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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71148c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #53482 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53482) diff --git a/old/53482-0.txt b/old/53482-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1b7d2a0..0000000 --- a/old/53482-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3176 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian Advance, by Marr Murray - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Russian Advance - -Author: Marr Murray - -Release Date: November 9, 2016 [EBook #53482] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - The Daily Telegraph - - WAR BOOKS - - -THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE - - - - - The Daily Telegraph - WAR BOOKS - - Cloth 1/- net each - - Post free 1/3 each - - - HOW THE WAR BEGAN - By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY - - THE FLEETS AT WAR - By ARCHIBALD HURD - - THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN - By GEORGE HOOPER - - THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE - By J. M. KENNEDY - - IN THE FIRING LINE - Battle Stories told by British Soldiers at the Front. - By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK - - GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD - By STEPHEN CRANE - Author of “The Red Badge of Courage.” - - BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT - The glorious story of their Battle Honours. - - THE RED CROSS IN WAR - By M. F. BILLINGTON - - FORTY YEARS AFTER - The Story of the Franco-German War. By H. C. BAILEY. - With an Introduction by W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D. - - A SCRAP OF PAPER - The Inner History of German Diplomacy. - By E. J. DILLON - - HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR - A companion volume to “How the War Began,” telling how the world faced - Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms. - By J. M. KENNEDY - - AIR-CRAFT IN WAR - By ERIC STUART BRUCE - - HACKING THROUGH BELGIUM - By EDMUND DANE - - FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE - REGIMENTS - By REGINALD HODDER - - THE RETREAT TO PARIS - By ROGER INGPEN - - THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE - By MARR MURRAY - - THE SUBMARINE IN WAR - By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE - - MOTOR TRANSPORTS IN WAR - By HORACE WYATT - - THE SLAV NATIONS - - - - - THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE - - BY - MARR MURRAY - - HODDER AND STOUGHTON - LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO - MCMXIV - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - INTRODUCTION 7 - - I. THE NATION AND THE WAR 19 - - II. MOBILISATION 37 - - III. THE POLISH PROCLAMATION 72 - - IV. THE PRELIMINARY PHASE 82 - - V. THE ADVANCE INTO EASTERN PRUSSIA 103 - - VI. THE ADVANCE INTO GALICIA 137 - - VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEMBERG 174 - - VIII. CONCLUSION 186 - - - - -[Illustration: - - COPYRIGHT. SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR The Daily Telegraph BY "GEOGRAPHIA" - LTD 55 FLEET STREET LONDON EC - - ALEXANDER GROSS F R G S -] - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -War between Russia and Austria has been inevitable since the latter -first cast her eyes eastwards and decided that Salonika was to be the -object of her expansion. To reach a port on the east the Teuton must -crush the Slav. Fundamentally, it is a battle of races. Hitherto the -Teuton has managed to avoid actual conflict; by means of carefully -designed coups at opportune moments, or, to put it more bluntly, by -the methods of a common thief, he has made very good progress during -the last few years without risking his own skin. But on the present -occasion circumstances were not so favourable as they appeared to be; -and instead of catching Slavdom at a disadvantage, he caught it ready -to fight for its existence--a serious miscalculation which bids fair to -have the most far-reaching results. - -With the exception of the Greeks, Turks and the sparse Teutonic -population, the inhabitants of the whole of eastern and south-eastern -Europe are of Slavonic origin. They number roughly 125 millions, and -they possess the best of all rights to their territories--that of -settlement at the time when the Aryan peoples migrated from Asia to -Europe. The Russians, Rumanians, Bulgars, Montenegrins and portions -of the Serbs, Croats and Poles are either self-governing or under the -rule of other Slavonic peoples. The remaining Slavs are under Teuton -domination. In East Prussia the Kaiser rules Poles, Kassubes and Serbs, -while Austria has several millions of Polish, Czech, Ruthenian, -Serbian, Croatian, Slovenik and Slovak subjects. - -The Slav is the world’s most fervent nationalist. An intense and -unconquerable vitality is the outstanding characteristic of every -Slavonic people. Like the Jews they maintain their national traits -distinct and unchanged in spite of centuries of foreign domination. -Their conquerors have never been able to absorb them. Unlike the Jews, -however, this vitality is not passive but active. They have never -been subdued. When not actively hostile they are sullenly awaiting -the opportunity to throw off the yoke. For nearly five hundred years -Serbia was a Turkish province, held in the most ruthless subjection. -But during all that time Serbia never forgot that once she had been -an empire, nor faltered in her determination to be an empire again. -In 1817 the chance came and Serbia rose like a nation defending its -liberties rather than a rebellious people with a dozen generations of -bondsmen for forebears. The modern experiments of Germany and Austria -have not proved any more successful than the mediæval methods of the -Turks. Neither country has had a moment’s peace from its Slavonic -subjects. They have never dared play any part but the bully’s. - -The growth of the organised Pan-Slavist movement has added enormously -to their difficulties, and Austria in particular has had many anxious -moments in the eastern portions of her Mosaic empire. The movement is -the definite expression of Slav aspirations. It aims at unity, if not -actual union, amongst all the Slav peoples. Russia is the natural head -of the movement, and the ultimate aim is a collection of free Slavonic -nations under the suzerainty or protection of the Tzar. In the -meantime the immediate object is to free the Slavs who are under the -rule of foreign races. - -Reference has already been made to Serbia’s aspirations to be once more -the empire she was in the days before the Turks overran south-eastern -Europe. When in 1817 she at length threw off the Turkish yoke her -object was but half fulfilled. A further portion was won back as a -result of the recent Balkan War. But there still remain some millions -of Serbs under Hapsburg rule. In 1908 Austria, taking advantage of -Russian weakness, seized the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both -of which are peopled by Serbs. For a time war seemed inevitable. But -the Powers stepped in and Serbia, unable to rely on strong Russian -help, was forced to acquiesce. She had formally to renounce all claims -to be a more natural ruler for Serbs than mongrel Austria, to moderate -the activities of the Pan-Slavist societies all of which were more -or less bitterly opposed to Austria, and to profess to be perfectly -satisfied with the arrangement and full of neighbourly love. - -It was not to be expected that such an agreement, forced on a small -nation by the Great Powers, would prove anything but a farce. Serbia -very naturally resented the indignities which she had suffered. The -nationalist societies, instead of being suppressed, became more bitter -and bolder in their activities. The chief of them, the Narodna Obrava, -has an immense membership, drawn from all classes. It is to be found in -every town and village. The press, the army and the government service -are its most enthusiastic adherents. - -One evening, early in June, five members of the Narodna Obrava met in a -house near the royal palace at Belgrade and hatched the plot which was -destined to prove the spark that kindled the European conflagration. -All the world knows how well their plans were conceived, how faithfully -carried into execution. On June 28th the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, -the heir to the Austrian throne was, with his wife, murdered in the -streets of Serajevo, the chief town in Bosnia. - -There is no need here to dwell on subsequent events. After a delay of -some three weeks, Austria was bullied by Germany into presenting her -famous Note to Serbia. Every line of that Note was a studied insult -designed to make Russian intervention and war inevitable. Serbia was -exhausted in every way after her two wars with Turkey and Bulgaria, -Russia was in the midst of a scheme of military reorganisation which -still required a couple of years for completion. War was the last -desire of either country. Acting on Russia’s advice, Serbia made an -almost abject reply to Austria. But Germany was not to be denied. She -was determined to unsheath the sword. Every proposal for peace was -dismissed for the most trivial reasons, every precautionary measure was -exaggerated into a hostile act. At last, on Friday, August 1st, when -the German military preparations were practically complete, Baron von -Pourtales, the German Ambassador, called on M. Sazonov, the Foreign -Minister and formally demanded that the Russian partial mobilisation -should cease within twelve hours. At seven o’clock the following day -war was declared and Russia took up her task of defending Slavdom -from the Teuton menace, and incidentally saved western Europe from -its direst peril since the days when Napoleon thought to crush its -liberties. - -The eastern campaign has been more or less overshadowed by the western, -especially during the early days of the war. It was natural that it -should be so. The western campaign was the more sensational. The Kaiser -hurled his finest forces westwards; every day brought its vital news; -doubts, joys, fears crowded one on the other; there were no tedious -preliminaries, no hesitation, but smashing stroke and counterstroke. -The storm in the east was comparatively slow in gathering and it lacked -the spectacular element. - -The result was that Russia was both neglected and misunderstood. In -spite of the public welcome accorded to journalists by the Grand Duke -Nicholas, the official lust for secrecy is as fierce in the east -as in the west. Only the sparsest details have been allowed to be -published. Defeats have been ignored or dismissed as “local checks.” -Every victory has been acclaimed a triumph and every step forward has -been supposed to echo menacingly in the streets of Berlin and in the -Kaiser’s headquarters. - -It has been practically impossible to obtain a clear view of the -eastern campaign, and consequently it is not to be wondered at that -there has sprung up a general disposition to regard Russia as something -of a disappointment. Ignorance of the conditions under which she is -fighting caused impossible triumphs to be expected of her. - -The best corrective for this distorted vision is to study the eastern -war from the Russian point of view. It is that point of view that I -have endeavoured to set forth in these pages. No claim is made to any -secret knowledge; in view of the extraordinary strict censorship in -Russia, such a claim would be absurd. But it is possible to record and -explain the events as they are known and understood by representative -opinion in Russia. Moreover, sufficient of the earlier stages of the -campaign have emerged from the fog of war to enable the period within -these pages to be analysed in the light of subsequent events. In the -circumstances, it can be confidently claimed that the views generally -held by men of moderate opinion in Russia provide a reliable if -somewhat sketchy history of the campaign. Some details may be meagre, -others faulty; that is only to be expected when for descriptions of the -actual fighting it is necessary to rely to a very large extent upon the -stories of the wounded. But the general outlines and deductions are -undoubtedly correct, and the study of them will enable the man in the -west to understand and appreciate the many difficulties connected with -the war in the east. - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE NATION AND THE WAR - - -The war that the nation fights is already half won. Tzars, Kaisers, -Kings and Governments may spend millions on perfecting their fighting -machines, they may hurl those machines at one another, but unless they -have behind them the united will of their subjects, their efforts -are bereft of more than half their force. The victorious army is the -one which enjoys the whole-hearted support of a people prepared to -face any sacrifice for the sake of its cause. The moral factor is as -important as the material or the ethical. History is full of instances -of wars being won against heavy odds by the sheer enthusiasm of a -people determined to win at all costs. For a modern example it is only -necessary to glance at the Austro-Serbian campaign. - -The Kaiser knew very well how essential it is for a nation to present a -united front to the foe. Ever of a religious disposition, he realised -how true was the text that a house divided against itself falls to -the ground. And so he chose his moment carefully. Britain was on the -verge of civil war over the Irish crisis; France was torn asunder -with political passions; both would obviously prove easy victims. And -Russia? Unfortunately for the Imperial plans Russia was in a contented -state. But the defect could soon be remedied! Russia has a reputation -for strikes and revolutions, two of the most valuable allies an -invading army can have. And so it happened that July saw the renewal of -labour troubles in Petrograd, Moscow and other large towns. - -The first sign that trouble was brewing came from the famous Putilov -works, the Russian armament factory. For some time past Germany has -been evincing a very keen interest in the factory, and not so long -ago an insolent attempt was made to get the control of the works into -the hands of German Jew financiers. Of course the attempt failed and -Germany had to content herself with filling the place with her spies. -There is little doubt that the German Secret Service was primarily -responsible for the strikes of 1914. For no particular reason -beyond vague references to the “rights of labour” and “the glorious -revolution,” some thousands of Putilov workmen went on strike. Thanks -to a vigorous campaign throughout the country by real and imitation -labour agitators, their example was extensively followed. Workers in -mills, factories and railways answered the call. Hundreds of thousands -were on strike although there was still no formulated demands on the -part of their leaders. The strikers were fed on the stock phrases and -generalities of the demagogue’s programme. Soon rioting took place. The -military had to be called out, and on several occasions at Petrograd -the Cossacks came into serious conflict with the strikers. - -Then suddenly the war clouds gathered. Russia appeared to have been -caught at the most inopportune moment possible. The war danger arose -at the very time when the strike movement seemed to be at its height. -There is no doubt that Russia’s advice to Serbia in regard to the -latter’s reply to Austria’s Note was to a large extent dictated by the -unfortunate internal condition of the country. - -But the nation rose to the occasion in a manner which even Russia’s -warmest friend would hardly have dared to predict. The national danger -forged a united people. The rioting and other disturbances ceased. -The military remained in their barracks; there was no work for them -in the streets. Then, as the international situation grew graver the -strikers realised how insignificant, yet how dangerous, were their own -squabbles, and they began to troop back to work of their own accord. -Throughout that period of agonising suspense the Russian statesmen -received no more inspiring news than this. It was the only ray of light -that pierced the gathering gloom. - -The people, realising that war was inevitable days before the -Governments gave up hope of peace, acclaimed it with enthusiasm. -Next to the Jews, the Germans, or _Nemetz_, as they are called, are -the most hated foreigners in Russia. They are found in nearly every -town and village, and their national habit of growing prosperous at -the expense of their hosts has earned for them an honest hatred. The -average Russian was only too pleased at the prospect of getting a -chance of paying off a few old scores. In addition to personal dislike, -the racial aspect of the war was also a very strong consideration with -the Russian democracy. Pan-Slavism is a very real doctrine amongst the -_mujhiks_, who have an unlimited faith in the heaven-sent destinies of -their race. There is hardly a soldier in all Russia’s immense army that -does not regard the freeing of all sorts and conditions of Slavs as his -most sacred duty. - -And there was the religious question to add to the nation’s enthusiasm. -Russia is the most religious nation in Europe. Every home, no matter -how humble, has its ikon. The festivals of the Church are real holy -days, and not mere secular holidays. The Church itself is indeed the -mother of the people. The simple, unquestioning faith of the _mujhiks_ -is without a parallel in Europe, except perhaps in the remote districts -of Ireland. Religion is a reality with them; it enters into every -action of their daily life. In the towns, of course, much of this faith -has been lost, and there is a parade of unbelief which is apt to lead -the casual observer to wrong conclusions. The real Russia is not to be -found in the towns, but in the villages and hamlets and amongst the -peasants. With them the war is a religious war. It is a battle between -the Orthodox Church, which is the peculiar property of the Slavs, and -the Western, which seeks to impose its tenets on the “true believers.” - -It is from these simple peasants with their racial hatreds and -rock-like faith that Russia draws nine-tenths of her soldiers. As -fighting men they can be compared only with Cromwell’s Ironsides. - -In the rural districts the popular enthusiasm for the war found an -outlet in religion; in the towns it sought a more secular form of -expression. Petrograd was the scene of unprecedented outbursts of -popular jubilation. Crowds paraded the streets singing the National -Anthem and cheering portraits of the Tzar. The French and particularly -the British Embassies were besieged by cheering throngs. Every public -appearance of the Tzar was the sign for vociferous outbursts of -loyalty such as are rarely witnessed in Russia. Even the Empress, -whose shattered nerves have kept her virtually a prisoner for years, -had to come forward and bow her acknowledgments to the crowds. And, -to crown all, the police, gendarmes and military were noticeably -absent from the streets. The crowds were orderly, in spite of their -patriotic fervour. Petrograd was as free and unrestrained as London. -It was difficult to realise that only a few days before the spectre of -revolution had stalked through the city. - -One incident alone marred the demonstrations. On August 4th, news -reached Petrograd of the scandalous treatment undergone by the Russian -diplomatic staff at the hands of the Berlin mob. Enraged beyond control -a huge crowd descended on the Nevski Prospect and after demolishing -a German café and several German-owned shops, made a resolute attack -on the Embassy. The police were overpowered, the gates forced and the -work of destruction began. The flagstaff was torn down, the Prussian -Eagle and several pieces of statuary were unceremoniously thrown into -the Moika Canal; furniture, pictures, linen, books, everything that -was inflammable was heaped on the ground and soon a huge bonfire was -raging. Amidst a roar of cheering a large portrait of the Kaiser -was hurled into the flames. The orgy continued until the police and -military appeared in force. But the most significant feature of the -affair was the discovery in the cellars of large stores of firearms and -revolutionary propaganda--concrete evidence that the suspicions that -Germany was fostering internal troubles in Russia to serve her own ends -were only too well founded. - -The most impressive of all the many scenes emphasising the facts that -not only the Russian nation but all Slavdom is united against the -Teuton menace, and that a new Russia is being built up as a result of -the common cause and danger, occurred on Saturday, August 8th, when -the Tzar received the two Houses of the Duma at the Winter Palace. -Early in the proceedings, striking evidence was given of the new order -of things. Party quarrels, personal jealousies and political enmities -were forgotten. The leader of every party came forward and announced -that he and his followers would support the Government by every means -in their power. Even M. Purishkivich, the implacable leader of the -Anti-Semite movement, abandoned his principles and praised his Jewish -fellow-subjects. - -The Tzar’s speech was simple and direct, but it was significant because -of the stress it laid upon the racial and religious aspects of the war: - - “In these great days of alarms and anxiety through which Russia is - passing, I greet you. Germany, following Austria, has declared war - on Russia. The enormous enthusiasm and the patriotic sentiments of - love and faith to the Throne, an enthusiasm which has swept like a - hurricane through our country, is a guarantee for me, as for you, - I hope, that great Russia will bring to a happy conclusion the war - which the Almighty has sent. - - “It is also in this unanimous enthusiasm of love and eagerness - to make every sacrifice, even life, that I am able to regard the - future with calm and firmness. It is not only the dignity and - honour of our country that we are defending, but we are fighting - for our brother Slavs, co-religionists, and blood brethren. In this - moment I see also with joy that the union of the Slavs with Russia - progresses strongly and indissolubly. - - “I am persuaded that all and each of you will be in your place to - assist me to support the test, and that all, beginning with myself, - will do their duty. Great is the God of the Russian Fatherland.” - -The effect of that ancient Russian saying was electrical. The whole -assembly burst into a storm of cheering; this was followed by “God save -the Tzar,” sung with a fervour which obviously affected his Majesty. -Finally that most beautiful of all Russian anthems, “Lord, save the -People,” was sung. Tears streamed down the cheeks of the deputies, as, -with voices choking with emotion and faith, they sang the simple words -of the anthem. - -Such a scene of patriotic fervour and national determination had not -been witnessed in Russia since the Napoleonic war of 1812. - -The practical enthusiasm of the nation was no less marked than the -sentimental. The wealthy classes contributed liberally to the various -relief funds, and made many sacrifices to help the country in its time -of danger. In spite of the inconvenience and dislocation of trade -caused by the military preparations, complaints were never heard. The -whole nation seemed to have combined in a common determination to see -the war through to a successful conclusion. - -The gathering of the harvest provided an instance of this practical -enthusiasm. Russia being the world’s largest producer of wheat, barley, -rye, and oats the matter was a very urgent one. Moreover, Russia is -self-supporting, and the failure of the crops would mean the ruin and -starvation of thousands during the winter months. Most of the men had -been called to the colours, and there was a serious danger of large -portions of the crops, especially in the more remote districts, being -allowed to rot for lack of labour. The problem was attacked with a -practical spirit unusual in the Russian with his Asiatic fatalism. -The _zemstvos_, the military, and the local authorities co-operated -in dealing with this problem. Women, boys, and old men were set to -work. Tramps and prisoners were forcibly transformed into temporary -harvesters. By means of a central bureau in each district it was -possible to keep in touch with every farm, no matter how remote, and -to ensure that no crops suffered through lack of labour. As a result -of these measures the whole harvest was successfully gathered, and -the nation was able to face the coming winter with the satisfactory -knowledge that, in any event, its food supply was assured. - -Perhaps the most remarkable effects of the war on the nation was the -complete change which came over its attitude towards the Jews. Partly -by reason of ancient religious intolerance and partly because of the -fact that the Jews, thanks to the thriftless and unbusinesslike methods -of the Russians, have managed to accumulate much of the national -wealth, the _Judiev_ hitherto have been regarded with fierce animosity -and subjected to pitiless persecution. The story of the pogroms is one -of the most hideous chapters in the history of any people. It was fully -expected in many quarters that the national enthusiasm engendered by -the war should find an outlet in a repetition of these horrors. Vienna -indeed was so confident that it officially informed the world that -Vilna was the scene of a terrible outbreak of anti-semitism. The report -was a lie. The Jews were no longer the best hated race in Russia; that -distinction had been wrested from them by the “_Nemetz_.” Everywhere a -new tolerance and a new respect for the Jews was apparent, especially -when news came of their heroic deeds at the front. Their enthusiasm -for the war and devotion to the Tzar rivalled that of the Russians -themselves. A quarter of a million of men--the largest Jewish army ever -assembled since the fall of Jerusalem--were with the Tzar’s forces. -Throughout the country the Jews set a splendid example in contributing -to the relief funds and in removing distress caused by the war. Hence -the Jew has become almost popular. Even when, as a mark of Imperial -appreciation of their loyalty, ukases were issued relieving them of -many of the disadvantages under which they suffered, and practically -admitting them to the full citizenship of the Russian Empire, hardly a -protesting voice was heard. - -Indeed, in many respects, the war has been for Russia a blessing in -disguise. It has completed the work of the past few years. On all sides -reforms have been effected and a new Russia has emerged. The old ideals -and the old standards have passed. But the change has been unconscious, -and the Russians, with their chronic fatalism, have not realised they -have been taking part in events which have practically transformed -the old autocratic regime into one which is almost democratic. Some -external shock was needed to rouse the nation to a sense of its new -glories. The war provided that shock, and Russia and the world have -realised that a new era has dawned in the dominions of the Tzar. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -MOBILISATION - - -Mobilisation in Russia is an inevitably slow and difficult operation. -The circumstances under which it is effected render it almost -impossible to reduce it to a matter of automatic precision, as is the -case with the German Army. It is typically Russian: rather ponderous -and very human. The chances of its being successfully and quickly -accomplished are so slight compared with those of its proving an orgy -of confusion and disorganisation that nobody, least of all in Russia -itself, where businesslike methods are not expected of officials of -any sort, dared hope that it would be carried out without a hitch. The -Allies were apprehensive, the Kaiser was openly contemptuous and left -only second-line troops to guard his eastern frontiers until Russia -could extricate her army from the inevitable confusion and be worthy of -the attentions of the perfect Teutonic fighting machine. - -The German, of course, with his keen materialism, has a reputation -for doing these things with an automatic efficiency. The Slav, on the -other hand, is of a very different temperament, and the Tzar’s army -has acquired, and deserved, a reputation for mismanagement. It is the -most human of armies, for certainly there never was one more given to -error. The Manchurian campaign was one of the worst muddles of modern -times. In comparison, the South African War was a model of efficient -management. It was always a case of the wrong thing at the wrong -moment: and even when there appeared to be a chance of the right thing -happening, corruption or ineptitude stepped in and stultified every -effort. Those who happened to be in Russia during that period will -remember that hardly a day passed without some fresh instance of the -national habit of blundering through. The railways were in a state of -frantic disorganisation; whole regiments got mislaid; food and clothing -were always lacking in spite of the most lavish expenditure. Worst of -all, numerous officials and Jewish contractors became suddenly and -mysteriously wealthy, and made small secret of the source of their -prosperity. - -Nobody raised his voice in protest because nobody had expected anything -different. The orgy of mismanagement was accepted with a good-humoured -shrug of the shoulders. _Nitchevo_, it can’t be helped! That was the -comment of the fatalism which is at once the greatest weakness and -greatest strength of the Russian character. - -Of course, there was excuse enough. Mobilisation is carried on in -the face of more difficulties in Russia than in any other country. -Everything militates against its speed and efficiency. It is all on so -vast a scale that it would seem impossible for human ingenuity to place -it on a systematised basis. The area of the Russian Empire is forty -times that of Germany, but its population is only three times as great. -The units to be concentrated are diffusely scattered; they have to be -gathered singly. The aggregate length of the Russian railway system is -only twice that of the German lines, and few of the Russian railways -have been laid with a view to meeting military needs. The majority of -the troops summoned to the colours have to traverse vast distances, -often on foot, before they can reach the railway which will take them -to their mobilisation centres. The sparseness of the population renders -it difficult for orders to filter through, and still more difficult for -troops to be quickly concentrated. A good deal must of necessity be -left to the zeal and initiative of the reservists themselves who, in -most cases, are utterly unreliable without supervision. - -At the best, therefore, with good weather and good luck, the -mobilisation is but a slow process. Previous to the present war the -most obstinate optimist did not believe that, in the most favourable -circumstances, it could be completed in less than three weeks or a -month. - -In the present case, too, there were special aggravating circumstances -which rendered success all the more doubtful. July had been a month -of labour disputes, and it seemed more than likely that the strikes -would seriously hamper the mobilisation. Moreover, the Russian military -plans were incomplete. A programme of reform was being pushed forward -with all possible speed, but it was not to be completed until 1916, at -least. The army was in a state of transition. A new system was being -imposed upon it, and it was by no means ready for the supreme test. -There was a general feeling that it would be better to rely on the old -system which, whatever its defects, had at least the merits of being -known and understood. A partial muddle was better than the risk of -absolute chaos. - -The order for mobilisation, therefore, could not have come at a more -inopportune time. Russia, in spite of all official assurances to the -contrary, was unprepared. - -It is well known that this inevitable slowness and possible impotence -on the part of Russia during the early period of the war was the -foundation on which the Kaiser constructed his plan of campaign. He -could, so he thought, smash the Allies in the West and return in time -to mete out similar treatment to the Russians before they could do any -damage in the East. Everything favoured the plan, which had all the -merits of simplicity and conciseness. Nobody who was acquainted with -the disadvantages under which Russia laboured could deny that, humanly -speaking, Germany was immune from a serious attack from Russia for -at least six weeks. Even that estimate seemed to err on the side of -optimism, for at that time there was no reason to suppose that Austria -would have much difficulty in defeating Serbia and menacing Russia with -a strong advance. - -But among the many factors with which the Kaiser omitted to reckon must -be included General Soukhomlinov--the Russian Kitchener, as he has, -not inaptly, been called. - -When the disastrous Manchurian campaign was ended, Russia sadly needed -a man who could take to heart the lessons of defeat and build up a new -and better army from the discredited fragments of the old. The moment -produced the man. Soukhomlinov, the greatest War Minister Russia has -known, has for the past nine years been engaged on an immense scheme -for the remodelling and reorganising of the army. Quietly and with -inexorable efficiency, he has cut away cancer after cancer and added -reform to reform. No problem has been too large, no detail too trivial, -and no circumstance too hopeless, for him to devote to it his tireless -energy. The whole military system from top to bottom, and in every nook -and cranny, has been renovated. - -Soukhomlinov’s greatest merit is that, in planning and carrying this -huge scheme into effect, he has not fallen into the trap that lurks -in the path of every military reformer. Although working on western -lines, he has not attempted to imitate the German or any other army. -That would have been the obvious course for a man of less genius. But -Soukhomlinov had the greatness to realise that an imitation army can -never be satisfactory. An army must be national to the core, or it will -fail in its object. “What is health to the Russian is death to the -German,” is a Russian saying that is very true. And an attempt to force -Teuton temperaments into Slav bodies would result only in a bastard -production emphasising the defects of both. - -Soukhomlinov knew that the Russian is the finest soldier in the world. -His bravery, his unquestioning obedience, his infinite capacity for -suffering and hardship, his stolid fatalism which makes him the same -in victory or defeat, all these qualities render him an ideal fighting -man. German helmets or the goose step would not add one jot to his -virtues. He has never had a chance, because he has never been properly -led or properly organised. It is in these two directions, therefore, -that General Soukhomlinov has concentrated his efforts. Under the -new regime the Russian officer has been transformed. The army is no -longer a hobby for fashionable young men, but a stern business in which -slackers and the inept are not wanted. The habit of heavy drinking -at night--which during the Manchurian campaign so often resulted in -such heavy slaughter in the morning--is a thing of the past. The -army requires clear heads, and Soukhomlinov has no use for befuddled -officers. - -Efficient organisation is as vital to an army as efficient leadership, -and the greatest test of organisation is the mobilisation. - -[Illustration] - -Owing to the speed with which Germany and Austria can effect their -mobilisation, Russia must of necessity begin a European war on the -defensive. Consequently, her mobilisation bases are not situated on the -frontier, but at a considerable distance in the interior, at Warsaw, -and other towns lying behind the Vistula. These towns are protected -by a long chain of fortresses and fortified positions, stretching from -Kovno to Radom, and designed to hold an invading force in check until -the troops have been mobilised and the advance can begin. - -The method by which the mobilisation is effected will be understood by -reference to the diagram. At the call to arms recruits and reservists -living at the outlying hamlets, _a a a_, make their way to the central -villages and towns, _b b_. This journey has usually to be performed -on foot, and may be anything up to fifty miles. At _b b_ the men are -collected in batches and passed on to the concentration centres, _c c -c_. For this journey railways are sometimes available, but in the more -remote districts the roads are, more often than not, the only means -of communication. The peasant soldiers troop into the concentration -centres in their ordinary dress, they leave them ready for the -field. All day long a constant stream of peasants is pouring into -the barracks, and a constant stream of soldiers, fully equipped for -hostilities, is pouring out. Regiments and battalions are formed. Then, -when all is complete, they pass on by train to the mobilisation base -_D_. - -The success of the system obviously depends on the maintenance of an -even flow of men from _a_ and _D_. A delay or hitch at any point may -throw the whole process out of gear. The area covered is so vast, the -population so sparse, the army so huge, and the means of communication -from point to point leave so much to be desired that difficulties and -dangers spring up in every direction. An especially weak point about -the system is that in the early stages so much depends upon the men -themselves. - -Ivan Ivan’ich, the Russian Tommy Atkins, is no better and no worse -than the rank and file of any army. He is not averse to temptation, -especially when it takes the form of alcohol. Vodka was the cause of -much of the muddle of the Manchurian mobilisation. In the present -instance, however, General Soukhomlinov very wisely decided to take no -risks. He decided on a bold stroke which, in the unsettled state of the -country at the beginning of the war, might easily have been the cause -of serious rioting. The Imperial ukase ordering the mobilisation was -followed by another which practically prohibited the sale of alcohol -in all districts likely to be affected by the military preparations. -The railway stations, concentration centres, and mobilisation bases -were signalled out for specially stringent regulations. There were also -severe pains and penalties for those who, in their patriotic fervour, -were inclined to be over-generous to the troops on their way to the -front. - -This drastic measure was fully justified by the results. With nothing -to delay them, the men arrived punctually at their posts. They were -sober, and displayed all the virtues of sobriety. Their health and -temper were noticeably improved. There were none of the quarrels and -disturbances usually associated with mobilisation. The conduct of the -troops was in every way irreproachable. The worries and work of the -officers were lightened a hundredfold. - -Russia, in short, provided the world with an object lesson in the value -of temperance. - -Of course there was some grumbling. Men who had tramped fifty versts -or so to serve the “Little Father” thought that they were at least -entitled to drink his health and damnation to the _Nemetz_. But -generally the order of things was accepted with the unquestioning -stolidness of the Russian peasant. The “Little Father” had said, “No -vodka”--therefore, _nitchevo_, why complain? - -The following description of the actual mobilisation is based upon -the letters written by Vasili Grigorovich, the cobbler of a little -town in the Ukraine, to an English friend. The bond between this -rather ill-assorted pair is Vasili’s unsatiable thirst for learning. -Self-taught, he reads everything and anything that comes his way, and -it was a chance conversation over an out-of-date newspaper during the -mending of the traveller’s boot that led to the friendship. - - “The news that a general mobilisation was ordered reached the - village late in the afternoon. The Governor himself came to tell - us that the ‘Little Father’ is at war with the _Nemetz_, and that - we must all start off for Berlin at once. He is a witty man, our - Governor. I started getting ready, but Marya scolded me for not - being quick enough. Indeed, she scolded me all the time, even when - I bade her goodbye. That’s like our women. They always hide their - heartaches. And after all they are quite right, for what are their - sorrows compared with the orders of the Tzar? She swore at me and - said I was not fit to be a soldier, when I kissed her. But her - voice was thick and her eyes glistened. And Dimitri, who caught me - up later, told me that when he passed he saw her praying before our - ikon. It was the first time, too, that he had seen Marya weeping. - - “She is a fine woman, though outwardly rough. I am very glad to - hear that the Tzar has ordered that the wives and families of the - soldiers