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diff --git a/old/53349-0.txt b/old/53349-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6a4aa84..0000000 --- a/old/53349-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7587 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Our Cavalry, by M. F. Rimington - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Our Cavalry - -Author: M. F. Rimington - -Release Date: October 23, 2016 [EBook #53349] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OUR CAVALRY *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -book was produced from images made available by the -HathiTrust Digital Library.) - - - - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: Boldface text is enclosed in =equals signs=; italics -text is enclosed in _underscores_. - - - - -MILITARY TEXT-BOOKS - - -8vo. - -_Ready._ - - =MODERN ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.= A Description of the Artillery of - the Field Army, and the Principles and Methods of its Employment. - By Colonel H. A. BETHELL, R.F.A. With 14 Plates and 126 - Illustrations in the Text. 7s. 6d. net. - - =AN OUTLINE OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR=, 1904, 1905. By Colonel - CHARLES ROSS, D.S.O. Volume I. Up to and including the Battle of - Liao-Yang. With 14 Maps. 10s. 6d. net. - - =OUR CAVALRY.= By Major-General M. F. RIMINGTON, C.V.O., C.B. With - 8 Diagrams. - - -_In the Press._ - - =FROM THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TO WAZIRISTAN.= Being an Account of - the Countries and the Tribes controlled by the N.W. Frontier - Province, and of our Military Relations with them in the Past. By - Colonel HAROLD WYLLY, C.B. - - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. - - - - -Military Text-Books - - -OUR CAVALRY - - - - -[Illustration] - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO - DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - - BY - MAJOR-GENERAL M. F. RIMINGTON - C.V.O., C.B. - - MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON - 1912 - - - - -COPYRIGHT - - - - -PREFACE - - -In this book no attempt has been made to produce an exhaustive treatise -on Cavalry; it has been written principally for junior officers of all -arms. - - M. F. R. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER I - - INTRODUCTORY - - Cavalry in past ages--Drawn from horse-lovers, success - followed on fixed principles, these are as applicable - to-day--Ballistics from horseback--Always a sign - and cause of weakening--The charge of good _moral_-- - Gunpowder and other improvements notwithstanding--Good - scouts always available--Best lessons are learnt in - war--Expense of cavalry--Duty of cavalry leader Page 1 - - - CHAPTER II - - ARMAMENT - - Constant changes--Cut _v._ thrust--Gerard’s experience-- - Point more deadly--The case for the lance--The - revolver--Confidence in the arm selected is of highest - importance--The rifle--The insistence of continental - writers inapplicable to British cavalry Page 10 - - - CHAPTER III - - THE HORSE - - Colossal bill for horse-flesh in South Africa largely due - to national ignorance of horses--The suitable horse, - two classes--Chest measurement test for stamina--Small - blood horse stands work best--Arabs bred for war-- - English and Australian horses for size--Care of horse in - war--An exception to this Page 18 - - - CHAPTER IV - - TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - - The squadron attack--Cohesion--And its result in - _moral_--Tactics--Cunning--The rally--Cromwell-- - Supports--Conclusions Page 29 - - - CHAPTER V - - CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - - FORMING TO THE FLANK - - I. The squadron--Forming to the front or flank--Defensive - or offensive flank. II. The regiment, advantage of - Echelon attack. III. The Brigade--Training of leaders-- - Co-operation of R.H.A.--Two forms of attack, when both - forces get away from the guns--Formations for moving to - a flank--Relative effect of artillery fire on the two - formations--Column of masses preferred--Formation for - the attack--Time for horse artillery to unlimber--Form - of attack must be simple--Conclusions Page 37 - - - CHAPTER VI - - FIRE ACTION IN TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - - Not a question to be shirked--Danger of recourse to fire - action weakening our leaders’ desire for shock action-- - An instance of fire _versus_ shock action--Rifle fire - against charging horsemen is ineffectual--Contradictory - memoranda on the subject--Henderson’s dictum-- - Dismounted action of cavalry--German regulations-- - Prince Kraft Page 50 - - - CHAPTER VII - - CAVALRY BRIGADE IN ACTION - - First objects in the attack--Concentric shock of fire and - horse--Plan to get a good field of fire by alternate - advance of two squadrons--Desiderata in artillery - position--Broad principles--Utilization of ground-- - Deception--Get away from our artillery--An example of - attack--The action of the artillery--_Moral_ necessary - to leader--Unreasoning hasty advance deprecated--If - anticipated by enemy, how we may have to act--Passage - of defiles--Dribbling squadrons into a fight--Cure for - dissemination Page 59 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - ACTION OF CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT - - Independent cavalry, danger of their detachment at - inopportune times--Cavalry and horse artillery at - LOIGNY-POUPRY--Unsatisfactory direction of cavalry in - 1870-71 followed by peace belief in rifle--Fallacy of - tendency to dismounted action shown by South African and - Manchurian Wars--The line our training should take-- - Cavalry instructional rides--Value of initiative-- - Conclusions--Frederick the Great’s cavalry compared - with our South African cavalry--Pursuit--Neglect of, - a British failing--The parallel pursuit--Its value-- - Blücher at Katzbach on cavalry pursuit Page 69 - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE DISPOSITION OF CAVALRY IN A CAMPAIGN - - FIRST PART - - Dependence on forage--Principles on which cavalry is - placed in the front--Want of direction in 1870-- - Galliffet’s influence--Service of information separated - from that of security--The Napoleonic traditions - revived--And generally adopted--French view--The - cavalry of exploration--The cavalry of army corps-- - The divisional cavalry--Generalissimo’s use of his - independent cavalry--Movement _en bondes_--The - effect of modern rifle--Difficulties in the attack of - protective cavalry and mixed detachments. Page 86 - - SECOND PART - - The modern disposition is theoretical--Tendency to - increase independent cavalry at the expense of - protective, for sake of initial advantages--Difficulty - of weaker cavalry rôle--Von Bernhardi on German - cavalry strength--Improvisation of cavalry--Dilemma-- - Cyclists--Difficulty of training for non-professional - cavalry--Danger of amateur cavalry officers--The - ULM Campaign--Effect of first success--Boer tactics - unsuitable to European war Page 93 - - - CHAPTER X - - HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT - - Deficiency in peace training--The energy of the attack-- - An instance--Plan of the attack--In the defence--Value - of artillery in the retreat Page 101 - - - CHAPTER XI - - CO-OPERATION OF HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY - - German tendency in 1870 to deprive cavalry of horse - artillery--Reversed by 1907 regulations--Effect of - modern horse artillery--Probable necessity to allocate - horse artillery--Mukden--Arrangement of artillery - support in attack on infantry--Sir Douglas Haig on the - counter-attack--Principles--Conclusions Page 108 - - - CHAPTER XII - - HORSE ARTILLERY FIRE EFFECT COMPARED WITH RIFLE FIRE - - Comparative efficacy in bullets--Reasons of Henderson’s - advocacy of mounted infantry--Demand for exceptional - arrangements--An instance of masked fire--Von - Bernhardi’s plan--A suggested alternative Page 117 - - - CHAPTER XIII - - IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY - - Duties of the Commander--A day in the outposts--At - night--The men--The horses--Care of men’s health-- - Wet weather--Hints for scouts--_Moral_--Sending - out scouts at night--Sniping by nervous sentries-- - Fireflies--Ruses and duplicity--Value of a knowledge of - strategy and tactics--To picket an enemy--Security and - information--Instances of picketing the enemy--Practice - in peace--Difficulty of instruction--Practice preferred - to theory--Honest outpost work--Night work--Regiment’s - practice of outposts Page 122 - - - CHAPTER XIV - - SOME DETACHED DUTIES OF CAVALRY - - Despatch-riding, value in instruction--An instance of a - scheme--Napoleon’s despatches--Tracking, etc.--Value - of maintaining interest--Boy scouts--Influence of - regimental _moral_ in detached work--Prisoners--Convoy - duty Page 139 - - - CHAPTER XV - - RAIDS - - Diverse views of the value of Stuart’s raid--Japanese raid - on railway line--Vulnerability of railways--Boer and - British Raids--Country which favours raids--Inopportune - raids, Wheeler’s--Futile raids by De Wet and Botha-- - An exception to them--Mischenko’s raid--Rennenkampf’s - reconnaissance--Von Pelet Narbonne--Japanese methods-- - Conclusions Page 145 - - - CHAPTER XVI - - THE TRAINING OF THE CAVALRY OFFICER - - The cavalry candidate--Causes of scarcity--Work now - and thirty years ago--Pay--Duties on joining-- - Hunting--The sense of duty--Pretence impossible in a - regiment--The effect of a slack commanding officer-- - Counteracted by four or five good officers--Value of - drill--Characteristic faults--The practice of possible - situations in war--Officer without imagination is a bad - trainer--Conclusions Page 154 - - - CHAPTER XVII - - TRAINING OF OFFICER (_continued_) - - Restless activity--The effect of hardship--Training-- - Preparation--Cynicism--Desirability of education - for senior officers--A rearguard device--Study and - discussion--A doctrine--Napoleon’s doctrine--He - honoured bravery--_Bis dot qui cito dat_--The selfish - officer--Comradeship--Conclusions Page 167 - - - CHAPTER XVIII - - TRAINING OF A SQUADRON - - Frederick the Great’s stern methods--How a good leader - is trained--Description of his squadron at work-- - Compared with an indifferent leader--Five points in - training a squadron: (i.) Efficiency for war of man and - horse; (ii.) Avoid samples; (iii.) Use of weapons; (iv.) - Self-reliance; (v.) The offensive spirit--The section - system--Value of individual instruction--Dismounted - work--Holding the balance--Problems as a means of - training in resolution--Napoleon’s genius--The Zulu - system--Conclusions Page 177 - - - CHAPTER XIX - - TRAINING OF THE HORSE - - Value of a well-trained horse on service--Ill-tempered - horses--The ideal of training--Seydlitz’s leap-- - The mameluke--The aids, how arrived at from nature-- - Their adaptation to our needs--Progress towards - the campaigning horse--A Boer method--Officers - training horses--The wrong leg leading in a race-- - The free-jumping lane--Remount competition--Noisy - instructors--Method of teaching horses to walk quickly-- - Duty of squadron leader--His value if he has ability Page 191 - - - CHAPTER XX - - TRAINING OF THE MAN - - Standard of proficiency--Riding, the old and the new - system--Instruction in care of horse--Most difficult - to teach or check--Result of a bad system--Napoleon’s - cavalry in Russia--The care of horses must be the - result of system--Long rides for recruits as a method - of instruction--Riding to hounds--Care of horse - now more necessary--Shooting--Is good, but fire - discipline is essential--The personal weapon--Method - of instruction--Mental and muscular development--The - handy man--Influence of sports--Swimming--Pioneering-- - Cooking--Seaside work for a cavalry brigade--Squadron - competition--Regular soldiers and colonials--The - practical instruction--Theory--Instruction in _moral_-- - A Japanese view--Demonstration--Intercourse between - officers and men--Grumbling Page 202 - - - - -DIAGRAMS - - - NO. PAGE - I. Defensive and Offensive Flanks 40 - - II. The Two Forms of Attack 43 - - III. Column of Regimental Masses compared with Column - of Squadrons 45 - - IV. The Formation for the Attack 47 - - V. Squadrons _en bondes_ 60 - - VI. Cavalry Brigade in Action 64 - - VII. The Passage of a Defile 67 - - VIII. Cavalry Attack on Dismounted Men holding a Kopje 104 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -INTRODUCTORY - - “We study the past to foresee the future.” - - -In these bustling days of headline-up-to-date newspapers, one shrinks -from reminding one’s readers that Xenophon gave excellent advice to -cavalry trainers and leaders--advice which a cavalryman will recognize -is quite as applicable to-day as it was in those distant ages; since -details with regard to grooming horses on hard stones, exercising -cavalry in rough ground, and so on are by no means out of date. -There is every reason to believe that Alexander, and later Rome and -Carthage at their zenith as military nations, had proportionately as -highly-trained cavalry as is possessed by any nation of to-day. Those -who have fought in rearguards and running fights realize that the -Parthian method of fighting must have required the highest training -and _moral_. The cavalry of the predominant nations were drawn from -those who kept horses for their own sport and amusement, and for the -gratification of their pride, and who felt they were better fighting -men on a horse. The descendants of the horse-lovers of those ages -are with us to-day; they are those who love danger, excitement, and -pace, and who find in the blood-horse an animal which shares their -love for these, and will generously sacrifice its life or limbs in the -co-partnership. - -Those who have never felt the sensation of a really good horse bounding -and stretching away under them, and the consequent elation, the wonder -as to “what could stop us?” cannot grasp what a cavalry soldier’s -feelings are in the “Charge.” - -Following the centuries which saw the final success of the -ordered phalanx of Rome, time after time the more savage races of -horsemen--Attila with his Hunnish squadrons or Abdur-Rahman with Moslem -hordes--drive all before them, anticipating the flight of peace-loving, -easy-going farmers and traders, living on the country and carrying off -what pleases them. - -Then held sway - - The good old rule ... the simple plan, - That they should take who have the power, - And they should keep who can. - -Ages roll by, the picture changes. The days of Norman chivalry animate -and fire the imagination. The hunter warriors, knights, and squires -lead their troops in battle array, throwing them into the combat at the -decisive moment. - -Broken bones incurred whilst unhorsing a friend, or a shrewd -spear-thrust when cleaving to the chine a foe, in single combat, were -adventures by no means to be declined or avoided. - -Chivalry or enthusiastic religious zeal qualify the rougher side of -their devotion to arms and horsemanship. - -In all ages the horse-lovers, the best-mounted nations, have carried -all before them. _Ceteris paribus_ this is true to-day. Then came the -days of “villainous saltpetre,” and many began to doubt and to number -the days of cavalry; and always after a time there rises the cavalry -leader who, emerging from the dangers of a youth spent in war and -sport, sees that pace, weight, _moral_, and the “àpropos” make up for -all the odds, if only leaders, men, and horses are trained, and their -weight and pace rightly applied. - -Next in order come Gustavus Adolphus; Cromwell, our great cavalry -leader, and his Ironsides riding knee to knee, and rallying immediately -after the shock; Frederick the Great, and his captains, Ziethen and -Seydlitz, and their ordered application of masses of cavalry. Then -grand old Blücher,[1] and his antagonists of the Napoleonic era, Murat, -Lasalle, Curély. - -Certain fixed principles keep cropping up which appear to have guided -these heroes in their movements and dispositions. They are:-- - - A. Cohesion in the ranks, or knee-to-knee riding. - B. The moral effect of advancing horsemen. - C. The flank march. - D. The “àpropos” charge ridden well home. - E. Surprise. - F. The immediate rally. - G. The necessity of a reserve. - H. Training of the individual man and horse. - I. Care of the horse’s condition. - -The more we are able to read and learn of their views of training, -leading, and applying the shock of cavalry, the more we see how little -which is new can be written on the subject. - -The same view may be taken of the fire action of cavalry. The best -cavalry leaders have always recognized its great value, where not -put forward as an alternative to the “àpropos” charge, and when -not substituted by the “weakening” leader for the dangerous but -more decisive shock action--that action in which we must have “no -half measures, no irresolution.”[2] But the very fact that they may -themselves have at some time weakened to the extent of shooting at the -enemy from afar, instead of resolutely going in at the unknown, must -have made these leaders recognize that the “charge” must be kept in the -front as our ideal. - -Those who cannot understand the predilection of the most advanced and -thoughtful cavalry soldiers for _l’arme blanche_ should ponder on the -success of the Zulu dynasty. Its founder insisted that his men should -be armed only with the stabbing assegai and would not allow them to -throw their assegais. He knew what shock tactics meant and the _moral_ -inspired by their successful adoption. - -A study of history shows the advocacy of ballistics from the horse at -a charging enemy to have been periodic during the last 2000 years in -peace time, and also that failure has invariably followed its adoption -in war. It is not now seriously considered by any nation. - -Whatever the cost, whatever the method, he who tries first to “handle” -his enemy is the one with whom “_moral_,” that incalculable factor, -will rest. Hear what a great trainer of cavalry, writing probably over -fifty years ago, said:--[3] - - It cannot be too often repeated that the main thing is to carry out - the mission _at any price_. If possible this should be done mounted - and with the _arme blanche_, but should that not be feasible, then - we must dismount and force a road with the carbine. I am convinced - that cavalry would not be up to the requirements of to-day if they - were not able under certain circumstances to fight on foot, nor - would it be worth the sacrifice that it costs the state. - -But if the croakers were alarmed at a sputtering rifle fire, what will -the faint-hearted of our time say to the new and alarming factor which -has now been introduced. Batteries of horse artillery, firing up to -sixty or more low trajectory shells per minute, must now be reckoned -with. These shells contain 236 bullets, weighing 41 to the pound. - -If the de Blochs and other theorists paused and wondered what would -happen to cavalry when magazine rifles were invented, what will be -their attitude now? Let them be reassured. But the words of those who -reassure them must ring true and be purified from the dross of the -first thought, “How can we do this and save our own skins?” Let them be -born of the stern resolve, “At all costs we will kill, capture, or put -to flight our enemies.” We must evolve tactics which will enable us to -use every new factor and to deny them to the foe.[4] - -Leave them to judge whether the plan of those tactics will be dashed -off by the pen of the ready-writer as a result of experiences gained -during a Whitsun-week holiday on some suburban training ground, or -whether the soldier who has felt the sharp stress of an enemy’s -victory, the heavy hand of adversity and the rough lessons of retreat, -who has seen the barometer of his men’s fate rise and fall under -cyclonic conditions, will painfully and doubtfully elaborate it. - -Cromwell, Frederick, Galliffet, these with bitter experience of -the everyday imperfections of human nature, and a well-weighed -determination to insist on tactics which will override those -weaknesses, did not attempt to avoid or shirk the difficulty of losses. -A cool contempt for the contingencies is the primary qualification in -the search for successful methods in cavalry tactics, as well as in the -encounter itself. - -Turning now to the detached duties of cavalry, of security and -information, no less do we see the recurrence of the same ideas. The -Curélys and de Bracks, the Mosbys, the cavalry who, “like a heavy -shower of rain, can get through anywhere,” such come right down to us -from ancient history. - -The daring hearts who, trusting in a good horse and a knowledge of -woodcraft, torment the enemy, whether in camp, bivouac, on the march, -or on the line of communication, are a product of all campaigns, ready -to the hand of those who know where to find them, and how to inspire -them aright so as to get the very best out of them. And what will good -men not dare and undergo for a word of praise or encouragement from one -whose soul is in what he says? - -Again and again, what is learnt in the hard school of campaigning, and -generally where that campaign has been lost, carries the best lesson. -Has any nation set itself more resolutely to correct the faults of its -cavalry[5] than the French nation after the 1870 war? - -Conversely, the nation that wins, learns little or nothing; no lesson -is worse than that of easy success in small wars. Witness the Russian -successes in Central Asia for a series of years, followed by the -_débâcle_ of their cavalry action in the Manchurian War when pitted -against an enemy whose cavalry was scarcely “in being,”[6] and the -erroneous conclusions arrived at in regard to cavalry by those who -only saw the first portion of the operations in South Africa 1899-1902. - -Von Moltke is credited with saying: “People say one must learn by -experience; I have always endeavoured to learn by the experience of -others.” - -The real lessons learnt from war are extremely difficult to impress on -the taxpayer, who, in modern Great Britain, only reads of them in the -newspaper, and who at best does not wish to pay for one more cavalry -soldier than is absolutely necessary. - -The cavalry leader must recognize that the arm is expensive, therefore -it cannot afford to be inactive; it is the hardest arm to replace, -therefore it must be used to the full. - -In all ages cavalry[7] have been expensive, and one may well wonder -if the frugal mind of the taxpayer balances them against who can say -what pictures of dead and wounded, indemnity, pillage, lost trade, and -damaged prestige, or whether he looks at one side of the balance-sheet -only, and forgets that from which they may save him. - -Ignoring these mundane views, it is still the duty of the cavalry -leader who has patriotism in his soul, to keep his heart young and his -muscles trained, and to leave no stone unturned in peace time in his -preparation, as a sacred duty, for war; just as in war it is his duty -to sacrifice his men, his reputation, his horses, everything, in order -to turn the tide of battle or render the victory decisive. - -Let officers of cavalry remember that he who in peace time cannot -sacrifice his pleasures to his duty, will in war find it much harder to -give up his life or aggrandisement, possibly in accordance with an idea -or order with which he does not agree, or in which he sees no sense. - -This is the serious side; mercifully there is a lighter side to war, -and it is well known that the hair-breadth escapes of themselves -or others, and the “hard tack” form the most amusing and abiding -recollections of a war to those who have participated in it. - - Against ill chances men are ever merry. - -Withal no cavalry leader is likely to succeed unless there is something -of the gambler’s spirit in him, the gambler who can coolly and calmly -put down his everything on the cards:-- - - He either fears his fate too much, - Or his deserts are small, - That dares not put it to the touch, - To gain or lose it all. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -ARMAMENT - - “Quot homines tot sententiae.” - - Armament also figures largely amongst conditions of success.... - There can certainly never be complete disparity between the - armament and the _moral_ of an army, since the latter includes - intelligence which takes care to provide good weapons. The want - of good armament immediately reacts upon the confidence of the - soldier. Defeat would thus appear excusable, and success cannot - have a worse enemy than this feeling.--VON DER GOLTZ, _Nation in - Arms_, p. 147. - - -The many changes through which regiments of cavalry go in this respect -are hardly credible, although in our case allowance must be made for -the many different enemies which a British cavalry regiment meets. The -lance will be adopted instead of or in addition to the sword, and six -or seven years later the sword alone, or perhaps even rifle alone, will -be carried.[8] It may be regarded as a certainty now that for some -years to come, as in the past, the Germans will arm both ranks with the -lance. One has hardly written this before one reads that the bayonet -may be substituted for the sword in the armament of German cavalry -regiments, for use in night attacks and in the attack of unturnable -small positions, or when occasion may arise. - -The bayonet on trial is straight, 14 inches long, with one cutting -edge, the back being flat. All under-officers and one-tenth of the -troops will carry a bayonet furnished with a saw edge. - -History repeats itself. In 1805, Napoleon organized dragoons who -carried a bayonet as well as a sword. There may have been a reason for -this, as their usual fate was to be dismounted and their horses given -to remount more highly-trained cavalry. - -Von Bernhardi[9] sums up the question of this new armament of the -German cavalry as follows: “The hand-to-hand fight on foot must be -exceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily -rôle for the sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great -mistake,” etc. - -When we come to the pattern of swords, the purely cutting sword has its -strenuous advocates, whilst as many more will beseech one to trust to -no personal weapon except the pointing sword. Authoritative quotations -will be given from well-known leaders advocating one or other form of -sword. - -It seems to be allowed that a scimitar or tulwar pattern, with its -curved blade, is unsuitable for pointing,[10] and also that the best -patterns of rapier-pointing sword are difficult to cut with. One may -read in Sir Montague Gerard’s book how he killed several Afghans. He -says:-- - - “One had but to make a feint of employing the obsolete cut No. 7, - and up would fly their guard over the face, when dropping your - point you went clean through your man.... The fourth man I tackled - fired at me just as I closed, and I felt a blow on my side, but - next moment my sword went through something hard, and the weapon - was twisted out of my hand and hung by the sword-knot. The blade, - which was a straight rapier, one by Wilkinson, got a slight but - permanent wave in it, and I can only account for receiving such - a wrench by having taken my opponent through the headpiece as he - crouched and tried to stab the horse from below.” - - Pages 255-256: “We counted sixty odd bodies, whilst our casualties - amounted to six men and seven horses.” And on page 257 he adds: - “The lance giving our Sowars a preponderating advantage.”[11] - -Perhaps of all those who have given their opinion on this subject, -that one to whom we would give most credence is a swordsman of the -11th Hussars of Marlborough’s time, who fought many duels and lived by -his prowess with the sword. His final dictum is: “One point with the -smallsword is as deadly as forty cuts with the broadsword.” - -Verdy du Vernois[12] says: “Experience has proved that a sword-cut -seldom, but a point with the sword always, throws a man off his horse. -The latter should therefore be chiefly practised at sword drill.” - -From the bolas of the South American to the tomahawk of the Red Indian -or the revolver of the cowboy every weapon has had its advocates. - -Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles were seen charging on horseback with -fixed bayonets[13] a few days after joining a South African column; -thus imitating the Australian contingent in the column, who invariably -did so--and very formidable they looked. - -A conclusion which experience forces upon us, as regards both the -armament and tactics of horsemen, is that when they attain a high -standard of horsemanship or when they are good horsemen from youth, -such as many Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, and Canadians -undoubtedly are, a short training will bring them almost level with -the regular cavalry and enable them to employ shock tactics. Then they -should be armed in addition to their rifle with sword or lance, as the -rifle and bayonet are not the best weapons for this purpose. As trained -cavalry thus armed they are equal in value to twice if not three times -their number of mounted rifles on the battlefield, if they have trained -troop, squadron, and regimental leaders in command of them. - -The oft-advanced theory that it is not the nature of such and such a -race to use the point is quite unfounded. It has been conclusively -proved that a recruit who has been allowed only to point with a sword, -can hardly be induced to cut, even if a good opportunity offers. - -The lance is undoubtedly the “queen of weapons,” but it has its -drawbacks. But first its great advantage is that it is formidable, and -so much so that lancers claim that regiments armed with the sword will -not face those armed with the lance. It is undoubtedly easier to use -against crouching men on foot. The Inniskilling Dragoons after a charge -at Zulus, who crouched down under their shields, sent for all available -tent-pegging spears. - -On the other hand, the lance’s shaft is difficult to withdraw from the -body of a man, and a lancer may have to leave it there. Then he will -draw his sword. But that entails another weapon. In a close mêlée the -lance is a clumsy weapon.[14] In the mêlées which occur after a charge, -men and horses are so intermingled that even the use of the sword is -difficult. But obviously the cure for this is to teach the men to rally -instantaneously and not to indulge in mêlées. The officers of the 9th -Lancers in the Afghan War had a short spike put into the hilt of their -swords, so that a blow from the hilt in the face was decisive. - -The weapon which (1) entails least weight and is easiest to carry, and -(2) is deadly, and (3) is most likely to be useful on all occasions, is -the straight sword or rapier. - -But this obviously must be made of the best steel, whereas a quite -serviceable cutting sword can be made of inferior iron. That the -cutting sword has been so much used is most probably because good steel -was difficult to obtain. Napier says to arm cavalry sepoys with heavy -English swords of one weight, one length, one shape is a mistake. The -cutting sword is not a deadly weapon, often it does not penetrate -clothes or accoutrements. The mamelukes, formidable antagonists to -Napoleon’s regular cavalry in Egypt, 1798-1801, carried a cutting sword -very considerably curved back, with which weapon they are said to have -inflicted terrible wounds; in addition they carried a poniard and two -pistols in their sash and another pair of pistols in their holsters. A -syce carrying a lance for them followed on foot. - -In the Peninsular War, whereas the English cavalry used the sword -almost exclusively as a cutting weapon, the French dragoons on the -contrary used only the point, which, with their straight sword, nearly -always caused a mortal wound. This made the English cavalry say that -the French fighting “was not fair.” - -Some amateurs talk of the revolver as a weapon with which to arm the -ranks in place of a sword or lance. They appear to ignore the fact -that a bullet once fired off in a mêlée may hit friend or foe. Very -fine horsemen, such as Arizona cowboys, who break the insulators of -the telegraph wire as they gallop along with a weapon, which they have -been accustomed to handle from their youth up, would probably do well -in a pursuit with such a weapon, but it is not, we believe, seriously -contemplated by any nation as a weapon for use in the ranks. For -officers, scouts, farriers, trumpeters, and possibly others it is most -useful, as it takes the place of a rifle and is light. - -If any particular personal weapon is carried habitually, that -weapon should be adopted; but failing that, there must be a long -apprenticeship to lance or sword. Perhaps the point to which most -attention should be given is that the man must be taught to have -implicit confidence in his weapon; this can be attained best with the -lance or with the pointing sword. A man appreciates the fact that with -either of these weapons the point goes through easily; whilst with the -cutting sword only the most expert can make any impression on, say, a -leg of mutton covered with a sack and a leather strap or two. - -In the German cavalry, stress is laid on teaching the trooper that the -sight of the lance is sure to make the enemy turn and fly. In our own -cavalry greater attention is now paid to practising the man in riding -at a gallop at a rebounding dummy, offering resistance equal to the -weight of a man. Without such practice the men sprain their wrists and -lose their grip of the sword, and do not understand how simple it is to -run a man through. - - -THE RIFLE - -Both French and German cavalry have, during the last few years, been -repeatedly urged by eminent writers on cavalry to bring themselves to -a better knowledge of the use of the rifle and fire tactics. The new -weapon issued to the German cavalry has been the signal for some of -this literature. Calling to mind that it is but a few short years since -German cavalry were armed with an out-of-date carbine, and carried -only some twenty rounds of ammunition, and further reading between -the lines of the latest addition to cavalry literature by General von -Bernhardi, these exhortations cannot be considered as uncalled for. -But to make them a text on which to lecture our regular cavalry only -exposes ignorance of their present training, and makes one wonder if -one is awaking from far back in the middle of the last century, when a -gallant lancer regiment, on being first armed with carbines, gravely -piled them on the stable-barrows and wheeled them to the manure-heap. -Our British regular cavalry are at least ten, if not fifteen, years -ahead of any continental cavalry in rifle shooting, fire discipline, -and the knowledge of when and how to resort to fire tactics. - -There are probably few of the more senior who have not come to a -conclusion formed from experience that the following quotation[15] is -as suitable in many respects to cavalry as it is to infantry:-- - - Volley firing, and limiting the range against infantry to 500 yards - at most, are the surest means of providing against the want of - ammunition at the supreme moment. And the sooner it is recognized - that long range fire is a special weapon to be used only on special - occasions, the better for the efficiency of our infantry in general. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE HORSE - - “A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!” - - -No apology is needed for including in a Treatise on Cavalry a chapter -on the subject of the Horse. Were it demanded, it would only be -necessary to point to the unfortunate ignorance in regard to horses, -horsemanship, and horsemastership which, extending as it does through -every gradation of rank of life in the nation, caused our bill for -horses in South Africa to total twenty-two millions--that is, about -one-tenth of the whole cost of the war. In fact, it may here be -remarked that, following this assessment, it is quite probable that -the horse question should be rated as 10 per cent in the percentage of -importance of matters in preparation for war; that is, in big wars, for -our thoughts are apt to be distracted by small wars from the essentials -of great wars. - -It is unfortunate that nowadays only at most 15 per cent of the men in -our cavalry have, before enlistment, had anything to do with horses. -Further, few indeed of the officers, though most of them have ridden, -and in that best of schools the hunting-field, have gained sufficient -experience in their early life, before joining a regiment, in the -stable management and training of horses, to enable them to look after -their horses well. This they will only attain to after they have had a -fairly long apprenticeship under a good squadron leader. - -The essentials of campaigning horse management only come to those who -live with horses constantly, and have to get work out of them. Those -who hand over their horse to a groom after a long day’s work, and who -do not see him till they wish to ride again, cannot learn about horses. - -That the ordinary hunting man in Great Britain knows very little indeed -about economizing his horse’s strength is evident from the fact that -not one in twenty is ever, after a sharp gallop, seen to dismount, -loosen his horse’s girth, and turn his head to the wind. Ten to one, -if any one does so, it is a soldier, and one who has served in South -Africa. - -First of all is the question, What is the most suitable animal for -cavalry work? And here the mind runs into two lines: (1) There is the -animal which will carry a moderately heavy man, whose weight is 11 -stone, together with his saddle, arms, etc., which may total up to -another 6 stone. For this the beau-ideal is the Irish horse of about -15·2 hands high. But these must be well and carefully fed and watered, -and not overdone. Their recuperative power grows less also with every -inch of height. (2) The other animal which will carry a lighter -cavalryman is seen at its best in the modern type of polo pony about -15 hands high, and as nearly thoroughbred as possible. These latter are -more able to withstand hardship than class (1). - -Though the limit to the height of the horse suitable for a campaign -should be 15·2 hands, it is more difficult to say how small a horse[16] -is suitable to carry a cavalryman. Chest measurement is the best known -test for stamina, and a good judge said truly that “a 13·2 hands pony -sixty-four inches round, will do double the work of a 14·2 hands pony -of equal girth.” - -Whilst we do not wish for one moment to be understood to advocate -unduly small horses for cavalry, we do wish the chest measurement -standard to be adopted more widely. We cannot help advancing the theory -that the natural height of the horse appears to be not more than 14 -to 15 hands at most, and all above that are in the nature of forced -exotics, obtained by selection and good food for mares and foals, and -in these stamina has not been grown in proportion; take, for instance, -the power of the heart, which has to pump blood farther to the -extremities in a big horse. - -Now, though it must be allowed that a squadron mounted on 15·2 hands -horses will, in a charge, easily defeat one mounted on 14·2 hands -horses, still the difficulty of maintaining the condition of the -squadron mounted on 15·2 hands horses, the increased cost of food, the -smaller amount of wear and tear which the horse, as it increases in -height, can bear, are all factors for consideration. - -It is because, unfortunately, our ideas in Great Britain are somewhat -inflated in respect to the size of the horse required to mount cavalry, -that we neglected at the beginning of the Boer War to collect every -animal of suitable age, if only 14 hands high, for the remounting of -our cavalry in South Africa, and went to other and far more unsuitable -sources for our horse-supply. Had we later, as was suggested, -commandeered all suitable animals in the Cape Colony, we should have -obtained a most useful reserve, and incidentally deprived our opponents -of a source of supply of which they took full advantage. The horse -and transport animal of the country are always the most suitable for -a campaign in that country. By the end of that war, many a cavalry -officer had gladly exchanged his 16 hands horse for a Boer or Basuto -pony of 14 to 14·2 hands high. - -But this, the South African War, it should be here remarked, can only -be regarded as giving us a view of one side of a great question. -Campaigning in the fertile plains of Europe, where food and water are -generally plentiful, where stabling may often shelter the animals, -and where enormous distances, with no food beyond that carried in the -waggons, are not necessarily covered, the larger horse may do his work -well. But he must be treated with the greatest care and the weight -carried, in his case, more rigorously reduced than in that of the -smaller horse. For shock tactics he is the best animal on which to -mount our cavalry, and our ideal is shock tactics. - -But let the squadron leader not forget that, when long distances are to -be traversed, a few ponies are perfectly invaluable (they can be driven -in a mob with his second line transport and are available to mount men -whose horses require a day or two’s rest, and which will, if they do -not get it, “give in” and never be any more use to them). - -In peace time, in the laudable desire for good appearance, these -expedients of war are too apt to be forgotten; they only force -themselves on us when it is too late. The animals usually described -as only fit for mounted infantry are those which see the finish of a -campaign, and must be available as reserves of remounts for cavalry. - -No doubt it requires experience and trained intelligence to -discriminate between the purchase of the large, fat, slow, -hairy-heeled, podgy-muscled brute that has never yet gone fast enough -to strain himself or be otherwise than perfectly sound, and the lean -son of the desert or veldt whose early toil has developed wind-galls, -splints, and so on, but whose conformation and muscular development are -as complete as will be his ability to live and carry weight, when the -other will fall down and die. - -Stamina has been mentioned above; it is obviously the first essential -in a cavalry horse. Next in rank to it comes good temper, usually -accompanied by good digestion and boldness, and marked by a full kind -eye and a broad forehead. - -Xenophon recommends us to test a horse’s courage by unaccustomed sounds -and sights before purchasing him as a war horse, and we recommend this -practice to cavalry officers. - -The Arabs, who have bred horses with a view to war for many -generations, have handed down a great deal of old-world wisdom on the -subject of the horse suitable for war.