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diff --git a/old/53264-0.txt b/old/53264-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 706cdde..0000000 --- a/old/53264-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29600 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of A History of the Peninsula war, Vol. I -1807-1809, by Charles Oman - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: A History of the Peninsula war, Vol. I 1807-1809 - From the Treaty of Fontainbleau To the Battle of Corunna - -Author: Charles Oman - -Release Date: October 12, 2016 [EBook #53264] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULA *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, readbueno, Ramon Pajares Box, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE - - * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps - are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS. - - * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected. - - * Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made - consistent when a predominant usage was found. - - * To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and - documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names - follow: - - Aguilar del Campo, now Aguilar de Campóo, - Albuquerque, now Alburquerque, - Alcaniz, now Alcañiz, - Alemtejo, now Alentejo, - Aljafferia, now Aljafería, - Aljubarotta, now Aljubarrota, - Almanza, now Almansa, - Ampurdam, now Ampurdán, - Arens de Mar, now Arenys de Mar, - Arguelles, now Argüelles, - Baylen, now Bailén, - Bergara, now Vergara, - Bidassoa, now Bidasoa, - Biscay, now Vizcaya, - Busaco, now Buçaco, - Cacabellos, now Cacabelos, - Cascaes, now Cascais, - Castro Gonzalo, now Castrogonzalo, - Compostella, now Compostela, - Constantino, now Constantín (Baralla, Lugo), - Cordova or Cordoue, now Córdoba, - Corunna, now La Coruña, - Despeña Perros, now Despeñaperros, - Elvina, now Elviña, - Estremadura, now Extremadura (for Spain), - Estremadura (for Portugal), - Freneda, now Freineda, - Gihon, now Gijón, - Guadalaviar (river), now Turia, - Guarraman, now Guarromán, - Huerba (river), now Huerva, - La Baneza, now La Bañeza, - Liñares, now Linares, - Loxa, now Loja, - Mulhaçen, now Mulhacén, - Nava (river), now Navia, - Noguera (river), now Noguera Ribagorzana, - Oña (river), now Oñar, - Pallaresa (river), now Noguera Pallaresa, - Pampeluna, now Pamplona, - Penilla, now Pinilla, - Peñas de Europa, now Picos de Europa, - Pezo-de-Ragoa, now Peso da Régua, - Porcuña, now Porcuna, - Praganza, now Pregança, - Puycerda, now Puigcerdá, - Requeña, now Requena, - Reynosa, now Reinosa, - San Estevan del Puerto, now Santisteban del Puerto, - Sanguesa, now Sangüesa, - Saragossa, now Zaragoza, - Setuval, now Setúbal, - Siguenza, now Sigüenza, - Tagus, now Tajo, - Tajuna, now Tajuña, - Toreño, now Toreno, - Truxillo, now Trujillo, - Valdestillos, now Vasdestillas, - Valmaceda, now Valmaseda, - Vellimar, now Villímar, - Vierzo, now Bierzo, - Vincente, now Vicente, - Vittoria, now Vitoria, - Zornoza, now Amorebieta-Echano. - - * Some maps and illustrations have been moved so that they do not - break up paragraphs and lie near the text they illustrate. Their - page numbers in the Lists of Maps and Portraits have been modified - accordingly. - - * Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote - is placed at the end of the paragraph that includes its anchor. - - * In p. 53, the anchor placement for footnote 54 is conjectured. - None found in the printed original. - - - - - [Illustration: - CARLOS IIII. - _REY DE ESPAÑA._] - - - - - A HISTORY OF THE - PENINSULAR WAR - - BY - CHARLES OMAN, M.A. - - FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE - AND DEPUTY-PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY (CHICHELE) - IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - - VOL. I - - 1807-1809 - - FROM THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU - TO THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA - - WITH MAPS, PLANS AND PORTRAITS - - [Illustration] - - - OXFORD - AT THE CLARENDON PRESS - 1902 - - - - - HENRY FROWDE, M.A. - PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - LONDON, EDINBURGH - NEW YORK - - - - -PREFACE - - -It is many years since an attempt has been made in England to deal -with the general history of the Peninsular War. Several interesting -and valuable diaries or memoirs of officers who took part in the -great struggle have been published of late[1], but no writer of the -present generation has dared to grapple with the details of the whole -of the seven years of campaigning that lie between the _Dos Mayo_ -and Toulouse. Napier’s splendid work has held the field for sixty -years. Meanwhile an enormous bulk of valuable material has been -accumulating in English, French, and Spanish, which has practically -remained unutilized. Papers, public and private, are accessible whose -existence was not suspected in the ’thirties; an infinite number of -autobiographies and reminiscences which have seen the light after fifty -or sixty years of repose in some forgotten drawer, have served to fill -up many gaps in our knowledge. At least one formal history of the first -importance, that of General Arteche y Moro, has been published. I fancy -that its eleven volumes are practically unknown in England, yet it is -almost as valuable as Toreño’s _Guerra de la Independencia_ in enabling -us to understand the purely Spanish side of the war. - - [1] I need only mention the diaries of Sir Harry Smith, Blakeney, - Shaw, and Tomkinson on our side, and Foy’s private diary and the - Memoirs of Fantin des Odoards, St. Chamans, and Thiébault on the - French. - -I trust therefore that it will not be considered presumptuous for one -who has been working for some ten or fifteen years at the original -sources to endeavour to summarize in print the results of his -investigations; for I believe that even the reader who has already -devoted a good deal of attention to the Peninsular War will find a -considerable amount of new matter in these pages. - -My resolve to take in hand a general history of the struggle was -largely influenced by the passing into the hands of All Souls College -of the papers of one of its most distinguished fellows, the diplomatist -Sir Charles Vaughan. Not only had Vaughan unique opportunities for -observing the early years of the Peninsular War, but he turned them -to the best account, and placed all his observations on record. -I suppose that there was seldom a man who had a greater love for -collecting and filing information. His papers contain not only his -own diaries and correspondence, but an infinite number of notes made -for him by Spanish friends on points which he desired to master, and -a vast bulk of pamphlets, proclamations, newspapers, and tables of -statistics, carefully bound together in bundles, which (as far as I -can see) have not been opened between the day of his death and that -on which they passed, by a legacy from his last surviving relative, -into the possession of his old college. Vaughan landed at Corunna in -September, 1808, in company with Charles Stuart, the first English -emissary to the Central Junta. He rode with Stuart to Madrid and -Aranjuez, noting everything that he saw, from Roman inscriptions to -the views of local Alcaldes and priests on the politics of the day. -He contrived to interview many persons of importance--for example, -he heard from Cuesta’s own lips of his treasonable plot to overthrow -the Junta, and he secured a long conversation with Castaños as to -the Capitulation of Baylen, from which I have extracted some wholly -new facts as to that event. He then went to Aragon, where he stayed -three weeks in the company of the Captain-General Joseph Palafox. -Not only did he cross-question Palafox as to all the details of his -famous defence of Saragossa, but he induced San Genis (the colonel -who conducted the engineering side of the operations) to write him a -memorandum, twelve pages long, as to the character and system of his -work. Vaughan accompanied Palafox to the front in November, but left -the Army of Aragon a day before the battle of Tudela. Hearing of the -disaster from the fugitives of Castaños’s army, he resolved to take -the news to Madrid. Riding hard for the capital, he crossed the front -of Ney’s cavalry at Agreda, but escaped them and came safely through. -On arriving at Madrid he was given dispatches for Sir John Moore, -and carried them to Salamanca. It was the news which he brought that -induced the British general to order his abortive retreat on Portugal. -Moore entrusted to him not only his dispatch to Sir David Baird, -bidding him retire into Galicia, but letters for Lord Castlereagh, -which needed instant conveyance to London. Accordingly Vaughan rode -with headlong speed to Baird at Astorga, and from Astorga to Corunna, -which he reached eleven days after his start from Tudela. From thence -he took ship to England and brought the news of the Spanish disasters -to the British Ministry. - -Vaughan remained some time in England before returning to Spain, but -he did not waste his time. Not only did he write a short account -of the siege of Saragossa, which had a great vogue at the moment, -but he collected new information from an unexpected source. General -Lefebvre-Desnouettes, the besieger of Saragossa, arrived as a prisoner -in England. Vaughan promptly went to Cheltenham, where the Frenchman -was living on parole, and had a long conversation with him as to the -details of the siege, which he carefully compared with the narrative -of Palafox. Probably no other person ever had such opportunities for -collecting first-hand information as to that famous leaguer. It will -please those who love the romantic side of history, to know that -Vaughan was introduced by Palafox to Agostina, the famous ‘Maid of -Saragossa,’ and heard the tale of her exploit from the Captain-General -less than three months after it had occurred. The doubts of Napier and -others as to her existence are completely dissipated by the diary of -this much-travelled Fellow of All Souls College. - -Vaughan returned to Spain ere 1809 was out, and served under various -English ambassadors at Seville and Cadiz for the greater part of the -war. His papers and collections for the later years of the struggle are -almost as full and interesting as those for 1808 which I have utilized -in this volume. - -I have worked at the Record Office on the British official papers of -the first years of the war, especially noting all the passages which -are omitted in the printed dispatches of Moore and other British -generals. The suppressed paragraphs (always placed within brackets -marked with a pencil) contain a good deal of useful matter, mainly -criticisms on individuals which it would not have been wise to publish -at the time. There are a considerable number of intercepted French -dispatches in the collection, and a certain amount of correspondence -with the Spaniards which contains facts and figures generally unknown. -Among the most interesting are the letters of General Leith, who was -attached to the head quarters of Blake; in them I found by far the best -account of the operations of the Army of Galicia in Oct.-Nov., 1808, -which I have come upon. - -As to printed sources of information, I have read all the Parliamentary -papers of 1808-9, and the whole file of the _Madrid Gazette_, as well -as many scores of memoirs and diaries, French, English, and Spanish. -I think that no important English or French book has escaped me; -but I must confess that some of the Spanish works quoted by General -Arteche proved unprocurable, both in London and Paris. The British -Museum Library is by no means strong in this department; it is even -short of obvious authorities, such as the monographs of St. Cyr and -of Cabanes on the War in Catalonia. The memoirs of the Peninsular -veterans on both sides often require very cautious handling; some -cannot be trusted for anything that did not happen under the author’s -eye. Others were written so long after the events which they record, -that they are not even to be relied upon for facts which must have been -under his actual observation. For example, General Marbot claims that -he brought to Bayonne the dispatch from Murat informing Napoleon of -the insurrection of Madrid on May 2, and gives details as to the way -in which the Emperor received the news. But it is absolutely certain, -both from the text of Murat’s letter and from Napoleon’s answer to it, -that the document was carried and delivered by a Captain Hannecourt. -The aged Marbot’s memory had played him false. There are worse cases, -where an eye-witness, writing within a short time of the events which -he describes, gives a version which he must have known to be incorrect, -for the glorification of himself or some friend. Thiébault and Le -Noble are bad offenders in this respect: Thiébault’s account of some -of the incidents in Portugal and of the combat of Aldea del Ponte, Le -Noble’s narrative of Corunna, seem to be deliberately falsified. I have -found one English authority who falls under the same suspicion. But -on both sides the majority of the mistakes come either from writers -who describe that which did not pass under their own eyes, or from -aged narrators who wrote their story twenty, thirty, or forty years -after the war was over. Their diaries written at the time are often -invaluable correctives to their memoirs or monographs composed after -an interval; e.g. Foy’s rough diary lately published by Girod de l’Ain -contains some testimonials to Wellington and the British army very much -more handsomely expressed than anything which the General wrote in his -formal history of the early campaigns of 1808. - -I hope to insert in my second volume a bibliography of all the works -useful for the first two years of the war. The inordinate size to which -my first volume has swelled has made it impossible to include in it a -list of authorities, which covers a good many pages. - -It will be noticed that my Appendices include several extensive tables, -giving the organization of the French and Spanish armies in 1808. -For part of them I am indebted to General Arteche’s work; but the -larger half has been constructed at great cost of time and labour from -scattered contemporary papers--from returns to be found in the most -varied places (some of the most important Spanish ones survive only in -the Record Office or in Vaughan’s papers, others only in the _Madrid -Gazette_). No one, so far as I know, had hitherto endeavoured to -construct the complete table of the Spanish army in October, or of that -of the exact composition of Napoleon’s ‘grand army’ in the same month. -I hope my Appendices therefore may be found of some use. - -More than one friend has asked me during the last few months whether -it is worth while to rewrite the history of the Peninsular War when -Napier’s great work is everywhere accessible. I can only reply that I -no more dream of superseding the immortal six volumes of that grand -old soldier, than Dr. S. R. Gardiner dreamed of superseding Clarendon’s -_History of the Great Rebellion_ when he started to write the later -volumes of his account of the reign of Charles I. The books of Napier -and Clarendon must remain as all-important contemporary narratives, -written by men who saw clearly one aspect of the events which they -describe; in each the personal element counts for much, and the -political and individual sympathies and enmities of the historian have -coloured his whole work. No one would think of going to Clarendon for -an unprejudiced account of the character and career of Oliver Cromwell. -But I do not think that it is generally realized that it is just as -unsafe to go to Napier for an account of the aims and undertakings of -the Spanish Juntas, or the Tory governments of 1808-14. As a narrator -of the incidents of war he is unrivalled: no one who has ever read them -can forget his soul-stirring descriptions of the charge of the Fusilier -brigade at Albuera, of the assault on the Great Breach at Badajoz, or -the storming of Soult’s positions on the Rhune. These and a hundred -other eloquent passages will survive for ever as masterpieces of -vigorous English prose. - -But when he wanders off into politics, English or Spanish, Napier is -a less trustworthy guide. All his views are coloured by the fact that -he was a bitter enemy of the Tories of his own day. The kinsman not -only of Charles James Fox, but of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, he could -never look with unprejudiced eyes on their political opponents. Canning -and Spencer Perceval were in his ideas men capable of any folly, any -gratuitous perversity. Castlereagh’s splendid services to England -are ignored: it would be impossible to discover from the pages of -the _Peninsular War_ that this was the man who picked out Wellington -for the command in Spain, and kept him there in spite of all manner -of opposition. Nor is this all: Napier was also one of those strange -Englishmen who, notwithstanding all the evidence that lay before them, -believed that Napoleon Bonaparte was a beneficent character, thwarted -in his designs for the regeneration of Europe by the obstinate and -narrow-minded opposition of the British Government. In his preface, he -goes so far as to say that the Tories fought the Emperor not because -he was the dangerous enemy of the British Empire, but because he -was the champion of Democracy, and they the champions of caste and -privilege. When the tidings of Napoleon’s death at St. Helena reached -him (as readers of his _Life_ will remember), he cast himself down on -his sofa and wept for three hours! Hence it was that, in dealing with -the Tory ministries, he is ever a captious and unkind critic, while -for the Emperor he displays a respect that seems very strange in an -enthusiastic friend of political liberty. Every one who has read the -first chapters of his great work must see that Bonaparte gets off with -slight reproof for his monstrous act of treachery at Bayonne, and for -the even more disgusting months of hypocritical friendship that had -preceded it. While pouring scorn on Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, the -silly father and the rebellious son, whose quarrels were the Emperor’s -opportunity, Napier forgets to rise to the proper point of indignation -in dealing with the false friend who betrayed them. He almost writes -as if there were some excuse for the crimes of robbery and kidnapping, -if the victim were an imbecile or a bigot, or an undutiful son. The -prejudice in favour of the Emperor goes so far that he even endeavours -to justify obvious political and military mistakes in his conduct of -the Peninsular War, by throwing all the blame on the way in which his -marshals executed his orders, and neglecting to point out that the -orders themselves were impracticable. - -On the other hand, Napier was just as over-hard to the Spaniards as -he was over-lenient to Bonaparte. He was one of those old Peninsular -officers who could never dismiss the memory of some of the things that -he had seen or heard. The cruelties of the Guerillas, the disgraceful -panic on the eve of Talavera, the idiotic pride and obstinacy of -Cuesta, the cowardice of Imaz and La Peña, prejudiced him against -all their countrymen. The turgid eloquence of Spanish proclamations, -followed by the prosaic incapacity of Spanish performance, sickened -him. He always accepts the French rather than the Spanish version -of a story, forgetting that Bonaparte and his official writers were -authorities quite as unworthy of implicit credence as their opponents. -In dealing with individual Spaniards--we may take for example Joseph -Palafox, or the unfortunate Daoiz and Velarde--he is unjust to the -extreme of cruelty. His astounding libel on La Romana’s army, I have -had occasion to notice in some detail on page 416 of this work. -He invariably exaggerates Spanish defeats, and minimizes Spanish -successes. He is reckless in the statements which he gives as to their -numbers in battle, or their losses in defeat. Evidently he did not -take the trouble to consult the elaborate collection of morning-states -of armies and other official documents which the Spanish War Office -published several years before he wrote his first volume. All his -figures are borrowed from the haphazard guesses of the French marshals. -This may seem strong language to use concerning so great an author, -but minute investigation seems to prove that nearly every statement of -Napier’s concerning a battle in which the Spaniards were engaged is -drawn from some French source. The Spaniards’ version is ignored. In -his indignation at the arrogance and obstinacy with which they often -hampered his hero Wellington, he refuses to look at the extenuating -circumstances which often explain, or even excuse, their conduct. -After reading his narrative, one should turn to Arguelles or Toreño or -Arteche, peruse their defence of their countrymen, and then make one’s -ultimate decision as to facts. Every student of the Peninsular War, in -short, must read Napier: but he must not think that, when the reading -is finished, he has mastered the whole meaning and importance of the -great struggle. - -The topographical details of most of my maps are drawn from the -splendid Atlas published by the Spanish War Office during the last -twenty years. But the details of the placing of the troops are my own. -I have been particularly careful in the maps of Vimiero and Corunna to -indicate the position of every battalion, French or English. - - -I am in duty bound to acknowledge the very kind assistance of three -helpers in the construction of this volume. The first compiled the -Index, after grappling with the whole of the proofs. The second, Mr. -C. E. Doble, furnished me with a great number of suggestions as to -revision, which I have adopted. The third, Mr. C. T. Atkinson, of -Exeter College, placed at my disposition his wide knowledge of British -regimental history, and put me in the way of obtaining many details as -to the organization of Wellesley’s and Moore’s armies. I am infinitely -obliged to all three. - - C. OMAN. - - ALL SOULS COLLEGE, - _March 31, 1902_. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - SECTION I - NAPOLEON AND THE SPANISH BOURBONS - - CHAPTER PAGE - I. The Treaty of Fontainebleau 1 - II. The Court of Spain 12 - III. The Conquest of Portugal 26 - IV. The French aggression in Spain: Abdication of Charles IV 33 - V. The Treachery at Bayonne 43 - VI. The Second of May: Outbreak of the Spanish Insurrection 57 - - - SECTION II - THE LAND AND THE COMBATANTS - - I. Military geography of the Peninsula: Mountains, Rivers, - Roads 72 - II. The Spanish Army in 1808 89 - III. The French Army in Spain 103 - IV. The tactics of the French and their adversaries during the - Peninsular War 114 - - - SECTION III - SARAGOSSA AND BAYLEN - - I. Opening of hostilities: the French Invasions of Andalusia - and Valencia 123 - II. Operations in the North: the siege of Saragossa 140 - III. Operations in the North: battle of Medina de Rio Seco 163 - IV. Dupont in Andalusia: the Capitulation of Baylen 176 - - - SECTION IV - THE ENGLISH IN PORTUGAL - - I. The outbreak of the Portuguese Insurrection 206 - II. Landing of the British: combat of Roliça 220 - III. Vimiero 242 - IV. The Convention of Cintra 263 - V. The French evacuate Portugal 279 - VI. The Court of Inquiry 291 - - - SECTION V - THE STRUGGLE IN CATALONIA - - I. Duhesme’s operations: first siege of Gerona (June-July, - 1808) 301 - II. The struggle continued: the second siege of Gerona - (July-August, 1808) 322 - - - SECTION VI - THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAYLEN - - I. The French retreat to the Ebro 334 - II. Creation of the ‘Junta General’ 342 - III. The ‘Junta General’ in Session 354 - IV. An episode in the Baltic 367 - - - SECTION VII - NAPOLEON’S INVASION OF SPAIN - - I. French and Spanish preparations 376 - II. The preliminary fighting: arrival of Napoleon 391 - III. The misfortunes of Joachim Blake: Zornoza and Espinosa - de los Monteros 402 - IV. Napoleon crosses the Ebro: the rout of Gamonal: Soult’s - pursuit of Blake 417 - V. Tudela 431 - VI. Passage of the Somosierra: Napoleon captures Madrid 450 - - - SECTION VIII - THE CAMPAIGN OF SIR JOHN MOORE - - I. Napoleon at Madrid 473 - II. Moore at Salamanca 486 - III. Moore’s advance to Sahagun 513 - IV. Napoleon’s pursuit of Moore: Sahagun to Astorga 539 - V. Soult’s pursuit of Moore: Astorga to Corunna 559 - VI. The battle of Corunna 583 - - - APPENDICES - - I. Godoy’s Proclamation of Oct. 5, 1806 603 - II. The Treaty of Fontainebleau 604 - III. Papers relating to the ‘Affair of the Escurial’ 606 - IV. Abdication of Charles IV 607 - V. The Spanish Army in 1808 607 - VI. The first French ‘Army of Spain’ 612 - VII. Papers relating to the Treachery at Bayonne 616 - VIII. Papers relating to the Capitulation of Baylen 618 - IX. Papers relating to the Convention of Cintra 625 - X. List of Members of the Central Junta 630 - XI. The Spanish Armies, Oct.-Nov. 1808 631 - XII. The second French ‘Army of Spain’ 640 - XIII. The Army of Sir John Moore, its strength and its losses 646 - - - INDEX 649 - - - MAPS - - 1. MADRID 60 - 2. SARAGOSSA 160 - 3. MEDINA DE RIO SECO 168 - 4. ANDALUSIA AND BAYLEN 184 - 5. VIMIERO 249 - 6. CATALONIA 304 - 7. NORTHERN SPAIN 384 - 8. ESPINOSA 413 - 9. TUDELA 435 - 10. CORUNNA 584 - LARGE MAP OF SPAIN _At end of volume_ - - - PORTRAITS - - CHARLES IV _Frontispiece_ - MARIA LUISA QUEEN OF SPAIN 17 - MANUEL GODOY, PRINCE OF THE PEACE 41 - - -NOTE - -The coins on the binding of the book are--the first a half-dollar of -the last issue of Charles IV, the second a siege-piece struck at Gerona -in 1808. That on the title-page is a peseta struck at Valencia, with a -patriotic legend on the reverse, RENUEVA VAL. SU JURAM. SELLADO CON SU -SANGRE. - - - - -SECTION I - -NAPOLEON AND THE SPANISH BOURBONS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU - - -‘I am not the heir of Louis XIV, I am the heir of Charlemagne,’ wrote -Napoleon, in one of those moments of epigrammatic self-revelation -which are so precious to the students of the most interesting epoch -and the most interesting personality of modern history[2]. There are -historians who have sought for the origins of the Peninsular War far -back in the eternal and inevitable conflict between democracy and -privilege[3]: there are others who--accepting the Emperor’s own version -of the facts--have represented it as a fortuitous development arising -from his plan of forcing the Continental System upon every state in -Europe. To us it seems that the moment beyond which we need not search -backward was that in which Bonaparte formulated to himself the idea -that he was not the successor of the greatest of the Bourbons, but of -the founder of the Holy Roman Empire. It is a different thing to claim -to be the first of European monarchs, and to claim to be the king of -kings. Louis XIV had wide-reaching ambitions for himself and for his -family: but it was from his not very deep or accurate knowledge of -Charlemagne that Napoleon had derived his idea of a single imperial -power bestriding Europe, of a monarch whose writ ran alike at Paris and -at Mainz, at Milan and at Hamburg, at Rome and at Barcelona, and whose -vassal-princes brought him the tribute of all the lands of the Oder, -the Elbe, and the middle Danube[4]. - - [2] He works out the idea in his letter to Talleyrand of May 16, - 1806. - - [3] Such is the main thesis of chapter I of Napier’s _Peninsular - War_. - - [4] It is curious to note how often the name of Charlemagne - occurs in Napoleon’s letters during the early months of 1806. It - is especially common in his correspondence about the relations of - the Papacy and the Empire. - -There is no need for us to trace back the growth of Napoleon’s -conception of himself as the successor of Charlemagne beyond the winter -of 1805-6, the moment when victorious at Austerlitz and master for -the first time of Central Europe, he began to put into execution his -grandiose scheme for enfeoffing all the realms of the Continent as -vassal states of the French Empire. He had extorted from Francis of -Austria the renunciation of his meagre and time-worn rights as head -of the Holy Roman Empire, because he intended to replace the ancient -shadow by a new reality. The idea that he might be Emperor of Europe -and not merely Emperor of the French was already developed, though -Prussia still needed to be chastised, and Russia to be checked and -turned back on to the ways of the East. It was after Austerlitz but -before Jena that the foundations of the Confederation of the Rhine -were laid[5], and that the Emperor took in hand the erection of that -series of subject realms under princes of his own house, which was to -culminate in the new kingdom of Spain ruled by ‘Joseph Napoleon the -First.’ By the summer of 1806 the system was already well developed: -the first modest experiment, the planting out of his sister Eliza and -her insignificant husband in the duchy of Lucca and Piombino was now -twelve months old. There had followed the gift of the old Bourbon -kingdom of Naples to Joseph Bonaparte in February, 1806, and the -transformation of the Batavian Republic into Louis Bonaparte’s kingdom -of Holland in June. The Emperor’s brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, had -been made Grand-Duke of Berg in March, his sister, Pauline, Duchess -of Guastalla in the same month. It cannot be doubted that his eye was -already roving all round Europe, marking out every region in which the -system of feudatory states could be further extended. - - [5] The negotiations for the Confederation were completed in - July, and it was formally constituted on Aug. 1, 1806. - -At the ill-governed realms of Spain and Portugal it is certain that he -must have taken a specially long glance. He had against the house of -the Bourbons the grudge that men always feel against those whom they -have injured. He knew that they could never forgive the disappointed -hopes of 1799, nor the murder of the Duc d’Enghien, however much they -might disguise their sentiments by base servility. What their real -feelings were might be guessed from the treacherous conduct of their -kinsmen of Naples, whom he had just expelled from the Continent. -The Bourbons of Spain were at this moment the most subservient and -the most ill-used of his allies. Under the imbecile guidance of his -favourite Godoy, Charles IV had consistently held to the league with -France since 1795, and had thereby brought down untold calamities upon -his realm. Nevertheless Napoleon was profoundly dissatisfied with -him as an ally. The seventy-two million francs of subsidies which he -was annually wringing from his impoverished neighbour seemed to him -a trifle. The chief gain that he had hoped to secure, when he goaded -Spain into war with England in 1804, had been the assistance of her -fleet, by whose aid he had intended to gain the control of the narrow -seas, and to dominate the Channel long enough to enable him to launch -his projected invasion against the shores of Kent and Sussex. But the -Spanish navy, always more formidable on paper than in battle, had -proved a broken reed. The flower of its vessels had been destroyed at -Trafalgar. There only remained in 1806 a few ships rotting in harbour -at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Ferrol, unable even to concentrate on account -of the strictness of Collingwood’s blockade. Napoleon was angry at his -ally’s impotence, and was already reflecting that in hands more able -and energetic than those of Charles IV Spain might give aid of a very -different kind. In after years men remembered that as early as 1805 he -had muttered to his confidants that a Bourbon on the Spanish throne -was a tiresome neighbour--too weak as an ally, yet dangerous as a -possible enemy[6]. For in spite of all the subservience of Charles IV -the Emperor believed, and believed quite rightly, that a Bourbon prince -must in his heart loathe the unnatural alliance with the child of the -Revolution. But in 1806 Bonaparte had an impending war with Prussia on -his hands, and there was no leisure for interfering in the affairs of -the Peninsula. Spain, he thought, could wait, and it is improbable -that he had formulated in his brain any definite plan for dealing with -her. - - [6] See, for example, the very interesting story told by Marshal - Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ (p. 9) of the long conversation which - the emperor had with him at Verona on June 16, 1805: ‘Tant pour - l’affermissement de ma dynastie que pour la sûreté de France,’ - concluded Napoleon, ‘un Bourbon sur le trône d’Espagne est un - voisin trop dangereux.’ - -The determining factor in his subsequent action was undoubtedly -supplied in the autumn of 1806 by the conduct of the Spanish government -during the campaign of Jena. There was a moment, just before that -decisive battle had been fought, during which European public opinion -was expecting a check to the French arms. The military prestige of -Prussia was still very great, and it was well known that Russia had not -been able to put forth her full strength at Austerlitz. Combined it -was believed that they would be too much for Napoleon. While this idea -was still current, the Spanish king, or rather his favourite Godoy, -put forth a strange proclamation which showed how slight was the bond -of allegiance that united them to France, and how hollow their much -vaunted loyalty to the emperor[7]. It was an impassioned appeal to the -people of Spain to take arms _en masse_, and to help the government -with liberal gifts of men, horses and money. ‘Come,’ it said, ‘dear -fellow countrymen, come and swear loyalty beneath the banners of the -most benevolent of sovereigns.’ The God of Victories was to smile on a -people which helped itself, and a happy and enduring peace was to be -the result of a vigorous effort. It might have been pleaded in defence -of Charles IV that all this was very vague, and that the anonymous -enemy who was to be crushed might be England. But unfortunately for -this interpretation, three whole sentences of the document are filled -with demands for horses and an instant increase in the cavalry arm -of the Spanish military establishment. It could hardly be urged with -seriousness that horsemen were intended to be employed against the -English fleet. And of naval armaments there was not one word in the -proclamation. - - [7] For the full text of this bombastic appeal see Appendix, No. - I. Godoy speaks throughout in his own name, not in that of his - master. - -This document was issued on Oct. 5, 1806: not long after there arrived -in Madrid the news of the battle of Jena and the capture of Berlin. -The Prince of the Peace was thunderstruck at the non-fulfilment of -his expectations and the complete triumph of Napoleon. He hastened to -countermand his armaments, and to shower letters of explanation and -apology on the Emperor, pointing out that his respected ally could -not possibly have been the ‘enemy’ referred to in the proclamation. -That document had reached Napoleon on the very battle-field of Jena, -and had caused a violent paroxysm of rage in the august reader[8]. -But, having Russia still to fight, he repressed his wrath for a -moment, affecting to regard as satisfactory Godoy’s servile letters -of explanation. Yet we can hardly doubt that this was the moment at -which he made up his mind that the House of Bourbon must cease to -reign in Spain. He must have reflected on the danger that southern -France had escaped; a hundred thousand Spaniards might have marched -on Bordeaux or Toulouse at the moment of Jena, and there would have -been no army whatever on the unguarded frontier of the Pyrenees to -hold them in check. Supposing that Jena had been deferred a month, -or that no decisive battle at all had been fought in the first stage -of the struggle with Prussia, it was clear that Godoy would have -committed himself to open war. A stab in the back, even if dealt with -no better weapon than the disorganized Spanish army, must have deranged -all Napoleon’s plans, and forced him to turn southward the reserves -destined to feed the ‘Grand Army.’ It was clear that such a condition -of affairs must never be allowed to recur, and we should naturally -expect to find that, the moment the war of 1806-7 was ended, Napoleon -would turn against Spain, either to dethrone Charles IV, or at least to -demand the dismissal from office of Godoy. He acknowledged this himself -at St. Helena: the right thing to have done, as he then conceded, would -have been to declare open war on Spain immediately after Tilsit[9]. - - [8] ‘Je jurai dès lors qu’ils me la paieraient, que je les - mettrais hors d’état de me nuire,’ said Napoleon to De Pradt, - eighteen months later (_Mémoires sur la Révolution d’Espagne_, p. - 16). The archbishop’s story is amply borne out by the repeated - allusions to this unhappy proclamation in Napoleon’s official - justification of his conduct in Spain. The Spanish ambassador at - Berlin, Don Benito Pardo, was told by Napoleon at the time that - he had forgiven the Proclamation, but could not forget it. - - [9] _Correspondance de Napoléon_, xxxii. 59. - -After eight years of experience of Bonaparte as an ally, the rulers -of Spain ought to have known that his silence during the campaigns of -Eylau and Friedland boded them no good. But his present intentions -escaped them, and they hastened to atone for the proclamation of -Oct. 5 by a servile obedience to all the orders which he sent them. -The most important of these was the command to mobilize and send -to the Baltic 15,000 of their best troops [March, 1807]. This was -promptly done, the depleted battalions and squadrons being raised to -war-strength, by drafts of men and horses which disorganized dozens -of the corps that remained at home[10]. The reason alleged, the fear -of Swedish and English descents on the rear of the Grand Army, was -plausible, but there can be no doubt that the real purpose was to -deprive Spain of a considerable part, and that the most efficient, of -her disposable forces. If Godoy could have listened to the interviews -of Napoleon and Alexander of Russia at Tilsit, he would have been -terrified at the offhand way in which the Emperor suggested to the -Czar that the Balearic Isles should be taken from Spain and given to -Ferdinand of Naples, if the latter would consent to cede Sicily to -Joseph Napoleon[11]. To despoil his allies was quite in the usual -style of Bonaparte--Godoy cannot have forgotten the lot of Trinidad -and Ceylon--but he had not before proposed to tear from Spain, not a -distant colony, but an ancient province of the Aragonese crown. The -project was enshrined in the ‘secret and supplementary’ clauses of the -Treaty of Tilsit, which Napoleon wished to conceal till the times were -ripe. - - [10] The demand was made in the most peremptory fashion, and - in almost threatening language. Napoleon writes to Talleyrand - that the Spanish division in Tuscany, which was to form part of - the expeditionary corps, must march in twenty-four hours after - receiving its orders. ‘If they refuse, everything is at an end,’ - a most sinister phrase (Napoleon to Talleyrand, March 25, 1807). - - [11] This was Article IV of the Seven ‘Secret Articles’ of the - Treaty of Tilsit. See for this proposal the notes in Vandal’s - _Napoléon et Alexandre Ier_, vol. i. - -It was only when Bonaparte had returned to France from his long -campaign in Poland that the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula began to -come seriously to the front. The Emperor arrived in Paris at the end -of July, 1807, and this was the moment at which he might have been -expected to produce the rod, for the chastisement which the rulers of -Spain had merited by their foolish proclamation of the preceding year. -But no sign of any such intention was displayed: it is true that early -in August French troops in considerable numbers began to muster at -Bayonne[12], but Bonaparte openly declared that they were destined to -be used, not against Spain, but against Portugal. One of the articles -of the Peace of Tilsit had been to the effect that Sweden and Portugal, -the last powers in Europe which had not submitted to the Continental -System, should be compelled--if necessary by force--to adhere to it, -and to exclude the commerce of England from their ports. It was natural -that now, as in 1801, a French contingent should be sent to aid Spain -in bringing pressure to bear on her smaller neighbour. With this idea -Godoy and his master persisted in the voluntary blindness to the signs -of the times which they had so long been cultivating. They gave their -ambassador in Lisbon orders to act in all things in strict conjunction -with his French colleague. - - [12] The first notice of the ‘Corps of Observation of the - Gironde’ is to be found in a dispatch of Masserano, the Spanish - ambassador at Paris, dated July 30, which gives notice of the - approaching concentration at Bayonne. But the quiet movement of - troops in this direction had begun long before the Russian war - was over. - -On August 12, therefore, the representatives of Spain and France -delivered to John, the Prince-Regent of Portugal (his mother, Queen -Maria, was insane), almost identical notes, in which they declared that -they should ask for their passports and leave Lisbon, unless by the -first of September the Regent had declared war on England, joined his -fleet to that of the allied powers, confiscated all British goods in -his harbours, and arrested all British subjects within the bounds of -his kingdom. The prince, a timid and incapable person, whose only wish -was to preserve his neutrality, answered that he was ready to break -off diplomatic relations with England, and to close his ports against -British ships, but that the seizure of the persons and property of the -British merchants, without any previous declaration of war, would be -contrary to the rules of international law and morality. For a moment -he hoped that this half-measure would satisfy Napoleon, that he might -submit to the Continental System without actually being compelled to -declare war on Great Britain. But when dispatches had been interchanged -between the French minister Rayneval and his master at Paris, the -answer came that the Regent’s offer was insufficient, and that the -representatives of France and Spain were ordered to quit Lisbon at -once. This they did on September 30, but without issuing any formal -declaration of war. - -On October 18, the French army, which had been concentrating at Bayonne -since the beginning of August, under the harmless name of the ‘Corps of -Observation of the Gironde,’ crossed the Bidassoa at Irun and entered -Spain. It had been placed under the orders of Junot, one of Napoleon’s -most active and vigorous officers, but not a great strategist after the -style of Masséna, Soult, or Davoust. He was a good fighting-man, but a -mediocre general. The reason that he received the appointment was that -he had already some knowledge of Portugal, from having held the post -of ambassador at Lisbon in 1805. He had been promised a duchy and a -marshal’s bâton if his mission was carried out to his master’s complete -satisfaction. - -It is clear that from the first Napoleon had intended that Portugal -should refuse the ignominious orders which he had given to the -Prince-Regent. If he had only been wishing to complete the extension of -the Continental System over all Southern Europe, the form of obedience -which had been offered him by the Portuguese government would have -been amply sufficient. But he was aiming at annexation, and not at -the mere assertion of his suzerainty over Portugal. The fact that he -began to mass troops at Bayonne before he commenced to threaten the -Regent is sufficient proof of his intentions. An army was not needed -to coerce the Portuguese: for it was incredible that in the then -condition of European affairs they would dare to risk war with France -and Spain by adhering too stiffly to the cause of England. The Regent -was timid and his submission was certain; but Napoleon took care to -dictate the terms that he offered in such an offensive form that the -Portuguese government would be tempted to beg for changes of detail, -though it sorrowfully accepted the necessity of conceding the main -point--war with England and the acceptance of the Continental System. -The Prince-Regent, as might have been expected, made a feeble attempt -to haggle over the more ignominious details, and then Napoleon withdrew -his ambassador and let loose his armies. - -Shortly after Junot had crossed the Bidassoa there was signed at -Fontainebleau the celebrated secret treaty which marks the second -stage of the Emperor’s designs against the Peninsula. It was drawn up -by Duroc, Napoleon’s marshal of the palace, and Eugenio Izquierdo, -the agent of Godoy. For the official ambassador of Spain in Paris, -the Prince of Masserano, was not taken into the confidence of his -master[13]. All delicate matters were conducted by the favourite’s -private representative, an obscure but astute personage, the director -of the Botanical Gardens at Madrid, whose position was legitimized by -a royal sign-manual giving him powers to treat as a plenipotentiary -with France. ‘Manuel is your protector: do what he tells you, and by -serving him you serve me,’ the old king had said, when giving him his -commission. - - [13] Talleyrand declares in his _Mémoires_ (i. 349) that Napoleon - kept Champagny, his own minister of foreign affairs, in equal - darkness. - -The Treaty of Fontainebleau is a strange document, whose main purpose, -at a first glance, seems to be the glorification of Godoy. It is -composed of fourteen articles[14], the most important of which contain -the details of a projected dismemberment of Portugal. The country was -to be cut up into three parts. Oporto and the northern province of -Entre-Douro-e-Minho were to become the ‘Kingdom of Northern Lusitania,’ -and to be ceded to a Bourbon, the young King of Etruria, whom Napoleon -was just evicting from his pleasant abode at Florence. All Southern -Portugal, the large province of Alemtejo and the coast region of -Algarve, was to be given as an independent principality to Godoy, under -the title of ‘Prince of the Algarves’[15]. The rest of Portugal, Lisbon -and the provinces of Beira, Estremadura and Tras-os-Montes were to be -sequestrated till the conclusion of a general peace, and meanwhile were -to be governed and administered by the French. Ultimately they were to -be restored, or not restored, to the house of Braganza according as the -high contracting parties might determine. - - [14] See the text in Appendix, No. II. - - [15] In the curious exculpatory memoirs which Godoy published - in 1835-6, with the aid of d’Esménard, he endeavours to make - out that he never desired the principality, and that Napoleon - pressed it upon him, because he wished to remove him from about - the person of Charles IV. ‘The gift of the principality of the - Algarves was a banishment’ (i. 54). This plea will not stand - in the face of the fact that Godoy had solicited just such - preferment as far back as the spring of 1806; see Arteche, - _Guerra de la Independencia_, i. 148. His real object was to - secure a place of refuge at the death of Charles IV. - -Instead therefore of receiving punishment for his escapade in the -autumn of 1806, Godoy was to be made by Napoleon a sovereign prince! -But Spain, as apart from the favourite, got small profit from this -extraordinary treaty: Charles IV might take, within the next three -years, the pompous title of ‘Emperor of the Two Americas,’ and was to -be given some share of the transmarine possessions of Portugal--which -meanwhile (treaties or no) would inevitably fall into the hands of -Great Britain, who held the command of the seas, while Napoleon did not. - -It is incredible that Bonaparte ever seriously intended to carry out -the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau: they were not even to be -divulged (as Article XIV stipulated) till it was his pleasure. Godoy -had deserved badly of him, and the Emperor was never forgiving. The -favourite’s whole position and character (as we shall presently show) -were so odious and disgraceful, that it would have required an even -greater cynicism than Napoleon possessed, to overthrow an ancient and -respectable kingdom in order to make him a sovereign prince. To pose -perpetually as the regenerator of Europe, and her guardian against -the sordid schemes of Britain, and then to employ as one’s agent for -regeneration the corrupt and venal favourite of the wicked old Queen of -Spain, would have been too absurd. Napoleon’s keen intelligence would -have repudiated the idea, even in the state of growing autolatry into -which he was already lapsing in the year 1807. What profit could there -be in giving a kingdom to a false friend, already convicted of secret -disloyalty, incapable, disreputable, and universally detested? - -But if we apply another meaning to the Treaty of Fontainebleau we -get a very different light upon it. If we adopt the hypothesis that -Bonaparte’s real aim was to obtain an excuse for marching French -armies into Spain without exciting suspicion, all its provisions -become intelligible. ‘This Prince of the Peace,’ he said in one of his -confidential moments, ‘this mayor of the palace, is loathed by the -nation; he is the rascal who will himself open for me the gates of -Spain[16].’ The phantom principality that was dangled before Godoy’s -eyes was only designed to attract his attention while the armies of -France were being poured across the Pyrenees. It is doubtful whether -the Emperor intended the project of the ‘Principality of the Algarves’ -to become generally known. If he did, it must have been with the -intention of making the favourite more odious than he already was to -patriotic Spaniards, at the moment when he and his master were about -to be brushed away by a sweep of the imperial arm. That Napoleon was -already in October preparing other armies beside that of Junot, and -that he purposed to overrun Spain when the time was ripe, is shown in -the Treaty itself. Annexed to it is a convention regulating the details -of the invasion of Portugal: the sixth clause of this paper mentions -that it was the emperor’s intention to concentrate 40,000 more troops -at Bayonne--in case Great Britain should threaten an armed descent on -Portugal--and that this force would be ready to cross the Pyrenees by -November 20. Napoleon sent not 40,000 but 100,000 men, and pushed them -into Spain, though no English invasion of Portugal had taken place, or -even been projected. After this is it possible to believe for a moment -in his good faith, or to think that the Treaty of Fontainebleau was -anything more than a snare? - - [16] ‘Le Prince de la Paix, véritable maire du palais, est en - horreur à la nation. C’est un gredin qui m’ouvrira lui-même les - portes de l’Espagne’ (Fouché, _Mémoires_, i. 365). - -Those who could best judge what was at the back of the emperor’s mind, -such as Talleyrand and Fouché, penetrated his designs long before the -treaty of Fontainebleau had been signed. Talleyrand declares in his -memoirs[17] that the reason for which he was deprived of the portfolio -of Foreign Affairs in August, 1807, was that he had disliked the scheme -of invading Spain in a treacherous fashion, and warned his master -against it. No improbability is added to this allegation by the fact -that Napoleon at St. Helena repeatedly stated that Talleyrand had -first thought of the idea, and had recommended it to him ‘while at -the same time contriving to set an opinion abroad that he was opposed -to the design.’ On the other hand, we are not convinced of the Prince -of Benevento’s innocence merely by the fact that he wrote in his -autobiography that he was a strenuous opponent of the plan. He says -that the emperor broached the whole scheme to him the moment that he -returned from Tilsit, asseverating that he would never again expose -himself to the danger of a stab in the back at some moment when he -might be busy in Central Europe[18]. He himself, he adds, combated the -project by every possible argument, but could not move his master an -inch from his purpose. This is probably true; but we believe it not -because Talleyrand wrote it down--his bills require the endorsement of -some backer of a less tarnished reputation--but because the whole of -the Spanish episode is executed in the true Napoleonesque manner. Its -scientific mixture of force and fraud is clearly the work of the same -hand that managed the details of the fall of the Venetian Republic, and -of the dethroning of Pope Pius VII. It is impossible to ascribe the -plot to any other author. - - [17] Talleyrand, _Mémoires_, i. 308-329. - - [18] Ibid., i. 378, 379. - - - - -SECTION I: CHAPTER II - -THE COURT OF SPAIN - - -Junot’s army was nearing the Portuguese frontier, and the reserve at -Bayonne was already beginning to assemble--it was now styled ‘the -Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde’--when a series of startling -events took place at the Spanish Court. On October 27, the very day -that the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed, Ferdinand, Prince of the -Asturias, was seized by his father and thrown into confinement, on a -charge of high treason, of having plotted to dethrone or even to murder -his aged parent. This astonishing development in the situation need -not be laid to Napoleon’s charge. There have been historians who think -that he deliberately stirred up the whole series of family quarrels at -Madrid: but all the materials for trouble were there already, and the -shape which they took was not particularly favourable to the Emperor’s -present designs. They sprang from the inevitable revolt against the -predominance of Godoy, which had long been due. - -The mere fact that an incapable upstart like Godoy had been able to -control the foreign and internal policy of Spain ever since 1792 is a -sufficient evidence of the miserable state of the country. He was a -mere court favourite of the worst class: to compare him to Buckingham -would be far too flattering--and even Piers Gaveston had a pretty -wit and no mean skill as a man-at-arms, though he was also a vain -ostentatious fool. After a few years, we may remember, the one met the -dagger and the other the axe, with the full approval of English public -opinion. But Godoy went on flourishing like the green bay-tree, for -sixteen years, decked with titles and offices and laden with plunder, -with no other support than the queen’s unconcealed partiality for -him, and the idiotic old king’s desire to have trouble taken off his -hands. Every thinking man in Spain hated the favourite as the outward -and visible sign of corruption in high places. Every patriot saw that -the would-be statesman who made himself the adulator first of Barras -and then of Bonaparte, and played cat’s-paw to each of them, to the -ultimate ruin and bankruptcy of the realm, ought to be removed. Yet -there was no sign of any movement against him, save obscure plots in -the household of the Prince Royal. But for the interference of Napoleon -in the affairs of Spain, it is possible that the Prince of the Peace -might have enjoyed many years more of power. Such is the price which -nations pay for handing over their bodies to autocratic monarchy and -their souls to three centuries of training under the Inquisition. - -It is perhaps necessary to gain some detailed idea of the unpleasant -family party at Madrid. King Charles IV was now a man of sixty years -of age: he was so entirely simple and helpless that it is hardly an -exaggeration to say that his weakness bordered on imbecility. His elder -brother, Don Philip, was so clearly wanting in intellect that he had to -be placed in confinement and excluded from the throne. It might occur -to us that it would have been well for Spain if Charles had followed -him to the asylum, if we had not to remember that the crown would then -have fallen to Ferdinand of Naples, who if more intelligent was also -more morally worthless than his brother. Till the age of forty Charles -had been entirely suppressed and kept in tutelage by an autocratic -father: when he came to the throne he never developed any will or mind -of his own, and remained the tool and servant of those about him. He -may be described as a good-natured and benevolent imbecile: he was not -cruel or malicious or licentious, or given to extravagant fancies. -His one pronounced taste was hunting: if he could get away from his -ministers to some country palace, and go out all day with his dogs, -his gun, and his gamekeepers, he was perfectly happy. His brother of -Naples, it will be remembered, had precisely the same hobby. Of any -other tastes, save a slight interest in some of the minor handicrafts, -which he shared with his cousin Louis XVI, we find no trace in the old -king. He was very ugly, not with the fierce clever ugliness of his -father Charles III, but in an imbecile fashion, with a frightfully -receding forehead, a big nose, and a retreating jaw generally set in -a harmless grin. He did not understand business or politics, but was -quite capable of getting through speeches and ceremonies when properly -primed and prompted beforehand. Even his private letters were managed -for him by his wife and his favourite. He had just enough brains to be -proud of his position as king, and to resent anything that he regarded -as an attack on his dignity--such as the mention of old constitutional -rights and privileges, or any allusion to a Cortes. He liked, in fact, -to feel himself and to be called an absolute king, though he wished to -hand over all the duties and worries of kingship to his wife and his -chosen servants. Quite contrary to Spanish usage, he often associated -Maria Luisa’s name with his own in State documents, and in popular -diction they were often called ‘los Reyes,’ ‘the Kings,’ as Ferdinand -and Isabella had been three hundred years before. - -The Queen was about the most unfit person in Europe to be placed on -the throne at the side of such an imbecile husband. She was his first -cousin, the daughter of his uncle Don Philip, Duke of Parma-Bourbon -on the mother’s side also, for she was the child of the daughter of -Louis XV of France. Maria Luisa was self-confident, flighty, reckless, -and utterly destitute of conscience of any sort. Her celebrated -portrait by Goya gives us at once an idea of the woman, bold, -shameless, pleasure-loving, and as corrupt as Southern court morality -allows--which is saying a good deal. She had from the first taken the -measure of her imbecile husband: she dominated him by her superior -force of will, made him her mere mouthpiece, and practically ruled -the realm, turning him out to hunt while she managed ministers and -ambassadors. - -For the last twenty years her scandalous partiality for Don Manuel -Godoy had been public property. When Charles IV came to the throne -Godoy was a mere private in the bodyguard--a sort of ornamental corps -of gentlemen-at-arms. He was son of a decayed noble family, a big -handsome showy young man of twenty-one--barely able to read and write, -say his detractors--but a good singer and musician. Within four years -after he caught the Queen’s eye he was a grandee of Spain, a duke, -and prime minister! He was married to a royal princess, the Infanta -Teresa, a cousin of the King, a mésalliance unparalleled in the whole -history of the house of Bourbon. Three years later, to commemorate his -part in concluding the disgraceful peace of Basle, he was given the -odd title of ‘Prince of the Peace,’ ‘Principe de la Paz’: no Spanish -subject had ever before been decorated with any title higher than that -of duke[19]. In 1808 he was a man of forty, beginning to get a little -plump and bald after so many years of good (or evil) living, but still -a fine personable figure. He had stowed away enormous riches, not -only from the gifts of the King and Queen, but by the sale of offices -and commissions, the taking of all sorts of illicit percentages, and -(perhaps the worst symptom of all) by colossal speculations on the -stock exchange. A French ambassador recorded the fact that he had to -keep the treaty of peace of 1802 quiet for three days after it was -signed, in order that Godoy might complete his purchases ‘for a rise’ -before the news got about[20]. Godoy was corrupt and licentious, but -not cruel or even tyrannical: though profoundly ignorant, he had the -vanity to pose as a patron of art and science. His foible was to be -hailed as a universal benefactor, and as the introducer of modern -civilization into Spain. He endeavoured to popularize the practice of -vaccination, waged a mild and intermittent war with the Inquisition, -and (a most astonishing piece of courage) tried to suppress the custom -of bull-fighting. The last two acts were by far the most creditable -items that can be put down to his account: unfortunately they were also -precisely those which appealed least to the populace of Spain. Godoy -was a notable collector of pictures and antiquities, and had a certain -liking for, and skill in, music. When this has been said, there is -nothing more to put down in his favour. Fifteen years of power had so -turned his head that for a long time he had been taking himself quite -seriously, and his ambition had grown so monstrous that, not contented -with his alliance by marriage with the royal house, he was dreaming of -becoming a sovereign prince. The bait by which Napoleon finally drew -him into the trap, the promise that he should be given the Algarves -and Alemtejo, was not the Corsican’s own invention. It had been an old -idea of Godoy’s which he broached to his ally early in 1806, only to -receive a severe rebuff. Hence came the joy with which he finally saw -it take shape in the treaty of Fontainebleau[21]. When such schemes -were running in his head, we can perfectly well credit the accusation -which Prince Ferdinand brought against him, of having intended to -change the succession to the crown of Spain, by a _coup d’état_ on the -death of Charles IV. The man had grown capable of any outburst of pride -and ambition. Meanwhile he continued to govern Spain by his hold over -the imbecile and gouty old king and his worthless wife, who was now far -over fifty, but as besotted on her favourite as ever. It was his weary -lot to be always in attendance on them. They could hardly let him out -of their sight. Toreño relates a ridiculous story that, when Napoleon -invited them to dinner on the first night of their unhappy visit to -Bayonne, he did not ask the Prince of the Peace to the royal table. -Charles was so unhappy and uncomfortable that he could not settle down -to his meal till the emperor had sent for Godoy, and found a place for -him near his master and mistress[22]. - - [19] The princes that occur in Spanish politics, e.g. Eboli or - Castelfranco, were holders of Italian, generally Neapolitan, - titles. - - [20] Foy, _Guerre de la Péninsule_, ii. 267. - - [21] See the proofs from papers in the Spanish Foreign Office, - quoted in Arteche’s _Guerra de la Independencia_, i. 148. - - [22] Toreño, i. 86. The story is confirmed by Savary, in his - _Mémoires_, ii. 221. - -The fourth individual with whose personality it is necessary to be -acquainted when studying the court of Spain in 1808 is the heir to the -throne, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias. Little was known of him, -for his parents and Godoy had carefully excluded him from political -life. But when a prince is getting on for thirty, and his father has -begun to show signs of failing health, it is impossible that eyes -should not be turned on him from all quarters. Ferdinand was not an -imbecile like his father, nor a scandalous person like his mother; but -(though Spain knew it not) he was coward and a cur. With such parents -he had naturally been brought up very badly. He was ignominiously -excluded from all public business, and kept in absolute ignorance of -all subjects on which a prince should have some knowledge: history, -military science, modern politics, foreign languages, were all sealed -books to him. He had been educated, so far as he was trained at all, -by a clever and ambitious priest, Juan Escoiquiz, a canon of Toledo. -An obscure churchman was not the best tutor for a future sovereign: he -could not instruct the prince in the more necessary arts of governance, -but he seems to have taught him dissimulation and superstition[23]. -For Ferdinand was pious with a grovelling sort of piety, which made -him carry about strings of relics, spend much of his time in church -ceremonies, and (as rumour said) take to embroidering petticoats for -his favourite image of the Virgin in his old age. - - [Illustration: - MARIA LUISA - _REYNA DE ESPAÑA_.] - -The prince had one healthy sentiment, a deep hatred for Godoy, who had -from his earliest youth excluded him from his proper place in the court -and the state. But he was too timid to resent the favourite’s influence -by anything but sulky rudeness. If he had chosen, he could at once -have put himself at the head of the powerful body of persons whom the -favourite had disobliged or offended. His few intimate friends, and -above all his tutor Escoiquiz, were always spurring him on to take some -active measures against the Prince of the Peace. But Ferdinand was too -indolent and too cautious to move, though he was in his secret heart -convinced that his enemy was plotting his destruction, and intended to -exclude him from the throne at his father’s death. - - [23] That Escoiquiz was a clever man, and not the mere intriguer - that he is often called, is (I think) shown not only by the - impression which he made upon Napoleon (who called him, in jest, - _le petit Ximénès_) and on De Pradt at Bayonne, but still more by - his work, the _Conversation avec Napoléon_. If he invented it, - he must have been a genius, so well has he caught the Emperor’s - style; if he only reproduced it he was at least an admirable and - picturesque reporter. - -To give a fair idea of the education, character, and brains of this -miserable prince it is only necessary to quote a couple of his letters. -The first was written in November, 1807, when he had been imprisoned -by his father for carrying on the famous secret correspondence with -Napoleon. It runs as follows:-- - -DEAR PAPA[24], - -I have done wrong: I have sinned against your majesty, both as -king and as father; but I have repented, and I now offer your -majesty the most humble obedience. I ought to have done nothing -without your majesty’s knowledge; but I was caught unawares. I -have given up the names of the guilty persons, and I beg your -majesty to pardon me for having lied to you the other night, -and to allow your grateful son to kiss your royal feet. - - (Signed) FERNANDO. - -San Lorenzo (The Escurial), Nov. 5, 1807. - - [24] Observe ‘Papa Mio’ instead of ‘Padre Mio.’ The Spanish text - I have printed as Appendix 3 of this volume. Some say that Godoy - dictated the wording of the letter, and did not merely insist - that a letter of some sort must be written to secure a pardon. In - any case the terms were such as no self-respecting person could - have signed. The sentence ‘pido à V. M. me perdone por haberle - mentido la otra noche,’ the most vile in the whole composition, - are omitted by the courtly De Pradt when he translates it into - French. - -It is doubtful whether the childish whining, the base betrayal of his -unfortunate accomplices, or the slavish tone of the confession forms -the most striking point in this epistle. - -But the second document that we have to quote gives an even worse idea -of Ferdinand. Several years after he had been imprisoned by Napoleon -at Valençay, a desperate attempt was made to deliver him. Baron Colli, -a daring Austrian officer, entered France, amid a thousand dangers, -with a scheme for delivering the prince: he hoped to get him to the -coast, and to an English frigate, by means of false passports and -relays of swift horses. The unfortunate adventurer was caught and -thrown into a dungeon at Vincennes[25]. After the plot had miscarried -Ferdinand wrote as follows to his jailor:-- - -‘An unknown person got in here in disguise and proposed to Señor -Amezaga, my master of the horse and steward, to carry me off from -Valençay, asking him to pass on some papers, which he had brought, to -my hands, and to aid in carrying out this horrible undertaking. My -honour, my repose, and the good opinion due to my principles might all -have been compromised, if Señor Amezaga had not given proof of his -devotion to His Imperial Majesty and to myself, by revealing everything -to me at once. I write immediately to give information of the matter, -and take this opportunity of showing anew my inviolable fidelity to the -Emperor Napoleon, and the horror that I feel at this infernal project, -whose author, I hope, may be chastised according to his deserts.’ - - [25] There is a very black underplot in the story of Baron - Colli. When he was caught the French police sent a spy with - his credentials to Valençay, to see how far the persons about - Ferdinand could be induced to compromise themselves. But the - prince’s terror, and abject delation of the supposed baron, - stopped further proceedings. - -It is not surprising to find that the man who was capable of writing -this letter also wrote more than once to congratulate Joseph Bonaparte -on his victories over the ‘rebels’ in Spain. - -It had been clear for some time that the bitter hatred which the -Prince Royal bore to Godoy, and the fear which the favourite felt -at the prospect of his enemy’s accession to the throne, would lead -to some explosion ere long. If Ferdinand had been a man of ordinary -ability and determination he could probably have organized a _coup -d’état_ to get rid of the favourite, without much trouble. But he -was so slow and timid that, in spite of all the exhortations of his -partisans, he never did more than copy out two letters to his father -which Escoiquiz drafted for him. He never screwed up his courage to the -point of sending them, or personally delivering them into his father’s -hands. They were rhetorical compositions, setting forth the moral and -political turpitude of Godoy, and warning the King that his favourite -was guilty of designs on the throne. If Charles IV had been given them, -he probably could not have made out half the meaning, and would have -handed them over for interpretation to the trusty Manuel himself. The -only other move which the prince was induced to make was to draw out -a warrant appointing his friend and confidant, the Duke of Infantado, -Captain-General of New Castile. It was to be used if the old king, who -was then labouring under one of his attacks of gout, should chance to -be carried off by it. The charge of Madrid, and of the troops in its -vicinity, was to be consigned to one whom Ferdinand could trust, so -that Godoy might be check-mated. - -But the Prince of the Asturias took one other step in the autumn of -1807 which was destined to bring matters to a head. It occurred to -him that instead of incurring the risks of conspiracy at home he -would do better to apply for aid to his father’s all-powerful ally. -If Napoleon took up his cause, and promised him protection, he would -be safe against all the machinations of the Prince of the Peace: for -a frank and undisguised terror of the Emperor was the mainspring of -Godoy’s foreign and domestic policy. Ferdinand thought that he had a -sure method of enlisting Bonaparte’s benevolence: he was at this moment -the most eligible _parti_ in Europe: he had lost his first wife, a -daughter of his uncle of Naples, and being childless was bound to marry -again[26]. By offering to accept a spouse of the Emperor’s choice he -would give such a guarantee of future loyalty and obedience that his -patron (who was quite aware of Godoy’s real feelings towards France) -would withdraw all his support from the favourite and transfer it to -himself. Acting under the advice of Escoiquiz, with whom he was always -in secret communication, Ferdinand first sounded the French ambassador -at Madrid, the Marquis de Beauharnais, a brother-in-law of the Empress -Josephine. Escoiquiz saw the ambassador, who displayed much pleasure -at his proposals, and urged him to encourage the prince to proceed -with his plan[27]. The fact was that the diplomatist saw profit to -his own family in the scheme: for in default of eligible damsels of -the house of Bonaparte, it was probable that the lady whom the Emperor -might choose as Queen of Spain would be one of his own relatives--some -Beauharnais or Tascher--a niece or cousin of the Empress. A wife for -the hereditary prince of Baden had been already chosen from among them -in the preceding year. - - [26] Godoy had the impudence to propose to the prince that - he should marry Donna Luisa, the younger sister of his own - unfortunate wife, and the cousin of the King. Ferdinand found - courage to refuse this alliance. - - [27] The intrigues of Escoiquiz had begun as early as March, - 1807, the month in which the letters to the King against Godoy - were drafted. The negotiation with Beauharnais began in June. - These dates are strongly against the idea that Bonaparte was at - the bottom of the whole affair; his hand does not appear till - July-August. Indeed he was far away in Eastern Germany when - Escoiquiz began his interviews with the ambassador. - -When therefore Escoiquiz broached the matter to the ambassador in June, -1807, the latter only asked that he should be given full assurance -that the Prince of the Asturias would carry out his design. No private -interview could be managed between them in the existing state of -Spanish court etiquette, and with the spies of Godoy lurking in every -corner. But by a prearranged code of signals Ferdinand certified to -Beauharnais, at one of the royal levées, that he had given all his -confidence to Escoiquiz, and that the latter was really acting in his -name. The ambassador therefore undertook to transmit to his master at -Paris any document which the prince might entrust to him. Hence there -came to be written the celebrated letter of October 11, 1807, in which -Ferdinand implored the pity of ‘the hero sent by providence to save -Europe from anarchy, to strengthen tottering thrones, and to give to -the nations peace and felicity.’ His father, he said, was surrounded -by malignant and astute intriguers who had estranged him from his son. -But one word from Paris would suffice to discomfit such persons, and -to open the eyes of his loved parents to the just grievances of their -child. As a token of amity and protection he ventured to ask Bonaparte -for the hand of some lady of his august house. He does not seem to have -had any particular one in his eye, as the demand is made in the most -general terms. The choice would really have lain between the eldest -daughter of Lucien Bonaparte, who was then (as usual) on strained terms -with his brother, and one of the numerous kinswomen of the Empress -Josephine. - -Godoy was so well served by his numerous spies that the news of the -letter addressed to Bonaparte was soon conveyed to him. He resolved to -take advantage to the full of the mistake which the prince had made -in opening a correspondence with a foreign power behind the back of -his father. He contrived an odious scene. He induced the old king to -make a sudden descent on his son’s apartments on the night of October -27, with an armed guard at his back, to accuse him publicly of aiming -at dethroning or even murdering his parents, and to throw him into -solitary confinement. Ferdinand’s papers were sequestrated, but there -was found among them nothing of importance except the two documents -denouncing Godoy, which the prince had composed or copied out under -the direction of his adviser Escoiquiz, and a cypher code which was -discovered to have belonged to the prince’s late wife, and to have been -used by her in her private letters to her mother, the Queen of Naples. - -There was absolutely nothing that proved any intention on the part of -Ferdinand to commit himself to overt treason, though plenty to show -his deep discontent, and his hatred for the Prince of the Peace. The -only act that an honest critic could call disloyal was the attempt to -open up a correspondence with Napoleon. But Godoy thought that he had -found his opportunity of crushing the heir to the throne, and even of -removing him from the succession. He caused Charles IV to publish an -extraordinary manifesto to his subjects, in which he was made to speak -as follows:-- - -‘God, who watches over all creation, does not permit the success of -atrocious designs against an innocent victim. His omnipotence has just -delivered me from an incredible catastrophe. My people, my faithful -subjects, know my Christian life, my regular conduct: they all love me -and give me constant proof of their veneration, the reward due to a -parent who loves his children. I was living in perfect confidence, when -an unknown hand delated to me the most enormous and incredible plot, -hatched in my own palace against my person. The preservation of my -life, which has been already several times in danger, should have been -the special charge of the heir to my throne, but blinded, and estranged -from all those Christian principles in which my paternal care and -love have reared him, he has given his consent to a plot to dethrone -me. Taking in hand the investigation of the matter, I surprised him -in his apartments and found in his hands the cypher which he used -to communicate with his evil counsellors. I have thrown several of -these criminals into prison, and have put my son under arrest in his -own abode. This necessary punishment adds another sorrow to the many -which already afflict me; but as it is the most painful of all, it is -also the most necessary of all to carry out. Meanwhile I publish the -facts: I do not hide from my subjects the grief that I feel--which can -only be lessened by the proofs of loyalty which I know that they will -display’[28] [Oct. 30, 1807]. - - [28] The manuscript of this decree was in the handwriting of - Godoy himself. - -Charles was therefore made to charge his son with a deliberate plot to -dethrone him, and even to hint that his life had been in danger. The -only possible reason for the formulating of this most unjustifiable -accusation must have been that Godoy thought that he might now dare to -sweep away the Prince of the Asturias from his path by imprisonment -or exile. There can be no other explanation for the washing in public -of so much of the dirty linen of the palace. Ferdinand, by his craven -conduct, did his best to help his enemy’s designs: in abject fear he -delated to the King the names of Escoiquiz and his other confidants, -the dukes of Infantado and San Carlos. He gave full particulars of his -attempt to communicate with Napoleon, and of all his correspondence -with his partisans--even acknowledging that he had given Infantado that -undated commission as Captain-General of New Castile, to come into -effect when he himself should become king, which we have already had -occasion to mention. This act, it must be owned, was a little unseemly, -but if it had really borne the sinister meaning that Godoy chose to -put upon it, we may guess that Ferdinand would never have divulged it. -In addition the prince wrote the disgusting letter of supplication to -his father which has been already quoted, owning that ‘he had lied the -other night,’ and asking leave to kiss his majesty’s royal feet. It -is beyond dispute that this epistle, with another similar one to the -Queen, was written after a stormy interview with Godoy. The favourite -had been allowed by his master and mistress to visit Ferdinand in -prison, and to bully him into writing these documents, which (as he -hoped) would ruin the prince’s reputation for ever with every man of -heart and honour. Godoy was wrong here: what struck the public mind far -more than the prince’s craven tone was the unseemliness of publishing -to the world his miserable letters. That a prince royal of Spain should -have been terrified by an upstart charlatan like Godoy into writing -such words maddened all who read them. - -Napoleon was delighted to see the royal family of Spain putting itself -in such an odious light. He only intervened on a side issue by sending -peremptory orders that in any proceedings taken against the Prince of -the Asturias no mention was to be made of himself or of his ambassador, -i.e. the matter of the secret appeal to France (the one thing for which -Ferdinand could be justly blamed) was not to be allowed to transpire. -It was probably this communication from Paris which saved Ferdinand -from experiencing the full consequences of Godoy’s wrath[29]. If any -public trial took place, it was certain that either Ferdinand or some -of his friends would speak of the French intrigue, and if the story -came out Napoleon would be angry. The mere thought of this possibility -so worked upon the favourite that he suddenly resolved to stop the -impeachment of the prince. In return for his humiliating prayers for -mercy he was given a sort of ungracious pardon. ‘The voice of nature,’ -so ran the turgid proclamation which Godoy dictated to the old king, -‘disarms the hand of vengeance; I forgive my son, and will restore -him to my good graces when his conduct shall have proved him a truly -reformed character.’ Ferdinand was left dishonoured and humiliated: he -had been accused of intended parricide, made to betray his friends and -to confess plots which he had never formed, and then pardoned. Godoy -hoped that he was so ruined in the eyes of the Spanish people, and -(what was more important) in the eyes of Napoleon, that there would be -no more trouble with him, a supposition in which he grievously erred. -After a decent interval the prince’s fellow conspirators, Escoiquiz and -Infantado, were acquitted of high treason by the court before which -they had been sent, and allowed to go free. Of the dreadful accusations -made in the Proclamation of Oct. 30 nothing more was heard. - - [29] Cf. Foy and Toreño, who agree on this point. Napoleon - insinuates as much in his letter to Ferdinand of April 16, 1808: - ‘I flatter myself that I contributed by my representations to the - happy ending of the affair of the Escurial’ (_Nap. Corresp._, - 13,750). - -The whole of the ‘Affair of the Escurial,’ as the arrest, imprisonment, -and forgiveness of Ferdinand came to be called, took place between the -twenty-seventh of October and the fifth of November, dates at which -it is pretty certain that Napoleon’s unscrupulous designs against the -royal house of Spain had long been matured. The open quarrel of the -imbecile father and the cowardly son only helped him in his plans, by -making more manifest than ever the deplorable state of the Spanish -court. It served as a useful plea to justify acts of aggression which -must have been planned many months before. If it had never taken place, -it is still certain that Napoleon would have found some other plea for -sweeping out the worthless house of Bourbon from the Peninsula. He -had begun to collect armies at the roots of the Pyrenees, without any -obvious military necessity, some weeks before Ferdinand was arrested. -When that simple fact is taken into consideration we see at once the -hollowness of his plea, elaborated during his exile at St. Helena[30], -that it was the disgraceful explosion of family hatred in the Spanish -royal house that first suggested to him the idea of removing the whole -generation of Bourbons, and giving Spain a new king and a new dynasty. - - [30] Las Cases, ii. 206. - - -NOTE TO CHAPTER II - -It may perhaps be worth while to give, for what it is worth, -a story which I find in the _Vaughan Papers_ concerning the -causes of the final quarrel between Godoy and the Prince of -the Asturias, ending in the arrest of the latter and the whole -‘Affair of the Escurial.’ Among Vaughan’s large collection -of miscellaneous papers is a long document addressed to him -by one of his Spanish friends, purporting to give the secret -history of the rupture; the narrative is said by the author to -have been obtained from the mouth of the minister Caballero, -who would certainly have had the best means of gaining court -intelligence in October, 1807. The tale runs as follows: ‘The -Queen had for many years been accustomed to make secret visits -to Godoy’s palace under cover of the dark, escorted only by a -lady-in-waiting and a single body-servant. The sentinels round -the palace had been designedly so placed that none of them -covered the postern door by which her majesty was accustomed -to pass in and out. One night in the autumn of 1807 the whole -system of the palace-guards was suddenly changed without the -Queen’s knowledge, and when she returned from her excursion -she ran into the arms of a corporal’s guard placed in front of -the privy entrance. The men, fortunately for Maria Luisa, did -not recognize the three muffled figures who fell into their -clutches, and allowed them to buy their way in for an _onza -d’oro_, or gold twenty-dollar piece. But when Godoy and the -Queen talked the matter over, and found that King Charles had -ordered the inconvenient alterations in the sentinels, they -came to the conclusion that Ferdinand had deliberately induced -his father to change the posts of the guard, with the object -either of stopping his mother’s exits or of making a public -scandal by causing her to be arrested at this strange place and -hour. The Prince chanced to have had a private conversation -with his father on the previous day, and this might well have -been its result.’ In high wrath, the story proceeds, the Queen -and the favourite resolved to crush Ferdinand at once, and -to get him excluded from the succession. They chose the very -inadequate excuse of the letter of the Prince to Napoleon, -of which they had perfect cognizance from the very moment of -its being written. But, we are assured, they were quite wrong -in their suspicions, the originator of the movement of the -sentries, which had so disconcerted them, having been Baron -Versage, the newly appointed colonel of the Walloon Guards. -He had got the King’s leave to rearrange the watching of the -palace, and going round it had spied the private door, which he -had blocked with a new picquet, quite unaware of the purpose -for which it had been used for so many years. This Versage, -it will be remembered, served under Palafox, and was killed -in Aragon during the first year of the war. I should imagine -the whole tale to be an ingenious fiction, in spite of the -name of Caballero cited in its support: of that personage -Napoleon wrote [_Nap. Corresp._ 14,015] ‘il a une très mauvaise -réputation; c’est tout dire que de dire qu’il était l’homme de -confiance de la Reine.’ But the story was current in Spain very -soon after the alleged adventure took place. - - - - -SECTION I: CHAPTER III - -THE CONQUEST OF PORTUGAL - - -There is certainly no example in history of a kingdom conquered in so -few days and with such small trouble as was Portugal in 1807. That a -nation of three million souls, which in earlier days had repeatedly -defended itself with success against numbers far greater than those -now employed against it, should yield without firing a single shot -was astonishing. It is a testimony not only to the timidity of the -Portuguese Government, but to the numbing power of Napoleon’s name. - -The force destined by the Treaty of Fontainebleau for the invasion of -Portugal consisted of Junot’s ‘Army of the Gironde,’ 25,000 strong, -and of three auxiliary Spanish corps amounting in all to about the -same numbers. Of these one, coming from Galicia[31], was to strike at -Oporto and the Lower Douro; another, from Badajoz[32], was to take -the fortress of Elvas, the southern bulwark of Portugal, and then to -march on Lisbon by the left bank of the Tagus. These were flanking -operations: the main blow at the Portuguese capital was to be dealt by -Junot himself, strengthened by a third Spanish force[33]; they were to -concentrate at Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, and make for Lisbon by the -high-road that passes by Almeida and Coimbra. - - [31] Composed of 6,500 men under General Taranco, marching from - Vigo. - - [32] Composed of 9,500 men under Solano, Captain-General of - Andalusia, and marching from Badajoz. - - [33] Composed of 9,500 men under Caraffa. - -The Army of the Gironde crossed the Bidassoa on October 18: by the 12th -of November it had arrived at Salamanca, having covered 300 miles in -twenty-five days--very leisurely marching at the rate of twelve miles -a day. The Spaniards would not have been pleased to know that, by -Napoleon’s orders, engineer officers were secretly taking sketches of -every fortified place and defile that the army passed, and preparing -reports as to the resources of all the towns of Old Castile and Leon. -This was one of the many signs of the Emperor’s ultimate designs. On -the 12th of November, in consequence we cannot doubt of the outbreak -of the troubles of October 27 at the Spanish court, Junot suddenly -received new orders, telling him to hurry. He was informed that every -day which intervened before his arrival at Lisbon was time granted to -the Portuguese in which to prepare resistance,--possibly also time in -which England, who had plenty of troops in the Mediterranean, might -make up her mind to send military aid to her old ally. Junot was -directed to quicken his pace, and to strike before the enemy could -mature plans of defence. - -For this reason he was told to change his route. The Emperor had -originally intended to invade the country over the usual line of attack -from Spain, by Almeida and Coimbra, which Masséna was to take three -years later, in 1810. But when the events at the Escurial showed that a -crisis was impending in Spain, Napoleon changed his mind: there was the -fortress of Almeida in the way, which might offer resistance and cause -delay, and beyond were nearly 200 miles of difficult mountain roads. -Looking at his maps, Napoleon saw that there was a much shorter way to -Lisbon by another route, down the Tagus. From Alcantara, the Spanish -frontier town on that river, to Lisbon is only 120 miles, and there is -no fortress on the way. The maps could not show the Emperor that this -road was for half of its length a series of rocky defiles through an -almost unpeopled wilderness. - -Orders were therefore sent to Junot to transfer his base of operations -from Salamanca to Alcantara, and to march down the Tagus. The Spaniards -(according to their orders) had collected the magazines for feeding -Junot’s force at Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. But for that Napoleon -cared little. He wrote that the army must take the shortest road -at all costs, whatever the difficulty of getting supplies. ‘I will -not have the march of the army delayed for a single day,’ he added; -‘20,000 men can feed themselves anywhere, even in a desert.’ It was -indeed a desert that Junot was ordered to cross: the hill-road from -Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, which hugs the Portuguese frontier, has -hardly a village on it; it crosses ridge after ridge, ravine after -ravine. In November the rains had just set in, and every torrent was -full. Over this stony wilderness, by the Pass of Perales, the French -army rushed in five days, but at the cost of dreadful privations. -When it reached Alcantara half the horses had perished of cold, all -the guns but six had been left behind, stranded at various points on -the road, and of the infantry more than a quarter was missing--the -famished men having scattered in all directions to find food. If -there had been a Portuguese force watching Alcantara, Junot must -have waited for many days to get his army together again, all the -more so because every cartridge that his men were carrying had been -spoiled by the wet. But there were no enemies near; Junot found at -the great Tagus bridge only a few Spanish battalions and guns on the -way to join his army. Confiscating their munitions to fill his men’s -pouches, and their food to provide them with two days’ rations, Junot -rushed on again upon the 19th of November. He found, to his surprise, -that there was no road suitable for wheeled traffic along the Tagus -valley, but only a poor track running along the foot of the mountains -to Castello Branco, the sole Portuguese town in this part of the -frontier. The march from Alcantara to Abrantes proved even more trying -than that from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara. It was through a treeless -wilderness of grey granite, seamed with countless ravines. The rain -continued, the torrents were even fuller than before, the country even -more desolate than the Spanish side of the border. It was only after -terrible sufferings that the head of the column reached Abrantes on -November 23: the rear trailed in on the 26th. All the guns except four -Spanish pieces of horse artillery had fallen behind: the cavalry was -practically dismounted. Half the infantry was marauding off the road, -or resting dead-beat in the few poor villages that it had passed. If -there had been even 5,000 Portuguese troops at Abrantes the French -would have been brought to a stop. But instead of hostile battalions, -Junot found there only an anxious diplomatist, named Barreto, sent by -the Prince-Regent to stop his advance by offers of servile submission -to the Emperor and proffers of tribute. Reassured as to the possibility -that the Portuguese might have been intending armed resistance, Junot -now took a most hazardous step. Choosing the least disorganized -companies of every regiment, he made up four battalions of picked men, -and pushed on again for Lisbon, now only seventy-five miles distant. -This time he had neither a gun nor a horseman left, but he struggled -forward, and on the 30th of November entered the Portuguese capital at -the head of 1,500 weary soldiers, all that had been able to endure to -the end. They limped in utterly exhausted, their clothes in rags, and -their cartridges so soaked through that they could not have fired a -shot had they been attacked. If the mob of Lisbon had fallen on them -with sticks and stones, the starving invaders must have been driven -out of the city. But nothing of the kind happened, and Junot was able -to install himself as governor of Portugal without having to strike -a blow. It was ten days before the last of the stragglers came up -from the rear, and even more before the artillery appeared and the -cavalry began to remount itself with confiscated horses. Meanwhile -the Portuguese were digesting the fact that they had allowed 1,500 -famished, half-armed men to seize their capital. - -While Junot had been rushing on from Salamanca to Alcantara, and from -Alcantara to Abrantes, Lisbon had been the scene of much pitiful -commotion. The Prince-Regent had long refused to believe that Napoleon -really intended to dethrone him, and had been still occupying himself -with futile schemes for propitiating the Emperor. Of his courtiers -and generals, hardly one counselled resistance: there was no talk of -mobilizing the dilapidated army of some 30,000 men which the country -was supposed to possess, or of calling out the militia which had done -such good service in earlier wars with Spain and France. Prince John -contented himself with declaring war on England on the twentieth of -October, and with garrisoning the coast batteries which protect Lisbon -against attacks from the sea. Of these signs of obedience he sent -reports to Napoleon: on the eighth of November he seized the persons of -the few English merchants who still remained in Portugal; the majority -had wisely absconded in October. At the same time he let the British -Government know that he was at heart their friend, and only driven by -brute force to his present course: he even permitted their ambassador, -Lord Strangford, to linger in Lisbon. - -In a few days the Regent began to see that Napoleon was inexorable: his -ambassador from Paris was sent back to him, and reported that he had -passed on the way the army of Junot marching by Burgos on Salamanca. -Presently an English fleet under Sir Sydney Smith, the hero of Acre, -appeared at the mouth of the Tagus, and declared Lisbon in a state of -blockade--the natural reply to the Regent’s declaration of war and -seizure of English residents. Other reasons existed for the blockade: -there had lately arrived in the Tagus a Russian squadron on its -homeward way from the Mediterranean. The Czar Alexander was at this -time Napoleon’s eager ally, and had just declared war on England; -it seemed wise to keep an eye on these ships, whose arrival appeared -to synchronize in a most suspicious way with the approach of Junot. -Moreover there was the Portuguese fleet to be considered: if the -Prince-Regent intended to hand it over to the French, it would have to -be dealt with in the same way as the Danish fleet had been treated a -few months before. - -Lord Strangford retired on board Sydney Smith’s flagship, the -_Hibernia_, and from thence continued to exchange notes with the -miserable Portuguese Government. The Regent was still hesitating -between sending still more abject proposals of submission to Bonaparte, -and the only other alternative, that of getting on board his fleet and -crossing the Atlantic to the great Portuguese colony in Brazil. The -news that Junot had reached Alcantara only confused him still more; he -could not make up his mind to leave his comfortable palace at Mafra, -his gardens, and the countless chapels and shrines in which his soul -delighted, in order to dare the unaccustomed horrors of the deep. On -the other hand, he feared that, if he stayed, he might ere long find -himself a prisoner of state in some obscure French castle. At last -his mind was made up for him from without: Lord Strangford on the -twenty-fifth of November received a copy of the Paris _Moniteur_ of the -thirteenth of October, in which appeared a proclamation in the true -Napoleonesque vein, announcing that ‘the house of Braganza had ceased -to reign in Europe.’ The celerity with which the paper had been passed -on from Paris to London and from London to Lisbon was most fortunate, -as it was just not too late for the prince to fly, though far too late -for him to think of defending himself. Junot was already at Abrantes, -but during the four days which he spent between that place and Lisbon -the die was cast. Abandoning his wonted indecision, the Regent hurried -on shipboard his treasure, his state papers, his insane mother, his -young family, and all the hangers-on of his court. The whole fleet, -fifteen men-of-war, was crowded with official refugees and their -belongings. More than twenty merchant vessels were hastily manned and -freighted with other inhabitants of Lisbon, who determined to fly with -their prince: merchants and nobles alike preferred the voyage to Rio de -Janeiro to facing the dreaded French. On the twenty-ninth of November -the whole convoy passed out of the mouth of the Tagus and set sail for -the West. When he toiled in on the thirtieth, Junot found the birds -flown, and took possession of the dismantled city. - -Junot’s Spanish auxiliaries were, as might have been expected from the -national character and the deplorable state of the government, much -slower than their French allies. Solano and the southern army did not -enter Portugal till the second of December, three days after Lisbon -had fallen. Taranco and the Galician corps only reached Oporto on the -thirteenth of December. To neither of them was any opposition offered: -the sole show of national feeling which they met was that the Governor -of Valenza closed his gates, and would not admit the Spaniards till he -heard that Lisbon was in the enemy’s hands, and that the Prince-Regent -had abandoned the country. - -Junot at first made some attempt to render himself popular and to keep -his troops in good discipline. But it was impossible to conciliate the -Portuguese: when they saw the exhausted condition and comparatively -small numbers of the army that had overrun their realm, they were -filled with rage to think that no attempt had been made to strike a -blow to save its independence. When, on the thirteenth of December, -Junot made a great show out of the ceremony of hauling down the -Portuguese flag and of hoisting the tricolour on the public buildings -of the metropolis, there broke out a fierce riot, which had to be -dispersed with a cavalry charge. But this was the work of the mob: -both the civil and the military authorities showed a servile obedience -to Junot’s orders, and no one of importance stood forward to head the -crowd. - -The first precautionary measure of the French general was to dissolve -the Portuguese army. He ordered the discharge of all men with less than -one and more than six years’ service, dissolved the old regimental -_cadres_, and reorganized the 6,000 or 7,000 men left into nine new -corps, which were soon ordered out of the realm. Ultimately they -were sent to the Baltic, and remained garrisoned in Northern Germany -for some years. At the time of the Russian War of 1812 there were -still enough of these unhappy exiles left to constitute three strong -regiments. Nearly all of them perished in the snow during the retreat -from Moscow. - -Further endeavour to make French rule popular in Portugal was soon -rendered impossible by orders from Paris. The Emperor’s mandate -not only bade Junot confiscate and realize all the property of the -15,000 persons, small and great, who had fled to Brazil with the -Prince-Regent; it also commanded him to raise a fine of 100,000,000 -francs, four millions of our money, from the little kingdom. But the -emigrants had carried away nearly half the coined money in Portugal, -and the rest had been hidden, leaving nothing but coppers and -depreciated paper money visible in circulation. With the best will in -the world Junot found it difficult to begin to collect even the nucleus -of the required sum. The heavy taxes and imposts which he levied had -no small effect in adding to the discontent of the people, but their -total did little more than pay for the maintenance of the invaders. -Meanwhile the troops behaved with the usual licence of a French army in -a conquered country, and repeatedly provoked sanguinary brawls with the -peasantry. Military executions of persons who had resisted requisitions -by force began as early as January, 1808. Nothing was wanting to -prepare an insurrection but leaders: of their appearance there was -no sign; the most spirited members of the upper classes had gone off -with the Regent. Those who had remained were the miserable bureaucrats -which despotic governments always breed. They were ready to serve the -stranger if they could keep their posts and places. A discreditable -proportion of the old state servants acquiesced in the new government. -The Patriarch of Lisbon issued a fulsome address in praise of Napoleon. -The members of the provisional government which the Regent had -nominated on his departure mostly submitted to Junot. There was little -difficulty found in collecting a deputation, imposing by its numbers -and by the names of some of its personnel, which travelled to Bayonne, -to compliment Bonaparte and request him to grant some definite form -of government to Portugal. The Emperor treated them in a very offhand -way, asked them if they would like to be annexed to Spain, and on -their indignant repudiation of that proposal, sent them off with a few -platitudes to the effect that the lot of a nation depends upon itself, -and that his eye was upon them. But this interview only took place in -April, 1808, when events in Spain were assuming a very different aspect -from that which they displayed at the moment of Junot’s first seizure -of Lisbon. - - - - -SECTION I: CHAPTER IV - -THE FRENCH AGGRESSION IN SPAIN: ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV - - -The ‘Affair of the Escurial’ added some complications to the situation -of affairs in Spain from Napoleon’s point of view. But there was -nothing in it to make him alter the plans which he was at this moment -carrying out: if the Bourbons were to be evicted from Spain, it -made the task somewhat easier to find that the heir to the throne -was now in deep disgrace. It would be possible to urge that by his -parricidal plots he had forfeited any rights to the kingdom which he -had hitherto possessed. In dealing with the politics of Spain he might -for the future be disregarded, and there would be no one to take into -consideration save the King and Queen and Godoy. All three were, as the -Emperor knew, profoundly unpopular: if anything had been needed to make -the nation more discontented, it was the late scandalous events at the -Escurial. Nothing could be more convenient than that the favourite and -his sovereigns should sink yet further into the abyss of unpopularity. - -Napoleon therefore went steadily on with his plans for pushing more -and more French troops into Spain, with the object of occupying all -the main strategical points in the kingdom. The only doubtful point in -his schemes is whether he ultimately proposed to seize on the persons -of the royal family, or whether he intended by a series of threatening -acts to scare them off to Mexico, as he had already scared the Prince -of Portugal off to Rio de Janeiro. It is on the whole probable that -he leaned to the latter plan. Every week the attitude of the French -armies became more aggressive, and the language of their master more -haughty and sinister[34]. The tone in which he had forbidden the court -of Spain to allow any mention of himself or his ambassador to appear, -during the trial of Prince Ferdinand and his fellow conspirators, had -been menacing in the highest degree. After the occupation of Portugal -no further allusion had been made to the project for proclaiming Godoy -Prince of the Algarves. His name was never mentioned either to the -Portuguese or to the officers of Junot. The favourite soon saw that he -had been duped, but was too terrified to complain. - - [34] It is impossible to doubt that Napoleon’s scheme was already - in progress as early as October. On Nov. 13 he sent orders for - the secret arming and provisioning of all the frontier fortresses - of France (_Nap. Corresp._, 13,343). On Nov. 24 he directed his - chamberlain, De Tournon, to spy out the condition of Pampeluna - and the other Spanish border strongholds, and to discover the - exact distribution of the Spanish army (13,354). Such moves could - have but one meaning. - -But it was the constant influx into Spain of French troops which -contributed in the most serious way to frighten the Spanish court. -Junot had entered Lisbon on Nov. 30, and the news that he had mastered -the place without firing a shot had reached the Emperor early in -December. But long before, on the twenty-second of November, the French -reserves, hitherto known as the ‘Second Corps of Observation of the -Gironde,’ which had been collected at Bayonne in November, crossed the -Spanish frontier. They consisted of 25,000 men--nearly all recently -levied conscripts--under General Dupont. The treaty of Fontainebleau -had contained a clause providing that, if the English tried to defend -Portugal by landing troops, Napoleon might send 40,000 men to aid Junot -_after giving due notice to the King of Spain_. Instead of waiting -to hear how the first corps had fared, or apprising his ally of his -intention to dispatch Dupont’s corps across the frontier, the Emperor -merely ordered it to cross the Bidassoa without sending any information -to Madrid. The fact was that whether the preliminary condition stated -in the treaty, an English descent on Portugal, did or did not take -place, Bonaparte was determined to carry out his design. A month later -the Spaniards heard, to their growing alarm, that yet a third army -corps had come across the border: this was the ‘Corps of Observation -of the Ocean Coast,’ which had been hastily organized under Marshal -Moncey at Bordeaux, and pushed on to Bayonne when Dupont’s troops -moved forward. It was 30,000 strong, but mainly composed of conscript -battalions of the levy of 1808, which had been raised by anticipation -in the previous spring, while the Russian war was still in progress. On -the eighth of January this army began to pass the Pyrenees, occupying -all the chief towns of Biscay and Navarre, while Dupont’s divisions -pressed on and cantoned themselves in Burgos, Valladolid, and the -other chief cities of Old Castile. They made no further advance towards -Portugal, where Junot clearly did not require their aid. - -The Spanish government was terror-stricken at the unexpected appearance -of more than 60,000 French troops on the road to Madrid. If anything -more was required to cause suspicion, it was the news that still more -‘corps of observation’ were being formed at Bordeaux and Poitiers. -What legitimate reason could there possibly be for the direction of -such masses of troops on Northern Spain? But any thought of resistance -was far from the mind of Godoy and the King. Their first plan was to -propitiate Napoleon by making the same request which had brought the -Prince of the Asturias into such trouble in October--that the hand of -a princess of the house of Bonaparte might be granted to the heir of -the Spanish throne. The Emperor was making an ostentatious tour in -Italy while his forces were overrunning the provinces of his ally--as -if the occupation of Castile and Biscay were no affair of his. His -most important act in November was to evict from Florence the ruling -sovereign, the King of Etruria, and the Regent, his mother, thus -annexing the last surviving Bourbon state save Spain to the French -crown. He wrote polite but meaningless letters to Madrid, making no -allusion to the boon asked by Charles IV. The fact was that Napoleon -could now treat Ferdinand as ‘damaged goods’; he was, by his father’s -own avowal, no more than a pardoned parricide, and it suited the policy -of the Emperor to regard him as a convicted criminal who had played -away his rights of succession. If Napoleon visited his brother Lucien -at Mantua, it was not (as was thought at the time) with any real -intention of persuading him to give his daughter to the craven suitor -offered her[35], but in order to tempt her father to accept the crown -of Portugal--even perhaps that of Spain. But Lucien, who always refused -to fall in with Napoleon’s family policy, showed no gratitude for the -offer of a thorny throne in the Iberian Peninsula, and not without -reason, for one of the details of the bargain was to be that he should -divorce a wife to whom he was fondly attached. - - [35] Note on this point Talleyrand’s _Mémoires_, i. 333, and - _Nap. Corresp._, 13,402 (Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, Dec. 17, - 1807). - -It was only after returning from Italy in January that the Emperor -deigned to answer the King of Spain’s letter, now two months old, in -precise terms. He did not object to the principle of the alliance, -but doubted if he could give any daughter of his house to ‘a son -dishonoured by his own father’s declaration.’ This reply was not very -reassuring to Godoy and his master, and worse was to follow. In the -end of January the _Moniteur_, which the Emperor always used as a -means for ventilating schemes which were before long to take shape in -fact, began a systematic course of abusing the Prince of the Peace as -a bad minister and a false friend. More troops kept pouring across the -Pyrenees without any ostensible reason, and now it was not only at -the western passes that they began to appear, but also on the eastern -roads which lead from Roussillon into Catalonia and Valencia. These -provinces are so remote from Portugal that it was clear that the army -which was collecting opposite them could not be destined for Lisbon. -But on February 10, 1808, 14,000 men, half French, half Italians, under -General Duhesme, began to drift into Catalonia and to work their way -down towards its capital--Barcelona. A side-light on the meaning of -this development was given by Izquierdo, Godoy’s agent at Paris, who -now kept sending his master very disquieting reports. French ministers -had begun to sound him as to the way in which Spain would take a -proposal for the cession to France of Catalonia and part of Biscay, in -return for Central Portugal. King Charles would probably be asked ere -long to give up these ancient and loyal provinces, and to do so would -mean the outbreak of a revolution all over Spain. - -In the middle of February Napoleon finally threw off the mask, and -frankly displayed himself as a robber in his ally’s abode. On the -sixteenth of the month began that infamous seizure by surprise of the -Spanish frontier fortresses, which would pass for the most odious act -of the Emperor’s whole career, if the kidnapping at Bayonne were not to -follow. The movement started at Pampeluna: French troops were quartered -in the lower town, while a Spanish garrison held, as was natural, the -citadel. One cold morning a large party of French soldiers congregated -about the gate of the fortress, without arms, and pretended to be -amusing themselves with snowballing, while waiting for a distribution -of rations. At a given signal many of them, as if beaten in the mock -contest, rushed in at the gate, pursued by the rest. The first men -knocked down the unsuspecting sentinels, and seized the muskets of the -guard stacked in the arms-racks of the guard-room. Then a company of -grenadiers, who had been hidden in a neighbouring house, suddenly ran -in at the gate, followed by a whole battalion which had been at drill a -few hundred yards away. The Spanish garrison, taken utterly by surprise -and unarmed, were hustled out of their quarters and turned into the -town[36]. - - [36] In _Nap. Corresp._, 13,588, will be found the orders to - General D’Armagnac to get possession of the citadel by menaces - if he can, but if he cannot, by the actual use of force. ‘S’il - arrivait que le commandant-général de Navarre se refusât à rendre - la citadelle, vous employeriez les troupes du Maréchal Moncey - pour l’y forcer.’ - -A high-spirited prince would have declared war at once, whatever the -odds against him, on receiving such an insulting blow. But this was -not to be expected from persons like Godoy and Charles IV. Accordingly -they exposed themselves to the continuation of these odious tricks. On -February 29 General Lecchi, the officer commanding the French troops -which were passing through Barcelona, ordered a review of his division -before, as he said, its approaching departure for the south. After -some evolutions he marched it through the city, and past the gate of -the citadel; when this point was reached, he suddenly bade the leading -company wheel to the left and enter the fortress. Before the Spaniards -understood what was happening, several thousand of their allies were -inside the place, and by the evening the rightful owners, who carried -their opposition no further than noisy protestations, had been evicted. -A few days later the two remaining frontier fortresses of Spain, San -Sebastian, at the Atlantic end of the Pyrenees, and Figueras, at the -great pass along the Mediterranean coast, suffered the same fate: the -former place was surrendered by its governor when threatened with an -actual assault, which orders from Madrid forbade him to resist [March -5]. Figueras, on the other hand, was seized by a _coup de main_, -similar to that at Pampeluna; 200 French soldiers, having obtained -entrance within the walls on a futile pretext, suddenly seized the -gates and admitted a whole regiment, which turned out the Spanish -garrison [March 18][37]. It would be hard, if not impossible, to find -in the whole of modern history any incident approaching, in cynical -effrontery and mean cunning, to these first hostile acts of the French -on the territory of their allies. The net result was to leave the two -chief fortresses, on each of the main entries into Spain from France, -completely in the power of the Emperor. - - [37] It will hardly be believed that Napier, in his blind - reverence for Napoleon, omits to give any details concerning the - seizure of the fortresses, merely saying that they were ‘taken - by various artifices’ (i. 13). It is the particulars which are - scandalous as well as the mere fact. - -Godoy and his employers were driven into wild alarm by these acts of -open hostility. The favourite, in his memoirs[38], tells us that he -thought, for a moment, of responding by a declaration of war, but that -the old king replied that Napoleon could not be intending treachery, -because he had just sent him twelve fine coach-horses and several -polite letters. In face of his master’s reluctance, he tells us that he -temporized for some days more. The story is highly improbable: Charles -had no will save Godoy’s, and would have done whatever he was told. It -is much more likely that the reluctance to take a bold resolve was the -favourite’s own. When the French troops still continued to draw nearer -to Madrid, Godoy could only bethink himself of a plan for absconding. -He proposed to the King and Queen that they should leave Madrid and -take refuge in Seville, in order to place themselves as far as possible -from the French armies. Behind this move was a scheme for a much longer -voyage. It seems that he proposed that the court should follow the -example of the Regent of Portugal, and fly to America. At Mexico or -Buenos Ayres they would at least be safe from Bonaparte. To protect -the first stage of the flight, the troops in Portugal were directed to -slip away from Junot and mass in Estremadura. The garrison of Madrid -was drawn to Aranjuez, the palace where the court lay in February and -March, and was to act as its escort to Seville. It is certain that -nothing would have suited Napoleon’s plans better than that Charles IV -should abscond and leave his throne derelict: it would have given the -maximum of advantage with the minimum of odium. It is possible that the -Emperor was working precisely with the object of frightening Godoy into -flight. If so his scheme was foiled, because he forgot that he had to -deal not only with the contemptible court, but with the suspicious and -revengeful Spanish nation. In March the people intervened, and their -outbreak put quite a different face upon affairs. - - [38] _Memoirs of Godoy_, i. 122. Cf. Arteche, i. 251. - -Meanwhile the Emperor was launching a new figure upon the stage. On -February 26 his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, the new Grand-Duke -of Berg, appeared at Bayonne with the title of ‘Lieutenant of the -Emperor,’ and a commission to take command of all the French forces in -Spain. On March 10 he crossed the Bidassoa and assumed possession of -his post. Murat’s character is well known: it was not very complicated. -He was a headstrong, unscrupulous soldier, with a genius for heading a -cavalry charge on a large scale, and an unbounded ambition. He was at -present meditating on thrones and kingdoms: Berg seemed a small thing -to this son of a Gascon innkeeper, and ever since his brothers-in-law -Joseph, Louis, and Jerome Bonaparte had become kings, he was determined -to climb up to be their equal. It has frequently been asserted that -Murat was at this moment dreaming of the Spanish crown: he was -certainly aware that the Emperor was plotting against the Bourbons, and -the military movements which he had been directed to carry out were -sufficient in themselves to indicate more or less his brother-in-law’s -intentions. Yet on the whole it is probable that he had not received -more than half-confidences from his august relative. His dispatches are -full of murmurs that he was being kept in the dark, and that he could -not act with full confidence for want of explicit directions. Napoleon -had certainly promised him promotion, if the Spanish affair came to a -successful end: but it is probable that Murat understood that he was -not to be rewarded with the crown of Charles IV. Perhaps Portugal, or -Holland, or Naples (if one of the Emperor’s brothers should pass on -to Madrid) was spoken of as his reward. Certainly there was enough at -stake to make him eager to carry out whatever Bonaparte ordered. In his -cheerful self-confidence he imagined himself quite capable of playing -the part of a Machiavelli, and of edging the old king out of the -country by threats and hints. But if grape-shot was required, he was -equally ready to administer an unsparing dose. With a kingdom in view -he could be utterly unscrupulous[39]. - - [39] That Murat did not dream of the Spanish crown is, I think, - fairly well demonstrated by his descendant, Count Murat, in his - useful _Murat, Lieutenant de l’Empereur en Espagne_ (1897). But - that after once reading the dispatches, _Nap. Corresp._, 13,588 - and 13,589, he failed to see that his brother-in-law’s intention - was to seize Spain, is impossible. - -On March 13 Murat arrived at Burgos, and issued a strange proclamation -bidding his army ‘treat the estimable Spanish nation as friends, for -the Emperor sought only the good and happiness of Spain.’ The curious -phrase could only suggest that unless he gave this warning, his troops -would have treated their allies as enemies. The scandalous pillage -committed by many regiments during February and March quite justified -the suspicion. - -The approach of Murat scared Godoy into immediate action, all the -more because a new _corps d’armée_, more than 30,000 strong, under -Marshal Bessières, was already commencing to cross the Pyrenees, -bringing up the total of French troops in the Peninsula to more than -100,000 men. He ordered the departure of the King and his escort, the -Madrid garrison, for Seville on March 18. This brought matters to a -head: it was regarded as the commencement of the projected flight to -America, of which rumours were already floating round the court and -capital. A despotic government, which never takes the people into its -confidence, must always expect to have its actions interpreted in the -most unfavourable light. Except Godoy’s personal adherents, there was -not a soul in Madrid who did not believe that the favourite was acting -in collusion with Napoleon, and deliberately betraying his sovereign -and his country. It was by his consent, they thought, that the French -had crossed the Pyrenees, had seized Pampeluna and Barcelona, and were -now marching on the capital. They were far from imagining that of all -the persons in the game he was the greatest dupe, and that the recent -developments of Napoleon’s policy had reduced him to despair. It was -correct enough to attribute the present miserable situation of the -realm to Godoy’s policy, but only because his servility to Bonaparte -had tempted the latter to see how far he could go, and because his -maladministration had brought the army so low that it was no longer -capable of defending the fatherland. Men did well to be angry with -the Prince of the Peace, but they should have cursed him as a timid, -incompetent fool, not as a deliberate traitor. But upstarts who guide -the policy of a great realm for their private profit must naturally -expect to be misrepresented, and there can be no doubt that the -Spaniards judged Godoy to be a willing helper in the ruin of his master -and his country. - -Aranjuez, ordinarily a quiet little place, was now crowded with the -hangers-on of the court, the garrison of Madrid, and a throng of -anxious and distraught inhabitants of the capital: some had come out to -avoid the advancing French, some to learn the latest news of the King’s -intentions, others with the deliberate intention of attacking the -favourite. Among the latter were the few friends of the Prince of the -Asturias, and a much greater number who sympathized with his unhappy -lot and had not gauged his miserable disposition. It is probable -that as things stood it was really the best move to send the King to -Seville, or even to America, and to commence open resistance to the -French when the royal person should be in safety. But the crowd could -see nothing but deliberate treason in the proposal: they waited only -for the confirmation of the news of the departure of the court before -breaking out into violence. - - [Illustration: - DON MANUEL GODOY - PRINCE OF THE PEACE - AT THE AGE OF 25] - -On the night of the seventeenth of March Godoy was actually commencing -the evacuation of Aranjuez, by sending off his most precious -possession, the too-celebrated Donna Josepha Tudo, under cover of -the dark. The party which was escorting her fell into the midst of a -knot of midnight loiterers, who were watching the palace. There was a -scuffle, a pistol was fired, and as if by a prearranged plan crowds -poured out into the streets. The cry went round that Godoy was carrying -off the King and Queen, and a general rush was made to his house. There -were guards before it, but they refused to fire on the mob, of which -no small proportion was composed of soldiers who had broken out of -their barracks without leave. In a moment the doors were battered down -and the assailants poured into the mansion, hunting for the favourite. -They could not find him, and in their disappointment smashed all his -works of art, and burnt his magnificent furniture. Then they flocked to -the palace, in which they suspected that he had taken refuge, calling -for his head. The King and Queen, in deadly terror, besought their -ill-used son to save them, by propitiating the mob, who would listen to -his voice if to no other. Then came the hour of Ferdinand’s triumph; -stepping out on to the balcony, he announced to the crowd that the King -was much displeased with the Prince of the Peace, and had determined to -dismiss him from office. The throng at once dispersed with loud cheers. - -Next morning, in fact, a royal decree was issued, declaring Godoy -relieved of all his posts and duties and banished from the court. -Without the favourite at their elbow Charles and his queen seemed -perfectly helpless. The proclamation was received at first with -satisfaction, but the people still hung about the palace and kept -calling for the King, who had to come out several times and salute -them. It began to look like a scene from the beginning of the French -Revolution. There was already much talk in the crowd of the benefit -that would ensue to Spain if the Prince of the Asturias, with whose -sufferings every one had sympathized, were to be entrusted with some -part in the governance of the realm. His partisans openly spoke of the -abdication of the old king as a desirable possibility. - -Next day the rioting commenced again, owing to the reappearance of -Godoy. He had lain concealed for thirty-six hours beneath a heap of -mats, in a hiding-place contrived under the rafters of his mansion; but -hunger at last drove him out, and, when he thought that the coast was -clear, he slipped down and tried to get away. In spite of his mantle -and slouched hat he was recognized almost at once, and would have been -pulled to pieces by the crowd if he had not been saved by a detachment -of the royal guard, who carried him off a prisoner to the palace. The -news that he was trapped brought thousands of rioters under the royal -windows, shouting for his instant trial and execution. The imbecile -King could not be convinced that he was himself safe, and the Queen, -who usually displayed more courage, seemed paralysed by her fears -for Godoy even more than for herself. This was the lucky hour of the -Prince of the Asturias; urged on by his secret advisers, he suggested -abdication to his father, promising that he would disperse the mob and -save the favourite’s life. The silly old man accepted the proposal with -alacrity, and drew up a short document of twelve lines, to the effect -‘that his many bodily infirmities made it hard for him to support any -longer the heavy weight of the administration of the realm, and that he -had decided to remove to some more temperate clime, there to enjoy the -peace of private life. After serious deliberation he had resolved to -abdicate in favour of his natural heir, and wished that Don Ferdinand -should at once be received as king in all the provinces of the Spanish -crown. That this free and spontaneous abdication should be immediately -published was to be the duty of the Council of Castile.’ - - - - -SECTION I: CHAPTER V - -THE TREACHERY AT BAYONNE - - -The news of the abdication of Charles IV was received with universal -joy. The rioters of Aranjuez dispersed after saluting the new -sovereign, and allowed Godoy to be taken off, without further trouble, -to the castle of Villaviciosa. Madrid, though Murat was now almost at -its gates, gave itself up to feasts and processions, after having first -sacked the palaces of the Prince of the Peace and some of his unpopular -relations and partisans. Completely ignorant of the personal character -of Ferdinand VII, the Spaniards attributed to him all the virtues and -graces, and blindly expected the commencement of a golden age--as if -the son of Charles IV and Maria Luisa was likely to be a genius and a -hero. - -Looking at the general situation of affairs, there can be no doubt that -the wisest course for the young king to have taken would have been to -concentrate his army, put his person in safety, and ask Napoleon to -speak out and formulate his intentions. Instead of taking this, the -only manly course, Ferdinand resolved to throw himself on the Emperor’s -mercy, as if the fall of Godoy had been Napoleon’s object, and not -the conquest of Spain. Although Murat had actually arrived at Madrid -on March 23, with a great body of cavalry and 20,000 foot, the King -entered the city next day and practically put himself in the hands of -the invader. He wrote a fulsome letter to Napoleon assuring him of his -devotion, and begging once more for the hand of a princess of his house. - -His reception in Madrid by the French ought to have undeceived -him at once. The ambassador Beauharnais, alone among the foreign -ministers, refrained from acknowledging him as king. Murat was equally -recalcitrant, and moreover most rude and disobliging in his language -and behaviour. The fact was that the Grand-Duke had supposed that he -was entering Madrid in order to chase out Godoy and rule in his stead. -The popular explosion which had swept away the favourite and the old -king, and substituted for them a young and popular monarch, had foiled -his design. He did not know how Bonaparte would take the new situation, -and meanwhile was surly and discourteous. But he was determined that -there should at least be grounds provided for a breach with Ferdinand, -if the Emperor should resolve to go on with his original plan. - -Accordingly, he not only refused to acknowledge the new king’s title, -but hastened to put himself in secret communication with the dethroned -sovereigns. They were only too eager to meet him halfway, and Maria -Luisa especially was half-mad with rage at her son’s success. At first -she and her husband thought of nothing but escaping from Spain: they -begged Murat to pass on to the Emperor letters in which they asked -to be permitted to buy a little estate in France, where they might -enjoy his protection during their declining years. But they begged -also that ‘the poor Prince of the Peace, who lies in a dungeon covered -with wounds and contusions and in danger of death,’ might be saved and -allowed to join them, ‘so that we may all live together in some healthy -spot far from intrigues and state business[40].’ - - [40] See the letters of March 22-7 in Toreño, Appendix, i. 436-45. - -Murat saw that the angry old queen might be utilized to discredit her -son, and promised to send on everything to Napoleon. At the first -word of encouragement given by the Grand-Duke’s agent, De Monthion, -Maria Luisa began to cover many sheets with abuse of her son. ‘He is -false to the core: he has no natural affection: he is hard-hearted and -nowise inclined to clemency. He has been directed by villains and will -do anything that ambition suggests: he makes promises, but does not -always keep them[41].’ Again she writes:--‘From my son we have nothing -to expect but outrages and persecution. He has commenced by forgery, -and he will go on manufacturing evidence to prove that the Prince of -the Peace--that innocent and affectionate friend of the Emperor, the -Duke of Berg, and every Frenchman!--may appear a criminal in the eyes -of the Spanish people and of Napoleon himself. Do not believe a word -that he says, for our enemies have the power and means to make any -falsehood seem true[42].’ In another letter she says that the riots of -Aranjuez were no genuine explosion of popular wrath, but a deliberate -plot got up by her son, who spent countless sums on debauching the -soldiery and importing ruffians from Madrid. He gave the signal for the -outburst himself by putting a lamp in his window at a fixed hour--and -so forth[43]. - - [41] Letter of March 27, in Toreño, Appendix, i. 441. - - [42] Ibid., p. 436. - - [43] Letter of March 26 in Toreño, i. 439. - -Finding the Queen in this state of mind, Murat saw his way to dealing a -deadly blow at Ferdinand: with his counsel and consent Charles IV was -induced to draw up and send to Bonaparte a formal protest against his -abdication. He was made to declare that his resignation had not been -voluntary, but imposed on him by force and threats. And so he ‘throws -himself into the arms of the great monarch who has been his ally, and -puts himself at his disposition wholly and for every purpose[44].’ -This document placed in Napoleon’s hands the precise weapon which -he required to crush King Ferdinand. If the Emperor chose to take -it seriously, he could declare the new monarch a usurper--almost a -parricide--the legality of whose accession had been vitiated by force -and fraud. - - [44] The Protest of Charles IV will be found printed in Appendix - No. 4. - -As a matter of fact Bonaparte’s mind had long been made up. The -revolution of Aranjuez had been a surprise and a disappointment to -him: his designs against Spain were made infinitely more difficult -of realization thereby. While he had only the weak and unpopular -government of Godoy and Charles IV to deal with, he had fancied that -the game was in his hands. It had been more than probable that the -Prince of the Peace would take fright, and carry off the King and -Queen to America--in which case he would, as it were, find Spain left -derelict. If, however, the emigration did not take place, and it -became necessary to lay hands on Charles and his favourite, Napoleon -calculated that the Spaniards would be more pleased to be rid of Godoy -than angry to see force employed against him. He was so profoundly -ignorant of the character of the nation, that he imagined that a few -high-sounding proclamations and promises of liberal reforms would -induce them to accept from his hands any new sovereign whom he chose to -nominate. It was clear that the accession of a young and popular king -would make matters far more difficult. It was no longer possible to -pose as the deliverer of Spain from the shameful predominance of Godoy. -Any move against Ferdinand must bear the character of an open assault -on the national independence of the kingdom. - -But Bonaparte had gone too far to recede: he had not moved 100,000 -men across the Pyrenees, and seized Pampeluna and Barcelona, merely -in order that his troops might assist at the coronation ceremonies of -another Bourbon king. In spite of all difficulties he was resolved -to persevere in his iniquitous plan. He would not recognize the new -monarch, but would sweep him away, and put in his place some member -of his own family. But his chosen instrument was not to be Murat, but -one of the Bonapartes. He knew too well the Duke of Berg’s restless -spirit and overweening ambition to trust him with so great a charge -as Spain. And he was right--with only Naples at his back Joachim was -powerful enough to do his master grave harm in 1814. The tool was to -be one of his own brothers. It was on the night of March 26 that the -news of the abdication of Charles IV reached him: on the morning of -the twenty-seventh he wrote to Amsterdam offering Louis Bonaparte the -chance of exchanging the Dutch for the Spanish crown. The proposal was -made in the most casual form--‘You say that the climate of Holland does -not suit you. Besides the country is too thoroughly ruined to rise -again. Give me a categorical answer: if I nominate you King of Spain -will you take the offer; can I count on you?[45]’ Louis very wisely -refused the proffered crown: but his weaker brother Joseph, tired of -Naples and its brigands, made no scruples when the same proposal was -laid before him. - - [45] _Nap. Corresp._, xvi. 500; see also in _Documents - historiques, publiés par Louis Bonaparte_ (Paris, 1829), ii. 290. - -This letter to Louis of Holland having been written on the first -news of the events at Aranjuez, and four days before Murat began to -send in his own plans and the letters of protest from the King and -Queen of Spain, it is clear that the Emperor had never any intention -of recognizing Ferdinand, and was only playing with him during the -month that followed. It was not in mere caution that Beauharnais, the -ambassador, and Murat, the military representative, of France, were -bidden never to address the new sovereign as king but as Prince of the -Asturias, and to act as if Charles IV were still legally reigning until -they should have specific directions from Paris[46]. - - [46] It is scarcely necessary to say that the letter which - Napoleon is said to have sent Murat on March 29, and which is - printed in the _Mémorial de Ste-Hélène_, is (as Lanfrey and - Count Murat have shown) a forgery composed by Napoleon himself - long after. It is quite inconsistent with the offer to Louis - Bonaparte, and with other letters to Murat of the same week. - -This state of semi-suspended relations lasted for a fortnight, from -Ferdinand’s arrival in Madrid on March 24, down to his departure from -it on April 10. They were very uncomfortable weeks for the new king, -who grew more alarmed as each day passed without a letter from Paris -ratifying his title, while French troops continued to pour into Madrid -till some 35,000 were assembled in it and its suburbs. - -A very few days after his accession Ferdinand was informed that it -was probable that Napoleon was intending a visit to Madrid, and was -at any rate coming as far as Bayonne. He immediately sent off his -eldest brother Don Carlos (the hero of the unhappy wars of 1833-40) to -compliment his patron, and if necessary to receive him at the frontier -[April 5]. Two days later there appeared in Madrid a new French -emissary, General Savary--afterwards Duke of Rovigo--who purported -to come as Bonaparte’s harbinger, charged with the duty of preparing -Madrid for his arrival. He carried the farce so far that he asked for -a palace for the Emperor’s residence, produced trunks of his private -luggage[47], and began to refurnish the apartments granted him. That -he bore secret orders for Murat we know from the latter’s dispatches, -but this was only half his task. Napoleon had confided to him verbal -instructions to lure Ferdinand to come out to meet him in the north -of Spain, among the French armies massed in Biscay and Navarre--if -possible even to get him to Bayonne on French soil. In his St. Helena -memoirs Napoleon denies this, and Savary in his autobiography also -states that he did not act the part of tempter or make any promises -to the young king: the journey to Bayonne, he says, was a silly -inspiration of Ferdinand’s own. But neither Bonaparte nor Savary are -witnesses whom one would believe on their most solemn oath. The former -we know well: the latter had been one of the persons most implicated -in the shocking murder of the Duc d’Enghien. When we find the Spanish -witnesses, who conversed with Savary during his short stay in Madrid, -agreeing that the general promised that Napoleon would recognize -Ferdinand as king, give him an imperial princess as wife, and take him -into favour, we need not doubt them. It is not disputed that Savary, -unlike Murat and Beauharnais, regularly addressed his victim by the -royal title, and it is certain that he started in his company and -acted as his keeper during the journey[48]. The move that he at first -proposed was not a long one: the general said that according to his -advices the Emperor must be due at Burgos on April 13: it would be time -enough to start to meet him on the tenth. Burgos lies well inside the -frontiers of Castile, and if it was packed with French troops, so was -Madrid: one place was no more dangerous than the other. - - [47] It is said that they afterwards turned out to be full of - smuggled goods, a private speculation of Savary or his underlings. - - [48] Savary, in his mendacious autobiography, denies that he - persuaded Ferdinand to start for Bayonne. But he is refuted by - two contemporary documents. The young king, in his letter of - adieu to his father, states that Savary has convinced him of the - necessity of going; while Murat in a dispatch to Bonaparte says - that ‘Savary has in no small degree contributed to induce the new - court to quit Madrid’ [April 8]. - -Exactly how far the perjuries of Savary went, or how far he was -apprised of his master’s final intentions, we cannot tell, but it is -certain that on April 10 he set out from Madrid in the King’s company: -with them went Escoiquiz, Ferdinand’s clerical confidant, Cevallos -the minister of foreign affairs, and half a dozen dukes and marquises -chosen from among the King’s old partisans. To administer affairs in -his absence Ferdinand nominated a ‘Junta’ or council of regency, with -his uncle Don Antonio, a simple and very silly old man, at its head[49]. - - [49] For Don Antonio’s habits we have on Talleyrand’s authority - some very curious stories. He spent most of his time of captivity - at Valençay sitting in the library, mutilating illustrated books - with his scissors, not to make a scrap-book, but to destroy any - engravings that sinned against morals or religion! - -On reaching Burgos, on April 12, the party found masses of French -troops but no signs of Napoleon. Savary appeared vexed, said that his -calculation must have been wrong, and got the King to go forward two -more stages, as far as Vittoria, at the southern foot of the Pyrenees -[April 14]. Here Ferdinand received a note from his brother Don Carlos, -whom he had sent ahead, saying that Bonaparte had been lingering -at Bordeaux, and was not expected at Bayonne till the fifteenth. -Ferdinand, always timid and suspicious, was getting restive: he had -nothing on paper to assure him of Napoleon’s intentions, and began -to suspect Savary’s blandishments. The latter doubted for a moment -whether he should not have the court seized by the French garrison of -Vittoria, but finally resolved to endeavour to get a letter from his -master, which would suffice to lure Ferdinand across the frontier. He -was entrusted with a petition of the same cast that Napoleon had been -in the habit of receiving from his would-be client, full of servile -loyalty and demands for the much-desired Bonaparte princess. - -The four days during which Savary was absent, while the royal party -remained at Vittoria, were a period of harassing doubt to Ferdinand. -He was visited by all manner of persons who besought him not to go on, -and especially by Spaniards lately arrived from Paris, who detailed all -the disquieting rumours which they had heard at the French court. Some -besought him to disguise himself and escape by night from the 4,000 -troops of the Imperial Guard who garrisoned Vittoria. Others pointed -out that the Spanish troops in Bilbao, which was still unoccupied by -the French, might be brought down by cross-roads, and assume charge -of the king’s person halfway between Vittoria and the frontier, in -spite of the 600 French cavalry which escorted the cavalcade. Guarded -by his own men Ferdinand might retire into the hills of Biscay. But -to adopt either of the courses proposed to him would have compelled -the King to come to an open breach with Bonaparte, and for this he had -not sufficient courage, as long as there was the slightest chance of -getting safely through his troubles by mere servility. - -On April 18 Savary reappeared with the expected communication from -Bayonne. It was certainly one of the strangest epistles that one -sovereign ever wrote to another, and one of the most characteristic -products of Napoleon’s pen. It was addressed to the Prince of the -Asturias, not to the King of Spain, which was an ominous preface. -But on the other hand the Emperor distinctly stated that ‘he wished -to conciliate his friend in every way, and to find occasion to give -him proofs of his affection and perfect esteem.’ He added that ‘the -marriage of your royal highness to a French princess seems conformable -to the interests of my people, and likely to forge new links of union -between myself and the house of Bourbon.’ The core of the whole was -the explicit statement that ‘if the abdication of King Charles was -spontaneous, and not forced on him by the riot at Aranjuez, I shall -have no difficulty in recognizing your royal highness as King of Spain. -On these details I wish to converse with your royal highness.’ This was -a double-edged saying: Napoleon had in his pocket Charles’s protest, -complaining that the abdication had been forced upon him by fears for -his personal safety: but Ferdinand was not aware of the fact; indeed -he so little realized his parent’s state of mind that he had written -to him before quitting Madrid in the most friendly terms. If he had -fathomed the meaning of Napoleon’s carefully constructed sentence, he -would have fled for his life to the mountains. - -These were the main clauses of Napoleon’s letter, but they are embedded -in a quantity of turgid verbiage, in which we are only uncertain -whether the hypocrisy or the bad taste is the more offensive. ‘How -perilous is it for kings to permit their subjects to seek justice for -themselves by deeds of blood! I pray God that your royal highness may -not experience this for yourself some day! It is not for the interest -of Spain that the Prince of the Peace should be hunted down: he is -allied by marriage to the royal house and has governed the realm for -many years. He has no friends now: but if your royal highness were to -fall into similar disgrace you would have no more friends than he. You -cannot touch him without touching your parents. You have no rights to -the crown save those which your mother has transmitted to you: if in -trying the Prince you smirch her honour, you are destroying your own -rights. You have no power to bring him to judgement: his evil deeds are -hidden behind the throne.... O wretched Humanity! Weakness, and Error, -such is our device! But all can be hushed up: turn the Prince out of -Spain, and I will give him an asylum in France.’ - -In the next paragraph Napoleon tells Ferdinand that he should never -have written to him in the preceding autumn without his father’s -knowledge--‘in that your royal highness was culpable; but I flatter -myself that I contributed by my remonstrances in securing a happy end -to the affair of the Escurial.’ Finally Ferdinand might assure himself -that he should have from his ally precisely the same treatment that his -father had always experienced--which again is a double-edged saying, if -we take into consideration the history of the relations of Charles IV -and France. - -The King and his confidant Escoiquiz read and reread this curious -document without coming to any certain conclusion: probably they -thought (as would any one else who did not know the Emperor thoroughly) -that the meeting at Bayonne would open with a scolding, and end -with some tiresome concessions, but that Ferdinand’s title would be -recognized. Savary’s commentary was reassuring: Spanish witnesses say -that he exclaimed ‘I am ready to have my head taken off if, within a -quarter of an hour of your majesty’s arrival at Bayonne, the Emperor -has not saluted you as King of Spain and the Indies.... The whole -negotiation will not take three days, and your majesty will be back in -Spain in a moment[50].’ - - [50] Cevallos, p. 36. - -On April 19, therefore, the royal party set out amid the groans of -the populace of Vittoria, who tried to hold back the horses, and to -cut the traces of the King’s coach: on the twentieth they reached -Bayonne. Napoleon entertained them at dinner, but would not talk -politics: after the meal they were sent home to the not very spacious -or magnificent lodgings prepared for them. An hour later the shameless -Savary presented himself at the door, with the astounding message that -the Emperor had thought matters over, and had come to the conclusion -that the best thing for Spain would be that the house of Bourbon should -cease to reign, and that a French prince should take their place. A -prompt acquiescence in the bargain should be rewarded by the gift of -the kingdom of Etruria, which had just been taken from Ferdinand’s -widowed sister and her young son. - -The possibility of such an outrage had never occurred to the young king -and his counsellors: when something of the kind had been suggested -to them at Vittoria, they had cried out that it was insulting to the -honour of the greatest hero of the age to dream that he could be -plotting treachery[51]. And now, too late, they learnt the stuff of -which heroes were made. Even with Savary’s words ringing in their ears, -they could not believe that they had heard aright. It must be some mere -threat intended to frighten them before negotiations began: probably -it meant that Spain would have to cede some American colonies or some -Catalonian frontier districts. Next morning, therefore, Ferdinand sent -his minister Cevallos to plead his cause: Napoleon refused to bargain -or compromise: he wanted nothing, he said, but a prompt resignation -of his rights by the Prince of the Asturias: there was nothing left -to haggle about. It was gradually borne in upon Ferdinand that the -Emperor meant what he had said. But though timid he was obstinate, -and nothing like an abdication could be got out of him. He merely -continued to send to Napoleon one agent after another--first the -minister Cevallos, then his tutor and confidant Escoiquiz, then Don -Pedro Labrador, a councillor of state, all charged with professions -of his great readiness to do anything, short of resigning the Spanish -throne, which might satisfy his captor. Cevallos and Escoiquiz have -left long narratives of their fruitless embassies. That of the latter -is especially interesting: he was admitted to a long conference with -Bonaparte, in which he plied every argument to induce him to leave -Ferdinand on the throne, after marrying him to a French princess and -exacting from him every possible guarantee of fidelity. The Emperor -was ready to listen to every remonstrance, but would not move from -his projects. He laughed at the idea that Spain would rise in arms, -and give him trouble. ‘Countries full of monks, like yours,’ he said, -‘are easy to subjugate. There may be some riots, but the Spaniards -will quiet down when they see that I offer them the integrity of -the boundaries of the monarchy, a liberal constitution, and the -preservation of their religion and their national customs[52].’ - - [51] It was the Duke of Infantado who made this exclamation. See - Urquijo’s letter to Cuesta in Llorente’s collection of papers on - the Bayonne business. - - [52] Escoiquiz, p. 318. Every student of Napoleon should read the - whole of the wonderful dialogue between the Emperor and the Canon - of Toledo. - -When such were Napoleon’s ideas it was useless to argue with him. But -Ferdinand refused to understand this, and kept reiterating all sorts -of impracticable offers of concession and subservience, while refusing -to do the one thing which the Emperor required of him. Napoleon, much -irritated at the refusal of such a poor creature to bow to his will, -has left a sketch of him during these trying days. ‘The Prince of the -Asturias,’ he wrote, ‘is very stupid, very malicious, a very great -hater of France.... He is a thoroughly uninteresting person, so dull -that I cannot get a word out of him. Whatever one says to him he makes -no reply. Whether I scold him, or whether I coax him, his face never -moves. After studying him you can sum him up in a single word--he is a -sulky fellow[53].’ - - [53] Napoleon to Talleyrand, May 6, 1808. - -As Ferdinand would not budge, Bonaparte had now to bring his second -device to the front. With the old king’s protest before him, the -Emperor could say that Charles IV had never abdicated in any real sense -of the word. He had been made to sign a resignation ‘with a pistol -levelled at his head,’ as a leading article in the _Moniteur_ duly -set forth. Such a document was, of course, worth nothing: therefore -Charles was still King of Spain, and might sign that surrender of -his rights which Ferdinand denied. Napoleon promptly sent for the old -king and queen, who arrived under a French escort on April 30, ten -days after their son’s captivity began. At Bayonne they rejoined their -dearly-loved Godoy, whom Murat had extorted from the Junta of Regency, -under cover of a consent sent by Ferdinand to Napoleon from Vittoria -two days before he crossed the frontier. - -Charles IV arrived in a state of lachrymose collapse, sank on -Napoleon’s breast and called him his true friend and his only support. -‘I really do not know whether it is his position or the circumstances, -but he looks like a good honest old man,’ commented the Emperor. ‘The -Queen has her past written on her face--that is enough to define her. -As to the Prince of the Peace, he looked like a prize bull, with a dash -of Count Daru about him.’ Godoy and the Queen had only one thought, to -avenge themselves on Ferdinand: after what had taken place they could -never go back to rule in Spain, so they cared little what happened to -the country. As to the King, his wife and his favourite pulled the -strings, and he gesticulated in the fashion that they desired. The -Emperor treated them with an ostentatious politeness which he had -always refused to the new king: at the first banquet that he gave them -occurred the absurd scene (already mentioned by us), in which Charles -refused to sit down to table till Godoy had been found and put near him. - -Two days after their arrival Napoleon compelled Ferdinand to appear -before his parents: he himself was also present. The interview[54] -commenced by King Charles ordering his son to sign a complete and -absolute renunciation of the Spanish throne. Bonaparte then threw in -a few threatening words: but Ferdinand, still unmoved, made a steady -refusal. At this the old king rose from his chair--he was half-crippled -with rheumatism--and tried to strike his son with his cane, while the -Queen burst in with a stream of abuse worthy of a fishwife. Napoleon, -horrified at the odious scene, according to his own narrative of it, -hurried Ferdinand, ‘who looked scared,’ out of the room. - - [54] Of this interview we have the version of Napoleon himself - in a dispatch to Murat, dated May 1; another by Cevallos, - Ferdinand’s minister; a third by De Pradt (afterwards Archbishop - of Mechlin), then present at Bayonne. - -The same night [May 1], Ferdinand’s advisers bethought them of a new -and ingenious move--we need not ascribe it to his own brains, which -were surely incapable of the device. He wrote to King Charles to the -effect that he had always regarded the abdication at Aranjuez as free -and unconstrained, but that if it had not been so, he was ready to lay -down his crown again and hand it back to his father. But the ceremony -must be done in an open and honourable way at Madrid, before the -Cortes. If his parent personally resumed the reins of power, he bowed -to his authority: but if his age and infirmities induced him to name a -regent, that regent should be his eldest son. - -This proposal did not suit the Emperor at all, so he dictated to the -old king a long letter, in which the Napoleonesque phraseology peeps -out in a score of places. Charles refuses all terms, says that his -son’s conduct had ‘placed a barrier of bronze between him and the -Spanish throne,’ and concludes that ‘only the Emperor can save Spain, -and he himself would do nothing that might stir up the fire of discord -among his loved vassals or bring misery on them’ [May 2]. Ferdinand -replied with an equally long letter justifying at large all his conduct -of the past year [May 4]. - -When things stood at this point there arrived from Madrid the news of -the bloody events of the second of May, which we have to relate in the -next chapter. This brought Napoleon up to striking point, and once -more he intervened in his own person. He sent for Ferdinand, and in -the presence of his parents accused him of having stirred up the riot -in the capital, and informed him that if he did not sign an abdication -and an acknowledgement of his father as the only true king by twelve -that night ‘he should be dealt with as a traitor and rebel.’ This is -Napoleon’s own version[55], but Spanish witnesses say that the words -used were that ‘he must choose between abdication and death[56].’ - - [55] Dispatch to Murat of May 5. - - [56] ‘Prince, il faut opter entre la cession et la mort’ - (Cevallos, p. 60). - -To any one who remembered the fate of the Duc d’Enghien such a phrase -was more than an idle threat. It brought the stubborn Ferdinand to his -knees at last. That evening he wrote out a simple and straightforward -form of abdication--‘without any motive, save that I limited my former -proposal for resignation by certain proper conditions, your majesty has -thought fit to insult me in the presence of my mother and the Emperor. -I have been abused in the most humiliating terms: I have been told -that unless I make an unconditional resignation I and my companions -shall be treated as criminals guilty of conspiracy. Under such -circumstances I make the renunciation which your majesty commands, that -the government of Spain may return to the condition in which it was on -March 19 last, the day on which your majesty _spontaneously_ laid down -your crown in my favour[57]’ [May 6]. - - [57] Toreño, Appendix, i. 466, 467. - -Ferdinand having abdicated, Napoleon at once produced a treaty which -King Charles had ratified on the previous day, twenty-four hours before -his son gave in. By it the old man ‘resigned all his rights to the -throne of Spain and the Indies to the Emperor Napoleon, the only person -who in the present state of affairs can re-establish order.’ He only -annexed two conditions: ‘(1) that there should be no partition of the -Spanish monarchy; (2) that the Roman Catholic religion should be the -only one recognized in Spain: there should, according to the existing -practice, be no toleration for any of the reformed religions, much less -for infidels.’ If anything is wanting to make the silly old man odious, -it is the final touch of bigotry in his abdication. The rest of the -document consists of a recital of the pensions and estates in France -conferred by the Emperor on his dupe in return for the abdication. -It took five days more to extort from Don Ferdinand a formal cession -of his ultimate rights, as Prince of the Asturias, to the succession -to the throne. It was signed on May 10, and purported to give him in -return a palace in France and a large annual revenue. But he was really -put under close surveillance at Talleyrand’s estate of Valençay, along -with his brother Don Carlos, and never allowed to go beyond its bounds. -The Emperor’s letter of instructions to Talleyrand is worth quoting -for its cynical brutality. He wrote to his ex-minister, who was much -disgusted with the invidious duty put upon him: ‘Let the princes be -received without any show, but yet respectably, and try to keep them -amused. If you chance to have a theatre at Valençay there would be no -harm in importing some actors now and then. You may bring over Mme de -Talleyrand [the notorious Mme Grand of 1800], and four or five ladies -in attendance on her. If the prince should fall in love with some -pretty girl among them, there would be no harm in it, especially if you -are quite sure of her. The prince must not be allowed to take any false -step, but must be amused and occupied. I ought, for political safety, -to put him in Bitche or some other fortress-prison: but as he placed -himself into my clutches of his own free will, and as everything in -Spain is going on as I desire, I have resolved merely to place him in a -country house where he can amuse himself under strict surveillance.... -Your mission is really a very honourable one--to take in three[58] -illustrious guests and keep them amused is a task which should suit a -Frenchman and a personage of your rank[59].’ Napoleon afterwards owned -that he was framing what he called ‘a practical joke’ on Talleyrand, by -billeting the Spaniards on him. The Prince of Benevento had wished to -make no appearance in the matter, and the Emperor revenged himself by -implicating him in it as the jailor of his captives. Talleyrand’s anger -may be imagined, and estimated by his after conduct. - - [58] The _third_ prisoner was Ferdinand’s uncle, Don Antonio. - - [59] This letter, eliminated by the editors of the - _Correspondance de Napoléon_, may be found in Lecestre, _Lettres - inédites de Napoléon I_, i. p. 207. - -At Valençay the unfortunate Ferdinand was destined to remain for nearly -six years, not amusing himself at all according to Napoleon’s ideas -of amusement, but employed in a great many church services, a little -partridge shooting, and (so his unwilling jailor tells us) the spoiling -of much paper, not with the pen but with the scissors; for he developed -a childish passion for clipping out paper patterns and bestowing them -on every one that he met. One could pardon him everything if he had -not spoilt his attitude as victim and martyr by occasionally sending -adulatory letters to the Emperor, and even to his own supplanter, -Joseph Bonaparte the new King of Spain. - - - - -SECTION I: CHAPTER VI - -THE SECOND OF MAY: OUTBREAK OF THE SPANISH INSURRECTION - - -When King Ferdinand had taken his departure to Bayonne, the position -of Murat in Madrid became very delicate. He might expect to hear at -any moment, since the Emperor’s plans were more or less known to him, -either that the Spanish king had been made a prisoner, or that he had -taken the alarm, escaped from his escort, and fled into the mountains. -In either case trouble at Madrid was very probable, though there was -no serious military danger to be feared, for of Spanish troops there -were only 3,000 in the city, while some 35,000 French were encamped in -or about it. But there might be a moment of confusion if the Junta of -Regency should take violent measures on hearing of the King’s fate, -or the populace of Madrid (and this was much more likely) burst into -rioting. - -From the tenth of April, the day of the King’s departure for the north, -down to the twenty-ninth there was no serious cause for apprehension. -The people were no doubt restless: they could not understand why the -French lingered in Madrid instead of marching on Portugal or Gibraltar, -according to their expressed intention. Rumours of all kinds, some -of which hit off fairly well the true projects of Bonaparte, were -current. Murat’s conduct was not calculated to reassure observers; -he gave himself the airs of a military governor, rather than those -of an officer engaged in conducting an allied army through friendly -territory. Some of his acts gave terrible offence, such as that of -insisting that the sword of Francis I, taken at Pavia in 1525, the -pride for three centuries of the royal armoury, should be given up to -him[60]. His call on the Junta for the surrender of the Prince of -the Peace, whom he forwarded under French escort to Bayonne, could -not fail to be unpopular. But the first real signs of danger were -not seen till the twenty-second of April, when Murat, in obedience -to his master, intended to publish the protest of Charles IV against -his abdication. It was to be presented to the Junta in the form of a -letter to its president, Don Antonio. Meanwhile French agents were -set to print it: their Spanish underlings stole and circulated some -of the proofs. Their appearance raised a mob, for the name of Charles -IV could only suggest the reappearance of Godoy. An angry crowd broke -into the printing office, destroyed the presses, and hunted away the -Frenchmen. Murat at once made a great matter of the affair, and began -to threaten the Junta. ‘The army which he commanded could not without -dishonouring itself allow disorders to arise: there must be no more -anarchy in Spain. He was not going to allow the corrupt tools of the -English government to stir up troubles.’ The Junta replied with rather -more spirit than might have been expected, asked why an army of 35,000 -French troops had now lingered more than a month around the capital, -and expressed an opinion that the riot was but an explosion of loyalty -to Ferdinand. But they undertook to deal severely with factious -persons, and to discourage even harmless assemblies like that of the -twenty-second. - - [60] Napoleon, disapproving of Murat’s action on this point, - committed himself to two astounding historical statements. ‘Why - trouble about the sword,’ he wrote; ‘Francis I was a Bourbon [!] - and he was taken by the Italians, not the Spaniards’ [!!] (_Nap. - Corresp._, 13,724). - -Meanwhile Murat wrote to the Emperor that it was absurd that he could -not yet establish a police of his own in Madrid, that he could not -print what he pleased, and that he had to negotiate with the Junta when -he wished his orders published, instead of being able to issue them -on his own authority[61]. He was answered in a style which must have -surprised him. Napoleon was ashamed, he said, of a general who, with -50,000 men at his back, asked for things instead of taking them. His -letters to the Junta were servile; he should simply assume possession -of the reins of power, and act for himself. If the _canaille_ stirred, -let it be shot down[62]. Murat could only reply that ‘if he had not yet -scattered rioters by a blast of grape, it was only because there were -no mobs to shoot: his imperial majesty’s rebuke had stunned him “like a -tile falling on his head” by its unmerited severity[63].’ - - [61] Murat to Napoleon, April 22. - - [62] Napoleon to Murat, April 26. - - [63] Murat to Napoleon, April 30. - -Within three days of this letter there was to be plenty of grape-shot, -enough to satisfy both Emperor and Grand-Duke. They probably had the -revolt of Cairo and the 13th Vendémiaire in their mind, and were -both under the impression that a good _émeute_ pitilessly crushed by -artillery was the best basis of a new régime. - -On the night of April 29 the first clear and accurate account of what -was happening at Bayonne arrived at Madrid. Napoleon had intercepted -all the letters which Don Ferdinand had tried to smuggle out of his -prison. He read them with grave disapproval, for his guest had not -scrupled to use the expression ‘the cursed French,’ and had hinted at -the propriety of resistance. He had not yet been cowed by the threat -of a rebel’s death. But on the twenty-third one of the Spaniards at -Bayonne succeeded in escaping in disguise, crossed the mountains by a -lonely track, and reached Pampeluna, whence he posted to Madrid. This -was a certain Navarrese magistrate named Ibarnavarro, to whom Ferdinand -had given a verbal message to explain Napoleon’s plans and conduct -to the Junta, and to inform them that he would never give in to this -vile mixture of force and fraud. He could not send them any definite -instructions, not knowing the exact state of affairs at Madrid, and a -premature stroke might imperil the life of himself, his brother, and -his companions: let them beware therefore of showing their warlike -intentions till preparations had been fully made to shake off the yoke -of the oppressor. - -This message Ibarnavarro delivered on the night of April 29-30 to the -Junta[64], who had summoned in to hear it a number of judges and other -magnates of the city. Next morning, of course, the information, in a -more or less garbled shape, spread all round Madrid: there were foolish -rumours that the Biscayans had already taken arms, and that 30,000 of -them were marching on Bayonne to save the King, as also that certain -of the coast towns had invited the English to land. On the thirtieth -leaflets, both written and printed, were being secretly circulated -round the city, setting forth the unhappy condition of the King, and -bidding his subjects not to forget Numancia[65]. It is astonishing that -riots did not break out at once, considering the growing excitement -of the people, and the habitual insolence of the French soldiery. -But leaders were wanting, and in especial the Junta of Regency and -its imbecile old president made no move whatever, on the pretext, -apparently, that any commotion might imperil the lives of Napoleon’s -prisoners. - - [64] Ibarnavarro’s story, written down by himself on September - 27, 1808, can be found printed in full on pp. 457-9 of the - Appendix to Toreño’s first volume. - - [65] For a specimen see the document on p. 462 of Count Murat’s - _Murat en Espagne_ (Paris, 1897). - -It was Murat himself who brought matters to a head next day, by -ordering the Junta to put into his hands the remaining members of the -royal family, Ferdinand’s youngest brother Don Francisco, a boy of -sixteen, and his sister the widowed and exiled Queen of Etruria, with -her children. Only Don Antonio, the incapable president of the Junta, -and the Archbishop of Toledo, the King’s second-cousin, were to be left -behind: the rest were to be sent to Bayonne. Knowing what had happened -to Don Ferdinand and Don Carlos, the people were horrified at the -news; but they trusted that the Regency would refuse its leave. To its -eternal disgrace that body did nothing: it did not even try to smuggle -away the young Don Francisco before Murat should arrest him. - -[Illustration: Madrid in 1808.] - -On the morning, therefore, of May 2 the streets were filled with -people, and the palace gates in especial were beset by an excited mob. -It was soon seen that the news was true, for the Queen of Etruria -appeared and started for the north with all her numerous family. She -was unpopular for having sided with her mother and Godoy against Don -Ferdinand, and was allowed to depart undisturbed. But when the carriage -that was to bear off Don Francisco was brought up, and one of Murat’s -aides-de-camp appeared at the door to take charge of the young prince, -the rage of the crowd burst all bounds. The French officer was stoned, -and saved with difficulty by a patrol: the coach was torn to pieces. -Murat had not been unprepared for something of the kind: the battalion -on guard at his palace was at once turned out, and fired a dozen -volleys into the unarmed mob, which fled devious, leaving scores of -dead and wounded on the ground. - -The Grand-Duke thought that the matter was over, but it had but just -begun. At the noise of the firing the excited citizens flocked into -the streets armed with whatever came to hand, pistols, blunderbusses, -fowling-pieces, many only with the long Spanish knife. They fell upon, -and slew, a certain number of isolated French soldiers, armed and -unarmed, who were off duty and wandering round the town, but they also -made a fierce attack on Murat’s guard. Of course they could do little -against troops armed and in order: in the first hour of the fight there -were only about 1,000 men at the Grand-Duke’s disposal, but this small -force held its own without much loss, though eight or ten thousand -angry insurgents fell upon them. But within seventy minutes the French -army from the suburban camps came pouring into the city, brigade after -brigade. After this the struggle was little more than a massacre: many -of the insurgents took refuge in houses, and maintained a fierce but -futile resistance for some time; but the majority were swept away in a -few minutes by cavalry charges. Only at one point did the fight assume -a serious shape. Almost the entire body of the Spanish garrison of -Madrid refrained from taking any part in the rising: without the orders -of the Junta the chiefs refused to move, and the men waited in vain for -the orders of their officers. But at the Artillery Park two captains, -Daoiz and Velarde, threw open the gates to the rioters, allowed them -to seize some hundreds of muskets, and when the first French column -appeared ran out three guns and opened upon it with grape[66]. Though -aided by no more than forty soldiers, and perhaps 500 civilians, -they beat off two assaults, and only succumbed to a third. Daoiz was -bayonetted, Velarde shot dead, and their men perished with them; but -they had poured three volleys of grape into a street packed with the -enemy, and caused the only serious losses which the French suffered -that day. - - [66] Napier (i. 15) says that Daoiz and Velarde were ‘in a state - of excitement from drink,’ a disgraceful French calumny. How - could he bear to reproduce such a libel on these unfortunate - officers? - -The whole struggle had occupied not more than four hours: when it was -over Murat issued an ‘order of the day,’ sentencing all prisoners taken -with arms in their hands, all persons discovered with arms concealed -in their houses, and all distributors of seditious leaflets, ‘the -agents of the English government,’ to be shot. It seems that at least a -hundred persons were executed under this edict, many of them innocent -bystanders who had taken no part in the fighting. Next morning Murat -withdrew his Draconian decree, and no further fusillades took place. -It is impossible, in the conflict of authorities, to arrive at any -clear estimate of the numbers slain on each side on May 2[67]. Probably -Toreño is not far out when he estimates the whole at something over a -thousand. Of these four-fifths must have been Spaniards, for the French -only lost heavily at the arsenal: the number of isolated soldiers -murdered in the streets at the first outbreak of the riot does not seem -to have been very large. - - [67] The Junta, to soothe the feelings of Madrid, gave out that - only 150 Spaniards had fallen. The _Moniteur_ said that 2,000 - criminals had been cut down or executed! Murat reported a loss of - eighty men only, while Napier says that he has excellent French - authority and eye-witnesses to the effect that 750 fell. - -Many French authors have called the rising a deliberate and -preconcerted conspiracy to massacre the French garrison. On the other -hand Spanish writers have asserted that Murat had arranged everything -so as to cause a riot, in order that he might have the chance of -administering a ‘whiff of grape-shot,’ after his master’s plan. -But it is clear that both are making unfounded accusations: if the -insurrection had been premeditated, the Spanish soldiery would have -been implicated in it, for nothing would have been easier than to -stir them up. Yet of the whole 3,000 only forty ran out to help the -insurgents. Moreover, the mob would have been found armed at the first -commencement of trouble, which it certainly was not. On the other hand, -if Murat had been organizing a massacre, he would not have been caught -with no more than two squadrons of cavalry and five or six companies -of infantry under his hand. These might have been cut to pieces before -the troops from outside could come to their help. He had been expecting -riots, and was prepared to deal with them, but was surprised by a -serious insurrection on a larger scale than he had foreseen, and at a -moment when he was not ready. - -For a few days after May 2, Murat at Madrid and his master at Bayonne -were both living in a sort of fools’ paradise, imagining that ‘the -affairs of Spain were going off wonderfully well,’ and that ‘the -party of Ferdinand had been crushed by the prompt suppression of its -conspiracy.’ The Grand-Duke had the simplicity or the effrontery to -issue a proclamation in which he said ‘that every good Spaniard had -groaned at the sight of such disorders,’ and another in which the -insurrection was attributed to ‘the machinations of our common enemy, -i.e. the British government[68].’ On May 4 Don Antonio laid down the -presidency of the Junta without a word of regret, and went off to -Bayonne, having first borrowed 25,000 francs from Murat. The latter, by -virtue of a decree issued by Charles IV, then assumed the presidency -of the Junta of Regency. The rest of the members of that ignoble body -easily sank into his servile instruments, though they had at last -received a secret note smuggled out from Bayonne, in which Ferdinand -(the day before his abdication) told them to regard his removal into -the interior of France as a declaration of war, and to call the nation -to arms. To this they paid no attention, while they pretended to take -the document of resignation, which Bonaparte had forced him to sign, -as an authentic and spontaneous expression of his will. The fact is -that twenty years of Godoy had thoroughly demoralized the bureaucracy -and the court of Spain: if the country’s will had not found better -exponents than her ministers and officials, Napoleon might have done -what he pleased with the Peninsula. - - [68] Proclamations of May 2 and 3: there are originals in the - _Vaughan Papers_. - -At present his sole interest seems to have lain in settling the details -of his brother Joseph’s election to the Spanish throne. Ferdinand’s -final resignation of all his rights having been signed on May 10, the -field was open for his successor. The Emperor thought that some sort of -deputation to represent the Spanish nation ought to be got together, -in order that his brother might not seem to receive the crown from his -own hands only. Murat was first set to work to terrorize the Junta -of Regency, and the ‘Council of Castile,’ a body which practically -occupied much the same position as the English Privy Council. At his -dictation the Junta yielded, but with an ill grace, and sent petitions -to Bayonne asking for a new monarch, and suggesting (as desired) that -the person chosen might be Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples [May -13]. Murat had just been informed that as all had gone well with the -Emperor’s plans he should have his reward: he might make his choice -between the thrones of Naples and of Portugal. He wisely chose the -former, where the rough work of subjection had already been done by his -predecessor. - -But resolved to get together something like a representative body -which might vote away the liberty of Spain, Napoleon nominated, in -the Madrid Gazette of May 24, 150 persons who were to go to Bayonne -and there ask him to grant them a king. He named a most miscellaneous -crowd--ministers, bishops, judges, municipal officers of Madrid, dukes -and counts, the heads of the religious orders, the Grand Inquisitor and -some of his colleagues, and six well-known Americans who were to speak -for the colonies. To the eternal disgrace of the ruling classes of -Spain, no less than ninety-one of the nominees were base enough to obey -the orders given them, to go to Bayonne, and there to crave as a boon -that the weak and incompetent Joseph Bonaparte might be set to govern -their unhappy country, under the auspices of his brother the hero and -regenerator. Long before the degrading farce was complete, the whole -country was in arms behind them, and they knew themselves for traitors. -The election of King Joseph I was only taken in hand on June 15, while -twenty days before the north and south of Spain had risen in arms in -the name of the captive Ferdinand VII. - -It took a week for the news of the insurrection of May 2 to spread -round Spain: in the public mouth it of course assumed the shape of -a massacre deliberately planned by Murat. It was not till some days -later that the full details of the events at Bayonne got abroad. But -ever since the surprise of the frontier fortresses in February and -March, intelligent men all over the country had been suspecting that -some gross act of treachery was likely to be the outcome of the French -invasion. Yet in most of the districts of Spain there was a gap of some -days between the arrival of the news of the King’s captivity and the -first outbreak of popular indignation. The fact was that the people -were waiting for the lawful and constituted authorities to take action, -and did not move of themselves till it was certain that no initiative -was to be expected from those in high places. But Spain was a country -which had long been governed on despotic lines; and its official -chiefs, whether the nominees of Godoy or of the knot of intriguers who -had just won their way to power under Ferdinand, were not the men to -lead a war of national independence. Many were mere adventurers, who -had risen to preferment by flattering the late favourite. Others were -typical bureaucrats, whose only concern was to accept as legitimate -whatever orders reached them from Madrid: provided those orders were -couched in the proper form and written on the right paper, they did not -look to see whether the signature at the bottom was that of Godoy or -of the Infante Don Antonio, or of Murat. Others again were courtiers -who owed their position to their great names, and not to any personal -ability. It is this fact that accounts for the fortnight or even three -weeks of torpor that followed the events of the second and sixth of -May. Murat’s orders during that space travelled over the country, and -most of the captains-general and other authorities seemed inclined to -obey them. Yet they were orders which should have stirred up instant -disobedience; the Mediterranean squadron was to be sent to Toulon, -where (if it did not get taken on the way by the British) it would -fall into the hands of Napoleon. A large detachment of the depleted -regular army was to sail for Buenos Ayres, with the probable prospect -of finding itself ere long on the hulks at Portsmouth, instead of on -the shores of the Rio de la Plata. The Swiss regiments in Spanish pay -were directed to be transferred to the French establishment, and to -take the oath to Napoleon. All this could have no object save that of -diminishing the fighting power of the country. - -The first province where the people plucked up courage to act without -their officials, and to declare war on France in spite of the dreadful -odds against them, was the remote and inaccessible principality of -the Asturias, pressed in between the Bay of Biscay and the Cantabrian -hills. Riots began at its capital, Oviedo, as early as the first -arrival of the news from Madrid on May 9, when Murat’s edicts were -torn down in spite of the feeble resistance of the commander of the -garrison and some of the magistrates. The Asturias was one of the few -provinces of Spain which still preserved vestiges of its mediaeval -representative institutions. It had a ‘Junta General,’ a kind of local -‘estates,’ which chanced to be in session at the time of the crisis. -Being composed of local magnates and citizens, and not of officials and -bureaucrats, this body was sufficiently in touch with public opinion to -feel itself borne on to action. After ten days of secret preparation, -the city of Oviedo and the surrounding country-side rose in unison -on May 24: the partisans of the new government were imprisoned, and -next day the estates formally declared war on Napoleon Bonaparte, and -ordered a levy of 18,000 men from the principality to resist invasion. -A great part of the credit for this daring move must be given to the -president of the Junta, the Marquis of Santa Cruz, who had stirred -up his colleagues as early as the thirteenth by declaring that ‘when -and wherever one single Spaniard took arms against Napoleon, he would -shoulder a musket and put himself at that man’s side.’ The Asturians -had knowledge that other provinces would follow their example; there -was only one battalion of regular troops and one of militia under arms -in the province; its financial resources were small. Its only strength -lay in the rough mountains that had once sheltered King Pelayo from -the Moors. It was therefore an astounding piece of patriotism when the -inhabitants of the principality threw down the challenge to the victor -of Jena and Austerlitz, confiding in their stern resolution and their -good cause. All through the war the Asturias played a very creditable -part in the struggle, and never let the light of liberty go out, though -often its capital and its port of Gihon fell into French hands. - -One of the first and wisest measures taken by the Asturian Junta was an -attempt to interest Great Britain in the insurrection. On May 30 they -sent to London two emissaries (one of whom was the historian Toreño) -on a Jersey privateer, whose captain was persuaded to turn out of his -course for the public profit. On June 7 they had reached London and had -an interview with Canning, the Foreign Secretary of the Tory government -which had lately come into power. Five days later they were assured -that the Asturias might draw on England for all it required in the way -of arms, munitions, and money. All this was done before it was known in -England that any other Spanish province was stirring, for it was not -till June 22 that the plenipotentiaries of the other juntas began to -appear in London. - -The revolt of other provinces followed in very quick succession. -Galicia rose on May 30, in spite of its captain-general, Filanghieri, -whose resistance to the popular voice cost him his popularity and, -not long after, his life. Corunna and Ferrol, the two northern -arsenals of Spain, led the way. This addition to the insurgent -forces was very important, for the province was full of troops--the -garrisons that protected the ports from English descents. There were -eighteen battalions of regulars and fourteen of militia--a whole -army--concentrated in this remote corner of Spain. Napoleon’s plan -of removing the Spanish troops from the neighbourhood of Madrid had -produced the unintended result of making the outlying provinces very -strong for self-defence. - -It is more fitting for a Spanish than an English historian to descend -into the details of the rising of each province of Spain. The general -characteristics of the outburst in each region were much the same: -hardly anywhere did the civil or military officials in charge of the -district take the lead. Almost invariably they hung back, fearing -for their places and profits, and realizing far better than did the -insurgents the enormous military power which they were challenging. -The leaders of the movement were either local magnates not actually -holding office--like the celebrated Joseph Palafox at Saragossa--or -demagogues of the streets, or (but less frequently than might have -been expected) churchmen, Napoleon was quite wrong when he called the -Spanish rising ‘an insurrection of monks.’ The church followed the -nation, and not the nation the church: indeed many of the spiritual -hierarchy were among the most servile instruments of Murat. Among them -was the primate of Spain, the Archbishop of Toledo, who was actually -a scion of the house of Bourbon. There were many ecclesiastics among -the dishonoured ninety-one that went to Bayonne, if there were others -who (like the Bishop of Santander) put themselves at the head of their -flocks when the country took arms. - -It was a great misfortune for Spain that the juntas, which were -everywhere formed when the people rose, had to be composed in large -part of men unacquainted with government and organization. There were -many intelligent patriots among their members, a certain number of -statesmen who had been kept down or disgraced by Godoy, but also a -large proportion of ambitious windbags and self-seeking intriguers. It -was hard to constitute a capable government, on the spur of the moment, -in a country which had suffered twenty years of Godoy’s rule. - -An unfortunate feature of the rising was that in most of the provinces, -and especially those of the south, it took from the first a very -sanguinary cast. It was natural that the people should sweep away in -their anger every official who tried to keep them down, or hesitated -to commit himself to the struggle with France. But there was no reason -to murder these weaklings or traitors, in the style of the Jacobins. -There was a terrible amount of assassination, public and private, -during the first days of the insurrection. Three captains-general were -slain under circumstances of brutal cruelty--Filanghieri in Galicia, -Torre del Fresno in Estremadura, Solano at Cadiz. The fate of Solano -may serve as an example: he tried to keep the troops from joining the -people, and vainly harangued the mob: pointing to the distant sails -of the English blockading squadron he shouted, ‘There are your real -enemies!’ But his words had no effect: he was hunted down in a house -where he took refuge, and was being dragged to be hung on the public -gallows, when the hand of a fanatic (or perhaps of a secret friend -who wished to spare him a dishonourable death) dealt him a fatal -stab in the side. Gregorio de la Cuesta, the Governor-General of Old -Castile, who was destined to play such a prominent and unhappy part in -the history of the next two years, nearly shared Solano’s fate. The -populace of Valladolid, where he was residing, rose in insurrection -like those of the other cities of Spain. They called on their military -chief to put himself at their head; but Cuesta, an old soldier of the -most unintelligent and brainless sort, hated mob-violence almost more -than he hated the French. He held back, not from a desire to serve -Bonaparte, but from a dislike to being bullied by civilians. The -indignant populace erected a gallows outside his house and came to hang -him thereon. It was not, it is said, till the rope was actually round -his neck that the obstinate old man gave in. The Castilians promptly -released him, and put him at the head of the armed rabble which formed -their only force. Remembering the awful slaughter at Cabezon, at Medina -de Rio Seco, and at Medellin, which his incapacity and mulish obstinacy -was destined to bring about, it is impossible not to express the wish -that his consent to take arms had been delayed for a few minutes longer. - -All over Spain there took place, during the last days of May and -the first week of June, scores of murders of prominent men, of old -favourites of Godoy, of colonels who would not allow their regiments -to march, of officials who had shown alacrity in obeying the orders of -Murat. In the Asturias and at Saragossa alone do the new juntas seem -to have succeeded in keeping down assassination. The worst scenes took -place at Valencia, where a mad priest, the Canon Baltasar Calvo, led -out a mob of ruffians who in two days [June 6-7] murdered 338 persons, -the whole colony of French merchants residing in that wealthy town. It -is satisfactory to know that when the Junta of Valencia felt itself -firmly seated in the saddle of power, it seized and executed this -abominable person and his chief lieutenants. In too many parts of Spain -the murderers went unpunished: yet remembering the provocation which -the nation had received, and comparing the blood shed by mob-violence -with that which flowed in Revolutionary France, we must consider the -outburst deplorable rather than surprising. - -When the insurrection had reached its full development, we find that -it centred round five points, in each of which a separate junta had -seized on power and begun to levy an army. The most powerful focus -was Seville, from which all Andalusia took its directions: indeed -the Junta of Seville had assumed the arrogant style of ‘supreme Junta -of Spain and the Indies,’ to which it had no legitimate title. The -importance of Andalusia was that it was full of troops, the regular -garrisons having been joined by most of the expeditionary corps which -had returned from southern Portugal. Moreover it was in possession of a -full treasury and a fleet, and had free communication with the English -at Gibraltar. On June 15 the Andalusians struck the first military blow -that told on Napoleon, by bombarding and capturing the French fleet -(the relics of Trafalgar) which lay at their mercy within the harbour -of Cadiz. - -The second in importance of the centres of resistance was Galicia, -which was also fairly well provided with troops, and contained the -arsenals of Ferrol and Corunna. The risings in Asturias, and the -feebler gatherings of patriots in Leon and Old Castile, practically -became branches of the Galician insurrection, though they were directed -by their own juntas and tried to work for themselves. It was on the -army of Galicia that they relied for support, and without it they would -not have been formidable. The boundaries of this area of insurrection -were Santander, Valladolid, and Segovia: further east the troops of -Moncey and Bessières, in the direction of Burgos and Aranda, kept the -country-side from rising. There were sporadic gatherings of peasants -in the Upper Ebro valley and the mountains of Northern Castile, but -these were mere unorganized ill-armed bands that half a battalion could -disperse. It was the same in the Basque Provinces and Navarre: here too -the French lay cantoned so thickly that it was impossible to meddle -with them: their points of concentration were Vittoria and the two -fortresses of Pampeluna and San Sebastian. - -The other horn of the half-moon of revolt, which encircled Madrid, was -composed of the insurrections in Murcia and Valencia to the south and -Aragon to the north. These regions were much less favourably situated -for forming centres of resistance, because they were very weak in -organized troops. When the Aragonese elected Joseph Palafox as their -captain-general and declared war on France, there were only 2,000 -regulars and one battery of artillery in their realm. The levies which -they began to raise were nothing more than half-armed peasants, with no -adequate body of officers to train and drill them. Valencia and Murcia -were a little better off, because the arsenal of Cartagena and its -garrison lay within their boundaries, but there were only 9,000 men -in all under arms in the two provinces. Clearly they could not hope to -deliver such a blow as Galicia or Andalusia might deal. - -The last centre of revolt, Catalonia, did not fall into the same -strategical system as the other four. It looked for its enemies not -at Madrid, but at Barcelona, where Lecchi and Duhesme were firmly -established ever since their _coup de main_ in February. The Catalans -had as their task the cutting off of this body of invaders from its -communication with France, and the endeavour to prevent new forces -from joining it by crossing the Eastern Pyrenees. The residence of the -insurrectionary Junta was at Tarragona, but the most important point in -the province for the moment was Gerona, a fortress commanding the main -road from France, which Napoleon had not had the foresight to seize at -the same moment that he won by treachery Barcelona and Figueras. While -the Spaniards could hold it, they had some chance of isolating the army -of Duhesme from its supports. In Catalonia, or in the Balearic Isles -off its coast, there were in May 1808, about 16,000 men of regular -troops, among whom there were only 1,200 soldiers of the cavalry arm. -There was no militia, but by old custom the _levée en masse_ might -always be called out in moments of national danger. These irregulars, -_somatenes_ as they were called (from _somaten_, the alarm-bell which -roused them), turned out in great numbers according to ancient custom: -they had been mobilized thirteen years before in the French War of -1793-5 and their warlike traditions were by no means forgotten. All -through the Peninsular struggle they made a very creditable figure, -considering their want of organization and the difficulty of keeping -them together. - -The French armies, putting aside Duhesme’s isolated force at Barcelona, -lay compactly in a great wedge piercing into the heart of Spain. Its -point was at Toledo, just south of Madrid: its base was a line drawn -from San Sebastian to Pampeluna across the Western Pyrenees. Its -backbone lay along the great high road from Vittoria by Burgos to -Madrid. The advantageous point of this position was that it completely -split Central Spain in two: there was no communication possible -between the insurgents of Galicia and those of Aragon. On the other -hand the wedge was long and narrow, and exposed to be pierced by a -force striking at it either from the north-east or the north-west. The -Aragonese rebels were too few to be dangerous; but the strong Spanish -army of Galicia was well placed for a blow at Burgos, and a successful -attack in that direction would cut off Madrid from France, and leave -the troops in and about the capital, who formed the point of the -intrusive wedge, in a very perilous condition. This is the reason why, -in the first stage of the war, Napoleon showed great anxiety as to what -the army of Galicia might do, while professing comparative equanimity -about the proceedings of the other forces of the insurrection. - -Having thus sketched the strategic position of affairs in the Peninsula -during the first days of June, we must set ourselves to learn the main -characteristics of the military geography of Spain, and to estimate the -character, organization, and fighting value of the two armies which -were just about to engage. Without some knowledge of the conditions -of warfare in Spain, a mere catalogue of battles and marches would be -absolutely useless. - - - - -SECTION II - -THE LAND AND THE COMBATANTS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF THE PENINSULA: MOUNTAINS, RIVERS, ROADS - - -Of all the regions of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula possesses the best -marked frontier. It is separated from France, its only neighbour, by -one broad range of mountains, which defines its boundaries even more -clearly than the Alps mark those of Italy. For the Alps are no single -chain, but a system of double and triple chains running parallel to -each other, and leaving between them debatable lands such as Savoy and -the Southern Tyrol. Between Spain and France there is no possibility -of any such claims and counter-claims. It is true that Roussillon, -where the eastern end of the Pyrenean range runs into the sea, was -Spanish down to 1659, but that was a political survival from the Middle -Ages, not a natural union: there can be no doubt that geographically -Roussillon is a French and not an Iberian land: the main backbone of -the boundary chain lies south and not north of it. - -The Pyrenees, though in height they cannot vie with the Alps, and -though they are not nearly so jagged or scarped as the greater chain, -are extremely difficult to cross, all the more so because the hand of -man has seldom come to help the hand of nature in making practicable -lines of access between France and Spain. In the whole length between -the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean there are only two short fronts -where intercommunication is easy, and these lie at the extreme east -and west, where the mountains touch the sea. In the 250 miles which -intervene there is hardly one good pass practicable for wheeled traffic -or for the march of an army: most are mere mule-paths, rarely used -save by smugglers and shepherds. The only one of these minor routes -employed in the war was that which leads from Jaca in Aragon to Oloron -in Béarn, and that was not much used: only on one single occasion -in 1813 does it appear prominently in history, when Clausel’s French -division, fleeing before Wellington and pressed up against the foot of -the mountains, escaped across it with some difficulty. - -The only passes that were systematically employed during the war were -those which lie close to the water at each end of the Pyrenean chain. -At the eastern end there are three which lead from Roussillon into -Catalonia. One hugs the water’s edge, and crawls along under the cliffs -from Perpignan to Rosas: this was not in 1808 the most important of the -three, though it is the one by which the railway passes to-day. Inland -there are two other roads over difficult crests--one ten, the other -forty miles from the shore--the former from Bellegarde to Figueras, the -other from Mont-Louis to Puycerda and Vich. The first was the pass most -used in the war, being less exposed than the Rosas route to English -descents from the sea: the coast road could actually be cannonaded by -warships at some corners. It was blocked indeed by the fortress of -Figueras, but that stronghold was only in Spanish hands for a very -short period of the war. The inmost, or Mont-Louis-Puycerda road was -bad, led into nothing more than a few upland valleys, and was very -little employed by the French. It would have been of importance had it -led down into the lowlands of Aragon, but after taking a long turn in -the hills it harks back towards the Catalan coast, and joins the other -two roads near Gerona--a fortress which is so placed as practically to -command every possible access into Eastern Spain. - -Taking all three of these paths into Catalonia together, they do -but form a sort of back door into the Iberian Peninsula. They only -communicate with the narrow eastern coast-strip from Barcelona to -Valencia. There is no direct access from them into Castile, the heart -of the country, and only a roundabout entrance by Lerida into Aragon. -The great mass of the Catalan and Valencian Sierras bars them out from -the main bulk of the Spanish realm. Catalonia and Valencia, wealthy and -in parts fertile as they are, are but its back premises. - -The true front door of the kingdom is formed by the passes at the -other, the western, end of the Pyrenees. Here too we have three -available routes, but they differ in character from the roads at the -edge of the Mediterranean, in that they open up two completely separate -lines of advance into Spain, and do not (like the Catalan defiles) -all lead on to the same goal. All three start from Bayonne, the great -southern fortress of Gascony. The first keeps for some time close to -the seaside, and after crossing the Bidassoa, the boundary river of -France and Spain, at Irun, leaves the fortress of San Sebastian a few -miles to its right and then charges the main chain of the mountains. It -emerges at Vittoria, the most northerly town of importance in the basin -of the Ebro. A few miles further south it crosses that stream, and then -makes for Burgos and Madrid, over two successive lines of Sierras. It -opens up the heart of both Old and New Castile. The other two roads -from Bayonne strike inland at once, and do not hug the Biscayan shore -like the Irun-Vittoria route. They climb the Pyrenees, one by the pass -of Maya, the other, twenty miles further east, by the more famous pass -of Roncesvalles, where Charlemagne suffered disaster of old, and left -the great paladin, Roland, dead behind him. The Maya and Roncesvalles -roads join, after passing the mountains, at the great fortress of -Pampeluna, the capital of Navarre. From thence several lines are -available for the invader, the two chief of which are the roads into -Old Castile by Logroño and into Aragon by Tudela. Pampeluna is quite as -valuable as Vittoria as the base for an attack on Central Spain. - -The whole Iberian Peninsula has been compared, not inaptly, to an -inverted soup-plate: roughly it consists of a high central plateau, -surrounded by a flat rim. But no comparison of that kind can be pressed -too hard, and we must remember that the rim is variable in width: -sometimes, as on the north coast, and in the extreme south-east of the -peninsula, it is very narrow, and much cut up by small spurs running -down to the sea. But as a rule, and especially in Central Portugal, -Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, it is broad and fertile. Indeed if we -set aside the northern coast--Biscay, Asturias, and Galicia--we may -draw a sharp division between the rich and semi-tropical coast plain, -and the high, wind-swept, and generally barren central plateau. All -the wealth of the land lies in the outer strip: the centre is its most -thinly inhabited and worthless part. Madrid, lying in the very midst -of the plateau, is therefore not the natural centre of the land in -anything save a mathematical sense. It is a new and artificial town of -the sixteenth century, pitched upon as an administrative capital by -the Hapsburg kings; but in spite of the long residence of the court -there, it never grew into a city of the first class. Summing up its -ineligibilities, an acute observer said that Madrid combined ‘the soil -of the Sahara, the sun of Calcutta, the wind of Edinburgh, and the -cold of the North Pole.’ Though in no sense the natural capital of -the country, it has yet a certain military importance as the centre -from which the road-system of Spain radiates. There is, as a glance at -the map will show, no other point from which all the main avenues of -communication with the whole of the provinces can be controlled. An -invader, therefore, who has got possession of it can make any combined -action against himself very difficult. But he must not flatter himself -that the capture of Madrid carries with it the same effect that the -capture of Paris or Berlin or Vienna entails. The provinces have -no such feeling of dependence on the national capital as is common -in other countries. France with Paris occupied by an enemy is like -a body deprived of its head. But for Andalusians or Catalonians or -Galicians the occupation of Madrid had no such paralysing effect. No -sentimental affection for the royal residence--and Madrid was nothing -more--existed. And a government established at Seville or Cadiz, or -any other point, would be just as well (or as ill) obeyed as one that -issued its orders from the sandy banks of the Manzanares. - -The main geographical, as well as the main political, characteristics -of Spain are determined by its very complicated mountain-system. It -is a land where the rivers count for little, and the hills for almost -everything, in settling military conditions. In most countries great -rivers are connecting cords of national life: their waters carry the -internal traffic of the realm: the main roads lie along their banks. -But in Spain the streams, in spite of their length and size, are -useless. They mostly flow in deep-sunk beds, far below the level of the -surrounding country-side. Their rapid current is always swirling round -rocks, or dashing over sandbanks: often they flow for mile after mile -between cliffs from which it is impossible to reach the water’s edge. -In the rainy season they are dangerous torrents: in the summer all save -the very largest dwindle down into miserable brooks. A river in Spain -is always a sundering obstacle, never a line of communication. Only for -a few scores of miles near their mouths can any one of them be utilized -for navigation: the Douro can be so employed as far as Freneda on the -frontier of Portugal, the Tagus in good seasons as far as Abrantes, the -Guadalquivir to Seville. For the rest of their long courses they are -not available even for the lightest boats. - -Spanish rivers, in short, are of importance not as lines of transit, -but as obstacles. They form many fine positions for defence, but -positions generally rendered dangerous by the fact that a very few -days of drought may open many unsuspected fords, where just before -there had been deep and impassable water. Rivers as broad as the Tagus -below Talavera and the Douro at Toro were occasionally crossed by whole -armies in dry weather. It was always hazardous to trust to them as -permanent lines of defence. - -It is the mountains which really require to be studied in detail from -the military point of view. Speaking generally we may describe the -Iberian system--as distinct from the Pyrenees--as consisting of one -chain running roughly from north to south, so as to separate the old -kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, while at right angles to this chain run -a number of others, whose general courses are parallel to each other -and run from east to west. There is no single name for the mountains -which separate Castile and Aragon, nor do they form one continuous -range. They are a number of separate systems, often divided from each -other by wide gaps, and sometimes broadening out into high tablelands. -The central nucleus, from which the rest run out, lies between the -provinces of New Castile and Valencia, from Guadalajara in the former -to Morella in the latter. Here there is a great ganglion of chaotic -sierras, pierced by hardly a single practicable road. Northward, in -the direction of Aragon, they sink down into the plain of the Ebro: -southward they spread out into the lofty plateau of Murcia, but rise -into higher and narrower ranges again as they get near the frontier of -Andalusia. - -This block of chains and plateaus forms the central watershed of Spain, -which throws westward the sources of the Douro, Tagus, Guadiana, and -Guadalquivir, and eastward those of the Xucar and Segura. The basins -of these streams and their tributaries form three-fourths of the -Iberian Peninsula. The rest consists mainly of the great valley of the -Ebro: this hardly falls into the system, and is somewhat exceptional. -It has been described as serving as a sort of wet-ditch to the main -fortification of the peninsula. Starting in the western extension of -the Pyrenees, quite close to the Bay of Biscay, it runs diagonally -across Spain, more or less parallel to the Pyrenees, and falls into the -Mediterranean between Catalonia and Valencia. It is more low-lying than -the rest of the main valleys of Spain, is broader, and is not so much -cramped and cut up by mountains running down to it at right angles to -its course. - -Behind the Ebro lie, chain after chain, the parallel sierras which -mark off the divisions of the great central plateau of Spain. Arteche -compares them to the waves of a great petrified sea, running some -higher and some lower, but all washing up into jagged crests, with deep -troughs between them. - -The first and most northerly of these waves is that which we may call -the range of Old Castile, which separates the basin of the Ebro from -that of the Douro. At one end it links itself to the Pyrenean chain in -the neighbourhood of Santander: at the other it curves round to join -the more central sierras in the direction of Soria and Calatayud. It is -the lowest of the chains which bound the central plateau of Spain, and -is pierced by three practicable roads, of which the most important is -that from Vittoria to Burgos. - -Between this chain on the east and the Cantabrian mountains on the -north lies the great plain of Old Castile and Leon, the heart of the -elder Spanish monarchy, in the days when Aragon was still independent -and Andalusia remained in the hands of the Moor. It is a fairly -productive corn-producing land, studded with ancient cities such as -Burgos, Palencia, Valladolid, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca. The _Tierra de -Campos_ (land of the plains), as it was called, was the granary of -Northern Spain, the most civilized part of the kingdom, and the only -one where there existed a fairly complete system of roads. For want of -the isolated mountain chains which cut up most provinces of the Iberian -Peninsula, it was hard to defend and easy to overrun. If the mountains -that divide it from the Ebro valley are once passed, there is no way of -stopping the invader till he reaches the border of Asturias, Galicia, -or New Castile. The whole plain forms the valley of the Upper Douro -and its tributaries, the Adaja, Pisuerga, Esla, Tormes, and the rest. -It narrows down towards Portugal, as the mountains of Galicia on the -one side and Estremadura on the other throw out their spurs to north -and south. Hence the Lower Douro valley, after the Portuguese frontier -has been passed, is a defile rather than a plain. Before Oporto and -the estuary are reached, there are many places where the mountains on -either side come right down to the river’s edge. - -The second chain is much more important, and more strongly marked: -it divides Old from New Castile, the valley of the Douro from that -of the Tagus. In its central and western parts it is really a double -range, with two narrow valleys between its chief ridges. These valleys -are drained by the Zezere and Alagon, two tributaries of the Tagus -which flow parallel for many scores of miles to the broad river which -they feed. If we call this great system of mountains the chain of New -Castile it is only for convenience’ sake: the Spaniards and Portuguese -have no common name for them. In the east they are styled the Sierra -de Ayllon; above Madrid they are known as the Guadarrama--a name -sometimes extended to the whole chain. When they become double, west -of Madrid, the northern chain is the Sierra de Gata, the southern the -Sierra de Gredos. Finally in Portugal the extension of the Sierra de -Gata is called the Sierra da Estrella, the southern parallel ridge -the Sierra do Moradal. The whole system forms a very broad, desolate, -and lofty belt of hills between the Tagus and Douro, through which -the practicable passes are few and difficult. Those requiring notice -are (1) the Somosierra Pass, through which runs the great northern -road from Burgos to Madrid: its name is well remembered owing to the -extraordinary way in which Napoleon succeeded in forcing it (against -all the ordinary rules of war) in the winter of 1808. (2) There is -a group of three passes, all within twelve miles of each other, -across the Guadarrama, through which there debouch on to Madrid the -main roads from North-western Spain--those from (_a_) Valladolid and -Segovia, (_b_) from Astorga, Tordesillas, and Arevalo, (_c_) from -Salamanca by Avila. After this group of passes there is a long space -of impracticable hills, till we come to the chief road from north to -south, parallel to the Portuguese frontier: it comes down the valley -of the Alagon from Salamanca, by Baños and Plasencia, on to the great -Roman bridge of Alcantara, the main passage over the Middle Tagus. -This is a bad road through a desolate country, but the exigencies of -war caused it to be used continually by the French and English armies, -whenever they had to transfer themselves from the valley of the Douro -to that of the Tagus. Occasionally they employed a still worse route, -a little further west, from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales to Alcantara. -When we get within the Portuguese frontier, we find a road parallel to -the last, from Almeida by Guarda to Abrantes, also a difficult route, -but like it in perpetual use: usually, when the French marched from -Salamanca to Alcantara, Wellington moved in a corresponding way from -near Almeida to Abrantes. This road runs along the basin of the Zezere, -though not down in the trough of the river, but high up the hillsides -above it. Spanish and Portuguese roads, as we shall see, generally -avoid the river banks and run along the slopes far above them. - -The next great chain across the Peninsula is that which separates the -barren and sandy valley of the Upper Tagus from the still more desolate -and melancholy plateau of La Mancha, the basin of the Guadiana. Of -all the regions of Central Spain, this is the most thinly peopled -and uninviting. In the whole valley there are only two towns of any -size, Ciudad Real, the capital of La Mancha, and Badajoz, the frontier -fortress against Portugal. The mountains north of the Guadiana are -called first the Sierra de Toledo, then the Sierra de Guadalupe, lastly -on the Portuguese frontier the Sierra de San Mamed. Their peculiarity, -as opposed to the other cross-ranges of the Peninsula, is that at their -eastern end they do not unite directly with the mountains of Valencia, -but leave a broad gap of upland, through which the roads from Madrid to -Murcia and Madrid to Valencia take their way. When the Sierra de Toledo -once begins roads are very few. There are practically only three--(1) -Toledo by San Vincente to Merida, a most break-neck route winding among -summits for forty miles; (2) Almaraz by Truxillo to Merida, the main -path from Tagus to Guadiana, and the most used, though it is difficult -and steep; (3) Alcantara by Albuquerque to Badajoz, a bad military road -parallel to the Portuguese frontier, continuing the similar route from -Salamanca to Alcantara. - -Leaving the barren basin of the Guadiana to proceed southward, we find -across our path a range of first-rate importance, the southern boundary -of the central plateaux of Spain: dropping down from its crest we are -no longer among high uplands, but in the broad low-lying semi-tropical -plain of Andalusia, the richest region of Spain. The chain between the -fertile valley of the Guadalquivir and the barren plateau of La Mancha -is known for the greater part of its course as the Sierra Morena, but -in its western section it takes the name of Sierra de Constantino. The -passes across it require special notice: the most eastern and the most -important is that of Despeña Perros, through which passes the high road -from Madrid to Cordova, Seville, and Cadiz. At its southern exit was -fought the fight of Baylen, in which the armies of Napoleon received -their first great check by the surrender of Dupont and his 20,000 men -on July 23, 1808. Higher up the defile lies another historic spot, on -which Christian and Moor fought the decisive battle for the mastery -of Spain in the early years of the thirteenth century, the well-known -fight of Las Navas de Tolosa. The Despeña Perros has two side-passes -close to its left and right: the former is that of San Estevan del -Puerto: the latter is known as the ‘King’s Gate’ (Puerto del Rey). All -these three defiles present tremendous difficulties to an assailant -from the north, yet all were carried in a single rush by the armies of -Soult and Sebastiani in 1810. The central pass of the Sierra Morena -lies ninety miles to the left, and is of much less importance, as it -starts from the most arid corner of La Mancha, and does not connect -itself with any of the great roads from the north. It leads down on to -Cordova from Hinojosa. Again sixty miles to the west three more passes -come down on to Seville, the one by Llerena, the second by Monasterio, -the third by Fregenal: they lead to Badajoz and Merida. These are -easier routes through a less rugged country: they were habitually used -by Soult in 1811 and 1812, when, from his Andalusian base at Seville, -he used to go north to besiege or to relieve the all-important fortress -of Badajoz. - -Last of all the great Spanish chains is that which lies close along the -Mediterranean Sea, forming the southern edge of the fertile Andalusian -plain. It is the Sierra Nevada, which, though neither the longest nor -the broadest of the ranges of the south, contains the loftiest peaks in -Spain, Mulhaçen and La Veleta. This chain runs from behind Gibraltar -along the shore, till it joins the mountains of Murcia, leaving only a -very narrow coast-strip between its foot and the southern sea. Three -roads cut it in its western half, which, starting from Granada, Ronda, -and Antequera all come down to the shore at, or in the neighbourhood -of, the great port of Malaga. The parts of the coast-line that are far -from that city are only accessible by following difficult roads that -run close to the water’s edge. - -We have still to deal with two corners of the Iberian Peninsula, -which do not fall into any of the great valleys that we have -described--Galicia and Northern Portugal in the north-west, and -Catalonia in the north-east. The geographical conditions of the former -region depend on the Cantabrian Mountains, the western continuation of -the Pyrenees. This chain, after running for many miles as a single -ridge, forks in the neighbourhood of the town of Leon. One branch -keeps on in its original direction, and runs by the coast till it -reaches the Atlantic at Cape Finisterre. The other turns south-west -and divides Spain from Portugal as far as the sea. The angle between -these forking ranges is drained by a considerable river, the Minho. -The basins of this stream and its tributary the Sil, form the greater -part of the province of Galicia. Their valleys are lofty, much cut up -by cross-spurs, and generally barren. The access to them from Central -Spain is by two openings. The main one is the high road from Madrid to -Corunna by Astorga; it does not follow the course of either the Sil or -the Minho, but charges cross-ridge after cross-ridge of the spurs of -the Galician hills, till at last it comes down to the water, and forks -into two routes leading the one to Corunna, the other to the still more -important arsenal of Ferrol. The other gate of Galicia is a little to -the south of Astorga, where a pass above the town of Puebla de Sanabria -gives access to a steep and winding road parallel to the Portuguese -frontier, which finally gets into the valley of the Minho, and turns -down to reach the port of Vigo. It will be remembered that Sir John -Moore, in his famous retreat, hesitated for some time at Astorga -between the Vigo and Corunna roads, and finally chose the latter. His -judgement was undoubtedly correct, but the best alternative was bad, -for in winter even the Madrid-Corunna road, the main artery of this -part of Spain, is distressing enough to an army. It does not follow any -well-marked valley, but cuts across four separate ranges, every one of -which in January was a nursery of torrents in its lower slopes, and -an abode of snow in its upper levels. Besides the roads with which we -have already dealt there is a third important line of communication in -Galicia, that by the narrow coast-plain of the Atlantic, from Corunna -by Santiago to Vigo, and thence into Portugal as far as Oporto. This -would be a good road but for the innumerable river-mouths, small and -great, which it has to cross: the road passes each stream just where -it ceases to be tidal, and at each is fronted at right angles by a -defensible position, which, if held by a competent enemy, is difficult -to force from the front, and still more difficult to turn by a detour -up-stream. Nevertheless it was by this route that Soult successfully -invaded Northern Portugal in the spring of 1809. It must be remembered -that he was only opposed by bands of peasants not even organized into -the loosest form of militia. - -The geography of Catalonia, the last Iberian region with which we have -to deal, is more simple than that of Galicia. The land is formed by a -broad mountain belt running out from the eastern end of the Pyrenees, -parallel to the Mediterranean. From this chain the slopes run down -and form on the eastern side a coast-plain, generally rather narrow, -on the western a series of parallel valleys drained by tributaries of -the Segre, the most important affluent of the Ebro. They all unite -near Lerida, an important town and a great centre of roads. But two -considerable rivers, the Ter and the Llobregat, have small basins -of their own in the heart of the central mountain mass, which open -down into the coast-plain by defiles, the one blocked by the peak -of Montserrat, the other by the town of Gerona. During the greater -part of the Peninsular War the French held the larger share of the -shoreland, dominating it from the great fortress of Barcelona, which -they had seized by treachery ere hostilities began. In 1811 they -captured Tarragona also, the second capital of the sea coast. But they -never succeeded in holding down all the small upland plains, and the -minor passes that lead from one to the other. Hunted out of one the -Spanish army took refuge in the next, and, though it dwindled down -ultimately to a mass of guerilla bands, was never caught _en masse_ -and exterminated. There were too many bolt-holes among the network -of hills, and the invaders never succeeded in stopping them all, so -that down to the end of the war the patriots always maintained a -precarious existence inland, descending occasionally to the shore to -get ammunition and stores from the English squadrons which haunted the -coast. They were supplied and reinforced from the Balearic Isles, which -Napoleon could never hope to touch, for his power (like that of the -witches of old) vanished when it came to running water. The survival -of the Catalan resistance after the French had drawn a complete cordon -around the hill-country, holding the whole coast-plain on the one hand, -and Lerida and the Segre valley on the other, is one of the incidents -of the war most creditable to Spanish constancy. - -Having dealt with the physical geography of Spain, it is necessary -for us to point out the way in which the natural difficulties of the -country had influenced its main lines of communication. Roads always -take the ‘line of least resistance’ in early days, and seek for easy -passes, not for short cuts. The idea that ‘time is money,’ and that -instead of going round two sides of a triangle it may be worth -while to cut a new path across its base, in spite of all engineering -difficulties, was one very unfamiliar to the Spaniard. Nothing shows -more clearly the state of mediaeval isolation in which the kingdom -still lay in 1808 than the condition of its roads. Wherever the country -presented any serious obstacles, little or no attempt had been made to -grapple with them since the days of the Romans. The energetic Charles -III, alone among the kings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, -had done something to improve the system of intercommunication. He -had, for example, superseded the old break-neck road from the plains -of Leon into Galicia, by building the fine new _chaussée_ from Astorga -to Villafranca by Manzanal; but among the line of Hapsburg and Bourbon -sovereigns Charles was a rare exception. Under the imbecile rule -of his son (or rather of Godoy) improvements ceased, and internal -communications were as much neglected as any other branch of state -management. What roads there were, when the war of 1808 broke out, were -in a state of dreadful neglect. The Spaniard was still too prone to -go round an intolerable distance rather than attempt a serious piece -of engineering work. Let us take, for example, the northern coast of -Spain: the Cantabrian range is no doubt a most serious obstacle to -intercourse between Castile and Leon, on the one side, and the maritime -provinces of Asturias and Biscay on the other. But who would have -conceived it possible that in a length of 300 miles of mountain, there -should be no more than five roads practicable for wheeled traffic and -artillery? Yet this was so: to get down from the central plateau to -the coast there are only available these five routes--one from Leon -to Oviedo, one from Burgos to Santander, one from Burgos to Bilbao, -one from Vittoria to Bilbao, and one from Vittoria to San Sebastian -and Irun. There were many other points at which a division travelling -in light order without guns or baggage could cross the watershed--as -was shown in Blake’s flight from Reynosa and Ney’s invasion of the -Asturias. But for an army travelling with all its _impedimenta_ such -bypaths were impracticable. - -Let us take another part of the Peninsula--its eastern side. The -ancient separation between Aragon and Castile is fully reflected by -the utter isolation of the two for intercommunication. To get from -Madrid to the east coast there are only three roads suitable for -wheeled traffic: one goes by the main gap in the hills by Chinchilla to -Murcia, another by Requeña to Valencia. The third passes by Calatayud -to Saragossa and ultimately to Barcelona. Between it and the Valencia -road there is a gap of no less than 120 miles unpierced by any good -practicable line of communication[69]. This being so, we begin to -understand how it was that the operations on the eastern side of Spain, -during the whole of the struggle, were a sort of independent episode -that never exercised any great influence on the main theatre of the -war, or, on the other hand, was much affected by the progress of the -strife in Castile or Portugal. Soult’s conquest of Andalusia did not -help Suchet to conquer Valencia. On the other hand, when the latter -did, in January, 1812, succeed in his attempt to subdue the eastern -coast-line, it did not much affect him that Wellington was storming -Ciudad Rodrigo and pressing back the French in the west. He was able -to hold on to Valencia till the allies, in 1813, got possession of the -upper valley of the Ebro and the great road from Madrid to Saragossa -and Lerida, after the battle of Vittoria. It was only then that his -flank was really turned, and that he was compelled to retreat and to -abandon his southern conquests. - - [69] The bad cross-roads Cuenca-Teruel and Molina-Teruel hardly - count. - -Summing up the general characteristics of the road-system of Spain, we -note first that the main routes are rather at right angles to the great -rivers than parallel to them. The sole exception is to be found in the -valley of the Ebro, where the only good cross-road of Northern Spain -does follow the river-bank from Logroño and Tudela on to Saragossa and -Lerida. - -Just because the roads do not cling to the valleys, but strike across -them at right angles, they are always crossing watersheds by means of -difficult passes. And so there is hardly a route in the whole Peninsula -where it is possible to find fifty miles without a good defensive -position drawn across the path. Moreover, the continual passes make -the question of supplies very difficult: in crossing a plain an army -can live, more or less, on the supplies of the country-side; but among -mountains and defiles there is no population, and therefore no food -to be had. Hence an army on the move must take with it all that it -consumes, by means of a heavy wagon train, or an enormous convoy of -pack-mules. But only the best roads are suitable for wheeled traffic, -and so the lines practicable for a large host are very restricted in -number. The student is often tempted to consider the movements of the -rival generals very slow. The explanation is simply that to transfer -an army from one river-basin to another was a serious matter. It was -necessary to spend weeks in collecting at the base food and transport -sufficient to support the whole force till it reached its goal. In 1811 -or 1812 the French and English were continually moving up and down the -Portuguese frontier parallel to each other, the one from Salamanca to -Badajoz, the other from Almeida or Guarda to Elvas. But to prepare for -one of these flittings was such a serious matter that by the time that -the army was able to move, the enemy had usually got wind of the plan, -and was able to follow the movement on his own side of the frontier. -There were months of preparation required before a few weeks of active -operations, and when the concentration was over and the forces massed, -they could only keep together as long as the food held out, and then -had to disperse again in order to live. This was what was meant by the -old epigram, that ‘in Spain large armies starve, and small armies get -beaten.’ - -Half the strategy of the campaigns of 1811-12-13 consisted in one of -the combatants secretly collecting stores, concentrating his whole -army, and then dashing at some important part of his adversary’s -line, before the other could mass his forces in a corresponding way. -If prompt, the assailant might gain a fortnight, in which he might -either try to demolish the enemy in detail before he could concentrate, -or else to take from him some important position or town. In 1811 -Marmont and Dorsenne played this trick on Wellington, during the short -campaign of El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte. They relieved Ciudad Rodrigo, -and nearly caught some divisions of the English army before the rest -could join. But missing the instant blow, and allowing Wellington time -to draw in his outlying troops, they failed and went home. In 1812, -on the other hand, the British general successfully played off this -device on the French. He first concentrated in the north, and captured -Ciudad Rodrigo in eleven days, before Marmont could mass his scattered -divisions; then going hastily south he took Badajoz in exactly the same -way, storming it after only nineteen days of siege. Soult drew his army -together at the news of Wellington’s move, but had to bring troops from -such distances, and to collect so much food, that he arrived within -three marches of Badajoz only to hear that the place had just fallen. - -In dealing with the main geographical facts of the war it is fair to -recollect that an invasion of Spain from France is one of the most -difficult of undertakings, because the whole river and mountain system -of the Peninsula lies _across_ the main line of advance from Bayonne -to Cadiz, which the invader must adopt. While the French conquest -must be pushed from north to south, both the streams and the Sierras -of Spain all run at right angles to this direction, i.e. from east to -west. In advancing from the Pyrenees to Madrid, and again from Madrid -to Seville and Cadiz, the invader has to cross every main river--Ebro, -Douro, Tagus, Guadiana, and Guadalquivir--and to force the passes of -every main range. Moreover, as he advances southward, he has to keep -his flanks safe against disturbance from the two mountainous regions, -Catalonia and Portugal, which lie along the eastern and western coasts -of the Peninsula. Unless the whole breadth of Spain, from the Atlantic -to the Mediterranean, be occupied step by step as the invader moves on -towards the Straits of Gibraltar, he can always be molested and have -his lines of communication with France threatened. In the end it may -be said that Napoleon’s whole scheme of conquest was shipwrecked upon -the blunder of attacking Andalusia and Cadiz while Portugal was still -unsubdued. Wellington’s constant sallies out of that country upon the -French flank, in Leon and Estremadura, detained such large forces to -protect the valleys of the Central Douro and Tagus that enough men were -never found to finish the conquest of the south and east. And finally -one crushing victory at Salamanca, in the plains of Leon, so threatened -the invader’s line of touch with France, that he had to abandon the -whole south of Spain in order to concentrate an army large enough to -force Wellington back from Burgos and the great northern road. - -On the other hand, one tremendous advantage possessed by the French -in the central years of the war must be remembered. It is manifest -that Madrid is the only really important road-centre in Spain, and -that its undisturbed possession by the French in 1809-11 gave them -the advantage of being able to operate from a single point, against -enemies who lay in a vast semicircle around, with no good cross-roads -to join them and enable them to work together. The small ‘Army of the -Centre,’ which was always kept in and around Madrid, could be used as a -reserve for any other of the French armies, and transferred to join it -in a few marches, while it was infinitely more difficult to unite the -various forces lying on an outer circle at Astorga, Almeida, Abrantes, -and Cadiz, which the Spaniards and the British kept in the field. In -short, in estimating the difficulties of the two parties, the advantage -of the central position must be weighed against the disadvantage of -long and exposed lines of communication. - -One of the cardinal blunders of Napoleon’s whole scheme for the -conquest of the Peninsula was that he persisted in treating it as if -it were German or Italian soil, capable of supporting an army on the -march. His troops were accustomed to live on the country-side while -crossing Central Europe, and therefore made no proper preparations -for supplying themselves by other means than plunder. But in Spain -there are only a few districts where this can be done: it may be -possible to get forward without an enormous train of convoys in -Andalusia, the coast plain of Valencia, and certain parts of the rather -fertile plateau of Leon, the wheat-bearing _Tierra de Campos_. But -over four-fifths of the Peninsula, an army that tries to feed on the -country-side will find itself at the point of starvation in a few days, -and be forced to disperse in order to live. - -Till he had seen Spain with his own eyes Napoleon might perhaps -have been excused for ignoring the fact that his ordinary method of -‘making war support itself’ was not in this case possible. But even -after he had marched from Bayonne to Madrid, and then from Madrid to -Astorga, in 1808, he persisted in refusing to see facts as they were. -We find him on his way back to Paris from the campaign uttering the -extraordinary statement that ‘Spain is a much better country than he -had ever supposed, and that he had no idea what a magnificent present -he had made to his brother Joseph till he had seen it[70].’ Of his -utter failure to grasp the difficulties of the country we may get a -fair conception from his orders, given at the same time, to Marshal -Soult, who was at that moment occupied in pushing Sir John Moore -towards Corunna. He told the Duke of Dalmatia that if he reached Lugo -on January 9, and the English got away safely by sea, he was to march -on Oporto, where he ought to arrive on the first of February; after -seizing that city he was to go on to Lisbon, which he might reach on or -about February 10. As a matter of fact Soult saw the English depart, -and occupied Corunna on January 19, but his army was so utterly worn -out, and his stores so entirely exhausted, that with the best will in -the world he could not move again till February 20, only took Oporto on -March 29, and had not yet started for Lisbon when Wellesley suddenly -fell on him and drove him out of the country on May 12, 1809. The -Emperor, in short, had given Soult orders executable perhaps, according -to the distance, in Lombardy or Bavaria, but utterly absurd when -applied to a country where roads are few and bad, with a defile or a -river crossing the path at every few miles, and where food has to be -carefully collected before a move, and taken on with the army by means -of enormous convoys. Moreover the month was January, when every brook -had become a raging mountain stream, and every highland was covered -with snow! With such conceptions of the task before him, it is not -wonderful that Napoleon was continually issuing wholly impracticable -orders. The one that we have just quoted was sent out from Valladolid: -how much worse would the case be when the Emperor persisted in -directing affairs from Paris or Vienna, the last news that had reached -him from the front being now several weeks old! With all his genius he -never thoroughly succeeded in grasping the state of affairs, and to the -very last continued to send directions that would have been wise enough -in Central Europe, but happened to be inapplicable in the Iberian -Peninsula. - - [70] He said this to De Pradt (_Révolutions d’Espagne_, p. 224). - -It is only fair to Napoleon to add that his Spanish enemies, who ought -at least to have known the limitations of their own road-system, and -the disabilities of their half-starved armies, used habitually to -produce plans of operations far more fantastically impossible than -any that he ever drafted. They would arrange far-reaching schemes, -for the co-operation of forces based on the most remote corners of -the Peninsula, without attempting to work out the ‘logistics’ of the -movement. The invariable result was that such enterprises either ended -in disaster, or at the best came to a stop after the first few marches, -because some vital point of the calculation had already been proved to -have been made on erroneous data. - - - - -SECTION II: CHAPTER II - -THE SPANISH ARMY IN 1808 - - -When the English student begins to investigate the Peninsular War -in detail, he finds that, as regards the Spanish armies and their -behaviour, he starts with a strong hostile prejudice. The Duke of -Wellington in his dispatches, and still more in his private letters -and his table-talk, was always enlarging on the folly and arrogance -of the Spanish generals with whom he had to co-operate, and on the -untrustworthiness of their troops. Napier, the one military classic -whom most Englishmen have read, is still more emphatic and far more -impressive, since he writes in a very judicial style, and with the most -elaborate apparatus of references and authorities. When the reader -begins to work through the infinite number of Peninsular diaries of -British officers and men (for there are a very considerable number of -writers from among the rank and file) the impression left upon him is -much the same. It must be confessed that for the most part they had a -very poor opinion of our allies. - -Before allowing ourselves to be carried away by the almost unanimous -verdict of our own countrymen, it is only fair to examine the state and -character of the Spanish army when the war broke out. Only when we know -its difficulties can we judge with fairness of its conduct, or decide -upon its merits and shortcomings. - -The armed force which served under the banners of Charles IV in the -spring of 1808 consisted of 131,000 men, of whom 101,000 were regulars -and 30,000 embodied militia. The latter had been under arms since 1804, -and composed the greater part of the garrisons of the seaports of -Spain, all of which had to be protected against possible descents of -English expeditions[71]. - - [71] See Appendix, containing the state of the Spanish army in - 1808. - -Of the 101,000 men of the regular army, however, not all were available -for the defence of the country. While the war with Russia was still in -progress, Bonaparte had requested the Spanish government to furnish -him with a strong division for use in the North [March, 1807], and in -consequence the Marquis of La Romana had been sent to the Baltic with -15,000 men, the picked regiments of the army. There remained therefore -only 86,000 regulars within the kingdom. A very cursory glance down -the Spanish army-list of 1808 is sufficient to show that this force -was far from being in a satisfactory condition for either offensive or -defensive operations. - -It is well worth while to look at the details of its composition. The -infantry consisted of three sorts of troops--the Royal Guard, the line -regiments, and the foreign corps in Spanish pay. For Spain, more than -any other European state, had kept up the old seventeenth-century -fashion of hiring foreign mercenaries on a large scale. Even in the -Royal Guard half the infantry were composed of ‘Walloon Guards,’ a -survival from the day when the Netherlands had been part of the broad -dominions of the Hapsburg kings. The men of these three battalions -were no longer mainly Walloons, for Belgium had been a group of -French departments for the last thirteen years. There were Germans -and other foreigners of all sorts in the ranks, as well as a large -number of native Spaniards. There were also six regiments of Swiss -mercenaries--over 10,000 bayonets--and in these the men in the ranks -did really come from Switzerland and Germany, though there was a -sprinkling among them of strangers from all lands who had ‘left their -country for their country’s good.’ There were also one Neapolitan and -three Irish regiments. These latter were survivals from the days of -the ‘Penal Laws,’ when young Irishmen left their homes by thousands -every year to take service with France or Spain, in the hope of getting -some day a shot at the hated redcoats. The regiments bore the names -of Hibernia, Irlanda, and Ultonia (i.e. Ulster). They were very much -under their proper establishment, for of late years Irish recruits -had begun to run short, even after the ’98: they now took service in -France and not in Spain. The three Irish corps in 1808 had only 1,900 -men under arms, instead of the 5,000 which they should have produced; -and of those the large majority were not real Irish, but waifs of all -nationalities. Of late native Spaniards had been drafted in, to keep -the regiments from dying out. On the other hand we shall find that not -only the foreign regiments but the whole Spanish army was still full -of officers of Irish name and blood, the sons and grandsons of the -original emigrants of two generations back. An astounding proportion -of the officers who rose to some note during the war bore Irish names, -and were hereditary soldiers of fortune, who justified their existence -by the unwavering courage which they always showed, in a time when -obstinate perseverance was the main military virtue. We need only -mention Blake, the two O’Donnells, Lacy, Sarsfield, O’Neill, O’Daly, -Mahony, O’Donahue. If none of them showed much strategical skill, yet -their constant readiness to fight, which no series of defeats could -tame, contrasts very well with the spiritless behaviour of a good many -of the Spanish generals. No officer of Irish blood was ever found among -the cowards, and hardly one among the traitors[72]. - - [72] The minister O’Farrill and General Kindelan were the chief - exceptions. - -The ten foreign corps furnished altogether about 13,000 men to the -Spanish regular army. The rest of the infantry was composed of -thirty-five regiments of troops of the line, of three battalions -each, and twelve single-battalion regiments of light infantry. They -were theoretically territorial, like our own infantry of to-day, and -mostly bore local names derived from the provinces--Asturias, Toledo, -Estremadura, and so forth. All the light infantry corps belonged to -the old kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, which were therefore scantily -represented in the nomenclature of the ordinary line regiments. -There were altogether 147 battalions of Spanish infantry, excluding -the foreign troops, and if all of these had been up to the proper -establishment of 840 men, the total would have amounted to 98,000 -bayonets. But the state of disorganization was such that as a matter of -fact there were only 58,000 under arms. The regiments which Napoleon -had requisitioned for service in the North had been more or less -brought up to a war-footing, and each showed on an average 2,000 men -in the ranks. But many of the corps in the interior of Spain displayed -the most lamentable figures: e.g. the three battalions of the regiment -of Estremadura had only 770 men between them, Cordova 793, and Navarre -822--showing 250 men to the battalion instead of the proper 840. -Theoretically there should have been no difficulty in keeping them -up to their proper strength, as machinery for recruiting them had -been duly provided. Voluntary enlistment was the first resource: but -when that did not suffice to keep the ranks full, there was a kind -of limited conscription called the _Quinta_[73] to fall back upon. -This consisted in balloting for men in the regimental district, under -certain rules which allowed an enormous number of exemptions--e.g. all -skilled artisans and all middle-class townsfolk were free from the -burden--so that the agricultural labourers had to supply practically -the whole contingent. Substitutes were allowed, if by any means the -conscript could afford to pay for them. The conscription therefore -should have kept the regiments up to their proper strength, and if -many of them had only a third of their complement under arms, it was -merely due to the general demoralization of the times. Under Godoy’s -administration money was always wanting, more especially since Napoleon -had begun to levy his monthly tribute of 6,000,000 francs from the -Spanish monarchy, and the gaps in the ranks probably represented -enforced economy as well as corrupt administration. - - [73] So called because it was originally supposed to take the - _fifth_ man. - -The 30,000 embodied militia, which formed the remainder of the Spanish -infantry, had been under arms since 1804, doing garrison duty; they -seem in many respects to have been equal to the line battalions in -efficiency. They bore names derived from the towns in whose districts -they had been raised--Badajoz, Lugo, Alcazar, and so forth. Their -officering was also strictly local, all ranks being drawn from the -leading families of their districts, and seems to have been quite -as efficient as that of the line. Moreover their ranks were, on the -average, much fuller than those of the regular regiments--only two -battalions in the total of forty-three showed less than 550 bayonets on -parade. - -It is when we turn to the cavalry that we come to the weakest part of -the Spanish army. There were twelve regiments of heavy and twelve of -light horse, each with a nominal establishment of 700 sabres, which -should have given 16,800 men for the whole force. There were only about -15,000 officers and troopers embodied, but this was a small defect. A -more real weakness lay in the fact that there were only 9,000 horses -for the 15,000 men. It is difficult for even a wealthy government, -like our own, to keep its cavalry properly horsed, and that of Charles -IV was naturally unable to cope with this tiresome military problem. -The chargers were not only too few, but generally of bad quality, -especially those of the heavy cavalry: of those which were to be -found in the regimental stables a very large proportion were not fit -for service. When the five regiments which Napoleon demanded for the -expedition to Denmark had been provided with 540 horses each and sent -off, the mounts of the rest of the army were in such a deplorable -state that some corps had not the power to horse one-third of their -troopers: e.g. in June, 1808, the Queen’s Regiment, No. 2 of the -heavy cavalry, had 202 horses for 668 men; the 12th Regiment had 259 -horses for 667 men; the 1st Chasseurs--more extraordinary still--only -185 horses for 577 men. It resulted from this penury of horses that -when Napoleon made a second demand for Spanish cavalry, asking for a -division of 2,000 sabres to aid Junot in invading Portugal, that force -had to be made up by putting together the mounted men of no less than -ten regiments, each contributing two or at the most three squadrons and -leaving the rest of its men dismounted at the dépôt. - -Even if the cavalry had all been properly mounted, they would have been -far too few in proportion to the other arms, only 15,000 out of a total -force of 130,000--one in eight; whereas in the time of the Napoleonic -wars one in six, or even one in five, was considered the proper -complement. In the Waterloo campaign the French had the enormous number -of 21,000 cavalry to 83,000 infantry--one to four. What with original -paucity, and with want of remounts, the Spaniards took the field in -1808, when the insurrection began, with a ridiculously small number of -horsemen. At Medina de Rio Seco they had only 750 horsemen to 22,000 -foot-soldiers, at Baylen only 1,200 to 16,000. Later in the war they -succeeded in filling up the ranks of the old cavalry regiments, and -in raising many new ones. But the gain in number was not in the least -accompanied by a gain in efficiency. For the whole six years of the -struggle the mounted arm was the weakest point of their hosts. Again -and again it disgraced itself by allowing itself to be beaten by half -its own numbers, or by absconding early in the fight and abandoning -its infantry. It acquired, and merited, a detestable reputation, and -it is hard to find half a dozen engagements in which it behaved even -reasonably well[74]. When Wellington was made generalissimo of the -Spanish armies in 1813 he would not bring it up to the front at all, -and though he took 40,000 Spaniards over the Pyrenees, there was -not a horseman among them. It is hard to account for the thorough -worthlessness of these squadrons, even when we make allowance for all -the difficulties of the time: Spain was notoriously deficient in decent -cavalry officers when the war began. The horses were inferior to the -French, and the equipment bad. From early disasters the troopers -contracted a demoralization which they could never shake off. But -granting all this, it is still impossible to explain the consistent -misbehaviour of these evasive squadrons. The officers, no doubt, had a -harder task in organizing their new levies than those of the infantry -and artillery, but it is curious that they should never have succeeded -in learning their business even after four or five years of war. - - [74] The successful and opportune charge of the _regimiento del - Rey_ at Talavera was about the only case which ever came under - English eyes. - -The artillery of the Spanish army, on the other hand, earned on the -whole a good reputation. This was not the result of proper preparation. -When the struggle began it consisted of thirty-four batteries of field -artillery, six of horse, and twenty-one garrison batteries (_compañias -fijas_), with a total of 6,500 men. Forty batteries--that is to say -240 guns or somewhat less, for in some cases there seem to have been -only four instead of six pieces in the battery--was according to the -standard of 1808 a mediocre allowance to an army of 130,000 men, only -about two-thirds of what it should have been[75]. But this was not the -worst. Deducting four fully-horsed batteries, which had been taken -off by Napoleon to Denmark, there remained in Spain four horse and -thirty-two field batteries. These were practically unable to move, for -they were almost entirely destitute of horses. For the 216 guns and -their caissons there were only in hand 400 draught animals! When the -war began, the artillery had to requisition, and more or less train, -3,000 horses or mules before they could move from their barracks! I -do not know any fact that illustrates better the state of Spanish -administration under the rule of Godoy. The raising of the great -insurrectionary armies in the summer of 1808 ought to have led to an -enormous increase to the artillery arm, but the trained men were so few -that the greatest difficulty was found in organizing new batteries. -Something was done by turning the marine artillery of the fleet into -land troops, and there were a few hundreds of the militia who had been -trained to work guns. But the officers necessary for the training and -officering of new batteries were so scarce, that for many months no -fresh forces of the artillery arm could take the field. In the autumn -of 1808, at the time of the battles of Espinosa and Tudela, if we -carefully add up the number of guns brought into action by the five -armies of Galicia, Estremadura, Aragon, the ‘Centre’ (i.e. Andalusia -and Castile), and Catalonia, we do not find a piece more than the 240 -which existed at the outbreak of the war. That is to say, the Spaniards -had raised 100,000 new levies of infantry, without any corresponding -extension of the artillery arm. During the campaign the conduct of the -corps seems on the whole to have been very good, compared with that of -the other arms. This was to be expected, as they were old soldiers to a -much greater extent than either the infantry or the cavalry. They seem -to have attained a fair skill with their weapons, and to have stuck -to them very well. We often hear of gunners cut down or bayonetted -over their pieces, seldom of a general bolt to the rear. For this very -reason the personnel of the batteries suffered terribly: every defeat -meant the capture of some dozens of guns, and the cutting up of the men -who served them. It was as much as the government could do to keep up -a moderate number of batteries, by supplying new guns and amalgamating -the remnants of those which had been at the front. Each batch of lost -battles in 1808-10 entailed the loss and consequent reconstruction of -the artillery. If, in spite of this, we seldom hear complaints as to -its conduct, it must be taken as a high compliment to the arm. But -as long as Spanish generals persisted in fighting pitched battles, -and getting their armies dispersed, a solid proportion of artillery -to infantry could never be established. Its average strength may be -guessed from the fact that at Albuera the best army that Spain then -possessed put in line 16,300 men with only fourteen guns, less than -one gun per thousand men--while Napoleon (as we have already noted) -believed that five per thousand was the ideal, and often managed in -actual fact to have three. In the latter years of the war the pieces -were almost always drawn by mules, yoked tandem-fashion, and not ridden -by drivers but goaded by men walking at their side--the slowest and -most unsatisfactory form of traction that can be imagined. Hence came, -in great part, their inability to manœuvre. - - [75] Napoleon had an ideal proportion of five guns per 1,000 men. - But, as we shall show in the next chapter, while dealing with the - French armies, he never succeeded in reaching anything like this - standard in the Peninsula. Yet his opponents were always worse - off. - -Of engineers Spain in 1808 had 169 officers dispersed over the kingdom. -The corps had no proper rank and file. But there was a regiment of -sappers, 1,000 strong, which was officered from the engineers. There -was no army service corps, no military train, no organized commissariat -of any kind. When moving about a Spanish army depended either on -contractors who undertook to provide horses and wagons driven by -civilians, or more frequently on the casual sweeping in by requisition -of all the mules, oxen, and carts of the unhappy district in which it -was operating. In this respect, as in so many others, Spain was still -in the Middle Ages. The fact that there was no permanent arrangement -for providing for the food of the army is enough in itself to account -for many of its disasters. If, like the British, the Spaniards had -possessed money to pay for what they took, things might have worked -somewhat better. Or if, like the French, they had possessed an -organized military train, and no scruples, they might have contrived -to get along at the cost of utterly ruining the country-side. But -as things stood, depending on incapable civil commissaries and the -unwilling contributions of the local authorities, they were generally -on the edge of starvation. Sometimes they got over the edge, and then -the army, in spite of the proverbial frugality of the Spanish soldier, -simply dispersed. It is fair to the men to say that they generally -straggled back to the front sooner or later, when they had succeeded in -filling their stomachs, and got incorporated in their own or some other -regiment. It is said that by the end of the war there were soldiers who -had, in their fashion, served in as many as ten different corps during -the six years of the struggle. - -Summing up the faults of the Spanish army, its depleted battalions, -its small and incompetent cavalry force, its insufficient proportion -of artillery, its utter want of commissariat, we find that its main -source of weakness was that while the wars of the French Revolution -had induced all the other states of Europe to overhaul their military -organization and learn something from the methods of the French, -Spain was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of -the eighteenth century. The national temperament, with its eternal -relegation of all troublesome reforms to the morrow, was no doubt -largely to blame. But Godoy, the all-powerful favourite who had also -been commander-in-chief for the last seven years, must take the main -responsibility. If he had chosen, he possessed the power to change -everything; and in some ways he had peddled a good deal with details, -changing the uniforms, and increasing the number of battalions in each -regiment. But to make the army efficient he had done very little: -the fact was that the commander-in-chief was quite ignorant of the -military needs and tendencies of the day: all his knowledge of the army -was gained while carpet-soldiering in the ranks of the royal bodyguard. -It was natural that the kind of officers who commended themselves to -his haughty and ignorant mind should be those who were most ready to -do him homage, to wink at his peculations, to condone his jobs, and to -refrain from worrying him for the money needed for reforms and repairs. -Promotion was wholly arbitrary, and was entirely in the favourite’s -hands. Those who were prepared to bow down to him prospered: those who -showed any backbone or ventured on remonstrances were shelved. After -a few years of this system it was natural that all ranks of the army -became demoralized, since not merit but the talents of the courtier -and the flatterer were the sure road to prosperity. Hence it came to -pass that when the insurrection began, the level of military ability, -patriotism, and integrity among the higher ranks of the army was very -low. There were a few worthy men like Castaños and La Romana in offices -of trust, but a much greater proportion of Godoy’s protégés. One cannot -condone the shocking way in which, during the first days of the war, -the populace and the rank and file of the army united to murder so -many officers in high place, like Filanghieri, the Captain-General of -Galicia, Torre del Fresno, the Captain-General of Estremadura, and -Solano, who commanded at Cadiz. But the explanation of the atrocities -is simple: the multitude were resenting the results of the long -administration of Godoy’s creatures, and fell upon such of them as -refused to throw in their lot immediately with the insurrection. The -murdered men were (rightly or wrongly) suspected either of an intention -to submit to Joseph Bonaparte, or of a design to hang back, wait on -the times, and make their decision only when it should become obvious -which paid better, patriotism or servility. The people had considerable -justification in the fact that a very large proportion of Godoy’s -protégés, especially of those at Madrid, did swear homage to the -intruder in order to keep their places and pensions. They were the base -of the miserable party of _Afrancesados_ which brought so much disgrace -on Spain. The misguided cosmopolitan liberals who joined them were much -the smaller half of the traitor-faction. - -Godoy and his clique, therefore, must take the main responsibility -for the state of decay and corruption in which the Spanish army was -found in 1808. What more could be expected when for so many years -an idle, venal, dissolute, ostentatious upstart had been permitted -to control the administration of military affairs, and to settle -all promotions to rank and office? ‘Like master like man’ is always -a true proverb, and the officers who begged or bought responsible -positions from Godoy naturally followed their patron’s example in -spreading jobs and peculation downwards. The undrilled and half-clothed -soldiery, the unhorsed squadrons, the empty arsenals, the idle and -ignorant subalterns, were all, in the end, the result of Godoy’s long -domination. But we do not wish to absolve from its share of blame the -purblind nation which tolerated him for so long. In another country he -would have gone the way of Gaveston or Mortimer long before. - -When this was the state of the Spanish armies, it is no wonder that -the British observer, whether officer or soldier, could never get over -his prejudice against them. It was not merely because a Spanish army -was generally in rags and on the verge of starvation that he despised -it. These were accidents of war which every one had experienced in his -own person: a British battalion was often tattered and hungry. The -Spanish government was notoriously poor, its old regiments had been -refilled again and again with raw conscripts, its new levies had never -had a fair start. Hence came the things which disgusted the average -Peninsular diarist of British origin--the shambling indiscipline, the -voluntary dirt, the unmilitary habits of the Spanish troops. He could -not get over his dislike for men who kept their arms in a filthy, rusty -condition, who travelled not in orderly column of route but like a -flock of sheep straggling along a high road, who obeyed their officers -only when they pleased. And for the officers themselves the English -observer had an even greater contempt: continually we come across -observations to the effect that the faults of the rank and file might -be condoned--after all they were only half-trained peasants--but that -the officers were the source and fount of evil from their laziness, -their arrogance, their ignorance, and their refusal to learn from -experience. Here is a typical passage from the Earl of Munster’s -_Reminiscences_:-- - -‘We should not have been dissatisfied with our allies, _malgré_ their -appearance and their rags, if we had felt any reason to confide in -them. The men might be “capable of all that men dare,” but the -appearance of their officers at once bespoke their not being fit to -lead them in the attempt. They not only did not look like soldiers, -but even not like gentlemen, and it was difficult from their mean and -abject appearance, particularly among the infantry, to guess what class -of society they could have been taken from. Few troops will behave well -if those to whom they should look up are undeserving respect. Besides -their general inefficiency we found their moral feeling different from -what we expected. Far from evincing devotion or even common courage -in their country’s cause, they were very often guilty, individually -and collectively, of disgraceful cowardice. We hourly regretted that -the revolution had not occasioned a more complete _bouleversement_ of -society, so as to bring forward fresh and vigorous talent from all -classes. Very few of the regular military showed themselves worthy of -command. Indeed, with the exception of a few self-made soldiers among -the Guerillas, who had risen from among the farmers and peasantry, it -would be hard to point out a Spanish officer whose opinion on the most -trivial military subject was worth being asked. We saw old besotted -generals whose armies were formed on obsolete principles of the _ancien -régime_ of a decrepit government. To this was added blind pride and -vanity. No proofs of inferiority could open their eyes, and they rushed -from one error and misfortune to another, benefiting by no experience, -and disdaining to seek aid and improvement’ [pp. 194-5]. - -A voice from the ranks, Sergeant Surtees of the Rifle Brigade, gives -the same idea in different words. - -‘Most of the Spanish officers appeared to be utterly unfit and -unable to command their men. They had all the pride, arrogance, and -self-sufficiency of the best officers in the world, with the very least -of all pretension to have a high opinion of themselves. It is true they -were not all alike, but the majority were the most haughty, and at the -same time the most contemptible creatures in the shape of officers that -ever I beheld’ [p. 109]. - -As a matter of fact the class of officers in Spain was filled up -in three different ways. One-third of them were, by custom, drawn -from the ranks. In an army raised by conscription from all strata -of society excellent officers can be procured in this way. But in -one mainly consisting of the least admirable part of the surplus -population, forced by want or hatred of work into enlisting, it was -hard to get even good sergeants. And the sergeants made still worse -sub-lieutenants, when the colonel was forced to promote some of them. -No wonder that the English observer thought that there were ‘Spanish -officers who did not look like gentlemen.’ This class were seldom -or never allowed to rise above the grade of captain. The remaining -two-thirds of the officers received their commissions from the war -office: in the cavalry they were supposed to show proofs of noble -descent, but this was not required in the infantry. There was a -large sprinkling, however, of men of family, and for them the best -places and the higher ranks were generally reserved--a thing feasible -because all promotion was arbitrary, neither seniority nor merit -being necessarily considered. The rest were drawn from all classes of -society: for the last fifteen years any toady of Godoy could beg or -buy as many commissions for his protégés as he pleased. But a large, -and not the worst, part of the body of officers was composed of the -descendants of soldiers of fortune--Irishmen were most numerous, but -there were also French and Italians--who had always been seen in great -numbers in the Spanish army. They held most of the upper-middle grades -in the regiments, for the promoted sergeants were kept down to the -rank of captain, while the nobles got rapid promotion and soon rose -to be colonels and generals. On the whole we cannot doubt that there -was a mass of bad officers in the Spanish army: the ignorant fellows -who had risen from the ranks, the too-rapidly promoted scions of the -noblesse, and the nominees of Godoy’s hangers-on, were none of them -very promising material with which to conduct a war _à outrance_ for -the existence of the realm. - -In 1808 there was but one small military college for the training of -infantry and cavalry officers. Five existed in 1790, but Godoy cut them -down to one at Zamora, and only allowed sixty cadets there at a time, -so that five-sixths of the young men who got commissions went straight -to their battalions, there to pick up (if they chose) the rudiments of -their military education. From want of some common teaching the drill -and organization of the regiments were in a condition of chaos. Every -colonel did what he chose in the way of manual exercise and manœuvres. -A French officer says that in 1807 he saw a Spanish brigade at a -review, in which, when the brigadier gave the order ‘Ready, present, -fire!’ the different battalions carried it out in three different -times and with wholly distinct details of execution. - -Not only was the Spanish army indifferently officered, but even of -such officers as it possessed there were not enough. In the old line -regiments there should have been seventy to each corps, i.e. 2,450 to -the 105 battalions of that arm. But Godoy had allowed the numbers to -sink to 1,520. When the insurrection broke out, the vacant places had -to be filled, and many regiments received at the same moment twenty -or thirty subalterns taken from civil life and completely destitute -of military training. Similarly the militia ought to have had 1,800 -officers, and only possessed 1,200 when the war began. The vacancies -were filled, but with raw and often indifferent material. - -Such were the officers with whom the British army had to co-operate. -There is no disguising the fact that from the first the allies could -not get on together. In the earlier years of the war there were some -incidents that happened while the troops of the two nations lay -together, which our countrymen could never forgive or forget. We -need only mention the midnight panic in Cuesta’s army on the eve of -Talavera, when 10,000 men ran away without having had a shot fired at -them, and the cowardly behaviour of La Peña in 1811, when he refused to -aid Graham at the bloody little battle of Barossa. - -The strictures of Wellington, Napier, and the rest were undoubtedly -well deserved; and yet it is easy to be too hard on the Spaniards. It -chanced that our countrymen did not get a fair opportunity of observing -their allies under favourable conditions; of the old regular army -that fought at Baylen or Zornoza they never got a glimpse. It had -been practically destroyed before we came upon the field. La Romana’s -starving hordes, and Cuesta’s evasive and demoralized battalions -were the samples from which the whole Spanish army was judged. In -the Talavera campaign, the first in which English and Spanish troops -stood side by side, there can be no doubt that the latter (with few -exceptions) behaved in their very worst style. They often did much -better; but few Englishmen had the chance of watching a defence like -that of Saragossa or Gerona. Very few observers from our side saw -anything of the heroically obstinate resistance of the Catalonian -_miqueletes_ and _somatenes_. Chance threw in our way Cuesta and La -Peña and Imaz as types of Peninsular generals, and from them the -rest were judged. No one supposes that the Spaniards as a nation are -destitute of all military qualities. They made good soldiers enough -in the past, and may do so in the future: but when, after centuries -of intellectual and political torpor, they were called upon to fight -for their national existence, they were just emerging from subjection -to one of the most worthless adventurers and one of the most idiotic -kings whom history has known. Charles IV and Godoy account for an -extraordinary amount of the decrepitude of the monarchy and the -demoralization of its army. - -It is more just to admire the constancy with which a nation so -handicapped persisted in the hopeless struggle, than to condemn it for -the incapacity of its generals, the ignorance of its officers, the -unsteadiness of its raw levies. If Spain had been a first-rate military -power, there would have been comparatively little merit in the six -years’ struggle which she waged against Bonaparte. When we consider her -weakness and her disorganization, we find ourselves more inclined to -wonder at her persistence than to sneer at her mishaps. - - - - -SECTION II: CHAPTER III - -THE FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN - - -§ 1. THE ARMY OF 1808: ITS CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATION. - -In dealing with the history of the imperial armies in the Peninsula, -it is our first duty to point out the enormous difference between the -troops who entered Spain in 1807 and 1808, under Dupont, Moncey, and -Murat, and the later arrivals who came under Bonaparte’s personal -guidance when the first disastrous stage of the war was over. - -Nothing can show more clearly the contempt which the Emperor -entertained, not only for the Spanish government but for the Spanish -nation, than the character of the hosts which he first sent forth -to occupy the Peninsula. After Tilsit he was the master of half a -million of the best troops in the world; but he did not consider the -subjugation of Spain and Portugal a sufficiently formidable task to -make it necessary to move southward any appreciable fraction of the -Grand Army. The victors of Jena and Friedland were left in their -cantonments on the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Oder, while a new force, -mainly composed of elements of inferior fighting value, was sent across -the Pyrenees. - -This second host was at Napoleon’s disposition mainly owing to the fact -that during the late war he had been anticipating the conscription. -In the winter of 1806-7 he had called out, a year too soon, the men -who were due to serve in 1808. In the late autumn of 1807, while his -designs in Spain were already in progress, he had summoned forth the -conscription of 1809. He had thus under arms two years’ contingents of -recruits raised before their proper time. The dépôts were gorged, and, -even after the corps which had been depleted in Prussia and Poland had -been made up to full strength, there was an enormous surplus of men in -hand. - -To utilize this mass of conscripts the Emperor found several ways. Of -the men raised in the winter of 1806-7 some thousands had been thrown -into temporary organizations, called ‘legions of reserve,’ and used -to do garrison duty on the Atlantic coast, in order to guard against -possible English descents. There were five of these ‘legions’ and two -‘supplementary legions’ in the army sent into Spain: they showed a -strength of 16,000 men. None of them had been more than a year under -arms, but they were at any rate organized units complete in themselves. -They formed the greater part of the infantry in the corps of Dupont. - -A shade worse in composition were twenty ‘provisional regiments’ which -the Emperor put together for Spain. Each regimental dépôt in the south -of France was told to form four companies from its superabundant mass -of conscripts. These bodies, of about 560 men each, were united in -fours, and each group was called a ‘provisional regiment.’ The men of -each battalion knew nothing of those of the others, since they were all -drawn from separate regiments: there was not a single veteran soldier -in the ranks: the officers were almost all either half-pay men called -back to service, or young sub-lieutenants who had just received their -commissions. These bodies, equally destitute of _esprit de corps_ and -of instruction, made up nearly 30,000 men of the army of Spain. They -constituted nearly the whole of the divisions under Bessières and -Moncey, which lay in Northern Spain at the moment of the outbreak of -the war. - -But there were military units even less trustworthy than the -‘provisional regiments’ which Napoleon transferred to Spain in the -spring of 1808. These were the five or six _régiments de marche_, which -were to be found in some of the brigades which crossed the Pyrenees -when the state of affairs was already growing dangerous. They were -formed of companies, or even smaller bodies, hastily drawn together -from such southern dépôts, as were found to be still in possession of -superfluous conscripts even after contributing to the ‘provisional -regiments.’ They were to be absorbed into the old corps when the -pressing need for instant reinforcements for the Peninsula should come -to an end. In addition to all these temporary units, Bonaparte was -at the same moment making a vast addition to his permanent regular -army. Down to the war of 1806-7 the French regiments of infantry -had consisted of three battalions for the field and a fourth at the -dépôt, which kept drafting its men to the front in order to fill up -the gaps in the other three. Napoleon had now resolved to raise the -establishment to five battalions per regiment, four for field service, -while the newly created fifth became the dépôt battalion. When the -Peninsular War broke out, a good many regiments had already completed -their fourth field-battalion, and several of these new corps are to -be found in the rolls of the armies which had entered Spain. The -multiplication of battalions had been accompanied by a reduction of -their individual strength: down to February, 1808, there were nine -companies to each unit, and Junot’s corps had battalions of a strength -of 1,100 or 1,200 bayonets. But those which came later were six-company -battalions, with a strength of 840 bayonets when at their full -establishment. - -All the troops of which we have hitherto spoken were native Frenchmen. -But they did not compose by any means the whole of the infantry which -the Emperor dispatched into Spain between October, 1807, and May, 1808. -According to his usual custom he employed great numbers of auxiliaries -from his vassal kingdoms: we note intercalated among the French units -seven battalions of Swiss, four of Italians, two each of Neapolitans -and Portuguese[76], and one each of Prussians, Westphalians, -Hanoverians, and Irish. Altogether there were no less than 14,000 -men of foreign infantry dispersed among the troops of Junot, Dupont, -Bessières, Moncey, and Duhesme. They were not massed, but scattered -broadcast in single battalions, save the Italians and Neapolitans, who -formed a complete division under Lecchi in the army of Catalonia. - - [76] These last were the rear battalions of the unfortunate - Portuguese legion which was in march for the Baltic; they were - still on this side of the Pyrenees when the war began, and were - hastily utilized against Saragossa. - -The cavalry of the army of Spain was quite as heterogeneous and -ill compacted as the infantry. Just as ‘provisional regiments’ of -foot were patched up from the southern dépôts of France, so were -‘provisional regiments’ of cavalry. The best of them were composed -of two, three, or four squadrons, each contributed by the dépôt of -a different cavalry regiment. The worst were _escadrons de marche_, -drawn together in a haphazard fashion from such of the dépôts as had -a surplus of conscripts even after they had given a full squadron -to the ‘provisional regiments.’ There were also a number of foreign -cavalry regiments, Italians, Neapolitans, lancers of Berg, and Poles. -Of veteran regiments of French cavalry there were actually no more than -three, about 1,250 men, among the 12,000 horsemen of the army of Spain. - -When we sum up the composition of the 116,000 men who lay south of the -Pyrenees on the last day of May, 1808, we find that not a third part -of them belonged to the old units of the regular French army. It may be -worth while to give the figures:-- - -Of veterans we have-- - - _Infantry._ _Cavalry._ - - (1) A detachment of the Imperial Guard, - which was intended to serve as the Emperor’s - special escort during his irruption into Spain 3,600 1,750 - - (2) Twenty-six battalions of infantry of the - line and light infantry, being all first, second, - or third battalions, and not newly raised fourth - battalions 25,800 - - (3) Three old regiments of cavalry of the line 1,250 - - (4) Three newly raised fourth battalions of - infantry regiments of the line 1,800 - - This gives a total of regularly organized ----------------- - French troops of the standing army of 31,200 3,000 - ----------------- - (5) Five legions of reserve, and two - ‘supplementary legions of reserve’ 16,000 - - (6) Fifteen ‘provisional regiments’ from the - dépôts of Southern France [the remaining five - had not crossed the frontier on May 31] 31,000 - - (7) Six _régiments de marche_ of conscripts 3,200 - - (8) Eighteen battalions of Italian, Swiss, - German, and other auxiliaries 14,000 - - (9) Sixteen ‘provisional regiments’ of cavalry, - and a few detached ‘provisional squadrons,’ and - _escadrons de marche_ 9,500 - - (10) Three regiments of foreign cavalry 1,000 - - This makes a total of troops in temporary ----------------- - organization, or of foreign origin, of 64,200 10,500 - -Napoleon, then, intended to conquer Spain with a force of about 110,000 -men, of which no more than 34,000 sabres and bayonets belonged to -his regular army; the rest were conscripts or foreign auxiliaries. -But we must also note that the small body of veteran troops was -not distributed equally in each of the corps, so as to stiffen the -preponderating mass of conscripts. If we put aside the division of -Imperial Guards, we find that of the remaining 25,000 infantry of old -organization no less than 17,500 belonged to Junot’s army of Portugal, -which was the only one of the corps that had a solid organization. -Junot had indeed a very fine force, seventeen old line battalions to -two battalions of conscripts and three of foreigners. The rest of -the veteran troops were mainly with Duhesme in Catalonia, who had a -good division of 5,000 veterans. In the three corps of Dupont, Moncey, -and Bessières on the other hand old troops were conspicuous by their -absence: among the 19,000 infantry of Dupont’s corps, on which (as it -chanced) the first stress of the Spanish war was destined to fall, -there was actually only two battalions (1,700 men) of old troops. In -Moncey’s there was not a single veteran unit; in Bessières’, only -four battalions. This simple fact goes far to explain why Dupont’s -expedition to Andalusia led to the capitulation of Baylen, and why -Moncey’s march on Valencia ended in an ignominious retreat. Countries -cannot be conquered with hordes of undrilled conscripts--not even -countries in an advanced stage of political decomposition, such as the -Spain of 1808. - - -§ 2. THE ARMY OF 1808-14: ITS CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATION. - -Baylen, as we shall see, taught Napoleon his lesson, and the second -army which he brought into the Peninsula in the autumn of 1808, to -repair his initial disasters, was very differently constituted from the -heterogeneous masses which he had at first judged to be sufficient for -his task. It was composed of his finest old regiments from the Rhine -and Elbe, the flower of the victors of Jena and Friedland. Even when -the despot had half a million good troops at his disposition, he could -not be in force everywhere, and the transference of 200,000 veterans to -Spain left him almost too weak in Central Europe. In the Essling-Wagram -campaign of 1809 he found that he was barely strong enough to conquer -the Austrians, precisely because he had left so many men behind him -in the Peninsula. In the Russian campaign of 1812, vast as were the -forces that he displayed, they were yet not over numerous for the -enterprise, because such an immense proportion of them was composed of -unwilling allies and disaffected subjects. If the masses of Austrians, -Prussians, Neapolitans, Portuguese, Westphalians, Bavarians, and so -forth had been replaced by half their actual number of old French -troops from Spain, the army would have been far more powerful. Still -more was this the case in 1813: if the whole of the Peninsular army had -been available for service on the Elbe and Oder at the time of Lützen -and Bautzen, the effect on the general history of Europe might have -been incalculable. Truly, therefore, did the Emperor call the Spanish -War ‘the running sore’ which had sapped his strength ever since its -commencement. - -A word as to the tactical organization of the French army in 1808 is -required. The infantry regiments of normal formation consisted, as we -have seen, of four field battalions and one dépôt battalion; the last -named never, of course, appeared at the front. Each field battalion -was composed of six companies of 140 men: its two flank companies, the -grenadiers and voltigeurs, were formed of the pick of the corps[77]: -into the grenadiers only tall, into the voltigeurs only short men -were drafted. Thus a battalion should normally have shown 840 and a -regiment 3,360 men in the field. But it was by no means the universal -rule to find the whole four battalions of a regiment serving together. -In the modern armies of France, Germany, or Russia, a regiment in -time of peace lives concentrated in its recruiting district, and can -take the field in a compact body. This was not the case in Napoleon’s -ever-wandering hosts: the chances of war were always isolating single -battalions, which, once dropped in a garrison or sent on an expedition, -did not easily rejoin their fellows. Many, too, of the new fourth -battalions raised in 1807 had never gone forward to Germany to seek the -main body of their regiments. Of the corps which were brought down to -Spain in the late autumn of 1808 there were more with three battalions -than with four concentrated under the regimental eagle. Some had only -two present, a few no more than one[78]. But the Emperor disliked to -have single isolated battalions, and preferred to work them in pairs, -if he could not get three or four together. The object of this was -that, if one or two battalions got much weakened in a campaign, the -men could be fused into a single unit, and the supernumerary officers -and sergeants sent back to the dépôt, where they would form a new -battalion out of the stock of conscripts. But the fresh organization -might very likely be hurried, by some sudden chance of war, to -Flushing, or Italy, or the Danube, while the eagle and the main body -remained in Spain--or vice versa. - - [77] French generals were much addicted to the pernicious - practice of massing the grenadier companies of all the regiments - of a division, or an army corps, in order to make a picked - battalion or brigade, to be used as a reserve. Junot had four - such battalions (_grenadiers réunis_) at Vimiero, and Victor - three at Barossa. - - [78] To take a later example, of the three _corps d’armée_ (II, - VI, VIII) with which Masséna invaded Portugal in 1810, there - were only _three_ regiments with four battalions present; while - seventeen had three, eight had two, and ten a single battalion - only. - -There was therefore, in consequence of the varying strength of the -regiments, no regularity or system in the brigading of the French -troops in Spain: in one brigade there might be five or six isolated -battalions, each belonging to a separate regiment; in another three -from one regiment and two from a second; in a third four from one -regiment and one from another. Nor was there any fixed number of -battalions in a brigade: it might vary from three (a very unusual -minimum) up to nine--an equally rare maximum. Six was perhaps the most -frequent number. A division was composed of two, or less frequently of -three, brigades, and might have any number from ten up to sixteen or -eighteen battalions--i.e. it varied, allowing for casual losses, from -6,000 to 10,000 men. This irregularity was part of Napoleon’s system: -he laid it down as an axiom that all military units, from a brigade to -an army corps, ought to differ in strength among themselves: otherwise -the enemy, if he had once discovered how many brigades or divisions -were in front of him, could calculate with accuracy the number of -troops with which he had to do. - -Much confusion is caused, when we deal with Napoleon’s army, by the -strange system of numeration which he adopted. The infantry, whether -called ‘line regiments’ or ‘light infantry regiments,’ were drilled and -organized in the same way. But the Emperor had some odd vagaries: he -often refused to raise again a regiment which had been exterminated, -or taken prisoners _en masse_. Hence after a few years of his reign -there were some vacant numbers in the list of infantry corps. The -regiments, for example, which were garrisoning the colonies at the time -of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, fell one after another into the -hands of the English as the war went on. They were never replaced, and -left gaps in the army list. On the other hand the Emperor sometimes -raised regiments with duplicate numbers, a most tiresome thing for the -military historian of the next age. It is impossible to fathom his -purpose, unless he was set on confusing his enemies by showing more -battalions than the list of existing corps seemed to make possible. Or -perhaps he was thinking of the old legions of the Roman Empire, of -which there were always several in existence bearing the same number, -but distinguished by their honorary titles. Those who wish to read the -story of one of these duplicate regiments may follow in the history of -Nodier the tale of the raising and extermination of Colonel Oudet’s -celebrated ‘9th Bis’ of the line[79]. - - [79] Nodier, _Souvenirs de la Révolution_, ii. 233-5. - -There is another difficulty caused by a second freak of the Emperor: -all regiments ought, as we have said, to have shown four field -battalions. But Bonaparte sometimes added one or even two more, to -corps which stood high in his favour, or whose dépôts produced on some -occasions a very large surplus of conscripts. Thus we find now and -then, in the morning state of a French army corps, a fifth or even -a sixth[80] battalion of some regiment. But as a rule these units -had not a very long existence: their usual fate was to be sent home, -when their numbers ran low from the wear and tear of war, in order -to be incorporated in the normal _cadres_ of their corps. On the -authority of that good soldier and admirable historian, Foy, we are -able to state that on the first of June, 1808, Napoleon had 417 field -battalions, over and above the dépôts, on his army rolls. If the 113 -regiments of the line, and the thirty-two light infantry regiments had -all been in existence and complete, there should have been 580 field -battalions. Clearly then some corps had disappeared and many others -had not more than three battalions ready. But the units were always -being created, amalgamated, or dissolved, from week to week, so that -it is almost impossible to state the exact force of the whole French -army at any given moment. The most important change that was made -during the year 1808 was the conversion of those of the provisional -regiments which escaped Dupont’s disaster into new permanent corps. -By combining them in pairs the 114th-120th of the line and the 33rd -léger were created[81]. In the succeeding five years more and more -corps were raised: the annexation of Holland and Northern Germany in -1810-11 ultimately enabled the Emperor to carry the total of his line -regiments up to 156 [1813], and of his light infantry regiments up to -thirty-six[82]. - - [80] In the campaign of 1810 the 26th, 66th, and 82nd regiments - in Masséna’s army had 5th and 6th battalions in the field. - - [81] This was done on July 7 (see _Nap. Corresp._, 14,164). Nos. - 1 and 2 became the 114th of the line, 3 and 4 the 115th, 5 and - 6 the 116th, 7 and 8 the 33rd léger, 9 and 10 the 117th, 11 the - 118th, 13 and 14 the 119th, 17 and 18 the 120th. When the 6th, - 7th, and 8th were captured at Baylen, new conscripts had to be - brought from France to complete the 116th and replace the 33rd - léger. - - [82] See Rousset’s excellent _La Grande Armée de 1813_. - -Of the French cavalry we need not speak at such length. When the -Spanish war broke out, Bonaparte was possessed of about eighty -regiments of horsemen, each taking the field with four squadrons of -some 150 to 200 men. There were twelve regiments of cuirassiers, two of -carabineers, thirty of dragoons, twenty-six of _chasseurs à cheval_, -ten of hussars, i.e. fourteen regiments of heavy, thirty of medium, and -thirty-six of light horse. The cuirassiers were hardly ever seen in -Spain--not more than two or three regiments ever served south of the -Pyrenees[83]. On the other hand the greater part of the dragoons were -employed in the Peninsula--there were in 1809 twenty-five of the thirty -regiments of them in the field against the English and Spaniards. -More than half of the hussars also served in Spain. To the veteran -corps of regulars there were added, at the outset of the war, as will -be remembered, a great number of ‘provisional regiments,’ but these -gradually disappeared, by being incorporated in the older _cadres_, or -in a few cases by being formed into new permanent units. There was also -a mass of Polish, German, and Italian cavalry; but these auxiliaries -did not bear such a high proportion to the native French as did the -foreign part of the infantry arm. By far the most distinguished of -these corps were the Polish lancers, whom the English came to know only -too well at Albuera. The Italians were almost exclusively employed on -the east coast of Spain, in the army of Catalonia. The Germans--mostly -from Westphalia, Berg, and Nassau--were scattered about in single -regiments among the cavalry corps of the various armies. They were -always mixed with the French horse, and never appeared in brigades -(much less in divisions) of their own. - - [83] The most distinguished of these was the 13th Cuirassiers, - a regiment of new formation, which served throughout the war in - Aragon and Catalonia, and was by far the best of Suchet’s mounted - corps. For its achievements the reader may be referred to the - interesting _Mémoires_ of Colonel de Gonneville. - -The average strength of a French cavalry regiment during the years -1809-14 was four squadrons of about 150 men each. It was very seldom -that a corps showed over 600 men in the ranks: not unfrequently it -sank to 450[84]. When it grew still further attenuated, it was usual -to send back the _cadres_ of one or two squadrons, and to complete to -full numbers the two or three which kept the field. These figures do -not hold good for the raw ‘provisional regiments’ which Bonaparte used -during the first year of the war: they sometimes rose to 700 or even -800 strong, when the dépôts from which they had been drawn chanced to -be exceptionally full of recruits[85]. But such large corps are not to -be found in the later years of the war. By 1812, when Napoleon, busied -in Central Europe, ceased to reinforce his Spanish armies, the average -of a cavalry regiment had shrunk to 500 men. In 1813 it was seldom that -400 effective sabres could be mustered by any mounted corps. - - [84] In Masséna’s army of 1810 the largest cavalry regiment (25th - Dragoons) had 650 men. In Suchet’s army in the same year there - was one exceptionally strong regiment (4th Hussars) with 759 - sabres. - - [85] The 2nd Provisional Dragoons of Moncey’s corps had no less - than 872 men in June, 1808. - -As to the scientific arms of the French service, the artillery and -engineers, there is no doubt that throughout the war they deserved very -well of their master. Artillery cannot be improvised in the manner that -is possible with infantry, and the batteries which accompanied Dupont’s -and Moncey’s conscripts into Spain in 1808 were veterans. Without them -the raw infantry would have fared even worse than it did, during the -first year of the struggle. The proportion of guns which the French -employed during the wars of the Empire was generally very large in -comparison with the size of their armies--one of the many results of -the fact that Bonaparte had originally been an artillery officer. He -raised, as was remarked, the number of gunners in the French service -to a figure as large as that of the whole regular army of Louis XVI at -the moment when the Revolution broke out. But in Spain the difficulties -of transport and the badness of the roads seem to have combined to -keep down the proportion of guns to something very much less than -was customary in the more favourable _terrain_ of Italy or Germany. -A large part, too, of the pieces were of very light metal--four- and -even three-pounders, which were found easier to transport across the -mountains than six- or eight-pounders, though much less effective in -the field. In many of the campaigns, therefore, of the Peninsular War -the French artillery stood in a proportion to the total number of men -present, which was so low that it barely exceeded that customary among -the British, who were notoriously more ‘under-gunned’ than any other -European army save that of Spain. Junot at Vimiero had twenty-three -guns to 13,500 men: Victor at Talavera had eighty guns to about 50,000 -men: Masséna in 1810 invaded Portugal with some 70,000 men and 126 -guns; at Fuentes d’Oñoro he only showed forty-two guns to 40,000 -bayonets and sabres[86]. Soult at Albuera had (apparently) forty guns -to 24,000 men: in the autumn campaign of 1813 the same marshal had 125 -guns to 107,000 men. It will be noted that the proportion never rises -to two guns per thousand men, and occasionally does not much exceed one -gun per thousand[87]. This contrasts remarkably with the 350 guns to -120,000 men which Bonaparte took out for the campaign of Waterloo, or -even with the 1,372 guns to 600,000 men of the Russian expedition and -1,056 guns to 450,000 men of the ill-compacted army of 1813. - - [86] In this case the low proportion was due to want of horses, - not to bad roads. Even the forty-two guns were only produced when - Bessières had lent Masséna many teams. - - [87] I take these figures respectively from Thiébault, Fririon, - Lapène, Le Clerc, and Rousset. - - - - -SECTION II: CHAPTER IV - -THE TACTICS OF THE FRENCH AND THEIR ADVERSARIES -DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR - - -An account of the numbers and the organization of an army is of -comparatively little interest, unless we understand the principles on -which its leaders are accustomed to handle it on the day of battle, and -its value as a fighting machine. - -Speaking generally, the tactics of the French infantry during the -Peninsular War were those which had been developed fifteen years -before, during the first struggles of the Revolution. They nearly -always attacked with a thick cloud of tirailleurs covering one or two -lines of battalions in column. The idea was that the very numerous -and powerful skirmishing line would engage the enemy sufficiently to -attract all his attention, so that the massed battalions behind arrived -at the front of battle almost without sustaining loss. The momentum -of the columns ought then to suffice to carry them right through the -enemy’s lines, which would already have suffered appreciably from -the fire of the tirailleurs. This form of attack had won countless -victories over Prussian, Austrian, and Russian; and many cases had been -known where a hostile position had been carried by the mere impetus -of the French columns, without a shot having been fired save by their -skirmishers. But this method, which Wellington called ‘the old French -style,’ never succeeded against the English. It had the fatal defect -that when the column came up through the tirailleurs and endeavoured -to charge, it presented a small front, and only the first two ranks -could fire. For the normal French battalion advanced in column of -companies, or less frequently of double companies, i.e. with a front -of forty or at most of eighty men, and a depth of nine or of eighteen, -since the company was always three deep, and there were six companies -to a battalion. The rear ranks only served to give the front ranks -moral support, and to impress the enemy with a sense of the solidity -and inexorable strength of the approaching mass. Sometimes a whole -regiment or brigade formed one dense column. Now if the enemy, as was -always the case with the British, refused to be impressed, but stood -firm in line, held their ground, and blazed into the head of the mass, -the attack was certain to fail. For 800 men in the two-deep line, -which Wellington loved, could all use their muskets, and thus poured -800 bullets per volley into a French battalion of the same strength, -which only could return 160. The nine-deep, or eighteen-deep, column -was a target which it was impossible to miss. Hence the front ranks -went down in rows and the whole came to a standstill. If, as was often -the case, the French battalion tried to deploy in front of the English -line, so as to bring more muskets to bear, it seldom or never succeeded -in accomplishing the manœuvre, for each company, as it straggled out -from the mass, got shot down so quickly that the formation could never -be completed. No wonder that Foy in his private journal felt himself -constrained to confess that, for a set battle with equal numbers on a -limited front, the English infantry was superior. ‘I keep this opinion -to myself,’ he adds, ‘and have never divulged it; for it is necessary -that the soldier in the ranks should not only hate the enemy, but also -despise him[88].’ Foy kept his opinion so closely to himself that he -did not put it in his formal history of the Peninsular War: it has only -become public property since his journals were published in 1900. - - [88] Diary of Foy, in Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie Militaire du Général - Foy_, p. 98. - -But the fact that with anything like equal numbers the line must beat -the column was demonstrated over and over again during the war. It had -first been seen at Maida in 1806, but that obscure Calabrian battle -was hardly known, even by name, save to those who had been present. -It was at Talavera, and still more at Busaco and Albuera, that it -became patent to everybody that the attack in battalion column, even -if preceded by a vigorous swarm of skirmishers, could never succeed -against the English. At the two former fights the French attacked -uphill, and laid the blame of their defeat upon the unfavourable -ground. But when at Albuera three English brigades drove double their -own numbers from the commanding ridge on which Soult had ranged them, -simply by the superiority of their musketry fire, there was no longer -any possibility of disguising the moral. Yet to the end of the war, -down to Waterloo itself, the French stuck to their old formation: at -the great battle in 1815, as Wellington tersely said, ‘The French came -on once more in the old style, and we beat them in the old style.’ - -But when Napoleon’s armies were opposed to troops who could not stand -firm to meet them in a line formation, they generally succeeded. The -Spaniards, in their earlier battles, often tried to resist in a line of -deployed battalions, but their _morale_ was not good enough when the -attacking column drew close to them, and they generally gave way at the -critical moment and let their assailants break through[89]. The same -had often been the case with the Austrians and Prussians, who in their -earlier wars with Napoleon used the line formation which Frederick the -Great had popularized fifty years before. The great king had accustomed -his troops to fight in a three- or four-deep line, with a comparatively -small provision of skirmishers to cover their front, for it was by the -fire of the whole battalion that his troops were intended to win. The -masses of tirailleurs which the French sent forward in front of their -columns generally succeeded in engaging the Prussian or Austrian line -so closely, that the columns behind them came up without much loss, and -then broke the line by their mere momentum and moral effect. Hence in -their later wars the German powers copied their enemies, and took to -using a very thick skirmishing line backed by battalion columns in the -French style. - - [89] The reader who wishes to see a logical explanation of the - phenomenon may find it in the remarks of the Spanish Colonel - Moscoso (1812) in Arteche, ii. 394. He explains that the - skirmishing line of his compatriots was always too thin to - keep back the tirailleurs. The latter invariably pushed their - way close up to the Spanish main body, and while presenting in - their scattered formation no definite mark for volleys, were yet - numerous enough to shoot down so many of their opponents as to - shake the Spanish formation before the columns in the rear came - up. - -Wellington never found any reason to do so. His method was to conceal -his main line as long as possible by a dip in the ground, a hedge, -or a wall, or to keep it behind the crest of the position which it -was holding. To face the tirailleurs each battalion sent out its -light company, and each brigade had assigned to it several detached -companies of riflemen: from 1809 onward some of the 60th Rifles and one -or two foreign light corps[90] were broken up and distributed round -the various divisions for this special purpose. This gave a line of -skirmishers strong enough to hold back the tirailleurs for a long time, -probably till the supporting columns came up to help them. It was only -then that the British skirmishing line gave way and retired behind -its main body, leaving the deployed battalions in face of the French -column, of which they never failed to give a satisfactory account. -The covering screen of light troops often suffered terribly; e.g., at -Barossa, Brown’s ‘light battalion’ lost fourteen out of twenty-one -officers and more than half its rank and file[91], while holding off -the French advance from the line which was forming in its rear. But the -combat always went well if the enemy’s skirmishers could be kept back, -and his supporting columns forced to come to the front, to engage with -the regiments in two-deep formation which were waiting for them. - - [90] e.g. _Brunswick-Oels_ and the _Chasseurs Britanniques_. - - [91] See Blakeney, _A Boy in the Peninsular War_, edited by - Sturges (1899), pp. 189, 190, for an account of this bloody - episode. - -Charges with the bayonet are often heard of in narratives--especially -French narratives--of the Peninsular War. But it was very seldom that -the opposing troops actually came into collision with the white weapon. -There were occasions, almost invariably in fighting in villages or -enclosed ground, on which considerable numbers of men were killed -or wounded with the bayonet, but they were but few. It is certain, -however, that the 43rd at Vimiero, the 71st and 88th at Fuentes -d’Oñoro, and the 20th at Roncesvalles, engaged in this fashion[92]; -and other cases could be quoted. But as a rule a ‘bayonet charge’ in -a French historian merely means the advance of a column up to the -enemy’s position without firing: it does not imply actual contact -or the crossing of weapons. An English charge on the other hand was -practically an advance in line with frequent volleys, or independent -file-firing. At Albuera, or Barossa, or Salamanca it was the ball not -the bayonet which did the work; the enemy was shot down, or gave way -without any hand-to-hand conflict. - - [92] The reader who is curious as to details of actual - bayonet-fighting may consult Grattan for the 88th, and the - anonymous ‘T.S.’ of the 71st for Fuentes d’Oñoro, and Steevens of - the 20th for Roncesvalles. The charge of Tovey’s company of the - latter corps, on the last-mentioned occasion, much resembled one - of the incidents of Inkerman. - -French cavalry tactics had by 1808 developed into as definite a system -as those of the infantry. Napoleon was fond of massing his horsemen -in very large bodies and launching them at the flank, or even at the -centre, of the army opposed to him. He would occasionally use as many -as 6,000 or 8,000, or (as at Waterloo) even 12,000 men for one of -these great strokes. Two or three of his famous battles were won by -tremendous cavalry charges--notably Marengo and Dresden, while Eylau -was just saved from falling into a disaster by a blow of the same -kind. But cavalry must be used at precisely the right moment, must be -skilfully led and pushed home without remorse, and even then it may be -beaten off by thoroughly cool and unshaken troops. It is only against -tired, distracted, or undisciplined battalions that it can count on a -reasonable certainty of success. All through the war the Spanish armies -supplied the French horsemen with exactly the opportunities that they -required: they were always being surprised, or caught in confusion -while executing some complicated manœuvre; and as if this was not -enough, they were often weak enough in _morale_ to allow themselves to -be broken even when they had been allowed time to take their ground -and form their squares. The battles of Gamonal (1808), Medellin, Alba -de Tormes, and Ocaña (1809), the Gebora, and Saguntum (1811) were good -examples of the power of masses of horse skilfully handled over a -numerous but ill-disciplined infantry. - -On the other hand, against the English the French cavalry hardly ever -accomplished anything worthy of note. It is only possible to name two -occasions on which they made their mark: the first was at Albuera, -where, profiting by an opportune cloud-burst which darkened the face -of day, two regiments of lancers came in upon the flank of a British -brigade (Colborne’s of the second division), and almost entirely cut it -to pieces. The second incident of the kind was at Fuentes d’Oñoro, in -the same summer, when Montbrun’s cavalry charged with some effect on -Houston’s division and hustled it back for some two miles, though they -never succeeded in breaking its squares. - -On the other hand the cases where the French horsemen found themselves -utterly unable to deal with the British infantry were very numerous--we -need only mention Cacabellos (during Moore’s retreat), El Bodon, -Salamanca, and several skirmishes during the retreat from Burgos in -1812. After such experiences it was no wonder that Foy, and other old -officers of the army of Spain, looked with dismay upon Napoleon’s great -attempt at Waterloo to break down the long line of British squares -between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, by the charges of ten or twelve -thousand heavy cavalry massed on a short front of less than a mile[93]. -The Emperor had never seen the British infantry fight, and was -entirely ignorant of their resisting power. - - [93] See Foy’s diary in Girod de l’Ain, p. 277. - -Of fights between cavalry and cavalry, where the two sides were -present in such equal numbers as to make the struggle a fair test -of their relative efficiency, there were but few in the Peninsular -War. In the early years of the struggle Wellington was very scantily -provided with horsemen, and never could afford to engage in a cavalry -battle on a large scale. Later on, when he was more happily situated -in this respect, he showed such a marked reluctance to risk great -cavalry combats that the old saying that he was ‘pre-eminently an -infantry general’ seems justified. That he could use his horsemen -vigorously enough, when he saw his opportunity, he showed at Assaye, -long before he had made his name known in Europe. Yet the only one -of his great battles in Spain where his dragoons took a prominent -part in the victory was Salamanca, where Le Marchant’s brigade struck -such a smashing blow on the flank of the French army. We have his own -authority[94] for the fact that he hesitated to mass great bodies of -horse, because he doubted the tactical skill of his officers, and the -power of the regiments to manœuvre. ‘I considered our cavalry,’ he -wrote ten years after the war was over, ‘so inferior to the French from -want of order, that although I considered one squadron a match for two -French, I did not like to see four British opposed to four French: and -as the numbers increased and order, of course, became more necessary, I -was the more unwilling to risk our men without having a superiority in -numbers. They could gallop, but could not preserve their order.’ - - [94] Letter to Lord William Russell, July 31, 1826. - -Foy, in his excellent history of the Spanish War, emits an opinion -in words curiously similar to those of Wellington, stating that -for practical purposes the English troopers were inferior to the -French on account of their headlong impetuosity and want of power to -manœuvre[95]. When two such authorities agree, there must clearly -have been some solid foundation for their verdict. Yet it is hard to -quote many combats in their support: there were cases, no doubt, where -English regiments threw their chances away by their blind fury in -charging, as did the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera, the 13th Light -Dragoons near Campo Mayor on March 25, 1811, and Slade’s brigade at -Maguilla on June 11, 1812. Yet with the memory before us of Paget’s -admirable operations at Sahagun and Benavente in December, 1808, of -Lumley’s skilful containing of Latour Maubourg’s superior numbers at -Albuera, and his brilliant success at Usagre over that same general in -1811, as well as Cotton’s considerable cavalry fight at Villa Garcia in -1812, it seems strange to find Wellington disparaging his own troopers. -No doubt we must concede that the British horsemen did not show that -marked superiority over their rivals of the same arm which Wellington’s -infantry always asserted. But fairly balancing their faults and their -merits, it would seem that there was something wanting in their general -no less than in themselves. A lover of the cavalry arm would have got -more profit out of the British horse than Wellington ever obtained. It -is noticeable that not one of the successful fights cited above took -place under the eye or the direction of the Duke. - - [95] Foy, i. 288-90. - -As to the Spanish cavalry, it was (as we have already had occasion to -remark) the weakest point in the national army. In the first actions -of the war it appeared on the field in such small numbers that it had -no chance against the French. But later on, when the juntas succeeded -in raising large masses of horsemen, their scandalous conduct on a -score of fields was the despair of Spanish generals. We need only -mention Medellin and Ocaña as examples of their misbehaviour. No French -cavalry-general ever hesitated to engage with double of his own number -of Spanish horse. When vigorously charged they never failed to give -way, and when once on the move it was impossible to rally them. It -was often found on the night of a battle that the mass of the cavalry -was in flight twenty miles ahead of the infantry, which it had basely -deserted. - -Napoleon, as every student of the art of war knows, had started his -career as an officer of artillery, and never forgot the fact. He -himself has left on record the statement that of all his tactical -secrets the concentration of an overwhelming artillery fire on a given -point was the most important. ‘When once the combat has grown hot,’ -he wrote, ‘the general who has the skill to unite an imposing mass of -artillery, suddenly and without his adversary’s knowledge, in front -of some point of the hostile position, may be sure of success.’ His -leading idea was to secure an overwhelming artillery preparation for -his infantry attacks: for this reason his typical battle began with -the massing of a great number of guns on the points of the enemy’s -line which he intended ultimately to break down. In this respect he -abandoned entirely the vicious tactics that prevailed in the earlier -years of the revolutionary war, when the cannon, instead of being -concentrated, were distributed about in twos and threes among the -infantry battalions. We shall find that his method had been perfectly -assimilated by his subordinates: when the ground allowed of it, they -were much given to collecting many guns at some salient point of the -line, and bringing a concentrated fire to bear on the weak spot in -the enemy’s position. At Ocaña a battery of this kind had a great -share in the credit of the victory; at Albuera it saved Soult’s routed -troops from complete destruction. The names of artillery generals like -Senarmont and Ruty need honourable mention for such achievements. If -the French artillery had less effect against the English than against -most of Napoleon’s foes, it was because of Wellington’s admirable -custom of hiding his troops till the actual moment of battle. Austrian, -Russian, or Prussian generals occupied a hillside by long lines drawn -up on the hither slope, of which every man could be counted. Hence they -could be thoroughly searched out and battered by the French guns, long -before the infantry was let loose. Wellington, on the other hand, loved -to show a position apparently but half-defended, with his reserves, or -even his main line, carefully hidden behind the crest, or covered by -walls and hedges, or concealed in hollows and ravines. Hence the French -artillery-preparation was much embarrassed: there were no masses to -fire at, and it was impossible to tell how any part of the line was -held. By the end of the war the French marshals grew very chary of -attacking any position where Wellington showed fight, for they never -could tell whether they were opposed by a mere rearguard, or by a whole -army skilfully concealed. - -The English armies, unlike the French, always took with them a -comparatively small proportion of artillery, seldom so much as two guns -to the thousand men, as Foy remarks. But what there was was excellent, -from its high discipline and the accuracy of its fire. The Duke -preferred to work with small and movable units, placed in well-chosen -spots, and kept dark till the critical moment, rather than with the -enormous lines of guns that Bonaparte believed in. His horse artillery -was often pushed to the front in the most daring way, in reliance on -its admirable power of manœuvring and its complete steadiness. At -Fuentes d’Oñoro, for example, it was made to cover the retreat of the -right wing before the masses of French cavalry, in a way that would -have seemed impossible to any one who was not personally acquainted -with Norman Ramsay and his gunners. Hence came the astounding fact that -during the whole war the Duke never in the open field lost an English -gun. Several times cannon were taken and retaken; once or twice guns -not belonging to the horse or field batteries were left behind in a -retreat, when transport failed. But in the whole six years of his -command Wellington lost no guns in battle. Foy gives an unmistakable -testimony to the English artillery in his history, by remarking that in -its material it was undoubtedly superior to the French[96]: the same -fact may be verified from the evidence of our own officers, several of -whom have left their opinion on record, that after having inspected -captured French cannon, limbers, and caissons they much preferred their -own. - - [96] Foy, i. 296. - -This statement, it must be remembered, only applies to the field and -horse artillery. The English siege artillery, all through the war, -was notably inferior to the French. Wellington never possessed a -satisfactory battering train, and the awful cost at which his sieges -were turned into successes is a testimony to the inadequacy of his -resources. The infantry were sent in to win, by sheer courage and -at terrible expense of life, the places that could not be reduced -by the ill-equipped siege artillery. There can be no doubt that in -poliorcetics the enemy was our superior: but with a very small number -of artillery officers trained to siege work, an insignificant body -of Royal Engineers[97], and practically no provision of trained -sappers[98], what was to be expected? It was not strange that the -French showed themselves our masters in this respect. But the fault -lay with the organization at head quarters, not with the artillery and -engineer officers of the Peninsular army, who had to learn their trade -by experience without having received any proper training at home. - - [97] It was usual to supplement the meagre supply of engineers by - officers who volunteered from the line. - - [98] There were only the ‘Royal Military Artificers’ in very - small numbers. The rank and file of the engineer corps did not - yet exist. - - - - -SECTION III - -SARAGOSSA AND BAYLEN - - - - -CHAPTER I - -OPENING OF HOSTILITIES: THE FRENCH INVASIONS OF ANDALUSIA AND VALENCIA - - -While the provinces of Spain were bursting out, one after another, -into open insurrection, Murat at Madrid and Bonaparte at Bayonne were -still enjoying the fools’ paradise in which they had dwelt since the -formal abdication of Ferdinand VII. The former was busy in forcing -the Junta of Regency to perform the action which he elegantly styled -‘swallowing the pill,’ i.e. in compelling it to do homage to Napoleon -and humbly crave for the appointment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of -Spain. He imagined that his only serious trouble lay in the lamentable -emptiness of the treasury at Madrid, and kept announcing smooth things -to his master--‘The country was tranquil, the state of public opinion -in the capital was far happier than could have been hoped: the native -soldiery were showing an excellent disposition, the captains-general -kept sending in good reports: the new dynasty was likely to be popular, -and the only desire expressed by the people was to see their newly -designated king arrive promptly in their midst[99].’ Letters of this -kind continued to flow from the pen of the Duke of Berg till almost the -end of the month. Even after details of the insurrection of Aragon and -the Asturias began to reach him, he could write on May 31 that a strong -flying column would suffice to put everything right. About this time he -was seized by a violent fever and took to his bed, just as things were -commencing to grow serious. On his convalescence he left for France, -after putting everything in charge of Savary, the man who of all -Frenchmen most deserved the hatred of Spain. About the middle of June -he recrossed the French frontier, and after a few weeks went off to -Naples to take up his new kingship there. Spain was never to see him -again: the catastrophe which he had, by his master’s orders, brought -about, was to be conducted to its end by other hands. - - [99] Murat to Napoleon, May 18. - -While Murat lay sick at the suburban palace of Chamartin, and while -Napoleon was drafting acts and constitutions which the assembly of -notables at Bayonne were to accept and publish, the first acts of war -between the insurgents and the French army of occupation took place. - -We have already had occasion to point out that the main military -strength of the insurrection lay in Galicia and Andalusia, the two -districts in which large bodies of regular troops had placed themselves -at the disposition of the newly organized juntas. In Valencia, -Catalonia, and Murcia the movement was much weaker: in Old Castile, -Aragon, and the Asturias it had hardly any other forces at its disposal -than hordes of half-armed peasants. Clearly then Galicia and Andalusia -were the dangerous points for the French, and the former more than the -latter, since an army descending from its hills, and falling on the -long line of communications between France and Madrid, might cause the -gravest inconvenience. If there had been any organized Spanish forces -in Aragon, there would have been an equal danger of an attack directed -from Saragossa against the eastern flank of the French communications. -But while Galicia was possessed of a numerous army of regular troops, -Aragon had nothing to show but a mass of hastily assembled peasants, -who were not yet fully provided with arms and were only just beginning -to be told off into battalions. - -Napoleon, at the moment when he began to order his troops to move, was -under the impression that he had to deal with a number of isolated -riots rather than with a general insurrection of the Spanish nation. -His first orders show that he imagined that a few flying columns would -be able to scour the disaffected districts and scatter the bands of -insurgents without much trouble. Instead of a strategical plan for -the conquest of Spain, we find in his directions nothing more than -provisions for the launching of a small column against each point where -he had been informed that a rising had broken out. He presupposes that -the kingdom as a whole is quiet, and that bodies of 3,000 or 4,000 -men may march anywhere, without having to provide for the maintenance -of their communications with Madrid, or with each other. Only in a -friendly country would it have been possible to carry out such orders. - -There were at the Emperor’s disposition, at the end of May, some -116,000 men beyond the Pyrenees: but the 26,000 troops under Junot in -Portugal were so completely cut off from the rest, by the insurrection -in Castile and Estremadura, that they had to be left out of -consideration. Of the remainder the corps of Dupont and Moncey, 53,000 -strong, lay in and about Madrid: Bessières, to whom the preservation -of the main line of communications with France fell, had some 25,000 -between Burgos and San Sebastian: Duhesme, isolated at Barcelona, and -communicating with France by Perpignan and not by Bayonne, had only -some 13,000 at his disposal in Catalonia. Up to the first week in June -the Emperor thought that the 91,000 men of these four corps would be -enough to pacify Spain. - -His first design was somewhat as follows: Bessières was to keep a firm -hand on the line of communications, but also to detach a division of -4,000 men under Lefebvre-Desnouettes against Saragossa, and a brigade -under Merle to pacify Santander and the northern littoral. The Emperor -does not at first seem to have realized that, with the army of Galicia -hanging on his western flank, Bessières might not be able to spare men -for such distant enterprises. He dealt with the corps as if it had -nothing to face save the local insurgents of Aragon and Old Castile. -From the large body of troops which lay about Madrid, Toledo, and -Aranjuez, two strong columns were to be dispatched to strike at the -two main centres of the insurrection in Southern Spain. Dupont was to -take the first division of his army corps, with two brigades of cavalry -and a few other troops, and march on Cordova and Seville. This gave -him no more than about 13,000 men for the subjugation of the large and -populous province of Andalusia. The other two infantry divisions of his -corps remained for the present near Madrid[100]. - - [100] For details of his force see the note on pp. 182-3. - -On the other side of the capital, Marshal Moncey with a somewhat -smaller force--one division of infantry from his own army corps and -one brigade of cavalry, 9,000 men in all--was to move on Valencia, -and to take possession of that city and of the great naval arsenal of -Cartagena. His expedition was to be supported by a diversion from the -side of Catalonia, for Duhesme (in spite of the small number of his -army) was told to send a column along the sea-coast route, by Tarragona -and Tortosa, to threaten Valencia from the north. Moncey’s remaining -infantry divisions, which were not detailed for the expedition that -he was to lead, remained near Madrid, available (like Dupont’s second -and third divisions) for the reinforcement of Bessières or the -strengthening of the two expeditionary columns, as circumstances might -decide. - -Clearly Dupont and Moncey were both sent forth to undertake impossible -tasks. Napoleon had not comprehended that it was not provincial -_émeutes_ that he had to crush, but the regular resistance of a nation. -To send a column of 12,000 men on a march through 300 miles of hostile -territory to Cadiz, or a column of 9,000 men on a march of 180 miles -to Valencia, presupposes the idea that the expeditions are affairs of -police and not strategical operations. Our astonishment grows greater -when we consider the character of the troops which Dupont and Moncey -commanded. In the army of the former there was _one_ veteran French -battalion--that of the Marines of the Guard, six of raw recruits of the -Legions of Reserve, two of Paris Municipal Guards (strangely distracted -from their usual duties), one of the contingent of the Helvetic -Confederation, and four of Swiss mercenaries in the Spanish service, -who had just been compelled to transfer their allegiance to Napoleon. -The cavalry consisted of four ‘provisional regiments’ of conscripts. -It was a military crime of the first order to send 13,000 troops of -this quality on an important expedition. Moncey’s force was of exactly -the same sort--eight battalions of conscripts formed in ‘provisional -regiments’ and two ‘provisional regiments’ of dragoons, plus a -Westphalian battalion, and two Spanish corps, who deserted _en masse_ -when they were informed that they were to march against Valencia in -company with the marshal’s French troops. He had not one single company -or squadron of men belonging to the old imperial army. - -Bessières was much more fortunate, as, among the 25,000 men of whom he -could dispose, there were four veteran battalions of the line and two -old regiments of cavalry; moreover there were sent ere long to his aid -three of the battalions of the Imperial Guard which lay at Madrid, and -four hundred sabres of the dragoons, chasseurs, and gendarmes of the -same famous corps. - -The march of the two expeditionary columns began on May 24, a date -at which Murat and his master had but the faintest notion of the -wide-spreading revolt which was on foot. Moncey and Dupont were both -officers of distinction: the marshal was one of the oldest and the -most respected officers of the imperial army: he had won the grade -of general of division in the days of the Republic, and did not owe -his first start in life to Napoleon. Of all the marshals he was by -several years the senior. He passed as a steady, capable, and prudent -officer of vast experience. Dupont on the other hand was a young man, -who had first won a name by his brilliant courage at the combat of -Dirnstein in the Austrian war of 1805. Since then he had distinguished -himself at Friedland: he was on the way to rapid promotion, and, if -his expedition to Andalusia had succeeded, might have counted on a -duchy and a marshal’s bâton as his reward. Napoleon knew him as a brave -and loyal subordinate, but had never before given him an independent -command. He could hardly guess that, when left to his own inspirations, -such a brilliant officer would turn out to be dilatory, wanting in -initiative, and wholly destitute of moral courage. It is impossible to -judge with infallible accuracy how a good lieutenant will behave, when -first the load of responsibility is laid upon his shoulders. On May 24, -Dupont quitted Toledo with his 13,000 men: in the broad plains of La -Mancha he met with no opposition. Everywhere the people were sullen, -but no open hostility was shown. Even in the tremendous defiles of the -Sierra Morena he found no enemy, and crossed the great pass of Despeña -Perros without having to fire a shot. Coming out at its southern end -he occupied Andujar, the town at the main junction of roads in Eastern -Andalusia, on June 5. Here he got clear intelligence that the whole -country-side was up in arms: Seville had risen on May 26, and the rest -of the province had followed its example. There was a large assembly -of armed peasants mustering at Cordova, but the regular troops had not -yet been brought up to the front. General Castaños, whom the Junta had -placed in chief command, was still busily engaged in concentrating his -scattered battalions, forming them into brigades and divisions, and -hastily filling up with recruits the enormous gaps which existed in the -greater part of the corps. The regulars were being got together at a -camp at Carmona, south of the Guadalquivir, and not far from Seville. -The organization of new battalions, from the large number of volunteers -who remained when the old regiments were completed, took place -elsewhere. It would be weeks, rather than days, before the unorganized -mass took shape as an army, and Dupont might count on a considerable -respite before being attacked. But it was not only with the forces -of Castaños that he had to reckon: at Cordova, Seville, Granada, and -all the other towns of Andalusia, the peasants were flocking in to be -armed and told off into new regiments. There was every probability -that in a few days the movement would spread northward over the Sierra -Morena into La Mancha. An insurrection in this district would sever -Dupont’s communications with Madrid, for he had not left behind him any -sufficient detachments to guard the defiles which he had just passed, -or to keep open the great post-road to the capital across the plains of -New Castile. When he started he had been under the impression that it -was only local troubles in Andalusia that he had to suppress. - -Dupont was already beginning to find that the insurgents were in much -greater numbers than he had expected when he crossed the Sierra Morena, -but till he had made trial of their strength he considered that it -would be wrong to halt. He had close before him the great city of -Cordova, a most tempting prize, and he resolved to push on at least so -far before taking it upon himself to halt and ask for reinforcements. -His continued movement soon brought about the first engagement of the -war, as at the bridge of Alcolea he found his advance disputed by a -considerable hostile force [June 7]. - -The military commandant of the district of Cordova was a certain Don -Pedro de Echávarri, a retired colonel whom the local Junta had just -placed in command of its levies. His force consisted of 10,000 or -12,000 peasants and citizens, who had only received their arms three -days before, and had not yet been completely told off into regiments -and companies. On the 4th of June he had been sent a small body of -old troops--one battalion of light infantry (Campo Mayor), and one -of militia (the 3rd Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia)--1,400 men -in all, and with them eight guns. To have abandoned Cordova without -a fight would have discouraged the new levies, and probably have led -to Echávarri’s own death; for the armed mob which he commanded would -have torn him to pieces as a traitor if he had refused to give battle. -Accordingly he resolved to defend the passage of the Guadalquivir -at the point where the high-road from Andujar crossed it, six miles -outside Cordova. He barricaded the bridge and placed his guns and the -two old battalions on the hither side of the river, in a position -commanding the defile. On each flank of them some thousands of the -Cordovan insurgents were drawn up, while the remainder of the levy, -including all the mounted men, were sent across the bridge, and hidden -in some hills which overhung the road by which the French were coming. -They were ordered to show themselves, and to threaten to fall upon the -enemy from the flank, when he should have developed his attack upon -the bridge. If Echávarri had been guided by military considerations he -would not have dared to offer battle with such a raw and motley force -to 12,000 French troops--even if the latter were but the conscripts of -Dupont. But political necessity compelled him to make the attempt. - -When Dupont found the position of Alcolea occupied, he cannonaded -the Spaniards for a time, and then launched his vanguard against the -bridge. The leading battalion (it was one of those formed of the Paris -Municipal Guards) stormed the barricades with some loss, and began to -cross the river. After it the rest of Pannetier’s brigade followed, -and began to deploy for the attack on the Spanish position. At this -moment the Cordovan levies beyond the river showed themselves, and -began to threaten a flank attack on Dupont. The latter sent his cavalry -against them, and a few charges soon turned back the demonstration, and -scattered the raw troops who had made it. Meanwhile Dupont’s infantry -advanced and overpowered the two regular battalions opposed to them: -seeing the line broken, the masses of insurgents on the flanks left the -field without any serious fighting. The whole horde gave way and poured -back into Cordova and right through the city, whose ruined walls they -made no attempt to defend. They had lost very few men, probably no more -than 200 in all, while the French had suffered even less, their only -casualties being thirty killed and eighty wounded, wellnigh all in the -battalion which had forced the barricades at the bridge. - -There would be no reason to linger even for a moment over this -insignificant skirmish, if it had not been for the deplorable events -which followed--events which did more to give a ferocious character -to the war than any others, save perhaps the massacre by Calvo at -Valencia, which was taking place (as it chanced) on that very same day, -June 7. - -Dupont, after giving his army a short rest, led it, still ranged in -battle array, across the six miles of plain which separated him from -Cordova. He expected to find the defeated army of Echávarri rallying -itself within the city. But on arriving in front of its gates, he found -the walls unoccupied and the suburbs deserted. The Cordovans had -closed their gates, but it was rather for the purpose of gaining time -for a formal surrender than with any intention of resisting. Dupont -had already opened negotiations for the unbarring of the gates, when a -few scattered shots were fired at the French columns from a tower in -the wall, or a house abutting on it. Treating this as a good excuse -for avoiding the granting of a capitulation, Dupont blew open one of -the gates with cannon, and his troops rushed into the empty streets -without finding any enemy to defeat. The impudent fiction of Thiers to -the effect that the entry of the French was seriously resisted, and -that desperate street-fighting took place, is sufficiently disproved -by the fact that in the so-called storming of Cordova the French lost -altogether two killed and seven wounded. - -Nevertheless the city was sacked from cellar to garret. Dupont’s -undisciplined conscripts broke their ranks and ran amuck through the -streets, firing into windows and battering down doors. Wherever there -was the least show of resistance they slew off whole households: but -they were rather intent on pillage and rape than on murder. Cordova was -a wealthy place, its shops were well worth plundering, its churches -and monasteries full of silver plate and jewelled reliquaries, its -vaults of the strong wines of Andalusia. All the scenes of horror that -afterwards occurred at Badajoz or San Sebastian were rehearsed for the -first time at Cordova; and the army of Dupont had far less excuse than -the English marauders and murderers of 1812 and 1813. The French had -taken the city practically without loss and without opposition, and -could not plead that they had been maddened by the fall of thousands of -their comrades, or that they were drunk with the fury of battle after -many hours of desperate fighting at the breaches. Nevertheless, without -any excuse of this sort, Dupont’s army behaved in a way that would have -suited better the hordes of Tilly and Wallenstein. Their commanders -could not draw them away from their orgies and outrages till the next -day: indeed, it seems that many of the French officers disgraced -themselves by joining in the plunder. While the men were filling their -haversacks with private property, there were found colonels and even -generals who were not ashamed to load carts and coaches with pictures, -tapestries, and metal-work from churches and public buildings, and bags -of dollars from the treasury, where no less than 10,000,000 reals of -specie had been found. Laplanne, whom Dupont appointed commandant of -the place, took 2,000 ducats of blackmail from the Count of Villanueva, -on whom he had billeted himself, in return for preserving his mansion -from pillage. When the French left Cordova, nine days later, they had -with them more than 500 wheeled vehicles seized in the place which were -loaded with all sorts of plunder[101]. - - [101] It is astonishing to find that Napier (i. 114) expressly - denies that Cordova was sacked. Foy (iii. 231), the best of the - French historians, acknowledges that ‘unarmed civilians were - shot, churches and houses sacked, and scenes of horror enacted - such as had not been seen since the Christian drove out the - Moor in 1236.’ Captain Baste, the best narrator among French - eye-witnesses, speaks of assassination, general pillage, and - systematic rape. Cabany, Dupont’s laudatory biographer, confesses - (p. 89) to drunkenness and deplorable excesses, and allows that - Dupont distributed 300,000 francs as a ‘gratification’ among his - general officers. Many of the details given above are derived - from the official narrative of the Cordovan municipal authorities - printed in the _Madrid Gazette_. - -Dupont had hardly settled down in Cordova, and begun to substitute -crushing military contributions for unsystematic pillage, when he found -himself cut off from his base. The valley of the Upper Guadalquivir, -and the slopes of the Sierra Morena, on both the southern and the -northern sides of the passes, rose in arms in the second week of -June. The French had left no detachments behind to preserve their -communications: between Cordova and Toledo there were only a few posts -where stragglers and sick had been collected, some isolated officers -busy on surveying or on raising contributions, and some bodies of ten -or twenty men escorting couriers or belated trains of wagons bearing -food or ammunition to the front. Most of these unfortunate people were -cut up by the insurgents, who displayed from the first a most ferocious -spirit. The news of the sack of Cordova drove them to the commission -of inhuman cruelties; some prisoners were blinded, others tortured -to death: Foy says that the brigadier-general Réné, surprised while -crossing the Morena, was thrown into a vat of boiling water and scalded -to death[102]. The parties, which escaped massacre hastily drew back -towards Madrid and Toledo, and soon there was not a French soldier -within 150 miles of Dupont’s isolated division. - -That general did not at first realize the unpleasantness of his -position. He had been sufficiently surprised by the opposition offered -at Alcolea, and the rumours of the concentration of the army of -Castaños, to make him unwilling to advance beyond Cordova. He wrote -to Murat asking for reinforcements, and especially for troops to keep -open his lines of communication. There were, he said, at least 25,000 -regular troops marching against him: the English might disembark -reinforcements at Cadiz: the whole province was in a flame: it was -impossible to carry out the Grand-Duke of Berg’s original orders to -push straight on to Seville. But matters were even worse than he -thought: in a few days he realized, from the non-arrival of couriers -from Madrid, that he was cut off: moreover, his foraging parties, even -when they were only a few miles outside Cordova, began to be molested -and sometimes destroyed. - - [102] Foy, iii. 233. Cabany (p. 96), on the other hand, says that - he was sawn in two between planks. Gille, in his _Mémoires d’un - Conscrit de 1808_ (p. 85), gives other distressing details. - -After waiting nine days, Dupont very wisely resolved to fall back, and -to endeavour to reopen communications with his base. On June 16 he -evacuated Cordova, much to the regret of his soldiers, who resented the -order to abandon such comfortable quarters. On the nineteenth, dragging -with him an enormous convoy of plunder, he reached Andujar, the great -junction of roads where the routes from the passes of the Morena come -down to the valley of the Guadalquivir. It would have been far wiser -to go still further back, and to occupy the debouches of the defiles, -instead of lingering in the plain of Andalusia. He should have retired -to Baylen, the town at the foot of the mountains, or to La Carolina, -the fortress in the upland which commands the southern exit of the -Despeña Perros. But he was vainly dreaming of resuming the attempt to -conquer the whole south of Spain when reinforcements should arrive, and -Andujar tempted him, since it was the best point from which he could -threaten at once Cordova, Jaen, and Granada, the three chief towns of -Eastern Andalusia. Here, therefore, he abode from June 19 to July 18, a -wasted month during which the whole situation of affairs in Spain was -changed. - -Here we must leave Dupont, while we treat of the doings of the other -French generals during the month of June. While the invasion of -Andalusia was running its course, both Moncey and Bessières had been -seriously engaged. - -The first named of the two marshals was placed in charge of one-half of -the offensive part of Napoleon’s plan for the subjugation of Spain, -while Bessières was mainly responsible for the defensive part, i.e. -for the maintaining of the communications between Madrid and Bayonne. -It is with Moncey’s expedition against Valencia, therefore, that we -must first deal. Although he started a few days later than Dupont, -that marshal was (like his colleague) still dominated by the idea that -possessed both Napoleon and Murat--that the insurrections were purely -local, and that their suppression was a mere measure of police. This -notion accounts for his choice of route: there are two roads from -Madrid to Valencia, a long and fairly easy one which passes through -the gap between the mountains of Murcia and those of Cuenca, by San -Clemente, Chinchilla, and the plain of Almanza, and a shorter one, -full of dangerous defiles and gorges, which cuts through the heart -of the hills by Tarancon, Valverde, and Requeña. The former crosses -the watershed between the valley of the Tagus and those of the rivers -flowing into the Mediterranean Sea at the easiest point, the latter at -one of the most difficult ones. But Moncey, thinking only of the need -to deal promptly with the Valencian insurgents, chose the shorter and -more difficult route. - -He left Madrid on June 4: a week later he was near Cuenca, in the -midst of the mountains. Not a shot had yet been fired at him, but as -he pressed eastward he found the villages more and more deserted, till -at last he had reached a region that seemed to have become suddenly -depopulated. He turned a little out of his way on the eleventh to -occupy the city of Cuenca[103], the capital of this wild and rugged -country, but resumed his advance on the eighteenth, after receiving -from Madrid peremptory orders to press forward[104]. There lay before -him two tremendous defiles, which must be passed if he was to reach -Valencia. The first was the deep-sunk gorge of the river Cabriel, where -the highway plunges down a cliff, crosses a ravine, and climbs again -up a steep opposing bank. The second, thirty miles further on, was the -Pass of the Cabrillas, the point where the road, on reaching the edge -of the central plateau of Spain, suddenly sinks down into the low-lying -fertile plain of Valencia. - - [103] Cuenca lies twenty-five miles off the main Madrid-Valencia - road, well to the north of it. - - [104] Moncey’s delay of a week at Cuenca provoked Savary (now - acting for the invalided Murat) to such an extent, that he sent - forward the cavalry-general Excelmans, nominally to take charge - of Moncey’s vanguard, really to spur the cautious marshal on to - action. But Excelmans was captured on the way by peasants, and - sent a prisoner to Valencia. - -If the Conde de Cervellon, the general whom the Valencian Junta had put -in charge of its army, had concentrated on these defiles the 7,000 or -8,000 regular troops who were to be found in the province and in the -neighbouring district of Murcia, it is probable that Moncey would never -have forced his way through the mountains; for each of the positions, -if held in sufficient force, is practically impregnable. But the -Spaniards had formed a deeply rooted notion that the invader would come -by the easy road over the plains, by San Clemente and Almanza, and not -through the mountains of Cuenca. The whole of the troops of Murcia and -the greater part of those of Valencia had been directed on Almanza, -where there was a good position for opposing an army descending from -Castile. Only a small detachment had been sent to watch the northern -road, and its commander, Don Pedro Adorno, had stationed at the bridge -of the Cabriel no more than one battalion of Swiss mercenaries (No. -1 of Traxler’s regiment) and 500 armed peasants with four guns. The -position was too extensive to be held by 1,500 men: Moncey found that -the river was fordable in several places, and detached a small column -to cross at each, while two battalions dashed at the bridge. In spite -of the steepness of the ravine the French got over at more than one -point, and climbed the opposite slope, whereupon the peasants fled, -and half the Swiss battalion was surrounded and captured while it was -trying to cover the retreat of the guns[105]. Adorno, who was lying -some miles to the rear, at Requeña, when he should have been present -in full force at the bridge, ought now to have fallen back to cover -Valencia, but in a moment of panic he fled across country to join the -army at Almanza [June 21]. - - [105] Moncey induced a good many of these mercenaries to take - service with him; but they deserted him when the time of trouble - began. - -This disgraceful flight left the Valencian Junta almost destitute of -troops for the defence of the still stronger defile of the Cabrillas, -which Moncey had yet to force before he could descend into the plain. -The Junta hurried up to it two regiments of recruits--one of which is -said to have been first practised in the manual exercise the day before -it went into action[106]. These, with 300 old soldiers, the wrecks of -the combat at the Cabriel, and three guns, tried to hold the pass. -Moncey turned both flanks of this very inadequate defending force, and -then broke through its centre. Many of the Spaniards dispersed, 500 -were slain or captured, and the rest fled down the pass to Valencia. -After riding round the position, Moncey remarked that it was so strong -that with 6,000 steady troops he would undertake to hold it against -Napoleon himself and the Grand Army [June 24]. - - [106] Arteche, _Guerra de la Independencia_, ii. 150. - -Two days later, after a rapid march down the defile and across the -fertile Valencian plain, Moncey presented himself before the gates of -its capital, and demanded its surrender. But he found that there was -still much fighting to be done: a small column of regulars had arrived -in the city, though the main army from Almanza was still far distant. -With three battalions of old troops and 7,000 Valencian levies, Don -José Caro, a naval officer and brother of the celebrated Marquis of -La Romana, had taken up a position four miles outside the city at San -Onofre. He had covered his front with some irrigation canals, and -barricaded the road. Moncey had to spend the twenty-seventh in beating -back this force into Valencia, not without some sharp fighting. - -On the next day he made a general assault upon the city. Valencia was -not a modern fortress: it had merely a wet ditch and an enceinte of -mediaeval walls. There were several points where it seemed possible -to escalade the defences, and the marshal resolved to storm the -place. But he had forgotten that he had to reckon with the auxiliary -fortifications which the populace had constructed during the last -three days. They had built up the gates with beams and earth, -barricaded the streets, mounted cannon on the walls where it was -possible, and established several batteries of heavy guns to sweep the -main approaches from the open country. The city being situated in a -perfectly level plain, and in ground much cut up by irrigation canals, -it had been found possible to inundate much of the low ground. As the -river Guadalaviar washed the whole northern side of the walls, Moncey’s -practicable points of attack were restricted to certain short spaces on -their southern front. - -The marshal first sent a Spanish renegade, a Colonel Solano, to summon -the place. But the Valencians were exasperated rather than cowed by -their late defeats; their leaders--especially Padre Rico, a fighting -priest of undoubted courage and capacity--had worked them up to a high -pitch of enthusiasm, and they must have remembered that, if they -submitted, they would have to render an account for Calvo’s abominable -massacre of the French residents. Accordingly the Junta returned -the stirring answer that ‘the people of Valencia preferred to die -defending itself rather than to open any sort of negotiations.’ A mixed -multitude of 20,000 men, of whom some 8,000 were troops of one sort -and another[107], manned the walls and barricades and waited for the -assault. - - [107] But only 1,500 were regulars; the rest were newly - incorporated levies. - -After riding round the exposed front of the city, Moncey resolved to -attack only the south-eastern section. He formed two columns, each of -a brigade, of which one assailed the gate of San José near the river, -while another marched on the gate of Quarte, further to the south. -Considering the weak resistance that he had met at the Cabriel and at -the Pass of the Cabrillas, he had formed a sanguine expectation that -the Valencians would not make a firm stand, even behind walls and -barricades. In this he was wofully deceived: the French had yet to -learn that the enemy, though helpless in the open, was capable of the -most obstinate resistance when once he had put himself under cover of -bricks and earth. The first assault was beaten off with heavy loss, -though Moncey’s conscripts showed great dash, reached the foot of the -defences, and tried to tear down the palisades with their hands. The -marshal should have seen at once that he had too large a business in -hand for the 8,000 men of whom he could dispose. But he persevered, -bringing forward his field artillery to batter the gates and earthworks -before a second assault should be made. It was to no purpose, as they -were soon silenced by the guns of position which the besieged had -prepared for this very purpose. Late in the afternoon Moncey risked a -second general attack, embracing the gate of Santa Lucia as well as the -other points which he had before assailed. But the stormers were beaten -off with even heavier loss than on the first assault, and bodies of -the defenders, slipping out by posterns and side-gates, harassed the -retreating columns by a terrible flanking fire. - -Clearly the game was up: Moncey had lost at least 1,200 men, a sixth of -his available infantry force[108]. He was much to blame for pressing -the attack when his first movement failed, for as Napoleon (wise after -the event) said in his commentary on the marshal’s operations: ‘On ne -prend pas par le collet une ville de quatre-vingt mille âmes.’ If the -first charge did not carry the walls, and the garrison stood firm, the -French could only get in by the use of siege artillery, of which they -did not possess a single piece. - - [108] Foy, generally a very fair calculator of French casualties, - gives the marshal’s losses at 2,000 men in all, which seems - rather a high figure. Napier (i. 95) says that he had 800 wounded - to carry, which supposes a total loss of 1,100 or 1,200. Thiers’ - estimate of 300 is as obviously absurd as most of the other - figures given by that historian. No such loss would have stopped - a French army--even an army of conscripts. - -Moncey’s position was now very dangerous: he knew that the country was -up in arms behind him, and that his communications with Madrid were -completely cut. He was also aware that Cervellon’s army from Almanza -must be marching towards him, unless it had taken the alternative -course of pressing in on his rear, to occupy the difficult passes by -which he had come down into the Valencian coast-plain. His conscripts -were dreadfully discouraged by their unexpected reverse: he was -hampered by a great convoy of wounded men, whose transport would cause -serious delays. Nothing had been heard of the diversion which General -Chabran, with troops detached from Duhesme’s army in Catalonia, had -been ordered to execute towards the northern side of Valencia. As a -matter of fact that general had not even crossed the Ebro. Retreat was -necessary: of the three possible lines on which it could be executed, -that along the coast road, in the direction where Chabran was to be -expected, was thought of for a moment, but soon abandoned: it was too -long, and the real base of the marshal’s corps was evidently Madrid, -and not Barcelona. The route by Tarancon and the Cabrillas, by which -the army had reached Valencia, was terribly difficult: clearly it would -be necessary to force again the defiles which had been cleared on the -way down to the coast. And it was possible that 9,000 or 10,000 regular -troops might now be occupying them. - -Accordingly, Moncey resolved to retire by the third road, that -through the plains by Almanza and San Clemente. If, as was possible, -Cervellon’s whole army was now blocking it, they must be fought and -driven off: a battle in the plain would be less dangerous than a battle -at the Cabrillas or the bridge of the Cabriel. Before daylight on June -29, therefore, the marshal moved off on this road. - -Luck now came to his aid: the incapable Spanish commander had made up -his mind that the French would retreat by the way that they had come, -and had sent forward General Llamas with all the troops of Murcia -to seize the defile of the Cabrillas. He himself followed with the -rest of the regulars, but halted at Alcira, behind the Xucar. Thus -while Moncey was marching to the south, the main body of his enemies -was moving northward. Cervellon refused to fight in the absence of -Llamas, so nothing was left in the marshal’s way save bands of peasants -who occupied the fords of the Xucar and the road between Jativa and -Almanza: these he easily brushed away in a couple of skirmishes. Nor -did a small column detached in pursuit from Valencia dare to meddle -seriously with his rearguard. So without even exchanging a shot with -the Spanish field-army, which Cervellon had so unwisely scattered and -sent off on a false track, Moncey was able to make his way by Jativa, -Almanza, and Chinchilla back towards La Mancha [July 2-6]. - -At San Clemente he met with reinforcements under General Frère, -consisting of the third division of Dupont’s original corps, some -5,000 strong. This division had been sent to search for him by Savary, -who had been filled with fears for his safety when he found that the -communications were cut, and that Cuenca and all the hill-country had -risen behind the expeditionary force. After vainly searching for Moncey -on the northern road, in the direction of Requeña, Frère at last got -news that he had taken the southern line of retreat, and successfully -joined him on July 8. At San Clemente the marshal intended to halt -and to wait for Cervellon’s arrival, in the hope of beating him in -the open. But a few days later he received news from Madrid, to the -effect that Savary wished to draw back the French forces nearer to the -capital, and that Frère, at least, must move in to Ocaña or Toledo. -Much displeased at finding a junior officer acting as the lieutenant of -the Emperor--for Savary was but a lieutenant-general, while he himself -was a marshal--Moncey threw up the whole scheme of waiting to fight -the Valencian army, and marched back to the immediate neighbourhood of -Madrid [July 15]. - -There can be no doubt that the marshal had extraordinary luck in this -short campaign. If he had been opposed by a general less timid and -incapable than the Conde de Cervellon, he might have found arrayed -against him, at the bridge of the Cabriel, or at the Cabrillas, a -considerable body of regulars--eight or nine thousand men--with a -numerous artillery, instead of the insignificant forces which he -actually defeated. Again, while he was trying to storm Valencia, -Cervellon might have attacked him in the rear with great chance of -success; or the Spaniard might have kept his forces united, and opposed -Moncey as he retreated from before Valencia. Instead of doing so he -split up his army into detachments, and the greater part of it was sent -off far from the central point of his operations, and did not fire -a shot. Truly such a general was, as Thucydides remarks concerning -the Spartans of old, ‘very convenient for his adversaries.’ A less -considerate enemy would have had a fair chance of bringing Moncey’s -campaign to the same disastrous end that befell that of Dupont. - - - - -SECTION III: CHAPTER II - -OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: THE SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA - - -Having watched the failure of the expeditions by which Napoleon had -hoped to complete the conquest of Southern Spain, we must turn our eyes -northward, to Madrid and the long line of communications which joined -the capital to the French base of operations at Vittoria, Pampeluna, -and San Sebastian. At the moment when the Valencian and Andalusian -expeditions were sent out from Madrid and Toledo, Murat had still -under his hand a large body of troops, the second and third division -of Moncey’s corps, the second and third of Dupont’s, and the 5,000 -horse and foot of the Imperial Guard--in all more than 30,000 men. -Bessières, if the garrison of the northern fortresses and some newly -arrived reinforcements are added to his original force, had more than -25,000. With these the grand-duke and the marshal had to contain the -insurrection in Northern Spain, and to beat back the advance of the -army of Galicia. - -The furthest points to the north and east to which the wave of -insurrection had washed up were Logroño and Tudela in the Ebro -valley, Santander on the coast of the Bay of Biscay, and Palencia and -Valladolid in Old Castile. All these places lay in Bessières’ sphere of -action, and he promptly took measures to suppress the rising at each -point. On June 2 a column sent out from Vittoria reoccupied Logroño, -slaying some hundreds of half-armed peasants, and executing some of -their leaders who had been taken prisoners. On the same day a stronger -force, six battalions and two squadrons under General Merle, marched -from Burgos on Santander. Driving before him the insurgents of the -Upper Ebro valley, Merle advanced as far as Reynosa, and was about -to force the defiles of the Cantabrian Mountains and to descend on -to Santander, when he received orders to return and to take part in -suppressing the more dangerous rising in the plains of Old Castile. -News had arrived that the captain-general, Cuesta, was collecting a -force at Valladolid, which threatened to cut the road between Burgos -and Madrid. To deal with him Bessières told off Merle, and another -small column of four battalions and two regiments of _chasseurs_ under -his brilliant cavalry-brigadier, Lasalle, one of the best of Napoleon’s -younger generals. After sacking Torquemada (where some peasants -attempted an ineffectual resistance) and ransoming the rich cathedral -town of Palencia, Lasalle got in touch with the forces of Cuesta at -the bridge of Cabezon, where the main road from Burgos to Valladolid -crosses the river Pisuerga. On the eleventh of June Merle joined him: -on the twelfth their united forces, 9,000 strong, fell upon the levies -of the Captain-general. - -Throughout the two years during which he held high command in the -field, Gregorio de la Cuesta consistently displayed an arrogance -and an incapacity far exceeding that of any other Spanish general. -Considering the state of his embryo ‘army of Castile,’ it was insane -for him to think of offering battle. He had but four cannon; his only -veteran troops were 300 cavalry, mainly consisting of the squadrons -which had accompanied Ferdinand VII as escort on his unhappy journey -to Bayonne. His infantry was composed of 4,000 or 5,000 volunteers of -the Valladolid district, who had not been more than a fortnight under -arms, and had seen little drill and still less musketry practice. It -was absolutely wicked to take them into action. But the men, in their -ignorance, clamoured for a battle, and Cuesta did not refuse it to -them. His dispositions were simply astounding; instead of barricading -or destroying the bridge and occupying the further bank, he led his -unhappy horde across the river and drew them up in a single line, with -the bridge at their backs. - -On June 12 Lasalle came rushing down upon the ‘army of Castile,’ and -dashed it into atoms at the first shock. The Spanish cavalry fled -(as they generally did throughout the war), the infantry broke, the -bridge and the guns were captured. Some hundreds of the unfortunate -recruits were sabred, others were drowned in the river. Cuesta fled -westwards with the survivors to Medina de Rio Seco, abandoning to its -fate Valladolid, which Lasalle occupied without opposition on the same -evening. The combat by which this important city was won had cost the -French only twelve killed and thirty wounded. - -This stroke had completely cleared Bessières’ right flank: there -could be no more danger from the north-west till the army of Galicia -should think proper to descend from its mountains to contest with -the French the dominion of the plains of Leon and Old Castile. The -marshal could now turn his attention to other fronts of his extensive -sphere of command. After the fight of Cabezon Merle’s division was -sent northward, to conquer the rugged coastland of the province of -Santander. There were frightful defiles between Reynosa and the shore -of the Bay of Biscay: the peasants had blocked the road and covered -the hillsides with _sungahs_. But the defence was feeble--as might be -expected from the fact that the district could only put into the field -one battalion of militia[109] and a crowd of recent levies, who had -been about three weeks under arms. On June 23 Merle finished clearing -the defiles and entered Santander, whose bishop and Junta fled, with -the wreck of their armed force, into the Asturias. - - [109] ‘Provincial of Laredo,’ 571 bayonets. - -Meanwhile the troops under Bessières had been equally active, but with -very different results, on the Middle Ebro and in the direction of -Aragon. It was known at Burgos and at Bayonne that Saragossa had risen -like the rest of the Spanish cities. But it was also known that there -was hardly a man of regular troops in the whole kingdom of Aragon: -here, as in Old Castile or in Santander, the invaders would have to -deal only with raw levies, who would probably disperse after their -first defeat. Saragossa itself, the central focus of the rising, was no -modern fortress, but a town of 60,000 souls, surrounded by a mediaeval -wall more fitted to assist in the levy of _octroi_ duties, than in a -defence against a regular army. Accordingly the column under Lefebvre -Desnouettes, which was directed to start from Pampeluna against the -Aragonese insurgents, was one of very moderate size--3,500 infantry, -1,000 horse, and a single battery of field artillery[110]. But it was -to be joined a few days later by another brigade[111] and battery, -which would bring its total force up to something more than 6,000 men. - - [110] They were a battalion each of the 15th, 47th, and 70th of - the line, all old troops, and the 2nd ‘Supplementary Regiment of - the legions of Reserve,’ two battalions strong, with a regiment - of Polish lancers and the 5th _escadron de marche_. - - [111] The 1st regiment of the Vistula (two batts.) and the 6th - _bataillon de marche_. - -The resources of the kingdom of Aragon were large, but the patriots -were, when the war broke out, in a condition most unfavourable for -strenuous action. The province was one of those which had been denuded -of its usual garrison: there only remained part of a cavalry regiment, -the ‘King’s Dragoons,’ whose squadrons had been so depleted that it had -only 300 men and ninety horses, with a weak battalion of Volunteers of -Aragon--some 450 men--and 200 gunners and sappers. In addition there -had straggled into Saragossa about 500 men from various Spanish corps -at Madrid, Burgos, and elsewhere, who had deserted their colours when -the news of the insurrection reached them. This was a small _cadre_ -on which to create a whole army, but the feat was accomplished by the -energetic young man who put himself at the head of the rising in the -middle valley of the Ebro. Joseph Palafox, the second son of a noble -family of Aragon, had been one of the suite which accompanied Ferdinand -VII to Bayonne, and was an indignant spectator of the abominable -treachery which there took place. When the tragedy was over he was -fortunate enough to escape to Spain: he retired to his native district, -took a prominent part in rousing the Aragonese, and was chosen by -them as Captain-general when the weak or incapable Guillelmi was -deposed. He was only twenty-eight years of age, and had no military -experience, for he had only served in the peaceful ranks of the king’s -bodyguard[112]. He had been a courtier rather than a soldier, yet at -the critical moment of his life it cannot be denied that he displayed -a courage and energy which justified the high opinions which the -Aragonese entertained of him. He kept Saragossa clean from the plague -of political assassination, which was so rife in every other corner of -Spain. He wisely got his appointment as Captain-general confirmed by -the Cortes of Aragon, which he summoned to meet in its ancient form. He -found out the most capable leaders of the populace, and always asked -their advice before taking any important step. But his main virtue was -his untiring activity: considering the procrastination and want of -organizing power displayed by most of the Spanish generals, his talent -for rapid work seems remarkable. He was only placed in power on May 26, -and by June 8 he was already engaged with the French. In this short -time he had raised and organized seven regiments of new levies--7,400 -men in all. They were stiffened with the deserters from Madrid, and -commanded by such retired and half-pay officers as could be got -together. There were some scores of cannon in the arsenal of Saragossa, -but hardly any gunners, and a very small store of ammunition. Palafox -started a powder factory and a manufactory of small arms, turned the -workmen of the Canal of Aragon into a corps of sappers, and made a -general levy of horses to remount his single regiment of dragoons, -and to provide his artillery with draught animals. This was but the -commencement of Palafox’s activity: ere Saragossa was saved he had -raised the whole kingdom, and got more than 30,000 men under arms[113]. - - [112] Palafox has been so often abused that I take the - opportunity of quoting the description of him given by Sir - Charles Vaughan, one of the three or four Englishmen who saw - him at Saragossa in the day of his power, and the only one who - has left his impressions on record. He lived with Palafox for - some five weeks in October-November, 1808. ‘This distinguished - nobleman is about thirty-four years of age [an overstatement by - six years]; his person is of middling stature, his eyes lively - and expressive, and his whole deportment that of a perfectly - well-bred man. In private life, so far as my daily intercourse - gave me an opportunity of judging, his manners were kind, - unaffected, and ingratiating. From the great readiness with - which he dispatched business, and from the letters and public - papers which were written by him with apparent great ease in my - presence, I was led to form a very favourable opinion of his - talents. There was a quickness in his manner of seizing objects, - an impatience until they were accomplished. He was fond of - talking of the events of the siege, and anxious to introduce to - us men of every class who had distinguished themselves. There - was a vivacity in his manner and conversation, an activity in - his exertions as an officer, that is rarely met in a Spaniard. - It was always a most cheering and interesting thing to ride with - him through the streets of Saragossa. The joy and exultation of - the people as he passed evidently sprung from the heart. To have - acquitted himself to their satisfaction was no mean reward, and - forms a sufficient answer to all the unworthy attempts (which - I have been disgusted to witness) to depreciate his character’ - (_Vaughan Papers_, from an unpublished journal of 1808). - - [113] Napier is always hard on Spanish officers and - administrators, but I think that of the whole class Palafox - receives the most undeserved contumely from his pen. He holds him - to have been a mere puppet, whose strings were pulled by obscure - Saragossan demagogues like the celebrated Tio Jorge. He even - doubts his personal courage. Both Spanish and French historians - unite in taking the Captain-general quite seriously, and I think - they are right. His best testimonial is the harsh and vindictive - treatment that he received at Napoleon’s hands. - -Already by the eighth of June he had hurried out a small force to -meet Lefebvre Desnouettes at Tudela, the frontier town on the Ebro, -which in the Middle Ages had been known as ‘the key of Aragon.’ This -force, which consisted of 2,000 of his new levies, was placed under the -command of his own elder brother the Marquis of Lazan, who had escaped -from Madrid under the pretext that he would bring pressure to bear upon -the Captain-general and induce him to submit to Murat. The marquis, -though joined by 3,000 or 4,000 peasants and citizens of Tudela, was -easily routed by the French column, and forced back to Mallen sixteen -miles nearer to Saragossa. Lefebvre followed him, after having executed -a certain number of the notables of Tudela and sacked the town. -Reinforced by more of his brother’s new levies, Lazan offered battle -again at Mallen, in a bad position, where his men had little protection -against the enemy’s artillery and the charges of his Polish lancers. He -was naturally routed with severe losses. But even then the Aragonese -were not broken in spirit: Palafox himself marched out with the -remainder of his new levies, some of whom had not been five days under -arms. At Alagon, only seventeen miles from the gates of Saragossa, he -drew up 6,000 infantry (of whom 500 were regulars) 150 dragoons and -four guns, trying to cover himself by the line of the Canal of Aragon -and some olive groves. It is hardly necessary to say that his artillery -was overpowered by the fourteen pieces of the French, and that his -infantry gave back when furiously assailed by the Poles. Palafox -charged at the head of his two squadrons of dragoons, but was wounded -in the arm and had his horse killed under him. His routed followers -carried him back into the city, where the majority took refuge, while -the more faint-hearted fled beyond it to Alcaniz and other points in -Upper Aragon. - -Elated by three easy victories, Lefebvre thought that there was nothing -more to do but to enter Saragossa in triumph. He was much deceived: -the citizens were standing at bay behind their flimsy defences, having -recovered in a single night from the dismay caused by the arrival of -the broken bands who had fought at Alagon. The military conditions -were not unlike those which Moncey had to face in another region, -a fortnight later: Saragossa like Valencia lies in an extensive -plain, with its northern side washed by the waters of the Ebro, and -its eastern by those of the shallow and fordable Huerba: but its -southern and western fronts are exposed to attack from the open. It -was surrounded by a brick wall of ten to twelve feet high, interrupted -in several places by convents and barracks whose blank back-faces -continued the line of the _enceinte_[114]. Inside the wall were the -crowded lanes in which dwelt the 60,000 citizens, a tangle of narrow -streets save the one broad Coso which intersects the place from east -to west. The houses were mostly solid and lofty structures of brick -and stone, with the heavy barred windows and doors usual in Spain. -The strength, such as it was, of Saragossa consisted not in its outer -shell, but in the closely packed houses, convents, and churches, each -of which might serve at need as a small fortress. Many of them were -solid enough to resist any form of attack save that of being battered -by artillery. When barricades had been thrown across the lanes from -side to side, each square of buildings would need to be assaulted -and captured piecemeal. But none of the French officers who arrived -in front of Saragossa on June 15, 1808, had any conception that the -problem about to be presented to them was that of street-fighting -carried on from house to house. There had been many sieges since the -war of the French Revolution began, but none carried on in this manner. -In Italy or Germany no one had ever heard of a city which tried, for -want of bastions and curtains, to defend itself by barricades: such -places always saved themselves by an obvious and blameless surrender. - - [114] The chief of these buildings inserted in the wall were the - convents or Santa Engracia and the Misericordia, and the cavalry - barracks. - -But if a siege was coming, there was one position just outside the town -which was clearly destined to play a chief part in it. Just across the -Huerba lay a broad flat-topped hill, the Monte Torrero, which rose to -the height of 180 feet, and overlooked all the south side of the place. -It was such a splendid vantage-ground for siege-batteries, that the -defenders were bound to hold it, lest it should fall into the power -of the French. It should have been crowned by a strong detached fort, -or even by an entrenched camp. But Palafox in the short time at his -disposal had only been able to throw up a couple of open batteries upon -it, and to loophole the extensive magazines and workshops of the Canal -of Aragon, which were scattered over the summit of the hill, while the -canal itself flowed, as a sort of outer defence, around its further -foot. - -Saragossa had two other outlying defences: the one was the Aljafferia, -an old square castle with four towers at its corners, which had been -the abode of Moorish emirs, and of Aragonese kings, but now served -as the prison of the Inquisition. It lay a couple of hundred yards -outside the western gate (Puerto del Portillo) of the city. It was a -solid brick structure, but quite unsuited to resist a serious artillery -attack. The second outwork was the suburb of San Lazaro beyond the -Ebro: it was connected with Saragossa by a new and handsome bridge, -known as the ‘Puente de Piedra,’ or ‘Stone Bridge.’ Cannon were -mounted at its southern end so as to sweep its whole length. - -On June 15, Lefebvre-Desnouettes appeared before the city, driving -before him some Spanish outposts which he had met upon the way. He -resolved at once to carry the place by storm, a task which, considering -the weakness of its walls, did not seem impossible, and all the more -so because the gates stood open, each defended only by an earthwork -containing two or three guns. The French general, neglecting the Monte -Torrero and its commanding slopes, attacked only the western front -between the gate of Portillo, near the Ebro, and the gate of Santa -Engracia, close to the banks of the Huerba. His French brigade assailed -the northern and his Polish regiment the southern half of this long -line of walls and buildings. His two field-batteries were run up into -the fighting line, to batter the earthworks and to reply to the Spanish -guns. The only reserve which he kept in hand consisted of his brigade -of cavalry. - -The resistance offered to Lefebvre was of the most irregular sort: -Palafox himself was not present, and his second-in-command, Bustamante, -seems to have done little in the way of issuing orders. The 6,000 -half-trained levies which had fought at Alagon had not recovered their -organization, and were hopelessly mixed in the line of defence with -4,000 or 5,000 armed citizens of all ages and classes who had gone to -the walls, each parish under the charge of two or three local leaders, -who paid little obedience to the commands of the regular officers. - -The Captain-General himself had started out that morning at the head -of 150 dragoons, and 200 infantry, all regulars, by the road beyond -the Ebro. He had told his subordinates that he was intending to raise -in Upper Aragon a force with which he would fall on Lefebvre’s line -of communications, and so compel him to abandon his attack on the -city. But there is no doubt that he had really conceived grave doubts -as to the possibility of Saragossa defending itself, and intended to -avoid being captured within its walls. He wished to have the power of -continuing the struggle outside, in case the French should penetrate -into the city. On the morning after the fight at Alagon, bruised and -wounded, he was in a pessimistic frame of mind, as his resolve shows. -But there is no occasion to brand him, as does Napier, with timidity: -his previous and his subsequent conduct preclude such a charge. It was -merely an error of judgement: the Captain-General should have stayed -behind to defend his capital, and have sent his brother Lazan, or some -other officer whom he could trust, to raise the country-side in the -rear of the French[115]. His retirement might well have discouraged -the Saragossans and led to deplorable results; but as a matter of -fact, Lefebvre’s attack began so soon after he had ridden out over the -bridge, that the news of his departure had not yet got abroad, and the -populace were still under the impression that he was among them. It was -not till the fighting was over that he was missed. - - [115] That Palafox and those about him despaired of the defence - is honestly confessed in the Marquis de Lazan’s _Campaña del - verano de 1808_. He and his brother ‘had not believed that an - open town defended by untrained peasants could defend itself,’ - and the news of Lefebvre’s first repulse astonished as much as it - pleased them. - -Lefebvre-Desnouettes before Saragossa was in exactly the same position -as Moncey before Valencia, and acted in the same way, pushing forward -a rather reckless attack on the city in full confidence that the -Spaniards would not stand before an assault pressed home. He had, -moreover, the advantages of being able to attack a wider front, of -having no ditches and inundations to cramp his operations, and of -dealing with walls even weaker than those of Valencia, and defended by -artillery of which very few were pieces of heavy calibre. - -The first attack was delivered in the most dashing, not to say -foolhardy, style. At the gate of Santa Engracia a squadron of Polish -lancers, who led the van, charged into and over the small battery which -covered the ingress into the city. Their wild rush carried them right -into the place, in spite of a dropping fire of musketry directed upon -them from every house that they passed. Turning into a broad lane to -the left, these headstrong horsemen rode forward, losing men at every -step, till they were brought to a stand in the Plaza del Portillo, -where the majority were shot down; a very few succeeded in escaping by -the way along which they had come. The Polish infantry, which should -have followed closely on the heels of the lancers, penetrated no -further than the earthwork at the gate, where it got closely engaged -with the Spaniards who held the neighbouring convent of Santa Engracia. -Exposed in the open street to a heavy fire from behind walls and -windows, the leading battalion gave way, and retired into the olive -groves and buildings outside the gate. - -Meanwhile the French brigade of Lefebvre’s division attacked the gates -of Portillo and the Carmen and the adjoining cavalry barracks. At -the last-named post they scaled the walls, which were particularly -low and weak at this point, and got into the city. But at the gates -the batteries in the narrow ingress held them back. After a sharp -skirmish, a general rush of peasants, soldiers, and citizens, swept -out the invaders from the cavalry barracks, and the front of defence -was restored. Lefebvre would have done well to pause before renewing -his assault: but (like Moncey at Valencia) he was loth to believe that -the enemy would face a persistent attempt to break in. He accordingly -ordered both the columns to renew their attacks: for some time it -seemed likely that he might succeed, for the French forced both the -Carmen and the Portillo gates and reoccupied the cavalry barracks, -while the Poles burst in for a second time at Santa Engracia. But it -proved impossible to make any further advance into the city, where -every house was full of musketeers and the narrow lanes were blocked -with artillery, which swept them from end to end. When it became clear -that the enemy were making no further progress, the Spaniards rallied -behind the Bull-Ring on the Portillo front, and in the convent of Santa -Engracia on the southern front, and swept out the decimated battalions -of Lefebvre by a determined charge[116]. - - [116] The Spaniards have called this first attack on Saragossa - the action of the Eras del Rey, the name of the meadows outside - the Portillo and Carmen gates, in which the French columns massed - themselves for the attack. - -It is not surprising to find that the assailants had suffered very -heavily in such a desperate attack on walls and barricades teeming with -defenders worked up to a high pitch of patriotic frenzy. Lefebvre lost -700 men, and left behind him at the Portillo gate several guns which -had been brought up too close to the place, and could not be dragged -off under the dreadful musketry fire from the walls, and the flanking -discharges from the neighbouring castle of Aljafferia. The Spaniards, -fighting under cover except at the moment of their final charges, had -suffered comparatively little: their loss is estimated at not much over -300 men. They might well be proud of their success: they had certainly -showed a heroic spirit in fighting so obstinately after three crushing -defeats in the open field. That a practically unfortified town should -defend itself by street-fighting was a new idea: and that peasants -and citizens (there were not 900 regulars in the place) should not -only hold out behind walls, but execute desperate charges _en masse_, -would till that day have been regarded as impossible by any soldier -of Napoleon. Every thinking man in the French army must have looked -with some dismay on the results of the fight, not because of the loss -suffered, for that was a mere trifle, but because of the prospect of -the desperate national resistance which had evidently to be faced. - -Meanwhile, Lefebvre-Desnouettes retired for some thousands of yards -from the city, and pitched his camp facing its western front. He sent -pressing letters asking for reinforcements both to Madrid and to -Bayonne, and attempted no offensive action for ten days. If he sent -a formal summons of surrender to the Saragossans, it was to waste -time and allow fresh troops to arrive, rather than with any hope that -he could intimidate the citizens. He was himself more likely to be -attacked during the next few days than to make any forward movement. -But he was already beginning to receive reinforcements: on June 21 -there arrived two battalions of the 2nd Regiment of the Vistula, and -more troops were behind. - -Palafox, on the other hand, received much unexpected encouragement -from the combat of the sixteenth. On receiving the news of it at -Belchite on the following morning, he sent back his brother, the -Marquis de Lazan, giving him the command of the city, and bidding him -tell the Saragossans that he would endeavour to raise the siege in a -very few days. There was already a considerable body of insurgents -in arms in South-western Aragon, under the Baron de Versage, who had -raised at Calatayud two battalions of new levies[117], and gathered in -some fugitives from the Spanish garrison of Madrid. Palafox ordered -the baron to join him with every man that he could bring, and their -two detachments met at Almunia on June 21, and from thence marched -towards Saragossa by the road which leads down the valley of the Xalon -by Epila. At the last-named place they were only fifteen miles from -Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ camp, and were already threatening the French -communications with Logroño and Vittoria. But their army was still very -small--no more than 550 regular infantry, 1,000 men of Versage’s new -regiments, 350 cavalry, and a couple of thousand levies of all kinds, -among whom were noted a company of eighty armed Capuchin friars and a -body of mounted smugglers. - - [117] He called them the ‘Regiment of Ferdinand VII,’ and the - ‘Second Regiment of the kingdom of Aragon.’ - -The French general had now to make up his mind whether he would raise -the siege and fall upon Palafox with his whole army, or whether he -would dare to divide his scanty resources, and maintain the attack on -the city with one part, while he sent a containing force against the -Captain-General’s bands. He resolved to take the latter course--a most -hazardous one considering the fact that he had, even with his last -reinforcements, not much more than 6,000 sound men in his camp. He -dispatched the Polish Colonel Chlopiski with the first regiment of the -Vistula, one French battalion, a squadron of lancers and four guns to -hold back Palafox, while with the 3,000 men that remained he executed -several demonstrations against outlying parts of the defences of -Saragossa, in order to distract the attention of the citizens. - -This very risky plan was carried out with complete success. While -the Saragossans were warding off imaginary attacks, Chlopiski made -a forced march and fell upon Palafox at Epila on the night of June -23-24. The Aragonese army was completely surprised and routed in a -confused engagement fought in the dark. Several hundred were cut up, -and the town of Epila was sacked: Palafox fell back in disorder towards -Calatayud and the mountains, while Chlopiski returned to the siege. - -The Captain-General, much disconcerted by this disaster, resolved that -he would fight no more battles in the open, but merely reinforce the -city with the best of his soldiers and resist behind its walls. So -sending back Versage and his levies to the hills, he made an enormous -detour with his handful of veteran troops and a few hundred irregulars, -and re-entered Saragossa by the northern side, which still remained -open. He had great difficulty in holding his followers together, for -many (and especially his untrustworthy cavalry) wished to retire on -Valencia and to abandon the struggle in Aragon. But by appealing -to their patriotism--‘he would give every man who insisted on it a -passport for Valencia, but those who loved him would follow him’--he -finally carried off the whole force, and took somewhat over 1,000 men -back to the besieged city [July 1]. - -During his absence the condition of affairs in Saragossa had been -considerably altered. On the one hand the defences had been much -improved: the gates had been strongly stockaded, and the walls had -been thickened with earth and sandbags, and furnished with a continuous -_banquette_, which had hitherto been wanting. On the other hand the -French were beginning to receive reinforcements: on the twenty-sixth -General Verdier arrived with three battalions of his division (the -second of Bessières’ corps)[118] and two _bataillons de marche_, in -all some 3,000 or 3,500 men. From this time forward small bodies of -troops began to reach the besiegers at short intervals, including two -more Polish battalions[119], one battalion of French regulars, two -Portuguese battalions (the last of the unfortunate division which was -on its way across Spain towards the Baltic), 1,000 National Guards -of the Hautes Pyrénées and Basses Pyrénées, hastily sent across the -frontier from Bayonne, and three squadrons of cavalry[120]. What was -more important than the mere numbers was that they brought with them -siege-guns, in which Lefebvre had hitherto been entirely deficient. -These pieces came from the citadel of Pampeluna, and were part of those -resources of which the French had so treacherously taken possession in -the preceding February. - - [118] They belonged to the 14th Provisional Regiment, and the - accompanying corps were the 4th and 7th _bataillons de marche_. - - [119] 3rd Regiment of the Vistula. - - [120] 3rd, 6th, and 9th _escadrons de marche_. - -Verdier on his arrival superseded Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who was -considerably his junior, and took charge of the siege. His first act -was to develop an attack on the Monte Torrero, the hill in the suburbs, -beyond the Huerba, which dominates, at a distance of 1,800 yards, -the southern front of the city. The Spaniards had neither encircled -it with continuous lines, nor crowned it with any closed work. It -was protected only by two small batteries and some trenches covering -the most obvious points of attack. The garrison was composed of no -more than 500 men, half peasants, half regulars of the Regiment of -Estremadura, of which three weak battalions had arrived from Tarrega -on the previous day (June 27)[121]. Verdier sent three columns, each -of one battalion, against the more accessible parts of the position, -and drove out the small defending force with ease. His task was made -lighter by a piece of casual luck: on the night before the assault the -main powder-magazine of the Saragossans, situated in the Seminary, -was ignited by the carelessness of a workman, and blew up, killing -many persons and wrecking the Seminary itself and many houses in its -vicinity. A few hours after this disaster had taken place, and while -the whole city was busy in extinguishing the conflagration, the French -attack was delivered; hence the original garrison got no help from -within the walls. But its own conduct was deplorably weak: the colonel -in command[122] headed the rush to the rear, a piece of cowardice for -which he was imprisoned and (after the siege had been raised) was sent -before a court-martial and shot. - - [121] The Regiment of Estremadura was so weak at the outbreak of - hostilities that its three battalions had only 770 men. It had - been hastily brought up to 900 bayonets before entering the city. - - [122] His name was Vincente Falco; he belonged to the artillery. - -On the evening of the twenty-eighth Verdier began to construct heavy -breaching batteries on the slopes of the Monte Torrero, commanding -all the southern side of the city. Others were thrown up on the -south-western front, opposite the points which had been unsuccessfully -assaulted twelve days before. On the thirtieth of June the works were -armed with thirty siege-guns, four mortars, and twelve howitzers, which -opened simultaneously on Saragossa at midnight, and continued to play -upon the place for twenty-four hours, setting many houses on fire, and -breaching the flimsy ramparts in half a dozen places. The old castle -of the Aljafferia was badly injured, and the gates of Portillo and the -Carmen knocked out of shape: there were also large gaps in the convent -of the Augustinians, and in the Misericordia, whose back wall formed -part of the _enceinte_. All the unarmed population was forced to take -refuge in the cellars, or the more solidly built parts of the churches, -while the fighting-men were trying to construct barricades behind the -worst breaches, and to block up with sandbags, beams, and barrels all -the lanes that opened upon them. - -Palafox entered Saragossa on the morning of July 2, just in time -to see Verdier launch his whole available infantry force upon the -shattered western and southern fronts of the city. The assault was -made under much more favourable conditions than that of June 16, since -the strength of the storming columns was more than doubled, and the -defences had been terribly mishandled by the bombardment. On the other -hand the garrison was in no degree shaken in spirit: the fire of the -last twenty-four hours had been much more dangerous to buildings than -to men, and the results of the first assault had given the defenders -a confidence which they had not felt on the previous occasion. Hence -it came to pass that of the six columns of assault not one succeeded -in making a permanent lodgement within the walls. Even the isolated -castle of Aljafferia and the convent of San José, just outside the -Porta Quemada, were finally left in the hands of the besieged, though -the latter was for some hours held by the French. The hardest fighting -was at the Portillo gate, where the assaulting battalions more than -once reached the dilapidated earthwork that covered the ingress to the -north-western part of the city. It was here that there occurred the -well-known incident of the ‘Maid of Saragossa.’ The gunners at the -small battery in the gate had been shot down one after another by the -musketry of the assailants, the final survivors falling even before -they could discharge the last gun that they had loaded. The infantry -supports were flinching and the French were closing in, when a young -woman named Agostina Zaragoza, whose lover (an artillery sergeant) had -just fallen, rushed forward, snatched the lighted match from his dying -hand, and fired the undischarged twenty-four-pounder into the head of -the storming column[123]. The enemy was shaken by a charge of grape -delivered at ten paces, the citizens, shamed by Agostina’s example, -rushed back to reoccupy the battery, and the assault was beaten off. -Palafox states that the incident occurred before his own eyes: he gave -the girl a commission as sub-lieutenant of artillery, and a warrant for -a life-pension: she was seen a year later by several English witnesses, -serving with her battery in Andalusia[124]. - - [123] Sir Charles Vaughan was introduced to the heroine by - Palafox while he was staying in Saragossa in October. He - describes her as ‘a handsome young woman of the lower class,’ and - says that when he met her she was wearing on her sleeve a small - shield of honour with the name ‘Zaragoza’ inscribed on it. The - fact that the dead sergeant was her lover is given by Palafox - in his short narrative of the siege, which ought to be a good - authority enough. - - [124] Napier, with all his prejudice against the Spaniards, does - not venture to absolutely reject the story. ‘Romantic tales - of women rallying the troops and leading them forward at the - most dangerous period of the siege were current; their truth - may be doubted. Yet when suddenly environed with horrors, the - sensitiveness of women, driving them to a kind of frenzy, might - have produced actions above the heroism of men’ (i. 45). W. - Jacob, M.P., in his _Travels in the South of Spain in 1809-10_ - (p. 123), says that he met Agostina at Seville, wearing a blue - artillery tunic, with one epaulette, over a short skirt; she was - present when Lord Wellesley entered Seville, and was welcomed by - the Junta. - -The fruitless attack of July 2 cost the French 200 killed and 300 -wounded. The Saragossan garrison lost somewhat less, in spite of -the bombardment, since they had been fighting under cover against -enemies who had to expose themselves whenever they got near the wall. -Verdier resolved for the future to shun attempts at escalade, and to -begin a regular siege. He commenced on the third of July to construct -parallels, for a main attack on the southern side of the place, and -a secondary attack on the north-western. He also threw a detachment -across the Ebro [July 11], to close the hitherto undisturbed access to -the city through the suburb of San Lazaro and the stone bridge. The -force which could be spared for this object from an army of no more -than 12,000 or 13,000 men was not really sufficient to hold the left -bank of the Ebro, and merely made ingress and egress difficult without -entirely preventing it. On two or three occasions when considerable -bodies of Spaniards presented themselves, the French could do no more -than skirmish with them and try to cut off the convoys which they were -bringing to the city. They could not exclude them, and for the whole -remainder of the siege the communications of the Saragossans with the -open country were never entirely closed[125]. - - [125] Foy exaggerates considerably when he says that from July - 12 onward ‘the blockade of Saragossa was complete’ (iii. 300). - Reinforcements entered on several subsequent occasions. - -By July 15, Verdier’s trenches were commencing to work up close -to the walls, and the next ten days of the month were occupied in -desperate struggles for the convents of San José, of the Capuchins and -Trinitarians, which lie outside the city near the Carmen and Porta -Quemada gates. By the twenty-fourth the French had occupied them, -connected them with their approaches, and begun to establish in them -breaching batteries. Another, but less powerful, attack was directed -against the Portillo gate. The mortars and howitzers bombarded the -city continuously from the first to the third. But it was not till the -dawn of August 4 that the heavy guns were ready to begin their task of -battering down the gates and walls of Saragossa. After five hours of -steady firing the Spanish batteries were silenced, and several breaches -had been made, mostly in or about the Convent of Santa Engracia, at the -southernmost point of the city. The streets behind it had been terribly -shattered by the previous bombardment, and many buildings destroyed, -notably the central hospital, from which the Spaniards had to remove, -under a terrible hail of shells, more than 500 sick and wounded, as -well as a number of lunatics and idiots: the institution had been used -as an asylum before the outbreak of the war. Many of these unfortunate -creatures were destroyed by the besiegers’ fire[126], as were also no -small number of the wounded and of their doctors and nurses. - - [126] Caballero and Toreño put the distressing scenes at the - hospital and the escape of the lunatics during the assault on the - 4th, but Arteche seems more correct in placing them during the - bombardment of the preceding day. - -Palafox and his brother the marquis remained near Santa Engracia, -trying to encourage their followers to repair the barricades behind -the breaches, and to loophole and strengthen those of the houses -which still stood firm. But amid the dreadful and unceasing storm -of projectiles it was hard to keep the men together, and most of -the projected retrenchments were battered down before they could be -finished. At two o’clock in the afternoon of the fourth, Verdier let -loose his storming columns, composed of four Polish and nine French -battalions[127]. They were directed in three bodies against three -separate breaches, the easternmost in the Convent of Santa Engracia, -the second at the gate of the same name, the third more to the left, -in the wall near the gate of the Carmen. All three were successful -in forcing their way into the city: the defences had been completely -shattered, and at one point 300 continuous yards of the outer wall had -fallen. The Spaniards clung for some time to the cloisters and church -of Santa Engracia, but were at last expelled or exterminated, and 1,000 -yards of the _enceinte_ with the adjoining buildings were in the hands -of the French. - - [127] I find in the _Vaughan Papers_ the following note: ‘General - Lefebvre-Desnouettes was residing at Cheltenham on parole, - having been taken prisoner at Benavente by Lord Paget. I went to - Cheltenham on May 27, 1809, for the express purpose of seeing - the general. He told me that he had advanced at first with no - more than 3,000 men, but that after General Verdier joined him, - the French force employed against Saragossa was 15,000 men. I - understood that in the attack of July 2 and the previous fighting - they lost 2,000 men, and that their total loss in the whole siege - was 4,000, including three generals wounded.’ _Nap. Corresp._ - (xvii. 389, 426) calls the whole force before Saragossa on August - 2, 17,300 men. But there seems to have been present in all only-- - - (1) Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ column: - { 2nd of the Vistula (1st and 2nd batts.) 1376 - Brigade { 70th of the line (3rd batt.) 379 - Grandjean { 4th _bataillon de marche_ 581 - { 6th ditto 655 = 2991 - - { 1st of the Vistula (1st and 2nd batts.) 1243 - Brigade { 1st supplementary regiment of the Legions - Habert { of Reserve (1st and 2nd batts.) 1030 - { 47th of the line (3rd batt.) 420 - { 15th ditto (4th batt.) 411 = 3104 - - { Regiment of Polish Lancers 717 - Cavalry { 5th _escadron de marche_ 217 = 934 - - (2) Division of Gomez Freire: - 14th Provisional Regiment (1st, 2nd, and - 3rd batts.) 1173 - 7th _bataillon de marche_ 334 - 5th Portuguese infantry 265 - Portuguese Cazadores 288 = 2060 - - (3) Column of Colonel Piré (arrived June 29): - 3rd of the Vistula (1st and 2nd batts.) 1332 - National Guards _d’élite_ (two batts.) 971 - 3rd, 8th, and 9th _escadrons de marche_ 275 = 2578 - - (4) Bazancourt’s Brigade (arrived August 1): - 14th of the line (1st and 2nd batts.) 1488 - 44th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.) 1614 - 11th _escadron de marche_ 205 = 3307 - - (5) Artillery and train 561 = 561 - ------ - Total 15,535 - - These are mainly Belmas’s figures. He mentions a battalion of - the 16th of the line as present at the great assault. There - must be some error here, as that regiment was not in Spain. It - is probably a misprint for the 70th of the line, which is not - mentioned by him as present, though it certainly was so. - -It was at this moment, apparently, that Verdier sent in a -_parlementaire_ with the laconic note--‘Head Quarters, Santa Engracia. -Capitulation?’ To which Palafox returned the well-known reply--‘Head -Quarters, Saragossa. War to the knife[128].’ - - [128] The story sounds theatrical, but is vouched for by good - authorities, Vaughan and Palafox himself, who chose the words - for the type of the reverse of the medal that was issued to the - defenders of Saragossa (see Arteche, ii. 394). - -All through the afternoon of the fourth of August, the French slowly -pushed their way up the streets which lead northward towards the -Coso, the main thoroughfare of Saragossa. They could only get forward -by storming each house, and turning each barricade that offered -resistance, so that their progress was very slow. While inflicting -terrible losses on the Spaniards, they were also suffering very heavily -themselves. But they drove a broad wedge into the city, till finally -they reached and crossed the Coso, halfway between the southern wall -and the river. In the streets beyond the Coso their impetus seemed to -have exhausted itself: many of the men were too tired to press forward -any longer; others turned aside to plunder the churches and the better -sort of houses[129]. Verdier tried to cut his way to the great bridge, -so as to divide the defenders into two separate bodies, and was so far -successful that many of the Spaniards began to troop off across the -river into the suburb of San Lazaro. But he himself was wounded, his -main column lost its way in the narrow side-streets, and the attack -died down. - - [129] Napier maintains (i. 45) that the city was saved only - because the French fell to pillaging, a contention which seems - very unjust to the Saragossans. - -In the late afternoon there was almost a suspension of hostilities, and -the firing slackened for a space. But at last the Aragonese, encouraged -by the exhaustion of their enemies, began to resume the offensive. -The fugitives who had crossed to the northern side of the Ebro were -hustled together and driven back by their leaders, while a loaded gun -was placed on the bridge to prevent their return. The garrison of -the eastern front, which had not been seriously attacked, sent all -the reinforcements that it could spare into the centre of the town. -At dusk masses of Spaniards debouched from the neighbourhood of the -two cathedrals, and began to assail the positions held by the French -beyond the line of the Coso. The first charge into the open street is -recorded to have been led by a monk[130] and sixteen peasants, every -one of whom were killed or wounded; but endless reinforcements poured -out of every lane, and the exhausted French began to lose ground. -The fighting was of that deadly sort in which the question has to be -settled, whether the defenders of the houses in a street can shoot down -their assailants, exposed in the roadway, before the latter can burst -into each separate dwelling and exterminate its garrison in detail. -Often the French held the upper stories long after the Spaniards had -seized the ground floor, and the staircases had to be stormed one after -the other. It was natural that in such struggles the defenders should -receive no quarter. Though the fight raged with many variations of -fortune in all the central parts of the city, there was after a time -no doubt that the Aragonese were gaining ground. The French detachments -which had penetrated furthest into the place were gradually cut off and -exterminated; the main bodies of the columns drew back and strengthened -themselves in two large stone buildings, the convents of San Francisco -and San Diego. At nightfall they retained only a wedge-like section of -the city, whose apex near San Francisco just touched the southern side -of the Coso, while its base was formed by the line of wall between the -gates of Santa Engracia and the Carmen. - - [130] Perhaps his name, Fray Ignacio de Santaromana, deserves as - much remembrance as that of Agostina. His conduct in a critical - moment was just as inspiring and told as much as hers (see - Arteche, ii. 406). - -The French had lost nearly 2,000 men in the struggle: the engineer -Belmas gives the total as 462 killed and 1,505 wounded[131], more than -a fifth of the troops which had actually been engaged in the assault. -Among the Saragossans, who before the street-fighting began had been -subjected to a severe bombardment for many hours, the casualties must -have been nearly as great. But they could spare combatants more easily -than their enemies: indeed they had more men than muskets, and as each -defender fell there was a rush of the unarmed to get possession of his -weapon. - - [131] Arteche accuses Belmas of giving only 505 wounded, - remarking that Verdier stated the higher number of 900. But my - edition of Belmas (Paris, 1836) distinctly says ‘quinze cent - cinq blessés’ (ii. 64). Napier gives no figures at all: Thiers, - understating French losses in his usual style, speaks of 300 dead - and 900 wounded. - -During the night of August 4-5 both sides, fatigued though they were, -set to work to cover themselves with barricades and works constructed -with the débris of ruined houses. In the morning both French and -Spaniards had rough but continuous lines of defence, those of the -latter circling round those of the former, with nothing but the -width of a narrow street between them. Wherever there was anything -approaching an open space cannon had been brought up to sweep it. Where -the houses still stood firm, communications had been made between them -by breaking holes through the party walls. In the streets the corpses -of both sides lay thick, for under the deadly cross-fire no one dared -venture out to remove them: in a day or two the sanitary conditions -would be horrible. - -Meanwhile both besiegers and besieged were too exhausted to undertake -any more serious operations, and the fighting sank to little more than -a desultory fusillade between enemies equally well protected by their -defences. Such interest as there was in the operations of August 5-6 -lay outside the walls of Saragossa. On the afternoon of the day of -the great assault a column of Spanish troops from Catalonia--two line -battalions and 2,000 or 3,000 new levies and armed peasants--arrived at -Villamayor on the north of the Ebro, only seven miles from the city. -It escorted a much-desired convoy of ammunition, for the supplies in -the city were running very low. While the fighting was still raging -in the streets Palafox rode out of the suburb of San Lazaro with 100 -dragoons and joined this force. On the next morning (August 5) he -skirmished with the French troops which lay beyond the Ebro, and passed -into the city one veteran battalion and a few wagons of munitions. He -then proposed to attack the detached French brigade (that of Piré) -with his whole remaining force on the next day, in order to clear the -northern front, and to send the rest of his convoy--no less than 200 -wagons--into Saragossa. But on the same night he received news of the -battle of Baylen and the surrender of Dupont’s army. Moreover, he was -informed that a division of the army of Valencia, under Saint-March, -was on the way to reinforce him. This induced him to halt for two days, -to see whether the French would not raise the siege without further -fighting. - -Verdier had got the same intelligence at the same hour, with orders -to be ready to retreat at a moment’s notice, and to avoid entangling -himself in further engagements. He was preparing to withdraw, when on -the seventh he received supplementary dispatches from Madrid, with -directions to hold on for the present, and to keep the Saragossans -occupied, without, however, compromising himself too much. Accordingly -he resumed the bombardment, and began to throw into the city an immense -number of shells: for he saw that when his retreat was definitely -ordered, he would not be able to carry off with him the vast stores of -munitions that he had accumulated in his camp. - - [Illustration: Saragossa.] - -Seeing that the French did not move, Palafox attacked the covering -force on the left bank of the Ebro on August 8. His enemies were very -inferior in numbers and had been told not to risk anything, considering -the delicate state of affairs. Accordingly the relieving force crossed -the river Gallego, pushed back Piré’s 2,000 men in a long skirmishing -fight, and ultimately established themselves on ground just outside -the suburb of San Lazaro: the convoy, under cover of the fighting, -successfully entered the city over the great bridge. That night Verdier -withdrew Piré’s brigade across the river, thus leaving the whole -northern front of the place free from blockade. Clearly this could only -mean that he was about to raise the siege, but for five days more he -continued to ravage the central parts of the city with his bombs, and -to bicker at the barricades with the Saragossans. But on the thirteenth -the Spaniards noted that his camps seemed to be growing empty, and on -the fourteenth a series of explosions told them that he was abandoning -his siege works. Santa Engracia and the other points held inside the -city were all destroyed on that day, and the ammunition which could not -be carried off was blown up. The guns which had been pressed forward -into the ruined streets were spiked and left behind, as it would have -been impossible to extricate them under the Spanish fire. Of those in -the outer batteries some were thrown into the canal, others disabled by -having their trunnions knocked off, others merely spiked. Altogether -no less than fifty-four pieces, all more or less injured, but many -susceptible of repair, were left behind to serve as trophies for the -Saragossans. - -Finally Verdier withdrew by slow marches up the Ebro to Tudela, where -he took post on August 17. He had lost in all over 3,500 men in his -long-continued struggle with the heroic city. The Aragonese must have -suffered at least as much, but the figures are of course impossible to -verify. They said that their casualties amounted to no more than 2,000, -but this must surely be an understatement, for Palafox says that by -August 1 there were of his original 7,000 levies only 3,500 left under -arms. Even allowing for heavy diminution by desertion and dispersion, -this implies very serious losses in action, and these seven Aragonese -battalions formed only a part of the garrison, which counted 13,000 men -on August 13. Probably the unembodied citizens and peasants suffered -in a still heavier proportion than troops which had received even a -small measure of organization. If the whole losses came to 4,500 it -would not be surprising--but nothing can be stated with certainty. -Yet whatever were their sufferings, the Saragossans had turned over -a new page in the history of the art of war. They had defended for -two months an unfortified place, by means of extemporized barricades, -retrenchments, and earthworks, and had proved their ability to resist -even a formidable train of siege artillery. If the news of Dupont’s -disaster had not arrived in time to save them, they would no doubt have -succumbed in the end, as must any besieged place which is not sooner or -later relieved from the outside. But meanwhile they had accomplished -a rare feat: almost unaided by regular troops, almost destitute of -trained artillerymen and engineers, they had held at bay a force which -Napoleon at the commencement of the siege would have supposed to be -equal to the task of conquering not only Aragon, but the whole eastern -side of the Iberian Peninsula. - - - - -SECTION III: CHAPTER III - -OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH: BATTLE OF MEDINA DE RIO SECO - - -While Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Verdier were making their long series of -attacks on Saragossa, matters were coming to a head in the north-west -of Spain. The army of Galicia had at last descended into the plains, -and commenced to threaten the right flank of Bessières and the -communications between Burgos and Madrid. This forward movement was due -neither to the Galician Junta, nor to the officer whom they had placed -in command of their army, but to the obstinate persistence of Cuesta, -who had not in the least learnt the lesson of caution from his defeat -at Cabezon, and was eager to fight a pitched battle with all the forces -that could be collected in Northern Spain. - -The resources at hand were not inconsiderable: in Galicia, or on the -way thither from Portugal, were no less than thirty-nine battalions -of regular infantry--though most of them were very weak: there were -also thirteen battalions of embodied militia, some thirty guns, and a -handful of cavalry (not more than 150 sabres). The Junta had placed -in command, after the murder of the captain-general Filanghieri, a -comparatively young general--Joachim Blake, one of those many soldiers -of fortune of Irish blood who formed such a notable element in the -Spanish army. When the insurrection broke out he had been merely -colonel of the regiment named ‘the Volunteers of the Crown’: he had -never had more than three battalions to manage before he found himself -placed at the head of the whole Galician army. Though a most unlucky -general--half a dozen times he seems to have been the victim of ill -fortune, for which he was hardly responsible--Blake was in real merit -far above the average of the Spanish commanders. He had neither the -slackness nor the arrogance which were the besetting sins of so many -of the Peninsular generals: and his dauntless courage was not combined -with recklessness or careless over-confidence. He showed from the first -very considerable organizing power: all his efforts were directed to -the task of inducing the Junta and the people of Galicia to allow him -to draft the crowds of recruits who flocked to his banner into the old -regiments of the line and the militia, instead of forming them into new -corps. With some trouble he carried his point, and was able to bring -up to their full complement most of the old battalions: of new units -very few[132] were created. When he took the field it was only the old -_cadres_ thus brought up to strength that accompanied him, not raw and -unsteady troops of new organization. - - [132] The best known was the _batallon literario_, composed of - the students of the University of Santiago. - -After hastily concentrating and brigading his army at Lugo, Blake led -them to the edge of the mountains which divide Galicia from the plains -of Leon. It was his original intention to stand at bay on the hills, -and force the French to attack him. With this object he occupied the -passes of Manzanal, Fuencebadon, and Puebla de Sanabria, the only -places where roads of importance penetrate into the Galician uplands -[June 23]. His whole field force, distributed into four divisions and a -‘vanguard brigade’ of light troops, amounted to some 25,000 men fit for -the field: in addition, 8,000 or 10,000 new levies were being organized -behind him, but he refused--with great wisdom--to bring them to the -front during his first movements. - -On Blake’s left flank were other Spanish troops: the Junta of the -Asturias had raised some 15,000 men: but these--unlike the Galician -army--were utterly raw and untrained. Of old troops there was but one -single militia battalion among them. The Junta had dispersed them in -small bodies all along the eastern and southern side of the province, -arraying them to cover not only the high road from Madrid and Leon to -Oviedo, but every impracticable mule-path that crosses the Cantabrian -Mountains. By this unwise arrangement the Asturian army was weak at -every point: it was impossible to concentrate more than 5,000 men for -the defence of any part of the long and narrow province. The fact was -that the Junta looked solely to the defence of its own land, and had -no conception that the protection of the Asturias should be treated as -only a section of the great problem of the protection of the whole of -Northern Spain. - -While the Galicians and the Asturians were taking up this purely -defensive attitude, they had forgotten to reckon with one factor in -their neighbourhood. Right in front of them lay the old Captain-General -of Castile, with the wrecks of the army that had been so signally -routed at Cabezon. He had retired to Benavente on the Esla, and there -had halted, finding that he was not pursued by Lasalle. Here he -reorganized his scattered Castilian levies into three battalions, and -raised three more in the province of Leon. He had still 300 or 400 -regular cavalry, but not a single gun. Quite undismayed by his late -defeat, he persisted in wishing to fight in the plain, and began to -send urgent messages both to Blake and to the Juntas of Asturias and -Galicia, begging them to send down their armies from the hills, and -aid him in making a dash at Valladolid, with the object of cutting off -Bessières’ communications with Madrid, and so disarranging the whole -system of Napoleon’s plan for the conquest of Spain. - -The Asturians, partly from a well-justified disbelief in Cuesta’s -ability, partly from a selfish desire to retain all their troops for -the defence of their own province, refused to stir. They sent the -Captain-General a modest reinforcement, two battalions of the newly -raised regiment of Covadonga, but refused any more aid. Instead, they -suggested that Cuesta should fall back on Leon and the southern slope -of the Asturian hills, so as to threaten from thence any advance of the -French into the plains of Leon. - -But the Galician Junta showed themselves less unyielding. Despite of -the remonstrances of Blake, who was set on maintaining the defensive, -and holding the passes above Astorga, they consented to allow their -army to move down into the plain of Old Castile and to join Cuesta. -After some fruitless remonstrances Blake moved forward with the bulk of -his host, leaving behind him his second division to hold the passes, -while with the other three and his vanguard brigade he marched on -Benavente [July 5]. - -On July 10 the armies of Galicia and Castile met at Villalpando, and a -brisk quarrel at once broke out between their commanders. Cuesta was -for attacking the French at once: Blake pointed out that for an army -with no more than thirty guns and 500 or 600 cavalry to offer battle -in the plains was sheer madness. The Irish general had the larger -and more effective army, but Cuesta was thirteen years his senior as -lieutenant-general, and insisted on assuming command of the combined -host in accordance with the normal rules of military precedence. After -some fruitless resistance Blake yielded, and the whole Spanish army -moved forward on Valladolid: all that Cuesta would grant on the side -of caution was that the third Galician division, 5,000 strong, should -be left as a reserve at Benavente. Even this was a mistake: if the two -generals were to fight at all, they should have put every available man -in line, and have endeavoured at all costs to induce the Asturians also -to co-operate with them. They might have had in all for the oncoming -battle 40,000 men, instead of 22,000, if the outlying troops had been -collected. - -A blow from the north-west was precisely what Napoleon at Bayonne -and Savary at Madrid had been expecting for some weeks. Both of them -were perfectly conscious that any check inflicted on Bessières in -Old Castile would wreck the whole plan of invasion. So much of the -marshal’s _corps d’armée_ had been distracted towards Saragossa, that -it was clearly necessary to reinforce him. From Madrid Savary sent up -half of the troops of the Imperial Guard which had hitherto been in -the capital--three battalions of fusiliers (first regiment) and three -squadrons of cavalry[133]. Napoleon afterwards blamed him severely for -not having sent more, saying that from the mass of troops in and about -Madrid he might have spared another complete division--that of Gobert, -the second division of Moncey’s corps. Without its aid the Emperor -half-expected that Bessières might be checked, if the Galicians came -down in full force[134]. He himself sent up from Bayonne nearly all the -troops which were at that moment under his hand, ten veteran battalions -just arrived from Germany, forming the division of General Mouton. - - [133] Oddly enough, in the Duke of Rovigo’s own _Mémoires_ the - statement is made that these troops arrived too late to fight at - Rio Seco, a curious error (ii. 248). - - [134] See the dispatch of July 13, to Savary, and that of the - same day to King Joseph (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,191). - -The reinforcements being hurried on to Bessières by forced marches, -that general found himself on July 9 at the head of a force with -which he thought that he might venture to attack Blake and Cuesta. If -they had brought with them all their troops, and had called in the -Asturians, it is probable that the marshal would have found himself too -weak to face them: fortunately for him he had only five-ninths of the -army of Galicia and Cuesta’s miserable levies in front of him. His -own fighting force was formed of odd fragments of all the divisions -which formed his _corps d’armée_: large sections of each of them were -left behind to guard his communications with France, and others were -before Saragossa. Bessières marched from Burgos with the brigade of the -Imperial Guard: at Palencia he picked up Lasalle’s cavalry with half -Mouton’s newly arrived division of veterans (the second brigade was -left at Vittoria) and a small part of Merle’s division, which had been -hastily brought over the mountains from Santander to join him. There -was also present the larger half of Verdier’s division, of which the -rest was now in Aragon with its commander[135]. - - [135] Bessières’ army seems to have consisted of the following - elements:-- - - _Infantry._ - _Cavalry._ - - (1) One regiment of the Fusiliers of the Imperial - Guard (three batts.) 1,900 - Three squadrons of cavalry of the Imperial Guard 300 - - (2) From Verdier’s Division: - Ducos’ {13th Provisional Regiment (four batts.) 2,000 - Brigade {14th Provisional Regiment (one batt.)[a] 500 - - Sabathier’s {17th Provisional Regiment (four batts.) } - Brigade {18th Provisional Regiment (four batts.)[b] } 2,800 - - (3) From Merle’s Division: - D’Armagnac’s {47th of the Line (one batt.)[c] } - Brigade {3rd Swiss Regiment (one batt.) } 1,600 - - (4) From Mouton’s Division: - Reynaud’s {4th Léger (three batts.) } - Brigade {15th of the Line (two batts.)[d] } 3,000 - - (5) Lasalle’s Cavalry Brigade: - 10th Chasseurs} - 22nd Chasseurs} 850 - ------ ----- - 11,800 1,150 - - We may add 750 men for the five batteries of artillery and - the train, and so get a total strength of 13,700. Napoleon - (_Corresp._, 14,213) called the force 15,000. - - [a] The other three batts. of the 14th were with Verdier at - Saragossa. This odd battalion was in the battle attached to - D’Armagnac’s brigade. Merle was given Ducos’ and D’Armagnac’s - brigades to make up a division. - - [b] These battalions were much weakened by detachments. - - [c] A very strong battalion: it was 1,200 strong on June 1, and - must still have had 1,000 bayonets. - - [d] Both regiments were incomplete, having dropped men at - Vittoria and Burgos. - -On the evening of July 13, Lasalle’s light cavalry got in touch with -the outposts of the Spaniards near Medina de Rio Seco, and reported -that Blake and Cuesta were present in force. On the next morning -Bessières marched before daybreak from Palencia, and just as the -day was growing hot, discovered the enemy drawn up on rising ground -a little to the east of the small town which has given its name to -the battle. Blake had 15,000 infantry and 150 cavalry with twenty -guns[136]; Cuesta 6,000 infantry and 550 cavalry, but not a single -cannon. They outnumbered Bessières by nearly two to one in foot -soldiery, but had little more than half his number of horse, and only -two-thirds as many guns. - - [136] In the _Vaughan Papers_ I find a ‘Journal of the operations - of General Blake,’ by some officer of his staff, unnamed. It - gives the force of the Galician army at Rio Seco as follows:-- - - _Officers._ - _Sergeants._ - _Drummers,&c._ - _Veteran rank and file._ - _Recruits._ - _Total._ - - Vanguard: - Gen. Count Maceda 75 81 76 1,678 277 = 2,187 - 1st Division: - Gen. Cagigal 186 194 166 4,795 1315 = 6,470 - 4th Division: - Marquis Portago 188 185 144 3,208 2281 = 5,818 - Head-quarters Guard: - Volunteers of Navarre 29 30 43 681 -- = 754 - --- --- --- ------ ----- ------ - 478 490 429 10,362 3,873 = 15,229 - - This total only differs by 26 from that given by Arteche (ii. 654). - -A more prudent general than Cuesta would have refused to fight at all -with an army containing in its ranks no less than 9,000 recruits, and -almost destitute of cavalry. But if fighting was to be done, a wise man -would at any rate have chosen a good position, where his flanks would -be covered from turning movements and inaccessible to the enemy’s very -superior force of horsemen. The old Captain-General cared nothing for -such caution: he had merely drawn up his army on a gentle hillside, -somewhat cut up by low stone walls, but practicable for cavalry at -nearly every point. His flanks had no protection of any kind from the -lie of the ground: behind his back was the town of Medina de Rio Seco, -and the dry bed of the Sequillo river, obstacles which would tend to -make a retreat difficult to conduct in orderly fashion. But a retreat -was the last thing in Cuesta’s thoughts. - - [Illustration: Battle of Medina de Rio Seco. July 14, 1808.] - -Bad as was the position selected, the way in which it was occupied was -still more strange. The Captain-General had divided his host into two -halves, the one consisting of the first division of the army of -Galicia and of the vanguard brigade, the other of the fourth Galician -division and the raw ‘Army of Castile.’ Blake with the first-named -force was drawn up in a short, compact formation, three lines deep, -at the south-eastern front of the hill, the ‘Plateau of Valdecuevas,’ -as it is called. His right looked down into the plain, his left, in -the centre of the plateau, stood quite ‘in the air.’ But nearly a mile -to his left rear, and quite out of sight, lay the other half of the -army, just too far off to protect Blake’s exposed flank if it should be -attacked, and in a very bad position for defending itself. Why Cuesta -ranged his left wing (or second line, if it may so be called) low down -on the reverse slope of the plateau, and in a place where it could not -even see Blake’s corps, it is impossible to conceive. Toreño hazards -the guess that, in his arrogant confidence, he placed Blake where he -would have to bear the stress of the battle, and might probably lose -ground, intending to come up himself with the left wing and restore the -fight when his colleague should be sufficiently humbled. Such a plan -would not have been outside the scope of the old man’s selfish pride. - -Bessières, marching up from the east, came in sight of the Spaniards -in the early morning. He at once deployed his whole army, and advanced -in battle array over the plain. In front was a slight cavalry screen -of Lasalle’s chasseurs; next came Mouton’s division, deployed to the -right, and Merle’s division, with Sabathier’s brigade, to the left of -the country-road which leads, over the plateau, towards Medina de Rio -Seco. The Imperial Guard, horse and foot, and the bulk of Lasalle’s -cavalry brigade were in reserve behind the centre. On getting near -the enemy’s position, Bessières soon discovered the two halves of the -Spanish army and the broad gap which lay between them. His mind was at -once made up: he proposed to contain Cuesta with a small force, and -to fall upon and envelop Blake with the rest of his army before the -Captain-General of Castile could come to his aid. This excellent plan -was carried out to the letter, thanks to the incapacity of Cuesta. - -Not far east of the plateau of Valdecuevas lay an isolated eminence, -the mound of Monclin: on it the marshal drew up the greater part of -his artillery (twenty guns) which began to batter Blake’s front line: -the Galician batteries replied, and held their own though outnumbered -by two to one. Then Sabathier’s eight weak battalions deployed and -commenced a cautious attack upon Blake’s front: this was not to be -pressed home for a time. Meanwhile Merle’s seven battalions pushed into -the fight, continuing Sabathier’s line to the south-west and trying to -envelop Blake’s southern flank. They forced the Galicians to throw back -their right wing, and to keep continually extending it, in order to -avoid being turned. The Spaniards fought not amiss, and for some hour -or more the battle was almost stationary. - -Meanwhile, far to the French right, Mouton’s five battalions were -executing a cautious demonstration against Cuesta’s forces, across -the northern folds of the plateau. The old general allowed himself to -be completely occupied by this trifling show of attack, and made no -movement to aid Blake’s wing. The gap between him and his colleague was -not filled up. Then came the sudden development of Bessières’ plan: -Sabathier and Merle were told to attack in earnest, and while Blake was -deeply engaged with their fifteen battalions, Lasalle rode into the -open space on the left of the Galicians, formed up the 22nd _chasseurs -à cheval_ at right angles to the Spanish line, and charged in furiously -upon Blake’s flank. The unfortunate troops on whom the blow fell were -deployed in line, and utterly unprepared for a cavalry shock from the -side. The first battalion which received the attack broke at once and -ran in upon the second[137]: in a few minutes Blake’s whole left wing -fell down like a pack of cards, each corps as it fled sweeping away -that next to it. The French infantry, advancing at the same moment, ran -in with the bayonet, seized the Spanish guns, and hustled the Galicians -westward along the plateau in a mob. Blake’s troops were only saved -from complete destruction by the steadiness of a Navarrese battalion, -which formed square to cover the retreat, and at the cost of one-third -of its strength allowed the other corps to get a long start in their -flight. They retired due west, and crossed the Sequillo to the south of -the town of Rio Seco before they could be rallied. - - [137] The flank battalion which started the rout was the - ‘Regiment of Buenos Ayres,’ a provisional corps which had been - formed out of the prisoners lately returned from England, who - had been captured during our unlucky South American expedition, - before Whitelock’s final fiasco (see the ‘Journal of Blake’s - Operations,’ in the _Vaughan Papers_). - -It was now the turn of Cuesta to suffer. The moment that Blake was -disposed of, Bessières marched over the hill towards the other half -of the Spanish army: leaving some of Lasalle’s cavalry and Sabathier’s -brigade to pursue the routed corps, he formed the whole of his -remaining troops in a line, bringing up the reserve of the Imperial -Guard to make its centre, while Mouton formed the right wing and the -two brigades of Merle the left. Cuesta, outnumbered and attacked down -hill, would have done wisely to retreat and to seek for shelter in and -behind the town of Rio Seco in his immediate rear. But he had prepared -a new surprise for the enemy; as they descended upon him they were -astonished to see his front line, the eight battalions which formed -the fourth Galician division, form itself into columns of attack and -slowly commence to climb the hill with the object of attacking their -right and centre. Meanwhile Cuesta’s handful of cavalry rode out on -the northern end of the line and fell upon the skirmishers of Mouton’s -division, whom it chased back till it was met and driven off by the -three squadrons of the Imperial Guard. - -The uphill charge of the fourth Galician division was a fine but an -utterly useless display of courage. They were attacking nearly double -their own numbers of victorious troops, who outflanked them on both -wings and tore them to pieces with a concentric fire of artillery -to which they could not respond. The regiments at each end of the -line were soon broken up, but in the centre two battalions of picked -grenadiers[138] actually closed with the French, captured four guns -of the Imperial Guard, and forced back the supporting infantry of the -same corps for a short space, till Bessières hurled upon them the three -squadrons of the Guard-Cavalry, which broke them and swept them down -hill again. - - [138] In accordance with the unwise practice prevailing in most - Continental armies, Blake had massed the grenadier companies of - all his line regiments into two battalions, to act as a select - reserve. - -Seeing his attack fail, Cuesta bade his last reserve, the raw Castilian -and Leonese levies, retreat behind the river and the town of Medina de -Rio Seco, which they did without much loss, covered to a certain extent -by the two Asturian battalions, the only part of Cuesta’s own force -which was seriously engaged. - -The ‘Army of Castile,’ therefore, had no more than 155 casualties, but -the two Galician divisions had suffered heavily. They left behind them -on the field nearly 400 dead, and over 500 wounded, with some 1,200 -prisoners. The ten guns of Blake’s wing had all been captured, and with -them several pairs of colours. In addition more than a thousand of the -Galician recruits had dispersed, and could not be rallied. Altogether -Blake’s army had lost over 3,000 men. The French, as might have been -expected, had suffered comparatively little: they had 105 killed and -300 wounded, according to Foy; other historians give even smaller -figures. - -A vigorous pursuit might have done much further harm to the defeated -Spaniards; but Bessières’ men had been marching since two in the -morning, and fighting all through the mid-day. They were much fatigued, -and their commander did not press the chase far beyond the river. -But the town of Rio Seco was sacked from cellar to garret, with much -slaying of non-combatants and outrages of all kinds[139], a fact very -discreditable to the marshal, who could have stopped the plunder had he -chosen. - - [139] When Stuart and Vaughan passed through Medina in September, - they were given many harrowing details by the local authorities. - -The defeated generals met, a little to the west of the battle-field, -and after a bitter altercation, in which Blake used the plainest words -about Cuesta’s generalship, parted in wrath. The Galicians retired by -the way they had come, and joined the division which had been left -behind three days before; they then went back to the passes above -Astorga, abandoning a considerable amount of stores at Benavente. -Cuesta took the army of Castile to Leon, retiring on the Asturias -rather than on Galicia. - -Bessières’ well-earned victory was creditable to himself and his -troops, but the way had been made easy for him by the astounding -tactical errors of the Captain-General of Castile. The rank and file of -the Spanish army had no reason to be ashamed of their conduct: it was -their commander who should have blushed at the reckless way in which he -had sacrificed his willing troops. Handled by Cuesta the best army in -the world might have been defeated by inferior numbers. - -The strategical results of the battle of Rio Seco were great and -far-reaching. All danger of the cutting of the communications between -Madrid and Bayonne was averted, and Napoleon, his mind set at rest -on this point, could now assert that Dupont’s position in Andalusia -was henceforth the only hazardous point in his great scheme of -invasion[140]. It would clearly be a very long time before the army of -Galicia would again dare to take the offensive, and meanwhile Madrid -was safe, and the attempt to conquer Southern Spain could be resumed -without any fear of interruption. Bessières, after such a victory, -was strong enough not to require any further reinforcements from the -central reserve in and about the capital. - - [140] See his remarks in the document of July 21, _Nap. - Corresp._, 14,223. - -The most obvious result of Rio Seco was that King Joseph was now able -to proceed on his way to Madrid, and to enter the city in triumph. -After receiving the homage of the Spanish notables at Bayonne, and -nominating a ministry, he had crossed the frontier on July 9. But he -had been obliged to stop short at Burgos, till Bessières should have -beaten off the attack of Blake and Cuesta: his presence there had been -most inconvenient to the marshal, who had been forced to leave behind -for his protection Rey’s veteran brigade of Mouton’s division, which he -would gladly have taken out to the approaching battle. - -When the news of Medina de Rio Seco arrived at Burgos, the usurper -resumed his march on Madrid, still escorted by Rey’s troops. He -travelled by short stages, stopping at every town to be complimented -by reluctant magistrates and corporations, who dared not refuse -their homage. The populace everywhere shut itself up in its houses -in silent protest. Joseph’s state entry into Madrid on July 20 was -the culminating point of the melancholy farce. He passed through the -streets with a brilliant staff, between long lines of French bayonets, -and amid the blare of military music. But not a Spaniard was to be seen -except the handful of courtiers and officials who had accepted the new -government. The attempts of the French to produce a demonstration, or -even to get the town decorated, had met with passive disobedience. Like -Charles of Austria when he entered Madrid in 1710, Joseph Bonaparte -might have exclaimed that he could see ‘a court, but no people’ about -him. But he affected not to notice the dismal side of the situation, -assumed an exaggerated urbanity, and heaped compliments and preferment -on the small section of _Afrancesados_ who adhered to him. - -The usurper had resolved to give himself as much as possible the air -of a Spanish national king. Of all his Neapolitan court he had brought -with him only one personage, his favourite Saligny, whom he had made -Duke of San Germano. The rest of his household was composed of nobles -and officials chosen from among the herd which had bowed before him at -Bayonne. There were among them several of the late partisans of King -Ferdinand, of whom some had frankly sold themselves to his supplanter, -while others (like the Duke of Infantado) were only looking for an -opportunity to abscond when it might present itself. The first list -of ministers was also full of names that were already well known in -the Spanish bureaucracy. Of the cabinet of Ferdinand VII, Cevallos the -minister of Foreign Affairs, O’Farrill at the War Office, Piñuela at -the ministry of Justice, were base enough to accept the continuation -of their powers by the usurper. Urquijo, who took the Secretaryship of -State, was an old victim of Godoy’s, who had once before held office -under Charles IV. Mazarredo, who was placed at the ministry of Marine, -was perhaps the most distinguished officer in the Spanish navy. But -Joseph imagined that his greatest stroke of policy was the appointment -as minister of the Interior of Gaspar de Jovellanos, the most prominent -among the Spanish liberals, whose reputation for wisdom and patriotism -had cost him a long imprisonment during the days of the Prince of the -Peace. The idea was ingenious, but the plan for strengthening the -ministry failed, for Jovellanos utterly refused to take office along -with a clique of traitors and in the cabinet of a usurper. Yet even -without him, the body of courtiers and officials whom Joseph collected -was far more respectable, from their high station and old experience, -than might have been expected--a fact very disgraceful to the Spanish -bureaucrats. - -In less troublous times, and with a more legitimate title to the -crown, Joseph Bonaparte might have made a very tolerable king. He -was certainly a far more worthy occupant of the throne than any of -the miserable Spanish Bourbons: but he was not of the stuff of which -successful usurpers are made. He was a weak, well-intentioned man, not -destitute of a heart or a conscience: and as he gradually realized all -the evils that he had brought on Spain by his ill-regulated ambition, -he grew less and less satisfied with his position as his brother’s -tool. He made long and untiring efforts to conciliate the Spaniards, -by an unwavering affability and mildness, combined with a strict -attention to public business. Unfortunately all his efforts were -counteracted by his brother’s harshness, and by the greed and violence -of the French generals, over whom he could never gain any control. It -is a great testimony in his favour that the Spanish people despised -rather than hated him: their more violent animosity was reserved for -Napoleon. His nominal subjects agreed to regard him as a humorous -character: they laughed at his long harangues, in which Neapolitan -phrases were too often mixed with the sonorous Castilian: they insisted -that he was blind of one eye--which did not happen to be the case. -They spoke of him as always occupied with the pleasures of the table -and with miscellaneous amours--accusations for which there was a very -slight foundation of fact. They insisted that he was a coward and a -sluggard--titles which he was far from meriting. He was, they said, -perpetually hoodwinked, baffled, and bullied, alike by his generals, -his ministers, and his mistresses. But they never really hated him--a -fact which, considering the manner of his accession, must be held to be -very much to his credit. - -But the first stay of the ‘Intrusive King,’ as the Spaniards called -him, in his capital, was to be very short. He had only arrived there -on July 20: his formal proclamation took place on the twenty-fourth. -He had hardly settled down in the royal palace, and commenced a -dispute with the effete ‘Council of Castile’--which with unexpected -obstinacy refused to swear the oath to him and to the constitution of -Bayonne--when he was obliged to take to flight. On the twenty-fourth -rumours began to be current in Madrid that a great disaster had taken -place in Andalusia, and that Dupont’s army had been annihilated. On the -twenty-eighth the news was confirmed in every particular. On August 1, -the King, the court, and the 20,000 French troops which still remained -in and about the capital, marched out by the northern road, and took -their way towards the Ebro. This retreat was the result of a great -council of war, in which the energetic advice of Savary, who wished to -fight one more battle in front of the capital, with all the forces that -could be concentrated, was overruled by the King and the majority of -the generals. ‘A council of war never fights,’ as has been most truly -observed. - - - - -SECTION III: CHAPTER IV - -DUPONT IN ANDALUSIA: THE CAPITULATION OF BAYLEN - - -We left General Dupont at Andujar, on the upper course of the -Guadalquivir, whither he had retired on June 19 after evacuating -Cordova. Deeply troubled by the interruption of his communications -with Madrid, and by the growing strength displayed by the Spanish army -in his front, he had resolved that it was necessary to draw back to -the foot of the Sierra Morena, and to recover at all costs his touch -with the main French army in the capital. He kept sending to Murat (or -rather to Savary, who had now superseded the Grand-Duke) persistent -demands for new orders and for large reinforcements. Most of his -messengers were cut off on the way by the insurgents, but his situation -had become known at head quarters, and was engrossing much of Savary’s -attention--more of it indeed than Napoleon approved. The Emperor wrote -on July 13 that the decisive point was for the moment in Castile, and -not in Andalusia, and that the best way to strengthen Dupont was to -reinforce Bessières[141]. - - [141] See Foy (iv. 45), and _Nap. Corresp._, 14,192, where the - Emperor goes so far as to say: ‘Si le Général Dupont éprouvait - un échec, cela ait de peu de conséquence. Il n’aurait d’autre - résultat que de lui faire repasser les montagnes’ (i.e. the - Sierra Morena). - -Such had not been Savary’s opinion: frightened at the isolation in -which Dupont now lay, he sent to his assistance the second division -of his corps, 6,000 men under General Vedel, all recruits of the -‘legions of reserve,’ save one single battalion of Swiss troops. The -division was accompanied by Boussard’s cavalry, the 6th Provisional -Dragoons, some 600 strong. Vedel made his way through La Mancha without -difficulty, but on entering the Despeña Perros defiles found his -passage disputed by a body of insurgents--2,000 peasants with four -antique cannon--who had stockaded themselves in the midst of the pass. -A resolute attack scattered them in a few minutes, and on reaching La -Carolina on the southern slope of the mountains Vedel got in touch -with Dupont, who had hitherto no notice of his approach [June 27]. - -Instead of leaving the newly arrived division to guard the passes, -Dupont called it down to join him in the valley of the Guadalquivir. -With the assistance of Vedel’s troops he considered himself strong -enough to make head against the Spanish army under Castaños, which was -commencing to draw near to Andujar. Keeping his original force at that -town--a great centre of roads, but a malarious spot whose hospitals -were already crowded with 600 sick,--he placed Vedel at Baylen, a -place sixteen miles further east, but still in the plain, though the -foot-hills of the Sierra Morena begin to rise just behind it. To -assert himself and strike terror into the insurgents, Dupont ordered -one of Vedel’s brigades to make a forced march to Jaen, the capital -of a province and a considerable focus of rebellion. This expedition -scattered the local levies, took and sacked Jaen, and then returned in -safety to Baylen [July 2-3]. - -Meanwhile Castaños was drawing near: he had now had a month in which to -organize his army. Like Blake in Galicia, he had used the recruits of -Andalusia to fill up the gaps in the depleted battalions of the regular -army. But less fortunate than his colleague in the north, he had not -been able to prevent the Juntas of Seville and Granada from creating a -number of new volunteer corps, and had been obliged to incorporate them -in his field army, where they were a source of weakness rather than of -strength. His total force was some 33,000 or 34,000 men, of whom 2,600 -were cavalry, for in this arm he was far better provided than was the -army of the North. The whole was organized in four divisions, under -Generals Reding, Coupigny, Felix Jones (an Irish officer, in spite of -his Welsh name), and La Peña. In addition there was a flying brigade of -new levies under Colonel Cruz-Murgeon, which was pushed forward along -the roots of the mountains, at a considerable distance in front of the -main body: it was ordered to harass Dupont’s northern flank and to cut -his communications with Baylen and La Carolina. - -With 16,000 or 17,000 men, including nearly 3,500 cavalry, Dupont -ought to have been able to contain Castaños, if not to beat him. -The proportion of his forces to those of the enemy was not much -less than that which Bessières had possessed at Medina de Rio Seco. -But, unfortunately for himself and his master, Dupont was far from -possessing the boldness and the skill of the marshal. By assuming not -a vigorous offensive but a timid defensive along a protracted front, -he threw away his chances. The line which he had resolved to hold was -that of the Upper Guadalquivir, from Andujar to the next passage up -the river, the ferry of Mengibar, eight miles from Baylen. This gave a -front of some fifteen miles to hold: but unfortunately even when drawn -out to this length the two divisions of Barbou and Vedel did not cover -all the possible lines of attack which Castaños might adopt. He might -still march past them and cut them off from the defiles of the Morena, -by going a little higher up the river and crossing it near Baeza and -Ubeda. Dupont was wrong to take this line of defence at all: unless he -was prepared to attack the army of Andalusia in the open, he should -have retired to Baylen or to La Carolina, where he would have been able -to cover the passes for as long as he might choose, since he could not -have had either of his flanks turned. - -Meanwhile he was gratified to hear that further reinforcements were -being sent to him. Unreasonably disquieted about Andalusia, as Napoleon -thought, Savary proceeded to send a third division to aid Dupont. This -was Gobert’s, the second of Moncey’s corps: it started from Madrid -not quite complete, and left strong detachments at the more important -towns along the road through La Mancha. Though originally seventeen -battalions strong, it reached the northern slope of the Sierra Morena -with only ten. Savary had not intended it to go any further: he had -told Dupont that it was to be used to cover his retreat, if a retreat -became necessary, but not for active operations in Andalusia. But -disregarding these directions Dupont commanded Gobert to cross the -Morena and come down to join Vedel: this he did, bringing with him -nine ‘provisional battalions[142]’ and the second provisional regiment -of cuirassiers, perhaps 5,000 men in all. There were now over 20,000 -French on the south side of the mountain, a force amply sufficient to -deal with Castaños and his 33,000 Andalusians [July 7]. But they were -still widely scattered. Dupont lay at Andujar with 9,000 or 10,000 -sabres and bayonets: Vedel was sixteen miles away at Baylen, with 6,000 -men, of whom 2,000 under General Liger-Belair were pushed forward to -the ferry of Mengibar. Gobert was at La Carolina, at the foot of the -passes, with five battalions about him, and a sixth encamped on the -summit of the defile. He had sent forward the remainder of his division -(the four battalions of the sixth provisional regiment, and half the -second provisional cuirassiers) to join Dupont at Andujar, so that he -had not more than 2,800 bayonets and 350 cavalry with him. - - [142] Of Gobert’s division the 5th provisional regiment and - the Irish battalion never marched south. The 6th, 7th, and 8th - provisional regiments--twelve battalions--formed the column; - they left one battalion at Madridejos, another at Manzanares. - One more remained in the pass at the Puerto del Rey; nine and - the cuirassiers (700 strong) descended into the plains. See for - details Cabany’s _Baylen_, p. 115. - -Castaños, meanwhile, had brought up his whole army, with the exception -of the flying corps of Cruz-Murgeon, to a line close in front of -Andujar: the heads of his columns were at Arjona and Arjonilla, only -five miles from Dupont. On July 11 the Spanish generals held a council -of war at Porcuña, and drew out their plan of operations. Since the -enemy seemed to be still quiescent, they resolved to attack him in -his chosen position behind the river. Castaños, in person--with the -divisions of Jones and La Peña, 12,000 strong--undertook to keep -Dupont employed, by delivering an attack on Andujar, which he did not -intend to press home unless he got good news from his second and third -columns. Meanwhile, six miles up the river, Coupigny with the second -division, nearly 8,000 strong, was to attempt to cross the Guadalquivir -by the ford of Villa Nueva. Lastly, Reding with the first division, the -best and most numerous of the whole army, 10,000 strong, was to seize -the ferry of Mengibar and march on Baylen. Here he was to be joined by -Coupigny, and the two corps were then to fall upon the rear of Dupont’s -position at Andujar, while Castaños was besetting it in front. It was -their aim to surround and capture the whole of the French division, -if its general did not move away before the encircling movement was -complete. Meanwhile the flying column of Cruz-Murgeon, about 3,000 -strong, was to cross the Guadalquivir below Andujar, throw itself into -the mountains in the north, and join hands with Reding and Coupigny -behind the back of Dupont. - -This plan, though ultimately crowned with success, was perilous in the -highest degree. But Castaños had seriously underestimated the total -force of Dupont, as well as misconceived his exact position. He was -under the impression that the main body of the French, which he did -not calculate at more than 12,000 or 14,000 men, was concentrated at -Andujar, and that there were nothing more than weak detachments at -Mengibar, Baylen, or La Carolina. These, he imagined, could not stand -before Reding, and when the latter had once got to the northern bank of -the river, he would easily clear the way for Coupigny to cross. But as -a matter of fact Vedel had 6,000 men at Mengibar and Baylen, with 3,000 -more under Gobert within a short march of him. If the Spanish plan had -been punctually carried out, Reding should have suffered a severe check -at the hands of these two divisions, while Dupont could easily have -dealt with Castaños at Andujar. Coupigny, if he got across at Villa -Nueva, while the divisions on each side of him were beaten off, would -have been in a very compromised position, and could not have dared to -push forward. But in this curious campaign the probable never happened, -and everything went in the most unforeseen fashion. - -On July 13 the Spanish plan began to be carried out, Reding marching -for Mengibar and Coupigny for Villa Nueva. Castaños kept quiet at -Arjonilla, till his lieutenants should have reached the points which -they were to attack. On the same day Dupont received the news of -Moncey’s repulse before Valencia, and made up his mind that he must -persevere in his defensive attitude, without making any attempt to -mass his troops and fall upon the enemy in his front[143]. Just at -the moment when his enemies were putting the game into his hands, by -dividing themselves into three columns separated from each other by -considerable gaps, he relinquished every intention of taking advantage -of their fault. - - [143] Dupont considered that Savary’s intention was to stop - all offensive movements whatever: ‘Le général-en-chef me fait - entrevoir que nous aurons peut-être à garder notre position - jusqu’à ce que Valence et Saragosse soient soumises’ (Dupont to - Vedel, July 13). - -On July 14 Reding appeared in front of the ferry of Mengibar, and -pushed back beyond the river the outlying pickets of Liger-Belair’s -detachment. He made no further attempt to press the French, but Dupont, -disquieted about an attack on this point, ordered Gobert to bring down -the remains of his division to Baylen, to join Vedel. Next morning -the Spaniards began to develop their whole plan: Castaños appeared -on a long front opposite Andujar, and made a great demonstration -against the position of Dupont, using all his artillery and showing -heads of columns at several points. Coupigny came down to the river -at Villa Nueva, and got engaged with a detachment which was sent -out from Andujar to hold the ford. Reding, making a serious attempt -to push forward, crossed the Guadalquivir at Mengibar and attacked -Liger-Belair. But Vedel came up to the support of his lieutenant, and -when the Swiss general found, quite contrary to his expectation, a -whole division deployed against him, he ceased to press his advance, -and retired once more beyond the river. - -Nothing decisive had yet happened: but the next day was to be far more -important. The operations opened with two gross faults made by the -French: Dupont had been so much impressed with the demonstration made -against him by Castaños, that he judged himself hopelessly outnumbered -at Andujar, and sent to Vedel for reinforcements. He bade him send a -battalion or two, or even a whole brigade, if the force that he had -fought at Mengibar seemed weak and unenterprising[144]. This was an -error, for Castaños only outnumbered the French at Andujar by two or -three thousand men, and was not really to be feared. But Vedel made a -worse slip: despising Reding overmuch, he marched on Baylen, not with -one brigade, but with his whole division, save the original detachment -of two battalions under Liger-Belair which remained to watch Mengibar. -Starting at midnight, he reached Andujar at two on the afternoon of -the sixteenth, to find that Castaños had done no more than repeat his -demonstration of the previous day, and had been easily held back. -Cruz-Murgeon’s levies, which the Spanish general had pushed over the -river below Andujar, had received a sharp repulse when they tried to -molest Dupont’s flank. Coupigny had made an even feebler show than his -chief at the ford of Villa Nueva, and had not passed the Guadalquivir. - - [144] Dupont to Vedel, evening of July 15. - -But Reding, on the morning of the sixteenth, had woken up to unexpected -vigour. He had forded the river near Mengibar, and fallen on -Liger-Belair’s detachment for the second time. Hard pressed, the French -brigadier had sent for succour to Baylen, whither Gobert had moved down -when Vedel marched for Andujar. The newly arrived general came quickly -to the aid of the compromised detachment, but he was very weak, for he -had left a battalion at La Carolina and sent another with a squadron -of cuirassiers to Liñares, to guard against a rumoured movement of -the Spaniards along the Upper Guadalquivir. He only brought with him -three battalions and 200 cavalry, and this was not enough to contain -Reding. The 4,000 men of the two French detachments were outnumbered -by more than two to one; they suffered a thorough defeat, and Gobert -was mortally wounded. His brigadier, Dufour, who took over the command, -fell back on Baylen, eight miles to the rear. Next morning, though not -pressed by Reding, he retired towards La Carolina, to prevent himself -being cut off from the passes, for he credited a false rumour that the -Spaniards were detaching troops by way of Liñares to seize the Despeña -Perros. - -Dupont heard of Gobert’s defeat on the evening of the sixteenth. It -deranged all his plans, for it showed him that the enemy were not -massed in front of Andujar, as he supposed, but had a large force -far up the river. Two courses were open to him--either to march on -Baylen with his whole army in order to attack Reding, and to reopen -the communications with La Carolina and the passes, or to fall upon -Castaños and the troops in his immediate front. An enterprising officer -would probably have taken the latter alternative, and could not have -failed of success, for the whole French army in Andalusia save the -troops of Belair and Dufour was now concentrated at Andujar, and not -less than 15,000 bayonets and 3,000 sabres were available for an attack -on Castaños’ 12,000 men[145]. Even if Coupigny joined his chief, the -French would have almost an equality in numbers and a great superiority -in cavalry and guns. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the -Spaniards would have suffered a defeat, and then it would have been -possible to expel Reding from Baylen without any danger of interference -from other quarters. - - [145] Dupont’s available force at this moment consisted of the - following troops. The numbers given are their original strength, - from which deductions must of course be made:-- - - Infantry--Barbou’s Division: - - Chabert’s { 4th Legion of Reserve (three batts.) 3,084 - Brigade { 4th Swiss Regiment (one batt.) 709 - { Marines of the Guard (one batt.) 532 - - Pannetier’s { 3rd Legion of Reserve (two batts.) 2,057 - Brigade { Garde de Paris (two batts.) 1,454 - - Schramm’s } Swiss regiments of Reding and Preux (four batts.) 2,000 - Brigade } - - Vedel’s Division: - - Poinsot’s { 5th Legion of Reserve (three batts.) 2,695 - Brigade { 3rd Swiss Regiment 1,174 - - Cassagnes’ { 1st Legion of Reserve (one batt.) [two batts. - Brigade { detached under Liger-Belair] 1,003 - - From Gobert’s Division: - 6th Provisional Regiment (four batts.) 1,851 - - Cavalry--Frésia’s Division: - - Privé’s { 1st Provisional Dragoons 778 - Brigade { 2nd ditto 681 - - Dupré’s { 1st Provisional _Chasseurs à Cheval_ 556 - Brigade { 2nd ditto 623 - - Boussard’s { 6th Provisional Dragoons 620 - Brigade { - - From Rigaud’s Brigade: - Half the 2nd Provisional Cuirassiers 341 - Artillery, &c. (36 guns) 900 - ------ - 21,058 - - Allowing a deduction of 3,000 men for sick and previous losses, - there remain 15,000 bayonets and 3,000 sabres. - -But, in a moment of evil inspiration, Dupont chose to deprive himself -of the advantage of having practically his whole army concentrated -on one spot, and determined to copy the error of the Spaniards by -splitting his force into two equal halves. He resolved to retain his -defensive position in front of Andujar, and to keep there his original -force--Barbou’s infantry and Frésia’s horse. But Vedel with his own -men, the four battalions from Gobert’s division which were at Andujar, -and 600 cavalry, was sent off to Baylen, where he was directed to rally -the beaten troops of Dufour and Liger-Belair, and then to fall upon -Reding and chase him back beyond the Guadalquivir[146]. - - [146] ‘Je vous prie, mon cher général, de vous porter le plus - rapidement possible, sur Baylen, pour y faire votre jonction avec - le corps qui a combattu aujourd’hui à Mengibar, et qui s’est - replié sur cette ville.... J’espère que demain l’ennemi sera - rejeté sur Mengibar, au delà du fleuve, et que les postes de - Guarroman et de la Caroline resteront en sûreté; ils sont d’une - grande importance’ (Dupont to Vedel, night of July 16). In these - orders lies the foundation of the disaster. - -On the morning, therefore, of July 17 Vedel set out with some 6,000 -men and marched to Baylen. Arriving there he found that Dufour had -evacuated the place, and had hurried on to La Carolina, on the false -hypothesis that Reding had pushed past him to seize the passes. As a -matter of fact the Spaniard had done nothing of the kind: after his -success at Mengibar, he had simply retired to his camp by the river, -and given his men twenty-four hours’ rest. It was a strange way to -employ the day after a victory--but his quiescence chanced to have the -most fortunate effect. Vedel, on hearing that Dufour had hastened -away to defend La Carolina and the passes, resolved to follow him. -He was so inexcusably negligent that he did not even send a cavalry -reconnaissance towards Mengibar, to find out whether any Spanish force -remained there. Had he done so, he would have found Reding’s whole -division enjoying their well-earned siesta! In the direction of La -Carolina and the passes there was no enemy save a small flanking column -of 1,800 raw levies under the Count of Valdecañas, which lay somewhere -near Liñares. - - [Illustration: Battle of Baylen July 19, 1808, at the moment of - Dupont’s third attack.] - - [Illustration: Part of Andalusia, between Andujar and the Passes. - July 19, 1808.] - -On the night of the seventeenth, Vedel and his men, tired out by a long -march of over twenty miles, slept at Guarroman, halfway between Baylen -and La Carolina. Dufour and Liger-Belair had reached the last-named -place and Santa Elena, and had found no Spaniards near them. On the -morning of the eighteenth Vedel followed them, and united his troops -to theirs. He had then some 10,000 or 11,000 men concentrated in and -about La Carolina, with one single battalion left at Guarroman to keep -up his touch with Dupont. The latter had been entirely deceived by the -false news which Vedel had sent him from Baylen--to the effect that -Reding and his corps had marched for the passes, in order to cut the -French communications with Madrid. Believing the story, he forwarded -to his subordinate an approval of his disastrous movement[147], and -bade him ‘instantly attack and crush the Spanish force before him, and -after disposing of it return as quickly as possible to Andujar, to deal -with the troops of the enemy in that direction.’ Unfortunately, as we -have seen, there was no Spanish corps at all in front of Vedel; but by -the time that he discovered the fact it was too late for him to rejoin -Dupont without a battle[148]. His troops were tired out with two -night marches: there were no supplies of food to be got anywhere but at -La Carolina, and he decided that he must halt for at least twelve hours -before returning to join Dupont. - - [147] ‘J’ai reçu votre lettre de Baylen. D’après le mouvement - de l’ennemi, le général Dufour a très-bien fait de regagner de - vitesse sur La Caroline et sur Ste-Hélène, pour occuper la tête - des gorges. Je vois avec plaisir que vous vous hâtez de vous - réunir à lui, afin de combattre avec avantage.... Si vous trouvez - l’ennemi à La Caroline ou sur tout autre point, tâchez de le - battre, pour venir me rejoindre et repousser ce qui est devant - Andujar’ (Dupont to Vedel, night of July 17). - - [148] Vedel had now with him the following troops:-- - - (1) His own whole division [he had rallied the two detached - battalions of Liger-Belair] 6,800 - - (2) Nine battalions of Gobert’s division (four from Baylen, - three which had fought at Mengibar under Dufour, two - from Liñares and La Carolina) 4,350 - - (3) Cavalry { 6th Provisional Dragoons 620 - { Half 2nd Provisional Cuirassiers 340 - - Artillery, &c. (18 guns) 500 - ------ - 12,610 - - Deduct 2,500 for losses in action at Mengibar and sick, and about - 10,000 remain. - -Meanwhile, on the morning of the eighteenth, Reding’s 9,500 men, of -whom 750 were cavalry, had been joined by Coupigny and the second -Andalusian division, which amounted to 7,300 foot and 500 horse. -Advancing from Mengibar to attack Baylen, they found to their surprise -that the place was unoccupied: Vedel’s rearguard had left it on the -previous afternoon. Reding intended to march on Andujar from the rear -on the next day, being under the full belief that Vedel was still with -Dupont, and that the troops which had retired on La Carolina were only -the fragments of Gobert’s force. For Castaños and his colleagues had -drawn up their plan of operations on the hypothesis that the enemy were -still concentrated at Andujar. - -Reding therefore, with some 17,000 men, encamped in and about Baylen, -intending to start at daybreak on July 19, and to fall on Dupont from -behind, while his chief assailed him in front. But already before -the sun was up, musket-shots from his pickets to the west announced -that the French were approaching from that direction. It was with the -head and not with the rear of Dupont’s column that Castaños’ first -and second divisions were to be engaged, for the enemy had evacuated -Andujar, and was in full march for Baylen. - -On the night of the seventeenth Dupont had received the news that Vedel -had evacuated Baylen and gone off to the north-east, so that a gap of -thirty miles or more now separated him from his lieutenant. He had -at first been pleased with the move, as we have seen: but presently -he gathered, from the fact that Castaños did not press him, but only -assailed him with a distant and ineffective cannonade, that the main -stress of the campaign was not at Andujar but elsewhere. The Spanish -army was shifting itself eastward, and he therefore resolved that -he must do the same, though he would have to abandon his cherished -offensive position, his entrenchments, and such part of his supplies as -he could not carry with him. Having made up his mind to depart, Dupont -would have done wisely to start at once: if he had gone off early on -the morning of the eighteenth, he would have found Reding and Coupigny -not established in position at Baylen, but only just approaching from -the south. Probably he might have brushed by their front, or even have -given them a serious check, if he had fallen on them without hesitation. - -But two considerations induced the French general to wait for the -darkness, and to waste fourteen invaluable hours at Andujar. The first -was that he hoped by moving at night to escape the notice of Castaños, -who might have attacked him if his retreat was open and undisguised. -The second was that he wished to carry off his heavy baggage train: -not only had he between 600 and 800 sick to load on his wagons, but -there was an enormous mass of other impedimenta, mainly consisting of -the plunder of Cordova. French and Spanish witnesses unite in stating -that the interminable file of 500 vehicles which clogged Dupont’s march -was to a very great extent laden with stolen goods[149]. And it was -the officers rather than the men who were responsible for this mass of -slow-moving transport. - - [149] Against Cabany’s defence of Dupont on this point there - must be set the impression of almost every French witness from - Napoleon downwards. - -It was not therefore till nine in the evening of the eighteenth that -the French general thought fit to move. After barricading and blocking -up the bridge of Andujar--he dared not use gunpowder to destroy it for -fear of rousing Castaños--he started on his night march. He had with -him thirteen battalions of infantry and four and a half regiments of -cavalry, with twenty-four guns, in all about 8,500 foot soldiers and -2,500 horse, allowing for the losses which he had sustained in sick -and wounded during the earlier phases of the campaign[150]. His march -was arranged as follows:--Chabert’s infantry brigade led the van: -then came the great convoy: behind it were the four Swiss battalions -under Colonel Schramm, which had lately been incorporated with the -French army. These again were followed by Pannetier’s infantry brigade -and Dupré’s two regiments of _chasseurs à cheval_. The rearguard -followed at some distance: it was composed of two and a half regiments -of heavy cavalry, placed under the command of General Privé, with -the one veteran infantry battalion which the army possessed, the 500 -Marines of the Guard, as also six _compagnies d’élite_ picked from -the ‘legions of reserve.’ From the fact that Dupont placed his best -troops in this quarter, it is evident that he expected to be fighting -a rearguard action, with Castaños in pursuit, rather than to come -into contact with Spanish troops drawn up across his line of march. -He was ignorant that Reding and Coupigny had occupied Baylen on the -previous day--a fact which speaks badly for his cavalry: with 2,500 -horsemen about him, he ought to have known all that was going on in his -neighbourhood. Probably the provisional regiments, which formed his -whole mounted force, were incapable of good work in the way of scouting -and reconnaissances. - - [150] Of the troops which we have recapitulated on page 182 there - still remained with Dupont the whole of Barbou’s infantry, four - of the five regiments of Frésia’s cavalry (the fifth had marched - with Vedel), half of the 2nd Provisional Cuirassiers, and the - two Swiss regiments of Reding and Preux. The original total of - these corps had been 13,274. There remained about 11,000, for - that number can be accounted for after the battle. The official - Spanish dispatch gave 8,242 unwounded prisoners and 2,000 - casualties. - -The little town of Baylen is situated in a slight depression of a -saddle-backed range of hills which runs southward out from the Sierra -Morena. The road which leads through it passes over the lowest point in -the watershed, as is but natural: to the north and south of the town -the heights are better marked: they project somewhat on each flank, so -that the place is situated in a sort of amphitheatre. The hill to the -south of Baylen is called the Cerrajon: those to the north the Cerro -del Zumacar Chico, and the Cerro del Zumacar Grande. All three are bare -and bald, without a shrub or tree: none of them are steep, their lower -slopes are quite suitable for cavalry work, and even their rounded -summits are not inaccessible to a horseman. The ground to the west of -them, over which the French had to advance, is open and level for a -mile and a half: then it grows more irregular, and is thickly covered -with olive groves and other vegetation, so that a force advancing over -it is hidden from the view of a spectator on the hills above Baylen -till it comes out into the open. The wooded ground is about two and -a half miles broad: its western limit is the ravine of a mountain -torrent, the Rumblar (or Herrumblar, as the aspirate-loving Andalusians -sometimes call it). The road from Andujar to Baylen crosses this -stream by a bridge, the only place where artillery can pass the rocky -but not very deep depression. - -It is necessary to say a few words about the ground eastward from -Baylen, as this too was not unimportant in the later phases of the -battle. Here the road passes through a broad defile rather than a -plain. It is entirely commanded by the heights on its northern side, -where lies the highest ground of the neighbourhood, the Cerro de San -Cristobal, crowned by a ruined hermitage. The difference between the -approach to Baylen from the west and from the east, is that on the -former side the traveller reaches the town through a semicircular -amphitheatre of upland, while by the latter he comes up a V-shaped -valley cut through the hills. - -Reding and Coupigny were somewhat surprised by the bicker of musketry -which told them that the French had fallen upon their outposts. But -fortunately for them their troops were already getting under arms, -and were bivouacking over the lower slopes of the hills in a position -which made it possible to extemporize without much difficulty a line -of battle, covering the main road and the approaches to Baylen. They -hastily occupied the low amphitheatre of hills north and south of the -town. Reding deployed to the right of the road, on the heights of the -Cerro del Zumacar Chico, Coupigny to its left on the Cerrajon. Their -force was of a very composite sort--seventeen battalions of regulars, -six of embodied militia, five of new Andalusian levies. The units -varied hopelessly in size, some having as few as 350 men, others as -many as 1,000. They could also dispose of 1,200 cavalry and sixteen -guns. The greater part of the latter were placed in battery on the -central and lowest part of the position, north and south of the high -road and not far in front of Baylen. The infantry formed a semicircular -double line: in front were deployed battalions near the foot of the -amphitheatre of hills; in rear, higher up the slope or concealed behind -the crest, was a second line in columns of battalions. The cavalry were -drawn up still further to the rear. Finally, as a necessary precaution -against the possible arrival of Vedel on the scene from La Carolina, -Reding placed seven battalions far away to the east, on the other side -of Baylen, with cavalry pickets out in front to give timely notice of -any signs of the enemy in this quarter. These 3,500 men were quite out -of the battle as long as Dupont was the only enemy in sight. - -Before it was fully daylight General Chabert and his brigade had thrust -back the Spanish outposts. But the strength of the insurgent army was -quite unknown to him: the morning dusk still lay in the folds of the -hills, and he thought that he might possibly have in front of him -nothing but some flying column of insignificant strength. Accordingly, -after allowing the whole of his brigade to come up, Chabert formed a -small line of attack, brought up his battery along the high road to the -middle of the amphitheatre, between the horns of the Spanish position, -and made a vigorous push forward. He operated almost entirely to the -south of the road, where, opposite Coupigny’s division, the hill was -lower and the slope gentler than further north. - -To dislodge 14,000 men and twenty guns in position with 3,000 men -and six guns was of course a military impossibility. But Chabert had -the excuse that he did not, and could not, know what he was doing. -His attempt was of course doomed to failure: his battery was blown -to pieces by the Spanish guns, acting from a concentric position, -the moment that it opened. His four battalions, after pushing back -Coupigny’s skirmishing line for a few hundred yards, were presently -checked by the reserves which the Spaniard sent forward. Having come to -a stand they soon had to retire, and with heavy loss. The brigade drew -back to the cover of the olive groves behind it, leaving two dismounted -guns out in the open. - -Behind Chabert the enormous convoy was blocking the way as far back as -the bridge of the Rumblar. Five hundred wagons with their two or four -oxen apiece, took up, when strung along the road, more than two and a -half miles. Dupont, who rode up at the sound of the cannon, and now -clearly saw the Spanish line drawn up on a front of two miles north and -south of the road, realized that this was no skirmish but a pitched -battle. His action was governed by the fact that he every moment -expected to hear the guns of Castaños thundering behind him, and to -find that he was attacked in rear as well as in front. He accordingly -resolved to deliver a second assault as quickly as possible, before -this evil chance might come upon him. With some difficulty the Swiss -battalions, Dupré’s brigade of light cavalry, and Privé’s dragoons -pushed their way past the convoy and got into the open. They were -terribly tired, having marched all night and covered fifteen miles -of bad road, but their general threw them at once into the fight: -Pannetier’s brigade and the Marines of the Guard were still far to the -rear, at or near the bridge of the Rumblar. - -Dupont’s second attack was a fearful mistake: he should at all costs -have concentrated his whole army for one desperate stroke, for there -was no more chance that 6,000 men could break the Spanish line than -there had been that Chabert’s 3,000 could do so. But without waiting -for Pannetier to come up, he delivered his second attack. The four -Swiss battalions advanced to the north of the road, Chabert’s rallied -brigade to the south of it: to the right of the latter were Privé’s -heavy cavalry, two and a half regiments strong, with whom Dupont -intended to deliver his main blow. They charged with admirable vigour -and precision, cut up two Spanish battalions which failed to form -square in time, and cleared the summit of the Cerrajon. But when, -disordered with their first success, they rode up against Coupigny’s -reserves, they failed to break through. Their own infantry was too far -to the rear to help them, and after a gallant struggle to hold their -ground, the dragoons and cuirassiers fell back to their old position. -When they were already checked, Chabert and Schramm pushed forward to -try their fortune: beaten off by the central battery of the Spanish -line and its infantry supports, they recoiled to the edge of the olive -wood, and there reformed. - -The French were now growing disheartened, and Dupont saw disaster -impending over him so closely that he seems to have lost his head, and -to have retained no other idea save that of hurling every man that he -could bring up in fruitless attacks on the Spanish centre. He hurried -up from the rear Pannetier’s brigade of infantry, leaving at the bridge -of the Rumblar only the single battalion of the Marines of the Guard. -At eight o’clock the reinforcements had come up, and the attack was -renewed. This time the main stress was at the northern end of the line, -where Pannetier was thrown forward, with orders to drive Reding’s right -wing off the Cerro del Zumacar Grande, while the other battalions -renewed their assault against the Spanish centre and left. But the -exhausted troops on the right of the line, who had been fighting since -daybreak, made little impression on Coupigny’s front, and Reding’s -last reserves were brought forward to check and hold off the one fresh -brigade of which Dupont could dispose. - -The fourth attack had failed. The French general had now but one intact -battalion, that of the Marines of the Guard, which had been left with -the baggage at the bridge over the Rumblar, to protect the rear against -the possible advent of Castaños. As there were still no signs of an -attack from that side, Dupont brought up this corps, ranged it across -the road in the centre of the line, and drew up behind it all that -could be rallied of Chabert’s and Pannetier’s men. The whole formed a -sort of wedge, with which he hoped to break through the Spanish centre -by one last effort. The cavalry advanced on the flanks, Privé’s brigade -to the south, Dupré’s to the north of the road. Dupont himself, with -all his staff around him, placed himself at the head of the marines, -and rode in front of the line, waving his sword and calling to the men -that this time they must cut their way through [12.30 P.M.]. - -All was in vain: the attack was pressed home, the marines pushed up to -the very muzzles of the Spanish cannon placed across the high road, and -Dupré’s chasseurs drove in two battalions in Reding’s right centre. -But the column could get no further forward: the marines were almost -exterminated: Dupré was shot dead: Dupont received a painful (but not -dangerous) wound in the hip, and rode to the rear. Then the whole -attack collapsed, and the French rolled back in utter disorder to the -olive groves which sheltered their rear. The majority of the rank and -file of the two Swiss regiments in the centre threw up the butts of -their muskets in the air and surrendered--or rather deserted--to the -enemy[151]. - - [151] That the desertion was pretty general is shown by the - fact that of 2,000 men of these corps only 308 were recorded as - prisoners in the Spanish official returns. If 300 more had been - killed and wounded, 1,400 must have deserted. Hardly any officers - were among those who went over to the enemy; Schramm, their - commander, was wounded. - -At this moment, just as the firing died down at the front, a lively -fusillade was heard from another quarter. Cruz-Murgeon’s light column, -from the side of the mountains, had come down upon the Rumblar bridge, -and had begun to attack the small baggage-guard[152] which remained -with the convoy. All was up. Cruz-Murgeon was the forerunner of La -Peña, and Dupont had not a man left to send to protect his rear. The -battalions were all broken up, the wearied infantry had cast themselves -down in the shade of the olive groves, and could not be induced even to -rise to their feet. Most of them were gasping for water, which could -not be got, for the stream-beds which cross the field were all dried -up, and only at the Rumblar could a drink be obtained. Not 2,000 men -out of the original 11,000 who had started from Andujar could be got -together to oppose a feeble front to Reding and Coupigny. It was only -by keeping up a slow artillery fire, from the few pieces that had not -been silenced or dismounted, that any show of resistance could be made. -When the attack from the rear, which was obviously impending, should be -delivered, the whole force must clearly be destroyed. - - [152] Three companies of Pannetier’s brigade. - -Wishing at least to get some sort of terms for the men whom he had -led into such a desperate position, Dupont at two o’clock sent his -aide-de-camp, Captain Villoutreys, one of the Emperor’s equerries, to -ask for a suspension of hostilities from Reding. He offered to evacuate -Andalusia, not only with his own troops but with those of Vedel and -Dufour, in return for a free passage to Madrid. This was asking too -much, and if the Spanish general had been aware of the desperate state -of his adversary, he would not have listened to the proposal for a -minute. But he did not know that La Peña was now close in Dupont’s -rear, while he was fully aware that Vedel, returning too late from the -passes, was now drawing near to the field from the north. His men were -almost as exhausted as those of Dupont, many had died from sunstroke in -the ranks, and he did not refuse to negotiate. He merely replied that -he had no power to treat, and that all communications should be made -to his chief, who must be somewhere in the direction of Andujar. He -would grant a suspension of arms for a few hours, while a French and a -Spanish officer should ride off together to seek for Castaños. - -Dupont accepted these terms gladly, all the more so because La Peña’s -division had at last reached the Rumblar bridge, and had announced its -approach by four cannon-shots, fired at regular intervals, as a signal -to catch Reding’s ear. It was with the greatest difficulty that the -commander of the fourth Andalusian division could be got to recognize -the armistice granted by his colleague; he saw the French at his -mercy, and wanted to fall upon them while they were still in disorder. -But after some argument he consented to halt. Captain Villoutreys, -accompanied by the Spanish Colonel Copons, rode through his lines to -look for Castaños. - -The Spanish commander-in-chief had displayed most blameworthy torpidity -on this day. He had let Dupont slip away from Andujar, and did not -discover that he was gone till dawn had arrived. Then, instead of -pursuing at full speed with all his forces, he had sent on La Peña’s -division, while he lingered behind with that of Felix Jones, surveying -the enemy’s empty lines. The fourth division must have marched late -and moved slowly, as it only reached the Rumblar bridge--twelve miles -from Andujar--at about 2 p.m. It could easily have been there by 8 or 9 -a.m., and might have fallen upon Dupont while he was delivering one of -his earlier attacks on the Baylen position. - -At much the same moment that Villoutreys and Copons reached Castaños -at Andujar, at about five o’clock in the afternoon, the second half -of the French army at last appeared upon the scene. General Vedel had -discovered on the eighteenth that he had nothing to fear from the side -of the passes. He therefore called down all Dufour’s troops, save -two battalions left at Santa Elena, united the two divisions at La -Carolina, and gave orders for their return to Baylen on the following -morning. Leaving the bivouac at five o’clock Vedel, with some 9,000 or -9,500 men, marched down the defile for ten miles as far as the village -of Guarroman, which he reached about 9.30 or 10 a.m.[153] The day was -hot, the men were tired, and though the noise of a distant cannonade -could be distinctly heard in the direction of Baylen, the general told -his officers to allow their battalions two hours to cook, and to rest -themselves. By some inexplicable carelessness the two hours swelled to -four, and it was not till 2 p.m. that the column started out again, to -drop down to Baylen. An hour before the French marched, the cannonade, -which had been growling in the distance all through the mid-day rest, -suddenly died down. Vedel was in nowise disturbed, and is said to have -remarked that his chief had probably made an end of the Spanish corps -which had been blocking the road between them. - - [153] There is some dispute as to the exact hours of Vedel’s - start and halt: I have adopted, more or less, those given by - Cabany. Vedel himself, when examined by the court-martial, said - ‘qu’il ne pouvait pas préciser l’heure,’ which is quite in - keeping with the rest of his doings. - -After this astonishing display of sloth and slackness, Vedel proceeded -along the road for ten miles, till he came in sight of the rear of the -Spanish position at Baylen. His cavalry soon brought him the news that -the troops visible upon the hillsides were enemies: they consisted of -the brigade which Reding had told off at the beginning of the day to -hold the height of San Cristobal and the Cerro del Ahorcado against -a possible attack from the rear. It was at last clear to Vedel that -things had not gone well at Baylen, and that it was his duty to press -in upon the Spaniards, and endeavour to cut his way through to his -chief. He had begun to deploy his troops across the defile, with the -object of attacking both the flanking hills, when two officers with a -white flag rode out towards him. They announced to him that Dupont had -been beaten, and had asked for a suspension of hostilities, which had -been granted. La Peña’s troops had stayed their advance, and he was -asked to do the same. - -Either because he doubted the truth of these statements, or because -he thought that his appearance would improve Dupont’s position, Vedel -refused to halt, and sent back the Spanish officers to tell Reding -that he should attack him. This he did with small delay, falling -on the brigade opposed to him with great fury. Boussard’s dragoons -charged the troops on the lower slopes of the Cerro del Ahorcado, and -rode into two battalions who were so much relying on the armistice -that they were surprised with their arms still piled, cooking their -evening meal. A thousand men were taken prisoners almost without firing -a shot[154]. Cassagnes’ infantry attacked the steep height of San -Cristobal with less good fortune: his first assault was beaten off, -and Vedel was preparing to succour him, when a second white flag came -out of Baylen. It was carried by a Spanish officer, who brought with -him De Barbarin, one of Dupont’s aides-de-camp. The general had sent a -written communication ordering Vedel to cease firing and remain quiet, -as an armistice had been concluded, and it was hoped that Castaños -would consent to a convention. The moment that his answer was received -it should be passed on; meanwhile the attack must be stopped and the -troops withdrawn. - - [154] Apparently they were the 1st battalion of the Irlanda - regiment, and the militia of Jaen, according to the narrative of - Maupoey and Goicoechea (Arteche, ii. 512). - -Vedel obeyed: clearly he could do nothing else, for Dupont was his -hierarchical superior, and, as far as he could see, was still a free -agent. Moreover, De Barbarin told him of the very easy terms which -the commander-in-chief hoped to get from Castaños. If they could be -secured it would be unnecessary, as well as risky, to continue the -attack. For La Peña might very possibly have annihilated the beaten -division before Vedel could force his way to its aid, since horse and -foot were both ‘fought out,’ and there was neither strength nor spirit -for resistance left among them. Vedel therefore was justified in his -obedience to his superior, and in his withdrawal to a point two miles -up the La Carolina road. - -Meanwhile Villoutreys, the emissary of Dupont, had reached the camp of -Castaños at Andujar[155] late in the afternoon, and laid his chief’s -proposals before the Spaniard. As might have been expected, they were -declined--Dupont was in the trap, and it would have been absurd to let -him off so easily. No great objection was made to the retreat of Vedel, -but Castaños said that the corps caught between La Peña and Reding must -lay down its arms. Early next morning (July 20) Villoutreys returned -with this reply to the French camp. - - [155] Or, according to some authorities, met Castaños at the - first post-house out of Andujar, on the Baylen road. - -Dupont meanwhile had spent a restless night. He had gone round the -miserable bivouac of his men, to see if they would be in a condition -to fight next morning, in the event of the negotiations failing. The -result was most discouraging: the soldiers were in dire straits for -want of water, they had little to eat, and were so worn out that they -could not be roused even to gather in the wounded. The brigadiers and -colonels reported that they could hold out no prospect of a rally -on the morrow[156]. Only Privé, the commander of the heavy-cavalry -brigade, spoke in favour of fighting: the others doubted whether even -2,000 men could be got together for a rush at the Spanish lines. When -an aide-de-camp, whom Vedel had been allowed to send to his chief, -asked whether it would not be possible to make a concerted attack on -Reding next morning, with the object of disengaging the surrounded -division, Dupont told him that it was no use to dream of any such -thing. Vedel must prepare for a prompt retreat, in order to save -himself; no more could be done. - - [156] No one confesses the demoralization of the French troops - more than Foy. ‘Dupont voulait combattre encore.... Mais pour - exécuter des résolutions vigoureuses il fallait des soldats à - conduire. Or, ces infortunés n’étaient plus des soldats; c’était - un troupeau dominé par les besoins physiques, sur lequel les - influences morales n’avaient plus de prise. La souffrance avait - achevé d’énerver les courages.’ - -At dawn, nothing having been yet settled, La Peña wrote to Dupont -threatening that if the 1,000 men who had been captured by Vedel on -the previous day were not at once released, he should consider the -armistice at an end, and order his division to advance. The request -was reasonable, as they had been surprised and taken while relying on -the suspension of arms. Dupont ordered his subordinate to send them -back to Reding’s camp. Castaños meanwhile was pressing for a reply to -his demand for surrender: he had brought up Felix Jones’s division -to join La Peña’s in the early morning, so that he had over 14,000 -men massed on the right bank of the Rumblar and ready to attack[157]. -Dupont was well aware of this, and had made up his mind to surrender -when he realized the hopeless demoralization of his troops. Early in -the morning he called a council of war; the officers present, after a -short discussion, drew up and signed a document in which they declared -that ‘the honour of the French arms had been sufficiently vindicated -by the battle of the previous day: that in accepting the enemy’s terms -the commander-in-chief was yielding to evident military necessity: -that, surrounded by 40,000 enemies, he was justified in averting by -an honourable treaty the destruction of his corps.’ Only the cavalry -brigadier Privé, refused to put his name to the paper, on which -appear the signatures of three generals of division, of the officers -commanding the artillery and engineers, of two brigadiers, and of three -commanders of regiments. - - [157] Namely, 6,600 of La Peña’s men, 5,400 of Jones’s, and 2,500 - or 3,000 of Cruz-Murgeon’s flying column. - -After this formality was ended Generals Chabert and Marescot rode out -from the French camp and met Castaños. They had orders to make the -best terms they could: in a general way it was recognized that the -compromised division could not escape surrender, and that Vedel and -Dufour would probably have to evacuate Andalusia and stipulate for a -free passage to Madrid. The Spaniards were not, as it seems, intending -to ask for much more. But while they were haggling on such petty points -as the forms of surrender, and the exemption of officers’ baggage -from search, a new factor was introduced into the discussion. Some -irregulars from the Sierra Morena came to Castaños, bringing with them -as a prisoner an aide-de-camp of Savary[158]. They had secured his -dispatch, which was a peremptory order to Dupont to evacuate Andalusia -with all his three divisions, and fall back towards Madrid. This put -a new face on affairs, for Castaños saw that if he conceded a free -retreat to Vedel and Dufour, he would be enabling them to carry out -exactly the movement which Savary intended. To do so would clearly be -undesirable: he therefore interposed in the negotiations, and declared -that the troops of these two generals should not be allowed to quit -Andalusia by the road which had been hitherto proposed. They must be -sent round by sea to some port of France not immediately contiguous -with the Spanish frontier. - - [158] His name was Captain de Fénelon (Cabany, p. 178). - -Chabert and Marescot, as was natural, declaimed vehemently against -this projected change in the capitulation, and declared that it was -inadmissible. But they were answered in even more violent terms by -the turbulent Conde de Tilly, who attended as representative of the -Junta of Seville. He taunted them with their atrocities at the sack -of Cordova, and threatened that if the negotiations fell through no -quarter should be given to the French army. At last Castaños suggested -a compromise: he offered to let Dupont’s troops, no less than those of -Vedel, return to France by sea, if the claim that the latter should be -allowed to retreat on Madrid were withdrawn. This was conceding much, -and the French generals accepted the proposal. - -Accordingly Castaños and Tilly, representing the Spaniards, and Chabert -and Marescot, on behalf of Dupont, signed preliminaries, by which it -was agreed that the surrounded divisions should formally lay down -their arms and become prisoners of war, while Vedel’s men should not -be considered to have capitulated, nor make any act of surrender. Both -bodies of men should leave Andalusia by sea, and be taken to Rochefort -on Spanish vessels. ‘The Spanish army,’ so ran the curiously worded -seventh article of the capitulation, ‘guarantees them against all -hostile aggression during their passage.’ The other clauses contain -nothing striking, save some rather liberal permissions to the French -officers to take away their baggage--each general was to be allowed two -wheeled vehicles, each field officer or staff officer one--without its -being examined. This article caught the eye of Napoleon, and has been -noted by many subsequent critics, who have maintained that Dupont and -his colleagues, gorged with the plunder of Cordova, surrendered before -they needed, in order to preserve their booty intact. That they yielded -before it was inevitable we do not believe: but far more anxiety than -was becoming seems to have been shown regarding the baggage. This -anxiety finds easy explanation if the Spanish official statement, that -more than £40,000 in hard cash, and a great quantity of jewellery and -silver plate was afterwards found in the _fourgons_ of the staff and -the superior officers, be accepted as correct[159]. - - [159] It will be found in the _Gazeta de Madrid_ of October 9, - 1808. It is stated that 60,000 dollars in silver and 136,000 - dollars in gold, besides much plate and jewellery, were found in - the _fourgons_ of Dupont and his staff. - -The fifteenth clause of the capitulation had contents of still more -doubtful propriety: it was to the effect that as many pieces of church -plate had been stolen at the sack of Cordova, Dupont undertook to make -a search for them and restore them to the sanctuaries to which they -belonged, if they could be found in existence. The confession was so -scandalous, that we share Napoleon’s wonder that such a clause could -ever have been passed by the two French negotiators; if they were aware -that the charge of theft was true (as it no doubt was), shame should -have prevented them from putting it on paper: if they thought it false, -they were permitting a gratuitous insult to the French army to be -inserted in the capitulation. - -While the negotiations were going on, Dupont sent secret orders to -Vedel to abscond during the night, and to retreat on Madrid as fast as -he was able. Chabert and Marescot had of course no knowledge of this, -or they would hardly have consented to include that general’s troops in -the convention. In accordance with his superior’s orders, and with the -obvious necessities of the case, Vedel made off on the night of July -20-21, leaving only a screen of pickets in front of his position, to -conceal his departure from the Spaniards as long as was possible. On -the return of his plenipotentiaries to his camp on the morning of the -twenty-first, Dupont learnt, to his surprise and discontent, that they -had included Vedel’s division in their bargain with Castaños. But as -that officer was now far away--he had reached La Carolina at daybreak -and Santa Elena by noon--the commander-in-chief hoped that his troops -were saved. - -The anger of the Spaniards at discovering the evasion of the second -French division may easily be imagined. Reding, who was the first to -become aware of it, sent down an officer into Dupont’s camp, with the -message that if Vedel did not instantly return, he should regard the -convention as broken, and fall upon the surrounded troops: he should -give no quarter, as he considered that treachery had been shown, and -that the armistice had been abused. Dupont could not hope to make a -stand, and was at the enemy’s mercy. He directed his chief of the -staff to write an order bidding Vedel to halt, and sent it to him by -one of his aides-de-camp, accompanied by a Spanish officer. This did -not satisfy Reding, who insisted that Dupont should write an autograph -letter of his own in stronger terms. His demand could not be refused, -and the two dispatches reached Vedel almost at the same hour, as he was -resting his troops at Santa Elena before plunging into the passes. - -Vedel, as all his previous conduct had shown, was weak and wanting in -initiative. Some of his officers tried to persuade him to push on, and -to leave Dupont to make the best terms for himself that he could. Much -was to be said in favour of this resolve: he might have argued that -since he had never been without the power of retreating, it was wrong -of his superior to include him in the capitulation. His duty to the -Emperor would be to save his men, whatever might be the consequences to -Dupont. The latter, surrounded as he was, could hardly be considered a -free agent, and his orders might be disregarded. But such views were -far from Vedel’s mind: he automatically obeyed his chief’s dispatch and -halted. Next day he marched his troops back to Baylen, in consequence -of a third communication from Dupont. - -On July 23 Dupont’s troops laid down their arms with full formalities, -defiling to the sound of military music before the divisions of La -Peña and Jones, who were drawn up by the Rumblar bridge. On the -twenty-fourth Vedel’s and Dufour’s troops, without any such humiliating -ceremony, stacked their muskets and cannon on the hillsides east of -Baylen and marched for the coast. When the two corps were numbered it -was found that 8,242 unwounded men had surrendered with Dupont: nearly -2,000 more, dead or wounded, were left on the battle-field; seven or -eight hundred of the Swiss battalions had deserted and disappeared. -With Vedel 9,393 men laid down their arms[160]. Not only did he deliver -up his own column, but he called down the battalion guarding the -Despeña Perros pass. Even the troops left beyond the defiles in La -Mancha were summoned to surrender by the Spaniards, and some of them -did so, though they were not really included in the capitulation, which -was by its wording confined to French troops in Andalusia. But the -commanders of three battalions allowed themselves to be intimidated -by Colonel Cruz-Murgeon, who went to seek them at the head of a few -cavalry, and tamely laid down their arms[161]. - - [160] This total of 17,635, given in the Spanish returns, seems - absolutely certain. It tallies very well with the original - figures of the French divisions, when losses in the campaign - are allowed for. I find in the _Vaughan Papers_ a contemporary - Spanish scrap of unknown provenance, giving somewhat different - figures, as follows:--Dupont’s corps: unwounded prisoners, - 6,000; killed and wounded on the field, 3,000; Swiss deserters, - 1,200; sick captured in the hospitals, 400; making a total of - 10,600. Whittingham, the English attaché in Castaños’ camp, gives - another set:--unwounded prisoners, 5,500; killed and wounded, - 2,600; Swiss deserters, 1,100; making 9,200. But both of these - are confessedly rough estimates, though made on the spot. As to - the other French prisoners, the Vaughan document says that 9,100 - surrendered with Vedel, 800 in the passes, and 700 more in La - Mancha. - - [161] Battalions surrendered at Santa Cruz, and at Manzanares. - But the officer in command at Madridejos refused to be cajoled, - and retreated on Madrid. - -The Spaniards had won their success at very small cost. Reding’s -division returned a casualty list of 117 dead and 403 wounded, in -which were included the losses of the skirmish of July 16 as well as -those of the battle of the nineteenth. Coupigny lost 100 dead and 894 -wounded. La Peña’s and Cruz-Murgeon’s columns, which had barely got -into touch with the French when the armistice was granted, cannot have -lost more than a score or two of men. The total is no more than 954. -There were in addition 998 prisoners captured by Vedel when he attacked -from the rear, but these were, of course, restored on the twentieth, in -consequence of the orders sent by Dupont, along with two guns and two -regimental standards. - -Castaños, a man of untarnished honour, had every intention of carrying -out the capitulation. The French troops, divided into small columns, -were sent down to the coast, or to the small towns of the Lower -Guadalquivir under Spanish escorts, which had some difficulty in -preserving them from the fury of the peasantry. It was necessary to -avoid the large towns like Cordova and Seville, where the passage of -the unarmed prisoners would certainly have led to riots and massacres. -At Ecija the mob actually succeeded in murdering sixty unfortunate -Frenchmen. But when the troops had been conducted to their temporary -destinations, it was found that difficulties had arisen. The amount of -Spanish shipping available would not have carried 20,000 men. This was -a comparatively small hindrance, as the troops could have been sent off -in detachments. But it was more serious that Lord Collingwood, the -commander of the British squadron off Cadiz, refused his permission for -the embarkation of the French. He observed that Castaños had promised -to send Dupont’s army home by water, without considering whether he -had the power to do so. The British fleet commanded the sea, and was -blockading Rochefort, the port which the capitulation assigned for the -landing of the captive army. No representative of Great Britain had -signed the convention[162], and she was not bound by it. He must find -out, by consulting his government, whether the transference of the -troops of Dupont to France was to be allowed. - - [162] There had been a British attaché, Captain Whittingham, at - Castaños’ head quarters. The French negotiators had tried to - induce him to approve the terms of capitulation. But he very - wisely refused, having no authority to do so. - -On hearing of the difficulties raised by Collingwood, Castaños got -into communication with Dupont, and drew up six supplementary articles -to the convention, in which it was stipulated that if the British -Government objected to Rochefort as the port at which the French troops -were to be landed, some other place should be selected. If all passage -by sea was denied, a way by land should be granted by the Spaniards. -This agreement was signed at Seville on August 6, but meanwhile the -Junta was being incited to break the convention. Several of its more -reckless and fanatical members openly broached the idea that no faith -need be kept with those who had invaded Spain under such treacherous -pretences. The newspapers were full of tales of French outrages, and -protests against the liberation of the spoilers of Cordova and Jaen. - -Matters came to a head when Dupont wrote to Morla, the Captain-General -of Andalusia, to protest against further delays, and to require -that the first division of his army should be allowed to sail at -once [August 8]. He received in reply a most shameless and cynical -letter[163]. The Captain-General began by declaring that there were -no ships available. But he then went on to state that no more had -been promised than that the Junta would request the British to allow -the French troops to sail. He supposed that it was probable that a -blank refusal would be sent to this demand. Why should Britain allow -the passage by sea of troops who were destined to be used against her -on some other point of the theatre of war? Morla next insinuated -that Dupont himself must have been well aware that the capitulation -could not be carried out. ‘Your Excellency’s object in inserting -these conditions was merely to obtain terms which, impossible as they -were to execute, might yet give a show of honour to the inevitable -surrender.... What right have you to require the performance of these -impossible conditions on behalf of an army which entered Spain under a -pretence of alliance, and then imprisoned our King and princes, sacked -his palaces, slew and robbed his subjects, wasted his provinces, and -tore away his crown?’ - - [163] This will be found printed at length in the Appendix of - Papers relating to Baylen. - -After a delay of some weeks Lord Collingwood sent in to the Junta the -reply of his government. It was far from being of the kind that Morla -and his friends had hoped. Canning had answered that no stipulations -made at Baylen could bind Great Britain, but that to oblige her -allies, and to avoid compromising their honour, she consented to -allow the French army to be sent back to France, and to be landed -in successive detachments of 4,000 men at some port between Brest -and Rochefort (i.e. at Nantes or L’Orient). It is painful to have to -add that neither the Junta of Seville nor the Supreme Central Junta, -which superseded that body, took any steps to carry out this project. -Dupont himself, his generals, and his staff, were sent home to France, -but their unfortunate troops were kept for a time in cantonments in -Andalusia, then sent on board pontoons in the Bay of Cadiz, where -they were subjected to all manner of ill usage and half-starved, and -finally dispatched to the desolate rock of Cabrera, in the Balearic -Islands, where more than half of them perished of cold, disease, and -insufficient nourishment[164]. Vedel’s men were imprisoned no less than -Dupont’s, and the survivors were only released at the conclusion of the -general peace of 1814. - - [164] For the horrors of Cabrera, the works of three of the - prisoners, Ducor of the Marines of the Guard, and Gille and Wagré - of Vedel’s division, may be consulted. Their story is deeply - distressing. - -So ended the strange and ill-fought campaign of Baylen. It is clear -that Dupont’s misfortunes were of his own creation. He ought never to -have lingered at Andujar till July was far spent, but should either -have massed his three divisions and fallen upon Castaños, or have -retired to a safe defensive position at Baylen or La Carolina and have -waited to be attacked. He might have united something over 20,000 men, -and could have defied every effort of the 35,000 Spaniards to drive -him back over the Sierra Morena. By dividing his army into fractions -and persisting in holding Andujar, he brought ruin upon himself. But -the precise form in which the ruin came about was due less to Dupont -than to Vedel. That officer’s blind and irrational march on La Carolina -and abandonment of Baylen on July 17-18 gave the Spaniards the chance -of interposing between the two halves of the French army. If Vedel had -made a proper reconnaissance on the seventeenth, he would have found -that Reding had not marched for the passes, but was still lingering at -Mengibar. Instead, however, of sweeping the country-side for traces of -the enemy, he credited a wild rumour, and hurried off to La Carolina, -leaving the fatal gap behind him. All that followed was his fault: not -only did he compromise the campaign by his march back to the passes, -but when he had discovered his mistake he returned with a slowness that -was inexcusable. If he had used ordinary diligence he might yet have -saved Dupont on the nineteenth: it was his halt at Guarroman, while -the cannon of Baylen were thundering in his ears, that gave the last -finishing touch to the disaster. If he had come upon the battle-field -at ten in the morning, instead of at five in the afternoon, he could -have aided his chief to cut his way through, and even have inflicted a -heavy blow on Reding and Coupigny. A careful study of Vedel’s actions, -from his first passage of the Sierra Morena to his surrender, shows -that on every possible occasion he took the wrong course. - -But even if we grant that Vedel made every possible mistake, it is -nevertheless true that Dupont fought his battle most unskilfully. If -he had marched on the morning instead of the night of July 18, he -probably might have brushed past the front of Reding and Coupigny -without suffering any greater disaster than the loss of his baggage. -Even as things actually fell out, it is not certain that he need have -been forced to surrender. He had 10,000 men, the two Spanish generals -had 17,000, but had been forced to detach some 3,500 bayonets to guard -against the possible reappearance of Vedel. If Dupont had refused -to waste his men in partial and successive attacks, and had massed -them for a vigorous assault on the left wing of the Spaniards, where -Coupigny’s position on the slopes of the Cerrajon was neither very -strong nor very well defined, he might yet have cut his way through, -though probably his immense baggage-train would have been lost. It -is fair, however, to remember that this chance was only granted him -because Castaños, in front of Andujar, was slow to discover his retreat -and still slower to pursue him. If that officer had shown real energy, -ten thousand men might have been pressing Dupont from the rear before -eight o’clock in the morning. - -As it was Dupont mismanaged all the details of his attack. He made four -assaults with fractions of his army, and on a long front. The leading -brigades were completely worn out and demoralized before the reserves -were sent into action. The fifth assault, in which every man was at -last brought forward, failed because the majority of the troops were -already convinced that the day was lost, and were no longer capable of -any great exertions. It is absurd to accuse Dupont of cowardice--he -exposed his person freely and was wounded--and still more absurd to -charge him (as did the Emperor) with treason. He did not surrender -till he saw that there was no possible hope of salvation remaining. -But there can be no doubt that he showed great incapacity to grasp the -situation, lost his head, and threw away all his chances. - -As to the Spaniards, it can truly be said that they were extremely -fortunate, and that even their mistakes helped them. Castaños framed -his plan for surrounding Dupont on the hypothesis that the main French -army was concentrated at Andujar. If this had indeed been the case, -and Dupont had retained at that place some 15,000 or 17,000 men, the -turning movement of Reding and Coupigny would have been hazardous in -the extreme. But the French general was obliging enough to divide -his force into two equal parts, and his subordinate led away one of -the halves on a wild march back to the passes. Again Reding acted -in the most strange and unskilful way on July 17; after defeating -Liger-Belair and Dufour he ought to have seized Baylen. Instead, he -remained torpid in his camp for a day and a half: this mistake led -to the far more inexcusable error of Vedel, who failed to see his -adversary, and marched off to La Carolina. But Vedel’s blindness does -not excuse Reding’s sloth. On the actual day of battle, on the other -hand, Reding behaved very well: he showed considerable tenacity, -and his troops deserve great credit. It was no mean achievement for -13,000 or 14,000[165] Spaniards, their ranks full of raw recruits -and interspersed with battalions levied only five weeks before, to -withstand the attack of 10,000 French, even if the latter were badly -handled by their general. The Andalusians had good reason to be proud -of their victory, though they might have refrained from calling -Dupont’s Legions of Reserve and provisional regiments the ‘invincible -troops of Austerlitz and Friedland,’ as they were too prone to do. They -had at least succeeded in beating in the open field and capturing a -whole French army, a thing which no continental nation had accomplished -since the wars of the Revolution began. - - [165] We must deduct the seven battalions (3,500 or 4,000 - men) which had been detached to the rear to watch for Vedel’s - approach, and were never engaged with Dupont’s troops. - - -NOTE - -Sir Charles Vaughan, always in search of first-hand -information, called on Castaños and had a long conversation -with him concerning the Convention. I find among his papers the -following notes:-- - -‘Among other particulars of the surrender, General Castaños -stated that the French General Marescot had the greatest -influence in bringing it about. The great difficulty was to -persuade them [Marescot and Chabert] to capitulate for Vedel’s -army as well as Dupont’s. A letter had been intercepted -ordering Vedel back to Madrid, and another ordering Dupont to -retire. This letter had considerable effect with the French: -but the offer of carrying away their baggage and the plunder of -the country was no sooner made, than the two generals desired -to be permitted to retire and deliberate alone. After a few -minutes they accepted the proposal. But General Castaños, to -make the article of as little value as possible, got them to -insert the clause that the French officers should be allowed -to embark all their baggage, &c., _according to the laws of -Spain_. He well knew that those laws forbid the exportation -of gold and silver. The consequence was that the French lost -all their more valuable plunder when embarking at Puerto Santa -Maria.’ - - - - -SECTION IV - -THE ENGLISH IN PORTUGAL - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE OUTBREAK OF THE PORTUGUESE INSURRECTION - - -Down to the moment of the general outbreak of the Spanish insurrection -Junot’s task in Portugal had not been a difficult one. As long as Spain -and France were still ostensibly allies, he had at his disposition a -very large army. He had entered Portugal in 1807 with 25,000 French -troops, and during the spring of 1808 he had received 4,000 men in -drafts from Bayonne, which more than filled up the gaps made in his -battalions by the dreary march from Ciudad Rodrigo to Abrantes[166]. -Of the three Spanish divisions which had been lent to him, Solano’s -had gone home to Andalusia, but he had still the two others, Caraffa’s -(7,000 strong) in the valley of the Tagus, and Taranco’s at Oporto. The -last-named general died during the winter, but his successor, Belesta, -still commanded 6,000 men cantoned on the banks of the Douro. The -discontent of the Portuguese during the early months of 1808 showed -itself by nothing save a few isolated deeds of violence, provoked by -particular acts of oppression on the part of Junot’s subordinates. -How promptly and severely they were chastised has been told in an -earlier chapter. There were no signs whatever of a general rising: the -means indeed were almost entirely wanting. The regular army had been -disbanded or sent off to France. The organization of the militia had -been dissolved. The greater part of the leading men of the country had -fled to Brazil with the Prince-Regent: the bureaucracy and many of the -clergy had shown a discreditable willingness to conciliate Junot by a -tame subservience to his orders. - - [166] See Thiébault, _Expédition de Portugal_, and Foy, iv. 363. - -The Duke of Abrantes himself thoroughly enjoyed his Viceroyalty, and -still deluded himself into believing that he might yet prove a popular -ruler in Portugal: perhaps he even dreamed of becoming some day one -of Bonaparte’s vassal-kings. He persisted in the farce of issuing -benevolent proclamations, and expressing his affection for the noble -Portuguese people, till his master at last grew angry. ‘Why,’ he wrote -by the hand of his minister Clarke, ‘do you go on making promises -which you have no authority to carry out? Of course, there is no end -more laudable than that of winning the affection and confidence of -the inhabitants of Portugal. But do not forget that the safety of the -French army is the first thing. Disarm the Portuguese: keep an eye -on the disbanded soldiers, lest reckless leaders should get hold of -them and make them into the nucleus of rebel bands.... Lisbon is an -inconveniently large place: it is too populous, and its people cannot -help being hostile to you. Keep your troops outside it, in cantonments -along the sea-front’: and so forth[167]. Meanwhile financial exactions -were heaped on the unfortunate kingdom to contribute to the huge fine -which the Emperor had laid upon it: but there was evidently no chance -that such a large sum could be raised, however tightly the screw of -taxation might be twisted. Junot accepted, as contributions towards -the £2,000,000 that he was told to raise, much confiscated English -merchandise, church plate, and private property of the royal house, but -his extortions did little more than pay for his army and the expenses -of government. Portugal indeed was in a dismal state: her ports were -blocked and her wines could not be sold to her old customers in -England, nor her manufactures to her Brazilian colonists. The working -classes in Lisbon were thrown out of employment, and starved, or -migrated in bands into the interior. Foy and other good witnesses from -the French side speak of the capital as ‘looking like a desert, with -no vehicles, and hardly a foot-passenger in the streets, save 20,000 -persons reduced to beggary and trying vainly to live on alms[168].’ The -only activity visible was in the arsenal and dockyards, where Junot had -10,000 men at work restoring the neglected material of the artillery, -and fitting out that portion of the fleet which had been in too bad -order to sail for Brazil in the previous November. - - [167] Compare _Nap. Corresp._, 13,608 and 13,620. - - [168] Foy, iv. 273-4. - -The sudden outbreak of the Spanish insurrection in the last days of -May, 1808, made an enormous change in the situation of the French -army in Portugal. Before Junot had well realized what was happening in -the neighbouring kingdom, his communications with Madrid were suddenly -cut, and for the future information only reached him with the greatest -difficulty, and orders not at all. The last dispatch that came through -to him was one from the Emperor which spoke of the beginnings of the -rising, and bade him send 4,000 men to Ciudad Rodrigo to hold out a -hand to Bessières, and 8,000 to the Guadiana to co-operate in Dupont’s -projected invasion of Andalusia[169]. These orders were dispatched in -the last days of May; before they could be carried out the situation -had been profoundly modified. - - [169] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,023 (from Bayonne, May 29). - -On June 6 there arrived at Oporto the news of the insurrection of -Galicia and the establishment of the Provincial Junta at Corunna. The -first thought of the new government in Galicia had been to call home -for its own defence the division in northern Portugal. When its summons -reached General Belesta, he obeyed without a moment’s hesitation. The -only French near him were General Quesnel, the Governor of Oporto, his -staff, and a troop of thirty dragoons which served as his personal -escort. Belesta seized and disarmed both the general and his guard, and -forthwith marched for Spain, by Braga and Valenza, with his prisoners. -Before leaving he called together the notables of Oporto, bade them -hoist the national flag, and incited them to nominate a junta to -organize resistance against Junot. But he left not a man behind to aid -them, and took off his whole force to join General Blake. - -On receiving, on June 9, the news of this untoward event, Junot -determined to prevent Caraffa’s troops on the Tagus from following -the example of their countrymen. Before they had fully realized the -situation, or had time to concert measures for a general evasion, -he succeeded in disarming them. Caraffa himself was summoned to the -quarters of the commander-in-chief, and placed under arrest before -he knew that he was suspected. Of his regiments some were ordered to -attend a review, others to change garrisons; while unsuspectingly on -their way, they found themselves surrounded by French troops and were -told to lay down their arms. All were successfully trapped except the -second cavalry regiment, the ‘Queen’s Own,’ whose colonel rode off -to Oporto with his two squadrons instead of obeying the orders sent -him, and fractions of the infantry regiments of Murcia and Valencia -who escaped to Badajoz after an ineffectual pursuit by the French -dragoons. But 6,000 out of Caraffa’s 7,000 men were caught, disarmed, -and placed on pontoons moored under the guns of the Lisbon forts, whose -commanders had orders to sink them if they gave any trouble. Here they -were destined to remain prisoners for the next ten weeks, till the -English arrived to release them after the battle of Vimiero. - -The imminent danger that Caraffa’s force might openly revolt, and -serve as the nucleus for a general rising of the Portuguese, was -thus disposed of. But Junot’s position was still unpleasant: he had -only some 26,500 men with whom to hold down the kingdom: if once -the inhabitants took arms, such a force could not supply garrisons -for every corner of a country 300 miles long and a hundred broad. -Moreover, there was considerable probability that the situation might -be complicated by the appearance of an English expeditionary army: -Napoleon had warned his lieutenant to keep a careful watch on the side -of the sea, even before the Spanish insurrection broke out. All through -the spring a British force drawn from Sicily was already hovering -about the southern coast of the Peninsula, though hitherto it had only -been heard of in the direction of Gibraltar and Cadiz. Another cause -of disquietude was the presence in the Tagus of the Russian fleet of -Admiral Siniavin: the strange attitude adopted by that officer much -perplexed Junot. He acknowledged that his master the Czar was at war -with Great Britain, and stated that he was prepared to fight if the -British fleet tried to force the entrance of the Tagus. But on the -other hand he alleged that Russia had not declared war on Portugal or -acknowledged its annexation by the Emperor, and he therefore refused to -land his marines and seamen to help in the garrisoning of Lisbon, or to -allow them to be used in any way on shore. Meanwhile his crews consumed -an inordinate amount of the provisions which were none too plentiful in -the Portuguese capital. - -Junot’s main advantage lay in the extreme military impotence of -Portugal. That realm found its one sole centre in Lisbon, where a -tenth of the population of the whole kingdom and half of its wealth -were concentrated. At Lisbon alone was there an arsenal of any size, -or a considerable store of muskets and powder. Without the resources -of the capital the nation was absolutely unable to equip anything fit -to be called an army. Oporto was a small place in comparison, and no -other town in the kingdom had over 20,000 souls. Almeida and Elvas, -the two chief fortresses of the realm, were safe in the hands of French -garrisons. The provinces might rise, but without lavish help from Spain -or England they could not put in the field an army of even 10,000 men, -for assemblies of peasants armed with pikes and fowling-pieces are not -armies, and of field-artillery there was hardly a piece outside Lisbon, -Elvas, and Almeida. Nor was there left any nucleus of trained soldiers -around which the nation might rally: the old army was dissolved and -its small remnant was on the way to the Baltic. The case of Spain and -of Portugal was entirely different when they rose against Napoleon. -The former country was in possession of the greater part of its own -fortresses, had not been systematically disarmed, and could dispose--in -Galicia and Andalusia--of large bodies of veteran troops. Portugal -was without an army, an arsenal, a defensible fortress, or a legal -organization--civil or military--of any kind. - -It is necessary to remember this in order to excuse the utter -feebleness of the Portuguese rising in June, 1808. Otherwise it would -have seemed strange that a nation of over 2,000,000 souls could not -anywhere produce forces sufficient to resist for a single day a column -of 3,000 or 4,000 French soldiers. - -The insurrection--such as it was--started in the north, where the -departure of Belesta and his division had left the two provinces of -Tras-os-Montes and Entre-Douro-e-Minho free from any garrison, French -or Spanish. Oporto had been bidden to work out its own salvation -by Belesta, and on the day of his departure (June 6), a junta of -insurrection had been acclaimed. But there followed a curious interval -of apathy, lasting for ten days: the natural leaders of the people -refused to come forward: here, just as in Spain, the bureaucracy showed -itself very timid and unpatriotic. The magistrates sent secret offers -of submission to Junot: the military commandant, Oliveira da Costa, -hauled down the national flag from the citadel of San João da Foz. The -members of the insurrectionary junta absconded from the city or kept -quiet[170]. It was only on the news that the neighbouring districts and -towns had risen, that the people of Oporto threw themselves frankly -into the rebellion. The rough mountain districts which lay to the east -of them showed a much more whole-hearted patriotism: between the ninth -and the twelfth of June the whole of the Tras-os-Montes took arms: one -junta at Braganza nominated as commander the aged General Sepulveda, -who had been governor of the district in the days of the Prince-Regent: -another, at Villa Real on the Douro, also put in its claim and chose -as its leader Colonel Silveira, an officer who was destined to see -much service during the war of independence. Though the French were no -further off than Almeida, the rival governors nearly came to blows, -but the final insurrection of Oporto created a new power to which both -consented to bow. - - [170] For these incidents, so discreditable to the leading men - of Oporto, see Foy, iv. 206, and Toreño, i. 152. Most Peninsular - historians consign them to oblivion. - -On June 18 the false report that a French column was drawing near -Oporto so roused the multitude in that city that they broke loose -from the control of the authorities, rehoisted the Portuguese flag, -threw into prison Da Costa and many other persons suspected, rightly -or wrongly, of a wish to submit to the enemy, and called for the -establishment of a provisional government. Accordingly a ‘Supreme Junta -of the Kingdom’ was hastily elected with the Bishop of Oporto at its -head. This was a strange choice, for the aged prelate, Dom Antonio -de Castro, though popular and patriotic, was neither a statesman -nor an administrator, and had no notion whatever as to the military -necessities of the situation. However, the other local juntas of -Northern Portugal united in recognizing his authority. His colleagues -started on the organization of an army with more zeal than discretion; -they called out the militia which Junot had disbanded, and tried to -reconstruct some of the old regular battalions, by getting together -the half-pay officers, and the men who had been dismissed from the -colours in December, 1807. But they also encouraged the assembly of -thousands of peasants armed with pikes and scythes, who consumed -provisions, but were of no military use whatever. In the seven weeks -which elapsed before the coming of the English, the Supreme Junta had -only got together 5,000 men properly equipped and told off into regular -corps[171]. The fact was that they could provide arms for no more, -Northern Portugal having always looked to Lisbon for its supplies. -Field artillery was almost wholly wanting--perhaps a dozen guns in all -had been found: of cavalry three skeleton regiments were beginning to -be organized. But of half-armed peasantry, disguised under the name of -militia, they had from 12,000 to 15,000 in the field. - - [171] They re-embodied the old 2nd, 12th, 21st, and 24th - battalions of infantry of the line, the 6th Cazadores, and the - 6th, 11th, and 12th light cavalry, as well as one or two other - old corps whose numbers I cannot identify. - -The Supreme Junta also concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive -alliance with the Galician Spaniards, from whom they hoped to get -arms, and perhaps a loan of troops. Moreover they sent two envoys to -England to ask for aid, and eagerly welcomed at Oporto Colonel Brown, -a British agent with a roving commission, who did his best to assist -in organizing the new levies. The command of the whole armed force -was given to General Bernardino Freire, a pretentious and incapable -person, who turned his very moderate resources to no profitable account -whatever. - -A few days later than the outbreak of the insurrection in the regions -north of the Douro, there was a corresponding movement, but of a weaker -kind, in the extreme south. On June 16 the small fishing-town of Olhão -in Algarve gave the signal for revolt: on the eighteenth Faro, the -capital of the province, followed the example. General Maurin, the -Governor of Algarve, was lying ill in his bed; he was made prisoner -along with seventy other French officers and men, and handed over to -the captain of an English ship which was hovering off the coast. The -whole shore between the Sierra de Caldeirão and the sea took arms, -whereupon Colonel Maransin, Maurin’s second-in-command, resolved -to evacuate the province. He had only 1,200 men, a battalion each -of the 26th of the line and the _Légion du Midi_, and had lost his -communications with Lisbon, wherefore he drew together his small force -and fell back first on Mertola and then on Beja, in the Alemtejo. -The insurgents whom he left behind him could do little till they had -obtained muskets from Seville and Gibraltar, and made no attempt to -follow the retreating column northwards. - -Meanwhile Junot, even after he had succeeded in disarming Caraffa’s -Spanish division, was passing through a most anxious time. In obedience -to the Emperor’s orders he had sent a brigade under General Avril -towards Andalusia, to help Dupont, and another under Loison to Almeida -to open communications with Bessières. But these detachments had -been made under two false ideas, the one that the troubles in Spain -were purely local, the other that Portugal would keep quiet. Avril -marched southward with 3,000 men, but, when his vanguard reached San -Lucar on the Spanish border, he found Andalusian militia provided -with artillery watching him across the Guadiana. He also learnt -that a large force was assembling at Badajoz, and that Dupont had -got no further than Cordova--more than 150 miles away. After some -hesitation he retraced his steps till he halted at Estremoz, facing -Badajoz. Loison had much the same experience: starting from Almeida he -crossed the border and scared away the small Spanish garrison of Fort -Concepcion: but when he drew near Ciudad Rodrigo and learnt that the -place was strongly held, that all the kingdom of Leon was in revolt, -and that Bessières was still far distant in Old Castile, he drew back -to Almeida [June 12-15]. Returning thither he heard of the troubles in -Northern Portugal, and resolved to march on Oporto, which was still -holding back from open insurrection when the news reached him. He -determined to hasten to that important city and to garrison it. Taking -two battalions and a few guns, while he left the rest of his brigade -at Almeida, he marched on Oporto, crossed the Douro at the ferry of -Pezo-de-Ragoa, and began to move on Amarante [June 21]. But the moment -that he was over the river, he found himself in the middle of the -insurrection: among the mountains the peasantry began to fire from -above on his long column, to roll rocks down the slopes at him, and to -harass his baggage and rearguard. Seeing that he had only 2,000 men in -hand, and that the whole country-side was up, Loison wisely returned -to Almeida, which he regained by a circular march through Lamego and -Celorico, dispersing several bands of insurgents on the way, for the -rebellion had already begun to spread across the Douro into the hills -of Northern Beira [July 1]. - -Lisbon in the meanwhile was on the verge of revolt, but was still -contained by the fact that Junot held concentrated in and about it the -main body of his army, some 15,000 men. On the Feast of Corpus Christi -(June 16) the annual religious procession through the streets nearly -led to bloodshed. This was the greatest festival of Lisbon, and had -always led to the assembly of enormous crowds: Junot allowed it to be -once more celebrated, but lined the streets with soldiers, and placed -artillery ready for action in the main squares and avenues. While the -function was in progress a senseless panic broke out among the crowd, -some shouting that they felt a shock of earthquake (always a terror in -Lisbon since the catastrophe of 1755), others that the English were -landing, others that the soldiers were about to fire on the people. -The frantic mob burst through the military cordon, the procession was -broken up, the prelate who bore the Sacrament took refuge in a church, -and the tumult grew so wild that the artillery were about to open -with grape, thinking that they had to deal with a carefully prepared -insurrection. A great and miscellaneous slaughter was only prevented -by the coolness of Junot, who threw himself into the throng, prevented -the troops from firing, cleared the street, prevailed on the clergy to -finish the procession, and dispersed the multitudes with no loss of -life save that of a few persons crushed or trampled to death in the -panic. - -But though this tumult passed off without a disaster, Junot’s position -was uncomfortable. He had just begun to realize the real proportions of -the insurrection in Spain, which had now completely cut him off from -communication with his colleagues. He had only the vaguest knowledge of -how Dupont and Bessières were faring: and the fact that large Spanish -forces were gathering both at Ciudad Rodrigo and at Badajoz inclined -him to think that affairs must be going ill in Castile and Andalusia. -The long-feared English invasion seemed at last to be growing imminent: -General Spencer’s division from Sicily and Gibraltar was at sea, and -had showed itself first off Ayamonte and the coast of Algarve, then off -the Tagus-mouth. Ignorant that Spencer had only 5,000 men, and that he -had been brought near Lisbon merely by a false report that the garrison -had been cut down to a handful, Junot expected a disembarkation. But -Spencer went back to Cadiz when he learnt that there were 15,000 -instead of 4,000 men ready to defend the capital. - -Meanwhile the populace of Lisbon was stirred up by all manner of wild -rumours: it was said that Loison had been surrounded and forced to -surrender by the northern insurgents, that the Spanish army of Galicia -was marching south, that an English corps had landed at Oporto. All -sorts of portents and signs were reported for the benefit of the -superstitious. The most preposterous was one which we should refuse -to credit if it were not vouched for by Foy, and other respectable -French authorities. A hen’s egg was found on the high-altar of the -patriarchal church, with the inscription _Morran os Franceses_ (‘Death -to the French’) indented in its shell. This caused such excitement -that Junot thought it worth while to show that a similar phenomenon -could be produced on any egg by a skilful application of acids. When -his chemists exhibited several branded in an equally convincing way -with the words, _Vive l’Empereur!_ the enthusiasm of the credulous was -somewhat damped[172]. - - [172] Foy, iv. 276; Napier, i. 97. - -Recognizing that he could expect no further help from the French -armies in Spain, and that the insurrection would certainly spread over -every parish of Portugal that did not contain a garrison, Junot wisely -resolved to concentrate the outlying fractions of his army, which lay -exposed and isolated at points far from Lisbon. At a council of war, -held on June 25, he laid before his chief officers the alternatives -of evacuating Portugal and retiring on Madrid by the way of Badajoz, -or of uniting the army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon and making an -attempt to hold Central Portugal, while abandoning the extreme north -and south. The latter plan was unanimously adopted: in the state -of ignorance in which the generals lay as to what was going on at -Madrid and elsewhere in Spain, the retreat by Badajoz seemed too -hazardous. Moreover, it was certain to provoke Napoleon’s wrath if it -turned out to have been unnecessary. Accordingly it was resolved to -place garrisons in the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida and Peniche, to -fortify Setuval on the peninsula opposite Lisbon, and to draw in all -the rest of the troops to the vicinity of the capital. Dispatches to -this effect were sent to Loison at Almeida, to Avril at Estremoz, to -Maransin at Mertola, and to Kellermann, who was watching Badajoz from -Elvas[173]. Many of the aides-de-camp who bore these orders were cut -off by the insurgents[174], but in the end copies of each dispatch were -transmitted to their destinations. In several instances the detached -corps had begun to fall back on the Tagus, even before they received -the command to do so. - - [173] For the twelve resolutions arrived at by the council of - war, see the analysis given by Thiébault, one of its members. - - [174] Foy says that of twenty messages sent to Loison only one - got through. - -This was the case with Maransin at Mertola, who, finding himself -hopelessly isolated with 1,200 men in the centre of the insurrection, -had marched on Lisbon via Beja. On June 26 he reached the latter place -and found its ancient walls manned by a disorderly mass of citizens, -who fired upon him as he drew near. But he stormed the town without -much difficulty, cruelly sacked it, and resumed his march on Lisbon -unharmed. This was not the first fighting that had occurred in the -Alemtejo; four days before Avril had had to march from Estremoz to -chastise the inhabitants of Villa Viciosa, who had taken arms and -besieged the company of the 86th regiment which garrisoned their town. -He scattered them with much slaughter, and, after the usual French -fashion, plundered the little place from cellar to garret. - -On receiving Junot’s orders, General Kellermann, who bore the chief -command in the Alemtejo, left a battalion and a half[175]--1,400 -men--in Elvas and its outlying fort of La Lippe. With the rest he -retired on Lisbon, picking up first the corps of Avril and then that of -Maransin, which met him at Evora. He then entered the capital, leaving -only one brigade, that of Graindorge, at Setuval to the south of the -Tagus [July 3]. - - [175] The 2nd Swiss, and four companies of the 86th regiment. - -Loison in the north did not receive his orders for a full week after -they were sent out, owing to the disorderly state of the intervening -country. But on July 4 he left Almeida, after making for it a garrison -of 1,200 men, by drafting into a provisional battalion all his soldiers -who did not seem fit for forced marching. He then moved for seven days -through the mountains of Beira to Abrantes, skirmishing with small -bands of insurgents all the way. At two or three places they tried to -block his path, and the town of Guarda made a serious attempt to defend -itself, and was in consequence sacked and partly burnt. Leaving a trail -of ruined villages behind him, Loison at last reached Abrantes and got -into communication with his chief. He had lost on the way 200 men, -mostly stragglers whom the peasantry murdered: but he had inflicted -such a cruel lesson on the country-side that his popular nickname -(_Maneta_, ‘One-Hand’) was held accursed for many years in Portugal. - -The withdrawal of the French troops from the outlying provinces gave -the insurrection full scope for development. It followed close in -the track of the retiring columns, and as each valley was evacuated -its inhabitants hoisted the national flag, sent in their vows of -allegiance to the Junta at Oporto, and began to organize armed bands. -But there was such a dearth of military stores that very few men -could be properly equipped with musket and bayonet. Junot had long -before called in the arms of the disbanded militia, and destroyed -them or forwarded them to Lisbon. In the southern provinces the lack -of weapons was even worse than in the valley of the Douro: there was -practically no armament except a few hundred muskets hastily borrowed -from the Spaniards of Badajoz and Seville, and a small dépôt of -cavalry equipment at Estremoz which Avril had forgotten to carry off. -An insurrectionary junta for the Alemtejo was formed at Evora, but -its general, Francisco Leite, could only succeed in equipping the -mere shadow of an army. In the north things were a little better: the -rising spread to Coimbra in the last week of June, and one of its -first leaders, the student Bernardo Zagalo, succeeded in capturing the -small coast-fortress of Figueira by starving out the scanty French -garrison, which had been caught wholly destitute of provisions [June -27]. Bernardino Freire then brought up the 5,000 regular troops, -which the Junta of Oporto had succeeded in getting together, as far -as the line of the Mondego. But the insurrectionary area spread much -further southward, even up to Leyria and Thomar, which lie no more than -sixty-five miles from the capital. From these two places, however, the -rebels were easily cleared out by a small expedition of 3,000 men under -General Margaron [July 5]. Junot’s army in the second week of July -held nothing outside the narrow quadrangle of which Setuval, Peniche, -Abrantes, and Lisbon form the four points. But within that limited -space there were now 24,000 good troops, concentrated and ready to -strike a blow at the first insurrectionary force that might press in -upon them. - -But for a fortnight the Portuguese made no further move, and Junot -now resolved to attack the insurgents who lay beyond the Tagus in the -plains of the Alemtejo. His chief motive seems to have been the wish to -reopen his communications with Elvas, and to keep the way clear towards -Badajoz, the direction in which he would have to retreat, if ever he -made up his mind to evacuate Lisbon and retire on Spain. Accordingly, -on July 25, he sent out the energetic Loison at the head of a strong -flying column--seven and a half battalions, two regiments of dragoons, -and eight guns--over 7,000 men in all[176]. This force was directed -to march on Elvas by way of Evora, the capital of the Alemtejo, and -the seat of its new Junta. On July 29 Loison appeared before the walls -of that city. To his surprise the enemy offered him battle in the -open; General Leite had brought up such of his newly organized troops -as he could collect--they amounted to no more than a battalion and -a half of infantry and 120 horse; but to help him there had come up -from Badajoz the Spanish Colonel Moretti with about the same number of -foot, a regiment of regular cavalry (the ‘Hussars of Maria Luisa’), and -seven guns[177]. In all the allies had under 3,000 men, but they were -presumptuous enough to form a line of battle outside Evora, and wait -for Loison’s attack. A mixed multitude of peasants and citizens, more -of them armed with pikes than with fowling-pieces, manned the walls of -the town behind them. Leite and his colleague should have drawn back -their regulars to the same position: they might have been able to do -something behind walls, but to expose them in the open to the assault -of more than double of their own numbers of French troops was absurd. - - [176] The column comprised the following troops:-- - - Two battalions of Reserve Grenadiers 1,100 - 12th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,253 - 15th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,305 - 58th Line (3rd batt.) 1,428 - 86th Line, twelve companies of the 1st and 2nd batts. 1,667 - 1st Hanoverian Legion 804 - 4th and 5th Provisional Dragoons 1,248 - - Deducting 1,200 for detached grenadier companies, &c., the whole - was well over 7,000. For details, see Thiébault’s _Expédition de - Portugal_. - - [177] The figures of the Portuguese historian, Accursio das - Neves, reproduced in Arteche (ii. 35), seem indubitable, as - they go into minute accounts of the regiments and fractions of - regiments present. It seems clear that the allies had nothing - like the 5,000 regular troops of which Foy speaks (iv. 267-8). - -Loison’s first charge broke the weak line of the allied army; the -Spanish cavalry fled without crossing swords with the French, and -General Leite left the field with equal precipitation. But the bulk -of the infantry fell back on Evora and aided the peasantry to defend -its ruined mediaeval walls. They could not hold out, however, for -many minutes; the French forced their way in at four or five points, -made a great slaughter in the streets, and ended the day by sacking -the city with every detail of sacrilege and brutality. Foy says that -2,000 Spaniards and Portuguese fell; his colleague Thiébault gives the -incredible figure of 8,000. Even the smaller number must include a good -many unarmed inhabitants of Evora massacred during the sack. The French -lost ninety killed and 200 wounded [July 29]. - -On the third day after the fight Loison marched for Elvas, and drove -away the hordes which were blockading it. He was then preparing to -push a reconnaissance in force against Badajoz, when he received -from his commander-in-chief orders to return at once to Lisbon. The -long-expected English invasion of Portugal had at last begun, for on -August 1 Sir Arthur Wellesley was already disembarking his troops -in Mondego Bay. Junot was therefore set on concentrating in order to -fight, and Loison’s expeditionary force was too important a part of -his army to be left out of the battle. Dropping the battalion of the -Hanoverian Legion as a garrison at Santarem, Loison brought the rest of -his 7,000 men to his commander’s aid. - - - - -SECTION IV: CHAPTER II - -LANDING OF THE BRITISH: COMBAT OF ROLIÇA - - -From the first moment when the Asturian deputies arrived in London, -with the news of the insurrection in Northern Spain [June 4], the -English Government had been eager to intervene in the Peninsula. -The history of the last fifteen years was full of the records of -unfortunate expeditions sent out to aid national risings, real or -imaginary, against France. They had mostly turned out disastrous -failures: it is only necessary to mention the Duke of York’s miserable -campaign of 1799 in Holland, Stewart’s invasion of Calabria in 1806, -and Whitelock’s disgraceful fiasco at Buenos Ayres in 1807. As a rule -the causes of their ill success had been partly incapable leading, -partly an exaggerated parsimony in the means employed. Considering the -vast power of France, it was futile to throw ashore bodies of five -thousand, ten thousand, or even twenty thousand men on the Continent, -and to expect them to maintain themselves by the aid of small local -insurrections, such as those of the Orange party in Holland or the -Calabrian mountaineers. The invasion of Spanish South America, on the -hypothesis that its inhabitants were all prepared to revolt against the -mother-country--a fiction of General Miranda--had been even more unwise. - -The ‘policy of filching sugar islands,’ as Sheridan wittily called -it--of sending out expeditions of moderate size, which only inflicted -pin-pricks on non-vital portions of the enemy’s dominions--was still -in full favour when the Spanish War began. There was hardly a British -statesman who rose above such ideas; Pitt and Addington, Fox and -Grenville, and the existing Tory government of the Duke of Portland, -had all persisted in the same futile plans. At the best such warfare -resulted in the picking up of stray colonies, such as Ceylon and -Trinidad, the Cape, St. Thomas, or Curaçao: but in 1808 the more -important oversea possessions of France and her allies were still -unsubdued. At the worst the policy led to checks and disasters small -or great, like Duckworth’s failure at Constantinople, the abortive -Egyptian expedition of 1807, or the catastrophe of Buenos Ayres. -Castlereagh seems to have been the only leading man who dared to -contemplate an interference on a large scale in Continental campaigns. -His bold scheme for the landing of 60,000 men in Hanover, during the -winter of 1805-6, had been foiled partly by the hesitation of his -colleagues, partly by the precipitation with which Francis II made -peace after Austerlitz[178]. - - [178] This fine and not unpromising scheme deserves study (see - Alison’s _Life of Castlereagh_, i. 199-202). - -But the policy of sending small auxiliary forces to the Iberian -Peninsula was quite a familiar one. We had maintained a few thousand -men under Generals Burgoyne and Townsend for the defence of Portugal -against Spain in 1762. And again in 1801 there had been a small -British division employed in the farcical war which had ended in -the Treaty of Badajoz. In the year after Austerlitz, when it seemed -likely that Bonaparte might take active measures against Portugal, -the Fox-Grenville ministry had offered the Regent military aid, but -had seen it politely refused, for the timid prince was still set on -conciliating the Emperor. - -With so many precedents before them, it was natural that the Portland -cabinet should assent to the demands of the Spanish deputies who -appeared in London in June, 1808. The insurrection in the Iberian -Peninsula was so unexpected[179] and so fortunate a chance, that it -was obviously necessary to turn it to account. Moreover, its attendant -circumstances were well calculated to rouse enthusiasm even in the -breasts of professional politicians. Here was the first serious sign -of that national rising against Bonaparte which had been so often -prophesied, but which had been so long in coming. Even the Whigs, -who had systematically denounced the sending of aid to the ‘effete -despotisms of the Continent,’ and had long maintained that Napoleon -was not so black as he was painted, were disarmed in their criticisms -by the character of the Spanish rising. What excuse could be made for -the treachery at Bayonne? And how could sympathy be refused to a people -which, deprived of its sovereign and betrayed by its bureaucracy, -had so gallantly taken arms to defend its national existence? The -debates in the British Parliament during the middle days of June show -clearly that both the Government and the Opposition had grasped the -situation, and that for once they were united as to the policy which -should be pursued. It is only needful to quote a few sentences from the -speeches of Canning as Foreign Secretary, and Sheridan as Leader of the -Opposition [June 15]. - - [179] I cannot quite credit the story that Toreño and Arteche - repeat of Pitt’s dying prophecy, that ‘Napoleon could only be - overthrown by a national war, and that such a war would probably - begin in Spain.’ - -‘Whenever any nation in Europe,’ said Canning, ‘starts up with a -determination to oppose that power which (whether professing insidious -peace or declaring open war) is alike the common enemy of all other -peoples, that nation, whatever its former relations with us may have -been, becomes _ipso facto_ the ally of Great Britain. In furnishing -the aid which may be required, the Government will be guided by three -principles--to direct the united efforts of both countries against the -common foe, to direct them in such a way as shall be most beneficial -to our common ally, and to direct them to such objects as may be -most conducive to British interests. But of these objects the last -shall never be allowed to come into competition with the other two. I -mention British interests chiefly for the purpose of disclaiming them -as any material part of the considerations which influence the British -Government. No interest can be so purely British as Spanish success: -no conquest so advantageous to England as conquering from France the -complete integrity of the Spanish dominions in every quarter of the -globe.’ - -Sheridan repeats the same theme in a slightly different key:--‘Hitherto -Buonaparte has run a victorious race, because he has contended with -princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom, and peoples without -patriotism. He has yet to learn what it is to combat a nation who are -animated with one spirit against him. Now is the time to stand up -boldly and fairly for the deliverance of Europe, and if the ministry -will co-operate effectually with the Spanish patriots they shall -receive from us cordial support.... Never was anything so brave, so -noble, so generous as the conduct of the Spaniards: never was there a -more important crisis than that which their patriotism has occasioned -to the state of Europe. Instead of striking at the core of the evil, -the Administrations of this country have hitherto gone on nibbling -merely at the rind: filching sugar islands, but neglecting all that was -dignified and consonant to the real interests of the country. Now is -the moment to let the world know that we are resolved to stand up for -the salvation of Europe. Let us then co-operate with the Spaniards, but -co-operate in an effectual and energetic way. And if we find that they -are really heart and soul in the enterprise, let us advance with them, -magnanimous and undaunted, for the liberation of mankind.... Above all, -let us mix no little interests of our own in this mighty combat. Let us -discard or forget British objects, and conduct the war on the principle -of generous support and active co-operation.’ - -It may perhaps be hypercritical to point out the weak spot in each -of these stirring harangues. But Canning protested a little too -much--within a few weeks of his speech the British Government was -applying to the Junta of Seville to allow them to garrison Cadiz, -which was refused (and rightly), for in the proposal British interests -peeped out a little too clearly. And Sheridan, speaking from vague and -overcoloured reports of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, went too -far when he extolled the unmixed generosity and nobility of the conduct -of the Spaniards: mingled with their undoubted patriotism there was -enough of bigotry and cruelty, of self-seeking and ignorance, to make -his harangue ring somewhat false in the ears of future generations. Yet -both Canning and Sheridan spoke from the heart, and their declarations -mark a very real turning-point in the history of the great struggle -with Bonaparte. - -Fortunately for Great Britain, and for the nations of the Iberian -Peninsula, we were far better prepared for striking a heavy blow on -the Continent in 1808 than we had been at any earlier period of the -war. There was no longer any need to keep masses of men ready in the -south-eastern counties for the defence of England against a French -invasion. There were no longer any French forces of appreciable -strength garrisoned along the English Channel: indeed Castlereagh -had just been planning a raid to burn the almost unprotected French -flotilla which still mouldered in the harbour of Boulogne. Our -standing army had recently been strengthened and reorganized by a not -inconsiderable military reform. The system had just been introduced by -which Wellington’s host was destined to be recruited during the next -six years. Every year two-fifths of the 120,000 embodied militia of -the United Kingdom were to be allowed to volunteer into the regular -army, while the places of the volunteers were filled up by men raised -by ballot from the counties. This sort of limited conscription worked -well: in the year 1808 it gave 41,786 men to the line, and these -not raw recruits, but already more or less trained to arms by their -service in the militia. All through the war this system continued: the -Peninsular army, it must always be remembered, drew more than half its -reinforcing drafts from the ‘old constitutional force.’ Hence came the -ease with which it assimilated its recruits. Meanwhile the embodied -militia never fell short in establishment, as it was automatically -replenished by the ballot. The result of these changes, for which -Castlereagh deserves the chief credit, was a permanent addition of -25,000 men to the regular force available for service at home or in -Europe. - -In June, 1808, there chanced to be several considerable bodies of -troops which could be promptly utilized for an expedition to Spain. The -most important was a corps of some 9,000 men which was being collected -in the south of Ireland, to renew the attack on South America which had -failed so disastrously in 1807. The news of the Spanish insurrection -had, of course, led to the abandonment of the design, and General -Miranda, its originator, had been informed that he must look for no -further support from England. In addition to this force in Ireland -there were a couple of brigades in the south-eastern counties of -England, which had been intended to form the nucleus of Castlereagh’s -projected raid on Boulogne. They had been concentrated at Harwich -and Ramsgate respectively, and the transports for them were ready. A -still more important contingent, but one that lay further off, and was -not so immediately available, was the corps of 10,000 men which Sir -John Moore had taken to the Baltic. In June it became known that it -was impossible to co-operate with the hairbrained King of Sweden, who -was bent on invading Russian Finland, a scheme to which the British -Ministry refused its assent. Moore, therefore, after many stormy -interviews with Gustavus IV, was preparing to bring his division home. -With the aid of Spencer’s troops, which had so long been hovering about -Cadiz and Gibraltar, and of certain regiments picked out of the English -garrisons, it was easily possible to provide 40,000 men for service in -Spain and Portugal. - -But a number of isolated brigades and battalions suddenly thrown -together do not form an army, and though Castlereagh had provided a -large force for the projected expedition to the Peninsula, it was -destitute of any proper organization. With the expedition that sailed -from Cork there was only half a regiment of cavalry, and the brigades -from Harwich, Ramsgate, and Gibraltar had not a single horseman with -them, so that there were actually 18,000 foot to 390 horse among the -contingents that first disembarked to contend with Junot’s army. -Transport was almost equally neglected: only the troops from Cork had -any military train with them, and that they were provided with horses -and vehicles was only due to the prescience of their commander, who had -at the last moment procured leave from London to enlist for foreign -service and take with him two troops of the ‘Royal Irish Corps of -Wagoners.’ ‘I declare,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘that I do not understand the -principles on which our military establishments are formed, if, when -large corps are sent out to perform important and difficult services, -they are not to have with them those means of equipment which they -require, such as horses to draw artillery, and drivers attached to -the commissariat[180].’ Without this wise inspiration, he would have -found himself unable to move when he arrived in the Peninsula: as it -was, he had to leave behind, when he landed, some of his guns and half -his small force of cavalry, because the authorities had chosen to -believe that both draft and saddle horses could readily be procured -in Portugal. Such little _contretemps_ were common in the days when -Frederick Duke of York, with the occasional assistance of Mrs. Mary Ann -Clark, managed the British army. - - [180] Wellesley to Castlereagh, June 29, 1808 (_Well. Suppl. - Disp._, vi. 87). - -But the arrangements as to the command of the expedition were the -most ill-managed part of the business. The force at Cork was, -as we have already explained, under the orders of Sir Arthur -Wellesley, the younger brother of the great viceroy who had so much -extended our Indian Empire between 1799 and 1805. He was the junior -lieutenant-general in the British army, but had already to his credit -a more brilliant series of victories than any other officer then -living, including the all-important triumph of Assaye, which had so -effectually broken the power of the Mahrattas. In 1808 he was a Member -of Parliament and Under-Secretary for Ireland, but Castlereagh (who -had the most unbounded belief in his abilities, and had long been -using his advice on military questions) had picked him out to command -the expedition mustering at Cork. When its destination was changed -from America to Spain, the Secretary for War still hoped to keep him -in command, but the Duke of York and the War Office were against -Wellesley[181]. There were many respectable lieutenant-generals of -enormous seniority and powerful connexions who were eager for foreign -service. None of them had Wellesley’s experience of war on a large -scale, or had ever moved 40,000 men on the field: but this counted for -little at head quarters. The command in Portugal was made over to two -of his seniors. The first was Sir Hew Dalrymple, a man of fifty-eight, -whose only campaigning had been with the Duke of York in Flanders -thirteen years back. He had been Governor of Gibraltar since 1806, knew -something of Spanish politics, and was now in active communication with -Castaños. The second in command was to be Sir Harry Burrard[182]: he -was an old Guards officer who had served during the American rebellion, -and had more recently commanded a division during the Copenhagen -expedition without any special distinction. The third was Sir John -Moore, and to being superseded by him Wellesley could not reasonably -have objected. He was at this moment perhaps the most distinguished -officer in the British service: he had done splendid work in the West -Indies, Egypt, and the Netherlands. He had reorganized the light -infantry tactics of the British army, and had won the enthusiastic -admiration of all who had ever served under him for his zeal and -intelligent activity. But Moore, like Wellesley, was to be placed under -Dalrymple and Burrard, and not trusted with an independent command. At -the present moment he was still far away in the Baltic, and was not -expected to arrive for some time. Meanwhile Wellesley was allowed to -sail in temporary charge of the expeditionary force, and still under -the impression that he was to retain its guidance. His transports -weighed anchor on July 12, and it was only on July 15 that the dispatch -from Downing Street, informing him that he had been superseded by -Dalrymple and Burrard, was drafted. It did not reach him till he had -already landed in Portugal. - - [181] For hints on this subject see the letter of W. Wellesley - Pole, a kinsman of Sir Arthur, in _Wellington Supplementary - Dispatches_ (vi. 171). ‘The desire that has been manifested at - Head Quarters for active command will render it natural for all - that has passed to be seen through a false medium.... The object - of Head Quarters, if it has any object at all, must be to keep - down the officer for whom the army has the greatest enthusiasm, - and to prevent him from being called by the voice of the nation - to the head of the forces upon active service, rather than to - crush old officers of known incapacity and want of following.... - Dalrymple is a Guardsman; Burrard is a Guardsman; their - connexions are closely united to Windsor and Whitehall, and for - years have not only been in the most confidential situation about - Head Quarters, but have imbibed all their military notions from - thence;’ &c. - - [182] Born in 1755, he was a favourite of the Duke of York, and - had acted as his aide-de-camp. At this moment he held a command - in the Home District. - -His political instructions had been forwarded as early as June 30. -They were drawn up mainly on the data that the Asturian and Galician -deputations had furnished to the ministry[183]. Both the Juntas had -been unwise enough to believe that the national rising would suffice -to expel the French--whose numbers they much underrated--from Spain. -While empowering their envoys to ask for money, arms, and stores, -they had ordered them to decline the offer of an auxiliary force. -They requested that all available British troops might be directed on -Portugal, in order to rouse an insurrection in that country (which was -still quiet when they arrived in London), and to prevent the troops -of Junot from being employed against the rear of the army of General -Blake. In deference to their suggestions the British Government had -sent enormous stores of muskets, powder, and equipment to Gihon and -Ferrol, but directed Wellesley to confine his activity to Portugal. -The Spaniards, with their usual inaccuracy, had estimated the total -of Junot’s army at no more than 15,000 men. Misled by this absurd -undervaluation, Castlereagh informed Wellesley that if he found that -his own and Spencer’s forces sufficed for the reduction of Portugal, -he might ‘operate against the Tagus’ at once. But if more men were -required, an additional 10,000 bayonets would be provided from England, -and the expeditionary force might meanwhile ask the leave of the -Galician Junta to stop at Vigo--a halt which would have cost many weeks -of valuable time. Wellesley himself was to choose a fast-sailing vessel -and make for Corunna, where he was to confer with the Junta and pick up -the latest information as to the state of affairs in the Peninsula. - - [183] Castlereagh to Wellington (_Well. Disp._, iv. 8, 9). - -In accordance with these instructions Sir Arthur preceded the bulk -of his armament on the _Crocodile_, and reached Corunna in the short -space of eight days [July 20]. He found the Galicians somewhat -depressed by the disaster of Medina de Rio Seco, whose details they -misrepresented in the most shameless fashion to their distinguished -visitor. Bessières, they said, had lost 7,000 men and six guns, and -although he had forced Blake and Cuesta to retreat on Benavente, -those generals had still 40,000 troops under arms, and had no need -of any auxiliary force. ‘The arrival of the British money yesterday -has entirely renewed their spirits,’ wrote Wellesley, ‘and neither -in them nor in the inhabitants of this town do I see any symptom of -alarm, or doubt of their final success.’ This vainglorious confidence -was supported by an infinity of false news: Lefebvre-Desnouettes was -said to have been thrice defeated near Saragossa, and Dupont and his -whole corps had been taken prisoners on June 22 in an action between -Andujar and La Carolina--a curious prophecy, for it foresaw and placed -a month too early the catastrophe of Baylen[184], which no reasonable -man could have predicted. Almost the only correct information which -was supplied to Wellesley was the news of the revolt of Oporto and the -rest of Northern Portugal. It was clear that there was now an opening -for the British army in that country, and as the Galicians continued to -display their reluctance to receive any military aid, Sir Arthur went -to sea again, joined his fleet of transports off Cape Finisterre, and -bade them make for the mouth of the Douro. He himself put into Oporto, -where he landed and interviewed the Bishop and the Supreme Junta. He -found them in no very happy frame of mind: they had, as they confessed, -only been able to arm 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, who lay under -Bernardino Freire at Coimbra, and 1,500 men more for a garrison at -Oporto. The rest of these levies consisted of 12,000 peasants with -pikes, ‘and though the people were ready and desirous to take arms, -unfortunately there were none in the country’--not even enough to equip -the disbanded regulars. The Bishop expressed himself as much alarmed -at the news of the disaster at Medina de Rio Seco, and his military -advisers acknowledged that in consequence of that battle they had given -up any hope of aid from Spain[185]. They asked eagerly for arms, of -which the English fleet carried many thousand stand, and were anxious -to see Wellesley’s troops landed. The place which they recommended for -putting the army ashore was Mondego Bay, near Coimbra, where the mouth -of the Mondego River furnishes an indifferent harbour, guarded by the -fort of Figueira. That stronghold, it will be remembered, had been -seized by the bold exploit of the student Zagalo; it was now garrisoned -by 300 British marines, so that the disembarkation would be safe from -disturbance by anything save the heavy Atlantic surf, which always -beats against the western coast of Portugal. There was no other port -available along the shore save Peniche, which was dangerously close to -Lisbon, and guarded by a castle still in French hands. Nearer still -to the capital, landing is just possible at Cascaes and a few other -places: but there was no regular harbour, and Admiral Cotton agreed -with Wellesley in thinking that it would be mad to attempt to throw -troops ashore on a dangerous rock-bound coast in the midst of Junot’s -cantonments. Mondego Bay was therefore appointed as the general place -of rendezvous for the fleet, which had now begun to arrive opposite the -mouth of the Douro. - - [184] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Corunna, July 21 (_Well. - Disp._, vi. 23-5). - - [185] Napier’s statement that Wellesley found the Supreme Junta - in an extravagant and irrational frame of mind is by no means - borne out by the dispatches which he sent off from Oporto on - July 25. They rather represent the Portuguese as in a state of - pronounced depression of spirits. - -As to the Portuguese troops, the Supreme Junta agreed that Bernardino -Freire and his 5,000 men should go forward with the British army, -while the new levies should blockade Almeida, and guard the frontier -along the Douro against any possible advance on the part of Marshal -Bessières from Castile. The Junta calculated that, if supplied with -arms, they could put into the field from the three northern provinces -of Portugal 38,000 foot and 8,000 horse--a liberal estimate, as they -had, including their peasant levies, no more than 19,000 collected on -July 25. They asked for weapons and clothing for the whole mass, and -for a loan of 300,000 Cruzado Novas (about £35,000)--no very large sum -considering the grants that were being made to the Spaniards at this -time. Wellesley would only promise that he would arm the militia and -peasantry who were lying along the Mondego in company with Freire’s -regulars, ‘if he found them worth it[186].’ The Bishop undertook -to forward from Oporto all the remounts for cavalry and all the -draught-mules for commissariat purposes that he could get together. He -thought that he could procure 150 of the former and 500 of the latter -in six days. - - [186] Wellesley to Castlereagh, from Oporto, July 25 (_Well. - Disp._, vi. 31). - -On August 1, 1808, the disembarkation in Mondego Bay began, in the -face of a heavy surf which rendered landing very dangerous, especially -for the horses, guns, and stores. Many boats were upset and a few -lives lost[187]; but the troops and their commander were in good -spirits, for the news of the surrender of Dupont at Baylen on July 20 -had reached them the day before the disembarkation began. Wellesley -was convinced that General Spencer would have sailed from Andalusia -to join him, the moment that this great victory made the presence of -British troops in the south unnecessary. He was right, for Spencer, -before receiving any orders to that effect, had embarked his men for -Portugal and came into Mondego Bay on August 5, just as the last of the -division from Cork had been placed on shore. It was therefore with some -13,000 men that Wellesley began his march on Lisbon[188]. But to his -bitter disappointment the young lieutenant-general had just learnt that -three commanders had been placed over his head, and that he might soon -expect Dalrymple to arrive and assume charge of the army. Castlereagh’s -dispatch of July 15, containing this unwelcome news, was delivered to -Wellesley as he lay in Mondego Bay on the thirtieth, and he had to make -all his arrangements for disembarkation while suffering under this -unexpected slight. Many men would have resigned under such a blow, and -Wellesley with his unbounded ambition, his strong sense of his deserts, -and his well-marked tendency to take offence[189] must have been -boiling over with suppressed indignation. But he felt that to ask to be -recalled, because he had been degraded from a commander-in-chief to a -mere general of division, would be an unsoldierly act. To Castlereagh -he merely wrote that ‘whether he was to command the army or to quit -it, he would do his best to ensure its success, and would not hurry -operations one moment in order to acquire credit before the arrival of -his superiors[190].’ - - [187] For the difficulties of disembarkation see the interesting - narrative of Landsheit of the 20th Dragoons, p. 248. He was - himself upset in the surf. - - [188] The force consisted of:-- - - _Infantry._ - _Cavalry._ - _Artillery._ - - (1) Division embarked at Cork: - 20th Light Dragoons (only 180 with horses) 394 - Artillery 226 - 5th Regiment (1st batt.) 990 - 9th ” ” 833 - 36th ” 591 - 38th ” (1st batt.) 957 - 40th ” ” 926 - 45th ” ” 670 - 60th Rifles (5th batt.) 936 - 71st Regiment (1st batt.) 903 - 91st ” ” 917 - 95th Rifles (2nd batt., four companies) 400 - ----- - 8,123 - ----- - - (2) Spencer’s troops from Andalusia: - Artillery 245 - 6th Regiment (1st batt.) 946 - 29th ” 806 - 32nd ” (1st batt.) 874 - 50th ” ” 948 - 82nd ” ” 929 - ----- --- --- - 4,503 394 471 - - A total of 12,626 infantry, 394 cavalry, 471 artillery = 13,491; - adding forty-five men of the Staff Corps we get 13,536. - - [189] To understand what Wellesley must have felt, we have only - to read his rather captious letter of 1801 (_Suppl. Disp._, ii. - 362) to his own brother concerning his merits, his promotion, and - his career. The man who could so write must have felt the blow in - the worst way. - - [190] _Well. Disp._, iv. 43. - -Meanwhile there were yet a few days during which he would retain the -command, and it was in his power to start the campaign on the right -lines, even if he was not to reap the reward of its success. His first -eight days on shore (August 2-9), were spent in the organization of the -commissariat of his army, which the Home Government had disgracefully -neglected. Except the two troops of the Irish Wagon Train, which he had -insisted on bringing with him, he had no transport at his disposal, -and, as he wrote to Castlereagh, ‘the existence of the army depends -upon the commissariat, and yet the people who manage it are incapable -of managing anything out of a counting-house[191].’ All that could -be got out of the country he utilized: the Bishop of Oporto had sent -him a few horses which enabled him to raise his force of mounted men -from 180 to 240[192], and to give some animals to the artillery[5], to -add to those that had come from Ireland[193]. But though he succeeded -in equipping his own three batteries, the two which Spencer brought -from Andalusia had to be left behind on the Mondego for want of -draught-horses[194]: the dismounted men of the 20th Dragoons had also -to be dropped. For the commissariat the Bishop of Oporto had sent -some mules, which were raised to a total of 500 by purchases in the -country-side, while 300 bullock-carts were procured for the heavier -stores by requisition from the neighbouring villages. It was only -on the ninth that things were so far ready that the army could move -forward. It was now divided into six small brigades under Generals -Hill, Ferguson, Nightingale, Bowes, Catlin Crawfurd, and Fane: the -third, fourth, and fifth brigades had only two battalions each, the -other four had three[195]. - - [191] Ibid., iv. 59; cf. pp. 168, 169. - - [192] Ibid., iv. 168. Cf. the returns for Vimiero of men present, - with the 180 horsed men brought from Ireland. - - [193] Ibid., iv. 168. - - [194] Ibid., iv. 59. - - [195] The brigading was as follows:--1st Brigade (Hill), 5th, - 9th, 38th; 2nd Brigade (Ferguson), 36th, 40th, 71st; 3rd Brigade - (Nightingale), 29th, 82nd; 4th Brigade (Bowes), 6th, 32nd; 5th - Brigade (C. Crawfurd), 50th, 91st; 6th Brigade (Fane), 45th, - 5/60th, 2/95th. Before Vimiero the 45th and 50th changed places - (see the narrative of Col. Leach of Fane’s Brigade). It is worth - noting that six of these sixteen battalions, as also the 20th - Light Dragoons, had just returned from the disheartening work of - the Buenos Ayres expedition. They were the 5th, 36th, 38th, 40th, - 45th, and 71st. - -Wellesley had resolved to advance by the coast-road on Lisbon, via -Alcobaça, Obidos, and Torres Vedras, and it was along the desolate -shore ‘up to the knees in sand and suffering dreadfully from -thirst[196],’ that his men made their first march of twelve miles to -Lugar. The distance was moderate, but the troops had been so long -cramped on shipboard that some of the regiments had fallen out of -condition and left many stragglers. - - [196] _Journal of a Soldier of the 71st Regiment_ (Edin. 1828), - p. 47. - -The reasons which had determined Wellesley to take the coast route, -rather than that which leads from the Mondego to Lisbon via Santarem, -were, as he afterwards explained, partly a wish to keep in touch with -the fleet for the purpose of obtaining supplies--for he found that -the country could support him in wine and beef, but not in flour--and -partly the fact that he had learnt that new reinforcements from England -were likely to appear within a few days. The brigades from Harwich and -Ramsgate, under Generals Acland and Anstruther, had sailed on July -19 and might be looked for at any moment. Sir John Moore, with the -division from Sweden, was also reported to be on his way to the south, -but could not be expected to arrive for some time. Having ascertained -that the French force in Portugal was somewhat larger than he -originally supposed, Sir Arthur wished to pick up the troops of Acland -and Anstruther before giving battle. In this he was even wiser than he -knew, for he still estimated Junot’s total disposable force at 18,000 -men[197], while it was really 26,000. To have attacked Lisbon with no -more than the 13,000 troops who had originally disembarked at the mouth -of the Mondego would have been most hazardous. - - [197] Wellesley to Burrard, August 8 (_Well. Disp._, iv. 53). - -Wellesley had at first intended to take on with him the whole of -Bernardino Freire’s army. He had visited the Portuguese commander at -Montemor Velho on the seventh, and had issued to his ally a supply -of 5,000 muskets. Freire was anxious to persuade him to give up the -coast route, and to throw himself into the interior on the side of -Santarem. But the cogent reasons which compelled him to prefer the -road which allowed him to keep in touch with the fleet, made him -refuse to listen to this plan, and he invited the Portuguese general -to transfer himself on to the same line. Freire so far submitted as to -move to Leiria, where he met the British army on August 10. But here -the two commanders came to hard words and parted. Freire, a self-willed -and shifty man, was determined not to act in unison with Wellesley. -Whether he wished to preserve his independent command, or whether he -feared (as Napier hints) to oppose his raw levies to the French, even -when supported by 13,000 British bayonets[198], he now showed himself -utterly impracticable. He began by laying hands on all the stores of -food in Leiria, though they had been promised to Wellesley. Then he -made the absurd and impudent statement that he could only co-operate -with his allies if Wellesley would undertake to provide rations for his -6,000 men. This proposal was all the more astounding because he had -just been trying to persuade his colleague to move into the inland, by -the statement that resources of every kind abounded in Estremadura, and -that the whole British army could easily live upon the country-side! -Wellesley’s men had now been subsisting for ten days on biscuit landed -by the fleet, and it was ludicrous that he should be asked to take -upon his shoulders the whole burden of feeding the Portuguese in their -own country. Accordingly he utterly rejected the proposal, but he -insisted that Freire should lend him some cavalry and light troops, and -these he promised to maintain. The bulk of the Portuguese, therefore, -remained behind at Leiria, their general being left free to take up, -if he should choose, his favourite plan of marching on Santarem. But -260 horsemen--the skeletons of three old cavalry regiments--a battalion -of Cazadores, and three weak line-regiments were placed at Wellesley’s -disposition: they amounted to about 2,300 men[199], according to the -Portuguese official figures, but the British commander repeatedly -states that he saw no more than 260 horse and 1,600 infantry[200]; so -it is probable that the regiments were somewhat under the estimate -given by Freire. They were commanded by Colonel Trant, a British -officer in the Portuguese service[201]. - - [198] Napier, i. 197. - - [199] According to the figures given by the Portuguese historian - of the war, Da Luz Soriano, they stood as follows:-- - - Cavalry of the 6th, 11th, and 12th Regiments 258 sabres. - 6th battalion of Cazadores 562 bayonets. - 12th, 21st, and 24th line battalions 1,514 ” - - A few troopers of the Lisbon Police Guard, forty-one in all, - according to Soriano, deserted Junot and joined the army - before Vimiero. Landsheit of the 20th Light Dragoons mentions - their arrival, and says that they were put in company with his - regiment. This would give 2,375 as the total of the Portuguese - whom Trant commanded. - - [200] _Well. Disp._ (iv. 78) says 1,400, but in his narrative of - Roliça Sir Arthur accounts for 1,600, 1,200 in his right and 400 - in his centre column. As a middle figure between Wellesley and - Soriano, 2,000 would probably be safe. - - [201] Their allies did not think much of their looks. Col. Leslie - describes them thus: ‘The poor fellows had little or no uniform, - but were merely in white jackets, and large broad-brimmed hats - turned up at one side, some having feathers and others none, so - that they cut rather a grotesque appearance’ (p. 40). - -Turning once more into the road that skirts the coast, Wellesley -marched on the thirteenth from Leiria, and reached Alcobaça on the -fourteenth. Here he got his first news of the French: a brigade under -Thomières had occupied the village till the previous day, and he learnt -that General Delaborde, with a weak division, was somewhere in his -front, in the direction of Obidos and Roliça. - -Junot had received prompt information of the landing of the British -in Mondego Bay; on the very day after it had commenced he was able -to send orders to Loison to abandon his post in front of Badajoz and -to march at once to join the main army. Meanwhile Delaborde was sent -out from Lisbon on August 6 to observe and, if possible, contain -Wellesley, till Junot should have concentrated his whole field-army -and be ready to fight. He was told to expect Loison from the direction -of Thomar and Santarem, and to join him as soon as was possible. For -his rather hazardous task he was given no more than five battalions -of infantry and a single regiment of _chasseurs à cheval_, with five -guns[202]--not much more than 5,000 men. - - [202] Delaborde’s numbers at the combat of Roliça have been the - cause of much controversy. Wellesley in one of his dispatches - estimated them at as much as 6,000 men; the unveracious Thiébault - would reduce them as low as 1,900. But it is possible to arrive - at something like the real figures. - - Delaborde brought out from Lisbon two battalions of the 70th, the - 26th _Chasseurs à Cheval_, and five guns. Thomières joined him - from Peniche with the 1st Provisional Light Infantry (a battalion - each of the 2nd and 4th Léger) and with the 4th Swiss. - - The numbers of these corps had been on July 15:-- - - 70th of the Line (two batts.) 2,358 - 2nd Léger (one batt.) 1,075 - 4th ” ” 1,098 - 4th Swiss ” 985 - 26th Chasseurs 263 - ----- - 5,779 - - But each of the four French corps had given its grenadier company - as a contribution to the ‘Reserve Grenadier Battalions’ which - Junot had organized. The battalions being on the old nine-company - establishment (see Foy’s large table of the _Armée d’Espagne_, - note _d_) we must deduct one-ninth of each, or about 500 men - in all. We have also to allow for six companies of the 4th - Swiss sent to garrison Peniche; not for the whole battalion, - as Foy says in iv. 306, for there were Swiss in the fight of - Roliça (Leslie’s _Military Journal_, p. 43), and at Vimiero - in the official state of Junot’s army we find two companies - of this corps with Brennier’s brigade. We must deduct, then, - three-fourths of them from the force present with Delaborde, - i.e. some 740 men. This leaves 4,276 men for the four and a - quarter battalions under fire at Roliça. Of course Junot’s troops - must have had a few men in hospital since July 15, the date of - the return which we are using. But they cannot have been many. - The 70th had been quiet in its quarters in Lisbon. The other - three battalions had been in Loison’s Beira expedition, and had - lost some men therein, but all before July 11. If we concede - 300 sick on August 16, it is ample. We can allow therefore for - 4,000 infantry, 250 cavalry, and some 100 gunners present with - Delaborde, i.e. his total force must have been about 4,350 men--a - number much closer to Wellesley’s 6,000 than to Thiébault’s - 1,900; Foy, usually so accurate, is clearly wrong in bringing the - figures down to 2,500 (iv. 310). - -Delaborde at first thought of making a stand, and compelling Wellesley -to show his force, at Batalha near Alcobaça, where John I had beaten -the Spaniards, four and a half centuries ago, at the decisive battle -of Aljubarotta. But, after examining the position, he found it so much -surrounded by woods, and so destitute of good points of view, that he -feared to be enveloped if he committed himself to a fight. Accordingly -he drew back to Roliça, leaving only a rearguard at Obidos to observe -the approach of the British. At the same time he detached six companies -of the 4th Swiss to garrison Peniche, thus reducing his available force -to 4,350 men. - -Wellesley, meanwhile, knowing himself to be close to the enemy, -advanced steadily but with caution. He left behind his tents and other -weighty baggage at Leiria, and moved forward with a lightly equipped -army to Alcobaça on the fourteenth, to Caldas on the fifteenth. On that -day the first shot of the campaign was fired: four companies of the -fifth battalion of the 60th and of the second battalion of the 95th -Rifles discovered the French outposts at Brilos in front of Obidos, -drove them in, and pursuing furiously for three miles, came on the -battalion which formed Delaborde’s rearguard. This corps turned upon -them, checked them with the loss of two[203] officers and twenty-seven -men killed and wounded, and only retired when General Spencer led up a -brigade to save the riflemen. - - [203] The name of Lieutenant Bunbury, of the 2/95th, perhaps - deserves remembrance as that of the first British officer killed - in the Peninsular War. - -Next morning the French were discovered to have fallen back no further -than Roliça, where Delaborde had found the position that he had sought -in vain at Batalha. The road from Caldas and Obidos towards Torres -Vedras and Lisbon passes for some miles over a sandy plain enclosed -on either flank by bold hills. The southern limit of the basin is a -cross-ridge, which connects the other two: in front of it lies Roliça, -on the side-slope of an isolated eminence which overlooks the whole -plain: a mile further south the road passes over the cross-ridge by -a sort of gorge or defile, on the right hand of which is the village -of Columbeira, while to its left rear lies that of Zambugeira. Though -Delaborde had drawn up his men on the hill of Roliça down in the plain, -it was not this advanced position that he intended to hold, but the -higher and steeper line of the cross-ridge, on either side of the -defile above Columbeira. Here he had a short front, only three-quarters -of a mile in length, scarped by precipitous slopes, and covered by -thickets and brushwood, which served to mask the strength (or rather -the weakness) of his division. - -Discovering Delaborde drawn up on the isolated hill of Roliça, -where both his flanks could easily be turned, the British commander -resolved to endeavour to envelop and surround him. He waited on the -sixteenth till the rear of the army had come up, and marched at dawn -on the seventeenth with his whole force--13,000 British and 2,000 -Portuguese, drawn up in a crescent-shaped formation with the centre -refused and the wings thrown far forward. On the right Colonel Trant, -with three battalions of Portuguese infantry and fifty horse of the -same nation, moved along the foot of the western range of heights, -to turn the Roliça position by a wide circular movement. On the left -General Ferguson, with his own brigade, that of Bowes, and six guns, -struck over the hills to get round the eastern flank of the French. -In the centre the remainder of the army--four brigades of British -infantry, 400 cavalry, half English and half Portuguese, with the -battalion of Cazadores and twelve guns, advanced on a broad front in -two lines, forming a most magnificent spectacle: ‘they came on slowly -but in beautiful order, dressing at intervals to correct the gaps -caused by the inequalities of ground, and all converging on the hill -of Roliça[204].’ Hill’s brigade formed the right, Fane’s the left, -Nightingale’s the centre, while Catlin Crawfurd’s two battalions and -the Cazadores acted as the reserve. - - [204] Foy, iv. 309. - -Delaborde had warned his men to be ready for a sudden rush to the rear -the minute that the enveloping movement should grow dangerous. Waiting -till the last possible moment, when Fane’s riflemen were already -engaged with his tirailleurs, and Trant and Ferguson were showing on -the flanks, he suddenly gave the order for retreat. His men hurried -back, easily eluding the snare, and took post on the wooded heights -above Columbeira a mile to the rear. Wellesley had to rearrange his -troops for an attack on the second position, and half the morning had -been wasted to no effect. He resolved, however, to repeat his original -manœuvre. Trant and the Portuguese once more made a long sweep to -the right: Ferguson’s column mounted the foot-hills of the Sierra de -Baragueda and commenced a toilsome detour to the left[205]. In the -centre two batteries formed up near a windmill on the northern slope -of Roliça hill and began to bombard the French position, while Fane’s -brigade to the left on the main road, and Hill’s and Nightingale’s to -the right deployed for the attack. - - [205] I cannot find the authority for Napier’s statement that - Fane joined Ferguson in the second move. He seems still to have - acted in the centre. - -Wellesley had not intended to assault the Columbeira heights till the -turning movements of Trant and Ferguson should be well developed. But, -contrary to his intention, part of his centre pushed forward at once, -and when it was engaged the other troops in the front line were sent -up to its aid. The face of the hill was scarred by four ‘passes’ as -Wellesley called them, or rather large ravines, up each of which some -of the British troops tried to penetrate. On the extreme right the -light companies of Hill’s brigade, supported by the first battalion -of the 5th Regiment from the same brigade, delivered their attack up -one gully. The second pass, just beyond the village of Columbeira, was -assayed by the 29th from Nightingale’s brigade, with the 9th of Hill’s -in support. The 82nd went towards the centre, while Fane’s two rifle -battalions and the 45th tried the heights far to the left. - -The 29th Regiment, urged on by the rash courage of its colonel, Lake, -attacked some time before any other corps was engaged. It pushed up a -narrow craggy pass, the bed of a dried-up mountain torrent, where in -some places only two or three men abreast could keep their footing: the -further that the battalion advanced, the more did the ravine recede -into the centre of the enemy, and the 29th was soon being fired on -from three sides. The right wing, which led, at last forced its way -to the brow of the hill, and was able to deploy in a more or less -imperfect way, and to commence its fire. In front of it were the few -companies of the 4th Swiss, some of whom tried to surrender, calling -out that they were friends, turning up their musket butts, and rushing -in to shake hands with the British[206]. But before the 29th could -fully recover its formation, it was fiercely charged from the rear: -some of the French troops on the lower slopes of the position, finding -themselves likely to be cut off, formed in a dense mass and rushed -straight through the right wing of Colonel Lake’s regiment from behind, -breaking it, killing its commander and capturing six officers and some -thirty of its rank and file, whom they took back with them in triumph. -The 29th reeled down the slope into a wood, where it reformed on its -comparatively intact left wing, and then resumed the fight, aided by -the 9th, its supporting regiment. About this moment the 5th and Fane’s -rifles made other attacks on the two ends of the hostile line, but were -at first checked. Delaborde and his brigadier, Brennier, had only -four battalions on the ridge, as they had detached three companies of -the 70th far to their right in the direction in which Ferguson was -moving. But they held their ground very gallantly, waiting till the -British skirmishers had begun to get a lodgement on the brow, and then -charging each detachment as it tried to deploy, and forcing it down to -the edge of the wood that covered the lower slopes. Three assaults were -thus repulsed, but the British troops would not be denied--Wellesley -wrote that he had never seen more gallant fighting than that of the 9th -and the 29th[207]--and after each reverse formed up again and came on -once more. After two hours of desperate struggles they made good their -lodgement on the crest at several points: Ferguson’s troops (though -they had lost their way and wasted much time) began to appear on the -extreme left, and Delaborde then saw that it was time for him to go. - - [206] Col. Leslie’s narrative, p. 43. The 4th Swiss was a very - discontented corps; individuals of it had begun to desert to the - British even before Roliça (Leach, p. 44), and a considerable - number of them took service in the 60th Rifles after the - Convention of Cintra, refusing to return to France. - - [207] _Well. Disp._, iv. 83, 87. - -He retired by alternate battalions, two in turn holding back the -disordered pursuers, while the other two doubled to the rear. His -regiment of _chasseurs à cheval_ also executed several partial charges -against the British skirmishers, and lost its commander mortally -wounded: the Portuguese cavalry refused to face them. In this way the -French reached the pass behind Zambugeira, a mile to the rear, without -any great loss. But in passing through this defile, they were forced to -club together by the narrowness of the road, were roughly hustled by -their pursuers, and lost three[208] of their guns and a few prisoners. -The rest of the force escaped in some disorder to Cazal da Sprega, -where Wellesley halted his men, seeing that it was now impossible to -catch Delaborde’s main body. Two miles to the rear the French were -rejoined by the three companies of the 70th Regiment which had been -detached to the east. They then retreated to Montechique some fifteen -miles from Lisbon, where they at last got news of Loison and Junot. - - [208] Foy says only one gun, but Wellesley, who had better - opportunities of knowing, says that he took three (_Well. Disp._, - iv. 83). - -Delaborde had fought a most admirable rearguard action, holding on to -the last moment, and escaping by his prompt manœuvres the very serious -risk of being enveloped and captured by the forces of the English, -who outnumbered him fourfold. But he had lost 600 men and three guns, -while his assailants had only suffered to the extent of 474 killed, -wounded, and prisoners[209], nearly half of whom were in the ranks of -the 29th[210]. The French flattered themselves that they had somewhat -shaken the _morale_ of Wellesley’s men by their obstinate resistance: -but this was far from being the case. The English had only put five and -a half battalions[211] into the fighting line, and were proud of having -turned the enemy out of such a position as that of Columbeira without -engaging more than 4,600 men. - - [209] Thiébault solemnly states our loss at 2,000 men! - _Mémoires_, iv. 186. - - [210] That corps lost no less than 190 officers and men, among - whom were six officers taken prisoners. - - [211] The 5th, 9th, 29th, 82nd, 5/60th, and four companies of the - 2/95th, in all 4,635 men. They lost respectively 46, 72, 190, 25, - 66, and 42 men, or 441 in all; while the rest of the army (ten - British and four Portuguese battalions) only lost the remaining - 38 of the total of 479 casualties suffered on the 17th, i.e. were - not really engaged. - -It is doubtful whether Delaborde should have fought at all: he was -holding on in the hope that Loison’s division would come up and join -him, but this junction was very problematical, as nothing had been -heard of that general for many days. By fighting at Columbeira, -Delaborde risked complete destruction for an inadequate end. It was -true that if Loison was now close at hand Wellesley’s further advance -might cut him off from Lisbon. But as a matter of fact Loison was still -far away. He had reached Santarem on August 13, with his troops so -tired by his long march from the Alemtejo, that he halted there for -two days to rest them and allow his stragglers to come up. Marching -again on the sixteenth, he was at Cercal, fifteen miles from Roliça to -the east, while Delaborde was fighting. He barely heard the distant -cannonade, and rejoined the rest of the army at Torres Vedras, by a -route through Cadaval and Quinta da Bugagliera, which crossed his -colleague’s line of retreat at an acute angle [August 18]. - -It is true that if Wellesley had been accurately informed of Loison’s -position on the seventeenth, he could have so manœuvred as to place -himself directly between that general and Lisbon on the following -day, by seizing the cross-roads at Quinta da Bugagliera. In that case -Loison’s division could only have rejoined Junot by a perilous flank -march through Villafranca and Saccavem, or by crossing the Tagus and -moving along its eastern bank to the heights of Almada opposite the -capital. But the English general’s object at this moment was not to -cut off Loison, but to pick up a considerable reinforcement, of -whose approach he had just heard. On the morning of the eighteenth -the brigade of General Acland from Harwich had arrived off the -Peniche peninsula, and its advent was reported to Wellesley, with the -additional news that that of General Anstruther, which had sailed from -Ramsgate, was close behind. It was all-important to get these 4,000 men -ashore: they could not be landed at Peniche, whose fort was still in -French hands, and the only other anchorage near was that of Porto Novo, -at the mouth of the little river Maceira, twelve miles south of Roliça. -To cover their disembarkation Wellesley marched by the coast-road -through Lourinhão, and encamped on the heights of Vimiero. This -movement allowed Loison, who moved by the parallel road more inland, to -pass the English and reach Torres Vedras. - - -NOTE TO CHAPTER II - -By far the best English account of Roliça is that by Col. -Leslie of the 29th, in his _Military Journal_, which was not -printed till 1887 (at the Aberdeen University Press). He -corrects Napier on several points. I have also found useful -details in the letters (unpublished) of Major Gell, of the -same regiment, which were placed at my disposition by Mr. P. -Lyttelton Gell. Leslie and Gell agree that Colonel Lake led on -his regiment too fast, contrary to Wellesley’s intentions. The -narrative of Colonel Leach of the 2/95th is also valuable. The -accounts of Landsheit of the 20th Light Dragoons, of Colonel -Wilkie in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_ (vol. i), and the -anonymous ‘T.S.’ of the 71st (Constable, Edinburgh, 1828) have -some useful points. Foy and Thiébault, the French narrators of -the fight, were not eye-witnesses, like the six above-named -British writers. - - - - -SECTION IV: CHAPTER III - -VIMIERO - - -Junot much disliked leaving Lisbon: he greatly enjoyed his viceregal -state, and was so convinced that to retain the capital was equivalent -to dominating the whole of Portugal[212], that he attached an -exaggerated importance to his hold on the place, and was very -reluctant to cut down its garrison. But it was clearly necessary to -support Delaborde and Loison, and at last he took his departure. As -a preliminary precaution he resolved to deal a blow at the Alemtejo -insurgents, who, emboldened by Loison’s retreat, were creeping nearer -to the mouth of the Tagus, and showing themselves opposite Setuval. -On August 11, five days after Delaborde had marched off, General -Kellermann was sent out with two battalions and a few dragoons to drive -off these hovering bands, a task which he executed with ease, giving -them a thorough beating at Alcacer do Sal. Having cleared this flank -Junot evacuated Setuval and his other outlying posts beyond the Tagus, -and only retained garrisons at Forts Bugio and Trafaria, which command -the entrance of the river, and on the heights of Almada, which face -Lisbon across the ‘Mar de Palio.’ He put in a state of defence the old -citadel which crowns the highest of the seven hills on which the city -is built, and established a battalion in each of the suburban villages -of Belem and Saccavem, another in Fort San Julian at the mouth of the -Tagus, and two at Cascaes, in the batteries which command the only -point where a disembarkation from the side of the Atlantic is barely -possible. This excess of precaution was largely due to the fact that -a small English convoy of transports, carrying the 3rd Regiment (the -Buffs) from Madeira, had been seen off the mouth of the Tagus. The duke -feared that this portended an attempt to throw troops ashore in the -immediate vicinity of the capital, when he should have gone off to meet -Wellesley. - - [212] As Foy well puts it, the idea was that ‘le Portugal était - dans Lisbonne, et Lisbonne était à elle seule tout le Portugal’ - (iv. 283). - -Altogether Junot left seven battalions, not less than 6,500 men, in -Lisbon and the neighbouring forts, a much greater number than was -really required, for, as Napoleon afterwards observed, capitals wait, -before declaring themselves, for events outside to cast their shadows -before[213]. Knowing that a decisive blow given to the English would be -the best way to keep the city quiet, the Duke of Abrantes would have -been wise to cut down his garrisons round Lisbon to 3,000 men, however -great the risk, and take every available man to meet Wellesley[214]. -It is probable that his error, which no French general would have -committed at a later period of the war, was due to that tendency to -despise the fighting power of the British which was prevalent on the -Continent all through the early years of the century. - - [213] See his curious criticism on Junot, recorded by Thiébault - in iv. 268, 269 of his _Mémoires_. - - [214] For clearness it may be worth while to give the dislocation - of Junot’s army on the day of the battle of Vimiero, adding the - force of each unit on July 15, the last available return. - - 1st Division, Delaborde:-- - - Brigade Avril: _Men._ _Station._ - 15th Line (3rd batt.) 1,086 At Saccavem and in Lisbon city. - 47th ” (2nd batt.) 1,541 In forts south of the Tagus-mouth. - 70th ” (1st and 2nd - batts.) 2,358 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - - Brigade Brennier: - 86th Line (1st and 2nd - batts.) 2,501 Field-army. Present at Vimiero - (except four companies left - at Elvas). - 4th Swiss (1st batt.) 985 Six companies at Peniche. Two - present at Vimiero. - - 2nd Division, Loison:-- - - Brigade Thomières: - ‘1st Provisional Léger’-- - 2nd Léger (3rd batt.) 1,075 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - 4th ” ” 1,098 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - ‘2nd Provisional Léger’-- - 12th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,253 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - 15th ” ” 1,305 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - - Brigade Charlot: - 32nd Line ” 1,034 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - 58th ” ” 1,428 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - 2nd Swiss (2nd batt.) 1,103 In garrison at Elvas. - - 3rd Division, Travot:-- - - Brigade Graindorge: - 31st Léger (3rd batt.) 846 { Partly on the heights of Almada, - 32nd ” ” 1,099 { partly guarding the Spanish - { prisoners at Lisbon. - 26th Line ” 517 At Belem. - 66th ” (3rd and 4th - batts.) 1,125 At Cascaes. - - Brigade Fusier: - 82nd Line (3rd batt.) 963 Field-army. Present at Vimiero. - _Légion du Midi_ 842 At Fort San Julian. - 1st Hanoverian Legion 804 At Santarem. - - All the four cavalry regiments of Margaron’s division, 1,754 - sabres, were present at Vimiero, save one troop of dragoons - captured with Quesnel at Oporto. - -Not the least of Junot’s troubles was the obstinate torpidity of the -Russian admiral, Siniavin, whose 6,000 seamen and marines might have -taken over the whole charge of Lisbon, if only their commander had -been willing. The Russian had refused to take part in the war as long -as only Portuguese were in the field, on the plea that his master -had never declared war on the Prince-Regent or recognized the French -annexation. But when the British had landed, Junot hoped to move him to -action, for there was no doubt that Russia and the United Kingdom were -technically at war. The Duke of Abrantes first tried to induce Siniavin -to put out from the Tagus, to fall upon scattered British convoys, and -to distract the attention of the blockading squadron under Cotton. -But the reply that to sally forth into the Atlantic would probably -mean destruction in two days by the British fleet was too rational to -be overruled. Then Junot proposed that Siniavin should at least take -charge of the pontoons containing the captive Spanish division of -Caraffa: but this too was denied him, and he had to leave a battalion -of Graindorge’s brigade to mount guard on the prisoners[215]. The -Russians were perfectly useless to Junot, except in so far as their -guns helped to overawe Lisbon, and presented a show of force to deter -British vessels from trying to force the passage of the forts at the -mouth of the Tagus. The fact was that Siniavin was not so much stupid -as disaffected: he belonged to the party in Russia which was opposed to -France, and he had perhaps received a hint from home that he was not -expected to show too much zeal in supporting the projects of Napoleon. - - [215] I cannot make out whether this was the 31st or the 32nd - Léger. Foy and Thiébault omit to give the detail. - -On the night of August 15, Junot marched out of Lisbon at the head -of his reserve, a very small force consisting of a battalion of the -82nd of the line, one of the two regiments of grenadiers, which he had -created by concentrating the grenadier companies of the eighteen line -battalions in his army[216], the 3rd provisional regiment of dragoons, -a squadron of volunteer cavalry formed by the French inhabitants of -Lisbon, and his reserve artillery--ten guns under General Taviel. He -also took with him the reserve ammunition-train, a large convoy of -food, and his military chest containing a million of francs in specie. -On the morning of the seventeenth the troops had reached Villafranca, -when a false report that the English were trying to land at Cascaes -caused them to retrace their steps for some miles, and to lose half a -day’s march. On learning that Lisbon and its neighbourhood were quiet, -Junot returned to the front, and growing vexed at the slow march of -the great convoy which the reserve was escorting, pushed on ahead, and -joined Loison at Cercal. He heard the distant thunder of the guns at -Roliça in the afternoon, but was too far away to help Delaborde. - - [216] Junot had created two of these regiments of grenadiers, - each of two battalions. The second was at this moment with Loison. - -On the eighteenth Loison and Junot marched southward to Torres Vedras, -and heard that Delaborde had fallen back so far that he was ten miles -to their rear, at Montechique. He only came up to join them next day -[August 19], and the reserve with its heavy convoy, much hampered by -bad country roads in the Monte Junto hills, did not appear till the -twentieth. - -Junot had been much exercised in mind by the doubt whether Wellesley -would march by the direct road on Lisbon through Torres Vedras and -Montechique, or would continue to hug the shore by the longer route -that passes by Vimiero and Mafra. Not knowing of the approach of -Acland’s and Anstruther’s brigades, he was ignorant of the main fact -which governed his adversary’s movements. But learning on the twentieth -that the British were still keeping to the coast-road, by which -they could in one more march turn his position at Torres Vedras, he -determined to rush upon them with his united forces and give battle. -At the last moment he resolved to draw a few more men from Lisbon, and -called up a battalion of the 66th of the line, and another composed of -four picked companies selected from the other corps of the garrison--a -trifling reinforcement of 1,000 or 1,200 men, which arrived just too -late for the fight at Vimiero. - -The organization of the French army had been so much cut up by the -numerous garrisons which Junot had thought fit to leave behind -him, that although five of his six infantry brigades were more or -less represented in his field-army, not one of them was complete. -He accordingly recast the whole system, and arranged his force in -two divisions under Delaborde and Loison, and a reserve brigade of -Grenadiers under Kellermann. His cavalry on the other hand was intact: -every one of the four regiments of Margaron’s division was present, and -over and above them he had the squadron of French volunteers raised -in Lisbon. He had also twenty-three guns: there should have been -twenty-six, but Delaborde had lost three at Roliça. The total of men -present amounted to 10,300 foot and 2,000 horse, with 700 artillerymen -and men of the military train[217], or about 13,000 in all. - - [217] Junot’s numbers at Vimiero are as much disputed as - Delaborde’s at Roliça. Among the French accounts the figures - vary from 12,500 to 9,200. Foy, usually the most conscientious - historian, gives 11,500; Thiébault, both in his narrative, - published in 1816, and in his private _Mémoires_, descends to - 9,200. Wellesley estimated the army that he had fought at 14,000 - (_Well. Disp._, iv. 101). - - It will be well to give the corps present, and to examine into - their probable strength. Just before the landing of the British - they had stood as follows (I have arranged them in their new - brigading):-- - - (1) Division Delaborde:-- - - Brigade Brennier: - 2nd Léger (3rd batt.) 1,075 - 4th ” ” 1,098 - 70th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 2,358 - ----- 4,531 - - Brigade Thomières: - 86th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.)(minus - four companies left at Elvas) 1,945 - 4th Swiss (two companies) 246 - ----- 2,191 - - (2) Division Loison:-- - - Brigade Solignac: - 12th Léger (3rd batt.) 1,253 - 15th ” ” 1,305 - 58th of the Line (3rd batt.) 1,428 - ----- 3,986 - - Brigade Charlot: - 32nd of the Line (3rd batt.) 1,034 - 82nd ” ” 963 - ----- 1,997 - ------ - 12,705 - - [(3) Reserve of Grenadiers:-- - - 1st Regiment (1st and 2nd batts.) } - 2nd ” ” ” } 2,100 - - This corps, being formed of companies drawn from every battalion - in Portugal, except the three foreign regiments and the _Légion - du Midi_, must not be counted in our first estimate.] - - (4) Cavalry Division Margaron:-- - 1st Provisional Chasseurs 263 - 3rd ” Dragoons 640 - 4th ” ” 589 - 5th ” ” 659 - Squadron of volunteer cavalry 100 - ----- 2,251 - - (5) Artillerymen for 23 guns, engineers, train, & 700 - ------ - 15,656 - - But from this 15,656 large deductions have to be made; each of the - eleven line battalions present had given its grenadier company to - contribute to the four battalions of ‘Reserve Grenadiers’ which Junot - had formed. We must therefore deduct from them about 1,350 bayonets. - Delaborde had lost 600 men at Roliça. Loison’s regiments had been - thinned by the dépôt battalion left to garrison Almeida, and by his - losses in his campaign on the Douro and in the Alemtejo. Thiébault - states that the casualties had amounted to 450 during these operations: - the details left at Almeida, including many sick, were 1,000 strong, - so we must subtract 1,450 from Loison’s total. This is liberal, as - some, both of the Almeida force and of the Alemtejo losses, came from - regiments not present at Vimiero (e.g. the 1st Hanoverians and the 4th - Swiss). - - We must make some deduction for the ordinary hospital wastage of the - troops which had come out of Lisbon with Delaborde and Junot, seven - battalions and two regiments of cavalry. Loison’s sick are already - partly accounted for by the Almeida details. It would seem that 1,000 - would be an ample allowance. When the French evacuated Portugal they - had 3,281 men in hospital. Of these, 1,200 were the wounded of Vimiero. - Of the remainder, 1,000 may have belonged to the ten and two-thirds - battalions present at the battle, the other 1,081 to the eleven and - one-third not present. - - For the infantry then we allow-- - - 12,705 of original strength, minus 1,350 Grenadiers, - 600 lost at Roliça, and 1,450 in garrison at Almeida - or lost in the insurrection, and 1,000 sick (4,400 - in all) 8,305 - Add for four battalions of Reserve Grenadiers 2,100 - ------ - Total 10,405 - - Margaron’s cavalry was practically intact: on July 15 - it was 2,151 strong (Thiébault); it hardly suffered - in the insurrection. If we allow 300 men for casual - losses and troopers on detachment or acting as - orderlies, it is ample 1,851 - We must add the 100 volunteer horse 100 - Lastly, for artillerymen of four batteries (23 guns), - engineers and train, &c., we allow 700 - ------ - Total 13,056 - - This is not far from Wellesley’s estimate of 14,000 men. - -Hearing that Wellesley was stationary in Vimiero since the morning -of the nineteenth, Junot determined to attack him at the earliest -possible moment. He was ignorant that his adversary’s halt was due to -the arrival of Anstruther and Acland, but knowing that more troops were -expected from the sea he resolved to fight at once. The reserve and -convoy joined him on the morning of the twentieth: the same night he -marched under cover of the darkness and traversed the ten miles which -separated him from the hostile position: at dawn he was close under it. - -But Wellesley meanwhile had received his reinforcements, and was -4,000 men stronger than the Duke of Abrantes supposed. On the -nineteenth Anstruther’s[218] brigade had accomplished its dangerous -disembarkation, through the surf that beats upon the sandy shore north -of the mouth of the Maceira. It had been a tedious business, many -boats having been upset and some lives lost. On the afternoon of the -twentieth the convoy that brought Acland’s brigade was got inshore, and -the greater part of the men disembarked in the dusk in the actual mouth -of the little river, and slept upon the beach. But some of them were -still on shipboard on the morning of the twenty-first, and came too -late for the battle of that day[219]. - - [218] Anstruther’s Brigade from Ramsgate consisted of-- - - 9th Regiment (2nd batt.) 633 - 43rd ” ” 721 - 52nd ” ” 654 - 97th ” 695 - ----- - 2,703 - - With them the 43rd and 52nd, so famous in many a Peninsular - battle-field in the Light Division, made their appearance. - - [219] Of Acland’s Brigade from Harwich there disembarked-- - - 2nd or Queen’s Regiment 731 - 20th Regiment (seven and a half companies) 401 - 95th Rifles (1st batt., two companies) 200 - ----- - 1,332 - - The ship that bore Colonel Ross and two and a half companies of - the 20th had drifted so far off the shore that it did not succeed - in getting its freight delivered till late on the twenty-first. - -While covering this disembarkation Wellesley had taken up an excellent -position on the heights of Vimiero, with the sea at his back. The -surrounding country was pleasant, good water was forthcoming in -abundance, and the neighbouring villages provided a considerable -quantity of food. The region is both more fertile and better wooded -than most of central Portugal. The only fault of the position was -that it was one from which retreat would have been very difficult. But -confident in himself and his men, and somewhat under-estimating the -possible maximum of force that Junot could bring against him, Wellesley -was thinking of nothing less than of retreat. If he had not been -attacked on the twenty-first, he would himself have pushed on towards -the enemy next day. He had now 16,778 British troops, besides Trant’s -2,000 Portuguese, and thought himself competent to cope with any force -that Junot could collect. - - [Illustration: Battle of Vimiero. August 21, 1808.] - -The position of Vimiero consists of a well-marked line of heights -sweeping from the north to the south-west, and cut through the centre -by the narrow valley of the river Maceira, on which the village of -Vimiero stands. The southern part of the range, which lies nearest the -sea, is especially steep and formidable: the northern part, beyond the -Maceira, is lower and broader: along its ridge runs a country road -leading northward to Lourinhão. But even here the position is very -strong, for a ravine creeps along its eastern foot and acts as a sort -of ditch to the broad ridge, or rather plateau, which the British army -was holding. Its only accessible side is the north, where it sinks -down into a rolling upland beyond the village of Ventosa. In the very -centre of the position, well in front of the main ridge, just above the -village of Vimiero, lies an isolated hill, well suited to serve as an -outwork or first line of defence. It was partly occupied by vineyards -and thickets, partly by open fields, and gave admirable cover for its -defenders. - -This hill Wellesley had chosen as the key of his position: on it were -placed the two brigades of Fane and Anstruther, seven battalions in -all. The high ridge running from behind it to the sea was held by the -brigades of Hill, Bowes, Catlin Crawfurd, Nightingale, and Acland. -That of Ferguson lay behind Vimiero, astride of the valley of the -Maceira. Trant’s four battalions of Portuguese were near Ferguson, on -the lower heights north of Vimiero, ready to act as a reserve to Fane -and Anstruther. The handful of cavalry, 240 English and 260 Portuguese -sabres, were in the low ground on the banks of the Maceira, close under -Crawfurd’s position. Of the three batteries which Wellesley had been -able to bring with him, six guns were on the projecting height with -Anstruther, eight were on the high mountain south of Vimiero, and four -were with the reserve. - -A glance at this order of battle shows that Wellesley expected to be -attacked from the south, up the valley of the Maceira, and that he -thought that the enemy’s plan would be to force his right-centre. -Little or no provision is made against the plan which Junot actually -adopted, that of assaulting the British left-centre and simultaneously -turning their extreme left flank, while leaving the right unmolested. -But the whole position was so short--it was less than three miles in -length--that there was no difficulty in shifting troops rapidly from -one end of it to the other, and, as the event showed, no risk whatever -was run. - -Wellesley was busy arranging his line of battle, when to his bitter -disappointment he received the news that he was superseded, a calamity -which he had been expecting to occur at any moment. Sir Harry Burrard -had arrived from England at the tail of Acland’s convoy, and was now on -board the sloop _Brazen_ in Maceira Bay. Sir Arthur at once went off -in a boat to greet him, and to give him an account of the condition in -which affairs stood. Burrard heard him out, and then placed a strong -embargo on any further offensive movement. He had learnt that Sir John -Moore, with the division from the Baltic, was now off the Portuguese -coast, and was resolved not to stir till those troops should have been -landed. Being, as it seems, a leisurely sort of man, he resolved to -sleep on board his ship for one night more, and to come ashore next -morning--a resolve which cost him that chance of commanding a British -army in a pitched battle which so many generals have in vain desired. -Wellesley went back through the surf charged, for a short fifteen hours -more, with the destinies of the army of Portugal[220]. - - [220] It may be well to give Wellesley’s army at Vimiero:-- - - Cavalry, 20th Light Dragoons 240 - Artillery, three batteries 226 - - 1st Brigade, Hill: - 5th (1st batt.) 944 - 9th ” 761 - 38th ” 953 - ---- 2,658 - - 2nd Brigade, Ferguson: - 36th 591 - 40th (1st batt.) 923 - 71st ” 935 - ---- 2,449 - - 3rd Brigade, Nightingale: - 29th 616 - 82nd (1st batt.) 904 - ---- 1,520 - - 4th Brigade, Bowes: - 6th (1st batt.) 943 - 32nd ” 870 - ---- 1,813 - - 5th Brigade, C. Crawfurd: - 45th (1st batt.) 915 - 91st 917 - ---- 1,832 - - 6th Brigade, Fane: - 50th (1st batt.) 945 - 60th (5th batt.) 604 - 95th (2nd batt., four companies) 456 - ---- 2,005 - - 7th Brigade, Anstruther: - 9th (2nd batt.) 633 - 43rd ” 721 - 52nd ” 654 - 97th ” 695 - ---- 2,703 - - 8th Brigade, Acland: - 2nd 731 - 20th (seven and a half companies) 401 - 95th (1st batt., two companies) 200 - ---- 1,332 - ------ - Total British present 16,778 - - We have also to add the Portuguese of Trant, 2,000 or 2,100 men, - making 18,800 for the whole force. - - Napier’s estimate on p. 499 of vol. i. of his _Peninsular War_, - is unfortunately quite inaccurate; he has-- - - (1) Omitted to deduct from each regiment the losses at Roliça, - 474 in all. - - (2) Counted the 50th Regiment twice. It had been moved from - Catlin Crawfurd’s to Fane’s brigade the day after Roliça, in - exchange for the 45th. Napier has inserted it, and counted it, in - both places with its 945 men. - - (3) Forgotten that Spencer’s artillery, 245 men, had been left - behind for want of horses. - - (4) Omitted (very excusably) to note that two and a half - companies of the 20th Regiment were not ashore yet, having - drifted away on a disabled transport, so that the regiment is - given 135 too strong. - - There is therefore a total excess of no less than 1,799 British - troops. On the other hand, the Portuguese of Trant are probably - understated by some 350 bayonets. - -The French cavalry had been hovering around Vimiero all through the -twentieth, and knowing that Junot was not far off, Sir Arthur had -taken all precautions against being surprised. General Fane, in charge -of the outposts, had pushed pickets of riflemen into the wooded -heights that faced the British position on the northern bank of the -Maceira[221]: vedettes of the 20th Light Dragoons were thrown out three -or four miles to the front, and especially watched the Torres Vedras -road. About midnight they began to hear the approach of the enemy; -the rumbling of his guns and caissons over the wooden bridge of Villa -Facaia travelled for miles through the still night air. In half an -hour Wellesley was warned that the French were drawing near, and sent -the order round all his brigades to be under arms and in line on their -designated position an hour before daybreak[222]. - - [221] Leach’s _Sketches_, p. 50. He was himself on the line of - pickets, 200 strong, which held the wooded height from which - Junot afterwards viewed the battle. - - [222] Napier says that the news was brought ‘by a German officer - of dragoons, who showed some consternation.’ This statement - much offended the news-bearer Landsheit, a sergeant of the 20th - Light Dragoons, not an officer. He has left his protest in his - interesting autobiography, p. 264. - -But the enemy was late in appearing: Junot had halted on the near -side of the bridge of Villa Facaia, four miles away, to rest his men -after their night march and to allow them to cook their breakfast. -It was not till nearly nine in the morning that dense clouds of dust -rolling along the Torres Vedras road bore witness to the approach of -the French. They were indistinctly visible, among woods and rolling -upland, as they advanced with a broad front on each side of the village -of Villa Facaia--a regiment of cavalry in front, then Loison on the -left and Delaborde on the right side of the road, finally Kellermann’s -grenadiers, the reserve of artillery, and the bulk of Margaron’s -cavalry. The English were surprised to note that the columns showed -as masses of dust colour, not of the customary dark blue. On account -of the hot weather they had been provided with white linen frocks, -and were wearing their uniform coats folded and buckled over their -knapsacks[223]. - - [223] Col. Leslie’s _Military Journal_, p. 52. - -Wellesley had been expecting to see the great column swerve to its -left, and approach him along the valley of the Maceira, by Cunhados and -Sobreiro Curvo. But instead of so doing Junot continued his progress -northward, till he had completely marched past the English right -wing, and only fronted and deployed when he had got on a level with -Vimiero. After driving off the small pickets of English riflemen who -still lay out in the woods a mile in front of Fane’s brigade[224], the -French began to form a line of battle whose southern end was opposite -Wellesley’s centre. But at the same time the cavalry advance-guard was -noted riding far away to the north, toward Carrasqueira and Praganza, -and it was clear that infantry were following them. Obviously there was -going to be an attempt to turn the English position at its northern -end, on the comparatively gentle slopes along the Lourinhão road. - - [224] Col. Leach’s _Sketches_, pp. 50, 51. - -Junot after reconnoitring the British position in a somewhat -perfunctory fashion, had resolved to leave alone the formidable heights -occupied by the right wing, and to try to storm the low hill in front -of Vimiero with his main body, while he turned Wellesley’s left with a -secondary column. This detachment was composed of the 3rd provisional -regiment of dragoons, and Brennier’s brigade, the same four battalions -which had fought so handsomely at Roliça. But the moment that Wellesley -had seen that his right flank was safe, and that his left was about -to be attacked, he rapidly changed his line of battle. Ferguson, from -behind Vimiero, started to march north. Behind him followed three of -the four brigades which had occupied the hills above the sea. Only -Hill was still left on the crest to the south-west of Vimiero; Bowes, -Nightingale, and Acland--six battalions in all, taking with them six -guns--dropped down into the valley of the Maceira, crossed it behind -Vimiero, and marched along the Lourinhão road parallel with Brennier’s -movement on the opposite side of the valley. In rear of these troops, -and nearer the sea, Catlin Crawfurd and the Portuguese also moved -northward, and took up a position near Ribamar, where they covered the -flank of the other corps and were in a good position for preventing -any movement of the French on the extreme north-west. Junot caught -a glimpse of the extensive transference of troops to the left which -his adversary was making, and struck with a sudden fear lest Brennier -might be overwhelmed, sent off another brigade--Solignac’s of Loison’s -division--to support him. He would have been much wiser had he kept -these three battalions in hand to support his main attack, and merely -directed Brennier to demonstrate against the British left without -pressing his attack home. His last movement had divided his army into -two halves, separated from each other by a gap of nearly two miles: for -the main attack he had only kept eight and a quarter battalions, three -regiments of cavalry and seventeen guns, while seven battalions, one -regiment of cavalry, and six guns had gone off on the turning movement. -How long their flank march was to be he had not calculated, for, not -discerning the steepness of the ravine at the foot of the British -position, he had not realized that Brennier and Solignac would have to -take a vast sweep to the north in order to cross it. As a matter of -fact they got completely out of touch with him and, what was worse, -with each other. Their diversion did not begin till the main battle was -nearly over[225]. - - [225] Thiébault (iv. 188, 189) expresses (and with reason) his - wonder that Junot mixed his divisions so hopelessly, and thinks - that it would have been more rational to send Delaborde and his - second brigade after Brennier, instead of breaking up Loison’s - division by taking the supporting brigade from it. - -Meanwhile the French general deployed the second brigades of his two -divisions, Charlot’s of Loison’s, and Thomières’ of Delaborde’s, only -four and a quarter battalions in all, as a first line for the attack -on Vimiero. Kellermann’s four battalions of grenadiers in a second -line were for the moment held back, as was the cavalry and the reserve -artillery. But seven guns went forward with the first line. The French -came on in their usual style, a thick line of tirailleurs, supported by -battalion columns close in their rear. Fane and Anstruther were very -comfortably placed for repelling the attack: the latter had drawn up -the 52nd and 97th in line on the slope of the hill, partly hidden by a -dip in the ground and largely covered by vines and brushwood: the 9th -and 43rd were in open column to the rear, ready to act as a reserve. -Fane had got most of the riflemen of the 60th and 95th out in front, -at the foot of the hill, in a very thick skirmishing line: only a few -companies of them were in reserve along with the 50th (the famous -‘dirty half-hundredth’) at the head of the slope. In consequence of the -order which Junot had adopted, Thomières’ two battalions were opposed -to Fane, and Charlot’s brigade to Anstruther on the southern half of -the hill. In each quarter the course of the fight was much the same: -the French tirailleurs pushed up the slope among the brushwood and -vineyards, slowly driving the riflemen before them. Then, as they drew -near the crest, the two English brigadiers suddenly let loose their -formed battalions upon the assailants. There was one fierce volley -from the six guns on the hill top, and then the 97th charged Charlot’s -men in front, while the 52nd swerved round and took them in flank. -One smashing discharge at ten paces blew to pieces the heads of the -columns of the 32nd and 82nd, which crumpled up in hopeless disorder -and rolled down to the foot of the hill, pursued by their assailants. A -few moments later Fane dashed the 50th and the reserve companies of his -rifles against Thomières’ troops, and sent them flying down the slope -in equal disorder. They could not be rallied till they had got out -of musketry range, and the seven guns which they had brought forward -with them were all captured: Delaborde and Charlot were wounded: the -commander of the 82nd was killed[226]. - - [226] The best narrative of the fight on Vimiero Hill is that in - General Anstruther’s ‘Journal,’ printed in the memoir attached to - Wyld’s _Atlas_: Leach and Rifleman Harris give many interesting - details. - -Junot’s first attack had failed, but his spirit was not yet broken: he -called up half his reserve of grenadiers, two battalions under Colonel -St. Clair, and sent them against the hill on the same point, while the -débris of the two wrecked brigades were rallied and pushed forward in -support. Eight guns under Foy (the historian in after-years of the -war), were brought out from the artillery reserve and pushed to the -front. The second attack, however, failed even more disastrously than -the first: the grenadiers, attacking on a narrow front and a single -point, were blown to pieces by the converging fire of the 52nd, the -97th, and Fane’s two rifle battalions, as well as by the battery on -the hill, which having no longer any British skirmishers in front of -it had a free field. It was here, as Wellesley’s dispatches show, that -shrapnell shell, a recent invention of the British colonel of that -name, was first used, and with the most effective results. St. Clair’s -battalions climbed halfway up the hill, but could do no more, and -finally gave way, bearing back with them their half-rallied supports. -The fight was rolling down the slope into the pine-wood at its foot, -when Junot made his last desperate stroke. His only infantry reserve -was now the 1st Regiment of Grenadiers, two battalions under Colonel -Maransin. He resolved to throw them into the fight _pour en finir_, -as he said to his chief of the staff, but they ‘made a finish of it’ -in a way very different from his intention. This time the assailants, -led by General Kellermann in person, made not for the front of the -hill, but for the gap between it and the heights to the north, trying -to turn Fane’s flank and to penetrate into the village of Vimiero by -coasting round the foot of the higher ground. There were at first no -troops directly opposed to the column, but soon the grenadiers found -themselves under fire from both flanks. On the southern side Anstruther -took from his reserve the 43rd, which had not yet fired a shot, and -threw it into the cemetery of Vimiero, from whence it descended on the -left flank of the leading battalion of grenadiers. On the northern -side a new force intervened: General Acland on the heights along the -Lourinhão road had been acting as the reserve of Wellesley’s left wing: -he was not needed there, and seeing Kellermann’s attack threatening -to break in between himself and Anstruther, took action on his own -responsibility. Marching a little southward along the ridge, he sent -his two companies of the 95th Rifles, and the light companies of his -two line-battalions to fall on the right flank of the grenadiers. At -the same time he turned upon them the fire of two field-guns which were -in reserve near his brigade. - -The double flank attack cost Kellermann many men, and brought his -column to a standstill, but he held his ground for some time, till -the 43rd closed in upon him at the eastern end of Vimiero village. -Both French and English were in great disorder, the houses and -enclosure-walls having broken up their formation. There was a furious -hand-to-hand fight, volleys were interchanged at the distance of five -yards, and both sides used the bayonet freely. At last the grenadiers -gave way and retired sullenly towards their original position: they had -lost many men, but so had the 43rd, who from a weak battalion of 700 -men had forty killed and seventy-nine wounded. - -All along the line the French were now falling back, and Junot brought -up a regiment of dragoons to cover the retreat of the disordered -masses. Wellesley now resolved to make use of his handful of cavalry: -close behind Vimiero there were drawn up the 240 sabres of the 20th -Light Dragoons, with 260 Portuguese horsemen in two squadrons on their -flanks[227]. ‘Now, Twentieth, now is the time!’ cried Wellesley, -lifting his cocked hat, and Colonel Taylor wheeled his regiment from -behind the sheltering hill and dashed at the retreating Frenchmen. -The two Portuguese squadrons started level with him, but after going -a few hundred yards and receiving a shot or two, they broke, fell -into disorder, and finally galloped to the rear amid the hoots of -Anstruther’s brigade. But the 20th rode at the French dragoons who -stood in their path, burst through them, and then plunged among the -flying infantry, sabring them to right and left and taking many -prisoners. They could not be stayed till they had hewn their way -through the fugitives, to the place where Junot himself sat watching -the rout of his men. The charge had been pushed beyond all reasonable -bounds, for the men were mad with excitement and would not halt. But as -they rode up the French hill they were checked by a stone wall, and at -the same time charged by the two reserve regiments of Margaron’s horse. -It was a wonder that the headstrong troopers were not annihilated, but -the larger part returned in safety to the English lines, leaving behind -them their colonel[228] and twenty men slain, twenty-four wounded, and -eleven prisoners. - - [227] All this comes from the narrative, which I have already - utilized in more than one place, of Sergeant Landsheit of the - 20th. - - [228] Taylor, like the heroic Blake, and like Graham the victor - of Barossa, was one of Oxford’s few fighting men. Every visitor - to Christ Church sees his memorial stone, stating how he had - reformed and disciplined the regiment, when it came home a - skeleton from the West Indies in 1805, and had practically to be - raised anew. Since then it had been in the unfortunate expedition - to Buenos Ayres. - -We must now turn to the northern part of the battle-field, where the -main stress of the fighting did not begin till the engagement round -Vimiero was nearly over. This was the result of the reckless way in -which Junot had sent his flanking brigades to attack over unexplored -ground. When Brennier reached the point at which he would naturally -have wheeled inward to climb the slopes along the Lourinhão road, -he came upon the deep and rugged valley of Toledo, the steepness of -whose slopes he did not realize till he had almost reached its brink. -Having guns with him, the French brigadier thought the obstacle -impassable, and turned northward again in a long sweep by the village -of Carrasqueira, the 3rd Dragoons still heading his march. In this wide -flanking movement he passed quite out of sight of the British. - -But Solignac, with the second brigade which Junot had told off for -the northern diversion, was not so cautious. He too came upon the -ravine; but instead of turning it he sought out its least precipitous -point and passed it near its head, underneath the farm of Ventosa. -Having crossed, he deployed his three battalions, brought up his right -shoulder, and ascended the gentle slope. By this movement he was -devoting his brigade to destruction. On the hill above he could see -only the thin line of British skirmishers, but hidden behind the crest -was the main body of Wellesley’s right wing, the seven battalions of -Ferguson, Nightingale, and Bowes. They had long watched the approach -of the French, and were lying down in battle order. In front were -Ferguson’s three regiments, the 36th, 40th, and 71st, and one of -Nightingale’s, the 82nd. A couple of hundred yards to the rear was the -second line, the 29th of Nightingale’s brigade, and the 6th and 32nd, -which formed Bowes’ command. Acland and Catlin Crawfurd were a mile -away in different directions, but not too far to have been called in if -necessary. - -When Solignac’s men reached the brow of the hill, the four British -battalions in the front line rose up and marched to meet them. Their -long array completely overlapped at both ends the advancing columns -and their screen of light troops[229], At the distance of one hundred -yards all the four regiments directed a converging volley on the -French, which almost swept away the tirailleurs and shook terribly -the supporting masses. Then they reloaded and advanced in silence on -the enemy, who were shouting, firing irregularly, and endeavouring to -deploy, with their officers all in front. For troops in such disorder -the near approach of the majestic two-deep line of 3,300 bayonets -was too much. They wavered and fled northward along the summit of -the ridge, carrying with them their commander, Solignac, desperately -wounded. The British pursued, halting at intervals to pour a volley -into the retreating masses, and picking up on the way many prisoners, -and also the three guns which the enemy had laboriously dragged up the -hill. - - [229] There is a good account of this charge in the anonymous - ‘T.S.’ of the 71st, p. 50. - -The pursuit was stopped by an unexpected development. General Brennier -had heard from afar the heavy musketry fire which told him that his -supporting brigade was engaged. He was now on the summit of the -heights, having at last accomplished his long flank march. Pushing -hastily forward, he came to the edge of a saddle-backed depression in -the ridge, and had the spectacle of the fight at his feet. The 36th -and 40th were engaged in driving the wrecks of Solignac’s men back in -a north-westerly direction, while the 71st and 82nd, halted around -the captured guns, were resting and reforming their ranks. Without -a moment’s hesitation, Brennier threw his four battalions upon the -two regiments that lay beneath him. He had taken them by surprise; -attacked diagonally by fresh troops, and charged by the two squadrons -of dragoons that accompanied the French, they reeled back in some -disorder and abandoned the guns that they had taken. But they rallied -in a moment, and returned to the fight aided by the 29th[230], the -reserve regiment of Nightingale’s brigade. There was heavy firing -for a moment, but very soon Brennier’s troops broke and fled up the -slope which they had just descended. Their flight was covered by the -dragoons, who suffered severely in holding off the pursuers, losing -many officers, among them the young Arrighi, a kinsman of the Bonaparte -family. Brennier was left on the field wounded and a prisoner, and not -only did his men lose the guns which they had just recaptured, but they -also left behind the three which had accompanied their own column. -Their hurried retreat was accelerated by the fire of a half-battery, -brought up from the reserve, which played upon them with effect till -they had plunged down into the ravine and regained their original -position on the opposite heights. - - [230] There are clear accounts of this fighting in Col. Leslie’s - autobiography, p. 61, as well as in the narrative of ‘T.S.’ of - the 71st. - -All the fighting here had been done by Ferguson’s and Nightingale’s -five battalions. Bowes’ brigade did not fire a shot or lose a man, and -Catlin Crawfurd and the Portuguese were only beginning to approach the -scene of action when Brennier’s column broke up and fled. The main -honours of the fight must be given to the 71st and 82nd, who lost -respectively 112 and 61 men out of the total of 272 casualties suffered -in this part of the action. - -Two and a half hours after the battle began the French, both in -the north and the south of the field, were retiring in confusion. -The British were awaiting eagerly the order for a general -advance--especially Ferguson, who, with the 36th and 40th, had got -part of Solignac’s brigade pinned into an angle of the hills, from -which they could not easily escape when attacked. But instead of the -order to advance there came a prohibition to move, and the French were -allowed to withdraw unmolested. The stream of fugitives from Brennier’s -and Solignac’s fight joined that from the centre; then both shook -themselves together and formed up in more or less order on the heights. -The reserve artillery under Hulot and Prost (Foy had been wounded) kept -up a distant and ineffective fire towards the hill of Vimiero, more -to put heart into their own infantry by the noise of their guns than -in any hope of harming the English. Margaron’s cavalry showed a front -behind them, and the two belated battalions from Lisbon, which arrived -about noon, were sent to the front and displayed on the edge of the -heights to make some show of force. But the French would not have stood -a serious attack: every single unit of their infantry had been deeply -engaged and had suffered a thorough defeat. More than half their guns -(thirteen out of twenty-three) had been captured. The cavalry was in -better case, though two of its regiments had suffered severely, yet it -could not by itself have resisted the attack of the victorious British. -A vigorous push would have sent the whole mass reeling backward, not on -Torres Vedras or Lisbon--for these roads would have been barred to them -when Wellesley advanced--but on the rugged path, over the spurs of the -Sierra da Baragueda, which leads to Santarem. - -But while the French were striving to rally and to form a new front, -the leaden hand of Sir Harry Burrard was laid upon the British -army. That leisurely person had only landed on the morning of the -twenty-first, and the battle was in full progress before he rode up -from the beach to Vimiero. He had the grace not to interfere with the -movements of troops which Wellesley had already ordered; but when -the victory was won, and his subordinate rode up to him crying, ‘Sir -Harry, now is your time to advance, the enemy is completely beaten, and -we shall be in Lisbon in three days[231],’ he refused to listen. The -army, he said, had done enough for one day, and he intended to wait -for the arrival of Sir John Moore and the division from the Baltic -before making any further move. Greatly disconcerted by this stolid -opposition, Wellesley launched forth into argument: the French army, -as he pointed out, was now so placed that it had lost control of its -line of retreat on Torres Vedras and Lisbon. Hill’s intact brigade, -and those of Fane and Anstruther had but to advance a mile or so, and -the French were irretrievably cut off from their base of operations. -At the same time the five brigades of the left wing, of which those -of Bowes and Crawfurd were absolutely intact, might so hustle and -press the retreating enemy that he could never rally. At this moment -arrived an aide-de-camp from Ferguson, who begged to be allowed to -go on: ‘a column of broken troops 1,500 to 2,000 strong had in their -confusion got into a hollow, and could be cut off from their main -body by a movement in advance of his brigade[232].’ The enemy had -lost all their artillery, were retiring in the utmost confusion, none -of them save the cavalry were regularly formed, and it was his hope -that he might be allowed to continue to go forward. Burrard still -remained obdurate, though Wellesley pointed out to him that he had -nine thousand fresh troops in hand, that every soldier had a day’s -food cooked in his haversack, that the ammunition reserve was ready -to move, and that, with twelve days’ provisions in the camp and an -ample store of munitions, he had it in his power to march forward both -rapidly and with complete security[233]. But all these arguments were -of no effect. The slow and cautious Burrard chose to believe that Junot -might still have a large and intact reserve, that his cavalry was too -dangerous to be meddled with, and that the dispersion of the British -brigades (there were more than three miles between Hill’s extreme -right and Ferguson’s extreme left) would make a general advance a very -dislocated and hazardous business[234]. He utterly refused to listen -to any further discussion, and, as the French were now in full retreat -and disappearing over the eastern horizon, ordered the troops back to -camp. They returned with colours flying and bands playing, dragging the -captured French guns, and with a considerable column of prisoners in -their midst. But every one, from Generals Spencer and Ferguson down to -the youngest private, was utterly puzzled at the tame and inconsequent -end to such a glorious day. - - [231] Evidence of Col. Torrens at the Court of Inquiry - (_Proceedings_, p. 127). - - [232] Message sent by Ferguson, borne by his aide-de-camp, - Captain Mellish (_Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry_, p. 121). - - [233] Evidence before the Court of Inquiry of Wellesley - (_Proceedings_, pp. 116, 117), and of Col. Torrens (p. 127). - - [234] Burrard’s account of his own views before the Court of - Inquiry (_Proceedings_, pp. 115, 116, 135). - -The losses had been very moderate--four officers and 131 men killed, -thirty-seven officers and 497 men wounded, two officers and forty-nine -men missing. Of the total of 720 no less than 573 were from the ten -battalions of Fane’s, Anstruther’s, and Ferguson’s brigades. Those of -Hill, Bowes, and Catlin Crawfurd did not return a single casualty. The -handful of prisoners were mainly supplied by the 20th Light Dragoons, -and by the two rifle battalions, whose pickets had been driven in -at the commencement of the fight[235]. The French losses were very -different: both Foy and Thiébault acknowledge a total of 1,800, and -this may be taken as a minimum: of these some 300 or 400 were unwounded -prisoners. Delaborde and three brigadier-generals--Charlot, Brennier, -and Solignac--as well as Colonels Foy and Prost of the artillery, were -wounded. Two battalion commanders were killed, a third and the disabled -Brennier were prisoners. Men and officers were alike disheartened: -every single corps present had been engaged: even the squadron of -volunteer cavalry had been in action against Taylor’s dragoons: more -than half the guns had been lost, and the officers who brought back -those that remained asked themselves in wonder how they had ever been -permitted to get away[236]. But at least they were unmolested in their -retreat: using the two battalions that had just come up from Lisbon -as his rearguard, Junot retired unharmed, but full of despair, on -Torres Vedras. It was not till early on the next morning that the last -stragglers of his scattered army drifted in to join the main body. - - [235] See table of losses at Vimiero in the Appendix. - - [236] _Souvenirs Militaires_ of Hulot, who commanded one of the - two reserve batteries, p. 235: ‘J’étais étonné de ne pas voir - l’ennemi fondre sur mes pièces,’ &c. - - - - -SECTION IV: CHAPTER IV - -THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA - - -For only one single day did the incubus of Burrard rest upon the -British army in Portugal, though that day was one on which he succeeded -in changing a decisive victory, which might have laid a whole kingdom -at his feet, into an ordinary successful defensive action. He had -stopped Wellesley’s triumphant march at noon on August 21; early on -the morning of the twenty-second Sir Hew Dalrymple appeared in Maceira -Bay, disembarked, and took over the command. He naturally began his -tenure of control by interviewing his two predecessors, whose divergent -views as to the situation and its requirements were laid before him. -He was an old man, and unpractised in the field: he had only seen -war in the wretched Flanders campaign of 1793-4. His prejudice was -in favour of caution, and he was not slow to let it be seen that he -regarded Wellesley’s actions in the past, and still more his plans -for the future, as rash and hazardous. ‘On the first interview that I -had with Sir Hew Dalrymple,’ said Wellesley at the Court of Inquiry -in the following winter, ‘I had reason to believe that I did not -possess his confidence: nay more, that he was prejudiced against any -opinions which I should give him[237].’ The veteran’s ill-concealed -hostility was, we cannot doubt, mainly due to an unhappy inspiration -of Castlereagh, who had sent him a letter bidding him ‘take Sir Arthur -Wellesley into his particular confidence, as he had been, for a length -of time past, in the closest habits of communication with His Majesty’s -ministers with respect to the affairs of Spain.’ He was also directed -‘to make the most prominent use of him which the rules of the service -would permit[238].’ Such a letter very naturally caused Dalrymple to -look upon the young lieutenant-general as a sort of emissary from the -Government, sent to overrule his plans and curb his full power of -command. He was inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to entertain a -strong prejudice against anything that Wellesley might recommend: and -we cannot doubt that the latter, always stiff and haughty, was at this -moment in a state of suppressed fury at the foiling of his plans by -Burrard on the preceding day. Probably, in his own cold way, he let his -indignation appear, and Dalrymple may have been glad of an excuse for -repressing him. - - [237] Wellesley’s evidence at the Court of Inquiry - (_Proceedings_, p. 81). - - [238] Castlereagh to Dalrymple, July 15 (_Well. Disp._, iv. 18). - -The plan which Wellesley had drawn up for the conduct of the campaign, -and which he now urged upon his chief, is detailed in the proceedings -of the Court of Inquiry. He had hoped to get Sir John Moore’s division, -whose arrival was just reported, sent to Santarem, to cut off any -attempt of Junot to escape out of the Lisbon peninsula by following -the road along the right bank of the Tagus: the Portuguese were to be -brought up to assist. Meanwhile the army which had fought at Vimiero -was to turn the position of Torres Vedras, on which the enemy had -retired, by marching along the sea-coast by the route that leads to -Mafra. If Junot let them march past him, he would infallibly lose -Lisbon; for they could, by forcing the pace, arrive in the capital as -soon as he. If he abandoned Torres Vedras, and fell back on Mafra or -Montechique as soon as he saw them moving, he would have to fight a -second battle on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, with an army which -had been gravely demoralized by the events of Roliça and Vimiero, and -which could not receive much succour from Lisbon: for the populace of -that city, when apprised of the defeat of the French, would undoubtedly -have burst into insurrection, and would have required for its -repression every man of the 5,000[239] troops who had been left to hold -it down. There was a third possibility, that Junot, on hearing that the -English were marching past his flank, might have hastened from Torres -Vedras to attack their line of march by one of the cross-roads (such -as that from Torres Vedras to Puente de Roll), which cut down to the -Atlantic coast. But Wellesley had convinced himself that this chance -would not occur: he reckoned, very rightly, on the exhaustion of the -enemy on the day after such a crushing blow as Vimiero. As a matter of -fact, on the morning of the twenty-second, at the moment when the head -of the British column, if it had marched, would have been outflanking -their position, Junot and those of his generals who were not _hors de -combat_ were sitting in council of war at Torres Vedras, with despair -in their souls, and resolving to ask for terms on which to evacuate -Portugal. Kellermann was just about to ride in to the English lines -to open negotiations[240]. The idea of an ‘offensive return’ by the -French was in the head of the cautious Burrard[241]: but not in that of -Wellesley, who had made up his mind ‘that they would act in Portugal -as they did in Egypt: they tried their strength once in the field, and -having failed they would have continued to retreat till they could have -got into safety. I do not believe that any corps could have fallen on -the flank of our march on the twenty-third.’ The only course open to -the French, in his opinion, was to throw over any idea of holding the -capital, withdraw its garrison, and cross the Tagus at Saccavem or -Villafranca, or Santarem, by means of the ships which lay in the river, -and the large fleet of barges which is always to be found in and near -Lisbon. Having passed the Tagus they might cut their way through the -insurgents of the Alemtejo, disperse the Spanish levies about Elvas and -Badajoz, and press north through Estremadura to join Bessières[242]. -This very idea did for a moment flash through the brains of some -of Junot’s council of war at Torres Vedras: but there lay on their -minds, like a nightmare, the remembrance of their awful march through -the Estremaduran mountains in the preceding autumn. If, journeying -unopposed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, they had been nearly starved -in that wilderness, what would be their fate if they had to cut their -way through an insurrection, with the English army hanging on their -heels? The most hopeful could only say that perhaps half the army might -struggle through to Old Castile. - - [239] This figure, of course, does not include the garrisons of - the outlying places, but only those immediately in and about - the capital, after the 66th and _compagnies d’élite_ marched to - Torres Vedras. - - [240] Hulot, _Mémoires Militaires_, p. 236. - - [241] Questions asked of Wellesley by Burrard at the Court of - Inquiry (_Proceedings_, p. 133). - - [242] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart, Aug. 25, 1808 (_Well. Disp._, iv. - 105); Wellesley’s address at the Court of Inquiry (_Proceedings_, - p. 132). - -Wellesley’s arguments to Dalrymple had no further effect than to induce -that general to make up his mind that the troops should march not on -the twenty-second but on the twenty-third, and not on Mafra but on -Torres Vedras. Sir John Moore’s division was to be brought down at -once to Maceira Bay, to join the main army, and not to be sent (as -Wellesley had urged) to Santarem. With the aid of this reinforcement -Dalrymple hoped to be strong enough to force back Junot into Lisbon. -The resolve meant fatal delay: Moore did not begin to disembark till -August 25, and his last men did not get ashore till August 30. On -that day only could Junot have been attacked seriously, and meanwhile -he would have obtained nine days in which to fortify his positions -and to place Lisbon in a thorough state of defence. The consequences -entailed would have been a long siege, the probable devastation of the -Portuguese capital, and the protraction of operations into November and -December. Even then there would still have been Elvas and Almeida to be -recaptured[243]. - - [243] This is Wellesley’s own view (_Well. Disp._, iv. 121, 184, - 185). - -But things were not destined to take this course. Dalrymple was busy -drafting his orders for the movement of the next day on Torres Vedras, -when an alarm ran through the camp that the French were at hand, and -the whole force flew to arms. This rumour was caused by the folly of -a Portuguese cavalry officer, whose vedettes had seen French horsemen -in the distance; he imagined an army on the move and reported its -approach. What he had really seen was General Kellermann, with two -squadrons of dragoons as his escort, bearing the white flag, and about -to propose to the British commander-in-chief the evacuation of Portugal -by the French army under a convention. - -We have already mentioned the fact that on the early morning of the -twenty-second, Junot had called together at Torres Vedras a council -of war composed of all his surviving generals--Loison, Kellermann, -Delaborde (who attended though suffering from two severe wounds), -Thiébault, the chief of the staff, Taviel, the commander of the -artillery, Col. Vincent, the chief engineer, and Trousset, the chief -commissary at Lisbon. Junot’s spirits were very low: he began by -explaining that he had only fought at Vimiero to save the honour of -the French arms, not because he hoped for victory--a statement which -will not bear investigation in the light of his previous dispatches and -letters[244]. The British, he said, were expecting huge reinforcements -from the sea: Freire was now moving on Obidos, another Portuguese corps -on Santarem: the reports of the state of public opinion in Lisbon were -most alarming. Under these circumstances, ought the army to try the -fortune of battle a second time? And if it must, what plan should be -adopted? If it could not, what alternative remained? When such was -the spirit of the leader, it was easy to foresee the replies of his -subordinates. The army, they soon resolved, had done its best in the -most honourable fashion, but it was not ready for another fight. Indeed -the stragglers had not yet finished pouring into Torres Vedras, and the -wearied rearguard which covered them had only reached the defile in -front of the town two hours after midnight[245]. The army, unmolested -as it was, did not get into fighting trim again till two days after -Vimiero. On the twenty-second it was still in a state of complete -disorganization: if Dalrymple had marched on Mafra he would not have -found a man in his path. - - [244] Cf. for Junot’s address, Foy, iv. 341, and Thiébault. - - [245] Hulot, _Souvenirs Militaires_, pp. 235, 236. - -Having resolved that the army was not ready for another battle, the -council of war had three alternatives before it: to fall back to cover -Lisbon on the positions of Mafra and Montechique; to evacuate Lisbon, -cross the Tagus, and make for Elvas; or to try to negotiate with the -British. The decision was soon made in favour of the third: Lisbon, -without regular fortifications, and swarming with a discontented -populace, would be a mere snare for the army. The retreat via Elvas on -Old Castile would mean the slow but certain destruction of the whole -corps[246]. For it was now known that Joseph Bonaparte had evacuated -Madrid, and that Burgos was probably the nearest point where a French -force was to be found. Not one of the officers present had the heart -to make a serious proposal for such a retreat. It only remained to try -whether Dalrymple was open to receive an offer: if he could be tempted -by the prospect of receiving Lisbon with all its magazines and riches -intact, he might allow the French army to return under safe conduct -to their own land. Kellermann, who could understand English, more or -less, and was considered a skilful diplomatist, was charged with the -negotiations. He rode out of Torres Vedras between ten and eleven in -the morning with his escort, charged with ample powers to treat. As he -passed the rearguard in the pass, four miles outside the town, he told -the officer in command that he was going to visit the English ‘to see -if he could get the army out of the mousetrap[247].’ - - [246] But it is said that Delaborde urged the possibility of this - move. - - [247] Hulot heard this himself. Kellermann said ‘qu’il allait - trouver les Anglais, pour voir à nous tirer de la souricière’ (p. - 236). - -By two o’clock Kellermann was conferring with the English commander--he -was astonished to find that it was Dalrymple and not Wellesley. The -reception that he met was an agreeable surprise to him. Dalrymple -showed his pleasure at the broaching of the idea of a convention in -the most undisguised fashion. The fact was that he was very glad -to avoid the possible dangers of an immediate advance and a second -fight. He called in Burrard and Wellesley to the interview, and from -his unguarded ‘asides’ to them, Kellermann soon learnt that Moore -had not yet landed, and that till he was ashore Dalrymple did not -feel safe. This gave the Frenchman a confidence which he had not -at first possessed, and he at once assumed an air of self-reliance -which he had been far from showing when he rode out of Torres Vedras. -Instead of merely trying to save the army at all costs, he began to -haggle about details, and to speak about the possibility of resuming -hostilities--the last thing in the world that he really desired[248]. - - [248] Foy, iv. 344, 345; _Well. Disp._, iv. 108. - -There was no doubt that a convention by which Portugal and all its -fortresses could be recovered without the necessity of firing another -shot was an eminently desirable thing. Wellesley did not hesitate a -moment in advising his superiors to take the offer. Burrard had given -away the certainty of recapturing Lisbon yesterday: Dalrymple, by -delaying his advance, had on this very morning sacrificed the second -chance (a much less brilliant one, it must be confessed) of ending -the campaign by a single blow. If Junot’s proposals were rejected and -hostilities were resumed, there lay before the British army either -a siege of Lisbon, which could not fail to ruin the city, or a long -stern-chase after the French, if they should resolve to cross the Tagus -and march off through the Alemtejo. No doubt it would sound better -in the ears of the British public if the surrender or destruction -of Junot’s army could be reported. But as a matter of practical -expediency, the recovery of Lisbon and all its wealth unharmed was -worth far more than the capture of a French army at the cost of much -time, many lives, and the ruin of the Portuguese capital. The loss of -25,000 soldiers would be nothing to Napoleon, who disposed of more than -half a million men: the blow to his pride would be almost as great if -he lost Portugal by a convention as if he lost it by a capitulation. As -a matter of fact he was much incensed at Junot, and would have dealt -hardly with him if Dupont had not drawn off his wrath by failing in an -even more disastrous fashion[249]. - - [249] See the curious account of the Emperor’s interviews with - Legendre and Thiébault, the chiefs of the staff to Dupont and - Junot, who appeared before him simultaneously at Valladolid - in January, 1809. The imperial thunders played so fiercely on - the army of Andalusia that the army of Portugal got off easily - (Thiébault, iv. 247-9). But Napoleon said that the English - had saved him the pain of crushing an old friend by sending - Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley before a court-martial. - -After hearing what Kellermann had to say, the three English generals -withdrew into an inner room, and after a very short discussion agreed -to treat. They told their visitor that he might have a forty-eight -hours’ suspension of hostilities at once, and that they would open -negotiations on the general base that Junot and his army should be -allowed to evacuate Portugal by sea without any of the forms of -capitulation, and be returned to their own country on British ships. -The details would take much discussion: meanwhile they invited -Kellermann to dine with them and to settle the main lines of the -Convention before he returned to his commander. There was a long -post-prandial debate, which showed that on two points there was likely -to be trouble; one was the way in which Siniavin’s Russian fleet in the -Tagus was to be treated: the other was how much the French should be -allowed to carry away with them from Portugal. Kellermann said that he -asked for no more than their ‘military baggage and equipments,’ but he -seemed to have a large idea of what came under these headings[250]. - - [250] Wellesley at the Court of Inquiry (_Well. Disp._, iv. 189). - -Meanwhile the terms of the suspension of hostilities were successfully -drafted; the line of the Zizandre river was to be fixed as that of -demarcation between the two hosts. Neither of them was to occupy -Torres Vedras: Dalrymple undertook to get the armistice recognized by -Freire and the other Portuguese generals in the field. They were not -to advance beyond Leiria and Thomar. The garrisons at Elvas, Almeida, -Peniche, and elsewhere were to be included in the Convention, unless -it should turn out that any of them had surrendered before August -25--which as a matter of fact they had not. The Russian fleet in the -Tagus was to be treated as if in a neutral port. This last clause was -much objected to by Wellesley, who found also several minor points in -the agreement of which he could not approve. But by the directions -of Dalrymple he signed the suspension of arms after a protest; his -superior had told him that it was ‘useless to drive the French to the -wall upon points of form[251].’ - - [251] Wellesley’s evidence before the Court of Inquiry - (_Proceedings_, p. 83). - -The subsequent negotiations for a definite convention occupied seven -days, from August 23 to 30. On the first-named day Junot evacuated -Torres Vedras, according to the stipulations of the agreement made by -Kellermann. He retired to the line of hills behind him, establishing -Loison’s division at Mafra and Delaborde’s at Montechique. Dalrymple, -on the other hand, moved his head quarters forward to Ramalhal, a -position just north of Torres Vedras, and only nine miles from Vimiero. -In this respect he profited less than the French from the suspension -of hostilities: it is true that he got leisure to disembark Moore’s -troops, but Junot gained the much more important advantage of a safe -retreat to a good position, and of leisure to strengthen himself in -it. It must not be supposed, however, that he was in a comfortable -situation; Lisbon was seething with suppressed rebellion. The news of -French victories, which had been published to quiet the people, had -soon been discovered to be nothing more than an impudent fiction. At -any moment an insurrection might have broken out: the garrison and the -mob were alike in a state of extreme nervous tension, which took shape -on the one side in assassinations, and on the other in wanton firing -at every person who approached a sentinel, or refused to stand when -challenged by a patrol. - -The negotiations for a definitive convention suffered several checks. -At one moment it seemed likely that the Portuguese army might give -trouble. General Freire arrived at Ramalhal in a state of high wrath, -to protest that he ought to have been made a party to the suspension -of hostilities. There was, as Napier remarks, more plausibility than -real foundation in his objection[252], for his motley army had taken no -part whatever in the operations that had brought Junot to his knees. -But he could make a distinct point when he asked by what authority -Dalrymple had given promises as to his neutrality in the agreement with -Kellermann, or laid down lines which he was not to pass. Freire was -all the bolder because his levies were now being strengthened by the -forces from Oporto which the Bishop had lately raised, while a small -Spanish brigade under the Marquis of Valladares, lent by the Galician -Junta, had come down as far as Guarda. But he contented himself with -protests, without committing any definite act that might have rendered -the Convention impossible. - - [252] Napier, i. 225. - -A more dangerous source of possible rupture was the view of the -situation taken by Sir Charles Cotton, the admiral in command of the -British blockading squadron off the mouth of the Tagus. As Wellesley -had foreseen, the naval men were determined to secure the possession of -the Russian ships of Siniavin. Cotton refused to entertain the proposal -that such a force should be allowed a free departure from Lisbon, as -if from a neutral port, and should be given a long start before being -pursued. He had held the Russians under blockade for many a weary -month, and was not going to abandon his hold upon them. Why should the -French evacuation of Portugal place Siniavin in a better position than -he had ever occupied before? The admiral declared that he saw no reason -why the Russians should be included in the Convention at all. If there -was going to be any agreement made with them, he should conduct it -himself, treating directly with Siniavin instead of through a French -intermediary. - -Sir Hew Dalrymple was forced to report to the French commander these -objections of the admiral. It seemed possible for a moment that the -difficulty would not be got over, and that war must recommence. -Wellesley strongly advised his chief to try the game of bluff--to -announce to Junot that operations would be resumed at the end of the -stipulated forty-eight hours, as Sir Charles Cotton had objected to -the terms of the armistice, but that he was prepared to take into -consideration any new proposals which might be made to him before the -interval of two days expired[253]. Such a firm policy, he thought, -would induce the French to yield the point--all the more because Junot -and Siniavin were known to be on very bad terms. But Dalrymple would -not accept this plan. He merely reported the admiral’s proposals to -Junot, without any intimation that the resumption of hostilities must -result from their rejection. This move placed the power of playing the -game of brag in the Frenchman’s hands. Seeing that Dalrymple did not -seem to desire to break off negotiations, he assumed an indignant tone, -and began to talk of his determination not to concede an inch, and of -the harm that he could do if he were forced to fight. ‘The English -might take away the half-drafted convention: he would have none of it. -He would defend Lisbon street by street: he would burn as much of it as -he could not hold, and it should cost them dear to take from him what -remained[254].’ At the same time he made a final proposal to Siniavin, -that he should put ashore his 6,000 seamen and marines, to take part -in the defence of Lisbon on the land side. This was only part of the -game of bluff, and intended for the benefit of the English rather than -of Siniavin, for Junot knew perfectly well, from the latter’s previous -conduct, that he was bent on playing his own hand, and would not fire a -single shot to help the French. - - [253] Evidence of Wellesley before the Court of Inquiry - (_Proceedings_, pp. 87-91). - - [254] Foy, iv. 352, and Thiébault. - -All Junot’s desperate language was, in fact, no more than a device -to squeeze better terms out of Dalrymple. The actual point on which -the argument grew hot was a mere pretext, for the Russian admiral -utterly refused to assist the French, and intimated that he should -prefer to conclude a separate convention of his own with Sir Charles -Cotton. Clearly it was not worth while for the Duke of Abrantes to risk -anything on behalf of such a torpid ally. - -Accordingly the Convention was reduced to a definitive form between -August 27 and 30. Colonel George Murray, the quartermaster-general, -acted as the British negotiator, while Kellermann continued to -represent Junot. The details were settled in Lisbon, where Murray -took up his residence, sending back frequent reports to his superior -officer at Ramalhal. Dalrymple and Cotton carried their point in that -no allusion whatever was made to the Russians in the document. Junot -found a salve for his injured pride by remembering that he had slipped -a mention of Napoleon as ‘Emperor of the French,’ into the text of the -suspension of hostilities[255]: in this he thought that he had won -a great success, for the British Government had hitherto refused to -recognize any such title, and had constantly irritated its adversaries -by alluding to the master of the Continent as ‘General Bonaparte,’ or -the ‘actual head of the French executive.’ - - [255] Article 1 of the armistice mentioned ‘his Imperial and - Royal Majesty, Napoleon I,’ though this formula did not recur in - the Convention, which only spoke of the ‘French Army.’ - -The terms of the Convention need close study[256]: it comprised -twenty-two articles and three supplementary paragraphs of addenda. The -first article provided that the French should surrender Lisbon and the -Portuguese fortresses in their existing condition, without harming or -dismantling them. The second and third granted the army of Junot a safe -departure by sea in English vessels: they were not to be considered -prisoners of war, might take their arms and baggage, and were to be -landed at any port between Rochefort and L’Orient. The fourth, fifth, -and sixth articles attempted to define the property which the French -might take away--their horses, their guns of French calibre (but not -any that they might have found in the Portuguese arsenals), with -sixty rounds for each piece, their wagons, their military chest, in -short, ‘all their equipment, and all that is comprehended under the -name of property of the army.’ It was found, later on, that these -paragraphs had been too loosely worded, and gave much endless occasion -for disputes. The next six articles settled the manner in which the -departing army was to embark, and the order in which each of the -strongholds that it evacuated was to be given up to the British. -The thirteenth and fourteenth articles arranged for the appointment -of commissaries by each side, to deal with disputed points in the -Convention, and added the curious clause that ‘where a doubt arose as -to the meaning of any article, it should be explained favourably to the -French army.’ - - [256] The full text will be found in the Appendix. - -But the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth articles were the most -objectionable part of the Convention. It was true that they secured -that no more taxes or contributions were to be raised by Junot, and -that undischarged fines which he had laid on the Portuguese should be -regarded as cancelled. But they also provided that French civilians in -Portugal might either depart with the army, or, if they preferred it, -might be allowed to remain behind unmolested, and have a year in which -to dispose of their property. This might perhaps pass: not so, however, -the ensuing clause, which provided that Portuguese subjects should not -be rendered accountable for their political conduct during the French -occupation: all who had taken service with the usurping government were -to be placed under the protection of the British, and to suffer no -injury in person or property. They were also to be granted liberty to -depart with the French army if they chose. - -The five remaining articles were unimportant. The eighteenth secured -the release of Caraffa and the rest of Junot’s Spanish prisoners, -and provided that in return the few French officers of the army of -Portugal, whom the Spaniards had captured at Oporto and Elvas, should -be liberated. The twenty-first permitted Junot to send one of his -aides-de-camp directly to France to carry the news of the Convention, -so that preparations might be made for the reception of the troops[257]. - - [257] For the strange way in which Junot utilized this permission - for his personal profit, see page 281. - -Three unimportant supplementary articles were added below the -signatures of Murray and Kellermann: one stipulated that French -civilian prisoners in the hands of the English and Portuguese should be -released, another that Junot’s army should subsist on its own magazines -till it embarked, a third that the British should permit the entry of -provisions into Lisbon, now that the Convention had been concluded. - -Such was the celebrated agreement which was destined to gain a most -unhappy notoriety in England under the name of the ‘Convention of -Cintra,’ a designation which it is hard to understand, for it was first -sketched at Torres Vedras, and was discussed and ratified at Lisbon. -The only connexion which it had with Cintra was that Dalrymple’s -dispatch to the British Government, enclosing the document in its -latest form, was dated from that pleasant spot in the environs of -Lisbon. But it would perhaps be pedantic to give any other name to such -a well-known document, than that under which it has been known for the -last ninety-three years. - -After a careful investigation of the details of this famous agreement, -the conclusion at which the impartial student will probably arrive is -that while on the military side it was justifiable, it presented grave -political faults. In order to recover Lisbon with its arsenals, its -forts and its shipping, all intact, Dalrymple might without serious -blame have granted even more to the French. By the Convention he saved, -not only the wealth of the capital, and the lives of the troops who -must have fallen in storming it, but, most important of all, time. If -he had but known the value of that commodity, he might have been in -Madrid at the head of all his British troops by October 1, or even -earlier. ‘I do not know what Sir Hew proposes to do,’ wrote Wellesley -the morning after the Convention was signed, ‘but if I were in his -situation I would have 20,000 men in Madrid in less than a month -from this day[258]’ But the importance of time was never realized by -the old commander-in-chief: he was superseded long before his army -had even moved up to the Portuguese frontier. Looking, therefore, -at the Convention in the broadest aspect, we hold that its military -advantages entirely outweighed those which might have been secured by -a prolongation of hostilities. But this conclusion does not mean that -there were not points in the military part of the agreement that might -have been modified with advantage. - - [258] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart, Sept. 1, 1808 (_Well. Disp._, iv. - 121). - -It is when we turn to the political section of the Convention that we -light upon grave faults and mistakes on the part of Dalrymple. The -first and foremost was that he signed the document without previously -submitting certain portions of it to the Portuguese government. In -the sixteenth and seventeenth articles the British general took upon -himself to grant certain favours both to French civilians resident in -Portugal, and to Portuguese subjects who had taken service under Junot, -which he had no authority to concede. These were points which concerned -not the British army but the Portuguese civil administration, and -should not have been decided without a consultation with our allies, -and a permission from them to make terms on their behalf. The sixteenth -article allowed Frenchmen resident in Lisbon to remain there for a -year after the Convention, if they did not chose to leave the country -with Junot and his troops. To permit subjects of the hostile power to -remain in Lisbon for so long was, of course, most distasteful to the -Portuguese government, which was naturally desirous of expelling at -once, according to the ordinary customs of war, a body of persons many -of whom had made themselves the partners and instruments of Junot’s -peculations, and who for the next twelve months would serve as spies -and purveyors of intelligence to the French Emperor. Nothing more than -the leave to quit Lisbon in Junot’s wake should have been secured to -them, unless the Junta of Regency gave its consent. The seventeenth -article is even more objectionable: a considerable portion of the -bureaucracy of Portugal had been weak and criminal enough to acquiesce -in the French usurpation, and to make themselves the tools of the Duke -of Abrantes. It was natural that their countrymen should feel deeply -indignant with them; and their lot was likely to be so hard that it was -but rational and humane to give them leave to quit the kingdom. But -considering that they had deserved very ill of the state, it was surely -wrong for the British general to promise to take them under his special -protection, and to guarantee them against injury to their persons or -property. He had no power to grant them an amnesty for their past -ill-doing; that could be given only by the Portuguese government. -When the latter resumed its ordinary functions at Lisbon, it was -absurd that it should be prevented, by the Convention, from taking -into consideration the cases of such of these unpatriotic persons as -it might wish to deal with. When, therefore, Kellermann broached to -Dalrymple the sixteenth and seventeenth articles, the latter should -have refused to accept them without a reference to the Junta at Oporto. -He might have granted both the French and the Portuguese satellites of -Junot a free passage out of Portugal, with such of their goods as they -could carry, but more than this he could not rationally concede on his -own authority. - -It was fortunate, therefore, that the practical harm done did not -turn out to be very great. Both the aliens and the natives covered by -these two clauses were so perfectly aware of their own unpopularity -in Lisbon, that they absconded almost _en masse_. The populace of the -capital had given them fair warning of what they might expect, for -not only were they threatened and insulted in the streets whenever -they were out of sight of a French sentry, but unknown hands posted -on the walls lists of houses to be sacked and individuals to be hung -as soon as Junot’s army should have sailed. The watchwords, ‘Death to -the French’ and ‘Death to the traitors,’ were muttered even under the -muzzles of the cannon, which had been trained on all the main streets, -to keep down the insurrection for the few days which had to elapse -before the embarkation. The invaders, therefore, had to take away with -them a very large body of civilian dependants, headed by the Comte de -Novion, a French _émigré_, who, after being hospitably entertained in -Lisbon for many years, had shown his gratitude by accepting the post of -head of Junot’s police--a capacity in which he had much odd business to -transact. - -But besides Articles XVI and XVII of the Convention there were other -clauses to which Dalrymple should not have given his assent without -consulting the representatives of his allies. Almeida was being -blockaded by a mass of Portuguese militia, and Elvas, a few days after -the treaty had been signed, was attacked by a Spanish force sent out -from Badajoz by Galluzzo, the Captain-General of Estremadura. No -British soldier had yet been seen within a hundred miles of either -fortress. What was to be done if the generals of the besieging troops -refused to abide by an agreement which they had not been asked to sign, -and which had not even been laid before their respective governments -ere it was definitively ratified? A grave crisis, as we shall find, was -created by Dalrymple’s neglect to foresee this difficulty. His conduct -all through the days of negotiation was very strange; not only did he -make no proper attempt to communicate with the Portuguese authorities, -but he actually left his own government uninformed of his proceedings -for a fortnight. He failed to send them any dispatch to announce -the armistice of August 22, and only forwarded that detailing the -Convention of August 30 on the fourth day of the succeeding month. - -Dalrymple’s main reason for leaving the Portuguese out of the -negotiations was that the Junta at Oporto had not yet been formally -recognized as the legitimate government of Portugal[259]. Wellesley, -no doubt, had conferred with the Bishop, given him arms and munitions, -procured from him food and draught animals, and asked his advice, but -the British ministry had not yet acknowledged the existence of any -regular executive in Portugal. This being so, Dalrymple thought himself -justified in acting as if there were none in being; and it cannot be -denied that thereby he saved himself much present trouble, at the cost -of future friction. All, therefore, that he did was to inform the -Junta’s agent at the British head quarters, one Pinto da Souza, that he -was negotiating with Junot for the evacuation of Lisbon, and that he -was open to receive any observations which the Junta might make. The -same announcement was made to Bernardino Freire, who had ridden over -to Ramalhal[260] to complain that he and his army were not mentioned -in the armistice of August 22. Both Freire and the Junta were treated -as persons whose opinions it was useful to obtain, not as constituted -authorities whose consent to the definitive convention was necessary -in order to make it binding. Dalrymple tried to cover himself during -the subsequent inquiry by maintaining that the Convention was purely -military, and concerned the French and English armies alone: but this -plea cannot seriously be put forward in face of Articles XV, XVI, and -XVII, all of which are concerned with problems of civil government, -which would arise after the French army should have embarked. Each -of these articles clearly required the ratification of some proper -Portuguese authority to make it valid. - - [259] Dalrymple’s _Memoir of the Affairs of Portugal_, p. 66. - - [260] Dalrymple says that he signed the armistice so soon after - landing, and with such an incomplete knowledge of the situation - in Portugal, that he did not know that Freire’s army was anywhere - in his neighbourhood (p. 65). - -Both the Bishop of Oporto and General Freire were deeply wounded by the -way in which Dalrymple ignored their status--the prelate more justly -than the soldier, for he had done his best to assist the British army, -while Freire by his captious and impracticable behaviour had been more -of a hindrance than a help. The Bishop charged the representative of -the Supreme Junta in London to complain to the British Government as -to the behaviour of their generals, denouncing not only their neglect -to make the Junta a party to the Convention, but also the terms of -that document, which were stated to be far too favourable to Junot. -Owing to Dalrymple’s extraordinary delay in apprising the ministry -of the details of the treaty, the Bishop’s excited denunciations of -the agreement had currency for nearly a fortnight, before any one in -England knew what exactly had been granted to Junot, or how far the -Junta was justified in its wrath. - - - - -SECTION IV: CHAPTER V - -THE FRENCH EVACUATE PORTUGAL - - -The Convention of Cintra being once signed, the difficulties which were -bound to arise from the unwisdom of some of its articles were not long -in showing themselves. Indeed the first fortnight of September turned -out to be a very critical time. - -The Portuguese authorities were furious: Dalrymple found the greatest -trouble in preventing the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who had gathered -opposite the mouth of the Tagus under the Conde de Castro Marim[261], -from attacking the French detachments in the forts on the left bank. -Their commander protested against the Convention, and actually appealed -to Admiral Cotton to repudiate it: fortunately he was content to -confine his opposition to words. But there was much more trouble at -Elvas: the Junta of Estremadura did not object to the settlement, and -liberated the French prisoners who were in its hands, according to the -proposal in the eighteenth article. But Galluzzo, the Captain-General -of that province, showed himself much more disobliging. He refused to -call off the troops under his lieutenant De Arce, who were beleaguering -Elvas, and behaved in the most dictatorial manner within Portuguese -territory, raising not only requisitions of food but contributions -of money. He even seized, at Campo Mayor, the military chest of the -Portuguese general Leite, who commanded the wrecks of the force that -had been beaten at Evora by Loison in July[262]. His detestable -behaviour had the good effect of throwing the natives of the country on -the English side, and Leite welcomed the arrival of troops from Lisbon, -which enabled him to protest with effect against the misdoings and -plunderings of the Spaniards. De Arce’s troops were doing no real good: -they only maintained a distant and futile bombardment of the citadel -of La Lippe, in which the garrison of Elvas had taken refuge. The -French commandant, Girod de Novillars, laughed their efforts to scorn, -and refused to listen to the proposals for a capitulation which they -kept pressing upon him. In spite of orders from the Junta of Seville, -bidding him abandon the siege and march for Madrid with his army, -Galluzzo persisted in his ridiculous proceedings till nearly the end -of September. It was only when Dalrymple moved up to the neighbourhood -first the 20th Regiment, and then two whole brigades under Sir John -Hope, that the Captain-General drew off his men and retired into -Spanish territory [September 25]. Then Girod and his garrison, which -was mainly composed of the 4th Swiss Regiment, were able to march to -Lisbon under British escort and embark for France. They did not sail -till October 9, so long had Galluzzo’s freaks delayed them. - - [261] Better known, from his court office, as the _Monteiro Mor_, - which answers to our ‘Master of the Horse.’ - - [262] See Leite’s indignant letters to Dalrymple in Napier, vol. - i. App. xii. De Arce is the real name of the Dearey of whom - Napier speaks on p. 245. Cf. Dalrymple’s _Memoir_, p. 82. - -The garrison of Almeida departed about the same time: they had -maintained themselves without difficulty against the Portuguese -insurgents, but duly yielded up the place on the arrival of British -troops. They were marched down to Oporto under an escort of 200 men, a -force so weak that it nearly led to a disaster. For the mob of Oporto, -under the pretext that church plate and other public plunder was being -carried off by the French, fell upon them as they were embarking and -nearly made an end of them. It required all the exertions of the -escort, the Bishop of Oporto, and Sir Robert Wilson--who was then on -the spot organizing his well-known ‘Lusitanian Legion’--to prevent the -populace from boarding the transports and slaying the whole of the -French battalion. The baggage of the departing troops was seized and -plundered, and they barely succeeded in escaping with their lives[263]. - - [263] Foy, iv. 361, 362; Napier, i. 246, 247. Napier suppresses - the part taken in saving the French by the Bishop and by Wilson, - to neither of whom were his feelings friendly. Foy acknowledges - the services of both. There is a good account of the whole by - Wilson, in his papers at the Record Office. - -Meanwhile, long before the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida had been -brought down to the coast, Junot and the main body of his army had -departed. The commander-in-chief himself had sailed on September 13, -the first division of his army on the fifteenth, the rest between -that day and the thirtieth. The last weeks of the French occupation -of Lisbon had been most uncomfortable for all parties concerned. -The populace was seething with discontent, assassinating isolated -soldiers, and threatening a general rising. The French were under -arms day and night, with cannon trained down every street and square. -Unpopular officers, such as Loison, could not stir from their quarters -without a large escort. Sullen at their defeat, and still more angry -at having to abandon the heaps of plunder which they had amassed, the -French were in a most disobliging mood in their dealings with the -Portuguese, and in a less degree with the English. The main source of -irritation was the very necessary measures which had to be taken for -searching the baggage of the departing army. A commission had been -formed, consisting of Kellermann on the one side and General Beresford -and Lord Proby on the other, to settle in all disputed cases what was -military equipment and legitimate personal property, and what was not. -The English commissioners discovered the most astounding hoards of -miscellaneous goods among the bags and boxes of the invaders[264]. The -conduct of most of the French officers, from the commander-in-chief -downwards, was most disgraceful. A few examples may suffice: Junot, -by the twenty-first article of the Convention, had been granted leave -to send a single officer to France with news for the Emperor. This -officer, his aide-de-camp Lagrave, took with him for his general’s -private profit the most valuable set of books in the Royal Library -of Lisbon, fourteen volumes of a manuscript Bible of the fifteenth -century, illustrated with miniatures by the best Florentine artists--a -gift to King Emanuel from one of the Renaissance popes. Junot’s widow -afterwards sold it to the French government for 85,000 francs. Lagrave, -having started before the commissioners had begun to work, got off with -his boxes unsearched. But other interesting items were discovered in -the baggage of the Duke of Abrantes--one was £5,000 worth of indigo in -fifty-three large chests, another was a quantity of valuable specimens -of natural history from the public museum. General Delaborde was found -to be in possession of a large collection of sacred pictures which had -adorned Lisbon churches. Scattered through the baggage of many officers -was a quantity of church plate--apparently part of the property -seized to pay the war contributions which Napoleon had imposed on -Portugal: but it had in some mysterious way passed from public into -private possession[265]. In the military chest were gold bars to the -value of 1,000,000 francs which had come from the same source, but the -paymaster-general tried to get them out of the country without paying -the numerous accounts owed by his department to private individuals in -Lisbon. They were not discharged till this individual, one Thonnellier, -had been put under arrest, and threatened with detention after the -rest of the army should have sailed[266]. Another most scandalous -proceeding discovered by the commissioners was that Junot, after the -signature of the Convention, had broken open the Deposito Publico, the -chest of the Supreme Court of Lisbon, which contained moneys whose -rightful ownership was in dispute between private litigants. He took -from it coin to the value of £25,000, which was only wrung out of -him with the greatest difficulty. Even after a vast amount had been -recovered, the French sailed with a military chest containing pay for -three months ahead for the whole army, though they had entered Portugal -penniless. For a general picture of their behaviour it may suffice to -quote the report of the British commissioners. ‘The conduct of the -French has been marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and -probity, publicly evincing their intention of departing with their -booty, and leaving acknowledged debts unpaid. Finally they only paid -what they were obliged to disgorge.... Unmindful of every tie of -honour or justice, the French army has taken away a considerable sum -in its military chest, still leaving its debts unpaid to a very large -amount[267].’ - - [264] Napier, with his customary tenderness for French - susceptibilities, has only very general allusions to these - disgraceful peculations. My details are mainly from Thiébault - (iv. 198-200), who frankly confesses everything, and gives many - scandalous particulars. He was, as Napoleon wrote, ‘not delicate - in money matters.’ - - [265] Cf. Thiébault, Napier, and some curious details given in - the _Annual Register_ for 1808, with Proby and Beresford’s Report. - - [266] For previous acts and plans of this shameless person see - Thiébault, iv. 151-3. - - [267] Report of General Beresford and Lord Proby to Sir Hew - Dalrymple after the evacuation. - -It was no wonder that the resentment of the Portuguese was so great -that the last French who embarked could only get away under the -protection of British bayonets, and that many of those who straggled -or lingered too long in remote corners of the town lost their lives. -The wild fury of the Lisbon mob surprised the British officers who -were charged with the embarkation[268]: they knew little of what had -been going on in the capital for the last nine months, and could not -understand the mad rage displayed against the garrison. - - [268] For the tumults and murders at the embarkation see Col. - Leslie’s _Military Journal_, pp. 66-76, and Col. Wilkie’s - _English in Spain_, p. 16. - -But finally the last French bayonet disappeared from the streets of -Lisbon, and the populace, with no object left on which to vent their -fury, turned to illuminations, feasts, and the childish delights of -fireworks. They did not show themselves ungrateful to the army of -liberation; all the British officers who have described the first -weeks after the evacuation of Lisbon, bear witness to the enthusiasm -with which they were received, and the good feeling displayed by their -allies[269]. It was only in the highest Portuguese quarters that -dissatisfaction was rampant: the Bishop of Oporto, General Freire, and -the Monteiro Mor, had all suffered what they considered an insult, -when their consent was not asked to the Convention of Cintra, and made -no secret of their anger against Dalrymple. But it does not seem that -their feelings affected any large section of the people. - - [269] See Col. Steevens’ _Reminiscences_, pp. 54, 55; Col. - Wilkie, p. 14; Col. Leslie, pp. 65, 66. - -The French army embarked for its native soil still 25,747 strong. -It had entered Portugal in the previous November with a strength of -nearly 25,000, and had received during the spring of 1808 some 4,500 -recruits: in the month of May, before hostilities began, its full -force had been 26,594[270]. Of this total 20,090 were under arms at -the moment that the Convention was signed, 3,522 were in hospital, -sick or wounded: 916 were prisoners in the hands of the English or the -Portuguese. There remain, therefore, some 4,500 men to be accounted -for: these, however, were not all dead. More than 500 had deserted -and taken service with the British before the embarkation: they -came, almost without exception, from the ranks of the three foreign -battalions which had been serving with Junot, the 1st Hanoverians and -the 2nd and 4th Swiss[271]. As the total force of these corps had been -only 2,548, it is clear that about one man in five deserted. This was -natural in the case of the Germans, who were old subjects of George -III, and most unwilling recruits to the French army, but the equally -well-marked defection of the Swiss is very notable. Most of the -latter were enlisted for the 5th Battalion of the 60th Rifles, while -the Hanoverians joined their countrymen in the ranks of the King’s -German Legion[272]. The real deficit, then, in Junot’s army was about -4,000 men: this represents the total loss of life by the fights of -Roliça and Vimiero, by the numerous combats with the Portuguese, by the -stragglers cut off during the forced marches of July and August, and by -the ordinary mortality in hospital. It must be considered on the whole -a very moderate casualty list: Junot’s corps, when it re-entered Spain -to serve once more under the Emperor, was still 22,000 strong. It would -have been even a trifle higher in numbers if a transport carrying two -companies of the 86th Regiment had not foundered at sea, with the loss -of every man on board. - - [270] _Well. Suppl. Disp._, vi. 207 (figures given for May 23), - and Thiébault. - - [271] Napier, i. 246; Foy, iv. 363. We have already had occasion - to note the proclivity of the 2nd Swiss to desert. The 4th Swiss, - who had formed the garrison of Elvas, showed exactly the same - tendency. - - [272] A table in the _Parliamentary Papers relative to Spain and - Portugal_ shows that the Legion received 163 recruits from this - source. The 5/60th obtained a much larger number, having still - over 200 Swiss with them in 1809. - -It is necessary to give some account of the fate of Siniavin’s Russian -squadron, before dismissing the topic of the evacuation of Portugal. -The admiral, as we have already had occasion to state, had steadfastly -refused to throw in his lot with Junot and to join in the Convention -of Cintra. He preferred to make an agreement of his own with Sir -Charles Cotton. It was a simple document of two articles: the first -provided that the nine sail of the line and one frigate, which formed -the Russian fleet, should be given up, sent to England, and ‘held as a -deposit’ by his Britannic majesty, to be restored within six months of -a peace between Great Britain and Russia. The second was to the effect -that Siniavin, his officers and crews, should be sent back to Russia on -English ships without being in any way considered prisoners of war, or -debarred from further service. - -Admiral Cotton, it is clear, regarded the ships as important and the -crews as worthy of small attention. It was profitable to Great Britain -to keep down the number of vessels in the power of Napoleon, though now -that the Danish fleet was captured, and the Spanish fleet transferred -to the other side of the balance, there could be no longer any -immediate danger of the French taking the offensive at sea. The easy -terms of release granted to the _personnel_ of the Russian squadron -suggest that the British admiral had determined to reward its commander -for his persistent refusal to help Junot. It almost appears that Cotton -looked upon Siniavin as a secret friend, and treated him accordingly. -Milder terms could hardly have been devised, for the moment that the -harbour-forts of Lisbon were surrendered to the British, the Russians -must obviously be made prisoners, since they could not get out of the -river. It is probable that the two admirals thoroughly understood each -other’s mind, and that the Russian was undisguisedly pleased at the -disaster of his detested French allies. - -The most pressing necessity in Portugal, after the French had departed, -was the construction of a new national government, for it was clear -that the Supreme Junta at Oporto represented in reality only the -northern provinces of the realm, and could not be accepted--as its -president, the Bishop, suggested--as a permanent and legitimate -executive for the whole kingdom. Constitutionally speaking, if one -may use such a phrase when dealing with a country like Portugal, the -only body which possessed a clear title of authority was the Council -of Regency, which Prince John had nominated nine months before, on the -eve of his departure for Brazil. But this council had long ceased to -act; its members were dispersed; several had compromised themselves -by submitting to the French and taking office under Junot; and its -composition gave no promise of vigorous action for the future. If a -choice must be made between the Junta at Oporto, which was active and -patriotic, though perhaps too much given up to self-assertion and -intrigue, and the effete old Regency, there could be no doubt that -the former possessed more claims to the confidence of the Portuguese -nation and its English allies. But it was not necessary to adopt -either alternative in full: Wellesley, who had already got a firm -grip upon the outlines of Portuguese politics, advised Dalrymple to -invite the old Regency, with the exception of those members who had -compromised themselves with the French, to reassemble, and to bring -pressure upon them to co-opt to the vacant places the Bishop of Oporto -and the other prominent members of the Junta. This proposal would have -secured legality of form (since the old Regency would theoretically -have continued to exist), while introducing new and vigorous elements -of undoubted patriotism into the body[273]. But Dalrymple preferred to -reinstate, by a proclamation of his own, those members of the Regency -who had never wavered in their allegiance to Prince John [Sept. 18]. -He called upon all public bodies and officials in the realm to obey -this reconstituted executive. Here was an undoubted mistake; it was -wounding to Portuguese pride to see the central governing body of -the kingdom created by the edict of an English general: Dalrymple -should surely have allowed the Regents to apprise the nation, by -a proclamation of their own, that they had resumed their former -functions. However, they fell in with Wellesley’s plans so far as -to co-opt the Bishop of Oporto as a colleague, though refusing any -places to the rest of his Junta. The whole body now consisted of -three original members, the Conde de Castro Marim (otherwise known -as the Monteiro Mor), Francisco Da Cunha, and Xavier de Noronha, of -two persons chosen from a list of possible substitutes, which the -Prince-Regent had left behind, Joam de Mendonça and General Miguel -Forjas Coutinho, and of two co-opted members, the Bishop and the Conde -das Minas, an old nobleman who had shown a very determined spirit in -resisting Junot during the days of his power. - - [273] Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, Sept. 9 (_Well. Disp._, iv. - 137). In spite of Napier’s denunciation of the Bishop, Wellesley - bears good witness in his favour, e.g. iv. 146. - -On the reconstitution of the Regency the Junta of Oporto, with more -self-denial than had been expected, dissolved itself. The minor -juntas in the Algarve, the Alemtejo, and the Tras-os-Montes followed -its example, and Portugal was once more in possession of a single -executive, whose authority was freely recognized throughout the -kingdom. Unfortunately it turned out to be slow, timid, and divided -into cliques which were always at variance with each other. - -We have already seen that owing to various causes of delay, of which -Galluzzo’s preposterous proceedings at Elvas were the most prominent, -the last French troops did not quit Portugal till September had -expired, and that Junot himself and the main body of his army had only -begun to leave on the fifteenth of that month. It would have been -impossible for Dalrymple to advance into Spain till the French had left -Lisbon, however urgently his presence might have been required. But it -would perhaps have proved feasible to push forward towards the Spanish -frontier a considerable part of his army, and to make preparations for -the movement of the whole towards Madrid or Salamanca as soon as the -evacuation should be complete. Dalrymple, however, was as leisurely -as the generals of the old days before the Revolutionary War. He kept -his troops cantoned about Lisbon, only pushing forward two brigades -towards Elvas in order to bring Galluzzo to reason, and dispatching -the 6th Regiment as a garrison to Almeida. He seems to have been -quite as much interested in the administration of Portugal as in the -further prosecution of the war in Spain. We find him much busied in -the reconstruction of the Portuguese government and army, reviewing -and rearming the Spanish division of Caraffa before shipping it off -to Catalonia [Sept. 22], and spending a great deal of time over the -redistribution into brigades and divisions of his army, which had now -swelled to something like 35,000 men, by the arrival of Moore’s force -and certain regiments from Madeira, Gibraltar, and England. He was also -engaged in endeavours to organize a proper commissariat for this large -body of men, a hard task, for every brigade arrived in the same state -of destitution as to means of transport as had those which landed with -Wellesley at Mondego Bay on the first of August. But in all his actions -there was evident a want of vigour and of purposeful resource, which -was very distressing to those of his subordinates who were anxious for -a rapid and decisive advance towards the main theatre of war in Spain. - -No one felt this more clearly than Wellesley, whose views as to his -commander’s competence had never changed since that hour on the morning -of August 22, when Dalrymple had refused to march on Mafra, and had -decided to delay his advance till the advent of Moore. Since then he -had offered his advice on several points, and had almost always seen it -refused. Dealing with the disputed details of the Convention of Cintra, -he had spoken in favour of meeting the French demands with high-handed -decision: hence he was vexed by Dalrymple’s tendency towards weakness -and compromise. One of his special grievances was that he had been -ordered to sign the armistice of August 22 as representing the British -army, although he had privately protested against its details[274]. His -unofficial letters home during the first half of September are full of -bitter remarks on the weakness of the policy that had been adopted, and -the many faults of the Convention[275]. Seeing that warlike operations -appeared likely to be postponed for an indefinite time, he at last -asked and obtained leave to return to England, after declining in -somewhat acid terms an offer made to him by Dalrymple that he should -go to Madrid, to concert a plan for combined operations with Castaños -and the other Spanish generals. ‘In order to be able to perform the -important part allotted to him,’ he wrote, ‘the person sent should -possess the confidence of those who employ him, and be acquainted with -their plans, the means by which they hope to carry them into execution, -and those by which they intend to enable the Spanish nation to execute -that which will be proposed to them. I certainly cannot consider myself -as possessing these advantages[276].’ Wellesley also refused another -and a less tempting offer of a mission to the Asturias, for the purpose -of seeing what facilities that province would offer as the base of -operations for a British army. He was not a ‘draftsman,’ he wrote, or -a ‘topographical engineer,’ and he could not pretend to describe in -writing the character of such a region. In short he was set on going -home, and would not turn from his purpose. But before leaving Portugal -he wrote two remarkable letters. One was to Sir John Moore, the third -in command of the army, telling him that he regarded him as the right -person to take charge of the British forces in the Peninsula, and would -use every effort with the ministers to get the post secured to him. -‘It is quite impossible that we can go on as we are now constituted: -the commander-in-chief must be changed, and the country and the army -naturally turn their eyes to you as their commander[277].’ The second -and longer was a letter to his patron Castlereagh, in which he laid -down his views as to the general state of the war in Spain, and the way -in which the British army could be best employed. It is a wonderful -document, as he foretells in it all the disasters that were about to -befall the Spaniards from their reckless self-confidence. The only -real fighting-force that they possessed was, he said, the army of -Castaños: the rest, with the possible exception of Blake’s Galicians, -were ‘armies of peasantry,’ which could not be relied upon to meet the -French in the field. Though they might on some occasions fight with -success in their own mountains, ‘yet in others a thousand French with -cavalry and artillery will disperse thousands of them.’ They would not, -and indeed could not, leave their native provinces, and no officer -could calculate upon them for the carrying out of a great combined -operation. How then could the British army of Portugal be best employed -to aid such allies? The only efficient plan, Wellesley concludes, would -be to place it upon the flank and rear of any French advance to Madrid, -by moving it up to the valley of the Douro, and basing it upon Asturias -and Galicia. Posted in the kingdom of Leon, with its ports of supply at -Gihon, Corunna, and Ferrol, it should co-operate with Blake, and hang -upon the right flank of the French army which was forming upon the line -of the Ebro. The result would be to prevent the invaders from moving -forward, even perhaps (here Wellesley erred from ignorance of the -enemy’s numbers) to oblige them to retire towards their own frontier. -But Bonaparte could, unless occupied by the affairs of Central Europe, -increase his armies in Spain to any extent. The moment that he heard -of an English force in the field, he would consider its destruction as -his first object, and so multiply his numbers in the Peninsula that -the British commander would have to give back. ‘There must be a line -of retreat open, and that retreat must be the sea.’ Accordingly, Sir -Arthur recommended that the Asturias should be made the ultimate base, -and the transports and stores sent to its port of Gihon[278]. - - [274] Wellesley to the Bishop of Oporto, Sept. 6: ‘I was present - during the negotiation of the agreement, and by the desire of the - Commander-in-chief I signed it. But I did not negotiate it, nor - can I in any manner be considered responsible for its contents’ - (_Well. Disp._, iv. 134). Wellesley to Castlereagh, Oct. 6: ‘I do - not consider myself responsible in any degree for the terms in - which it was framed, or for any of its provisions.’ - - [275] Wellesley to Mr. Stuart (_Well. Disp._, iv. 120). To Lord - Castlereagh (iv. 118). To the Duke of Richmond (_Suppl. Disp._, - vi. 129). - - [276] Wellesley to Dalrymple _(Well. Disp._, iv. 138). - - [277] Wellesley to Moore, Sept. 17, 1808 (_Well. Disp._, p. 142). - Moore, as a noted Whig, was imagined not to be a _persona grata_ - at head quarters; Wellesley offers, in the most handsome way, to - endeavour to smooth matters for him. - - [278] This letter, written to Castlereagh from Zambujal (_Well. - Disp._, iv. 127-32), is one of the most conclusive proofs of - Wellesley’s military genius. He valued the Spanish armies at - their true force. He foresaw that Bonaparte would make ‘the - driving of the leopard into the sea’ a point of honour, and - would send corps on corps into Spain in order to secure it. He - even noted that the affairs of Central Europe, ‘of which I have - no knowledge whatever,’ would be the only possible reason that - might prevent the Emperor from inundating the Peninsula with his - legions. He saw that the presence of the British in Leon would be - the one thing that would keep the French from subduing Central - Spain: a disaster in the Douro valley was the nightmare of the - Emperor, as half a dozen of his dispatches show. The first news - that Moore was near Valladolid drew Napoleon from Madrid in wild - haste, and deferred for six months the conquest of the valley of - the Guadiana. - -This letter was different in its general character from the other -reports which Castlereagh was receiving: most of the correspondents -of the Secretary for War could write of nothing but the enthusiastic -patriotism of the Spaniards and their enormous resources: they spoke -of the French as a dispirited remnant, ready to fly, at the first -attack, behind the line of the Pyrenees. It is therefore greatly to -the credit of Castlereagh that he did not hesitate to pin his faith -upon Wellesley’s intelligence, and to order the execution of the very -plan that he recommended. It was practically carried out in the great -campaign of Sir John Moore, after the collapse of the Spanish armies -had justified every word that Sir Arthur had written about them. - -Wellesley sailed from Lisbon on September 20, and reached Plymouth on -October 4. On his arrival in England he was met with news of a very -mixed character. On the one hand he was rejoiced to hear that both -Dalrymple and Burrard had been recalled, and that Sir John Moore had -been placed in command of the British forces in the Peninsula. He -wrote at once to the latter, to say that there could be no greater -satisfaction than to serve under his orders, and that he would return -at once to Spain to join him: ‘he would forward with zeal every wish’ -of his new commander[279]. It was also most gratifying to Wellesley to -know that the dispatch of September 25, by which Moore was given the -command of the army of Portugal, directed him to move into Northern -Spain and base himself upon the Asturias and Galicia, the very plan -which formed the main thesis of the document that we have been -discussing. There can be no doubt that Castlereagh had recognized the -strategical and political verities that were embodied in Wellesley’s -letter, and had resolved to adopt the line therein recommended. - - [279] Wellesley to Moore, Oct. 8 (_Well. Suppl. Disp._, vi. 150, - 151). - - - - -SECTION IV: CHAPTER VI - -THE COURT OF INQUIRY - - -There was another and a less pleasant surprise in store for Wellesley -when he landed at Plymouth. He learnt that if he himself disliked the -armistice of August 22, and the Convention of Cintra, the British -public had gone far beyond him, and was in a state of frantic rage -concerning them. To his anger and amazement he also learnt that he -himself was considered no less responsible for the two agreements than -were Dalrymple and Burrard. The fact that the former had told him to -set his signature opposite to that of Kellermann on the document signed -at Vimiero, had misled the world into regarding him as the negotiator -and framer of the armistice. ‘Every whisperer who disliked the name of -Wellesley[280]’--and Sir Arthur’s brother, the Governor-General, had -made it very unpopular in certain quarters--was busy propagating the -story that of the three generals who had lately commanded in Portugal, -each one was as slack and supine as the others. - - [280] The Duke of Richmond to Wellesley, Oct. 12, 1808 (_Well. - Suppl. Disp._, vi. 633). - -The wave of indignation which swept across England on the receipt of -the news of the Convention of Cintra is, at this distance of time, a -little hard to understand. Successes had not been so plentiful on the -Continent during the last fifteen years, that an agreement which gave -back its liberty to a whole kingdom need have been criticized with -vindictive minuteness. But the news of Baylen had set the public mind -on the look-out for further triumphs, and when the dispatches which -gave an account of Roliça and of Vimiero had come to hand, there had -been a confident expectation that the next news received would be that -Junot’s army had been scattered or captured, and that Lisbon had been -set free. Then came a gap of thirteen days, caused by Dalrymple’s -strange fit of silence. The only intelligence that reached London in -this interval was the Bishop of Oporto’s letter of protest against the -armistice, in which, without giving any definite details about that -agreement, he denounced it as insulting to Portugal and unworthy of -England. The public was prepared, therefore, to hear that something -timid and base had been done, when Dalrymple’s dispatch of September -3, enclosing the Convention of Cintra, came to hand. It was easy to -set forth the terms of that treaty in an odious light. Junot, it was -said, had been beaten in the field, he was completely isolated from all -the other French armies, and his surrender must have followed in a few -days, if the British generals had only chosen to press their advantage. -Instead of this, they preferred to let him return to France with the -whole of his troops, and with most of his plunder. He was not even -compelled to release a corresponding number of British prisoners in -return for the freedom secured to his army. In fact, his position was -much better after than before his defeat at Vimiero, for the Convention -granted him a quiet and safe return home with his force intact, while, -even if he had won some success in battle, the best that he would have -been able to secure himself would have been a retreat on Northern -Spain, through the midst of great dangers. Excitable politicians and -journalists used the most exaggerated language, and compared the -Convention with that of Kloster Seven, and the conduct of the generals -who had not pressed the campaign to its logical end with Admiral Byng’s -shirking before Minorca. Caricatures were issued showing Dalrymple, -Burrard, and Wellesley sporting the white feather, or hanging from -three gibbets as traitors[281]. Nor was Admiral Cotton spared: he was -denounced in bitter terms for taking the Russian ships as ‘deposits,’ -when he should have towed them into Spithead as prizes: moreover the -repatriation of the Russian crews was asserted to be a deadly blow at -our unfortunate ally the King of Sweden. - - [281] Toreño, then acting as agent for the Asturian Junta in - London, has much interesting information on this point. He saw - the gibbet caricature and papers published with black edges (i. - 251). - -The rage against the Convention was not confined to any one class or -faction in the state. If some Whigs tried to turn it into the shape of -an attack on the government, there were plenty of Tories who joined in -the cry, begging their leaders in the ministry to dismiss and punish -the three unpopular generals. A number of public meetings were held -with the object of forcing the hands of the Duke of Portland and his -colleagues, but the most prominent part in the agitation was taken -by the Corporation of London. Recalling the old days of Wilkes and -Beckford, they resolved that the Lord Mayor, with a deputation of -Sheriffs, Aldermen, and Common-Councillors, should present a petition -to the King begging him to order ‘an inquiry into this dishonourable -and unprecedented transaction, for the discovery and punishment of -those by whose misconduct and incapacity the cause of the kingdom and -its allies has been so shamelessly sacrificed.’ - -Accordingly such a petition was laid before the King on October 12. -Its terms are worth a moment’s attention, as they show very clearly -the points on which popular indignation had been concentrated. ‘The -treaty,’ it states, ‘is humiliating and degrading, because after -a signal victory, by which the enemy appears to have been cut off -from all means of succour or escape, we had the sad mortification of -seeing the laurels so nobly acquired torn from the brows of our brave -soldiers, and terms granted to the enemy disgraceful to the British -name.... By this ignominious Convention British ships are to convey to -France the French army and its plunder, where they will be at liberty -immediately to recommence their active operations against us and our -allies. And the full recognition of the title and dignity of Emperor -of France[282], while all mention of the Government of Portugal is -omitted, must be considered as highly disrespectful to the authorities -of that country.’ There was another clause denouncing the sending back -of the Russian sailors, but not so much stress was laid on this point. -Finally the King is asked ‘in justice to the outraged feelings of a -brave, injured, and indignant people, whose blood and treasure have -been thus expended,’ to cause the guilty persons to be punished. - - [282] The petitioners ought in fairness to have stated that this - was only made in the document setting forth the armistice, and - not in the definitive Convention. - -King George III replied to these flowers of oratory by a short speech -which displays admirably that power of getting an occasional lucid -glimpse of the obvious in which he was by no means deficient. He -was fully sensible, he said, of the loyalty and good intentions of -the City of London, but he wished the deputation to remember that -to pronounce judgement without previous trial and investigation was -hardly consonant with the principles of British justice. He was always -ready to institute an inquiry when the honour of the British arms was -in question: and the interposition of the City of London was not -necessary to induce him to set one on foot in this case, when the hopes -and expectations of the nation had been so much disappointed. - -It was not, however, till seventeen days later that his majesty’s -formal orders for the summoning of a Court of Inquiry ‘to investigate -into the late Armistice and Convention concluded in Portugal, and -all the circumstances connected therewith,’ were communicated to -the Commander-in-Chief. Dalrymple and Burrard, both of whom had now -returned to England, were directed to hold themselves in readiness -to present themselves before the court, and Wellesley, for the same -reason, was directed to abandon his project of going back to the -Peninsula in order to serve under Sir John Moore. - -The members of the celebrated Court of Inquiry, which commenced its -sittings on November 14, 1808, were seven in number, all general -officers of great respectability and advanced years, men more likely, -for the most part, to sympathize with caution than with daring. The -president was Sir David Dundas, the author of a celebrated drill-book -which had long been the terror of young officers: the other members -were Lord Moira, Lord Heathfield[283], the Earl of Pembroke, and -Generals Craig, Sir G. Nugent, and Nicholls. Not one of them has left -behind a name to be remembered, save indeed Lord Moira, who, as Lord -Rawdon in the old American War, had won the victory of Hobkirk’s Hill, -and who was destined to be the next Viceroy of India and to make the -name of Hastings famous for a second time in the East. - - [283] Not, of course, the Eliot who had defended Gibraltar so - well in 1780-3, but his son, the second Lord Heathfield. - -The court began its sittings on November 14, and did not terminate -them till December 22. In the great hall of Chelsea Hospital, where -its proceedings were held, there was much warm debate. As the details -of the Campaign of Portugal were gradually worked out, not only by the -cross-examination of Dalrymple, Burrard, and Wellesley, but by that of -many of the other officers of rank who had been in Portugal--Spencer, -Acland, Ferguson, Lord Burghersh, and others--the points on which -the verdict of the court must turn gradually became clear. They were -six in number:--Had Burrard been justified in preventing Wellesley -from pursuing the French at the end of the battle of Vimiero? Had -Dalrymple erred in refusing to take Wellesley’s advice to march on -Mafra the next morning? Should Kellermann’s offer of an armistice -have been accepted on the twenty-second, and, if so, were the terms -granted him too favourable? Lastly, was the Convention of Cintra -itself justifiable under the existing circumstances, and were all -its articles reasonable and proper? Much evidence was produced for -and against each view on every one of these topics. On the first two -Wellesley practically impeached Burrard and Dalrymple for unwarrantable -slackness and timidity. He was so much in love with his own bold plans -that his superior’s caution appeared to him contemptible. He stood up -to them and cross-questioned them with an acidity and a complete want -of deference that seemed very reprehensible to military men steeped in -the old traditions of unquestioning deference to one’s senior officers. -Sir Walter Scott, who followed the inquiry with great interest, called -him ‘a haughty devil,’ but expressed his admiration for him at the -same moment[284]. It is curious to find that Wellesley showed less -anger with Burrard, whose caution on the afternoon of the twenty-first -really wrecked his plan of campaign, than with Dalrymple. The latter -had snubbed him on his first arrival, had persistently refused him -his confidence, and would not state clearly to the court that the -armistice, though it bore Wellesley’s name, had not been drawn up or -approved in detail by him. Of the numerous minor witnesses who were -examined, all who had served at Roliça and Vimiero spoke on Wellesley’s -side: Spencer and Ferguson were especially strong in their statements. -The fact was that they were intensely proud of their two fights, and -looked upon Burrard as the man who had prevented them from entering -Lisbon in triumph after capturing Junot and his whole host. So strong -was this feeling that the brigadiers and field-officers of the eight -brigades that fought at Vimiero had presented Wellesley with a handsome -testimonial--a service of plate worth £1,000--as a sort of mark of -confidence in him, and of protest against those who had stayed his hand. - - [284] Lockhart’s _Life of Sir Walter Scott_, ii. 226. - -On the other hand, Burrard and Dalrymple urged all the justifications -of caution. Each had arrived at a crisis, the details of which could -not be properly known to him from sheer want of time to master them. -Each acknowledged that Wellesley had vehemently pressed him to strike -boldly and promptly, but thought that he had not been justified in -doing so till he had made out for himself the exact situation of -affairs. Burrard pleaded that Junot might have possessed reserves -unknown to him, which might have changed the fortune of the fight -if a headlong pursuit had been ordered. Wellesley had told him that -none such existed (and this turned out to have been the fact), but he -himself had not seen any clear proof of it at the time[285]. Dalrymple -went even further, and stated that he had considered the whole conduct -of the campaign, from the landing in Mondego Bay till the battle of -Vimiero, terribly rash[286]. If he had permitted the army to march on -Mafra on the twenty-second, the French from Torres Vedras might have -taken him in the flank as he passed through a very difficult country, -and the most disastrous results might have ensued. He was positive -that nothing hazardous ought to have been attempted, and that it was -necessary to wait for Sir John Moore’s division before pressing the -French to extremity. - - [285] Burrard before the Court of Inquiry (_Proceedings_, pp. - 115, 116, 135). - - [286] Dalrymple before the Court of Inquiry (_Well. Disp._, iv. - 178, 180, 181). - -With regard to the armistice and the Convention, all the three -generals, when defending themselves, agreed that they were wise and -justifiable. To clear the French out of Portugal without further -fighting, and to recover Lisbon and all its resources intact, were -ends so important that it was well worth while to sacrifice even the -practical certainty of capturing all Junot’s army, after a resistance -that might have been long and desperate. But as to the wisdom of -certain clauses and articles, both in the document of August 22 and -that of August 30, there was considerable difference of opinion. -Wellesley proved that he had opposed many details of each agreement, -and that he was in no way responsible for the final shape taken by -them. He only assented to the general proposition that it was right to -let the French army depart under a convention, rather than to force it -to a capitulation. He considered that Dalrymple had yielded far too -much, from his unwillingness to ‘drive Junot into a corner.’ - -On December 22 the Court of Inquiry issued its report. It was a very -cautious and a rather inconclusive document. But its main point -was that nothing had been done in Portugal which called for the -punishment of any of the parties concerned: ‘On a consideration of -all the circumstances, we most humbly submit our opinion that no -further military proceeding is necessary,’ i.e. there was no ground -for a court-martial on any one of the three British generals. As to -Burrard’s refusal to pursue the French on the afternoon of Vimiero, -there were ‘fair military grounds’ for his decision: the court omitted -to say whether the decision itself was right or wrong. ‘It could not -pronounce with confidence whether or not a pursuit could have been -efficacious.’ As to the halt on the following day, for which Dalrymple -no less than Burrard was responsible, ‘under the extraordinary -circumstances that two new commanding generals arrived from the ocean -and joined the army within the space of twenty-four hours, it is not -surprising that the army was not carried forward until the second -day after the action, from the necessity of the generals becoming -acquainted with the actual state of things, and of their army, and -proceeding accordingly.’ Finally, as to the Convention, ‘howsoever -some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting its fitness in the -relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration -that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear to have been exhibited -throughout both by Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur -Wellesley.’ There was a special compliment inserted for Wellesley’s -benefit, to the effect that his whole action, from the landing in -Mondego Bay down to the battle of Vimiero, was ‘highly honourable and -successful, and such as might have been expected from a distinguished -officer.’ - -Such a report amounted to a plain acquittal of all the three -generals, but it left so much unsaid that the Government directed -the Commander-in-Chief to require from the members of the court -their decision as to whether the armistice of the twenty-second and -the Convention of the thirtieth were advisable, and, if they were -advisable, whether their terms were proper, and honourable. On the -twenty-seventh the court returned its answer: there was, this time, no -unanimous report, but a series of written opinions, for the members of -the body differed from each other on many points. As to the armistice, -six members replied that they approved of it, one, but he the most -distinguished of the seven--Lord Moira--said that he did not. On the -question as to the definitive Convention there was more difference -of opinion: Dundas, Lord Heathfield, Craig, and Nugent thought it -fair and reasonable; Lord Moira, the Earl of Pembroke, and Nicholls -considered it as unjustifiable, considering the relative situations of -the two armies. The two last-named officers added short explanatory -notes to their opinions, while Lord Moira subjoined to his a long and -elaborate argument, a document which does not seem in the least to -deserve the slighting reference made to it by Napier[287]. It is very -sensible in its general drift. Lord Moira contended that while on -August 22 there was no reason why an armistice should not have been -concluded, yet the paper drawn up by Kellermann contained clauses -that limited unduly the demands which the British commander might -make in the subsequent Convention. Dalrymple ought, before conceding -them, to have reflected that Junot’s anxious and hurried offer of -terms betokened demoralization. If the French had been pressed, and a -confident and haughty answer returned to their envoy, Junot would have -accepted any conditions that might be imposed upon him. His army was -in such a state of disorder and dismay that it was most unlikely that -he would have tried either to burn Lisbon or to retreat across the -Alemtejo. Moreover, the contention that the deliverance of Portugal -was the one object of the expedition, and that it was duly secured by -the Convention, was a mistake. Lord Moira wished to point out that -our armies were sent forth, not only to emancipate Portugal, but also -to destroy the forces and lower the prestige of France by every means -in their power. By forcing Junot to a capitulation, or by making the -terms of the Convention more stringent, a much greater blow might -have been dealt to Bonaparte’s reputation. As an instance of what -might have been done, he suggested that some remote and inconvenient -landing-place--Belle Isle for example--might have been imposed upon the -French troops, or they might have been compelled to engage not to serve -for some specified time against England and her allies. - - [287] He calls it ‘a laboured criticism, which nevertheless left - the pith of the question entirely untouched’ (Napier, i. 249). I - have printed Lord Moira’s plea in an Appendix, to show that it is - well-reasoned and practical. - -The Court of Inquiry had thus delivered its last opinion. But the -matter of the Convention was not even yet at an end. The ministry -resolved to inflict a rebuke on Dalrymple, not for his military action, -on which they completely accepted the verdict of the seven generals, -but for his political action in allowing the Articles XV, XVI, and XVII -to be inserted in the Convention. These, it will be remembered, were -the clauses which conceded certain privileges to the French inhabitants -of Lisbon, and to the Portuguese who had compromised themselves by -taking service under Junot. The Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, -was ordered to convey to Dalrymple ‘His Majesty’s disapprobation -of those articles in the Convention in which stipulations were made -affecting the interests and feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese -nations[288].’ It was to be impressed upon Sir Hew that it was most -improper and dangerous to admit into a military convention articles of -such a description, which (especially when carelessly and incautiously -framed) might lead to the most injurious consequences. Furthermore, -Dalrymple was to be gravely censured for his extraordinary delay in not -sending the news of the armistice of the twenty-second till September -3, whereby ‘great public inconvenience’ had been caused. - - [288] _The King’s Opinion on the Convention of Cintra_, - paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. - -It cannot be denied that these rebukes were well deserved: we have -already pointed out that the three articles to which allusion is -made were the only part of the Convention for which no defence is -possible. It is equally clear that it was the thirteen days’ gap in the -information sent home which gave time for the rise and development of -the unreasoning popular agitation against the whole agreement made with -Junot. - -As to the verdict of the court, it does substantial justice to the -case. There existed ‘fair military reasons’ for all that Burrard and -Dalrymple had done, or left undone. In a similar way ‘fair military -reasons’ can be alleged for most of the main slips and errors committed -during any campaign in the Napoleonic War--for Dupont’s stay at -Andujar, or for Murray’s retreat from Tarragona, or for Grouchy’s -operations on June 17 and 18, 1815. It would be unjust to punish old -and respectable generals for mere errors of judgement, and inability -to rise to the height of the situation. Burrard and Dalrymple had -sacrificed the most brilliant possibilities by their torpid caution, -after refusing to listen to Wellesley’s cogent arguments for bold -action. But their conduct had resulted neither from cowardice nor -from deliberate perversity. The blame must rest quite as much on -the government, which had entrusted the expedition to elderly men -unaccustomed to command in the field, as on those men themselves. And -as to the details of the armistice and Convention, we may well accept -Wellesley’s verdict, that the gain secured by the rescue of Lisbon with -all its wealth intact, and by the prompt termination of the campaign, -fully justified the resolve not to drive Junot to extremity. - -But there was an unexpressed corollary to the verdict of the court -which the ministry fully realized, and upon which they acted. Burrard -and Dalrymple, with their ‘fair military reasons,’ must never again -appear in the field. It was not by such men that Bonaparte would be -foiled and Spain emancipated, and so they were relegated to home -service and quiet retirement for the rest of their lives. Wellesley, -on the other hand, was marked out as a man of energy, resource, and -determination, eminently fit to be employed again. Within four months -of the termination of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry he was -once more in command of the British army in the Peninsula[289]. - - [289] The proceedings terminated Dec. 27, 1808. Wellesley took up - the command at Lisbon on April 25, 1809. - - - - -SECTION V - -THE STRUGGLE IN CATALONIA - - - - -CHAPTER I - -DUHESME’S OPERATIONS: FIRST SIEGE OF GERONA (JUNE-JULY, 1808) - - -There is still one corner of the Iberian Peninsula whose history, -during the eventful summer months of 1808, we have not yet chronicled. -The rugged and warlike province of Catalonia had already begun that -heroic struggle against its French garrison which was to endure -throughout the whole of the war. Far more than any other section of -the Spanish nation do the Catalans deserve credit for their unswerving -patriotism. Nowhere else was the war maintained with such resolution. -When the struggle commenced the French were already masters by -treachery of the chief fortresses of the land: the force of Spanish -regular troops which lay within its borders was insignificant: there -was no recognized leader, no general of repute, to head the rising -of the province. Yet the attack on the invaders was delivered with a -fierceness and a persistent energy that was paralleled in no other -quarter of the Peninsula. For six years marshal after marshal ravaged -the Catalan valleys, sacked the towns, scattered the provincial levies. -But not for one moment did the resistance slacken; the invaders -could never control a foot of ground beyond the narrow space that -was swept by the cannon of their strongholds. The spirit of the race -was as unbroken in 1813 as in 1808, and their untiring bands still -held out in the hills, ready to strike at the enemy when the least -chance was offered. Other provinces had equal or greater advantages -than Catalonia for protracted resistance: Biscay, the Asturias, and -Galicia were as rugged, Andalusia far more populous, Valencia more -fertile and wealthy. But in none of these was the struggle carried on -with such a combination of energy and persistence as in the Catalan -hills. Perhaps the greatest testimony that can be quoted in behalf -of the people of that devoted province is that Napier, bitter critic -as he was of all things Spanish, is forced to say a good word for -it. ‘The Catalans,’ he writes, ‘were vain and superstitious; but -their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts -more sustained than those of the rest. The _somatenes_ were bold and -active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and the juntas -apparently disinterested[290].’ No one but a careful student of Napier -will realize what a handsome testimonial is contained in the somewhat -grudging language of this paragraph. What the real credit due to the -Catalans was, it will now be our duty to display. - - [290] Napier, _History of the Peninsular War_, i. 90. - -It will be remembered that in the month of February the French general -Duhesme had obtained possession of the citadel and forts of Barcelona -by a particularly impudent and shameless stratagem[291]. Since that -time he had been lying in the city that he had seized, with his whole -force concentrated under his hand. Of the 7,000 French and 5,000 -Italian troops which composed his corps, all were with him save a -single battalion of detachments which had been left behind to garrison -Figueras, the fortress close to the French frontier, which commands -the most important of the three roads by which the principality of -Catalonia can be entered. - - [291] See pp. 36, 37 of this book. - -Duhesme believed himself to be entirely secure, for of Spanish -regular troops there were barely 6,000 in all scattered through the -province[292], and a third of these were Swiss mercenaries, who, -according to the orders of Bonaparte, were to be taken at once into -the French service. That there was any serious danger to be feared -from the _miqueletes_ of the mountains never entered into the heads -of the Emperor or his lieutenant. Nor does it seem to have occurred -to them that any insurrection which broke out in Catalonia might be -immediately supported from the Balearic Isles, where a heavy garrison -was always kept, in order to guard against any descent of the British -to recover their old stronghold of Port Mahon[293]. If Napoleon had -realized in May that the Spanish rising was about to sweep over the -whole Peninsula, he would not have dared to leave Duhesme with such a -small force. But persisting in his original blunder of believing that -the troubles which had broken out were merely local and sporadic, he -was about to order Duhesme to make large detachments from a corps that -was already dangerously weak. - - [292] They were the following:-- - - Regiment of Estremadura 840 strong at Tarrega - (near Lerida). - Regiment of Ultonia 421 ” Gerona. - Two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment 2,149 ” Tarragona. - Two battalions of Spanish and Walloon Guards 1,700 ” Barcelona. - Cavalry Regiment of Borbon 658 ” ” - Artillery 300 ” in various - forts on - coast. - ------ - 6,068 - - - [293] The Spanish garrisons in the Balearic Isles consisted of - the following troops:-- - - Regiment of Granada (three batts.) 1,183 at Port Mahon. - Regiment of Soria (three batts.) 1,381 ” - Regiment of Borbon (three batts.) 1,570 at Palma. - Swiss Regiment of Beschard (two batts.) 2,121 ” - Light Infantry of Barcelona, No. 2 1,341 at Port Mahon. - ” ” Aragon, No. 2. 