shall be well supplied with money. He is a great Tzar. - However, it will be very lonely for Marya all through the winter, - and if it were not for thinking of her I should be quite happy. - - “Dimitri and I had to tramp thirty-two versts--a good stretch. - We went some distance out of our way to reach an inn. But it was - closed by the Tzar’s orders. Well, the Little Father knows best. - - “We decided to walk all through the night, because we both wanted - to be fighting the _Nemetz_ as soon as possible. We had not gone - far before a farm cart full of soldiers caught us up and they gave - us a lift. It was rather cold, but we did not mind. We talked - about the war, and the news about the inns. We are sure to win, but - it is rather hard on the innkeepers, who will lose a lot of money. - However, they are all rich. - - “We reached ---- before dawn. The officer there was very surprised, - because the men from our district were not supposed to arrive until - late in the evening. He was rather cross too, because everybody was - coming too soon, and upsetting the arrangements. However, a landed - proprietor offered his mansion for the use of the soldiers. Fancy - that! - - “The next day we marched to ----, where there is a railway station. - There are no trains for the ordinary passengers, because the Tzar - has taken them all for the soldiers. Fifty trainloads of soldiers - are passing through ---- every day! Dimitri said we should be able - to get drinks at the station, but he was wrong. I hear now that it - is a crime to give vodka to the soldiers. - - “Our train was very full, because of the men all being so early. It - was rather uncomfortable, but we were all too glad to be going to - the front to notice it. At one station two boys, who had run away - from home and wanted to fight, were discovered by an officer and - turned out. They were very disappointed, but there was more room - for us. - - “At last, after sixteen hours, we reached ----. At first we thought - that there was no accommodation for us, but we found that a camp - had been prepared for us. The town was very full of soldiers, but - they were all very orderly and quiet. The day after our arrival we - received our new uniforms, rifles and other things. The uniforms - are very smart, something like the English, I am told. The boots, - too, are excellent. The very best leather. It is evidently true - that the Tzar has made our army better than ever it was. It is a - bad lookout for the _Nemetz_. In these uniforms and boots we shall - be able to chase them all the way to Berlin quite comfortably. - - “Our regiment is complete. To-morrow we start for Warsaw, where our - Army Corps is forming. In a few days we shall meet the _Nemetz_. - Good-bye.” - -Among the Cossacks, who are, of course, a less reliable people than the -ordinary peasants, the mobilisation was no less smooth. A Government -official in the Ural provinces gives a vivid account of the scenes. -The Cossacks, it may be noted, supply their own horses, uniforms and -equipment. - - “On July 31st the village awoke to find a red flag waving before - the Government building, the sign that a general mobilisation had - been ordered. Immediately everything was in a state of uproar. - Nobody knew who was the enemy and nobody cared. It was sufficient - that there was war. Only the women made wild conjectures as to whom - it was against. There was no thought for work. Horses were groomed, - uniforms donned, rifles and sabres cleaned with enthusiastic - vigour. Soon the Government veterinary surgeon took his stand - before the chief building and the work of examining the horses - began. Each man in turn brought up his horse and put it through - its paces. The test was most strict, and any animal showing the - slightest defect was promptly branded as useless. All day the work - continued, a crowd of women and children watching the proceedings. - At night the red flag was pulled down and a red lamp was hoisted in - its place. In the evening there was a great feast. A whole ox was - roasted, there was dancing among the younger people, but owing to - the new regulations there was practically no vodka. All through the - night men came riding into the village from the outlying districts. - - “On the Sunday when the preparations were almost complete the - consecration service was held. The whole village assembled before - the little wooden church. It was a stirring sight to see these - great warriors in their full battle array kneeling before their - Maker and solemnly asking His aid. At the conclusion of the service - each man was blessed by the priest and anointed with holy water. - Then he led his horse away and received the blessings of his family. - - “On the following day they set off on journey of thousands of - miles. The women, children and old men watched them. Their eyes - gleamed with tears and their breasts heaved. Then, when the last - man had disappeared from view, they turned away, walked to the - fields and took over the labours which the men had left unfinished.” - -In the simple narrative of Vasili Grigorovich and the description of -the Cossack scenes may be found all the causes which contributed to -the startling success of the Russian mobilisation. - -The organisation, thanks to the genius of Soukhomlinov, proved perfect. -The smallest detail had been prepared, and every possibility foreseen. -In no direction was there any fluster or confusion. The commissariat -and transport arrangements worked splendidly; the equipment of the -troops with the new service uniform--an idea borrowed from the results -of Britain’s South African experiences--was an unqualified success. -The uniform has been designed for business purposes only, and with no -regard for show. It is very similar to the British uniform; the chief -differences being that the Russian tunics are looser, and in place -of puttees, long boots are worn. Special attention has been given to -this latter detail. Manchuria taught Russia to realise the advantages -enjoyed by a well-shod army. - -But perhaps the greatest triumph of the mobilisation was the prompt -and businesslike way in which the financial question was settled. All -who had suffered any loss as a result of the dislocation of trade -and traffic caused by the requisition of the railways and other -means of transport, were recompensed without delay. By utilising -the organisation of the zemstvos or local councils, it was possible -to prevent all distress and to make ample provision for the wives, -families, and other dependants of the men called to the colours. -Indeed, in Moscow and Southern Russia money has seldom been so -plentiful as it was during the period of the mobilisation, and many -families are better off now than they ever were. - -Another contributing cause was the conduct and efficiency of both -officers and men. The former proved that they have taken the reforms of -the last few years thoroughly to heart. The latter showed that even the -lowest ranks felt that they were “Soukhomlinov’s men.” To some extent, -of course, their efficiency was due to their enforced sobriety. But -much of it arose from an honest determination to rise to the occasion. -Ivan Ivan’ich is taking this war very seriously. He is calmly confident -of his ability to win, and he is immensely proud of the new army, of -which he is a member. Moreover, he had an unlimited enthusiasm for the -war. He was anxious to be killing the hated _Nemetz_, who threatened -his own liberty and that of his brother Slavs, and he knew that the -better he behaved the sooner he would be at the front. There was no -mistaking his eagerness to do the right thing. - -The following is an extract from the diary of a traveller, who spent -nearly thirty hours in Kiev waiting for a train to be available for -civilian passengers to Petrograd. - - “Everywhere there are soldiers. There must be tens of thousands of - infantry, cavalry and artillery. They are constantly on the move. - In their peasant blouses, baggy trousers, and birch-bark shoes, - they pour in ceaseless streams into the barracks, where they are - served with their equipment. They issue forth transformed into as - smart soldiers as could be wished. All the uniforms are new, and - appear to be made of excellent material. They are greyish khaki - in hue, and not unlike the British service uniform in appearance. - Seven million brand-new uniforms of the finest quality! That gives - some idea of the millions which Russia has been quietly spending - on her army! - - “The men are as proud as peacocks, and tremendously in earnest. - Ivan Ivanovich is a very important person just now, and he knows - it. Physically, he is splendid. Seldom tall, but always thick-set - and well proportioned, he is a first-class fighting man, and, with - his experience of Russia’s climate, he can endure practically any - hardship. I doubt if there are any troops living who will suffer - more and grumble less. That is the advantage of being a Russian. - And it is all done on the most frugal of vegetarian diets! What - would our Tommies say to a diet of black bread and fermented - cabbage! - - “Those who doubted Russia’s military value should spend a few hours - in Kiev and note how regiment after regiment marches through with - never the slightest hitch or confusion. They should see these - sturdy Tommies, with their cruel rapier like bayonets always fixed. - They should hear their deep-throated war chants. Then they would - realise that Russia is going to play a very important part in this - war....” - -It must not be forgotten that the nation itself was largely responsible -for the success of the mobilisation. The self-sacrificing enthusiasm of -all classes was a revelation to those who believed that Russia was in a -parlous condition internally. The inevitable losses and inconvenience -were cheerfully borne. The rich came forward in a wholly unprecedented -manner. In Russia, owing to the lack of a middle class, the distinction -between noble and peasant is most rigorously observed. The old days -of the serfdom have not been entirely forgotten. But during those -early weeks of August the national call was responded to with equal -enthusiasm by rich and poor. Mansions were placed at the disposal of -the peasant soldiers. Food and gifts were showered upon them; even -carriages were offered to help them on their way. The owner of an -estate near Novgorod, not only entertained, at his own expense, nearly -three hundred troops a day, but his wife and daughters served them with -their own hands. A year ago such an action would have meant social -ostracism. To-day it is an example which is being followed everywhere. - -This _rapprochement_ between the classes will have effects extending -far beyond the mobilisation. They give promise of a new and happier -Russia, for Ivan Ivan’ich never forgets a kindness. - -The enthusiasm of the people was evinced in a thousand different ways. -There was cheering and singing everywhere, but practical enthusiasm was -no less in evidence. Often it resulted in trouble. The impersonation -of reservists who had been called up, by those who had not, was very -frequent. In many cases the discovery of the trick ended in blows with -the result that neither proceeded to the front, the impersonator going -to gaol and the impersonated to the hospital. Thousands of boys ran -away from their homes in order to enlist. Some Polish boys living at -Vilna were so disappointed at being refused admission to the army on -account of their age that they formed themselves into an unofficial -patrol. Unfortunately they fell in with some Austrian Cavalry, and the -next day their bodies were discovered hanging from the branches of a -tree. - -The enthusiasm was not confined to the men. Women and girls sacrificed -their tresses and disguised themselves as recruits. Some actually -managed to reach the front without being detected, and one even -contrived to enter the air service. - -At no time during the mobilisation was the religious aspect of the war -allowed to be forgotten. Before starting on their journey reservists -knelt before their humble ikons. In every village the priest blessed -the troops as they passed. Ikons and sacred relics have been taken to -the front. - -Petrograd witnessed the most impressive scenes. The most holy of all -ikons, the famous Smolensk, “Mother of God,” which is embellished -with jewels enough to ransom the Tzar himself, was carried in solemn -procession to Kazan Cathedral. Hundreds of thousands stood in the -streets through which the ikon passed. Every head was bared, a muttered -prayer was on every lip. Thousands were unable to gain admission into -the cathedral during the services, and gathered in the square outside, -sometimes to the extent of fifty thousand, chanting the responses and -singing the hymns. On the Sunday following the declaration of war, the -Tzar blessed the Russian arms and those of the Allies. The flags of the -nations were placed on the altar before the Smolensk ikon, and with all -the Byzantine pomp and circumstance of the Greek ritual the aid of the -Almighty was invoked. - -Thus in most gratifying circumstances the news went forth that Russia -was ready. The mobilisation was sufficiently complete to warrant an -advance. The date was August 16th, barely a fortnight after the issue -of the general mobilisation order and a full month sooner than the -Kaiser had calculated. The number of men in the field cannot be stated -with accuracy. Experts have talked glibly of millions, but none know -the exact number of Russia’s fighting men except the Russian General -Staff, and doubtless the German. Four million men in the field and a -further three million in reserve may be taken as a likely estimate. - -In any case the mobilisation was the finest feat of the war. It was -a triumph over almost insuperable difficulties and a miracle of -national organisation and effort. It was the most significant and most -threatening of the many clouds which were beginning to gather round -Germany. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE POLISH PROCLAMATION - - -On August 15th the Grand Duke Nicholas issued, on behalf of the Tzar, -the following Proclamation addressed to all the Poles: - - “POLES,--The hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers - and your grandfathers may be realised. A century and a half has - passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the - soul of the country is not dead. It continues to live, inspired - by the hope that there will come for the Polish people an hour of - resurrection, and of fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia. - The Russian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation - which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peoples, which - it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Tzar. Under - this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and - her language. Russian autonomy only expects from you the same - respect for the rights of those nationalities to which history has - bound you. With open heart and brotherly hand Great Russia advances - to meet you. She believes that the sword, with which she struck - down her enemies at Grünwald, is not yet rusted. From the shores of - the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian armies are marching. The - dawn of a new life is beginning for you, and in this glorious dawn - is seen the sign of the Cross, the symbol of suffering and of the - resurrection of peoples.” - -This master stroke of policy was one of the most significant and -important events in the whole war. It has revolutionised the whole -outlook in Eastern Europe. This pledge to restore to dismembered -Poland her lands, her liberties, her religion and her national tongue -is the most momentous act of any Tzar since the days when Alexander -II. abolished the serfdom. With dramatic suddenness it brings to a -close one of the most terrible chapters in the history of Europe. For -generations Russia has been engaged in a ruthless and vain attempt -to force her Polish subjects to become, at least to all outward -appearance, Russians. The Poles have been subjected to the fiercest -persecution, their religion and language have been denied them, their -history has been a stream of blood. Poland has been the greatest -tragedy in Europe. Now at a stroke all is changed. - -The spoliation of Poland has been a bond between Russia, Austria and -Prussia for a century and a half. The three nations combined to carry -out the crime, and as a consequence they have ever since remained more -or less united over the results of the crime. They have regarded the -Polish question as their own particular concern, and have brooked no -interference from the rest of Europe. They have vied with each other in -their efforts to crush the Polish spirit. They have made every move in -unison. - -The Tzar’s Proclamation consigned the whole system to the limbo of the -past. One of the conspirators had realised the errors of his ways, and -was determined to make reparation. Of course, the decision to issue the -Proclamation was to a large extent dictated by material considerations. -But whatever the reasons, there can be no doubt as to the excellence -of the results. And by thus breaking the bond of generations Russia -proved that she realised that this war was to be fought to the death. -After this solemn pledge on the part of Russia, both Germany and -Austria must not only be beaten, but conquered. A free Poland would -mean the loss to Prussia of the whole province of Posen, and the -setting back of her frontiers to Pomerania. Austria would lose all -her territories beyond the Carpathians from Silesia to the borders of -Roumania. Both countries can be relied upon to resist such a wholesale -shrinkage of their boundaries to the utmost of their power. It would -be more than a defeat; it would be humiliation, such as no first-class -Power has yet been called upon to undergo. - -The effects of the Proclamation were anxiously awaited, not only in -Russia, but in Germany and Austria as well. It was addressed to the -most sacred emotions of the Poles, to that fierce patriotism which -no violence has been able to crush. It solemnly promised them all -that they have been struggling for so bitterly. But would they forget -the past? The treatment they have received would hardly be likely to -encourage trust. Massacres and repression are not usually associated -with the “dawn of a new life.” - -The Polish Deputies immediately hailed the Proclamation with joy. But -the people hesitated. It was too sudden a change to be grasped at once. -Then the leaders set the example, first one and then another came -forward. Sienkiewicz addressed a stirring appeal to his compatriots. -The people realised that the promise was genuine, that Poland was -really to be free again. Scenes of indescribable enthusiasm followed. -The Poles are the most emotional nation in Europe, and from Kalisz to -Biala and from Mlava to Stopnika they abandoned themselves to their -joy. Thereafter the Polish enthusiasm for the war vied with that of -the Russians themselves. The effect was immediately felt in the army. -In one of the early dispatches received at Petrograd from the front, -mention was made of the furious heroism of the Polish regiments. In -Russia, therefore, the results of the Proclamation were to remove the -last shreds of apathy and to weld both the subjects and the armies of -the Tzar into one pulsating whole. - -But the appeal was also addressed to the Polish subjects of the Kaiser -and the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was an open invitation to them to -revolt. In the circumstances, the German and Austrian Poles who have -so often experienced Teutonic methods of stamping out rebellion, can -hardly be blamed for accepting the proposal in a cautious spirit. They -were quite unprepared for open rebellion, and at the best would have -stood but little chance of success against the armies already mobilised -in their midst. In addition, the cream of their manhood was with the -forces of the Kaiser and Emperor. Only in Austria did a Polish regiment -dare to mutiny, with the result that it was shot down to a man. For -the rest, wiser if less heroic counsels prevailed. Everything possible -was done covertly to assist the Russian advance. Both German and -Austrian commanders complained of the extreme activity of innumerable -spies, lamented that the whole population seemed to have combined in -an effort to be of every possible service to the enemy, and admitted -that fighting in Eastern Prussia and Galicia was fraught with all the -difficulties attending operations in a hostile country. - -But the Proclamation, and the obvious sincerity which prompted it, have -had effects extending far beyond military exigencies and the future of -the Poles. It has done more than anything else to raise Russia in the -estimation of the world. The oppression of Poland has always estranged -the leading democracies of the world from Russia. In France it was -used as an argument against the Franco-Russian alliance, in Britain it -has caused the Triple Entente to be regarded as a potential danger to -ourselves. At the time of the war with Japan it withheld the sympathy -of the United States from Russia. Now all is changed. The Proclamation -was received with approbation by the whole world, with the exception, -of course, of Germany and Austria. It was realised by all that Russia -is indeed advancing, that the short-sighted autocratic government is -giving way to the finest ideals of democracy, and that Russia is an -ally worthy of the most ardent lover of liberty. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE PRELIMINARY PHASE - - -Apart from the initial handicap of having to fight on the defensive -because of the comparative slowness of her mobilisation, Russia is the -most advantageously situated of all European Powers for war on the -grand scale. Britain is dependent on her command of the sea for her -food and trade; the existence of both France and Germany more or less -depend on supplies from the outer world. But Russia is self-contained. -Her vast “lump” of empire can supply all her needs, from food and -trade to an unlimited store of first-class fighting material. Mainly -agricultural and possessing a comparatively small foreign trade, -Russia could face with equanimity a war of any duration. Until the -end of the seventeenth century Russia was the Tibet of Europe, and -practically cut off from the rest of the world. She could, with very -little inconvenience, retire again behind her frontiers and bid -defiance to the world. Time has always been her greatest ally, and her -strategy is based upon utilising that ally to the utmost. - -The boundaries between the Tzar’s dominions and those of Germany and -Austria are, for the most part, purely artificial. They follow no -distinct line of demarcation. The great Russian plain extends far into -Prussia and Austria, and along the whole length of the frontiers the -only obstacles to the advance of an invading army are forests, marshes -and the fact that generally speaking the roads are very poor. - -Each country has had, therefore, to take defensive measures to -remedy the deficiencies of nature. Russia has the chain of fortresses -and fortified positions, extending from Kovno to Radom, which are -intended to hold an invading force in check until the mobilisation can -be completed. Special attention has of late years been given to the -defence of the north-western frontier. Plans have been drawn up for the -construction of more fortresses and of strategic railways and military -roads. But these works are not yet in a sufficiently advanced state to -serve any practical end in the present war. - -Germany, realising the significance of Russia’s military -reorganisation, has recently spent huge sums on strengthening her -eastern frontiers. The works are by no means complete, but they are -more advanced and of more practical service than those on the Russian -side of the frontier. - -To the south where Russia and Austria meet, neither Power has taken or -contemplated taking any such extensive measures for defence. Cracow, -Lemberg and Przemysl are the only fortresses of any value in Galicia, -and they are faced by fortifications of about equal strength on the -Russian side. - -Russia, however, possesses a very great advantage over Austria, and -in lesser degree over Germany, in that the inhabitants of Galicia and -Eastern Prussia are mostly of Slavonic origin and therefore more or -less strongly in sympathy with Russia. The Poles being members of the -Catholic Church and having strong nationalistic aspirations, the bond -is less strong in their case. But reference has already been made to -the results of the Russian Proclamation, and it will be seen therefore -that both Germany and Austria are under the disadvantage of having to -defend hostile territories. - -At the moment when war was declared, Russia had nine army corps, or -about 400,000 men guarding her western frontiers. Three corps were -stationed at Warsaw, and one each at Vilna, Grodno, Bialystok, Minsk, -Lublin, Rovno and Vinnitza. In addition to these troops, there were -three army corps at Kiev and one at Odessa. There was thus available -for immediate hostilities a total of about 600,000 men. Against these -Germany and Austria could muster about 400,000 men. There were German -army corps at Königsberg, Dantzig, Posen, Breslau, Allenstein and -Stettin. The Austrian corps were at Cracow, Lemberg and Przemysl. This -numerical advantage on the side of Russia was further increased by -the withdrawal of some of the German corps for service in the western -campaign. Russia might, therefore, have made an immediate attack on -Prussia with every prospect of success. But she refrained. In the -first place, time was not of such particular importance as to warrant -the taking of any risks. In the second place Russia needed all her -energies for the successful completion of the mobilisation. And finally -there was the Austrian menace. - -Theoretically Austria could muster her two and a half million men, and -invade Russia long before the latter’s mobilisation was complete. To -Austria, then, was assigned the task of maintaining the prestige and -reputation of the Mailed Fist in Eastern Europe. Russian Poland was -to be invaded, Warsaw captured and the Russian army kept at bay until -the conquerors of France could come and complete their victorious -work. Unfortunately for the success of the plan, however, Austria -could not get her rheumatic knuckles into the famous gauntlet. Even -Serbia, exhausted though she was after two hard-fought wars, proved -more than a match for Austria. And when the latter attempted to advance -into Russia, she found herself more or less paralysed by her old -enemy--internal dissension. - -In Russia the war was the signal for all internal animosities to vanish -and to leave the nation pulsating with one determination. In Austria -the reverse was the effect. All semblance of unity and loyalty in the -eastern provinces disappeared, the crisis tore aside the artificial -bonds and Austria stood revealed for what she was and always has -been--a ramshackle collection of wrangling races and creeds. - -Francis Joseph is the nominal ruler of a heterogeneous collection of -Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Croatians, -Rumanians and Italians. Of a total population of fifty-three millions, -half are Slavs. And it was with an army drawn from all these sources -that Austria sought to invade Russia, the protector of all the Slavs. -She foresaw the likelihood of trouble, and took measures accordingly. -The outbreak of the war was the signal for a reign of terror to begin -in Dalmatia, Bosnia and Croatia and other Slav provinces. In order to -get the inhabitants under military control and to take the sting out -of any revolutionary movement, all the men up to the age of fifty were -mobilised. The newspapers were suppressed; clubs and societies, even -the most harmless, were dissolved. The people were forbidden to leave -the towns and villages; the leading Slavs were seized, imprisoned and -held as hostages. - -But even these ruthless measures could not crush the rebellious -spirit of the Slavs. In Herzegovina the murder of some government -officials was followed by a wholesale slaughter of priests held by the -authorities as hostages. Everywhere there were savage acts of rebellion -followed by more savage acts of reprisal. In the army matters reached -a climax. The Slav regiments mutinied. Concerted action was impossible -owing to the fact that the authorities kept the Slav regiments -separated and disposed their loyal Teuton and Magyar regiments in the -most advantageous positions for quelling any mutiny on the part of -their “comrades.” Nevertheless thousands of Slavs mutinied rather than -fight against their brothers. They were shot to a man. In some cases -whole regiments refused to serve and were promptly exterminated. The -mutinous spirit spread to Poland and Bohemia. In Prague there were -daily executions and the Moldava ran red with Czech blood. - -These measures of wholesale murder were effective. The Slav regiments -were driven to the front at the points of their “comrades” bayonets. -But Austria’s plans were already wrecked. The mutinous spirit of her -army had caused the mobilisation to break down. Time was valuable; the -Russian mobilisation was pressing forward to its triumphant conclusion. -The project of invading Russia and capturing Poland became daily less -likely of accomplishment. - -The campaign in the east therefore, opened in the most inauspicious -circumstances for the Mailed Fist. All was well with Russia and all was -wrong with Austria. The troops were sullen and utterly lacking in the -fighting spirit; they were badly led and their equipment left much to -be desired. The Kaiser realised that in relying on Austria he had made -another serious miscalculation. Instead of being a useful ally she -appeared far more likely to prove a millstone about his neck. Cripples -are of little use in war. Desperate efforts were made to obtain more -satisfactory help. Italy and Turkey were alternately coaxed and -bullied. The world was deluged with a frantic flood of wireless lies -which were obviously designed to attract help from anywhere. But they -were all in vain. Fate seemed to have taken especial care to have the -last word. - -Accordingly, Germany had to content herself with an attempt to -revitalise the Austrian millions. At any rate the material was there, -if only it could be forced into shape. So German officers were -requisitioned for the Austrian army. - -The operations during this preliminary phase of the war, during which -Russian effort was concentrated upon preparing for the coming advance, -were necessarily of a somewhat desultory and unimportant nature. They -were interesting chiefly as showing in what way subsequent and more -important fighting would be likely to develop. - -For some days nothing more exciting occurred than a few collisions -between patrols guarding the frontiers. Then, on August 3rd, the -Germans made a definite move. A small force from Lublinitz, a town -near the point where the Russian, German, and Austrian frontiers meet, -crossed into Russia and occupied Tchenstochov. Further to the north -other German forces seized Bendzin and Kalish, in Poland. Russia -immediately answered this move by making a cavalry raid into Prussia, -with the result that Johannisburg was occupied and a rather important -railway was broken. - -The Germans, however, continued to be aggressive. Numerous raids were -made at various points along the frontiers. In some quarters it was -feared that these raids were the prelude to an early invasion. They -were, as a matter of fact, designed to harass the Russians and keep -them engaged while the Germans completed the mobilisation of the forces -which were to defend Eastern Prussia and, if possible, invade Poland -during the absence of the first line troops in the western theatre -of war. These new forces were chiefly composed of the Landwehr, and -comprised about twenty divisions of 20,000 men each, with thirty-one -cavalry regiments and six batteries of artillery. This army, under the -command of General von Hindenburg, was mobilised along a line about -thirty miles from the frontier. Its right flank was protected by the -marshes around Arys, while its left rested on Insterburg. Naturally it -took some days to collect this army and prepare it for attack, and it -was not until nearly the middle of August that the Germans were in a -position to contemplate any serious advance. - -In the meantime the Russians, who were collecting considerable forces -under General Rennenkampf, were able to throw back the cavalry which -was harassing them, and to make a tentative advance over the Prussian -frontier. On August 5th they entered Eydtkuhnen without opposition, and -proceeded to advance towards the main German army. It was not until -they reached Stalluponen that they encountered serious opposition. A -sharp action resulted in the Germans being turned out of the town, -leaving 200 dead and some machine guns. - -This advance on the part of Russia was hailed in the west as a definite -invasion with the object of sweeping across Prussia to Berlin. It was -nothing of the sort. Russia was only advancing because the Germans had -not yet collected their full forces. Indeed, Russia was by no means -ready, and she carefully refrained from pressing too far forward, -pending the completion of her own preparations. After the affair of -Stalluponen there was obviously the temptation to push forward. But -this would have brought the attacking force dangerously near the main -German army and dangerously distant from Russian support. The advance, -therefore, ceased until stronger forces could be brought forward. The -German preparations, too, were progressing, and they were able to -deliver vigorous attacks on the small invading force. Numerous attempts -were made to recapture both Stalluponen and Eydtkuhnen, but all were -beaten back. Then, after an interval of about a week, the main Russian -army, under General Rennenkampf pushed forward, and the advance into -Eastern Prussia may be said to have definitely begun. - -Meanwhile, the Germans had been active further to the south. The -provinces of Kalish and Kelche in Russian Poland were invaded. The -invading forces were not in any great strength, but the Russians did -not attempt to offer any serious opposition to the advance, contenting -themselves with pursuing the same tactics as those adopted by the -Germans in Eastern Prussia. The Germans, for their part, were in no -mind to hurry, and were content to advance slowly and prepare for the -coming shock between the main armies. They established themselves -firmly along a line extending from Sieradz in the north, through -Radomsk towards Kelche. - -In the preliminary operations between Russia and Germany, therefore, -neither side could claim any great advantage. The Russians obtained a -footing in Eastern Prussia, and the Germans penetrated into Russian -Poland. As events turned out, however, the latter was the more -permanent advantage. - -The operations between Russia and Austria were more decisive. The -invasion of Russian Poland by the Austrians was a very half-hearted -affair. The mutinous spirit of the troops and the wholly unexpected -success of the attack by the Serbians and Montenegrins on Bosnia and -Herzegovina paralysed the Austrian advance. Nevertheless, some progress -was made in Poland, thanks more to lack of opposition than to any -display of military virtues. Forces from Cracow proceeded northward -over the frontier, and joined the Germans between Kelche and Radomsk. -This advance was described in Berlin and Vienna as a triumphant march -on Warsaw, but it was not anything so serious. Warsaw was never in the -slightest danger. However, it was certainly an advance. - -The Russian invasion of Galicia, on the other hand, was of definite -significance. As early as August 8th a Russian army advanced from -Rovno, crossed the Styr, and obtained a footing across the frontier. -On the 10th the Austrians had their first experience of the Cossacks. -Two regiments of infantry, supported by a regiment of cavalry, occupied -a position near Brody. They were attacked by a company of Cossacks, -and in the course of a few minutes were in the wildest flight, leaving -ample evidence of the prowess of the Cossacks. - -On the 12th the Russians gained an important success by capturing -Sokal, which lies on the River Bug, just across the frontier. The -town is an important railway centre, and its possession was a matter -of vital interest to Austria. A determined advance towards Vladimir -Volynski was a definite part of the Austrian programme. If successful, -the move would have had far-reaching effects, for it would have broken -the railway between Rovno and Warsaw, and so seriously impeded the -completion of the Russian mobilisation and render communication between -her central and southern armies very difficult. For this advance Sokal -was the only possible base of operations. The Austrians, therefore, -defended the town to the utmost of their power. The passage of the -Bug was fiercely contended, but after some hours of furious fighting, -during which both sides lost heavily, the Russians managed to capture -the bridge. This practically settled the engagement. The town was -unfortified, and at the mercy of the attacking force. The Austrians, -with the dreaded Cossacks in pursuit, were soon in headlong flight out -of the town. The destruction of the railway station and bridge rendered -the Austrian advance in this direction impossible for some considerable -time. - -When, therefore, on August 17th, a general advance was ordered, -Russia had every reason to be satisfied with the state of affairs. -True, the enemy had established themselves in Poland, but this was -more than balanced by the advances into Eastern Prussia and Galicia. -Russia indeed had achieved more than she had reckoned on. During this -preliminary phase she had fully expected that Poland would be invaded. -She had also expected that her right and left flanks would have been -more or less seriously threatened by forces from Eastern Prussia and -Galicia during the most difficult process of mobilisation. The forces -at Kovno and Rovno were sent to deal with that menace, and to hold it -in check until the main armies were ready. They not only achieved that -object, but carried the attack into the enemies’ countries. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE ADVANCE INTO EASTERN PRUSSIA - - -The Russians must be somewhat of a disappointment to many experts, -professional and amateur, whose supreme ignorance of the conditions -obtaining in the eastern theatre of the war was only equalled by their -sublime confidence in the ability of a steamroller to push forward, -full steam ahead, over all obstacles and against all opposition. When -towards the middle of August the news came that Russia was ready for -serious business, it was confidently predicted that the end was in -sight. It was only a matter of 180 miles from the Russian frontier -to Berlin, the Germans had only Landwehr and Landsturm forces, -contemptible third-rate fighting material, to defend her territories, -and Austria was too busy shooting her own mutinous soldiers to be a -menace to anybody. Obviously then, said the strategists, it could only -be a matter of days before the tramp of the Russian legions would be -heard perilously close to Berlin, the Kaiser would have to withdraw his -forces from the west to meet the danger in the east, the allies would -overthrow his weakened armies and hurl them back against the oncoming -Russian hordes. Armageddon looked to be in danger of degenerating into -a race to Berlin. - -The expected has not happened. In spite of many rumours it may be taken -as certain that the Germans have not to any great extent reduced their -forces in the west. The fierceness of the fighting there is sufficient -proof of this. And instead of being on the very threshold of Berlin, -the main Russian armies are still 400 miles away. - -It is Russia’s due that this failure to come up to expectation should -be explained. - -It is quite true that from the most westerly point on the frontier of -Russian Poland to Berlin is only a matter of 180 miles. A glance at the -map, however, will show that Poland is more or less a wedge driven into -German territory. The average distance from the frontier to Berlin is -much more than 180 miles. Nevertheless, Russia might have made a dash -on Berlin along the route indicated. There would be every likelihood, -too, of the dash proving successful. The country would be favourable -for a quick advance. The communications are good--well-made roads and -direct railway connection with the Russian base at Warsaw. The River -Oder would be the only natural obstacle, and the fortress of Posen the -only artificial one. And the country being open, it would be easier to -attack than to defend. - -But apart from the fact that the capture of Berlin would no more crush -Germany than the occupation of Brussels has crushed Belgium, such an -advance would be doomed to disaster. The invading army might reach -Berlin itself, but sooner or later, it would find itself cut off from -its supplies. It would necessarily have left behind it large forces of -German troops in Eastern Prussia, and equally strong Austrian armies -in Galicia. It could only be a matter of time before Russia would -meet with a greater and more disastrous Sedan. Such a move would be a -terrible blunder of which no general in his senses would be guilty. - -It may be objected that the German troops in East Prussia were only -Landwehr reserves and that the _moral_ of the Austrians was so bad that -it would have been possible for Russians to leave sufficient forces to -hold both armies in check. In the first place it has been amply proved, -again and again during the present war that the partially trained -reserves when capably led, and in sufficiently large numbers, can hold -their own with first line troops. In the second place, although the -Slav regiments were mutinous, Austria had quite two million Teutons -and Magyars in her army. These men were unquestionably loyal and quite -capable of giving a good account of themselves. - -Before, therefore, they could set off on that 180 mile journey, it was -necessary for the Russians to remove all sources of danger to their -rear. The Germans must be turned out of Eastern Prussia or safely held -in their own territories, and the Austrians swept from Galicia. - -The task of capturing Eastern Prussia is one of unusual difficulty. -It is a region which it is very much easier to defend than to -attack. The greater part of it is covered with marshes, lakes and -forests, most difficult country for an army to traverse. The means of -communication are poor, the roads--a most important consideration in -connection with the movement of the heavy artillery necessary for a -successful invasion--are in many instances little better than tracks. -Moreover, it is strongly fortified. Königsberg is a first-class modern -fortress, whilst those on the line of the Vistula at Thorn, Graudenz -and Dantzig are even more powerful. Königsberg and Dantzig, it should -also be noted, have the advantage of being ports as well as fortified -towns. In other words, they could be used for large supplies of men -and material. An invading army, therefore, could not content itself -with merely masking the fortresses unless it was supported by a navy -enjoying the command of the sea. The Russian fleet was practically -a prisoner in the Gulf of Finland. The German navy was in complete -command of the Baltic, and, therefore, to be safe, the invading army -would have to storm the fortresses and gain possession of the ports. - -The German War Staff, of course, knew perfectly well how difficult was -Russia’s task of subduing Eastern Prussia. Hence it was not likely that -they were in any way panic stricken over Russia’s advance, at least in -that direction. Before that advance could become dangerous the whole of -Eastern Prussia would have to be in Russian hands and the passage of -the Vistula forced. There was every prospect of Russia being busily -engaged for weeks to come. - -And it must not be forgotten that the mobilisation was not complete -at the time that the general advance was ordered. Thousands of -troops cannot be gathered from the farthest confines of Siberia and -transported across Asia and half-way across Europe. Only the first -phase was completed. Time was still necessary before Russia could put -her full strength in the field. The army under General Rennenkampf -which invaded Prussia did not comprise the million men with which -it was credited. It is doubtful whether he had half-a-million men -with him. Certainly he had no more during the early stages of the -campaign. Besides invading Prussia, Russia had to invade Galicia, -drive back the forces invading Poland and generally guard a frontier -about seven times as long as that between Germany and France. Another -reason why General Rennenkampf’s army was not so large as it was -popularly supposed to be was the fact that the Grand Duke Nicholas, -the Commander-in-Chief, did not, for reasons that will be subsequently -examined, regard the invasion of Eastern Prussia as of such paramount -importance as the invasion of Galicia. - -In dealing with this campaign, therefore, its secondary importance -should not for a moment be forgotten. Both victory and defeat must be -tempered with the knowledge that neither will have the far-reaching -effect hoped for or feared. Of course, that is not to say that the -Russians did not care what happened in Prussia. If it should prove that -the defending German forces were weaker than was believed, if it were -possible to overcome all transport difficulties, if Rennenkampf should -march from victory to victory, driving the Germans back over the line -of the Vistula, so much the better. But such an accomplishment would -be a feat of arms worthy of Napoleon himself. Rennenkampf was known -to be a remarkably clever general and great things were expected of -him--otherwise he would not have been chosen for the most difficult -command--but there was no reason to credit him with superhuman genius. - -Popular enthusiasm, however, both in Russia and the West, knowing -nothing of circumstances and conditions, and full of implicit faith in -Russian prowess, immediately jumped to the conclusion that Rennenkampf -was the man who was destined to alter the whole trend of the war. The -campaign, therefore, assumed a rather exaggerated importance which -was not remedied until actual events had their inevitable sobering -influence. - -At the beginning of the general advance, the Russians found themselves -firmly established in the neighbourhood of Stalluponen. Before them -lay a strong German army, under General von Hindenburg. The advantage -in numbers was with the Germans, who were in the proportion of roughly -three to two. On the other hand they were composed to a very large -extent of reserves. The smaller Russian army was composed of fully -trained first line troops. The coming operations, therefore, were a -test of the comparative values of numbers and training. Sheer numbers -supported by perfect discipline, such as that which obtains in the -German army, can accomplish much in modern warfare. The advance of the -Germans in the western theatre of war had already proved as much. And -in these days when the personal factor in warfare, at least so far -as the rank and file is concerned, has been practically eliminated, -and the tendency is to rely for victory more and more on artillery -and material superiority rather than on personal qualities, the age, -training and fitness of the troops is of less importance than in the -old days when battles consisted of downright fighting. The finest -troops in the world are helpless when exposed to an efficient artillery -attack. In point of artillery the two armies in Eastern Prussia were -about evenly matched, the superiority, if any, being on the side of the -Germans. Consequently, it will be realised that the Russians were faced -with a difficult task. - -The advance, which after the taking of Stalluponen had temporarily -ceased, was resumed with vigour. The region to the north towards Tilsit -was cleared of the enemy. Cavalry patrols scoured the country and -there were innumerable minor engagements. In all of these the Russians -were successful and the Germans were forced to withdraw their outposts -towards the line Stillen, Gumbinnen and Goldap. The only engagement of -any importance occurred some miles to the north of Stalluponen. Here a -strong Russian force fell on a German army corps, which was occupying -a rather advanced position. The fighting continued for practically a -whole day, and in spite of fierce Russian attacks, the Germans held -their ground. Towards the evening, however, their left flank was turned -and soon they were in full retreat towards Gumbinnen. The Russians -captured some hundreds of prisoners besides eight field guns, twelve -cannons and three machine guns. - -Inspired by this success the Russians pushed forward. But the -Germans contested every foot of ground. The Russian movement, too, -was considerably hampered by the excellence of the German means of -obtaining information. Their airmen were everywhere in evidence, and -displayed the greatest courage and daring in face of the Russian -aeroplanes, which were mostly of the heavy Sikorski type. The latter, -excellent machines though they are, were outmatched in point of -speed by the German Taube machines, and were therefore unable to -deal effectively with the menace from the air. The country, too, was -infested with spies. Every movement of the Russians was signalled to -the defending forces. - -On one occasion a large force of Cossacks was sent to carry out a -surprise attack on a German force occupying a village to the south of -Stalluponen. As they moved forward, it was noticed that a haystack had -caught alight. A tramp and a pipe were the explanation. The owner was -greatly upset at his loss and made every effort to save his property. -He worked with desperate energy, throwing bucket after bucket of water -on the flames. The only result, however, was that a dense column of -black smoke rose from the stack. The Cossacks pushed on. A couple -of miles from the village they had to pass through wooded country. -Suddenly a storm of lead swept through them. They had been ambushed. -In close formation, and scarcely able to turn, they were mowed down by -the score. When the few survivors returned to their headquarters the -haystack was still smouldering, but the owner had disappeared. It was -found subsequently that the “water” which he had so vigorously thrown -on the flames was a chemical solution which had caused the dense -clouds of smoke, serving to warn the Germans of the coming attack. - -The advance, however, continued in spite of all the courage and -cunning displayed by the Germans. The Russian cavalry in particular -distinguished itself by its dash and bravery. The German advance guards -and outposts were overwhelmed by the fury of its attack. Thanks to its -superb, almost reckless, bravery and its bewildering mobility, the way -was cleared for the main army, so that on the 19th it found itself -facing a strong German army defending Gumbinnen. - -In the meantime a Russian force had advanced in a north-westerly -direction from Bialestock and had crossed the frontier at Prostken. -Moving rapidly, it captured Lyck after a sharp engagement, and pushed -on towards Lotzen. Here their progress was barred by a German army -corps holding a strong position. Some desperate fighting ensued, but -the Russians forced their way into the town and the Germans retreated -northward along the lakes towards their main army at Gumbinnen. - -Obviously the time had now come for a decisive engagement. Any further -retreat on the part of the Germans would entail the abandonment of -Insterburg, a most important railway junction, the possession of which -was the key to the whole of the country lying east of Königsberg -and Allenstein. The Germans, faced by the main Russian army on the -south-east towards Goldap, and with its right flank threatened by the -victorious force marching on from Lotzen, prepared for a determined -resistance. - -As early as the 17th the civilian inhabitants had been ordered to leave -the town, at the same time reinforcements were brought up from the -west and north so that the strength of the defending army amounted -to about 200,000 men. On the morning of the 20th, the Russian right -rested on the village of Pilkallen, its left on Goldap. Everything was -in readiness for a determined onslaught. At dawn the battle began with -a terrific artillery duel. Soon the shells of the heavy German guns -were causing havoc in the Russian lines, but after a time the Russian -artillery began to manifest a superiority, and some of the enemy’s guns -were silenced. The Russian infantry then moved forward to the attack, -and some of the most desperate fighting of the war took place. - -The Russians were subjected to a merciless fire from machine and -field guns. On all sides men were falling. But they never wavered for -an instant. On and on they pressed until they reached the German -trenches. There the bayonets got to work and soon the defenders were -forced to give ground. But they were by no means defeated. Time after -time they hurled themselves forward in the most desperate counter -attacks, but the Russians succeeded in holding their own. - -It was during this period of the engagement that one of the most -significant events--so far as Russia is concerned--of the whole war -occurred. A Russian battalion was in the midst of a veritable inferno. -The Germans were determined to hold an important position at all costs. -The Russians were equally determined to capture it. On both sides -the carnage had been terrible. At last, with a desperate rush, the -Russians succeeded in getting to grips with the Germans. Indescribable -hand-to-hand fighting ensued. In the midst of the mêlée a German -bayoneted the Russian Standard-bearer and seized the flag. Emboldened -by this emblem of victory the Germans renewed their efforts and dashed -to the assistance of their comrade. But before they could reach him a -young Russian had sprung forward, killed him and recaptured the flag. -With a howl of disappointment the Germans attacked him. For a moment -he seemed to be doomed. Germans, were all round him struggling for the -possession of the flag. Then there came a deep-throated roar, a sudden -rush, and the Germans were hurled back. The Russians had captured the -position and saved their flag. - -The youth who had held it against such odds was afterwards discovered -severely wounded. He proved to be a young Jewish medical student from -Vilna, named Osnas. He was at once hailed on all sides as a hero, and -on being invalided back to Petrograd the Commander himself gave orders -that every care was to be taken to save the life of “Osnas the hero.” -Subsequently he received the military cross of St. George, the Russian -V.C., from the hands of the Tzar himself. - -The significance of the incident does not lie in the bravery of Osnas, -but in the fact that he was a Jew. His action, which has made him a -popular hero throughout the Russian Empire, has done more to improve -the position of the Jews than any event in the whole course of their -history in Russia. It has made the nation realise that a Jew can be a -worthy son of Russia. - -While these fierce attacks and counter-attacks were taking place at -the centre and on the Russian left, determined attempts were made -to envelop the right flank resting on Pilkallen. The successful -resistance of this movement was chiefly due to the brilliant work of -the Russian cavalry. - -The Germans occupied a strong position towards the north-west, from -which their artillery was able to pour a murderous fire into the -Russian ranks. At length it became obvious that unless the guns were -silenced the Russians would have to retreat. The Horse Guards were -ordered to take the guns. The first squadron charged straight at the -battery. There was an ominous silence. The distance grew less and -less. Then at point blank range the gunners fired. The squadron was -practically annihilated. The second squadron then charged. It seemed as -if it were doomed to a like fate, but at the critical moment the third -squadron took the battery on the flank. In a few minutes every gunner -was either sabred or fleeing for safety. - -For fourteen hours the battle raged until darkness caused a cessation -of hostilities. The Russians were, on the whole, satisfied with the -results of the day’s work. They had suffered heavy losses, but the -enemy had suffered more. They had made distinct progress in the centre, -had captured thirty guns and large numbers of prisoners. - -The engagement on the 21st opened sensationally. In the early hours -of the morning a strong force of Cossack cavalry moved northwards and -managed to envelop the German left flank. Dawn was the signal for a -combined movement. The Germans found themselves vigorously attacked -in the centre and left. For a time they held their ground, but their -position soon became untenable. There was no holding the Russian -attack. A regiment of Cossacks, finding the ground unsuitable for -cavalry operations, dismounted and hurled themselves forward with all -their reckless ferocity. Gradually the Russians pressed forward until -they were attacking the enemy on three sides. The result was then -inevitable. Von Hindenburg had the choice of flight or of allowing his -army to be surrounded. He decided to retreat. Soon retreat degenerated -into rout, and vast quantities of stores and ammunition, besides -thousands of prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians. - -The battle of Gumbinnen was the first decisive engagement of the war. -Its immediate result was to make Russia master of the whole of Prussia -east of the line from Königsberg to Allenstein. There was no position -which afforded von Hindenburg any hope of successful resistance even -if he were able to collect his routed troops. Insterburg, the main -point in the network of German strategic railways, fell into Russian -hands on the evening after the battle and ensured for Rennenkampf -ample supplies. Tilsit was isolated, and its capture was a matter of -convenience. The whole region of the Mauer lakes was at the mercy of -the Russians. - -The moral advantages were as great as the material. Von Hindenburg’s -army had been badly beaten, and would never be able to face the -Russians again with the same confidence. Moreover, the rout of the -Germans and the reputation of the pursuing Cossacks caused a panic -throughout the province. From every village and town the inhabitants -began to fly in terror, some towards Danzig, others towards Graudenz in -the hope of reaching Berlin. Soon Danzig was in a state of chaos. Two -hundred and fifty thousand refugees poured in with the most exaggerated -stories of the prowess of the Russians. Commerce was at a stand-still; -the prices of provisions rose daily. Soon there was rioting in the -streets. There was no accommodation for the refugees, most of whom were -penniless, and who were almost as numerous as the ordinary inhabitants -of the town. It was not until the sternest measures had been taken by -the military authorities that the panic subsided and some show of order -was restored. - -Meanwhile the Russians were following up their victory with a vigorous -pursuit. Von Hindenburg’s army divided into two, one portion retreating -through Tapiau to Königsberg, the other pressing in a south-westerly -direction towards Allenstein, and the fortresses of Thorn and -Graudenz. The former portion safely reached its destination, which -was invested by the Russians on the 25th. On the same day Tilsit was -formally occupied. Meanwhile the main Russian army, meeting with -practically no resistance, pushed on along the line of the railway, -occupying Angerberg and Korschen. By this time, however, heavy German -reinforcements had come up, and the advance began to be contested with -increasing determination. For three days there was vigorous fighting in -the neighbourhood of Allenstein. Then, after inflicting heavy losses -on the Germans, Rennenkampf entered the town and again forced von -Hindenburg to retreat. The action, however, was not a decisive battle -comparable with Gumbinnen, and the Russian advance became slow. Further -fierce fighting, most of which resulted satisfactorily to the Russians, -took place further to the south around Soldau and Nesdenberg. - -The Russians, after a remarkably quick advance through very difficult -country, had now come within hail of the line of the Vistula. The line -was protected by three first-class fortresses covered by at least four -army corps in addition to the armies which had been driven back by the -Russians. It was the critical moment of the campaign. With their heavy -numerical superiority and strongly fortified position, the Germans -would be sure to make a more determined resistance, and in greater -force than any which the Russians had yet had to meet. In attacking -the line Rennenkampf would be handicapped by a lack of heavy siege -artillery, and by the numerical inferiority of his forces. On the other -hand his troops comprised some of the finest fighting material in the -world, they were flushed with victory and could be relied upon to make -a tremendous effort to win the greatest triumph of all. If they could -drive the Germans over the Vistula and bring up sufficiently large -forces to invest Thorn, Graudenz and Danzig, the northern route to -Berlin would be open to them as far as the Oder. The beginning of the -end would indeed have arrived. - -The Russians accordingly pushed forward. But they did not advance much -further on the road to the Vistula. An immense German army, heavily -supported by artillery, including numbers of the heavy siege guns which -had already proved themselves to be the Kaiser’s most potent weapons, -awaited the Russians in a strong position in the neighbourhood of -Osterode, midway between Allenstein and Graudenz. - -Von Hindenburg now proved himself to be a leader of remarkable skill -and resource and he performed as brilliant a feat of generalship as -the war has yet produced. Only a year before he had taken part in -the manœuvres in East Prussia, and was acquainted with every inch of -the ground. It was even stated that he had already solved the exact -military problem with which he was now faced, and in the same locality. -In addition he enjoyed the advantage of outnumbering the Russians by at -least two to one. - -These factors practically decided the battle. The district around -Allenstein and Osterode is of the worst possible description for an -invading force. It is a mass of lakes, swamps and forests, and an -intimate knowledge of the locality is essential for the success of any -military operations there. There are almost insuperable difficulties in -the way of transport alone. - -Utilising his advantages to the full, von Hindenburg lured the Russians -towards Tannenberg to the south-east of Osterode. The Russians, -realising that a successful offensive was their only chance, blundered -forward. They pressed on until they found themselves in a position -where their flanks rested on more or less solid ground, but their -centre was backed by a vast swamp. Then von Hindenburg struck his blow. -An immense force was hurled against the Russian right. A desperate -encounter followed, but sheer weight of numbers gave victory to the -Germans. The Russians were forced back on to the swamps. A similar -attack on the Russian left was equally successful. - -What followed was not a battle; it was one of the most hideous -slaughters history has known. The Russians were unable to manœuvre on -the swampy ground; the Germans, on the other hand, were in possession -of the solid higher ground and free to move at will. From three sides -they poured a murderous fire into the helpless Russians, forcing them -deeper and deeper into the swamps. Guns sank in the mud, horses were -unable to move, men stood up to their waists in the deadly slime. The -carnage continued until nightfall, when Rennenkampf managed to escape -with a remnant of his army, leaving Generals Samsonov, Martos and -Pestitsch among the thousands of slain. - -Thus von Hindenburg won the battle of Osterode and obtained ample -revenge for his defeat at Gumbinnen. - -The battle caused a complete reversal of the campaign. The route to -Berlin via the north was not only barred, but the Russian advance was -turned into a retreat. Hopelessly outnumbered, Rennenkampf was forced -back on Allenstein. Every foot of the way was contested, but bit by -bit he had to give up the results of his victorious move forward. -Allenstein and Intersburg were in turn evacuated before the merciless -pressure of the advancing Germans. The troops investing Königsberg -were recalled. It was not until the frontiers were almost reached and -strong reinforcements came up from Kovno and Grodno that the German -advance was checked and finally held. - -In spite of official attempts at secrecy, the news soon spread that the -invasion of Germany upon which Russia’s Allies had placed such high -hopes had ended in what appeared to be complete failure. Berlin was -as far off as ever, and the Germans were at the very gates of Paris. -Something had gone seriously wrong with the steam roller on which so -much had depended! - -The strategists were wrong in the blame they heaped on Rennenkampf’s -head because of his failure. As a matter of fact, his chief fault was -that he had played his part too well. He had never been expected to -push forward so far as Osterode. His “advance” was intended simply -to attract German attention and to prevent Germany from sending -reinforcements to the Austrian army. In attaining this object he -succeeded admirably. After the battle of Gumbinnen the Germans poured -regiment after regiment of Landwehr and Landsturm troops into Eastern -Prussia, which otherwise would have gone to the aid of the Austrians. -Rennenkampf’s unexpected success took him too far forward. His advance -was so rapid that it was difficult to bring up reinforcements. Osterode -and its heavy losses was the penalty he paid for success. - -The only really unfortunate result of his efforts was that he attracted -such strong forces into Prussia that the Russians will have great -difficulty in dislodging them. They are, however, strong enough to keep -them confined to their own territories, and so have little to fear from -that direction. - -Besides, there are other ways to Berlin. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE ADVANCE INTO GALICIA - - -It has already been pointed out that Russia could not advance directly -on Berlin and thus expose herself to the danger of being cut off and -annihilated by German armies from East Prussia and Austrians from -Galicia. A march on Posen would more likely than not have resulted in -another and more stupendous Sedan. In the previous chapter it was shown -that, for various reasons, the Russian General Staff decided not to -threaten Berlin by the northern route through Prussia. The nature of -the country was unfavourable for any such movement; it was strongly -fortified and capably defended. Moreover, the fact that winter was -approaching had to be taken into account. Those who have had the -misfortune to spend the winter months at Königsberg or other towns in -Eastern Prussia will agree with the Russian Staff that the conditions -during that period of the year do not favour military or any other -operations. And it was essential that Russia should maintain a vigorous -offensive, if only to keep faith with her allies. - -That there was another route to Berlin, and one which possessed many -obvious advantages, was overlooked by most of the strategists. The -route in question lies along the banks of the Oder, through Silesia -and Saxony. If Russia could crush the military power of Austria in -Galicia and drive the remnants of her armies across the Carpathians, -either pursuing them to Buda-Pesth and Vienna or confining them to the -Hungarian plains, she would be free to advance upon Breslau and Berlin. - -There are many advantages possessed by this route. In the first -place, it would be safe, assuming that Austria were thoroughly broken -beforehand. The country is open and well provided with railways, -excellent roads, and other means of communication; it contains only one -fortress of any strength--Neisse--which could be easily masked, and -is generally favourable to a rapid advance. An additional advantage -is that Silesia is a busy mining and industrial province, with a -population of nearly 6,000,000. The invading army would be preceded -by armies of panic-stricken fugitives, who would impede any defensive -measures and strike terror in Berlin long before the menace of the -invaders became serious. - -There can be little doubt, in view of (1) that the chief Russian armies -are engaged in Galicia and Poland, and (2) that no serious attempt -has been made either to follow up General Rennenkampf’s remarkable -advance in East Prussia or to retrieve the ground lost as a result of -the defeat at Osterode, that an advance on the lines suggested through -Galicia and Silesia is the main feature of the Russian strategy. It is -the simplest, safest and most effective route by which Germany could -be invaded. It is the one route an advance along which, supported by a -vigorous offensive from Poland, would have an immediate effect on the -war in the west. When once the Russians begin to march on Breslau, it -will be only a matter of weeks before they reach Berlin, unless the -Germans detach very strong forces from their western army and hurry -them across to defend the capital. - -But first of all, Austria must be smashed, and Galicia and Poland -swept clear of the enemy. - -At the end of the preliminary phase of the campaign, the Russians -had already gained a footing in Galicia in the neighbourhood of the -River Styr, whilst the Austrians had advanced northwards from Cracow -and established themselves in Poland. This Austrian army, after being -heavily reinforced, so that it amounted to about 500,000 men, began to -march northward towards Warsaw. It was then still further reinforced -by a German army which had advanced from Posen, and invaded the -Polish province of Kalisch. In Poland, therefore, there was a very -considerable army which seriously threatened Lublin and Warsaw, and -would require heavy and probably extended operations before it could be -forced back. - -A second Austrian army, smaller than the first, was in Galicia, with -Lemberg for its base. - -The operations against these two armies constitute the real “Russian -Advance,” the movement intended to prepare for the crushing of Austria -and a march on Berlin. That it would be slow was obvious. Opposing -it were, at the time under review, about 1,500,000 troops, with two -first-class fortresses in Cracow and Przemysl and a hardly less strong -position in Lemberg. The question remained, how would Russia act? Would -she concentrate her attention on driving the first Austrian army on to -Galicia, or would she deliver her main attack on the second army, and -invade Galicia from the east, trusting on her success and consequent -menace to the communications of the first army to force that army back -on to its base? The former course would be the safer, for the first -Austro-German army was a more formidable force than the second. The -latter course, if the more hazardous, had the merit of speed. The -Grand Duke Nicholas decided to adopt this plan, much to the surprise -of the Austrians. An army was sent from Warsaw to operate against the -Austro-German army in Poland, but the main army, under General Russki, -had Kiev for base, and immediate preparations began for a vigorous and -sweeping movement through Galicia. - -It was, however, essential for the success of the plan that the -Austro-German army should be held in check until the menace to its -rear was strong enough to force it back. If it were to capture Lublin -or seriously threaten Warsaw, the whole scheme would be in danger of -collapse. - -It must not be forgotten that while these operations were in progress -Austria was fighting on her southern frontier against Serbia and -Montenegro. The war in the south naturally affected to some extent the -war in the north. A series of victories in the south would undoubtedly -have provided the Austrians in the north with the moral tonic they -so sadly needed. As it happened, however, the war in the south was a -complete failure. Seven attempts were made to capture Belgrade, an -utterly defenceless town, but each was repulsed. The invasion of Serbia -ended in the rout of Shabatz. The Austrians thereupon abandoned their -operations against Serbia, and threw all their forces into the northern -war. Whatever advantage was gained by this increase in numbers was -for the time being more than counterbalanced by the shattered _moral_ -of the additional troops. Mutiny had already done much to destroy the -spirit of the troops. The companionship of men who had been routed by -the despised Serbians was not calculated to improve matters. However, -Austria needed every man in the north to defend her reputation as a -first-class military power. - -Her plan of campaign amounted to an attempt to force the reversal of -the Russian plan. The main army was to carry out a vigorous invasion -of Poland in two directions, towards Lublin on the north-east and -towards Lodz on the north. The latter movement would receive help -from the Germans operating in the province of Kalisch. The success of -these movements would render a determined invasion of Galicia from the -east impossible. Russia would have to change her plan and concentrate -her efforts on defeating the invading Austrians and driving them back -across the frontier. Obviously this would have suited the German -plans admirably, because it would have delayed the Russian advance -indefinitely, and so relieve the dangerous position resulting from -the unexpected success of the Russian mobilisation and the equally -unexpected failure of the attempt to crush France in the course of a -few weeks. Viewing the war as a whole, therefore, the main object of -both sides was to gain time. The Allies wanted to delay the German -advance until the pressure of Russia on the east became unbearable. The -Austrian object was to hold Russia in check and so enable Germany to -maintain an undiminished army in the west. The issue of the whole war -now depended on the efforts of Austria, for even if the Allies in the -west were able, as the result of a vigorous offensive, to force the -Germans out of France and Belgium, it was extremely doubtful whether -they would be able to invade Germany itself with anything more than -moderate success, unless the Germans were forced to divide their -troops more or less equally between the two frontiers. - -The most important operations in the east, therefore, were the advance -of the main Austrian army on Lublin and the advance of the Germans -through Kalisch. Until these were positively checked the projected -Russian advance could not be pushed forward. But, once checked, a -successful Russian advance would cause the retirement or downfall of -these invaders of Poland unless they were heavily reinforced. - -The campaign opened with a serious defeat for Russia. The Austrian army -crossed the frontier and established contact with the defending forces -in the neighbourhood of Krasnik, a little town some fifteen miles -across the border. Details of the engagement are very few. Officially, -the Russians ignored it, being wholly taken up with the telling the -world about their successes in Prussia. What appears to have happened -was that the Russians did not expect the enemy to throw forward such -strong forces, and were taken by surprise. Heavily superior in point -of numbers and well supported by artillery, the Austrians, while -unable to break the Russian centre, seem to have successfully carried -out a flanking movement. The Russians fought gamely, and inflicted -heavy losses on the enemy, but their defeat was inevitable. The -Austrians claimed to have captured some thousands of prisoners and much -artillery. In view of the results of the battle, it is quite possible -that their claims were not exaggerated. - -The serious results of this engagement were at once apparent. The -heaviness of the defeat made it impossible for the Russians to make a -determined resistance against the Austrian advance for some time. The -Austrians overran Kelche and pressed forward on Lublin. - -In the course of this advance the Austrians made brave attempts to -imitate their German allies. The occupation of Kamenetz Podolski was a -good example of their efforts to play the Hun. The town was captured -after a sharp engagement, in the course of which the Austrian commander -had the misfortune to be slightly wounded. His first act was to demand -200,000 roubles, 200 horsed carts, 800 poods of bread and 60 oxen. -Unless this levy were forthcoming by eight o’clock the next morning, -the mayor was to be hanged and the town sacked. At the best of times -this would have been an almost impossible demand on the resources of -Kamenetz, which is only a small town. On the approach of the Austrians -the Municipal Treasurer, the bankers and all the wealthy families had -fled, taking their riches with them. Nobody in the town had so much as -twenty-five roubles in his possession. - -The mayor went to inform the general that it was impossible to fulfil -his demands. The general replied that he would bombard the town unless -the whole levy were delivered by eight o’clock. - -The night was spent by the inhabitants in the impossible task of trying -to raise the money. Rings, watches and jewellery of all kinds were -collected. The churches were stripped of their crucifixes and plate. A -valuable collection of old coins, worth at least 15,000 roubles, left -the scales at an appraisement of seven hundred roubles. At half-past -six in the morning it was found that not more than five or six thousand -roubles’ worth of gold and silver had been collected towards the -200,000 demanded. The mayor went to find the general in the forlorn -hope that the latter would relent. The inhabitants crouched in their -cellars awaiting the dreaded bombardment. - -Eight o’clock passed and nothing happened. The Austrian general had -left during the night, leaving a colonel as governor of the town. -The latter gravely assessed the levy at 25,000 rubles, returned the -crucifixes and church plate and announced that he was perfectly -satisfied. Then a few hours later, acting on instructions from -Vienna, he returned the whole levy, to the utter bewilderment of the -inhabitants. - -But in spite of these half-hearted attempts to imitate the Huns, there -is no doubt that for a time the advance of the Austrian army was a -serious matter. General Bankal, the commander of the force, drove -the Russians from position after position in a series of desperate -engagements and it was not until he reached the line Lublin Kholm that -he was definitely checked, and General Russki was able to advance in -earnest. - -The primary cause of General Bankal’s check was the fact that he found -himself face to face with a strong Russian army, with the fortress of -Ivangorod for a base. This army was as large as his own, and occupied -an immensely strong position. Bankal, realising the necessity for -maintaining the offensive, attempted to break through the Russian -centre. After a heavy bombardment he threw his men forward in close -formation, hoping by force of numbers to cut a way through. The attempt -was a costly failure. A second and third attempt fared no better. Then, -realising that his position was hopeless in the face of such superior -forces, Bankal retired, and soon was in full retreat towards the south. - -In this battle the Russians captured over 5,000 prisoners; whilst the -Austrian losses may be estimated from the fact that over 3,000 of their -dead were buried by the victors. - -A secondary cause contributing to General Bankal’s failure was the lack -of German support from Posen. This was the direct result of General -Rennenkampf’s successful offensive in Eastern Prussia. In the previous -chapter it was shown how, after the battle of Gumbinnen and the rapid -advance through Allenstein, the Germans brought up several army corps -to cope with the menace. They drove back Rennenkampf, but only at -the cost of starving their offensive in Poland. They were unable -to reinforce both the defensive line of the Vistula and the armies -attacking Poland, unless they withdrew a portion of their forces from -the western theatre of war. In spite of rumours, it may be stated for -certain that no such withdrawal took place. There was no apparent -diminution of German power in the west, and no reinforcements arrived -in Poland. - -The Germans, however, managed to penetrate as far as Lodz. Their -advance was more due to lack of opposition than to their own prowess. -They were in no great numbers, and on meeting with a superior force at -Pobianitz, they at once began to retire without offering any serious -resistance. - -Nevertheless, their advance, insignificant as it was, is worthy of -attention as affording a comparison between themselves and their -Austrian allies. The latter in the course of their advance made -half-hearted attempts to win a reputation for savagery, such as the -incident at Kamenetz, but on the whole, their conduct, apart from much -drunkenness and a little looting, was admirable. The Germans, on the -other hand, fully lived up to the reputation which their comrades in -Belgium had won for themselves. - -Their chief exploit was the sacking of Kalisch. During the German -occupation of the town in the early stages of the war it was stated -that some of the inhabitants had fired on the soldiers. General -Preusker, the German commander, at once indulged in the most savage -reprisals. Numerous inhabitants were shot. Some hundreds of the leading -citizens, including the priests, were seized as hostages and