[17] The best Arabian horses are -undoubtedly the outcome of centuries of breeding to a type, and that -the type suitable to carry a light man throughout a long campaign, to -face danger courageously, to possess fair speed, immunity from disease -and sickness, especially pulmonary complaints, and to bear the jar of -galloping on hard ground. - -Our own British horses and the Australian Walers have unfortunately -been bred for size, speed, and--in the case of the former--ability to -carry a man in a burst over a big hunting country, and with, for the -last fifty years, a disregard for stamina and temper which has gone far -to remove many of them from the type of animal suitable for cavalry. - -Situated as we are in regard to knowledge of horses, and hampered as -we are in our preparation for war by the difficulty of teaching the -essentials of campaigning horse management during peace time, we shall -always find that it is in the early part of a war that our cavalrymen -will fail to comprehend the necessity for nursing the strength of their -horses, for discarding all unnecessary impedimenta, and limiting the -task to what is absolutely necessary. In peace time, horses which are -in regular work are not appreciably affected by their rider sitting on -their backs for five or ten minutes at a halt instead of dismounting, -or by his not allowing the horse to pick a few mouthfuls of grass -twenty or thirty times in the day, or by his not watering him at every -chance. - -In peace time the horse will get food and water on his return home; but -in war these little things in the aggregate matter greatly. They are -like the snatches of sleep which a tired man gets when he can; they -keep him going. The man can sustain himself by the hope of sleep at a -future time. The man has certain traits in his nature which carry him -through. - -It is said that Murat, in Napoleon’s Russian campaign, though he -crossed the Niemen with 43,000 horses, could only put 18,000 in the -field two months later. Murat had worn them out by keeping them -saddled up sixteen hours a day, by giving them insufficient food, and -by chasing wisps of Cossacks. _À propos_ of this, Nansouty said to -Murat: “The horses of the cuirassiers not, unfortunately, being able to -sustain themselves on their patriotism, fell down by the roadside and -died.” Tired men soon express their feelings, the horse is unable to do -so. _Verb. sap._ - -Intimately connected with this question is the feeding of the horses. -We know that no concentrated ration can constitute a substitute for -bulk for continued periods, but it is not generally known how many -articles of diet a horse will relish when hungry. In the Pamirs the -ponies eat the offal of game which is thrown aside, thus recalling the -story of our childhood of Black Bess, Dick Turpin’s celebrated mare, -who had a beefsteak tied round her bit on the ride to York. - -Ruskin once said in a lecture to the cadets at Woolwich: - - Whilst all knowledge is often little more than a means of - amusement, there is no science which a soldier may not at some time - or another find bearing on the business of life and death; your - knowledge of a wholesome herb may involve the feeding of an army, - and acquaintance with an obscure point of geography the success of - a campaign. - -This is applicable to the cavalryman and his horses. - -De Brack devotes eight pages of his valuable work, _Cavalry Outpost -Duties_, to a chapter on “Forage and Subsistence,” every word of which -should be known to any cavalry officer who may have to serve in Europe -or elsewhere. - -The theory of horse management is brought now to a very high standard -by our Veterinary Department, and their publication of an excellent -book on _Animal Management_ marks a step forward which must be -appreciated by all who are in agreement with the theory expressed -earlier in this chapter, that the horse question is one-tenth in war. -It is little different from Frederick the Great’s saying that “Victory -lies in the legs.” - -One word of caution is necessary for those who command cavalry in -war. They must metaphorically keep a finger on the equine pulse, and -this is, most of all, necessary when working horse artillery in heavy -ground, or horses fed on anything less than full rations, or horses -in bad weather. Wet saddle-blankets put next a horse’s back act like -a poultice. There is no alternative in wet weather in a bivouac but -to keep the blanket dry, or dry it before a start is made. Further, -since the health of their horses is vital to the efficiency of cavalry, -their leader must be willing to take risks in grazing, off-saddling, -and foraging for food. Against surprise on these occasions long range -rifles and our guns now confer on us great advantages. - -In this matter of attending to the welfare of the horse, however, it -must be fully realized when it is permissible and when the horse must -be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation. - -An instructive example of what far-reaching results may come from -ill-judged watering of horses is given in the _American Civil War_, -by General Alexander. In June 1864 Grant, after his encounter at Cold -Harbour with Lee, undertook the bold step of moving south across the -James River and attacking the Confederate right flank. For three days, -though the movement was reported to Lee, he would not believe it. - -On the 15th of June the Federal General Smith, with 1600 men, was -moving on Petersburg, a vital point on Lee’s right. Beauregard, the -Confederate commander, then had only about 2500 men to hold his -extended lines with; he, however, expected reinforcements by night. -Every hour’s delay of the Federal advance was therefore invaluable. -With one cavalry regiment and a battery he delayed Smith’s column for -three hours, and it was not till 5 P.M. that that General had completed -his reconnaissance of Beauregard’s position. By 6 P.M. everything -was ready for the attack; but it was then found that the Chief of -Artillery had sent all the artillery horses to water. This delayed the -attack till 7 P.M. It was partially successful, and a portion of the -Confederates’ lines were captured; but night came on, and with it the -Confederates’ reinforcements. “Petersburg was lost and won by that -hour.” That was on the 15th June 1864, and Petersburg did not fall into -Federal hands till April 1865. - -The question, whether the present day greatly-extended rôle of cavalry -on the battlefield, hitherto entirely confined to theory, will answer -in practice, is a burning one for the horse-master. Without an enormous -force of cavalry will there be squadrons available for these services? - -In Frederick the Great’s army the horses were a first consideration, -and he got the greatest results. In Napoleon’s campaigns there is not -much evidence of the horses being considered. - -Frederick saw that the task suited the horse. Napoleon made the horse -suit the task or perish in the attempt. The latter’s lost campaigns -teach lessons about cavalry which we cavalrymen cannot afford to -ignore. Cavalry worn out in the first week of a campaign, with scores -of horses scattered along a line of communication in vain efforts to -effect some coup, entail a bitter retribution. - -Campaigns of three weeks’ duration are not the rule, and every extra -exertion for which horses are called upon has its price. It is only in -the pursuit that we can afford to disregard our horses. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - - -For the purposes of making this subject plain, the Squadron, the -tactical unit, will be first considered. - -Let us picture, then, a squadron led at a trot with absolute cohesion -(that is, every man’s knees close against those of the next man,[18] -but not so as to prevent the pace being increased to such a gallop -as is compatible with that of the slower horses in the squadron). -This squadron being led till they are within 50 to 100 yards of their -opponents, and then at a command breaking into the full pace of the -charge with a crashing, ear-splitting yell rather than a cheer, will, -it is universally allowed, go through, break up, and cause to turn an -opposing squadron which has any intervals in its ranks.[19] In the -latter, men and horses can, since there is room, turn or pull round; -and they will do so. Your men and horses cannot turn; there is no room. -Weapons in this case may be ignored, the horses’ weight and momentum -is the weapon. Horse and man total upwards of a thousand pounds in -weight, they represent 9 feet in height by 3 feet in width. The front -extends for, say, 70 or 80 yards. The pace is 10 yards per second. It -is a rushing wall, there is nowhere any gap. - -The opposing squadron has started out with equally gallant intentions, -but before they reached the charging point, or even later, something -has occurred to prevent them appearing like a wall; more often than -not their direction has been changed, and, whilst shouldering, these -on the hand turned to may be closed up well enough, but those on the -outer flank have not had time to gain the direction; pace may not -have been uniform; a direction may not have been given by the leader; -or his order may have been mistaken. No matter what it is: fifty -things may happen. It is just enough to prevent that squadron being -the more compact, well-built wall of the two. And what follows? They -are defeated and disgraced. They will not, as a squadron, again face -the cavalry of the enemy whose squadron defeated them. Better, far -better draft the squadron and send the leader to another arm or work -if, unfortunately, he has survived. Why be so severe? Why treat them -thus? Because the heart, the _moral_ of the defeated squadron has lost -two-thirds, whilst the winning squadron is elated, believes in itself -and its leader, and despises the enemy. It will charge three squadrons -next time and will not turn. Still keeping before us the idea of a -wall moving at speed, let us consider what better fortune it may have; -it may catch the enemy on a half flank, or full in flank. - -Place a row of books standing quite an inch or two apart from each -other, hurl a spare book at the end book, and see what happens. At -least four or five will fall down. “Ten men on the flanks and rear (of -the enemy) do more than one hundred riding in front.” - -Trusting that this idea of a knee-to-knee charge, the cardinal point, -has been made clear, let us consider the other matters which a squadron -leader should keep before him when opposed to cavalry. He must utilize -surprise, what Galliffet refers to as “the horrible and unexpected”; he -should always be “the first to attack, always take the initiative, and -charge resolutely.” Again, our leader must utilize the ground: first, -its hollows and ridges must be accommodated to his tactics; secondly, -he should try to give the enemy bad ground, ground which will tire -or disintegrate them whilst he himself uses the best, since a ditch, -narrow drain, or small nullah diagonal to his front, a fallen tree, a -patch of boggy land, a few rabbit holes, some thorns or rocks may mean -two or three men and horses down or out of place. - -It is certain that an enemy who sees your squadron disappear in a -hollow, as you advance towards him, will, nine times out of ten, expect -it to continue its direction towards him; here, then, a wheel to the -flank, a gallop of a hundred yards or so, followed by a change of -direction, and later a wheel into line, may give the opportunity of a -lifetime. - -These may appear small things, but they must be second nature to a -cavalry leader as they are to some, and those the most dangerous, wild -animals; for in the skilled utilization of these small things lies his -honour and hopes of success. - -Watch the cat tribe: deliberate preparations, every advantage taken -of cover in the stealthy advance, then the gathering of the limbs -under--for the rush. From a fighting point of view we want every -instinct of this kind; with the cavalry there is no place for -“Gentlemen of the Guard, fire first”--cunning, nerve, unflinching -resolution, reckless, bloody-minded intrepidity, and with all this -the power to inspire your command, even those of doubtful courage, -with the certainty of success; though they must know some cannot come -back, still they like to be deceived, to die, or to be maimed, fierce, -high-hearted, happy, and elated. The sight of the enemy’s backs makes -them all brave. - - And then we re-formed and went at them once more, - And ere they had rightly closed up the old track, - We broke through the lane we had opened before, - And as we went forward e’en so we came back. - - LINDSAY GORDON. - - -THE RALLY - -An endeavour has been made, then, to show that the success of the -charge lies: first, in the ordered momentum of the unit; second, in the -suitable application of this by the leader. Disciplined experience -turns the scale. First, the impact, lessened in degree as one side -turns sooner or later. Then the mêlée. These beaten back, the others -victorious; these looking for safety, the others for victims. Now, -at this moment the wild man’s first instinct is to pursue “all out,” -without a reserve, to kill, perhaps, a weaker instinct, to capture, or -to plunder. A new element of disorder follows on this mad desire to -cast prudence to the winds and pursue, _l’épée dans les reins_. - -Once more the governing mind of the leader must assert itself, his -foresight and knowledge must reign supreme and repress the natural -instinct of the many; he by voice and example must rally his squadron. -Failing this, or a portion of his squadron held in reserve, his -horsemen are a prey to the first formed body which attacks them, though -of inferior strength.[20] “That side which is able to throw in the -last-formed body will win.” So excited is his command and so irregular -their course of action, that he will have great difficulty in getting -them to obey him. _Cavalry Training_, p. 128, realizes this: - - As the pursuers will be in disorder and consequently at the mercy - of any fresh body of the enemy’s cavalry, the necessity of - organizing a support without delay is imperative. - -Here let us remember that we have glorious traditions. The name of -Cromwell inspires very diverse thoughts in the British Isles. To the -Irish, battered walls; to the Scots, ruthless discipline; to the -English, a constitution upheld or a monarchy overturned. Suitable -memories of our great cavalry leader.[21] To the cavalryman what does -this man, who can still inspire such diverse thoughts in nations, -represent? - -The highest attribute in a general is that he should be able to order -the elements of disorder. War is the acme of disorder. The instant -conversion of the available remnants out of disorder, chaos, a hundred -wishes, shouts and orders, broken legs, loose horses, dead or wounded, -men fierce and reckless, constitutes the triumph of discipline and the -guiding foreseeing mind. - -In minutes, perhaps seconds, the enemy’s support or reserve, taking -advantage in turn of our disorder, will be upon us; we who have ceased -to be a wall, and are now scattered masonry, must be built up, so as -at any rate to _look_ formidable and to make those of the enemy, who -as individuals still bravely dispute the ground, turn and fly, and -perhaps throw into disorder the ranks of those who are coming to their -support. More than this, we must move in the direction of the enemy, -as though we still wished to fight. As wind is caught, stunned men -regain their senses, disabled horses exchanged for sound ones captured -at hazard, broken weapons replaced, the ranks refill, order at last -prevails. - -We have laid stress on the rally of the squadron,[22] but hardly less -important is the maxim that the victory rests with those who can last -throw a formed body into the combat. This may be the support of which -De Brack says:[23] - - Almost all the failures of charges are due to the slowness or - ignorance of the supports. A charge badly supported, no matter - how bravely begun, becomes only a bloody affray, whilst one well - supported is always victorious and decisive. - -Let us, then, for our guidance, and before considering larger forces, -formed of many squadrons and supplied with another element of offence -in their horse artillery, consider what conclusions are arrived at from -the fight of squadron _v._ squadron. They appear to be:-- - - 1. Provided that there is space to manœuvre and fight, that - cavalry which can manœuvre with cohesion at the greatest pace will - win. - - 2. The element of surprise affects the result. - - 3. The utilization of terrain is a _sine qua non_. - - 4. A flank attack is the object to be aimed at. - - 5. On the quickness with which the rally is carried out much - depends. - - 6. A skilled direction of the support influences the action. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - -FORMING TO THE FLANK - - “When you charge make a change of front and attack them in flank. - This manœuvre can always be successfully practised against an - enemy like the English, who make a vigorous and disunited charge, - whose horses are not very manageable, and whose men, brave but - uninstructed, begin their charge too far away from the enemy.”--DE - BRACK. - - “Ten men on the flank do more than 100 in front.”--VON SCHMIDT (p. - 90). - - -I. THE SQUADRON - -1. In the mounted attack of cavalry on cavalry that side will win -which makes use of a wall of mounted men, advancing knee to knee with -no intervals showing. Two means of quickly forming and launching this -wall are as follows: 1st. The head of the squadron column is directed -towards the enemy, and line is formed to the front. 2nd. The head is -led obliquely to the enemy’s advance, and at such a distance as will -enable the troops to wheel into line, get up pace, and attack. - -2. _Forming to the Front or to the Flank._--The first plan is that -which the beginner almost invariably adopts; the enemy’s squadron has a -fatal attraction for him; he distrusts himself and imagines that there -is not time to manœuvre. This attack generally “leads to undecided -cavalry duels.” - -The second plan is that which is always advocated, as, though it -demands more _sang-froid_, practice, and experience on the part of the -squadron leader. Its advantages are considerable; they are as follows: -(_a_) It gives more space and consequently more time to the leader. -(_b_) The enemy’s squadron, if already formed, will usually shoulder -towards the attacker, and thus become disintegrated. (_c_) The movement -does not entail the disorder consequent on front forming; on the -contrary, a wheel into line generally ensures well-ordered and cohesive -ranks. (_d_) The squadron is usually successful in striking the flank -of the enemy. - -Von Schmidt says: - - An attack direct to the front must be an exceptional thing; to - advance and at the same time gain ground to a flank must be the - rule. - -General Sir D. Haig says: - - The efficacy of flank attack is so universally admitted as to need - no argument to support it. A more difficult question is--how should - we protect our own flanks from attack? - -3. _Defensive and Offensive Flanks._--Usually the best protection -is afforded by either a defensive or an offensive flank; that is, a -portion of the unit, say, a troop from a squadron, a squadron from a -regiment, should drop back or be ready to drop back in echelon; or, on -the other hand, should be thrown forward. The duty of the defensive -flank is to act against an enemy overlapping or taking in flank the -unit in front. The object of the offensive flank is to threaten even -more completely than with the remaining force the flank of the enemy, -who will be tempted to edge across to meet it. - -What is true for a squadron is true for a regiment, and is still -more true for a brigade, because with this comes in the question of -artillery fire. - - -II. THE REGIMENT - -4. Let us then picture a regiment moving in “mass” from the south to -the north of the paper, map, or ground. - -Our regimental commander seeing the enemy’s mass in front and bearing -down on him, say, eight hundred yards away, gives the command, “Left -shoulders,” and moves N.E. The first effect is that the enemy have a -moving mark to hit, and to do so must “shoulder” or change direction; -while at the same time they are deploying to the front. - -Both forces move three hundred yards. Then our regimental commander -gives the command, “Echelon attack to the Left.” The squadron nearest -to the enemy wheels into line and attacks; the remaining squadrons -continue their direction and wheel into line in succession and attack -as required. - -The attack eventuates somewhat as in the diagram. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM I.] - -5. _Advantages of the Echelon Attack._--This form of attack has the -following advantages: (_a_) The wheel into line, the least discomposing -of evolutions, takes but a few seconds to carry out, and then there -is presented a formed body to charge the enemy. (_b_) A succession of -formed bodies coming up on the unprotected flank give confidence to -the squadron, which feels it is supported by other lines near enough -to catch any outflanking enemy. (_c_) An echelon of squadrons, seen -from the enemy’s point of view at a distance of three hundred yards, is -practically indistinguishable from line. It is, moreover, easier than -in forming to the front to abolish all intervals between squadrons; a -point of the greatest importance in an attack. (_d_) To be the last to -form the attack from a compact formation is a considerable advantage. -(_e_) The leader may even be able to change the direction of his mass -so as to attack from due east to west. - - -III. THE BRIGADE - -6. _Training of Leaders._--Our present squadron leaders, our future -brigade and divisional leaders, must be brought up to regard this -forming to the flank as the only plan, as second nature; they must -believe that if they act otherwise they are voluntarily tying one hand -behind their back. Otherwise the maintenance of horse artillery with a -view to co-operation with cavalry is almost useless. - -7. _Co-operation of R.H.A._--In the cavalry fight horse artillery is -the only factor which has assumed totally different proportions in the -last ten years (_i.e._ since Q.F. guns were introduced) to those which -formerly obtained. Von Schmidt, p. 163, writing in the middle of last -century, says: - - The co-operation of horse artillery with the shock of the cavalry - must be a very exceptional occurrence, as when the circumstances of - the ground are very favourable, allowing it to act and at the same - time protecting it. - -Nor does it appear that any instance of ideal co-operation between the -two arms occurred in the War of 1870. With the old guns the help which -horse artillery could give was not great; and consequently co-operation -was not practised in peace nor attempted in war. - -Strange as it may appear, our cavalry officers still find it hard not -to deserve the reproach cast upon them by the Duke of Wellington, who, -writing after the battle of Salamanca, remarks: “The trick our officers -of cavalry have acquired of galloping _at_ everything; they never think -of manœuvring before an enemy.” - -8. _The Two Forms of Attack._--A brigade of cavalry which moves in mass -with its guns alongside it and attacks straight to its front, masking -its guns by means of its squadrons’ extensions, voluntarily throws away -at least ¼ of its power, _i.e._ its guns. It will be beaten every time -by the brigade which sends its guns to one of the flanks and goes to -the other itself. By this last method both gun fire and charging power -are fully applied. Further, it is probable the guns will be able to -enfilade the enemy’s lines before they attack. A very short experience -of fighting a cavalry brigade shows this conclusively, and both sides -will learn to drop their guns’ trails at a favourable opportunity -and move their squadrons away from them or, _vice versa_, the guns -moving from the squadrons. The latter may be an excellent plan, and it -certainly entails less wear and tear on the squadrons. Directly the -guns come into action the horses can rest. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM II.] - -The choice between the two will usually be dictated by the ground; and -in most cases there will be a combination of the two. Thus a brigade is -advancing towards a crest, the brigadier ahead. He sends his guns away -to the high ground on one flank, and his squadrons over or round the -ridge and down to the level ground on the other. - -9. _When both Forces get away from their Guns._--Both sides will -usually drop the trails on the same, say, the west side, and move -eastwards, opposite to each other, to attack. If working along a ridge, -both sides will usually keep their guns on the higher ground. - -Other things being equal, the squadrons which move farthest, fastest, -and in the best order will have an advantage--(1) because they will put -the enemy’s squadrons between themselves and the enemy’s gun fire; (2) -because they will compel the enemy’s squadrons to form so that they are -fired on by artillery and very probably enfiladed. - -It becomes obvious, then, that if these tactics are adopted, and the -squadrons of both sides act in exactly the same way, they will meet on -perfectly level terms. - -10. _Formations for moving to a Flank._--The point then to aim at is to -bring some deciding factor in the attack. In what formation is it best -to move the squadrons away to the flank? - -11. _Column of Regimental Masses compared with Column of -Squadrons._--Let us compare column of regimental mass with column of -squadrons, and let the pace be a trot. Allow thirty seconds for the -shoulder of a regimental mass, five seconds for the wheel of troops. At -the end of four minutes the head of the mass will have gone 820 yards; -the head of the column 920 yards. But if there are twelve squadrons, -with a front of 64 yards, nine intervals of 8 yards, and two of 16 -yards, the last squadron will have only gone 50 yards; while in the -mass the rear squadron will have gone 630 yards. It follows, then, that -the leader who adopted column of regimental masses practically has all -his squadrons within reach of his voice, and they have moved well away -from his guns. - -[Illustration: _Column of Squadrons_ - - 1. _Stationary Target for 4 minutes._ - - 2. _Difficult Target thereafter._ - - _Column of Masses_ - - _Moving Target, able to change pace, direction or position, and to - use ground if fired on._ - -DIAGRAM III.] - -12. _Relative Effect of Artillery Fire on the two Formations._--The -relative effect of the guns on the two columns may be compared. For -four minutes the column of squadrons affords, before it gets on the -move, a stationary though every moment decreasing mark. After that the -target might be taken where the column has to pass some tree or house, -and each squadron saluted in succession as it reaches this place. -Otherwise it is not a very easy mark, and certainly not such a large -mark as column of regimental masses, but the latter moves at once, is -easily hidden, and can more easily change pace and direction. - -13. _Column of Masses preferred._--On the whole, the column of -squadrons formation compares unfavourably with the mass formation, not -only as a means of moving rapidly to a flank, but also for facility of -evolution when arrived there. - -14. _The Formation for the Attack._--If, then, we take mass as the best -formation, in what mode shall we move our mass, and evolve our lines of -attack from it? - -We will compare two methods. One, ours, being the echelon attack from -mass to a flank, and the other, the enemy’s, being an attack to the -right from quarter column. Ours only involves sufficient distance being -taken between regimental masses, and we are ready to attack at once. -Theirs involves the formation of lines of squadron columns and then -lines, and must commence at such a distance from the enemy as to allow -for the time and space used up in these two formations. For our echelon -attack little or no ground is consumed in the direction of the enemy; -and this means late formation. Consequently our mass can go on moving -away from the guns for a longer period. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM IV.] - -Another great point, directly we see him begin to open to squadron -column we can give one more change to our direction, and so gain his -flank. He will either be taken at an angle, or have to shoulder his -line of squadron columns. Thus we have gained the outside; he must mask -his own guns, and must be taken in flank by ours. - -15. _Time for Horse Artillery to unlimber._--It would appear as though -the leader who first dropped his guns’ trails would be likely to win; -but there is a saving clause to this. If the other side see the trails -dropped in an obviously good position, they will avoid the combat -there, or perhaps leave a section or portion of their horse artillery -to deal with these guns, and take the remainder with them to the flank. -They will avoid the cavalry combat till they are well away from the -enemy’s guns, and will then fight, when they have guns and cavalry, -against cavalry alone. This shows that in the cavalry combat it is a -very difficult matter to know just when to drop the trails, and get -away to a flank and attack. It must come as an inspiration, something -like Wellington’s move at Salamanca. - -16. _Form of Attack must be simple._--To have to decide between a great -many complicated forms of attack is out of the question. The form of -attack must be simple, understood by all, and only the timing of it can -be left to the leader at the supreme moment. - -17. _Conclusions._--Our conclusions, then, are: - -1st. That it is always advisable to move diagonally to an attack coming -at us, even with a squadron or regiment. - -2nd. That when we have to consider the combination of horse artillery -and cavalry squadrons in attack, it is still more necessary. - -3rd. That the mode in which we move to a flank prior to throwing in our -squadrons must be carefully considered, and the plan adopted which -gives us most squadrons at the critical point, and the handiest and -simplest mode of evolution. - -4th. That intervals between squadrons are a positive evil in an -attacking line. - -5th. That in an echelon the supporting body must be near enough to give -confidence to the body in front, far enough to catch the enemy on the -turn. - -6th. That no squadron must form line till it sees an enemy before it to -charge. Therefore, if, as the echelon opens out, the squadron leader -sees that he will be beyond the flank, he should not form to the flank, -but should lead round in squadron column and look for his opportunity. - - * * * * * - -“Why is it,” asks Ardant du Picq, “so hard to use cavalry well?” and -replies: “Because the rôle is all movement, all _moral_; _moral_ and -movement so closely allied, that often the movement alone without a -charge, without physical action of any sort, makes an enemy retreat, -and if that is followed up, causes his total rout. The latter follows -from the rapidity of cavalry for those who know how to use it.” - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -FIRE ACTION IN TACTICS OF CAVALRY _V._ CAVALRY - - -A very frequent question, also quite a justifiable one and one which -cavalry soldiers must not shirk, but must on the other hand thoroughly -understand and thresh out in their own minds, both by practical -experiment and theoretical discussion,[24] is the following:-- - -Since cavalry are armed with an excellent magazine rifle, may they not -more easily and effectually inflict loss and defeat on the enemy’s -cavalry by that means rather than by employing shock action, with its -gambling uncertainty, its losses in men and horses, its need of intense -resolution or complete absence of _arrière pensée_ on the part of the -leader? - -Those cavalry soldiers who have had experience in such affairs, -who have thought the matter out and thus obtained certain guiding -principles, will reply: “There are certainly many occasions when the -conditions of terrain or the nature of the combat favour such action. -We have only to mention a rearguard or a running fight and many -instances come to mind at once in the case of those pursued.” - -Intricate ground always favours fire action, and in small affairs, as a -sequel to a dash at the flank of an enemy holding a position on a rough -and unrideable kopje, it is obviously the right course. - -Of all these occasions it is our intention to take full advantage; -never to miss an opportunity. At the same time, practical experience -has convinced us that we must guard against such action being adopted -to the prejudice of shock action in cases where the latter is of -supreme value, and we must also recognize the “inherent weakness of -mounted troops who attempt to force a decision with fire action without -combining it with shock action.” - -In the _Report on the Cavalry Division Training_, 1909, by General Sir -D. Haig, we find the following:-- - - The principles which should determine the choice between mounted - and dismounted action require to be more thoroughly considered. - Small units have been seen on several occasions to dismount on open - ground when mounted action was the only sound course to adopt. - On the other hand, squadrons have been seen to remain mounted in - enclosed country when under fire at close range of dismounted men. - -Further, we feel that the very fact that there are many more occasions -suitable for fire action than for shock action must not make us lose -sight of this, namely, that though we may use fire action when we meet -the enemy nine times out of ten, it is on the tenth occasion, and then -because shock action takes place, that something definite, something -which affects the result of the campaign, is seen to happen. Therefore -we must not let our future leaders be brought up with distorted views. -We have to recognize that whilst recourse to shock action demands great -resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased -distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles -and increases our _moral_, the latter is a sign in many cases of -the leader weakening, temporizing, or waiting for orders which will -never--and _he knows it_--come.[25] - -We desire to face this question squarely, and with a just appreciation -of human nature and its many weaknesses and failings. Nor do we forget -the Arab proverb that victory is gained not so much by the numbers -killed as by the numbers frightened. It is in view of this that we -adopt certain lines in our cavalry training. - -It appears desirable to give an instance of a case where shock action -is decisive. Imagine two brigades of cavalry each with their H.A. -Battery meeting on an open plain. Each wishes to get forward. One, Red, -determining to use rifle action only, adopts the best formation he can -think of, a double echelon formation with his guns either on the flanks -well drawn back or in the centre. Dismounting, he prepares to attack. -Blue, leaving a fraction of his force in guns and rifles to hold Red -to his ground (and cavalry will credit how difficult it is for Red to -break off from such an attack), moves round Red’s flank, out of easy -range and at speed, and with the remainder of his brigade attacks Red’s -flank, choosing the angle at which he will “go in.” - -Red has of his own accord rendered his mobile force to a great extent -immobile; he suffers accordingly. Blue, using gun fire just in advance -of his shock action, rolls Red up. - -It is the fact, that the leaders of both sides instinctively feel that -they should not immobilize their commands, which will lead to “mounted -combats of cavalry forces.” Scores of actual happenings have convinced -those who have been present at them that there is nothing harder to hit -than a galloping man and horse; further, that if the mark is men and -horses approaching, the fire will be still less effectual. Whether the -men firing are under shell fire and their own horses are near them, -whether the enemy are armed with a personal weapon, especially a lance -or long rapier, each of these factors reduces the number of hits in a -way which can only have been seen to be believed. - -In the case of Red, their own and the enemy’s movements are -disconcerting and inimical to accuracy of fire. In the case of Blue, -movement every moment is conferring increased advantages on him, and -not the least of these liberty of action. - -Red, since he must send his horses to some distance back, takes a long -time to mount and move; and would give opportunities to Blue during his -movement.[26] - -As regards the difficulty of hitting a galloping horseman, the -following incident in South Africa may be of interest. An officer -and four good shots, with their horses close at hand, remained to -observe after the squadron had been withdrawn from a debatable kopje. -Occasionally they took long shots at the Boers, who in twos and threes -rode strung out across the front, almost out of range. Without any -warning, suddenly about seventy Boers turned and galloped straight at -the kopje. “Fire steadily till I tell you to mount,” was the order -given by the officer, who then fired at a man in the centre on a white -horse and well in advance. No Boers were seen to fall, and with 100 -yards start the five raced back to their squadron. When they came to -compare notes, it was found that all had fired at the same man on -a white horse, at whom some forty rounds had been discharged. The -conclusion arrived at was that rifle fire is not effective against -galloping individual horsemen, a conclusion which was duly acted upon. - -Cavalry must have space to manœuvre and fight. Without these, cavalry -lose the advantages conferred on them by mobility, and become at a -disadvantage compared with infantry. - -That there are very diverse opinions on the power of rifle fire -against cavalry must be evident from the fact that instructions so -very different in their import as the following were issued in Mounted -Troops’ Manuals shortly after the war in South Africa:-- - - “This Memorandum is not meant for cavalry who turn their backs, - but for those who, when they see the enemy preparing to charge - with sabre and lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and when he - gets within reach, pour in such a withering fire as will in five - minutes kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and - lance would kill in five hours on active service.”--Preface to Lord - Dundonald’s _Cavalry Training_, Canada, 1904. - - “If an attack of cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should, if - time admits, gallop to cover or enclosed or broken ground and there - repel and retaliate.”--General Hutton’s _Mounted Service Manual, - Australian Commonwealth_. - -The method is illustrated on an opposite page and shows the formation -of square, horses inside. This formation offers a splendid target to -H.A. or machine-gun fire for preparation of the attack which would -undoubtedly be made by cavalry from a direction at right angles to that -fire. - -Colonel Henderson, in _Science of War_, page 160, sums up the situation -as follows:-- - - It is beyond question that dealing with a dismounted force, - whatever may be the amount of fire with which it is endowed, shock - tactics may play an important part. - - The opportunities of effective outflanking and surprise may - possibly be few; but the very fact that the enemy has both the - power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to charge - home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the _moral_ of - any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone. - - Such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be - unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make any - forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at the mercy - of its antagonist,[27] and it would thus be absolutely prevented - from bursting through the hostile cavalry and from acquiring the - information which it is its main object to obtain. - - In the valley of the Shenandoah in 1864 the Confederate squadrons - were armed only with rifles, while the Federals under Sheridan were - trained both to fire and charge. The result is significant. The - southerners, though admirable horsemen, were worsted at every turn, - and their commander had at last to report that his mounted infantry - were absolutely useless against the Union cavalry. - - -DISMOUNTED ACTION OF CAVALRY - -Objection is often raised to cavalry practising the rôle of the -infantry attack, and generally with reason, for, where there is any -other better plan for cavalry, it is obviously wrong for them to -dismount, leave their horses far behind, and immobilize themselves in -order to carry out this form of attack. But on the other hand, and -especially in rearguard affairs, it is quite possible that a weak -rearguard or detached force well posted in a gorge or other unturnable -position will hold out till such an attack is made. Then take plenty -of cartridges, carry your swords with you,[28] and “go in.” But do -not imagine that this costly mode of attack should be adopted on all -occasions. - -It may be taken as a general rule that full value is not obtained -from cavalry who are far distant or long separated from their horses. -In the latest German cavalry regulations there is an important -modification. It is laid down that the decisive dismounted action -should only be attempted when the leader is convinced of possessing -numerical superiority, and very rarely over ground giving the enemy a -prepared field of fire. It is fatal, they say, to commit your forces -with numbers insufficient for success. They further say (para. 452): -“Half-hearted dismounted action contains the germs of failure”; and -evidently disapprove of the view that the extent of the rôle of -cavalry dismounted should be delimitated, as there is a tendency to do -in our army by those who expect the cavalryman to protest if they ask -him to dismount, and to argue how far he should go in attack--whereas -he must be, and will be, ready to accept any rôle which aids victory. - -Prince Kraft’s contribution to the discussion which followed the war -of 1870-71 should be regarded, by the British army at any rate, as out -of date. He wrote: “A blow is given to the true spirit of cavalry if a -trooper once believes that he can fight without his horse.” This blow, -duly received by the British cavalry, has proved innocuous; they have -learnt to _reculer pour mieux sauter_, with an additional power, in the -form of the rifle, of the greatest value to them, whilst at the same -time they will retain the tradition that their - - IDEAL IS SHOCK ACTION. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -A CAVALRY BRIGADE IN ACTION - - -In a cavalry attack the first objects are:-- - -1. To give the guns a good field of fire against the enemy’s attacking -squadrons for as long as possible. This thought comes first, and the -first order is accordingly that which puts the horse artillery in -motion. - -2. To keep our attacking squadrons from view of the enemy till the last -moment.[29] - -3. To make the line of direction of the cavalry attack such that it and -the line of the artillery fire meet approximately at right angles on -the mass of the enemy’s squadrons advancing to the attack, as already -explained in the chapter on flank attack. - -In order to attain a good field of fire for the guns it is often worth -while to send two squadrons (not necessarily from the same regiment) -to work towards the enemy _en bondes_, as the French expression is. -For example (see Diagram V.), “A” squadron Carbineers pushes on half a -mile or so (never more than a mile) and gets into any likely artillery -position. