept our promise, and after establishing an orderly government -in Cuba withdrew our army and left her as an independent power; -performing an act which, as far as I know, is entirely without parallel -in the dealings of stronger with weaker nations. - -In the same way our action in San Domingo, when we took and -administered her customs houses, represented a substantial and -efficient achievement in the cause of international peace which stands -high in the very honorable but scanty list of such actions by great -nations in dealing with their less fortunate sisters. In the same way -our handling of the Panama situation, both in the acquisition of the -canal, in its construction, and in the attitude we have taken toward -the dwellers on the Isthmus and all the nations of mankind, has been -such as to reflect signal honor on our people. In the same way we -returned the Chinese indemnity, because we deemed it excessive, just -as previously we had returned a money indemnity to Japan. Similarly -the disinterestedness with which we have administered the Philippines -for the good of the Philippine people is something upon which we have a -right to pride ourselves and shows the harm that would have been done -had we not taken possession of the Philippines. - -But, unfortunately, in dealing with schemes of universal peace and -arbitration, we have often shown an unwillingness to fulfil proper -promises which we had already made by treaty, coupled with a reckless -willingness to make new treaties with all kinds of promises which -were either improper and ought not to be kept or which, even if -proper, could not and would not be kept. It has again and again proved -exceedingly difficult to get Congress to appropriate money to pay some -obligation which under treaty or arbitration or the like has been -declared to be owing by us to the citizens of some foreign nation. -Often we have announced our intention to make sweeping arbitration -treaties or agreements at the very time when by our conduct we were -showing that in actual fact we had not the slightest intention of -applying them with the sweeping universality we promised. In these -cases we were usually, although not always, right in our refusal -to apply the treaties, or rather the principles set forth in the -treaties, to the concrete case at issue; but we were utterly wrong, -we were, even although perhaps unintentionally, both insincere and -hypocritical, when at the same time we made believe we intended that -these principles would be universally applied. This was particularly -true in connection with the universal arbitration treaties which our -government unsuccessfully endeavored to negotiate some three years -ago. Our government announced at that time that we intended to enter -into universal arbitration treaties under which we would arbitrate -everything, even including questions of honor and of vital national -interest. At the very time that this announcement was made and the -negotiation of the treaties begun, the government in case after case -where specific performance of its pledges was demanded responded with -a flat refusal to do the very thing it had announced its intention of -doing. - -Recently, there have been negotiated in Washington thirty or forty -little all-inclusive arbitration or so-called “peace” treaties, which -represent as high a degree of fatuity as is often achieved in these -matters. There is no likelihood that they will do us any great material -harm because it is absolutely certain that we would not pay the -smallest attention to them in the event of their being invoked in any -matter where our interests were seriously involved; but it would do us -moral harm to break them, even although this were the least evil of -two evil alternatives. It is a discreditable thing that at this very -moment, with before our eyes such proof of the worthlessness of the -neutrality treaties affecting Belgium and Luxembourg, our nation should -be negotiating treaties which convince every sensible and well-informed -observer abroad that we are either utterly heedless in making promises -which cannot be kept or else willing to make promises which we have no -intention of keeping. What has just happened shows that such treaties -are worthless except to the degree that force can and will be used in -backing them. - -There are some well-meaning people, misled by mere words, who doubtless -think that treaties of this kind do accomplish something. These good -and well-meaning people may feel that I am not zealous in the cause -of peace. This is the direct reverse of the truth. I abhor war. In -common with all other thinking men I am inexpressibly saddened by the -dreadful contest now waging in Europe. I put peace very high as an -agent for bringing about righteousness. But if I must choose between -righteousness and peace I choose righteousness. Therefore, I hold -myself in honor bound to do anything in my power to advance the cause -of the peace of righteousness throughout the world. I believe we can -make substantial advances by international agreement in the line -of achieving this purpose and in this book I state in outline just -what I think can be done toward this end. But I hold that we will do -nothing and less than nothing unless, pending the accomplishment of -this purpose, we keep our own beloved country in such shape that war -shall not strike her down; and, furthermore, unless we also seriously -consider what the defects have been in the existing peace, neutrality, -and arbitration treaties and in the attitude hitherto assumed by the -professional pacificists, which have rendered these treaties such -feeble aids to peace and the ultrapacificist attitude a positive -obstacle to peace. - -The truth is that the advocates of world-wide peace, like all -reformers, should bear in mind Josh Billings’s astute remark that “it -is much easier to be a harmless dove than a wise serpent.” The worthy -pacificists have completely forgotten that the Biblical injunction is -two-sided and that we are bidden not only to be harmless as doves but -also to be wise as serpents. The ultrapacificists have undoubtedly been -an exceedingly harmless body so far as obtaining peace is concerned. -They have exerted practically no influence in restraining wrong, -although they have sometimes had a real and lamentable influence in -crippling the forces of right and preventing them from dealing with -wrong. An appreciable amount of good work has been done for peace -by genuine lovers of peace, but it has not been done by the feeble -folk of the peace movement, loquacious but impotent, who are usually -unfortunately prominent in the movement and who excite the utter -derision of the great powers of evil. - -Sincere lovers of peace who are wise have been obliged to face the fact -that it is often a very complicated thing to secure peace without the -sacrifice of righteousness. Furthermore, they have been obliged to face -the fact that generally the only way to accomplish anything was by not -trying to accomplish too much. - -The complicated nature of the problem is shown by the fact that whereas -the real friends of righteousness believe that our duty to peace ought -to be fulfilled by protesting against--and doubtless if necessary doing -more than merely protest against--the violation of the rights secured -to Belgium by treaty, the professional pacificists nervously point -out that such a course would expose us to accusations of abandoning -our “neutrality.” In theory these pacificists admit it to be our duty -to uphold the Hague treaties of which we were among the signatory -powers; but they are against effective action to uphold them, for they -are pathetic believers in the all-sufficiency of signatures, placed -on bits of paper. They have pinned their faith to the foolish belief -that everything put in these treaties was forthwith guaranteed to all -mankind. In dealing with the rights of neutrals Article 10 of Chapter -1 explicitly states that if the territory of a neutral nation is -invaded the repelling of such invasion by force shall not be esteemed a -“hostile” act on the part of the neutral nation. Unquestionably under -this clause Belgium has committed no hostile act. Yet, this sound -declaration of morality, in a treaty that the leading world-powers have -signed, amounts to precisely and exactly nothing so far as the rights -of poor Belgium are concerned, because there is no way provided of -enforcing the treaty and because the American government has decided -that it can keep at peace and remain neutral only by declining to do -what, according to the intention of the Hague treaty, it would be -expected to do in securing peace for Belgium. In practice the Hague -treaties have proved and will always prove useless while there is no -sanction of force behind them. For the United States to proffer “good -offices” to the various powers entering such a great conflict as the -present one accomplishes not one particle of good; to refer them, when -they mutually complain of wrongs, to a Hague court which is merely -a phantom does less than no good. The Hague treaties can accomplish -nothing, and ought not to have been entered into, unless in such a -case as this of Belgium there is willingness to take efficient action -under them. There could be no better illustration of how extremely -complicated and difficult a thing it is in practice instead of in -theory to make even a small advance in the cause of peace. - -I believe that international opinion can do something to arrest wrong; -but only if it is aroused and finds some method of clear and forceful -expression. For example, I hope that it has been aroused to the -point of preventing any repetition at the expense of Brussels of the -destruction which has befallen Louvain. The peaceful people of Brussels -now live in dread of what may happen to them if the Germans should -evacuate the city. In such an event it is possible that half a dozen -fanatics, or half a dozen young roughs of the “Apache” type, in spite -of everything that good citizens may do, will from some building fire -on the retiring soldiers. In such case the offenders ought to be and -must be treated with instant and unsparing rigor, and those clearly -guilty of aiding or shielding them should also be so treated. But if -in such case Brussels is in whole or in part destroyed as Louvain -was destroyed, those destroying it will be guilty of a capital crime -against civilization; and it is heartily to be regretted that civilized -nations have not devised some method by which the collective power of -civilization can be used to prevent or punish such crimes. In every -great city there are plenty of reckless or fanatical or downright -evil men eagerly ready to do some act which is abhorrent to the vast -majority of their fellows; and it is wicked to punish with cruel -severity immense multitudes of innocent men, women, and children for -the misdeeds of a few rascals or fanatics. Of course, it is eminently -right to punish by death these rascals or fanatics themselves. - -Kindly people who know little of life and nothing whatever of the -great forces of international rivalry have exposed the cause of peace -to ridicule by believing that serious wars could be avoided through -arbitration treaties, peace treaties, neutrality treaties, and the -action of the Hague court, without putting force behind such treaties -and such action. The simple fact is that none of these existing -treaties and no function of the Hague court hitherto planned and -exercised have exerted or could exert the very smallest influence in -maintaining peace when great conflicting international passions are -aroused and great conflicting national interests are at stake. It -happens that wars have been more numerous in the fifteen years since -the first Hague conference than in the fifteen years prior to it. It -was Russia that called the first and second Hague conferences, and in -the interval she fought the war with Japan and is now fighting a far -greater war. We bore a prominent part at the Hague conferences; but if -the Hague court had been in existence in 1898 it could not have had the -smallest effect upon our war with Spain; and neither would any possible -arbitration treaty or peace treaty have had any effect. At the present -moment Great Britain owes its immunity from invasion purely to its navy -and to the fact that that navy has been sedulously exercised in time -of peace so as to prepare it for war. Great Britain has always been -willing to enter into any reasonable--and into some unreasonable--peace -and arbitration treaties; but her fate now would have been the fate -of Belgium and would not have been hindered in the smallest degree by -these treaties, if she had not possessed a first-class navy. The navy -has done a thousand times more for her peace than all the arbitration -treaties and peace treaties of the type now existing that the wit of -man could invent. I believe that national agreement in the future -can do much toward minimizing the chance for war; but it must be by -proceeding along different lines from those hitherto followed and in -an entirely different spirit from the ultrapacificist or professional -peace-at-any-price spirit. - -The Hague court has served a very limited, but a useful, purpose. Some, -although only a small number, of the existing peace and arbitration -treaties have served a useful purpose. But the purpose and the service -have been strictly limited. Issues often arise between nations which -are not of first-class importance, which do not affect their vital -honor and interest, but which, if left unsettled, may eventually cause -irritation that will have the worst possible results. The Hague court -and the different treaties in question provide instrumentalities for -settling such disputes, where the nations involved really wish to -settle them but might be unable to do so if means were not supplied. -This is a real service and one well worth rendering. These treaties -and the Hague court have rendered such service again and again in time -past. It has been a misfortune that some worthy people have anticipated -too much and claimed too much in reference to them, for the failure -of the excessive claims has blinded men to what they really have -accomplished. To expect from them what they cannot give is merely -short-sighted. To assert that they will give what they cannot give is -mischievous. To promise that they will give what they cannot give is -not only mischievous but hypocritical; and it is for this reason that -such treaties as the thirty or forty all-inclusive arbitration or peace -treaties recently negotiated at Washington, although unimportant, are -slightly harmful. - -The Hague court has proved worthless in the present gigantic crisis. -There is hardly a Hague treaty which in the present crisis has not -in some respect been violated. However, a step toward the peaceful -settlement of questions at issue between nations which are not vital -and which do not mark a serious crisis has been accomplished on certain -occasions in the past by the action of the Hague court and by rational -and limited peace or arbitration treaties. Our business is to try to -make this court of more effect and to enlarge the class of cases where -its actions will be valuable. In order to do this, we must endeavor to -put an international police force behind this international judiciary. -At the same time we must refuse to do or say anything insincere. -Above all, we must refuse to be misled into abandoning the policy of -efficient self-defense, by any unfounded trust that the Hague court, -as now constituted, and peace or arbitration treaties of the existing -type, can in the smallest degree accomplish what they never have -accomplished and never can accomplish. Neither the existing Hague -court nor any peace treaties of the existing type will exert even the -slightest influence in saving from disaster any nation that does not -preserve the virile virtues and the long-sightedness that will enable -it by its own might to guard its own honor, interest, and national -life. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE CAUSES OF THE WAR - - -From what we have so far considered, two things are evident. First, it -is quite clear that in the world, as it is at this moment situated, -it is literally criminal, literally a crime against the nation, not -to be adequately and thoroughly prepared in advance, so as to guard -ourselves and hold our own in war. We should have a much better army -than at present, including especially a far larger reserve upon which -to draw in time of war. We should have first-class fortifications, -especially on the canal and in Hawaii. Most important of all, we should -not only have a good navy but should have it continually exercised -in manœuvring. For nearly two years our navy has totally lacked -the practice in manœuvring in fleet formation indispensable to its -efficiency. - -Of all the lessons hitherto taught by the war, the most essential -for us to take to heart is that taught by the catastrophe that has -befallen Belgium. One side of this catastrophe, one lesson taught by -Belgium’s case, is the immense gain in the self-respect of a people -that has dared to fight heroically in the face of certain disaster and -possible defeat. Every Belgian throughout the world carries his head -higher now than he has ever carried it before, because of the proof -of virile strength that his people have given. In the world at large -there is not the slightest interest concerning Luxembourg’s ultimate -fate; there is nothing more than amusement as to the discussion whether -Japan or Germany is most to blame in connection with the infringement -of Chinese neutrality. This is because neither China nor Luxembourg has -been able and willing effectively to stand for her own rights. At this -moment Luxembourg is enjoying “peace”--the peace of death. But Belgium -has stood for her own rights. She has shown heroism, courage, and -self-sacrifice, and, great though the penalty, the ultimate reward will -be greater still. - -If ever this country is attacked and drawn into war as Belgium, through -no fault of her own, was drawn into war, I hope most earnestly that -she will emulate Belgium’s courage; and this she cannot do unless she -is prepared in advance as Belgium was prepared. In one point, as I -have already stated, I very earnestly hope that she will go beyond -Belgium. If any great city, such as New York or San Francisco, Boston -or Seattle, is held for ransom by a foreign foe, I earnestly hope that -Americans, within the city and without, will insist that not one dollar -of ransom shall be paid, and will gladly acquiesce in the absolute -destruction of the city, by fire or in any other manner, rather than -see a dollar paid into the war chest of our foes for the further -prosecution of the war against us. Napoleon the Great made many regions -pay for their own conquest and the conquest of the nations to which -they belonged. But Spain and Russia would not pay, and the burning of -Moscow and the defense of Saragossa marked the two great stages in the -turn of the tide against him. The prime lesson of this war is that no -nation can preserve its own self-respect, or the good-will of other -nations, unless it keeps itself ready to exact justice from others, -precisely as it should keep itself eager and willing to do justice to -others. - -The second lesson is the utter inadequacy in times of great crises of -existing peace and neutrality treaties, and of all treaties conceived -in the spirit of the all-inclusive arbitration treaties recently -adopted at Washington; and, in fact, of all treaties which do not put -potential force behind the treaty, which do not create some kind of -international police power to stand behind international sense of right -as expressed in some competent tribunal. - -It remains to consider whether there is not--and I believe there -is--some method which will bring nearer the day when international -war of the kind hitherto waged and now waging between nations shall -be relegated to that past which contains the kind of private war that -was habitually waged between individuals up to the end of the Middle -Ages. By degrees the work of a national police has been substituted -for the exercise of the right of private war. The growth of sentiment -in favor of peace within each nation accomplished little until an -effective police force was put back of the sentiment. There are a few -communities where such a police force is almost non-existent, although -always latent in the shape of a sheriff’s posse or something of the -kind. In all big communities, however, in all big cities, law is -observed, innocent and law-abiding and peaceful people are protected -and the disorderly and violent classes prevented from a riot of -mischief and wrong-doing only by the presence of an efficient police -force. Some analogous international police force must be created if war -between nations is to be minimized as war between individuals has been -minimized. - -It is, of course, essential that, if this end is to be accomplished, we -shall face facts with the understanding of what they really signify. -Not the slightest good is done by hysterical outcries for a peace which -would consecrate wrong or leave wrongs unredressed. Little or nothing -would be gained by a peace which merely stopped this war for the moment -and left untouched all the causes that have brought it about. A peace -which left the wrongs of Belgium unredressed, which did not leave her -independent and secured against further wrong-doing, and which did not -provide measures hereafter to safeguard all peaceful nations against -suffering the fate that Belgium has suffered, would be mischievous -rather than beneficial in its ultimate effects. If the United States -had any part in bringing about such a peace it would be deeply to our -discredit as a nation. Belgium has been terribly wronged, and the -civilized world owes it to itself to see that this wrong is redressed -and that steps are taken which will guarantee that hereafter conditions -shall not be permitted to become such as either to require or to permit -such action as that of Germany against Belgium. Surely all good and -honest men who are lovers of peace and who do not use the great words -“love of peace” to cloak their own folly and timidity must agree that -peace is to be made the handmaiden of righteousness or else that it is -worthless. - -England’s attitude in going to war in defense of Belgium’s rights, -according to its guarantee, was not only strictly proper but represents -the only kind of action that ever will make a neutrality treaty or -peace treaty or arbitration treaty worth the paper on which it is -written. The published despatches of the British government show that -Sir Edward Grey clearly, emphatically, and scrupulously declined to -commit his government to war until it became imperative to do so if -Great Britain was to fulfil, as her honor and interest alike demanded, -her engagements on behalf of the neutrality of Belgium. Of course, as -far as Great Britain is concerned, she would not be honorably justified -in making peace unless this object of her going to war was achieved. -Our hearty sympathy should go out to her in this attitude. - -The case of Belgium in this war stands by itself. As regards all the -other powers, it is not only possible to make out a real case in favor -of every nation on each side, but it is also quite possible to show -that, under existing conditions, each nation was driven by its vital -interests to do what it did. The real nature of the problem we have -ahead of us can only be grasped if this attitude of the several powers -is thoroughly understood. To paint the Kaiser as a devil, merely bent -on gratifying a wicked thirst for bloodshed, is an absurdity, and -worse than an absurdity. I believe that history will declare that the -Kaiser acted in conformity with the feelings of the German people and -as he sincerely believed the interests of his people demanded; and, as -so often before in his personal and family life, he and his family -have given honorable proof that they possess the qualities that are -characteristic of the German people. Every one of his sons went to -the war, not nominally, but to face every danger and hardship. Two of -his sons hastily married the girls to whom they were betrothed and -immediately afterward left for the front. - -This was a fresh illustration of one of the most striking features -of the outbreak of the war in Germany. In tens of thousands of cases -the officers and enlisted men, who were engaged, married immediately -before starting for the front. In many of the churches there were -long queues of brides waiting for the ceremony, so as to enable their -lovers to marry them just before they responded to the order that meant -that they might have to sacrifice everything, including life, for the -nation. A nation that shows such a spirit is assuredly a great nation. -The efficiency of the German organization, the results of the German -preparation in advance, were strikingly shown in the powerful forward -movement of the first six weeks of the war and in the steady endurance -and resolute resourcefulness displayed in the following months. - -Not only is the German organization, the German preparedness, highly -creditable to Germany, but even more creditable is the spirit lying -behind the organization. The men and women of Germany, from the -highest to the lowest, have shown a splendid patriotism and abnegation -of self. In reading of their attitude, it is impossible not to feel a -thrill of admiration for the stern courage and lofty disinterestedness -which this great crisis laid bare in the souls of the people. I most -earnestly hope that we Americans, if ever the need may arise, will show -similar qualities. - -It is idle to say that this is not a people’s war. The intensity of -conviction in the righteousness of their several causes shown by the -several peoples is a prime factor for consideration, if we are to take -efficient means to try to prevent a repetition of this incredible world -tragedy. History may decide in any war that one or the other party was -wrong, and yet also decide that the highest qualities and powers of the -human soul were shown by that party. We here in the United States have -now grown practically to accept this view as regards our own Civil War, -and we feel an equal pride in the high devotion to the right, as it was -given each man to see the right, shown alike by the men who wore the -blue and the men who wore the gray. - -The English feel that in this war they fight not only for themselves -but for principle, for justice, for civilization, for a real and -lasting world peace. Great Britain is backed by the great free -democracies that under her flag have grown up in Canada, in Australia, -in South Africa. She feels that she stands for the liberties and rights -of weak nations everywhere. One of the most striking features of the -war is the way in which the varied peoples of India have sprung to arms -to defend the British Empire. - -The Russians regard the welfare of their whole people as at stake. -The Russian Liberals believe that success for Russia means an end of -militarism in Europe. They believe that the Pole, the Jew, the Finn, -the man of the Caucasus will each and all be enfranchised, that the -advance of justice and right in Russia will be immeasurably furthered -by the triumph of the Russian people in this contest, and that the -conflict was essential, not only to Russian national life but to the -growth of freedom and justice within her boundaries. - -The people of Germany believe that they are engaged primarily in a -fight for life of the Teuton against the Slav, of civilization against -what they regard as a vast menacing flood of barbarism. They went to -war because they believed the war was an absolute necessity, not merely -to German well-being but to German national existence. They sincerely -feel that the nations of western Europe are traitors to the cause of -Occidental civilization, and that they themselves are fighting, each -man for his own hearthstone, for his own wife and children, and all -for the future existence of the generations yet to come. - -The French feel with passionate conviction that this is the last stand -of France, and that if she does not now succeed and is again trampled -under foot, her people will lose for all time their place in the -forefront of that great modern civilization of which the debt to France -is literally incalculable. It would be impossible too highly to admire -the way in which the men and women of France have borne themselves in -this nerve-shattering time of awful struggle and awful suspense. They -have risen level to the hour’s need, whereas in 1870 they failed so to -rise. The high valor of the French soldiers has been matched by the -poise, the self-restraint, the dignity and the resolution with which -the French people and the French government have behaved. - -Of Austria and Hungary, of Servia and Montenegro, exactly the same is -true, and the people of each of these countries have shown the sternest -and most heroic courage and the loftiest and most patriotic willingness -for self-sacrifice. - -To each of these peoples the war seems a crusade against threatening -wrong, and each man fervently believes in the justice of his cause. -Moreover, each combatant fights with that terrible determination to -destroy the opponent which springs from fear. It is not the fear -which any one of these powers has inspired that offers the difficult -problem. It is the fear which each of them genuinely feels. Russia -believes that a quarter of the Slav people will be trodden under the -heel of the Germans, unless she succeeds. France and England believe -that their very existence depends on the destruction of the German -menace. Germany believes that unless she can so cripple, and, if -possible, destroy her western foes, as to make them harmless in the -future, she will be unable hereafter to protect herself against the -mighty Slav people on her eastern boundary and will be reduced to a -condition of international impotence. Some of her leaders are doubtless -influenced by worse motives; but the motives above given are, I -believe, those that influence the great mass of Germans, and these are -in their essence merely the motives of patriotism, of devotion to one’s -people and one’s native land. - -We nations who are outside ought to recognize both the reality of -this fear felt by each nation for others, together with the real -justification for its existence. Yet we cannot sympathize with that -fear-born anger which would vent itself in the annihilation of the -conquered. The right attitude is to limit militarism, to destroy the -menace of militarism, but to preserve the national integrity of each -nation. The contestants are the great civilized peoples of Europe and -Asia. - -Japan’s part in the war has been slight. She has borne herself with -scrupulous regard not only to the rights but to the feelings of the -people of the United States. Japan’s progress should be welcomed by -every enlightened friend of humanity because of the promise it contains -for the regeneration of Asia. All that is necessary in order to remove -every particle of apprehension caused by this progress is to do what -ought to be done in reference to her no less than in reference to -European and American powers, namely, to develop a world policy which -shall guarantee each nation against any menace that might otherwise be -held for it in the growth and progress of another nation. - -The destruction of Russia is not thinkable, but if it were, it would -be a most frightful calamity. The Slavs are a young people, of -limitless possibilities, who from various causes have not been able -to develop as rapidly as the peoples of central and western Europe. -They have grown in civilization until their further advance has become -something greatly to be desired, because it will be a factor of immense -importance in the welfare of the world. All that is necessary is -for Russia to throw aside the spirit of absolutism developed in her -during the centuries of Mongol dominion. She will then be found doing -what no other race can do and what it is of peculiar advantage to the -English-speaking peoples that she should do. - -As for crushing Germany or crippling her and reducing her to political -impotence, such an action would be a disaster to mankind. The Germans -are not merely brothers; they are largely ourselves. The debt we owe -to German blood is great; the debt we owe to German thought and to -German example, not only in governmental administration but in all the -practical work of life, is even greater. Every generous heart and every -far-seeing mind throughout the world should rejoice in the existence of -a stable, united, and powerful Germany, too strong to fear aggression -and too just to be a source of fear to its neighbors. - -As for France, she has occupied, in the modern world, a position as -unique as Greece in the world of antiquity. To have her broken or cowed -would mean a loss to-day as great as the loss that was suffered by -the world when the creative genius of the Greek passed away with his -loss of political power and material greatness. The world cannot spare -France. - -Now, the danger to each of these great and splendid civilizations -arises far more from the fear that each feels than from the fear that -each inspires. Belgium’s case stands apart. She inspired no fear. -No peace should be made until her wrongs have been redressed, and -the likelihood of the repetition of such wrongs provided against. -She has suffered incredibly because the fear among the plain German -people, among the Socialists, for instance, of the combined strength -of France and Russia made them acquiesce in and support the policy of -the military party, which was to disregard the laws of international -morality and the plain and simple rights of the Belgian people. - -It is idle merely to make speeches and write essays against this fear, -because at present the fear has a real basis. At present each nation -has cause for the fear it feels. Each nation has cause to believe that -its national life is in peril unless it is able to take the national -life of one or more of its foes or at least hopelessly to cripple -that foe. The causes of the fear must be removed or, no matter what -peace may be patched up to-day or what new treaties may be negotiated -to-morrow, these causes will at some future day bring about the same -results, bring about a repetition of this same awful tragedy. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -HOW TO STRIVE FOR WORLD PEACE - - -In the preceding chapters I have endeavored to set forth, in a spirit -of absolute fairness and calmness, the lessons as I see them that this -war teaches all the world and especially the United States. I believe -I have shown that, while, at least as against Belgium, there has been -actual wrong-doing, yet on the whole and looking back at the real and -ultimate causes rather than at the temporary occasions of the war, -what has occurred is due primarily to the intense fear felt by each -nation for other nations and to the anger born of that fear. Doubtless -in certain elements, notably certain militaristic elements, of the -population other motives have been at work; but I believe that the -people of each country, in backing the government of that country, in -the present war have been influenced mainly by a genuine patriotism and -a genuine fear of what might happen to their beloved land in the event -of aggression by other nations. - -Under such conditions, as I have shown, our duty is twofold. In the -first place, events have clearly demonstrated that in any serious -crisis treaties unbacked by force are not worth the paper upon which -they are written. Events have clearly shown that it is the idlest of -folly to assert and little short of treason against the nation for -statesmen who should know better to pretend, that the salvation of any -nation under existing world conditions can be trusted to treaties, -to little bits of paper with names signed on them but without any -efficient force behind them. The United States will be guilty of -criminal misconduct, we of this generation will show ourselves traitors -to our children and our children’s children if, as conditions are now, -we do not keep ourselves ready to defend our hearths, trusting in great -crises not to treaties, not to the ineffective good-will of outsiders, -but to our own stout hearts and strong hands. - -So much for the first and most vital lesson. But we are not to be -excused if we stop here. We must endeavor earnestly but with sanity to -try to bring around better world conditions. We must try to shape our -policy in conjunction with other nations so as to bring nearer the day -when the peace of righteousness, the peace of justice and fair dealing, -will be established among the nations of the earth. With this object -in view, it is our duty carefully to weigh the influences which are at -work or may be put to work in order to bring about this result and -in every effective way to do our best to further the growth of these -influences. When this has been done no American administration will -be able to assert that it is reduced to humiliating impotence even -to protest against such wrong as that committed on Belgium, because, -forsooth, our “neutrality” can only be preserved by failure to help -right what is wrong--and we shall then as a people have too much -self-respect to enter into absurd, all-inclusive arbitration treaties, -unbacked by force, at the very moment when we fail to do what is -clearly demanded by our duty under the Hague treaties. - -Doubtless in the long run most is to be hoped from the slow growth of a -better feeling, a more real feeling of brotherhood among the nations, -among the peoples. The experience of the United States shows that -there is no real foundation in race for the bitter antagonism felt -among Slavs and Germans, French and English. There are in this country -hundreds of thousands, millions, of men who by birth and parentage are -of German descent, of French descent or Slavonic descent, or descended -from each of the peoples within the British Islands. These different -races not only get along well together here, but become knit into one -people, and after a few generations their blood is mingled. In my own -veins runs not only the blood of ancestors from the various peoples of -the British Islands, English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish, but also the -blood of Frenchman and of German--not to speak of my forefathers from -Holland. It is idle to tell us that the Frenchman and the German, the -Slav and the Englishman are irreconcilably hostile one to the other -because of difference of race. From our own daily experiences we know -the contrary. We know that good men and bad men are to be found in -each race. We know that the differences between the races above named -and many others are infinitesimal compared with the vital points of -likeness. - -But this growth is too slow by itself adequately to meet present -needs. At present we are confronted with the fact that each nation -must keep armed and must be ready to go to war because there is a real -and desperate need to do so and because the penalty for failure may be -to suffer a fate like that of China. At present in every great crisis -treaties have shown themselves not worth the paper they are written on, -and the multitude of peace congresses that have been held have failed -to secure even the slightest tangible result, as regards any contest in -which the passions of great nations were fully aroused and their vital -interests really concerned. In other words, each nation at present in -any crisis of fundamental importance has to rely purely on its own -power, its own strength, its own individual force. The futility of -international agreements in great crises has come from the fact that -force was not back of them. - -What is needed in international matters is to create a judge and then -to put police power back of the judge. - -So far the time has not been ripe to attempt this. Surely now, in view -of the awful cataclysm of the present war, such a plan could at least -be considered; and it may be that the combatants at the end will be -willing to try it in order to secure at least a chance for the only -kind of peace that is worth having, the peace that is compatible with -self-respect. Merely to bring about a peace at the present moment, -without providing for the elimination of the causes of war, would -accomplish nothing of any permanent value, and the attempt to make it -would probably represent nothing else than the adroit use of some more -or less foolish or more or less self-interested outsider by some astute -power which wished to see if it could not put its opponents in the -wrong. - -If the powers were justified in going into this war by their vital -interests, then they are required to continue the war until these -vital interests are no longer in jeopardy. A peace which left without -redress wrongs like those which Belgium has suffered or which in effect -consecrated the partial or entire destruction of one or more nations -and the survival in aggravated form of militarism and autocracy, and -of international hatred in its most intense and virulent form, would -really be only a worthless truce and would not represent the slightest -advance in the cause of righteousness and of international morality. - -The essential thing to do is to free each nation from the besetting -fear of its neighbor. This can only be done by removing the causes of -such fear. The neighbor must no longer be a danger. - -Mere disarmament will not accomplish this result, and the disarmament -of the free and enlightened peoples, so long as a single despotism or -barbarism were left armed, would be a hideous calamity. If armaments -were reduced while causes of trouble were in no way removed, wars -would probably become somewhat more frequent just because they would -be less expensive and less decisive. It is greatly to be desired that -the growth of armaments should be arrested, but they cannot be arrested -while present conditions continue. Mere treaties, mere bits of papers, -with names signed to them and with no force back of them, have proved -utterly worthless for the protection of nations, and where they are the -only alternatives it is not only right but necessary that each nation -should arm itself so as to be able to cope with any possible foe. - -The one permanent move for obtaining peace, which has yet been -suggested, with any reasonable chance of attaining its object, is by an -agreement among the great powers, in which each should pledge itself -not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal but to back -with force the decisions of that common tribunal. The great civilized -nations of the world which do possess force, actual or immediately -potential, should combine by solemn agreement in a great World League -for the Peace of Righteousness. In a later chapter I shall briefly -outline what such an agreement should attempt to perform. At present -it is enough to say that such a world-agreement offers the only -alternative to each nation’s relying purely on its own armed strength; -for a treaty unbacked by force is in no proper sense of the word an -alternative. - -Of course, if there were not reasonable good faith among the nations -making such an agreement, it would fail. But it would not fail merely -because one nation did not observe good faith. It would be impossible -to say that such an agreement would at once and permanently bring -universal peace. But it would certainly mark an immense advance. It -would certainly mean that the chances of war were minimized and the -prospects of limiting and confining and regulating war immensely -increased. At present force, as represented by the armed strength -of the nations, is wholly divorced from such instrumentalities -for securing peace as international agreements and treaties. In -consequence, the latter are practically impotent in great crises. -There is no connection between force, on the one hand, and any scheme -for securing international peace or justice on the other. Under these -conditions every wise and upright nation must continue to rely for its -own peace and well-being on its own force, its own strength. As all -students of the law know, a right without a remedy is in no real sense -of the word a right at all. In international matters the declaration of -a right, or the announcement of a worthy purpose, is not only aimless, -but is a just cause for derision and may even be mischievous, if force -is not put behind the right or the purpose. Our business is to make -force the agent of justice, the instrument of right in international -matters as it has been made in municipal matters, in matters within -each nation. - -One good purpose which would be served by the kind of international -action I advocate is that of authoritatively deciding when treaties -terminate or lapse. At present every treaty ought to contain provision -for its abrogation; and at present the wrong done in disregarding a -treaty may be one primarily of time and manner. Unquestionably it may -become an imperative duty to abrogate a treaty. The Supreme Court of -the United States set forth this right and duty in convincing manner -when discussing our treaty with France during the administration of -John Adams, and again a century later when discussing the Chinese -treaty. The difficulty at present is that each case must be treated on -its own merits; for in some cases it may be right and necessary for a -nation to abrogate or denounce (not to violate) a treaty; and yet in -other cases such abrogation may represent wrong-doing which should be -suppressed by the armed strength of civilization. At present in cases -where only two nations are concerned there is no substitute for such -abrogation or violation of the treaty by one of them; for each of the -two has to be judge in its own case. But the tribunal of a world league -would offer the proper place to which to apply for the abrogation -of treaties; and, with international force back of such a tribunal, -the infraction of a treaty could be punished in whatever way the -necessities of the case demanded. - -Such a scheme as the one hereinafter briefly outlined will not bring -perfect justice any more than under municipal law we obtain perfect -justice; but it will mark an immeasurable advance on anything now -existing; for it will mean that at last a long stride has been taken -in the effort to put the collective strength of civilized mankind -behind the collective purpose of mankind to secure the peace of -righteousness, the peace of justice among the nations of the earth. - -It may be, though I sincerely hope to the contrary, that such a -scheme is for the immediate future Utopian--it certainly will not be -Utopian for the remote future. If it is impossible in the immediate -future to devise some working scheme by which force shall be put -behind righteousness in disinterested and effective fashion, where -international wrongs are concerned, then the only alternative will be -for each free people to keep itself in shape with its own strength -to defend its own rights and interests, and meanwhile to do all that -can be done to help forward the slow growth of sentiment which is -assuredly, although very gradually, telling against international -wrong-doing and violence. - -Man, in recognizedly human shape, has been for ages on this planet, -and the extraordinary discoveries in Egypt and Mesopotamia now enable -us to see in dim fashion the beginning of historic times six or seven -thousand years ago. In the earlier ages of which history speaks there -was practically no such thing as an international conscience. The -armies of Babylon and Assyria, Egypt and Persia felt no sense of -obligation to outsiders and conquered merely because they wished to -conquer. In Greece a very imperfect recognition of international -right grew up so far as Greek communities were concerned, but it never -extended to barbarians. In the Roman Empire this feeling grew slightly, -if only for the reason that so many nations were included within its -bounds and were forced to live peaceably together. In the Middle Ages -the common Christianity of Europe created a real bond. There was at -least a great deal of talk about the duties of Christian nations to -one another; and although the action along the lines of the talk -was lamentably insufficient, still the talk itself represented the -dawning recognition of the fact that each nation might owe something -to other nations and that it was not right to base action purely on -self-interest. - -There has undoubtedly been a wide expansion of this feeling during the -last few centuries, and particularly during the last century. It now -extends so as to include not only Christian nations but also those -non-Christian nations which themselves treat with justice and fairness -the men of different creed. We are still a lamentably long distance -away from the goal toward which we are striving; but we have taken a -few steps toward that goal. A hundred years ago the English-speaking -peoples of Britain and America regarded one another as inveterate and -predestined enemies, just as three centuries previously had been the -case in Great Britain itself between those who dwelt in the northern -half and those who dwelt in the southern half of the island. Now war is -unthinkable between us. Moreover, there is a real advance in good-will, -respect, and understanding between the United States and all the other -nations of the earth. The advance is not steady and it is interrupted -at times by acts of unwisdom, which are quite as apt to be committed by -ourselves as by other peoples; but the advance has gone on. There is -far greater sentiment than ever before against unwarranted aggressions -by stronger powers against weak powers; there is far greater feeling -against misconduct, whether in small or big powers; and far greater -feeling against brutality in war. - -This does not mean that the wrong-doing as regards any one of these -matters has as yet been even approximately stopped or that the -indignation against such wrong-doing is as yet anything like as -effective as it should be. But we must not let our horror at the -wrong that is still done blind us to the fact that there has been -improvement. As late as the eighteenth century there were continual -instances where small nations or provinces were overrun, just as -Belgium has been overrun, without any feeling worth taking into account -being thereby excited in the rest of mankind. In the seventeenth -century affairs were worse. What has been done in Belgian cities has -been very dreadful and the Belgian countryside has suffered in a way -to wring our hearts; but our sympathy and indignation must not blind -us to the fact that even in this case there has been a real advance -during the last three hundred years and that such things as were done -to Magdeburg and Wexford and Drogheda and the entire Palatinate in the -seventeenth century are no longer possible. - -There is every reason to feel dissatisfied with the slow progress that -has been made in putting a stop to wrong-doing; it is our bounden duty -now to act so as to secure redress for wrong-doing; but nevertheless -we must also recognize the fact that some progress has been made, and -that there is now a good deal of real sentiment, and some efficient -sentiment, against international wrong-doing. There has been a real -growth toward international peace, justice, and fair dealing. We have -still a long way to go before reaching the goal, but at least we have -gone forward a little way toward the goal. This growth will continue. -We must do everything that we can to make it continue. But we must not -blind ourselves to the fact that as yet this growth is not such as in -any shape or way to warrant us in relying for our ultimate safety in -great national crises upon anything except the strong fibre of our -national character, and upon such preparation in advance as will give -that character adequate instruments wherewith to make proof of its -strength. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE PEACE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS - - “Come, Peace! not like a mourner bowed - For honor lost and dear ones wasted, - But proud, to meet a people proud, - With eyes that tell o’ triumph tasted! - Come, with han’ gripping on the hilt, - An’ step that proves ye Victory’s daughter! - Longin’ for you, our sperits wilt - Like shipwrecked men’s on raf’s for water. - - “Come, while our country feels the lift - Of a great instinct shouting ‘Forwards!’ - An’ knows that freedom ain’t a gift - Thet tarries long in han’s of cowards! - Come, sech ez mothers prayed for, when - They kissed their cross with lips that quivered, - An’ bring fair wages for brave men, - A nation saved, a race delivered!” - - -These are the noble lines of a noble poet, written in the sternest days -of the great Civil War, when the writer, Lowell, was one among the -millions of men who mourned the death in battle of kinsfolk dear to -him. No man ever lived who hated an unjust war more than Lowell or who -loved with more passionate fervor the peace of righteousness. Yet, like -the other great poets of his day and country, like Holmes, who sent -his own son to the war, like gentle Longfellow and the Quaker Whittier, -he abhorred unrighteousness and ignoble peace more than war. These men -had lofty souls. They possessed the fighting edge, without which no man -is really great; for in the really great man there must be both the -heart of gold and the temper of steel. - -In 1864 there were in the North some hundreds of thousands of men who -praised peace as the supreme end, as a good more important than all -other goods, and who denounced war as the worst of all evils. These -men one and all assailed and denounced Abraham Lincoln, and all voted -against him for President. Moreover, at that time there were many -individuals in England and France who said it was the duty of those -two nations to mediate between the North and the South, so as to stop -the terrible loss of life and destruction of property which attended -our Civil War; and they asserted that any Americans who in such event -refused to accept their mediation and to stop the war would thereby -show themselves the enemies of peace. Nevertheless, Abraham Lincoln -and the men back of him by their attitude prevented all such effort at -mediation, declaring that they would regard it as an unfriendly act to -the United States. Looking back from a distance of fifty years, we can -now see clearly that Abraham Lincoln and his supporters were right. -Such mediation would have been a hostile act, not only to the United -States but to humanity. The men who clamored for unrighteous peace -fifty years ago this fall were the enemies of mankind. - -These facts should be pondered by the well-meaning men who always -clamor for peace without regard to whether peace brings justice or -injustice. Very many of the men and women who are at times misled into -demanding peace, as if it were itself an end instead of being a means -of righteousness, are men of good intelligence and sound heart who only -need seriously to consider the facts, and who can then be trusted to -think aright and act aright. There is, however, an element of a certain -numerical importance among our people, including the members of the -ultrapacificist group, who by their teachings do some real, although -limited, mischief. They are a feeble folk, these ultrapacificists, -morally and physically; but in a country where voice and vote are -alike free, they may, if their teachings are not disregarded, create -a condition of things where the crop they have sowed in folly and -weakness will be reaped with blood and bitter tears by the brave men -and high-hearted women of the nation. - -The folly preached by some of these individuals is somewhat startling, -and if it were translated from words into deeds it would constitute a -crime against the nation. One professed teacher of morality made the -plea in so many words that we ought to follow the example of China and -deprive ourselves of all power to repel foreign attack. Surely this -writer must have possessed the exceedingly small amount of information -necessary in order to know that nearly half of China was under foreign -dominion and that while he was writing the Germans and Japanese were -battling on Chinese territory and domineering as conquerors over the -Chinese in that territory. Think of the abject soul of a man capable -of holding up to the admiration of free-born American citizens such a -condition of serfage under alien rule! - -Nor is the folly confined only to the male sex. A number of women -teachers in Chicago are credited with having proposed, in view of the -war, hereafter to prohibit in the teaching of history any reference -to war and battles. Intellectually, of course, such persons show -themselves unfit to be retained as teachers a single day, and indeed -unfit to be pupils in any school more advanced than a kindergarten. But -it is not their intellectual, it is also their moral shortcomings which -are striking. The suppression of the truth is, of course, as grave an -offense against morals as is the suggestion of the false or even the -lie direct; and these teachers actually propose to teach untruths to -their pupils. - -True teachers of history must tell the facts of history; and if they -do not tell the facts both about the wars that were righteous and the -wars that were unrighteous, and about the causes that led to these wars -and to success or defeat in them, they show themselves morally unfit to -train the minds of boys and girls. If in addition to telling the facts -they draw the lessons that should be drawn from the facts, they will -give their pupils a horror of all wars that are entered into wantonly -or with levity or in a spirit of mere brutal aggression or save under -dire necessity. But they will also teach that among the noblest deeds -of mankind are those that have been done in great wars for liberty, in -wars of self-defense, in wars for the relief of oppressed peoples, in -wars for putting an end to wrong-doing in the dark places of the globe. - -Any teachers, in school or college, who occupied the position that -these foolish, foolish teachers have sought to take, would be forever -estopped from so much as mentioning Washington and Lincoln; because -their lives are forever associated with great wars for righteousness. -These teachers would be forever estopped from so much as mentioning -the shining names of Marathon and Salamis. They would seek to blind -their pupils’ eyes to the glory held in the deeds and deaths of Joan of -Arc, of Andreas Hofer, of Alfred the Great, of Arnold von Winkelried, -of Kosciusko and Rákóczy. They would be obliged to warn their pupils -against ever reading Schiller’s “William Tell” or the poetry of -Koerner. Such men are deaf to the lament running: - - “Oh, why, Patrick Sarsfield, did we let your ships sail, - Across the dark waters from green Innisfail?” - -To them Holmes’s ballad of Bunker Hill and Whittier’s “Laus Deo,” -MacMaster’s “Ode to the Old Continentals” and O’Hara’s “Bivouac of the -Dead” are meaningless. Their cold and timid hearts are not stirred by -the surge of the tremendous “Battle Hymn of the Republic.” On them -lessons of careers like those of Timoleon and John Hampden are lost; -in their eyes the lofty self-abnegation of Robert Lee and Stonewall -Jackson was folly; their dull senses do not thrill to the deathless -deaths of the men who died at Thermopylæ and at the Alamo--the fight of -those grim Texans of which it was truthfully said that Thermopylæ had -its messengers of death but the Alamo had none. - -It has actually been proposed by some of these shivering apostles of -the gospel of national abjectness that, in view of the destruction that -has fallen on certain peaceful powers of Europe, we should abandon all -efforts at self-defense, should stop building battle-ships, and cease -to take any measures to defend ourselves if attacked. It is difficult -seriously to consider such a proposition. It is precisely and exactly -as if the inhabitants of a village in whose neighborhood highway -robberies had occurred should propose to meet the crisis by depriving -the local policeman of his revolver and club. - -There are, however, many high-minded people who do not agree with -these extremists, but who nevertheless need to be enlightened as to -the actual facts. These good people, who are busy people and not able -to devote much time to thoughts about international affairs, are often -confused by men whose business it is to know better. For example, a -few weeks ago these good people were stirred to a moment’s belief -that something had been accomplished by the enactment at Washington -of a score or two of all-inclusive arbitration treaties; being not -unnaturally misled by the fact that those responsible for the passage -of the treaties indulged in some not wholly harmless bleating as -to the good effects they would produce. As a matter of fact, they -_probably_ will not produce the smallest effect of any kind or sort. -Yet it is _possible_ they may have a mischievous effect, inasmuch -as under certain circumstances to fulfil them would cause frightful -disaster to the United States, while to break them, even although under -compulsion and because it was absolutely necessary, would be fruitful -of keen humiliation to every right-thinking man who is jealous of our -international good name. - -If for example, whatever the outcome of the present war, a great -triumphant military despotism declared that it would not recognize -the Monroe Doctrine or seized Magdalena Bay, or one of the Dutch West -Indies, or the Island of St. Thomas, and fortified it; or if--as would -be quite possible--it announced that we had no right to fortify the -Isthmus of Panama, and itself landed on adjacent territory to erect -similar fortifications; then, under these absurd treaties, we would -be obliged, if we happened to have made one of them with one of the -countries involved, to go into an interminable discussion of the -subject before a joint commission, while the hostile nation proceeded -to make its position impregnable. It seems incredible that the United -States government could have made such treaties; but it has just done -so, with the warm approval of the professional pacificists. - -These treaties were entered into when the administration had before -its eyes at that very moment the examples of Belgium and Luxembourg, -which showed beyond possibility of doubt, especially when taken in -connection with other similar incidents that have occurred during the -last couple of decades, that there are various great military empires -in the Old World who will pay not one moment’s heed to the most solemn -and binding treaty, if it is to their interest to break it. If any -one of these empires, as the result of the present contest, obtains -something approaching to a position of complete predominance in the -Old World, it is absolutely certain that it would pay no heed whatever -to these treaties, if it desired to better its position in the New -World by taking possession of the Dutch or Danish West Indies or of the -territory of some weak American state on the mainland of the continent. -In such event we would be obliged either instantly ourselves to -repudiate the scandalous treaties by which the government at Washington -has just sought to tie our hands--and thereby expose ourselves in our -turn to the charge of bad faith--or else we should have to abdicate our -position as a great power and submit to abject humiliation. - -Since these articles of mine were written and published, I am glad to -see that James Bryce, a lifelong advocate of peace and the stanchest -possible friend of the United States, has taken precisely the position -herein taken. He dwells, as I have dwelt, upon the absolute need of -protecting small states that behave themselves from absorption in -great military empires. He insists, as I have insisted, upon the need -of the reduction of armaments, the quenching of the baleful spirit of -militarism, and the admission of the peoples everywhere to a fuller -share in the control of foreign policy--all to be accomplished by -some kind of international league of peace. He adds, however, as the -culminating and most important portion of his article: - -“But no scheme for preventing future wars will have any chance of -success unless it rests upon the assurance that the states which enter -it will loyally and steadfastly abide by it and that each and all of -them will join in coercing by their overwhelming united strength any -state which may disregard the obligations it has undertaken.” - -This is almost exactly what I have said. Indeed, it is almost word for -word what I have said--an agreement which is all the more striking -because when he wrote it Lord Bryce could not have known what I -had written. We must insist on righteousness first and foremost. -We must strive for peace always; but we must never hesitate to put -righteousness above peace. In order to do this, we must put force back -of righteousness, for, as the world now is, national righteousness -without force back of it speedily becomes a matter of derision. To the -doctrine that might makes right, it is utterly useless to oppose the -doctrine of right unbacked by might. - -It is not even true that what the pacificists desire is right. The -leaders of the pacificists of this country who for five months now have -been crying, “Peace, peace,” have been too timid even to say that -they want the peace to be a righteous one. We needlessly dignify such -outcries when we speak of them as well-meaning. The weaklings who raise -their shrill piping for a peace that shall consecrate successful wrong -occupy a position quite as immoral as and infinitely more contemptible -than the position of the wrong-doers themselves. The ruthless strength -of the great absolutist leaders--Elizabeth of England, Catherine of -Russia, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck--is -certainly infinitely better for their own nations and is probably -better for mankind at large than the loquacious impotence, ultimately -trouble-breeding, which has recently marked our own international -policy. A policy of blood and iron is sometimes very wicked; but it -rarely does as much harm, and never excites as much derision, as a -policy of milk and water--and it comes dangerously near flattery to -call the foreign policy of the United States under President Wilson -and Mr. Bryan merely one of milk and water. Strength at least commands -respect; whereas the prattling feebleness that dares not rebuke any -concrete wrong, and whose proposals for right are marked by sheer -fatuity, is fit only to excite weeping among angels and among men the -bitter laughter of scorn. - -At this moment any peace which leaves unredressed the wrongs of -Belgium, and which does not effectively guarantee Belgium and all other -small nations that behave themselves, against the repetition of such -wrongs would be a well-nigh unmixed evil. As far as we personally are -concerned, such a peace would inevitably mean that we should at once -and in haste have to begin to arm ourselves or be exposed in our turn -to the most frightful risk of disaster. Let our people take thought -for the future. What Germany did to Belgium because her need was great -and because she possessed the ruthless force with which to meet her -need she would, of course, do to us if her need demanded it; and in -such event what her representatives now say as to her intentions toward -America would trouble her as little as her signature to the neutrality -treaties troubled her when she subjugated Belgium. Nor does she stand -alone in her views of international morality. More than one of the -great powers engaged in this war has shown by her conduct in the past -that if it profited her she would without the smallest scruple treat -any land in the two Americas as Belgium has been treated. What has -recently happened in the Old World should be pondered deeply by the -nations of the New World; by Chile, Argentina, and Brazil no less than -by the United States. The world war has proved beyond peradventure that -the principle underlying the Monroe Doctrine is of vast moment to the -welfare of all America, and that neither this nor any other principle -can be made effective save as power is put behind it. - -Belgium was absolutely innocent of offense. Her cities have been laid -waste or held to ransom for gigantic sums of money; her fruitful -fields have been trampled into mire; her sons have died on the field -of battle; her daughters are broken-hearted fugitives; a million of -her people have fled to foreign lands. Entirely disregarding all -accusations as to outrages on individuals, it yet remains true that -disaster terrible beyond belief has befallen this peaceful nation -of six million people who themselves had been guilty of not even -the smallest wrong-doing. Louvain and Dinant are smoke-grimed and -blood-stained ruins. Brussels has been held to enormous ransom, -although it did not even strive to defend itself. Antwerp did strive -to defend itself. Because soldiers in the forts attempted to repulse -the enemy, hundreds of houses in the undefended city were wrecked with -bombs from air-ships, and throngs of peaceful men, women, and children -were driven from their homes by the sharp terror of death. Be it -remembered always that not one man in Brussels, not one man in Antwerp, -had even the smallest responsibility for the disaster inflicted upon -them. Innocence has proved not even the smallest safeguard against -such woe and suffering as we in this land can at present hardly imagine. - -What befell Antwerp and Brussels will surely some day befall New York -or San Francisco, and may happen to many an inland city also, if we -do not shake off our supine folly, if we trust for safety to peace -treaties unbacked by force. At the beginning of last month, by the -appointment of the President, peace services were held in the churches -of this land. As far as these services consisted of sermons and prayers -of good and wise people who wished peace only if it represented -righteousness, who did not desire that peace should come unless it -came to consecrate justice and not wrong-doing, good and not evil, -the movement represented good. In so far, however, as the movement -was understood to be one for immediate peace without any regard to -righteousness or justice, without any regard for righting the wrongs of -those who have been crushed by unmerited disaster, then the movement -represented mischief, precisely as fifty years ago, in 1864, in our own -country a similar movement for peace, to be obtained by acknowledgment -of disunion and by the perpetuation of slavery, would have represented -mischief. In the present case, however, the mischief was confined -purely to those taking part in the movement in an unworthy spirit; for -(like the peace parades and newspaper peace petitions) it was a merely -subjective phenomenon; it had not the slightest effect of any kind, -sort, or description upon any of the combatants abroad and could not -possibly have any effect upon them. It is well for our own sakes that -we should pray sincerely and humbly for the peace of righteousness; but -we must guard ourselves from any illusion as to the news of our having -thus prayed producing the least effect upon those engaged in the war. - -There is just one way in which to meet the upholders of the doctrine -that might makes right. To do so we must prove that right will make -might, by backing right with might. - -In his second inaugural address Andrew Jackson laid down the rule by -which every national American administration ought to guide itself, -saying: “The foreign policy adopted by our government is to do justice -to all, and to submit to wrong by none.” - -The statement of the dauntless old fighter of New Orleans is as true -now as when he wrote it. We must stand absolutely for righteousness. -But to do so is utterly without avail unless we possess the strength -and the loftiness of spirit which will back righteousness with deeds -and not mere words. We must clear the rubbish from off our souls and -admit that everything that has been done in passing peace treaties, -arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, Hague treaties, and the -like, with no sanction of force behind them, amounts to literally and -absolutely zero, to literally and absolutely nothing, in any time of -serious crisis. We must recognize that to enter into foolish treaties -which cannot be kept is as wicked as to break treaties which can and -ought to be kept. We must labor for an international agreement among -the great civilized nations which shall put the full force of all of -them back of any one of them, and of any well-behaved weak nation, -which is wronged by any other power. Until we have completed this -purpose, we must keep ourselves ready, high of heart and undaunted of -soul, to back our rights with our strength. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -AN INTERNATIONAL POSSE COMITATUS - - -Most Western Americans who are past middle age remember young, rapidly -growing, and turbulent communities in which there was at first -complete anarchy. During the time when there was no central police -power to which to appeal every man worth his salt, in other words -every man fit for existence in such a community, had to be prepared -to defend himself; and usually, although not always, the fact that he -was prepared saved him from all trouble, whereas unpreparedness was -absolutely certain to invite disaster. - -In such communities before there was a regular and fully organized -police force there came an interval during which the preservation of -the peace depended upon the action of a single official, a sheriff -or marshal, who if the law was defied in arrogant fashion summoned -a posse comitatus composed of as many armed, thoroughly efficient, -law-abiding citizens as were necessary in order to put a stop to the -wrong-doing. Under these conditions each man had to keep himself armed -and both able and willing to respond to the call of the peace-officer; -and furthermore, if he had a shred of wisdom he kept himself ready in -an emergency to act on his own behalf if the peace-officer did not or -could not do his duty. - -In such towns I have myself more than once seen well-meaning but -foolish citizens endeavor to meet the exigencies of the case by simply -passing resolutions of disarmament without any power back of them. -That is, they passed self-denying ordinances, saying that nobody was -to carry arms; but they failed to provide methods for carrying such -ordinances into effect. In every case the result was the same. Good -citizens for the moment abandoned their weapons. The bad men continued -to carry them. Things grew worse instead of better; and then the -good men came to their senses and clothed some representative of the -police with power to employ force, potential or existing, against the -wrong-doers. - -Affairs in the international world are at this time in analogous -condition. There is no central police power, and not the least -likelihood of its being created. Well-meaning enthusiasts have tried -their hands to an almost unlimited extent in the way of devising -all-inclusive arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, disarmament -proposals, and the like, with no force back of them, and the result -has been stupendous and discreditable failure. Preparedness for war on -the part of individual nations has sometimes but not always averted -war. Unpreparedness for war, as in the case of China, Korea, and -Luxembourg, has invariably invited smashing disaster, and sometimes -complete conquest. Surely these conditions should teach a lesson that -any man who runs may read unless his eyes have been blinded by folly or -his heart weakened by cowardice. - -The immediately vital lesson for each individual nation is that as -things are now it must in time of crisis rely on its own stout hearts -and ready hands for self-defense. Existing treaties are utterly -worthless so far as concerns protecting any free, well-behaved people -from one of the great aggressive military monarchies of the world. The -all-inclusive arbitration treaties such as those recently negotiated -by Messrs. Wilson and Bryan, when taken in connection with our refusal -to act under existing treaties, represent about the highest point of -slightly mischievous fatuity which can be attained in international -matters. Inasmuch as we ourselves are the power that initiated their -negotiation, we can do our plain duty to ourselves and our neighbors -only by ourselves proceeding from the outset on the theory, and by -warning our neighbors, that these treaties in any time of crisis will -certainly not be respected by any serious adversary, and probably will -of necessity be violated by ourselves. They do not in even the very -smallest degree relieve us of the necessity of preparedness for war. To -this point of our duty to be prepared I will return later. - -But we ought not to and must not rest content merely with working for -our own defense. The utterly appalling calamity that has befallen -the civilized world during the last five months, and, above all, the -horrible catastrophe that has overwhelmed Belgium without Belgium’s -having the smallest responsibility in the matter, must make the -least thoughtful realize how unsatisfactory is the present basis of -international relations among civilized powers. In order to make things -better several things are necessary. We must clearly grasp the fact -that mere selfish avoidance of duty to others, even although covered by -such fine words as “peace” and “neutrality,” is a wretched thing and an -obstacle to securing the peace of righteousness throughout the world. -We must recognize clearly the old common-law doctrine that a right -without a remedy is void. We must firmly grasp the fact that measures -should be taken to put force back of good faith in the observance of -treaties. The worth of treaties depends purely upon the good faith with -which they are executed; and it is mischievous folly to enter into -treaties without providing for their execution and wicked folly to -enter into them if they ought not to be executed. - -It is necessary to devise means for putting the collective and -efficient strength of all the great powers of civilization back of any -well-behaved power which is wronged by another power. In other words, -we must devise means for executing treaties in good faith, by the -establishment of some great international tribunal, and by securing -the enforcement of the decrees of this tribunal through the action of -a posse comitatus of powerful and civilized nations, all of them being -bound by solemn agreement to coerce any power that offends against -the decrees of the tribunal. That there will be grave difficulties in -successfully working out this plan I would be the first to concede, -and I would be the first to insist that to work it out successfully -would be impossible unless the nations acted in good faith. But the -plan is feasible, and it is the only one which at the moment offers -any chance of success. Ever since the days of Henry IV of France there -has been a growth, slow and halting to be sure but yet evidently a -growth, in recognition by the public conscience of civilized nations -that there should be a method of making the rules of international -morality obligatory and binding among the powers. But merely to trust -to public opinion without organized force back of it is silly. Force -must be put back of justice, and nations must not shrink from the duty -of proceeding by any means that are necessary against wrong-doers. -It is the failure to recognize these vital truths that has rendered -the actions of our government during the last few years impotent -to preserve world peace and fruitful only in earning for us the -half-veiled derision of other nations. - -The attitude of the present administration during the last five months -shows how worthless the present treaties, unbacked by force, are, and -how utterly ineffective mere passive neutrality is to secure even -the smallest advance in world morality. I have been very reluctant -in any way to criticise the action of the present administration in -foreign affairs; I have faithfully, and in some cases against my -own deep-rooted personal convictions, sought to justify what it has -done in Mexico and as regards the present war; but the time has come -when loyalty to the administration’s action in foreign affairs means -disloyalty to our national self-interest and to our obligations toward -humanity at large. As regards Belgium the administration has clearly -taken the ground that our own selfish ease forbids us to fulfil our -explicit obligations to small neutral states when they are deeply -wronged. It will never be possible in any war to commit a clearer -breach of international morality than that committed by Germany in the -invasion and subjugation of Belgium. Every one of the nations involved -in this war, and the United States as well, have committed such -outrages in the past. But the very purpose of the Hague conventions -and of all similar international agreements was to put a stop to such -misconduct in the future. - -At the outset I ask our people to remember that what I say is based on -the assumption that we are bound in good faith to fulfil our treaty -obligations; that we will neither favor nor condemn any other nation -except on the ground of its behavior; that we feel as much good-will -to the people of Germany or Austria as to the people of England, of -France, or of Russia; that we speak for Belgium only as we could -speak for Holland or Switzerland or one of the Scandinavian or Balkan -nations; and that if the circumstances as regards Belgium had been -reversed we would have protested as emphatically against wrong action -by England or France as we now protest against wrong action by Germany. - -The United States and the great powers now at war were parties to the -international code created in the regulations annexed to the Hague -conventions of 1899 and 1907. As President, acting on behalf of this -government, and in accordance with the unanimous wish of our people, -I ordered the signature of the United States to these conventions. -Most emphatically I would not have permitted such a farce to have -gone through if it had entered my head that this government would not -consider itself bound to do all it could to see that the regulations to -which it made itself a party were actually observed when the necessity -for their observance arose. I cannot imagine any sensible nation -thinking it worth while to sign future Hague conventions if even such a -powerful neutral as the United States does not care enough about them -to protest against their open breach. Of the present neutral powers the -United States of America is the most disinterested and the strongest, -and should therefore bear the main burden of responsibility in this -matter. - -It is quite possible to make an argument to the effect that we never -should have entered into the Hague conventions, because our sole duty -is to ourselves and not to others, and our sole concern should be to -keep ourselves at peace, at any cost, and not to help other powers -that are oppressed, and not to protest against wrong-doing. I do not -myself accept this view; but in practice it is the view taken by the -present administration, apparently with at the moment the approval of -the mass of our people. Such a policy, while certainly not exalted, and -in my judgment neither far-sighted nor worthy of a high-spirited and -lofty-souled nation, is yet in a sense understandable, and in a sense -defensible. - -But it is quite indefensible to make agreements and not live up to -them. The climax of absurdity is for any administration to do what -the present administration during the last five months has done. Mr. -Wilson’s administration has shirked doing the duty plainly imposed on -it by the obligations of the conventions already entered into; and at -the same time it has sought to obtain cheap credit by entering into a -couple of score new treaties infinitely more drastic than the old ones, -and quite impossible of honest fulfilment. When the Belgian people -complained of violations of the Hague tribunal, it was a mockery, -it was a timid and unworthy abandonment of duty on our part, for -President Wilson to refer them back to the Hague court, when he knew -that the Hague court was less than a shadow unless the United States -by doing its clear duty gave the Hague court some substance. If the -Hague conventions represented nothing but the expression of feeble -aspirations toward decency, uttered only in time of profound peace, and -not to be even expressed above a whisper when with awful bloodshed and -suffering the conventions were broken, then it was idle folly to enter -into them. If, on the other hand, they meant anything, if the United -States had a serious purpose, a serious sense of its obligations to -world righteousness, when it entered into them, then its plain duty as -the trustee of civilization is to investigate the charges solemnly made -as to the violation of the Hague conventions. If such investigation is -made, and if the charges prove well founded, then it is the duty of the -United States to take whatever action may be necessary to vindicate the -principles of international law set forth in these conventions. - -I am not concerned with the charges of individual atrocity. The prime -fact is that Belgium committed no offense whatever, and yet that her -territory has been invaded and her people subjugated. This prime fact -cannot be left out of consideration in dealing with any matter that -has occurred in connection with it. Her neutrality has certainly been -violated, and this is in clear violation of the fundamental principles -of the Hague conventions. It appears clear that undefended towns have -been bombarded, and that towns which were defended have been attacked -with bombs at a time when no attack was made upon the defenses. This -is certainly in contravention of the Hague agreement forbidding the -bombardment of undefended towns. Illegal and excessive contributions -are expressly condemned under Articles 49 and 52 of the conventions. If -these articles do not forbid the levying of such sums as $40,000,000 -from Brussels and $90,000,000 from the province of Brabant, then the -articles are absolutely meaningless. Articles 43 and 50 explicitly -forbid the infliction of a collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, -on a population on account of acts of individuals for which it cannot -be regarded as collectively responsible. Either this prohibition is -meaningless or it prohibits just such acts as the punitive destruction -of Visé, Louvain, Aerschot, and Dinant. Furthermore, a great deal of -the appalling devastation of central and eastern Belgium has been -apparently terrorizing and not punitive in its purpose, and this is -explicitly forbidden by the Hague conventions. - -Now, it may be that there is an explanation and justification for -a portion of what has been done. But if the Hague conventions mean -anything, and if bad faith in the observation of treaties is not -to be treated with cynical indifference, then the United States -government should inform itself as to the facts, and should take -whatever action is necessary in reference thereto. The extent to -which the action should go may properly be a subject for discussion. -But that there should be some action is beyond discussion; unless, -indeed, we ourselves are content to take the view that treaties, -conventions, and international engagements and agreements of all kinds -are to be treated by us and by everybody else as what they have been -authoritatively declared to be, “scraps of paper,” the writing on -which is intended for no better purpose than temporarily to amuse the -feeble-minded. - -If the above statements seem in the eyes of my German friends hostile -to Germany, let me emphasize the fact that they are predicated upon a -course of action which if extended and applied as it should be extended -and applied would range the United States on the side of Germany if -any such assault were made upon Germany as has been made upon Belgium, -or if either Belgium or any of the other allies committed similar -wrong-doing. Many Germans assert and believe that if Germany had not -acted as she did France and England would have invaded Belgium and have -committed similar wrongs. In such case it would have been our clear -duty to behave toward them exactly as we ought now to behave toward -Germany. But the fact that other powers might under other conditions do -wrong, affords no justification for failure to act on the wrong that -has actually been committed. It must always be kept in mind, however, -that we cannot expect the nation against whose actions we protest to -accept our position as warranted, unless we make it clear that we have -both the will and the power to interfere on behalf of that nation if in -its turn it is oppressed. In other words, we must show that we believe -in right and therefore in living up to our promises in good faith; and, -furthermore, that we are both able and ready to put might behind right. - -As I have before said, I think that the party in Germany which believes -in a policy of aggression represents but a minority of the nation. -It is powerful only because the great majority of the German people -are rightfully in fear of aggression at the expense of Germany, and -sanction striking only because they fear lest they themselves be -struck. The greatest service that could be rendered to peace would -be to convince Germany, as well as other powers, that in such event -we would do all we could on behalf of the power that was wronged. -Extremists in England, France, and Russia talk as if the proper outcome -of the present war would be the utter dismemberment of Germany and her -reduction to impotence such as that which followed for her upon the -Thirty Years’ War. I have actually received letters from Frenchmen and -Englishmen upbraiding me for what they regard as a pro-German leaning -in these articles I have written. To these well-meaning persons I can -only say that Americans who remember the extreme bitterness felt by -Northerners for Southerners, and Southerners for Northerners, at the -end of the Civil War, are saddened but in no wise astonished that -other peoples should show a like bitterness. I can only repeat that to -dismember and hopelessly shatter Germany would be a frightful calamity -for mankind, precisely as the dismemberment and shattering of the -British Empire or of the French Republic would be. It is right that the -United States should regard primarily its own interests. But I believe -that I speak for a considerable number of my countrymen when I say that -we ought not solely to consider our own interests. Above all, we should -not do as the present administration does; for it refuses to take any -concrete action in favor of any nation which is wronged; and yet it -also refuses to act so that we may ourselves be sufficient for our own -protection. - -We ought not to trust in words unbacked by deeds. We should be able -to defend ourselves. We should also be ready and able to join in -preventing the infliction of disaster of the kind of which I speak upon -any civilized power, great or small, whether it be at the present time -Belgium, or at some future day Germany or England, Holland, Sweden or -Hungary, Russia or Japan. - -So much for questions of international right, and of our duty to others -in international affairs. Now for our duty to ourselves. - -A sincere desire to act well toward other nations must not blind us to -the fact that as yet the standard of international morality is both -low and irregular. The behavior of the great military empires of the -Old World, in reference to their treaty obligations and their moral -obligations toward countries such as Belgium, Finland, and Korea, shows -that it would be utter folly for us in any grave crisis to trust to -anything save our own preparedness and resolution for our safety. The -other day there appeared in the newspapers extracts from a translation -of a report made by an officer of the Prussian army staff outlining -the plan of operations by Germany in the event of war with America. -Great surprise was expressed by innocent Americans that such plans -should be in existence, and certain gentlemen who speak for Germany -denied that the report (which was printed and openly sold in Germany -in pamphlet form) was “official.” Neither the resentment expressed -nor yet the denials were necessary. One feature of the admirable -preparedness in which Germany and Japan stand so far above all other -nations, and especially above our own, is their careful consideration -of hostilities with all possible antagonists. Bernhardi’s famous books -treat of possible war with Austria, and possible attack by Austria upon -Germany, although the prime lessons that they teach are those contained -in the possibility of war as it has actually occurred, with Germany -and Austria in alliance. This does not indicate German hostility to -Austria; it merely indicates German willingness to look squarely in -the face all possible facts. Of course, and quite properly, the German -General Staff has carefully considered the question of hostilities -with America, and, of course, plans were drawn up with minute care -and prevision at the time when there was friction between the two -countries over Samoa, at the time when Admiral Dietrich clashed with -Dewey in Manila Bay, and on the later occasion when there was friction -in connection with Venezuela. This did not represent any special German -ill will toward America. It represented the common-sense--albeit -somewhat cold-blooded--consideration of possibilities by Germany’s -rulers; and the failure to give this consideration would have reflected -severely upon these rulers--although I do not regard some of the -actions proposed as proper from the standpoint of warfare as the United -States has practised it. To become angry because such plans exist would -be childish. To fail to profit by our knowledge that they certainly -do exist would, however, be not merely childish but imbecile. I have -myself become personally cognizant of the existence of such plans for -operations against us, and of the larger features of their details, in -two cases, affecting two different nations. - -The essential feature of these plans was (and doubtless is) the -seizure of some of our great coast cities and the terrorization of -these cities so as to make them give enormous ransoms; ransoms of -such size that our own country would be crippled, whereas our foes -would be enabled to run the war against us with a handsome profit to -themselves. These plans are based, of course, upon the belief that we -have not sufficient foresight and intelligence to keep our navy in -first-class condition, and upon not merely the belief but the knowledge -that our regular army is so small and our utter unpreparedness -otherwise so great that on land we would be entirely helpless against -a moderate-sized expeditionary force belonging to any first-class -military power. Foreign military and naval observers know well that -our navy has been used during the last eighteen months in connection -with the Mexican situation in such manner as to accomplish the minimum -of results as regards Mexico, while at the same time to do the maximum -of damage in interrupting the manœuvring and the gun practice of our -fleets. They regard Messrs. Wilson and Bryan as representative of the -American people in their entire inability to understand the real nature -of the forces that underlie international relations and the importance -of preparedness. They are entirely cold-blooded in their views of us. -Foreign rulers may despise us for our supine unpreparedness, and for -our readiness to make treaties, taken together with our refusal to -fulfil these treaties by seeking to avert wrong done to others. But -their contempt will not prevent their using this nation as arbiter in -order to bring about peace if to do so suits their purposes; and if, on -the contrary, one or the other of the several great military empires -becomes the world mistress as the result of this war, that power -will infringe our rights whenever and to the extent that it deems it -advantageous to do so, and will make war upon us whenever it believes -that such war will be to its own advantage. - -In the event of such a war against us it is well to remember that the -spiritless and selfish type of neutrality which we have observed in -the present war will be remembered by all other nations on whichever -side they have been engaged in this contest, and will give each of them -more or less satisfaction in the event of disaster befalling us. These -nations, if they come to a deadlock as the result of this war, will not -be withheld by any sentiment of indignation against or contempt for us -from utilizing the services of the President as a medium for bringing -about peace, if this seems the most convenient method of getting peace. -But, whether they do this or not, they will retain a smouldering ill -will toward us, one and all of them; and if we were assailed it would -be utterly quixotic, utterly foolish of any one of them to come to -our aid no matter what wrongs were inflicted upon us. It would be -quite impossible for any power to treat us worse than Belgium has been -treated by Germany or to attack us with less warrant than was shown -when Belgium was attacked. Bombs have been continually dropped by the -Germans in the city of Paris and in other cities, wrecking private -houses and killing men, women, and children at a time when there was no -pretense that any military attacks were being made upon the cities, or -that any other object was served than that of terrorizing the civilian -population. Cities have been destroyed and others held to huge ransom. -All these practices are forbidden by the Hague conventions. Inasmuch as -we have not made a single protest against them when other powers have -suffered, it would be both ridiculous and humiliating for us to make -even the slightest appeal for assistance or to expect any assistance -from any other powers if ever we in our turn suffer in like fashion. -It would be purely our affair. We would have no right to expect that -other powers would take the kind of action which we ourselves have -refused to take. It would be our time to take our medicine, and it -would be folly and cowardice to make wry faces over it or to expect -sympathy, still less aid, from outsiders. As I have already stated, my -own view is most strongly that, if we are assailed in accordance with -the plans of foreign powers above mentioned, it would be our business -positively to refuse to allow any city to ransom itself, and sternly -to accept the destruction of New York, or San Francisco, or any other -city as the alternative of such ransom. Our duty would be to accept -these disasters as the payment rightfully due from us to fate for our -folly in having listened to the clamor of the feeble folk among the -ultrapacificists, and in having indorsed the unspeakable silliness of -the policy contained in the proposed all-inclusive arbitration treaties -of Mr. Taft and in the accomplished all-inclusive arbitration treaties -of Messrs. Wilson and Bryan. - -I very earnestly hope that this nation will ultimately adopt a -dignified and self-respecting policy in international affairs. I -earnestly hope that ultimately we shall live up to every international -obligation we have undertaken--exactly as we did live up to them -during the seven and a half years while I was President. I earnestly -hope that we shall ourselves become one of the joint guarantors of -world peace under such a plan as that I in this book outline, and that -we shall hold ourselves ready and willing to act as a member of the -international posse comitatus to enforce the peace of righteousness as -against any offender big or small. This would mean a great practical -stride toward relief from the burden of excessive military preparation. -It would mean that a long step had been taken toward at least -minimizing and restricting the area and extent of possible warfare. It -would mean that all liberty-loving and enlightened peoples, great and -small, would be freed from the haunting nightmare of terror which now -besets them when they think of the possible conquest of their land. - -Until this can be done we owe it to ourselves as a nation effectively -to safeguard ourselves against all likelihood of disaster at the hands -of a foreign foe. We should bring our navy up to the highest point of -preparedness, we should handle it purely from military considerations, -and should see that the training was never intermitted. We should make -our little regular army larger and more effective than at present. We -should provide for it an adequate reserve. In addition, I most heartily -believe that we should return to the ideal held by our people in the -days of Washington although never lived up to by them. We should -follow the example of such typical democracies as Switzerland and -Australia and provide and require military training for all our young -men. Switzerland’s efficient army has unquestionably been the chief -reason why in this war there has been no violation of her neutrality. -Australia’s system of military training has enabled her at once to ship -large bodies of first-rate fighting men to England’s aid. Our northern -neighbors have done even better than Australia; perhaps special mention -should be made of St. John, Newfoundland, which has sent to the front -one in five of her adult male population, a larger percentage than -any other city of the empire; a feat probably due to the fact that in -practically all her schools there is good military training, while her -young men have much practice in shooting tournaments. England at the -moment is saved from the fate of Belgium only because of her navy; and -the small size of her army, her lack of arms, her lack of previous -preparations doubtless afford the chief reason why this war has -occurred at all at this time. There would probably have been no war if -England had followed the advice so often urged on her by the lamented -Lord Roberts, for in that case she would have been able immediately to -put in the field an army as large and effective as, for instance, that -of France. - -Training of our young men in field manœuvres and in marksmanship, as -is done in Switzerland, and to a slightly less extent in Australia, -would be of immense advantage to the physique and morale of our whole -population. It would not represent any withdrawal of our population -from civil pursuits, such as occurs among the great military states -of the European Continent. In Switzerland, for instance, the ground -training is given in the schools, and the young man after graduating -serves only some four months with the branch of the army to which he -is attached, and after that only about eight days a year, not counting -his rifle practice. All serve alike, rich and poor, without any -exceptions; and all whom I have ever met, the poor even more than the -rich, are enthusiastic over the beneficial effects of the service and -the increase in self-reliance, self-respect, and efficiency which it -has brought. The utter worthlessness of make-believe soldiers who have -not been trained, and who are improvised on the Wilson-Bryan theory, -will be evident to any one who cares to read such works as Professor -Johnson’s recent volume on Bull Run. Our people should make a thorough -study of the Swiss and Australian systems, and then adapt them to our -own use. To do so would not be a stride toward war, as the feeble folk -among the ultrapacificists would doubtless maintain. It would be the -most effectual possible guarantee that peace would dwell within our -borders; and it would also make it possible for us not only to insure -peace for ourselves, but to have our words carry weight if we spoke -against the commission of wrong and injustice at the expense of others. - -But we must always remember that no institutions will avail unless the -private citizen has the right spirit. When a leading congressman, -himself with war experience, shows conclusively in open speech in -the House that we are utterly unprepared to do our duty to ourselves -if assailed, President Wilson answers him with a cheap sneer, with -unworthy levity; and the repeated warnings of General Wood are treated -with the same indifference. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this -attitude on the part of our public servants really represents the real -convictions of the average American. The ideal citizen of a free state -must have in him the stuff which in time of need will enable him to -show himself a first-class fighting man who scorns either to endure -or to inflict wrong. American society is sound at core and this means -that at bottom we, as a people, accept as the basis of sound morality -not slothful ease and soft selfishness and the loud timidity that -fears every species of risk and hardship, but the virile strength of -manliness which clings to the ideal of stern, unflinching performance -of duty, and which follows whithersoever that ideal may lead. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -SELF-DEFENSE WITHOUT MILITARISM - - -The other day one of the typical ultrapacificists or peace-at-any-price -men put the ultrapacificist case quite clearly, both in a statement of -his own and by a quotation of what he called the “golden words” of Mr. -Bryan at Mohonk. In arguing that we should under no conditions fight -for our rights, and that we should make no preparation whatever to -secure ourselves against wrong, this writer pointed out China as the -proper model for America. He did this on the ground that China, which -did not fight, was yet “older” than Rome, Greece, and Germany, which -had fought, and that its example was therefore to be preferred. - -This, of course, is a position which saves the need of argument. If -the average American wants to be a Chinaman, if China represents his -ideal, then he should by all means follow the advice of pacificists -like the writer in question and be a supporter of Mr. Bryan. If any man -seriously believes that China has played a nobler and more useful part -in the world than Athens and Rome and Germany, then he is quite right -to try to Chinafy the United States. In such event he must of course -believe that all the culture, all the literature, all the art, all the -political and cultural liberty and social well-being, which modern -Europe and the two Americas have inherited from Rome and Greece, and -that all that has been done by Germany from the days of Charlemagne to -the present time, represent mere error and confusion. He must believe -that the average German or Frenchman or Englishman or inhabitant of -North or South America occupies a lower moral, intellectual, and -physical status than the average coolie who with his fellows composes -the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population. To my mind such -a proposition is unfit for debate outside of certain types of asylum. -But those who sincerely take the view that this gentleman takes are -unquestionably right in copying China in every detail, and nothing that -I can say will appeal to them. - -The “golden words” of Mr. Bryan were as follows: - - I believe that this nation could stand before the world to-day - and tell the world that it did not believe in war, that it did - not believe that it was the right way to settle disputes, that - it had no disputes which it was not willing to submit to the - judgment of the world. If this nation did that, it not only - would not be attacked by any other nation on the earth, but it - would become the supreme power in the world. - -Of course, it is to be assumed that Mr. Bryan means what he says. If he -does, then he is willing to submit to arbitration the question whether -the Japanese have or have not the right to send unlimited numbers -of immigrants to this shore. If Mr. Bryan does not mean this, among -other specific things, then the “golden words” in question represent -merely the emotionalism of the professional orator. Of course if Mr. -Bryan means what he says, he also believes that we should not have -interfered in Cuba and that Cuba ought now to be the property of -Spain. He also believes that we ought to have permitted Colombia to -reconquer and deprive of their independence the people of Panama, and -that we should not have built the Panama Canal. He also believes that -California and Texas ought now to be parts of Mexico, enjoying whatever -blessings complete abstinence from foreign war has secured that country -during the last three years. He also believes that the Declaration -of Independence was an arbitrable matter and that the United States -ought now to be a dependency of Great Britain. Unless Mr. Bryan does -believe all of these things then his “golden words” represent only a -rhetorical flourish. He is Secretary of State and the right-hand man -of President Wilson, and President Wilson is completely responsible for -whatever he says and for the things he does--or rather which he leaves -undone. - -Now, it is quite useless for me to write with any view to convincing -gentlemen like Mr. Bryan and the writer in question. If they really -do represent our fellow countrymen, then they are right in holding -up China as our ideal; not the modern China, not the China that is -changing and moving forward, but old China. In such event Americans -ought frankly to class themselves with the Chinese. That is where, on -this theory, they belong. If this is so, then let us fervently pray -that the Japanese or Germans or some other virile people that does not -deify moral, mental, and physical impotence, may speedily come to rule -over us. - -I am, however, writing on the assumption that Americans are still on -the whole like their forefathers who followed Washington, and like -their fathers who fought in the armies of Grant and Lee. I am writing -on the assumption that, even though temporarily misled, they will -not permanently and tamely submit to oppression, and that they will -ultimately think intelligently as to what they should do to safeguard -themselves against aggression. I abhor unjust war, and I deplore that -the need even for just war should ever occur. I believe we should set -our faces like flint against any policy of aggression by this country -on the rights of any other country. But I believe that we should look -facts in the face. I believe that it is unworthy weakness to fear to -face the truth. Moreover, I believe that we should have in us that -fibre of manhood which will make us follow duty whithersoever it may -lead. Unquestionably, we should render all the service it is in our -power to render to righteousness. To do this we must be able to back -righteousness with force, to put might back of right. It may well be -that by following out this theory we can in the end do our part in -conjunction with other nations of the world to bring about, if not--as -I hope--a world peace, yet at least an important minimizing of the -chances for war and of the areas of possible war. But meanwhile it is -absolutely our duty to prepare for our own defense. - -This country needs something like the Swiss system of war training for -its young men. Switzerland is one of the most democratic governments in -the world, and it has given its young men such an efficient training as -to insure entire preparedness for war, without suffering from the least -touch of militarism. Switzerland is at peace now primarily because -all the great military nations that surround it know that its people -have no intention of making aggression on anybody and yet that they -are thoroughly prepared to hold their own and are resolute to fight to -the last against any invader who attempts either to subjugate their -territory or by violating its neutrality to make it a battle-ground. - -A bishop of the Episcopal Church recently wrote me as follows: - - How lamentable that we should stand idle, making no preparations - to enforce peace, and crying “peace” when there is none! I have - scant sympathy for the short-sightedness of those who decry - preparation for war as a means of preventing it. - -The manager of a land company in Alabama writes me urging that some one -speak for reasonable preparedness on the part of the nation. He states -that it is always possible that we shall be engaged in hostilities with -some first-class power, that he hopes and believes that war will never -come, but adds: - - I may not believe that my home will burn down or that I am going - to die within the period of my expectancy, but nevertheless I - carry fire and life insurance to the full insurable value on my - property and on my life to the extent of my ability. The only - insurance of our liberties as a people is full preparation for - a defense adequate against any attack and made in time to fully - meet any attack. We do not _know_ the attack is coming; but to - wait until it does come will be too late. Our present weakness - lies in the wide-spread opinion among our people that this - country is invincible because of its large population and vast - resources. This I believe is true if, and only if, we use these - resources or a small part of them to protect the major part, - and if we train at least a part of our people how to defend the - nation. Under existing conditions we can hardly hope to have - an effective army in the field in less time than eight or ten - months. To-day not one per cent of our people know anything about - rifle shooting. - -I quote these two out of many letters, because they sum up the general -feeling of men of vision. Both of my correspondents are most sincerely -for peace. No man can possibly be more anxious for peace than I am. -I ask those individuals who think of me as a firebrand to remember -that during the seven and a half years I was President not a shot was -fired at any soldier of a hostile nation by any American soldier or -sailor, and there was not so much as a threat of war. Even when the -state of Panama threw off the alien yoke of Colombia and when this -nation, acting as was its manifest duty, by recognizing Panama as -an independent state stood for the right of the governed to govern -themselves on the Isthmus, as well as for justice and humanity, -there was not a shot fired by any of our people at any Colombian. -The blood recently shed at Vera Cruz, like the unpunished wrongs -recently committed on our people in Mexico, had no parallel during my -administration. When I left the presidency there was not a cloud on -the horizon--and one of the reasons why there was not a cloud on the -horizon was that the American battle fleet had just returned from its -sixteen months’ trip around the world, a trip such as no other battle -fleet of any power had ever taken, which it had not been supposed -could be taken, and which exercised a greater influence for peace than -all the peace congresses of the last fifty years. With Lowell I most -emphatically believe that peace is not a gift that tarries long in the -hands of cowards; and the fool and the weakling are no improvement on -the coward. - -Nineteen centuries ago in the greatest of all books we were warned -that whoso loses his life for righteousness shall save it and that he -who seeks to save it shall lose it. The ignoble and abject gospel of -those who would teach us that it is preferable to endure disgrace and -discredit than to run any risk to life or limb would defeat its own -purpose; for that kind of submission to wrong-doing merely invites -further wrong-doing, as has been shown a thousand times in history and -as is shown by the case of China in our own days. Moreover, our people, -however ill-prepared, would never consent to such abject submission; -and indeed as a matter of fact our publicists and public men and our -newspapers, instead of being too humble and submissive, are only too -apt to indulge in very offensive talk about foreign nations. Of all the -nations of the world we are the one that combines the greatest amount -of wealth with the smallest ability to defend that wealth. Surely one -does not have to read history very much or ponder over philosophy a -great deal in order to realize the truth that the one certain way -to invite disaster is to be opulent, offensive, and unarmed. There -is utter inconsistency between the ideal of making this nation the -foremost commercial power in the world and of disarmament in the face -of an armed world. There is utter inconsistency between the ideal of -making this nation a power for international