forced to -lie for hours under a broiling sun. Then suddenly they were marched -out of the town and were told to prepare for execution. When all was -ready, and the wretched prisoners thought that their last moment had -come, the order was countermanded. The town was then bombarded by -the German artillery. The town hall and all the chief buildings were -ruined, hundreds of innocent men, women and children were killed. After -witnessing the destruction of their homes the hostages were sent as -prisoners to Posen. - -After this savage display, General Preusker issued a proclamation to -the Poles, stating that the Kaiser, in return for their help, would -effect the regeneration of the Polish nation through the influence of -Western culture. Needless to say, the proclamation met with no response. - -The news of this event naturally caused something of a panic in Western -Poland. At Lodz, for instance, the approach of the Germans resulted -in the town being in danger of falling into a state of anarchy. -The administrative authorities and the bankers immediately fled to -Warsaw, leaving the town, which has over 600,000 inhabitants, without -protection and without money. The manufacturers, to their credit, -stayed in the town. The closing of the banks rendered them for the time -being penniless, and there was danger of riots from their employés -who could not be paid. The workpeople, however, kept their heads, and -notes were issued by a committee of leading citizens. Owing to the -impossibility of providing them with food, the prisoners had to be -released. For a time the fate of the town hung in the balance. The most -trivial event might have inflamed the workpeople. But, thanks in no -small measure to the fact that all the taverns had been closed since -the beginning of the mobilisation, calm was gradually restored. It was -almost a relief when the Uhlans at last appeared and the thoughts of -the people were distracted by the new menace. - -The fighting around Lodz, although temporarily decisive in that it -resulted in the Germans being driven back over the frontier, was of -only small extent. It was here, however, that the Cossacks gave the -_Nemetz_ a taste of their qualities. Indeed, the exploit of Kusma -Krutchakov and his companions was one of the most courageous feats of -the whole war. - -He was out on patrol duty with his comrades, Stchergolkov, Astachov, -Ivankov; and Rvatchov, when they learned that twenty-seven German -horsemen had been seen in their immediate neighbourhood. Rvatchov was -at once despatched to headquarters with the news, while the others, -without a moment’s hesitation, set out to tackle their formidable -antagonists, whom they had seen disappearing behind a hill. - -After making a detour to escape observation, the Cossacks divided into -pairs, Krutchakov and Ivankov approaching the Germans from the rear, -the other two from the front. The leader of the patrol attempted to -inveigle the Germans into a bog, but in this he was unsuccessful, and -the whole party charged down upon the Cossacks, who made off on their -swift horses. - -As soon, however, as the Germans gave up the chase Krutchakov and his -companion, who had meanwhile been joined by the other two, followed -them and continued the pursuit for four miles. At last, getting the -enemy in full view in the open country, they dismounted and opened -fire. The Germans now saw that they had only four men to deal with, and -charged down upon them at a gallop. - -At this the Cossacks mounted and prepared for a hand-to-hand struggle. -As the Germans approached, their officer was shot dead. They then -closed in upon Ivankov, who was nearest to them, and attacked him with -their lances. - -Before they could get him down, however, his three companions had -sprung in to his assistance. - -Krutchakov swung to one side and engaged three of the Germans, while -his comrades together got into a close scuffle with the rest. While -one German was trying to run Astachov through the body, he himself -was pierced by the lance of Stchergolkov and fell to the ground. -Another German aimed a blow at the head of Stchergolkov, but was just -in time put down by Ivankov. Three Cossacks then broke free from the -mêlée, Ivankov and Astachov on one side, pursued by six Germans, and -Stchergolkov on the left, with three of the enemy on his heels. When -the Germans abandoned the pursuit Ivankov and Astachov dashed in to the -assistance of Krutchakov, who, at first beset by three Germans, now -had a dozen round him. - -Against these desperate odds he was defending himself with coolness and -address. A non-commissioned officer aimed a blow at his head, but he -parried it by swinging up his carbine. His fingers were slashed, but -not severed, and, dropping the carbine, he seized the sword and chopped -his assailant down. - -When at length help arrived, only five Germans remained alive. -Krutchakov had received sixteen wounds, and his horse eleven. -Stchergolkov was wounded in two places, whilst Ivankov escaped with -only one hurt. - -The retreat of General Bankal from Lublin and the driving back of the -Germans from Lodz left General Russki free to move forward in earnest. -The conditions were at once reversed. Hitherto the successful advance -of General Bankal had caused his army to be the most important factor -in the campaign. Now it was only of secondary importance. The centre of -interest had shifted from Poland to Eastern Galicia. - -The advance which was now beginning was the most important move in the -war. On its success or failure depended the issue of the whole war. If -the Austrians had been powerful enough to inflict a really decisive -defeat on General Russki, the whole plan of the Allies would have been -thrown to the ground. Russia, instead of advancing, would have been -forced to act on the defensive, at least for a time, and her Allies -in the west would have had to abandon all hope of help until the lost -ground could be retrieved and a fresh advance begun. In view of the -supreme importance of success and of continued success, every care was -taken to render the advancing army as invincible as human endeavour -could make it. It represents the flower of the Russian army, from -general to rank and file the Tzar could put no finer force into the -field. Its failure would appear to be impossible. - -The Russians crossed the frontier at several points. It is at once -apparent that they would have the advantage of operating in a friendly -country. The Ruthenians welcomed them as heaven-sent deliverers. Every -man up to the age of fifty had been summoned to the Austrian armies, -but the women, children and old men who were left were wild with -delight. Processions, headed by priests, went forward from the villages -to greet the invaders; food and provisions were gladly given to the -troops. - -The first action of any magnitude was the storming of Tarnopol. The -Austrians were in strong force, well entrenched and supported by -artillery. On the morning of August 23rd the Russian attack began. -For some time an artillery duel raged, and then the Russian infantry -began to advance. It was received with a hail of bullets from rifles -and machine guns. For four hours the battle continued, the Russians -gradually pressing forward. Meanwhile their shrapnel was working havoc -in the Austrian trenches. The defence was showing signs of flagging. A -bayonet charge settled the affair. Unable to keep back the Russians, -the Austrians, rather than face the bayonets, abandoned their positions -and fled into the town. - -But victory was not yet achieved. With the aid of machine guns mounted -on church towers and prominent buildings, the Austrians kept up a -murderous fire on the Russians. The order was given to storm the -town, street by street. In fighting of this description, in which -the personal element predominates, the Cossacks excel. With ruthless -completeness they scoured the town until there was not an Austrian -defender left. Thousands lay dead in the streets; the rest were in -full flight towards the main Austrian army defending Lemberg. Several -machine guns, some artillery, and numerous prisoners fell into the -hands of the Russians. - -This victory forced back the Austrian centre, and gave the Russians -possession of the north-eastern corner of Galicia. - -The next move was to force back the Austrian right on to Lemberg, and -so gather the enemy into a suitable position for a decisive attack -and also gain possession of all the means of communication in Eastern -Galicia. This was effected successfully by the engagement at Halish, -a small town on the Dniester, on which the Austrian right rested. -Here the victory was in the main due to the dash and courage of the -Russian cavalry. Early in the engagement the enemy’s cavalry was put -out of action. In the meantime their artillery had been playing with -good effect on the Russian infantry. But a cavalry charge on the flank -silenced the guns and the infantry was able to advance. The Austrians -made a desperate resistance, but were soon forced into flight. - -General Russki, now master of all Galicia east of Lemberg, immediately -began his preparations for the attack on what was now the chief -Austrian army, defending that important town. - -Before, however, dealing with the operations round Lemberg, it is -necessary to refer to the other Austrian army--that under General -Bankal. After its defeat between Lublin and Kholm, this army retreated -southwards in the direction of Tomasov. Any further advance into Poland -being out of the question, General Bankal’s object was to join forces -with the army defending Lemberg, and so present a greater resistance -to General Russki’s advance. The troops, which had been occupying -the Polish province of Kielce were also hurriedly withdrawn towards -Lemberg. In order to prevent this threatened junction of forces, the -Russians made the most determined efforts to overtake the Austrians. -For some days, however, Bankal, in spite of heavy losses of artillery -and stores, managed to elude his pursuers. It was not until he was -within a few miles of Tomasov that he was forced to give battle. There -he was met by a force sent forward from the right flank of General -Russki’s army. Hastily entrenching himself, he prepared for a desperate -attempt to throw back the Russians and force his way to Lemberg. His -position, however, was hopeless. Faced by a force superior in every -way, and attacked on his left flank by the Russians, who had been -pursuing him, defeat was inevitable. Nevertheless, the Austrians fought -desperately, and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. But their own -losses were terrible. Entire regiments were annihilated. A shrapnel -shell killed Bankal himself, and several of his staff officers. Within -a few hours the remnants of the army were pouring over the frontier in -full flight for Przemysl. - -In this engagement the Russians captured five thousand prisoners and -twenty pieces of artillery. - -In the meantime the remaining Austrian forces in Poland were faring -but little better. At Podgorzo, the troops from Kielce who were -endeavouring to join General Bankal’s army, and push forward to -Lemberg, were forced to give battle as a result of a successful -turning movement from the north-east. Here again the fighting was of a -desperate character, but again the issue was inevitable. Three thousand -prisoners and large quantities of artillery and stores fell into the -hands of the Russians. - -Thus ended to all practical intents, the preliminary Austrian advance -into Poland. It was not until later, when the German victory at -Osterode enabled large forces to be thrown into Poland, that the enemy -were able to make any definite impression in that quarter. - -Meanwhile the movement which it was supposed to prevent was developing -strongly. The battle for the possession of Lemberg had already been -fought and won. - -That the Austrians were determined to defend the town at all hazards -may be judged from the fact that they had accumulated there sufficient -stores for a year. The defending army formed a semicircle facing north -and east, with the fortress in the centre. By pushing forward his right -wing towards the west, General Russki formed another outer semicircle. -Then the Russian semicircle began to contract, and with vice-like -pressure forced the Austrian line back and back. - -The battle lasted for seven days, and the fighting was of the most -stubborn nature. By means of successive bombardments and infantry -attacks on the defending forces, the Russians gradually forced -themselves forward. But every inch of ground was contested, and the -losses on both sides were enormous. As the days passed, however, the -superiority of the Russian artillery began to assert itself, and the -Austrian fire weakened. At all points the Russians were increasingly -successful. At length on the seventh day the main Austrian force, -comprising five army corps, was driven back with heavy loss on to the -town itself. - -This was the beginning of the end. At half-past two in the morning the -actual storming of the town began. The Austrians attempted to reform -their forces, but were thrown into confusion by repeated artillery and -cavalry attacks. The Austrian left was driven in. The whole army was in -danger of being surrounded. - -At this stage of the conflict an episode occurred which finally sealed -the fate of the Galician capital. A particularly searching fire was -directed by the Russian batteries at the centre before the town, their -object being to impede the retreat of the Austrians, who had been -beaten on the right flank, and, if possible, to surround the town -completely before its garrisons could be withdrawn. - -In the hope of checking the Russian advance till the town had been -evacuated, the Austrians threw out a rearguard screen of Slav troops -with a backing of Magyars, who received orders to shoot the Slavs down -from behind the moment they showed any hesitation. This circumstance -became known to the Russian commander, and at the critical moment a -terrific artillery fire was opened over the heads of the Slavs upon the -retreating Austrian columns. This dropping hail of projectiles set up a -wild panic in the ranks of the enemy. Abandoning guns, ammunition, and -stores, his troops broke into frantic disorder, and fled helter-skelter -along the road to Grodek. - -This was shortly after nine o’clock, and proved to be the decisive -stroke of the battle. It appeared that the Austrians then lost all -hopes of holding the town, for the strong forts by which it was -defended rapidly fell one after another. - -It was now that the strong Russian forces poured into the town from the -north, and the final battle began in the streets. For some time the -fierce fight was kept up, but the Austrian detachments, recognising the -hopelessness of their position, surrendered one by one. - -The Slav inhabitants received the conquerors with demonstrations of -delight and shouts of “Long live the army of the Russian liberators.” -The singing of the Russian National Anthem mingled with the last shots -fired at the routed Austrians in the neighbourhood of the town. - -Then the progress of the Russian regiments through the town became like -a triumphal procession. As they passed down the streets cheers were -raised, and flowers were showered upon them from the crowded windows. -At half-past ten the Russian flag fluttered out from the staff on the -roof of the Town Hall. - -Russia thus achieved the first great triumph of the war and ensured -the accomplishment of the first step towards Berlin--the smashing of -the military power of Austria. In addition they had won 637 guns, 44 -quickfirers, flags, and 64,000 prisoners, in addition to immense stores -of ammunition and provisions. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEMBERG - - -The Austrians had prepared Lemberg for a siege of at least a year. The -Russians captured it in a week. The fortresses, which were reckoned -as first-class examples of modern fortifications, were reduced to -ruins by the bombardment of the Russian heavy artillery. The victory, -therefore, proved to the Russians, just as Liège and Namur had proved -to the Germans in the west, that modern fortresses are helpless against -modern artillery. The Russians employed no remarkably heavy guns, but -merely their ordinary siege howitzers. There are no secrets about these -weapons. They are of about the same calibre and weight as those of the -Germans and of every other army. The question of transport limits the -size of these weapons, and no nation can employ a gun which exceeds -a certain well-defined standard. Just as, however, the fall of Namur -and Liège was responsible for rumours of secret monsters from Krupp’s -of infinite power, so the fall of Lemberg was responsible for similar -rumours about the Russian guns. In each case the rumours were absurd, -for the simple reason that guns of such immense power would be too -heavy to move. - -In any case, the Russians had every reason to be satisfied with the -performance of their guns. They had proved themselves capable of -reducing the finest modern fortifications. What had been accomplished -at Lemberg could be done with equal facility at Przemysl, Cracow, Posen -and all the other fortresses guarding the road to Berlin. Germany and -Austria have spent millions on these fortresses, which have been proved -to be practically worthless as obstacles in the path of an invader. - -The remarkable speed with which the position had been taken, coupled -with the enormous losses inflicted on the defending army, was certain -to have a most damaging effect on the _moral_ of the Austrians. Owing -to racial jealousies and hatreds the Austrians had already displayed -a lack of cohesion and fighting spirit, except perhaps in the German -and Magyar regiments operating with the chief army in Poland. Now the -last shreds of moral force would disappear. The troops had been sullen -and half-hearted; now they were dejected as well. To extricate herself -from a very critical position Austria demanded the utmost spirit and -determination from her troops. In her hour of need there was every -prospect of their failing her. - -The magnitude of the defeat, coupled with the rout of the army in -Poland, made it impossible for Austria to make any further offensive -movement in Russia, or defensive movement in Galicia for some -considerable time. Her armies were scattered in confusion and fleeing -at random. To arrest the flight of a routed army, to disentangle the -units and to present a battle front again is the most difficult task -a commander can have. And in the present case the difficulties of the -Austrian generals were increased a hundredfold by the fact that their -men were not only defeated but broken in spirit. Further resistance -east of Przemysl was out of the question. The Russians were undisputed -masters of Eastern Galicia. - -The Russians, therefore, gained an immense moral advantage over the -troops facing them. The material gains were on a similar gigantic scale. - -Lemberg had been expected by the Austrians to hold out indefinitely. -It contained a year’s supply of provisions and munitions. These -vast quantities of stores fell into the hands of the Russians, -thus lightening very considerably the strain upon the transport -and commissariat departments. Lemberg, moreover, being the capital -of Galicia and the chief Austrian military centre north of the -Carpathians, contained an arsenal, railway works, and numerous other -works useful to the invaders. The huge capture of rolling stock was -perhaps the most valuable of all. When it was seen that it was doubtful -whether the town would be able to hold out long, the Austrians had -collected all the available rolling stock, in order to remove as much -as possible of the stores west to Przemysl and Cracow. The rapid -success of the Russians prevented the carrying out of this plan. The -Austrians made desperate efforts, but the lines became hopelessly -congested, and not a train escaped. Thirty locomotives and immense -numbers of carriages and trucks thus fell into the hands of the -Russians. - -Most important of all were the strategic results. Lemberg, being the -chief town in Galicia, and the administrative centre, the town is -naturally the point on which all the means of communication converge. -Eight railways and as many high roads connect the town with every -point of civil and military importance north of the Carpathians. It -is, therefore, an ideal base for the Russian operation in Galicia. -It commands the approaches to Przemysl on the west and to the passes -over the Carpathians leading to Vienna and Buda-Pesth on the south. It -has railway connection with no less than four points on the Russian -frontier, allowing direct communication with the important military -centres of Kiev on the east and Warsaw on the north. - -Lemberg may therefore be described as the key to Austria. Its -possession opened the way for the Russian armies westwards to Silesia -and Berlin, southwards to Buda-Pesth and Vienna. It was the most -important town in the whole eastern theatre of war, and its capture was -far more than a stage in an advance, it was an event which must have -the most far-reaching effects on the whole course of the war. - -In addition to these direct advantages gained by Russia, the victory -had other results affecting the course of the war. It roused the -entire Slav race, giving increased enthusiasm and determination to -those engaged in the war and strengthening the sympathies of those who -had remained neutral. Bulgaria and Roumania, neither of whom were on -friendly terms with the Serbs as a result of the recent wars in the -Balkans, now veered round at the prospect of the power of the Austrians -being broken. More important was the effect produced on Turkey. -Bound to Germany in many ways, Turkey had been seriously considering -whether she should not throw in her lot with the Kaiser in the hope of -regaining some of the territory of which she had been despoiled after -the Balkan war. German diplomacy had been making strenuous efforts to -induce the Turkish Government to tempt fate once more. And relations -between Russia and Turkey had been rather strained over the _Goeben_ -incident. The purchase of Germany’s finest Dreadnought, by Turkey, was -of vital interest to Russia, who could not afford to allow Turkey to -become the chief naval power in the south-east of Europe. In answer to -her representations, Turkey had protested her determination to remain -neutral, but there was considerable cause for doubting the sincerity of -these protestations. The fact that there were numerous German officers -with the Turkish army and superintending the placing of the heavy Krupp -guns in position along the fortification of the Dardanelles did not -tend to allay the suspicions. After Lemberg, however, Turkey realised -that Austria was a broken power, that Germany was in a position of some -jeopardy and that neither was a suitable ally for a nation whose chief -object was to rob its neighbours. - -Although, however, the capture of Lemberg was a triumph of the first -magnitude which rendered the downfall of Austria inevitable, it must -not be assumed that Russia’s task was to all intents and purposes -accomplished. It was rashly predicted at the time, as in the case of -every Russian victory, that the end of the war was in sight, that -there was nothing to prevent the steam roller going full speed ahead -to Berlin. Subsequent events have proved how ill-founded were these -prophecies, most of which were based more on hope than on fact. Lemberg -fell during the first week of September, and Russia is still a very -long way from Berlin. - -One triumph does not smash a nation, not even a ramshackle one such -as Austria. After Lemberg she was in a desperate position, faced with -almost certain defeat, but she still had considerable fighting power. -France struggled for over a year after Sedan. And Lemberg was not such -an overwhelmingly decisive event as Sedan. The latter resulted in the -surrender in an Emperor, his finest generals, and his chief army. -Lemberg, after all, only routed the chief Austrian army. In spite of -terrific losses, and in spite of the demoralisation of her troops, -Austria still had over two million men in the field and a large number -of reserves, as yet untouched. Obviously she was still a power that -could not be neglected. - -Large numbers of Austrians were still in south-west Poland. The -fortresses of Cracow and Przemysl were untaken, and were defended -by practically the whole remaining military force of the country. -And reinforcements were being hurried up to help stay the Russian -advance. The operations against Serbia and Montenegro had been finally -abandoned, further reserves were being called to the colours, and the -armies thus raised were being hurried northward. German aid was also -forthcoming. The success of the operations in Prussia had set free -some of the army corps for the purpose for which they were originally -intended. - -Germany was also forced to realise that the Russian advance was a -serious menace, and it was now that she transferred troops from the -west to the east. This eased the task of the Allies, but, of course, -made that of the Russians all the more difficult. The German advance -into Western Poland, which has now continued for nearly two months, -is as determined as that into France. Unless, therefore, the Russians -can win a stupendous victory, this second phase of the war will be -prolonged. There can, however, be no doubt as to the final result. -Russia is inexhaustible. - -To sum up, then, the capture of Lemberg was one of the most significant -events of the whole war. The tide of victory had now definitely -turned in favour of Russia, nothing short of a miracle could stem it. -But Russia was still faced with a task of considerable magnitude, and -much time and patient work was necessary before it could be finally -accomplished. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -CONCLUSION - - -To the unthinking, Russia has proved somewhat disappointing. Such great -things were expected of her by those who knew nothing of the conditions -in the eastern theatre of war. At the end of over a month of fighting -she had not advanced a mile along the direct road to Berlin. Her army -in the north, after an advance which was acclaimed as of tremendous -importance, was defeated, driven back and practically forgotten. The -south-west of Poland was still overrun by the enemy, and the only real -advance that had been made was to penetrate about a hundred miles into -Galicia. - -Certainly it does not appear at first glance to be a very considerable -achievement. It is only when matters are thoroughly investigated that -the truth is grasped. Russia has achieved more than any other Power -engaged in the war, and far more than could rightly have been expected -of her. In the west the Germans advanced to the very gates of Paris, -but they won no decisive victory; the allied armies remained intact and -unbroken. The Allies then assumed the offensive, and the Germans were -pushed back. But again no decisive battle has been fought, at least -during the period under review. The German armies are, at the moment -of writing, still intact and to all appearances capable of assuming a -renewed offensive with vigour. It is only in the eastern theatre of war -that victories have been won. Tarnopol, Tomasov, and Lemberg were not -merely favourable engagements which resulted in the enemy being forced -to retreat a few miles. They were victories which routed as well as -defeated the enemy. - -It must be remembered, too, that these operations in Galicia and Poland -are being fought on the same vast scale as those in the west. They -extend along a front of no less than 200 miles. In point of numbers -engaged, the Galician and Polish operations are again very similar to -those in France. In fact, the conditions in the east and west are more -or less equal, and therefore Russia’s victories were the only really -decisive engagements won by any of the armies. - -Official opinion in Russia would have been quite satisfied if, by the -beginning of September, the mobilisation was completed, and Warsaw, -Vilna and Kiev still in Russian hands. It was certainly expected that -at the end of a month’s warfare Russia would be engaged in fiercely -defending her own territories and in making desperate efforts to drive -the invaders back over the frontier. In short, she was fully expected -to be faced with a month or more of sheer defensive fighting before she -could hope to advance. The magnitude of her task in this direction -will be obvious when it is remembered that, in addition to the -inevitable slowness of mobilisation which renders her a comparatively -easy prey for invaders, she has a frontier of well over 1,000 miles to -defend against Germany and Austria. - -Of course, much was made of the fact that Russia could mobilise no -less than eight million men. It was assumed that an immense army of at -least two million men would march on Berlin. By sheer force of numbers -Russia was going to bring both Austria and Germany to their knees. In -the first place there is a limit to human organising power, and it is -doubtful whether any general can successfully direct the operations -of such vast quantities of men. Napoleon himself never fought with a -million men, and no modern general has yet proved that he possesses -the military genius of the Corsican. Numbers are all very well up to -a certain point, but in excess they are only a hindrance and a menace. -The larger the army the slower it moves. It is the very unwieldiness of -the armies in the west that has caused their lack of success. They have -such enormous fighting power that there is no particular reason why -either should suffer defeat. - -Superfluous men do not add to an army’s efficiency. They only -hamper its mobility and throw an extra strain on the commissariat -and transport. The ideal army is the one which is large enough to -accomplish its object thoroughly and no more. Employing two men to do -the work of one is merely a wasteful proceeding. - -Russia has no intention of putting all her eight million men in the -firing line. Her object is to place adequate armies in the field and to -maintain those armies at their full strength of first-class fighting -men. She has no particular ambition to make herself bankrupt. - -In view of the difficulties with which she had to contend and the -gigantic nature of her task, Russia may be said to have accomplished a -brilliant feat in rendering the ultimate defeat of Austria inevitable -and in opening up the most advantageous road to Berlin. The remarkable -success of her mobilisation has been followed by equally brilliant -achievements in the field. Soukhomlinov’s work has not been in vain. -Russia has indeed fulfilled her part and made the issue of the war as -sure as it is humanly possible to make it. Much remains to be done, but -the tasks of smashing Austria and reducing Germany to her knees will -now be taken up with every confidence. - -The events in Russia have been as significant as those in the -battlefields. Not only has this war proved that Russia as a military -power has come into its own at last, but it marks the beginning of a -new era in Russian history. The world is witnessing the rebirth of -Russia. The nation is united as it has never previously been. The old -autocratic institutions are passing away, the Duma is gaining strength, -the coming rehabilitation of Poland is a master-stroke of liberalism. A -new Russia is emerging. Democracy is coming into its own at last in the -empire of the Tzar. - - - _Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd., London and Reading_ - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Text on cover added by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain. - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -The illustration following the Table of Contents is a detailed map of -Central Europe. If your book reader cannot display it, you can find it -among the book materials for "The Russian Advance" at www.gutenberg.org. - -Page 17: “Moreover, sufficient of the earlier stages” was printed that -way. - -Page 33: “remarkable effects of the war on the nation was” was printed -that way. - -Page 50: “mobilisation bases were signalled out” was printed that way. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian Advance, by Marr Murray - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE *** - -***** This file should be named 53482-0.txt or 53482-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/4/8/53482/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Russian Advance - -Author: Marr Murray - -Release Date: November 9, 2016 [EBook #53482] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="transnote covernote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note<br /> -Text on cover added by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p> -</div> - -<div class="newpage p4 center narrow10 xlarge bbox"> -<div class="bbox vspace"> -The Daily Telegraph<br /> -<span class="smaller bold wspace">WAR BOOKS</span> -</div></div> - -<h1 class="nobreak wspace b4">THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE</h1> - -<div class="newpage p4 center narrow35 bbox2"> -<table class="p1" summary="booklist heading"> - <tr> - - <td class="tdc">Cloth <br /><span class="xxlarge bold">1/-</span><br />net<br />each</td> - - <td class="tdc large bbox dbl vspace wspace">The Daily Telegraph<br /><span class="bold">WAR BOOKS</span></td> - - <td class="tdc">Post<br />free<br /><span class="larger">1/3</span><br />each</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p class="p1 center"> -<span class="bold">HOW THE WAR BEGAN</span><br /> -By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE FLEETS AT WAR</span><br /> -By ARCHIBALD HURD<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN</span><br /> -By GEORGE HOOPER<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE</span><br /> -By J. M. KENNEDY<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">IN THE FIRING LINE</span><br /> -<span class="smaller">Battle Stories told by British Soldiers at the Front.</span><br /> -By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD</span><br /> -By STEPHEN CRANE<br /> -Author of “The Red Badge of Courage.”<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT</span><br /> -The glorious story of their Battle Honours.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE RED CROSS IN WAR</span><br /> -By M. F. BILLINGTON<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">FORTY YEARS AFTER</span><br /> -The Story of the Franco-German War. By H. C. BAILEY.<br /> -With an Introduction by W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D.<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">A SCRAP OF PAPER</span><br /> -The Inner History of German Diplomacy.<br /> -By E. J. DILLON<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR</span><br /> -A companion volume to “How the War Began,” telling how the world faced<br /> -Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms.<br /> -By J. M. KENNEDY<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">AIR-CRAFT IN WAR</span><br /> -By ERIC STUART BRUCE<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">HACKING THROUGH BELGIUM</span><br /> -By EDMUND DANE<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE REGIMENTS</span><br /> -By REGINALD HODDER<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE RETREAT TO PARIS</span><br /> -By ROGER INGPEN<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE</span><br /> -By MARR MURRAY<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE SUBMARINE IN WAR</span><br /> -By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">MOTOR TRANSPORTS IN WAR</span><br /> -By HORACE WYATT<br /> -<br /> -<span class="bold">THE SLAV NATIONS</span> -</p> -</div> - -<hr /> -<p class="newpage center xlarge vspace wspace bold"> -THE RUSSIAN<br /> -ADVANCE</p> - -<p class="p2 center vspace wspace large"><span class="small">BY</span><br /> -MARR MURRAY</p> - -<p class="p2 center large vspace wspace">HODDER AND STOUGHTON<br /> -<span class="smaller">LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO</span><br /> -<span class="small">MCMXIV</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2> -</div> - -<table id="toc" summary="Contents"> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdl">INTRODUCTION</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">7</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">I.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE NATION AND THE WAR</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">19</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">II.</td> - <td class="tdl">MOBILISATION</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">37</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">III.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE POLISH PROCLAMATION</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">72</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IV.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE PRELIMINARY PHASE</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">82</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">V.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE ADVANCE INTO EASTERN PRUSSIA</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">103</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VI.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE ADVANCE INTO GALICIA</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">137</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VII.</td> - <td class="tdl">THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEMBERG</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">174</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VIII.</td> - <td class="tdl">CONCLUSION</td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">186</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<div class="newpage figcenter" style="max-width: 36em;"> -<a href="images/i_maplarge.jpg"> - <img src="images/i_map.jpg" width="575" height="481" alt="Map" /> - </a> - <div class="captionl">COPYRIGHT. SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR <span class="bold">The Daily Telegraph</span> BY<br />"GEOGRAPHIA" - L<sup>TD</sup> 55 FLEET STREET LONDON EC</div> - <div class="captionr">ALEXANDER GROSS F R G S</div> - <div class="caption hidepub">(Click map to see it full-size)</div> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="INTRODUCTION"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<p>War between Russia and Austria has been -inevitable since the latter first cast her eyes -eastwards and decided that Salonika was -to be the object of her expansion. To -reach a port on the east the Teuton must -crush the Slav. Fundamentally, it is a -battle of races. Hitherto the Teuton has -managed to avoid actual conflict; by means -of carefully designed coups at opportune -moments, or, to put it more bluntly, by -the methods of a common thief, he has -made very good progress during the last -few years without risking his own skin. -But on the present occasion circumstances -were not so favourable as they appeared -to be; and instead of catching Slavdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">8</a></span> -at a disadvantage, he caught it ready to -fight for its existence—a serious miscalculation -which bids fair to have the most far-reaching -results.</p> - -<p>With the exception of the Greeks, Turks -and the sparse Teutonic population, the -inhabitants of the whole of eastern and -south-eastern Europe are of Slavonic origin. -They number roughly 125 millions, and -they possess the best of all rights to their -territories—that of settlement at the time -when the Aryan peoples migrated from -Asia to Europe. The Russians, Rumanians, -Bulgars, Montenegrins and portions -of the Serbs, Croats and Poles are -either self-governing or under the rule of -other Slavonic peoples. The remaining -Slavs are under Teuton domination. In -East Prussia the Kaiser rules Poles, Kassubes -and Serbs, while Austria has several -millions of Polish, Czech, Ruthenian,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span> -Serbian, Croatian, Slovenik and Slovak -subjects.</p> - -<p>The Slav is the world’s most fervent -nationalist. An intense and unconquerable -vitality is the outstanding characteristic -of every Slavonic people. Like the -Jews they maintain their national traits -distinct and unchanged in spite of centuries -of foreign domination. Their conquerors -have never been able to absorb them. -Unlike the Jews, however, this vitality -is not passive but active. They have never -been subdued. When not actively hostile -they are sullenly awaiting the opportunity -to throw off the yoke. For nearly five -hundred years Serbia was a Turkish province, -held in the most ruthless subjection. -But during all that time Serbia never forgot -that once she had been an empire, nor -faltered in her determination to be an -empire again. In 1817 the chance came<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -and Serbia rose like a nation defending its -liberties rather than a rebellious people with -a dozen generations of bondsmen for forebears. -The modern experiments of Germany -and Austria have not proved any -more successful than the mediæval methods -of the Turks. Neither country has had a -moment’s peace from its Slavonic subjects. -They have never dared play any part but -the bully’s.