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM V.] - -“B” squadron Dragoons pushes on past their inner flank and gets into -the next likely position half a mile farther on, and so on, each -moving as soon as, or perhaps a little before, the other dismounts and -gets ready to use rifle fire on all scouting parties, bodies of the -enemy, etc. These parties are considerably disconcerted in their work -by this mode of advance. - -It is a point of honour, that these squadrons should if possible -get up in time for the general encounter (unless detained as escort -to horse artillery, a very likely contingency for one of them). But -this bounden duty to be up in the fight, if possible, is a maxim with -cavalry, against whom INACTION is the greatest reproach which can be -levelled, next to cowardice, for which it is liable, and justly so, to -be mistaken. - -Having thus got a choice of artillery positions, and having determined -the position of the enemy’s cavalry, our first care is to select the -best position for the horse artillery. - -(_a_) It must have a good field of fire over the ground where the -encounter is likely to take place. - -(_b_) We do not want the enemy to locate it; therefore it may be -advantageous to unlimber under cover and then manhandle the guns up, or -down into action; or it may remain behind cover and come into action -when it is _à propos_. It is quite possible that in order to bring an -effective fire on the enemy’s squadrons it may have to come into action -on forward slopes. - -(_c_) It is preferable for the guns to be defiladed from the enemy’s -artillery. - -(_d_) The teams should be near the guns but under cover. - -(_e_) The escort should be under cover from view, mounted or ready to -mount, prepared to charge attacking squadrons in flank. Rifle fire -against squadrons, who have nerve enough to charge a battery of Q.F. -guns, is not likely to stop them.[30] - -Whether we take all our squadrons away to a flank, whether we use one -regiment, or wing of a regiment, as a feint or bait, how far we go to a -flank, in what formation, and the hundred other possibilities, we must -leave to be settled at the time. Only the broad principles can then be -focussed, viz.:-- - -1. Utilize the ground, choosing cover for the squadrons and good ground -to work over. - -2. Deceive and bewilder the enemy. - -3. Get well away from our own artillery. - - -EXAMPLE - -i. The regiment or squadrons A----A sent with the horse artillery (see -Diagram VI.) must not keep too near it, because the enemy’s horse -artillery may get the range. Nothing shows more decidedly ignorance of -the duties of escort to horse artillery than that the cavalry should -hug or take into custody their horse artillery. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM VI.] - -ii. It must not mask its own horse artillery fire against the enemy’s -cavalry or upon his guns. The cavalry officer who masks his own guns -by his clumsiness usually deserves to be shelled by them. - -iii. The O.C. of the escorting regiment or squadrons must use his own -judgment as to whether he can spare one, two, or three squadrons to -help the two attacking regiments in the combat or in the rally. - -iv. He must decide whether to be outside or inside the horse artillery, -or in wings both outside and inside. - -v. Often the O.C. the regiment or squadrons A----A may have to decide -if he shall show up as bait, but in doing so he must, again, never mask -the artillery. He may (in this case) move west to his left, especially -if he thinks Blue cavalry is coming on and has not seen the regiments -C----C and B----B making their flank movement. But usually the regiment -or squadrons A----A should move up in this case more to the right, -east, as this means that Blue horse artillery will come into action -facing south and consequently cannot easily change front and pelt the -regiments C----C and B----B.[31] - -As our horse artillery will always if possible come into action on a -hill or on high ground there will be some hill behind which A----A is -able to manœuvre or to get cover, or to simulate (by showing up in -different places) a larger force than it actually represents. - -The leading of the regiments B----B and C----C will depend on -the signals sent from the Brigadier (who rides wide on the inner -flank--eastern side in this case--and where he can see the enemy’s -advance) to the Brigade Major. These regiments B----B and C----C -should make their move if possible under cover from view, and at the -critical moment the order to attack should be conveyed to them. - -As one of the objects of this manœuvre is to give our guns a good -target, the O.C. horse artillery must direct his fire on the enemy’s -squadrons, in this case, X----X and Y----Y. The enemy’s artillery, if -already in action, will sustain little harm from his fire. The result -of the encounter will depend on which side wins the shock action, -therefore every shell which falls in an enemy’s squadron is a help. The -enemy’s supporting squadrons are a special target, also the enemy’s -rallying squadrons. - -Let the O.C. horse artillery remember that the sight and sound of -his bursting shells will often enlighten the Brigadier as to the -position of the enemy’s squadrons and guide him in his attack, on which -everything depends. - -Before the combat, RESOLUTION, _i.e._ fixedness of purpose, the instant -adaptation of stratagem to the features of the terrain, an attack -at the psychological moment galloping knee to knee; in the combat, -constantly keeping a reserve and constantly re-forming into good order -for the next effort,--these are the secrets with which to ensure coming -successfully out of a cavalry encounter. “’Tis dogged as does it.” But -do not let the leader imagine that he will always be making an advance, -when this combat comes off. - -Especially to be deprecated is the unreasoning gallop of squadrons, -so commonly seen at manœuvres in an advance towards an enemy, which -deprives them of any value from the reports of officers, patrols, etc. - -If it is evident that the enemy has forestalled our manœuvre, and that -any move to the front will place our brigade in the jaws of his attack, -then, as Von Bernardi (page 147, _Cavalry in War and Peace_) says, the -“deployment should either be on existing lines or to the rear, and -should be covered by dismounted action of the advanced guard or by -artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action be regained, -as superior breadth of deployment is the first and perhaps the most -important step towards maintenance of the initiative.” - -Other cases in which it may be a positive advantage to allow the enemy -some measure of initiative occur either when you are quite ignorant of -his strength, or when the ground on which your squadrons stand or in -their rear is most suitable for the combat from your point of view. - -In the passage of defiles in the face of an enemy, say, in the case -of a river or swamp, the rule is for the column, as it emerges from -the far end of the defile, to move in column of troops parallel to -the river or swamp. It will thus (i.) be ready to wheel into line and -attack quickly, (ii.) there is no fear of the column being pushed back -on to succeeding troops coming through the defile, (iii.) the head of -the defile is kept clear of troops, (iv.) there is one safe flank for -your column, _i.e._ that on the side of the swamp or river, and (v.) -there is not the same danger of the enemy pounding[32] an easy mark at -the mouth of the defile with his artillery. If your own artillery can -occupy any ground on this side of the defile, from which the exit can -be seen, the accompanying diagram shows that a considerable force of -your cavalry can make the passage with comparative safety under cover -of its fire. It should always be remembered that the attack against -troops, in course of the passage of a defile, will usually take place -when only that proportion has crossed which the enemy thinks he can -beat decisively. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM VII.] - -A word of warning is necessary as regards a common and most enticing -error, which is that of allowing squadron after squadron to be drawn -into a fight. - -As regards the dissemination of squadrons, this would not be such a -serious matter if every detachment would return immediately its rôle -had been played; but unfortunately Providence does not appear to make -commanders of detachments like that; if it did, automatically our force -would become, say, one-quarter stronger.[33] - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT - - “It was thought that to engage the enemy to fight was our - business.”--CROMWELL at Preston. - - “The part played varies according to the quality of the instrument - and the capabilities of the operator.”--CHERFILS. - - -In the last few years considerable prominence has been given to the -action of independent cavalry, and there is reason to believe that this -might lead to a large portion of the cavalry of an army being detached -when a general engagement was imminent. This tendency may well arise -where the general officer commanding has not a complete grasp[34] -or perhaps belief in the possibility of a rôle for cavalry on the -battlefield, nor entire reliance on them for that assistance, which, if -properly trained and directed, they are well able to give.[35] - -The general officer commanding may, under the impression that the -combat can be carried through by the artillery and infantry without -much further assistance, order the cavalry commander to take the bulk -of his squadrons and make a detour, involving half the night spent in -the saddle, and thus place himself on the flank or rear of the enemy, -and there to attack or wait his opportunity in the event of the enemy’s -defeat. - -Acting in accordance with these orders, we may picture the cavalry -arrived at a point some twelve or fifteen miles away, where the leader -may very well find it is by no means all plain sailing. His progress -may be blocked at some bridge or defile, and, whilst he is endeavouring -to push aside the opposition, reinforcements, including artillery, come -upon the scene, and he finds that to avoid heavy loss he must draw off -the larger portion of his force in order to make a still longer detour. -This wastes several hours and results in a drawn fight, or, if he does -get nearer to his objective, he finds that, with timely warning given, -the enemy are well able to hold him off. - -Meanwhile the flank left open, or practically denuded of mobile -troops, has every chance of being turned; all the tendency of modern -fighting is towards extension and dispersion, whilst the desperate -counter-attack is the theme of every writer. We can imagine no more -galling occurrence than a counter-attack,[36] thrust in on one’s own -flank (more probably than not, the very flank from which the cavalry -have been sent), and, in their absence, carried through with decisive -results. These wide turning movements, or rather action against the -flank and rear of the enemy, are in the nature of putting all one’s -eggs in one basket, and not infrequently taking it for granted that the -enemy will not stand his ground. - -It has been very well said that cavalry is an arm of opportunity, and -opportunities are most likely to occur where actual fighting is going -on. Against the Boers, who had no idea of counter-attack, these turning -movements came off; against well-led troops, suitably disposed in -depth,[37] and avoiding wide dispersion, their success is very doubtful. - -Napoleon said: - - Cavalry charges were good at the beginning, during the course - of, and at the end of a battle. They should always be made, if - possible, on the flanks of infantry, especially when this last is - engaged in front.--Napoleon’s Maxim, No. 50. - -He would no doubt go further now and speak of the intervention of -cavalry with horse artillery and machine guns as likely to turn the -scale in the crisis of battle. - -But Napoleon would recognize that it is by rapidly prolonging their own -flank against being turned, or by enveloping or enfilading the enemy’s -line by participation in the counter-attack, or by work such as that -done by the German horse artillery and cavalry at Loigny-Poupry on -December 2, 1870 (late in the war when the German cavalry had learnt -their lesson), that cavalry show to advantage. There 2150 German sabres -and 24 guns, acting in combination, first dashed aside the opposition -offered by the French in villages on the left flank of their line of -battle, and then, sweeping round, proceeded to threaten and shell the -left rear of the French infantry line--good work, and showing the value -of mobile forces boldly thrown at a flank, but lacking in the final -stage in that resolute determination which gives full value to such -a movement, and this, no doubt, because they had not been trained in -peace to act together.[38] - -This leads one to consider what was the training of our own cavalry -subsequent to 1870. Was it not the general tendency of our authorities -and tactical experts to discredit the action of cavalry on the -battlefield, without considering whether the armament, organization, -and previous training of the cavalry of both France and Germany were -such as to lead to success? - -These points all influenced the course of the actions in the first -months of the 1870 war in the most remarkable manner. Again, was the -leading, except for a few bright exceptions, satisfactory? French -and German writers on cavalry plainly intimate that the direction of -cavalry enterprise by the higher leaders, and the action of the cavalry -leaders, were distinctly disappointing.[39] - -Meantime a belief gained from the American War that dismounted tactics -were the solution to the cavalry question obsessed some, as it always -will those who lack (i.) a practical knowledge of the arm, (ii.) -imagination, (iii.) an acquaintance with military history, though the -most acute thinker of that time, Henderson, lays down very concisely -in _Science of War_, p. 60, “that mounted infantry were absolutely -worthless against cavalry.” - -In peace, as the value of the bullet rose, the use of cavalry fell in -the mind of the man of theory. Probably only the few, who with an open -mind thoroughly tested the two rival lines of action in the field, -and on every kind of ground, were able to give a correct appreciation. -But these never swerved from the opinion that mounted men relying only -on the rifle were hopeless in attack or in the open against cavalry, -but were, on the other hand, of great value in defence, or in broken -ground, or in retreat, and further, that many small opportunities, far -more than for shock action, would be offered to them, which cunning and -versatility would enable them to profit by. - -But all this talk had not been without its effect, and the result was -that it was not considered ridiculous that a large force of mounted men -should be frittered away in ineffective dismounted action, sitting all -day on a hill or ridge, and firing at great distances at an equally -sticky enemy. Such action is a slur on cavalry for whom “Action and -again action” is the motto. - -If both cavalries work on this principle, and this was often the case -both in the early portion of the South African War[40] and in the -Manchurian campaign, certainly no important combats will take place; -but, directly one side begins to “push,” mounted combats will result, -and as each side finds that the greatest number of squadrons, _ceteris -paribus_, wins, there will be great combats of masses, and a “fight -to a finish” amongst the cavalry on the flank of the great general -encounter. - -As we have said, in the South African War during the first year, with -few exceptions, fire at long distances and infinitely wearisome tactics -were the rule; it was only in the last year of the war that the British -cavalry, colonials, and mounted infantry--their attack in some cases -supported by really effective and _à propos_ artillery and machine-gun -fire--began to push and gallop at the Boers at every opportunity. Then -the Boers always galloped away, but gradually they, too, learnt from us -the value of pushing, and Botha, Delarey, and others executed some good -charges with marked effect, but they never attempted, and wisely so, to -charge men armed with swords. That was too much for the cavalry soldier -to hope for. - -In the Manchurian War the Japanese, with their small force of cavalry, -wisely played the defensive game; the Russians,[41] trained and -organized for twenty years on wrong principles, and led without much -attempt at reasoned dash or enterprise, seldom imposed their will on -the enemy, or made any effort to push in with their numerous squadrons -and sotnias on an open flank. If there was an exception it was when, -before the battle of Mukden, a force of Cossacks under General Liubarin -attacked the Japanese right flank in the mountains, and are stated -to have “rendered the situation critical” till driven off by mixed -forces of infantry and cavalry. This is given as one of the few cavalry -lessons of the Manchurian War. The Russian cavalry officer had not -received sufficient training in grand tactics, nor does the combined -action of their horse artillery with cavalry appear to have been in any -respect effective. - -The lesson for our cavalry from these two wars appears to be, that -we should teach our officers to think about something bigger than -the tactics of a squadron or regiment, to learn _esprit d’armée_, to -remember that a few independent squadrons cut up rarely influence a -war, whereas in every big combat the result (and that result may be -affected largely by the leading of a few squadrons) is a national -matter. And there always recurs the most supreme question for the -cavalry leader of masses on the battlefield, whether, apart from the -cases in which a sacrifice is necessary, the anticipated results are -in any way proportionate with the stake. Even the riding down of an -infantry brigade will not always compensate for the expenditure of a -cavalry division. - -Langlois pictures “cavalry with its light batteries in the decisive -attack moving by ways which are hidden from view and fire ... falling -on the enemy in mass and surprising him. Reconstructing his (the -enemy’s) defences, and keeping hostile troops at a distance, measures -which,” he says, “require a short dismounted fight, then part of the -cavalry advance and harass and prevent the enemy returning, whilst the -rest holds the position with fire. The infantry will follow the cavalry -as quickly as possible.” - -There is no more important subject of training for the cavalry officer -than cavalry action on the battlefield of all arms. Theoretical study -is not enough, it is absolutely necessary to study in the field with -troops or flags representing troops. Since cavalry action is almost -invariably[42] on the flanks, staff rides, cavalry instructional rides, -manœuvres, and other exercises can commence by dealing with only one -flank, thus half the number of men, flags, etc., will suffice. - -The director should never permit one side to know the strength in any -arm on the other side; this is desirable, if only to increase the -difficulty and value of gaining information by reconnaissance in these -exercises. For this purpose a proportion of cavalry-scouting parties -should be detailed. Too much stress can scarcely be laid on this -essential of training. Cavalry can now simulate infantry, smokeless -powder renders it impossible to judge the volume of fire, every bit -of information has to be fought for, and will cost the lives of both -horses and men. Even the boldest and most cunning scouting, without -fighting, will not lead to any certain information; it is “peacetime -talk” to imagine that it will be otherwise. Having this in view, -the director should lay the greatest stress on dash and enterprise -as opposed to stickiness and a desire to do nothing or await further -report. It is at these exercises that the director can go far to -establish a _doctrine_, that of the resolute offensive. - -If officers cannot act with dash in field manœuvres, how can they be -expected to do so in war? Ground gained in peace manœuvres matters -little, but in war a position gained on the flank of an army by a -cavalry brigade may now mean the enfilading by horse artillery of -entrenched infantry for three miles in extent. - -A very good plan is to take some well-known battle and lay out the -situation with flags at some portion of the day, and then work out the -cavalry action in theory and practice. This will admit of considerable -variation. To lay out fresh battlefields or inaugurate new general -ideas each time leads to waste of time in preliminary study of the -situation. There is not the slightest doubt that the want of this -very practical study has affected the leading of cavalry in the past -in a marked degree.[43] Want of determination comes from want of -knowledge of what to do in the situation. In the past, sticky leading -has been condoned because few knew any better. Long ago Lewal wrote -prophetically of the bad effect on cavalry of “being umpired out of -action at peace manœuvres, and told of smokeless powder and magazine -rifles” (Lewal, p. 62). - -It is all very well to say that every hill should be regarded as being -held by the enemy till you know otherwise, but let us take care to know -one way or other without delay, and not to imagine that there is any -great value or safety in being on a hill. Hills may be well shelled by -the enemy’s horse artillery, whilst his cavalry gallop up to the dead -ground to be found in front and flank of nine hills out of ten, where, -if supported by horse artillery fire, it is better placed than the -dismounted men on the hill. - -Finally our leaders, after preparing themselves, their staffs, and -subordinate leaders by constant practice, “must ever remember and -must impress on their subordinates that hesitation and delay handicap -operations far more heavily than do mere mistakes in choice of -methods.”--_German Cavalry Training_, para. 399. - -That the risks which one side takes paralyses the action of the other -has been true of every battle. There is (and peace-time theorists on -the military art often neglect this fact) a first idea or instinct in -the minds of the majority of the human race, that the man or animal -dashing straight at them has some good reason to believe that he can, -and will, hurt them; this primary instinct leads them to subordinate -themselves to the initiative of the other. Watch the unreasoning -game of chase and check between a cat and a dog, and you have a -good example of much that happens, and will always happen, on a -battlefield.[44] - -“Initiative is the greatest virtue in a leader; to avoid dissipation of -force is a well-proved means of victory.”--_German Cavalry Training_, -para. 407. - - -CONCLUSIONS - -1. There are risks of doubtful value in action directed on wide lines -against the enemy’s flank and rear. - -2. The 1870 and American Wars confused the issues and led in some cases -to sticky action by cavalry on South African battlefields. - -3. In Manchuria the Japanese adopted correct tactics in view of Russian -want of enterprise and their own want of cavalry. The rôle of the -weaker cavalry was exemplified in some respects. - -4. Push on the part of one side will compel the other to bring up more -squadrons and lead to the fight of cavalry masses. - -5. It is only by special training that cavalry leaders can learn their -duties in a general engagement. - -6. Much depends on the leader’s initiative, whilst this again depends -on his knowledge gained by previous practice in similar circumstances. - -There are those who ask, “But where are the Ziethen and Seydlitz -cavalry charges nowadays?” Let them call to mind, for it is -instructive to do so, the combination of circumstances, and, be it -noted, circumstances which may well rise again, which conduced to the -success of the cavalry of Frederick the Great. - -I. A king general, who had a taste for and knowledge of training -cavalry. - -II. A training of all ranks suited to the war about to be undertaken. - -III. A cavalry with picked leaders quite unencumbered by officers past -or unsuited to their work. - -IV. Horses well conditioned under the eye of an autocrat, who had the -common sense to demand and see that he got, not fat, but fit horses. - -V. A skilled direction of the cavalry on the battlefield by a cool -and intensely determined generalissimo, such as Frederick the Great -undoubtedly was. - -Now let us, on the other hand, state the case in the South African -operations of 1899-1902. (In almost the same words as regards some -paragraphs as were used in 1897.) - -I. An unskilled training and inspection of cavalry in the large -proportion of cases, often conducted by officers of other arms, and -such as tended to inspire all ranks with a desire for display and fine -appearance on parade, rather than with a whole-souled yearning for -efficiency for the war in hand. - -II. The training of cavalry regiments in small, flat twelve-acre -drill-fields walled in from the slums of a city, in which cavalry were -still stationed for hopelessly out-of-date political reasons. What -real cavalry training was possible along the tram lines and between -rows of suburban villas? - -III. A personnel too largely drawn from towns, and ignorant of the -exigencies of campaigning horse-management. - -IV. Horses, three-quarters bred, of fair pace and condition, but the -latter necessary qualification for a campaign entirely spoiled in -most cases by, say, a thirty days’ voyage, followed by a five or six -days’ railway journey, then semi-starvation at the end of a line of -communication, then some quick work followed by two or three days’ -total starvation, then more work, and so on. Constantly our strategy -outran our supply arrangements and the condition of our horses. - -V. An enemy fighting in their own country, and each man owning two or -three hardy, well-conditioned country-breds. - -VI. Tactics of the enemy; to hold on to a position with rifle fire, and -when seriously attacked or their flanks turned to disperse at a gallop. - -Tactics all very well in their way, and just as disconcerting and -annoying to our squadrons as they were to Murat’s cavalry in the -advance into Russia; but these Parthian tactics are only suited to -a limited number of strategical phases, a point difficult to bring -home to the mind of those who have not studied strategy. They were -tactics which resulted in a loss to the Boers of about 5000 men, -generally foot people, at Paardeberg and, later, another 5000 in the -Wittebergen. Meanwhile the cavalry to which they were opposed was able, -by simple turning movements, to afford the main column, a practically -uninterrupted advance from the Orange River to the Portuguese border. - -It is strange, indeed, how the lesson of those operations has in many -cases been read upside down by a nation which takes no steps to study -military history, and which, consequently, forgets that the spirit of -vigorous offensive, which did and must result in occasional heavy loss, -had been sternly discountenanced by the majority of their press, after -the experiences of Black Monday. “Conduct the operations without loss, -or, better, by diplomacy--and above all with kindness,” was then the -cry. - - -PURSUIT - -One of the great fallacies, and one to which in England especially we -are victims, is that war can be conducted on haphazard principles by -the instinct of brave men. - -Not only do these brave men “let us in,” on every possible occasion -(especially when they are so brave and foolish as to neglect proper -precautions), but they forget that the sole thing in war is to “get -there,” that is, to bring the enemy to his knees and win. - -One of their failings, and it is a typical British failing, is the -neglect to pursue, or, if they pursue, they neglect to do so properly. -Again, and again, in the early part of the operations in South Africa -was this neglected. The first good instance of pursuit, conducted -on proper principles, was that carried out by General French, and -resulting in the ultimate surrender of Cronje. Why was this on the -right principle? The answer is, “Because it was conducted on the -principle of “the parallel pursuit,” and resulted in intercepting -Cronje at a crossing of the Modder River.” - -It is in such matters that the professional has the advantage of the -amateur; the latter would, no doubt, see no reason why a pursuit should -do otherwise than follow in the tracks of the enemy, forgetting that -there he will find the best and freshest troops, with good supplies of -ammunition, and under the best leaders,[45] their orders may probably -be, “To stop and die.” Again, that along this line he will run his head -against positions, hastily prepared no doubt, but still positions, -which are meant to delay pursuit. The whole proceeding would be -analogous to trying to beat the enemy at chess by taking piece after -piece till only the king was left. - -Compare with this the “parallel pursuit.” Sufficient troops are -pushing the enemy’s rearguard and lulling his main force to a fancied -security; then the cavalry leader moves several miles to the flank -of the direction taken by the enemy with as much speed as possible, -since there is nothing to delay him, and he goes on till there is some -obstacle, perhaps some defile, which the enemy must cross; here he -throws himself boldly in the way of the enemy, of whom those who have -led the stampede, the weakest and least courageous, will be in front. -Ten to one some of these will surrender, unable to bear up against this -fresh disaster, and may be used to assist to block the defile, and thus -affect the _moral_ of those who are following, and who are, perhaps, in -better order. - -To the minds of leaders of the stamp of Napoleon’s marshals this form -of pursuit was ever present, and we come on instances of it.[46] It is -essentially a duty of cavalry and horse artillery. - -That it often requires strong determination on the part of the leader -to urge tired men and horses to pursue is well known. After the -battle of Katzbach, Blücher had pressed his cavalry to pursue, but -these made a very weak attempt at pursuit, blaming the weather and -alleging extreme fatigue. Blücher summed up the situation of cavalry as -follows:-- - - The State can afford to lose a few hundred horses in order to make - a victory complete, or when it is a question of the annihilation of - the enemy’s entire army. To neglect to obtain the full results of a - victorious battle is inevitably to oblige yourself sooner or later - to gamble again. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE DISPOSITION OF CAVALRY IN A CAMPAIGN - - -FIRST PART - -It is related that its owner tried as an experiment to find out what -was the smallest amount on which a horse could work. When he had -reduced the animal to one straw per diem, the experiment ceased, as the -horse died. - -The reader, constantly bearing in mind the above anecdote (since, if -great generals have overlooked in the past the moral of the tale, there -is no reason why others should not do so in future), may proceed to the -subject of this chapter, but not without the recurrent thought, that, -however dashing the conception of the use of cavalry in a campaign, -this one point must be foremost. What will the cavalry horses live -on? Horses cannot live on nothing. Few survive if put for a prolonged -period on ½-grain rations and no hay or grazing, if such is followed by -work. - -How far motor vehicles carrying supplies have changed the aspect -of affairs in regard to this question is at present a moot point. -Undoubtedly the effect of the domination of the air by man has -materially affected the question of obtaining information. - -The principle, “that an army should place in its front the whole of -its available cavalry forces from the very beginning of a campaign,” -to some extent arises from the desirability of an undisturbed -concentration for one’s own army, and also the advantage of checking -that of the enemy. - -Next in order will be the desire of the commander-in-chief of the -army to have definite information of the enemy’s movements whilst at -the same time his own movements are covered. This will enable him to -direct the movements of his army, whilst still at a distance from the -enemy’s advanced guards, and effect concentration for battle neither -too soon nor too late (since both of these contingencies entail grave -inconveniences), but at the right moment. - -But when it comes to practical politics, it is plain, and must be -regarded as a principle, that a cavalry brigade, division or corps -cannot be relied upon to perform efficiently the duties of policeman -and detective at one and the same time. The duty of the latter would -carry the former away from his beat. - -The French cavalry in 1870, though they possessed what Ardant du Picq -describes as the true “Casse cou”[47] readiness to charge (and by the -bye, that _is_ a portion of the _cavalry spirit_), almost entirely -lacked skilled direction by the higher leaders. This fault was no -doubt due, in some degree, to the three arms training each in separate -water-tight compartments, and not on a large and comprehensive scale -in peace, precisely as Langlois says of us in reference to our army’s -work in South Africa: “The English took no steps in peace to create and -strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them.” - -Direction by the higher leaders will always be lacking, where those -leaders, in peace time, are unable to divorce themselves from the -surroundings and prejudices of their own particular arm, whatever it -may be, and to enter whole-heartedly and unreservedly into the spirit -of the Napoleonic maxim (No. 47): “Infantry, cavalry, and artillery -_are nothing without each other_.” - -Be that as it may, after the 1870-71 war the French cavalry had a -moving spirit in General Galliffet, and he was well supported by some -of the cleverest French military writers. They dissected French and -German cavalry action in 1870-71 (and that of cavalry in other wars), -laying bare the mistakes and failures of the cavalry of both armies. -They saw what was wanted, higher direction and co-ordination of the -work of cavalry, so that the two functions of cavalry, information and -security (prior to its rôle on the battlefield), might be realized to -their full extent. Their deduction from the campaigns of the Napoleonic -period was, that that great leader and organizer had discerned the -impossibility of co-ordinating these duties; that in his earlier -campaigns there were two great units of war, the cavalry of army corps -and a corps of reserve cavalry;[48] the latter was composed of numerous -light cavalry, acting about a day in front of the columns of the main -body. Again, that in 1812, corresponding with the formation of groups -of armies, the corps of cavalry was created to act independently, in -advance of the general movement of the armies, making a third great -unit. They arrived at the conclusion that war brings into play three -great units, each of which requires its special cavalry. - -1. In front of armies under the generalissimo an independent cavalry, -in one or more bodies, to insure liberty of offensive action to the -generalissimo. - -2. In each army a division of cavalry to ensure to it the liberty of -defensive action by giving time to concentrate and take up favourable -positions. - -3. In each army corps a regiment or half-regiment to ensure -tranquillity and freedom from surprise. - -Nor did they fail to bring to notice that Napoleon’s system was to find -a cavalry leader, and let him organize his cavalry to help the plan of -campaign, and not to waste his cavalry in a sort of insurance policy. - -The essence of cavalry is offence, “offensive résolue, offensive quand -même offensive à outrance, qui fut le plus souvent la seule règle de -tactique,” not defence and shepherding infantry divisions;[49] this -latter work does not demand the most highly trained cavalry. - -By these steps gradually the principle, which is clearly stated in our -F.S. Regulations, was arrived at, viz.: - - The main force of cavalry will usually be organized in one - or more cavalry divisions, and retained as the instrument of - strategical reconnaissance under the immediate orders of the - commander-in-chief.--Part II., British F.S.R., 1909, p. 25. - -At the present date the French, German, and Austrian organization is -practically identical in this respect. All recognize that “we must -fight to reconnoitre, and fight to screen.”[50] - -The rôle of cavalry, as defined at p. 182 of the French _Service de la -Cavalerie_, 1909, is as follows: - - 1. _The Cavalry of Exploration_ (answering to our own independent - cavalry), the personal agent of the generalissimo, is sent where he - wishes, in quest of the news he desires. This news the leader of - this cavalry must send in good time; his independence is limited to - the means he employs to get news. The cavalry of exploration may - also be sent on special missions against the columns or convoys - of the enemy, and ought, _whilst observing its instructions and - carrying out its_ important rôle, to seize any opportunity of - destroying the enemy’s cavalry. - - Cavalry is the arm, above all, of surprise, and consequently may - often obtain the greatest results by a sudden attack on the wings - or rear of the adversary. - - 2. _The Cavalry of the Army Corps_ (answering to our protective - cavalry) and the divisional cavalry find out and inform their - commander what is happening in the zone allotted to them. - - They must keep off the enemy’s cavalry, guard the columns against - surprise, cover their deployment, and seek every opportunity of - intervening with effect in the combat. - - 3. _The Divisional Cavalry_ may, in the combat, be the only troops - on whom the divisional general can depend for safety from surprise: - their commander must, accordingly, not only seek opportunities to - use the bulk of his troops opportunely in the combat, but also give - information and guard the division against surprise on its flanks - and rear. - -What use, then, does the generalissimo make of his independent cavalry? -He sends it forward to tear the veil from his adversary’s armies; -whilst thus engaged it may, in fact almost certainly will, meet the -enemy’s independent cavalry similarly employed, when, with a view to -carrying out its orders, it will probably be compelled to fight--to -fight for information. - -Let us suppose it successful and the squadrons of the enemy’s -independent cavalry dispersed, unable to face their adversary. Our -independent cavalry push on to the enemy and meet the screen of -cavalry, the service of security which covers his army. This again -they must tear aside, and lay bare the heads of the enemy’s infantry -columns. Even then their mission is not complete; they must direct -their energies against the flanks of the enemy’s columns and -demoralize them. It is plain, then, that on the successful action of -the independent cavalry great issues may depend. - -With regard to the movement of these forces, whenever cavalry are -moving in the direction of an enemy (whether they are the independent -cavalry or the protective cavalry), it is obvious that they will -endeavour to pass quickly through ground which is for any reason -unfavourable to them and advantageous to the enemy for attack, whilst -they will dwell in positions which present obvious advantages to them. -The result is, that from large forces of cavalry down to the smallest -unit there is a tendency to move forward in bounds. - -The protective cavalry will further be influenced by the desire to -forestall the enemy in gaining positions for the infantry columns -following them, and in taking up for the night a line of outposts on -some natural obstacle, which will give them some security whilst they -are halted. - -It is quite a debatable question whether the evolution of cavalry into -three classes as at present is not largely due to the arming of cavalry -with a good rifle, and to rendering them consequently able to protect -themselves, and able to turn out small parties of the enemy who hold -defiles, railway stations, etc., against them. The new German Cavalry -Regulations, para. 391, state: “Thus cavalry, owing to its great -adaptability, is capable of independent action in practically every -eventuality of the battlefield.” - -In any case horse artillery, machine guns, and the rifle have added -enormously to the defensive power of cavalry; when, therefore, the -protective cavalry are thrown back on the infantry, by the enterprise -of the enemy’s independent squadrons, the latter may lightly, and -without warning, find themselves attacking infantry in position, by -mistake for dismounted cavalry, and consequently suffer very severely. -Not only that, but the mixed detachments of all arms likely to be met -with at this juncture, possess a power and length of resistance, which -our cavalry may perhaps successfully simulate, and thus hold back and -delay the advance of the enemy’s cavalry. - - -SECOND PART - - “A writer upon strategy and tactics ought to treat his subjects as - national strategy and tactics; for only such teaching can be of - real service to his country.”--VON DER GOLTZ, _Nation in Arms_, p. - 143. - -Instead of labouring the point as to the rôle of cavalry under these -circumstances, perhaps one may be permitted to recall to the reader’s -mind that, unless we go back to Napoleonic precedent, there are no -actual experiences in modern times of the effect to be obtained by -using cavalry in the manner prescribed at present. The whole is pure -theory, but we can say from our own experience that the protective -cavalry may fail if they attempt to be strong everywhere on the old -“pepper-box” system. - -The drives in South Africa, in which we were strong nowhere and -weak everywhere, proved, as indeed was expected, that a strong and -determined enemy can always break through the long weak line unless the -latter follows the line of some serious obstacle. - -It is also a matter of easy demonstration and universal agreement that -the cavalry which dominates in the first great cavalry struggle has -already gained an enormous advantage for its side. - -What is the logical outcome? It is, that unless (1) our cavalry force -is redundant, or (2) there are difficulties in feeding our independent -cavalry, or (3) the enemy’s cavalry is very weak, or (4) our cavalry -comprises squadrons, which we cannot, from reasons of want of training -or armament, oppose to the enemy’s cavalry, we shall see every -available squadron taken from the protective cavalry and handed over -to the independent cavalry. Intelligence comes before security.