righteousness and at the -same time refusing to make us a power efficient in anything save empty -treaties and emptier promises. - -I do not believe in a large standing army. Most emphatically I do not -believe in militarism. Most emphatically I do not believe in any policy -of aggression by us. But I do believe that no man is really fit to be -the free citizen of a free republic unless he is able to bear arms and -at need to serve with efficiency in the efficient army of the republic. -This is no new thing with me. For years I have believed that the young -men of the country should know how to use a rifle and should have a -short period of military training which, while not taking them for any -length of time from civil pursuits, would make them quickly capable of -helping defend the country in case of need. When I was governor of New -York, acting in conjunction with the administration at Washington under -President McKinley, I secured the sending abroad of one of the best -officers in the New York National Guard, Colonel William Cary Sanger, -to study the Swiss system. As President I had to devote my attention -chiefly to getting the navy built up. But surely the sight of what has -happened abroad ought to awaken our people to the need of action, not -only as regards our navy but as regards our land forces also. - -Australia has done well in this respect. But Switzerland has worked out -a comprehensive scheme with practical intelligence. She has not only -solved the question of having men ready to fight, but she has solved -the question of having arms to give these men. At present England is in -more difficulty about arms than about men, and some of her people when -sent to the front were armed with hunting rifles. Our own shortcomings -are far greater. Indeed, they are so lamentable that it is hard to -believe that our citizens as a whole know them. To equip half the -number of men whom even the British now have in the field would tax -our factories to the limit. In Switzerland, during the last two or -three years of what corresponds to our high-school work the boy is -thoroughly grounded in the rudiments of military training, discipline, -and marksmanship. When he graduates he is put for some four to six -months in the army to receive exactly the training he would get in time -of war. After that he serves eight days a year and in addition often -joins with his fellows in practising at a mark. He keeps his rifle -and accoutrements in his home and is responsible for their condition. -Efficiency is the watchword of Switzerland, and not least in its army. -At the outbreak of this terrible war Switzerland was able to mobilize -her forces in the corner of her territory between France and Germany -as quickly as either of the great combatants could theirs; and no one -trespassed upon her soil. - -The Swiss training does not to any appreciable extent take the man away -from his work. But it does make him markedly more efficient for his -work. The training he gets and his short service with the colors render -him appreciably better able to do whatever his job in life is, and, in -addition, benefit his health and spirits. The service is a holiday, and -a holiday of the best because of the most useful type. - -There is no reason whatever why Americans should be unwilling or unable -to do what Switzerland has done. We are a far wealthier country -than Switzerland and could afford without the slightest strain the -very trifling expense and the trifling consumption of time rendered -necessary by such a system. It has really nothing in common with the -universal service in the great conscript armies of the military powers. -No man would be really taken out of industry. On the contrary, the -average man would probably be actually benefited so far as doing his -life-work is concerned. The system would be thoroughly democratic in -its workings. No man would be exempted from the work and all would have -to perform the work alike. It would be entirely possible to arrange -that there should be a certain latitude as to the exact year when the -four or six months’ service was given. - -Officers, of course, would need a longer training than the men. This -could readily be furnished either by allowing numbers of extra students -to take partial or short-term courses at West Point or by specifying -optional courses in the high schools, the graduates of these special -courses being tested carefully in their field-work and being required -to give extra periods of service and being under the rigid supervision -of the regular army. There could also be opportunities for promotion -from the ranks for any one who chose to take the time and the trouble -to fit himself. - -The four or six months’ service with the colors would be for the most -part in the open field. The drill hall and the parade-ground do not -teach more than five per cent of what a soldier must actually know. -Any man who has had any experience with ordinary organizations of the -National Guard when taken into camp knows that at first only a very -limited number of the men have any idea of taking care of themselves -and that the great majority suffer much from dyspepsia, just because -they do not know how to take care of themselves. The soldier needs -to spend some months in actual campaign practice under canvas with -competent instructors before he gets to know his duty. If, however, he -has had previous training in the schools of such a type as that given -in Switzerland and then has this actual practice, he remains for some -years efficient with no more training than eight or ten days a year. - -The training must be given in large bodies. It is essential that men -shall get accustomed to the policing and sanitary care of camps in -which there are masses of soldiers. Moreover, officers and especially -the higher officers are wholly useless in war time unless they are -accustomed to handle masses of men in co-operation with one another. - -There are small sections of our population out of which it is possible -to improvise soldiers in a short time. Men who are accustomed to ride -and to shoot and to live in the open and who are hardy and enduring and -by nature possess the fighting edge already know most of what it is -necessary that an infantryman or cavalryman should know, and they can -be taught the remainder in a very short time by good officers. Morgan’s -Virginia Riflemen, Andrew Jackson’s Tennesseans, Forrest’s Southwestern -Cavalry were all men of this kind; but even such men are of real use -only after considerable training or else if their leaders are born -fighters and masters of men. Such leaders are rare. The ordinary -dweller in civilization has to be taught to shoot, to walk (or ride if -he is in the cavalry), to cook for himself, to make himself comfortable -in the open, and to take care of his feet and his health generally. -Artillerymen and engineers need long special training. - -It may well be that the Swiss on an average can be made into good -troops quicker than our own men; but most assuredly there would be -numbers of Americans who would not be behind the Swiss in such a -matter. A body of volunteers of the kind I am describing would of -course not be as good as a body of regulars of the same size, but they -would be immeasurably better than the average soldiers produced by any -system we now have or ever have had in connection with our militia. Our -regular army would be strengthened by them at the very beginning and -would be set free in its entirety for immediate aggressive action; -and in addition a levy in mass of the young men of the right age would -mean that two or three million troops were put into the field, who, -although not as good as regulars, would at once be available in numbers -sufficient to overwhelm any expeditionary force which it would be -possible for any military power to send to our shores. The existence -of such a force would render the immediate taking of cities like San -Francisco, New York, or Boston an impossibility and would free us -from all danger from sudden raids and make it impossible even for an -army-corps to land with any prospect of success. - -Our people are so entirely unused to things military that it is -probably difficult for the average man to get any clear idea of our -shortcomings. Unlike what is true in the military nations of the Old -World, here the ordinary citizen takes no interest in the working of -our War Department in time of peace. No President gains the slightest -credit for himself by paying attention to it. Then when a crisis comes -and the War Department breaks down, instead of the people accepting -what has happened with humility as due to their own fault during the -previous two or three decades, there is a roar of wrath against the -unfortunate man who happens to be in office at the time. There was such -a roar of wrath against Secretary Alger in the Spanish War. Now, as a -matter of fact, ninety per cent of our shortcomings when the war broke -out with Spain could not have been remedied by any action on the part -of the Secretary of War. They were due to what had been done ever since -the close of the Civil War. - -We were utterly unprepared. There had been no real manœuvring of so -much as a brigade and very rarely had any of our generals commanded -even a good-sized regiment in the field. The enlisted men and the -junior officers of the regular army were good. Most of the officers -above the rank of captain were nearly worthless. There were striking -exceptions of course, but, taking the average, I really believe that -it would have been on the whole to the advantage of our army in 1898 -if all the regular officers above the rank of captain had been retired -and if all the captains who were unfit to be placed in the higher -positions had also been retired. The lieutenants were good. The lack -of administrative skill was even more marked than the lack of military -skill. No one who saw the congestion of trains, supplies, animals, and -men at Tampa will ever forget the impression of helpless confusion -that it gave him. The volunteer forces included some organizations and -multitudes of individuals offering first-class material. But, as a -whole, the volunteer army would have been utterly helpless against any -efficient regular force at the outset of the 1898 war, probably almost -as inefficient as were the two armies which fought one another at Bull -Run in 1861. Even the efficiency of the regular army itself was such -merely by comparison with the volunteers. I do not believe that any -army in the world offered finer material than was offered by the junior -officers and enlisted men of the regular army which disembarked on -Cuban soil in June, 1898; and by the end of the next two weeks probably -the average individual infantry or cavalry organization therein was -at least as good as the average organization of the same size in an -Old-World army. But taking the army as a whole and considering its -management from the time it began to assemble at Tampa until the -surrender of Santiago, I seriously doubt if it was as efficient as a -really good European or Japanese army of half the size. Since then we -have made considerable progress. Our little army of occupation that -went to Cuba at the time of the revolution in Cuba ten years ago was -thoroughly well handled and did at least as well as any foreign force -of the same size could have done. But it did not include ten thousand -men, that is, it did not include as many men as the smallest military -power in Europe would assemble any day for manœuvres. - -This is no new thing in our history. If only we were willing to learn -from our defeats and failures instead of paying heed purely to our -successes, we would realize that what I have above described is one of -the common phases of our history. In the War of 1812, at the outset of -the struggle, American forces were repeatedly beaten, as at Niagara and -Bladensburg, by an enemy one half or one quarter the strength of the -American army engaged. Yet two years later these same American troops -on the northern frontier, when trained and commanded by Brown, Scott, -and Ripley, proved able to do what the finest troops of Napoleon were -unable to do, that is, meet the British regulars on equal terms in the -open; and the Tennessee backwoodsmen and Louisiana volunteers, when -mastered and controlled by the iron will and warlike genius of Andrew -Jackson, performed at New Orleans a really great feat. During the year -1812 the American soldiers on shore suffered shameful and discreditable -defeats, and yet their own brothers at sea won equally striking -victories, and this because the men on shore were utterly unprepared -and because the men at sea had been thoroughly trained and drilled long -in advance. - -Exactly the same lessons are taught by the histories of other nations. -When, during the Napoleonic wars, a small force of veteran French -soldiers landed in Ireland they defeated without an effort five times -their number of British and Irish troops at Castlebar. Yet the men -whom they thus drove in wild flight were the own brothers of and often -the very same men who a few years later, under Wellington, proved an -overmatch for the flower of the French forces. The nation that waits -until the crisis is upon it before taking measures for its own safety -pays heavy toll in the blood of its best and its bravest and in bitter -shame and humiliation. Small is the comfort it can then take from the -memory of the times when the noisy and feeble folk in its own ranks -cried “Peace, peace,” without taking one practical step to secure peace. - -We can never follow out a worthy national policy, we can never be of -benefit to others or to ourselves, unless we keep steadily in view -as our ideal that of the just man armed, the man who is fearless, -self-reliant, ready, because he has prepared himself for possible -contingencies; the man who is scornful alike of those who would advise -him to do wrong and of those who would advise him tamely to suffer -wrong. The great war now being waged in Europe and the fact that -no neutral nation has ventured to make even the smallest effort to -alleviate[1] or even to protest against the wrongs that have been -done show with lamentable clearness that all the peace congresses -of the past fifteen years have accomplished precisely and exactly -nothing so far as any great crisis is concerned. Fundamentally this is -because they have confined themselves to mere words, seemingly without -realizing that mere words are utterly useless unless translated into -deeds and that an ounce of promise which is accompanied by provision -for a similar ounce of effective performance is worth at least a ton -of promise as to which no effective method of performance is provided. -Furthermore, a very serious blunder has been to treat peace as the end -instead of righteousness as the end. The greatest soldier-patriots -of history, Timoleon, John Hamden, Andreas Hofer, Koerner, the great -patriot-statesman-soldiers like Washington, the great patriot-statesmen -like Lincoln whose achievements for good depended upon the use of -soldiers, have all achieved their immortal claim to the gratitude of -mankind by what they did in just war. To condemn war in terms which -include the wars these men waged or took part in precisely as they -include the most wicked and unjust wars of history is to serve the -devil and not God. - - [1] The much advertised sending of food and supplies to - Belgium has been of most benefit to the German conquerors - of Belgium. They have taken the money and food of the - Belgians and permitted the Belgians to be supported by - outsiders. Of course, it was far better to send them food, - even under such conditions, than to let them starve; but - the professional pacificists would do well to ponder the - fact that if the neutral nations had been willing to - prevent the invasion of Belgium, which could only be done - by willingness and ability to use force, they would by - this act of “war” have prevented more misery and suffering - to innocent men, women, and children than the organized - charity of all the “peaceful” nations of the world can now - remove. - -Again, these peace people have persistently and resolutely blinked -facts. One of the peace congresses sat in New York at the very time -that the feeling in California about the Japanese question gravely -threatened the good relations between ourselves and the great empire -of Japan. The only thing which at the moment could practically be -done for the cause of peace was to secure some proper solution of the -question at issue between ourselves and Japan. But this represented -real effort, real thought. The peace congress paid not the slightest -serious attention to the matter and instead devoted itself to listening -to speeches which favored the abolition of the United States navy and -even in one case the prohibiting the use of tin soldiers in nurseries -because of the militaristic effect on the minds of the little boys and -girls who played with them! - -Ex-President Taft has recently said that it is hysterical to endeavor -to prepare against war; and he at the same time explained that the -only real possibility of war was to be found “in the wanton, reckless, -wicked willingness on the part of a narrow section of the country to -gratify racial prejudice and class hatred by flagrant breach of treaty -right in the form of state law.” This characterization is, of course, -aimed at the State of California for its action toward the Japanese. -If--which may Heaven forfend--any trouble comes because of the action -of California toward the Japanese, a prime factor in producing it will -be the treaty negotiated four years ago with Japan; and no clearer -illustration can be given of the mischief that comes to our people from -the habit our public men have contracted of getting cheap applause for -themselves by making treaties which they know to be shams, which they -know cannot be observed. The result of such action is that there is -one set of real facts, those that actually exist and must be reckoned -with, and another set of make-believe facts which do not exist except -on pieces of paper or in after-dinner speeches, which are known to be -false but which serve to deceive well-meaning pacificists. Four years -ago there was in existence a long-standing treaty with Japan under -which we reserved the right to keep out Japanese laborers. Every man -of any knowledge whatever of conditions on the Pacific Slope, and, -indeed, generally throughout this country, knew, and knows now, that -any immigration in mass to this country of the Japanese, whether the -immigrants be industrial laborers or men whose labor takes the form of -agricultural work or even the form of small shopkeeping, was and is -absolutely certain to produce trouble of the most dangerous kind. The -then administration entered on a course of conduct as regards Manchuria -which not only deeply offended the Japanese but actually achieved the -result of uniting the Russians and Japanese against us. To make amends -for this serious blunder the administration committed the far worse -blunder of endeavoring to placate Japanese opinion by the negotiation -of a new treaty in which our right to exclude Japanese laborers, -that is, to prevent Japanese immigration in mass, was abandoned. The -extraordinary and lamentable fact in the matter was that the California -senators acquiesced in the treaty. Apparently they took the view, which -so many of our public men do take and which they are encouraged to take -by the unwisdom of those who demand impossible treaties, that they were -perfectly willing to please some people by passing the treaty because, -if necessary, the opponents of the treaty could at any time be placated -by its violation. One item in securing their support was the statement -by the then administration that the Japanese authorities had said -that they would promise under a “gentlemen’s agreement” to keep the -immigrants out if only they were by treaty given the right to let them -in. Under the preceding treaty, during my administration, the Japanese -government had made and had in good faith kept such an agreement, the -agreement being that as long as the Japanese government itself kept out -Japanese immigrants and thereby relieved us of the necessity of passing -any law to exclude them, no such law would be passed. Apparently the -next administration did not perceive the fathomless difference between -retaining the power to enact a law which was not enacted as long as no -necessity for enacting it arose, and abandoning the power, surrendering -the right, and trusting that the necessity to exercise it would not -arise. - -I immensely admire and respect the Japanese people. I prize their -good-will. I am proud of my personal relations with some of their -leading men. Fifty years ago there was no possible community between -the Japanese and ourselves. The events of the last fifty years have -been so extraordinary that now Japanese statesmen, generals, artists, -writers, scientific men, business men, can meet our corresponding men -on terms of entire equality. I am fortunate enough to have a number -of Japanese friends. I value their friendship. They and I meet on a -footing of absolute equality, socially, politically, and in every -other way. I respect and regard them precisely as in the case of my -German and Russian, French and English friends. But there is no use -blinking the truth because it is unpleasant. As yet the differences -between the Japanese who work with their hands and the Americans who -work with their hands are such that it is absolutely impossible for -them, when brought into contact with one another in great numbers, to -get on. Japan would not permit any immigration in mass of our people -into her territory, and it is wholly inadvisable that there should be -such immigration of her people into our territory. This is not because -either side is inferior to the other but because they are different. -As a matter of fact, these differences are sometimes in favor of the -Japanese and sometimes in favor of the Americans. But they are so -marked that at this time, whatever may be the case in the future, -friction and trouble are certain to come if there is any immigration -in mass of Japanese into this country, exactly as friction and trouble -have actually come in British Columbia from this cause, and have been -prevented from coming in Australia only by the most rigid exclusion -laws. Under these conditions the way to avoid trouble is not by making -believe that things which are not so are so but by courteously and -firmly facing the situation. The two nations should be given absolutely -reciprocal treatment. Students, statesmen, publicists, scientific men, -all travellers, whether for business or pleasure, and all men engaged -in international business, whether Japanese or American, should have -absolute right of entry into one another’s countries and should be -treated with the highest consideration while therein, but no settlement -in mass should be permitted of the people of either country in the -other country. All travelling and sojourning by the people of either -country in the other country should be encouraged, but there should be -no immigration of workers to, no settlement in, either country by the -people of the other. I advocate this solution, which for years I have -advocated, because I am not merely a friend but an intense admirer of -Japan, because I am most anxious that America should learn from Japan -the great amount that Japan can teach us and because I wish to work -for the best possible feeling between the two countries. Each country -has interests in the Pacific which can best be served by their cordial -co-operation on a footing of frank and friendly equality; and in -eastern Asiatic waters the interest and therefore the proper dominance -of Japan are and will be greater than those of any other nation. -If such a plan as that above advocated were once adopted by both -our nations all sources of friction between the two countries would -vanish at once. Ultimately I have no question that all restrictions of -movement from one country to the other could be dispensed with. But -to attempt to dispense with them in our day and our generation will -fail; and even worse failure will attend the attempt to make believe to -dispense with them while not doing so. - -It is eminently necessary that the United States should in good faith -observe its treaties, and it is therefore eminently necessary not to -pass treaties which it is absolutely certain will not be obeyed, and -which themselves provoke disobedience to them. The height of folly, of -course, is to pass treaties which will not be obeyed and the disregard -of which may cause the gravest possible trouble, even war, and at -the same time to refuse to prepare for war and to pass other foolish -treaties calculated to lure our people into the belief that there will -never be war. - -I advocate that our preparedness take such shape as to fit us to -resist aggression, not to encourage us in aggression. I advocate -preparedness that will enable us to defend our own shores and to -defend the Panama Canal and Hawaii and Alaska, and prevent the seizure -of territory at the expense of any commonwealth of the western -hemisphere by any military power of the Old World. I advocate this -being done in the most democratic manner possible. We Americans do -not realize how fundamentally democratic our army really is. When -I served in Cuba it was under General Sam Young and alongside of -General Adna Chaffee. Both had entered the American army as enlisted -men in the Civil War. Later, as President, I made both of them in -succession lieutenant-generals and commanders of the army. On the -occasion when General Chaffee was to appear at the White House for -the first time as lieutenant-general, General Young sent him his own -starred shoulder-straps with a little note saying that they were from -“Private Young, ’61, to Private Chaffee, ’61.” Both of the fine old -fellows represented the best type of citizen-soldier. Each was simply -and sincerely devoted to peace and justice. Each was incapable of -advocating our doing wrong to others. Neither could have understood -willingness on the part of any American to see the United States -submit tamely to insult or injury. Both typified the attitude that we -Americans should take in our dealings with foreign countries. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -OUR PEACEMAKER, THE NAVY - - -The course of the present administration in foreign affairs has now -and then combined officiously offensive action toward foreign powers -with tame submission to wrong-doing by foreign powers. As a nation we -have refused to do our duty to others and yet we have at times tamely -submitted to wrong at the hands of others. This has been notably -true of our conduct in Mexico; and we have come perilously near such -conduct in the case of Japan. It is also true of our activities as -regards the European war. We failed to act in accordance with our -obligations as a signatory power to the Hague treaties. In addition to -the capital crime committed against Belgium we have seen outrage after -outrage perpetrated in violation of the Hague conventions, and yet the -administration has never ventured so much as a protest. It has even at -times, and with wavering and vacillation, adopted policies unjust to -one or the other of the two sets of combatants. But it has immediately -abandoned these policies when the combatants in violent and improper -fashion overrode them; and it has submitted with such tame servility -to whatever the warring nations have dictated that in effect we see, -as Theodore Woolsey, the expert on international law, has pointed out, -the American government protecting belligerent interests abroad at the -expense of neutral interests both at home and abroad. Not since the -Napoleonic wars have belligerents acted with such high-handed disregard -of the rights of neutrals. Germany was the first and greatest offender; -and when we failed to protest in her case the administration perhaps -felt ashamed to protest, felt that it was estopped from protesting, in -other cases. England in its turn has violated our neutrality rights, -and while exercising both force and ingenuity in making this violation -effective has protested as if she herself were the injured party. As a -matter of fact, England and France should note that in view of their -command of the seas our war trade is of such value to them that certain -congressmen, whose interest in Germany surpasses their interest in -the United States, have sought by law totally to prohibit it. This -proposed--and thoroughly improper--action is a sufficient answer to -the charges of the Allies, and should remind them how ill they requite -the service rendered by our merchants when they seek to block all our -intercourse with other nations. They, however, are only to be blamed -for short-sightedness; there is no reason why they should pay heed to -American interests. But the administration should represent American -interests; it should see that while we perform our duties as neutrals -we should be protected in our rights as neutrals; and one of these -rights is the trade in contraband. To prohibit this is to take part in -the war for the benefit of one belligerent at the expense of another -and to our own cost. - -Of course it would be an ignoble action on our part after having -conspicuously failed to protest against the violation of Belgian -neutrality to show ourselves overeager to protest against comparatively -insignificant violations of our own neutral rights. But we should never -have put ourselves in such a position as to make insistence on our own -rights seem disregard for the rights of others. The proper course for -us to pursue was, on the one hand, scrupulously to see that we did -not so act as to injure any contending nation, unless required to do -so in the name of morality and of our solemn treaty obligations, and -also fearlessly to act on behalf of other nations which were wronged, -as required by these treaty obligations; and, on the other hand, with -courteous firmness to warn any nation which, for instance, seized or -searched our ships against the accepted rules of international conduct -that this we could not permit and that such a course should not be -persevered in by any nation which desired our good-will. I believe I -speak for at least a considerable portion of our people when I say that -we wish to make it evident that we feel sincere good-will toward all -nations; that any action we take against any nation is taken with the -greatest reluctance and only because the wrong-doing of that nation -imposes a distinct, although painful, duty upon us; and yet that we do -not intend ourselves to submit to wrong-doing from any nation. - -Until an efficient world league for peace is in more than mere process -of formation the United States must depend upon itself for protection -where its vital interests are concerned. All the youth of the nation -should be trained in warlike exercises and in the use of arms--as -well as in the indispensable virtues of courage, self-restraint, and -endurance--so as to be fit for national defense. But the right arm of -the nation must be its navy. Our navy is our most efficient peacemaker. -In order to use the navy effectively we should clearly define to -ourselves the policy we intend to follow and the limits over which we -expect our power to extend. Our own coasts, Alaska, Hawaii, and the -Panama Canal and its approaches should represent the sphere in which -we should expect to be able, single-handed, to meet and master any -opponent from overseas. - -I exclude the Philippines. This is because I feel that the present -administration has definitely committed us to a course of action which -will make the early and complete severance of the Philippines from -us not merely desirable but necessary. I have never felt that the -Philippines were of any special use to us. But I have felt that we had -a great task to perform there and that a great nation is benefited by -doing a great task. It was our bounden duty to work primarily for the -interests of the Filipinos; but it was also our bounden duty, inasmuch -as the entire responsibility lay upon us, to consult our own judgment -and not theirs in finally deciding what was to be done. It was our -duty to govern the islands or to get out of the islands. It was most -certainly not our duty to take the responsibility of staying in the -islands without governing them. Still less was it--or is it--our duty -to enter into joint arrangements with other powers about the islands; -arrangements of confused responsibility and divided power of the -kind sure to cause mischief. I had hoped that we would continue to -govern the islands until we were certain that they were able to govern -themselves in such fashion as to do justice to other nations and to -repel injustice committed on them by other nations. To substitute for -such government by ourselves either a government by the Filipinos with -us guaranteeing them against outsiders, or a joint guarantee between us -and outsiders, would be folly. It is eminently desirable to guarantee -the neutrality of small civilized nations which have a high social -and cultural status and which are so advanced that they do not fall -into disorder or commit wrong-doing on others. But it is eminently -undesirable to guarantee the neutrality or sovereignty of an inherently -weak nation which is impotent to preserve order at home, to repel -assaults from abroad, or to refrain from doing wrong to outsiders. It -is even more undesirable to give such a guarantee with no intention of -making it really effective. That this is precisely what the present -administration would be delighted to do has been shown by its refusal -to live up to its Hague promises at the very time that it was making -similar new international promises by the batch. To enter into a joint -guarantee of neutrality which in emergencies can only be rendered -effective by force of arms is to incur a serious responsibility which -ought to be undertaken in a serious spirit. To enter into it with no -intention of using force, or of preparing force, in order at need to -make it effective, represents the kind of silliness which is worse than -wickedness. - -Above all, we should keep our promises. The present administration was -elected on the outright pledge of giving the Filipinos independence. -Apparently its course in the Philippines has proceeded upon the theory -that the Filipinos are now fit to govern themselves. Whatever may be -our personal and individual beliefs in this matter, we ought not as a -nation to break faith or even to seem to break faith. I hope therefore -that the Filipinos will be given their independence at an early date -and without any guarantee from us which might in any way hamper our -future action or commit us to staying on the Asiatic coast. I do not -believe we should keep any foothold whatever in the Philippines. Any -kind of position by us in the Philippines merely results in making -them our heel of Achilles if we are attacked by a foreign power. They -can be of no compensating benefit to us. If we were to retain complete -control over them and to continue the course of action which in the -past sixteen years has resulted in such immeasurable benefit for them, -then I should feel that it was our duty to stay and work for them -in spite of the expense incurred by us and the risk we thereby ran. -But inasmuch as we have now promised to leave them and as we are now -abandoning our power to work efficiently for and in them, I do not -feel that we are warranted in staying in the islands in an equivocal -position, thereby incurring great risk to ourselves without conferring -any real compensating advantage, of a kind which we are bound to -take into account, on the Filipinos themselves. If the Filipinos are -entitled to independence then we are entitled to be freed from all the -responsibility and risk which our presence in the islands entails upon -us. - -The great nations of southernmost South America, Brazil, the Argentine, -and Chile are now so far advanced in stability and power that there is -no longer any need of applying the Monroe Doctrine as far as they are -concerned; and this also relieves us as regards Uruguay and Paraguay -the former of which is well advanced and neither of which has any -interests with which we need particularly concern ourselves. As regards -all these powers, therefore, we now have no duty save that doubtless if -they got into difficulties and desired our aid we would gladly extend -it, just as, for instance, we would to Australia and Canada. But we can -now proceed on the assumption that they are able to help themselves and -that any help we should be required to give would be given by us as an -auxiliary rather than as a principal. - -Our naval problem, therefore, is primarily to provide for the -protection of our own coasts and for the protection and policing of -Hawaii, Alaska, and the Panama Canal and its approaches. This offers -a definite problem which should be solved by our naval men. It is for -them, having in view the lessons taught by this war, to say what is -the exact type of fleet we require, the number and kind of submarines, -of destroyers, of mines, and of air-ships to be used against hostile -fleets, in addition to the cruisers and great fighting craft which must -remain the backbone of the navy. Civilians may be competent to pass -on the merits of the plans suggested by the naval men, but it is the -naval men themselves who must make and submit the plans in detail. Lay -opinion, however, should keep certain elementary facts steadily in mind. - -The navy must primarily be used for offensive purposes. Forts, not the -navy, are to be used for defense. The only permanently efficient type -of defensive is the offensive. A portion, and a very important portion, -of our naval strength must be used with our own coast ordinarily as a -base, its striking radius being only a few score miles, or a couple -of hundred at the outside. The events of this war have shown that -submarines can play a tremendous part. We should develop our force of -submarines and train the officers and crews who have charge of them -to the highest pitch of efficiency--for they will be useless in time -of war unless those aboard them have been trained in time of peace. -These submarines, when used in connection with destroyers and with -air-ships, can undoubtedly serve to minimize the danger of successful -attack on our own shores. But the prime lesson of the war, as regards -the navy, is that the nation with a powerful seagoing navy, although it -may suffer much annoyance and loss, yet is able on the whole to take -the offensive and do great damage to a nation with a less powerful -navy. Great Britain’s naval superiority over Germany has enabled her -completely to paralyze all Germany’s sea commerce and to prevent goods -from entering her ports. What is far more important, it