</p> - -<p>The growth of the organised Pan-Slavist -movement has added enormously to their -difficulties, and Austria in particular has -had many anxious moments in the eastern -portions of her Mosaic empire. The movement -is the definite expression of Slav -aspirations. It aims at unity, if not actual -union, amongst all the Slav peoples. -Russia is the natural head of the movement, -and the ultimate aim is a collection of free -Slavonic nations under the suzerainty or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span> -protection of the Tzar. In the meantime -the immediate object is to free the Slavs -who are under the rule of foreign races.</p> - -<p>Reference has already been made to -Serbia’s aspirations to be once more the -empire she was in the days before the Turks -overran south-eastern Europe. When in -1817 she at length threw off the Turkish -yoke her object was but half fulfilled. A -further portion was won back as a result -of the recent Balkan War. But there still -remain some millions of Serbs under Hapsburg -rule. In 1908 Austria, taking advantage -of Russian weakness, seized the -provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both -of which are peopled by Serbs. For a -time war seemed inevitable. But the -Powers stepped in and Serbia, unable -to rely on strong Russian help, was forced -to acquiesce. She had formally to renounce -all claims to be a more natural<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -ruler for Serbs than mongrel Austria, to -moderate the activities of the Pan-Slavist -societies all of which were more or less -bitterly opposed to Austria, and to profess -to be perfectly satisfied with the arrangement -and full of neighbourly love.</p> - -<p>It was not to be expected that such an -agreement, forced on a small nation by the -Great Powers, would prove anything but a -farce. Serbia very naturally resented the -indignities which she had suffered. The -nationalist societies, instead of being suppressed, -became more bitter and bolder in -their activities. The chief of them, the -Narodna Obrava, has an immense membership, -drawn from all classes. It is to be -found in every town and village. The -press, the army and the government service -are its most enthusiastic adherents.</p> - -<p>One evening, early in June, five members -of the Narodna Obrava met in a house near<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -the royal palace at Belgrade and hatched the -plot which was destined to prove the spark -that kindled the European conflagration. -All the world knows how well their plans -were conceived, how faithfully carried into -execution. On June 28th the Archduke -Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian -throne was, with his wife, murdered in the -streets of Serajevo, the chief town in Bosnia.</p> - -<p>There is no need here to dwell on subsequent -events. After a delay of some -three weeks, Austria was bullied by Germany -into presenting her famous Note -to Serbia. Every line of that Note was -a studied insult designed to make Russian -intervention and war inevitable. Serbia -was exhausted in every way after her two -wars with Turkey and Bulgaria, Russia -was in the midst of a scheme of military -reorganisation which still required a couple -of years for completion. War was the last<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -desire of either country. Acting on Russia’s -advice, Serbia made an almost abject reply -to Austria. But Germany was not to -be denied. She was determined to unsheath -the sword. Every proposal for -peace was dismissed for the most trivial -reasons, every precautionary measure was -exaggerated into a hostile act. At last, -on Friday, August 1st, when the German -military preparations were practically complete, -Baron von Pourtales, the German -Ambassador, called on M. Sazonov, the -Foreign Minister and formally demanded -that the Russian partial mobilisation should -cease within twelve hours. At seven o’clock -the following day war was declared and -Russia took up her task of defending Slavdom -from the Teuton menace, and incidentally -saved western Europe from its direst -peril since the days when Napoleon thought -to crush its liberties.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -The eastern campaign has been more or -less overshadowed by the western, especially -during the early days of the war. It was -natural that it should be so. The western -campaign was the more sensational. The -Kaiser hurled his finest forces westwards; -every day brought its vital news; doubts, -joys, fears crowded one on the other; -there were no tedious preliminaries, no -hesitation, but smashing stroke and counterstroke. -The storm in the east was comparatively -slow in gathering and it lacked -the spectacular element.</p> - -<p>The result was that Russia was both -neglected and misunderstood. In spite of -the public welcome accorded to journalists -by the Grand Duke Nicholas, the official -lust for secrecy is as fierce in the east as -in the west. Only the sparsest details have -been allowed to be published. Defeats -have been ignored or dismissed as “local<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span> -checks.” Every victory has been acclaimed -a triumph and every step forward has been -supposed to echo menacingly in the streets -of Berlin and in the Kaiser’s headquarters.</p> - -<p>It has been practically impossible to -obtain a clear view of the eastern campaign, -and consequently it is not to be wondered -at that there has sprung up a general -disposition to regard Russia as something -of a disappointment. Ignorance of the -conditions under which she is fighting -caused impossible triumphs to be expected -of her.</p> - -<p>The best corrective for this distorted -vision is to study the eastern war from the -Russian point of view. It is that point of -view that I have endeavoured to set forth -in these pages. No claim is made to any -secret knowledge; in view of the extraordinary -strict censorship in Russia, such -a claim would be absurd. But it is possible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -to record and explain the events as they are -known and understood by representative -opinion in Russia. Moreover, sufficient -of the earlier stages of the campaign have -emerged from the fog of war to enable -the period within these pages to be analysed -in the light of subsequent events. In the -circumstances, it can be confidently claimed -that the views generally held by men of -moderate opinion in Russia provide a -reliable if somewhat sketchy history of the -campaign. Some details may be meagre, -others faulty; that is only to be expected -when for descriptions of the actual fighting -it is necessary to rely to a very large extent -upon the stories of the wounded. But the -general outlines and deductions are undoubtedly -correct, and the study of them will -enable the man in the west to understand -and appreciate the many difficulties connected -with the war in the east.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Nation and the War</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The war that the nation fights is already -half won. Tzars, Kaisers, Kings and Governments -may spend millions on perfecting -their fighting machines, they may hurl -those machines at one another, but unless -they have behind them the united will of -their subjects, their efforts are bereft of more -than half their force. The victorious army -is the one which enjoys the whole-hearted -support of a people prepared to face any -sacrifice for the sake of its cause. The -moral factor is as important as the material -or the ethical. History is full of instances -of wars being won against heavy odds by -the sheer enthusiasm of a people determined -to win at all costs. For a modern example<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span> -it is only necessary to glance at the Austro-Serbian -campaign.</p> - -<p>The Kaiser knew very well how essential -it is for a nation to present a united front to -the foe. Ever of a religious disposition, -he realised how true was the text that a -house divided against itself falls to the -ground. And so he chose his moment -carefully. Britain was on the verge of -civil war over the Irish crisis; France -was torn asunder with political passions; -both would obviously prove easy victims. -And Russia? Unfortunately for the Imperial -plans Russia was in a contented state. -But the defect could soon be remedied! -Russia has a reputation for strikes and -revolutions, two of the most valuable allies -an invading army can have. And so it -happened that July saw the renewal of -labour troubles in Petrograd, Moscow and -other large towns.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -The first sign that trouble was brewing -came from the famous Putilov works, the -Russian armament factory. For some time -past Germany has been evincing a very keen -interest in the factory, and not so long ago -an insolent attempt was made to get the -control of the works into the hands of -German Jew financiers. Of course the -attempt failed and Germany had to content -herself with filling the place with her -spies. There is little doubt that the German -Secret Service was primarily responsible -for the strikes of 1914. For no particular -reason beyond vague references to the -“rights of labour” and “the glorious -revolution,” some thousands of Putilov -workmen went on strike. Thanks to a -vigorous campaign throughout the country -by real and imitation labour agitators, -their example was extensively followed. -Workers in mills, factories and railways<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span> -answered the call. Hundreds of thousands -were on strike although there was still no -formulated demands on the part of their -leaders. The strikers were fed on the -stock phrases and generalities of the demagogue’s -programme. Soon rioting took -place. The military had to be called out, -and on several occasions at Petrograd -the Cossacks came into serious conflict -with the strikers.</p> - -<p>Then suddenly the war clouds gathered. -Russia appeared to have been caught at -the most inopportune moment possible. -The war danger arose at the very time -when the strike movement seemed to be -at its height. There is no doubt that -Russia’s advice to Serbia in regard to the -latter’s reply to Austria’s Note was to a -large extent dictated by the unfortunate -internal condition of the country.</p> - -<p>But the nation rose to the occasion in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span> -a manner which even Russia’s warmest -friend would hardly have dared to predict. -The national danger forged a united people. -The rioting and other disturbances ceased. -The military remained in their barracks; -there was no work for them in the streets. -Then, as the international situation grew -graver the strikers realised how insignificant, -yet how dangerous, were their own squabbles, -and they began to troop back to work of -their own accord. Throughout that period -of agonising suspense the Russian statesmen -received no more inspiring news than -this. It was the only ray of light that -pierced the gathering gloom.</p> - -<p>The people, realising that war was inevitable -days before the Governments gave -up hope of peace, acclaimed it with enthusiasm. -Next to the Jews, the Germans, -or <i>Nemetz</i>, as they are called, are the most -hated foreigners in Russia. They are found<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span> -in nearly every town and village, and their -national habit of growing prosperous at -the expense of their hosts has earned -for them an honest hatred. The average -Russian was only too pleased at the prospect -of getting a chance of paying off a few old -scores. In addition to personal dislike, -the racial aspect of the war was also a very -strong consideration with the Russian democracy. -Pan-Slavism is a very real doctrine -amongst the <i>mujhiks</i>, who have an unlimited -faith in the heaven-sent destinies of their -race. There is hardly a soldier in all Russia’s -immense army that does not regard the -freeing of all sorts and conditions of Slavs -as his most sacred duty.</p> - -<p>And there was the religious question -to add to the nation’s enthusiasm. Russia -is the most religious nation in Europe. -Every home, no matter how humble, has -its ikon. The festivals of the Church are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span> -real holy days, and not mere secular -holidays. The Church itself is indeed the -mother of the people. The simple, unquestioning -faith of the <i>mujhiks</i> is without -a parallel in Europe, except perhaps in -the remote districts of Ireland. Religion -is a reality with them; it enters into every -action of their daily life. In the towns, of -course, much of this faith has been lost, -and there is a parade of unbelief which is -apt to lead the casual observer to wrong -conclusions. The real Russia is not to be -found in the towns, but in the villages and -hamlets and amongst the peasants. With -them the war is a religious war. It is a -battle between the Orthodox Church, which -is the peculiar property of the Slavs, and -the Western, which seeks to impose its -tenets on the “true believers.”</p> - -<p>It is from these simple peasants with their -racial hatreds and rock-like faith that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -Russia draws nine-tenths of her soldiers. -As fighting men they can be compared -only with Cromwell’s Ironsides.</p> - -<p>In the rural districts the popular enthusiasm -for the war found an outlet in religion; -in the towns it sought a more secular form -of expression. Petrograd was the scene -of unprecedented outbursts of popular -jubilation. Crowds paraded the streets -singing the National Anthem and cheering -portraits of the Tzar. The French and -particularly the British Embassies were -besieged by cheering throngs. Every public -appearance of the Tzar was the sign for -vociferous outbursts of loyalty such as are -rarely witnessed in Russia. Even the -Empress, whose shattered nerves have -kept her virtually a prisoner for years, had -to come forward and bow her acknowledgments -to the crowds. And, to crown all, -the police, gendarmes and military were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -noticeably absent from the streets. The -crowds were orderly, in spite of their -patriotic fervour. Petrograd was as free -and unrestrained as London. It was difficult -to realise that only a few days before -the spectre of revolution had stalked through -the city.</p> - -<p>One incident alone marred the demonstrations. -On August 4th, news reached -Petrograd of the scandalous treatment -undergone by the Russian diplomatic staff -at the hands of the Berlin mob. Enraged -beyond control a huge crowd descended -on the Nevski Prospect and after demolishing -a German café and several German-owned -shops, made a resolute attack on -the Embassy. The police were overpowered, -the gates forced and the work of destruction -began. The flagstaff was torn down, the -Prussian Eagle and several pieces of statuary -were unceremoniously thrown into the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span> -Moika Canal; furniture, pictures, linen, -books, everything that was inflammable was -heaped on the ground and soon a huge -bonfire was raging. Amidst a roar of -cheering a large portrait of the Kaiser was -hurled into the flames. The orgy continued -until the police and military appeared in -force. But the most significant feature -of the affair was the discovery in the cellars -of large stores of firearms and revolutionary -propaganda—concrete evidence that the suspicions -that Germany was fostering internal -troubles in Russia to serve her own ends -were only too well founded.</p> - -<p>The most impressive of all the many -scenes emphasising the facts that not only -the Russian nation but all Slavdom is -united against the Teuton menace, and that -a new Russia is being built up as a result -of the common cause and danger, occurred -on Saturday, August 8th, when the Tzar<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -received the two Houses of the Duma at -the Winter Palace. Early in the proceedings, -striking evidence was given of the -new order of things. Party quarrels, personal -jealousies and political enmities were -forgotten. The leader of every party came -forward and announced that he and his -followers would support the Government -by every means in their power. Even -M. Purishkivich, the implacable leader of -the Anti-Semite movement, abandoned his -principles and praised his Jewish fellow-subjects.</p> - -<p>The Tzar’s speech was simple and direct, -but it was significant because of the stress -it laid upon the racial and religious aspects -of the war:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“In these great days of alarms and -anxiety through which Russia is passing, -I greet you. Germany, following -Austria, has declared war on Russia.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -The enormous enthusiasm and the -patriotic sentiments of love and faith -to the Throne, an enthusiasm which has -swept like a hurricane through our -country, is a guarantee for me, as for -you, I hope, that great Russia will -bring to a happy conclusion the war -which the Almighty has sent.</p> - -<p>“It is also in this unanimous enthusiasm -of love and eagerness to make -every sacrifice, even life, that I am -able to regard the future with calm -and firmness. It is not only the -dignity and honour of our country -that we are defending, but we are -fighting for our brother Slavs, co-religionists, -and blood brethren. In -this moment I see also with joy that -the union of the Slavs with Russia -progresses strongly and indissolubly.</p> - -<p>“I am persuaded that all and each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -of you will be in your place to assist -me to support the test, and that all, -beginning with myself, will do their -duty. Great is the God of the Russian -Fatherland.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>The effect of that ancient Russian saying -was electrical. The whole assembly burst -into a storm of cheering; this was followed -by “God save the Tzar,” sung with a -fervour which obviously affected his -Majesty. Finally that most beautiful of -all Russian anthems, “Lord, save the -People,” was sung. Tears streamed down -the cheeks of the deputies, as, with voices -choking with emotion and faith, they sang -the simple words of the anthem.</p> - -<p>Such a scene of patriotic fervour and -national determination had not been witnessed -in Russia since the Napoleonic war -of 1812.</p> - -<p>The practical enthusiasm of the nation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -was no less marked than the sentimental. -The wealthy classes contributed liberally -to the various relief funds, and made many -sacrifices to help the country in its time -of danger. In spite of the inconvenience -and dislocation of trade caused by the -military preparations, complaints were never -heard. The whole nation seemed to have combined -in a common determination to see the -war through to a successful conclusion.</p> - -<p>The gathering of the harvest provided -an instance of this practical enthusiasm. -Russia being the world’s largest producer -of wheat, barley, rye, and oats the matter -was a very urgent one. Moreover, Russia -is self-supporting, and the failure of the -crops would mean the ruin and starvation -of thousands during the winter months. -Most of the men had been called to the -colours, and there was a serious danger of -large portions of the crops, especially in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -the more remote districts, being allowed to -rot for lack of labour. The problem was -attacked with a practical spirit unusual in -the Russian with his Asiatic fatalism. -The <i>zemstvos</i>, the military, and the local -authorities co-operated in dealing with this -problem. Women, boys, and old men were -set to work. Tramps and prisoners were -forcibly transformed into temporary harvesters. -By means of a central bureau in -each district it was possible to keep in -touch with every farm, no matter how -remote, and to ensure that no crops suffered -through lack of labour. As a result of -these measures the whole harvest was -successfully gathered, and the nation was -able to face the coming winter with the -satisfactory knowledge that, in any event, -its food supply was assured.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the most remarkable effects of -the war on the nation was the complete<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -change which came over its attitude towards -the Jews. Partly by reason of ancient -religious intolerance and partly because -of the fact that the Jews, thanks to the -thriftless and unbusinesslike methods of -the Russians, have managed to accumulate -much of the national wealth, the <i>Judiev</i> -hitherto have been regarded with fierce -animosity and subjected to pitiless persecution. -The story of the pogroms is one of -the most hideous chapters in the history -of any people. It was fully expected in -many quarters that the national enthusiasm -engendered by the war should find an -outlet in a repetition of these horrors. -Vienna indeed was so confident that it -officially informed the world that Vilna -was the scene of a terrible outbreak of -anti-semitism. The report was a lie. The -Jews were no longer the best hated race in -Russia; that distinction had been wrested<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -from them by the “<i>Nemetz</i>.” Everywhere -a new tolerance and a new respect for the -Jews was apparent, especially when news -came of their heroic deeds at the front. -Their enthusiasm for the war and devotion -to the Tzar rivalled that of the Russians -themselves. A quarter of a million of -men—the largest Jewish army ever assembled -since the fall of Jerusalem—were -with the Tzar’s forces. Throughout the -country the Jews set a splendid example -in contributing to the relief funds and -in removing distress caused by the war. -Hence the Jew has become almost popular. -Even when, as a mark of Imperial appreciation -of their loyalty, ukases were issued -relieving them of many of the disadvantages -under which they suffered, and practically -admitting them to the full citizenship of -the Russian Empire, hardly a protesting -voice was heard.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -Indeed, in many respects, the war has -been for Russia a blessing in disguise. -It has completed the work of the past few -years. On all sides reforms have been -effected and a new Russia has emerged. -The old ideals and the old standards have -passed. But the change has been unconscious, -and the Russians, with their chronic -fatalism, have not realised they have been -taking part in events which have practically -transformed the old autocratic regime into -one which is almost democratic. Some -external shock was needed to rouse the -nation to a sense of its new glories. The -war provided that shock, and Russia and -the world have realised that a new era has -dawned in the dominions of the Tzar.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">Mobilisation</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Mobilisation in Russia is an inevitably -slow and difficult operation. The circumstances -under which it is effected render it -almost impossible to reduce it to a matter -of automatic precision, as is the case with -the German Army. It is typically Russian: -rather ponderous and very human. The -chances of its being successfully and quickly -accomplished are so slight compared with -those of its proving an orgy of confusion -and disorganisation that nobody, least of -all in Russia itself, where businesslike -methods are not expected of officials of any -sort, dared hope that it would be carried -out without a hitch. The Allies were<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -apprehensive, the Kaiser was openly contemptuous -and left only second-line troops -to guard his eastern frontiers until Russia -could extricate her army from the inevitable -confusion and be worthy of the attentions -of the perfect Teutonic fighting machine.</p> - -<p>The German, of course, with his keen -materialism, has a reputation for doing -these things with an automatic efficiency. -The Slav, on the other hand, is of a very -different temperament, and the Tzar’s army -has acquired, and deserved, a reputation -for mismanagement. It is the most human -of armies, for certainly there never was one -more given to error. The Manchurian -campaign was one of the worst muddles of -modern times. In comparison, the South -African War was a model of efficient -management. It was always a case of the -wrong thing at the wrong moment: and -even when there appeared to be a chance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -of the right thing happening, corruption or -ineptitude stepped in and stultified every -effort. Those who happened to be in -Russia during that period will remember -that hardly a day passed without some -fresh instance of the national habit of -blundering through. The railways were in -a state of frantic disorganisation; whole -regiments got mislaid; food and clothing -were always lacking in spite of the most -lavish expenditure. Worst of all, numerous -officials and Jewish contractors became -suddenly and mysteriously wealthy, and -made small secret of the source of their -prosperity.</p> - -<p>Nobody raised his voice in protest because -nobody had expected anything different. -The orgy of mismanagement was accepted -with a good-humoured shrug of the -shoulders. <i>Nitchevo</i>, it can’t be helped! -That was the comment of the fatalism which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -is at once the greatest weakness and greatest -strength of the Russian character.</p> - -<p>Of course, there was excuse enough. -Mobilisation is carried on in the face of -more difficulties in Russia than in any other -country. Everything militates against its -speed and efficiency. It is all on so vast -a scale that it would seem impossible for -human ingenuity to place it on a systematised -basis. The area of the Russian Empire -is forty times that of Germany, but its -population is only three times as great. -The units to be concentrated are diffusely -scattered; they have to be gathered singly. -The aggregate length of the Russian railway -system is only twice that of the German -lines, and few of the Russian railways -have been laid with a view to meeting -military needs. The majority of the troops -summoned to the colours have to traverse -vast distances, often on foot, before they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -can reach the railway which will take them -to their mobilisation centres. The sparseness -of the population renders it difficult -for orders to filter through, and still more -difficult for troops to be quickly concentrated. -A good deal must of necessity -be left to the zeal and initiative of the -reservists themselves who, in most cases, -are utterly unreliable without supervision.</p> - -<p>At the best, therefore, with good weather -and good luck, the mobilisation is but a -slow process. Previous to the present war -the most obstinate optimist did not believe -that, in the most favourable circumstances, -it could be completed in less than three -weeks or a month.</p> - -<p>In the present case, too, there were -special aggravating circumstances which -rendered success all the more doubtful. -July had been a month of labour disputes, -and it seemed more than likely that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -strikes would seriously hamper the mobilisation. -Moreover, the Russian military plans -were incomplete. A programme of reform -was being pushed forward with all possible -speed, but it was not to be completed until -1916, at least. The army was in a state of -transition. A new system was being imposed -upon it, and it was by no means -ready for the supreme test. There was a -general feeling that it would be better to -rely on the old system which, whatever its -defects, had at least the merits of being -known and understood. A partial muddle -was better than the risk of absolute chaos.</p> - -<p>The order for mobilisation, therefore, -could not have come at a more inopportune -time. Russia, in spite of all official assurances -to the contrary, was unprepared.</p> - -<p>It is well known that this inevitable -slowness and possible impotence on the part -of Russia during the early period of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span> -war was the foundation on which the -Kaiser constructed his plan of campaign. -He could, so he thought, smash the Allies in -the West and return in time to mete out -similar treatment to the Russians before -they could do any damage in the East. -Everything favoured the plan, which had -all the merits of simplicity and conciseness. -Nobody who was acquainted with the disadvantages -under which Russia laboured -could deny that, humanly speaking, Germany -was immune from a serious attack -from Russia for at least six weeks. Even -that estimate seemed to err on the side of -optimism, for at that time there was no -reason to suppose that Austria would have -much difficulty in defeating Serbia and -menacing Russia with a strong advance.</p> - -<p>But among the many factors with which -the Kaiser omitted to reckon must be included -General Soukhomlinov—the Russian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span> -Kitchener, as he has, not inaptly, been -called.</p> - -<p>When the disastrous Manchurian campaign -was ended, Russia sadly needed a -man who could take to heart the lessons of -defeat and build up a new and better army -from the discredited fragments of the old. -The moment produced the man. Soukhomlinov, -the greatest War Minister Russia has -known, has for the past nine years been -engaged on an immense scheme for the remodelling -and reorganising of the army. -Quietly and with inexorable efficiency, he -has cut away cancer after cancer and -added reform to reform. No problem has -been too large, no detail too trivial, and no -circumstance too hopeless, for him to -devote to it his tireless energy. The whole -military system from top to bottom, and in -every nook and cranny, has been renovated.</p> - -<p>Soukhomlinov’s greatest merit is that, in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -planning and carrying this huge scheme -into effect, he has not fallen into the trap -that lurks in the path of every military -reformer. Although working on western -lines, he has not attempted to imitate the -German or any other army. That would -have been the obvious course for a man of -less genius. But Soukhomlinov had the -greatness to realise that an imitation army -can never be satisfactory. An army must -be national to the core, or it will fail in its -object. “What is health to the Russian -is death to the German,” is a Russian saying -that is very true. And an attempt to -force Teuton temperaments into Slav bodies -would result only in a bastard production -emphasising the defects of both.</p> - -<p>Soukhomlinov knew that the Russian -is the finest soldier in the world. His -bravery, his unquestioning obedience, his -infinite capacity for suffering and hardship,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span> -his stolid fatalism which makes him the -same in victory or defeat, all these qualities -render him an ideal fighting man. German -helmets or the goose step would not add -one jot to his virtues. He has never had a -chance, because he has never been properly -led or properly organised. It is in these -two directions, therefore, that General -Soukhomlinov has concentrated his efforts. -Under the new regime the Russian officer -has been transformed. The army is no -longer a hobby for fashionable young men, -but a stern business in which slackers and -the inept are not wanted. The habit of -heavy drinking at night—which during the -Manchurian campaign so often resulted in -such heavy slaughter in the morning—is a -thing of the past. The army requires clear -heads, and Soukhomlinov has no use for -befuddled officers.</p> - -<p>Efficient organisation is as vital to an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -army as efficient leadership, and the greatest -test of organisation is the mobilisation.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="max-width: 25em;"> -<img src="images/i_047.jpg" width="400" height="327" alt="Mobilization diagram" /> -</div> - -<p>Owing to the speed with which Germany -and Austria can effect their mobilisation, -Russia must of necessity begin a European -war on the defensive. Consequently, her -mobilisation bases are not situated on the -frontier, but at a considerable distance in -the interior, at Warsaw, and other towns -lying behind the Vistula. These towns are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -protected by a long chain of fortresses and -fortified positions, stretching from Kovno -to Radom, and designed to hold an invading -force in check until the troops have been -mobilised and the advance can begin.</p> - -<p>The method by which the mobilisation -is effected will be understood by reference -to the diagram. At the call to arms -recruits and reservists living at the outlying -hamlets, <i>a a a</i>, make their way to the -central villages and towns, <i>b b</i>. This journey -has usually to be performed on foot, and -may be anything up to fifty miles. At -<i>b b</i> the men are collected in batches and -passed on to the concentration centres, -<i>c c c</i>. For this journey railways are sometimes -available, but in the more remote -districts the roads are, more often than not, -the only means of communication. The -peasant soldiers troop into the concentration -centres in their ordinary dress, they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -leave them ready for the field. All day -long a constant stream of peasants is pouring -into the barracks, and a constant stream -of soldiers, fully equipped for hostilities, -is pouring out. Regiments and battalions -are formed. Then, when all is complete, -they pass on by train to the mobilisation -base <i>D</i>.</p> - -<p>The success of the system obviously depends -on the maintenance of an even flow -of men from <i>a</i> and <i>D</i>. A delay or hitch -at any point may throw the whole process -out of gear. The area covered is so vast, -the population so sparse, the army so huge, -and the means of communication from -point to point leave so much to be desired -that difficulties and dangers spring up in -every direction. An especially weak point -about the system is that in the early stages -so much depends upon the men themselves.</p> - -<p>Ivan Ivan’ich, the Russian Tommy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -Atkins, is no better and no worse than the -rank and file of any army. He is not -averse to temptation, especially when it -takes the form of alcohol. Vodka was the -cause of much of the muddle of the Manchurian -mobilisation. In the present instance, -however, General Soukhomlinov -very wisely decided to take no risks. He -decided on a bold stroke which, in the unsettled -state of the country at the beginning -of the war, might easily have been the -cause of serious rioting. The Imperial -ukase ordering the mobilisation was followed -by another which practically prohibited the -sale of alcohol in all districts likely to be -affected by the military preparations. The -railway stations, concentration centres, and -mobilisation bases were signalled out for -specially stringent regulations. There were -also severe pains and penalties for those who, -in their patriotic fervour, were inclined to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span> -be over-generous to the troops on their way -to the front.</p> - -<p>This drastic measure was fully justified -by the results. With nothing to delay -them, the men arrived punctually at their -posts. They were sober, and displayed all -the virtues of sobriety. Their health and -temper were noticeably improved. There -were none of the quarrels and disturbances -usually associated with mobilisation. The -conduct of the troops was in every way -irreproachable. The worries and work of -the officers were lightened a hundredfold.</p> - -<p>Russia, in short, provided the world -with an object lesson in the value of -temperance.</p> - -<p>Of course there was some grumbling. -Men who had tramped fifty versts or so to -serve the “Little Father” thought that -they were at least entitled to drink his -health and damnation to the <i>Nemetz</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -But generally the order of things was -accepted with the unquestioning stolidness -of the Russian peasant. The “Little -Father” had said, “No vodka”—therefore, -<i>nitchevo</i>, why complain?</p> - -<p>The following description of the actual -mobilisation is based upon the letters -written by Vasili Grigorovich, the cobbler -of a little town in the Ukraine, to an -English friend. The bond between this -rather ill-assorted pair is Vasili’s unsatiable -thirst for learning. Self-taught, he reads -everything and anything that comes his -way, and it was a chance conversation over -an out-of-date newspaper during the mending -of the traveller’s boot that led to the -friendship.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“The news that a general mobilisation -was ordered reached the village -late in the afternoon. The Governor -himself came to tell us that the ‘Little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span> -Father’ is at war with the <i>Nemetz</i>, -and that we must all start off for Berlin -at once. He is a witty man, our -Governor. I started getting ready, but -Marya scolded me for not being quick -enough. Indeed, she scolded me all -the time, even when I bade her goodbye. -That’s like our women. They -always hide their heartaches. And -after all they are quite right, for -what are their sorrows compared with -the orders of the Tzar? She swore -at me and said I was not fit to be -a soldier, when I kissed her. But -her voice was thick and her eyes -glistened. And Dimitri, who caught -me up later, told me that when he -passed he saw her praying before our -ikon. It was the first time, too, that -he had seen Marya weeping.</p> - -<p>“She is a fine woman, though<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -outwardly rough. I am very glad to -hear that the Tzar has ordered that the -wives and families of the soldiers shall -be well supplied with money. He is -a great Tzar. However, it will be very -lonely for Marya all through the winter, -and if it were not for thinking of her -I should be quite happy.</p> - -<p>“Dimitri and I had to tramp -thirty-two versts—a good stretch. We -went some distance out of our way to -reach an inn. But it was closed by -the Tzar’s orders. Well, the Little -Father knows best.</p> - -<p>“We decided to walk all through -the night, because we both wanted to -be fighting the <i>Nemetz</i> as soon as -possible. We had not gone far before -a farm cart full of soldiers caught us -up and they gave us a lift. It was -rather cold, but we did not mind. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -talked about the war, and the news -about the inns. We are sure to win, -but it is rather hard on the innkeepers, -who will lose a lot of money. However, -they are all rich.</p> - -<p>“We reached —— before dawn. -The officer there was very surprised, -because the men from our district were -not supposed to arrive until late in -the evening. He was rather cross too, -because everybody was coming too -soon, and upsetting the arrangements. -However, a landed proprietor offered -his mansion for the use of the soldiers. -Fancy that!</p> - -<p>“The next day we marched to ——, -where there is a railway station. There -are no trains for the ordinary passengers, -because the Tzar has taken them -all for the soldiers. Fifty trainloads of -soldiers are passing through ——<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span> -every day! Dimitri said we should be -able to get drinks at the station, but -he was wrong. I hear now that it is -a crime to give vodka to the soldiers.</p> - -<p>“Our train was very full, because -of the men all being so early. It was -rather uncomfortable, but we were all -too glad to be going to the front to -notice it. At one station two boys, -who had run away from home and -wanted to fight, were discovered by -an officer and turned out. They were -very disappointed, but there was more -room for us.</p> - -<p>“At last, after sixteen hours, -we reached ——. At first we -thought that there was no accommodation -for us, but we found that a -camp had been prepared for us. The -town was very full of soldiers, but they -were all very orderly and quiet. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span> -day after our arrival we received our -new uniforms, rifles and other things. -The uniforms are very smart, something -like the English, I am told. -The boots, too, are excellent. The -very best leather. It is evidently true -that the Tzar has made our army better -than ever it was. It is a bad lookout -for the <i>Nemetz</i>. In these uniforms -and boots we shall be able to chase -them all the way to Berlin quite comfortably.</p> - -<p>“Our regiment is complete. To-morrow -we start for Warsaw, where -our Army Corps is forming. In a few -days we shall meet the <i>Nemetz</i>. -Good-bye.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>Among the Cossacks, who are, of course, -a less reliable people than the ordinary -peasants, the mobilisation was no less -smooth. A Government official in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -Ural provinces gives a vivid account of the -scenes. The Cossacks, it may be noted, -supply their own horses, uniforms and -equipment.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“On July 31st the village awoke -to find a red flag waving before the -Government building, the sign that a -general mobilisation had been ordered. -Immediately everything was in a state -of uproar. Nobody knew who was -the enemy and nobody cared. It was -sufficient that there was war. Only -the women made wild conjectures as -to whom it was against. There was -no thought for work. Horses were -groomed, uniforms donned, rifles and -sabres cleaned with enthusiastic vigour. -Soon the Government veterinary surgeon -took his stand before the chief -building and the work of examining -the horses began. Each man in turn<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -brought up his horse and put it through -its paces. The test was most strict, -and any animal showing the slightest -defect was promptly branded as useless. -All day the work continued, a -crowd of women and children watching -the proceedings. At night the red -flag was pulled down and a red lamp -was hoisted in its place. In the -evening there was a great feast. A -whole ox was roasted, there was -dancing among the younger people, -but owing to the new regulations -there was practically no vodka. All -through the night men came riding -into the village from the outlying -districts.</p> - -<p>“On the Sunday when the preparations -were almost complete the consecration -service was held. The whole -village assembled before the little<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span> -wooden church. It was a stirring -sight to see these great warriors in -their full battle array kneeling before -their Maker and solemnly asking His -aid. At the conclusion of the service -each man was blessed by the priest -and anointed with holy water. Then -he led his horse away and received -the blessings of his family.</p> - -<p>“On the following day they set off -on journey of thousands of miles. -The women, children and old men -watched them. Their eyes gleamed -with tears and their breasts heaved. -Then, when the last man had disappeared -from view, they turned away, -walked to the fields and took over the -labours which the men had left unfinished.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>In the simple narrative of Vasili Grigorovich -and the description of the Cossack<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -scenes may be found all the causes which -contributed to the startling success of the -Russian mobilisation.</p> - -<p>The organisation, thanks to the genius -of Soukhomlinov, proved perfect. The -smallest detail had been prepared, and -every possibility foreseen. In no direction -was there any fluster or confusion. The -commissariat and transport arrangements -worked splendidly; the equipment of the -troops with the new service uniform—an -idea borrowed from the results of Britain’s -South African experiences—was an unqualified -success. The uniform has been designed -for business purposes only, and with -no regard for show. It is very similar to -the British uniform; the chief differences -being that the Russian tunics are looser, and -in place of puttees, long boots are worn. -Special attention has been given to this -latter detail. Manchuria taught Russia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -to realise the advantages enjoyed by a well-shod -army.</p> - -<p>But perhaps the greatest triumph of the -mobilisation was the prompt and businesslike -way in which the financial question was -settled. All who had suffered any loss -as a result of the dislocation of trade and -traffic caused by the requisition of the railways -and other means of transport, were -recompensed without delay. By utilising -the organisation of the zemstvos or local -councils, it was possible to prevent all distress -and to make ample provision for the -wives, families, and other dependants of -the men called to the colours. Indeed, in -Moscow and Southern Russia money has -seldom been so plentiful as it was during the -period of the mobilisation, and many -families are better off now than they ever -were.</p> - -<p>Another contributing cause was the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span> -conduct and efficiency of both officers and -men. The former proved that they have taken -the reforms of the last few years thoroughly -to heart. The latter showed that even the -lowest ranks felt that they were “Soukhomlinov’s -men.” To some extent, of -course, their efficiency was due to their -enforced sobriety. But much of it arose -from an honest determination to rise to the -occasion. Ivan Ivan’ich is taking this -war very seriously. He is calmly confident -of his ability to win, and he is immensely -proud of the new army, of which he is a -member. Moreover, he had an unlimited -enthusiasm for the war. He was anxious -to be killing the hated <i>Nemetz</i>, who -threatened his own liberty and that of his -brother Slavs, and he knew that the better -he behaved the sooner he would be at the -front. There was no mistaking his eagerness -to do the right thing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -The following is an extract from the -diary of a traveller, who spent nearly thirty -hours in Kiev waiting for a train to be available -for civilian passengers to Petrograd.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Everywhere there are soldiers. -There must be tens of thousands of -infantry, cavalry and artillery. They -are constantly on the move. In their -peasant blouses, baggy trousers, and -birch-bark shoes, they pour in ceaseless -streams into the barracks, where -they are served with their equipment. -They issue forth transformed into as -smart soldiers as could be wished. All -the uniforms are new, and appear to -be made of excellent material. They -are greyish khaki in hue, and not -unlike the British service uniform in -appearance. Seven million brand-new -uniforms of the finest quality! That -gives some idea of the millions which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span> -Russia has been quietly spending on -her army!</p> - -<p>“The men are as proud as peacocks, -and tremendously in earnest. Ivan -Ivanovich is a very important person -just now, and he knows it. Physically, -he is splendid. Seldom tall, but always -thick-set and well proportioned, -he is a first-class fighting man, and, -with his experience of Russia’s climate, -he can endure practically any hardship. -I doubt if there are any troops living -who will suffer more and grumble less. -That is the advantage of being a -Russian. And it is all done on the -most frugal of vegetarian diets! What -would our Tommies say to a diet of -black bread and fermented cabbage!</p> - -<p>“Those who doubted Russia’s military -value should spend a few hours in -Kiev and note how regiment after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span> -regiment marches through with never -the slightest hitch or confusion. They -should see these sturdy Tommies, with -their cruel rapier like bayonets always -fixed. They should hear their deep-throated -war chants. Then they would -realise that Russia is going to play a -very important part in this war....”</p></blockquote> - -<p>It must not be forgotten that the nation -itself was largely responsible for the success -of the mobilisation. The self-sacrificing -enthusiasm of all classes was a revelation to -those who believed that Russia was in a -parlous condition internally. The inevitable -losses and inconvenience were -cheerfully borne. The rich came forward -in a wholly unprecedented manner. In -Russia, owing to the lack of a middle class, -the distinction between noble and peasant -is most rigorously observed. The old days -of the serfdom have not been entirely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span> -forgotten. But during those early weeks -of August the national call was responded -to with equal enthusiasm by rich and poor. -Mansions were placed at the disposal of -the peasant soldiers. Food and gifts were -showered upon them; even carriages were -offered to help them on their way. The -owner of an estate near Novgorod, not only -entertained, at his own expense, nearly -three hundred troops a day, but his wife -and daughters served them with their -own hands. A year ago such an action -would have meant social ostracism. To-day -it is an example which is being followed -everywhere.</p> - -<p>This <i>rapprochement</i> between the classes -will have effects extending far beyond the -mobilisation. They give promise of a new -and happier Russia, for Ivan Ivan’ich -never forgets a kindness.</p> - -<p>The enthusiasm of the people was evinced<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -in a thousand different ways. There was -cheering and singing everywhere, but -practical enthusiasm was no less in evidence. -Often it resulted in trouble. The impersonation -of reservists who had been called -up, by those who had not, was very frequent. -In many cases the discovery of -the trick ended in blows with the result -that neither proceeded to the front, the -impersonator going to gaol and the impersonated -to the hospital. Thousands of -boys ran away from their homes in order to -enlist. Some Polish boys living at Vilna -were so disappointed at being refused -admission to the army on account of their -age that they formed themselves into an -unofficial patrol. Unfortunately they fell -in with some Austrian Cavalry, and the -next day their bodies were discovered -hanging from the branches of a tree.</p> - -<p>The enthusiasm was not confined to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span> -men. Women and girls sacrificed their -tresses and disguised themselves as recruits. -Some actually managed to reach the -front without being detected, and one even -contrived to enter the air service.</p> - -<p>At no time during the mobilisation was -the religious aspect of the war allowed to -be forgotten. Before starting on their -journey reservists knelt before their humble -ikons. In every village the priest blessed -the troops as they passed. Ikons and -sacred relics have been taken to the front.</p> - -<p>Petrograd witnessed the most impressive -scenes. The most holy of all ikons, the -famous Smolensk, “Mother of God,” which -is embellished with jewels enough to -ransom the Tzar himself, was carried in -solemn procession to Kazan Cathedral. -Hundreds of thousands stood in the streets -through which the ikon passed. Every -head was bared, a muttered prayer was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span> -on every lip. Thousands were unable to -gain admission into the cathedral during -the services, and gathered in the square -outside, sometimes to the extent of fifty -thousand, chanting the responses and singing -the hymns. On the Sunday following -the declaration of war, the Tzar blessed -the Russian arms and those of the Allies. -The flags of the nations were placed on -the altar before the Smolensk ikon, and -with all the Byzantine pomp and circumstance -of the Greek ritual the aid of the -Almighty was invoked.</p> - -<p>Thus in most gratifying circumstances -the news went forth that Russia was ready. -The mobilisation was sufficiently complete -to warrant an advance. The date was -August 16th, barely a fortnight after the -issue of the general mobilisation order and -a full month sooner than the Kaiser had -calculated. The number of men in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -field cannot be stated with accuracy. -Experts have talked glibly of millions, but -none know the exact number of Russia’s -fighting men except the Russian General -Staff, and doubtless the German. Four -million men in the field and a further -three million in reserve may be taken as -a likely estimate.</p> - -<p>In any case the mobilisation was the -finest feat of the war. It was a triumph -over almost insuperable difficulties and a -miracle of national organisation and effort. -It was the most significant and most -threatening of the many clouds which -were beginning to gather round Germany.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Polish Proclamation</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>On August 15th the Grand Duke Nicholas -issued, on behalf of the Tzar, the following -Proclamation addressed to all the Poles:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“<span class="smcap">Poles</span>,—The hour has sounded -when the sacred dream of your fathers -and your grandfathers may be realised. -A century and a half has passed since -the living body of Poland was torn -in pieces, but the soul of the country -is not dead. It continues to live, -inspired by the hope that there will -come for the Polish people an hour of -resurrection, and of fraternal reconciliation -with Great Russia. The -Russian Army brings you the solemn<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span> -news of this reconciliation which -obliterates the frontiers dividing the -Polish peoples, which it unites conjointly -under the sceptre of the Russian -Tzar. Under this sceptre Poland will -be born again, free in her religion and -her language. Russian autonomy only -expects from you the same respect for -the rights of those nationalities to which -history has bound you. With open -heart and brotherly hand Great Russia -advances to meet you. She believes -that the sword, with which she struck -down her enemies at Grünwald, is not -yet rusted. From the shores of the -Pacific to the North Sea the Russian -armies are marching. The dawn of a -new life is beginning for you, and in -this glorious dawn is seen the sign of -the Cross, the symbol of suffering and -of the resurrection of peoples.”</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span> -This master stroke of policy was one of -the most significant and important events -in the whole war. It has revolutionised the -whole outlook in Eastern Europe. This -pledge to restore to dismembered Poland -her lands, her liberties, her religion and her -national tongue is the most momentous act -of any Tzar since the days when Alexander II. -abolished the serfdom. With dramatic suddenness -it brings to a close one of the most -terrible chapters in the history of Europe. -For generations Russia has been engaged in -a ruthless and vain attempt to force her -Polish subjects to become, at least to all -outward appearance, Russians. The Poles -have been subjected to the fiercest persecution, -their religion and language have been -denied them, their history has been a stream -of blood. Poland has been the greatest -tragedy in Europe. Now at a stroke all is -changed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span> -The spoliation of Poland has been a bond -between Russia, Austria and Prussia for a -century and a half. The three nations -combined to carry out the crime, and as a -consequence they have ever since remained -more or less united over the results of the -crime. They have regarded the Polish -question as their own particular concern, -and have brooked no interference from the -rest of Europe. They have vied with each -other in their efforts to crush the Polish -spirit. They have made every move in -unison.</p> - -<p>The Tzar’s Proclamation consigned the -whole system to the limbo of the past. One -of the conspirators had realised the errors -of his ways, and was determined to make -reparation. Of course, the decision to -issue the Proclamation was to a large extent -dictated by material considerations. But -whatever the reasons, there can be no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span> -doubt as to the excellence of the results. -And by thus breaking the bond of generations -Russia proved that she realised that -this war was to be fought to the death. -After this solemn pledge on the part of -Russia, both Germany and Austria must -not only be beaten, but conquered. A free -Poland would mean the loss to Prussia of -the whole province of Posen, and the setting -back of her frontiers to Pomerania. Austria -would lose all her territories beyond the -Carpathians from Silesia to the borders of -Roumania. Both countries can be relied -upon to resist such a wholesale shrinkage -of their boundaries to the utmost of their -power. It would be more than a defeat; -it would be humiliation, such as no first-class -Power has yet been called upon to -undergo.</p> - -<p>The effects of the Proclamation were -anxiously awaited, not only in Russia,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span> -but in Germany and Austria as well. It -was addressed to the most sacred emotions -of the Poles, to that fierce patriotism which -no violence has been able to crush. It -solemnly promised them all that they have -been struggling for so bitterly. But would -they forget the past? The treatment they -have received would hardly be likely to -encourage trust. Massacres and repression -are not usually associated with the “dawn -of a new life.”</p> - -<p>The Polish Deputies immediately hailed -the Proclamation with joy. But the -people hesitated. It was too sudden a -change to be grasped at once. Then the -leaders set the example, first one and then -another came forward. Sienkiewicz addressed -a stirring appeal to his compatriots. -The people realised that the promise was -genuine, that Poland was really to be free -again. Scenes of indescribable enthusiasm<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span> -followed. The Poles are the most emotional -nation in Europe, and from Kalisz to Biala -and from Mlava to Stopnika they abandoned -themselves to their joy. Thereafter the -Polish enthusiasm for the war vied with that -of the Russians themselves. The effect was -immediately felt in the army. In one of -the early dispatches received at Petrograd -from the front, mention was made of the -furious heroism of the Polish regiments. In -Russia, therefore, the results of the Proclamation -were to remove the last shreds -of apathy and to weld both the subjects -and the armies of the Tzar into one pulsating -whole.</p> - -<p>But the appeal was also addressed to the -Polish subjects of the Kaiser and the -Emperor Francis Joseph. It was an open -invitation to them to revolt. In the circumstances, -the German and Austrian Poles -who have so often experienced Teutonic<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -methods of stamping out rebellion, can -hardly be blamed for accepting the proposal -in a cautious spirit. They were quite unprepared -for open rebellion, and at the best -would have stood but little chance of -success against the armies already mobilised -in their midst. In addition, the cream of -their manhood was with the forces of the -Kaiser and Emperor. Only in Austria did -a Polish regiment dare to mutiny, with the -result that it was shot down to a man. -For the rest, wiser if less heroic counsels -prevailed. Everything possible was done -covertly to assist the Russian advance. -Both German and Austrian commanders -complained of the extreme activity of -innumerable spies, lamented that the whole -population seemed to have combined in -an effort to be of every possible service to -the enemy, and admitted that fighting in -Eastern Prussia and Galicia was fraught<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -with all the difficulties attending operations -in a hostile country.</p> - -<p>But the Proclamation, and the obvious -sincerity which prompted it, have had -effects extending far beyond military -exigencies and the future of the Poles. -It has done more than anything else -to raise Russia in the estimation of the -world. The oppression of Poland has always -estranged the leading democracies -of the world from Russia. In France it was -used as an argument against the Franco-Russian -alliance, in Britain it has caused the -Triple Entente to be regarded as a potential -danger to ourselves. At the time of the -war with Japan it withheld the sympathy -of the United States from Russia. Now -all is changed. The Proclamation was received -with approbation by the whole -world, with the exception, of course, of -Germany and Austria. It was realised by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -all that Russia is indeed advancing, that -the short-sighted autocratic government is -giving way to the finest ideals of democracy, -and that Russia is an ally worthy of the -most ardent lover of liberty.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Preliminary Phase</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Apart from the initial handicap of having -to fight on the defensive because of the -comparative slowness of her mobilisation, -Russia is the most advantageously situated -of all European Powers for war on the -grand scale. Britain is dependent on her -command of the sea for her food and trade; -the existence of both France and Germany -more or less depend on supplies from the -outer world. But Russia is self-contained. -Her vast “lump” of empire can supply all -her needs, from food and trade to an -unlimited store of first-class fighting material. -Mainly agricultural and possessing -a comparatively small foreign trade, Russia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span> -could face with equanimity a war of any -duration. Until the end of the seventeenth -century Russia was the Tibet of Europe, -and practically cut off from the rest of the -world. She could, with very little inconvenience, -retire again behind her frontiers -and bid defiance to the world. Time has -always been her greatest ally, and her -strategy is based upon utilising that ally -to the utmost.</p> - -<p>The boundaries between the Tzar’s -dominions and those of Germany and Austria -are, for the most part, purely artificial. -They follow no distinct line of demarcation. -The great Russian plain extends far into -Prussia and Austria, and along the whole -length of the frontiers the only obstacles -to the advance of an invading army are -forests, marshes and the fact that generally -speaking the roads are very poor.</p> - -<p>Each country has had, therefore, to take<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span> -defensive measures to remedy the deficiencies -of nature. Russia has the chain of -fortresses and fortified positions, extending -from Kovno to Radom, which are intended -to hold an invading force in check until the -mobilisation can be completed. Special -attention has of late years been given to -the defence of the north-western frontier. -Plans have been drawn up for the construction -of more fortresses and of strategic -railways and military roads. But these -works are not yet in a sufficiently advanced -state to serve any practical end in the -present war.</p> - -<p>Germany, realising the significance of -Russia’s military reorganisation, has recently -spent huge sums on strengthening her -eastern frontiers. The works are by no -means complete, but they are more advanced -and of more practical service than those on -the Russian side of the frontier.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span> -To the south where Russia and Austria -meet, neither Power has taken or contemplated -taking any such extensive measures -for defence. Cracow, Lemberg and Przemysl -are the only fortresses of any value in -Galicia, and they are faced by fortifications -of about equal strength on the Russian side.</p> - -<p>Russia, however, possesses a very great -advantage over Austria, and in lesser degree -over Germany, in that the inhabitants of -Galicia and Eastern Prussia are mostly of -Slavonic origin and therefore more or less -strongly in sympathy with Russia. The -Poles being members of the Catholic Church -and having strong nationalistic aspirations, -the bond is less strong in their case. But -reference has already been made to the -results of the Russian Proclamation, and it -will be seen therefore that both Germany -and Austria are under the disadvantage of -having to defend hostile territories.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span> -At the moment when war was declared, -Russia had nine army corps, or about -400,000 men guarding her western frontiers. -Three corps were stationed at Warsaw, and -one each at Vilna, Grodno, Bialystok, -Minsk, Lublin, Rovno and Vinnitza. In -addition to these troops, there were three -army corps at Kiev and one at Odessa. -There was thus available for immediate -hostilities a total of about 600,000 men. -Against these Germany and Austria could -muster about 400,000 men. There were -German army corps at Königsberg, Dantzig, -Posen, Breslau, Allenstein and Stettin. -The Austrian corps were at Cracow, Lemberg -and Przemysl. This numerical advantage -on the side of Russia was further -increased by the withdrawal of some of -the German corps for service in the western -campaign. Russia might, therefore, have -made an immediate attack on Prussia with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -every prospect of success. But she refrained. -In the first place, time was not -of such particular importance as to warrant -the taking of any risks. In the second -place Russia needed all her energies for the -successful completion of the mobilisation. -And finally there was the Austrian menace.</p> - -<p>Theoretically Austria could muster her -two and a half million men, and invade -Russia long before the latter’s mobilisation -was complete. To Austria, then, was assigned -the task of maintaining the prestige -and reputation of the Mailed Fist in Eastern -Europe. Russian Poland was to be invaded, -Warsaw captured and the Russian -army kept at bay until the conquerors of -France could come and complete their -victorious work. Unfortunately for the -success of the plan, however, Austria could -not get her rheumatic knuckles into the -famous gauntlet. Even Serbia, exhausted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -though she was after two hard-fought wars, -proved more than a match for Austria. -And when the latter attempted to advance -into Russia, she found herself more or less -paralysed by her old enemy—internal dissension.</p> - -<p>In Russia the war was the signal for all -internal animosities to vanish and to leave -the nation pulsating with one determination. -In Austria the reverse was the effect. All -semblance of unity and loyalty in the -eastern provinces disappeared, the crisis -tore aside the artificial bonds and Austria -stood revealed for what she was and always -has been—a ramshackle collection of wrangling -races and creeds.</p> - -<p>Francis Joseph is the nominal ruler of a -heterogeneous collection of Germans, Magyars, -Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs, -Slovaks, Croatians, Rumanians and Italians. -Of a total population of fifty-three millions,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span> -half are Slavs. And it was with an army -drawn from all these sources that Austria -sought to invade Russia, the protector of -all the Slavs. She foresaw the likelihood -of trouble, and took measures accordingly. -The outbreak of the war was the signal for -a reign of terror to begin in Dalmatia, -Bosnia and Croatia and other Slav provinces. -In order to get the inhabitants -under military control and to take the -sting out of any revolutionary movement, -all the men up to the age of fifty were -mobilised. The newspapers were suppressed; -clubs and societies, even the -most harmless, were dissolved. The people -were forbidden to leave the towns and -villages; the leading Slavs were seized, -imprisoned and held as hostages.</p> - -<p>But even these ruthless measures could -not crush the rebellious spirit of the Slavs. -In Herzegovina the murder of some government<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -officials was followed by a wholesale -slaughter of priests held by the authorities -as hostages. Everywhere there were savage -acts of rebellion followed by more savage -acts of reprisal. In the army matters -reached a climax. The Slav regiments -mutinied. Concerted action was impossible -owing to the fact that the authorities kept -the Slav regiments separated and disposed -their loyal Teuton and Magyar regiments -in the most advantageous positions for -quelling any mutiny on the part of their -“comrades.” Nevertheless thousands of -Slavs mutinied rather than fight against -their brothers. They were shot to a man. -In some cases whole regiments refused to -serve and were promptly exterminated. -The mutinous spirit spread to Poland and -Bohemia. In Prague there were daily executions -and the Moldava ran red with -Czech blood.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -These measures of wholesale murder -were effective. The Slav regiments were -driven to the front at the points of their -“comrades” bayonets. But Austria’s -plans were already wrecked. The mutinous -spirit of her army had caused the mobilisation -to break down. Time was valuable; -the Russian mobilisation was pressing forward -to its triumphant conclusion. The -project of invading Russia and capturing -Poland became daily less likely of accomplishment.</p> - -<p>The campaign in the east therefore, -opened in the most inauspicious circumstances -for the Mailed Fist. All was well -with Russia and all was wrong with Austria. -The troops were sullen and utterly lacking -in the fighting spirit; they were badly led -and their equipment left much to be desired. -The Kaiser realised that in relying on -Austria he had made another serious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span> -miscalculation. Instead of being a useful ally -she appeared far more likely to prove a -millstone about his neck. Cripples are of -little use in war. Desperate efforts were -made to obtain more satisfactory help. -Italy and Turkey were alternately coaxed -and bullied. The world was deluged with -a frantic flood of wireless lies which were -obviously designed to attract help from -anywhere. But they were all in vain. -Fate seemed to have taken especial care to -have the last word.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, Germany had to content -herself with an attempt to revitalise the -Austrian millions. At any rate the material -was there, if only it could be forced into -shape. So German officers were requisitioned -for the Austrian army.</p> - -<p>The operations during this preliminary -phase of the war, during which Russian -effort was concentrated upon preparing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span> -for the coming advance, were necessarily -of a somewhat desultory and unimportant -nature. They were interesting chiefly as -showing in what way subsequent and more -important fighting would be likely to -develop.</p> - -<p>For some days nothing more exciting -occurred than a few collisions between -patrols guarding the frontiers. Then, on -August 3rd, the Germans made a definite -move. A small force from Lublinitz, a -town near the point where the Russian, -German, and Austrian frontiers meet, -crossed into Russia and occupied Tchenstochov. -Further to the north other -German forces seized Bendzin and Kalish, -in Poland. Russia immediately answered -this move by making a cavalry raid into -Prussia, with the result that Johannisburg -was occupied and a rather important railway -was broken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -The Germans, however, continued to be -aggressive. Numerous raids were made at -various points along the frontiers. In some -quarters it was feared that these raids were -the prelude to an early invasion. They -were, as a matter of fact, designed to -harass the Russians and keep them engaged -while the Germans completed the -mobilisation of the forces which were to -defend Eastern Prussia and, if possible, -invade Poland during the absence of the first -line troops in the western theatre of war. -These new forces were chiefly composed -of the Landwehr, and comprised about -twenty divisions of 20,000 men each, -with thirty-one cavalry regiments and six -batteries of artillery. This army, under -the command of General von Hindenburg, -was mobilised along a line about thirty -miles from the frontier. Its right flank -was protected by the marshes around Arys,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -while its left rested on Insterburg. Naturally -it took some days to collect this army and -prepare it for attack, and it was not until -nearly the middle of August that the Germans -were in a position to contemplate any -serious advance.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the Russians, who were -collecting considerable forces under General -Rennenkampf, were able to throw back the -cavalry which was harassing them, and to -make a tentative advance over the Prussian -frontier. On August 5th they entered -Eydtkuhnen without opposition, and proceeded -to advance towards the main German -army. It was not until they reached Stalluponen -that they encountered serious opposition. -A sharp action resulted in the -Germans being turned out of the town, -leaving 200 dead and some machine guns.</p> - -<p>This advance on the part of Russia was -hailed in the west as a definite invasion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span> -with the object of sweeping across Prussia -to Berlin. It was nothing of the sort. -Russia was only advancing because the -Germans had not yet collected their full -forces. Indeed, Russia was by no means -ready, and she carefully refrained from -pressing too far forward, pending the -completion of her own preparations. After -the affair of Stalluponen there was obviously -the temptation to push forward. But this -would have brought the attacking force -dangerously near the main German army -and dangerously distant from Russian support. -The advance, therefore, ceased until -stronger forces could be brought forward. -The German preparations, too, were progressing, -and they were able to deliver -vigorous attacks on the small invading force. -Numerous attempts were made to recapture -both Stalluponen and Eydtkuhnen, but all -were beaten back. Then, after an interval<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -of about a week, the main Russian army, -under General Rennenkampf pushed forward, -and the advance into Eastern Prussia -may be said to have definitely begun.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Germans had been active -further to the south. The provinces of -Kalish and Kelche in Russian Poland were -invaded. The invading forces were not in -any great strength, but the Russians did -not attempt to offer any serious opposition -to the advance, contenting themselves -with pursuing the same tactics as those -adopted by the Germans in Eastern Prussia. -The Germans, for their part, were in no -mind to hurry, and were content to advance -slowly and prepare for the coming shock -between the main armies. They established -themselves firmly along a line extending -from Sieradz in the north, through -Radomsk towards Kelche.</p> - -<p>In the preliminary operations between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span> -Russia and Germany, therefore, neither -side could claim any great advantage. The -Russians obtained a footing in Eastern -Prussia, and the Germans penetrated into -Russian Poland. As events turned out, -however, the latter was the more permanent -advantage.</p> - -<p>The operations between Russia and -Austria were more decisive. The invasion -of Russian Poland by the Austrians was a -very half-hearted affair. The mutinous -spirit of the troops and the wholly unexpected -success of the attack by the Serbians -and Montenegrins on Bosnia and Herzegovina -paralysed the Austrian advance. -Nevertheless, some progress was made in -Poland, thanks more to lack of opposition -than to any display of military virtues. -Forces from Cracow proceeded northward -over the frontier, and joined the Germans -between Kelche and Radomsk. This<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span> -advance was described in Berlin and Vienna -as a triumphant march on Warsaw, but it -was not anything so serious. Warsaw was -never in the slightest danger. However, it -was certainly an advance.</p> - -<p>The Russian invasion of Galicia, on the -other hand, was of definite significance. -As early as August 8th a Russian army -advanced from Rovno, crossed the Styr, -and obtained a footing across the frontier. -On the 10th the Austrians had their first -experience of the Cossacks. Two regiments -of infantry, supported by a regiment of -cavalry, occupied a position near Brody. -They were attacked by a company of Cossacks, -and in the course of a few minutes -were in the wildest flight, leaving ample -evidence of the prowess of the Cossacks.</p> - -<p>On the 12th the Russians gained an important -success by capturing Sokal, which -lies on the River Bug, just across the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span> -frontier. The town is an important railway -centre, and its possession was a matter -of vital interest to Austria. A determined -advance towards Vladimir Volynski was a -definite part of the Austrian programme. -If successful, the move would have had -far-reaching effects, for it would have -broken the railway between Rovno and -Warsaw, and so seriously impeded the completion -of the Russian mobilisation and -render communication between her central -and southern armies very difficult. For -this advance Sokal was the only possible -base of operations. The Austrians, therefore, -defended the town to the utmost of -their power. The passage of the Bug was -fiercely contended, but after some hours of -furious fighting, during which both sides -lost heavily, the Russians managed to capture -the bridge. This practically settled -the engagement. The town was unfortified,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span> -and at the mercy of the attacking force. The -Austrians, with the dreaded Cossacks in -pursuit, were soon in headlong flight out of -the town. The destruction of the railway -station and bridge rendered the Austrian -advance in this direction impossible for -some considerable time.</p> - -<p>When, therefore, on August 17th, a -general advance was ordered, Russia had -every reason to be satisfied with the state -of affairs. True, the enemy had established -themselves in Poland, but this was more -than balanced by the advances into Eastern -Prussia and Galicia. Russia indeed had -achieved more than she had reckoned on. -During this preliminary phase she had fully -expected that Poland would be invaded. -She had also expected that her right and -left flanks would have been more or less -seriously threatened by forces from Eastern -Prussia and Galicia during the most<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span> -difficult process of mobilisation. The forces -at Kovno and Rovno were sent to deal with -that menace, and to hold it in check until -the main armies were ready. They not -only achieved that object, but carried the -attack into the enemies’ countries.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Advance into Eastern Prussia</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The Russians must be somewhat of a disappointment -to many experts, professional -and amateur, whose supreme ignorance -of the conditions obtaining in the eastern -theatre of the war was only equalled by -their sublime confidence in the ability of a -steamroller to push forward, full steam -ahead, over all obstacles and against all -opposition. When towards the middle of -August the news came that Russia was -ready for serious business, it was confidently -predicted that the end was in -sight. It was only a matter of 180 miles -from the Russian frontier to Berlin, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -Germans had only Landwehr and Landsturm -forces, contemptible third-rate fighting -material, to defend her territories, -and Austria was too busy shooting her -own mutinous soldiers to be a menace to -anybody. Obviously then, said the strategists, -it could only be a matter of days -before the tramp of the Russian legions -would be heard perilously close to Berlin, -the Kaiser would have to withdraw his -forces from the west to meet the danger -in the east, the allies would overthrow -his weakened armies and hurl them back -against the oncoming Russian hordes. -Armageddon looked to be in danger of -degenerating into a race to Berlin.