[51] -Meanwhile the protective rôle will be carried out by divisional mounted -troops, cyclists, and infantry detachments (see sec. 92, F.S.R.). - -_Ceteris paribus_, the first advantage will be with the side which can -put the greatest number of squadrons into the corps of independent -cavalry, and, in view of this, a fact plainly spoken of and counted -upon in all strategical conceptions of future campaigns on the -Continent, the preponderance of well-trained squadrons is clearly the -object to be aimed at. - -Generally speaking, the ideas which are promulgated as to the rôle -for the weaker cavalry, by which a cavalry, worse trained, worse -armed, and proportionately less in numbers will compensate for these -shortcomings by superior tactics, are purely Utopian. This “fond thing -vainly invented” may interest or beguile the mind of the unfortunate -tax-payer, but does not belong to the regions of plain military common -sense, which, in its preparation for war, has no place for chance work, -and must have no weak link in the chain. - -Let those with whom the wish is master of the thought read General von -Bernardi’s most recent statement in _Cavalry in Peace and War_, p. 356, -where speaking of the German force of trained cavalry, enormous as it -already is, he says: - - I have repeatedly stated that I consider our cavalry to be of - itself too weak. The more I study modern warfare, the more - convinced do I feel that the value of the arm, when handled - according to modern ideas, has increased. - -Let us remember that cavalry cannot be improvised, and that even -squadrons of the best class of mounted rifles, formed entirely of -natural horsemen and fairly good shots, are very heavily penalized, -apart from their armament and training, unless they have professional -brigade, regimental, and squadron leaders, and know how to work with -horse artillery. They cannot be expected to face trained and properly -organized cavalry brigades on anything like equal terms. At the same -time, if reliance is placed on numbers, one is at once faced (i.) by -the forage supply and its carriage, (ii.) by the enormous item of -expense in remounting, already referred to in the chapter on “The -horse.” - -The outcome is that one arrives at this plain and simple -proposition.[52] Only the most highly trained cavalry soldier is worth -a horse and food for his horse when a nation is engaged against an -enemy of modern continental type. This point is undoubtedly grasped -on the Continent, where the proposal to use cyclists as a reserve of -riflemen with cavalry is generally accepted. - -Every one, practically, can now ride and look after a bicycle, and -given passable roads, cyclists can travel farther and faster than -horses, and carry more days’ reserve rations. In war in a civilized and -well-roaded country they cannot fail to be a most useful adjunct to -cavalry: (1) as a reserve of rifles, (2) as despatch-riders, (3) as an -accessory in outpost and reconnoitring duty. - -It is not the scheme of this book to enter into the question of -training other than regular cavalry, nor to enter into any discussion -as to the precise value in war of hastily raised mounted troops; -since in doing so one might say something which had the appearance -of discouraging the volunteer; whereas there is no question that the -spirit, which animated for instance those yeomanry and colonial troops -who came out early in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902, is a -great national and imperial asset. - -At the same time it is right to make it perfectly plain that the -non-professional cavalry soldier has an exceedingly hard task before -him, and one requiring very exceptional qualities such as are not -usually found in those who do not possess the initial asset of being -constantly in the saddle and out in the open. Even these must find -it extremely difficult to train to anything but a very mediocre -standard, unless they possess (i.) sufficient leisure to prepare -themselves amidst the surroundings of regular troops, and (ii.) the -large amount of patriotism and right feeling which induces a man -voluntarily to place himself under and endure the irksome restraints of -discipline.[53] Ten times more does this apply to the officer; purely -amateur officers are poison (the virus being in direct proportion to -their rank), and entirely out of place in war. To imagine that it is -patriotism to wait till war begins, and then aspire to lead others, is -an idea that should be crushed once for all. It is not patriotism, it -is murder. - -Few amateurs would aspire to conduct the operations in a London -hospital, and the operations of war are, in their way, no less -intricate, and perhaps entail more loss of life and limb when conducted -by the unskilled. The amateur who comes out to the war, with the -courage of ignorance, and finds how helpless he is, how useless are his -best efforts, how complete the disillusionment of those under him as to -his power to keep or get them out of trouble, let alone hurt the enemy, -will, if he survives, have learnt a very useful and painful lesson, but -no nation can afford to give lessons on the field of battle. - -The cavalry of an army are a part of a machine, in which reliance must -be placed, and in which every nut or screw of doubtful metal is a -danger. Cherfils rightly says: “Three-quarters of the strategy of war -lies in the method of employment of the cavalry.” Why? Because of the -supreme importance to the generalissimo of _Liberty of Manœuvre_. But -this liberty can only be gained by a thrusting forward of masses of -cavalry, _which must go on_ and get the greatest share of the terrain -intervening between the two armies. As an instance of this, in the -Ulm Campaign on the 4th October Napoleon in his orders to Murat makes -it plain that he wants him to push aside the enemy’s patrols and make -plenty of prisoners; he tells him to take _three_ divisions of cavalry -and do so, leaving _one_ division only to watch his left flank, that -on which Napoleon was making his main infantry advance. He left the -initiative to Murat. - -Does any one imagine that these cavalry masses could, solely by means -of musketry fire, drive the enemy out of the positions which they will -take up, on finding a stronger force of cavalry in front of them? We -believe certain people do reckon on this, though it has never occurred -in actual combat, and (in the opinion of those who have witnessed -attempts at it) will not do so in the immediate future. Across the open -plains the weaker, worse armed and equipped cavalry will keep falling -back rapidly to the next defensive line. If this is a river or range of -hills, experience shows that the stronger cavalry will soon cross it -and move forward. - -Too much emphasis can hardly be laid on the value of success in the -first great cavalry combat, in “initial ascendancy.”[54] Let those who -doubt this inquire of any who have been on stricken fields and have -learnt the great lessons only taught by defeat. - -But these lessons are not to be confused with the tendency to say “A” -nation beat “B” nation, therefore “A” nation’s methods are right, and -forthwith slavishly follow their methods, even carrying this so far as -to follow the fashion of some pelisse or _pickelhaube_ as well. - -Occasionally the Boers read us a lesson, and, as Kipling says, “a -jolly good lesson too”; at once there is a great rush to imitate their -methods, by those impressed by them, as though these were applicable -to every possible case. To take one case--they are certainly not -suitable for mounted troops who wish to advance. In that case we want -the resolute offensive, with a thorough understanding in all ranks that -they must be prepared to fight for information and liberty of manœuvre. -Now spectators of any large fight in South Africa cannot claim to have -seen this resolute offensive on the part of the Boers. They never -pushed us back, partly, no doubt, from difficulties of command, but -chiefly from defective armament and training, and consequent inability -to bring the combat to a hand-to-hand fight. On the other hand, they -fell back fighting whenever we attacked resolutely. Exactly what a -generalissimo could not permit his cavalry to do. Why? Because he, by -doing so, surrenders his share of liberty of manœuvre, of which there -is a limited amount between the armies, to his adversary. - -Our conclusion is that _the trained cavalry masses which have a -personal weapon and good support from horse artillery will push back -any improvised or worse-armed cavalry with the utmost rapidity across -all open ground, and that the moral ascendancy thus established will -render the enemy’s defeat in rough ground an easy task_. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY - - “Fundamental principles of action against different arms must be - laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular - case will not be required. This is needed because the utmost - possible independence of leaders down to the squadron commander is - desirable. It must not degenerate into selfish wilfulness.”--VON - BERNARDI. - - -That modern horse artillery coupled with cavalry and machine guns has -almost unlimited opportunities can hardly be gainsaid. Only a madman or -an absolute ignoramus would willingly dispense with horse artillery. -But can it be said that, without an organization and training in -peace-time, which has afforded full opportunity of practising every -situation which we can meet, we shall get full co-operation in war? - -Arms brought together almost for the first time on the battlefield -cannot have mutual confidence in one another. Yet how much depends on a -thorough understanding and good feeling between the cavalry leader and -his commander of horse artillery. If the battery commander cannot from -constant practice and usage actually foretell nine times out of ten -what the cavalry brigadier will order at a certain stage of the attack, -or if the officer commanding horse artillery of a cavalry division -does not know by intuition his divisional general’s views, farewell to -any idea of valuable combination between the two arms. - -Heretofore this brotherhood of arms has not existed, nor has our -organization aimed at effecting it. - -Langlois in _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 140, puts this very -tersely: - - Cavalry has need of the support of the other arms in strategical - exploration. - -And again: - - The English took no steps in peace to create and strengthen any - union between the arms, and evil overtook them. I cannot insist too - much on this point, and we (the French) must profit by the lesson. - -A large number of horse artillery officers never have opportunities -of working with cavalry. Our horse artillery batteries are too often -quartered where such cannot be obtained. But even at places like -Aldershot and the Curragh little can be done in this direction, the -ground is too cramped and too well known, and there was always the -necessity of a good classification at the practice camp haunting the -mind of the battery commander, and making him grudge every moment not -spent in the direction of attaining that most important item. - -Unfortunately it is hard to find concrete examples of cavalry and horse -artillery action. For good horse artillery and cavalry, trained to -work in conjunction, on modern ideas, have never yet been seen on any -battlefield in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1870? No. -In South Africa? No. In Manchuria? A thousand times no. We have to go -back to the days of Frederick and Napoleon. - -In all cases where the army is on the defensive a great and potent -factor is in the energy of the attack, or, as one might put it, -in carrying through the whole according to prearrangement and “at -one run,” so that the gun and machine-gun fire is directed at that -particular portion of the defence which can offer most opposition, and -do most damage to the attack. - -Let us take an instance of a cavalry attack on dismounted men holding -an isolated kopje. Starting from 1200 yards’ distance, and suddenly -appearing over a ridge, one squadron of the attacking cavalry riding -_en fourrageur_, supported by another squadron echeloned on the first -squadron’s flank, will probably reach the dead ground, which exists -in the front of nearly every kopje, when within some 400 yards of the -enemy’s firing line; then their leader should give the order “Right -turn,” or “Left turn” (never “Right wheel” or “Left wheel” of troops, -which would obviously cause them to afford a good mark), and gallop to -one flank or the other. He should of course choose the weakest flank. -(It may assist him in his decision if he remembers that, in a force -rapidly taking up a position on a hill, the greater number of rifles -will go to the right side, as they approach it, because there the hill -will cover all but a small portion of their body and head as they -shoot; but on the left side, unless left-handed, half the body will be -shown.) See Diagram VIII. - -[Illustration: DIAGRAM VIII.] - -Arrived at the flank, whilst the artillery and machine guns of the -attack shell that end of the ridge to be attacked from the moment the -cavalry leader makes his right or left turn, he halts and dismounts -his men (that is, if the ground is unsuitable for mounted action), and -sweeps the hill from end to end; the artillery, etc., now firing one -hundred yards in front of his line of men. His other squadron should, -meanwhile, “go for” the led horses. What time is at the defender’s -disposal if this attack is made suddenly? Frederick the Great used to -say: “Rapidity is an element of particular importance in the tactical -offensive; therefore the sharper attacks are, the fewer men they will -cost.” - -Picture yourself on the ridge, where ten minutes before the enemy’s -cavalry have been reported as moving apparently away from or parallel -to the defence. Your men have resumed their avocations; if they have -been there some time, some will be cooking, others sleeping. Suddenly -some unusually alert individual shouts out, “Hallo! the enemy are -galloping straight at us.” Men scramble to the sangars, or are waked -up and hustled to their loopholes. They will not be ready to fire -under a minute; this will bring the enemy’s cavalry at a gallop over -six hundred yards nearer. For two or three hundred yards the attackers -will be exposed to magazine fire, but they are certainly not an easy -mark, and few would fall, even on a rifle range. But at this moment -during the twenty or thirty seconds which elapse before most of them -will be in dead ground, a perfect inferno of shell and, still worse, -machine-gun fire bursts on the ridge. Many men will now slightly shift -their position in order to get more cover and wait for the enemy to -come straight on, nearer, where they can see him. But the attack does -not come on; instead, it has slipped away to a flank, and the men’s -next thought will be for their led horses and so on. They are already -beat. - -This is no fancy picture of artillery and machine-gun support, but a -method which was utilized a score of times in the latter part of the -operations of 1899-1902 in South Africa by both cavalry and mounted -colonials. It is one which can be made, where the artillery and machine -guns are in cool, skilled hands, with comparative safety, but it is -not one which the average cavalryman would care to make, supported by -rifle fire, unless the latter can be brought up to six hundred or seven -hundred yards’ distance, where they can distinguish friend from foe. - -Whilst by the above we attempt to show that horse artillery is a most -valuable accessory to cavalry in the attack, we believe it is even -more efficacious in retreat. An artillery officer sent in advance of -the rearguard can select various positions from which horse artillery, -practically covered from view, can put a few shells into the mass of -the enemy’s troops, as they pass some defile; or it may engage the -hostile artillery in order to draw fire off the retreating cavalry, if -the former exposes itself unduly. Meantime another section or battery -is sent on, thus the action is taken up successively. In every case -the ground should be selected so that it is (i.) possible to act in -combination with the cavalry, and (ii.) withdraw without the enemy -seeing the movement. Nor must it be forgotten that the enemy may -engage in the “parallel pursuit,” consequently the wider the front -shown by the force covering the retreat the better. - -Thus it may happen that, following the rule that in a retreat the most -mobile troops should be farthest out to the flanks, a cross fire may be -brought by two sections on the enemy’s pursuit. The drill regulations -of German cavalry, 1909, impress the point - - ... that, should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the - cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate the retreat of the - other arms. It is in just such cases that they must assume a - restless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of pursuing - troops will produce the best results. - -In regard to the many other occasions on which horse artillery can -assist cavalry they say: - - The horse artillery will often by its fire cause the foe to - disclose his strength and thus help reconnaissance. In union - with maxims it enables the opposition of the enemy in occupied - positions and defiles to be overcome, and thus spares the cavalry a - dismounted attack. - - Horse artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry to hem in - at long range the enemy’s marching columns, to cause these to - partially deploy through flank fire to change the direction of - their march. - -Horse artillery is the one thing that prevents an enemy sitting still -and thus preventing the cavalry factor of mobility asserting itself. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -CO-OPERATION OF HORSE ARTILLERY WITH CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT - - “Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry, because it - cannot reply to fire, but can fight only with the steel.”--NAPOLEON. - - -Of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry -against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the -battles of 1870. The training of cavalry and horse artillery and the -organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines, -as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books -such as Von Schmidt before that war, or in Prince Kraft’s _Letters on -Cavalry_ after it. The latter writer shows that the tendency was to -deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took -place, and put it with the corps artillery. It was claimed that by so -doing the horse artillery were practically of double use. - - The batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. If the - cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. If a - battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in - reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps - artillery and considerably augments its fire. The horse artillery - of the Guards corps was thus employed in 1870. - - For a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle _does not - require any horse artillery_. It is held at first in reserve. - - If it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an - opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. There is thus - no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is, - besides, no time to do so. - -Compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the German _Exerzier -Reglement für die Kavallerie 1895_, No. 375: - - In a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to - the cavalry _will remain with them_, because they are indispensable - to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during, - and particularly after, the battle. - - The cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general - position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in - co-operation with the rest of the artillery. The horse artillery - and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general - engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s - flanks and rear. Their sudden appearance from a flank or from the - rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy. - -There could scarcely be a greater _volte face_ than is indicated by -these two extracts. - -Further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present -date, in both the German and French manœuvres, leads us to the -conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together -in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both -shaken and unshaken infantry. - -The reader should study some of the instances given in Colonel Maude’s -book, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, chaps. xi. and xii., of the -charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself -what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by -even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery, -say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles. - -A conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the rôle of the -three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry -force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their -flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. But -battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where -natural obstacles cover our flank. Therefore, we must have sufficient -cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they -will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are -accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is -already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage -over us. - -The latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is -furnished by Captain Spaits, who himself went through the retreat -with the Russians after Mukden, in his book, _With Cossacks through -Manchuria_. - -He “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of -the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without -discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions, -energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could -have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.” - -The above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made -on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.[55] - -Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that -cavalry with horse artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield -against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the -attack is _à propos_, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery -and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against -infantry should take. _Cavalry Training_ indicates that it should -be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of -the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without -sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader -accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently -the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with -the infantry commander in that portion of the field. - -That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press -in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the -troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two -points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best -position for the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In -these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as -a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it--and -we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A -flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable -of deciding victory in itself.” - -The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered -at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry; -and “B,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the -general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “C,” when we -utilize surprise. It is usually in the return from such enterprises -after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. A good -instance is that of Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth; see page -203, Maude’s _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_. - - Suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of Michel’s Brigade, - now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still - preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the - Prussians. The latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at - full gallop from the halt. Owing to the suddenness of the attack - there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to - gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the - French. There was a short mêlée, and then the Prussians, promptly - rallying, swept up the debris of the French, and brought in some - sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. The prompt resolution to - attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation. - -Many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed -with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact, -of the De Bloch School, are under the impression that cavalry will not -charge infantry. It is probable that, never having ridden in a force of -cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much -simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much -less resolution is needed. - -In the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion -which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop -almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for -a long way after being hit. As the enemy are reached, the desire for -slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught -to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding -their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point. - -An example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile -infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in -General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p. 40: - - The problem here presented is one of considerably more danger - and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops - and reaping the fruits of victory. The enemy’s infantry, far - from having lost their _moral_, are pressing victoriously to - the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained - heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in - reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness. - The responsibility for ordering an attack of this nature ... - rests with the commander-in-chief. Against such an objective it - is useless to send regiments at the gallop. It is necessary to - (1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring - a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the - objective; (2) make a definite plan. This must be based on what - can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the - most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the - execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their - objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment. - -In the _Manual of Infantry Training_, 1905, under “Formations -Applicable to Savage Warfare,” is found S. No. 118, which contains an -instruction for “Meeting an Attack by Cavalry or Swordsmen.” - - When a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in - force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened - flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander - giving the command, “Back, No. ----, up, No. ----.” - -Such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would -favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed -at right angles to the attack as indicated above. - -May, writing in 1896, _Guns and Cavalry_, says: - - True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery - moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle, - may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or - prevent a telling flank movement. But for such occasions special - arrangements could no doubt be made as the exigencies of the - moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand. - -It is evident from the German regulations quoted above that they have -no intention of trusting to the “Special arrangements” for “Exigencies.” - -Their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows: - -1st. Horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry. - -2nd. Attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such -a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry. - -3rd. In order to get freedom of manœuvre for our squadrons to a flank, -cavalry are bound to meet an enemy’s cavalry force, possibly belonging -to an enemy whose cavalry does not leave its horse artillery behind -with the corps artillery in a great general engagement. - -On which side wins will depend the subsequent course of events on that -flank. - -4th. A cavalry force of three regiments and one battery of horse -artillery is quite equal, or more than equal, to one of four regiments -without horse artillery. - -Having in view the above consideration, cavalry should not be prepared -to forgo their horse artillery in a great general engagement, since -it foredooms them to the inaction of the French and German cavalry -divisions of the war of 1870, or perhaps to their comparative failure -and losses, when, unsupported by horse artillery fire, they attacked -infantry columns to cover the retreat of their own infantry. - -Special arrangements of this kind are not made, and we know also, too -well, that “No man can serve two masters.” - -The latest German regulations appear, therefore, to have been -formulated on sound reasoning. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -HORSE ARTILLERY FIRE EFFECT COMPARED WITH RIFLE FIRE - - -Henderson in _Science of War_, written in 1893-1902, asked the -question, whether the necessary fire power should be found by the -cavalry itself or by a body of mounted riflemen attached to the brigade -or the division? and answered it by proposing trained mounted infantry. -To the view that this fire power had better be supplied by the horse -artillery he gives little or no consideration. Machine guns are also -more or less ignored, and yet these in common with horse artillery are -what the _cavalry attack_ requires most in support. - -Those who have frequently had to rely on fire to cover a mounted -advance will agree that the fire of two hundred riflemen at eight -rounds a minute for five minutes is not to be compared in efficacy with -the shells of a Q.F. horse artillery battery. Their comparative value -would work out in projectiles as follows: - - Guns. Rounds. Bullets. Minutes. Bullets. - 6 × 10 × 236 × 5 = 70,800. - - Rifles. Rounds. Minutes. Bullets. - 200 × 8 ... × 5 = 8000. - -That is, the riflemen fire less than 1/8 of the number of projectiles -fired by a battery, or 1770 riflemen shoot as many projectiles as a -battery in five minutes. - -It is superfluous to remark on the range attained by the Q.F. gun -compared with the rifle, but it is to the point to bring to notice that -a Q.F. battery is controlled by one individual who is furnished with -good glasses, and that the guns have telescopic sights. At a mile he -will distinguish his own side. Again the battery’s front is 100 yards -compared to the mile of front required by 1770 riflemen. The battery is -in action within one minute and thirty seconds, whereas from the time -the order is given a brigade of mounted riflemen will not be in action -under five minutes at least, and will not be shooting with any degree -of accuracy under eight minutes. Further, the fire of a big line of one -mile in length cannot be directed, whereas a battery can be switched on -and off, or so many degrees to a flank, and so on, by a simple command. - -It is obvious, then, that in the attack of infantry, whether unshaken -or shaken, the extended line of charging cavalry will find their most -reliable support in horse artillery and machine-gun fire and not in the -fire of dismounted men. - -Henderson would therefore appear to have written at this time under the -influence of the then accepted theory that the horse artillery would -not be available to assist cavalry in a general engagement. He was -also much impressed by the view that mounted infantry should supply -the fire power for cavalry and prevent cavalry having recourse to fire -action as much as possible; since he considered that the _élan_ of the -cavalryman would soon disappear, if once accustomed to dismount and -fire as an alternative to shock action when the latter was feasible. - -To sum up, present-day opinion is not in favour of mounted infantry -being attached to cavalry brigades, but on the other hand horse -artillery and machine guns will remain with cavalry in the general -engagement, ready for any opportunity. - -In order once more to emphasize the opinion that these charges of -cavalry on infantry demand exceptional arrangements on the part of the -general commanding the cavalry and his artillery commander, the case -quoted by Prince Kraft in _Letters on Cavalry_, page 64, may be cited. -Speaking of a French cavalry charge on Prussian infantry at Woerth, a -Prussian infantry officer told him that: - - At the moment our infantry were falling back down a slope from - an attack which had failed, a hail of Chassepot and Mitrailleuse - bullets followed them, and every one felt that he would never reach - the cover of the wood which lay below them. - - Tired to death and resigned to their fate, the whole of the - infantry were slowly crawling towards the wood. Suddenly the - murderous fire ceased. Every one stopped, astonished, to see - what had saved them from the fate which seemed certain to - them. Then they saw the French cuirassiers who, as they pushed - forward, _masked the fire_ of their infantry and artillery. These - cuirassiers appeared to them like guardian angels. With the most - perfect calm every man halted on the spot where he stood and fired - at the cuirassiers, who were soon swept away by the rapid fire. - -He adds at p. 67: - - We see, moreover, that cavalry charges, if they break out from the - front of their own infantry and _mask the fire of the latter_, - enable the infantry which is charged to gain time, owing to the - cessation of this fire, to recover their formation. - -The above is one more argument in favour of constantly training our -cavalry leaders till it is a second nature to apply shock at right -angles to fire effect, and on no account whatever to mask the fire of -their own artillery and infantry, and thus become the “guardian angels” -of the infantry whom they are attacking. - -Von Bernardi appears to lose sight of this, when he says, p. 208, -_Cavalry in Peace and War_: - - It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the - formation, for the attack, must take place beyond the effective - range of the enemy’s fire ... and nothing else can be done but to - gallop straight to the front. As, however, our infantry will have - to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case - to attack in close order. - -This is what we consider should be avoided in the dispositions of the -cavalry leader. - -Again, p. 200, Von Bernardi says: “The attack will best take place from -the flank.” To this there is the objection that there is not likely to -be a good rallying-point in the middle of the enemy’s line. - -Our conclusion is that these attacks will be least costly if they break -out from our line in valleys running at right angles to it, or round -the contour of a hill, and sweep the enemy by a charge parallel to -our front, and that the rallying-point should be outside the flank or -within our own line. - -On the occasions when our infantry or dismounted riflemen made one of -their regular attacks in extended order on the positions taken up by -the Boers, there were almost invariably not only critical moments, but -also opportunities afforded by the lie of the ground which invited a -leader at the head of three or four squadrons of lancers to issue from -cover in or near the Boer lines at a gallop in open order, and to sweep -over the widely extended men. Three to four minutes at most would have -covered the time during which these lancers would have been exposed to -fire; then they could have reached a rallying-point in their own lines. - -There are good grounds for the belief that such an attack is extremely -demoralizing, especially if the troops have not been accustomed in -peace-time to undergo it. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY - - “The most arduous, while at the same time the most important, - duties that devolve upon soldiers in the field are those of - outposts ... all concerned should feel that the safety of the army - and the honour of the country depend upon their untiring vigilance - and activity.”--LORD WOLSELEY. - - -The art of maintaining himself and his command in the outpost line is a -question of vigilance, imagination, and forethought on the part of the -commander, and cunning on the part of his men. Let us place ourselves -in the position of an officer commanding a hundred to two hundred men, -and detached some ten miles out to the flank and front of a force. - -The commander must take it for granted that he may be attacked at -any moment, and so he must run through in his mind what he intends -to do. It is his business to look ahead and foresee dangers and -misfortunes--and by his preparations to rob them of their bad -effect.[56] If he has left his bivouac a couple of hours before dawn -and moved, carefully feeling his way, in the direction of the enemy, -and has perhaps driven in one of their outposts, he need not feel -it incumbent on him to hold the ground gained _à outrance_. He has -seen into their outpost line, gained certain information, and come -to certain conclusions; therefore when the enemy attack him, as they -certainly will do, he should have made all preparations to fall back to -the bit of good ground previously selected, where he can see and where -his movements cannot be seen. Here he can make a good show, and ten to -one they will let him stay there. But instead of staying there with 100 -men all day, which would fatigue his men and horses without result, he -places some Cossack posts and a small picket or two and retires all the -rest of his men, without the enemy’s knowledge, to his bivouac, and is -at breakfast by 9 or 10 A.M., his horses watered and fed. At 4 P.M. he -canters out to his posts, spends the remaining daylight in observation -of the enemy’s movements, relief of posts, etc., and withdraws his -Cossack posts and picket at dark, leaving the picket fires well stoked -up; one or two men only are left to feed these fires at intervals -through the night. His real line of night outposts is placed on the -possible lines of advance to his bivouac. But if his bivouac can be -observed, or is likely to be reported upon to the enemy, he may change -it after dark. His men should have been practised so constantly in -alarm posts at night that they know exactly where to go, and what to do -in case of a night alarm, and how to do so in absolute silence. Only -the C.O. may make a few uncomplimentary remarks about the enemy in a -stentorian voice, and invite them to “come on,” which goes far to cool -the ardour of a night attack and hearten up his own men. - -Next morning up again at two hours before dawn by the sound of a -long-drawn-out whistle, upsaddle and off again, and get into your -outpost line before dawn or, if preferred, take up a fresh line. - -During the day there is plenty to do, but it is well to have an hour -or so during which the men get a sleep; though with most men, after a -time, it becomes a habit to sleep whenever they have nothing to do or -think about, and, if they go to sleep directly it is dark, and do not -sit up and talk, they get enough sleep, and are alert before dawn. All -talking should be stopped a quarter of an hour after dark in every part -of the lines. - -The men soon learn the routine, and know how to take care of -themselves, sleeping, bathing, washing, and feeding when they get a -chance, and forming into small messes of four or five, who co-operate -in all their food, messing, and fuel arrangements. In a very short time -everything begins to go smoothly. The kits are packed, horses saddled, -waggons inspanned, and coffee drunk in twenty minutes to half an hour -(considerably less if there is an alarm) from the time the men are -roused, whether in the dark or not. It is only when they have attained -a fair degree of celerity that their C.O. can feel any confidence in -them in the outpost line. - -The officers, except the quarter-master and adjutant, must attend every -stable hour, see the horses finished before the men leave stables, and -one officer per squadron must also go to water. One glance is enough -to tell an experienced eye if all is right with a horse or not. They -cannot speak, but they are very full of expression if anything is -wrong. The good troop and squadron leader is for ever solicitous about -his horses, and woe betide the unlucky stable-guard whom he catches -resting his back against a bale of hay when there is a horse loose. -Once it is understood that each man stands or falls in the squadron -leader’s estimation, and is noted for punishment or a light reprimand -when brought up before him, according to the care of his horse, -everything will go well. Nothing less will make some of them always -keep up to the mark. - -Nor must you forget the magpie instinct in some men, which leads them -to collect all sorts of rubbish and carry it on their horses. So, -on some favourable occasion on the march, halt near a deep river or -pond, hold a kit and saddlery inspection, and hurl far into the water -all unauthorized articles. Let the leader set the example himself of -walking and leading his horse a great deal, especially down hills, when -the loaded saddle slips forward on to the shoulder-blades. This is -the merest routine, but a hundred things will occupy the C.O.’s mind. -First, forage and water in plenty for his horses. Second, food and -firing for his men. It is essential to keep the men well fed, dry,[57] -if possible, and that they should always have their coffee and tea, -and in trying times their glass of rum twice a week or so. Soap and -tobacco are the other main essentials. If you can give them half their -ration in flour and half in biscuit, it will preserve their health. -There are at least twenty reasons why, if you requisition anything, you -should never permit the slightest waste or prodigality. De Brack says -truly: “In peace wastefulness is a wrong; in war it is a crime.” Always -see a receipt is given in due form. - -Detached, or in the outpost line, you are more likely to get shelter -in rainy weather for your horses and men than in a big camp. Take -advantage of this, but recollect that it entails extra vigilance as -a rule in your outposts, and that to get out of a farm and into a -fighting formation requires forethought, prearrangement, and test -practice, and usually entails the improvement of existing exits, and -the blocking of all approaches, etc. - -One of the rules, in all contact with the enemy, is always to do the -opposite to what you appear to him to be about to do, _e.g._ never -go straight to the point for which you are really making. Never come -straight back to your support. Mystify him as much as you can. Never -do the same thing two days running. Always come back from a patrol by -a different way from that by which you went out. When alone go across -country rather than on the tracks. Patrols should go across open -country in the dark and be in observation and concealed before dawn. -Cunning rather than audacity is required, and should be rewarded when -it has good results. - -Scouts have a hard time, and it is most important to have relays of -them and not to let them go out too many nights running. They must -also learn to put up with or remain impervious to that foolish and -abominable remark of Tommy Knowall, the young and inexperienced staff -or intelligence officer: “WE knew all that before.” If chased in by -superior numbers, double as a buck or fox does directly you are out of -sight. - -If you are scouting near the enemy’s lines do not take cover on your -side of rocks, bushes, etc., but on theirs, and turn your horses and -pretend to look back at your own side. They will hesitate to fire on -you at 700 yards or upwards, as they will think you are their own -scouts riding in. But never permit a party of your own scouts to ride -in to your line without sending one of their number to gallop on and -tell you who they are. A shot “across the bows” of one of your own -parties which is coming into a line of videttes or bivouac, without -taking this precaution, will soon teach them all to do so. _À propos_ -of this, “punishments should fit the crime,” they are more easily -remembered; after all, punishments are for the prevention of similar -conduct in others and not retaliatory. - -A high standard of conduct, zeal, and bravery comes from the example -set in the first few encounters of coolness and light-heartedness. A -C.O. whose men were under a wearing fire was sent a message by a troop -leader, who did not quite enjoy the situation, asking, “What shall I -do?” The reply was, “Give your men the second lecture on musketry.” - -No one likes to be out of the fashion, and it is desirable to lay -stress on not coming off second best to the enemy; to give him more -than you get; to make him pay for his audacity heavily, and so on. -To do so distracts the men’s minds from your own losses in dead or -wounded men, etc., of which you must make little.