has enabled the -British to land two or three hundred thousand men to aid the French, -and has enabled Canada and Australia to send a hundred thousand men -from the opposite ends of the earth to Great Britain. If Germany had -had the more powerful navy England would now have suffered the fate of -Belgium. - -The capital work done by the German cruisers in the Atlantic, the -Pacific, and the Indian Oceans shows how much can be accomplished in -the way of hurting and damaging an enemy by even the weaker power if -it possesses fine ships, well handled, able to operate thousands of -miles from their own base. We must not fail to recognize this. Neither -must we fail heartily and fully to recognize the capital importance of -submarines as well as air-ships, torpedo-boat destroyers, and mines, -as proved by the events of the last three months. But nothing that -has yet occurred warrants us in feeling that we can afford to ease up -in our programme of building battle-ships and cruisers, especially the -former. The German submarines have done wonderfully in this war; their -cruisers have done gallantly. But so far as Great Britain is concerned -the vital and essential feature has been the fact that her great battle -fleet has kept the German fleet immured in its own home ports, has -protected Britain from invasion, and has enabled her land strength to -be used to its utmost capacity beside the armies of France and Belgium. -If the men who for years have clamored against Britain’s being prepared -had had their way, if Britain during the last quarter of a century had -failed to continue the upbuilding of her navy, if the English statesmen -corresponding to President Wilson and Mr. Bryan had seen their ideas -triumph, England would now be off the map as a great power and the -British Empire would have dissolved, while London, Liverpool, and -Birmingham would be in the condition of Antwerp and Brussels. - -The efficiency of the German personnel at sea has been no less -remarkable than the efficiency of the German personnel on land. This -is due partly to the spirit of the nation and partly to what is itself -a consequence of that spirit, the careful training of the navy during -peace under the conditions of actual service. When, early in 1909, our -battle fleet returned from its sixteen months’ voyage around the world -there was no navy in the world which, size for size, ship for ship, -and squadron for squadron, stood at a higher pitch of efficiency. We -blind ourselves to the truth if we believe that the same is true now. -During the last twenty months, ever since Secretary Meyer left the Navy -Department, there has been in our navy a great falling off relatively -to other nations. It was quite impossible to avoid this while our -national affairs were handled as they have recently been handled. -The President who intrusts the Departments of State and the Navy to -gentlemen like Messrs. Bryan and Daniels deliberately invites disaster, -in the event of serious complications with a formidable foreign -opponent. On the whole, there is no class of our citizens, big or -small, who so emphatically deserve well of the country as the officers -and the enlisted men of the army and navy. No navy in the world has -such fine stuff out of which to make man-of-war’s men. But they must -be heartily backed up, heartily supported, and sedulously trained. -They must be treated well, and, above all, they must be treated so as -to encourage the best among them by sharply discriminating against the -worst. The utmost possible efficiency should be demanded of them. They -are emphatically and in every sense of the word men; and real men -resent with impatient contempt a policy under which less than their -best is demanded. The finest material is utterly worthless without -the best personnel. In such a highly specialized service as the navy -constant training of a purely military type is an absolute necessity. -At present our navy is lamentably short in many different material -directions. There is actually but one torpedo for each torpedo tube. It -seems incredible that such can be the case; yet it is the case. We are -many thousands of men short in our enlistments. We are lamentably short -in certain types of vessel. There is grave doubt as to the efficiency -of many of our submarines and destroyers. But the shortcomings in our -training are even more lamentable. To keep the navy cruising near -Vera Cruz and in Mexican waters, without manœuvring, invites rapid -deterioration. For nearly two years there has been no fleet manœuvring; -and this fact by itself probably means a twenty-five per cent loss of -efficiency. During the same periods most of the ships have not even -had division gun practice. Not only should our navy be as large as our -position and interest demand but it should be kept continually at the -highest point of efficiency and should never be used save for its own -appropriate military purposes. Of this elementary fact the present -administration seems to be completely ignorant. - -President Wilson and Secretary Daniels assert that our navy is in -efficient shape. Admiral Fiske’s testimony is conclusive to the -contrary, although it was very cautiously given, as is but natural -when a naval officer, if he tells the whole truth, must state what -is unpleasant for his superiors to hear. Other naval officers have -pointed out our deficiencies, and the newspapers state that some -of them have been reprimanded for so doing. But there is no need -for their testimony. There is one admitted fact which is absolutely -conclusive in the matter. There has been no fleet manœuvring during -the past twenty-two months. In spite of fleet manœuvring the navy may -be unprepared. But it is an absolute certainty that without fleet -manœuvring it cannot possibly be prepared. In the unimportant domain -of sport there is not a man who goes to see the annual football game -between Harvard and Yale who would not promptly cancel his ticket -if either university should propose to put into the field a team -which, no matter how good the players were individually, had not been -practised as a team during the preceding sixty days. If in such event -the president of either university or the coach of the team should -announce that in spite of never having had any team practice the -team was nevertheless in first-class condition, there is literally -no intelligent follower of the game who would regard the utterance as -serious. Why should President Wilson and Secretary Daniels expect the -American public to show less intelligence as regards the vital matter -of our navy than they do as regards a mere sport, a mere play? For -twenty-two months there has been no fleet manœuvring. Since in the -daily press, early in November, I, with emphasis, called attention to -this fact Mr. Daniels has announced that shortly manœuvring will take -place; and of course the failure to manœuvre for nearly two years has -been due less to Mr. Daniels than to President Wilson’s futile and -mischievous Mexican policy and his entire ignorance of the needs of -the navy. I am glad that the administration has tardily waked up to -the necessity of taking some steps to make the navy efficient, and if -the President and the Secretary of the Navy bring forth fruits meet -for repentance, I will most heartily acknowledge the fact--just as -it has given me the utmost pleasure to praise and support President -Wilson’s Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison. But misstatements as to actual -conditions make but a poor preparation for the work of remedying these -conditions, and President Wilson and Secretary Daniels try to conceal -from the people our ominous naval shortcomings. The shortcomings -are far-reaching, alike in material, organization, and practical -training. The navy is absolutely unprepared; its efficiency has been -terribly reduced under and because of the action of President Wilson -and Secretary Daniels. Let them realize this fact and do all they can -to remedy the wrong they have committed. Let Congress realize its own -shortcomings. Far-reaching and thoroughgoing treatment, continued for -a period of at least two and in all probability three years, is needed -if the navy is to be placed on an equality, unit for unit, no less than -in the mass, with the navies of England, Germany, and Japan. In the -present war the deeds of the _Emden_, of the German submarines, of Von -Spee’s squadron, have shown not merely efficiency but heroism; and the -navies of Great Britain and Japan have been handled in masterly manner. -Have the countrymen of Farragut, of Cushing, Buchanan, Winslow, and -Semmes, of Decatur, Hull, Perry, and MacDonough, lost their address and -courage, and are they willing to sink below the standard set by their -forefathers? - -It has been said that the United States never learns by experience -but only by disaster. Such method of education may at times prove -costly. The slothful or short-sighted citizens who are now misled by -the cries of the ultrapacificists would do well to remember events -connected with the outbreak of the war with Spain. I was then -Assistant Secretary of the Navy. At one bound our people passed from -a condition of smug confidence that war never could occur (a smug -confidence just as great as any we feel at present) to a condition of -utterly unreasoning panic over what might be done to us by a very weak -antagonist. One governor of a seaboard State announced that none of the -National Guard regiments would be allowed to respond to the call of the -President because they would be needed to prevent a Spanish invasion -of that State--the Spaniards being about as likely to make such an -invasion as we were to invade Timbuctoo or Turkestan. One congressman -besought me to send a battle-ship to protect Jekyll Island, off the -coast of Georgia. Another congressman asked me to send a battle-ship -to protect a summer colony which centred around a large Atlantic-coast -hotel in Connecticut. In my own neighborhood on Long Island clauses -were gravely inserted into the leases of property to the effect that -if the Spaniards destroyed the property the leases should terminate. -Chambers of commerce, boards of trade, municipal authorities, leading -business men, from one end of the country to the other, hysterically -demanded, each of them, that a ship should be stationed to defend -some particular locality; the theory being that our navy should be -strung along both seacoasts, each ship by itself, in a purely defensive -attitude--thereby making certain that even the Spanish navy could pick -them all up in detail. One railway president came to protest to me -against the choice of Tampa as a point of embarkation for our troops, -on the ground that his railway was entitled to its share of the profit -of transporting troops and munitions of war and that his railway -went to New Orleans. The very senators and congressmen who had done -everything in their power to prevent the building up and the efficient -training of the navy screamed and shrieked loudest to have the navy -diverted from its proper purpose and used to protect unimportant -seaports. Surely our congressmen and, above all, our people need to -learn that in time of crisis peace treaties are worthless, and the -ultrapacificists of both sexes merely a burden on and a detriment to -the country as a whole; that the only permanently useful defensive is -the offensive, and that the navy is properly the offensive weapon of -the nation. - -The navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and -is emphatically the peacemaker. Woe to our country if we permit that -right arm to become palsied or even to become flabby and inefficient! - - - - -CHAPTER X - -PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR - - -Military preparedness meets two needs. In the first place, it is a -partial insurance against war. In the next place, it is a partial -guarantee that if war comes the country will certainly escape dishonor -and will probably escape material loss. - -The question of preparedness cannot be considered at all until we -get certain things clearly in our minds. Right thinking, wholesome -thinking, is essential as a preliminary to sound national action. Until -our people understand the folly of certain of the arguments advanced -against the action this nation needs, it is, of course, impossible to -expect them to take such action. - -The first thing to understand is the fact that preparedness for war -does not always insure peace but that it very greatly increases the -chances of securing peace. Foolish people point out nations which, in -spite of preparedness for war, have seen war come upon them, and then -exclaim that preparedness against war is of no use. Such an argument -is precisely like saying that the existence of destructive fires in -great cities shows that there is no use in having a fire department. -A fire department, which means preparedness against fire, does not -prevent occasional destructive fires, but it does greatly diminish and -may completely minimize the chances for wholesale destruction by fire. -Nations that are prepared for war occasionally suffer from it; but if -they are unprepared for it they suffer far more often and far more -radically. - -Fifty years ago China, Korea, and Japan were in substantially the -same stage of culture and civilization. Japan, whose statesmen had -vision and whose people had the fighting edge, began a course of -military preparedness, and the other two nations (one of them in -natural resources immeasurably superior to Japan) remained unprepared. -In consequence, Japan has immensely increased her power and standing -and is wholly free from all danger of military invasion. Korea on the -contrary, having first been dominated by Russia has now been conquered -by Japan. China has been partially dismembered; one half of her -territories are now subject to the dominion of foreign nations, which -have time and again waged war between themselves on these territories, -and her remaining territory is kept by her purely because these foreign -nations are jealous of one another. - -In 1870 France was overthrown and suffered by far the most damaging -and disastrous defeat she had suffered since the days of Joan of -Arc--because she was not prepared. In the present war she has suffered -terribly, but she is beyond all comparison better off than she was in -1870, because she has been prepared. Poor Belgium, in spite of being -prepared, was almost destroyed, because great neutral nations--the -United States being the chief offender--have not yet reached the -standard of international morality and of willingness to fight for -righteousness which must be attained before they can guarantee small, -well-behaved, civilized nations against cruel disaster. England, -because she was prepared as far as her navy is concerned, has been able -to avoid Belgium’s fate; and, on the other hand, if she had been as -prepared with her army as France, she would probably have been able to -avert the war and, if this could not have been done, would at any rate -have been able to save both France and Belgium from invasion. - -In recent years Rumania, Bulgaria, and Servia have at times suffered -terribly, and in some cases have suffered disaster, in spite of being -prepared for war; but Bosnia and Herzegovina are under alien rule at -this moment because they could no more protect themselves against -Austria than they could against Turkey. While Greece was unprepared she -was able to accomplish nothing, and she encountered disaster. As soon -as she was prepared, she benefited immensely. - -Switzerland, at the time of the Napoleonic wars, was wholly unprepared -for war. In spite of her mountains, her neighbors overran her at will. -Great battles were fought on her soil, including one great battle -between the French and the Russians; but the Swiss took no part in -these battles. Their territory was practically annexed to the French -Republic, and they were domineered over first by the Emperor Napoleon -and then by his enemies. It was a bitter lesson, but the Swiss learned -it. Since then they have gradually prepared for war as no other small -state of Europe has done, and it is in consequence of this preparedness -that none of the combatants has violated Swiss territory in the present -struggle. - -The briefest examination of the facts shows that unpreparedness for war -tends to lead to immeasurable disaster, and that preparedness, while -it does not certainly avert war any more than the fire department of a -city certainly averts fire, yet tends very strongly to guarantee the -nation against war and to secure success in war if it should unhappily -arise. - -Another argument advanced against preparedness for war is that such -preparedness incites war. This, again, is not in accordance with -the facts. Unquestionably certain nations have at times prepared -for war with a view to foreign conquest. But the rule has been that -unpreparedness for war does not have any real effect in securing peace, -although it is always apt to make war disastrous, and that preparedness -for war generally goes hand in hand with an increased caution in going -to war. - -Striking examples of these truths are furnished by the history of the -Spanish-American states. For nearly three quarters of a century after -these states won their independence their history was little else than -a succession of bloody revolutions and of wars among themselves as well -as with outsiders, while during the same period there was little or -nothing done in the way of effective military preparedness by one of -them. During the last twenty or thirty years, however, certain of them, -notably Argentina and Chile, have prospered and become stable. Their -stability has been partly caused by, and partly accompanied by, a great -increase in military preparedness. During this period Argentina and -Chile have known peace as they never knew it before, and as the other -Spanish-American countries have not known it either before or since, -and at the same time their military efficiency has enormously increased. - -Proportionately, Argentina and Chile are in military strength beyond -all comparison more efficient than the United States; and if our navy -is permitted to deteriorate as it has been deteriorating for nearly -two years, the same statement can soon be made, although with more -qualification, of their naval strength. Preparedness for war has -made them far less liable to have war. It has made them less and not -more aggressive. It has also made them for the first time efficient -potential factors in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine as coguarantors, -on a footing of complete equality with the United States. The Monroe -Doctrine, conceived not merely as a measure of foreign policy vital to -the welfare of the United States, but even more as the proper joint -foreign policy of all American nations, is by far the most efficient -guarantee against war that can be offered the western hemisphere. By -whatever name it is called, it is absolutely indispensable in order to -keep this hemisphere mistress of its own destinies, able to prevent any -part of it from falling under the dominion of any Old World power, and -able absolutely to control in its own interest all colonization on and -immigration to our shores from either Europe or Asia. - -The bloodiest and most destructive war in Spanish-American history, -that waged by Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against Paraguay, was -waged when all the nations were entirely unprepared for war, especially -the three victorious nations. During the last two or three decades -Mexico, the Central American states, Colombia, and Venezuela have been -entirely unprepared for war, as compared with Chile and Argentina. -Yet, whereas Chile and Argentina have been at peace, the other states -mentioned have been engaged in war after war of the most bloody -and destructive character. Entire lack of preparedness for war has -gone hand in hand with war of the worst type and with all the worst -sufferings that war can bring. - -The lessons taught by Spanish-America are paralleled elsewhere. When -Greece was entirely unprepared for war she nevertheless went to war -with Turkey, exactly as she did when she was prepared; the only -difference was that in the one case she suffered disaster and in the -other she did not. The war between Italy and Turkey was due wholly -to the fact that Turkey was not prepared--that she had no navy. The -fact that in 1848 Prussia was entirely unprepared, and moreover -had just been engaged in a revolution heartily approved by all the -ultrapacificists and professional humanitarians, did not prevent her -from entering on a war with Denmark. It merely prevented the war from -being successful. - -Utter and complete lack of preparation on our part did not prevent our -entering into war with Great Britain in 1812 and with Mexico in 1848. -It merely exposed us to humiliation and disaster in the former war; in -the latter, Mexico was even worse off as regards preparation than we -were. As for civil war, of course military unpreparedness has not only -never prevented it but, on the contrary, seems usually to have been one -of the inciting causes. - -The fact that unpreparedness does not mean peace ought to be patent -to every American who will think of what has occurred in this country -during the last seventeen years. In 1898 we were entirely unprepared -for war. No big nation, save and except our opponent, Spain, was more -utterly unprepared than we were at that time, nor more utterly unfit -for military operations. This did not, however, mean that peace was -secured for a single additional hour. Our army and navy had been -neglected for thirty-three years. This was due largely to the attitude -of the spiritual forebears of those eminent clergymen, earnest social -workers, and professionally humanitarian and peace-loving editors, -publicists, writers for syndicates, speakers for peace congresses, -pacificist college presidents, and the like who have recently come -forward to protest against any inquiry into the military condition of -this nation, on the ground that to supply our ships and forts with -sufficient ammunition and to fill up the depleted ranks of the army and -navy, and in other ways to prepare against war, will tend to interfere -with peace. In 1898 the gentlemen of this sort had had their way for -thirty-three years. Our army and navy had been grossly neglected. But -the unpreparedness due to this neglect had not the slightest effect of -any kind in preventing the war. The only effect it had was to cause -the unnecessary and useless loss of thousands of lives in the war. -Hundreds of young men perished in the Philippine trenches because, -while the soldiers of Aguinaldo had modern rifles with smokeless -powder, our troops had only the old black-powder Springfield. Hundreds -more, nay thousands, died or had their health impaired for life in -fever camps here in our own country and in the Philippines and Cuba, -and suffered on transports, because we were entirely unprepared for -war, and therefore no one knew how to take care of our men. The lives -of these brave young volunteers were the price that this country paid -for the past action of men like the clergymen, college presidents, -editors, and humanitarians in question--none of whom, by the way, -risked their own lives. They were also the price that this country paid -for having had in previous cabinets just such incompetents as in time -of peace Presidents so often, for political reasons, put into American -cabinets--just such incompetents as President Wilson has put into the -Departments of State and of the Navy. - -Now and then the ultrapacificists point out the fact that war is bad -because the best men go to the front and the worst stay at home. There -is a certain truth in this. I do not believe that we ought to permit -pacificists to stay at home and escape all risk, while their braver and -more patriotic fellow countrymen fight for the national well-being. -It is for this reason that I wish that we would provide for universal -military training for our young men, and in the event of serious war -make all men do their part instead of letting the whole burden fall -upon the gallant souls who volunteer. But as there is small likelihood -of any such course being followed in the immediate future, I at least -hope that we will so prepare ourselves in time of peace as to make our -navy and army thoroughly efficient; and also to enable us in time of -war to handle our volunteers in such shape that the loss among them -shall be due to the enemy’s bullets instead of, as is now the case, -predominantly to preventable sickness which we do not prevent. I call -the attention of the ultrapacificists to the fact that in the last -half century all the losses among our men caused by “militarism,” as -they call it, that is, by the arms of an enemy in consequence of our -going to war, have been far less than the loss caused among these same -soldiers by applied pacificism, that is, by our government having -yielded to the wishes of the pacificists and declined in advance to -make any preparations for war. The professional peace people have -benefited the foes and ill-wishers of their country; but it is probably -the literal fact to say that in the actual deed, by the obstacles they -have thrown in the way of making adequate preparation in advance, they -have caused more loss of life among American soldiers, fighting for -the honor of the American flag, during the fifty years since the close -of the Civil War than has been caused by the foes whom we have fought -during that period.[2] - - [2] Some of the leading pacificists are men who have made great - fortunes in industry. Of course industry inevitably takes - toll of life. Far more lives have been lost in this country - by men engaged in bridge building, tunnel digging, mining, - steel manufacturing, the erection of sky-scrapers, the - operations of the fishing fleet, and the like, than in all - our battles in all our foreign wars put together. Such loss - of life no more justifies us in opposing righteous wars - than in opposing necessary industry. There was certainly - far greater loss of life, and probably greater needless - and preventable and uncompensated loss of life, in the - industries out of which Mr. Carnegie made his gigantic - fortune than has occurred among our troops in war during - the time covered by Mr. Carnegie’s activities on behalf of - peace. - -But the most striking instance of the utter failure of unpreparedness -to stop war has been shown by President Wilson himself. President -Wilson has made himself the great official champion of unpreparedness -in military and naval matters. His words and his actions about foreign -war have their nearest parallel in the words and the actions of -President Buchanan about civil war; and in each case there has been -the same use of verbal adroitness to cover mental hesitancy. By his -words and his actions President Wilson has done everything possible -to prevent this nation from making its army and navy effective and to -increase the inefficiency which he already found existing. We were -unprepared when he took office, and every month since we have grown -still less prepared. Yet this fact did not prevent President Wilson, -the great apostle of unpreparedness, the great apostle of pacificism -and anti-militarism, from going to war with Mexico last spring. It -merely prevented him, or, to speak more accurately, the same mental -peculiarities which made him the apostle of unpreparedness also -prevented him, from making the war efficient. His conduct rendered the -United States an object of international derision because of the way in -which its affairs were managed. President Wilson made no declaration -of war. He did not in any way satisfy the requirements of common -international law before acting. He invaded a neighboring state, with -which he himself insisted we were entirely at peace, and occupied the -most considerable seaport of the country after military operations -which resulted in the loss of the lives of perhaps twenty of our men -and five or ten times that number of Mexicans; and then he sat supine, -and refused to allow either the United States or Mexico to reap any -benefit from what had been done. - -It is idle to say that such an amazing action was not war. It was an -utterly futile war and achieved nothing; but it was war. We had ample -justification for interfering in Mexico and even for going to war -with Mexico, if after careful consideration this course was deemed -necessary. But the President did not even take notice of any of the -atrocious wrongs Americans had suffered, or deal with any of the -grave provocations we had received. His statement of justification -was merely that “we are in Mexico to serve mankind, if we can find a -way.” Evidently he did not have in his mind any particular idea of -how he was to “serve mankind,” for, after staying eight months in -Mexico, he decided that he could not “find a way” and brought his -army home. He had not accomplished one single thing. At one time it -was said that we went to Vera Cruz to stop the shipment of arms into -Mexico. But after we got there we allowed the shipments to continue. -At another time it was said that we went there in order to exact an -apology for an insult to the flag. But we never did exact the apology, -and we left Vera Cruz without taking any steps to get an apology. In -all our history there has been no more extraordinary example of queer -infirmity of purpose in an important crisis than was shown by President -Wilson in this matter. His business was either not to interfere at -all or to interfere hard and effectively. This was the sole policy -which should have been allowed by regard for the dignity and honor of -the government of the United States and the welfare of our people. -In the actual event President Wilson interfered, not enough to quell -civil war, not enough to put a stop to or punish the outrages on -American citizens, but enough to incur fearful responsibilities. Then, -having without authority of any kind, either under the Constitution -or in international law or in any other way, thus interfered, and -having interfered to worse than no purpose, and having made himself -and the nation partly responsible for the atrocious wrongs committed -on Americans and on foreigners generally in Mexico by the bandit -chiefs whom he was more or less furtively supporting, President -Wilson abandoned his whole policy and drew out of Mexico to resume -his “watchful waiting.” When the President, who has made himself the -chief official exponent of the doctrine of unpreparedness, thus shows -that even in his hands unpreparedness has not the smallest effect in -preventing war, there ought to be little need of discussing the matter -further. - -Preparedness for war occasionally has a slight effect in creating or -increasing an aggressive and militaristic spirit. Far more often it -distinctly diminishes it. In Switzerland, for instance, which we -can well afford to take as a model for ourselves, effectiveness in -preparation, and the retention and development of all the personal -qualities which give the individual man the fighting edge, have in no -shape or way increased the militarist or aggressive spirit. On the -contrary, they have doubtless been among the factors that have made the -Swiss so much more law-abiding and less homicidal than we are. - -The ultrapacificists have been fond of prophesying the immediate -approach of a universally peaceful condition throughout the world, -which will render it unnecessary to prepare against war because there -will be no more war. This represents in some cases well-meaning -and pathetic folly. In other cases it represents mischievous and -inexcusable folly. But it always represents folly. At best, it -represents the inability of some well-meaning men of weak mind, and of -some men of strong but twisted mind, either to face or to understand -facts. - -These prophets of the inane are not peculiar to our own day. A little -over a century and a quarter ago a noted Italian pacificist and -philosopher, Aurelio Bertela, summed up the future of civilized mankind -as follows: “The political system of Europe has arrived at perfection. -An equilibrium has been attained which henceforth will preserve peoples -from subjugation. Few reforms are now needed and these will be -accomplished peaceably. Europe has no need to fear revolution.” - -These sapient statements (which have been paralleled by hundreds of -utterances in the many peace congresses of the last couple of decades) -were delivered in 1787, the year in which the French Assembly of -Notables ushered in the greatest era of revolution, domestic turmoil, -and international war in all history--an era which still continues and -which shows not the smallest sign of coming to an end. Never before -have there been wars on so great a scale as during this century and -a quarter; and the greatest of all these wars is now being waged. -Never before, except for the ephemeral conquests of certain Asiatic -barbarians, have there been subjugations of civilized peoples on so -great a scale. - -During this period here and there something has been done for peace, -much has been done for liberty, and very much has been done for reform -and advancement. But the professional pacificists, taken as a class -throughout the entire period, have done nothing for permanent peace -and less than nothing for liberty and for the forward movement of -mankind. Hideous things have been done in the name of liberty, in the -name of order, in the name of religion; and the victories that have -been gained against these iniquities have been gained by strong men, -armed, who put their strength at the service of righteousness and who -were hampered and not helped by the futility of the men who inveighed -against all use of armed strength. - -The effective workers for the peace of righteousness were men like -Stein, Cavour, and Lincoln; that is, men who dreamed great dreams, but -who were also pre-eminently men of action, who stood for the right, and -who knew that the right would fail unless might was put behind it. The -prophets of pacificism have had nothing whatever in common with these -great men; and whenever they have preached mere pacificism, whenever -they have failed to put righteousness first and to advocate peace as -the handmaiden of righteousness, they have done evil and not good. - -After the exhaustion of the Napoleonic struggles there came thirty-five -years during which there was no great war, while what was called “the -long peace” was broken only by minor international wars or short-lived -revolutionary contests. Good, but not far-sighted, men in various -countries, but especially in England, Germany, and our own country, -forthwith began to dream dreams--not of a universal peace that should -be founded on justice and righteousness backed by strength, but of a -universal peace to be obtained by the prattle of weaklings and the -outpourings of amiable enthusiasts who lacked the fighting edge. -About 1850, for instance, the first large peace congress was held. -There were numbers of kindly people who felt that this congress, and -the contemporary international exposition, also the first of its kind, -heralded the beginning of a régime of universal peace. As a matter of -fact, there followed twenty years during which a number of great and -bloody wars took place--wars far surpassing in extent, in duration, in -loss of life and property, and in importance anything that had been -seen since the close of the Napoleonic contest. - -Then there came another period of nearly thirty years during which -there were relatively only a few wars, and these not of the highest -importance. Again upright and intelligent but uninformed men began to -be misled by foolish men into the belief that world peace was about to -be secured, on a basis of amiable fatuity all around and under the lead -of the preachers of the diluted mush of make-believe morality. A number -of peace congresses, none of which accomplished anything, were held, -and also certain Hague conferences, which did accomplish a certain -small amount of real good but of a strictly limited kind. It was well -worth going into these Hague conferences, but only on condition of -clearly understanding how strictly limited was the good that they -accomplished. The hysterical people who treated them as furnishing a -patent peace panacea did nothing but harm, and partially offset the -real but limited good the conferences actually accomplished. Indeed, -the conferences undoubtedly did a certain amount of damage because -of the preposterous expectations they excited among well-meaning but -ill-informed and unthinking persons. These persons really believed -that it was possible to achieve the millennium by means that would not -have been very effective in preserving peace among the active boys -of a large Sunday-school--let alone grown-up men in the world as it -actually is. A pathetic commentary on their attitude is furnished by -the fact that the fifteen years that have elapsed since the first Hague -conference have seen an immense increase of war, culminating in the -present war, waged by armies, and with bloodshed, on a scale far vaster -than ever before in the history of mankind. - -All these facts furnish no excuse whatever for our failing to work -zealously for peace, but they absolutely require us to understand that -it is noxious to work for a peace not based on righteousness, and -useless to work for a peace based on righteousness unless we put force -back of righteousness. At present this means that adequate preparedness -against war offers to our nation its sole guarantee against wrong and -aggression. - -Emerson has said that in the long run the most uncomfortable truth is -a safer travelling companion than the most agreeable falsehood. The -advocates of peace will accomplish nothing except mischief until they -are willing to look facts squarely in the face. One of these facts is -that universal military service, wherever tried, has on the whole been -a benefit and not a harm to the people of the nation, so long as the -demand upon the average man’s life has not been for too long a time. -The Swiss people have beyond all question benefited by their system -of limited but universal preparation for military service. The same -thing is true of Australia, Chile, and Argentina. In every one of these -countries the short military training given has been found to increase -in marked fashion the social and industrial efficiency, the ability to -do good industrial work, of the man thus trained. It would be well for -the United States from every standpoint immediately to provide such -strictly limited universal military training. - -But it is well also for the United States to understand that a system -of military training which from our standpoint would be excessive and -unnecessary in order to meet our needs, may yet work admirably for some -other nation. The two