</p> - -<p>The expected has not happened. In -spite of many rumours it may be taken as -certain that the Germans have not to any -great extent reduced their forces in the west. -The fierceness of the fighting there is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -sufficient proof of this. And instead of being -on the very threshold of Berlin, the main -Russian armies are still 400 miles away.</p> - -<p>It is Russia’s due that this failure to -come up to expectation should be explained.</p> - -<p>It is quite true that from the most -westerly point on the frontier of Russian -Poland to Berlin is only a matter of 180 -miles. A glance at the map, however, -will show that Poland is more or less a -wedge driven into German territory. The -average distance from the frontier to Berlin -is much more than 180 miles. Nevertheless, -Russia might have made a dash on -Berlin along the route indicated. There -would be every likelihood, too, of the -dash proving successful. The country -would be favourable for a quick advance. -The communications are good—well-made -roads and direct railway connection with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -the Russian base at Warsaw. The River -Oder would be the only natural obstacle, -and the fortress of Posen the only artificial -one. And the country being open, it -would be easier to attack than to defend.</p> - -<p>But apart from the fact that the capture -of Berlin would no more crush Germany -than the occupation of Brussels has crushed -Belgium, such an advance would be doomed -to disaster. The invading army might -reach Berlin itself, but sooner or later, it -would find itself cut off from its supplies. -It would necessarily have left behind it -large forces of German troops in Eastern -Prussia, and equally strong Austrian armies -in Galicia. It could only be a matter of time -before Russia would meet with a greater and -more disastrous Sedan. Such a move would -be a terrible blunder of which no general in -his senses would be guilty.</p> - -<p>It may be objected that the German<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -troops in East Prussia were only Landwehr -reserves and that the <i>moral</i> of the Austrians -was so bad that it would have been possible -for Russians to leave sufficient forces to -hold both armies in check. In the first -place it has been amply proved, again and -again during the present war that the -partially trained reserves when capably led, -and in sufficiently large numbers, can hold -their own with first line troops. In the -second place, although the Slav regiments -were mutinous, Austria had quite two million -Teutons and Magyars in her army. These -men were unquestionably loyal and quite -capable of giving a good account of themselves.</p> - -<p>Before, therefore, they could set off -on that 180 mile journey, it was necessary -for the Russians to remove all sources of -danger to their rear. The Germans must -be turned out of Eastern Prussia or safely<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -held in their own territories, and the -Austrians swept from Galicia.</p> - -<p>The task of capturing Eastern Prussia -is one of unusual difficulty. It is a -region which it is very much easier to defend -than to attack. The greater part of it is -covered with marshes, lakes and forests, -most difficult country for an army to traverse. -The means of communication are -poor, the roads—a most important consideration -in connection with the movement -of the heavy artillery necessary for a -successful invasion—are in many instances -little better than tracks. Moreover, it is -strongly fortified. Königsberg is a first-class -modern fortress, whilst those on the -line of the Vistula at Thorn, Graudenz and -Dantzig are even more powerful. Königsberg -and Dantzig, it should also be noted, -have the advantage of being ports as well -as fortified towns. In other words, they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -could be used for large supplies of men and -material. An invading army, therefore, -could not content itself with merely masking -the fortresses unless it was supported -by a navy enjoying the command of the -sea. The Russian fleet was practically a -prisoner in the Gulf of Finland. The -German navy was in complete command -of the Baltic, and, therefore, to be safe, -the invading army would have to storm the -fortresses and gain possession of the ports.</p> - -<p>The German War Staff, of course, knew -perfectly well how difficult was Russia’s -task of subduing Eastern Prussia. Hence -it was not likely that they were in any way -panic stricken over Russia’s advance, at -least in that direction. Before that advance -could become dangerous the whole -of Eastern Prussia would have to be in -Russian hands and the passage of the -Vistula forced. There was every prospect<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -of Russia being busily engaged for weeks -to come.</p> - -<p>And it must not be forgotten that the -mobilisation was not complete at the time -that the general advance was ordered. -Thousands of troops cannot be gathered -from the farthest confines of Siberia and -transported across Asia and half-way across -Europe. Only the first phase was completed. -Time was still necessary before -Russia could put her full strength in the -field. The army under General Rennenkampf -which invaded Prussia did not -comprise the million men with which it -was credited. It is doubtful whether he -had half-a-million men with him. Certainly -he had no more during the early -stages of the campaign. Besides invading -Prussia, Russia had to invade Galicia, -drive back the forces invading Poland and -generally guard a frontier about seven<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -times as long as that between Germany -and France. Another reason why General -Rennenkampf’s army was not so large as -it was popularly supposed to be was the -fact that the Grand Duke Nicholas, the -Commander-in-Chief, did not, for reasons -that will be subsequently examined, regard -the invasion of Eastern Prussia as of such -paramount importance as the invasion of -Galicia.</p> - -<p>In dealing with this campaign, therefore, -its secondary importance should not for a -moment be forgotten. Both victory and -defeat must be tempered with the knowledge -that neither will have the far-reaching -effect hoped for or feared. Of course, that -is not to say that the Russians did not -care what happened in Prussia. If it should -prove that the defending German forces -were weaker than was believed, if it were -possible to overcome all transport difficulties,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span> -if Rennenkampf should march from -victory to victory, driving the Germans -back over the line of the Vistula, so much -the better. But such an accomplishment -would be a feat of arms worthy of Napoleon -himself. Rennenkampf was known to be -a remarkably clever general and great -things were expected of him—otherwise -he would not have been chosen for the -most difficult command—but there was no -reason to credit him with superhuman -genius.</p> - -<p>Popular enthusiasm, however, both in -Russia and the West, knowing nothing -of circumstances and conditions, and full of -implicit faith in Russian prowess, immediately -jumped to the conclusion that -Rennenkampf was the man who was -destined to alter the whole trend of the -war. The campaign, therefore, assumed -a rather exaggerated importance which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -was not remedied until actual events had -their inevitable sobering influence.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of the general advance, -the Russians found themselves firmly established -in the neighbourhood of Stalluponen. -Before them lay a strong German army, -under General von Hindenburg. The advantage -in numbers was with the Germans, -who were in the proportion of roughly -three to two. On the other hand they -were composed to a very large extent of -reserves. The smaller Russian army was -composed of fully trained first line troops. -The coming operations, therefore, were a -test of the comparative values of numbers -and training. Sheer numbers supported -by perfect discipline, such as that which -obtains in the German army, can accomplish -much in modern warfare. The -advance of the Germans in the western -theatre of war had already proved as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -much. And in these days when the personal -factor in warfare, at least so far as -the rank and file is concerned, has been -practically eliminated, and the tendency -is to rely for victory more and more on -artillery and material superiority rather -than on personal qualities, the age, training -and fitness of the troops is of less importance -than in the old days when battles consisted -of downright fighting. The finest troops -in the world are helpless when exposed to -an efficient artillery attack. In point of -artillery the two armies in Eastern Prussia -were about evenly matched, the superiority, -if any, being on the side of the Germans. -Consequently, it will be realised that the -Russians were faced with a difficult task.</p> - -<p>The advance, which after the taking of -Stalluponen had temporarily ceased, was -resumed with vigour. The region to the -north towards Tilsit was cleared of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span> -enemy. Cavalry patrols scoured the country -and there were innumerable minor -engagements. In all of these the Russians -were successful and the Germans were -forced to withdraw their outposts towards -the line Stillen, Gumbinnen and Goldap. -The only engagement of any importance -occurred some miles to the north of Stalluponen. -Here a strong Russian force fell -on a German army corps, which was occupying -a rather advanced position. The -fighting continued for practically a whole -day, and in spite of fierce Russian attacks, -the Germans held their ground. Towards -the evening, however, their left flank was -turned and soon they were in full retreat -towards Gumbinnen. The Russians captured -some hundreds of prisoners besides -eight field guns, twelve cannons and three -machine guns.</p> - -<p>Inspired by this success the Russians<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -pushed forward. But the Germans contested -every foot of ground. The Russian -movement, too, was considerably hampered -by the excellence of the German means of -obtaining information. Their airmen were -everywhere in evidence, and displayed the -greatest courage and daring in face of the -Russian aeroplanes, which were mostly of -the heavy Sikorski type. The latter, excellent -machines though they are, were outmatched -in point of speed by the German -Taube machines, and were therefore unable -to deal effectively with the menace from -the air. The country, too, was infested -with spies. Every movement of the -Russians was signalled to the defending -forces.</p> - -<p>On one occasion a large force of Cossacks -was sent to carry out a surprise attack on a -German force occupying a village to the -south of Stalluponen. As they moved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span> -forward, it was noticed that a haystack -had caught alight. A tramp and a pipe -were the explanation. The owner was -greatly upset at his loss and made every -effort to save his property. He worked -with desperate energy, throwing bucket after -bucket of water on the flames. The only -result, however, was that a dense column -of black smoke rose from the stack. The -Cossacks pushed on. A couple of miles -from the village they had to pass through -wooded country. Suddenly a storm of -lead swept through them. They had been -ambushed. In close formation, and scarcely -able to turn, they were mowed down -by the score. When the few survivors -returned to their headquarters the haystack -was still smouldering, but the owner had -disappeared. It was found subsequently -that the “water” which he had so vigorously -thrown on the flames was a chemical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -solution which had caused the dense clouds -of smoke, serving to warn the Germans of -the coming attack.</p> - -<p>The advance, however, continued in spite -of all the courage and cunning displayed by -the Germans. The Russian cavalry in -particular distinguished itself by its dash -and bravery. The German advance guards -and outposts were overwhelmed by the -fury of its attack. Thanks to its superb, -almost reckless, bravery and its bewildering -mobility, the way was cleared for the -main army, so that on the 19th it found -itself facing a strong German army defending -Gumbinnen.</p> - -<p>In the meantime a Russian force had -advanced in a north-westerly direction -from Bialestock and had crossed the frontier -at Prostken. Moving rapidly, it captured -Lyck after a sharp engagement, and pushed -on towards Lotzen. Here their progress<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span> -was barred by a German army corps holding -a strong position. Some desperate fighting -ensued, but the Russians forced their -way into the town and the Germans retreated -northward along the lakes towards -their main army at Gumbinnen.</p> - -<p>Obviously the time had now come for a -decisive engagement. Any further retreat -on the part of the Germans would entail -the abandonment of Insterburg, a most -important railway junction, the possession -of which was the key to the whole of the -country lying east of Königsberg and -Allenstein. The Germans, faced by the -main Russian army on the south-east -towards Goldap, and with its right flank -threatened by the victorious force marching -on from Lotzen, prepared for a determined -resistance.</p> - -<p>As early as the 17th the civilian inhabitants -had been ordered to leave the town,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -at the same time reinforcements were -brought up from the west and north so -that the strength of the defending army -amounted to about 200,000 men. On the -morning of the 20th, the Russian right -rested on the village of Pilkallen, its left -on Goldap. Everything was in readiness -for a determined onslaught. At dawn the -battle began with a terrific artillery duel. -Soon the shells of the heavy German guns -were causing havoc in the Russian lines, -but after a time the Russian artillery began -to manifest a superiority, and some of the -enemy’s guns were silenced. The Russian -infantry then moved forward to the attack, -and some of the most desperate fighting -of the war took place.</p> - -<p>The Russians were subjected to a merciless -fire from machine and field guns. On -all sides men were falling. But they never -wavered for an instant. On and on they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span> -pressed until they reached the German -trenches. There the bayonets got to work -and soon the defenders were forced to give -ground. But they were by no means -defeated. Time after time they hurled -themselves forward in the most desperate -counter attacks, but the Russians succeeded -in holding their own.</p> - -<p>It was during this period of the engagement -that one of the most significant -events—so far as Russia is concerned—of -the whole war occurred. A Russian battalion -was in the midst of a veritable inferno. -The Germans were determined to hold an -important position at all costs. The -Russians were equally determined to capture -it. On both sides the carnage had -been terrible. At last, with a desperate -rush, the Russians succeeded in getting to -grips with the Germans. Indescribable -hand-to-hand fighting ensued. In the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span> -midst of the mêlée a German bayoneted -the Russian Standard-bearer and seized the -flag. Emboldened by this emblem of -victory the Germans renewed their efforts -and dashed to the assistance of their comrade. -But before they could reach him a -young Russian had sprung forward, killed -him and recaptured the flag. With a howl -of disappointment the Germans attacked -him. For a moment he seemed to be -doomed. Germans, were all round him -struggling for the possession of the flag. -Then there came a deep-throated roar, a -sudden rush, and the Germans were hurled -back. The Russians had captured the -position and saved their flag.</p> - -<p>The youth who had held it against such -odds was afterwards discovered severely -wounded. He proved to be a young Jewish -medical student from Vilna, named Osnas. -He was at once hailed on all sides as a hero,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span> -and on being invalided back to Petrograd -the Commander himself gave orders that -every care was to be taken to save the life -of “Osnas the hero.” Subsequently he -received the military cross of St. George, -the Russian V.C., from the hands of the -Tzar himself.</p> - -<p>The significance of the incident does not -lie in the bravery of Osnas, but in the fact -that he was a Jew. His action, which has -made him a popular hero throughout the -Russian Empire, has done more to improve -the position of the Jews than any event in -the whole course of their history in Russia. -It has made the nation realise that a Jew -can be a worthy son of Russia.</p> - -<p>While these fierce attacks and counter-attacks -were taking place at the centre -and on the Russian left, determined -attempts were made to envelop the -right flank resting on Pilkallen. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span> -successful resistance of this movement was -chiefly due to the brilliant work of the -Russian cavalry.</p> - -<p>The Germans occupied a strong position -towards the north-west, from which their -artillery was able to pour a murderous fire -into the Russian ranks. At length it -became obvious that unless the guns were -silenced the Russians would have to retreat. -The Horse Guards were ordered to take the -guns. The first squadron charged straight -at the battery. There was an ominous -silence. The distance grew less and less. -Then at point blank range the gunners -fired. The squadron was practically annihilated. -The second squadron then -charged. It seemed as if it were doomed -to a like fate, but at the critical moment the -third squadron took the battery on the -flank. In a few minutes every gunner was -either sabred or fleeing for safety.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -For fourteen hours the battle raged until -darkness caused a cessation of hostilities. -The Russians were, on the whole, satisfied -with the results of the day’s work. They -had suffered heavy losses, but the enemy -had suffered more. They had made distinct -progress in the centre, had captured -thirty guns and large numbers of prisoners.</p> - -<p>The engagement on the 21st opened sensationally. -In the early hours of the morning -a strong force of Cossack cavalry moved -northwards and managed to envelop the -German left flank. Dawn was the signal -for a combined movement. The Germans -found themselves vigorously attacked in -the centre and left. For a time they held -their ground, but their position soon became -untenable. There was no holding the -Russian attack. A regiment of Cossacks, -finding the ground unsuitable for cavalry -operations, dismounted and hurled themselves<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -forward with all their reckless ferocity. -Gradually the Russians pressed forward -until they were attacking the enemy on -three sides. The result was then inevitable. -Von Hindenburg had the choice of flight or -of allowing his army to be surrounded. -He decided to retreat. Soon retreat degenerated -into rout, and vast quantities of -stores and ammunition, besides thousands -of prisoners fell into the hands of the -Russians.</p> - -<p>The battle of Gumbinnen was the first -decisive engagement of the war. Its immediate -result was to make Russia master -of the whole of Prussia east of the line -from Königsberg to Allenstein. There was -no position which afforded von Hindenburg -any hope of successful resistance even if he -were able to collect his routed troops. -Insterburg, the main point in the network -of German strategic railways, fell into<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span> -Russian hands on the evening after the -battle and ensured for Rennenkampf ample -supplies. Tilsit was isolated, and its capture -was a matter of convenience. The -whole region of the Mauer lakes was at the -mercy of the Russians.</p> - -<p>The moral advantages were as great as -the material. Von Hindenburg’s army had -been badly beaten, and would never be able -to face the Russians again with the same -confidence. Moreover, the rout of the -Germans and the reputation of the pursuing -Cossacks caused a panic throughout the -province. From every village and town -the inhabitants began to fly in terror, some -towards Danzig, others towards Graudenz -in the hope of reaching Berlin. Soon Danzig -was in a state of chaos. Two hundred and -fifty thousand refugees poured in with the -most exaggerated stories of the prowess -of the Russians. Commerce was at a stand-still;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span> -the prices of provisions rose daily. Soon -there was rioting in the streets. There was -no accommodation for the refugees, most -of whom were penniless, and who were -almost as numerous as the ordinary inhabitants -of the town. It was not until -the sternest measures had been taken by -the military authorities that the panic -subsided and some show of order was -restored.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Russians were following -up their victory with a vigorous pursuit. -Von Hindenburg’s army divided into two, -one portion retreating through Tapiau to -Königsberg, the other pressing in a south-westerly -direction towards Allenstein, and -the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz. The -former portion safely reached its destination, -which was invested by the Russians -on the 25th. On the same day Tilsit was -formally occupied. Meanwhile the main<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -Russian army, meeting with practically no -resistance, pushed on along the line of the -railway, occupying Angerberg and Korschen. -By this time, however, heavy German reinforcements -had come up, and the advance -began to be contested with increasing determination. -For three days there was vigorous -fighting in the neighbourhood of Allenstein. -Then, after inflicting heavy losses on the -Germans, Rennenkampf entered the town -and again forced von Hindenburg to retreat. -The action, however, was not a -decisive battle comparable with Gumbinnen, -and the Russian advance became -slow. Further fierce fighting, most of which -resulted satisfactorily to the Russians, took -place further to the south around Soldau -and Nesdenberg.</p> - -<p>The Russians, after a remarkably quick -advance through very difficult country, -had now come within hail of the line of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -Vistula. The line was protected by three -first-class fortresses covered by at least four -army corps in addition to the armies which -had been driven back by the Russians. -It was the critical moment of the campaign. -With their heavy numerical superiority -and strongly fortified position, the Germans -would be sure to make a more determined -resistance, and in greater force than any -which the Russians had yet had to meet. -In attacking the line Rennenkampf would -be handicapped by a lack of heavy siege -artillery, and by the numerical inferiority -of his forces. On the other hand his troops -comprised some of the finest fighting -material in the world, they were flushed -with victory and could be relied upon to -make a tremendous effort to win the -greatest triumph of all. If they could -drive the Germans over the Vistula and -bring up sufficiently large forces to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -Thorn, Graudenz and Danzig, the northern -route to Berlin would be open to them as -far as the Oder. The beginning of the end -would indeed have arrived.</p> - -<p>The Russians accordingly pushed forward. -But they did not advance much -further on the road to the Vistula. An -immense German army, heavily supported -by artillery, including numbers of the heavy -siege guns which had already proved themselves -to be the Kaiser’s most potent -weapons, awaited the Russians in a strong -position in the neighbourhood of Osterode, -midway between Allenstein and Graudenz.</p> - -<p>Von Hindenburg now proved himself to -be a leader of remarkable skill and resource -and he performed as brilliant a feat of -generalship as the war has yet produced. -Only a year before he had taken part in -the manœuvres in East Prussia, and was -acquainted with every inch of the ground.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span> -It was even stated that he had already -solved the exact military problem with -which he was now faced, and in the same -locality. In addition he enjoyed the -advantage of outnumbering the Russians -by at least two to one.</p> - -<p>These factors practically decided the -battle. The district around Allenstein and -Osterode is of the worst possible description -for an invading force. It is a mass of lakes, -swamps and forests, and an intimate knowledge -of the locality is essential for the -success of any military operations there. -There are almost insuperable difficulties in -the way of transport alone.</p> - -<p>Utilising his advantages to the full, -von Hindenburg lured the Russians towards -Tannenberg to the south-east of -Osterode. The Russians, realising that a -successful offensive was their only chance, -blundered forward. They pressed on until<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span> -they found themselves in a position where -their flanks rested on more or less solid -ground, but their centre was backed by a -vast swamp. Then von Hindenburg struck -his blow. An immense force was hurled -against the Russian right. A desperate -encounter followed, but sheer weight of -numbers gave victory to the Germans. -The Russians were forced back on to the -swamps. A similar attack on the Russian -left was equally successful.</p> - -<p>What followed was not a battle; it -was one of the most hideous slaughters -history has known. The Russians were -unable to manœuvre on the swampy -ground; the Germans, on the other hand, -were in possession of the solid higher ground -and free to move at will. From three sides -they poured a murderous fire into the -helpless Russians, forcing them deeper and -deeper into the swamps. Guns sank in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span> -the mud, horses were unable to move, men -stood up to their waists in the deadly slime. -The carnage continued until nightfall, when -Rennenkampf managed to escape with a -remnant of his army, leaving Generals -Samsonov, Martos and Pestitsch among -the thousands of slain.</p> - -<p>Thus von Hindenburg won the battle of -Osterode and obtained ample revenge for -his defeat at Gumbinnen.</p> - -<p>The battle caused a complete reversal -of the campaign. The route to Berlin via -the north was not only barred, but the -Russian advance was turned into a retreat. -Hopelessly outnumbered, Rennenkampf was -forced back on Allenstein. Every foot of -the way was contested, but bit by bit he -had to give up the results of his victorious -move forward. Allenstein and Intersburg -were in turn evacuated before the merciless -pressure of the advancing Germans. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span> -troops investing Königsberg were recalled. -It was not until the frontiers were almost -reached and strong reinforcements came up -from Kovno and Grodno that the German -advance was checked and finally held.</p> - -<p>In spite of official attempts at secrecy, -the news soon spread that the invasion of -Germany upon which Russia’s Allies had -placed such high hopes had ended in what -appeared to be complete failure. Berlin -was as far off as ever, and the Germans -were at the very gates of Paris. Something -had gone seriously wrong with the steam -roller on which so much had depended!</p> - -<p>The strategists were wrong in the blame -they heaped on Rennenkampf’s head because -of his failure. As a matter of fact, -his chief fault was that he had played his -part too well. He had never been expected -to push forward so far as Osterode. His -“advance” was intended simply to attract<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span> -German attention and to prevent Germany -from sending reinforcements to the Austrian -army. In attaining this object he succeeded -admirably. After the battle of -Gumbinnen the Germans poured regiment -after regiment of Landwehr and Landsturm -troops into Eastern Prussia, which otherwise -would have gone to the aid of the -Austrians. Rennenkampf’s unexpected success -took him too far forward. His advance -was so rapid that it was difficult to bring up -reinforcements. Osterode and its heavy -losses was the penalty he paid for success.</p> - -<p>The only really unfortunate result of -his efforts was that he attracted such strong -forces into Prussia that the Russians will -have great difficulty in dislodging them. -They are, however, strong enough to keep -them confined to their own territories, and -so have little to fear from that direction.</p> - -<p>Besides, there are other ways to Berlin.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Advance into Galicia</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>It has already been pointed out that Russia -could not advance directly on Berlin and -thus expose herself to the danger of being -cut off and annihilated by German armies -from East Prussia and Austrians from -Galicia. A march on Posen would more -likely than not have resulted in another and -more stupendous Sedan. In the previous -chapter it was shown that, for various -reasons, the Russian General Staff decided -not to threaten Berlin by the northern -route through Prussia. The nature of the -country was unfavourable for any such -movement; it was strongly fortified and -capably defended. Moreover, the fact that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span> -winter was approaching had to be taken into -account. Those who have had the misfortune -to spend the winter months at -Königsberg or other towns in Eastern -Prussia will agree with the Russian Staff -that the conditions during that period -of the year do not favour military or -any other operations. And it was essential -that Russia should maintain a vigorous -offensive, if only to keep faith with her -allies.</p> - -<p>That there was another route to Berlin, -and one which possessed many obvious -advantages, was overlooked by most of the -strategists. The route in question lies along -the banks of the Oder, through Silesia and -Saxony. If Russia could crush the military -power of Austria in Galicia and drive -the remnants of her armies across the -Carpathians, either pursuing them to Buda-Pesth -and Vienna or confining them to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span> -Hungarian plains, she would be free to -advance upon Breslau and Berlin.</p> - -<p>There are many advantages possessed by -this route. In the first place, it would be -safe, assuming that Austria were thoroughly -broken beforehand. The country is open and -well provided with railways, excellent roads, -and other means of communication; it contains -only one fortress of any strength—Neisse—which -could be easily masked, and -is generally favourable to a rapid advance. -An additional advantage is that Silesia is -a busy mining and industrial province, with -a population of nearly 6,000,000. The -invading army would be preceded by armies -of panic-stricken fugitives, who would impede -any defensive measures and strike -terror in Berlin long before the menace of -the invaders became serious.</p> - -<p>There can be little doubt, in view of -(1) that the chief Russian armies are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span> -engaged in Galicia and Poland, and (2) that -no serious attempt has been made either to -follow up General Rennenkampf’s remarkable -advance in East Prussia or to retrieve -the ground lost as a result of the defeat -at Osterode, that an advance on the lines -suggested through Galicia and Silesia is the -main feature of the Russian strategy. It -is the simplest, safest and most effective -route by which Germany could be invaded. -It is the one route an advance along which, -supported by a vigorous offensive from -Poland, would have an immediate effect -on the war in the west. When once the -Russians begin to march on Breslau, it will -be only a matter of weeks before they reach -Berlin, unless the Germans detach very -strong forces from their western army -and hurry them across to defend the -capital.</p> - -<p>But first of all, Austria must be smashed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -and Galicia and Poland swept clear of the -enemy.</p> - -<p>At the end of the preliminary phase of -the campaign, the Russians had already -gained a footing in Galicia in the neighbourhood -of the River Styr, whilst the -Austrians had advanced northwards from -Cracow and established themselves in -Poland. This Austrian army, after being -heavily reinforced, so that it amounted to -about 500,000 men, began to march northward -towards Warsaw. It was then still -further reinforced by a German army which -had advanced from Posen, and invaded the -Polish province of Kalisch. In Poland, -therefore, there was a very considerable -army which seriously threatened Lublin -and Warsaw, and would require heavy and -probably extended operations before it -could be forced back.</p> - -<p>A second Austrian army, smaller than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -the first, was in Galicia, with Lemberg for -its base.</p> - -<p>The operations against these two armies -constitute the real “Russian Advance,” the -movement intended to prepare for the crushing -of Austria and a march on Berlin. That -it would be slow was obvious. Opposing it -were, at the time under review, about -1,500,000 troops, with two first-class fortresses -in Cracow and Przemysl and a -hardly less strong position in Lemberg. -The question remained, how would Russia -act? Would she concentrate her attention -on driving the first Austrian army on to -Galicia, or would she deliver her main -attack on the second army, and invade -Galicia from the east, trusting on her -success and consequent menace to the -communications of the first army to force -that army back on to its base? The former -course would be the safer, for the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span> -Austro-German army was a more formidable -force than the second. The latter -course, if the more hazardous, had the -merit of speed. The Grand Duke Nicholas -decided to adopt this plan, much to the -surprise of the Austrians. An army was -sent from Warsaw to operate against the -Austro-German army in Poland, but the -main army, under General Russki, had -Kiev for base, and immediate preparations -began for a vigorous and sweeping movement -through Galicia.</p> - -<p>It was, however, essential for the success -of the plan that the Austro-German army -should be held in check until the menace -to its rear was strong enough to force it -back. If it were to capture Lublin or -seriously threaten Warsaw, the whole -scheme would be in danger of collapse.</p> - -<p>It must not be forgotten that while -these operations were in progress Austria<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span> -was fighting on her southern frontier against -Serbia and Montenegro. The war in the -south naturally affected to some extent -the war in the north. A series of victories -in the south would undoubtedly have -provided the Austrians in the north with -the moral tonic they so sadly needed. As -it happened, however, the war in the south -was a complete failure. Seven attempts -were made to capture Belgrade, an utterly -defenceless town, but each was repulsed. -The invasion of Serbia ended in the rout of -Shabatz. The Austrians thereupon abandoned -their operations against Serbia, and -threw all their forces into the northern war. -Whatever advantage was gained by this -increase in numbers was for the time being -more than counterbalanced by the shattered -<i>moral</i> of the additional troops. Mutiny -had already done much to destroy the spirit -of the troops. The companionship of men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -who had been routed by the despised -Serbians was not calculated to improve -matters. However, Austria needed every -man in the north to defend her reputation -as a first-class military power.</p> - -<p>Her plan of campaign amounted to an -attempt to force the reversal of the Russian -plan. The main army was to carry out a -vigorous invasion of Poland in two directions, -towards Lublin on the north-east -and towards Lodz on the north. The -latter movement would receive help from -the Germans operating in the province of -Kalisch. The success of these movements -would render a determined invasion of -Galicia from the east impossible. Russia -would have to change her plan and concentrate -her efforts on defeating the invading -Austrians and driving them back across the -frontier. Obviously this would have suited -the German plans admirably, because it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -would have delayed the Russian advance -indefinitely, and so relieve the dangerous -position resulting from the unexpected -success of the Russian mobilisation and the -equally unexpected failure of the attempt -to crush France in the course of a few weeks. -Viewing the war as a whole, therefore, the -main object of both sides was to gain time. -The Allies wanted to delay the German -advance until the pressure of Russia on the -east became unbearable. The Austrian -object was to hold Russia in check and -so enable Germany to maintain an undiminished -army in the west. The issue of -the whole war now depended on the efforts -of Austria, for even if the Allies in the west -were able, as the result of a vigorous offensive, -to force the Germans out of France and -Belgium, it was extremely doubtful whether -they would be able to invade Germany -itself with anything more than moderate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span> -success, unless the Germans were forced to -divide their troops more or less equally -between the two frontiers.</p> - -<p>The most important operations in the -east, therefore, were the advance of the -main Austrian army on Lublin and the -advance of the Germans through Kalisch. -Until these were positively checked the -projected Russian advance could not be -pushed forward. But, once checked, a successful -Russian advance would cause the -retirement or downfall of these invaders of -Poland unless they were heavily reinforced.</p> - -<p>The campaign opened with a serious -defeat for Russia. The Austrian army -crossed the frontier and established contact -with the defending forces in the neighbourhood -of Krasnik, a little town some fifteen -miles across the border. Details of the -engagement are very few. Officially, the -Russians ignored it, being wholly taken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span> -up with the telling the world about their -successes in Prussia. What appears to -have happened was that the Russians did -not expect the enemy to throw forward -such strong forces, and were taken by -surprise. Heavily superior in point of -numbers and well supported by artillery, -the Austrians, while unable to break the -Russian centre, seem to have successfully -carried out a flanking movement. The -Russians fought gamely, and inflicted heavy -losses on the enemy, but their defeat was -inevitable. The Austrians claimed to have -captured some thousands of prisoners and -much artillery. In view of the results of -the battle, it is quite possible that their -claims were not exaggerated.</p> - -<p>The serious results of this engagement -were at once apparent. The heaviness -of the defeat made it impossible for the -Russians to make a determined resistance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span> -against the Austrian advance for some time. -The Austrians overran Kelche and pressed -forward on Lublin.</p> - -<p>In the course of this advance the Austrians -made brave attempts to imitate -their German allies. The occupation of -Kamenetz Podolski was a good example -of their efforts to play the Hun. The town -was captured after a sharp engagement, in -the course of which the Austrian commander -had the misfortune to be slightly -wounded. His first act was to demand -200,000 roubles, 200 horsed carts, 800 poods -of bread and 60 oxen. Unless this levy -were forthcoming by eight o’clock the -next morning, the mayor was to be hanged -and the town sacked. At the best of -times this would have been an almost impossible -demand on the resources of Kamenetz, -which is only a small town. On -the approach of the Austrians the Municipal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -Treasurer, the bankers and all the wealthy -families had fled, taking their riches with -them. Nobody in the town had so much -as twenty-five roubles in his possession.