[58] Much mourning -for the dead makes men sorry for themselves too, and has a bad effect. -Shakespeare tells us: - - Wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss, - But cheerly seek how to redress their harms. - - (3 _Henry VI._ v. 4.) - -Deceiving the enemy by ruses, and killing or taking him prisoner, is -very desirable, and plans for doing so should be thought over and -deliberately carried out. Henderson, _Science of War_, p. 101, says: - - To sustain the _moral_ of his own men; to break down the _moral_ of - his enemy--these are the great objects which, if he be ambitious of - success, the leader must always keep in view. - -Shaikh Sadi says: - - If thou art harsh the foe will fight shy of thee; if thou art - lenient they will be audacious and forward. - -If the force to which you belong suffers reverses early in the war, -“traitors,” “spies,” etc., are words which one may hear, and they will -be applied ungenerously, indiscriminately, and invariably wrongly. Any -talk of this sort should be sternly repressed; it is due to a craven -desire to blame others for their own cowardice, which some men, curs -and runaways themselves, are base enough to indulge in. This will -certainly not help them to be brave on future occasions, whilst it -serves to disintegrate a force. It will be found that on those men who -are practised frequently in going up to the enemy’s pickets before -dawn, and retiring gradually, there is not, even in a severe retreat, -the same bad moral effect which there is on unpractised men. - -A very important point to impress on your men is the following. No -horseman should believe that he cannot escape capture, or that a -bullet will hit him. Let it be clearly understood by all that, as the -saying goes, “A horseman and a heavy shower of rain can get through -anything.” Snap-shots fired by men in haste, or when excited, never do -hit any one who is mounted and moving, especially if the firer is being -“peppered” himself. A very good reason this for arranging for covering -fire, if only by one rifle, when riding up to ground likely to be held -by the enemy’s pickets. Another point to be remembered by scouts is -that when they get into the dead ground, which is almost always to be -found in front of a hill, they should always change both their pace -and direction, and arrive at the top of the hill both sooner and at -a different point from where they might be reasonably expected to -arrive. Again, scouts in their advance should invariably look out for -an alternative line of retreat, especially if they cross an obstacle -such as a brook, ditch, or strong fence. They should not expect to see -the enemy’s picket or videttes if they deliberately dismount in view -and look for them. But if they ride back over a hill, disappear, and -then creep back at another point, they are pretty sure to see some -heads coming up. - -In all the arrangements to be made for sending out scouts, never -neglect the value of darkness for getting near the enemy’s lines, or -through their line of pickets. What can be done with ease then, is -impossible in daytime for the cleverest scout in the world, and it is -foolish and unfair to scouts to ask them to do this; in fact, it is -seldom asked for except by officers unacquainted with their business. -All who have attempted to shoot big game, even in a fair moonlight, -are aware how uncertain their aim is then. Consequently, if a scout -stumbles on a sentry or picket at night, it is twenty chances to one -that he gets off without a bullet in him. This fact it is well to -remember when posting your own pickets, whom you should protect from -being rushed by wires and ropes stretched a foot from the ground, some -ten yards or so from their post, rather than trust to their rifle fire, -for the “bullet is a fool.” - -As will be seen from the above, pickets, Cossack posts, and observing -parties should be in position, halted and invisible to the enemy before -dawn, and should not, as a rule, be withdrawn till dusk covers them -from the enemy’s observation. It seems puerile to urge these obviously -common-sense precautions, and they would be omitted were it not that -experience shows that they are most studiously neglected by our regular -and irregular troops till bitter experience teaches their necessity.[59] - -Sniping by nervous sentries, which will always take place the first -few nights on which untrained or unseasoned troops are, or think they -are, in contact with the enemy (note the Dogger Bank episode with -Rozhestvenski’s fleet), must, and can be, at once firmly put a stop -to. To do so, give orders that the C.O., adjutant, and regimental -sergeant-major of the corps, in whose section of outposts it occurs, -are at once to go and spend a couple of hours in the outposts, and then -on their return to report whether “all is quiet in the outpost line.” - -Young men, especially, are apt to get “rattled” when “on sentry go,” -and to imagine small bushes and so on are the enemy’s scouts. Even -fireflies are known to have been mistaken for the enemy’s lanterns and -subjected to a heavy fire. When the fire had ceased, and it became -evident that they _were_ fireflies and not the enemy with lanterns, -the commander of the picket was much annoyed at receiving an order to -“Push in now and kill the remainder with the bayonet.” Sentries had far -better rouse the rest of the group quietly in case of the enemy really -being on the move towards their picket, and then all may fire a volley -at “point blank” range only. - -It is frequently desirable to impress the enemy with a mistaken -estimate of your strength. This might be done by sending a detachment -out some hours before dawn towards your base, then before it is light -they turn round and march in to your bivouac in full daylight and in -sight of the enemy as reinforcements. - -There are obviously many plans by which an enemy can be deceived as -to the strength of your force, if you can work behind cover, by first -showing a number of men in one place and then in another. It is well -to remember that even if an enemy sees you acting with duplicity the -effect is by no means a bad one, as next time he sees you moving in -your real direction he may think the action is for his benefit, and -covers a movement from an entirely different direction. - -In the outposts a knowledge of strategy and battle tactics is most -necessary, and every officer should try to make himself thoroughly -acquainted with the terrain, geography, and strategical issues of the -campaign, otherwise he may miss great chances, and his extracts from -the information, which he will get first of all, may be valueless -instead of being such as will bring him to the favourable notice of his -superiors. Nor should his superiors forget the late Admiral Makarov’s -opinion, that “a sub-lieutenant acting intelligently and sensibly was -more useful to the state than a flag officer who was carrying out to -the letter an order which he did not clearly understand.” - -In regard to terrain, if, as is most probable, the map is on a very -small scale, the general direction of the watershed is one of the best -general helps in finding the way. - -It is absolutely necessary for any cavalry scout moving at night to -know enough of the stars to orient himself and to guess correctly -the time. British troops serve in so many parts of the world that -no special instructions can be given, but Orion is one of the -constellations which may prove useful, and which is quite unmistakable. - -To establish a system by which you “picket the enemy,” which may be -defined as placing observers round him so that he can make no movement -without your knowledge, is the acme of good work in the outpost line: -it is almost a counsel of perfection. But there are two points which -deserve consideration in this connection: the first is that the -mounted men whom you employ for this purpose must know, or have time -to learn, the country thoroughly; and the second is that, however -thoroughly you may imagine that you have picketed the enemy, he will -be able to move out of his environment at night, and if your safety -is based on knowledge of his movements he will, as likely as not, -upset your calculations. This deduction is drawn from facts. The Boers -habitually picketed our garrison towns and columns, but our columns, -taking the ordinary precautions of moving by night and off the main -tracks or roads, constantly surprised and captured their laagers of -waggons. The “desultory operations for two or three years in South -Africa,” 1899-1902, contain no unusual circumstances, we are told, -but one is tempted to consider whether the outpost system evolved out -of their own consciousness by the Boers was not better than that so -laboriously studied by us in former days at Sandhurst. Our system was -almost entirely directed towards “security,” and largely neglected -“information.” Theirs studied information of the enemy first, a desire -for security being a secondary consideration.[60] - -As regards a service of information, certainly an idea of using contact -squadrons had long been known and considered by us. Had we not long -ago read the fascinating account of Curély’s adventures in De Brack, -and also the “Conduct of a Contact Squadron,” translated from the -German? But it soon became evident in South Africa that it was not -very easy to carry out; every native was of assistance to the Boers, -and afraid to serve us, even if we understood their language and could -interrogate them. In this respect the Russians in Manchuria were almost -similarly handicapped. It will usually be the same in war; one side can -go anywhere, the other finds every man’s hand against it. Under these -circumstances, to lay down one law for both sides is obviously folly. -Every report on the Peninsular War shows the extent to which the French -were handicapped by the guerrillas, and how our troops were assisted. - -De Brack and many other writers make it plain that whilst from 1805 up -to, perhaps, 1812 information was easily gained by the French cavalry -for Napoleon, later a complete change came over the scene, and the -Cossacks, overrunning the country, picketed the French columns. Perhaps -the natives were weary of French exactions, but in any case the result -is said to have been that “the genius of the Emperor was paralysed by -the activity of the Cossacks.” - -We have at least four or five instances where one side’s light cavalry -or guerrillas “paralysed the genius” of the other’s generals by gaining -superiority in the outposts, or, rather, anywhere outside their -opponent’s outposts: (_a_) in 1812, 1813, 1814; (_b_) in the Peninsular -War; (_c_) in the early part of the American Civil War; (_d_) in the -South African War; and (_e_) in the Manchurian War. - -With these examples before us it must become a serious factor in taking -thought for a campaign, how far the cavalry will be able to effect -this. Our training must be such as to enable us to play this part, -of picketing the enemy, if possible; certainly we should do so in a -friendly country.[61] We know it is usually only done by the side -which has a knowledge of the country; but may not the almost universal -knowledge of map-reading in the cavalry and a good supply of maps -obviate this? But let us remember above all things that nothing will be -done in war which has not by constant practice become a second nature -in peace. Let us then practise not only our officers, but our men, in -picketing every large body of troops which train within fifty miles of -us. - -Often C.O.’s, shortsightedly we think, do not welcome the attention of -cavalry thus picketing them; but even if this is the case, it may still -be practised by our cavalry, but in a way which does not draw attention -to the fact--the training will be none the worse, and (though perhaps -hardly in this sense) the “offensive spirit” must be second nature to -us.[62] - -The instruction of cavalry in outpost work is difficult, because in -the first place many parts of the duty make great demands on the -instructor’s imagination, powers of explanation, and what we may call -ability for stage management. - -In teaching recruits, it is far better, instead of saying “You will -imagine the enemy are in that direction,” to say, “Those red flags -carried by horsemen, or those men in the white caps _are_ the enemy.” -Farther, the parties carrying the red flags should, in order to show -that they are enemies, take some action, such as to come within about -800 to 600 yards, and shoot with blank at the parties of recruits, -retiring when the latter return the fire, etc., etc. Beginning from -this point the recruit may be asked by the instructor how they -would suggest that the duties of a vedette, or, better, “look-out -man”[63] should be carried out, and he will then gradually impart to -them the accepted mode of outpost duty, which is, after all is said -and done, only common sense. For it is certain that, under active -service conditions, men learn very quickly by their own mother-wit in -real dangers and difficulties what precautions are necessary. These -services are consequently ill taught by theoretical instruction in the -barrack-room, and well taught if the work is done from the start in -the open, and, for choice, in unknown ground and with a represented -enemy. The ground also must be changed constantly, and this, certainly -in the United Kingdom, is difficult, and makes considerable demands -on horse-flesh and on the instructor’s time. But it is the one thing -for which horse-flesh must not be grudged, even though the work is -thankless from the point of view of immediate reward or recognition, -for it is work which presents more difficulties in regard to inspection -than any other; consequently, a careful instructor gets little or no -credit for his work till war begins. It is only then that the immense -difference between the cavalry or infantry, who are well grounded and -thoroughly honest in their outpost work and those who are not so, comes -to light in so-called “regrettable incidents.” - -A cunning enemy will soon discriminate between those who do their -outpost work well and those who do it carelessly, and will attack the -latter. It may be of interest to state that a very close union soon -grows up between regiments of cavalry and infantry in a column, where -there is a mutual recognition of honest work in the outposts, whilst -there is a wholesome detestation for slack regiments. A most important -point is to train men in the duty of night outposts, whilst the -subordinate leaders should have it dinned into their minds that there -is always a definite point beyond which no one is to retire. It has -been very truly said that sentries always think of retiring on groups, -groups on pickets, pickets on supports, and supports on reserves, with -the result that the enemy is in camp before you know where you are. - -The training of regiments in the duties of outpost work cannot -be carried out really satisfactorily and thoroughly unless the -regiment goes into camp for a few days. Otherwise, many of the -real difficulties, such as the cooking and supplies of food, the -off-saddling, watering, reliefs of sentries and pickets, lighting of -fires, arrangements for men to get a good sleep, are never grasped. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -SOME DETACHED DUTIES - - -DESPATCH-RIDING - -One often hears a party of cavalrymen employed on reconnoitring work -blamed because they continue to observe or follow up the enemy, -whom they have just discovered, without a thought of conveying the -information to those who sent them out. But this forgetfulness is not -to be wondered at when we call to mind that in the first few weeks -of the 1870 war German officers were sent on long rides of 60 or 70 -miles, whilst little or no arrangement was made for the purpose of -transmitting the information, obtained at great risk and trouble. It -leads one to think that the subject of despatch-riding is one of those -points connected with war of which the knowledge lapses or rusts in -peace-time, or, like the manufacture of Waterford glass, becomes a lost -art. - -To begin with, to train men in the duties of despatch-riding with -anything like thoroughness entails a certain amount of prearrangement -for food, forage, and shelter for men and horses; for it cannot -be taught in the immediate vicinity of the town where the men are -quartered. In war it may entail cross-country work, if capture is -to be avoided; whilst the task on roads can often be carried out -much better by cyclists. It is suggested that this little-practised -art, despatch-riding, may be made to take a form which will serve an -excellent purpose in the general instruction of the cavalryman. By -it he will learn (1) to take notice of the country passed through; -(2) to see a good reason for the trouble now taken to instruct him in -map-reading; (3) to gain immensely in self-reliance; (4) to become an -expert in campaigning horse-management; (5) to gain knowledge of pace. - -In regard to the last point, pace, it may be interesting to give some -particulars of a despatch-riding scheme. In this exercise a series -of despatches were sent from the east to the west of Ireland, 120 -miles as the crow flies and about 135 by road, under the following -circumstances:--About eighty cavalrymen under two years’ service and -two subalterns were billeted along a certain route. The base of this -route was shifted north or south after a few days, causing the greater -part of the line to be altered. Two messages per diem were sent off at -uncertain hours of day or night, and were carried on from post to post -without intermission. The men were provided with maps at 4 miles to -the inch. Three regiments furnished the above detachment for this work -in three successive fortnights. The first regiment brought or took the -despatches through on the average in twenty-eight hours; the second -regiment in twenty-four hours; the third regiment in twenty-two hours. -The pace was not to exceed the walk and trot. The roads were in fair -condition. - -When instruction in despatch-riding takes place, it is of considerable -importance to shift the line to one flank or another after a few days. -This may have to be done at any time in an unfriendly country, and, -though it makes the exercise much more difficult, is capital practice. - -In several of Napoleon’s campaigns there are incidentally indications -of the extensive use then made of despatch-riders. In the course of the -Jena Campaign Murat is reproached by Napoleon, who writes to him as -follows:-- - - A despatch took six hours to come to hand from Kronach to - Coburg--15 miles. This is not quick enough. You have not placed a - service of despatch-riders as I told you to do. - -In the Ulm campaign despatches were sent through at regular intervals -from Murat’s column of cavalry in the Black Forest to Napoleon many -miles away on his left, but this work was usually performed by officers -riding despatch. - - -TRACKING, ETC. - -Nearly all men brought up in the country have a certain instinct, and -habitually read the story of tracks on the ground wherever they go, but -the remainder require a considerable amount of training not to ride -over the most obvious tracks without any observation and deduction. -A few lessons of following tracks in the early morning after a wet -night across country and along roads will tend to establish this very -necessary habit in a cavalry soldier, and once acquired, it will last -him a lifetime. - -The institution of regimental scouts has gone far to train our troops -in all these forms of useful knowledge, and where commanding officers -make a point of passing all those who are likely to come on for -promotion to N.C.O.’s, through the scouts’ course, the advance of the -regiment in a most useful, but not very showy, accomplishment has been -most marked. In all this form of instruction it is well worth while to -make the schemes interesting and even romantic, and let them run to -a conclusion which depends largely on the cunning and ability of the -officers and men engaged. - -There can surely be few more marked successes in the efforts of the -nation to “return to the wild” in the body, whilst raising the mind to -the higher levels, than the institution of “Boy Scouts,” and it is one -which every genuine soldier must heartily welcome. - -In all detached work where the cavalryman is engaged “on his own” -against well-armed men, far more dangerous antagonists than any wild -animals, there usually comes a time when prudence calls loudly to -the ordinary man to turn and so avoid the chance of a bullet, whilst -duty tells him that he should try and see or find out more. There -is no reward in sight, there are no onlookers to applaud, there is -none of the retriever dog’s instinct to save, which leads men to -sacrifice their life in pulling out a comrade; there may be a love -for excitement and taking chances, but it is soon dulled by frequent -experiences, or there may be the callousness resulting from daily risk. -It is at these times that the previous training and bringing up, the -tone of his corps and comrades, and the thought that he has a duty to -those comrades, may have a good deal to say to a man alone with his -duty. - -The sneering, niggling cynic will calculate, “What reward is there for -this?” and go back ready to lie, whilst the honest soldier will go -forward ready to take his medicine, even if he feels the anticipatory -pain about the third button of the waistcoat. That was the right sort -of man, who, when chaffed by a comrade for his evident trepidation, -replied, “Yes, and if you were half as much afraid as I am, you would -run away.” It is the reasoned four-o’clock-in-the-morning courage, -determination, and honesty, backed by a trained knowledge of his duty, -that is needed when the cavalry soldier is on detached work. - - -PRISONERS - -To make prisoners is often one of the most important means of obtaining -information. Prisoners almost invariably will give information quite -willingly. Incidentally this is a point which should be known to all -cavalry officers, who should constantly warn their men: first, that -they are certain to be cleverly questioned if taken prisoner; second, -if that fails, they will probably be placed where pretended prisoners -of war can hear their conversation, and so on; third, threats and -inducements will be made use of. - - -CONVOY DUTY - -This is work for which a detachment of cavalry is frequently told -off to do the advanced, flank, and rear guards. In order to save the -horses, it will be found best to divide the respective forces and -work _en bondes_, moving quickly over open ground, and getting into -successive positions where cover is available. In each of these a rest, -and possibly a mouthful of grass, will serve to keep the horses fresh. - -Nothing is more annoying to a column commander, who has regard for -his horses, than to see one of his mounted men using his horse as an -easy-chair whilst delay takes place at some difficult crossing. Strict -orders are necessary in this matter. Many a time have we seen an -irascible commanding officer ride up behind one of these spectators and -jerk him violently off his horse. - -It may not be out of place here to say that an escort to a convoy -should invariably be at least twice the strength of any force which is -likely to attack it. The handicap of being tied to a convoy following a -certain route and supplying detachments for advanced and flank guards -and of fighting on ground of the enemy’s choosing, etc., necessitates -this, if safety is desired. Small parties of horsemen should be sent -on, wide of and parallel to the road, to get touch of the enemy; the -principle of separating the rôle of information and security is thus -adhered to. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -RAIDS - - -The very idea of a cavalry raid is attractive and carries with it a -certain romance. - -It is impossible to do otherwise than admire the boldness of the -conception of Stuart’s raid in 1862, when, with 1200 men and two -guns, he rode right round the Federal lines, alarmed McClellan, and -caused him to withdraw troops to cover his line of cavalry and thus -weaken his first line. Yet even this raid, brilliant as it was and -tactically successful, is said to be strategically a mistake. For, to -quote General Alexander’s _American Civil War_, it “seriously alarmed -McClellan for his rear. But for it the probabilities are he would never -have given the subject any thought, and he certainly would not have -been prepared with a fleet of loaded transports on hand when he was, -soon after, forced to change his base to Harrison’s landing on the -James River.... On the whole, therefore, the _éclat_ of our brilliant -raid lost us much more than its results were worth. Where important -strategy is on foot, too great care can scarcely be used to avoid -making any such powerful suggestion to the enemy as resulted in this -case.” - -Similarly the raid in 1863, by the same general, had disastrous results -for the Confederates. Lee was then preparing for his campaign north of -the Potomac. Stuart proposed moving with the cavalry in between the -Federal army and Washington, and rejoining the main army when north of -the Potomac. Lee, unfortunately, sanctioned it, and Stuart set out on -the 24th June, did some minor damage to the Federals, but lost Lee, not -rejoining him till late in the afternoon of the 2nd July, the second -day of the battle of Gettysburg. Had Lee had his cavalry with him, that -campaign might have had a very different ending. Therefore, in this -case, the timing of the raid was wrong, and of benefit only to the -enemy. - -The value of Gourko’s raid across the Balkans in July 1877, when in -eight days he carried dismay into the heart of Turkey, destroyed parts -of the railroad and telegraph on the principal lines, and gained a -great deal of information as to Turkish movements, appears to be -undoubted. His force, however, was not entirely a cavalry one. - -Coming to a more recent date, in the Manchurian War, the Japanese, only -a few days before the battle of Mukden, by means of an undertaking -against the rear of the Russians, which was carried out by two Japanese -squadrons (280 men), marching as quickly as possible by night and -hiding by day, succeeded in reaching an important railway bridge 200 -kilometres north of Tieh-ling and in rear of the Russians. The troops -covering the bridge were surprised at night, and their attention -was thus drawn away from the bridge, which a skilfully-led patrol -succeeded in blowing up. The railway service was interrupted for -several days. A regular panic set in among the Russian Headquarter -Staff. The immediate result was that 8000 Russian troops were diverted -for the defence of the line and were unable to take part in the -decisive battle at Mukden: an instance of most admirable timing of a -raid. - -It is true that cavalry raids may disorganize the lines of -communication “which in the case of large armies,” as Bernhardi says, -“have increased in importance.” But, on the other hand, we must -remember that well-organized lines of communication are now almost -invariably railways. On these there is a most efficient engineer -service, with a breakdown train and gang of trained road-layers and -menders always ready. These are able to mend a railway in approximately -the same time that it takes to break it up. It is only badly organized -lines of communication which are really vulnerable,--though we must -not forget that the blowing up of a French bridge near the frontier in -1870, during the siege of Paris, very nearly caused the siege to be -raised. - -The pages of De Brack’s _Light Cavalry Outposts_ are full of instances -of successful raids, those of which Curély was the hero being specially -attractive and effective.[64] In our own knowledge are the raids of -De Wet and others on our line of communication in South Africa, which -entailed a large number of troops being allotted to the defence of -the railway; whilst little less effective were the operations of our -columns against the Boers when, hiding by day and riding by night, -they swooped down upon the Boers and captured their herds of cattle -and horses. The Boers suffered little inconvenience from those columns -which had not recourse to methods combining speed with avoidance of -observation, and with secrecy in their preparation. - -All these operations are obviously those which are favoured by -“conditions of sparsely-settled terrain and very partially-developed -telegraphic communication, and few roads and railways,” and the success -of many of the American raids forms no basis for the assumption, so -often made, that equal results would attend their employment in Europe -outside Russia.[65] - -The other side of the question may be seen in some of the unsuccessful -raids entered upon by both sides in the American War, when raids became -“the fashion”--raids, which were not only unsuccessful, but which even -had the effect of depriving their own side of their cavalry at a most -important juncture, quite apart from the number of cavalry horses -rendered useless. - -A typical instance of this is seen in Wheeler’s raid on the Federal -lines of communications. When beaten off at Dalton he made his way -into East Tennessee; his subsequent operations in that region had no -effect upon the fortune of the two armies battling round Atlanta. -Hood, deprived of Wheeler’s cavalry--“the eyes of his army”--found -himself in the dark as to Sherman’s movements. On the evening of the -27th he jumped hastily to the conclusion that Wheeler’s raid had been -successful, and that Sherman’s army was retiring from lack of supplies -to the other side of the Chattahoochee. For forty-eight hours he -adhered to this strange delusion, and by that time the Federals had -gained a position from which it was impossible to dislodge them.[66] - -Quite without permanent result were the big raids by De Wet into the -Cape Colony and by Botha into Natal, both of which caused the loss of -many overridden horses, and had a bad moral effect on the Boers, who -were hunted from pillar to post; but the attack on our mule transport -in rear of the columns moving on Kimberley and Paardeberg was an -excellent piece of work and far-reaching in its effect. - -Again, the Russian raids against the Japanese were strangely -unfortunate in their results, but it is probable that sufficient -secrecy was not observed prior to these raids moving off. - -Taking Mischenko’s raid or reconnaissance into Northern Korea early in -the Russo-Japanese War as an instance, it is interesting to see the -manner, first, in which it was met by the Japanese; second, in which -it allowed itself to be distracted from the main object. This raid was -sent to find out what force of Japanese was in front of the Russians, -and, arriving at Chon Chou at 11 A.M., “tumbled upon” a town garrison, -deployed five sotnias in all, keeping one in reserve, thus voluntarily -renouncing its mobility to attack a town. The result might have been -foretold. The force was held in front by two squadrons dismounted and -attacked by one squadron mounted on the flank, meanwhile a Japanese -infantry battalion is brought up at the double. Result: retirement of -the Russians, reconnaissance practically valueless. - -In the case of General Mischenko’s long ride to Yinkov with fifty-three -sotnias of Cossacks, four commandos of mounted scouts, twenty-two guns, -and four machine guns, the primary object of the raid, and a notable -one, was to interrupt the junction of the Japanese troops, freed by -the fall of Port Arthur, with those on the Shaho, a quite secondary -objective being the stores at Yinkov. 1500 pack-horses accompanied -the column. 30 kilometres were covered in two days. On the third day -the garrisons of Hai-cheng (1500) and Ta-shih-chiao, somewhat larger -(the distance between these towns being 20 miles), sufficed to turn -the leader of 9000 cavalry from his first objective, and to send him -towards Yinkov. Here he dismounted sixteen sotnias for a night attack, -but, meeting with wire entanglements and a vigorous resistance, retired. - -Nothing had been effected. - -Rennenkampf’s reconnaissance on the 9th May to Kuan-tien-cheng. Force -at his disposal one battalion, ten sotnias, and eight guns. We read -that, making “two very trying marches,” he reaches Kuan-tien-cheng -with six sotnias. “The remainder of the detachment had been left behind -at various points on the line of communication, partly on account of -the exhaustion of the men and horses, partly to secure its line of -retreat. As the march had been carried out without any regard to the -pace of the various arms, the detachment was completely scattered.” -A Japanese force of 400 infantry left the town, but shortly returned -reinforced by a battalion, which unexpectedly attacked and drove the -Russians away. The result of the reconnaissance was nil. And so on.... -Rennenkampf was indefatigable. But the work “though so fruitless had -exhausted the sotnias, which were now considerably under strength, and -most of the horses had sore backs,” and so it will always be. Those who -have seen the state of men and horses after four, three, or even two -nights in the saddle will not need assurance on this subject. - -Von Pelet Narbonne puts down the general failure of Russian raids to -the small value of the Cossacks, who were not trained in offensive -dismounted action, nor possessed with a keen desire to use the sword. -He then compares the method of the Japanese, whose tactics were more -suited in his opinion to the intricate and mountainous nature of the -country. They sent infantry with their cavalry, who carried out the -unavoidable reconnaissance combat. This method certainly economized the -cavalry, an arm in which the Japanese were very deficient. Again, the -Japanese cavalry frequently met the Russian cavalry by dismounted fire -from the mud walls of villages, and were mistaken by them for infantry. - -What, then, are the general conclusions at which we arrive?-- - -1st. That big raids seldom have results which justify the loss and wear -and tear of the horses and men. - -2nd. That a raid must not be entered upon except with a special and -adequate purpose and as a result of careful reconnaissance by spies and -others. - -3rd. That once entered upon, the leader must devote himself to carrying -out his mission and not allow himself to be turned aside on any account -whatever. - -4th. That a small, swift, well-hidden raid on a line of communication -made at a favourable moment may cause the detachment of a large number -of troops, whose absence will be felt in the decisive battle. - -5th. That raids against which the enemy has made preparations are -purposeless, but are nevertheless often made by cavalry leaders, lest -they should incur the reproach of having done nothing. - -6th. That the first raids in a war are often successful. - -7th. That a friendly country favours raids, and conversely an enemy’s -country renders them difficult to the verge of impracticability. - -8th. That cavalry should not be sent off on raids when required for -action on a battlefield. - -9th. That a raid is like any other detachment, _i.e._ if it succeeds in -drawing away from the decisive point at the right time a stronger force -than itself, it is justified; and therefore the chief point to consider -in planning a raid is its timing. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -THE TRAINING OF THE CAVALRY OFFICER - - “However much thou art read in theory, if thou hast no practice - thou art ignorant. He is neither a sage philosopher nor an acute - divine, but a beast of burden with a load of books. How can that - brainless head know or comprehend whether he carries on his back a - library or bundle of faggots?”--SADI, _Gulistan_, p. 273. - - -As each year passes it appears to be more difficult to get officers -for the cavalry, consequently any attempt to state what is the best -way to train them is always subject to the proviso of the old-time -cookery-book, “First catch your hare.” We all know the type of officer -required, but we are also aware how hard it is to get him. He has been -described over and over again, and can be seen in any cavalry regiment; -a man who combines an addiction to, and some knowledge of, field -sports, involving horses, with sufficient intelligence to pass into -Sandhurst. In order to catch this hare, mess expenses in cavalry have -been reduced to a minimum. He is given chargers by Government; they are -hired by him if used for other than military purposes, but otherwise -they are not paid for. Uniform has been made less expensive. Finally, -examinations have been relaxed, though certainly an increase of pay -has not yet been tried. And still parents and guardians hesitate to -send their sons into a service which affords a better training and -discipline of mind, body, and manners for the first few years, than is -available in any other profession. - -Extravagances in the old days have frightened candidates for cavalry -commissions away. The more irresponsible press write against the -Cavalry.[67] Fewer country gentlemen can afford the requisite allowance -to their sons.[68] Expenditure all round has increased, whilst incomes, -at any rate those derived from land, have shrunk. More youngsters go -abroad to the colonies. “How hardly shall the rich man enter” the -barrack gate now, when so much more work is to be done![69] All honour -to him when he does so, and sticks to his profession. Hard work, -danger, adversity are the making of a man, and those who fear or shirk -such are not likely to make good cavalry officers, or, for the matter -of that, good citizens of the Empire. A short comparison of the life -of the cavalry officer thirty to forty years ago and nowadays may -elucidate this to some extent. - -Then, as a rule, throughout the winter one parade per week, a horse -parade on Saturday, took place. The officer who could afford to do so -could hunt every day in the week as long as he went round his stables -once during the day. Only the orderly officer (and often his belt was -taken by the adjutant, or riding master, or a sergeant-major in the -winter) remained in barracks. Sometimes there appeared in orders for -Saturday: “Riding School for officers not hunting.” In the summer there -were no manœuvres, and only in very exceptional cases was there brigade -training. A regimental parade under the C.O. once a week. An adjutant’s -drill (only officers junior to the adjutant being present) once a week. -All training of men, and they were of longer service then, was done -by the adjutant and regimental drill instructors; men and horses were -handed over, theoretically ready for the ranks, to the troop officer. -To sum up, then, the pay was nominal, and the enforced work was ditto. - -Nowadays young officers begin work at daybreak and go on till midday, -1 o’clock, or perhaps till 3 P.M. The squadron officer is now training -a succession of men for the Reserve. There is winter training, then -squadron training, regimental, brigade, and possibly divisional -training. The men are trained to a much higher standard, and they are -trained now by the squadron officers and not by the adjutant and his -staff. - -The nation, supremely ignorant in regard to the detail of military -matters, hardly appreciates the fact (i.) that nowadays a cavalry -officer does at least twice as much work as he did formerly, and (ii.) -that the cavalry officer not only devotes his life to a patriotic idea, -but must also devote a large portion of his income, at least £200 to -£300 a year, to the same purpose.[70] (iii.) The emoluments which he -derives from the public purse are, if anything, less nowadays than a -hundred years ago. - -The old type of cavalry officer, who joined the service for the -amusement to be derived from it, is scarcer; but still he is to -be found, and he faces hard work cheerfully and well. Against the -discouraging influences, and the worst of these is “worry” substituted -for “work,” he has his _esprit de corps_ and a fondness for the life, -which is an open-air one, and in many respects an interesting one. - -For the first few years or so of his service an excess of book -knowledge is not required, but it is desirable that the young cavalry -officer should be able to express himself clearly in words or on -paper, and this he must gain by thinking clearly. Let us consider his -duties in those first years, and then we shall see what to teach him. -The principle has always been maintained that it is right to work -him hard when he first joins, and later he can drop into the pace of -the remainder. You must teach him to ride and to train a horse. A few -officers can do this when they join, and think they are fit to pass out -of the riding school at once. But this is not the case; they have next -to learn to teach others. Again, he must learn to shoot. He must learn -to groom and shoe a horse, and to apply simple remedies. He must learn -the few main rules of tactics, reconnaissance, and scouting. He must -learn cavalry pioneering. He must learn to use his personal weapon on -foot and horseback. All these he must learn, not merely so that he is -able to do them himself, but so that he may be able to instruct and be -an example to others. He will be taught the care of his men’s health -in barracks and on service. He may even be taught book-keeping, and he -will certainly learn something of house economy on the mess committee. - -But the high-spirited youngster whom we want, and who can leave the -service when he wants to, must in some respects be treated like a blood -horse, whom we feel we can guide, but cannot stop at a single stride’s -notice, as we could a temperate old horse. We must preserve his verve -and desire to take the initiative, even if it occasionally leads him to -do wrong, when we should remember the great legal maxim, “If the heart -is right,” and also our own youthful days. - -The addiction to manly, and especially to rough and dangerous, field -sports must be regarded as an immense asset towards efficiency for war. -Time spent in the chase, “the image of war,” must not be regarded as -so many hours less given to his employer by the cavalry officer. We -particularly want the hunting breed of man, because he goes into danger -for the love of it.