nations that during the last fifty years have -made by far the greatest progress are Germany and Japan; and they are -the two nations in which preparedness for war in time of peace has -been carried to the highest point of scientific development. The feat -of Japan has been something absolutely without precedent in recorded -history. Great civilizations, military, industrial, and artistic, -have arisen and flourished in Asia again and again in the past. But -never before has an Asiatic power succeeded in adopting civilization -of the European or most advanced type and in developing it to a point -of military and industrial efficiency equalled only by one power of -European blood. - -As for Germany, we believers in democracy who also understand, as every -sound-thinking democrat must, that democracy cannot succeed unless it -shows the same efficiency that is shown by autocracy (as Switzerland -on a small scale has shown it) need above all other men carefully to -study what Germany has accomplished during the last half century. Her -military efficiency has not been more astounding than her industrial -and social efficiency; and the essential thing in her career of -greatness has been the fact that this industrial and social efficiency -is in part directly based upon the military efficiency and in part -indirectly based upon it, because based upon the mental, physical, and -moral qualities developed by the military efficiency. The solidarity -and power of collective action, the trained ability to work hard for an -end which is afar off in the future, the combination of intelligent -forethought with efficient and strenuous action--all these together -have given her her extraordinary industrial pre-eminence; and all of -these have been based upon her military efficiency. - -The Germans have developed patriotism of the most intense kind, and -although this patriotism expresses itself in thunderous songs, in -speeches and in books, it does not confine itself to these methods -of expression, but treats them merely as incitements to direct and -efficient action. After five months of war, Germany has on the whole -been successful against opponents which in population outnumber her -over two to one, and in natural resources are largely superior. Russian -and French armies have from time to time obtained lodgement on German -soil; but on the whole the fighting has been waged by German armies on -Russian, French, and Belgian territory. On her western frontier, it is -true, she was checked and thrown back after her first drive on Paris, -and again checked and thrown slightly back when, after the fall of -Antwerp, she attempted to advance along the Belgian coast. But in the -west she has on the whole successfully pursued the offensive, and her -battle lines are in the enemies’ territory, although she has had to -face the entire strength of France, England, and Belgium. - -Moreover, she did this with only a part of her forces. At the same time -she was also obliged to use immense armies, singly or in conjunction -with the Austrians, against the Russians on her Eastern frontier. No -one can foretell the issue of the war. But what Germany has already -done must extort the heartiest admiration for her grim efficiency. -It could have been done only by a masterful people guided by keen -intelligence and inspired by an intensely patriotic spirit. - -France has likewise shown to fine advantage in this war (in spite -of certain marked shortcomings, such as the absurd uniforms of her -soldiers) because of her system of universal military training. England -has suffered lamentably because there has been no such system. Great -masses of Englishmen, including all her men at the front, have behaved -so as to command our heartiest admiration. But qualification must -be made when the nation as a whole is considered. Her professional -soldiers, her navy, and her upper classes have done admirably; but -the English papers describe certain sections of her people as making -a poor showing in their refusal to volunteer. The description of -the professional football matches, attended by tens of thousands of -spectators, none of whom will enlist, makes a decent man ardently -wish that under a rigid conscription law the entire body of players, -promoters, and spectators could be sent to the front. Scotland and -Canada have apparently made an extraordinary showing; the same thing -is true of sections, high and low, of society in England proper; but -it is also true that certain sections of the British democracy under -a system of free volunteering have shown to disadvantage compared to -Germany, where military service is universal. The lack of foresight -in preparation was also shown by the inability of the authorities to -furnish arms and equipment for the troops that were being raised. These -shortcomings are not alluded to by me in a censorious spirit, and least -of all with any idea of reflecting on England, but purely that our own -people may profit by the lessons taught. America should pay heed to -these facts and profit by them; and we can only so profit if we realize -that under like conditions we should at the moment make a much poorer -showing than England has made. - -It is indispensable to remember that in the cases of both Germany and -Japan their extraordinary success has been due directly to that kind -of efficiency in war which springs only from the highest efficiency in -preparedness for war. Until educated people who sincerely desire peace -face this fact with all of its implications, unpleasant and pleasant, -they will not be able to better present international conditions. In -order to secure this betterment, conditions must be created which -will enable civilized nations to achieve such efficiency without being -thereby rendered dangerous to their neighbors and to civilization -as a whole. Americans, particularly, and, to a degree only slightly -less, Englishmen and Frenchmen need to remember this fact, for while -the ultrapacificists, the peace-at-any-price men, have appeared -sporadically everywhere, they have of recent years been most numerous -and noxious in the United States, in Great Britain, and in France. - -Inasmuch as in our country, where, Heaven knows, we have evils enough -with which to grapple, none of these evils is in even the smallest -degree due to militarism--inasmuch as to inveigh against militarism -in the United States is about as useful as to inveigh against eating -horse-flesh in honor of Odin--this seems curious. But it is true. -Probably it is merely another illustration of the old, old truth -that persons who shrink from grappling with grave and real evils -often strive to atone to their consciences for such failure by empty -denunciation of evils which to them offer no danger and no temptation; -which, as far as they are concerned, do not exist. Such denunciation is -easy. It is also worthless. - -American college presidents, clergymen, professors, and publicists -with much pretension--some of it founded on fact--to intelligence -have praised works like that of Mr. Bloch, who “proved” that war was -impossible, and like those of Mr. Norman Angell, who “proved” that it -was an illusion to believe that it was profitable. The greatest and -most terrible wars in history have taken place since Mr. Bloch wrote. -When Mr. Angell wrote no unprejudiced man of wisdom could have failed -to understand that the two most successful nations of recent times, -Germany and Japan, owed their great national success to successful war. -The United States owes not only its greatness but its very existence -to the fact that in the Civil War the men who controlled its destinies -were the fighting men. The counsels of the ultrapacificists, the -peace-at-any-price men of that day, if adopted, would have meant not -only the death of the nation but an incalculable disaster to humanity. -A righteous war may at any moment be essential to national welfare; and -it is a lamentable fact that nations have sometimes profited greatly by -war that was not righteous. Such evil profit will never be done away -with until armed force is put behind righteousness. - -We must also remember, however, that the mischievous folly of the -men whose counsels tend to inefficiency and impotence is not worse -than the baseness of the men who in a spirit of mean and cringing -admiration of brute force gloss over, or justify, or even deify, the -exhibition of unscrupulous strength. Writings like those of Homer -Lea, or of Nietzsche, or even of Professor Treitschke--not to speak of -Carlyle--are as objectionable as those of Messrs. Bloch and Angell. -Our people need to pay homage to the great efficiency and the intense -patriotism of Germany. But they need no less fully to realize that this -patriotism has at times been accompanied by callous indifference to the -rights of weaker nations, and that this efficiency has at times been -exercised in a way that represents a genuine setback to humanity and -civilization. Germany’s conduct toward Belgium can be justified only -in accordance with a theory which will also justify Napoleon’s conduct -toward Spain and his treatment of Prussia and of all Germany during -the six years succeeding Jena. I do not see how any man can fail to -sympathize with Stein and Schornhorst; with Andreas Hofer, with the -Maid of Saragossa, with Koerner and the Tugendbund; and if he does so -sympathize, he must extend the same sympathy and admiration to King -Albert and the Belgians. - -Moreover, it is well for Americans always to remember that what -has been done to Belgium would, of course, be done to us just as -unhesitatingly if the conditions required it. - -Of course, the lowest depth is reached by the professional pacificists -who continue to scream for peace without daring to protest against any -concrete wrong committed against peace. These include all of our fellow -countrymen who at the present time clamor for peace without explicitly -and clearly declaring that the first condition of peace should be the -righting of the wrongs of Belgium, reparation to her, and guarantee -against the possible repetition of such wrongs at the expense of any -well-behaved small civilized power in the future. It may be that peace -will come without such reparation and guarantee but if so it will be -as emphatically the peace of unrighteousness as was the peace made at -Tilsit a hundred and seven years ago. - -When the President appoints a day of prayer for peace, without -emphatically making it evident that the prayer should be for the -redress of the wrongs without which peace would be harmful, he cannot -be considered as serving righteousness. When Mr. Bryan concludes -absurd all-inclusive arbitration treaties and is loquacious to peace -societies about the abolition of war, without daring to protest against -the hideous wrongs done Belgium, he feebly serves unrighteousness. -More comic manifestations, of course entirely useless but probably -too fatuous to be really mischievous, are those which find expression -in the circulation of peace postage-stamps with doves on them, or in -taking part in peace parades--they might as well be antivaccination -parades--or in the circulation of peace petitions to be signed by -school-children, which for all their possible effect might just as well -relate to the planet Mars. - -International peace will only come when the nations of the world form -some kind of league which provides for an international tribunal to -decide on international matters, which decrees that treaties and -international agreements are never to be entered into recklessly and -foolishly, and when once entered into are to be observed with entire -good faith, and which puts the collective force of civilization -behind such treaties and agreements and court decisions and against -any wrong-doing or recalcitrant nation. The all-inclusive arbitration -treaties negotiated by the present administration amount to almost -nothing. They are utterly worthless for good. They are however slightly -mischievous because: - -1. There is no provision for their enforcement, and, - -2. They would be in some cases not only impossible but improper to -enforce. - -A treaty is a promise. It is like a promise to pay in the commercial -world. Its value lies in the means provided for redeeming the promise. -To make it, and not redeem it, is vicious. A United States gold -certificate is valuable because gold is back of it. If there were -nothing back of it the certificate would sink to the position of -fiat money, which is irredeemable, and therefore valueless; as in the -case of our Revolutionary currency. The Wilson-Bryan all-inclusive -arbitration treaties represent nothing whatever but international fiat -money. To make them is no more honest than it is to issue fiat money. -Mr. Bryan would not make a good Secretary of the Treasury, but he -would do better in that position than as Secretary of State. For his -type of fiat obligations is a little worse in international than in -internal affairs. The all-inclusive arbitration treaties, in whose free -and unlimited negotiation Mr. Bryan takes such pleasure, are of less -value than the thirty-cent dollars, whose free and unlimited coinage he -formerly advocated. - -An efficient world league for peace is as yet in the future; and it may -be, although I sincerely hope not, in the far future. The indispensable -thing for every free people to do in the present day is with efficiency -to prepare against war by making itself able physically to defend its -rights and by cultivating that stern and manly spirit without which no -material preparation will avail. - -The last point is all essential. It is not of much use to provide -an armed force if that force is composed of poltroons and -ultrapacificists. Such men should be sent to the front, of course, for -they should not be allowed to shirk the danger which their braver -fellow countrymen willingly face, and under proper discipline some use -can be made of them; but the fewer there are of them in a nation the -better the army of that nation will be. - -A Yale professor--he might just as well have been a Harvard -professor--is credited in the press with saying the other day that -he wishes the United States would take the position that if attacked -it would not defend itself, and would submit unresistingly to any -spoliation. The professor said that this would afford such a beautiful -example to mankind that war would undoubtedly be abolished. Magazine -writers, and writers of syndicate articles published in reputable -papers, have recently advocated similar plans. Men who talk this way -are thoroughly bad citizens. Few members of the criminal class are -greater enemies of the republic. - -American citizens must understand that they cannot advocate or -acquiesce in an evil course of action and then escape responsibility -for the results. If disaster comes to our navy in the near future it -will be directly due to the way the navy has been handled during the -past twenty-two months, and a part of the responsibility will be shared -by every man who has failed effectively to protest against, or in any -way has made himself responsible for, the attitude of the present -administration in foreign affairs and as regards the navy. - -The first and most important thing for us as a people to do, in order -to prepare ourselves for self-defense, is to get clearly in our minds -just what our policy is to be, and to insist that our public servants -shall make their words and their deeds correspond. As has already been -pointed out, the present administration was elected on the explicit -promise that the Philippines should be given their independence, and -it has taken action in the Philippines which can only be justified -on the theory that this independence is to come in the immediate -future. I believe that we have rendered incalculable service to the -Philippines, and that what we have there done has shown in the most -striking manner the extreme mischief that would have followed if, -in 1898 and the subsequent years, we had failed to do our duty in -consequence of following the advice of Mr. Bryan and the pacificists -or anti-imperialists of that day. But we must keep our promises; and -we ought now to leave the islands completely at as early a date as -possible. - -There remains to defend--the United States proper, the Panama Canal and -its approaches, Alaska, and Hawaii. To defend all these is vital to our -honor and interest. For such defense preparedness is essential. - -The first and most essential form of preparedness should be making the -navy efficient. Absolutely and relatively, our navy has never been at -such a pitch of efficiency as in February, 1909, when the battle fleet -returned from its voyage around the world. Unit for unit, there was -no other navy in the world which was at that time its equal. During -the next four years we had an admirable Secretary of the Navy, Mr. -Meyer--we were fortunate in having then and since good Secretaries of -War in Mr. Stimson and Mr. Garrison. Owing to causes for which Mr. -Meyer was in no way responsible, there was a slight relative falling -off in the efficiency of the navy, and probably a slight absolute -falling off during the following four years. But it remained very -efficient. - -Since Mr. Daniels came in, and because of the action taken by Mr. -Daniels under the direction of President Wilson, there has been a most -lamentable reduction in efficiency. If at this moment we went to war -with a first-class navy of equal strength to our own, there would be a -chance not only of defeat but of disgrace. It is probably impossible -to put the navy in really first-class condition with Mr. Daniels at -its head, precisely as it is impossible to conduct our foreign affairs -with dignity and efficiency while Mr. Bryan is at the head of the State -Department. - -But the great falling off in naval efficiency has been due primarily -to the policy pursued by President Wilson himself. He has kept the -navy in Mexican waters. The small craft at Tampico and elsewhere could -have rendered real service, but the President refused to allow them -to render such service, and left English and German sea officers to -protect our people. The great war craft were of no use at all; yet at -this moment he has brought back from Mexico the army which could be -of some use and has kept there the war-ships which cannot be of any -use, and which suffer terribly in efficiency from being so kept. The -fleet has had no manœuvring for twenty-two months. It has had almost -no gun practice by division during that time. There is not enough -powder; there are not enough torpedoes; the bottoms of the ships are -foul; there are grave defects in the submarines; there is a deficiency -in aircraft; the under-enlistments indicate a deficiency of from ten -thousand to twenty thousand men; the whole service is being handled in -such manner as to impair its fitness and morale. - -Congress should summon before its committees the best naval experts -and provide the battle-ships, cruisers, submarines, floating mines, -and aircraft that these experts declare to be necessary for the full -protection of the United States. It should bear in mind that while -many of these machines of war are essentially to be used in striking -from the coasts themselves, yet that others must be designed to keep -the enemy afar from these coasts. Mere defensive by itself cannot -permanently avail. The only permanently efficient defensive arm is -one which can act offensively. Our navy must be fitted for attack, -for delivering smashing blows, in order effectively to defend our own -shores. Above all, we should remember that a highly trained personnel -is absolutely indispensable, for without it no material preparation is -of the least avail. - -But the navy alone will not suffice in time of great crisis. If England -had adopted the policy urged by Lord Roberts, there would probably have -been no war and certainly the war would now have been at an end, as -she would have been able to protect Belgium, as well as herself, and -to save France from invasion. Relatively to the Continent, England was -utterly unprepared; but she was a miracle of preparedness compared to -us. There are many ugly features connected with the slowness of certain -sections of the English people to volunteer and with their deficiency -in rifles, horses, and equipment; and there have been certain military -and naval shortcomings; but until we have radically altered our -habits of thought and action we can only say with abashed humility -that if England has not shown to advantage compared to Germany, she -has certainly done far better than we would have done, and than, as -a matter of fact, we actually have done during the past twenty-two -months, both as regards Mexico and as regards the fulfilment of our -duty in the situation created by the world war. - -Congress should at once act favorably along the lines recommended in -the recent excellent report of the Secretary of War and in accordance -with the admirable plan outlined in the last report of the Chief -of Staff of the army, General Wotherspoon--a report with which his -predecessor as Chief of Staff, General Wood, appears to be in complete -sympathy. Our army should be doubled in size. An effective reserve -should be created. Every year there should be field manœuvres on a -large scale, a hundred thousand being engaged for several weeks. The -artillery should be given the most scientific training. The equipment -should be made perfect at every point. Rigid economy should be demanded. - -Every officer and man should be kept to the highest standard of -physical and moral fitness. The unfit should be ruthlessly weeded out. -At least one third of the officers in each grade should be promoted -on merit without regard to seniority, and the least fit for promotion -should be retired. Every unit of the regular army and reserve should be -trained to the highest efficiency under war conditions. - -But this is not enough. There should be at least ten times the -number of rifles and the quantity of ammunition in the country that -there are now. In our high schools and colleges a system of military -training like that which obtains in Switzerland and Australia should -be given. Furthermore, all our young men should be trained in actual -field-service under war conditions; preferably on the Swiss, but if not -on the Swiss then on the Argentinian or Chilean model. - -The Swiss model would probably be better for our people. It would -necessitate only four to six months’ service shortly after graduation -from high school or college, and thereafter only about eight days a -year. No man could buy a substitute; no man would be excepted because -of his wealth; all would serve in the ranks on precisely the same terms -side by side. - -Under this system the young men would be trained to shoot, to march, -to take care of themselves in the open, and to learn those habits of -self-reliance and law-abiding obedience which are not only essential -to the efficiency of a citizen soldiery, but are no less essential to -the efficient performance of civic duties in a free democracy. My own -firm belief is that this system would help us in civil quite as much -as in military matters. It would increase our social and industrial -efficiency. It would help us to habits of order and respect for law. - -This proposal does not represent anything more than carrying out the -purpose of the second amendment to the Federal Constitution, which -declares that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security -of a free nation. The Swiss army is a well-regulated militia; and, -therefore it is utterly different from any militia we have ever had. -The system of compulsory training and universal service has worked -admirably in Switzerland. It has saved the Swiss from war. It has -developed their efficiency in peace. - -In theory, President Wilson advocates unpreparedness, and in the actual -fact he practises, on our behalf, tame submission to wrong-doing -and refusal to stand for our own rights or for the rights of any -weak power that is wronged. We who take the opposite view advocate -merely acting as Washington urged us to act, when in his first annual -address he said: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual -means for preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed -but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is -requisite.” Jefferson was not a fighting man, but even Jefferson, -writing to Monroe in 1785, urged the absolute need of building up -our navy if we wished to escape oppression to our commerce and “the -present disrespect of the nations of Europe,” and added the pregnant -sentence: “A coward is much more exposed to quarrels than a man of -spirit.” As President, he urged our people to train themselves to arms, -so as to constitute a citizen soldiery, in terms that showed that his -object was to accomplish exactly what the Swiss have accomplished, and -what is advocated in this book. In one annual message he advocated -“the organization of 300,000 able-bodied men between the ages of -eighteen and twenty-five for offense or defense at any time or in any -place where they may be wanted.” In a letter to Monroe he advocated -compulsory military service, saying: “We must train and classify the -whole of our male citizenry and make military instruction a part of -collegiate education. We can never be safe until this is done.” The -methods taken by Jefferson and the Americans of Jefferson’s day to -accomplish this object were fatally defective. But their purpose was -the same that those who think as we do now put forward. The difference -is purely that we present efficient methods for accomplishing this -purpose. Washington was a practical man of high ideals who always -strove to reduce his ideals to practice. His address to Congress in -December, 1793, ought to have been read by President Wilson before -the latter sent in his message of 1914 with its confused advocacy -of unpreparedness and its tone of furtive apology for submission to -insult. Washington said: “There is much due to the United States -among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the -reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able -to repel it. If we desire to secure peace ... it must be known that we -are at all times ready for war,” and he emphasized the fact that the -peace thus secured by preparedness for war is the most potent method of -obtaining material prosperity. - -The need of such a system as that which I advocate is well brought out -in a letter I recently received from a college president. It runs in -part as follows: - - What the average young fellow of eighteen to thirty doesn’t know - about shooting and riding makes an appalling total. I remember - very well visiting the First Connecticut Regiment a day or two - before it left for service in the Spanish War. A good many of - my boys were with them and I went to see them off. One fellow - in particular, of whom I was and am very fond, took me to his - tent and proudly exhibited his rifle, calling attention to the - beautiful condition to which he had brought it. It certainly was - extremely shiny, and I commended him for his careful cleansing of - his death-dealing weapon. Then I discovered that the firing-pin - (it was an old Springfield) was rusted immovably into its place, - and that my boy didn’t know that there was any firing-pin. He had - learned to expect that if you put a cartridge into the breech, - pulled down the block, and pulled the trigger, it would probably - go off if he had previously cocked it; but he had never done any - of these things. - - It was my fortune to grow up amid surroundings and in a time - when every boy had and used a gun. Any boy fourteen years old - who was not the proprietor of some kind of shooting-iron and - fairly proficient in its use was in disgrace. Such a situation - was unthinkable. So we were all fairly dependable shots with - a fowling-piece or rifle. As a result of this and subsequent - experience, I really believe that so long as my aging body would - endure hardship, and provided further that I could be prevented - from running away, I should be a more efficient soldier than most - of the young fellows on our campus to-day. - - I have watched with much dissatisfaction the gradual - disappearance of the military schools here in the East. There - are some prominent and useful ones in the West, but they are far - too few, and I do not believe there is any preliminary military - training of any sort in our public schools. I fear that the - military training required by law in certain agricultural and - other schools receiving federal aid is more or less of a fake; - the object seeming to be to get the appropriation and make the - least possible return. - - If in any way you can bring it about that our boys shall be - taught to shoot, I believe with you that they can learn the - essentials of drill very quickly when need arises. And even so, - however, our rulers must learn the necessity of having rifles - enough and ammunition enough to meet any emergency at all likely - to occur. - -It is idle for this nation to trust to arbitration and neutrality -treaties unbacked by force. It is idle to trust to the tepid good-will -of other nations. It is idle to trust to alliances. Alliances change. -Russia and Japan are now fighting side by side, although nine years ago -they were fighting against one another. Twenty years ago Russia and -Germany stood side by side. Fifteen years ago England was more hostile -to Russia, and even to France, than she was to Germany. It is perfectly -possible that after the close of this war the present allies will fall -out, or that Germany and Japan will turn up in close alliance. - -It is our duty to try to work for a great world league for righteous -peace enforced by power; but no such league is yet in sight. At present -the prime duty of the American people is to abandon the inane and -mischievous principle of watchful waiting--that is, of slothful and -timid refusal either to face facts or to perform duty. Let us act -justly toward others; and let us also be prepared with stout heart and -strong hand to defend our rights against injustice from others. - -In his recent report the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, has put the -case for preparedness in the interest of honorable peace so admirably -that what he says should be studied by all our people. It runs in part -as follows: - - “This, then, leaves for consideration the imminent questions of - military policy; the considerations which, in my view, should be - taken into account in determining the same; and the suggestions - which occur to me to be pertinent in the circumstances. - - It would be premature to attempt now to draw the ultimate lessons - from the war in Europe. It is an imperative duty, however, to - heed so much of what it brings home to us as is incontrovertible - and not to be changed by any event, leaving for later and - more detailed and comprehensive consideration what its later - developments and final conclusions may indicate. - - For orderly treatment certain preliminary considerations may be - usefully adverted to. It is, of course, not necessary to dwell on - the blessings of peace and the horrors of war. Every one desires - peace, just as every one desires health, contentment, affection, - sufficient means for comfortable existence, and other similarly - beneficent things. But peace and the other states of being just - mentioned are not always or even often solely within one’s own - control. Those who are thoughtful and have courage face the facts - of life, take lessons from experience, and strive by wise conduct - to attain the desirable things, and by prevision and precaution - to protect and defend them when obtained. It may truthfully be - said that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in - order to obtain the desirable things of life and to defend them. - - In collective affairs the interests of the group are confided - to the government, and it thereupon is charged with the duty to - preserve and defend these things. The government must exercise - for the nation the precautionary, defensive, and preservative - measures necessary to that end. All governments must therefore - have force--physical force--_i. e._, military force, for these - purposes. The question for each nation when this matter is under - consideration is, How much force should it have and of what - should that force consist? - - In the early history of our nation there was a natural, almost - inevitable, abhorrence of military force, because it connoted - military despotism. Most, if not all, of the early settlers - in this country came from nations where a few powerful persons - tyrannically imposed their will upon the people by means of - military power. The consequence was that the oppressed who - fled to this country necessarily connected military force with - despotism and had a dread thereof. Of course, all this has - long since passed into history. No reasonable person in this - country to-day has the slightest shadow of fear of military - despotism, nor of any interference whatever by military force - in the conduct of civil affairs. The military and the civil are - just as completely and permanently separated in this country as - the church and the state are; the subjection of the military - to the civil is settled and unchangeable. The only reason for - adverting to the obsolete condition is to anticipate the action - of those who will cite from the works of the founders of the - republic excerpts showing a dread of military ascendancy in - our government. Undoubtedly, at the time such sentiments were - expressed there was a very real dread. At the present time such - expressions are entirely inapplicable and do not furnish even a - presentable pretext for opposing proper military preparation. - - It also seems proper, in passing, to refer to the frame of - mind of those who use the word “militarism” as the embodiment - of the doctrine of brute force and loosely apply it to any - organized preparation of military force, and therefore deprecate - any adequate military preparation because it is a step in the - direction of the contemned “militarism.” It is perfectly apparent - to any one who approaches the matter with an unprejudiced mind - that what constitutes undesirable militarism, as distinguished - from a necessary, proper, and adequate preparation of the - military resources of the nation, depends upon the position in - which each nation finds itself, and varies with every nation - and with different conditions in each nation at different - times. Every nation must have adequate force to protect itself - from domestic insurrections, to enforce its laws, and to repel - invasions; that is, every nation that has similar characteristics - to those of a self-respecting man. (The Constitution obliges the - United States to protect each State against invasion.) If it - prepares and maintains more military force than is necessary for - the purposes just named, then it is subject to the conviction, in - the public opinion of the world, of having embraced “militarism,” - unless it intends aggression for a cause which the public - opinion of the world conceives to be a righteous one. To the - extent, however, that it confines its military preparedness - to the purposes first mentioned, there is neither warrant nor - justification in characterizing such action as “militarism.” - Those who would thus characterize it do so because they have - reached the conclusion that a nation to-day can properly dispense - with a prepared military force, and therefore they apply the word - to any preparation or organization of the military resources of - the nation. Not being able to conceive how a reasonable, prudent, - patriotic man can reach such a conclusion, I cannot conceive any - arguments or statements that would alter such a state of mind. It - disregards all known facts, flies in the face of all experience, - and must rest upon faith in that which has not yet been made - manifest. - - Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between - nations, followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international - courts of arbitration, and other greatly-to-be-desired measures - to lessen or prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all - know that at present these conditions are not existing. We can - and will eagerly adapt ourselves to each beneficent development - along these lines; but to merely enfeeble ourselves in the - meantime would, in my view, be unthinkable folly. By neglecting - and refusing to provide ourselves with the necessary means of - self-protection and self-defense we could not hasten or in any - way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire in these - respects.” - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -UTOPIA OR HELL? - - -Sherman’s celebrated declaration about war has certainly been borne -out by what has happened in Europe, and above all in Belgium, during -the last four months. That war is hell I will concede as heartily as -any ultrapacificist. But the only alternative to war, that is to hell, -is the adoption of some plan substantially like that which I herein -advocate and which has itself been called utopian. It is possible that -it is utopian for the time being; that is, that nations are not ready -as yet to accept it. But it is also possible that after this war has -come to an end the European contestants will be sufficiently sobered to -be willing to consider some such proposal, and that the United States -will abandon the folly of the pacificists and be willing to co-operate -in some practical effort for the only kind of peace worth having, the -peace of justice and righteousness. - -The proposal is not in the least utopian, if by utopian we understand -something that is theoretically desirable but impossible. What I -propose is a working and realizable Utopia. My proposal is that the -efficient civilized nations--those that are efficient in war as well as -in peace--shall join in a world league for the peace of righteousness. -This means that they shall by solemn covenant agree as to their -respective rights which shall not be questioned; that they shall agree -that all other questions arising between them shall be submitted to a -court of arbitration; and that they shall also agree--and here comes -the vital and essential point of the whole system--to act with the -combined military strength of all of them against any recalcitrant -nation, against any nation which transgresses at the expense of any -other nation the rights which it is agreed shall not be questioned, -or which on arbitrable matters refuses to submit to the decree of the -arbitral court. - -In its essence this plan means that there shall be a great -international treaty for the peace of righteousness; that this treaty -shall explicitly secure to each nation and except from the operations -of any international tribunal such matters as its territorial -integrity, honor, and vital