</p> - -<p>The mayor went to inform the general -that it was impossible to fulfil his demands. -The general replied that he would bombard -the town unless the whole levy were -delivered by eight o’clock.</p> - -<p>The night was spent by the inhabitants -in the impossible task of trying to raise -the money. Rings, watches and jewellery -of all kinds were collected. The churches -were stripped of their crucifixes and plate. -A valuable collection of old coins, worth at -least 15,000 roubles, left the scales at an -appraisement of seven hundred roubles. -At half-past six in the morning it was -found that not more than five or six -thousand roubles’ worth of gold and silver -had been collected towards the 200,000<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -demanded. The mayor went to find the -general in the forlorn hope that the latter -would relent. The inhabitants crouched in -their cellars awaiting the dreaded bombardment.</p> - -<p>Eight o’clock passed and nothing happened. -The Austrian general had left during -the night, leaving a colonel as governor of -the town. The latter gravely assessed the -levy at 25,000 rubles, returned the crucifixes -and church plate and announced that he -was perfectly satisfied. Then a few hours -later, acting on instructions from Vienna, -he returned the whole levy, to the utter -bewilderment of the inhabitants.</p> - -<p>But in spite of these half-hearted attempts -to imitate the Huns, there is no -doubt that for a time the advance of the -Austrian army was a serious matter. General -Bankal, the commander of the force, -drove the Russians from position after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -position in a series of desperate engagements -and it was not until he reached the line -Lublin Kholm that he was definitely -checked, and General Russki was able to -advance in earnest.</p> - -<p>The primary cause of General Bankal’s -check was the fact that he found himself face -to face with a strong Russian army, with -the fortress of Ivangorod for a base. This -army was as large as his own, and occupied -an immensely strong position. Bankal, -realising the necessity for maintaining the -offensive, attempted to break through the -Russian centre. After a heavy bombardment -he threw his men forward in close -formation, hoping by force of numbers to -cut a way through. The attempt was -a costly failure. A second and third attempt -fared no better. Then, realising -that his position was hopeless in the face -of such superior forces, Bankal retired,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span> -and soon was in full retreat towards the -south.</p> - -<p>In this battle the Russians captured over -5,000 prisoners; whilst the Austrian losses -may be estimated from the fact that over -3,000 of their dead were buried by the -victors.</p> - -<p>A secondary cause contributing to General -Bankal’s failure was the lack of German -support from Posen. This was the direct -result of General Rennenkampf’s successful -offensive in Eastern Prussia. In the previous -chapter it was shown how, after the -battle of Gumbinnen and the rapid advance -through Allenstein, the Germans brought up -several army corps to cope with the menace. -They drove back Rennenkampf, but only -at the cost of starving their offensive in -Poland. They were unable to reinforce -both the defensive line of the Vistula and -the armies attacking Poland, unless they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span> -withdrew a portion of their forces from -the western theatre of war. In spite of -rumours, it may be stated for certain that -no such withdrawal took place. There was -no apparent diminution of German power -in the west, and no reinforcements arrived -in Poland.</p> - -<p>The Germans, however, managed to penetrate -as far as Lodz. Their advance was -more due to lack of opposition than to -their own prowess. They were in no great -numbers, and on meeting with a superior -force at Pobianitz, they at once began to -retire without offering any serious resistance.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, their advance, insignificant -as it was, is worthy of attention as affording -a comparison between themselves and their -Austrian allies. The latter in the course -of their advance made half-hearted attempts -to win a reputation for savagery, such as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -the incident at Kamenetz, but on the -whole, their conduct, apart from much -drunkenness and a little looting, was admirable. -The Germans, on the other hand, -fully lived up to the reputation which their -comrades in Belgium had won for themselves.</p> - -<p>Their chief exploit was the sacking of -Kalisch. During the German occupation -of the town in the early stages of the -war it was stated that some of the -inhabitants had fired on the soldiers. -General Preusker, the German commander, -at once indulged in the most savage reprisals. -Numerous inhabitants were shot. Some -hundreds of the leading citizens, including -the priests, were seized as hostages and -forced to lie for hours under a broiling sun. -Then suddenly they were marched out of -the town and were told to prepare for -execution. When all was ready, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span> -wretched prisoners thought that their last -moment had come, the order was countermanded. -The town was then bombarded -by the German artillery. The town hall -and all the chief buildings were ruined, -hundreds of innocent men, women and -children were killed. After witnessing the -destruction of their homes the hostages -were sent as prisoners to Posen.</p> - -<p>After this savage display, General Preusker -issued a proclamation to the Poles, -stating that the Kaiser, in return for their -help, would effect the regeneration of the -Polish nation through the influence of -Western culture. Needless to say, the proclamation -met with no response.</p> - -<p>The news of this event naturally caused -something of a panic in Western Poland. -At Lodz, for instance, the approach of the -Germans resulted in the town being in -danger of falling into a state of anarchy.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -The administrative authorities and the -bankers immediately fled to Warsaw, leaving -the town, which has over 600,000 -inhabitants, without protection and without -money. The manufacturers, to their -credit, stayed in the town. The closing of -the banks rendered them for the time being -penniless, and there was danger of riots -from their employés who could not be paid. -The workpeople, however, kept their heads, -and notes were issued by a committee of -leading citizens. Owing to the impossibility -of providing them with food, the -prisoners had to be released. For a time -the fate of the town hung in the balance. -The most trivial event might have inflamed -the workpeople. But, thanks in no small -measure to the fact that all the taverns had -been closed since the beginning of the -mobilisation, calm was gradually restored. -It was almost a relief when the Uhlans at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -last appeared and the thoughts of the -people were distracted by the new menace.</p> - -<p>The fighting around Lodz, although temporarily -decisive in that it resulted in the -Germans being driven back over the frontier, -was of only small extent. It was here, however, -that the Cossacks gave the <i>Nemetz</i> a -taste of their qualities. Indeed, the exploit -of Kusma Krutchakov and his companions -was one of the most courageous feats of -the whole war.</p> - -<p>He was out on patrol duty with his comrades, -Stchergolkov, Astachov, Ivankov; -and Rvatchov, when they learned that -twenty-seven German horsemen had been -seen in their immediate neighbourhood. -Rvatchov was at once despatched to headquarters -with the news, while the others, -without a moment’s hesitation, set out to -tackle their formidable antagonists, whom -they had seen disappearing behind a hill.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -After making a detour to escape observation, -the Cossacks divided into pairs, Krutchakov -and Ivankov approaching the Germans -from the rear, the other two from the -front. The leader of the patrol attempted -to inveigle the Germans into a bog, but in -this he was unsuccessful, and the whole -party charged down upon the Cossacks, -who made off on their swift horses.</p> - -<p>As soon, however, as the Germans gave -up the chase Krutchakov and his companion, -who had meanwhile been joined by -the other two, followed them and continued -the pursuit for four miles. At last, getting -the enemy in full view in the open country, -they dismounted and opened fire. The -Germans now saw that they had only -four men to deal with, and charged down -upon them at a gallop.</p> - -<p>At this the Cossacks mounted and prepared -for a hand-to-hand struggle. As the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">160</a></span> -Germans approached, their officer was shot -dead. They then closed in upon Ivankov, -who was nearest to them, and attacked -him with their lances.</p> - -<p>Before they could get him down, however, -his three companions had sprung in to his -assistance.</p> - -<p>Krutchakov swung to one side and -engaged three of the Germans, while his -comrades together got into a close scuffle -with the rest. While one German was trying -to run Astachov through the body, he -himself was pierced by the lance of Stchergolkov -and fell to the ground. Another -German aimed a blow at the head of -Stchergolkov, but was just in time put -down by Ivankov. Three Cossacks then -broke free from the mêlée, Ivankov and -Astachov on one side, pursued by six -Germans, and Stchergolkov on the left, -with three of the enemy on his heels. When -the Germans abandoned the pursuit Ivankov -and Astachov dashed in to the assistance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">161</a></span> -of Krutchakov, who, at first beset by -three Germans, now had a dozen round -him.</p> - -<p>Against these desperate odds he was -defending himself with coolness and address. -A non-commissioned officer aimed a blow -at his head, but he parried it by swinging up -his carbine. His fingers were slashed, but -not severed, and, dropping the carbine, he -seized the sword and chopped his assailant -down.</p> - -<p>When at length help arrived, only five -Germans remained alive. Krutchakov had -received sixteen wounds, and his horse -eleven. Stchergolkov was wounded in two -places, whilst Ivankov escaped with only -one hurt.</p> - -<p>The retreat of General Bankal from Lublin -and the driving back of the Germans -from Lodz left General Russki free to move -forward in earnest. The conditions were at -once reversed. Hitherto the successful advance -of General Bankal had caused his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">162</a></span> -army to be the most important factor in -the campaign. Now it was only of secondary -importance. The centre of interest -had shifted from Poland to Eastern Galicia.</p> - -<p>The advance which was now beginning -was the most important move in the war. -On its success or failure depended the issue -of the whole war. If the Austrians had -been powerful enough to inflict a really -decisive defeat on General Russki, the whole -plan of the Allies would have been thrown -to the ground. Russia, instead of advancing, -would have been forced to act on the -defensive, at least for a time, and her Allies -in the west would have had to abandon all -hope of help until the lost ground could be -retrieved and a fresh advance begun. In -view of the supreme importance of success -and of continued success, every care was -taken to render the advancing army as -invincible as human endeavour could make -it. It represents the flower of the Russian -army, from general to rank and file the Tzar<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">163</a></span> -could put no finer force into the field. Its -failure would appear to be impossible.</p> - -<p>The Russians crossed the frontier at -several points. It is at once apparent that -they would have the advantage of operating -in a friendly country. The Ruthenians -welcomed them as heaven-sent deliverers. -Every man up to the age of fifty had been -summoned to the Austrian armies, but the -women, children and old men who were left -were wild with delight. Processions, headed -by priests, went forward from the villages -to greet the invaders; food and provisions -were gladly given to the troops.</p> - -<p>The first action of any magnitude was the -storming of Tarnopol. The Austrians were -in strong force, well entrenched and supported -by artillery. On the morning of -August 23rd the Russian attack began. -For some time an artillery duel raged, and -then the Russian infantry began to advance. -It was received with a hail of bullets from -rifles and machine guns. For four hours<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">164</a></span> -the battle continued, the Russians gradually -pressing forward. Meanwhile their shrapnel -was working havoc in the Austrian trenches. -The defence was showing signs of flagging. -A bayonet charge settled the affair. Unable -to keep back the Russians, the Austrians, -rather than face the bayonets, abandoned -their positions and fled into the town.</p> - -<p>But victory was not yet achieved. With -the aid of machine guns mounted on church -towers and prominent buildings, the Austrians -kept up a murderous fire on the -Russians. The order was given to storm the -town, street by street. In fighting of this description, -in which the personal element predominates, -the Cossacks excel. With ruthless -completeness they scoured the town -until there was not an Austrian defender -left. Thousands lay dead in the streets; -the rest were in full flight towards the main -Austrian army defending Lemberg. Several -machine guns, some artillery, and numerous -prisoners fell into the hands of the Russians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">165</a></span> -This victory forced back the Austrian -centre, and gave the Russians possession of -the north-eastern corner of Galicia.</p> - -<p>The next move was to force back the -Austrian right on to Lemberg, and so -gather the enemy into a suitable position -for a decisive attack and also gain possession -of all the means of communication in -Eastern Galicia. This was effected successfully -by the engagement at Halish, a small -town on the Dniester, on which the Austrian -right rested. Here the victory was in the -main due to the dash and courage of the -Russian cavalry. Early in the engagement -the enemy’s cavalry was put out of action. -In the meantime their artillery had been -playing with good effect on the Russian -infantry. But a cavalry charge on the -flank silenced the guns and the infantry -was able to advance. The Austrians made -a desperate resistance, but were soon forced -into flight.</p> - -<p>General Russki, now master of all Galicia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">166</a></span> -east of Lemberg, immediately began his -preparations for the attack on what was -now the chief Austrian army, defending -that important town.</p> - -<p>Before, however, dealing with the operations -round Lemberg, it is necessary to refer -to the other Austrian army—that under -General Bankal. After its defeat between -Lublin and Kholm, this army retreated -southwards in the direction of Tomasov. -Any further advance into Poland being out -of the question, General Bankal’s object -was to join forces with the army defending -Lemberg, and so present a greater resistance -to General Russki’s advance. The -troops, which had been occupying the -Polish province of Kielce were also hurriedly -withdrawn towards Lemberg. In order to -prevent this threatened junction of forces, -the Russians made the most determined -efforts to overtake the Austrians. For -some days, however, Bankal, in spite of -heavy losses of artillery and stores, managed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">167</a></span> -to elude his pursuers. It was not until he -was within a few miles of Tomasov that he -was forced to give battle. There he was -met by a force sent forward from the right -flank of General Russki’s army. Hastily -entrenching himself, he prepared for a -desperate attempt to throw back the -Russians and force his way to Lemberg. -His position, however, was hopeless. Faced -by a force superior in every way, and -attacked on his left flank by the Russians, -who had been pursuing him, defeat was -inevitable. Nevertheless, the Austrians -fought desperately, and inflicted heavy -losses on the Russians. But their own losses -were terrible. Entire regiments were annihilated. -A shrapnel shell killed Bankal -himself, and several of his staff officers. -Within a few hours the remnants of the -army were pouring over the frontier in full -flight for Przemysl.</p> - -<p>In this engagement the Russians captured<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">168</a></span> -five thousand prisoners and twenty pieces -of artillery.</p> - -<p>In the meantime the remaining Austrian -forces in Poland were faring but little -better. At Podgorzo, the troops from Kielce -who were endeavouring to join General -Bankal’s army, and push forward to Lemberg, -were forced to give battle as a result -of a successful turning movement from the -north-east. Here again the fighting was -of a desperate character, but again the issue -was inevitable. Three thousand prisoners -and large quantities of artillery and stores -fell into the hands of the Russians.</p> - -<p>Thus ended to all practical intents, the -preliminary Austrian advance into Poland. -It was not until later, when the German -victory at Osterode enabled large forces to -be thrown into Poland, that the enemy were -able to make any definite impression in that -quarter.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the movement which it was -supposed to prevent was developing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">169</a></span> -strongly. The battle for the possession -of Lemberg had already been fought and -won.</p> - -<p>That the Austrians were determined to -defend the town at all hazards may be -judged from the fact that they had accumulated -there sufficient stores for a year. -The defending army formed a semicircle -facing north and east, with the fortress in -the centre. By pushing forward his right -wing towards the west, General Russki -formed another outer semicircle. Then the -Russian semicircle began to contract, and -with vice-like pressure forced the Austrian -line back and back.</p> - -<p>The battle lasted for seven days, and the -fighting was of the most stubborn nature. -By means of successive bombardments and -infantry attacks on the defending forces, -the Russians gradually forced themselves -forward. But every inch of ground was -contested, and the losses on both sides were -enormous. As the days passed, however,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">170</a></span> -the superiority of the Russian artillery -began to assert itself, and the Austrian fire -weakened. At all points the Russians were -increasingly successful. At length on the -seventh day the main Austrian force, comprising -five army corps, was driven back -with heavy loss on to the town itself.</p> - -<p>This was the beginning of the end. At -half-past two in the morning the actual -storming of the town began. The Austrians -attempted to reform their forces, but -were thrown into confusion by repeated -artillery and cavalry attacks. The Austrian -left was driven in. The whole army -was in danger of being surrounded.</p> - -<p>At this stage of the conflict an episode -occurred which finally sealed the fate of the -Galician capital. A particularly searching -fire was directed by the Russian batteries -at the centre before the town, their object -being to impede the retreat of the Austrians, -who had been beaten on the right flank, -and, if possible, to surround the town<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">171</a></span> -completely before its garrisons could be -withdrawn.</p> - -<p>In the hope of checking the Russian advance -till the town had been evacuated, the -Austrians threw out a rearguard screen of -Slav troops with a backing of Magyars, -who received orders to shoot the Slavs down -from behind the moment they showed any -hesitation. This circumstance became -known to the Russian commander, and at -the critical moment a terrific artillery fire -was opened over the heads of the Slavs upon -the retreating Austrian columns. This -dropping hail of projectiles set up a wild -panic in the ranks of the enemy. Abandoning -guns, ammunition, and stores, his troops -broke into frantic disorder, and fled helter-skelter -along the road to Grodek.</p> - -<p>This was shortly after nine o’clock, and -proved to be the decisive stroke of the -battle. It appeared that the Austrians -then lost all hopes of holding the town, for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">172</a></span> -the strong forts by which it was defended -rapidly fell one after another.</p> - -<p>It was now that the strong Russian forces -poured into the town from the north, and -the final battle began in the streets. For -some time the fierce fight was kept up, -but the Austrian detachments, recognising -the hopelessness of their position, surrendered -one by one.</p> - -<p>The Slav inhabitants received the conquerors -with demonstrations of delight and -shouts of “Long live the army of the -Russian liberators.” The singing of the -Russian National Anthem mingled with the -last shots fired at the routed Austrians in -the neighbourhood of the town.</p> - -<p>Then the progress of the Russian regiments -through the town became like a -triumphal procession. As they passed down -the streets cheers were raised, and flowers -were showered upon them from the crowded -windows. At half-past ten the Russian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">173</a></span> -flag fluttered out from the staff on the roof -of the Town Hall.</p> - -<p>Russia thus achieved the first great -triumph of the war and ensured the accomplishment -of the first step towards Berlin—the -smashing of the military power of Austria. -In addition they had won 637 guns, -44 quickfirers, flags, and 64,000 prisoners, -in addition to immense stores of ammunition -and provisions.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">174</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">The Significance of Lemberg</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The Austrians had prepared Lemberg for -a siege of at least a year. The Russians -captured it in a week. The fortresses, -which were reckoned as first-class examples -of modern fortifications, were reduced to -ruins by the bombardment of the Russian -heavy artillery. The victory, therefore, -proved to the Russians, just as Liège and -Namur had proved to the Germans in the -west, that modern fortresses are helpless -against modern artillery. The Russians -employed no remarkably heavy guns, but -merely their ordinary siege howitzers. -There are no secrets about these weapons. -They are of about the same calibre and -weight as those of the Germans and of every -other army. The question of transport<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">175</a></span> -limits the size of these weapons, and no -nation can employ a gun which exceeds a -certain well-defined standard. Just as, -however, the fall of Namur and Liège was -responsible for rumours of secret monsters -from Krupp’s of infinite power, so the fall -of Lemberg was responsible for similar -rumours about the Russian guns. In each -case the rumours were absurd, for the -simple reason that guns of such immense -power would be too heavy to move.</p> - -<p>In any case, the Russians had every -reason to be satisfied with the performance -of their guns. They had proved themselves -capable of reducing the finest modern fortifications. -What had been accomplished at -Lemberg could be done with equal facility at -Przemysl, Cracow, Posen and all the other -fortresses guarding the road to Berlin. -Germany and Austria have spent millions -on these fortresses, which have been proved -to be practically worthless as obstacles in -the path of an invader.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">176</a></span> -The remarkable speed with which the -position had been taken, coupled with the -enormous losses inflicted on the defending -army, was certain to have a most damaging -effect on the <i>moral</i> of the Austrians. -Owing to racial jealousies and hatreds the -Austrians had already displayed a lack of -cohesion and fighting spirit, except perhaps -in the German and Magyar regiments -operating with the chief army in Poland. -Now the last shreds of moral force would -disappear. The troops had been sullen and -half-hearted; now they were dejected as -well. To extricate herself from a very -critical position Austria demanded the -utmost spirit and determination from her -troops. In her hour of need there was -every prospect of their failing her.</p> - -<p>The magnitude of the defeat, coupled -with the rout of the army in Poland, -made it impossible for Austria to make any -further offensive movement in Russia, or -defensive movement in Galicia for some<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">177</a></span> -considerable time. Her armies were scattered -in confusion and fleeing at random. -To arrest the flight of a routed army, to -disentangle the units and to present a -battle front again is the most difficult task -a commander can have. And in the present -case the difficulties of the Austrian generals -were increased a hundredfold by the fact -that their men were not only defeated -but broken in spirit. Further resistance -east of Przemysl was out of the question. -The Russians were undisputed masters of -Eastern Galicia.</p> - -<p>The Russians, therefore, gained an immense -moral advantage over the troops -facing them. The material gains were on -a similar gigantic scale.</p> - -<p>Lemberg had been expected by the -Austrians to hold out indefinitely. It contained -a year’s supply of provisions and -munitions. These vast quantities of stores -fell into the hands of the Russians, thus -lightening very considerably the strain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">178</a></span> -upon the transport and commissariat departments. -Lemberg, moreover, being the -capital of Galicia and the chief Austrian -military centre north of the Carpathians, -contained an arsenal, railway works, and -numerous other works useful to the invaders. -The huge capture of rolling stock was -perhaps the most valuable of all. When -it was seen that it was doubtful whether -the town would be able to hold out long, -the Austrians had collected all the available -rolling stock, in order to remove as much -as possible of the stores west to Przemysl -and Cracow. The rapid success of the -Russians prevented the carrying out of -this plan. The Austrians made desperate -efforts, but the lines became hopelessly congested, -and not a train escaped. Thirty -locomotives and immense numbers of carriages -and trucks thus fell into the hands of -the Russians.</p> - -<p>Most important of all were the strategic -results. Lemberg, being the chief town<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">179</a></span> -in Galicia, and the administrative centre, -the town is naturally the point on which -all the means of communication converge. -Eight railways and as many high roads -connect the town with every point of civil -and military importance north of the Carpathians. -It is, therefore, an ideal base -for the Russian operation in Galicia. It -commands the approaches to Przemysl on -the west and to the passes over the Carpathians -leading to Vienna and Buda-Pesth on -the south. It has railway connection with -no less than four points on the Russian -frontier, allowing direct communication -with the important military centres of Kiev -on the east and Warsaw on the north.</p> - -<p>Lemberg may therefore be described as -the key to Austria. Its possession opened -the way for the Russian armies westwards -to Silesia and Berlin, southwards to Buda-Pesth -and Vienna. It was the most important -town in the whole eastern theatre -of war, and its capture was far more than<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">180</a></span> -a stage in an advance, it was an event -which must have the most far-reaching -effects on the whole course of the war.</p> - -<p>In addition to these direct advantages -gained by Russia, the victory had other -results affecting the course of the war. It -roused the entire Slav race, giving increased -enthusiasm and determination to those -engaged in the war and strengthening -the sympathies of those who had remained -neutral. Bulgaria and Roumania, neither -of whom were on friendly terms with the -Serbs as a result of the recent wars in the -Balkans, now veered round at the prospect -of the power of the Austrians being broken. -More important was the effect produced on -Turkey. Bound to Germany in many -ways, Turkey had been seriously considering -whether she should not throw in her lot -with the Kaiser in the hope of regaining -some of the territory of which she had -been despoiled after the Balkan war. German -diplomacy had been making strenuous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -efforts to induce the Turkish Government -to tempt fate once more. And relations -between Russia and Turkey had been rather -strained over the <i>Goeben</i> incident. The -purchase of Germany’s finest Dreadnought, -by Turkey, was of vital interest to Russia, -who could not afford to allow Turkey to -become the chief naval power in the south-east -of Europe. In answer to her representations, -Turkey had protested her determination -to remain neutral, but there was -considerable cause for doubting the sincerity -of these protestations. The fact -that there were numerous German officers -with the Turkish army and superintending -the placing of the heavy Krupp guns in -position along the fortification of the Dardanelles -did not tend to allay the suspicions. -After Lemberg, however, Turkey realised -that Austria was a broken power, that -Germany was in a position of some jeopardy -and that neither was a suitable ally for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">182</a></span> -a nation whose chief object was to rob -its neighbours.</p> - -<p>Although, however, the capture of Lemberg -was a triumph of the first magnitude -which rendered the downfall of Austria -inevitable, it must not be assumed that -Russia’s task was to all intents and purposes -accomplished. It was rashly predicted at -the time, as in the case of every Russian -victory, that the end of the war was in -sight, that there was nothing to prevent -the steam roller going full speed ahead to -Berlin. Subsequent events have proved -how ill-founded were these prophecies, most -of which were based more on hope than on -fact. Lemberg fell during the first week -of September, and Russia is still a very long -way from Berlin.</p> - -<p>One triumph does not smash a nation, -not even a ramshackle one such as Austria. -After Lemberg she was in a desperate -position, faced with almost certain defeat, -but she still had considerable fighting power.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">183</a></span> -France struggled for over a year after Sedan. -And Lemberg was not such an overwhelmingly -decisive event as Sedan. The latter -resulted in the surrender in an Emperor, -his finest generals, and his chief army. Lemberg, -after all, only routed the chief Austrian -army. In spite of terrific losses, and in spite -of the demoralisation of her troops, Austria -still had over two million men in the field -and a large number of reserves, as yet -untouched. Obviously she was still a -power that could not be neglected.</p> - -<p>Large numbers of Austrians were still -in south-west Poland. The fortresses of -Cracow and Przemysl were untaken, and -were defended by practically the whole remaining -military force of the country. -And reinforcements were being hurried up -to help stay the Russian advance. The -operations against Serbia and Montenegro -had been finally abandoned, further reserves -were being called to the colours, and -the armies thus raised were being hurried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">184</a></span> -northward. German aid was also forthcoming. -The success of the operations in -Prussia had set free some of the army corps -for the purpose for which they were originally -intended.</p> - -<p>Germany was also forced to realise that -the Russian advance was a serious menace, -and it was now that she transferred troops -from the west to the east. This eased -the task of the Allies, but, of course, -made that of the Russians all the more -difficult. The German advance into -Western Poland, which has now continued -for nearly two months, is as determined -as that into France. Unless, therefore, -the Russians can win a stupendous victory, -this second phase of the war will be prolonged. -There can, however, be no doubt -as to the final result. Russia is inexhaustible.</p> - -<p>To sum up, then, the capture of Lemberg -was one of the most significant events of -the whole war. The tide of victory had<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">185</a></span> -now definitely turned in favour of Russia, -nothing short of a miracle could stem it. -But Russia was still faced with a task of -considerable magnitude, and much time -and patient work was necessary before it -could be finally accomplished.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">186</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -<span class="subhead"><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>To the unthinking, Russia has proved -somewhat disappointing. Such great things -were expected of her by those who knew -nothing of the conditions in the eastern -theatre of war. At the end of over a month -of fighting she had not advanced a mile -along the direct road to Berlin. Her army -in the north, after an advance which was -acclaimed as of tremendous importance, -was defeated, driven back and practically -forgotten. The south-west of Poland was -still overrun by the enemy, and the only real -advance that had been made was to penetrate -about a hundred miles into Galicia.</p> - -<p>Certainly it does not appear at first glance -to be a very considerable achievement. It<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">187</a></span> -is only when matters are thoroughly investigated -that the truth is grasped. Russia -has achieved more than any other Power -engaged in the war, and far more than could -rightly have been expected of her. In the -west the Germans advanced to the very -gates of Paris, but they won no decisive -victory; the allied armies remained intact -and unbroken. The Allies then assumed -the offensive, and the Germans were pushed -back. But again no decisive battle has -been fought, at least during the period -under review. The German armies are, at -the moment of writing, still intact and to -all appearances capable of assuming a -renewed offensive with vigour. It is only -in the eastern theatre of war that victories -have been won. Tarnopol, Tomasov, and -Lemberg were not merely favourable engagements -which resulted in the enemy -being forced to retreat a few miles. They -were victories which routed as well as -defeated the enemy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">188</a></span> -It must be remembered, too, that these -operations in Galicia and Poland are being -fought on the same vast scale as those in -the west. They extend along a front of -no less than 200 miles. In point of numbers -engaged, the Galician and Polish operations -are again very similar to those in France. -In fact, the conditions in the east and west -are more or less equal, and therefore Russia’s -victories were the only really decisive engagements -won by any of the armies.</p> - -<p>Official opinion in Russia would have -been quite satisfied if, by the beginning of -September, the mobilisation was completed, -and Warsaw, Vilna and Kiev still in -Russian hands. It was certainly expected -that at the end of a month’s warfare -Russia would be engaged in fiercely defending -her own territories and in making -desperate efforts to drive the invaders back -over the frontier. In short, she was fully -expected to be faced with a month or more -of sheer defensive fighting before she could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">189</a></span> -hope to advance. The magnitude of her -task in this direction will be obvious when -it is remembered that, in addition to the -inevitable slowness of mobilisation which -renders her a comparatively easy prey for -invaders, she has a frontier of well over -1,000 miles to defend against Germany and -Austria.</p> - -<p>Of course, much was made of the fact -that Russia could mobilise no less than -eight million men. It was assumed that -an immense army of at least two million -men would march on Berlin. By sheer -force of numbers Russia was going to bring -both Austria and Germany to their knees. -In the first place there is a limit to human -organising power, and it is doubtful whether -any general can successfully direct the -operations of such vast quantities of men. -Napoleon himself never fought with a -million men, and no modern general has -yet proved that he possesses the military -genius of the Corsican. Numbers are all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">190</a></span> -very well up to a certain point, but in -excess they are only a hindrance and a -menace. The larger the army the slower -it moves. It is the very unwieldiness of -the armies in the west that has caused their -lack of success. They have such enormous -fighting power that there is no particular -reason why either should suffer defeat.</p> - -<p>Superfluous men do not add to an army’s -efficiency. They only hamper its mobility -and throw an extra strain on the commissariat -and transport. The ideal army -is the one which is large enough to accomplish -its object thoroughly and no more. -Employing two men to do the work of one -is merely a wasteful proceeding.</p> - -<p>Russia has no intention of putting all -her eight million men in the firing line. -Her object is to place adequate armies in the -field and to maintain those armies at their -full strength of first-class fighting men. -She has no particular ambition to make -herself bankrupt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">191</a></span> -In view of the difficulties with which she -had to contend and the gigantic nature of -her task, Russia may be said to have -accomplished a brilliant feat in rendering -the ultimate defeat of Austria inevitable -and in opening up the most advantageous -road to Berlin. The remarkable success of -her mobilisation has been followed by -equally brilliant achievements in the field. -Soukhomlinov’s work has not been in vain. -Russia has indeed fulfilled her part and -made the issue of the war as sure as it is -humanly possible to make it. Much remains -to be done, but the tasks of smashing -Austria and reducing Germany to her knees -will now be taken up with every confidence.</p> - -<p>The events in Russia have been as significant -as those in the battlefields. Not only -has this war proved that Russia as a military -power has come into its own at last, but it -marks the beginning of a new era in Russian -history. The world is witnessing the rebirth -of Russia. The nation is united<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">192</a></span> -as it has never previously been. The -old autocratic institutions are passing away, -the Duma is gaining strength, the coming -rehabilitation of Poland is a master-stroke -of liberalism. A new Russia is emerging. -Democracy is coming into its own at last -in the empire of the Tzar.</p> - -<p class="p2 center smaller"> -<i>Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd., London and Reading</i> -</p> - -<div class="chapter"><div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> - -<p>The illustration following the Table of Contents is a detailed map of Central -Europe. If your book reader cannot display it, you can find it among the -book materials for "The Russian Advance" at www.gutenberg.org.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_17">17</a>: “Moreover, sufficient of the earlier stages” was -printed that way.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_33">33</a>: “remarkable effects of the war on the nation was” -was printed that way.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_50">50</a>: “mobilisation bases were signalled out” was printed -that way.</p> -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian Advance, by Marr Murray - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE *** - -***** This file should be named 53482-h.htm or 53482-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/4/8/53482/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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