[71] He must also be able to perform any of the -diverse duties which he may be called on to carry out on service, such -as to fortify a village, construct a pontoon, court-martial a prisoner, -and so on. - -It is very desirable that he should have as much as possible -practically taught to him. A knowledge of the tactics of the other -arms should be gained thus, and we are responsible for giving the -opportunities, since this will not and cannot be learnt theoretically; -_verb. sap._ Officers, _faute de mieux_, should be sent to infantry -camps and artillery practice camps, not to gun and company drill. This -attachment to other arms is carried out by some nations, and especially -France, to a far greater extent than in our service. It is invaluable -in breaking down the watertight compartment system of training, and in -establishing a closer union of arms. - -The elements of strategy should also be taught. A few good lectures by -an officer who has a taste for this will teach more than a six months’ -poring over books, for which during his first three years a young -officer has little time to spare. At the same time the genuine soldier -cannot but be interested in questions of strategy. A knowledge of it -gives an entirely new aspect to what might otherwise appear rather dull -history. - -Then you may say that after three years of this “our young officer is -complete and a valuable asset”? - -“Far from it.” - -“But what more can be asked of him? This covers the complete syllabus, -appendices, etc., etc.” - -“There is one thing without which all this is as ‘that which profiteth -not.’” - -“And that is?” - -“He must have a strong sense of DUTY, without which he is ‘as sounding -brass or a tinkling cymbal.’” - -Now man is not born with a sense of duty (though the most riotous young -hound often becomes the best in the pack); it has to be taught; it -has to be learnt practically as well as theoretically; it has to be -borne in on him by precept and example as an excellent, a noble and a -desirable thing, a thing in which to glory. What is it? The abnegation -of self, the working for the good of all, _in foro conscientiae_, and, -above all, without making difficulties. - -The French _Manuel du gradé de cavalerie_, p. 12, gives the following -definition: “Le dévouement, le sentiment généreux qui pousse l’homme -à faire le sacrifice de sa vie pour le salut de la patrie et de ses -semblables.” - -He must learn that the “superiority which disciplined soldiers -show over undisciplined masses is primarily the consequence of the -confidence which each has in his comrades” (Von der Goltz, _Nation in -Arms_, p. 162). - -The young officer begins by having a pride in his troop, squadron, -and regiment, by trying by his own individual exertions first to make -himself fit to lead and instruct, and next to make his own unit better -than others. If he does not set the example of being better than -others, he will not render much help to the men serving under him. They -will look to him, admiring what is good in him and despising what is -bad, summing him up, weighing him in mind, if not in words, as they see -him.[72] And the eyes of a regiment see everything. He must be a very -acute dissembler who can escape the five hundred pairs of eyes which -watch him at every turn. This alone is a good training for any man. -Very much indeed naturally depends on the influences under which an -officer falls on joining a regiment. - -A strict but just commanding officer, who works, but does not worry, -the men under him, makes not only a good regiment, but a regiment -which will fight well in war, whilst a slack and indulgent commanding -officer, even if just, will soon lessen a regiment’s discipline to -an extent which will render it of little value in war. In peace, to -be sure, no one takes much notice of this fact, but in war the slack -commanding officer becomes an object of detestation to all concerned, -and he invariably “lets in” every one. He is most despised by the very -men whom he tries to save from dangers. It is a curious fact in human -nature that usually they think he is doing this because he himself is -afraid. - -If, however, there are altogether some four or five really good -officers of various ranks in a regiment, their influence and -peace-activity will save the regiment from much that even a slack -commanding officer can do to its detriment. All young officers fall -under their influence, and there remains a substratum of rock under the -shifting sands. - -Von der Goltz says (_Nation in Arms_, p. 144): “Every regiment brings -into the field a certain character of its own.” That character depends -on its officers--often on one officer long since dead and gone. In one -regiment the shoeing was remarkably good; it transpired that a former -colonel, a martinet dead thirty years before, used to “break” the -farrier if a horse lost a shoe in the field. - -With his duties and his sports, for the first two or three years in a -good regiment, the subaltern has no time to think, and if he is the -right man in the right place, enjoys himself thoroughly. - -Let us now hark forrard to the full-fledged cavalry officer of three -to seven years’ service who is learning to command a squadron, and may -find himself doing so often enough. He has now time to look round, -and much depends again on the tone of the regiment and the man himself -whether he takes to his profession seriously or “soldiers” on to pass -the time pleasantly. He may aspire to be a staff officer, or a good -regimental officer, or may have no aspirations. - -With the staff officer we are not concerned; what we are now -considering is, What process will render the regimental cavalry officer -of most value to the service? Constant drills and parades will not do -so; they belong to the past. To put first spit and polish and show -parades is a thing of the past in nearly all minds. But this must not -be taken to mean that drill is not necessary. Those who have led in war -drilled and undrilled men aver, with reason, that smooth, easy working -and confident leading only exist where the men have been carefully -drilled. A good deal can be done at a slow, go-as-you-please pace with -semi-drilled intelligent men, but they have no chance, especially in -cases of emergency, against men of lower intelligence, well trained by -the officer who leads them. Drill in the evolutions necessary in the -field is consequently essential to a high standard of fighting ability. -To drill well largely resolves itself into the power to observe -and correct faults in such a way that the impression remains. The -experienced drill and the coach of a racing eight know by experience -that, owing to the imperfections of man’s nature, they are bound to -meet with certain faults which will have an unsteadying and deterrent -effect on the squadron’s or boat’s progress. They address themselves -to the correction of these characteristic faults, explaining their -reasons, often affecting decorative, if forceful epithets, similes, and -expressions, just as a preacher or orator does, in order to give point -and pungency to his discourse and to make it remembered. Von Schmidt in -his _Cavalry Instructions_ usually details at the end of each paragraph -bearing on an evolution or practice their characteristic faults, and -the cause, effect, and cure of these. Primed with a knowledge of these, -and possessed of some small power of explanation, the squadron or troop -officer will soon make an astonishing difference in his command’s power -of evolution. Without them, he too often gropes in the dark. - -What we would suggest, then, is to encourage this officer (i.) -constantly to practise the situations in which he and his men may find -themselves in war, and (ii.) to train and exercise his command so that -it is difficult for circumstances to arise of which they have not had -some previous experience;[73] (iii.) to practise giving short verbal -orders in the saddle in proper form (_vide_ _F.S.R._, Part I.) till -it becomes a second nature, both in himself to give orders thus, and -his command to place those orders in their mind and act upon them in a -logical sequence; (iv.) to become by practice a person of resource, and -to train his men so that they become “handy men,” _e.g._ able to get a -waggon up and down a steep slope, or improvise rafts, etc., or to place -a farm in a state of defence, and to do so quietly and in an orderly -manner; (v.) to be himself a capable master of his weapons, and able to -instruct intelligently; (vi.) to know the situations in which a battle -on a large scale may place him, and to be able to foresee what are the -probable opportunities of which he may have to take advantage, and so -to train his men that they will act with intelligence in such cases.[74] - -Here we must pause whilst we make it plain that the really stupid man, -who has no imagination, makes a very bad officer for training purposes, -because in peace-time he is quite unable to picture to himself what -does happen in an action. The same unfortunate trait makes him a bad -leader in war, because he is unable to picture what the enemy will -most probably do in certain cases. In the cavalry this type of officer -has no place, even in the lower ranks, because the cavalry officer so -frequently has to act by himself, and then the fate of an army may be -dependent on what he sees, or on the information which he sifts and -sends into the chief. As an infantry officer of the same rank he is -more under the eyes of a commanding officer. - -What, then, are the conclusions at which we arrive? - -1. That we draw on a class who have not been used to much brain work. - -2. That the young officer should be for choice country bred, fond of -sport, a “trier,” and must have some private income. - -3. That now he works much harder than he used to do, at first -especially; but the work is, or ought to be, congenial work. His pay -is the same as when he did little or no work in peace-time. So he is a -practical patriot. - -4. That his work consists largely of teaching others. - -5. That many of the attributes which are most desirable, can be tested -by no written examination. - -6. That to recognize and do his duty is one of these. As regards this, -much depends on his surroundings in the regiment which he joins. - -7. That a cavalry officer as he gets up to three to seven years’ -service, though he requires little book learning, requires fairly wide -practical knowledge, also considerable powers of imagination; without -these, his abilities for training his men and for leading them in war -are likely to be defective. - -8. Also that the main point which he must regard in all his training is -not only, “Is this a situation in which my command may find itself in -war?” but also, “Is there any situation in war in which my command is -not practised?” - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE TRAINING OF THE CAVALRY OFFICER (_continued_) - - ... “ignorance is the curse of God, - Knowledge the wing wherewith we fly to heaven.” - - SHAKESPEARE. - - “War is a business and must be learned like any other - profession.”--NAPOLEON. - - -The attributes which a cavalry officer of the rank of squadron -leader and upwards may to advantage possess are so many as to defy -enumeration; some of them really possessed in perfection are so rare -and valuable that _in war_ they may even counterbalance the fact that -their owner is barely able to read or write. - -It was not without reason that Napoleon said of Ney: “When a man is as -brave as he is, he is worth his weight in diamonds.” - -To cavalry officers of all others are the reflections of Von der Goltz -applicable, when he says: “_Restless activity_ on the part of the -general is the first condition of connected and rapid action in war”; -and then he details the weakening of troops exposed to hardships, -“exertion, and privations of all kinds, fatiguing marches, and wet -nights in bivouac, cheerfully endured for a short time, but not -for months together. They damp martial ardour considerably. A few -privileged natures escape the effect of such conditions, but not so the -mass of men.” - -To the officer it is well that it should be known that, as war goes -on, he may expect to find himself weakening, but, as with any other -disease, forewarned is forearmed. - -It is a duty to his country for a cavalry officer in peace-time to -take such exercise in the available sports of hunting, pig-sticking, -polo, big-game shooting, and other exercises as will keep muscles -and lungs in condition and training, and his nerves in order. The -cavalry officer, and for that matter the general and staff officer, -who seldom gets on a horse in peace-time, will not suddenly change -his nature in war; on the contrary, the enforced exercise will knock -him up. Long days in the saddle, and nights spent on the outpost line -with an insufficiency of food, the constant strain of vigilance will -tell on most men, in fact in some degree on all men. But the officer -who knows beforehand that he may expect his initiative, firmness, -zeal, and love for action to evaporate somewhat after some months or -even weeks of campaigning will be on the look-out. He will school his -mind and countenance in cheerfulness and lightheartedness before his -subordinates: - - Jog on, jog on, the footpath way, - And merrily hent the stile-a; - A merry heart goes all the day, - Your sad tires in a mile-a. - - _Winter’s Tale_, iv. 3. - -He will practise himself in firmly repressing all grumbling and -cynicism, in assiduously performing all details of duty, and in -constantly caring for the welfare of his men and horses. “Such -independent persons,” says Emil Reich, “have long since learnt to stand -adversity, to be, as the saying is, ‘good losers.’ This has given -England her peculiar tone, her stamina, her power in adversity.”[75] -With such all will go well, for war is the region of reality in which -there is no place for shams; but woe betide the regiment where the -senior officers set an example of cynicism, grumbling, neglect of duty, -want of zeal; these faults become exaggerated in their subordinates -till they result in the worst military crimes and in the disgrace of -the regiment, by a state of indiscipline and neglect of duty which only -the strongest measures can put right.[76] - -Whatever the value of a senior officer of cavalry from the point of -view of courage, horsemanship, resolution, and bodily fitness for a -campaign, there are other points to which he should devote attention. -Von Bernhardi (p. 288 of _Cavalry in Future Wars_) says: - - A comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp - of the principles of higher strategy, are essentials for every - reconnoitring officer. - -Now a field officer of cavalry may find himself at any time thrown -on his own resources, perhaps cut off from his base, many miles from -superior authority and with several squadrons at his disposal. His -action, its direction and scope, and the information gained or missed -may have the most marked effect on the course of the operations. - -Again, at any period in an engagement the moment for action may arise; -will then an officer, who is not trained in peace-time to know his -duty, and to act on his own initiative, have the nerve “to go in,” -without waiting for the order which nearly always comes too late? -Settled convictions as to his duty,[77] acquired by previous practice -and study of similar situations in peace, will nerve him to a correct -interpretation of his duty, which may or may not be to charge. He will -remember what was said of so-and-so who did or did not “go in.” He must -be able to await a favourable opportunity in cold-blooded calm; and the -time for deliberation once over, he must possess the cool daring to -throw relentlessly all his available forces into battle.[78] - -About the end of the Boer War an officer was heard to say: “I only -learnt one thing at a garrison class which I attended. In a rearguard -action my instructor told me to go lightly out of two positions and -then let the enemy have it hot at the third one, when they came on with -confidence and without discretion. That tip has been more useful to me -than anything else I ever learnt, and has pulled me through again and -again.” - -But besides this a great deal is now to be learnt, and many ideas -gained from the many excellent military works which are translated into -English from other languages. Thirty years ago, beyond Von Schmidt -and De Brack (certainly the best of their kind), few foreign works on -tactics and the more recent wars had been translated. Nowadays four -are translated where one was formerly. These give a better idea of the -varied rôle of cavalry on a battlefield; we get a little farther than -the drill of a squadron or regiment; we can see laid bare the faults -of our cavalry and of their direction in South Africa, or what was -noticed by various military attachés as regards the shortcomings of -cavalry in the Manchurian or other campaigns. These, read and noted in -an intelligent fashion, and more especially if later discussed amongst -the officers of a regiment in their application to the work of training -a regiment, are of great value. Perhaps their principal value is that -they enable officers to lay out plans of action for emergencies, to -get what Langlois calls a doctrine.[79] “Without a doctrine,” he says, -“text-books are of little avail. Better a doctrine without text-books -than text-books without a doctrine, for the former was the case in -Napoleon’s time.” - -And what was Napoleon’s doctrine? Did not Napoleon beyond all others -study _moral_ in its application to the training of officers and men, -and to the winning of battles? We see it in his selection of his -generals. Ney began as a leader of partisan forces. Massena was the -head of a band of smugglers. Again, we may note it in the selection of -his staff officers and A.D.C.’s of whom he asked (1st): Is he lucky? -and (2nd): Is he enterprising? It is evident in his wise distribution -of rewards; “I want blood, not ink,” he remarked to a commanding -officer who had put forward his quartermaster for a decoration. To -another, of whom he had asked the character of a man who was claiming -a reward for well-known acts of bravery, when the reply was that the -man was a “drunkard and a thief,” he said, “Bah, blood washes all that -away.” We see, then, that his _doctrine_ was that the man who will shed -his blood is the rarest and most valuable asset in war; and so he, -the great leader and organizer of armies, put it before all others, -and thus he made it the “fashion.” No doubt Napoleon could have made -“ink” the fashion, had he thought it desirable to do so. Further, -he decorated men on the field of battle, bearing in mind the maxim: -“Bis dat qui cito dat.” Any senior officer may imitate this excellent -practice, by putting in his orders, regimental, brigade or otherwise, -a notice of an “Act of Courage,” etc. If this is done the same evening -it has a great effect. - -That the Japanese thought of this is evidenced by the fact that -repeatedly in the orders of the day, and in the proclamations of the -army commanders and of the commander-in-chief, there were references -to the excellent information and reports which reached them from -reconnoitring detachments and patrols, and on one occasion Marshal -Oyama categorically stated that without the help which had been -afforded him by the cavalry, he would have been groping in the dark in -the measures he was undertaking.[80] - -Those who neglect to think about these matters soon wear out the -patience of the bravest men.[81] De Brack writes:-- - - Reward, then, above all things the courage of him who is first in - the mêlée, who delivers his blows with coolness and certainty, - who is last in a retreat, who rescues his officers, his comrades, - who captures a standard, who recaptures artillery, who is never - dismayed by bad luck, and is always ready and willing.... There - are several kinds of courage, but it is courage of the daring and - impetuous kind which wins battles. - -Our text-books have had little to say about _moral_, and we were apt -to take it for granted that all is for the best in the best of all -possible armies, so long has the question been overlooked. But is that -wise? Should we not know why one regiment will take a loss of 50 per -cent and “go in” next day again cheerfully, while another loses 10 per -cent, and does not want any more fighting? - -Is it not part of the training of the senior officers of cavalry that -they should know the nature of the infantry combat, that they should -grasp the consumption of reserves and the gradual moral degradation -of the enemy’s infantry, that they should have studied works such as -Colonel Ardant du Picq’s _Études du Combat_, which furnish the most -thorough and complete dissection of _moral_ in war? - -In a note to one of his chapters on the value of discipline, Ardant -du Picq relates how in the eighteenth century four British captains -“stood off” when signalled to for help in an attack about to be made -by their admiral. The latter won his fight, but was mortally wounded. -He, however, sent for the four captains, court-martialled them and -had three hanged at the yard-arm, and the fourth cashiered before he -himself died. - -Every leader should know how narrow is the path which he will tread -when in command of troops in a fight. How essential it is, then, in -cricket parlance to “give no chances.” And it is a great mistake for -young officers to be left in ignorance of the fact that a good fighting -regiment, battery or battalion, yes, and brigade or division, can only -exist where there is a high standard of _moral_ and a thorough mutual -understanding that every one will, and must, play the game, be the -risk, difficulty, or odium what it may. - -Polo players will tell you that one selfish player will ruin a team. -This is ten times more true in war, where they will see the selfish -polo player skulk, run away, or let in his commanding officer and the -army in the very first fight he gets into. And cavalry officers of all -ranks must learn in peace that it is only by practising at all times -broad-minded comradeship not only in their own corps and arm, but with -the other arms, that victory in the field can be ensured. Let them read -and ponder on what a French general says of our army in South Africa:-- - - Each arm acted on its own.... This comradeship can only be - fostered by daily intercourse in peace.... In England it exists - neither between the different arms nor between one battalion and - another.... Good fellowship in the fight can only be produced by - good fellowship in time of peace, and the latter results from a - _life in common_.[82] - -This ideal is apparently realized in the Japanese army, where, it is -said, “there are no regiments that have a reputation or a history which -is not that of the whole army. Just as there are no crack corps, so -there is no crack arm. The pay and standard of education and living -of cavalry officers are the same as those of other branches of the -service.” - -Our conclusions then must be:-- - -1. That courage and activity are the most valuable attributes in the -field. - -2. That these may wane when the body is exposed to unaccustomed wear -and tear, unless this is foreseen and guarded against. - -3. That habits of decision in tactical situations must be acquired by -practice in peace-time. - -4. That a doctrine permeating all ranks is essential to success in war. - -5. The doctrine is “THE UNISON OF ARMS AND THE RESOLUTE OFFENSIVE.” - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE TRAINING OF A SQUADRON - - “Soignez les détails, ils ne sont pas sans gloire; c’est le premier - pas qui mène à la victoire.”--FREDERICK THE GREAT. - - -Pages 104 to 142, _Cavalry Training_, are devoted to the training of -the troop and squadron, and leave little to be desired as far as they -take us. But those who wish to study the matter more fully, and to -learn some of the “whys and wherefores,” should read _Instructions for -Cavalry_, by the Prussian General Von Schmidt, of whom it was said, -“No man exercised so great an influence for good on our arm since the -Great King.” His theory was that “everything that is dull, cannot be -easily understood or is uninteresting must disappear; the cavalry -soldier has less need of this than any one. With such instruction he -is quite useless, for to him more than to any one else are freshness, -life, activity, mental quickness and vivacity necessary.”[83] But -most valuable are the glimpses which the book affords us of the Great -King (Frederick) in his rôle as a trainer of cavalry. How thoroughly -he “meant business,” and how sternly any weakening, wavering, or -indiscipline was dealt with under that resolute autocrat, when not -only an army but a nation was “in the making,” may be seen from the -following:-- - - It was an old and strict order of Frederick the Great that no - cavalry officer should allow himself to be attacked at the halt; - whoever does it should be cashiered.[84] - - In the cavalry of Frederick the Great the squadron leader was - authorized to sabre any _éclaireur_ met riding at random across the - front.[85] - -Elliot mentions a further inspiriting regulation:-- - - If it is found that any soldier is not doing his duty, or is - wishing to fly, the first officer or sub-officer will pass his - sword through his body. - -Frederick the Great, familiar with war, readily grasped the fact -that the military discipline necessary in order to train men in the -highest degree for the act of war must be stern and inexorable. No bank -holiday, please-do-as-you-are-told soldiering for him. He knew what he -wanted, and that time was limited. - - On Sundays after divine service the men shall mount, as His Majesty - considers it of the highest importance for the preservation of the - horse that he should be ridden every day. The horses will then - always be in wind, will not be stiff in the legs, and not get too - fat. This His Majesty has found to be the case with his own horses. - He desires to have horses in working condition, and does not care - so much that they should be fat as that they should be sound and - fit to march and stand fatigue.[86] - -It must not be imagined that every officer who rides at its head can -train or lead a squadron. Those who can do both in perfection are few -and far between. An apprenticeship of several years under various -good leaders, added to natural ability, good horsemanship, an eye for -country, a thorough sympathy with both his men and horses, are a few of -the talents required to make a good squadron leader. But if a regiment -is so fortunate as to possess even one good squadron leader, there will -soon be found, especially among the junior officers, many to imitate -him, and thus one good squadron leader makes many. - -“A,” the good squadron leader, is easily recognized in the field; -he rides well away from his squadron, confident that they will obey -his word or signal; his squadron know his ruses and plans, and move -smoothly, ready to act at the indicated speed in any direction -signalled by him. They are led covered from view,[87] duly avoiding -or overcoming obstacles, quietly picking their way; the leader is now -far to the front, with his eye on the enemy; his second in command -passes any signals which are made. Suddenly pace is increased, and the -squadron is galloping along under the crest of the hill, the cover -which they know without an order he wishes them to utilize; then the -troops wheel into line, “direction the enemy”; a defensive flank is -dropped back, or an offensive flank pushed up; whilst the enemy’s -leader, taken by surprise, is making up his mind, A’s squadron has -drawn swords and is upon him with a mighty cheer. - -“B,” the indifferent squadron leader, nervously and fretfully jobbing -his horse in the mouth, rides _near_ his squadron, at which he -constantly looks back to see if the men have not already got out of -dressing or committed some fault. Querulously addressing his second -in command or sergeant major, he asks some foolish question; already -he wants some one to lean on. His squadron moves round from behind -some cover, where he has unwisely placed it, at an uneven pace, -his ill-bitted horses tossing their heads in pain. Now he executes -some movement; but before it is completed, he has given another -order to “form squadron,” which formation he forthwith regards with -disapprobation from a flank and at some 20 yards from his squadron. He -has no eyes for the enemy; two patrols have been sent out who _ought_ -to inform him. He gets the information right enough, but riding, as -he is, near his squadron, which is walking now, he has barely time to -give an order to increase the pace and then “left shoulder” towards the -enemy, who are getting to one flank, before he notices his swords are -not drawn. To get this done increases the confusion in his squadron. - -But enough has been said to show the difference in cavalry leaders. -In a cavalry engagement A’s squadron will beat B’s nineteen times out -of twenty. B, poor fellow, is a danger to the State, and generally -not happy in his position. No man likes work which he performs -indifferently. Will this kind of leader ever charge unless he receives -a direct order to do so, and even then will it be well done? - -Take it all round, any officer who is up to the business of efficiently -training and leading a squadron must possess qualities which would -have rendered his career a successful one in any walk of life. It is -impossible to enumerate the hundred and one cares, anxieties, and -responsibilities which beset a squadron commander. But it is a good -thing to mention what he should regard as his guiding stars. They are:-- - -1. Efficiency for war in men and horses. - -2. Avoidance of mere samples of efficiency. - -3. Constant steps taken to make the soldiers confident in their power -to use their weapons with deadly effect. - -4. To make every trooper self-reliant in danger or unusual -circumstances, especially when alone. - -5. To cultivate the offensive spirit and a determination to get at the -enemy somehow. - -1. Efficiency for war in men and horses. Men not worked hard in -peace-time are quite useless in war, where they have the added -privation of want of food and sleep. Active service is quite unlike -peace service; in the latter a man often spends but an hour or two -in the open and most of the rest of the day in grooming and cleaning -up; these duties are, generally speaking, a pure waste of time, as -far as cavalry is concerned, in war. Too much of this barrack-square -soldiering is apt to unfit men and make them slack and tired after a -long day’s work, of which gillies, herdsmen, and keepers would think -nothing. Few officers are knowledgeable enough to be able to discern -the difference between fit, hard horses and poor horses. Looking at -the horse sideways on, the ribs may easily deceive one, but following -a horse it is much more easily seen to which category he belongs. The -poor horse is split up and hollow in the region of the muscles lying -alongside the backbone. Feeling the neck is not a safe criterion--big -neck muscles may merely mean that the horse has been fed on the ground; -the appearance of the coat is also fallacious. A sharp canter of a mile -should, however, furnish a good test, as the blowing and snorting of an -untrained squadron and a soapy lather instead of a clear watery sweat -at once tell their tale. - -2. It is a common but most pernicious practice, instead of making the -effort to train all men in the squadron up to a certain standard of -knowledge and ability, to take some of the smart men and make them -into “show” teams. It is obviously flat-catching to have a prize team -of ten marksmen, whilst the rest of the squadron are indifferent -rifle shots. A man who wins prizes year after year at tournaments and -assaults-at-arms is not of value unless he teaches other men. Often -he does not do this for fear they should come on, “until at last the -old man was beaten by the boy.” The best, though perhaps not the most -showy, squadrons are those in which there is a recognized standard -of efficiency in every exercise and attainment, below which no man -is allowed to fall. The story is told of an inspector-general of -cavalry of past days, that, after the usual inspection, the commanding -officer at luncheon said to him, “I should like you to see my regiment -tent-pegging.” “Certainly,” was the reply. Arrived on the maidan, about -forty men had paraded. “But,” said the I.G.C., “you asked me to come -and see your _regiment_ tent-peg, and I wish to do so.” The regiment -was forthwith paraded, and the first squadron’s exhibition was quite -sufficient to expose the fallacy of “samples.” - -3. See under heading “the personal weapon” in chapter on Training of -the Man. - -4. Self-reliance may be gained by giving the individual various tasks -to carry out by himself and on his own initiative. The return for -this form of “casting the bread on the waters” is not immediate, but -directly the regiment goes on manœuvres or on service, the result -between a squadron trained on this system and one where this is not -done is most marked. - -The squadron in which every man can read a map and orient himself (and -this is now not exceptional) moves with perfect confidence on the -line marked out for it, and if “held up” in front at once proceeds -to find a way round or through. Squadrons trained to this degree may -be confidently expected to give great results when employed with -independent cavalry or as contact squadrons. - -From this it will be seen that the education of the modern working -classes has been exploited and improved upon to a very high degree -in the cavalry squadron and regimental school. Cavalry work, which -would have been a severe test of map-reading[88] and troop-leading to -a subaltern officer of cavalry thirty-five years ago, is now within -the powers of every sergeant and corporal, and most of the men. To -attain this has meant hard work for the regimental officer, and it is -doubtful, if the work had not been largely delegated to the section -leader, and thereby a proper chain of responsibility established, -whether such progress would have been made. - -Competitions between sections and troops, the former for choice, -work great things in a squadron. If the minds of sixteen section -leaders are all at work to find out the best way to train a recruit -in various exercises, to feed a horse to the best advantage with the -forage available, to get the best shooting average, and so on, it is -obvious that the squadron leader has a good chance of disseminating his -knowledge, when found out, through his squadron, whilst an interest is -given to the work which is perfectly invaluable. Certainly men, who -have to go through four or five months’ hot weather in the plains of -India with the thermometer occasionally at 115° in the verandah, want -these mental exercises and interests just as they want games of hockey, -cricket, and football in the evening to keep them sound in wind, limb, -and mind. - -In every respect competition is a healthy lever in training; only quite -recently a squadron which, _mirabile dictu_, stopped all smoking for -some weeks before shooting, were successful in winning an army rifle -competition. Above all things, it acts in putting a stop to the waste -of time which is so frequent an occurrence, where there is no spur to -prevent it. It is distressing to see a troop of men and horses standing -in line, whilst one individual goes through some exercise, or jumps -some fences; a clever squadron leader will never permit this, he will -point out to the troop or section leader that the remainder would be -much better occupied in “suppling” their horses, or making cuts and -points, till their turn arrived:[89] and that there is no reason why -they should not light a pipe meanwhile. These amenities make things go -easier. - -Again, when on the march, or going to or returning from a field day, -by means of judging distance on prominent objects (to be checked -afterwards from the map), or by noticing the features of the country -and subsequently answering questions on them, or by guessing what is on -the other side of a hill, habits of observation which are invaluable -in a cavalryman may be inculcated. This last is a capital exercise, -and one which the Duke of Wellington practised. It is related that he -was posting with a friend, and they passed the time in guessing what -was behind the next hill. His friend remarked how often he was right -in his guesses. Wellington replied, “Well, it is what I have been -practising all my life.” This instruction is best delegated to section -leaders, since a squadron, or even troop, is too unwieldy for this -kind of education, which is specially one which should aim at bringing -the slower and more stupid men up to a good level. The Germans rightly -lay the greatest stress on the fact that collective perfection is only -attainable by individual excellence, and this can only be obtained by -individual instruction. - -It is not in the brigade nor even in the regiment that dismounted work -can be taught, but it is there that the effects can be seen. It is -in the troop and the squadron that men should be taught to be quick, -not hurried, in getting on and off their horses, and it must be done -without the old-fashioned caution in the navy, “Five-and-twenty for the -last man up the rigging.” - -A brigade is manœuvring against an enemy; a house, a garden, a clump -of trees is seen, which, if seized and held by rifle fire, will prove -a most valuable pivot of manœuvre. A squadron is ordered to seize it. -Now is the time to see whether men have been taught their work in the -squadron. Are they awkward in getting off their horses? Is there delay -in handing over the horses to the Nos. 3? Is there uncertainty what -to do with the lances? Are proper precautions taken? If the men have -been well taught, they will be ready to meet with fire the opposing -squadrons sent to seize it. And further, when the meeting between -the brigades takes place, a well-trained squadron will have had time -to mount again, and will be on the spot to throw in a flank attack, -which may decide the fight. The cavalryman must learn that never is the -difference between cavalry and infantry to be observed more than when -cavalry are acting dismounted. - -A whole brigade may have to act dismounted. One not trained in the -work will leave its horses behind and become inferior infantry. If -the squadron training has been well done, they will act like a swarm -of bees, trying here, trying there, everywhere _moral_ and movement, -till the weak spot is discovered; and then the rush will be made with -an irresistible force in the firing line, and no slow pushing up of -supports and reserves. - -We do not wish to see cavalry always getting off their horses and -trying everywhere to shoot their enemy out of each bit of difficult -ground, but neither do we wish to see a regiment or brigade sitting -helplessly in mass with an infantry or cavalry patrol holding a defile -in front of them, unable to turn them out because the ground prevents -them galloping at it. Von Bernhardi says:[90] - - Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between - fire and shock, and in the training of the former never to allow - the troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence - of the cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of - some great strategical design, or in joining hands with the other - arms to obtain by united fire action some common purpose, implies - a balance of judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest - occurrence in normal natures. - -The practical problems, which invariably follow upon contact with the -enemy, placed before his subalterns, unexpectedly for choice, by means -of flags or real troops, and their proposed solutions, actually carried -out, and then followed by a discussion, constitute the best and most -useful work done by a squadron leader. If his imagination fails him, -he must read up instances. Nor should he forget to give them problems -which are what would be called unfair in a test examination, because -the odds are too great, or the situation too difficult. He can and -should explain this later, _coram populo_, but meantime it is just such -problems which come to try the cavalry officer most highly. For if he -is doing his duty he must constantly find himself in scrapes, and what -our ancestors called “outfalls,” in which the life and liberty of his -men, and more, victory and honour, depend on his action. Often enough -a rapid dispersal with a prearranged rendezvous is the only rational -course and alternative to defeat or heavy and useless loss. Again, a -bold front shown or a feint at attack may give time to warn others or -to get to cover. - -These problems come as too much of a surprise in war for the ordinary -individual, unless he has acquired character and a large degree of -confidence by frequent exercises in peace-time such as those indicated -above. But, thus equipped, and steeled, as it were, by a doctrine of -resolution, the officer or non-commissioned officer will perhaps call -to his mind some saying such as “a mounted man and a shower of rain can -get through anywhere.” In an instant he has drawn swords, indicated, -first, the line of attack, and second, the rendezvous after dispersal, -then with a cheer or view-holloa he goes at them. His bold and rapid -course of action pulls him through with little or no loss.