interest, and shall guarantee it in the -possession of these rights; that this treaty shall therefore by its -own terms explicitly provide against making foolish promises which -cannot and ought not to be kept; that this treaty shall be observed -with absolute good faith--for it is worse than useless to enter into -treaties until their observance in good faith is efficiently secured. -Finally, and most important, this treaty shall put force back of -righteousness, shall provide a method of securing by the exercise of -force the observance of solemn international obligations. This is to be -accomplished by all the powers covenanting to put their whole strength -back of the fulfilment of the treaty obligations, including the decrees -of the court established under and in accordance with the treaty. - -This proposal, therefore, meets the well-found objections against the -foolish and mischievous all-inclusive arbitration treaties recently -negotiated by Mr. Bryan under the direction of President Wilson. These -treaties, like the all-inclusive arbitration treaties which President -Taft started to negotiate, explicitly include as arbitrable, or as -proper subjects for action by joint commissions, questions of honor -and of vital national interest. No such provision should be made. No -such provision is made as among private individuals in any civilized -community. No man is required to “arbitrate” a slap in the face or an -insult to his wife; no man is expected to “arbitrate” with a burglar -or a highwayman. If in private life one individual takes action which -immediately jeopardizes the life or limb or even the bodily well-being -and the comfort of another, the wronged party does not have to go into -any arbitration with the wrong-doer. On the contrary, the policeman or -constable or sheriff immediately and summarily arrests the wrong-doer. -The subsequent trial is not in the nature of arbitration at all. It is -in the nature of a criminal proceeding. The wronged man is merely a -witness and not necessarily an essential witness. For example, if, in -the streets of New York, one man assaults another or steals his watch, -and a policeman is not near by, the wronged man is not only justified -in knocking down the assailant or thief, but fails in his duty if he -does not so act. If a policeman is near by, the policeman promptly -arrests the wrong-doer. The magistrate does not arbitrate the question -of property rights in the watch nor anything about the assault. He -satisfies himself as to the facts and delivers judgment against the -offender. - -A covenant between the United States and any other power to arbitrate -all questions, including those involving national honor and interest, -neither could nor ought to be kept. Such a covenant will be harmless -only if no such questions ever arise. Now, all the worth of promises -made in the abstract lies in the way in which they are fulfilled in the -concrete. The Wilson-Bryan arbitration treaties are to be tested in -this manner. The theory is, of course, that these treaties are to be -made with all nations, and this is correct, because it would be a far -graver thing to refuse to make them with some nations than to refuse -to enter into them with any nation at all. The proposal is, in effect, -and disregarding verbiage, that all questions shall be arbitrated or -settled by the action of a joint commission--questions really vital to -us would, as a matter of fact, be settled adversely to us pending such -action. There are many such questions which in the concrete we would -certainly not arbitrate. I mention one, only as an example. Do Messrs. -Wilson and Bryan, or do they not, mean to arbitrate, if Japan should -so desire, the question whether Japanese laborers are to be allowed -to come in unlimited numbers to these shores? If they do mean this, -let them explicitly state that fact--merely as an illustration--to the -Senate committee, so that the Senate committee shall understand what -it is doing when it ratifies these treaties. If they do not mean this, -then let them promptly withdraw all the treaties so as not to expose -us to the charge of hypocrisy, of making believe to do what we have no -intention of doing, and of making promises which we have no intention -of keeping. I have mentioned one issue only; but there are scores of -other issues which I could mention which this government would under no -circumstances agree to arbitrate. - -In the same way, we must explicitly recognize that all the peace -congresses and the like that have been held of recent years have done -no good whatever to the cause of world peace. All their addresses and -resolutions about arbitration and disarmament and such matters have -been on the whole slightly worse than useless. Disregarding the Hague -conventions, it is the literal fact that none of the peace congresses -that have been held for the last fifteen or twenty years--to speak -only of those of which I myself know the workings--have accomplished -the smallest particle of good. In so far as they have influenced free, -liberty-loving, and self-respecting nations not to take measures for -their own defense they have been positively mischievous. In no respect -have they achieved anything worth achieving; and the present world war -proves this beyond the possibility of serious question. - -The Hague conventions stand by themselves. They have accomplished a -certain amount--although only a small amount--of actual good. This was -in so far as they furnished means by which nations which did not wish -to quarrel were able to settle international disputes not involving -their deepest interests. Questions between nations continually arise -which are not of first-class importance; which, for instance, refer to -some illegal act by or against a fishing schooner, to some difficulty -concerning contracts, to some question of the interpretation of a -minor clause in a treaty, or to the sporadic action of some hot-headed -or panic-struck official. In these cases, where neither nation wishes -to go to war, the Hague court has furnished an easy method for the -settlement of the dispute without war. This does not mark a very great -advance; but it is an advance, and was worth making. - -The fact that it is the only advance that the Hague court has -accomplished makes the hysterical outbursts formerly indulged in by the -ultrapacificists concerning it seem in retrospect exceedingly foolish. -While I had never shared the hopes of these ultrapacificists, I had -hoped for more substantial good than has actually come from the Hague -conventions. This was because I accept promises as meaning something. -The ultrapacificists, whether from timidity, from weakness, or from -sheer folly, seem wholly unable to understand that the fulfilment -of a promise has anything to do with making the promise. The most -striking example that could possibly be furnished has been furnished -by Belgium. Under my direction as President, the United States signed -the Hague conventions. All the nations engaged in the present war -signed these conventions, although one or two of the nations qualified -their acceptance, or withheld their signatures to certain articles. -This, however, did not in the least relieve the signatory powers from -the duty to guarantee one another in the enjoyment of the rights -supposed to be secured by the conventions. To make this guarantee -worth anything, it was, of course, necessary actively to enforce it -against any power breaking the convention or acting against its clear -purpose. To make it really effective it should be enforced as quickly -against non-signatory as against signatory powers; for to give a power -free permission to do wrong if it did not sign would put a premium on -non-signing, so far as big, aggressive powers are concerned. - -I authorized the signature of the United States to these conventions. -They forbid the violation of neutral territory, and, of course, the -subjugation of unoffending neutral nations, as Belgium has been -subjugated. They forbid such destruction as that inflicted on Louvain, -Dinant, and other towns in Belgium, the burning of their priceless -public libraries and wonderful halls and churches, and the destruction -of cathedrals such as that at Rheims. They forbid the infliction of -heavy pecuniary penalties and the taking of severe punitive measures at -the expense of civilian populations. They forbid the bombardment--of -course including the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes--of unfortified -cities and of cities whose defenses were not at the moment attacked. -They forbid such actions as have been committed against various cities, -Belgian, French, and English, not for military reason but for the -purpose of terrorizing the civilian population by killing and wounding -men, women, and children who were non-combatants. All of these offenses -have been committed by Germany. I took the action I did in directing -these conventions to be signed on the theory and with the belief that -the United States intended to live up to its obligations, and that our -people understood that living up to solemn obligations, like any other -serious performance of duty, means willingness to make effort and to -incur risk. If I had for one moment supposed that signing these Hague -conventions meant literally nothing whatever beyond the expression -of a pious wish which any power was at liberty to disregard with -impunity, in accordance with the dictation of self-interest, I would -certainly not have permitted the United States to be a party to such -a mischievous farce. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, however, -take the view that when the United States assumes obligations in order -to secure small and unoffending neutral nations or non-combatants -generally against hideous wrong, its action is not predicated on any -intention to make the guarantee effective. They take the view that -when we are asked to redeem in the concrete, promises we made in the -abstract, our duty is to disregard our obligations and to preserve -ignoble peace for ourselves by regarding with cold-blooded and timid -indifference the most frightful ravages of war committed at the expense -of a peaceful and unoffending country. This is the cult of cowardice. -That Messrs. Wilson and Bryan profess it and put it in action would -be of small consequence if only they themselves were concerned. The -importance of their action is that it commits the United States. - -Elaborate technical arguments have been made to justify this timid and -selfish abandonment of duty, this timid and selfish failure to work for -the world peace of righteousness, by President Wilson and Secretary -Bryan. No sincere believer in disinterested and self-sacrificing work -for peace can justify it; and work for peace will never be worth much -unless accompanied by courage, effort, and self-sacrifice. Yet those -very apostles of pacificism who, when they can do so with safety, -scream loudest for peace, have made themselves objects of contemptuous -derision by keeping silence in this crisis, or even by praising Mr. -Wilson and Mr. Bryan for having thus abandoned the cause of peace. They -are supported by the men who insist that all that we are concerned -with is escaping even the smallest risk that might follow upon the -performance of duty to any one except ourselves. This last is not a -very exalted plea. It is, however, defensible. But if, as a nation, -we intend to act in accordance with it, we must never promise to do -anything for any one else. - -The technical arguments as to the Hague conventions not requiring us to -act will at once be brushed aside by any man who honestly and in good -faith faces the situation. Either the Hague conventions meant something -or else they meant nothing. If, in the event of their violation, none -of the signatory powers were even to protest, then of course they meant -nothing; and it was an act of unspeakable silliness to enter into them. -If, on the other hand, they meant anything whatsoever, it was the duty -of the United States, as the most powerful, or at least the richest and -most populous, neutral nation, to take action for upholding them when -their violation brought such appalling disaster to Belgium. There is no -escape from this alternative. - -The first essential to working out successfully any scheme whatever for -world peace is to understand that nothing can be accomplished unless -the powers entering into the agreement act in precisely the reverse -way from that in which President Wilson and Secretary Bryan have acted -as regards the Hague conventions and the all-inclusive arbitration -treaties during the past six months. The prime fact to consider in -securing any peace agreement worth entering into, or that will have -any except a mischievous effect, is that the nations entering into the -agreement shall make no promises that ought not to be made, that they -shall in good faith live up to the promises that are made, and that -they shall put their whole strength unitedly back of these promises -against any nation which refuses to carry out the agreement, or which, -if it has not made the agreement, nevertheless violates the principles -which the agreement enforces. In other words, international agreements -intended to produce peace must proceed much along the lines of the -Hague conventions; but a power signing them, as the United States -signed the Hague conventions, must do so with the intention in good -faith to see that they are carried out, and to use force to accomplish -this, if necessary. - -To violate these conventions, to violate neutrality treaties, as -Germany has done in the case of Belgium, is a dreadful wrong. It -represents the gravest kind of international wrong-doing. But it is -really not quite so contemptible, it does not show such short-sighted -and timid inefficiency, _and, above all, such selfish indifference to -the cause of permanent and righteous peace_ as has been shown by us of -the United States (thanks to President Wilson and Secretary Bryan) in -refusing to fulfil our solemn obligations by taking whatever action -was necessary in order to clear our skirts from the guilt of tame -acquiescence in a wrong which we had solemnly undertaken to oppose. - -It has been a matter of very real regret to me to have to speak in the -way I have felt obliged to speak as to German wrong-doing in Belgium, -because so many of my friends, not only Germans, but Americans of -German birth and even Americans of German descent, have felt aggrieved -at my position. As regards my friends, the Americans of German birth -or descent, I can only say that they are in honor bound to regard all -international matters solely from the standpoint of the interest of the -United States, and of the demands of a lofty international morality. -I recognize no divided allegiance in American citizenship. As regards -Germany, my stand is for the real interest of the mass of the German -people. If the German people as a whole would only look at it rightly, -they would see that my position is predicated upon the assumption that -we ought to act as unhesitatingly in favor of Germany if Germany were -wronged as in favor of Belgium when Belgium is wronged. - -There are in Germany a certain number of Germans who adopt -the Treitschke and Bernhardi view of Germany’s destiny and of -international morality generally. These men are fundamentally exactly -as hostile to America as to all other foreign powers. They look down -with contempt upon Americans as well as upon all other foreigners. -They regard it as their right to subdue these inferior beings. They -acknowledge toward them no duty, in the sense that duty is understood -between equals. I call the attention of my fellow Americans of German -origin who wish this country to act toward Belgium, not in accordance -with American traditions, interests, and ideals, but in accordance -with the pro-German sympathies of certain citizens of German descent, -to the statement of Treitschke that “to civilization at large the -[Americanizing] of the German-Americans means a heavy loss. Among -Germans there can no longer be any question that the civilization of -mankind suffers every time a German is transformed into a Yankee.” - -I do not for one moment believe that the men who follow Treitschke -in his hatred of and contempt for all non-Germans, and Bernhardi in -his contempt for international morality, are a majority of the German -people or even a very large minority. I think that the great majority -of the Germans, who have approved Germany’s action toward Belgium, have -been influenced by the feeling that it was a vital necessity in order -to save Germany from destruction and subjugation by France and Russia, -perhaps assisted by England. Fear of national destruction will prompt -men to do almost anything, and the proper remedy for outsiders to work -for is the removal of the fear. If Germany were absolutely freed from -danger of aggression on her eastern and western frontiers, I believe -that German public sentiment would refuse to sanction such acts as -those against Belgium. The only effective way to free it from this -fear is to have outside nations like the United States in good faith -undertake the obligation to defend Germany’s honor and territorial -integrity, if attacked, exactly as they would defend the honor and -territorial integrity of Belgium, or of France, Russia, Japan, or -England, or any other well-behaved, civilized power, if attacked. - -This can only be achieved by some such world league of peace as that -which I advocate. Most important of all, it can only be achieved by -the willingness and ability of great, free powers to put might back -of right, to make their protest against wrong-doing effective by, if -necessary, punishing the wrong-doer. It is this fact which makes the -clamor of the pacificists for “peace, peace,” without any regard to -righteousness, so abhorrent to all right-thinking people. There are -multitudes of professional pacificists in the United States, and of -well-meaning but ill-informed persons who sympathize with them from -ignorance. There are not a few astute persons, bankers of foreign -birth, and others, who wish to take sinister advantage of the folly -of these persons, in the interest of Germany. All of these men clamor -for immediate peace. They wish the United States to take action for -immediate peace or for a truce, under conditions designed to leave -Belgium with her wrongs unredressed and in the possession of Germany. -They strive to bring about a peace which would contain within itself -the elements of frightful future disaster, by making no effective -provision to prevent the repetition of such wrong-doing as has been -inflicted upon Belgium. All of the men advocating such action, -including the professional pacificists, the big business men largely -of foreign birth, and the well-meaning but feeble-minded creatures -among their allies, and including especially all those who from sheer -timidity or weakness shrink from duty, occupy a thoroughly base and -improper position. The peace advocates of this stamp stand on an exact -par with men who, if there was an epidemic of lawlessness in New York, -should come together to demand the immediate cessation of all activity -by the police, and should propose to substitute for it a request that -the highwaymen, white slavers, black-handers, and burglars cease -their activities for the moment on condition of retaining undisturbed -possession of the ill-gotten spoils they had already acquired. The -only effective friend of peace in a big city is the man who makes the -police force thoroughly efficient, who tries to remove the causes of -crime, but who unhesitatingly insists upon the punishment of criminals. -Pacificists who believe that all use of force in international matters -can be abolished will do well to remember that the only efficient -police forces are those whose members are scrupulously careful not to -commit acts of violence when it is possible to avoid them, but who -are willing and able, when the occasion arises, to subdue the worst -kind of wrong-doers by means of the only argument that wrong-doers -respect, namely, successful force. What is thus true in private life is -similarly true in international affairs. - -No man can venture to state the exact details that should be followed -in securing such a world league for the peace of righteousness. But, -not to leave the matter nebulous, I submit the following plan. It would -prove entirely workable, if nations entered into it with good faith, -and if they treated their obligations under it in the spirit in which -the United States treated its obligations as regarded the independence -of Cuba, giving good government to the Philippines, and building -the Panama Canal; the same spirit in which England acted when the -neutrality of Belgium was violated. - -All the civilized powers which are able and willing to furnish and to -use force, when force is required to back up righteousness--and only -the civilized powers who possess virile manliness of character and the -willingness to accept risk and labor when necessary to the performance -of duty are entitled to be considered in this matter--should join to -create an international tribunal and to provide rules in accordance -with which that tribunal should act. These rules would have to accept -the _status quo_ at some given period; for the endeavor to redress all -historical wrongs would throw us back into chaos. They would lay down -the rule that the territorial integrity of each nation was inviolate; -that it was to be guaranteed absolutely its sovereign rights in certain -particulars, including, for instance, the right to decide the terms -on which immigrants should be admitted to its borders for purposes -of residence, citizenship, or business; in short, all its rights in -matters affecting its honor and vital interest. Each nation should be -guaranteed against having any of these specified rights infringed upon. -They would not be made arbitrable, any more than an individual’s right -to life and limb is made arbitrable; they would be mutually guaranteed. -All other matters that could arise between these nations should be -settled by the international court. The judges should act not as -national representatives, but purely as judges, and in any given case -it would probably be well to choose them by lot, excluding, of course, -the representatives of the powers whose interests were concerned. Then, -and most important, the nations should severally guarantee to use their -entire military force, if necessary, against any nation which defied -the decrees of the tribunal or which violated any of the rights which -in the rules it was expressly stipulated should be reserved to the -several nations, the rights to their territorial integrity and the -like. Under such conditions--to make matters concrete--Belgium would be -safe from any attack such as that made by Germany, and Germany would be -relieved from the haunting fear its people now have lest the Russians -and the French, backed by other nations, smash the empire and its -people. - -In addition to the contracting powers, a certain number of outside -nations should be named as entitled to the benefits of the court. -These nations should be chosen from those which are as civilized and -well-behaved as the great contracting nations, but which, for some -reason or other, are unwilling or unable to guarantee to help execute -the decrees of the court by force. They would have no right to take -part in the nomination of judges, for no people are entitled to do -anything toward establishing a court unless they are able and willing -to face the risk, labor, and self-sacrifice necessary in order to -put police power behind the court. But they would be treated with -exact justice; and in the event of any one of the great contracting -powers having trouble with one of them, they would be entitled to go -into court, have a decision rendered, and see the decision supported, -precisely as in the case of a dispute between any two of the great -contracting powers themselves. - -No power should be admitted into the first circle, that of the -contracting powers, unless it is civilized, well-behaved, and able -to do its part in enforcing the decrees of the court. China, for -instance, could not be admitted, nor could Turkey, although for -different reasons, whereas such nations as Germany, France, England, -Italy, Russia, the United States, Japan, Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, -Uruguay, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium -would all be entitled to go in. If China continues to behave as well -as it has during the last few years it might soon go into the second -line of powers which would be entitled to the benefits of the court, -although not entitled to send judges to it. Mexico would, of course, -not be entitled to admission at present into either circle. At present -every European power with the exception of Turkey would be so entitled; -but sixty years ago the kingdom of Naples, for instance, would not -have been entitled to come in, and there are various South American -communities which at the present time would not be entitled to come -in; and, of course, this would at present be true of most independent -Asiatic states and of all independent African states. The council -should have power to exclude any nation which completely fell from -civilization, as Mexico, partly with the able assistance of President -Wilson’s administration, has fallen during the past few years. There -are various South and Central American states which have never been -entitled to the consideration as civilized, orderly, self-respecting -powers which would entitle them to be treated on terms of equality in -the fashion indicated. As regards these disorderly and weak outsiders, -it might well be that after a while some method would be devised to -deal with them by common agreement of the civilized powers; but until -this was devised and put into execution they would have to be left as -at present. - -Of course, grave difficulties would be encountered in devising such -a plan and in administering it afterward, and no human being can -guarantee that it would absolutely succeed. But I believe that it could -be made to work and that it would mark a very great improvement over -what obtains now. At this moment there is hell in Belgium and hell -in Mexico; and the ultrapacificists in this country have their full -share of the responsibility for this hell. They are not primary factors -in producing it. They lack the virile power to be primary factors in -producing anything, good or evil, that needs daring and endurance. -But they are secondary factors; for the man who tamely acquiesces in -wrong-doing is a secondary factor in producing that wrong-doing. Most -certainly the proposed plan would be dependent upon reasonable good -faith for its successful working, but this is only to say what is also -true of every human institution. Under the proposed plan there would be -a strong likelihood of bettering world conditions. If it is a Utopia, -it is a Utopia of a very practical kind. - -Such a plan is as yet in the realm of mere speculation. At present -the essential thing for each self-respecting, liberty-loving nation -to do is to put itself in position to defend its own rights. Recently -President Wilson, in his message to Congress, has announced that we -are in no danger and will not be in any danger; and ex-President Taft -has stated that the awakening of interest in our defenses indicates -“mild hysteria.” Such utterances show fatuous indifference to the -teachings of history. They represent precisely the attitude which a -century ago led to the burning of Washington by a small expeditionary -hostile force, and to such paralyzing disaster in war as almost to -bring about the break-up of the Union. In his message President Wilson -justifies a refusal to build up our navy by asking--as if we were -discussing a question of pure metaphysics--“When will the experts tell -us just what kind of ships we should construct--and when will they -be right for ten years together? Who shall tell us now what sort of -navy to build?” and actually adds, after posing and leaving unanswered -these questions: “I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There -is no need to discuss it.” Lovers of Dickens who turn to the second -paragraph of chapter XI of “Our Mutual Friend” will find this attitude -of President Wilson toward preparedness interestingly paralleled by -the attitude Mr. Podsnap took in “getting rid of disagreeables” by -the use of the phrases, “I don’t want to know about them! I refuse -to discuss them! I don’t admit them!” thus “clearing the world of -its most difficult problems by sweeping them behind him. For they -affronted him.” If during the last ten years England’s attitude toward -preparedness for war and the upbuilding of her navy had been determined -by statesmanship such as is set forth in these utterances of President -Wilson, the island would now be trampled into bloody mire, as Belgium -has been trampled. If Germany had followed such advice--or rather no -advice-during the last ten years, she would now have been wholly unable -so much as to assert her rights anywhere. - -Let us immediately make our navy thoroughly efficient; and this can -only be done by reversing the policy that President Wilson has followed -for twenty-two months. Recently Secretary Daniels has said, as quoted -by the press, that he intends to provide for the safety of both the -Atlantic and Pacific coasts by dividing our war fleet between the -two oceans. Such division of the fleet, having in view the disaster -which exactly similar action brought on Russia ten years ago, would be -literally a crime against the nation. Neither our foreign affairs nor -our naval affairs can be satisfactorily managed when the President is -willing to put in their respective departments gentlemen like Messrs. -Bryan and Daniels. President Wilson would not have ventured to make -either of these men head of the Treasury Department, because he would -thereby have offended the concrete interests of American business men. -But as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy the harm they do -is to the country as a whole. No concrete interest is immediately -affected; and, as it is only our own common welfare in the future, only -the welfare of our children, only the honor and interest of the United -States through the generations that are concerned, it is deemed safe to -disregard this welfare and to take chances with our national honor and -interest. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -SUMMING UP - - -“Blessed are the peacemakers,” not merely the peace lovers; for action -is what makes thought operative and valuable. Above all, the peace -prattlers are in no way blessed. On the contrary, only mischief has -sprung from the activities of the professional peace prattlers, the -ultrapacificists, who, with the shrill clamor of eunuchs, preach the -gospel of the milk and water of virtue and scream that belief in the -efficacy of diluted moral mush is essential to salvation. - -It seems necessary every time I state my position to guard against -the counterwords of wilful folly by reiterating that my disagreement -with the peace-at-any-price men, the ultrapacificists, is not in the -least because they favor peace. I object to them, first, because they -have proved themselves futile and impotent in working for peace, and, -second, because they commit what is not merely the capital error but -the crime against morality of failing to uphold righteousness as the -all-important end toward which we should strive. In actual practice -they advocate the peace of unrighteousness just as fervently as they -advocate the peace of righteousness. I have as little sympathy as -they have for the men who deify mere brutal force, who insist that -power justifies wrong-doing, and who declare that there is no such -thing as international morality. But the ultrapacificists really play -into the hands of these men. To condemn equally might which backs -right and might which overthrows right is to render positive service -to wrong-doers. It is as if in private life we condemned alike both -the policeman and the dynamiter or black-hand kidnapper or white -slaver whom he has arrested. To denounce the nation that wages war in -self-defense, or from a generous desire to relieve the oppressed, in -the same terms in which we denounce war waged in a spirit of greed -or wanton folly stands on an exact par with denouncing equally a -murderer and the policeman who, at peril of his life and by force of -arms, arrests the murderer. In each case the denunciation denotes not -loftiness of soul but weakness both of mind and of morals. - -In a capital book, by a German, Mr. Edmund von Mach, entitled “What -Germany Wants,” there is the following noble passage at the outset: - - During the preparation of this book the writer received from his - uncle, a veteran army officer living in Dresden, a brief note - containing the following laconic record: - - “1793, your great-grandfather at Kostheim. - - “1815, your grandfather at Liegnitz. - - “1870, myself--all severely wounded by French bullets. - - “1914, my son, captain in the 6th Regiment of Dragoons. - - “Four generations obliged to fight the French!” - - When the writer turns to his American friends of French descent, - he finds there similar records, and often even greater sorrow, - for death has come to many of them. In Europe their families and - his have looked upon each other as enemies for generations, while - a few years in the clarifying atmosphere of America have made - friends of former Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, and Englishmen. - - Jointly they pray that the present war may not be carried to - such a pass that an early and honorable peace becomes impossible - for any one of these great nations. Is it asking too much that - America may be vouchsafed in not too distant a future to do for - their respective native lands what the American institutions - have done for them individually, help them to regard each other - at their true worth, unblinded by traditional hatred or fiery - passion? - -It is in the spirit of this statement that we Americans should act. We -are a people different from, but akin, to all the nations of Europe. -We should feel a real friendship for each of the contesting powers and -a real desire to work so as to secure justice for each. This cannot -be done by preserving a tame and spiritless neutrality which treats -good and evil on precisely the same basis. Such a neutrality never -has enabled and never will enable any nation to do a great work for -righteousness. Our true course should be to judge each nation on its -conduct, unhesitatingly to antagonize every nation that does ill as -regards the point on which it does ill, and equally without hesitation -to act, as cool-headed and yet generous wisdom may dictate, so as -disinterestedly to further the welfare of all. - -One of the greatest of international duties ought to be the protection -of small, highly civilized, well-behaved, and self-respecting states -from oppression and conquest by their powerful military neighbors. Such -nations as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Uruguay, Denmark, Norway, -and Sweden play a great and honorable part in the development of -civilization. The subjugation of any one of them is a crime against, -the destruction of any one of them is a loss to, mankind. - -I feel in the strongest way that we should have interfered, at least -to the extent of the most emphatic diplomatic protest and at the -very outset--and then by whatever further action was necessary--in -regard to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium; for this act -was the earliest and the most important and, in its consequences, the -most ruinous of all the violations and offenses against treaties -committed by any combatant during the war. But it was not the only -one. The Japanese and English forces not long after violated Chinese -neutrality in attacking Kiao-Chau. It has been alleged and not denied -that the British ship _Highflyer_ sunk the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ -in neutral Spanish waters, this being also a violation of the Hague -conventions; and on October 10th the German government issued an -official protest about alleged violations of the Geneva convention by -the French. Furthermore, the methods employed in strewing portions of -the seas with floating mines have been such as to warrant the most -careful investigation by any neutral nations which treat neutrality -pacts and Hague conventions as other than merely dead letters. Not a -few offenses have been committed against our own people. - -If, instead of observing a timid and spiritless neutrality, we had -lived up to our obligations by taking action in all of these cases -without regard to which power it was that was alleged to have done -wrong, we would have followed the only course that would both have -told for world righteousness and have served our own self-respect. The -course actually followed by Messrs. Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels has -been to permit our own power for self-defense steadily to diminish -while at the same time refusing to do what we were solemnly bound to -do in order to protest against wrong and to render some kind of aid -to weak nations that had been wronged. Inasmuch as, in the first and -greatest and the most ruinous case of violation of neutral rights and -of international morality, this nation, under the guidance of Messrs. -Wilson and Bryan, kept timid silence and dared not protest, it would -be--and is--an act of deliberate bad faith to protest only as regards -subsequent and less important violations. Of course, if, as a people, -we frankly take the ground that our actions are based upon nothing -whatever but our own selfish and short-sighted interest, it is possible -to protest only against violations of neutrality that at the moment -unfavorably affect our own interests. Inaction is often itself the most -offensive form of action; the administration has persistently refused -to live up to the solemn national obligations to strive to protect -other unoffending nations from wrong; and this conduct adds a peculiar -touch of hypocrisy to the action taken at the same time in signing a -couple of score of all-inclusive arbitration treaties pretentiously -heralded as serving world righteousness. If we had acted as we ought to -have acted regarding Belgium we could then with a clear conscience have -made effective protest regarding every other case of violation of the -rights of neutrals or of offenses committed by the belligerents against -one another or against us in violation of the Hague conventions. -Moreover, the attitude of the administration has not even placated -the powers it was desired to please. Thanks to its action, the United -States during the last five months has gained neither the good-will nor -the respect of any of the combatants. On the contrary, it has steadily -grown rather more disliked and rather less respected by all of them. - -In facing a difficult and critical situation, any administration is -entitled to a free hand until it has had time to develop the action -which it considers appropriate, for often there is more than one -way in which it is possible to take efficient action. But when so -much time has passed, either without action or with only mischievous -action, as gravely to compromise both the honor and the interest of -the country, then it becomes a duty for self-respecting citizens to -whom their country is dear to speak out. From the very outset I felt -that the administration was following a wrong course. But no action of -mine could make it take the right course, and there was a possibility -that there was some object aside from political advantage in the -course followed. I kept silence as long as silence was compatible -with regard for the national honor and welfare. I spoke only when it -became imperative to speak under penalty of tame acquiescence in tame -failure to perform national duty. It has become evident that the -administration has had no plan whatever save the dexterous avoidance -of all responsibility and therefore of all duty, and the effort to -persuade our people as a whole that this inaction was for their -interest--combined with other less openly expressed and less worthy -efforts of purely political type. - -There is therefore no longer any reason for failure to point out that -if the President and Secretary of State had been thoroughly acquainted -in advance, as of course they ought to have been acquainted, with -the European situation, and if they had possessed an intelligent and -resolute purpose squarely to meet their heavy responsibilities and -thereby to serve the honor of this country and the interest of mankind, -they would have taken action on July 29th, 30th, or 31st, certainly -not later than August 1st. On such occasions there is a peculiar -applicability in the old proverb: Nine tenths of wisdom consists in -being wise in time. If those responsible for the management of our -foreign affairs had been content to dwell in a world of fact instead of -a world of third-rate fiction, they would have understood that at such -a time of world crisis it was an unworthy avoidance of duty to fuss -with silly little all-inclusive arbitration treaties when the need of -the day demanded that they devote all their energies to the terrible -problems of the day. They would have known that a German invasion -of Switzerland was possible but improbable and a German invasion of -Belgium overwhelmingly probable. They would have known that vigorous -action by the United States government, taken with such entire good -faith as to make it evident that it was in the interest of Belgium -and not in the interest of France and England, and that if there was -occasion it would be taken against France and England as quickly as -against Germany, might very possibly have resulted in either putting -a stop to the war or in localizing and narrowly circumscribing its -area. It is, of course, possible that the action would have failed of -its immediate purpose. But even in that case it cannot be doubted that -it would have been efficient as a check upon the subsequent wrongs -committed. - -Nor was the opportunity for action limited in time. Even if the -administration had failed thus to act at the outset of the war, the -protests officially made both by the German Emperor and by the Belgian -government to the President as to alleged misconduct in the prosecution -of the war not only gave him warrant for action but required him to -act. Meanwhile, from the moment when the war was declared, it became -inexcusable of the administration not to take immediate steps to -put the navy into efficient shape, and at least to make our military -forces on land more respectable. It is possible not to justify but to -explain the action of the administration in using the navy for the -sixteen months prior to this war in such a way as greatly to impair -its efficiency; for of course when the President selected Mr. Daniels -as Secretary of the Navy he showed, on the supposition that he was not -indifferent to its welfare, an entire ignorance of what that welfare -demanded; and therefore the failure to keep the navy efficient may have -been due at first to mere inability to exercise foresight. But with war -impending, such failure to exercise foresight became inexcusable. None -of the effective fighting craft are of any real use so far as Mexico -is concerned. The navy should at once have been assembled in northern -waters, either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, and immediate steps -taken to bring it to the highest point of efficiency. - -It is because I believe our attitude should be one of sincere good-will -toward all nations that I so strongly feel that we should endeavor -to work for a league of peace among all nations rather than trust to -alliances with any particular group. Moreover, alliances are very -shifty and uncertain. Within twenty years England has regarded France -as her immediately dangerous opponent; within ten years she has felt -that Russia was the one power against which she must at all costs -guard herself; and during the same period there have been times when -Belgium has hated England with a peculiar fervor. Alliances must be -based on self-interest and must continually shift. But in such a world -league as that of which we speak and dream, the test would be conduct -and not merely selfish interest, and so there would be no shifting of -policy. - -It is not yet opportune to discuss in detail the exact method by -which the nations of the world shall put the collective strength of -civilization behind the purpose of civilization to do right, using as -an instrumentality for peace such a world league. I have in the last -chapter given the bare outline of such a plan. Probably at the outset -it would be an absolute impossibility to devise a non-national or -purely international police force which would be effective in a great -crisis. The prime necessity is that all the great nations should agree -in good faith to use their combined warlike strength to coerce any -nation, whichever one it may be, that declines to abide the decision of -some competent international tribunal. - -Our business is to create the beginnings of international order out of -the world of nations as these nations actually exist. We do not have to -deal with a world of pacificists and therefore we must proceed on the -assumption that treaties will never acquire sanctity until nations are -ready to seal them with their blood. We are not striving for peace in -heaven. That is not our affair. What we were bidden to strive for is -“peace on earth and good-will toward men.” To fulfil this injunction -it is necessary to treat the earth as it is and men as they are, as -an indispensable pre-requisite to making the earth a better place in -which to live and men better fit to live in it. It is inexcusable moral -culpability on our part to pretend to carry out this injunction in such -fashion as to nullify it; and this we do if we make believe that the -earth is what it is not and if our professions of bringing good-will -toward men are in actual practice shown to be empty shams. Peace -congresses, peace parades, the appointment and celebration of days -of prayer for peace, and the like, which result merely in giving the -participants the feeling that they have accomplished something and are -therefore to be excused from hard, practical work for righteousness, -are empty shams. Treaties such as the recent all-inclusive arbitration -treaties are worse than empty shams and convict us as a nation of -moral culpability when our representatives sign them at the same time -that they refuse to risk anything to make good the signatures we have -already affixed to the Hague conventions. - -Moderate and sensible treaties which mean something and which can -and will be enforced mark a real advance for the human race. As has -been well said: “It is our business to make no treaties which we are -not ready to maintain with all our resources, for every such ‘scrap -of paper’ is like a forged check--an assault on our credit in the -world.” Promises that are idly given and idly broken represent profound -detriment to the morality of nations. Until no promise is idly entered -into and until promises that have once been made are kept, at no -matter what cost of risk and effort and positive loss, just so long -will distrust and suspicion and wrong-doing rack the world. No honest -lawyer will hesitate to advise his client against signing a contract -either detrimental to his interests or impossible of fulfilment; -and the individual who signs such a contract at once makes himself -either an object of suspicion to sound-headed men or else an object of -derision to all men. One of the stock jokes in the comic columns of -the newspapers refers to the man who swears off or takes the pledge, -or makes an indefinite number of good resolutions on New Year’s Day, -and fails to keep his pledge or promise or resolution; this was one of -Mark Twain’s favorite subjects for derision. The man who continually -makes new promises without living up to those he has already made, and -who takes pledges which he breaks, is rightly treated as an object for -contemptuous fun. The nation which behaves in like manner deserves no -higher consideration. - -The conduct of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan in signing these -all-inclusive treaties at the same time that they have kept silent -about the breaking of the Hague conventions has represented the kind of -wrong-doing to this nation that would be represented in private life -by the conduct of the individuals who sign such contracts as those -mentioned. The administration has looked on without a protest while -the Hague conventions have been torn up and thrown to the wind. It has -watched the paper structure of good-will collapse without taking one -step to prevent it; and yet foolish pacificists, the very men who in -the past have been most vociferous about international morality, have -praised it for this position. The assertion that our neutrality carries -with it the obligation to be silent when our own Hague conventions are -destroyed represents an active step against the peace of righteousness. -The only way to show that our faith in public law was real was to -protest against the assault on international morality implied in the -invasion of Belgium. - -Unless some one at some time is ready to take some chance for the -sake of internationalism, that is of international morality, it will -remain what it is to-day, an object of derision to aggressive nations. -Even if nothing more than an emphatic protest had been made against -what was done in Belgium--it is not at this time necessary for me -to state exactly what, in my judgment, ought to have been done--the -foundations would have been laid for an effective world opinion against -international cynicism. Pacificists claim that we have acted so as to -preserve the good-will of Europe and to exercise a guiding influence -in the settlement of the war. This is an idea which appeals to the -thoughtless, for it gratifies our desire to keep out of trouble and -also our vanity by the hope that we shall do great things with small -difficulty. It may or may not be that the settlement will finally be -made by a peace congress in which the President of the United States -will hold titular position of headship. But under conditions as they -are now the real importance of the President in such a peace congress -will be comparable to the real importance of the drum-major when he -walks at the head of a regiment. Small boys regard the drum-major as -much more important than the regimental commander; and the pacificist -grown-ups who applaud peace congresses sometimes show as regards the -drum-majors of these congresses the same touching lack of insight -which small boys show toward real drum-majors. As a matter of fact, -if the United States enters such a congress with nothing but a record -of comfortable neutrality or tame acquiescence in violated Hague -conventions, plus an array of vague treaties with no relation to -actual facts, it will be allowed to fill the position of international -drum-major and of nothing more; and even this position it will be -allowed to fill only so long as it suits the convenience of the men -who have done the actual fighting. The warring nations will settle -the issues in accordance with their own strength and position. Under -such conditions we shall be treated as we deserve to be treated, as a -nation of people who mean well feebly, whose words are not backed by -deeds, who like to prattle about both their own strength and their own -righteousness, but who are unwilling to run the risks without which -righteousness cannot be effectively served, and who are also unwilling -to undergo the toil of intelligent and hard-working preparation without -which strength when tested proves weakness. - -In this world it is as true of nations as of individuals that the -things best worth having are rarely to be obtained in cheap fashion. -There is nothing easier than to meet in congresses and conventions and -pass resolutions in favor of virtue. There is also nothing more futile -unless those passing the resolutions are willing to make them good by -labor and endurance and active courage and self-denial. Readers of John -Hay’s poems will remember the scorn therein expressed for those who -“resoloot till the cows come home,” but do not put effort back of their -words. Those who would teach our people that service can be rendered or -greatness attained in easy, comfortable fashion, without facing risk, -hardship, and difficulty, are teaching what is false and mischievous. -Courage, hard work, self-mastery, and intelligent effort are all -essential to successful life. As a rule, the slothful ease of life is -in inverse proportion to its true success. This is true of the private -lives of farmers, business men, and mechanics. It is no less true of -the life of the nation which is made up of these farmers, business men, -and mechanics. - -As yet, as events have most painfully shown, there is nothing to be -expected by any nation in a great crisis from anything except its -own strength. Under these circumstances it is criminal in the United -States not to prepare. Critics have stated that in advocating universal -military service on the Swiss plan in this country, I am advocating -militarism. I am not concerned with mere questions of terminology. The -plan I advocate would be a corrective of every evil which we associate -with the name of militarism. It would tend for order and self-respect -among our people. Not the smallest evil among the many evils that -exist in America is due to militarism. Save in the crisis of the Civil -War there has been no militarism in the United States and the only -militarist President we have ever had was Abraham Lincoln. Universal -service of the Swiss type would be educational in the highest and -best sense of the word. In Switzerland, as compared with the United -States, there are, relatively to the population, only one tenth the -number of murders and of crimes of violence. Doubtless other causes -have contributed to this, but doubtless also the intelligent collective -training of the Swiss people in habits of obedience, of self-reliance, -self-restraint and endurance, of applied patriotism and collective -action, has been a very potent factor in producing this good result. - -As I have already said, I know of my own knowledge that two nations -which on certain occasions were obliged, perhaps as much by our fault -as by theirs, to take into account the question of possible war with -the United States, planned in such event to seize the Panama Canal and -to take and ransom or destroy certain of our great coast cities. They -planned this partly in the belief that our navy would intermittently -be allowed to become extremely inefficient, just as during the last -twenty months it has become inefficient, and partly in the belief -that our people are so wholly unmilitary, and so ridden to death -on the one hand by foolish pacificists and on the other by brutal -materialists whose only God is money, that we would not show ourselves -either resolutely patriotic or efficient even in what belated action -our utter lack of preparation permitted us to take. I believe that -these nations were and are wrong in their estimate of the underlying -strength of the American character. I believe that if war did really -come both the ultrapacificists, the peace-at-any-price men, and the -merely brutal materialists, who count all else as nothing compared to -the gratification of their greed for gain or their taste for ease, -for pleasure, and for vacuous excitement, would be driven before the -gale of popular feeling as leaves are driven through the fall woods. -But such aroused public feeling in the actual event would be wholly -inadequate to make good our failure to prepare. - -We should in all humility imitate not a little of the spirit so much -in evidence among the Germans and the Japanese, the two nations which -in modern times have shown the most practical type of patriotism, -the greatest devotion to the common weal, the greatest success in -developing their economic resources and abilities from within, and the -greatest far-sightedness in safeguarding the country against possible -disaster from without. In the _Journal of the Military Service -Institution_ for the months of November and December of the present -year will be found a quotation from a Japanese military paper, _The -Comrades’ Magazine_, which displays an amount of practical good sense -together with patriotism and devotion to the welfare of the average -man which could well be copied by our people and which is worthy of -study by every intelligent American. Germany’s success in industrialism -has been as extraordinary and noteworthy as her success in securing -military efficiency, and fundamentally has been due to the development -of the same qualities in the nation. - -At present the United States does not begin to get adequate return -in the way of efficient preparation for defense from the amount of -money appropriated every year. Both the executive and Congress are -responsible for this--and of course this means that the permanent -and ultimate responsibility rests on the people. It is really less a -question of spending more money than of knowing how to get the best -results for the money that we do spend. Most emphatically there should -be a comprehensive plan both for defense and for expenditure. The best -military and naval authorities--not merely the senior officers but the -best officers--should be required to produce comprehensive plans for -battle-ships, for submarines, for air-ships, for proper artillery, -for a more efficient regular army, and for a great popular reserve -behind the army. Every useless military post should be forthwith -abandoned; and this cannot be done save by getting Congress to accept -or reject plans for defense and expenditure in their entirety. If each -congressman or senator can put in his special plea for the erection -or retention of a military post for non-military reasons, and for -the promotion or favoring of some given officer or group of officers -also for non-military reasons, we can rest assured that good results -can never be obtained. Here, again, what is needed is not plans by -outsiders but the insistence by outsiders upon the army and navy -officers being required to produce the right plans, being backed up -when they do produce the right plans, and being held to a strict -accountability for any failure, active or passive, in their duty. - -Moreover, these plans must be treated as part of the coherent policy of -the nation in international affairs. With a gentleman like Mr. Bryan -in the State Department it may be accepted as absolutely certain that -we never will have the highest grade of efficiency in the Departments -of War and of the Navy. With a gentleman like Mr. Daniels at the -head of the navy, it may be accepted as certain that the navy will -not be brought to the level of its possible powers. This means that -the people as a whole must demand of their leaders that they treat -seriously the navy and army and our foreign policy. - -The waste in our navy and army is very great. This is inevitable as -long as we do not discriminate against the inefficient and as long -as we fail to put a premium upon efficiency. When I was President I -found out that a very large proportion of the old officers of the -army and even of the navy were physically incompetent to perform many -of their duties. The public was wholly indifferent on the subject. -Congress would not act. As a preliminary, and merely as a preliminary, -I established a regulation that before promotion officers should be -required to walk fifty miles or ride one hundred miles in three days. -This was in no way a sufficient test of an officer’s fitness. It -merely served to rid the service of men whose unfitness was absolutely -ludicrous. Yet in Congress and in the newspapers an extraordinary -din was raised against this test on the ground that it was unjust to -faithful elderly officers! The pacificists promptly assailed it on -the ground that to make the army efficient was a “warlike” act. All -kinds of philanthropists, including clergymen and college presidents, -wrote me that my action showed not only callousness of heart but also -a regrettable spirit of militarism. Any officer who because of failure -to come up to the test or for other reasons was put out of the service -was certain to receive ardent congressional championship; and every -kind of pressure was brought to bear on behalf of the unfit, while -hardly the slightest effective championship was given the move from -any outside source. This was because public opinion was absolutely -uneducated on the subject. In our country the men who in time of -peace speak loudest about war are usually the ultrapacificists whose -activities have been shown to be absolutely futile for peace, but who -do a little mischief by persuading a number of well-meaning persons -that preparedness for war is unnecessary. - -It is not desirable that civilians, acting independently of and without -the help of military and naval advisers, shall prepare minute or -detailed plans as to what ought to be done for our national defense. -But civilians are competent to advocate plans in outline exactly as -I have here advocated them. Moreover, and most important, they are -competent to try to make public opinion effective in these matters. A -democracy must have proper leaders. But these leaders must be able to -appeal to a proper sentiment in the democracy. It is the prime duty of -every right-thinking citizen at this time to aid his fellow countrymen -to understand the need of working wisely for peace, the folly of acting -unwisely for peace, and, above all, the need of real and thorough -national preparedness against war. - -Former Secretary of the Navy Bonaparte, in one of his admirable -articles, in which he discusses armaments and treaties, has spoken as -follows: - - Indeed, it is so obviously impolitic, on the part of the - administration and its party friends, to avow a purpose to keep - the people in the dark as to our preparedness (or rather as to - our virtually admitted unpreparedness) to protect the national - interests, safety, and honor, that a practical avowal of such - purpose on their part would seem altogether incredible, but for - certain rather notorious facts developed by our experience during - the last year and three quarters. - - It has gradually become evident, or, at least, probable that - the mind (wherever that mind may be located) which determines, - or has, as yet, determined, our foreign policy under President - Wilson, really relies upon a timid neutrality and innumerable - treaties of general arbitration as sufficient to protect us from - foreign aggression; and advisedly wishes to keep us virtually - unarmed and helpless to defend ourselves, so that a sense of - our weakness may render us sufficiently pusillanimous to pocket - all insults, to submit to any form of outrage, to resent no - provocation, and to abdicate completely and forever the dignity - and the duties of a great nation. - - In the absence of actual experience, a strong effort of the - imagination would be required, at least on the part of the - writer, to conceive of anybody’s not finding such an outlook - for his country utterly intolerable; but incredulity must yield - to decisive proof. Even the votaries of this novel cult of - cowardice, however, are evidently compelled to recognize that, as - yet, they constitute a very small minority among Americans, and, - for this reason, they would keep their fellow countrymen, as far - as may be practicable, in the dark as to our national weakness - and our national dangers; they delight in gagging soldiers and - sailors and, to the extent of their power, everybody else who - may speak with any authority, and, if they could, would shut out - every ray of light which might aid public opinion to see things - as they are. - - * * * * * - - There is no room for difference as to the utter absurdity of - reliance on treaties, no matter how solemn or with whomsoever - made, as substitutes for proper armaments to assure the national - safety; Belgium’s fate stares in the face any one who should even - dream of this. Her neutrality was established and guaranteed, not - by one treaty but by several treaties, not by one power but by - all the powers; yet she has been completely ruined because she - relied upon these treaties, refused to violate them herself and - tried, in good faith, to fulfil the obligations they imposed on - her. - - For any public man, with this really terrible object-lesson - before his eyes, to seriously ask us to believe that arbitration - treaties or Hague tribunals or anything else within that order of - ideas can be trusted to take the place of preparation impeaches - either his sincerity or his sanity, and impeaches no less - obviously the common sense of his readers or hearers. - - A nation unable to protect itself may have to pay a frightful - price nowadays as a penalty for the misfortune of weakness; the - Belgians may be, in a measure, consoled for their misfortune by - the world’s respect and sympathy; in the like case, we should - be further and justly punished by the world’s unbounded and - merited contempt, for our weakness would be the fruit of our own - ignominious cowardice and incredible folly. - -Secretary Garrison in his capital report says that if our outlying -possessions are even insufficiently manned our mobile home army will -consist of less than twenty-five thousand men, only about twice the -size of the police force of New York City. Yet, in the face of this, -certain newspaper editors, college presidents, pacificist bankers and, -I regret to say, certain clergymen and philanthropists enthusiastically -champion the attitude of President Wilson and Mr. Bryan in refusing -to prepare for war. As one of them put it the other day: “The way -to prevent war is not to fight.” Luxembourg did not fight! Does -this gentleman regard the position of Luxembourg at this moment as -enviable? China has not recently fought. Does the gentleman think -that China’s position is in consequence a happy one? If advisers of -this type, if these college presidents and clergymen and editors of -organs of culture and the philanthropists who give this advice spoke -only for themselves, if the humiliation and disgrace were to come -only on them, no one would have a right to object. They have servile -souls; and if they chose serfdom of the body for themselves only, it -would be of small consequence to others. But, unfortunately, their -words have a certain effect upon this country; and that effect is -intolerably evil. Doubtless it is the influence of these men which is -largely responsible for the attitude of the President. The President -attacks preparedness in the name of antimilitarism. The preparedness we -advocate is that of Switzerland, the least militaristic of countries. -Autocracy may use preparedness for the creation of an aggressive -and provocative militarism that invites and produces war; but in a -democracy preparedness means security against aggression and the best -guarantee of peace. The President in his message has in effect declared -that his theory of neutrality, which is carried to the point of a -complete abandonment of the rights of innocent small nations, and his -theory of non-preparedness, which is carried to the point of gross -national inefficiency, are both means for securing to the United States -a leading position in bringing about peace. The position he would thus -secure would be merely that of drum-major at the peace conference; and -he would do well to remember that if the peace that is brought about -should result in leaving Belgium’s wrongs unredressed and turning -Belgium over to Germany, in enthroning militarism as the chief factor -in the modern world, and in consecrating the violation of treaties, -then the United States, by taking part in such a conference, would have -rendered an evil service to mankind. - -At present our navy is in wretched shape. Our army is infinitesimal. -This large, rich republic is far less efficient from a military -standpoint than Switzerland, Holland, or Denmark. In spite of the -fact that the officers and enlisted men of our navy and army offer -material on the whole better than the officers and men of any other -navy or army, these two services have for so many years been neglected -by Congress, and during the last two years have been so mishandled -by the administration, that at the present time an energetic and -powerful adversary could probably with ease drive us not only from -the Philippines but from Hawaii, and take possession of the Canal and -Alaska. If invaded by a serious army belonging to some formidable Old -World empire, we would be for many months about as helpless as China; -and, as nowadays large armies can cross the ocean, we might be crushed -beyond hope of recuperation inside of a decade. Yet those now at the -head of public affairs refuse themselves to face facts and seek to -mislead the people as to the facts. - -President Wilson is, of course, fully and completely responsible for -Mr. Bryan. Mr. Bryan appreciates this and loyally endeavors to serve -the President and to come to his defense at all times. As soon as -President Wilson had announced that there was no need of preparations -to defend ourselves, because we loved everybody and everybody loved us -and because our mission was to spread the gospel of peace, Mr. Bryan -came to his support with hearty enthusiasm and said: “The President -knows that if this country needed a million men, and needed them in -a day, the call would go out at sunrise and the sun would go down on -a million men in arms.” One of the President’s stanchest newspaper -adherents lost its patience over this utterance and remarked: “More -foolish words than these of the Secretary of State were never spoken -by mortal man in reply to a serious argument.” However, Mr. Bryan had -a good precedent, although he probably did not know it. Pompey, when -threatened by Cæsar, and told that his side was unprepared, responded -that he had only to “stamp his foot” and legions would spring from -the ground. In the actual event, the “stamping” proved as effectual -against Cæsar as Mr. Bryan’s “call” would under like circumstances. I -once heard a Bryanite senator put Mr. Bryan’s position a little more -strongly than it occurred to Mr. Bryan himself to put it. The senator -in question announced that we needed no regular army, because in the -event of war “ten million freemen would spring to arms, the equals of -any regular soldiers in the world.” I do not question the emotional -or oratorical sincerity either of Mr. Bryan or of the senator. Mr. -Bryan is accustomed to performing in vacuo; and both he and President -Wilson, as regards foreign affairs, apparently believe they are living -in a world of two dimensions, and not in the actual workaday world, -which has three dimensions. This was equally true of the senator in -question. If the senator’s ten million men sprang to arms at this -moment, they would have at the outside some four hundred thousand -modern rifles to which to spring. Perhaps six hundred thousand more -could spring to squirrel pieces and fairly good shotguns. The remaining -nine million men would have to “spring” to axes, scythes, hand-saws, -gimlets, and similar arms. As for Mr. Bryan’s million men who would at -sunset respond under arms to a call made at sunrise, the suggestion is -such a mere rhetorical flourish that it is not worthy even of humorous -treatment; a high-school boy making such a statement in a theme would -be marked zero by any competent master. But it is an exceedingly -serious thing, it is not in the least a humorous thing, that the man -making such a statement should be the chief adviser of the President -in international matters, and should hold the highest office in the -President’s gift. - -Nor is Mr. Bryan in any way out of sympathy with President Wilson in -this matter. The President, unlike Mr. Bryan, uses good English and -does not say things that are on their face ridiculous. Unfortunately, -his cleverness of style and his entire refusal to face facts apparently -make him believe that he really has dismissed and done away with ugly -realities whenever he has uttered some pretty phrase about them. This -year we are in the presence of a crisis in the history of the world. -In the terrible whirlwind of war all the great nations of the world, -save the United States and Italy, are facing the supreme test of their -history. All of the pleasant and alluring but futile theories of the -pacificists, all the theories enunciated in the peace congresses -of the past twenty years, have vanished at the first sound of the -drumming guns. The work of all the Hague conventions, and all the -arbitration treaties, neutrality treaties, and peace treaties of the -last twenty years has been swept before the gusts of war like withered -leaves before a November storm. In this great crisis the stern and -actual facts have shown that the fate of each nation depends not in -the least upon any elevated international aspirations to which it has -given expression in speech or treaty, but on practical preparation, on -intensity of patriotism, on grim endurance, and on the possession of -the fighting edge. Yet, in the face of all this, the President of the -United States sends in a message dealing with national defense, which -is filled with prettily phrased platitudes of the kind applauded at the -less important type of peace congress, and with sentences cleverly -turned to conceal from the average man the fact that the President has -no real advice to give, no real policy to propose. There is just one -point as to which he does show real purpose for a tangible end. He -dwells eagerly upon the hope that we may obtain “the opportunity to -counsel and obtain peace in the world” among the warring nations and -adjures us not to jeopardize this chance (for the President to take -part in the peace negotiations) by at this time making any preparations -for self-defense. In effect, we are asked not to put our own shores -in defensible condition lest the President may lose the chance to -be at the head of the congress which may compose the differences -of Europe. In effect, he asks us not to build up the navy, not to -provide for an efficient citizen army, not to get ammunition for our -guns and torpedoes for our torpedo-tubes, lest somehow or other this -may make the President of the United States an unacceptable mediator -between Germany and Great Britain! It is an honorable ambition for the -President to desire to be of use in bringing about peace in Europe; -but only on condition that the peace thus brought is the peace of -righteousness, and only on condition that he does not sacrifice this -country’s vital interests for a clatter of that kind of hollow applause -through which runs an undertone of sinister jeering. He must not -sacrifice to this ambition the supreme interest of the American people. -Nor must he believe that the possibility of his being umpire will have -any serious effect on the terrible war game that is now being played; -the outcome of the game will depend upon the prowess of the players. -No gain will come to our nation, or to any other nation, if President -Wilson permits himself to be deluded concerning the part the United -States may take in the promotion of European peace. - -Peace in Europe will be made by the warring nations. They and they -alone will in fact determine the terms of settlement. The United States -may be used as a convenient means of getting together; but that is all. -If the nations of Europe desire peace and our assistance in securing -it, it will be because they have fought as long as they will or can. It -will not be because they regard us as having set a spiritual example to -them by sitting idle, uttering cheap platitudes, and picking up their -trade, while they have poured out their blood like water in support of -the ideals in which, with all their hearts and souls, they believe. -For us to assume superior virtue in the face of the war-worn nations -of the Old World will not make us more acceptable as mediators among -them. Such self-consciousness on our part will not impress the nations -who have sacrificed and are sacrificing all that is dearest to them in -the world, for the things that they believe to be the noblest in the -world. The storm that is raging in Europe at this moment is terrible -and evil; but it is also grand and noble. Untried men who live at ease -will do well to remember that there is a certain sublimity even in -Milton’s defeated archangel, but none whatever in the spirits who kept -neutral, who remained at peace, and dared side neither with hell nor -with heaven. They will also do well to remember that when heroes have -battled together, and have wrought good and evil, and when the time has -come out of the contest to get all the good possible and to prevent as -far as possible the evil from being made permanent, they will not be -influenced much by the theory that soft and short-sighted outsiders -have put themselves in better condition to stop war abroad by making -themselves defenseless at home. - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber’s note: - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors and occasional unbalanced quotation marks -were corrected. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR*** - - -******* This file should be named 53651-0.txt or 53651-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/3/6/5/53651 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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