[91] The -Japanese _Cavalry Training_, p. 57, says:-- - - From commander to privates all cavalry soldiers must be accustomed - to act on their own initiative throughout the various trainings and - instruction, and in all cases should observe the following rule: - - Attack--but do not be attacked. - - -Problems can be found in the support of mounted attacks by fire, -dismounted attacks, rearguard actions, the defence or attack of -positions taken up in farms or kopjes by flankguards or rearguards, -feints made to draw the enemy or distract his attention, the -precautions necessary at a halt to water or when in bivouac, the -scouting of an enemy’s outpost line or in getting into a position -before dawn, the passage of obstacles and defiles, and so on. Always -remember to vary the ground, conceal the enemy’s numbers, and insist -on decisive action. In practice, in cavalry matters, the wrong action -taken in a resolute fashion is sometimes preferable to right action -arrived at after vast consideration. - -The reflection on our British cavalry made, we believe, by a cavalry -officer, that it was well drilled but badly instructed for war in -1899, appears to be a genuine and well-founded one. How to escape it -in future must be our squadron leaders’ chief concern. Napoleon said: -“It is not my genius that suddenly reveals to me, in secret, what I -should say or do in an unforeseen circumstance. It is reflection, it is -meditation. I always work at dinner, at the theatre; at night I wake up -to work.” - -Above all, let us study in our instruction how best to make _moral_ go -hand-in-hand with method; without this what army can do great things? -Have not civilization, education (conducted on our own lines), the -insidious lessening of animus all conspired against our soldier’s -_moral_ in war? How much simpler and more effective was the _modus -operandi_ of the Zulu Impis clearly enunciated in their war chant, “If -we go forward we conquer, if we go back we die”; their ruler invariably -putting to death all who returned from an unsuccessful expedition. - - -CONCLUSIONS - -1. That interest must be sustained. - -2. That with cavalry above all arms, there is a need for a very stern -discipline. - -3. That only a really good man can lead a cavalry squadron. - -4. That flat-catching must be sternly discountenanced. - -5. That a wise delegation of certain points of instruction and -horse-management to section leaders will have valuable results. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -THE TRAINING OF THE HORSE - - -We have only to consider the contingencies of service in the cavalry -to come to a conclusion that the officer or man who begins a campaign -on a well-trained horse has many chances in his favour against him who -enters it riding an indifferently-trained animal; and no more striking -instance of this can be brought forward than the circumstances of the -Prince Imperial’s death in Zululand. The horse in this case was ridden -by an excellent horseman, but it was well known to be awkward to mount, -with the result that, when suddenly attacked by a rush of Zulus, the -Prince was unable to mount and get away. - -But the chance in the rider’s favour[92] is not the only consideration; -the work which a well-trained, well-balanced, equably-minded horse will -do, and the accidents of all kinds, leading to disablement and time -spent in the sick lines, which it will itself avoid and also allow its -master to help it to avoid, are well exemplified in any day s hunting -in a rough country. There is the so-called unlucky horse, who never -goes out without hurting himself or his master. This unlucky horse is -associated in our minds with a narrow forehead with a bump low down on -it, a rapidly shifting ear, and a small eye showing too much white. - -The really ill-tempered horse is not fit to mount a cavalryman, whose -life may depend on the behaviour of his horse; though here it must be -confessed that some horses with very bad characters have been trained -by real masters of the art to be good and reliable animals. - -Not long ago the ideal laid down in training a horse for cavalry work -was to make him as “clever across country as a good hunter, active and -handy as a polo pony, and reliable as a shooting horse.” Nor is it -advisable to lower that ideal. Major Noel Birch in his excellent book, -_Modern Riding_, tells us “the ideal is an excellent one and seldom -impossible if the training is scientific.” - -A lack of imagination prevents the soldier, who has not undergone the -vicissitudes of active service, from quite grasping the situations -which cavalry work may bring about for him, since, whilst acting as a -scout, any cavalry soldier may be called upon to engage in personal -combat, to swim a rapid river, again to leave his horse standing alone -in the open whilst he creeps over a ridge to reconnoitre a valley, or -to ride for his life or freedom over stiff fences or big ditches. _À -propos_ of this, a story is related of Seydlitz. He had been telling -Frederick the Great that a cavalryman should never be taken alive. One -day the King was riding with him over a bridge, and in order to try and -prove him wrong, gave an order to the advanced guard to face about and -close one end of the bridge, and to the next files coming on similarly -to close the other end. He then asked Seydlitz what he would do now. -Seydlitz put his horse at the parapet and leapt over it into the -stream. This was a high trial for the manners of the horse as well as -the determination of the man. - -Undoubtedly a good swordsman on a perfectly trained horse should -account for any three men of ordinary ability mounted on average -horses. Napoleon said that “two mamelukes could make head against three -French cavalrymen, but that one thousand French cuirassiers could -easily beat fifteen hundred mamelukes.” One showed high individual -training of man and horse in single combat, and the other collective -training as a troop or squadron. Both are difficult of attainment, and -both point to considerable trouble, forethought, and knowledge on the -part of the trainer. - -In the days of the professional soldier the training of the horse was -probably at a higher standard than at present, because it was made -plain to every man’s mind that a good horse meant honour, profit, and -safety to him. There was, therefore, as much competition for a horse -which was likely to train well, and for a trained horse, as there is -nowadays for a finished hunter or polo pony trained on similar lines. - -In all ages there have been some men who could do wonders on horses -quite unrideable by others, but the exceptions are not to the point. We -have to consider how to train horses in a manner suitable to cavalry -work. - -In the first place, concurrently with his physical development, a point -requiring the closest attention, the squadron horse must be trained to -answer to certain conventional aids, so that any man in the squadron -who applies these will find the horse answer implicitly to them. Now, -let any one who wishes to study the aids exhaustively, and set up a -line of conduct in the training of the horse for himself, turn a fresh -young horse loose in a riding-school or enclosed manège, and keep him -on the move, with a whip, if necessary. Let him note how the horse -bears and uses his head, neck, leg, forehand, and haunches, as he bends -and turns. The most correct aids are those indications by the reins, -weight of body, legs, whip, and spur which a rider applies, so as to -produce the natural preliminary attitudes for the flexion, pace, or -movement desired. - -If the observant horseman follows this line, he will find that he must -make a rule, first, not to apply unnatural aids, and secondly, not to -apply more than one aid at a time in the early stages of instruction of -either man or horse. - -Now take for instance the case of a horse which turns _on his -shoulders_ at a sharp gallop; it will be noticed that he stops -immediately after turning; but if, on the other hand, he turns _on -his haunches_ at the gallop, it is with a view to going on in his -new direction at the same or a faster pace. Therefore the rider will -do well to collect his horse on the haunches as he turns at the -gallop, if that is the pace at which he wishes to continue in the new -direction. Whereas if he turns, meaning to stop, he will pull one--say -the left--rein, and (in the later stage of the training) add the aid -of the drawn-back left leg to circle the horse’s quarters round his -forehand.[93] - -Such will be the outcome of his observations on the loose horse in the -manège, and following this system he will fix in his own mind, with -the assistance of the book, a list of natural aids. The fact is, that -nature has taught the horse to act in such a way as to utilize the -mechanism of his head, neck, body, limbs, and even tail to the greatest -advantage in his movements. We note these and adapt them to the aids, -which we can apply by means of our mechanical devices, such as the -reins, and by our natural devices, such as the legs and the weight of -the body.[94] - -Habits of long standing have accustomed horsemen to apply, often quite -unknown to themselves, certain aids to which their horse answers. They -are often incorrect, slovenly, or not to the best advantage of horse or -man, but their owners are satisfied, and often with a very inadequate -repertoire. But when it is a question of fighting on horseback, we want -to get a lightning-like system of aids, so that we may get where the -adversary least expects us, or wishes us to be, and kill him. The man -with experience in riding, a quick eye, a blood-horse under him, which -he himself has trained, can “play with” one or two, or even three, -adversaries who have not these advantages. - -Undoubtedly since 1902 steps have been made towards an improvement -in the training of the squadron horse. There are fewer “shooting -stars,” that is, horses who bolt out of the ranks, and fewer horses -who refuse to leave the ranks; the horses go better across country, -and are, generally speaking, suited for campaign riding. Under the old -Canterbury system much time was spent with a view to showing up a good -ride of _haute école_ animals, whilst the new system aims at training -a horse which will go well in the ranks, and will be generally useful -on a campaign, either in single combat or for a scout’s riding, or for -work in the ranks. - -The horse is now trained a great deal in the open, whereas under the -old system it was trained almost entirely in a school or manège, -and not in the open. Whilst by no means underrating the value and -convenience of a riding-school, there is little doubt that the old -system made the horse a stupid animal and quite unable to look after -himself or his rider in a rough country.[95] Under the new system the -limited intelligence of the horse is exploited to a considerable degree. - -Whilst officers of continental cavalry spend considerably more time -than English officers in the training of their remounts, this is to -some extent counterbalanced by the opportunities which the latter have -of riding to hounds over difficult country, pig-sticking, and playing -polo. For the mêlée the latter is a splendid training, whilst the two -former give an officer an eye for country, and a decision in crossing -it, unobtainable in any other fashion. - -After estimating the instruction and advantages gained by cavalry -officers taking part in these and other sports, which are really a -preparation for and the “image of war,” it may be reasonably asserted -that the British Government by no means gets the worst of the -bargain.[96] - -At the same time it is undoubtedly a slur on any cavalry officer that -he should be unable to train a remount. If he is not a rich man, it -is well worth his while to learn, so as to train his own polo ponies -and hunters. Many officers do so most successfully. Scores of horses, -cast as unruly animals, are, by the aid of some of our riding-school -methods, quickly brought to hand, and turn out most useful and -temperate hunters or polo ponies. A comparison of military and civilian -horsemanship is not a desirable theme, but it is surprising how many -of the horsemen of the nation, even those who ride to hounds and -between flags, are profoundly ignorant of all-round horsemanship and -horse-training. The writer recently counted only four horses, out of -some twenty running in an important race at Punchestown, a right-handed -course, which passed the stand with the right leg leading. The four who -were leading with the right leg gained at least four or five lengths at -the next fence, which is on the turn. - -Very few six-year-old hunters answer to their rider’s legs, or are -really nice horses to ride. A bending lesson every day for a month in -a good military rough-rider’s hands would do them an immense amount of -good. - -One of the recent innovations which has done most to improving our -squadron horses in cross-country work is the introduction of the -free-jumping lane for remounts: thanks to which horses get used to -jumping, and regard it as fun instead of a penance accompanied by jabs -in the mouth. - -Another most important factor in the training of remounts is the -system of long reining. The colonel of a regiment, in which the horses -were particularly well trained, assured me that he considered this -proficiency was due principally to long reining. His system was to take -a couple of non-commissioned officers, whom he found were getting too -fat, and let them do all the long reining. When I saw them, neither of -the long reiners were much too fat; both, from long practice, at often -as many as fifteen or twenty remounts per diem, were such adepts that, -in their hands, the remounts, as yet almost unbacked, had learnt nearly -half their lessons. The value of this system no doubt depends largely -on the operator. There may be something also in the adage, “Who drives -fat oxen should himself be fat.” The patient-minded man is an asset in -this work. - -A suggestion recently made that the reins should be carried from the -bit to a pulley at the highest point of the pad, and then vertically -to another pulley on the side, and so to the operator’s hands, is full -of common-sense, as it ensures the horse holding his head right whilst -there is control of the hind quarters.[97] - -A system of giving prizes for the best-trained remount encourages a -very deserving class of man in cavalry regiments, and evidences to all -that the commanding officer is taking an interest in their work; the -danger is that the men sometimes confuse circus tricks with legitimate -training for campaign riding. If the commanding officer gets on the -three or four best-trained horses before awarding the prize, and -generally keeps an eye on the progress of the remounts in training, it -will have a marked effect. - -Above all, rough methods, shouting in the riding school,[98] and any -attempt to hurry training should be discouraged; a horse takes a little -time to learn in good hands, but it should be remembered that most -of the gymnastics which he has to learn involve training muscles and -sinews to an unnatural extent, and that this must be done with a weight -on the horse’s back which nature did not contemplate. - -If there is one thing more important than another in the training of a -squadron horse it is that he should be taught to walk well, quickly, -and freely. By constantly placing the fastest walking horses at the -head of the rides, and teaching the men to ride with a fairly loose -rein, this is soon effected. The result in a regiment where this has -been consistently done is surprising. - -Once placed in the ranks the squadron leader should not lose sight -of the horse, but watch his career. There is a key to every horse’s -mouth, so it is said; certain it is that, whilst one squadron commander -will see his horses tossing their heads, poking their noses, and -going with their jaws set against one side of the bit, without in the -least knowing what is the matter, another officer would in a short -half-hour have loosened the curb there, adjusted a nose-band or added a -martingale here, and have discovered an injured jaw in two other cases. -For the latter he would order his farrier to make a carrago nose-band, -or would improvise a string bridle with ten or twelve feet of small -cord, so that the horses could go on with their work. - -Let us take an instance, then, of the actual value to the State -of these two squadron commanders. In one case the horse becomes -unmanageable from pain, develops bolting propensities, injures one or -two riders, and is perhaps cast and sold for £5 as vicious. The value -of the horse (£40 by purchase at four years’ and £60 for two years’ -keep, etc.) is £100. In the other case the mouth is healed and the -animal does eight or nine years’ good service. The value to the State -of an observant, skilled horse-manager as compared with an indifferent -one is some £500 per annum. On service this value may be multiplied by -5 or 10. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -THE TRAINING OF THE MAN - - 1. That soldiers should make it their function to exert themselves - to the utmost of their loyalty and patriotism. - - 2. That they should strictly observe decorum. - - 3. That they should prize courage and bravery. - - 4. That they should treasure faith and confidence. - - 5. That they should practise frugality. - - (_Order issued by the Emperor of Japan in 1882._) - - -The standard of proficiency in cavalry work to which we wish to attain -is a very high one; our men must, in the first place, be taught-- - - (A) To ride well. - - (B) To be able to look after their horses. - - (C) Rifle-shooting and fire discipline. - - (D) The use of at least one personal weapon, when mounted, with - good effect. - - (E) Individuality, and to use their brains. - - (F) Bodily and muscular development. - - -(A) RIDING - -There is no doubt that our methods of teaching riding have greatly -improved of late years.[99] The recruit is not made afraid of his -horse, and of his work in the riding-school, as he often was under the -old régime. From the day he joins, no opportunity should be lost of -teaching the recruit that amongst his first duties is to love, honour, -and have a pride in his horse. He certainly will not recognize this -duty, if, as under the old “cast-iron” system, his horse becomes the -means of applying an unpleasant discipline to him. - -Further, he is now taught to ride in the open, and over a natural -country in many cases, picking his own line. In fact he is taught -campaign riding, rather than as formerly the elements of _haute école_; -the latter plan was by no means unsuitable if the man had the previous -knowledge of riding which many men, brought up in the country, joined -with forty or fifty years ago. - - -(B) SOLDIER’S CARE OF HORSES - -Of all instructions to be given to the young soldier the most difficult -is that in campaigning horse-management. - -It should be explained that the care of his own horse in a campaign -is quite a different matter in the cavalry from what it is in the -artillery; in the latter the horses are always under the master’s eye -in the first place, and in the second they are kept at a uniform pace, -whereas in the cavalry men are detached here and there, and it is only -by the individual’s care of his mount that the latter can win through -a campaign. In fact the difference is as great as if, instead of -carrying on his business under one roof, Mr. Whiteley had to send out -all his young men and women in troops and sections and as individuals -to effect sales. It would certainly lead to a very great diminution of -profits, and just as in any great business the profits are effected by -small and seemingly petty economies, so in a regiment it is the small -economies of horse-flesh which mount up to a great sum in a month or -so of campaigning. It is the regiment or squadron, in which, from the -start, the man has been taught always to dismount at every opportunity, -always to off-saddle and massage his horse’s back when a spare quarter -of an hour affords him time to do so, always to give his horse a chance -to nibble the short grass, or drink a few go-downs of water, always to -report without fail a loose clinch or a swelling on the back, even if -the latter is only the size of a shilling, that will constantly show a -good return of sound horses. A bad system of horse-management will in a -week incapacitate as many horses from work as will a general engagement. - -As a rule great things are expected of cavalry in the first week of -a campaign; these great things are often to be carried out _at all -costs_--all costs in this case meaning in many instances half the -horses overridden and a crop of sore backs[100] and incipient injuries -incurred which the cavalry will not get over for months after. There -is also another difficult matter to cope with in the cavalry; it is as -follows:-- - -The ordinary soldier has no idea of the limit of his horse’s capacity -for work such as that soon gained by the hunting man or traveller on -horseback. In peace-time he will not once in one thousand times be -given a task which can possibly injure or cause him to override his -horse; further, the latter invariably gets back to his stable, gets the -best of food and a rest, or goes to the sick lines if he is evidently -out of sorts; the responsibility of overriding his horse is thus not -fixed, and the man escapes any punishment. As the man is riding a -Government horse and not his own animal, he does not suffer pecuniarily. - -We believe that enough has been shown to warrant our saying that -the cavalry of an army where (1) a good system of campaigning -horse-management[101] has been instilled into the individual, and -where (2) the officers, from those who order the task to those who -superintend it, have the knowledge to do so with a sense of the horse’s -capacity as affected by work, food, and drink, weight carried, nature -of terrain, will, at the end of one month’s work, possibly have lost 15 -per cent of its horses; whereas in the cavalry where these matters are -not understood, only 15 per cent of the horses will remain available. -What was the case in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia? A statement called -for by the emperor at Witebsk on the 29th July, twenty-five days after -the river Niemen had been crossed, gave the loss as follows: Murat’s -cavalry[102] reduced from 22,000 to 14,000 horses, the cavalry of army -corps by half, Latour Maubourg’s from 10,000 to 6000. Later, on the 9th -November, only 1900 horses were left to this immense force of cavalry. -The loss by fatigue in the campaign of Ulm, lasting little more than -a fortnight, was less, 46 per regiment. One campaign resulted in a -victory within eighteen days, whereas the other went on long enough to -bring the loss and criminal waste of horses home to those responsible. -In campaigns brought to a close in a few days by desperate though -successful strategy, these matters, like many matters which occur in -small campaigns against natives, never come to notice. - -This subject has been gone into at some length under the training of -the man, because without his co-operation in the individual care of -his horse no cavalry general can hope to be successful. His best-laid -schemes “gang aft agley.” The cavalry soldier should feel that he will -get a horse, good, bad, or indifferent, accordingly as he shows himself -a good, bad, or indifferent horseman and horsemaster, and should -be made perfectly aware that he will be punished with the greatest -severity for every act of carelessness, neglect, or ill-treatment of -his horse. Whilst, on the other hand, a well-cared-for horse should be -a certain passport to the good graces of his leader. A squadron leader, -careless of this mode of procedure, never has good and well-cared-for -horses on service. - -A very successful way of teaching the soldier to care for his horse -is to let it form part of the test before he passes from the recruit -stage to that of the trained soldier, that he should by himself ride -his horse to a place 70 to 100 miles away, report on some bridge or -other topographical feature, and return, enough money being given him -for the subsistence of himself and his horse for the necessary number -of days--the condition of the latter being carefully scrutinized on his -return. - -Other forms of long-distance rides and patrols (as distinct from -long-distance races, a cruel form of competition with which no -horse-lover can have any sympathy) are most useful, as they teach the -men how to regulate their paces, spare their horses, and judge distance -by time and pace. - -Often arrangements have been made to take some N.C.O.’s out with -the regimental pack of hounds, local pack, or on a drag-hunt or -paper-chase; all these forms of instruction teach the men to ride fast -in a reasoned fashion and not in the Johnny Gilpin and “making the -running” style of the amateur horseman or horsewoman, and to think -properly of their horse, and not as the old lady, who said to the -coachman, when he had reported the brougham horse was lame, “He is a -horse and he _must go_.” - -That the care of the horse is the weak link in the cavalry chain, and -the most difficult one in which to give such instruction as may render -it strong and reliable, is clear. Every day we get fewer men accustomed -before they are recruited, to work with horses, and the use of the -horse as a means of locomotion, by all ranks in Great Britain, is -quickly dying out. Strong measures are needed to counteract our daily -growing ignorance of horsemastership.[103] - - -(C) SHOOTING AND FIRE DISCIPLINE - -The cavalry are now armed with a rifle equal to that of the infantry, -and can hold their own in rifle-shooting. The greatest interest is -taken in this exercise; tests similar in all respects to those in -vogue in the infantry are exacted before the man is entitled to get -his full rate of pay. Practically all officers and many N.C.O.’s of -cavalry now possess Hythe certificates,[104] and there is no reason -why fire discipline in the cavalry should not be equal to that in the -infantry. In many cavalry regiments it undoubtedly is so. In others -there is too much talking and the Jack ashore kind of behaviour, which -renders difficult the control of the larger parties. If the officers -recognize that good fire discipline is essential in order to kill their -enemy, they will take more trouble to instil it. As our cavalry are -undoubtedly the best shooting cavalry in the world, it is a pity to -spoil the ship for this ha’porth of tar (fire discipline). - - -(D) THE PERSONAL WEAPON - -Fencing and single stick (and other exercises such as boxing, -non-essential in themselves, but which quicken the eye and make the man -cool in combat) will do a great deal towards teaching men the use of -the sword, while a little tent-pegging and a great deal of work at the -dummies will teach the unrivalled value of the queen of weapons. - -In many cavalry training-grounds can now be seen an acre of ground in -which are a score or more of self-adjusting dummies of varying heights, -and representing horse and foot; there is no better practice than to -send half-a-dozen horsemen into this tilting ground at a sharp gallop, -and let them practise for the mêlée for a minute or so. - -The French cavalry lay great stress on these pointing exercises; they -do not expect to turn out many real swordsmen in a squadron, but they -want every man to be able to ride his horse at an enemy, and run him -through. - - -(E AND F) MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO - -In addition to the four headings mentioned above, there is the -preparation requisite to meet the hundred-and-one eventualities of -detached work and miscellaneous duties. - -Whilst it is quite impossible to foresee or delimitate these, there -are a number of exercises and sports which tend to make a young man -(and keep an old man) not only supple in his body and sound in wind -and limb, but also alert in mind: to put it shortly, they make him -more “handy,” more able when left to himself or with a few others to -carry out his duty; they give him more confidence in himself; they -make the town-bred man approximate more to the pioneer. The ordinary -lad of eighteen brought up in a town knows nothing of the country in -which his soldiering and scouting will be done, and is not able to do -a great many things which a country-bred lad has learnt as a matter of -course. On the other hand, the town-bred lad is undoubtedly quicker at -picking up and assimilating knowledge. Both have their good qualities, -and both can be made into excellent cavalry soldiers by training in the -particular points in which they are by breeding deficient.[105] - -Let us now glance at the sports which tend to make men handy and useful. - -Every cavalryman should learn to swim, since, unless he can do so, he -may either not attempt to cross a swollen river, or he may get drowned -in doing so. Not only this, but he should be able to make his horse -cross a deep and rapid river whether he can swim or not himself. Some -of us still remember the disaster to a cavalry regiment when crossing a -river on the frontier. - -Many sports and exercises--to be able to swim, to row a boat, and so -on--are not essentials in the training of a cavalryman, but they are -very desirable; and when an opportunity of practising them occurs, -every commanding officer should make his men take advantage of it. - -Again, in the _Manual of Military Engineering_ there is a great deal -which may be said to be more suited to pioneers, and a knowledge of -which cannot be expected from every cavalry soldier. Knotting and -lashing, construction of rafts, scientific demolitions of railways -and telegraph lines come under this heading. A certain number of men -in each squadron are detailed to act as pioneers, but since in most -cavalry operations there is a very good chance of these not being -available at the critical moment, it is well that every man should be -brought up to a good standard of knowledge in all forms of pioneering, -rough field fortifications, and in tapping a wire, blowing up a -culvert, etc., etc. - -Another point over which too much time must not be spent, but which is -for the benefit of the soldier, especially in his first few trying days -of active service, is a slight knowledge of cooking, and especially how -to make use of flour; otherwise you may find the men throwing away the -flour because they do not know how to cook it. The poorer classes in -Great Britain nowadays nearly all buy bread instead of making it from -flour once a week, on baking day, as in the old days. - -It will obviously be for the good of a regiment or brigade of cavalry -that it should leave its barracks for a month in the summer, and go for -choice to some seaside place where there is an estuary, and practise -exhaustively the various non-essential items of instruction indicated -above. Such a change of scene is immensely appreciated by the men, -who get very tired of barrack routine, and it gives the officers -opportunities for instruction which they do not usually possess in -barracks. - -New ground is worked over, practice in camping duties and expedients -takes place, and, last of all, there is time and opportunity to carry -out thoroughly and practically the instruction; there is time for -the men, because they are freed from many duties which are necessary -in barracks, and for the officers, because they have the whole day -before them, and do not go on leave. If a whole cavalry brigade has -gone to such a camp of instruction, the element of competition may be -introduced in many ways, which will help to stir the most sluggish. The -desire of the distinction of being the best swimming squadron in the -brigade will make his comrades hurry up many a slow, inert lout, who -could do better if he tried, and this will, indirectly, cause him to -have more confidence later in himself. - -Again, if two rival squadrons are marched down to a river, and -find, a hundred yards apart, for each squadron a similar amount of -rafting and bridging material, and instructions are given to them -to prepare means for a small column to cross the river, the interest -excited by the competition will be considerable. In a case like this -marks may be given for (1) the most thorough arrangements for the -crossing, including orders by the commanding officer; (2) the best and -most workmanlike construction of boats, rafts, etc.; (3) the speed -in carrying out the work; (4) silence; (5) tidiness, such as, for -instance, all arms, extra clothing, etc., being placed in an orderly -manner, so that they can be resumed, if necessary, after dark, or at a -moment’s notice. - -In the sands, usually to be found at any seaside place, good practice -can be gained in digging hasty field fortifications without the labour -involved in doing so in the stiffer soils. - -In the late South African War one might sum up the situation in a few -words: our regular soldiers had need to be more like colonials, and -our colonials more like regular soldiers. Some of our soldiers lost -their way a mile from camp; our colonials never did this, but their -views of military discipline were curiously lax. Our soldiers were the -victims of routine, and it cost them their lives often enough; our -colonials could hardly be trusted to lay sufficient stress on an order -to carry it out, but they were never at a loss for an expedient. Both -looked after their own interests at the expense of the enemy, or even -their own side.[106] Both were very brave; both fought and scouted -cunningly; but it came first and naturally to the colonial, who gave -his enemy credit for slimness, and had a more cultivated imagination -and better appreciation of the value of ground. In rearguards both -“stuck it out,” if anything, too long, rather than give the enemy an -idea that they could be hustled. - -It is suggested that instruction should never stop short of the actual -and practical. Few educated people are able to understand how very -little words convey to the ordinary untrained intelligence, and for how -short a time, even if understood, theory is retained in the mind.[107] - -Anything which is worth learning must be learnt as a well-known amateur -billiard player and game shot taught himself. In billiards he first -placed the balls again and again till he could make the difficult -cannon; he then went on till he could make it twenty times running. -Similarly, in regard to a difficult kind of shot, he went to a shooting -school and had clay pigeons shot out in a particular way; at length -having hit, he went on till he practically could not miss. - - -THEORY - -The theoretical instruction given by our officers to the men in -lectures benefits, we verily believe, the former quite as much as the -latter. It benefits the officer, in the first place, because it compels -him, if he is anxious to do his work well, to look up his subject -thoroughly beforehand; and in the second place, because it accustoms -him to speak in public more readily; and this may be of value not only -to him but to the army and nation later. But his instruction should -not be devoted entirely to professional subjects. It is a part of his -duty to attend to the education of his subordinates in the subject of -_moral_, and to develop by every means in his power their sentiments -of bravery, straightforwardness, confidence in their leaders, and -devotion to duty and patriotism. Without these as a foundation there -are few who will adhere to the requirements of that discipline, without -which, in the absence of religious fanaticism,[108] no difficult task -in war will be carried through. There are sound grounds for saying that -“if we examine the condition of the people we shall find that _moral_ -deteriorates in inverse proportion to advance in education.”[109] -Officers who have to deal with such conditions must not only know -how to teach thoroughly, minutely, and convincingly, but must also -study all branches of their profession in such a way that by their -intellectual ability they may earnestly and loyally interpret the true -spirit that should animate a soldier. - -In all the professions, trades, and handicrafts nowadays, with -increased facilities for reading and book-learning, theory is -overriding practice, apprenticeship is shortened or even dispensed -with, the boy of to-day has read about and thinks he understands what -the man of yesterday has been through and is still pondering over; and -it is chiefly because we see so much weight being laid on theory, to -the detriment of practice in the profession of arms, that we register -this protest. - -That we cavalry have learnt that parrot-like instruction cannot replace -demonstration is evidenced by our _Method of Instruction in Riding in -Cavalry_; in it we find first “that the instructor, after describing -fully and clearly what he requires, should _illustrate_ it,” and -later, “these instructions _carefully illustrated_ by the instructor -and understood by the recruit,” etc., etc. At present in most cavalry -regiments each squadron has a sand table, on which models of country -are made, and map-reading is taught in a most practical manner. - -The more the officers see of the men the better, and the horse gives an -invaluable mutual ground of interest. We read in _The Truth about Port -Arthur_: - - The battle for these hills was severe, and the coolness of our men - was remarkable. If any of them ran away, or if any panic set in, it - was the fault of the officers, for any officer whom the men respect - and love in peace-time can rely on their steadiness in war. - - How many Russian officers know and care for their men? For some - reason or other they rarely mix with or among them, and know - nothing of them or their habits, and bitter are the fruits they - reap in war. - -This is plain speaking, but it is in accordance with the dictates of -common-sense that the superior and inferior must become of one mind in -order to carry out their duties adequately. - -By whatever means it may be done, it is the duty of every officer to -check cynicism and grumbling amongst his subordinates, and to develop -a high _moral_. It has been said that it is the “soldier’s privilege -to grumble.” This is an absolutely wrong view; it is, instead, his -glory not to grumble, but to face every kind of danger and trouble -unflinchingly, and to make the best of it. Small worries overcome -prepare the mind for facing great emergencies.[110] - -With such a feeling throughout a regiment, what may it not do? Every -man becomes a hero and a leader. The conduct of 500 heroes may temper -the mind of an army. - - - - -INDEX - - - Abd-el-Kader, 23 - - Abdur-Rahman, 2 - - Afghan War, officers of the 9th Lancers in the, 14 - - Afghans, Sir Montague Gerard and the, 11 - - Aids, conventional, 194; - natural, 195 - - Alexander the Great, 1 - - Alexander, General, 26, 145 - - Amateur officers entirely out of place in war, 97 - - American Civil War, 73, 135 - - American view of British cavalry in South African operations, 8 - - Arab horses, a type bred for war, 23; - proverb, 52 - - Arabs’ old-world wisdom as regards the horse, 23 - - Aristocracy in the armies of the French Republic, 97 - - Armament, 10 - - Artillery fire, relative effect of, 46 - - Artillery, horse, 26, 41 - - Atlanta campaign, 149 - - Attachment to other arms on the part of officers, 159 - - Attila with his Hunnish squadrons, 2 - - _Australian Commonwealth, Manual of_, 55 - - Australians as horsemen, 13 - - - Ballistics from horseback, 5 - - Basuto pony, 21 - - Batteries of horse artillery, 5 - - Bayonet of German cavalry, 10 - - Bernhardi, Von, on bayonet, 11, 147; - cavalry literature by, 17; - _Cavalry in Future Wars_, 52, 77, 90, 94, 99, 169, 187; - _Cavalry in War and Peace_, 62, 66, 95, 208; - on fundamental principles of action, 101 - - Birch, Major Noel, 192 - - Boers, 71, 75, 82, 99, 133, 134 - - Boer system of training a horse, 197 - - Bloch, De, 5, 113 - - Blücher, 3, 85, 128 - - Bonie, Colonel, 6, 7 - - Botha, General, 75 - - “Boy Scouts,” 142 - - Brack, De, 7, 35, 37, 126, 135, 147, 171, 173 - - Brigade, the, 41-48 - - British cavalry ahead of continental cavalry in fire tactics, 17; - ignorance of horses, 18; - inflation of idea as to size of horse required, 21; - horse bred for size, speed, etc., 23 - - - Campaigning, horse-management in, 24 - - Canadians as horsemen, 13 - - Canterbury system of horse training, 196 - - Cape Colony as a source of horse-supply, 21 - - Carrago nose-band, 201 - - “Casse cou,” 87 - - Cavalry, expense of, 8; - leader, 8, 73; - brigade in action, 59; - in the general engagement, 69; - disposition of, in a campaign, 86; - masses of, 99, 109; - screen, 135; - shooting and fire discipline of, 208 - - _Cavalry Training, Manual of_, 111 - - Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 37 - - “Charge,” the, 2, 4 - - Cherfils, 69, 98 - - Chest measurement as sign of stamina of horse, 20 - - Chivalry, 2; - Norman, 2 - - Colonials in the South African War, 75 - - Competition of squadrons, 212 - - Convoy duty, 144 - - Cooking, knowledge of, 211 - - Cossacks, 75, 150; - activity of the, 135 - - Cost of horse-flesh in South African operations, 18 - - Country-bred men, 210 - - Cromwell, 3, 6, 34, 69 - - Cronje, General, 84 - - Culverwell, Professor, on teaching, 214 - - Curély, 3, 7, 134 - - Cyclists, 94, 96 - - Cynic, 143; - cynicism, 217 - - - Daumas, General, book on Arab horses by, 23 - - Delarey, 75 - - Denison on cavalry recruits, 208 - - Despatch-riding, 139 - - Detached duties of cavalry, 139 - - De Wet, raids of, 147 - - Direction of cavalry by higher leaders, 88 - - Dismounted action of cavalry, 57; - work, 11, 73, 186 - - Disposition of cavalry in a campaign, 86 - - Dissemination of squadrons, 68 - - Divisional cavalry, 91 - - Doctrine, Langlois’, 171; - Napoleon’s, 172 - - Dogger Bank, 131 - - Dragoons of Napoleon, 11 - - Drives in South Africa, 93 - - Drying tent, 125 - - Dundonald, Lord, Preface to his _Cavalry Training_, 55 - - Duty, sense of, 160 - - - Echelon attack, advantages of the, 39 - - Elliot, on the possibilities of cavalry, 6; - inspiriting regulation mentioned by, 178 - - _En bondes_, to work towards the enemy, 59 - - Enemy, in contact with the, 122 - - _Engineering, Manual of Military_, 211 - - English cavalry, 59 - - Europe, supply of food for horses when campaigning in, 21 - - Expenses in cavalry, 154, 155 - - Expensive, want of cavalry is, American view, 8 - - Exploration, cavalry of, 90 - - - Fanaticism, religious, 215 - - Field Service Regulations, 90, 94 - - Fire action in tactics, 50; - action by cavalry, German opinion on, 57; - effect, horse artillery, compared with rifle fire, 117 - - Fixed principles of the great cavalry leaders, 3 - - Flags, use of, 78 - - Flank, forming to the, 37 - - Forage supply and its carriage, 95, 96 - - Forming to the flank, 37 - - Frederick the Great, 3, 6, 90; - sayings of, 25, 105, 177; - his horses duly considered, 27; - on the rapid rallying of squadrons, 33; - success of the cavalry of, 81; - horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103; - and his officer Seydlitz, 193 - - Free-jumping lane, 198 - - French, General Sir John, 84 - - French cavalry, 7, 209; - regulations, 90, 134, 136, 159, 171 - - French dragoons in the Peninsular War, 15; - nation and the war of 1870, 7; - Republic, the armies of the, 97; - _Manuel du gradé de cavalerie_, 160, 217 - - Frossard, General, and the episode at Vionville, 73 - - - Galliffet, General, 6, 31, 88 - - Gambling spirit necessary in cavalry leader, 9 - - Gerard, Sir Montague, 11 - - German cavalry, bayonet substituted for the sword in, 10; - and the lance, 16; - rifle and fire tactics, 16; - at Loigny-Poupry, 72; - regulations, 70, 71, 79, 80, 92, 107, 109, 115, 170; - considered too weak, 95 - - German officers in the 1870 war, 139; - opinion on mounted infantry, 56; - opinion on fire action by cavalry, 57 - - Goltz, Von der, his _Nation in Arms_, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167 - - Gordon, Lindsay, poem by, 32 - - Gourko, General, his raid across the Balkans, 146 - - Grumbling--the soldier’s privilege to grumble, 217 - - Gustavus Adolphus, 3 - - - Haig, General Sir D., 35, 38, 51, 67, 71, 78, 113 - - _Haute école_, 196, 197, 203 - - Henderson, Colonel, in _Science of War_, 56, 117, 118, 128 - - Hood, General, and Wheeler’s raid, 149 - - Horse, the, 18; - Arab, 23; - in South African operations, 82; - what will the cavalry horse live on? 86; - despatch-riding, 139; - loss of many overriden, 149; - exhaustion of, 151; - Frederick the Great and his, 178; - efficiency for war in, 181; - training of the, 191 - - Horse artillery, 26, 41, 76, 78, 93, 101; - batteries of, 5; - German, 72; - and cavalry, 101; - co-operation of, with cavalry, 108; - fire effect compared with rifle fire, 117 - - Horse-management, good system of campaigning, 205; - theory of, 25, 26 - - Horse, training of the, 191; - economy in, 204 - - Hunting as an exercise for a cavalry officer, 159, 168, 197 - - Hutton, General Sir E., 55 - - - Imagination, want of, 165 - - Inaction, 61 - - Independent cavalry, 94 - - India, cavalrymen in, 184 - - Infantry attack, cavalry practising the rôle of, 57 - - _Infantry Training, Manual of_, 114 - - Information and security, the two functions of cavalry, 87-88 - - Instruction, general, 140; - theoretical, 214 - - Instructional rides, manœuvres, etc., 77 - - Irish horse, beau-ideal for cavalry, 19 - - - Japan, Emperor of, order by, 202 - - Japanese, 8, 75, 146, 149-51, 173 - - Jena, campaign of, 89 - - - Katzbach, pursuit after battle of, 85 - - Kleber, General, and cowardice, 217 - - Kraft, Prince, on cavalry dismounting, 58; - _Letters on Cavalry_, 108, 119; - on expenses of cavalry officer, 157 - - - Lance, 13, 14, 16 - - Lancers, 9th, in the Afghan War, 14 - - Langlois, General, in _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, 69, 71, 76, - 88, 102, 165, 171, 175 - - Lasalle, 3, 131, 169 - - Leading, sticky, condoned in the past, 78 - - Lewal, 78 - - Liberty of manœuvre, 98, 100 - - Lindsay Gordon, poem by, 32 - - Line of communication, raid on a, 152 - - Liubavin, General, 76 - - Lloyd’s Maxims, extract from, 179 - - Loigny-Poupry, German cavalry at, in 1870, 72 - - Lonsdale Hale, Colonel, 72 - - - McClellan, General, 145 - - Machine guns, 103, 109 - - Makarov, Admiral, 132 - - Mamelukes, 15, 193 - - Man, training of the, 202 - - Manchuria, Russians in, 7 - - Manchurian War, 75, 146 - - Map-reading, 184 - - Masses of cavalry, 99, 109; - column of, 46 - - Maude, Colonel, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, 110, 112, 148 - - May, General, _Guns and Cavalry_, 114 - - Mêlée, 14, 209 - - Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth, 112 - - Mischenko, General, 149, 150 - - Moltke, Yon, sayings of, 8, 155 - - _Moral_, 1, 5, 30, 49, 217 - - Mosby, 7 - - Mounted infantry, 56, 73, 75, 117, 205 - - Mounted infantry horse see finish of campaign, 22 - - Mukden, battle of, 110, 146 - - Murat, 3, 24, 82, 98, 141, 206 - - - Nansouty and Murat, 24 - - Napier, on sword, 14 - - Napoleon and his dragoons of 1805, 11; - the mamelukes formidable antagonists to, 15; - light cavalry horse of, 20; - in Russian campaign, 24; - his lack of consideration for the horse, 27; - maxims of, 71, 88, 122, 167; - discerns the impossibility of co-ordinating the two functions of - cavalry--information and security, 88; - horse artillery and cavalry of, 102, 103; - sayings of, 108, 112, 167, 190; - and Lasalle, 131; - information easily gained by the French cavalry for, 135; - extensive use of despatch-riders in several of his campaigns, 141; - his doctrine of _moral_, 172; - on the mamelukes, 193; - his loss of horse in the invasion of Russia, 206 - - Napoleonic era, 3 - - New Zealanders as horsemen, 13 - - Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” 84 - Napoleon’s appreciation of, 167 - - Night attack, a, 124 - - Norman chivalry, 2 - - - Officer, cavalry, the training of the, 154, 167 - - Officers, amateur, 97 - - Officers’ want of experience in horse-flesh on joining a regiment, 18 - - - Paardeberg, 82, 149 - - Pace, exercise in, 140 - - Pamirs, horse food in the, 25 - - Parthian tactics, 1, 82 - - Patriotism, 6, 97 - - Peace-time theorists, 79 - - Pelet Narbonne, Von, 111, 151 - - Peninsular War, 15, 135, 159 - - “Pepper-box” system, 93 - - Personal weapon, 209. _See also_ Armament - - Personnel, 82 - - Petersburg, 27 - - Picard, 89, 206, 214 - - “Picket the enemy,” 133 - - Picq, Ardant du, 29, 49, 80, 87, 174 - - Pioneering, every man should possess a good knowledge of, in all its - forms, 211 - - Polo-playing as an exercise for cavalry officers, 168, 197 - - Polo pony, 20, 192 - - Pompom, use of the, 68 - - Pony, the, as adjunct to squadrons, 20-21 - - Preuil, General de, 73 - - Prince Imperial, death of, in Zululand, 191 - - Principles of cavalry leading, 3 - - Prisoners, Spanish, 10,000 captured by the French, 85; - the taking of, very desirable, 128; - as a means of obtaining information, 143 - - Problems, practical, and their proposed solutions, 188 - - Protective cavalry, their duty to secure positions for infantry - columns following them, 92 - - Punchestown, training horses, 198 - - Pursuit, 83; - parallel, 84 - - - Rafts, 211 - - Raids, 145 - - Rally, the, 32; - instantaneous, 14 - - Rearguards, 1, 144, 189, 214 - - Recruits, 136, 207 - - Reich, Emil, 169 - - Rennenkampf, his reconnaissance to Kuan-tien-cheng, 150 - - Resolute offensive, 78 - - Revolver as a weapon in place of a sword, 15 - - Riding, methods of teaching, 202 - - Rifle, the, 16; - magazine, cavalry armed with, 50 - - Rifle fire compared with horse artillery fire effect, 117 - - Romer, General, 204 - - Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles, 12 - - Rozhestvenski, fleet of, 131 - - Rupert, his defeat, 34 - - Ruskin, sayings of, 25, 155 - - Russian successes in Central Asia, 7; - officers, 76, 217; - campaign of 1812, 89 - - Russians, 146, 149-51 - - - Saddles, General Romer on, 204 - - St. Cyr, General, 85 - - Samsonov, General, 8 - - Sands, seaside, digging hasty field fortifications at, 213 - - Scabbard, steel, 10 - - Schmidt, Von, his _Instructions for Cavalry_, 4, 5, 29, 33, 38, 41, - 108, 164, 177, 178 - - Scouts, 127, 130, 142 - - Section leaders, competition of, 184-185 - - Seydlitz, 3, 80, 193 - - Shaikh Sadi, sayings of, 128, 154 - - Shakespeare, 128, 167 - - Sherman, General, 149 - - Shock action, 4; - tactics, 4, 13, 52 - - Shooting of cavalry, 208 - - “Show” teams, 182 - - Small horse for war, 20; - wars distract attention from essentials, 18 - - South Africa, cost of horse-flesh in, 18; - mounting of our cavalry in, 21 - - South African War, 59, 74, 81, 97, 106, 134, 147, 161, 213; - operations, 1899-1902, erroneous conclusions from, 8 - - South Africans, 13 - - Sowars, 12 - - Spaits, Captain, 110 - - Squadron, the training of a, 177; - leader, 179-80, 200 - - Squadrons, competition of, 212 - - Stamina of horse essential, 22 - - Sticky leading, 78; - action, 80 - - Stuart, General, 145, 146 - - Swimming as an exercise for cavalrymen, 210-11 - - Sword, 10-16 - - - Tactics of Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 29 - - Tactics, Parthian, 1, 82; - Zulu, 4 - - Tax-payer of Great Britain and lessons from war, 8 - - Telissu, cavalry at battle of, 8 - - Theoretical instruction, 214 - - Tracking, etc., 141 - - - Ulm, campaign of, 98, 141; - despatch-riding in, 141 - - Union of arms, 88 - - Unison of arms, 50 - - - Verdy du Vernois on the possibilities of cavalry, 6; - on the sword, 12 - - Veterinary Department and their book, _Animal Management_, 25 - - Volley firing, 17 - - Von der Goltz, 10, 69, 93, 97, 161, 162, 167 - - - Walers (Australian), horses, bred for size, speed, etc., 23 - - Waterloo, battle of, 3 - - Weaker cavalry, rôle of, 95 - - Wellington, Duke of, 42, 185 - - Wet saddle-blankets to be carefully avoided, 204 - - Wheeler’s raid, 149 - - Wolseley, Lord, 122 - - Wood and Edmonds, their _Civil War in the United States_, 149 - - Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, 135 - - - Xenophon, advice _re_ stable management, 1; - on purchasing of horse, 23; - and Argesilaus, 208 - - - Yeomanry as a national and imperial asset, 97 - - Yinkov, raid to, 150 - - - Ziethen, 3, 80 - - Zulu tactics, 4 - - Zulus, _modus operandi_ of the, 190 - - -THE END - - -_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_ - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Blücher, two days before Waterloo and then seventy years of age, -but as hard as nails and quite indefatigable, was charging at the head -of the Treskow Brigade, when his horse fell on him and he was left at -the mercy of the French cuirassiers. Luckily he was not recognized, and -when his own side again charged, he was pulled from under his horse and -got away on that of a sergeant. - -[2] Von Schmidt, p. 229. - -[3] Von Schmidt, p. 188. - -[4] All the principal students of war of the type of Von Hoenig, -“A. A.,” Lewal, Von Schmidt, Galliffet, Kaehler, Prince Kraft, Verdy du -Vernois, Cherfils, Meckel, Waldor de Heusch, Von Schell, and others in -a minor degree, express unlimited confidence in the possibilities of -cavalry if trained according to a sufficiently high standard.--Elliot, -_Cavalry Literature_, Preface. - -To preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics -must be changed every ten years.--Colonel BONIE. - -[5] Colonel Bonie, speaking of the French cavalry before the war of -1870-71, says: “In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke -out and we were obliged to appear on the field with our old ideas and -our old mistakes.” - -[6] This is written with the reservation that experience shows that -much of the best and most useful work rendered to an army by its -cavalry is never known and certainly not recorded. The effectual -manner in which General Samsonov, after the battle of Telissu, checked -pursuit, held off, and at the same time kept touch with the Japanese -for three weeks or more, is dismissed in a few lines of history. - -[7] An American, writing in 1899, delivered the following prophecy: -“Cavalry may be an expensive arm to organize, equip, and subsist, -but if it comes to a matter of dollars and cents the security of the -British Army in recent reverses would have been worth a million times -what an effective cavalry screen might have cost. From the moral -effect of the recent defeats the war in South Africa is expected -to cost the British Government between 100 million and 300 million -dollars.” Later he adds: “Let not our legislators forget in the coming -reorganization of our army the importance, nay the economy in money and -lives which cannot be measured by money, of maintaining an adequate -force of cavalry. Cavalry cannot be made in a month from militia. The -transformation process is slow. Given brave and fearless men, well-bred -horses, expert marksmen, improved arms and equipments, it is not -necessarily cavalry. Training is necessary and training takes time, but -when war begins, time is the one element which is most in demand.” - -[8] A cavalry reformer, writing sixty or more years ago, says: “What is -the use of trying to get the authorities to abolish the steel scabbard, -when no attention was paid to a similar request fifty years ago?” - -[9] _Cavalry in War and Peace_, p. 175. - -[10] Though it is said that the Afghans point very effectively by means -of an upward prod. - -[11] _Leaves from the Diary of a Soldier and Sportsman_, p. 256. - -[12] _Studies in Troop Leading_, p. 196, _note_. - -[13] For the very good reason that they possessed nothing better for -the purpose. - -[14] The disadvantages of the lance, that it is conspicuous in detached -and scouting work and is in the way to some extent on dismounted work, -are defects easily got over. - -[15] _The Campaign of Fredericksburg_, p. 129. - -[16] It has been remarked that in Napoleon’s army the light cavalry, -though they did more work, lost fewer horses than the heavy cavalry. -This is attributed to the horses being better bred. - -[17] Most interesting deductions are to be found in General Daumas’s -book, _The Horses of the Sahara_, in which conversations with the -celebrated Chief Abd-el-Kader are related. - -[18] Von Schmidt, p. 72. But by cohesion is not meant that the men -are to be jammed together, for this only produces disorder, men being -forced out of their places, the number of ranks increased. - -[19] The reader who desires full information, examples, and proof of -this well-ascertained fact should consult Colonel Ardant du Picq’s -book, one of the most interesting military works ever written and one -constantly referred to by French writers on cavalry. - -[20] Von Schmidt’s _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 159. The great -Frederick attached the greatest importance to the rapid rallying of -squadrons from the most complete confusion. “It must be impressed upon -the Hussar that he must be most attentive to the sound ‘Appell,’ on -hearing which each man will join his squadron and rank with the utmost -rapidity possible,” etc. And again: _N.B._--“His Majesty will most -particularly observe that the squadrons learn to rally rapidly.” And -also p. 77: “An acknowledged authority on our army says: ‘That cavalry -remains master of the field and gains the victory which can most -quickly rally and reform.’” - -[21] _Cromwell_, by Captain P. A. Charrier, p. 11: “After Rupert’s -defeat Cromwell rallied and re-formed ready for the next job at hand. -The pursuit of Rupert’s troopers was entrusted to the smallest fraction -sufficient to do the work efficiently.... After each attack he re-forms -quickly and in good order ready for the next effort ... attacks the -royal infantry.... Towards the end of the battle he is rallied and -ready to meet yet another effort; ready to meet Lucas and Goring’s -squadrons.” - -[22] “The rally after an action, mounted or dismounted, and against an -enemy mounted or dismounted, requires careful thinking out and constant -practice. During peace training, operations are rarely worked out to a -logical conclusion, and too often cease with a final charge; so that -the problem is not faced of what is to happen _after_ the enemy has -been routed, or the position captured or galloped through, or what is -to happen should the attack fail.”--General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on -the Cavalry Divisional Training_, 1909, p. 14. - -[23] De Brack, Chapter on Charges, p. 252. - -[24] Acrimonious discussion with officers of other branches of the -service as to their relative powers is to be deprecated as not -conducive to “the unison of arms.” Good cavalry will beat bad infantry, -and _vice versa_. An officer of artillery or infantry should believe -that he and his men cannot be ridden over so long as they keep -steady and in good heart, whilst a cavalry officer should, on the -contrary, believe that he and his men can ride over anything. These -two propositions, speaking in a logical sense, it is impossible to -bring into agreement. Officers on the staff and general officers have -by their training risen superior to the petty jealousies between the -various arms; but experience shows that this can never be the case -throughout the army. - -[25] _Cavalry in Future Wars_, Von Bernardi, page 115: “It is never -permissible to wait until driven into action by superior commands, but -one must always endeavour to reap, on one’s own initiative, the utmost -possibilities the situation holds out.” - -[26] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 97: “Let us consider -them (mounted infantry) next in the fight. They attack like infantry -and leave their horses some way behind them. How easily could these -groups of horses, held by a few men, be scattered by some squadrons of -cavalry. But the squadrons, it is said, will be checked by the fire of -dismounted men. To begin with, this will mean so many less carbines in -the firing line. But can these moderate or at most ordinary shots--for -they are not Boers--stop a resolute charge? Will it not be sufficient -in any case to dismount a few men with carbines and so contain the few -dismounted men who have to defend these herds of horses? And if needs -be, would not fire alone be good enough to disperse the troops of -riderless animals and reduce the men who are fighting some way off on -foot to infantry without valises, without food, and soon even without -cartridges?” And on page 98: “Does this mean that cavalry are never to -use their carbines? No one has, I believe, and no one ever will, uphold -such a theory. Improvements in firearms have rendered this particular -weapon more and more useful, one may even say indispensable. Its -employment has become more frequent and more justified in every phase -of the engagement.” - -[27] In Germany it is held that mounted infantry cannot hold the field -against a highly trained cavalry, for sooner or later they would be -caught when in the saddle, and then before they had time to dismount -and fire it would be all over with them (Elliot, p. 31). - -[28] The sword in its scabbard may be put through the shoulder cord, -and so down the back and through the belt. - -[29] A lesson taught us by our South African experiences, of which -there is a danger of our losing sight, is the possible result of -bringing large bodies of troops in close formation under the effective -fire of modern guns and rifles. - -[30] I altogether disagree with General von Bernardi where he says, p. -157, _Cavalry in War and Peace_: “It is at the same time advisable that -a specially detailed cavalry escort should be _dismounted_ for this -object.” - -[31] This is still more applicable in the fight of the cavalry -division, since two horse artillery brigades in action occupy a front -of 475 yards, and once the guns are in position the direction in which -this front faces can only be altered to any appreciable extent by -limbering up. - -[32] General Sir D. Haig’s _2nd Staff Ride_, p. 11: “With a force of -greater strength than half a squadron, defiles should never be passed -at a faster pace than the trot in order that each unit of the force -may keep well closed up and the column be not unduly lengthened. After -passing through, deployment should be made at a gallop so as to make -room for units in rear.” - -[33] The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too -long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of -this question. - -[34] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_. Speaking of the -battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry _received no orders_, and -did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six -squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction -have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the -generalissimo against the cavalry arm? - -[35] Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, _Nation in Arms_: “It is not sufficient -to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior -authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes -unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be -allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of -the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were -formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the -tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day, -to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce -the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently -required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of -the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance -with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be -clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with -perfect clearness to the cavalry.” - -_German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more -distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they -must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the -event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be -the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also -section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R. - -[36] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle -decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile -attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.” - -Also see p. 33 of the _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, by General -Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground -to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is -drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which -the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature. - -[37] See Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, where the greatest -stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops -on the battlefield. - -[38] [This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale -Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, _Journal of R.U.S.I._] - -It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly -belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside -the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the -cavalry. - -[39] There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at -Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil -to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the -charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all -lost.” - -[40] The cavalry attack _en route_ to the relief of Kimberley and -several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons -into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the -part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as -happened in these cases, decamp. - -[41] “The greatest error that the Russians made before even the -outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course -of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their -opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could -not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a -sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European -Russia--guards and dragoons--for the theatre of war in Asia. Only -three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and -52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps -area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army -leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their -best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved -by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the -Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in -thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...” -etc., etc.--Supplement No. 86, _Internationale Revue über die gesammten -Armeen und Flotten_. - -[42] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 81: “The cavalry should -be forward and sideward to the line of battle.” - -[43] General Sir D. Haig’s _Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride_, p. -33: “The main lessons are that the cavalry leader must be in close -communication with the commander-in-chief, that the staff and all -leaders must be carefully prepared for this kind of work, and the -troops trained to take advantage of ground.” - -[44] Ardant du Picq gives an account of how two parties of infantry, -suddenly meeting each other as they advanced over a hill-crest, _both_ -turned and ran away. - -[45] Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” found riding alone in rear of the -retreating French army, was asked, “Where is the rearguard?” “I am the -rearguard,” was the reply. - -[46] After the action at the bridge of El Rey, St. Cyr sent his cavalry -in pursuit of the Spanish forces who were making for the defiles of -Montserrat. The French cavalry, gaining ground at a gallop on the left -flank of the column of fugitives, took up a position at the entrance to -the defile, and captured the whole of the enemy’s supplies and baggage -as well as 10,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns. - -[47] “Casse cou,” a rare plant, and much smothered in Great Britain -in the twenty-five years previous to the South African War with the -inevitable effect. - -[48] Un corps de réserve de cavalerie qui devait, à la fois, éclairer, -couvrir et seconder l’armée.--Picard, vol. i. p. 257. - -[49] In the campaign of Jena, 1806, the Prussian cavalry still -maintained the Ziethen and Seydlitz tradition; they were well horsed, -well trained, and extraordinarily exact in their evolutions; but -the squadrons were mixed up with infantry divisions by groups of -ten squadrons, and commanded by the aged lieutenants of the Great -Frederick, still living on the traditions of their youthful successes. -Direction was entirely wanting in the disposition of the cavalry, -though it is said that at no time was military literature in a more -flourishing condition than in the years following the death of -Frederick the Great, and mathematical science was especially held in -honour. - -[50] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 32 of Goldman’s -translation. - -[51] Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future War_, p. 28. - -[52] In a well-reasoned article on “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War” -in the _Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten_, it -is said: “So it is seen that in this war it has been proved once again, -and that to a high degree, that nothing great can be accomplished -with improvisations of cavalry, and that cavalry, especially when -incorporated in divisions, if it wishes to be led to high aims, cannot -be stamped out of the ground immediately before great events.” - -[53] Von der Goltz, _The Nation in Arms_, p. 168, says: “The armies of -the French Republic numbered many members of the highest aristocracy -in the lower ranks, and there was no lack of intelligence, but it was -an undisciplined intelligence wanting in uniform training--hence also -an absence of unity of action. This latter is guaranteed by certain -principles being engrafted into the flesh and blood of the commanders -of troops by teaching and practice. The idea of utilizing our numerical -superiority and the efficiency of our troops in a vigorous and rapid -offensive pervaded all our minds, this principle having been imbibed -with the very air of our military school. If such discipline of the -intelligence exists, the commander may, with composure, leave much to -the initiative of the individual.” - -[54] Nor does the effect of the victory of masses end there. “It -intensifies and invigorates the sense of superiority in individual -combats, and is essential if the patrols are to carry out their duties -in the true cavalry spirit.”--Von Bernardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, -p. 31. - -[55] Extract from Von Pelet Narbonne’s _Lectures on and Cavalry Lessons -from the Manchurian War_. - -[56] A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day, -What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on -my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these -questions, he is ill-posted and should seek to remedy it.--Napoleon’s -Maxims, No. 8. - -[57] In continuous heavy rain one tent should be made into a “drying” -tent by putting a fire on a stone fireplace in it, and thus bringing -the heat up to 120°, to 130°, or more. The wettest clothes hung up in -it will dry in about twenty minutes. - -[58] Blücher on one occasion shouted to a tottering regiment: “You -scoundrels, do you then want to live for ever?” - -[59] Napoleon considered it necessary, in 1807, to write to Lasalle as -follows: “Be very careful to send out frequent reconnoitring parties, -but do not let them go out each day by the same way and at the same -time, and return in similar fashion, _so that what happened to you at -Wischau occurs again_”! - -[60] The French cavalry regulations state that between the service of -_sûreté_ and exploration in the cases of small forces ill-provided -with cavalry, the line is not drawn so clearly as in the case of large -forces with their normal establishment of cavalry.--_Service de la -cavalerie en campagne_, p. 58. - -[61] Wrangel, in _Cavalry in the Japanese War_, puts tersely the true -line to take:--“The idea of a thin cavalry screen surrounding their own -army for protection against view of the enemy is very fallacious. An -energetic enemy, full of enterprise, will easily pierce this thin web -with his scouts. Only an active screen can be of any use, which really -in practice is no longer a screen only, but is coincident with the true -offensive reconnaissance. He who advances regardlessly into the hostile -reconnaissance zone, and attacks the cavalry detachments of the enemy -with determination wherever they are found, gives the death-blow to the -information apparatus of the enemy. His patrols and detachments robbed -of these supports are soon useless. They, like their reports, only in -the fewest cases are able to reach their destination.” - -[62] A regulation in the French army is as follows: “One of the most -important missions on which young officers should be sent is the -conduct of reconnaissance of discovery. Opportunity should be taken to -give them practice in this, by sending them to reconnoitre the movement -of troops of another garrison. These exercises where the officer stays -out for two or three days at the head of his troop are extremely -useful.”--_Service de la cavalerie_, p. 190. - -[63] Plain English words should always be used, if possible, in -instruction. - -[64] Curély, in 1812, at Pultusk, with 100 men of the 20th Chasseurs, -captured from the enemy twenty pieces of artillery, and took the -general-in-chief of the Russian army a prisoner. - -[65] Maude, _Cavalry: Its Past and Future_, p. 185. - -[66] The Atlanta Campaign, p. 389 of Wood and Edmonds’ _Civil War in -the United States_. - -[67] Undoubtedly the press wrote against the cavalry and the medical -departments far more than against other arms and departments during the -late South African War. Both have made great progress since the war. -_Sic itur ad astra!_ - -[68] True nobility is seen in the reply of Von Moltke, who, asked -why he was so economical, as far as his person was concerned, whilst -generous to others, replied, that it was in the hope that the officers -of the army might be persuaded to follow his example, for that he knew -how many families grudged themselves all possible luxuries to keep -their sons in their position of officers of the army. “The less a man -requires the greater he is,” he added. - -[69] We like to call to mind Ruskin’s saying in _The Future of -England_: “Riches, so far from being necessary to _noblesse_, are -adverse to it. So utterly that the first character of all the nobility, -who have founded past dynasties in the world, is to be poor; poor -often by oath, always by generosity, and of every true knight in the -chivalric age the first thing that history tells you is that he never -kept treasure himself.” - -[70] Prince Kraft points out how great a price a German officer pays -for the swagger of belonging to a cavalry regiment. He enlarges on the -trials to health entailed thereby, the long work in the riding school, -with the shakes and jars given to the bowels and spine, which in many -cases have sown the seeds of chronic illness, even during their first -year of service as lieutenants, owing to which some of them have been -invalided before their time. Then he goes on to point out the expenses -entailed by good chargers and their upkeep. Finally, he says that in -the German cavalry in no regiment can an officer live unless he can -afford to pay £100 a year out of his own pocket, and so he reckons that -a cavalry officer before he has twenty years’ service has expended -£2000, that is, has sacrificed that sum to the Fatherland. - -[71] The French rightly lay stress on ability to cross an intricate -country. Their _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, p. 191, says: “To -ride hard across country and particularly over a steeplechase course is -an excellent preparation for reconnaissance work. An officer accustomed -to long gallops, not only at ordinary, but also at racing pace, may -defy pursuit by one who has not had the same experience of leaping, and -especially of leaping at full speed, and of the powers of his horse.” - -Our British cavalry officers had justly a great reputation for their -abilities in this respect in the Peninsular War. - -[72] After a sharp fight one day in South Africa, a colonial officer -remarked to his column commander, “We did not think there would be -anything on to-day, because you were wearing your slacks and riding the -black horse!” The column commander felt, though he did not acknowledge, -the justice of the remark. - -[73] In _Before Port Arthur in a Torpedo Boat_ the Japanese officer -reflects: “Is there any situation which can happen for which I and my -men have not been practised?” - -[74] Cf. Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 144: “The manner -in which troops are to be employed in the different situations which -arise must be left to the initiative of those in command in every -degree of rank.” - -[75] _Germany’s Swelled Head_, p. 165. - -[76] Note the strong measures which Lasalle, one of Napoleon’s best -cavalry leaders, is said to have taken at Pultusk in 1807. His brigade -was about to attack the Russian artillery, and about 2 P.M. had hardly -advanced twenty paces before the cry of “Halt!” was heard and at once -passed down the line without any one knowing where it had started. -The two regiments turned and began to retire at a gallop, though the -Russian guns had not fired a shot. Rallied after seven or eight minutes -and brought back, their brigadier-general, in a furious rage, kept -them in line until midnight under the enemy’s fire. So heavy was this -that the general had two horses killed under him. Men and horses fell -at every minute, but it is said not a man stirred, nor was a murmur -heard.--PICARD. - -[77] On one occasion in the operations in South Africa, 1899-1902, -a troop, ordered to gallop a kopje, halted at 700 yards from it, -dismounted, and began to shoot; a troop of a rival corps was at once -sent to gallop through them and did what they had been told to do--took -the kopje; a salutary and effective lesson. - -Another time a squadron attacking was held up by wire whilst under -fire, and began to come back; another squadron was led at a gallop -through them. The irresolute squadron at once turned and followed -them. The art is to loose the support at the right moment and with due -emphasis. - -[78] _German Cavalry Regulations_, 1909, par. 398. - -[79] The French _Service de la cavalerie en campagne_, 1909, at page -190, thus lays down the rôle of the commanding officer: “To direct -his officers towards a common doctrine, that of resolves which are -determined, even rash, but well considered; to develop in them -initiative and personality, and to make them not merely carriers-out -of orders, but leaders who know how to reflect, decide, and take -responsibility on themselves.” - -[80] Supplement No. 86 to the _International Revue über die gesammten -Armeen und Flotten_, May 1907. - -[81] Curély, the hero of countless brave deeds and daring -reconnaissances in Napoleon’s campaigns, had by 1814 got as far as -the command of a regiment, the 10th Hussars. On the 12th February at -Château-Thierry he got an opportunity, and successfully threw his -regiment at the flank of thirty squadrons of Landwehr. This gave an -opportunity to Letort with the Dragoons of the Guard to charge the -front. Napoleon in his bulletin only put: “Colonel Curély made himself -conspicuous”; but he at once promoted him to the rank of general for -this feat of arms. - -[82] Langlois, _Lessons from Two Recent Wars_, p. 70. - -[83] Von Schmidt, _Instructions for Cavalry_, p. 7. - -[84] Von Schmidt, p. 227. - -[85] _Ibid._ p. 73. - -[86] _Ibid._ p. 13. - -[87] Every manœuvre which is not founded upon the nature of the ground -is absurd and ridiculous.--Lloyd’s Maxims. - -[88] The tests in map-reading for a field officer for tactical fitness -for command and for a cavalry trooper for service pay were at one time -almost identical. - -[89] There is an additional reason for this, in that, if one horse -refuses, the next two or three who have seen him do so will probably do -the same. Horses are extremely impressionable. - -[90] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Future Wars_, p. 90. - -[91] Taking an instance which comes to mind: a troop of cavalry on -outpost duty at Colesberg found themselves cut off at dawn by some 500 -Boers; instantly they rode at the enemy, and, with small loss and doing -some execution with their lances, came out. - -[92] The cavalry soldier is often required to perform independent -duties and penetrate far into the enemy’s lines under conditions -entailing danger and hardship. He should, therefore, not only be brave, -strong, and determined, but also intelligent, enthusiastic, deliberate, -and calm. He must be able to act on his own initiative in accordance -with the orders he receives and the situation of the moment. His horse -is the cavalryman’s best weapon. The soldier should prize his horse -more than his own body, and thus in an emergency he will be able to -rely without fail upon this weapon. It is only when the foregoing -qualities have been acquired by training and experience in the field -that a man can call himself a true cavalry soldier.--_Japanese, Cavalry -Drill Regulations_, 1907, 44 (trans.). - -[93] For practical riding, however, turning on the forehand is not -advocated. - -[94] At the same time these natural movements are not all that we -demand of a horse; we must therefore add the proviso that with the -weight of a rider on the horse’s back, some of the natural turns, and -twists, and bearings can be, and need be, improved on. For instance, -by means of the bit and legs, we pull a polo pony on to his haunches, -and then turn him with the snaffle in order that on slippery ground we -may save a slip, slide, or fall, which would very probably occur if we -let him turn on the forehand in his own natural and easiest way. Nor -does every horse, as he moves along at the walk, trot, or gallop, or as -he jumps, necessarily do so in the best or safest way; he will often -slouch, as we would describe it in a man, in doing so. We then use the -aid of bit, leg, spur, or whip to make him go up to his bit, which -we know by experience is a better fashion than his natural mode of -carrying himself. - -Many a slack rider has let his horse, when he was wearily plodding his -way home after a long day’s hunting, fall and break his knees; whereas, -if the animal had been well balanced by the strong pressure of the legs -and warning spurs, and light hand on the curb, of a good and alert -horseman, he would have reached home safely. - -[95] The Boer system of training a horse not to fall in the antbear and -porcupine holes was to put a native on the animal and lunge it where -there were nests of these holes. - -[96] The pose, however, of decrying _haute école_ methods is a totally -mistaken one. The finest all-round horsemen in the world are the -masters of _haute école_, whilst some of the worst horsemen are the -butchering hard-riders to hounds, who bunch up their reins in their -mutton fists, and hold on by them till their mount stops pulling and -going. They are little better than, though of another class to, the -viceroy who said to his A.D.C., “Don’t talk to me now; don’t you see I -am busy riding?” - -[97] _Cavalry Journal_, July 1910. - -[98] Experience shows that the noisiest instructors are almost -invariably the worst; they are usually trying to appeal by means of -their lungs to the rider’s ears instead of demonstrating their meaning -by an appeal to his sense of sight. - -[99] The material common-sense changes made in regard to the comfort, -amusements, health, and pay of the cavalryman, in common with the other -arms, is one of the most marked advances in the army of to-day. - -[100] General Romer, after the American Civil War, wrote as follows: -“Bad saddles destroy more horses than are lost in action.” - -It is certain that _wet_ horse blankets put on under a saddle will -give more sore backs in one day’s march than will occur in a month of -ordinary marching. - -[101] It has been said that “it is a peace theory that mounted infantry -are as good as trained cavalry; it is a war fact that their ignorance -of horse-management makes them five times as costly at the commencement -of a war.” However that may be, we know that under first-rate officers, -a proportion of whom have since joined the cavalry to its advantage, -there was exemplary horse-management in some corps of mounted infantry, -not only in the late South African War of 1899-1902 but long ago in the -eighties. - -[102] Picard, _Cavalry of the Revolution and Empire_, vol. ii. p. 94. - -[103] “The idea of drawing cavalry recruits from the best -horse-breeding districts,” says Denison, “is not original. Zenophon -says that Argesilaus did so” (p. 41). It is certain that our best -cavalry soldiers come from Ireland now. - -[104] Von Bernhardi, _Cavalry in Peace and War_, p. 273, says, -speaking of German cavalry: “In the cavalry there is a want of trained -instruction, and most regiments are even reduced to borrowing infantry -under-officers and officers to assist in their musketry training, who -are then also employed to teach the rudiments of the cavalry fight.” - -[105] The Japanese realize how far strength and activity go to make up -for the unsuitability of the race for cavalry work, and from the moment -a recruit enters barracks, every effort is made to render him active -and energetic.--_Education and Training of the Japanese Divisional -Cavalry_, p. 13. - -[106] Les Hussards étaient d’ailleurs les maraudeurs par excellence; -ils se sentaient encore de leur premier recrutement. On respectait ce -penchant des troupes légères pour leur donner plus de mordant dans la -poursuite à laquelle elles se trouvaient ainsi plus particulièrement -intéressées.--Picard, _La Cavalerie dans les guerres de la Revolution -et de l’Empire_, p. 201. - -[107] “In teaching it is not sufficient for the teacher to express -clearly what he means--the words may be to him quite clear, but the -real question is, are they clear to the pupil, do they put his mind -into a condition in which he follows and grasps the idea that the -teacher would emphasize?”--Professor Culverwell on the Herbartian -Psychology. - -[108] May not a trace of this religious fanaticism, however, be seen in -the letter of an Irish soldier, who wrote home during the South African -War of 1899-1902 as follows:-- - -“Dear mother, we are having a lovely time of it, shooting Protestants -all day long, and no one to stop us.” - -[109] This view was expressed in 1907 by the commander of the 1st -Japanese cavalry regiment. - -[110] General Kleber, when his men, overcome by fatigue, refused to -move a step farther, called them cowards. As they protested that they -were at any rate always brave in a fight, he replied, “Yes, you are -brave men, but you are not soldiers. To be a soldier is not to eat when -you are hungry, not to drink when you are thirsty, and to carry your -comrade when you cannot drag yourself along.”--_Manuel du gradé de -cavalerie._ - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Some illustrations were moved closer to the text that referenced them. - -The spelling of non-English words was not checked. - -Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references. - -In the Table of Contents, one of the page numbers for Chapter IX was -missing and the other was incorrect. Both remedied here. - -Page 84: Transcriber added a closing quotation mark at the end of the -paragraph ending with “a crossing of the Modder River.” - -Footnote 62, originally on page 136: Transcriber added a closing -quotation mark after “troop are extremely useful.” - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Our Cavalry, by M. F. 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