1,267 at Palma. - Militia Battalion of Majorca 604 ” - 6th Hussars (_Husares Españoles_) 680 ” - Artillery 500 ” and Port Mahon. - ------ - 10,647 - -The geography of Catalonia, as we have had occasion to relate in an -earlier chapter, is rather complicated. Not only is the principality -cut off by its mountains from the rest of Spain--it faces towards the -sea, while its neighbour Aragon faces towards the Ebro--but it is -divided by its numerous cross-ranges into a number of isolated valleys, -between which communication is very difficult. Its coast-plain along -the Mediterranean is generally narrow, and often cut across by spurs -which run down from the mountains of the inland till they strike the -sea. Except on the eastern side of the principality, where it touches -Aragon in the direction of Lerida, there is no broad expanse of level -ground within its borders: much the greater part of its surface is -upland and mountain. - -Catalonia may be divided into four regions: the first is the district -at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, drained by the Fluvia and the -Ter. This narrow corner is called the Ampurdam; it contains all the -frontier-fortresses which protect the province on the side of France. -Rosas commands the pass along the sea-shore, Figueras the main road -from Perpignan, which runs some twenty miles further inland. A little -further south both these roads meet, and are blocked by the strong -city of Gerona, the capital of all this region and its most important -strategical point. South of Gerona a cross-range divides the Ampurdam -from the coast-plain of Central Catalonia; the defile through this -range is covered by the small fortified town of Hostalrich, but there -is an alternative route from Gerona to Barcelona along the coast by -Blanes and Arens de Mar. - -The river-basin of Central Catalonia is that of the Llobregat, near -whose estuary Barcelona stands. Its lower course lies through the -level ground along the coast, but its upper waters and those of its -tributaries drain a series of highland valleys, difficult of access -and divided from each other by considerable chains of hills. All these -valleys unite at the foot of the crag of Montserrat, which, crowned -by its monastery, overlooks the plain, and stands sentinel over the -approach to the upland. In the mountains behind Montserrat was the -main stronghold of the Catalan insurrection, whose rallying-places -were the high-lying towns of Manresa, Cardona, Berga, and Solsona. -Only three practicable roads enter the valleys of the Upper Llobregat, -one communicates by the line of Manresa and Vich with the Ampurdam; -a second goes from Manresa via Cervera to Lerida, and ultimately to -the plains of Aragon; the third is the high-road from Barcelona to -Manresa, the main line of approach from the shore to the upland. But -there is another route of high importance in this section of Catalonia, -that which, starting from Barcelona, avoids the upper valleys, strikes -inland by Igualada, crosses the main watershed between the coast and -the Ebro valley below Cervera, and at that place joins the other road -from Manresa and the Upper Llobregat, and continues on its way to -Lerida and the plains of Aragon. This, passing the mountains at the -point of least resistance, forms the great trunk-road from Barcelona to -Madrid. - - [Illustration: Catalonia.] - -The third region of the principality is the coastland of Tarragona, -a district cut off from the coastland of Barcelona by a well-marked -cross-ridge, which runs down from the mountains to the sea, and reaches -the latter near the mouth of the Llobregat. The communication between -the two maritime districts is by two roads, one passing the cross-ridge -by the defile of Ordal, the other hugging the beach and finding its way -between the hills and the water’s edge by Villanueva de Sitjas. The -coastland of Tarragona is not drained by a single river of considerable -volume, like the Llobregat, but by a number of small streams such as -the Francoli and the Gaya, running parallel to each other and at right -angles to the coast. Each is separated from the next by a line of hills -of moderate height. The southern limit of this region is the Ebro, -whose lower course is protected by the strong fortress of Tortosa. -Its main line of internal communication is the great coast-route from -Barcelona to Tarragona, and from Tarragona to the mouth of the Ebro. -Its touch with Aragon and Central Spain is maintained by a good road -from Tarragona by Montblanch to Lerida. - -The fourth and last region of Catalonia is the inland, which looks not -towards the Mediterranean but to the Ebro and Aragon. It is drained -by the Segre, an important stream, which after being joined by its -tributaries, the Noguera and the Pallaresa, falls into the Ebro not -far to the south of Lerida. The tracts around that town are flat and -fertile, part of the main valley of the Ebro. But the head-waters of -the Segre and its affluents flow through narrow and difficult mountain -valleys, starting in the highest and wildest region of the Pyrenees. -They are very inaccessible, and served by no roads suitable for the use -of an army. Hence, like the upper valley of the Llobregat, they served -as places of refuge for the Catalan insurgents when Lerida and the flat -country had been lost. The only place of importance in these highlands -is the remote town of Seu d’ Urgel[294], a mediaeval fortress near the -sources of the Segre, approached by mule-paths only, and quite lost in -the hills. - - [294] Urgel is more accessible from France than from Spain. The - easiest path to it is that which, starting from Mont-Louis, - crosses the Spanish frontier at Puycerda, and follows the - head-water of the Segre to the foot of the hill on which the Seu - stands. - -Catalonia, then, is pre-eminently a mountain land, and one presenting -special difficulties to an invader, because it has no central system -of roads or valleys, but is divided into so many heterogeneous parts. -Though not fertile, it was yet rich, and fairly well peopled when -compared with other regions of Spain[295]. Its wealth came not from -agriculture but from commerce and manufactures. Barcelona, a city of -180,000 souls, was the greatest Mediterranean port of Spain: on each -side of it, along the coast, are dozens of large fishing-villages and -small harbour-towns, drawing their living from the sea. Of the places -which lay farther back from the water there were many which made an -ample profit from their manufactures, for Catalonia was, and still -remains, the workshop of Spain. It is the only province of the kingdom -where the inhabitants have developed industries on a large scale: its -textile products were especially successful, and supplied the whole -Peninsula. - - [295] The population of the Principality in 1803 was 858,000 - souls. - -More than any other part of Spain, Catalonia had suffered from the -war with England and the Continental System. The closure of its ports -had told cruelly upon its merchants and manufacturers, who were -fully aware that their sufferings were the logical consequence of -the French alliance. They had, moreover, a historic grudge against -France: after encouraging them to revolt in the seventeenth century, -the Bourbons had then abandoned them to the mercies of the King of the -Castilians. In the great war of the Spanish Succession, Catalonia had -taken sides against France and Don Philip, and had proclaimed Charles -of Austria its king--not because it loved him, but because it hated -the French claimant. Even after the Peace of Utrecht the Catalans -had refused to lay down their arms, and had made a last desperate -struggle for provincial independence. It was in these wars that their -_miqueletes_[296] had first made their name famous by their stubborn -fighting. These bands were a levy _en masse_ of the population of -military age, armed and paid by their parishes, not by the central -government, which could be called out whenever the principality was -threatened with invasion. From their liability to turn out whenever the -alarm-bell (_somaten_) was rung, they were also known as _somatenes_. -The system of the _Quinta_ and the militia ballot, which prevailed in -the provinces under the crown of Castile, had never been applied to -the Catalans, who gloried in the survival of their ancient military -customs. The _somatenes_ had been called out in the French war of -1793-5, and had done good service in it, distinguishing themselves -far more than the troops of the line which fought on the frontier -of the Eastern Pyrenees. The memories of that struggle were still -fresh among them, and many of the leaders who had won a name in it -were still fit for service. In Catalonia then, more than in any other -corner of Spain, there were all the materials at hand for a vigorous -popular insurrection, even though the body of regular troops in the -principality was insignificant. The Catalans rose to defend their -provincial independence, and to recover their capital, which had been -seized so shamelessly by the trickery of Duhesme. They did not concern -themselves much with what was going on in Aragon and Valencia, or even -in Madrid. Their fight with the invader forms an episode complete -in itself, a sort of underplot in the great drama of the Peninsular -War, which only touches the main struggle at infrequent intervals. It -was not affected by the campaigns of Castile, still less had it any -noticeable influence on them. It would be equally possible to write the -history of the war in Catalonia as a separate treatise, or to compile a -general history of the war in which Catalonia was barely mentioned. - - [296] So called from Miquelot de Prats, the Catalan _condottiere_ - who served under Caesar Borgia. From him the light infantry, once - called _almogavares_, got the name of _miqueletes_. - -When the echoes of the cannon of the second of May went rolling round -Spain, they stirred up Catalonia no less than the other provinces which -lie at a distance from the capital. The phenomena which appeared in the -South and the West were repeated here, in much the same sequence, and -at much the same dates, as elsewhere. But the rising of the Catalans -was greatly handicapped by the fact that their populous and wealthy -capital was occupied by 12,000 French troops. Barcelona could not set -the example to the smaller places, and for some time the outburst was -spasmodic and local. The chief focus of rebellion was Lerida, where an -insurrectionary Junta was formed on May 29. At Tortosa the populace -rose a few days later, and murdered the military governor, Santiago -de Guzman, because he had been slow and reluctant to place himself at -their head. On June 2 Manresa, in the upper valley of the Llobregat, -followed their example, and from it the flame of insurrection spread -all over the central upland. In Barcelona itself there were secret -meetings, and suspicious gatherings in the streets, on which Duhesme -had to keep a watchful eye. But the main preoccupation of the French -general was that there were still several thousand Spanish troops -in the town, who might easily lead the populace in an _émeute_. He -had got rid of one regiment, that of Estremadura, in May: he gave it -orders to march to Lerida, where the magistrates and people refused to -receive it within their walls, dreading that it might not be ready to -join in their projected rising. This was a vain fear, for the corps -readily took its part in the insurrection, and marched to join Palafox -at Saragossa. But there still remained in Barcelona a battalion each -of the Spanish and the Walloon Guards, and the cavalry regiment of -Borbon, some 2,500 men in all. To Duhesme’s intense satisfaction, -these troops, instead of keeping together and attacking the French -garrison when the news of the revolt reached them, began to desert in -small parties. Far from attempting to compel them to stay by their -colours, Duhesme winked at their evasion, and took no notice of their -proceedings, even when a whole squadron of the Borbon Regiment rode off -with trumpets sounding and its officers at its head. Within a few days -the greater part of the Spanish troops had vanished, and when Duhesme -was directed by his master to disarm them, there were very few left -for him to deal with. These scattered remnants of the Guard Regiments -drifted in small bands all over Catalonia, some were found at Gerona, -others at Tarragona, others at Rosas. Nearly 400 went to Aragon and -fought under Palafox at Epila: another considerable body joined the -Valencian insurgents[297]. But these two strong veteran battalions -never were united again, or made to serve as a nucleus for the Catalan -levies[298]. - - [297] There were 400 Spanish Guards at the fight on the - Cabrillas, who must have come from the battalion at Barcelona. - - [298] I cannot make out the movements of the cavalry regiment of - Borbon; it was certainly at Barcelona, 600 strong, in May. But - in July it had got down to Andalusia, and was marching with a - strength of 401 in the army of Castaños. - -Saved from the peril of a rising of the Spanish regiments in Barcelona, -Duhesme had still the insurrection of the province on his hands. But he -was not left free to deal with it according to his own inspirations. -By the last dispatch from Napoleon which reached him before the -communications with Madrid and Bayonne were cut, a plan of campaign was -dictated to him. The Emperor ordered him to chastise the insurgents of -Lerida and Manresa, without ceasing to keep a strong grip on Barcelona, -and on the line of touch with France through Figueras. But, as if this -was not enough to occupy his small army of 12,000 or 13,000 men, he -was to provide two strong detachments, one of which was to co-operate -with Moncey in Valencia, and the other with Lefebvre-Desnouettes in -Aragon. A glance at the Emperor’s instructions is enough to show how -entirely he had misconceived the situation, and how thoroughly he had -failed to realize that all Spain was up in arms. The first detachment, -4,000 strong, was to march on Lerida, and to enter Aragon along the -line of the Ebro. It was then to move on Saragossa to join Lefebvre. -The second detachment, also 4,000 strong, was to move on Valencia -via Tortosa, join Marshal Moncey, and finally occupy the great naval -arsenal of Cartagena. With the 5,000 men that remained Duhesme was to -hold down Barcelona and Central Catalonia, while keeping open the line -of communications with Figueras and Perpignan. - -Either Duhesme was as blind to the real state of affairs as his -master, or he considered that unquestioning obedience was his first -duty. He told off the two columns as directed, only cutting down -their strength a little, so as not wholly to ungarnish Barcelona. For -the Valencian expedition he told off General Chabran, with the best -brigade in his army, three veteran French battalions of the 7th and -16th of the line[299]. With this force he sent his single brigade of -French cavalry, two regiments under General Bessières (the brother of -the Duke of Istria). The whole amounted to 2,500 foot and 600 horse. -For the attack on Lerida, he had to send out troops of more doubtful -value--all foreigners, for there were no more French to be spared. -General Schwartz was given one Swiss, two Neapolitan, and one Italian -battalion[300], with no more than a single squadron of cavalry, for -his march was to lie over a very mountainous country. His whole force -was 3,200 strong. To the general directions given by Napoleon, Duhesme -added some supplementary orders of his own. Chabran was to pass by -Tarragona, leave a battalion in its citadel, and take as a compensation -the two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment, which was to be -incorporated in the French army. It was expected that he would get into -touch with Marshal Moncey when he should reach Castellon de la Plana. -Schwartz, on the other hand, was told to march by the mountain road -leading to Manresa, in order to punish the inhabitants of that town for -their rebellion. He was to fine them 750,000 francs, and to destroy a -powder-mill which they possessed. He was then to march on Lerida, from -which he was to evict the insurrectionary Junta: the city was to pay -a heavy war-contribution, and to receive a garrison of 500 men. With -the rest of his brigade Schwartz was to join the French forces before -Saragossa, not later than June 19. - - [299] This force was Goulas’s Brigade of Chabran’s Division, - viz.:-- - - 7th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,785 - 16th ” (3rd batt.) 789 - ----- 2,574 - - and Bessières’ Cavalry: - 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers (minus one - squadron) 205 - 3rd Provisional Chasseurs 416 - ---- 621 - ----- 3,195 - with eight guns. - - - [300] Schwartz’s force was:-- - - 2nd Swiss (3rd batt.) 580 - 1st Neapolitans (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,944 - 1st Italian _Velites_ (1st batt.) 519 - ----- 3,043 - One squadron of the 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 204 - ----- 3,247 - with four guns. - - [That the detached squadron were cuirassiers is proved by - Arteche, ii. 86. The French authorities do not give the regiment.] - - Foy makes the odd mistake of saying ‘trois bataillons du - deuxième Suisse,’ instead of ‘le troisième bataillon du - deuxième Suisse.’ There was only one battalion of this regiment - with Duhesme. - -Schwartz started from Barcelona on June 4: a tempest forced him to wait -for a day at Martorel, in the coast-plain, but on the sixth he reached -the pass of Bruch, at whose foot the roads from Igualada and from -Manresa join. Here he met with opposition: the news of his approach -had spread all up the valley of the Llobregat, and the _somatenes_ of -the upland towns were hurrying forward to hold the defile by which the -high-road from Barcelona climbs into the upper country. At the moment -when the invaders, marching in the most careless fashion, were making -their way up the hill, only the levy of Manresa was in position. They -were a mere handful, 300 or 400 at most, and many were destitute of -muskets. But from the cover of a pine-wood they boldly opened fire upon -the head of Schwartz’s column. Surprised to find himself attacked, -the French general deployed a battalion and drove the _somatenes_ out -of their position: they retired in great disorder up the hill towards -Manresa. Schwartz followed them with caution, under the idea that they -must be the vanguard of a larger force, and that there were probably -regular troops in support, further along the defile. In this he was -wrong, but the retreating Manresans received reinforcements a few -miles behind the place of the first skirmish. They were joined by the -levies of San Pedor and other villages of the Upper Llobregat, marching -forward to the sound of the single drum that was to be found in the -upland. The peasants ensconced themselves in the rocks and bushes on -either side of the road, and again offered battle. Schwartz took their -opposition much too seriously, extended a long front of tirailleurs -against them, but did not push his attack home. Soon other bands of -_somatenes_ from the direction of Igualada began to gather round his -left flank, and it seemed to him that he would soon be surrounded and -cut off from his line of communications with Barcelona. His regiments -were raw and not of the best quality: the Neapolitans who composed more -than half his force passed, and with reason, as the worst troops in -Europe. He himself was a cavalry officer who had never held independent -command before, and was wholly unversed in mountain warfare. Reflecting -that the afternoon was far spent, that he was still twelve miles from -Manresa, and that the whole country-side was on the move against him, -he resolved to abandon his expedition. Instead of hurling his four -battalions upon the _somatenes_, who must have been scattered to the -winds if attacked by such superior numbers, he drew back, formed his -men in a great square, with the cavalry and guns in the middle, and -began a retreat across the more open parts of the defile. The Spaniards -followed, pressing in the screen of tirailleurs by which the square -was covered, and taking easy shots into the solid mass behind them. -After six miles of marching under fire, Schwartz’s Swiss and Italians -were growing somewhat demoralized, for nothing could be more harassing -to raw and unwilling troops than such a retreat. At last they found -their way blocked by the village of Esparraguera, where the inhabitants -barricaded the streets and opened a hot fire upon the front face of -the square. Seeing his men hesitate and break their ranks, Schwartz -hastily bade them scatter right and left and pass round the village -without attempting to storm it. This device succeeded, but when the two -halves of the column reunited beyond Esparraguera, they were in such -disorder that there was no means of stopping them. The whole streamed -into Martorel in a confused mass at nightfall, after a retreat whose -incidents remind the military reader, in every detail, of the rout of -the British troops in the march to Lexington, on the first day of the -old American War of 1775. - -When he reached the plains Schwartz was able to retire unharmed to -Barcelona, having saved three of his four guns[301] and lost no very -large proportion of his men. But he had suffered the disgrace of being -worsted by inferior numbers of undisciplined peasantry, and brought his -troops back in a state of demoralization, which was very discouraging -to the rest of the garrison of the Catalonian capital. Duhesme, instead -of taking him to task, fully approved of his retreat, on the ground -that if he had pushed on for Manresa and Lerida he would probably have -lost his whole brigade. Realizing at last the true strength of the -insurrection, and learning that the _somaten_ was sounding in every -village, and that the peasantry were flocking together in thousands, -Duhesme determined to concentrate his whole force, and sent orders -to Chabran to abandon his Valencian expedition and return at once to -Barcelona. He was probably quite right in his resolve, though Chabran’s -retreat was the determining fact that ruined Moncey’s campaign in the -province south of the Ebro. The Emperor had sketched out the whole plan -of operations on false premises, and when the new military situation -had developed itself, it would have been absurd for his lieutenants to -carry out his original orders in blind and servile obedience. - - [301] One gun was lost after leaving Esparraguera by the fall of - a rickety bridge over the Abrera (Arteche, ii. 93, 94). Foy and - other French narrators do not mention this loss. - -Chabran’s column had reached Tarragona when it received Duhesme’s -letters of recall. It had started on June 4, and found the coastland -still quiet, the insurrection not having yet spread downwards from the -hills. On arriving at Tarragona Chabran took possession of the citadel, -and issued orders to the two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment, -which formed the garrison of the place, to prepare to march with him -against Valencia. The Swiss officers showed no alacrity in falling in -with this plan. They were not animated by the patriotic fury which had -carried away the rest of the Spanish regular troops into the insurgent -camp. On the other hand they felt no enthusiasm at the idea of joining -the French in an attack on their late employers. They were deferring -obedience to the orders of the French general on various futile pleas, -when the news of Schwartz’s defeat at Bruch reached Tarragona. Directed -to return in haste and to rejoin Duhesme, General Chabran marched off -on June 9, leaving Wimpfen’s mercenaries behind: they would not follow -him, and declared in favour of the insurgent Junta at Lerida the moment -that his back was turned. The retreating French column had to brush -aside several considerable bands of _somatenes_, which tried to arrest -its progress, for the coastland had taken arms after the combat of -Bruch, and its levies hoped to treat Chabran as their compatriots -of the upland had treated Schwartz. But the three veteran French -battalions were of tougher material than the Neapolitans and Italians -who had been routed on the sixth, and successfully cut their way back -to Barcelona. They were aided by the unwisdom of the insurgents, who, -instead of trying to defend the difficult defile of Ordal, came down -into the plain. When they attacked Chabran at Vendrell and Arbos, they -were charged by his cavalry and scattered to the winds with heavy loss. -The French, when the actions were over, sacked with every circumstance -of brutality all the villages which lay along their path[302]. On June -11 they got into touch with Duhesme’s outposts, and on the twelfth -re-entered Barcelona. - - [302] For details see Arteche, ii. 98, 99, and Foy, iv. 150, who - adds that Arbos ‘fut pillé et réduit en cendres, _conformément - aux usages de la guerre_’(!) - -The whole of the ‘Army of the Eastern Pyrenees’ was now reunited -under its commander’s hand, and Duhesme thought himself strong enough -to punish the peasantry of the Upper Llobregat for their victory at -Bruch. On the fourteenth Chabran, with his own brigade and the Swiss -and Italians of Schwartz, marched from Martorel to assault once more -the pass which the uplanders had defended so well eight days before. -But the woods and rocks of Bruch were now manned by many thousands of -_somatenes_: all Central Catalonia had sent its levies thither, and -they were supported by 400 regulars from Lerida and four pieces of -artillery. After feeling the position, and directing against it at -least one serious attack, Chabran drew back and refused to press on the -action--apparently influenced by the manifest reluctance of Schwartz’s -troops to advance, no less than by the strength of the ground. After -losing nearly 400 men he retired to the plain and marched back to -Barcelona [June 15]. - -Duhesme had a more pressing business in hand than the chastisement of -the mountaineers of the Upper Llobregat. He had now learnt, by the fact -that couriers from France had ceased to arrive, that his communications -with Figueras and Upper Catalonia had been cut, and it was absolutely -necessary that they should be reopened. This was to prove a harder task -than he imagined: the _somatenes_ were now up in every valley as far -as the French frontier; they had driven into the citadel of Figueras -the weak battalion of detachments that had been left to hold that -town, and some of the bolder spirits were feeling their way through -the Pyrenean recesses to commence raids on Roussillon. Such alarm was -felt at Perpignan that the general commanding the district had begun to -call out the national guards, for he had no regulars at his disposal -save a few hundred men of details and detachments, who were waiting to -go forward to join their regiments in Duhesme’s corps. But all this -was unknown at Barcelona, and it was with very little conception of -the difficulties before him that Duhesme resolved to march on Gerona -and reopen the main road to France. He told off for this service one -half of the infantry battalions which composed his army--the Italian -division of Lecchi, consisting of the brigades of Schwartz and of -Milosewitz, the latter of which had hitherto remained in garrison at -Barcelona, and had not taken part in the futile attacks on the defile -of Bruch. He also took with him nearly the whole of his cavalry, four -French and three Italian squadrons of cuirassiers and chasseurs, and -a battery of eight guns. This gave him a formidable force of 5,900 -men[303], about half of the total strength of his corps when the losses -suffered at Bruch and elsewhere are deducted. - - [303] Brigade of Milosewitz: - 2nd Italian Line (2nd batt.) 740 - 4th ” (3rd batt.) 587 - 5th ” (2nd batt.) 806 - ---- 2,133 - - Brigade of Schwartz: - 1st Neapolitans (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,944 - 1st Italian _Velites_ (1st batt.) 519 - (Minus 300 men lost in the actions at - Bruch on June 6 and 14) - ----- 2,163 - - Cavalry: - 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 409 - 3rd ” Chasseurs 416 - Italian _Chasseurs à Cheval_ 504 - 2nd Neapolitan ” 388 - (Minus one squadron left at - Barcelona, say 200) - ----- 1,517 - - Artillerymen for eight guns 150 - ----- 5,963 - - -Duhesme had resolved to march on Gerona by the comparatively easy road -along the sea-coast, rather than by the alternative route which passes -further inland by the valley of the Besos and the town of Hostalrich. -Even in the lowland, however, he found the _somatenes_ prepared to -oppose him. At the castle of Mongat, only six miles outside Barcelona, -he met the first swarm 8,000 or 9,000 strong. They had procured a -few guns, which they had mounted so as to sweep the road, and lay in -disorderly masses along the crest of a rising ground. Duhesme, amusing -them in front by a false attack, sent a strong column to turn their -right flank: seeing themselves likely to be enveloped, the peasants -fled after a short skirmish, in which they suffered considerable loss. -Pushing onward, Duhesme arrived that same afternoon at the large open -town of Mataro, a place of 20,000 souls given over to the manufacture -of glass and cotton goods. The populace had hastily barricaded -the outlets of the streets with carts and piles of furniture, and -discharged two or three cannon against the approaching enemy. But -Milosewitz’s Italian brigade easily burst through the feeble defences -and took Mataro by storm. Its attempt at resistance was considered by -Duhesme to justify its sack, and he granted the plunder of the town to -his men, who only moved on the next day after having thoroughly robbed -every dwelling of its portable goods and murdered a considerable number -of the inhabitants. The French army of Catalonia was the most motley -and undisciplined force of all the imperial hosts in Spain, and for -that reason it was by far the most cruel and brutal in its behaviour to -the natives, who had not as yet justified any such treatment by their -manner of conducting the war. Any ferocity which they showed from this -time onward was a well-deserved revenge for what they had suffered. - -Leaving Mataro on the eighteenth, Duhesme arrived before Gerona on the -twentieth, after burning most of the villages on the road, in revenge -for the constant molestation which he suffered from the _somatenes_. -He found the city placed in a state of defence, so far as was possible -in the case of an old-fashioned fortress called upon to stand a siege -at ten days’ notice. There was a small regular garrison, the Irish -regiment of Ultonia, under its two lieutenant-colonels, O’Donovan and -O’Daly: but this corps only counted 350 bayonets. In addition there -were a few trained artillerymen, and the armed citizens of the town, -not more than 2,000 in all, for Gerona had but 14,000 inhabitants. The -place lies on either side of the small stream of the Oña, just above -its confluence with the river Ter. On the south bank is the main part -of the town, straggling up the side of a steep hill, which is crowned -at its eastern end by an ancient citadel, known (like those of several -other Catalonian towns) by the name of Monjuich. Further westward, -along the crest of this hill, lie three other forts, those of the -Constable, Queen Anne, and the Capuchins. These, like the citadel, are -detached works, not connected by any line of wall but only by a ditch. -The town, which is completely commanded by the four forts, has no -protection on the south side of the Oña but a mediaeval wall, destitute -of a ditch and not more than twenty feet high. But on the other side -of the river, the northern suburb, known as the Mercadal, having no -line of outlying heights to protect it, had been fortified in the style -of Vauban with a regular front of five bastions, though, like the -fortifications of the city, it was without a ditch. - -Duhesme had no battering-train, and his force of 5,900 men was -insufficient to invest the whole circumference of the city of Gerona -and its forts. But, like Moncey before Valencia, he was resolved to -make an attempt to storm the city by escalade, or by battering in its -gates. He left alone the citadel and the line of works on the hill, -only sending a single battalion to demonstrate against the fort of the -Capuchins. His real attack was directed against the sole point where -the old _enceinte_ of the city is not fully protected by the forts, -the gate of the Carmen, on the very brink of the Oña. In no very -honourable spirit, he sent in one of his aides-de-camp, with a white -flag, to demand the surrender of Gerona, and while that officer was -conferring with the governor and the local Junta, suddenly launched his -column of assault against the gate, hoping to catch the Spaniards off -their guard. The attack was a failure: the heavy guns from the forts -above silenced the French field-artillery which tried to batter in the -gate. Then Duhesme sent forward a storming party, with artillerymen -at its head bearing petards with which to blow open the entrance: -but the heavy musketry-fire from the walls laid low the head of the -column, and the rest swerved, and fell back to get under cover. A -feeble demonstration beyond the Oña against the bastions of Santa Clara -and San Francisco had not even the desired effect of distracting the -attention of the defenders of the Carmen Gate. - -Seeing his attack foiled, Duhesme sent in at dusk a second flag of -truce, inviting the Junta of Gerona to send out deputies to confer with -him on certain points which he was desirous of submitting to them. -The Catalans were simple enough to comply with his offer: they would -have been wiser to avoid all negotiations with such an enemy. For this -parley was only intended to cover a second assault. Seeing that he -could not hope to batter his way into the place by means of his light -field-artillery, Duhesme was preparing a great escalade under cover of -the night. The point which he chose for it was the bastion of Santa -Clara, on the centre of the low front of the Mercadal, beyond the Oña. -He collected a quantity of ladders from the neighbouring villages, -and told off for the assault the three battalions of the brigade of -Schwartz. - -At ten o’clock[304] the Italians crept up beneath the ramparts, where -the citizens on guard do not seem to have kept a good look out, and -delivered their attack. But these raw troops, moving in the darkness, -made many mistakes: the chief one was that many of the ladder-party -went astray among the water-courses and field-walls, so that the -provision of ladders proved insufficient. The garrison of the bastion, -however, had been taken completely by surprise, and allowed the head -of the column to escalade the twenty-foot wall with no more hindrance -than a few musket-shots. The Neapolitan Colonel Ambrosio and the -leading files had actually mounted, and driven back the citizens to -the gorge of the bastion, when there arrived reinforcements, a company -of the Regiment of Ultonia, which charged with the bayonet, drove the -Italians back, and hurled them over the rampart. An Irish lieutenant, -Thomas Magrath, and a Carmelite friar seized and overturned the -ladders, at the cost of the life of the former. When the garrison began -firing down into the mass of assailants crowded at the foot of the -wall, and the neighbouring bastion commenced to discharge a flanking -fire of artillery, the Italians broke and fled. A second attempt at -an escalade, made two hours later at another bastion, failed even -more lamentably, for the garrison were on the alert and detected the -assailants before they drew near the walls. - - [304] Napier says that the assault was delivered at seven in - the evening, before dark (i. 79); but all the Spanish accounts - speak of it as having taken place long after dark, though before - midnight (cf. Arteche, Toreño, and Minali, quoted by the former); - so does Foy (iv. 158), who fixes the hour as ‘between nine and - ten.’ - -Convinced that he was too weak to take Gerona without siege-artillery, -Duhesme broke up his camp and fled under cover of the night, marking -his retreat by a third insincere attempt to open negotiations with the -garrison. He hastily made off by the same road by which he had come, -and returned to Barcelona by forced marches, dropping on the way one of -his Italian brigades at Mataro [June 24]. In the whole expedition he -had lost 700 men[305]. - - [305] Yet he had the hardihood to write to the Emperor that - ‘after some slight skirmishing, he did not think it worth while - to make a serious attack on Gerona’ (_Nap. Corresp._, xvii. 347). - -So ended the first attempt on Gerona, to the great credit of its -gallant defenders, and more especially to that of the weak Irish -regiment which had borne the brunt of the fighting. Duhesme’s whole -campaign bore a singular resemblance to that which Moncey was making at -the same moment in Valencia, and, like it, was wrecked on the initial -blunder of supposing that Spanish towns, defended by a population in -a high state of patriotic enthusiasm, could be carried by escalade -without any proper preparation by artillery. French generals soon got -to know their adversaries better: the same levies that could be easily -scattered in the open field were formidable under cover of stone walls. - -On returning to Barcelona, Duhesme found that the insurgents of Central -Catalonia had drawn close to the capital in his absence. Eight or ten -thousand _somatenes_ had come down to the line of the Llobregat, had -broken its bridges, had entrenched themselves opposite its fords, -and were preparing to blockade Barcelona. They had brought up a -considerable number of guns taken from the batteries on the coast, -which had so long kept watch upon the English. But of regular troops -there were only a few present--a mixed body of 400 men from Lerida, -and some small remnants of the old Spanish garrison of Barcelona. The -command seems to have been held by Juan Baget, a lawyer of Lerida, -who had been named colonel of _miqueletes_ by the Junta of his native -town. Duhesme was determined not to be deprived of his hold on the -coast-plain by this tumultuary army. On the thirtieth he sallied out -from Barcelona with Goulas’s French brigade and three of Lecchi’s -Italian battalions, accompanied by the cuirassiers of Bessières. -Though the line of the Llobregat is marked by steep banks, and though -a considerable number of guns were mounted behind it, the position was -too long and too much exposed to be capable of defence by undisciplined -bands of mountaineers. While the Italians menaced its front, Goulas and -Bessières forded the river and turned the flank of the Catalans. Chased -out from the villages of San Boy and Molins de Rey by a sweeping -charge, they were pursued across the plain, stripped of all their -artillery, and forced to take refuge in their old positions along the -edge of the mountains of Montserrat, after losing a considerable number -of men. - -Less successful was another stroke against the insurgents which Duhesme -endeavoured to deal five days later. General Chabran, with the Italian -brigade that had been left at Mataro, a regiment of French cavalry and -a field-battery, moved out to clear the hills above the coast, and to -sweep the valley of the Besos. He had before him the _somatenes_ of -the regions about Vich, Hostalrich, and Santa Coloma, under Francisco -Milans, a half-pay lieutenant-colonel, who had been placed at their -head by the local Junta. Chabran forced his way for some distance -inland till he reached Granollers, always harassed but never seriously -attacked by the insurgents. Milans, who showed all through his career -a real genius for guerilla warfare, had ordered his levies never to -stand when pressed, but to hang about the enemy’s line of march, cut -off his pickets and scouting parties, and fall upon the baggage-train -which trailed at the rear of his column. These tactics were perfectly -successful: having reached Granollers after a most toilsome march, -Chabran refused to push further among the mountains, turned back, and -retreated to Mataro, accompanied home by the _somatenes_, who pursued -him to the very outskirts of the town, and cut off his stragglers and -many of his baggage animals [July 4]. - -The moment that the Catalan insurrection grew serious, Duhesme had sent -repeated appeals for help to the Emperor: the land route to Perpignan -being cut, he had to use small vessels which put out to sea at night, -risked capture by the English ships lying off the coast, and when -fortunate reached the harbours of Collioure or Port-Vendres, just -beyond the Pyrenees. Napoleon looked upon the Catalonian war as a very -small matter, but he was fully resolved that Duhesme must be succoured. -Accordingly he determined to concentrate a division at Perpignan, but -he refused to allot to it any of his veteran French troops. He swept -together from the Southern Alps and Piedmont a most heterogeneous body -of 7,000 or 8,000 men, even worse in quality than the motley army which -he had entrusted to Duhesme. The command was entrusted to a capable -officer, General Reille, one of the Emperor’s aides-de-camp, who was -told to advance and relieve Figueras, after which he was to stretch -out his hand to Duhesme, who would push northward to meet him. His -improvised army consisted of two battalions of recruits just levied -in the lately annexed duchy of Tuscany, and constituting the nucleus -of a new regiment with the number 113, of a battalion of national -guards, some mobilized gendarmerie, a battalion of the ‘Legion of -Reserve of the Alps’ from Grenoble, five ‘battalions of detachments,’ -and the single battalion which formed the contingent of the little -republic of the Valais[306]. The cavalry comprised two squadrons of -Tuscan dragoons, and two _escadrons de marche_ of French cuirassiers -and chasseurs. There seem to have been no more than two batteries of -artillery allotted to the force[307]. Reille was informed that other -troops from Italy would ultimately arrive at Perpignan, but that they -were not to be expected till the end of July or the beginning of -August. For the relief of Figueras and the opening up of communications -with Duhesme he must depend on his own forces. - - [306] The Valais was a republic from 1802 till 1810, when it was - annexed to the Empire, as the ‘department of the Simplon.’ - - [307] From _Nap. Corresp._, 14,092, 14,150, 14,151, and 14,168, - we get the composition of this force. They account for the - following: - - Two batts. of the 113th (Tuscans) 1,300 - National Guards of the Pyrénées Orientales 560 - 1st Provisional Battalion of Perpignan (companies from the - dépôts of the 1st, 5th, 24th, 62nd of the Line, and 16th - and 22nd Léger) 840 - 2nd Provisional Battalion, similarly formed from the 23rd, - 60th, 79th, 81st of the Line, and the 8th and 18th - Léger 840 - A mixed battalion of the 16th and 32nd French and 2nd Swiss 1,100 - Another from the 7th and 93rd of the Line 840 - Another from the 2nd, 56th, and 37th of the Line 840 - One battalion of the ‘5th Legion of Reserve’ from Grenoble 500 - Battalion of the Valais 800 - Two squadrons of Tuscan Dragoons 250 - Two _escadrons de marche_ (French) 300 - Two batteries of artillery 200 - ----- - 8,370 - - There were also nine companies of gendarmerie and ‘departmental - reserves.’ - -Travelling with commendable rapidity, Reille arrived at Perpignan on -July 3. Of all the detachments that were marching to join him he found -that nothing had yet reached the frontier but the local national guards -and gendarmerie, the two Tuscan battalions, a company of the 2nd Swiss -Regiment, and artillerymen enough to serve a couple of guns. With no -more than the Tuscans and the Swiss, less than 1,600 men in all, he -marched on Figueras on July 5, dispersing on the way some bands of -_somatenes_, who tried to oppose him at the passage of the Muga. He -threw a convoy into the place and strengthened its garrison, but could -do no more, for all the country beyond Figueras was up in arms, and his -raw Italian recruits could hardly be kept to their colours. Indeed he -was forced to make them march in solid columns whenever he moved them, -for when ordered to deploy they always fell into disorder, and tried to -make off to the rear[308]. - - [308] Foy, iv. 165, 166. - -But by July 11 Reille had begun to receive many of the drafts and -detachments which the Emperor was pouring into Perpignan, and having -now three or four thousand men disposable, he resolved to strike a -blow at Rosas, the small seaport town which blocks the coast-road from -Perpignan to Barcelona. Marching through the plains of the Ampurdam -he reached his objective, an insignificant place with a dilapidated -outer entrenchment and a citadel of some small strength. It was -defended by no more than 400 _miqueletes_, and had but five guns on -its land-front. But the little garrison showed a bold face, and when -Reille proceeded to invest Rosas he found himself attacked from the -rear by four or five thousand _somatenes_ levied by Don Juan Claros, a -retired infantry captain who had called to arms the peasantry of the -coast. They beset the besiegers so fiercely that Reille resolved to -abandon the investment, a determination which was assisted by the sight -of a British line-of-battle ship[309] landing marines to strengthen the -garrison. Accordingly he cut his way back to Figueras on the twelfth, -harassed all the way by the bands of Claros, who killed or took no -less than 200 of his men[310]. Rosas was to defy capture for some -months more, for Reille’s next effort was, by his master’s direction, -devoted to a more important object--the clearing of the great road -from Perpignan to Barcelona, and the opening up of communications with -Duhesme. - - [309] The _Montague_, of 74 guns, Captain R. W. Otway. - - [310] Foy, iv. 169. - - - - -SECTION V: CHAPTER II - -THE STRUGGLE IN CATALONIA (JULY-AUGUST, 1808): THE SECOND SIEGE OF -GERONA - - -For the first six weeks of the war in Catalonia Duhesme and Reille had -been opposed only by the gallant _somatenes_. Of the handful of regular -troops who had been stationed in the principality when the insurrection -broke out, the greater part had drifted off to the siege of Saragossa, -or to the struggle in the south. Only the Irish regiment at Gerona, -and certain fragments of the disbanded battalions of the Guards from -Barcelona had aided the peasantry in resisting the invader. The success -of the Catalans, in hemming in Duhesme and checking Reille’s advance, -is all the more notable when we reflect that their levies had not been -guided by any central organization, nor placed under the command of any -single general. The Junta at Lerida had done little more than issue -proclamations and serve out to the _somatenes_ the moderate amount -of munitions of war that was at its disposition. It had indeed drawn -out a scheme for the raising of a provincial army--forty _tercios_ of -_miqueletes_, each 1,000 strong, were to be levied and kept permanently -in the field. But this scheme existed only on paper, and there were -no means of officering or arming such a mass of men. Even as late as -August 1, there were only 6,000 of them embodied in organized corps: -the mass of the men of military age were still at their own firesides, -prepared to turn out at the sound of the _somaten_, whenever a French -column appeared in their neighbourhood, but not ready to keep the field -for more than a few days, or to transfer their service to the more -distant regions of the principality. The direction of these irregular -bands was still in the hands of local leaders like Claros, Milans, and -Baget, who aided each other in a sufficiently loyal fashion when they -had the chance, but did not obey any single commander-in-chief, or act -on any settled military plan. Their successes had been due to their -own untutored intelligence and courage, not to the carrying out of any -regular policy. - -This period of patriotic anarchy was now drawing to an end; regular -troops were beginning to appear on the scene in considerable numbers, -and the direction of the military resources of Catalonia was about to -be confided to their generals. The change was not all for the better: -during the whole struggle the Spaniards showed themselves admirable -insurgents but indifferent soldiers. After one more short but brilliant -period of success, the balance of fortune was about to turn against -the Catalans, and a long series of disasters was to try, but never to -subdue, their indomitable and persevering courage. - -We have already shown that the only body of regular troops available -for the succour of Catalonia was the corps of 10,000 men which lay -in the Balearic Islands. That these thirteen battalions of veterans -had not yet been thrown ashore in the principality was mainly due to -the over-caution of the aged General Vives, the Captain-General at -Palma, to whom the charge of the garrisons of Majorca and Minorca was -committed[311]. He had a deeply rooted idea that if he left Port Mahon -unguarded, the English would find some excuse for once more making -themselves masters of that ancient stronghold, where the Union Jack -had waved for the greater part of the eighteenth century. Even the -transparent honesty of Lord Collingwood, the veteran admiral of the -Mediterranean fleet, could not reassure him. It was only when strong -pressure was applied to him by his second in command, the Marquis -del Palacio, governor of Minorca, and when he had received the most -explicit pledges from Collingwood concerning the disinterested views -of Great Britain, that he consented to disgarnish Port Mahon. His mind -was only finally made up, when the Aragonese and Catalan battalions -of his army burst out into open mutiny, threatening to seize shipping -and transport themselves to the mainland without his leave, if any -further delay was made [June 30]. A fortnight later Vives permitted Del -Palacio, with the greater part of the Balearic garrisons, to set sail -for the seat of war. The Aragonese regiment landed near Tortosa, and -marched for Saragossa: but the bulk of the expeditionary force, nearly -5,000 strong, was put ashore in Catalonia between July 19 and 23. - - [311] Neither Toreño nor Arteche mentions the trouble caused by - this tiresome old man, to whom the delay in succouring Catalonia - was due. For the negotiations with him see Lord Collingwood’s - correspondence (_Life_, ii. 291, 292), and Foy (iv. 181). - -Meanwhile affairs in the principality had taken a new turn. Duhesme -had remained quiet for six days after Chabran’s check at Granollers, -though his position at Barcelona grew daily more uncomfortable, owing -to the constant activity of the _somatenes_. But when he learnt that -Reille’s vanguard had reached Figueras, and that he might expect ere -long to be aided by a whole division of fresh troops from the north, -he resolved to renew his attack on Gerona, the fortress which so -completely blocked his communications with France. Sending messages -by sea to bid his colleague meet him under the walls of that place, -he sallied out from Barcelona, on July 10, with the larger half of -his army. This time he took with him the French brigades of Goulas -and Nicolas only, leaving Barcelona to the care of Lecchi and the -foreign troops. He felt that the situation was too grave for him to -trust the fate of Catalonia to the steadiness of Lombard or Neapolitan -regiments. So leaving four Italian and one Swiss battalion, 3,500 men -in all, in the Barcelona forts, he marched for Gerona with seven French -battalions, a regiment of Italian cavalry, and twenty-two guns, of -which ten were heavy siege-artillery. At Mataro he picked up Chabran, -who had been resting there since his check at Granollers on July 4, -and incorporated with his expedition the Italian battalions which -that officer had with him, as well as a regiment of French cavalry. -This gave him a total force of some 7,000 men[312]; yet his march was -slow and difficult. Milans with the _somatenes_ of the upland was -always hanging upon his left flank, and Lord Cochrane with two British -frigates followed him along the coast, bombarding his columns whenever -the road came within cannon-shot of the sea. At Arens de Mar Duhesme -halted for no less than five days, either from sheer indecision as to -the advisability of proceeding with his project, or because he was -waiting for definite news of Reille. At last he made up his mind: two -routes meet at Arens, the main _chaussée_ from Barcelona to Gerona -via Tordera, and a cross-road which seeks the same end by a detour -through the small hill-fortress of Hostalrich. The three battalions -of Goulas’s brigade were sent by this latter path, with orders to -endeavour to seize the place if they could. The main column, with the -battering-train, followed the high-road. Goulas found Hostalrich too -strong for him: it was garrisoned by 500 _miqueletes_ under Manuel -O’Sullivan, a captain of the Regiment of Ultonia, who gallantly -held their own against an attempt at escalade. The French brigadier -thereupon abandoned the attack, crossed the mountains, and joined his -chief before Gerona on July 22. Duhesme meanwhile had been harassed for -three days by the _somatenes_ of Milans, and, though he always drove -them off in the end, had lost much of his baggage, and an appreciable -number of men, before he reached the banks of the Ter. On the day after -he was rejoined by Goulas he forced the passage of that river and took -post before Gerona. On the next morning [July 24] he was rejoiced -to meet with the vanguard of Reille’s division descending from the -north. That general had started from Figueras two days before, with -all the fractions of his motley force that had reached the front, two -Tuscan battalions, the Swiss from the Valais, three French _bataillons -de marche_, the two ‘Provisional Battalions of Perpignan,’ and some -other improvised units, with a total strength of some 6,500 men. He -established his head quarters at Puente Mayor to the north of the city, -on the right bank of the Ter, while Duhesme placed his at Santa Eugenia -on the left bank. There were good and easy communications between them -by means of two fords, and the bridge of Salt, a little further from -Gerona, was also available. - - [312] The numbers of these corps before the fighting commenced in - June had been: - - Goulas’s Brigade (three batts.) 2,574 - Nicolas’s Brigade (four batts.) 2,891 - Two Italian battalions 1,300 - 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 409 - 2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs 388 - Artillery 250 - ----- - 7,812 - - But as the Italians, Goulas, and the cuirassiers had all been - engaged several times, and had suffered serious losses, we must - deduct 800 men at least, in order to get the figures of July 17. - Foy gives only 6,000. - -Thirteen thousand men seemed enough to make an end of an old-fashioned -fortress like Gerona, held by a garrison which down to the first day -of the siege counted no more than 400 regular troops--that same Irish -regiment of Ultonia which had stood out against Duhesme’s first attack -in June. It was fortunate for the defenders that at the very moment of -the arrival of the French they received a powerful reinforcement. The -light infantry regiment named the 2nd Volunteers of Barcelona, 1,300 -strong, entered the city on the night of July 22[313], slipping between -the heads of Duhesme’s and Reille’s columns. This corps had formed -part of the garrison of Minorca: instead of being landed at Tarragona -with the rest of Del Palacio’s troops, it was dropped at San Feliu, the -nearest port on the coast to Gerona, and had just time to reach that -place before its investment was completed. - - [313] Not on the twenty-fifth, as Napier says (i. 83), following - apparently the dates given by Cabanes. I have followed Arteche - here, as his search into times and seasons seems more careful - than that of any other authority. - -Duhesme had resolved to avoid for the future the fruitless attempts -at escalade, which had cost him so many men during his first siege of -Gerona, and to proceed by the regular rules of poliorcetics. He had -with him a battering-train more than sufficient to wreck the ancient -walls of the city: accordingly he opened a secondary attack on the -lower town on the left of the Oña, but turned the greater part of his -attention to the citadel of Monjuich. If this work, which from its -lofty hill commands the whole city, were once mastered, the place could -not hold out for a day longer. By this arrangement the charge of the -main attack fell to Reille, and Duhesme himself undertook only the -demonstration against the Mercadal. The French began by establishing -themselves on the lower slopes of the tableland of which Monjuich -occupies the culminating point. They found shelter in three ruined -towers which the garrison was too weak to occupy, and raised near them -three batteries with six heavy guns and two howitzers, which battered -the citadel, and also played upon certain parts of the town wall near -the gate of San Pedro. The batteries in Duhesme’s section of the -siege-lines consisted only of mortars and howitzers, which shelled and -several times set fire to the Mercadal, but could make no attempt to -open breaches in its walls. - -The siege-approaches of the French before Gerona were conducted with -an astonishing slowness: it was not till sixteen days after they had -established themselves on the slopes round Monjuich, that they began to -batter it in a serious fashion [Aug. 12]. This delay was partly due to -the steepness of the ground up which the guns had to be dragged, partly -to the necessity for sending to Figueras for extra artillery material, -which could only be brought slowly and under heavy escort to the banks -of the Ter. But Duhesme’s slackness, and the want of skill displayed by -his engineer officers, were responsible for the greater portion of the -delay. Moreover the investment of Gerona was so badly managed, that not -only did the garrison keep up a regular communication at night with -the chiefs of the _somatenes_ who lay out on the hills to the west, -but convoys repeatedly left and entered the town in the dark, without -meeting a single French picket or patrol. - -This delay of a fortnight in pressing the attack on Gerona led to two -important results. The first was that the news of the capitulation of -Baylen reached both camps, producing grave discouragement in the one, -and a disposition for bold action in the other. The second was that Del -Palacio and the troops from Minorca had time granted to them to prepare -for interference in the siege. The marquis had landed at Tarragona on -July 23, with all his division, save the regiment sent to St. Feliu and -the Aragonese battalion which had been directed on Tortosa. Immediately -on his arrival the insurrectionary Junta of Catalonia transferred -itself from Lerida to Tarragona and elected Del Palacio Captain-General -of the principality. Thus a real central authority was established in -the province, and a single military direction could at last be given -to its armies. The new Captain-General was well-intentioned and full -of patriotism, but no great strategist[314]. His plan was to press -Barcelona with the bulk of his regular forces, so that Lecchi might -be compelled to call for instant help from Duhesme, while a small -column under the Conde de Caldagues was to march on Gerona, not so much -with the hope of raising the siege, as to aid the _somatenes_ of the -Ampurdam in harassing the investing force and throwing succours into -the city[315]. - - [314] Collingwood (_Correspondence_, ii. 271) calls him ‘a fat - unwieldy marquess, who, if his principles are good, has a very - limited ability.’ - - [315] For Del Palacio’s intentions see his orders to Caldagues, - quoted by Arteche (ii. 622). - -Accordingly the main body of Del Palacio’s army, the regiments of -Soria, Granada, and Borbon, with Wimpfen’s two Swiss battalions from -Tarragona, marched on the Llobregat, drove in Lecchi’s outposts, and -confined him to the immediate environs of Barcelona. The _somatenes_ -came to give help in thousands, and a cordon of investment was -established at a very short distance from the great city. On the -seaside Lord Cochrane, with the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ frigates, -kept up a strict blockade, so that Lecchi, with his insufficient and -not too trustworthy garrison of 3,500 Swiss and Italian troops, was in -a most uncomfortable position. If it had not been that Barcelona was -completely commanded by the impregnable citadel of Monjuich, he could -not have maintained his hold on the large and turbulent city. His last -outpost was destroyed on July 31: this was the strong castle of Mongat, -six miles out on the coast-road from Barcelona to Mataro. It was held -by a company of Neapolitans, 150 men with seven guns. Attacked on the -land-side by 800 _miqueletes_ under Francisco Barcelo, and from the sea -by the broadside of the _Impérieuse_, the Italian officer in command -surrendered to Lord Cochrane, in order to save his men from massacre -by the Catalans. Cochrane then blew up the castle, and destroyed the -narrow coast-road on each side of it by cuttings and explosions[316], -so that there was no longer any practicable route for guns, horses, -or wagons along the shore. Thus hemmed in, Lecchi began to send to -Duhesme, by various secret channels, appeals for instant aid, and -reports painting his situation in gloomy but not much exaggerated -colours. He asserted that the _somatenes_ were pushing their incursions -to within 600 yards of his advanced posts, and that there were now -30,000 Catalans in arms around him. If he had said 10,000 he would have -been within the limits of fact. - - [316] For a good narrative of these operations see Lord - Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 262-5. - -On August 6 the Captain-General, after carefully arranging his troops -in the positions round Barcelona, sent off Caldagues to harass Duhesme -in the north. This enterprising brigadier-general was given no more -than four companies of regulars, three guns, and 2,000 _miqueletes_ -from the Lerida district under their colonel, Juan Baget. Marching by -the mountain road that goes by Hostalrich, and picking up many recruits -on the way, he established himself on the fourteenth at Castella, in -the hills that lie between Gerona and the sea. Here he was met by all -the _somatenes_ of Northern Catalonia, under their daring leaders, -Milans and Claros. - -The investment of Gerona was so badly managed, that when the news -of Caldagues’ approach was received, two colonels (O’Donovan of the -Ultonia Regiment and La Valeta of the Barcelona Volunteers) were able -to penetrate the French lines and to confer with the commander of the -army of succour. These two officers were really conducting the defence, -for the titular governor, Bolivar, seems to have been a nonentity[317], -who exercised no influence on the course of events. At a council of -war which they attended, it was resolved to try a stroke which was far -bolder than anything that the Captain-General had contemplated when -he sent Caldagues northward. The relieving force was to attack from -the rear Reille’s troops on the heights before Monjuich, while at the -same time every man that could be spared from the garrison was to be -flung on the breaching batteries from the front. Duhesme’s army in the -plain beyond the Oña was to be left alone: it was hoped that the whole -business would be over before he could arrive at the spot where the -fate of battle was to be decided. There were somewhat over 8,000 men -disposable for the attack: 1,000 regulars and four hundred _miqueletes_ -were to sally out of Gerona: Caldagues could bring up 7,000 more, all -raw levies except the four companies of old troops that he had brought -from Tarragona. He had also five field-guns. As Duhesme and Reille had -13,000 men, of whom 1,200 were cavalry, it was a daring experiment -to attack them, even though their forces were distributed along an -extensive line of investment. - - [317] It is very odd, as Arteche remarks (ii. 611), that none of - the contemporary Spanish narratives mention the name of Bolivar. - They only speak of La Valeta and O’Donovan as heading the defence. - -A bold and confident general, placed in Duhesme’s position, would not -have waited to be attacked in his trenches. The moment that he heard of -the approach of Caldagues, he would have drawn off half his battalions -from the siege, and have gone out to meet the relieving army, before -it could get within striking distance of Gerona. But Duhesme was not -in the mood for adventurous strokes: he was chilled in his ardour by -the news of the disaster of Baylen: he was worried by Lecchi’s gloomy -reports; and he had been pondering for some days whether it would not -be well to raise the siege and march off to save Barcelona. But the -ravages which his bombardment was producing in the beleaguered city, -and the fact that a breach was beginning to be visible in the walls of -Monjuich, induced him to remain before the place, hoping that it might -fall within the next few days. If this was his determination, he should -at least have made preparations to receive Caldagues: but no attempt -whatever appears to have been made to resist an attack from without. - -On the morning of August 16, the Spaniards struck their blow. Between -nine and ten o’clock in the morning, the 1,400 men of the garrison -deployed from behind the cover of the citadel, and charged down upon -the trenches and batteries of the besiegers[318]. They completely -swept away the battalion of the 5th Legion of Reserve, which was -furnishing the guard of the trenches, captured the siege-guns, and set -fire to the fascines of the batteries. Then pushing on, they drove off -the Swiss battalion of the Valais, and the two Tuscan battalions of the -113th Regiment, pressing them down hill towards Reille’s head quarters -at Puente Mayor. The French general rallied them upon the 1st _Régiment -de Marche_, which formed his reserve at this point of the line, and -mounting the slope retook some of the works which had been lost. But at -this moment Caldagues’ whole army appeared upon the heights, pressing -forward in four columns with great confidence. The sight of these -multitudes checked Reille, who hastily drew back, evacuated Puente -Mayor and withdrew to the other bank of the Ter. Duhesme, on his side, -abandoned all his outlying positions and concentrated his whole force -in front of the village of Santa Eugenia. - - [318] The Barcelona Volunteers under La Valeta led; the Ultonia, - under Major Henry O’Donnell, supported. - -The Catalans were wise enough not to descend into the plain, where -Duhesme’s cavalry and guns would have had a free hand. Caldagues -refrained from passing the Ter, and merely drew up his army on the -slopes above Puente Mayor, ready to receive battle. But the expected -attack never came; Duhesme held back all the afternoon, and then fled -away under cover of the darkness. His losses in the fighting on the -hills had not been heavy--seventy-five killed and 196 wounded--but -his spirit was broken. He would not risk an assault on such a strong -position with his motley and somewhat demoralized army. For a moment -he thought of leading his whole force back to Reille’s base at -Figueras: but the reflection that in this case Lecchi would probably be -destroyed, and he himself be made responsible for the loss of Barcelona -by the Emperor, deterred him from such a cowardly move. Bidding Reille -take the northern road and keep open the communications with France, -he drew off the rest of his army to the south to rejoin his Italian -comrades. The move was made with some panic and precipitation: the -remaining siege-guns were buried in a perfunctory fashion, and some -stores destroyed. Then Duhesme marched away over the mountains, pursued -by the _somatenes_ of Milans; while Reille retired across the plains of -the Ampurdam, and had a fairly easy journey to Figueras. Claros, who -tried to harass his retreat, never dared to close in upon him in the -open country, fearing his cavalry and guns. Far more toilsome was the -lot of Duhesme’s column, which had to march for twenty miles through -very broken ground, chased by the levies of Milans, to whom the whole -district was familiar. When he reached the sea at Malgrat he found that -his troubles were only growing worse. The _somatenes_ hung on his right -flank, while Lord Cochrane’s frigate the _Impérieuse_ followed him on -the left hand, giving him a broadside whenever his march lay within -cannon-shot of the beach. Moreover, the peasants had been cutting -and blasting away the road under Cochrane’s direction; and at each -point where one of these obstructions had been made, it was necessary -to drag the guns and wagons of the column across almost impassable -hillsides[319]. Finding that he was making no appreciable progress, and -that his men were growing utterly demoralized, Duhesme at last took a -desperate step. He blew up his ammunition, burnt his baggage, cast his -field-guns into the sea, and fled away by hill-tracks parallel with the -shore. After long skirmishing with the _somatenes_ he reached Mongat, -where Lecchi came out to his aid with 1000 men and a battery--all -that could be spared from the depleted garrison of Barcelona. There -the Catalans stayed their pursuit, and Duhesme’s harassed battalions -poured back into the city, sick of mountain warfare, half-starved, and -carrying with them nothing but what they brought in on their backs -[August 20]. As a fighting force for offensive operations they were -useless for some weeks, and all that their general could do was to hold -for foraging purposes as much of the open ground about Barcelona as he -could manage to retain. Nothing more could be essayed till Napoleon -should vouchsafe to send heavy reinforcements to Catalonia, for the -purpose of reopening the severed communications with France. - - [319] See Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 266. - -Two obvious criticisms on these operations in the month of August must -be made. The first is that Del Palacio might probably have destroyed -Duhesme’s whole army, if, instead of sending out his lieutenant -Caldagues with a handful of regulars and 2,000 _miqueletes_, he had -marched on Gerona with his entire force, the 5,000 old troops from -Port Mahon and the whole of the local levies of Central Catalonia. -Lecchi was so weak in Barcelona that a few thousand _somatenes_ could -have kept him in check, for he dared not ungarnish the city. If the -Captain-General had thrown every man into the struggle at Gerona, -it seems certain that Duhesme must either have been annihilated or -have fled away with Reille to Figueras, abandoning Barcelona to its -inevitable fate. - -The second comment is equally obvious: Duhesme’s generalship was even -worse than that of Del Palacio. Since the Spaniards came against him -not with the whole army of Catalonia, but with a mere detachment of -7,000 _somatenes_, he should have formed a covering force of 5,000 -men, and have fallen upon them while they were still at some distance -from Gerona. Instead of doing this, he allowed them to encamp for -three days unmolested at Castella, a village no more than five miles -distant from Reille’s outposts. There they concerted their operations -with the garrison, and fell upon the investing force at the moment that -suited them best. It is the extraordinary apathy or neglect displayed -by Duhesme that justifies Caldagues’ bold stroke at the French lines. -Finding the enemy so torpid, he might well venture an assault upon -them, without incurring the charge of rashness of which Napier finds -him guilty[320]. In other circumstances it would have been mad for the -Spaniard, who had no more than 7,000 _somatenes_, to attack a French -army 13,000 strong. But seeing Duhesme so utterly negligent--and his -army strung out on a long front of investment, without any covering -force--Caldagues was quite justified in making the experiment which -turned out so successfully. Duhesme tried to extenuate his fault, by -giving out that he had been about to abandon the siege even before he -was attacked, and that he had orders from Bayonne authorizing such a -step. But we may be permitted to join his successor St. Cyr in doubting -both the original intention and the imperial authorization[321]. There -is at least no trace of it in the correspondence of Napoleon, who as -late as August 23, seven days after the fight outside Gerona, was under -the impression that Reille’s division alone might suffice to capture -the city, though he was prepared if necessary to support him with -other troops. On the seventeenth of the same month, the day on which -Duhesme began his disastrous retreat on Barcelona, Napoleon had already -made up his mind to supersede him, and had directed St. Cyr, with two -fresh divisions, to take post at Perpignan. But in the orders given to -the new commander in Catalonia there is no sign that the Emperor had -acquiesced in the raising of the siege of Gerona, though it may perhaps -be deduced from a later dispatch that he had not disapproved of the -strengthening of Lecchi’s garrison at Barcelona by the withdrawal of -Chabran’s division from the leaguer[322]. - - [320] Napier, i. 89. - - [321] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, 1808-9, p. 15. - - [322] The notices of the army of Catalonia and its intended - operations are not very numerous in Napoleon’s dispatches. Foy - accepts Duhesme’s story that he had intended all along to raise - the siege after receiving from Bayonne an order to suspend active - operations (iv. 177). But it seems difficult to read this into - the Emperor’s dispatches; Napoleon received the news of Baylen - on Aug. 3, but did not begin pushing large reinforcements on to - Catalonia till Aug. 10 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,249), nor supersede - Duhesme by St. Cyr till Aug. 17 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256). - On Aug. 23 he concludes that Duhesme would be best placed at - Barcelona, but that Reille must take Gerona with his division, - which may be reinforced by that of Chabot, newly arrived at - Perpignan, or even by more troops due from Italy in a few weeks. - The expectation which he expresses, that Reille alone might very - possibly be strong enough to capture the place, is enough to - show that he did not intend to raise the siege, but (at most) - to order Duhesme to strengthen Lecchi with men drawn off from - the leaguer--which is a very different thing from that general’s - statement of the case. - -Meanwhile Napoleon had recognized that even with Reille’s -reinforcements, Catalonia was not adequately garrisoned, and on August -10 had directed 18,000 fresh troops upon the principality. These, -moreover, were not the mere sweepings of his dépôts, like Reille’s -men, but consisted of two strong divisions of old troops; Souham’s was -composed of ten French battalions from Lombardy, Pino’s of 10,000 men -of the best corps of the army of the kingdom of Italy[323]. A little -later the Emperor resolved to send one division more, Germans this -time, to Catalonia. Instead of the 13,000 men whom he had originally -thought sufficient for the subjugation of the province, he had now -set aside more than 40,000 for the task, and this did not prove to be -one man too many. No better testimonial could be given to the gallant -_somatenes_, than that they had forced the enemy to detach so large -a force against them. Nor could any better proof be given of the -Emperor’s fundamental misconception of the Spanish problem in May and -June, than the fact that he had so long been under the impression that -Duhesme’s original divisions would be enough to subdue the rugged and -warlike Catalan principality. - - [323] The Emperor writes to Eugène Beauharnais that the 10,000 - Italians, horse, foot, and artillery, must be ‘un extrait de - l’armée italienne dans le cas de se faire honneur,’ the best that - could be got (_Dispatch_ 14,249, Aug. 10). - -Before Souham, Pino, and the rest could arrive on the scene, many -weeks must elapse, and meanwhile we must turn back to the main course -of the war in Central Spain, where the condition of affairs had been -profoundly modified by the results of the Capitulation of Baylen. - - - - -SECTION VI - -THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAYLEN - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE FRENCH RETREAT TO THE EBRO - - -While dealing with the operations of the French armies in the various -provinces of Spain, we have observed that at every point the arrival -of the news of Dupont’s disaster at Baylen produced notable results. -It was this unexpected intelligence that drove the intrusive king out -of Madrid within a week of his arrival, and ere the ceremonial of his -proclamation had been completed. It brought back Bessières from the -Esla to the Arlanzon, and raised the siege of Saragossa. Knowing of -it Junot summoned his council of war at Torres Vedras with a sinking -heart, and Duhesme lacked the confidence to try the ordeal of battle -before Gerona. Beyond the Pyrenees its influence was no less marked. -Napoleon had imagined that the victory of Rio Seco had practically -decided the fate of the Peninsula, and at the moment of Baylen was -turning his attention to Austria rather than to Spain. On July 25, -five days after Dupont had laid down his arms, he was meditating the -reinforcement of his army in Germany, and drafting orders that directed -the garrisons of northern France on Mainz and Strasburg[324]. To a -mind thus preoccupied the news of the disaster in Andalusia came like -a thunderclap. So far was the Spanish trouble from an end, that it -was assuming an aspect of primary importance. If Austria was really -intending mischief, it was clear that the Emperor would have two great -continental wars on his hands at the same moment--a misfortune that -had never yet befallen him. It was already beginning to be borne in -upon him that the treachery at Bayonne had been a blunder as well as a -crime. Hence came the wild rage that bursts out in the letters written -upon the days following that on which the news of Baylen reached him -at Bordeaux. ‘Has there ever, since the world began,’ wrote Bonaparte -to Clarke, his minister of war, ‘been such a stupid, cowardly, idiotic -business as this? Behold Mack and Hohenlohe justified! Dupont’s own -dispatch shows that all that has occurred is the result of his own -inconceivable folly.... The loss of 20,000 picked men, who have -disappeared without even inflicting any considerable loss on the -enemy, will necessarily have the worst moral influence on the Spanish -nation.... Its effect on European politics will prevent me from going -to Spain myself.... I wish to know at once what tribunal ought to try -these generals, and what penalty the law can inflict on them for such -a crime[325].’ A similar strain runs through his first letter to his -brother Joseph after the receipt of the news--‘Dupont has soiled our -banners. What folly and what baseness! The English will lay hands on -his army[326]. Such events make it necessary for me to go to Paris, -for Germany, Poland, Italy, and all, are tied up in the same knot. -It pains me grievously that I cannot be with you, in the midst of -my soldiers[327].’ In other letters the capitulation is ‘a terrible -catastrophe,’ ‘a horrible affair, for the cowards capitulated to save -their baggage,’ and (of course) ‘a machination paid for with English -gold[328]. These imbeciles are to suffer on the scaffold the penalty -of this great national crime[329].’ The Emperor did well to be angry, -for the shock of Baylen was indeed felt to every end of Europe. But he -should have blamed his own Macchiavellian brain, that conceived the -plot of Bayonne, and his own overweening confidence, that launched -Dupont with 20,000 half-trained conscripts (not, as he wrote to -Clarke, with _vingt mille hommes d’élite et choisis_) on the hazardous -Andalusian enterprise. - - [324] Napoleon to Jerome, King of Westphalia, July 25 (_Nap. - Corresp._, 14,230): ‘L’Autriche arme: elle nie ses armements, - elle arme donc contre nous.... Puisque l’Autriche arme, il faut - donc armer. Aussi j’ordonne que la Grande Armée soit renforcée. - Mes troupes se réunissent à Strasbourg, Mayence, Wesel,’ &c. - Compare this with the great harangue made to Metternich on August - 15 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,254) and with _Nap. Corresp._, 14,248, - which discusses the co-operation of Russia in a war with Austria. - - [325] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,242). - - [326] i.e. Napoleon is aware that they will never allow the army - to be taken home by sea, as the capitulation provided. - - [327] Napoleon to Joseph, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,243): - ‘L’Allemagne, l’Italie, la Pologne etc., tout se lie,’ is the - Emperor’s phrase. - - [328] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,244, 14,272, 14,283. - - [329] A few words as to Dupont’s fate may be added. His - experiences during the next four years throw a curious light - on the administration of military justice under the Empire. - He, together with Vedel, Chabert, Marescot, Legendre, and the - aide-de-camp Villoutreys, were arrested on returning to France, - and thrown into prison. They were told to prepare for a trial - before the Supreme High Court (_Haute Cour Impériale_), and - a long series of interrogatories was administered to them. A - military commission drew up a preliminary report on the case: - on reading it the Emperor saw that Dupont had a fair defence to - make on all the charges brought against him, with the exception - of that of military incapacity. He countermanded the order for - a trial, and the prisoners (after nine months of confinement) - were released, but left under police surveillance. After Dupont - had spent two years and a half of peace in the country-house of - a relative, he was suddenly arrested at midnight on Feb. 12, - 1812, and given a secret trial, not before a court of justice or - a court-martial, but before a special military commission. He - was allowed neither counsel nor documents, and forced to defend - himself at forty-eight hours’ notice. The judges declared him - guilty of having signed a capitulation containing ‘des conditions - honteuses et avilissantes,’ but not of having surrendered without - necessity, or of having shown cowardice or treason. Since the - capitulation had been ‘contrary to the political interests of - the Empire, and had compromised the safety of the State,’ while - yet ‘there would be grave inconvenience in giving the accused a - public trial,’ the court advised the Emperor to deprive Dupont of - rank, title, and pension, and to relegate him to the country. The - other accused officers might suffer the same penalties. Refusing - to consider this a sufficient punishment, Napoleon shut up Dupont - in the lonely fort of Joux, in the Jura, where he remained a - prisoner till the fall of the Empire. Vedel and Legendre were - pardoned, and afterwards served in Italy. Chabert and Villoutreys - were put on half-pay. - -Meanwhile he had to face the situation: within a few hours of the -moment when Villoutreys placed Dupont’s dispatch in his hands, he had -so far got over the first spasms of his wrath that he was able to -dictate a general plan for the reconcentration of his armies[330]. We -have compared the French forces in Spain to a broad wedge, of which -the point, directed against the heart of the insurrection, was formed -by the three divisions of Dupont’s corps. This point had now been -broken off; but the Emperor, still clinging to the idea of the wedge, -wished to preserve Madrid and to form in and about it a new army fit -for offensive operations. With this force he would strike at the -insurgents of Andalusia and Valencia when they marched on the capital, -while Bessières in the valley of the Douro, and Verdier in the valley -of the Ebro were still to preserve a forward position, and shield the -army of the centre from the flank attacks of the Galicians and the -Aragonese. The troops left around Madrid at the moment of the disaster -of Baylen were parts of the three divisions of Moncey’s corps[331], -one of Dupont’s, and the brigade which had escorted Joseph Napoleon -from Burgos, together with 3,000 horse--a total of about 23,000 men. -Bonaparte judged that this was not enough to resist the combined attack -of Castaños and of the Valencians and Murcians of Saint March and -Llamas. Accordingly he intended that Bessières should lend the King two -brigades of infantry--a deduction from his force which would compel him -to fall back from Leon into Old Castile[332]--and that Verdier should -spare a brigade from the army in front of Saragossa[333], though it was -none too strong for the task before it. Six battalions from the reserve -at Bayonne were to make a forced march to Madrid to join the King. Thus -reinforced up to 35,000 men, the corps at Madrid would be able, as -the Emperor supposed, to make head against any combination of Spanish -troops that could possibly be brought against it. - - [330] The ‘Note sur la situation actuelle de l’Espagne,’ which - forms No. 14,241 of the _Correspondance_. It is dated at - Bordeaux, Aug. 2, the very day on which Villoutreys brought the - news of the capitulation. - - [331] Viz. Musnier’s division of Moncey’s corps 6,500 men - Frere’s division of Dupont’s corps 4,400 ” - Bujet’s brigade of Morlot’s division of Moncey’s corps 3,700 ” - Remains (5 batts.) of Gobert’s division of Moncey’s corps 2,500 ” - Rey’s brigade of infantry (Joseph’s escort) 2,000 ” - Infantry and Cavalry of the Imperial Guard 2,500 ” - Cavalry of the Line 1,700 ” - ------ - 23,300 ” - - [332] Lefebvre’s brigade, which belonged to Morlot’s division of - Moncey’s corps--it had been lent to Bessières for the moment--and - Reynaud’s brigade, i.e. 5,300 foot, also two cavalry regiments, - making 6,000 in all. - - [333] Bazancourt’s brigade of two veteran regiments (14th and - 44th of the line), the last that had arrived at Saragossa. - -But all these arrangements were futile. Bonaparte at Bordeaux was -separated from his brother at the Retiro by so many miles that his -orders were grown stale before they reached their destination. His -scheme was made out on August 2, but on the preceding day King Joseph -and his whole army had evacuated Madrid. The terror of Baylen was -upon them, and they were expecting every moment to find themselves -attacked by Castaños, who was as a matter of fact celebrating triumphal -feasts at Seville. With a haste that turned out to be altogether -unnecessary, Moncey’s corps, escorting the King, his court, and his -long train of Spanish refugees, crossed the Somosierra and did not -halt till they reached Aranda de Duero, in the plains of Old Castile. -Napoleon was forced to make other plans in view of this retreat, whose -moral consequences were hardly inferior in importance to those of -Dupont’s capitulation. For both the Spanish nation and the courts of -Europe looked upon the evacuation of Madrid as marking the complete -downfall of Napoleon’s policy, and portending a speedy retirement of -the invaders behind the Pyrenees. It is certain that if the spirit of -Joseph and his advisers had been unbroken, they might have clung to the -capital till the reinforcements which the Emperor was hurrying to their -aid had arrived. It is probable that the 35,000 men, of whom Savary -and Moncey could then have disposed, might have held Castaños in check -till the army from the Rhine had time to come up. Yet there is every -excuse for the behaviour of the French commanders, for they could not -possibly have known that the Spaniards would move with such astonishing -slowness, or that they would refrain from hurling every available man -on Madrid. And as a matter of fact the evacuation of the capital turned -out in the end to be advantageous to Napoleon, for it inspired his -adversaries with a foolish self-confidence which proved their ruin. If -they had been forced to fight hard in New Castile, they would have been -obliged to throw much more energy into the struggle, and could not have -slackened their efforts under the false impression that the French were -absconding in dismay to Bayonne. - -When Bonaparte learnt that his brother had fled from Madrid and crossed -the passes into Old Castile, he was forced to draw out a wholly -different scheme from that which he had sketched on August 2. The -King, he wrote, with Moncey’s corps, must take post at Aranda, where -the Douro is crossed by the high-road from France to Madrid. His army -should be strengthened to a force of 30,000 men: meanwhile Bessières -and Verdier must protect his flanks. The former with 15,000 men should -take Valladolid as his head quarters and guard against any attempt -of Blake to resume the offensive. As to Verdier, since he had been -instructed to abandon the siege of Saragossa--a grave blunder--he must -be drawn back as far as Tudela on the Middle Ebro. From that point he -would easily be able to ‘contain’ the tumultuary army of Palafox. If -the Spaniards showed signs of pressing in on any part of the front, -the King, Verdier, or Bessières--as the case might demand--must not -hang back, but endeavour to shatter the vanguard of any advancing -force by a bold stroke. At all costs the war must not be waged in a -timid style--in short, to adopt a well-known military axiom, ‘the -best defensive would be a vigorous local offensive[334].’ Meanwhile -it should be known that enormous reinforcements were in march from -the Rhine and the Elbe. This was indubitably correct, for on August 5 -the 1st and 6th Corps of the ‘Grand Army,’ and two divisions of heavy -cavalry, had been sent their orders to break up from their garrisons -and set out for Spain[335]. The Viceroy of Italy and the Princes of -the Confederation of the Rhine had also been directed to send large -contingents to the Peninsula: the troops from Italy were to move on -Perpignan and strengthen the army of Catalonia; those from the German -states were to march on Bayonne and join the main army[336]. Somewhat -later the Emperor directed still further masses of men to be drawn -off from Germany, namely Marshal Mortier with the 5th Corps and two -more divisions of dragoons[337], while the whole of the Imperial Guard -came down from Paris on the same errand[338]. There were still nearly -100,000 of the old army left in Spain[339], and the reinforcements -would amount to 130,000 more, a force which when united would far -surpass both in numbers and in quality any army that the Spaniards -would be able to get together in the course of the next two months. - - [334] Note on the situation of Spain, Aug. 5 (_Nap. Corresp._, - 14,245). - - [335] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 5 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,244). - - [336] Napoleon to Eugène, Aug. 10 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,249), and - to Clarke (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256). - - [337] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 17 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256). - - [338] Except of course the brigade of fusiliers and the three - cavalry regiments which were already in Spain. - - [339] Or 98,000 to be exact, unless Reille’s force in Roussillon - be added. - -It was from Rochefort and on August 5 that Napoleon sent off his orders -to his brother to stay his retreat at Aranda de Duero, and to keep -Bessières at Valladolid and Verdier at Tudela. Once more the distances -of space and time were too much for him. Before the dispatch from -Rochefort came to hand, Joseph and Savary had already abandoned Aranda: -they left it on the sixth and by the ninth were at Burgos. At that city -they were met by Bessières, who according to the King’s orders had -fallen back from the Esla to the Arlanzon. Napoleon’s elaborate scheme -for the maintenance of the line of the Douro had thus fallen through, -as completely as his earlier plan for the defence of Madrid. Seeing -that his orders were clearly out of date, Moncey and Bessières[340] -agreed that they might be disregarded. The next line suitable for an -army acting on the defensive was that of the Ebro, and to the banks of -that river the dispirited army of France now withdrew. - - [340] Savary had left the army on Aug. 4, and returned to France. - -The head quarters were established at Miranda: the troops of Bessières -and Moncey were massed at that place and at Logroño, with a strong -detachment across the Ebro at Pancorbo, and some cavalry lying out -as far as Burgos: Verdier’s army, after finally raising the siege of -Saragossa, fell back on Milagro, the point where the Aragon falls into -the Ebro. Thus some 70,000 men were concentrated on a comparatively -short and compact front, covering the two great roads which lead to -France by Vittoria and by Pampeluna. Against any frontal attack from -the direction of Madrid the position was very strong. But a glance at -the map shows that the flanks were not properly protected: there was -nothing to prevent Blake from turning the extreme right by an advance -into Biscay, or to prevent Palafox from turning the extreme left by -a march on Pampeluna via Tafalla or Sanguesa. If either of these -moves were made by a powerful force, the army on the Ebro would be -compelled either to abandon its positions in order to go in pursuit, -or else to leave them occupied by a detachment insufficient to resist -a serious attack along the line of the high-road from Madrid. Both -those operations were ultimately taken in hand by the Spaniards, but -it was at too late an hour, when the reinforcements from Germany had -begun to arrive, and when ample means were at the disposal of the -French generals for repulsing flank attacks, without drawing off men -from the line of the Ebro. The astounding slowness of the Spaniards, -and the lamentable want of union between the commanders of the various -provincial armies, ruined any chance that there might have been of -success. The troops of King Joseph were safely installed in their -defensive positions by August 15. On that day the leading columns of -the Spanish army had only just arrived at Madrid. It was not till a -month later that the number of troops brought forward to the line of -the Ebro approached the total strength of the host of the intrusive -King. The offensive operations of Blake and Palafox did not commence -till the second half of September, when the columns of the ‘Grand Army’ -were already drawing near to the Pyrenees, and all possible chance -of success had long gone by. They were not developed till October, -when the counter-stroke of the French was fully prepared. From August -15 down to the day of the battle of Zornoza (October 31) there are -two months and a half of wasted time, during which the Spaniards -did nothing more than stir up an ineffectual rising in Biscay and -gradually push to the front scattered corps whose total did not amount -to much more than 100,000 men. The troops of Bonaparte on the other -hand--now under the orders of Jourdan, who arrived at Miranda on August -25[341]--had little to do but to ward off the feeble attempts to cut -their communications in Biscay, and to incorporate, brigade by brigade, -the numerous reinforcements which kept marching in from Bayonne. For -even ere the three veteran corps from Germany came to hand, there -was a continuous stream of troops pouring across the Pyrenees. Most -important, perhaps, of all the arrivals was that of Marshal Ney, the -toughest and most resolute of all the Emperor’s fighting-men, who -brought with him a spirit of enterprise and confidence which had long -been wanting in the army of Spain[342]. - - [341] See his _Mémoires_ (pp. 66, 67) for the situation at this - date. - - [342] He arrived at Irun on Aug. 30 (_Madrid Gazette_, Sept. - 17th, 1808). - - - - -SECTION VI: CHAPTER II - -CREATION OF THE ‘JUNTA GENERAL’ - - -On August 1, Madrid had seen the last of the French: yet it was not -till the thirteenth that the Spanish troops appeared before the gates -of the capital. Even then it was not the victorious army of Andalusia -which presented itself, but only the Valencian corps of Llamas, a mere -division of 8,000 men, which would not have dared to push forward, -had it not known that Joseph Bonaparte and all his train were now far -on their way towards the Ebro. During the thirteen days which elapsed -between his departure and the arrival of the Valencians there was -a curious interregnum in Madrid. It took some time to convince the -populace and the local authorities that the hated invaders were really -gone, and that they were once more their own masters. Nothing reflects -the state of public opinion better than the _Madrid Gazette_: down to -August 1, it shows the hand of a French editor; ‘His Majesty’ means -King Joseph, and all the foreign intelligence is coloured with French -views. On August 2 the foreign influence begins to disappear, and we -note a very cautious and tentative proclamation by the old ‘Council -of Castile.’ That effete body, shorn by the French of most of its -prominent members, had repeatedly yielded to the orders of Murat and -Savary: it had carried out many decrees of the new executive, yet it -had never actually recognized the legality of King Joseph’s accession. -Indeed at the last moment it had striven, by feeble methods of evasion -and delay, to avoid committing itself to this final step. But we may -guess that, had there been no Baylen, the Council would finally have -made up its mind to ‘swallow the pill’--if we may use once more Murat’s -characteristic phrase. However, the flight of Joseph had saved it -from being forced to range itself on the side of the traitors, and -its members were able to stay behind in Madrid without fearing for -their necks. In their first manifesto there is not a word that could -have offended Savary, if he had returned the next day. It preaches -the necessity of calm, order, and quiet: no one must stir up mobs, -compromise the public safety, or vex his respectable neighbours[343]. -The rest of the paper on this and the two following days is filled -up with essays on geography and political economy, lists of servants -seeking places, and colourless foreign news many weeks old. Such -piteous stuff was not likely to keep the people quiet: on August 4 a -mob assembled, broke open the house of Don Luis Viguri (one of Godoy’s -old confidants), murdered him, and dragged his body through the -streets. Fearing that they too might be considered _Afrancesados_ the -Council published a second proclamation of the most abject kind. The -‘melancholy instance of insubordination’ of the previous day causes -them ‘intolerable sorrow’ and is ‘unlikely to tend to public felicity.’ -The loyal and generous citizens ought to wait for the working of the -law and its ministers, and not to take the execution of justice into -their own hands. The clergy, the local officials, every employer of -labour, every father of a family, are begged to help to maintain peace -and order. Then comes a page of notices of new books, and a short paper -on the ethics of emigration! Of Ferdinand VII or Joseph I, of politics -domestic or foreign, there is not a word. Two days later the Council at -last makes up its mind, and, after a week of most uncomfortable sitting -on the fence, suddenly bursts out into an ‘Address to the honourable -and generous people of the capital of Spain,’ in the highest strain -of patriotism: ‘Our loved King is in chains, but his loyal subjects -have risen in his name. Our gallant armies have achieved triumphs over -“the invincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena.” All Europe stands -surprised at their rapid victories. These fellow citizens of ours, -crowned with the laurels of success, will soon be with us. Meanwhile -the Council must beg the patriotic citizens of Madrid to abstain from -riot and murder, and to turn their energies into more useful channels. -Let them prostrate themselves before the altar in grateful thanks -to God, and make preparations to receive and embrace the oncoming -bands of liberators.’ Domestic intelligence becomes for the future a -list of French atrocities, and of (sometimes apocryphal) victories -in the remoter corners of Spain[344]. Foreign intelligence is served -up with an English rather than a French flavour. The arsenal of -‘Volovich[345]’ is shipping scores of cannon and thousands of muskets -for the use of the brave Spaniards, the treasures of Great Britain -are to be poured into the hands of the insurrectionary Juntas, and -so forth. All this comes a little late: the good intentions of the -Council would have been more clear if they had been expressed on August -2 instead of August 7, when the French were still at Buitrago, rather -than when they were far away beyond Aranda de Duero[346]. - - [343] Proclamation of the Council, dated Aug. 1, published Aug. 2 - in the _Gazette_. There is an original copy of the broadsheet in - the _Vaughan Papers_. - - [344] On Aug. 9 the reader is invited to believe that Roussillon - has risen against Napoleon, and that the peasantry have stormed - its frontier-fortress of Bellegarde. - - [345] i.e. Woolwich. - - [346] It is hard to agree with Napier’s verdict that ‘The Council - was not wanting to itself; the individuals comprising it did - not hesitate to seize the reins of power when the French had - departed, and the prudence with which they preserved tranquillity - in the capital, and prevented all reaction, proves that they were - not without merit, and forms a striking contrast to the conduct - of the provincial Juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of - excess was committed and even encouraged’ (Napier, i. 299). - -It is really astonishing to find that the Council made a bid for power, -and attempted to assume the pose of a senate of warm-hearted patriots, -after all its base servility to Murat and Savary during the last six -months. Its president, Don Arias Mon y Velarde, actually had the -audacity to write a circular-note to the various provincial Juntas of -Spain, proposing that, as a single central government must obviously -be established, they should send representatives to Madrid to concert -with the Council on means of defence, and lend it the aid of their -influence and authority. That such a discredited body should attempt -to assume a kind of presidential authority over the local Juntas who -had raised and directed the insurrection was absurd. The replies which -were returned were of the most uncompromising kind: the Galician Junta -taunted the Council with having been ‘the most active instrument of -the Usurper.’ Palafox, speaking for Aragon, wrote that it ‘was a -corporation which had not done its duty.’ The active and ambitious -Junta of Seville wished to accuse the Council before the face of the -Spanish people ‘of having subverted the fundamental laws of the realm, -of having given the enemy every facility for seizing the domination of -Spain, of having lost all legal authority and become null and void, and -of being suspected of deliberate treason of the most atrocious sort -possible.’ The Valencians voted that ‘no public body of any kind ought -to enter into correspondence with the Council of Castile, or come -to any understanding with it[347].’ All these rebuffs to the Council -were well deserved, and it is clear that the provincial Juntas were -entirely justified in their action. But it is to be feared that there -lay at the bottom of their hearts not merely honest indignation at the -impudent proposal that had been laid before them, but a not unnatural -desire to cling as long as possible to their existing power and -authority. In many of the provinces there was shown a most unworthy and -unwise reluctance to proceed at once to the construction of a single -governing body for Spain, even when the proposal was put forward not -by a discredited corporation like the Council, but by men of undoubted -patriotism. - - [347] All these quotations come from the documents inserted by - Toreño in his fifth book (i. 262). - -The credit of starting a serious agitation for the erection of a -‘Supreme Junta’ must be given to the Murcians, whose councils were -guided by the old statesman Florida Blanca, a survivor from the days -of Charles III. As far back as June 22 they had issued a proclamation -setting forth the evils of provincial particularism, and advocating -the establishment of a central government. None of the other Juntas -ventured openly to oppose this laudable design, and some of them did -their best to further it. But there were others who clung to power, -and were determined to surrender it at as late a date as they could -manage. The Junta of Seville was far the worst: that body--as we have -had occasion to mention in another place--was largely in the hands -of intriguers, and had put forth unjustifiable claims to domination -in the whole southern part of the realm, even usurping the title of -‘Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies[348].’ In their desire for -self-aggrandizement they took most unjustifiable steps: they suppressed -Florida Blanca’s Murcian proclamation, lest it might stir up an -agitation in Andalusia in behalf of the establishment of a central -government[349]. But this was a comparatively venial sin: their worst -act was to stay the march of Castaños on Madrid after Baylen. The -pretext used was that they wished to welcome the victorious general -and his army with triumphal entries and feasts of rejoicing--things -entirely out of place, so long as the French were still holding the -capital of the realm. To his own entire dissatisfaction Castaños was -dragged back to Seville, there to display the captured guns and flags -of the French, and to be received with salvos fired by patriotic -ladies who had learnt the drill of the artilleryman[350]. But he -soon found to his disgust that the Junta was really aiming at the -employment of his troops not for national purposes but for their own -aggrandizement. They wished to speak with 40,000 men at their back, -and were most reluctant to let the army pass the Sierra Morena, lest -it should get out of their control. Their most iniquitous design was -to overawe by armed force their neighbours, the Junta of Granada, who -refused to recognize them as a central authority for Andalusia, and had -given their assent to the Murcian proposal for the prompt formation of -a national government. They were actually issuing orders for a division -to march against the Granadans, when Castaños--though a man of mild -and conciliatory manners--burst out in wrath at the council board. -Springing up from his chair and smiting the table a resounding blow, -he exclaimed, ‘Who is the man that dares bid the troops march without -my leave? Away with all provincial differences: I am the general of -the Spanish nation, I am in command of an honourable army, and we are -not going to allow any one to stir up civil war[351].’ Conscious that -the regiments would follow the victor of Baylen, and refuse obedience -to mere civilians, the Junta dropped their suicidal project. But -they turned all their energy into devising pretexts for delaying the -march of the army on Madrid. Their selfishness was undisguised: when -Castaños begged for leave to march on the capital without further -delay[352], the Conde de Tilly (the most intriguing spirit among -all the politicians of Seville) responded with the simple question, -‘And what then will become of _us_?’ He then moved that the Junta of -Andalusia should concern itself with Andalusia and Portugal alone, and -not interfere in what went on beyond the Sierra Morena. This proposal -was a little too strong even for the narrow-minded particularists of -the Junta: but though they let Castaños go, they contrived excuses for -delaying the march of the greater part of his army. He did not get to -Madrid till August 23, more than a month after Baylen, and then brought -with him only the single division of La Peña, about 7,000 strong. The -other three divisions, those of Reding, Jones, and Coupigny, did not -cross the Sierra Morena for many weeks after, and some of the troops -had not even left Andalusia at the moment when the French resumed -offensive operations in October. On various specious pretences the -Junta detained many regiments at Seville and Cadiz, giving out that -they were to form the nucleus of a new ‘army of reserve,’ which was -still a mere skeleton three months after Baylen had been fought. If we -compare the Andalusian army-list of November with that of July, we find -that only seven new battalions[353] had joined the army of Castaños in -time to fight on the Ebro. It is true that a new division had been also -raised in Granada, and sent to Catalonia under General Reding, but this -was due to the energy of the Junta of that small kingdom, which was far -more active than that of Seville. Andalusia had 40,000 men under arms -in July, and no more than 50,000 at the beginning of November, though -the Junta had promised to have at least thirty reserve battalions ready -before the end of the autumn, and had received from England enormous -stores of muskets and clothing for their equipment. - - [348] See page 69. - - [349] Lord Collingwood’s _Correspondence_, ii. 98. - - [350] Arteche, ii. 124. - - [351] Toreño, i. 264. - - [352] This story is told by Lord Collingwood, in an official - dispatch to Castlereagh, dated July 29. He states that he _knows_ - that the colloquy took place, and clearly had the information - from Castaños himself (_Collingwood Correspondence_, ii. 199). - - [353] Tiradores de España, Provincial de Cadiz, Carmona, Baylen, - Navas de Tolosa, 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Seville. - -In the northern parts of Spain there was almost as much confusion, -particularism, and selfishness as in the south. The main sources of -trouble were the rivalry of the Juntas of Asturias and Galicia, and -the extravagant claims of the aged and imbecile Cuesta, in virtue of -his position as Captain-General of Castile. It will be remembered -that in June insurrectionary Juntas had been established at Leon -and Valladolid, the former purporting to represent the kingdom of -Leon, the latter the kingdom of Old Castile. Each had been under -the thumb of Cuesta, who looked upon them as nothing more than -committees established under his authority for the civil government -of the provinces of the Douro. But the disaster of Medina de Rio Seco -destroyed both the power and the credit of the Captain-General. Flying -before the French, the Juntas took refuge in Galicia, where they -settled down at Ponferrada for a few days, and then moved to Lugo, -whither the Junta of Galicia came out to meet them. The three bodies, -joining in common session, chose as their president Don Antonio Valdes, -the Bailiff of the Knights of Malta, who was one of the representatives -of Castile. They claimed to be recognized as the supreme civil -government of Northern Spain, but their position was weakened by two -mischances. The Asturian Junta refused to have anything to do with -them, and persisted in remaining sovereign within the borders of its -own principality. Even more vexatious was the conduct of Cuesta: though -he was wandering in the mountains with only three or four thousand -raw levies--the wrecks of Rio Seco--he refused to recognize any -authority in the three federated Juntas, and pretended to revoke by his -proclamation any powers vested in those of Castile and Leon. The fact -was that he knew that they would lend support to his military rival -Blake, and not to himself. He feigned to regard the Captains-General -and the old _Audiencias_, or provincial tribunals, as the sole -legitimate powers left in the kingdom, and to consider the Juntas -as irregular assemblies destitute of any valid authority. In what a -scandalous form he translated his theories into action, we shall soon -see. Meanwhile he refused to co-operate with the troops of Galicia, and -made no attempt to follow the retreating French. All his efforts were -directed to increasing the numbers of the mass of raw levies which he -called the ‘Army of Castile.’ But from the whole of the provinces over -which he claimed authority he had only succeeded in scraping together -12,000 men by the middle of September, though as far as population went -they represented nearly a sixth of the people of Spain. - -The want of any central executive for directing the armies of the -patriots had the most disastrous results. By September 1 Castaños and -Llamas had not more than 20,000 men at Madrid. Galluzzo’s army of -Estremadura, which ought to have joined them long before, was still -employed in its futile siege of Elvas. Cuesta was hanging back in -Castile, as jealous of Castaños as he had been of Blake. The only -armies which were in touch with the French were Palafox’s troops on -the Ebro and the Valencian division of Saint March, which the Junta of -Valencia (showing more patriotism than most of their colleagues) had -pushed up to Saragossa to aid the Aragonese. Blake, with the powerful -army of Galicia, had descended to Astorga when Bessières retreated to -Burgos. But from Astorga he advanced most cautiously, always clinging -to the southern slope of the Cantabrian hills, in order to avoid the -plains, where the cavalry of the French would have a free hand. It -was not till September 10 that he had concentrated his main body at -Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro, where he was at last near enough -to the front to be able to commence operations. - -The whole month of August, it is not too much to say, was lost for -military purposes because Spain had not succeeded in furnishing itself -with a central government or a commander-in-chief. It had been wasted -in constitutional debates of the most futile kind. To every one, except -to certain of the more selfish members of the Juntas, it was clear -that a way must be found out of the existing anarchy. Three courses -seemed possible: one was to appoint a Regent, or a small Council of -Regency, and to entrust to him (or to them) the conduct of affairs. -The second was to summon the Cortes, the old national parliament of -Spain. The third was to establish a new sort of central government, -by inducing each of the existing Juntas to send deputies, with full -powers of representation, to sit together as a ‘Supreme Central Junta’ -for the whole realm. The project of appointing a Regent had at first -many advocates: it occurred to both Castaños and Palafox, and each (as -it chanced) pitched upon the same individual as most worthy of the -post[354]. This was the Archduke Charles of Austria, the sole general -in Europe who had won a military reputation of the first class while -contending with the French. He would have been an excellent choice--if -only he could have been secured. But it did not take much reflection -to see that if Austria allowed her greatest captain to accept such a -post, she would involve herself in instant war with Bonaparte, and if -such a war broke out the Archduke would be wanted on the Danube rather -than upon the Ebro. There was no other name likely to command general -confidence. Some spoke of the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo[355], the -last prince of the Spanish royal house who remained in the realm. But -he was an insignificant and incapable person, and much discredited by -his dallyings with Murat in the days before the insurrection had begun. -Clearly he would be no more than a puppet, worked by some astute person -behind the viceregal throne. Other names suggested were those of the -young Dom Pedro of Portugal (son of the Prince-Regent John), and of -Prince Leopold, the son of Ferdinand IV of Sicily. The former was a -grandson, the latter a nephew of Charles IV. Both therefore were near -to the throne, but both were foreigners, young, untried in matters of -state, and utterly unknown to the Spaniards. Dom Pedro’s claims were -not strongly pushed, but the Sicilian court made a strenuous attempt -to forward those of Prince Leopold. Their ambassador in London tried to -enlist the support of the English Government for him: but Canning and -Castlereagh were anxious to avoid any appearance of dictating orders -to Spain, and firmly refused to countenance the project. Before their -reply came to hand, King Ferdinand (or rather that old intriguer, his -spouse, and her son-in-law the Duke of Orleans) sent the prince to -Gibraltar, on a man-of-war which they had obtained from Mr. Drummond, -the British minister at Palermo. By lending his aid to the plan this -unwise diplomat almost succeeded in compromising his government. But -most fortunately our representatives in Spain nipped in the bud this -intrigue, which could not have failed to embroil them with the Juntas, -none of whom had the least love for the Sicilian house. When the -_Thunderer_ arrived at Gibraltar [August 9] Sir Hew Dalrymple--then -just on the eve of starting for Portugal--refused to allow the prince -to land, or to distribute the proclamations which he had prepared. -These were the work of Leopold’s brother-in-law, Louis Philippe of -Orleans, who had accompanied him from Palermo with the design of -fishing in troubled waters, a craft of which he was to show himself -in later days a past master. If Leopold should become regent, Orleans -intended to be the ‘power behind the throne.’ Dalrymple detained the -two princes at Gibraltar, and when he was gone Lord Collingwood[356] -took the same attitude of hostile neutrality. Tired of detention, -Louis Philippe after a few days sailed for London, in the vain hope of -melting the hearts of the British Cabinet. The Sicilian prince lingered -some time, protesting against the fashion in which he was treated, -and holding secret colloquies with deputations which came to him from -many quarters in which the Junta of Seville was detested. But there -was no real party in his favour. What benefit could come to Spain from -the election of a youth of nineteen, whose very name was unknown to -the people, and who could help them neither with men nor with money, -neither with the statesmanship that comes from experience, nor with the -military capacity that must be developed on the battle-field? After -remaining long enough in Spanish waters to lose all his illusions, -Prince Leopold returned to his mother in Sicily[357]. There had -never been any foundation for a persistent rumour that he was to be -made co-regent along with the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and the -Conde de Montijo. Not even the least intelligent members of the Juntas -would have consented to hand over the rule of Spain to this strange -triumvirate--an imbecile, a boy, and a turbulent intriguer. There was -about as much chance that another vain project might be carried out--an -invitation to General Dumouriez to take command of all the Spanish -armies. Yet this plan too was seriously brought forward: the Frenchman -would not have been unwilling, but the Spanish officers, flushed with -their recent successes, were not the kind of people to welcome a -foreign leader, and one whose last military exploit had been to desert -his own army and go over to the enemy. - - [354] See Arteche, iii. 118. - - [355] First cousin to Charles IV, being the son of the Infante - Luis, and brother of Godoy’s unfortunate wife. - - [356] Napier is wrong in hinting that Canning lent himself to the - Sicilian scheme (i. 177, 178) in order to disoblige Castlereagh. - Collingwood’s dispatches show that he opposed it, as much as - did Dalrymple, and thereby won approval from his government - (_Collingwood Correspondence_, ii. 216, 217). - - [357] He sailed on Nov. 4 (_Madrid Gazette_). - -Much more specious, at first sight, than any project for the -establishment of a regency, was the proposal mooted in many quarters -for the summoning of the Cortes--whose name recalled so many ancient -memories, and was connected with the days of constitutional freedom in -the Middle Ages. But not only had the Cortes been obscured by the long -spell of autocracy under the Hapsburg and Bourbon kings, but it was by -its very constitution unsuited to represent a nation seeking for a new -and vigorous executive. It was full of mediaeval anomalies: for example -the Asturias had never been represented in it, but had possessed (like -Wales in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) separate governmental -machinery of its own. This might have been altered without much -difficulty, but it was more fatal that the distribution of seats in the -lower estates represented an archaic survival. Many decayed towns in -Castile sent members to the Cortes, while on the other hand the warlike -and populous province of Galicia had only one single vote. To rearrange -the representation on a rational basis would take so long, and cause -so much provincial jealousy, that it was recognized as practically -impossible. - -There remained therefore only the third plan for creating a supreme -government in Spain--that which proposed that the various existing -Juntas should each send deputies to some convenient spot, and that the -union of these representatives should constitute a central authority -for the whole realm. This scheme was not so clearly constitutional -as the summoning of the Cortes would have been, nor did it provide -for real unity of direction in so complete a way as would have been -secured by the appointment of a single Regent. But it had the practical -advantage of conciliating the various provincial Juntas: though they -sacrificed their local sovereignty, they obtained at least the power -of nominating their own masters. In each of them the more active and -ambitious members hoped that they might secure for themselves the -places of delegates to the new supreme assembly. Accordingly the -Juntas were induced, one after another, to consent to the scheme. -Public opinion ran so strongly in favour of unity, and the existing -administrative chaos was so clearly undesirable, that it was impossible -to protest against the creation of a Supreme Central Junta. Some of the -provinces--notably Murcia, Valencia, and Granada--showed a patriotic -spirit of self-abnegation and favoured the project from the first. Even -Galicia and Seville, where the spirit of particularism was strongest, -dared not openly resist the movement. There were malcontents who -suggested that a federal constitution was preferable to a centralized -one, and that it would suffice for the provinces to bind themselves -together by treaties of alliance, instead of handing themselves over to -a newly created executive. But even in Aragon, where federal union with -Castile seemed more attractive to many than complete incorporation, -the obvious necessity for common military action determined the -situation[358]. Every province of Spain at last adhered to the project -for constructing a Supreme Central Junta. Even the narrow-minded -politicians at Seville had to assume an attitude of hearty consent. But -their reluctance peeped out in the suggestion which they made that the -Junta should meet, not at Madrid, but at Ciudad Real or Almagro in La -Mancha, places convenient to themselves, but obscure and remote in the -eyes of inhabitants of Asturias or Galicia. Their aversion to Madrid -was partly caused by its remoteness from their own borders, but much -more by jealousy of the Council of Castile, which still hung together -and exercised local authority in the capital. Other Juntas showed -their aversion for the Council in the same way, and ultimately the -place selected for the gathering of the new government was the royal -residence of Aranjuez, which stands to Madrid much as do Versailles -or Windsor to Paris and London. This choice was an obvious mistake: -the central government of a country loses in dignity when it does not -reside in the national capital. It seems to distrust its own power or -its legality, when it exiles itself from its proper abode. At the best -it casts a slur on the inhabitants of the capital by refusing to trust -itself among them. Madrid, it is true, is not to Spain what Paris is -to France, or London to England: it is a comparatively modern place, -pitched upon by Philip II as the seat of his court, but destitute of -ancient memories. Nevertheless, it was at least infinitely superior to -Aranjuez as a meeting-place. On geographical or strategical grounds -they are so close that no advantage accrues to one that does not belong -to the other. But for political reasons the capital was distinctly -preferable to the almost suburban palace[359]. If the existence of the -Council of Castile so much disturbed the Junta, it would have been -quite possible to dissolve that discredited body. No one would have -made any serious effort in its favour, even in the city of its abode. - - [358] Note the federalist views of the Aragonese Miguel Principe, - quoted by Arteche (ii. 121). - - [359] Both Florida Blanca and Jovellanos were in favour of making - Madrid the meeting-place. The Andalusians defeated them. - - - - -SECTION VI: CHAPTER III - -THE ‘JUNTA GENERAL’ IN SESSION - - -The provincial Juntas, when once they had consented to sacrifice -their local sovereignty, made no great delay in forwarding their -representatives to the chosen meeting-place at Aranjuez. The number of -deputies whom they sent to the Supreme Central Junta was thirty-five, -seventeen provincial Juntas each contributing two, and the Canary -Islands one. The Biscayan provinces, still wholly in the possession -of the French, had no local body to speak for them, and could not -therefore choose deputies. The number thus arrived at was not a very -convenient one: thirty-five is too few for a parliament, and too many -for an executive government. Moreover proportional representation was -not secured; Navarre and the Balearic Islands were given too much -weight by having two members each. Andalusia, having eight deputies -for its four Juntas of Seville, Jaen, Granada, and Cordova, was -over-represented when compared with Galicia, Aragon, and Catalonia, -which had each no more than two. The quality of the delegates was very -various: among the most notable were the ex-ministers Florida Blanca -and Jovellanos, who represented respectively the better sides of the -Conservative and the Liberal parties of Spain--if we may use such -terms. The former, trained in the school of ‘benevolent despotism’ -under Charles III, was a good specimen of the eighteenth-century -statesman of the old sort--polite, experienced, energetic, a ripe -scholar, and an able diplomat. But he was eighty years old and failing -in health, and his return to active politics killed him in a few -months. Jovellanos, a somewhat younger man[360], belonged in spirit -to the end rather than the middle of the eighteenth century, and was -imbued with the ideas of liberty and constitutional government which -were afloat all over Europe in the early days of the French Revolution. -He represented modern liberalism in the shape which it took in Spain. -For this reason he had suffered many things at the hands of Godoy, -and emerged from a long period of imprisonment and obscurity to take -his place in the councils of the nation. Unhappily he was to find that -his ideas were still those of a minority, and that bureaucracy and -obscurantism were deeply rooted in Spain. - - [360] He was born in 1743. - -Of the other members[361] of the Supreme Junta, the Bailiff Valdez and -Francisco Palafox, fresh from his brother’s triumphs at Saragossa, were -perhaps the best known. Among the rest we note a considerable number of -clergy--two archbishops, a prior, and three canons--but not more than -might have been expected in a country where the Church was so powerful. -Military men were not so strongly represented, being only five in -number, and three of these were militia colonels. The rest were mainly -local notables--grandees, marquises, and counts predominated over mere -commoners. Some of them were blind particularists, and a few--like the -disreputable Conde de Tilly--were intriguers with doubtful antecedents. -The whole body represented Spain well enough, but Spain with her -weaknesses as well as her strong points. It was not a very promising -instrument with which to achieve the liberation of the Peninsula, or to -resist the greatest general in Europe. Considered as a government of -national defence, it had far too little military knowledge: a haphazard -assembly of priests, politicians, and grandees is not adapted for the -conduct of a war of independence. Hence came the incredible blindness -which led it to refuse to appoint a single commander-in-chief, and the -obstinacy with which it buried itself in constitutional debates of the -most futile sort when Napoleon was thundering at the gates of Spain. - - [361] For a complete list of the names and professions of the - members of the Junta, see the Appendix. - -The meeting of the Supreme Junta was fixed for September 25, but long -ere that date came round the military situation was assuming new -developments. The first modification in the state of affairs was caused -by the abortive attempt of the Basque provinces to free themselves. The -news of Baylen had caused as great a stir in the northern mountains as -in the south or the east of Spain. But Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava -had considerable French garrisons, and the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte -to the Ebro only increased the number of enemies in their immediate -neighbourhood. It would have been no less patriotic than prudent for -these provinces to delay their insurrection till it had some chance of -proving useful to the general scheme of operations for the expulsion -of the French from Spain. If they could have waited till Blake and -Castaños had reached the Ebro, and then have taken arms, they might -have raised a most dangerous distraction in the rear of the French, and -have prevented them from turning all their forces against the regular -armies. But it was mad to rise when Blake was still at Astorga, and -Castaños had not yet reached Madrid. It could not have been expected -that the local patriots should understand this: but grave blame falls -on those who ought to have known better. The Duke of Infantado, who -was acting under Blake, and Colonel Doyle, the English representative -at that general’s head quarters, did their best to precipitate the -outbreak in Biscay. They promised the Biscayan leaders that a division -from Asturias should come to their aid, and that English arms and -ammunition should be poured into their harbours[362]. At the first -word of encouragement all Biscay took arms [August 6]: a great mass of -insurgents collected at Bilbao, and smaller bands appeared along the -line of the mountains, even as far as Valcarlos on the very frontier -of France. But no external aid came to them: the Asturians--averse to -every proposal that came from Galicia--did not move outside their own -provincial boundary, and no other Spanish army was within striking -distance. Bessières was able, at his leisure, to detach General Merlin -with 3,000 men to fall on Bilbao. This brigade proved enough to deal -with the main body of the Biscayan insurgents, who after a creditable -fight were dispersed with heavy loss--1,200 killed, according to the -French commander’s dispatch [August 16]. Bilbao was taken and sacked, -and English vessels bringing--now that it was too late--5,000 stand -of arms for the insurgents, narrowly escaped capture in its harbour. -All along the line of the Basque hills there was hanging and shooting -of the leaders of the abortive rising[363]. The only result of this -ill-advised move was that Bessières was warned of the danger in his -rear, and kept a vigilant eye for the future on the coastland. The -Biscayans, as was natural, were much discouraged at the way in which -they had been left in the lurch by their fellow countrymen, and at -the inefficacy of their own unaided efforts. They were loth to rise a -second time. - - [362] See the letters of Doyle quoted in Napier, i. 287. - - [363] Joseph Bonaparte to Napoleon, Sept. 5, 1808. - -It was not till twenty days had passed since the fall of Bilbao -that the first attempts at combined action were made by the Spanish -generals. On September 5 there met at Madrid a council of war, -composed of Castaños, Cuesta, the Valencian General Llamas, and the -representatives of Blake and Palafox--the Duke of Infantado and Calvo -de Rozas, intendant-general of the army of Aragon. These officers met -with much suppressed jealousy and suspicion of each other. The Duke -had his eye on Cuesta, in accordance with the instructions of Blake. -Castaños and Cuesta were at daggers drawn, for the old Captain-General -had just proposed a _coup d’état_ against the Junta to the Andalusian, -and had been repulsed with scorn[364]. The representative of the army -of Aragon had been charged to see that no one was put above the head -of Palafox. When the meeting opened, Cuesta proposed that it should -appoint a single general to direct all the forces of Spain. The -others demurred: Cuesta was much their senior in the army-list, and -they imagined--probably with truth--that he would claim the post of -commander-in-chief for himself, in spite of the memories of Cabezon -and Rio Seco. They refused to listen to his arguments, though it was -certain that unity of command was in every way desirable. Nor was any -disposition shown to raise Castaños to supreme authority, though this -was the obvious step to take, as he was the only general of Spain who -had won a great battle in the open field. But personal and provincial -jealousy stood in the way, and Castaños himself, though not without -ambition, was destitute of the arts of cajolery, and made no attempt to -push his own candidature for the post of commander-in-chief. Perhaps -he hoped that the Supreme Junta would do him justice ere long, and -refrained for that reason from self-assertion before his colleagues. -Nothing, therefore, was settled on September 5, save a plan for common -operations against the French on the Ebro. Like all schemes that are -formed from a compromise between the views of several men, this was -not a very brilliant strategical effort: instead of providing for a -bold stroke with the whole Spanish army, at some point on the long line -between Burgos and Milagro, it merely brought the insurgent forces -in half-a-dozen separate columns face to face with the enemy. Blake, -with his own army and the Asturians, was to be asked to concentrate -near Reynosa, at the sources of the Ebro, and to endeavour to turn -Bessières’ flank and penetrate into Biscay[365]. He would have 30,000 -men, or more, but not a single complete regiment of cavalry. Next to -him Cuesta was to operate against the front of Bessières’ corps, with -his ‘Army of Castile,’ eight or nine thousand raw levies backed by -about 1,000 horse. He undertook to make Burgo de Osma his point of -starting. More to the east, Castaños was to gather at Soria the four -divisions of the army of Andalusia, but at present he had only that of -La Peña in hand: the Junta of Seville was detaining the rest. Still -more to the right, Llamas with his 8,000 Valencians and Murcians was -to march on Tudela. Lastly Palafox, with the army of Aragon and the -Valencian division of Saint March, was to keep north of the Ebro, and -turn the left flank of Moncey’s corps by way of Sanguesa: he could -bring about 25,000 men into line, but there were not more than five or -six regular battalions among them; the rest were recent levies. When -the army of Estremadura should come up (it was still about Elvas and -Badajoz), it was to join Castaños; and it was hoped that the English -forces from Portugal might also be directed on the same point. - - [364] I find the story of Cuesta’s projected _coup d’état_ (in - Toreño, i. 267), which was supposed to rest on the authority - of Castaños alone, completely corroborated in Sir Charles - Vaughan’s private diary. On Sept. 15 Vaughan, while passing - through Segovia, met Cuesta, who told him ‘that two measures - were absolutely necessary: (1) the abolition of the provincial - Juntas, and the restoration of the ancient authority of the - Captains-General and _Real Audiencia_; (2) _The exercise of - military force_ over the Junta at Ocaña (i.e. the supreme - ‘Central Junta’) sufficient to compel them to elect an executive - council of three or five persons to be placed at the head of - different departments, and to be responsible to the nation at - large.’ This is precisely what Cuesta proposed to Castaños. - - [365] So Toreño. Arteche says that he was to concentrate at - Aranda. - -But meanwhile only 75,000 men were available in the first line; and -this force, spread along the whole front from Reynosa to Sanguesa, and -acting on wide external lines, was not likely to make much impression -on the French. The numbers of the invaders were considerably greater -than those of the patriot-armies. Jourdan had 70,000 men by September -1, and was being reinforced every day by fresh battalions, though the -three corps from Germany were still far off. Before the Spaniards -could move he appreciably outnumbered them, and he had the inestimable -advantage of holding a comparatively short front, and of being able to -concentrate on any point with far greater rapidity than was possible to -his adversaries. Even had they thrown all their forces on one single -point, the French, always using the ‘interior lines,’ could have got -together in a very short time. The only weak point, indeed, in the -French position was that Bessières’ vanguard at Burgos was too far -forward, and in some peril of being enveloped between Blake and Cuesta. -But this detachment, as we shall see, was ere long drawn back to the -Ebro. - -Before the campaign began the Spaniards obtained one notable -advantage--the removal of Cuesta from command, owing to his own -incredible arrogance and folly. It will be remembered that he regarded -the Juntas of Leon and Castile as recalcitrant subordinates of his own, -and had declared all their acts null and void. When they proceeded, -like the other Juntas, to elect representatives for the meeting at -Aranjuez, he waited till the deputies of Leon were passing near his -camp, and then suddenly descended upon them. Don Antonio Valdez, the -Bailiff of the Maltese Knights, and the Vizconde de Quintanilla, were -arrested by his troopers and shut up in the castle of Segovia. He -announced that they should be tried by court-martial, for failing in -obedience to their Captain-General. This astonishing act of presumption -drew down on him the wrath of the Supreme Junta, which was naturally -eager to protect its members from the interference of the military -arm. Almost its first act on assembling was to order him to appear -at Aranjuez and to suspend him from command. Cuesta would have liked -to resist, but knowing that his own army was weak and that Blake and -Castaños were his bitter enemies, he had to yield. He came to Aranjuez, -and was superseded by General Eguia. Valdez and Quintanilla were -immediately released, and took their seats in the Supreme Junta. - -The sessions of that body had begun on September 25. Twenty-four -members out of the designated thirty-five had assembled on that day, -and after a solemn religious ceremony had re-proclaimed Ferdinand VII, -and elected Florida Blanca as their President. They then proceeded to -nominate a Cabinet, chosen entirely from outside their own body. Don -Pedro Cevallos was to be Minister of Foreign Affairs: he had served -Ferdinand VII in that capacity, but had smirched his reputation by his -submission to Bonaparte after the treachery at Bayonne. However, his -ingenious justification[366] of his conduct, and his early desertion -of King Joseph, were allowed to serve as an adequate defence. Don -Antonio Escaño was Minister of Marine, Don Benito Hermida Minister -of Justice, Don Francisco de Saavedra Minister of the Interior. The -most important place of all, that of Minister of War, was given to -an utterly unknown person, General Antonio Cornel, instead of to -any of the officers who had distinguished themselves during the -recent campaigns. He was to be aided by a supreme council of war, -consisting of six members of the Junta, three of whom were civilians -without any military knowledge whatever. No intention of appointing -a commander-in-chief was shown, and the Minister of War corresponded -directly with all the generals in charge of the provincial armies. -Nothing could have been more ill judged; from the want of a single -hand at the helm all the oncoming operations were doomed to inevitable -failure. The supreme direction was nominally entrusted to the obscure -war-minister and his councillors, really it lay with the generals in -the field, who obeyed orders from head quarters only just as much as -they chose. Each played his own game, and the result was disaster. - - [366] His very elaborate vindication of himself can be read - in his pamphlet of September, 1808, which was translated into - English in the same winter, and reprinted in London. It contains - a good account of the Bayonne business, and many valuable state - papers. - -A glance at the subjects which were discussed by the members of -the Junta, during its first weeks of session, suffices to show the -short-sightedness of their policy, and their utter inability to grasp -the situation. They should have remembered that they were a government -of national defence, whose main duty was the expulsion of the French -from the soil of Spain. But military subjects furnished the smallest -portion of their subjects of debate. They published indeed a manifesto -to the effect that they intended to levy an army of 500,000 foot, and -50,000 horse--a much greater force than Spain in her most flourishing -days could have raised or maintained. But this paper army was never -seen in the field: less than a third of the number were under arms -at the moment in December when the Junta had to fly from Aranjuez, -before the advancing legions of Napoleon. Nor was it likely that a -great army could be raised, equipped, and disciplined, while the -central government was devoting the greater part of its attention to -futilities. The most cruel comment on its work lies in the fact that -its troops were ill furnished, badly armed, and half starved, at the -moment when the provinces were doing their best to provide equipment, -and every port in Spain was gorged with cannon, muskets, munitions, and -stores sent from England--a great part of them destined to fall into -the hands of the French. Partly from want of experience, but still more -from want of energy, the Junta failed to use the national enthusiasm -and the considerable resources placed at its disposal. - -When we look at the main topics of its debates we begin to understand -its failures. A good deal of time was spent in voting honorary -distinctions to its own members. The President was to be addressed -as ‘his highness,’ the Junta as a corporation was ‘its majesty,’ if -we may use the ludicrous phrase. Each member became ‘his excellency’ -and received the liberal salary of 120,000 reals (£1,200), besides -the right of wearing on his breast a gold plaque with an embossed -representation of the eastern and western hemispheres. There was a -good deal of dispensing of places and patronage in the army and the -civil service among relatives and dependencies of ‘their excellencies,’ -but not more perhaps than happens in other countries in war-time when -a new government comes in. At least the changes led to the getting -rid of a good many of Godoy’s old bureaucrats. The real fault of the -Junta lay in its readiness to fall into factions, and fight over -constitutional questions that should have been relegated to times of -peace. Among the thirty-five members of the Junta a clear majority -were, like their president, Florida Blanca, Spaniards of the old -school, whose ideas of government were those of the autocratic sort -that had prevailed under Alberoni and Charles III. They looked upon -all innovations as tinged with the poison of the French Revolution and -savouring of Jacobinism and infidelity. On the other hand there was a -powerful minority, headed by Jovellanos and including Martin de Garay, -the secretary of the Junta, the Marquis of Campo Sagrado, Valdes, -Calvo de Rozas, and others, who held more modern views and hoped that -the main result of the war would be to make Spain a constitutional -monarchy of the English type. How far this dream was from realization -was shown by the fact that among the first measures passed through -the Supreme Junta were ordinances allowing the Jesuits (expelled long -since by Charles III) to return to Spain, recreating the office of -Inquisitor-General, and suspending the liberty of the press. Such -measures filled the liberal section in the Junta with despair, by -showing the narrow and reactionary views of the majority. But the -greater part of the time spent in session by ‘its majesty’ was wasted -on purely constitutional questions. Firstly there was a long polemic -with the Council of Castile, whose hatred for the Junta took the form -of starting doubts as to the legality of its constitution[367]. It -suggested that all constitutional precedents were against a body so -numerous as thirty-five persons taking charge of the governance of -the realm. Former councils of regency had been composed of three or -five members only, and there was no legal authority for breaking the -rule. The Council suggested that the only way out of the difficulty -would be to call the Cortes, and that assembly would at once supersede -the authority of the Supreme Junta. Instead of arguing with the -Council of Castile, the new government would have done well to arrest -or disperse that effete and disloyal body; but it chose instead to -indulge in a war of manifestos and proclamations which led to nothing. -To find the supreme government consenting to argue about its own -legality was not reassuring to the nation. Moreover, Jovellanos and -his followers spent much time in impressing on their colleagues that -it was their duty to appoint a regency, and to cut down their own -unwieldy numbers, as well as to provide machinery for the summoning -of the Cortes at some not too distant date. To be reminded that they -were no permanent corporation, but a temporary committee dressed in -a little brief authority, was most unpleasant to the majority. They -discussed from every point of view the question of the regency and -the Cortes, but would not yield up their own supremacy. Indeed they -proposed to begin legislation on a very wide basis for the reform of -the constitution--business which should rather have been left to the -Cortes, and which was particularly inappropriate to the moment when -Napoleon was crossing the Pyrenees. The great manifesto of the Junta -[October 26] sets forth its intentions very clearly. ‘The knowledge and -illustration of our ancient and constitutional laws; the changes which -altered circumstances render necessary in their re-establishment; the -reforms necessary in civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects -for improving public education; a system of regulated economy for the -collection and distribution of the public revenue ... are the subjects -for the investigation of wise and thoughtful men. The Junta will form -different committees, each entrusted with a particular department, to -whom all writings on matters of government and administration may be -addressed. The exertions of each contributing to give a just direction -to the public mind, the government will be enabled to establish the -internal happiness of Spain[368].’ From another official document we -learn that ‘among the most grave and urgent objects of the attention of -the Central Junta will be the encouragement of agriculture, the arts, -commerce, and navigation[369].’ - - [367] For these documents see the _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 4. - - [368] Manifesto of the Junta to the Spanish people, Oct. 26. - - [369] _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 18, p. 1,301. - -Clearly nothing could be more inappropriate and absurd than that this -government of national defence should turn its attention to subjects -such as the reform of national education, or the encouragement of the -arts. It is equally certain that if it should propose to ‘consider -the changes necessary in our ancient laws,’ it would be going beyond -its competence; for such business belonged only to a permanent and -properly constituted national assembly, such as the Cortes. This was -not the time for constitutional debates, nor was the Central Junta the -body that should have started them. All their energies should have -been devoted to the war. But misled as to the situation by the long -quiescence of the French army on the Ebro, they turned their minds to -every topic that should have been avoided, and neglected the single one -that should always have been before their eyes. It was in vain that -Calvo de Rozas, the Aragonese deputy, and a few more, tried to keep -their colleagues to the point. The majority fell to debating on the -subjects on which the despotic and the liberal theories of government -clash, and spent themselves on discussions that were as heated as they -were futile. Meanwhile the time that should have been turned to account -was slipping away, and the army was not being reinforced. A glance -at the field-states of the Spanish troops, comparing those of August -1 with those of November 1, sufficiently proves this. The provinces -which had been recovered by the retreat of the French to the Ebro were -not doing their duty. The wide and populous regions of Old Castile -and Leon had sent 4,600 men to Rio Seco in July: in October they had -less than 12,000 under arms[370]. From New Castile there seem to have -been raised nothing more than four battalions of Madrid Volunteers, -a weak cavalry regiment, and two battalions of _Cazadores de Cuenca_ -and _Tiradores de Castilla_: at any rate no troops but these are to -be found recorded in the lists of the armies that fought in October, -November, and December, 1808. Even allowing that New Castile may have -supplied recruits to its own corps of embodied militia serving with the -Andalusian army[371], it is clear that, with a population of 1,200,000 -souls, it ought to have done much more in raising new regiments. And -this was the district in whose very midst the Junta was sitting! What -little was done in Madrid seems to have been mainly the result of -private enterprise: the _Gazette_ for October is full of voluntary -donations of horses, saddlery, and money, for the equipment of a corps -of dragoons for the army of Old Castile, and of similar gifts received -by Calvo de Rozas for the army of Aragon. But there are no signs of -requisitions by the government for the purpose of raising an army of -New Castile, which could certainly have been done. The kingdom with -its five provinces ought to have given 40,000 men instead of 4,000: -for Asturias, with only 370,000 souls, had raised 13,000: Aragon -with 650,000 had placed no less than 32,000 levies in the field: and -Estremadura with 420,000 had sent to the front 12,000 men by October, -while keeping 10,000 more of undrilled recruits in its dépôts[372]. -New Castile, as we have already had occasion to remark, had 1,200,000 -inhabitants, and yet had only added to its original five battalions -of militia six more of volunteers, and a single regiment of horse, at -the moment when Napoleon’s armies came flooding across the Ebro. The -Central Junta’s authority in Andalusia or Galicia was much limited -by the survival of the ambitious local Juntas. But in Leon and the -two Castiles there was, when once Cuesta had been got out of the way, -no rival power in the field. No one was to blame but the central -government, if the full resources of those regions were not utilized -in September, October, and November. The English representatives at -Madrid saw all this, and did their best to stir up the Junta. But it -was not likely that mere foreigners would succeed, where Castaños -and the other more energetic Spanish officers had failed. Already in -October the situation appeared most unpromising: ‘We have made repeated -representations,’ wrote Mr. Stuart, the British minister, ‘and I have -given in paper after paper, to obtain something like promptitude and -vigour: but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, -we scarcely quit the members of the Junta before their attention is -absorbed in petty pursuits and in wrangling, which impedes even the -simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of the -country.... In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish: and I -assure you we have infamous tools to work with[373].’ Exactly the same -impression is produced by a study of the dispatches of Lord William -Bentinck, our military representative at Madrid, and of the diary of -Sir Charles Vaughan, who carefully attended and followed the debates -of the Central Junta at Aranjuez. It was clear to any dispassionate -observer that time was being wasted, and that the best was not being -done with the available material. - - [370] Napier is not quite correct in saying (i. 293) that ‘Leon - never raised a single soldier for the cause.’ It had three - battalions of volunteers (2,400 men) at Rio Seco, and raised - four more at Leon, Zamora, Ledesma, and Benavente in September - (_Madrid Gazette_, Sept. 28). But this was a poor contribution - for a kingdom of four provinces and 620,000 souls. - - [371] I see no proof that even this was done. There were only - five of them, the _Provinciales_ of Cuenca, Toledo, Ciudad Real, - Alcazar de Don Juan, and Siguenza. Toledo and Alcazar had 579 - and 595 under arms at the time of Baylen, and only 500 each, - apparently, in Nov. 1808. See Arteche, iii. 496. - - [372] For the Asturians see the table in Arteche (ii. 651): - they were still 10,000 strong after having shared in Blake’s - disastrous campaign. For the Estremadurans compare the list of - regiments raised in the _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 21, giving - a total of 23,600 men, with the actual morning state of the - Estremaduran troops at Madrid on their way to Burgos, 12,846 in - all, given in Arteche (iii. 477). - - [373] Stuart to Moore, from Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808. - -This was all the more inexcusable because the nation was thoroughly -in earnest, and prepared to make any sacrifices. The voluntary -contributions made both by provinces and by individuals were astounding -when the poverty of Spain is taken into consideration[374]. It was -the energy and will to use them on the part of the leaders that was -wanting. Moreover, England was pouring in supplies of all sorts: before -November 16 she had sent at least 122,000 muskets and other military -equipment of all kinds to the value of several hundred thousand pounds. -Before the same date she had forwarded 4,725,000 dollars in hard -cash[375], and Mr. Frere, the newly appointed minister, brought another -million to Corunna. - - [374] For details see the tables in Arguelles, and the grants - recorded in the _Madrid Gazette_ for September, October, and - November. - - [375] I take these figures as to what had been actually received - from Vaughan, who was at Madrid, in constant communication with - Stuart and Bentinck. They represent what had been paid over and - acknowledged, not what had been promised or provided, and may be - taken as accurate. - -Instead of utilizing every possible resource the government went on -debating about things unessential, as if the war had been ended at -Baylen. It would neither conduct the new campaign itself, nor appoint -a single commander-in-chief to conduct it in its behalf. With absolute -truth Colonel Graham wrote from the head quarters of the Army of the -Centre that ‘the miserable system established by the Junta was at the -bottom of all misfortunes. I pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and -came away disgusted to the greatest degree[376].’ - - [376] Graham to Moore, from Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808. - - - - -SECTION VI: CHAPTER IV - -AN EPISODE IN THE BALTIC - - -It will be remembered that one of Napoleon’s preliminary measures, in -his long campaign against the freedom of Spain, had been the removal of -the flower of her army to the shores of the Baltic. In the spring of -1807 the Marquis of La Romana, with fourteen battalions of infantry and -five regiments of cavalry, all completed to war strength, had marched -for Hamburg. After wintering in the Hanseatic towns, Mecklenburg, and -Swedish Pomerania, this corps had been moved up early in 1808 into -Denmark[377]. It is clear that there was no military object in placing -it there. The Danish fleet was gone, carried off by Lord Cathcart’s -expedition in the previous September, and there was no probability -that the English would return for a second visit, when they had -completely executed their plan for destroying the naval resources of -Denmark. France and Sweden, it is true, were still at war, but King -Gustavus was so much occupied by the defensive struggle against the -Russians in Finland, that it was unlikely that he would detach troops -for an objectless expedition against the Danes. On the other hand the -Anglo-Swedish fleet was so completely dominant in the Baltic and the -Sound, that there was no possibility of launching an expedition from -Denmark against Southern Sweden. Even between the various islands at -the mouth of the Baltic, where the water-distances are very short, -troops could only be moved at night, and with infinite precautions -against being surprised on the passage by English frigates. Gothenburg -and the other harbours of South-western Sweden served as convenient -ports of call to the British squadron told off for the observation -of the Cattegat, the two Belts, and the Sound. Nothing could be done -against Sweden, unless indeed a frost of exceptional severity might -close the waterway between Zealand and Scania. Even then an attempt to -make a dash at Helsingborg or Malmö would involve so many difficulties -and dangers that few generals would have cared to risk it. - - [377] The Spanish troops, though the best of the whole army, do - not seem to have much impressed the German observer with their - discipline. See the Mecklenburger Von Suckow’s observations on - what he saw of them in his _From Jena to Moscow_, p. 92. - -La Romana’s corps formed part of an army under Marshal Bernadotte, -whose sphere of command extended all over the south-western shores of -the Baltic, and whose head quarters were sometimes at Schleswig and -sometimes at Lübeck or Stralsund. He had considerable French and Dutch -contingents, but the bulk of his force consisted of 30,000 Danes. In -preparation for Napoleon’s scheme against the Spanish Bourbons, La -Romana’s forces had been carefully scattered between Jutland and the -Danish Isles, so that there was no large central body concentrated -under the Marquis’s own hand. The garrisons of the Spanish regiments -were interspersed between those of Danish troops, so that it would be -difficult to get them together. In March, 1808, when the Emperor had at -last shown his hand by the treacherous seizure of Pampeluna, Barcelona, -and Figueras, the troops of La Romana were cantoned as follows. Six -battalions were in the island of Zealand, mainly in and about the old -royal residence of Roeskilde[378]. Four battalions and two cavalry -regiments were in Fünen, the central island of the Danish group, and -with them La Romana himself, whose head quarters were at Nyborg[379]. -One battalion lay in the island of Langeland, close to the south coast -of Fünen[380]. In the mainland of Jutland were three cavalry regiments -and three battalions of infantry[381], quartered in the little towns -at the southern end of the Cattegat--Fredericia, Aarhuus, and Randers. -In Zealand the 4,000 Spaniards were under the eyes of the main Danish -army of observation against Sweden. In Fünen La Romana’s 4,500 horse -and foot were cantoned in small detachments, while a solid body of -3,000 Danes garrisoned Odense in the centre of the island, separating -the Spanish regiments one from another. In Langeland, along with the -Catalonian light battalion, were a company of French grenadiers and -about 800 Danes. The troops in Jutland were mixed up with a brigade of -Dutch light cavalry and some Danish infantry. Napoleon’s own provident -eye had been roving round Denmark, and he had himself given the orders -for the dislocation of the Spanish corps in the fashion that seemed -best calculated to make any common action impossible. To keep them -in good temper he had recently raised the pay of the officers, and -announced his intention of decorating La Romana with the Grand Cross of -the Legion of Honour. Bernadotte, by his desire, displayed the greatest -confidence in his auxiliaries, and took a troop of the cavalry regiment -Del Rey as his personal escort while moving about in Denmark[382]. - - [378] Infantry regiments of Guadalajara and Asturias, of three - battalions each. - - [379] Infantry regiment of Princesa (three battalions), light - battalion of Barcelona, and cavalry regiments of Almanza and - Villaviciosa. - - [380] Light battalion of ‘Volunteers of Catalonia.’ - - [381] Infantry regiment of Zamora, cavalry regiments Del Rey, - Algarve, Infante. - - [382] Arteche, iii. 151. - -In spite of all this, the Marquis and his officers began to grow uneasy -in April, 1808, for the stream of dispatches and letters from Spain, -which had been reaching them very regularly during the winter, began -to dry up in the spring. When the first communication from the new -ministry of Ferdinand VII reached La Romana he found that it contained -a complaint that the home government had received no reports from the -expeditionary force since January, and that fifteen separate dispatches -sent to him from Madrid had failed to get any answer. The fact was -that Napoleon had been systematically intercepting every document -which the war minister at one end of the line, and the Marquis at the -other, had been committing to the French post[383]. The last dispatch -had only come to hand because such an important announcement as that -of the accession of King Ferdinand had been sent by the hands of a -Spanish officer, whom Bonaparte or Fouché had not thought proper to -arrest, though they had intercepted so much official correspondence. -The Emperor himself had sent orders to Bernadotte that the news of the -revolution at Aranjuez should be kept as long as possible from the -Marquis and his troops[384]: and so it came to pass that only a very -few days after the events of March 19 became known in Denmark, there -followed the deplorable intelligence of the treachery of Bayonne and -of the Madrid insurrection of May 2. These tidings produced the same -feelings in Nyborg and Fredericia that they had caused at Seville -or Corunna. But on the shores of the Baltic, further north than any -Spanish troops had ever been before, the expeditionary corps felt -itself helpless and surrounded by enemies. Yet as Joseph O’Donnell, -then one of La Romana’s staff, observed: ‘The more they tried to -persuade us that Spain was tranquil, and had settled down to enjoy -an age of felicity under Napoleon, the more clearly did we foresee -the scenes of blood, strife, and disaster which were to follow these -incredible events[385].’ - - [383] Bourrienne, _Mémoires_, viii. 20. - - [384] Napoleon to Berthier, March 29, 1808 (_Nap. Corresp._, - 13,699). - - [385] See his words quoted in Arteche, iii. 154. - -On June 24 there reached Nyborg the intelligence which showed the whole -of Napoleon’s schemes completed: it was announced to La Romana that -Joseph Bonaparte had been proclaimed King of Spain, and he was ordered -to transmit the news to his troops, and to inform them in General -Orders that they were now serving a new master. The only commentary on -this astonishing information which the Spanish officers could procure -consisted of the nauseous banalities of the _Moniteur_ concerning the -‘regeneration of Spain.’ - -A very few days later the first ray of hope shone upon the humbled -and disheartened general. One of the earliest ideas of the British -Government, on hearing of the Spanish insurrection, had been to open -communications with the troops in Denmark. Castaños, in his first -interview with the Governor of Gibraltar, had expressed his opinion -that they would strike a blow for liberty if only they were given the -chance. The fleet of Sir Richard Keates so completely commanded the -Baltic that it would be possible to rescue the Spanish expeditionary -force, if only it were willing and able to cut its way to the coast. -But it was necessary to find out whether the Marquis was ready to risk -his neck in such an enterprise, and whether he could depend on the -loyalty of his troops. - -To settle this all-important question some agent must be found who -would undertake to penetrate to La Romana’s head quarters, a task -of the most uninviting kind, for it was quite uncertain whether the -Spaniard would eagerly join in the plan, or whether he would make up -his mind to espouse the cause of Napoleon, and hand over his visitor to -the French police. To find a man who knew the Continent well enough to -move about without detection, and who would take the risk of placing -himself at La Romana’s mercy, in case his offers were refused, did -not seem easy. But the right person was pitched upon by Sir Arthur -Wellesley just before he sailed for Portugal. He recommended to -Canning a Roman Catholic priest of the name of James Robertson. This -enterprising ecclesiastic was a Scot who had spent most of his life -in a monastery at Ratisbon, but had lately come to England and was -acting as tutor in the house of an English Catholic peer. He had some -time before offered himself to Wellesley as a man who knew Germany -well, and was prepared to run risks in making himself useful to the -Government[386]. - - [386] See his interesting little book, _A Secret Mission to the - Danish Isles in 1808_, published at Edinburgh in 1863 by his - relative Alexander Fraser. - -Under the belief that the Spaniards were still quartered in the Hanse -towns and Holstein, Canning sent for Robertson and asked him whether -he would undertake this dangerous mission to Northern Germany. The -priest accepted the offer, and was dispatched to Heligoland, where -Mr. Mackenzie, the British agent in this lately seized island, found -him a place on board a smuggling vessel bound for the mouth of the -Weser. He was safely landed near Bremerhafen and made his way to -Hamburg, only to find that the Spaniards had been moved northward into -the Danish isles. This made the mission more dangerous, as Robertson -knew neither the country nor the language. But he disguised himself -as a German commercial traveller, and laid in a stock of chocolate -and cigars--things which were very rare in the North, as along with -other colonial produce they were proscribed by the Continental System, -and could only be got from smugglers. It was known that the Spanish -officers felt deeply their privation of the two luxuries most dear to -their frugal race, so that it seemed very natural that a dealer in such -goods should attempt to find a market among them. - -Getting to Nyborg without much difficulty, the priest took his fate in -his hands, and introduced himself to La Romana with a box of cigars -under one arm and a dozen packets of chocolate under the other. -When they were alone, he threw himself on the Marquis’s confidence, -owning that he was a priest and a British subject, not a German or a -commercial traveller. The Spaniard was at first suspicious and silent, -thinking that he had to deal with an _agent provocateur_ of the French -Government, who was trying to make him show his hand. Robertson -had no written vouchers for his mission--they would have been too -dangerous--but had been given some verbal credentials by Canning, which -soon convinced La Romana of his good faith. The Marquis then owned that -he was disgusted with his position, and felt sure that Napoleon had -plotted the ruin of Spain, though what exactly had happened at Bayonne -he had not yet been able to ascertain. Robertson next laid before him -Canning’s offer--that if the expeditionary force could be concentrated -and got to the coast, the Baltic fleet should pick it up, and see that -it was landed at Minorca, Gibraltar, the Canaries, in South America, or -at any point in Spain that the Marquis might select. - -La Romana asked for a night to talk the matter over with his staff, -and next day gave his full consent to the plan, bidding the priest -pass the word on to Sir Richard Keates, and discover the earliest day -on which transports could be got ready to carry off his men. Robertson -tried to communicate with a British frigate which was hovering off the -coast of Fünen, but was arrested by Danish militiamen while signalling -to the ship from a lonely point on the beach. His purpose was almost -discovered, and he only escaped by a series of ingenious lies to the -militia colonel before whom he was taken by his captors. Moving further -south, he again tried to get in touch with Sir Richard Keates, and -this time succeeded. The news was passed to London, and transports -were prepared for the deliverance of the Spaniards. Canning also sent -to Fünen an agent of the Asturian Junta, who would be able to give his -countrymen full news of the insurrection that had taken place in June. - -Meanwhile La Romana had sounded his subordinates, and found them -all eager to join in the plan of evasion, save Kindelan, the -brigadier-general commanding the troops in Jutland, who showed such -unpatriotic views that the officer sent to confer with him dropped the -topic without revealing his commission. The plan which the Marquis -had formed was rather ingenious: Bernadotte was about to go round the -garrisons in his command on a tour of inspection. It was agreed that -under the pretext of holding a grand field-day for his benefit, all the -scattered Spanish troops in Fünen should be concentrated at Nyborg. The -regiments in Zealand and Jutland were to join them, when the arrival of -the British fleet should be reported, by seizing the Danish small craft -in the harbours nearest to them, and crossing over the two Belts to -join their commander. - -An unfortunate _contretemps_, however, interfered to prevent the full -execution of the scheme. Orders came from Paris that all the Spanish -troops were to swear allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte, each corps -parading at its head quarters for the purpose on July 30 or 31. This -news caused grave disorders among the subordinate officers and the men, -who were of course in complete ignorance of the plan for evasion. La -Romana and his councillors held that the ceremony had better be gone -through--to swear under compulsion was not perjury, and to refuse -would draw down on the Spanish corps overwhelming numbers of Danes and -French, so that the whole scheme for escape would miscarry. Accordingly -the troops in Jutland and Fünen went through the ceremony in a more or -less farcical way--in some cases the men are said to have substituted -the name Ferdinand for the name Joseph in their oath, while the -officers took no notice of this rather startling variation. - -But in Zealand things went otherwise: the two infantry regiments of -Guadalajara and Asturias, when paraded and told to take the oath, -burst out into mutiny, drove off those of their own officers who -tried to restrain them, killed the aide-de-camp of the French General -Fririon, who was presiding at the ceremony, and threatened to march on -Copenhagen. Next day they were surrounded by masses of Danish troops, -forced to surrender, disarmed, and put in confinement in small bodies -at various points in the island [August 1]. - -This startling news revealed to Bernadotte the true state of feeling -in the Spanish army, and he wrote to La Romana to announce that he was -about to visit the Danish Isles in order to inquire into the matter. -Fortunately there came at the same moment news from England that the -time for escape was at hand. On August 4, only three days after the -mutiny at Roeskilde, the brigantine _Mosquito_, having on board Rafael -Lobo (the emissary of the Asturian deputies), reached the Baltic, and -communicated by night with some of the Spanish officers on the island -of Langeland. The British fleet had sailed, and the time for action had -arrived. - -Accordingly La Romana gave the word to the officers in each garrison to -whom the secret had been entrusted. On August 7, the troops in Fünen -concentrated, and seized the port of Nyborg: the Danes were completely -taken by surprise, and no resistance was made save by a gallant and -obstinate naval officer commanding a brig in the harbour. He fired on -the Spaniards, and would not yield till an English frigate and five -gunboats ran into the port and battered his vessel to pieces. - -On August 8 the troops in Jutland struck their blow: the infantry -regiment of Zamora at Fredericia seized a number of fishing-vessels, -and ferried itself over into Fünen with no difficulty. General -Kindelan, the only traitor in the camp, had been kept from all -knowledge of what was to happen: when he saw his troops on the -move, and received an explanatory note from La Romana putting him -in possession of the state of affairs, he feigned compliance in the -plan, but disguised himself and fled to the nearest French cantonment, -where he gave enemy a full account of the startling news. The cavalry -regiments Infante and Del Rey had the same luck as their comrades of -Zamora: they seized boats at Aarhuus, and, abandoning their horses, got -across unopposed to Fünen. Their comrades of the regiment of Algarve -were less lucky: they were delayed for some time by the indecision of -their aged and imbecile colonel: when Costa, their senior captain, took -command and marched them from Horsens towards the port of Fredericia, -it was now too late. A brigade of Dutch Hussars, warned by Kindelan, -beset them on the way and took them all prisoners. Costa, seeing that -the responsibility would fall on his head, blew out his brains at the -moment of surrender. - -Romana had concentrated in Fünen nearly 8,000 men, and was so strong -that the Danish general at Odense, in the centre of the island, dared -not meddle with him. On August 9, 10, and 11 he passed his troops over -to the smaller island of Langeland, where the regiment of Catalonia had -already disarmed the Danish garrison and seized the batteries. Here he -was safe, for Langeland was far out to sea, and he was now protected -from the Danes by the English warships which were beginning to gather -on the spot. A few isolated men from Zealand, about 150 in all, -succeeded in joining the main body, having escaped from their guards -and seized fishing-boats: but these were all that got away from the -regiments of Asturias and Guadalajara, the mutineers of July 31. - -For ten days Langeland was crammed with 9,000 Spanish troops, waiting -anxiously for the expected British squadron. On the twenty-first, -however, Admiral Keates appeared, with three sail of the line and -several smaller craft. On these and on small Danish vessels the whole -army was hastily embarked: they reached Gothenburg in Sweden on August -27, and found there thirty-seven large transports sent from England -for their accommodation. After a long voyage they reached the Spanish -coast in safety, and the whole expeditionary corps of the North, now -9,000 strong, was concentrated at Santander by October 11. The infantry -was sent to take part in the second campaign of General Blake. The -dismounted cavalry were ordered to move to Estremadura, and there to -provide themselves with horses. La Romana himself was called to Madrid -to interview the Junta, so that his troops went to the front under the -charge of his second in command, the Count of San Roman, to take part -in the bloody fight of Espinosa. - - - - -SECTION VII - -NAPOLEON’S INVASION OF SPAIN - - - - -CHAPTER I - -FRENCH AND SPANISH PREPARATIONS - - -While the Supreme Junta was expending its energy on discussing -the relative merits of benevolent despotism and representative -government, and while Castaños fretted and fumed for the moving up -of reinforcements that never arrived, the French Emperor was getting -ready to strike. It took many weeks for the veteran divisions from -Glogau and Erfurt, from Bayreuth and Berlin, to traverse the whole -breadth of the French Empire and reach the Pyrenees. While they were -trailing across the Rhineland and the plains of France, well fêted and -fed at every important town[387], their master employed the time of -waiting in strengthening his political hold on Central Europe. We have -seen that he was seriously alarmed at the possibility of an Austrian -war, and alluded to it in his confidential letters to his kinsfolk. -But the court of Vienna was slow to stir, and as August and September -slipped by without any definite move on the Danube, Bonaparte began -to hope that he was to be spared the dangerous problem of waging two -European wars at the same time. Meanwhile he assumed an arrogant and -blustering tone with the Austrian Government, warning them that though -he was withdrawing 100,000 men from Germany, he should replace them -with new levies, and was still strong enough to hold his own[388]. -Metternich gave prudent and evasive answers, and no immediate signs -of a rupture could be discerned. But to make matters sure, the Emperor -hastened to invite his ally the Emperor Alexander of Russia to meet -him at Erfurt. The ostensible object of the conference was to make -a final effort to induce the British Government to accept terms of -peace. Its real meaning was that Bonaparte wished to reassure himself -concerning the Czar’s intentions, and to see whether he could rely -upon the support of Russia in the event of a new Austrian war. There -is no need to go into the details of the meeting (September 27 to -October 14), of the gathering of four vassal kings and a score of -minor princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to do homage to their -master, of the feasts and plays and reviews. Suffice it to say that -Napoleon got what he wanted, a definite promise from the Czar of an -offensive and defensive alliance against all enemies whatsoever: a -special mention of Austria was made in the tenth clause of the new -treaty[389]. In return Alexander obtained leave to carry out his -designs against Finland and the Danubian principalities: his ally was -only too glad to see him involved in any enterprise that would distract -his attention from Central Europe. The Emperor Francis II hastened to -disarm the suspicions of Napoleon by sending to Erfurt an envoy[390] -charged with all manner of pacific declarations: they were accepted, -but the acceptance was accompanied by a message of scarcely concealed -threats[391], which must have touched the court of Vienna to the quick. -Strong in his Russian alliance, Bonaparte chose rather to bully than to -cajole the prince who, by the strangest of chances, was destined within -eighteen months to become his father-in-law. The quiet reception given -to his hectoring dispatches showed that, for the present at least, -nothing need be feared from the side of Austria. The Emperor’s whole -attention could be turned towards Spain. After telling off a few more -regiments for service beyond the Pyrenees, and giving leave to the -princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to demobilize their armies, -he left Erfurt [October 14] and came rushing back across Germany and -France to Paris; he stayed there ten days and then started for Bayonne, -where he arrived on the twentieth day after the termination of the -conference [November 3]. - - [387] For the banquets given (under imperial orders) by the - cities, see _Nap. Corresp._, 14,291, 14,331. Clearly Napoleon I - understood the ‘policy of champagne and sausages’ as well as his - nephew. - - [388] Considering the delicate nature of the political situation, - Napoleon’s language to the Austrians was most rude and - provocative. See the long interview with Metternich [Aug. 15] - reported by Champagny in his dispatch (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,254): - ‘Vous avez levé 400,000 hommes: je vais en lever 200,000. La - Confédération du Rhin, qui avait renvoyé ses troupes, va les - réunir et faire des levées. Je rétablirai les places de Silésie, - au lieu d’évacuer cette province et les états Prussiens, comme - je me le proposais. L’Europe sera sur pied, et le plus léger - incident amènera le commencement des hostilités,’ &c. - - [389] ‘Dans le cas où l’Autriche se mettrait en guerre contre - la France, l’Empereur de Russie s’engage à se déclarer contre - l’Autriche, et à faire cause commune avec la France’ (Article X, - clause 2, of the Secret Treaty). - - [390] Baron Vincent. - - [391] See the dispatch (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,380). - -Meanwhile the ostensible purpose of that meeting had been carried out, -by the forwarding to the King of England of a joint note in which -France and Russia offered him peace on the basis of _Uti Possidetis_. -It was a vague and grandiloquent document, obviously intended for -the eye of the public rather than for that of the old King. The two -Emperors expatiated on the horrors of war and on the vast changes -made of late in the map of Europe. Unless peace were made ‘there -might be greater changes still, and all to the disadvantage of the -English nation.’ The Continental System was working untold misery, and -the cessation of hostilities would be equally advantageous to Great -Britain and to her enemies. King George should ‘listen to the voice -of humanity,’ and assure the happiness of Europe by consenting to a -general pacification. - -Though well aware of the hollowness of these protestations, which were -only intended to throw on England the odium of continuing the war, -the British Cabinet took them into serious consideration. The replies -to the two powers were carefully kept separate, and were written, not -in the name of the King (for the personal appeal to him was merely -a theatrical device), but in that of the ministry. To Russia a very -polite answer was returned, but the question on which the possibility -of peace rested was brought straight to the front. Would France -acknowledge the existing government of Spain as a power with which she -was prepared to treat? Canning, who drafted the dispatch, was perfectly -well aware that nothing was further from the Emperor’s thoughts, and -could not keep himself from adding an ironical clause, to the effect -that Napoleon had so often spoken of late of his regard for the dignity -and welfare of the Spanish people, that it could not be doubted that he -would consent. The late transactions at Bayonne, ‘whose principles were -as unjust as their example was dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns,’ -must clearly have been carried through without his concurrence or -approbation. - -The reply to France was still more uncompromising. ‘The King,’ it -said, ‘was desirous for peace on honourable terms. The miserable -condition of the Continent, to which allusion had been made, was not -due to his policy: a system devised for the destruction of British -commerce had recoiled on its authors and their instruments.’ But the -distress even of his enemies was no source of pleasure to the King, and -he would treat at once, if the representatives of Sweden, Portugal, -Sicily, and Spain were admitted to take part in the negotiations. It -was to be specially stipulated that the ‘Central Junta of Government’ -at Madrid was to be a party to any treaty of peace. - -The two British notes brought the replies from St. Petersburg and Paris -that Canning expected. Count Romanzoff, writing for the Czar, could -only state that his master had acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as King -of Spain, and could not recognize the existence of any other legal -authority in that kingdom. But if this point (the only really important -one) could be got over, the Russian Government was ready to treat on a -basis of _Uti Possidetis_, or any other just and honourable terms. The -French reply was, as was natural, couched in very different language. -Napoleon had been irritated by Canning’s sarcastic allusions to the -failure of the Continental System: he thought the tone of the British -note most improper and insulting--‘it comes from the same pen which the -English ministry employs to fabricate the swarm of libels with which it -inundates the Continent. Such language is despicable, and unworthy of -the imperial attention[392].’ - - [392] Napoleon to Champagny (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,643). - -Considering the offensive and bullying tone which Bonaparte was wont -to use to other powers--his note written to Austria a few days before -was a fair example of it--he had little reason to be indignant at the -epigrams of the English minister. Yet the latter might perhaps have -done well to keep his pen under control, and to forget that he was not -writing for the _Anti-Jacobin_, but composing an official document. -Even though Napoleon’s offer was hollow and insincere, it should have -been met with dry courtesy rather than with humorous irony. - -Of course Bonaparte refused to treat the Spaniards as a free and equal -belligerent power. He had declared his brother King of Spain, and had -now reached that pitch of blind autolatry in which he regarded his own -fiat as the sole source of legality. In common honour England could -not abandon the insurgents; for the Emperor to allow his brother’s -claim to be ignored was equally impossible. In his present state of -mind he would have regarded such a concession to the enemy as an -acknowledgement of disgraceful defeat. It was obvious that the war must -go on, and when the Emperor suggested that England might treat with him -without stipulating for the admission of the Junta as a party to the -negotiations[393], he must have been perfectly well aware that he was -proposing a dishonourable move which the ministry of Portland could not -possibly make. His suggestions as to a separate treaty with England on -the basis of _Uti Possidetis_ were futile: he intended that they should -be declined, and declined they were. But he had succeeded in his end -of posing before the French nation and the European powers as a lover -of peace, foiled in his devices by the unbending arrogance of Great -Britain. This was all that he had desired, and so far his machinations -attained their object[394]. - - [393] Napoleon to Champagny (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,643). - - [394] It is strange to find that Napier was convinced that - Napoleon had a real desire for peace, and hoped to secure it by - the proposals of October, 1808. He writes (i. 210): ‘The English - ministers asserted that the whole proceeding was an artifice - to sow distrust among his enemies. Yet what enemies were they - among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, Sicily, - Portugal! the notion as applied to them was absurd; it is more - probable that he was sincere. He said so at St. Helena, and the - circumstances of the period warrant a belief in that assertion.’ - But Napier has failed to see that the design was not to ‘sow - distrust among his enemies.’ The whole business was intended - to influence French public opinion, and in a secondary way the - public opinion of all Europe. Bonaparte wished to pose as a - friend of peace, and to bestow on England the unenviable rôle of - the selfish fomenter of wars. With many simple folk in France and - elsewhere he succeeded, but no Englishman, save one blinded by a - dislike for everything Tory, could have been deceived. - -Long before the English replies had been sent off to Champagny and -Romanzoff, the much-delayed campaign on the Ebro had commenced. All -through the months of August and September the French had behaved as if -their adversaries were acting on proper military principles, and might -be expected to throw their whole force on the true objective point. -Jourdan and his colleagues had no reason to foresee that the Spanish -Government would launch out into the hideous series of blunders which, -as a matter of fact, were committed. That no commander-in-chief would -be appointed, that the victorious troops of Baylen would be held back -for weeks in Andalusia, that no strenuous effort would be made to raise -new armies in Leon and the two Castiles, were chances that seemed so -improbable that King Joseph and his advisers did not take them into -consideration. They expected that the Spaniards would mass the armies -of Andalusia, Estremadura, Castile, and Aragon, and endeavour to turn -their left flank on the side of Sanguesa and Pampeluna, or that (the -other rational course) they would send the Asturians, the Andalusians, -and the Castilians to join Blake, and debouch down the line of the -Upper Ebro, from Reynosa on to Vittoria and Miranda. In the first case -70,000, and in the latter case 80,000 men would be flung against one -flank of the French position, and it would be necessary to concentrate -in hot haste in order to hold them back. But, as a matter of fact, -the Spanish forces did not even come up to the front for many weeks, -and when they did appear it was, as we have seen, not in the form of -one great army concentrated for a stroke on a single point, but as a -number of weak and isolated columns, each threatening a different part -of the long line that lay along the Ebro from Miranda to Milagro. When -feeble demonstrations were made against so many separate sections of -his front, Jourdan supposed that they were skilful feints, intended -to cover some serious attack on a weak spot, and acted accordingly, -holding back till the enemy should develop his real plan, and refusing -to commit himself meanwhile to offensive operations on a serious scale. -It must be confessed that the chaotic and inconsequent movements of -the Spaniards bore, to the eye of the observer from the outside, -something like the appearance of a deep plan. On August 27 the Conde -de Montijo, with a column of the Aragonese army, felt his way up the -Ebro as far as the bridge of Alfaro, nearly opposite the extreme left -flank of the French at Milagro. When attacked by Lefebvre-Desnouettes -at the head of a few cavalry and a horse-battery, the Spanish general -refused to stand, and retreated on Tudela. Marshal Moncey then pressed -him with an infantry division, but Montijo again gave back. The French -thought that this move must be a mere diversion, intended to attract -their attention to the side of Aragon, for Montijo had acted with such -extreme feebleness that it was unnatural to suppose that he was making -anything but a feint. They were quite wrong however: Palafox had told -the count to push as far up the Ebro as he could, without any thought -of favouring operations by Blake or Castaños, the former of whom was -at this moment not far in front of Astorga, while the latter was still -at Madrid. Montijo had given way simply because his troops were raw -levies, and because there were no supports behind him nearer than -Saragossa. It was to no effect, therefore, that King Joseph, after the -fighting in front of Alfaro and Tudela, moved his reserves up the river -to Miranda, thinking that the real attack must be coming from that -side. There was no real attack intended, for the enemy had not as yet -brought any considerable force up to the front. - -It was not till nearly three weeks later that the Spaniards made -another offensive move. This time Blake was the assailant. On September -10 he had at last concentrated the greater part of his army at -Reynosa--the centre of roads at the source of the Ebro, of which we -have already had to speak on several occasions. He had with him four -divisions of the army of Galicia, as well as a ‘vanguard brigade’ and a -‘reserve brigade’ of picked troops from the same quarter. Close behind -him were 8,000 Asturians under General Acevedo. The whole came to -32,000 men, but there were no more than 400 cavalry with the corps--a -fact which made Blake very anxious to keep to the mountains and to -avoid the plains of Old Castile[395]. He had left behind him in Galicia -and about Astorga more than 10,000 men of new levies, not yet fit to -take the field. There were also some 9,000 Asturians in similar case, -held back within the limits of their own principality[396]. - - [395] For the organization and state of Blake’s force, see the - Appendix. - - [396] The Asturias had raised nineteen new battalions: of these - eight went forward with Blake, and eleven remained behind. - -In the elaborate plan of operations which had been sketched out at -Madrid on September 5, it will be remembered that Blake’s army was -intended to co-operate with those of Castaños and of Eguia. But he -paid no attention whatever to the promises which his representative, -Infantado, had made in his name, and executed an entirely different -movement: there was no commander-in-chief to compel him to act in -unison with his colleagues. The Castilian and Estremaduran armies were -not ready, and Castaños had as yet only a feeble vanguard facing the -enemy on the Central Ebro, his rear divisions being still far back, -on the road from Andalusia. Blake neither asked for nor received any -assistance whatever from his colleagues, and set out in the most -light-hearted way to attack 70,000 French with his 32,000 Galicians and -Asturians. - -His plan was to threaten Burgos with a small portion of his army, -while with the main body he marched on Bilbao, in order to rouse Biscay -to a second revolt, and to turn the right flank of the French along the -sea-shore. Accordingly he sent his ‘vanguard’ and ‘reserve’ brigades -towards Burgos, by the road that passes by Oña and Briviesca, while -with four complete divisions he moved on Bilbao. On the twentieth his -leading column turned out of that town General Monthion, who was in -garrison there with a weak brigade of details and detachments. - -Here at last, as it seemed to Joseph Bonaparte and to Jourdan, was -the long-expected main attack of the Spaniards. Accordingly they -concentrated to their right, with the object of meeting it. Bessières -evacuated Burgos and drew back to the line of the Upper Ebro. He there -replaced the King’s reserve, and the incomplete corps that was forming -at Miranda and Vittoria under the command of Marshal Ney: thus these -troops became available for operations in Biscay. Ney, with two small -infantry divisions, marched on Bilbao by way of Durango: Joseph, with -the reserve, followed him. But when the Marshal reached the Biscayan -capital, the division of Blake’s army[397], which had occupied it for -the last six days, retired and took up a defensive attitude in the -hills above Valmaceda, twenty miles to the west. Here it was joined by -a second division of the Galician army[398], and stood fast in a very -difficult country abounding in strong positions. Ney therefore held -back, unwilling to attack a force that might be 30,000 strong (for -all that he knew) with the 10,000 men that he had brought. Clearly he -must wait for King Joseph and the reserve, in case he should find that -Blake’s whole army was in front of him. - - [397] The 4th Galician Division under the Marquis of Portago. - - [398] The 3rd Galician Division under General Riquelme. - -But the King and his corps failed to appear: Bessières had sent to -inform him that Blake, far from having moved his whole army on to -Bilbao, had still got the bulk of it in positions from which he could -march down the Ebro and attack Miranda and Vittoria. This was to a -certain extent true, for the first and second divisions of the Galician -army were now at Villarcayo, on the southern side of the Cantabrian -hills, a spot from which they could march either northward to Bilbao -or eastward to Miranda. Moreover, Blake’s ‘reserve’ and ‘vanguard’ -brigades were still about Frias and Oña, whither they had been pushed -before the French evacuated Burgos. Bessières, therefore, had much to -say in favour of his view, that the point of danger was in the Ebro -valley and not in Biscay. King Joseph, convinced by his arguments, -left Ney unreinforced, and took post with the 6,000 men of the central -reserve at Vittoria. His conclusion that Bilbao was not the true -objective of the Spaniards was soon confirmed by other movements of -the enemy. The feeble columns of Castaños were at last showing on the -Central Ebro, and Palafox was on the move on the side of Aragon. - -Under the idea that all Blake’s Biscayan expedition had been no more -than a feint and a diversion, and that the real blow would be struck -on the Ebro, Jourdan and the King now directed Ney to come back from -Bilbao and to take up his old positions. The Marshal obeyed: leaving -General Merlin with 3,000 men in the Biscayan capital, he returned with -7,000 bayonets to La Guardia, on the borders of Alava and Navarre. His -old head quarters at Logroño, beyond the Ebro, had been occupied by the -head of one of Castaños’s columns. He did not attack this force, but -merely encamped opposite it, on the northern bank of the river [October -5][399]. - - [399] All these moves are best described in Marshal Jourdan’s - _Mémoires_ (edited by Grouchy; Paris, 1899), pp. 71-5. - - [Illustration: Part of Northern Spain.] - -It is now time to review the position and forces of the Spanish -armies, which were at last up in the fighting line. Blake’s 32,000 -Asturians[400] and Galicians were divided into two masses, at Valmaceda -and Villarcayo, on the two sides of the Cantabrian hills. They were -within three marches of each other, and the whole could be turned -either against Biscay or against Vittoria, as the opportunity might -demand. But between Blake and the central divisions of the Spanish -army there was a vast gap. This, at a later period of the campaign, -was filled up by bringing forward the 12,000 men of the Estremaduran -army to Burgos: but this force, insufficient as it was for the purpose, -had not reached the front: in the middle of October it had not even -arrived at Madrid[401]. There seems to have been at Burgos nothing -more than a detached battalion or two, which had occupied the place -when Bessières drew back towards the Ebro[402]. Of all the Spanish -forces, the nearest organized corps on Blake’s right consisted of -the main body of this same army of Castile. This division, for it was -no more, consisted of about 10,000 or 11,000 men: it contained a few -regular corps (Regiment of Cantabria, a battalion of Grenadiers, the -Leon Militia) which had been lent to it by the army of Andalusia, and -twelve raw Leonese and Castilian battalions, of the new levy which -Cuesta had raised. There were also some 800 cavalry with it. The -commander was now Pignatelli, for Eguia (who had originally been told -off to the post) had fallen sick. This small and inefficient force was -at Logroño on the Central Ebro, having taken possession of that place -when it was evacuated by Marshal Ney in the last week of September. -A little further down the river lay the 2nd Division of the army of -Andalusia, which, under the orders of Coupigny, had taken a creditable -part in the battle of Baylen. Released by the Junta of Seville in -September, it had at last gone forward and joined Castaños. But it was -somewhat changed in composition, for three of its original fourteen -battalions had been withdrawn[403] and sent to Catalonia, while three -new Andalusian corps had replaced them. Its commander was now General -Grimarest, Coupigny having been told off to another sphere of duty. The -division numbered about 6,000 bayonets, with 400 or 500 cavalry, and -a single battery. It occupied Lodosa, on the north bank of the Ebro, -some twelve miles down-stream from Logroño. Quite close to its right -there lay at Calahorra the 4th Division of the army of Andalusia, under -La Peña--a somewhat stronger force--about 7,500 foot, with 400 horse -and two batteries. The only remaining division of Castaños’ ‘Army of -the Centre’ consisted of the Murcian and Valencian corps under Llamas. -This had entered Madrid 8,000 strong on August 13, but one of its -regiments had been left behind at Aranjuez to guard the Junta. It now -consisted of no more than 7,000 men, and lay at Tudela, in close touch -with La Peña’s Andalusians. The total, therefore, of Castaños’ army -in the second half of October did not amount to more than 31,000 foot -and 3,000 horse. The 1st and 3rd divisions of the Andalusian army, -long detained beyond the Morena by the Junta of Seville, were but just -commencing to arrive at Madrid: of their 15,000 men less than half -reached the front in November, in time to take their share in the -rout of Tudela. Even these were not yet at Castaños’ disposition in -October[404]. - - [400] Acevedo’s 8,000 Asturians joined Blake at Villarcayo on - Oct. 11 (see his dispatch in _Madrid Gazette_, Oct. 25). - - [401] I gather from _Madrid Gazette_ (Oct. 21, p. 1,333) that it - was still organizing in and about Badajoz on Oct. 6, and did not - begin to march till later. - - [402] Volunteers of Benavente from the army of Castile, and Tuy - Militia of Blake’s army. - - [403] These three Granadan battalions had been sent, along with - the rest of the levies of that kingdom, to form part of the - division which Reding was leading to Catalonia. They had been - replaced by the new Andalusian battalions of Baylen, Navas de - Tolosa, and 5th of Seville. - - [404] Castaños himself, in his exculpatory memoir, will not allow - that he ever had more than 26,000 men, even including the belated - troops of the 1st and 3rd Andalusian divisions which came up in - November. - -The right wing of the Spanish army of the Ebro consisted of the raw -and half-organized masses composing the army of Aragon. Palafox had -succeeded in getting together a great body of men from that loyal -province, but he had not been able to form them into a force fit to -take the field. Owing to the way in which Aragon had been stripped -of regular troops before the commencement of the war, there was no -solid body round which the new levies could be organized, and no -supply of trained officers to drill or discipline the thousands of -eager recruits. It would seem that in all no less than 32,000 were -raised, but no force in any degree approaching these numbers took the -field. Every village and every mountain valley had contributed its -_partida_ or its company, but with the best of wills Palafox had not -yet succeeded in incorporating all these small and scattered units into -regiments and brigades. Many of them had not even been armed: very few -had been properly clothed and equipped. Nevertheless no fewer than -thirty-nine battalions in a state of greater or less organization were -in existence by the end of October. They varied in strength to the most -extraordinary degree: many were no more than 300 strong[405], one or -two were enormous and ran up to 1,300 or 1,400 bayonets. Of the whole -thirty-nine battalions only three belonged to the old regular army, -and these corps--whose total numbers only reached 2,350 men--had been -largely diluted with raw recruits[406]. Of the remainder some belonged -to the _tercios_ who had taken arms in June, and had served through -the first siege of Saragossa, but a large number had only been raised -after Verdier had retired from before the city in August. It would seem -that the total of Palafox’s Aragonese, who went to the front for the -campaign of October and November, was about 12,000 men. The rest were -left behind at Saragossa, being not yet organized or equipped for field -service. - - [405] See the tables in Arteche, iii. 479, 480. The Regiment of - Calatayud was only 310 strong, that of Doyle 306, and that of - Navarre 302; on the other hand the 2nd Volunteers of Aragon had - 1,302, the 1st Volunteers of Huesca 1,319, and the overgrown - ‘Aragonese Fusiliers’ no less than 1,836. - - [406] 3rd Spanish Guards 609, Estremadura 600, 1st Volunteers of - Aragon 1,141. These figures are from a return of Nov. 1, sent to - England by Colonel Doyle, then in high favour with Palafox. It - may be found in the Record Office. - -But Palafox had also in his army troops which did not belong to his -native kingdom. These were the Murcians and Valencians of Saint March -and O’Neille, who after taking part in the campaign against Moncey, -had not marched with Llamas to Madrid, but had turned off to aid in -raising the siege of Saragossa. Saint March had brought with him -fourteen battalions and a cavalry regiment, O’Neille had with him three -more infantry corps. The total of their force reached 11,200 bayonets -and 620 sabres. Adding these to the best of his own Aragonese levies, -Palafox sent out 23,000 men: of these only about 800 were cavalry[407]. -A force such as this, backed by the mass of unorganized levies at -Saragossa, was barely sufficient to maintain a defensive position on -the frontiers of Aragon. But the Junta, with great unwisdom, came to -the conclusion that Palafox was strong enough not only to hold his own -against the French in his immediate front, but to spare some troops -to reinforce the army of Catalonia. By their orders he told off six -battalions--some 4,000 men--who were placed under the command of his -brother, the Marquis of Lazan, and dispatched to Lerida with the object -of aiding the Captain-General of Catalonia to besiege Duhesme in -Barcelona. - - [407] The Valencian and Murcian contributions to the army of - Aragon consisted of the following troops:--One old line regiment - of three battalions (Volunteers of Castile), the militia - battalion of Soria, and of new levies the 1st and 2nd Volunteers - of Murcia, the 2nd Volunteers of Valencia, the regiments of Turia - (three battalions), Alicante (three battalions), Segorbe (two - battalions), Borbon, Chelva, and Cazadores de Fernando VII, the - Dragoons of Numancia (an old corps), and two squadrons of new - Valencian cavalry. I get these names partly from the return of - Nov. 1 in the Record Office at London, partly from Saint March’s - return of his killed and wounded at Tudela. Some more Murcian - corps started to join Palafox, but were not in time for Tudela, - though they took part in the second defence of Saragossa: viz. - 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Murcia, the regiment of Florida Blanca, - and 1st and 2nd Tiradores of Murcia. Their start from Murcia on - Oct. 13 is noted in the _Madrid Gazette_ of 1808 (p. 1,336). - -Nor was this the only force that was drawn off from the main theatre -of the war in order to take part in helping the Catalans, who had -hitherto proved quite strong enough to help themselves. The Junta -directed Reding, the victor of Baylen, to take command of all the -Granadan troops in the army of Andalusia, and lead them to Tortosa -with the object of joining Lazan. With Reding there marched nearly -15,000 men[408]: to raise this force all the regiments belonging to the -kingdom of Granada had been drafted out from the 1st and 2nd Divisions -of Castaños’ army, which were thus mutilated before they reached the -Ebro. To those comparatively veteran troops were added eight new -battalions of raw levies--the regiments of Baza, Almeria, Loxa, and -Santa Fé. Starting on their long march from Granada on October 8, the -head of Reding’s column had only reached Murcia on October 22, and was -thus hopelessly distant from any point where it could have been useful -when the campaign began[409]. Nor was this the last detachment which -the Junta directed on Catalonia: it sent thither part of the prisoners -from Lisbon, whom the Convention of Cintra had delivered--3,500 of the -men who had once formed the division of Caraffa. Laguna, who now held -the command, landed from English transports at La Rapita near Tortosa -on October 25, and marched from thence on Tarragona[410]. - - [408] Just 14,970, according to the details given in the _Madrid - Gazette_ for Oct. 12 (p. 1,379). See my Appendix on the Spanish - forces in Oct.-Nov. - - [409] _Madrid Gazette_, Oct. 28 (p. 1,381). - - [410] Ibid., Nov. 1 (p. 1,407). - -It is safe to say that of these 23,000 men transferred to Catalonia -from Aragon, Granada, and Portugal, every man ought to have been -pushed forward to help Castaños on the Ebro, and not distracted to the -side-issue at Barcelona. It was mad to send them thither when the main -force facing Jourdan and King Joseph did not yet amount to 75,000 men. -Catalonia, with such small aid as the Balearic Islands could give, was -strong enough to defend herself against the motley hordes of Duhesme -and Reille. - -At the moment when the feeble offensive of Castaños and Palafox began, -on the line of the Ebro, the French had some 65,000 men ranged opposite -them[411], while a reserve of 10,000 was formed at Bayonne, and the -leading columns of the ‘Grand Army’ from Germany were only ten or -twelve marches away. Napoleon had, by a decree issued on September -7, recast the form of his army of Spain. It was in the future to -consist of seven army corps. The 1st, 4th, and 5th were to be composed -of old divisions from the Rhine and the Elbe. Of the forces already -on the spot Bessières’ troops were to form the 2nd Corps, Moncey’s -the 3rd, the still incomplete divisions under Ney the 6th. The army -of Catalonia, where St. Cyr was superseding Reille, formed the 7th -Corps[412]. Junot’s army from Portugal, when it once more appeared -upon the scene, made the 8th, but in September Napoleon did not yet -know of its fate, and it only received its number and its place in the -host at a much later date. Many alterations of detail were made in the -brigades and divisions that formed the new 2nd and 3rd Corps. All the -_bataillons de marche_ were abolished, and their men drafted into the -old regiments. The fifteen ‘provisional regiments,’ which had composed -the whole of Moncey’s and a considerable part of Bessières’ strength, -were taken into the regular establishment of the army, and renumbered -as the 114th-120th of the Line and the 33rd Léger, two provisional -regiments being told off to form each of the new bodies[413]. There was -a certain amount of shifting of units, but in the main the brigades and -divisions of these two corps remained intact. - - [411] The figures given by Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ seem - quite accurate, and are borne out by all the details in _Nap. - Corresp._; they are:-- - Corps of Bessières [2nd Corps] 17,597 - Corps of Moncey [3rd Corps] 20,747 - Corps of Ney [6th Corps], incomplete 8,957 - The King’s general reserve 6,088 - Garrisons of Navarre and Biscay 11,559 - ------ - 64,948 - - [412] It was originally to be called the 5th, but this title was - taken from it, in order that Mortier’s corps might keep its old - number. - - [413] For their distribution see p. 110. - -On or about October 8-10 Bessières lay at Miranda and Murguia, guarding -against any possible descent of Blake from Villarcayo upon the Upper -Ebro. Ney was at La Guardia, facing Pignatelli’s Castilians, who -occupied his old head quarters at Logroño. Moncey had thrown back his -left to guard against a possible descent of Palafox upon Navarre, and -was behind the line of the river Aragon, with his right at Estella, -his centre at Falces and Tafalla, and his left facing Sanguesa, where -it was opposed by the advanced division of the army of Palafox under -O’Neille. For the Captain-General of Aragon, pleased with a plan -proposed to him by Colonel Doyle, the English military attaché in his -camp, had resolved to make a long turning movement under the roots of -the Pyrenees, exactly parallel to that which Blake was executing at the -other end of the line. With this object he sent out from Saragossa, -on September 29, O’Neille with a division of Aragonese strengthened -by a few Murcian and Valencian battalions, and numbering some 9,000 -bayonets. This detachment, marching in a leisurely way, reached -Sanguesa on the Upper Aragon, but there stopped short, on getting -information that Moncey’s corps lay before it in some strength. Palafox -then sent up in support a second division, Saint March’s Murcians -and Valencians, who advanced to Egea and there halted. There was -considerable bickering all through the second half of October on this -line, but Sanguesa remained in the hands of the Spaniards, Moncey being -too much distracted by the movements of Castaños in the direction of -Tudela to dare to concentrate his whole force for a blow at Saint March -and O’Neille. The latter, on the other hand, had realized that if they -pressed further forward towards Pampeluna, as their commander-in-chief -had originally intended, they would leave Moncey so much in their rear -that he could cut them off both from Saragossa and from the Army of the -Centre. Here then matters had come to a deadlock; but the position was -all in favour of the French, who lay compactly in the centre, while -O’Neille and Saint March were separated from Castaños by a gap of sixty -miles, and Blake on the other wing was about seventy (as the crow -flies) from the army of Castile. - - - - -SECTION VII: CHAPTER II - -THE PRELIMINARY FIGHTING: ARRIVAL OF NAPOLEON - - -By the middle of October the French and Spanish armies were in presence -of each other along the whole line of the Ebro, and it seemed certain -that one or other of them must at last take the offensive. Both were -still in expectation of reinforcements, but those which the Spaniards -could expect to receive within the next few weeks were comparatively -unimportant, while their adversaries knew that more than 100,000 men -from Germany were due at Bayonne in the last days of October. Clearly -it was for Castaños and his colleagues to make a move now or never. The -wasted months of August and September could not be recalled, but there -was still time to attack Bessières, Ney, and Moncey, before the arrival -of the Emperor and the three veteran corps from the Elbe. - -Matters lay thus when the Spanish generals resolved on a perfectly new -and wildly impracticable scheme. Castaños had come to the conclusion--a -thoroughly sound one--that his 34,000 men were too few to make a -frontal attack on the French on the line between Miranda and Calahorra. -He left Madrid on October 13, deeply chagrined to find that the Central -Junta had no intention of making him commander-in-chief. Instead of -being able to issue orders to the other generals, he must meet them on -equal terms and endeavour to cajole them into adopting a common plan -of operations. Accordingly he rode to Saragossa to visit Palafox, and -after long and not very friendly converse drew out a new plan. The Army -of the Centre was to shift itself down the Ebro, leaving the troops of -Pignatelli (the ‘Army of Castile’) and of Grimarest (the 2nd Andalusian -division) to ‘contain’ Ney and Bessières. The rest were to concentrate -at Tudela, where they were to be joined by as many battalions of the -Aragonese levies at Saragossa as could take the field. With some 25,000 -or 30,000 men at the highest estimate, Castaños and Palafox were to -fall upon Moncey’s flank at the bridge of Caparrosa. Meanwhile O’Neille -and Saint March, with the advanced divisions of the army of Aragon, -were to break up from Sanguesa, march round Pampeluna by the foot-hills -of the Pyrenees, and place themselves across the road to France. Moncey -was thus to be surrounded, and a second Baylen was to ensue! Indeed, -if Blake could be persuaded to push forward once more to Bilbao, and -thence into Guipuzcoa, the whole army of King Joseph (as it was hoped) -might be cut off and made prisoners. Eighty thousand men, according -to this strange scheme, starting from bases 200 miles apart, were to -surround 65,000 French in a most difficult mountain country. Meanwhile -the enormous gap between Blake’s right and Castaños’ left was to -remain wholly unguarded, for the army of Estremadura was still in the -far distance; while nothing was to be left opposite Bessières and Ney -save Pignatelli’s disorderly ‘Army of Castile,’ and Grimarest’s 6,000 -Andalusians. - -But before the scheme for the cutting off of Moncey had even begun -to be carried out, Castaños and Palafox had a rude awakening. They -were themselves attacked by the army which they were so confidently -proposing to surround. King Joseph, emboldened by the long delay of his -adversaries in advancing, had several times discussed with Jourdan, -Bessières, and Ney schemes for taking the offensive. Indeed he had -sketched out in September no less than five separate plans for bringing -the enemy to an action, and it is probable that he might have tried one -of them if he had been allowed a free hand[414]. Napoleon, however, -having determined to come to Spain in person, put an embargo on any -comprehensive scheme for an advance on Madrid, and restricted his -brother to minor operations. - - [414] The paper containing them was captured in Joseph’s carriage - at Vittoria five years later. It will be found printed in full in - Napier (Appendix to vol. i, pp. 453, 454). - -But there was nothing in the Emperor’s instructions which forbade -a blow on a small scale, if the Spaniards should grow too daring. -There was now a good excuse for such a move, for both Pignatelli and -Grimarest had been trespassing beyond the Ebro. They seem to have moved -forward quite contrary to the intentions of Castaños, who at this -moment was proposing to refuse battle with his left and centre, and to -draw the bulk of his army southward to Tudela. But his two divisional -generals pushed so far forward, that they at last drew upon themselves -most undesired attentions from the French marshals. Pignatelli -had thrown troops across the Ebro to Viana: Grimarest had pushed -detachments still further forward into Navarre, to Mendavia, Sesma, -and Lerin. Joseph and Jourdan resolved to drive back these outlying -posts, and to find out what was behind them. About 25,000 men were put -in movement against the 16,000 Spaniards who had so rashly crossed the -river. Moncey marched against Grimarest [Oct. 25-6] with two divisions: -Ney with a similar force fell upon Pignatelli, while Bessières sent a -division down the southern bank of the Ebro by Haro and Briones, to -threaten the line of retreat of the army of Castile across the bridge -of Logroño. - -Against such forces the Spaniards could do nothing: on the twenty-fifth -Ney marched on Viana, and drove in Pignatelli’s advanced guard. On the -following day he opened a fierce cannonade upon Logroño from across the -river, while at the same time Bonnet’s division, sent by Bessières, -marched upon the town from the hither side of the Ebro. Pignatelli was -a craven, and his Castilian levies proved to be the worst of all the -material which the Spaniards had brought to the front. General and -army vanished in the night, without even stopping to blow up the great -bridge, though they had mined it and laid the train in due form. Ney’s -officers crossing at dawn found all prepared, except the sappers who -should have applied the match[415]! Neither Ney nor Bonnet got in touch -with the flying horde: but in sheer panic Pignatelli abandoned his -guns by the roadside, and did not stop till he had joined Castaños at -Cintruenigo, near Tudela. His hurried retreat was wholly unnecessary, -for the French did not move beyond Logroño, and Castaños was able to -send out next morning a brigade which picked up the deserted guns -and brought them in without molestation. Rightly indignant, the -Commander-in-chief removed Pignatelli from his post, and distributed -his demoralized battalions among the divisions of Grimarest, La Peña, -and Llamas[416], leaving in separate existence only a single brigade -of six battalions under Cartaojal, which mainly consisted of the few -regular battalions that had been lent to Pignatelli to stiffen his raw -levies. Thus the ‘Army of Castile’ ceased to exist[417]. - - [415] For an account of this curious affair see the _Mémoires_ - of General Boulart, then an artillery officer under Ney, who - discovered the flight of the Castilians and the abandoned mine - below the bridge (pp. 202, 203). Oddly enough he gives the wrong - date for the incident, Oct. 30 instead of Oct. 27. - - [416] I cannot find any details as to their redistribution. - - [417] See Colonel Graham’s _Diary_, p. 275 (Oct. 30). He reached - Castaños’ camp on that day. - -On the same day that the Castilians were routed by Ney, the 2nd -Andalusian division was severely handled by Moncey. When that Marshal -advanced against Lerin and Sesma with the divisions of Morlot and -Maurice Mathieu, Grimarest withdrew beyond the Ebro, abandoning by -some oversight his vanguard. This force, commanded by a resolute -officer, Colonel Cruz-Murgeon, was enveloped at Lerin by the division -of Morlot[418]. The colonel shut himself up in the mediaeval castle of -that town, and defended himself for two days, in hopes that he might -be succoured. But his chief had fled beyond the river, and could not -be induced to return by any appeals. On October 27 Cruz-Murgeon had to -surrender, after two-thirds of his troops had been killed or wounded. -Their obstinate defence was the more creditable because they were all -new levies, consisting of a single Andalusian battalion (_Tiradores -de Cadiz_) and a few Catalan volunteers. Marshal Moncey then occupied -Lodosa and its bridge, but made no attempt to follow Grimarest, who was -able to rejoin his chief without further loss. - - [418] Jourdan in his _Mémoires_ (p. 77) says that it was Morlot - who acted against Lerin, and I follow him rather than those who - state that it was Maurice Mathieu. - -Castaños was greatly disturbed by the vigorous offensive movement of -Ney and Moncey. Seeing the French so strong and so confident, he was -struck with sudden qualms as to the advisability of the movement on -Caparrosa and Pampeluna, which he and Palafox had agreed to carry out. -He proposed to his colleague that they should drop their plan for -surrounding Moncey, and attempt no more than an attack on his flanks at -Caparrosa and Sanguesa. Meanwhile he concentrated the greater part of -his army at Calahorra and Tudela [Oct. 29]. The initiative had passed -to the French, and if Ney and Moncey did not seize the opportunity for -an advance against the Army of the Centre, it was merely because they -knew that Napoleon was now close at hand--he reached Bayonne four days -later--and would not wish them to attempt anything decisive without his -orders. - -Meanwhile there arrived from Madrid a deputation from the Supreme -Junta, consisting of Francisco Palafox (the younger brother of the -Captain-General), of Coupigny, Reding’s colleague at the victory of -Baylen, and the intriguing Conde de Montijo. The Junta were indignant -that Castaños had not made bricks without straw. Though they had not -given him any appreciable reinforcements, they had expected him to -attack the French and win a great victory beyond the Ebro. Conscious -that the deputies came to him in no friendly spirit, Castaños -nevertheless received them with all respect, and laid before them the -difficulties of his situation. Joseph Palafox came up from Saragossa -to join the conference, and after a long and stormy meeting--this was -the conference which so disgusted Colonel Graham[419]--it was decided -to resume offensive operations [November 5]. The idea was a mad one, -for six days before the council of war was held two French army corps, -those of Victor and Lefebvre, had crossed the Bidassoa and entered -Spain. There were now 110,000 instead of 65,000 enemies in front of the -Spanish armies. Moreover, and this was still more important, Napoleon -himself had reached Bayonne on November 3. - - [419] Cf. p. 366 and Graham’s _Diary_, p. 276. - -Nevertheless it was resolved once more to push forward and fall upon -Moncey. Castaños was to leave one division at Calahorra, and to bring -the rest of his army over the Ebro to attack the bridge of Caparrosa: -O’Neille and Saint March were to come down from Sanguesa to co-operate -with him: Joseph Palafox was to bring up the Aragonese reserves from -Saragossa. The only sign of prudence that appeared was that the council -of war agreed not to commence the attack on Moncey till they had -learnt how Blake and the army of Galicia were faring in Biscay. For -that general had, as they knew, commenced some days before his second -advance on Bilbao. Since the armies on the Central Ebro hung back, -it was in the distant region on the coast that the first important -collision between the Spaniards and the French reinforcements from -Germany was to take place. For a fortnight more there was comparative -quiet in front of Tudela and Caparrosa. Meanwhile Castaños, prostrated -by an attack of the gout[420], took to his bed, and the Army of the -Centre was abandoned for a few days to the tender mercies of the -deputation from Madrid. - - [420] According to Toreño; but Graham, who was present in the - camp, calls it rheumatism. - -There is a strange contrast when we turn from the study of the rash -and inconsiderate plans of the Spanish generals to mark the movements -of Napoleon. The Emperor had left Erfurt on October 14: on the -nineteenth he had reached Paris, where he stayed for ten days, busied -not only with the ‘logistics’ of moving the columns of the ‘Grand Army’ -across France, but with all manner of administrative work. He had also -to arrange the details of the conscription: though he had raised in -1807 the enormous mass of new levies of which we had to speak in an -earlier chapter, he now asked for 140,000 men more[421]. Of these, -80,000 were to be drawn from the classes of 1806-9, which had already -contributed so heavily to the army. The balance was to be taken from -the class of 1810, whose members were still fifteen months below the -legal age. From these multitudes of young soldiers every regiment -of the army of Spain was to be brought up to full strength, but the -majority were destined to reinforce the depleted armies of Germany and -Italy, which had been thinned of veterans for the Peninsular War. - - [421] See _Nap. Corresp._, 14,312 (xvii. 505, 506), and compare - with 14,601 (xviii. 141, 142). - -On October 25 Bonaparte presided at the opening of the Legislative -Assembly, and made a characteristic harangue to its members. He -painted the situation of the Empire in the most roseate colours. ‘The -sight of this great French family, once torn apart by differences of -opinion and domestic hatreds, but now so tranquil, prosperous, and -united, had sensibly touched his soul. To be happy himself he only -required the assurance that France also was happy. Law, finance, the -Church, every branch of the state, seemed in the most flourishing -condition. The Empire was strong in its alliances with Russia, the -Confederation of the Rhine, Denmark, Switzerland, and Naples. Great -Britain, it was true, had landed some troops in the Peninsula, and -stirred up insurrections there. But this was a blessing in disguise. -The Providence which had so constantly protected the arms of France, -had deigned to strike the English ministry with blindness, and to -induce them to present an army on the Continent where it was doomed to -inevitable destruction. In a few days the Emperor would place himself -at the head of his troops, and, with the aid of God, would crown in -Madrid the true King of Spain, and plant his eagles on the forts of -Lisbon[422].’ - - [422] _Discours prononcé le 25 oct._ (_Nap. Corresp._, xviii. 20, - 21). - -Four days later Bonaparte quitted Paris, and passing hastily through -Orleans and Bordeaux reached Bayonne at three o’clock in the morning -of November 3. The corps of Victor and Lefebvre, with two divisions -of dragoons, were several days ahead of him, and had already crossed -the Bidassoa. The Imperial Guard and the divisions destined for -Ney[423], as well as a great mass of cavalry, were just converging on -the frontier. Mortier’s corps was not very far off: Junot’s army from -Portugal had already landed at Quiberon and Rochefort, and was being -directed on Bordeaux. All the machinery for the great blow was now -ready. - - [423] Those of Marchand and Bisson, forming the old 6th Corps, - with which he fought at Jena and Friedland. - -Napoleon profoundly despised the Spanish army and the Spanish generals. -His correspondence is full of contemptuous allusions to them: ‘ever -since he served at Toulon he knew them for the worst troops in Europe.’ -‘Nothing could be so bad as the Spaniards--they are mere rabble--6,000 -French can beat 20,000 of them.’ ‘The whole Spanish army could not -turn 15,000 good troops out of a position that had been properly -occupied[424].’ Nevertheless he had determined to run no risks: the -second Peninsular campaign must not end like the first, in a fiasco -and a humiliating retreat. It was for this reason that the Emperor had -massed more than 250,000 good troops against the tumultuary levies of -the Junta--a force which, in his private opinion, was far more than -enough to sweep the whole of his adversaries into the sea before the -year 1808 should have run out. Any expedition in which he himself took -part must, for the sake of his prestige, be conducted from beginning -to end in a series of spectacular triumphs. It was better to use a -larger army than was absolutely necessary, in order to make his blows -sufficiently heavy, and to get the Spanish business over as rapidly -as possible. If the whole Peninsula were overrun in a few months, and -resistance had been completely beaten down ere the winter was over, -there would be no chance of that intervention on the part of Austria -which was the only danger on the political horizon[425]. - - [424] Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, to Caulaincourt, to Eugène - Beauharnais (vols. xvii, xviii of _Nap. Corresp._). - - [425] The clearest proof which I find in the _Napoleon - Correspondance_ of the Emperor’s intention to sweep over the - whole Peninsula, with a single rush, is that already in November - he was assembling at Bayonne naval officers who were to take - charge of the port of Lisbon, and to reorganize the Portuguese - fleet. This was a little premature! (See Napoleon to Decrès, - Minister of Marine, _Nap. Corresp._, 14,514, vol. xviii.) - -Napoleon, therefore, drew out his plans not merely for a triumphant -advance on Madrid, but for the complete annihilation of the Spanish -armies on the Ebro and in Biscay. From a careful study of the -dispatches of his lieutenants, he had realized the existence of the -great gap in the direction of Burgos between the armies of Blake and -of Castaños. His plan of campaign, stated shortly, was to burst in -through this gap, so as to separate the Spanish armies on his left -and right, and then to wheel troops outwards in both directions so as -to surround and annihilate them. Both Blake and Palafox were, at this -moment, playing the game that he most desired. The further that the -former pressed onward into Biscay, the nearer that the latter drew to -the roots of the Pyrenees, the more did they expose themselves to being -encompassed by great masses of troops breaking out from Burgos and -Logroño to fall upon their flank and rear. When the Emperor drew up his -scheme he knew that Blake was in front of Zornoza, and that the bulk -of the army of Aragon was at Sanguesa. Meanwhile the French advanced -divisions were in possession of Miranda, Logroño, and Lodosa, the three -chief passages over the Upper Ebro. A glance at the map is sufficient -to show that the moment that the Emperor and his reserves reached -Vittoria the Spanish armies were in the most perilous position. It -would suffice to order a march on Burgos on the one hand and on Tudela -on the other, and then the troops of Aragon and Galicia would not -merely be cut off from any possible retreat on Madrid, but run grave -danger of annihilation. A further advance of the French would probably -thrust the one against the Pyrenees, and roll the other into the Bay of -Biscay. - -For this reason it was the Emperor’s wish that his lieutenants should -refrain from attacking Blake and Palafox till he himself was ready to -march on Burgos. For any premature advance against the Spaniards might -force them to retreat from their dangerous advanced positions, and fall -back the one on Reynosa the other on Saragossa, where they would be -much less exposed. - -The distribution of the ‘Grand Army’ was to be as follows. Lefebvre -with the 4th Corps was to present himself in front of Blake between -Durango and Zornoza, and to hold him fast without pressing him. Moncey -with the 3rd Corps, in a similar way, was to ‘contain’ Palafox and -Castaños from his posts at Lodosa, Caparrosa, and Tafalla. Meanwhile -Victor, with the newly arrived 1st Corps, was to endeavour to get -into Blake’s rear, by the road Vittoria--Murguia--Orduña. The main -body of the army, consisting of the troops of Bessières and Ney, King -Joseph’s reserve, the Imperial Guard, and four divisions of cavalry, -was to march on Burgos. Napoleon knew that there was no large body -of Spaniards in that place: he expected to find there Pignatelli’s -‘Army of Castile,’ but this force (as we have seen) had ceased to -exist, having been drafted with ignominy into the ranks of the army -of Andalusia[426]. As a matter of fact Burgos was now occupied by a -new force from the second line--the long-expected army of Estremadura, -some 12,000 strong, which had at last come up from Madrid and taken -its place at the front. But Napoleon’s reasoning still held good: any -Spanish army that might chance to be at Burgos must be overwhelmed by -the enormous mass of troops that was about to be hurled upon it. The -moment that it was disposed of, Ney with the 6th Corps was to wheel -to the east, and march by Aranda and Soria, so as to place himself -between Castaños and Palafox and Madrid. Then he would turn their flank -at Tarazona and Tudela, and--in conjunction with Moncey--drive them -northward against the Pyrenees. In a similar way, upon the other flank, -the 2nd Corps was to wheel to the north-west and march from Burgos on -Reynosa, there to intercept Blake, if he had not already been cut off -by Victor’s shorter turning movement. Meanwhile the Emperor with the -rest of his army, followed by the new reserves (Mortier’s corps and -other troops) which were due from France, would march straight from -Burgos on Madrid, force the defiles of the Somosierra and Guadarrama, -and seize the Spanish capital. He was well aware that there would be -no serious hostile force in front of him, since the armies of Blake, -Palafox, and Castaños were all provided for. He does not seem to have -known of the army of Estremadura, or to have had any idea that the -English forces from Portugal might conceivably be on their way to -cover Madrid. There is no mention of Sir John Moore and his host in the -imperial dispatches till December 5. - - [426] Napoleon to Bessières, Nov. 6: ‘J’ai vu vos dépêches du 5 - novembre sur l’existence d’un corps de 24,000 hommes à Burgos. - Si cela est, ce ne peut être que 12,000 hommes de l’armée de - Castille qui ont évacué Logroño, et qui ne sont pas en cas de - faire tête à 3,000 ou 4,000 de vos gens’ (_Nap. Corresp._, - 14,443, xviii. 38). - -All being ready, Bonaparte rode out of Bayonne on November 4, having -stayed there only thirty-six hours. Before leaving he had received -one vexatious piece of news: Lefebvre, in direct disobedience to his -orders, had attacked Blake on October 31, and forced him back beyond -Bilbao. This made the plan for the cutting off of the army of Galicia a -little more difficult, since the Spaniards were now forty miles further -back, and not nearly so much exposed as they had been hitherto. But it -was still not impossible that Victor might succeed in circumventing -them, and forcing them into the Bay of Biscay. - -It is impossible to withhold our admiration from the Emperor’s simple -yet all-embracing plan of operations. It is true that the campaign -was made more easy by the fact that he was dealing with raw and -undisciplined armies and inexpert generals. It is also clear that he -rightly reckoned on having two men in the field against every one whom -the Spaniards could produce. But the excellence of a scheme is not to -be judged merely by the difficulties in its way; and military genius -can be displayed in dealing with an easy as well as with a dangerous -problem. Half a dozen other plans for conducting the invasion of Spain -might have been drawn up, but it is impossible to see that any better -one could have been constructed. In its main lines it was carried out -with complete success: the armies of the Junta were scattered to the -winds, and Madrid fell almost without a blow. - -It was only when the capital had been occupied, and the troops of -Blake and Belvedere, of Castaños and Palafox were flying devious over -half the provinces of Spain, that the difficulties of the Peninsular -War began to develop themselves. Napoleon had never before had any -experience of the character of guerilla warfare, or the kind of -resistance that can be offered by a proud and revengeful nation which -has made up its mind never to submit to the conqueror. In his complete -ignorance of Spain and the Spaniards, he imagined that he had a very -simple campaign to conduct. The subjugation of the Peninsula was to -him an ordinary military problem, like the invasion of Lombardy or of -Prussia, and he went forth in cheerful confidence to ‘plant the eagles -of France on the forts of Lisbon,’ and to ‘drive the Britannic leopard -from the soil of the Peninsula, which it defiles by its presence.’ But -the last chapter of this story was to be told not at Lisbon but at -Toulouse: and ‘the Beneficent Providence which had deigned to strike -the British ministry with such blindness that they had been induced to -send an army to the Continent[427],’ had other designs than Bonaparte -supposed. - - [427] See page 396. - - - - -SECTION VII: CHAPTER III - -THE MISFORTUNES OF JOACHIM BLAKE: ZORNOZA AND ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS - - -The campaign of November 1808 was fought out upon three separate -theatres of war, though every movement of the French armies which -engaged in it formed part of a single plan, and was properly linked to -the operations which were progressing upon other sections of the front. -The working out of Napoleon’s great scheme, therefore, must be dealt -with under three heads--the destruction of Blake’s ‘Army of the Left’ -in the north-west; the rout of the armies of Andalusia and Aragon upon -the banks of the Ebro; and the central advance of the Emperor upon -Burgos and Madrid, which completed the plan. - -We must first deal with the misfortunes of Blake and his Galician host, -both on chronological grounds--it was he who first felt the weight -of the French arms--and also because Napoleon rightly attached more -importance to the destruction of this, the most formidable of the -Spanish armies, than to the other operations which he was carrying out -at the same moment. - -It will be remembered that after his first abortive expedition against -Bilbao, and his retreat before Ney [October 5], Blake had fallen back -to Valmaceda. Finding that he was not pursued, he drew up to that point -the divisions which he had hitherto kept in the upper valley of the -Ebro, and prepared to advance again, this time with his whole army -massed for a bold stroke. On October 11 he again marched into Biscay, -and drove out of Bilbao the division of General Merlin, which Ney -had left behind him to hold the line of the Nervion. On the twelfth -this small force fell back on Zornoza and Durango, and halted at the -latter place, after having been reinforced from King Joseph’s reserve -at Vittoria. Verdier headed the succours, which consisted of three -battalions of the Imperial Guard, two battalions of the 118th Regiment, -two battalions of Joseph’s own Royal Guards, and the 36th Regiment, -which had just come up from France. When strengthened by these 7,000 -men, Merlin considered himself able to make a stand, and took up a -strong position in front of Durango, the important point at which the -roads from Bayonne and from Vittoria to Bilbao meet. - -When committing himself to his second expedition into Biscay, Blake -was not wholly unaware of the dangers of the step, though he failed -to realize them at their full value, since (in common with the other -Spanish generals) he greatly underrated the strength of the French army -on the Ebro. He intended to carry out his original plan of cutting off -Bessières and King Joseph from their retreat on Bayonne, by forcing -the position of Durango, and seizing the high-road at Bergara; but he -was aware that an advance to that point had its dangers. As long as -his divisions had lain in or about Villarcayo and Valmaceda, he had a -perfectly clear line of retreat westward in the event of a disaster. -But the moment that he pushed forward beyond Bilbao, he could be -attacked in flank and rear by any troops whom the King might send -up from the valley of the Ebro, by the two mountain-roads which run -from Vittoria to the Biscayan capital. One of these is the main route -from Vittoria to Bilbao via Murguia and Orduña. The other is a more -obscure and difficult path, which leads across the rough watershed -from Vittoria by Villareal and Villaro to Bilbao. Aware of the fact -that he might be assailed by either of these two passes, Blake told -off a strong covering force to hold them. Half of Acevedo’s Asturian -division, 4,000 strong, was placed at Orduña: the other half, with -the whole of Martinengo’s 2nd Division of Galicia, 8,500 bayonets in -all, took its post in the direction of Villaro. These detachments -were eminently justifiable, but they had the unfortunate result of -enfeebling the main force that remained available for the stroke at -the French in front of Durango. For that operation Blake could only -count on his 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions, as well as the ‘Vanguard’ and -‘Reserve’ Brigades--a total of 18,000 men[428]. - - [428] Viz. - Vanguard Brigade, General Mendizabal 2,884 - 1st Division, General Figueroa 4,018 - 3rd Division, General Riquelme 4,789 - 4th Division, General Carbajal 3,531 - Reserve Brigade, General Mahy 3,025 - ------ - Total 18,247 - - The detached corps being-- - 2nd Division, General Martinengo 5,066 - Asturian Division, General Acevedo 7,633 - -Blake had seized Bilbao on October 11: it is astonishing therefore -to find that he made no forward movement till the twenty-fourth. By -this sluggishness he sacrificed his chance of crushing Merlin before -he could be reinforced, and--what was far worse--allowed the leading -columns of the ‘Grand Army’ to reach Irun. If he had pressed forward -on the twelfth or thirteenth, they would still have been many marches -away, trailing across Guyenne and Gascony. Having once put his hand to -such a dangerous manœuvre as that of pushing between the French flank -and the northern sea, Blake was most unwise to leave the enemy time to -divine his object and to concentrate against him. A rapid stroke at -Durango and Bergara, so as to cut the great high-road to France in the -rear of Bessières, was his only chance. Such an attempt would probably -have landed him in ultimate disaster, for the enemy (even before the -‘Grand Army’ arrived) were far more numerous than he supposed. He -had valued them at 40,000 men, while they were really 64,000 strong. -But having framed the plan, he should at least have made a strenuous -attempt to carry it out. It is possible to explain but not to excuse -his delay: his army was not equipped for a winter campaign, and the -snow was beginning to lie on the upper slopes of the Cantabrian hills -and the Pyrenees. While he was vainly trying to obtain great-coats -and shoes for his somewhat tattered army, from the Central Junta or -the English, and while he was accumulating stores in Bilbao, the days -slipped by with fatal rapidity. - -It was not till October 24 that he at last moved forward from Bilbao, -and committed himself to the now hopeless task of clearing the way to -Durango and Bergara. On that day his advanced guard drove Merlin’s -outlying posts from their positions, and came face to face with the -French main body, drawn out on the hillsides of Baquijano, a few miles -in front of Durango. The enemy expected him to attack next day, but he -had just received confused notices from the peasantry to the effect -that enormous reinforcements had reached Irun and San Sebastian, and -were within supporting distance of the comparatively small force with -which he had hitherto been dealing. This information threw him back -into the condition of doubt and hesitation from which he had for a -moment emerged, and he proceeded to halt for another full week in -front of the Durango position. Yet it was clear that there were only -two rational alternatives before him: one was to attack Merlin and -Verdier before they could draw succour from the newly arrived corps. -The other was to fall back at once to a position in which he could not -be enveloped and outflanked, i.e. to retire behind Bilbao, holding that -town with nothing more than a small detachment which could easily get -away if attacked. But Blake did nothing, and waited in the supremely -dangerous post of Zornoza, in front of Durango, till the enemy fell -upon him at his leisure. - -The troops whose arrival at Irun had been reported consisted of the -two leading divisions of the 4th Corps, that of Lefebvre, and of the -whole of the 1st Corps, that of Victor. The former, arriving as early -as October 18, only seven days after Blake captured Bilbao, marched -westward, and replaced Merlin and Verdier in the Durango position. The -troops of these two generals were directed by King Joseph to rejoin -their proper commanders when relieved, so Verdier led the Guards back -to the central reserve, while Merlin reported himself to Ney, at La -Guardia. To compensate Lefebvre for their departure, and for the -non-arrival of his third division, that of Valence, which still lay far -to the rear, Villatte’s division of the 1st Corps was sent to Durango. -Marshal Victor himself, with his other two divisions, took the road to -Vittoria, and from thence, at the King’s orders, transferred himself to -Murguia, on the cross-road over the mountains to Bilbao. Here he was in -a position to strike at Blake’s rear, after driving off the 4,000 men -of Acevedo’s Asturian division, who (as it will be remembered) had been -told off by the Spanish General to cover this road[429]. - - [429] There is a clear and precise account of all these moves in - the _Mémoires_ of Jourdan, who was still acting as Joseph’s chief - of the staff (pp. 79-81). - -King Joseph, inclining for once to a bold stroke, wished to push Victor -across the hills on to Bilbao, while Lefebvre should advance along -the high-road and drive Blake into the trap. Bessières at the same -moment might move a division by Orduña and Oquendo, and place himself -at Valmaceda, which Blake would have to pass if he escaped from Victor -at Bilbao. This plan was eminently sound, for there was no doubt that -the two marshals, who had at their disposal some 35,000 men, could -easily have brushed out of their way the two divisions under Acevedo -and Martinengo which Blake had left behind him in the passes. Nothing -could have prevented them from seizing Bilbao and Valmaceda, and the -Spanish army would have been surrounded and captured. At the best some -part of it might have escaped along the coast-road to Santander, if its -commander detected ere it was too late the full danger of his position. - -This scheme, however, was not carried out: Bessières, Victor, and -Ney showed themselves opposed to it: Napoleon had announced that he -intended ere long to appear in person, and that he did not wish to -have matters hurried before his arrival. His obsequious lieutenants -refused to concur in any great general movement which might not win -his approval. Victor, in particular, urged that he had been ordered to -have the whole of the 1st Corps concentrated at Vittoria, and that if -he marched northward into Biscay he would be violating his master’s -express command[430]. Joseph and Jourdan, therefore, resolved to defer -the execution of their plan for the annihilation of Blake, and sent -orders to Lefebvre to maintain his defensive position at Durango, and -make no forward movement. In so doing they were acting exactly as the -Emperor desired. - - [430] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 79. - -They had forgotten, however, to reckon with the personal ambition of -the old Duke of Dantzig. Lefebvre, in spite of his many campaigns, had -never before had the chance of fighting on his own account a pitched -battle of the first class. The Spanish army had been lying before him -for a week doing nothing, its commander being evidently afraid to -attack. Its force was not very great--indeed it was outnumbered by -that of the Marshal whose three divisions counted not less than 21,000 -bayonets[431]. Noting with the eye of an old soldier Blake’s indecision -and obvious timidity, he could not resist the temptation of falling -upon him. Notwithstanding the King’s orders, he resolved to strike, -covering his disobedience by a futile excuse to the effect that he -had observed preparations for taking the offensive on the part of the -enemy, and that his outposts had been attacked. - - [431] He had - Sebastiani’s Division, 28th (three batts.), 32nd, 58th - (two batts. each), and 75th of the Line (three batts.) 5,808 - Leval’s Division, seven German and two Dutch battalions 8,347 - Villatte’s Division, 27th, 63rd, 94th, and 95th of the - Line (each of three batts.) 7,169 - ------ - Total 21,324 - - Arteche gives twelve German battalions (iii. 491); but the - Frankfort Regiment had only one battalion, those of Nassau, - Baden, and Darmstadt two each. The figures are those of the - return of Oct. 10. - -Blake’s army lay before him, posted in three lines, with the village of -Zornoza to its rear. In front, on a range of comparatively low hills, -was the ‘Vanguard Brigade,’ drawn up across the road with the 1st -Division of Galicia to its left on somewhat higher ground. They were -supported by the 3rd and 4th Divisions, while the ‘Reserve Brigade’ -occupied the houses of Zornoza to the rear of all. There were only six -guns with the army, as Blake had sent the rest of his artillery to the -rear, when advancing into the mountains: this single battery lay with -the Vanguard on the lower heights. The whole amounted to 19,000 men, a -slight reinforcement having just come to hand by the arrival of the 1st -Catalonian Light Infantry[432], the advanced guard of La Romana’s army -from the Baltic. That general, having landed at Santander on October -11, had reorganized his force as the ‘5th Division of the army of -Galicia’ and sent it forward under his senior brigadier, the Conde de -San Roman. But only the single Catalonian battalion had passed Bilbao -at the moment when Lefebvre delivered his attack. - - [432] It counted 1,066 bayonets when entering on the campaign, - and was attached to the Vanguard. - -The plan of the Marshal’s advance was quite simple. The division of -Villatte drove in the front line of the Spanish right, and then spread -itself out on a long front threatening to turn Blake’s flank. That -of Sebastiani, formed in a single dense column, marched along the -high-road at the bottom of the valley to pierce the Spanish centre; -meanwhile Leval’s Germans attacked the left wing of the enemy, the -1st Division of the army of Galicia[433]. A dense fog, a common -phenomenon in the Pyrenees in the late autumn, hid the advance of -the French, so that they were close upon the front line of Blake’s -army before they were observed. The first line was easily driven in, -but the whole army rallied on the heights of San Martin and stood at -bay. Lefebvre cannonaded them for some time, without meeting with any -reply, for Blake had hurried off his single battery to the rear when -his first line gave way. Then the Marshal sent in the ten battalions -of the division of Sebastiani, who completely cut through the Spanish -centre, and left the two wings in isolated and dangerous positions. -Without waiting for further developments, Blake gave way and ordered -a retreat on Bilbao and Valmaceda. His intact wing-divisions covered -the retreat, and though badly beaten he got away with very small loss, -no more than 300 killed and wounded, and about the same number of -prisoners. The French casualties were insignificant, not amounting in -all to more than 200 men. The whole combat, indeed, though 40,000 men -were on the field, was very short and not at all costly. The fact was -that Blake had been surprised, and had given way at the first push, -without making a serious attempt to defend himself. His sending away -the guns, at the very commencement of the action, makes it sufficiently -clear that he did not hope for ultimate success, and was already -contemplating a retreat on Bilbao. His army, if properly handled, could -have made a much more creditable fight; in fact it was tactically -beaten rather than defeated by force of arms. It made its retreat in -very fair order, and was irritated rather than cowed by the check which -it had received. English eye-witnesses vouch for the steadiness and -good spirit shown by the troops[434]. - - [433] Captain Carroll, an eye-witness, gives a good account of - this action in his report to General Leith, dated from Valmaceda - on Nov. 2. - - [434] Report of Captain Carroll in papers of 1809 in the Record - Office. - -Immediately after giving orders for a general retreat behind the river -Nervion, Blake had sent dispatches to the two divisions of Acevedo -and Martinengo, which were covering his flank against a possible -turning movement from the valley of the Ebro. They were told to save -themselves, by falling back at once to Bilbao and joining the main -army in its retreat. The part of the Asturian division which lay at -Orduña succeeded in carrying out this order. But the remainder of -Acevedo’s men and the whole of those of Martinengo--some 8,000 bayonets -in all--were at Villaro, a point higher up in the mountains, on a -much more difficult road, and closer to the French. They received -Blake’s dispatch too late, and on pushing down the northern side of -the pass which they had been holding, they learnt at Miravalles, only -ten miles from Bilbao, that the latter town was in the hands of the -French. Blake had evacuated it on the early morning of November 1, and -Lefebvre had occupied it on the same night. Urging his pursuit some -way beyond Bilbao in the hope of overtaking Blake, the duke pushed as -far as Valmaceda: but even here the Galician army would make no stand, -but fell back still further westward to Nava. Seeing that he could -not reach his adversary, Lefebvre left the division of Villatte at -Valmaceda to observe Blake, and returned with those of Sebastiani and -Leval to Bilbao, to feed and rest his men in the town, after four days -of marching in the mountains with very insufficient supplies. This -was a very dangerous step, for Blake had been outmanœuvred rather than -beaten, and was still far too strong to be contained by a mere 7,000 -men. - -When therefore Acevedo and his column drew near to Bilbao, they learnt -that 13,000 French troops blocked their road towards Blake [Nov. 3]. -They drew back a little up the pass, keeping very quiet, and very -fortunately failed to attract the attention of Lefebvre, who thought at -the most that there were some bands of stragglers in the mountains on -his left. - -But their situation was still most uncomfortable, for their rearguard -began to report that French troops were pushing up from Vittoria and -entering the southern end of the defile in which they were blocked. -King Joseph had been much vexed to hear of Lefebvre’s disobedience -to his orders at Zornoza, but, wishing to draw what profit he could -from the victory, sent Victor up the Murguia--Orduña road, with -orders to cut in upon the line of Blake’s retreat. This the Duke of -Belluno failed to accomplish, on account of the rapidity with which -the Spanish army had retired. But reaching Amurrio, a few miles beyond -Orduña, he came upon the flank of Acevedo’s column, whose head was -blocked at Miravalles, ten miles further north, by the presence of -Lefebvre at Bilbao. If either marshal had realized the situation, the -8,000 Spaniards, caught in a defile without lateral issues, must have -surrendered _en masse_. But Victor had only one division with him, the -other was far behind: and imagining that he had chanced upon the whole -of Blake’s army he came to a dead stop, while Lefebvre, not yet aware -of Victor’s approach, did not move at all. Acevedo wisely kept quiet, -and tried to slip across Victor’s front towards Orantia and the river -Salcedon: meanwhile the news of his situation reached Blake. - -That general was never wanting in personal courage, and had been deeply -distressed to hear that his flanking detachment had been cut off. -Realizing Acevedo’s danger he resolved to make a sudden ‘offensive -return’ against Lefebvre, and to endeavour to clear for a moment the -road from Miravalles to Valmaceda, by which his subordinate could -escape. On the night of November 4 he concentrated his whole army, -which had now been raised to 24,000 men by the arrival of the main -body of La Romana’s division from Santander. At dawn on the fifth he -fell upon the enemy in his front, by the two roads on each side of the -river Salcedon, sending one division[435] and the ‘Vanguard Brigade’ -to attack Valmaceda, and two[436] and the ‘Reserve Brigade’ by Orantia -along the southern bank of the stream. Villatte had been holding both -these paths; but on seeing the heavy forces deployed against him, he -withdrew from Orantia and concentrated at Valmaceda. This left the -path clear for Acevedo, who escaped along the hillsides without being -molested by Victor’s advanced guard, and got into communication with -his chief. The inactivity of Victor is inexplicable: when he saw the -Asturian division pushing hastily across his front, he should have -attacked it at all costs; but though he heard plainly the cannonade of -Villatte’s fight with Blake at Valmaceda, he held back, and finally -retired on Orduña when Acevedo had got out of sight[437]. His only -excuse was that he had heard the distant roar of battle die down, -and concluded therefore that Villatte (who as he supposed might be -supported by the whole of Lefebvre’s corps) must have been victorious. - - [435] The 4th Division. - - [436] The 1st and 3rd Divisions. See the dispatches of Captain - Carroll from Valmaceda, dated Nov. 5, in the Record Office. - - [437] Napoleon, furious at the escape of the Asturians, - administered a fiery rebuke to the Marshal. ‘He had left one of - his own divisions, exposed by Lefebvre’s imprudence, to run the - risk of annihilation. He had never gone to the front himself to - look at Acevedo, but had allowed the reconnoitring to be done - by an incapable subordinate. His guess that Villatte had been - victorious and did not need help was absurd; why should the dying - down of the fire mean that the French were successful rather than - beaten? The first principles of the art of war prescribe that a - general should march toward the cannon, when he knows that his - colleagues are engaged’ (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,445). - -As a matter of fact the isolated French division had almost suffered -the fate that should have befallen the Asturians. Driven out of -Valmaceda by Blake, it was falling back on Guenes when it came across -Acevedo’s men marching on the opposite side of the Salcedon to join -their comrades. Thereupon the Asturian general threw some of his -men[438] across the stream to intercept the retiring column. Villatte -formed his troops in a solid mass and broke through, but left behind -him one gun (an eight-pounder), many of his baggage-wagons, and 300 -prisoners. That he escaped at all is a fine testimony to his resolution -and his capable handling of his troops, for he had been most wantonly -exposed to destruction by Victor’s timidity and Lefebvre’s carelessness -[November 5]. - - [438] One battalion of Segovia and two of volunteers of Galicia. - -On hearing of Villatte’s desperate situation, the Duke of Dantzig had -realized the consequences of his unjustifiable retreat to Bilbao, and -marched up in hot haste with the divisions of Sebastiani and Leval. He -was relieved to find that Villatte had extricated himself, and resolved -to punish Blake for his unexpected offensive move. But he was unable -to do his adversary much harm: the Galician general had only advanced -in order to save Acevedo, and did not intend to engage in any serious -fighting. When Lefebvre moved forward he found that the Spaniards -would not stand. Blake had pushed out two flanking divisions to turn -the position at Guenes, on to which Villatte had fallen back, and had -his main body placed in front of it. But when Lefebvre advanced, the -whole Galician army fell back, only fighting two rearguard actions on -November 7, in which they suffered small loss. On the next day there -was a more serious engagement of the same sort at Valmaceda, to which -the Galicians had withdrawn on the previous night. The troops with -which Blake covered his retreat were hustled out of the town with the -loss of 150 killed and wounded, and 600 missing[439]. In his dispatches -the Spanish general explains that he retreated not because he could -not have made a better resistance, but because he had used up all his -provisions, and was prevented by the bad weather and the state of the -roads from drawing further supplies from Santander and Reynosa, the -two nearest points at which they could be procured. For Western Biscay -had been eaten bare by the large forces that had been crossing and -re-crossing it during the last two months, and was absolutely incapable -of feeding the army for a single day. The men too were in a wretched -condition, not only from hunger[440] but from bad equipment: hardly -any of them had received great-coats, their shoes were worn out, and -sickness was very prevalent. An appreciable number of the raw Galician -and Asturian levies deserted during the miserable retreat from Guenes -and Valmaceda to Espinosa de los Monteros, the next point on the -Bilbao-Reynosa road at which Blake stood at bay. When he reached that -place he was short of some 6,000 men, less from losses in battle than -from wholesale straggling. Moreover he was for the moment deprived of -the aid of the greater part of one of his divisions. This was the 4th -Galician division, that of General Carbajal: it had formed the extreme -left of the army, and had lain nearest to the sea during the fighting -about Guenes and Valmaceda. Cut off from the main body, a large portion -of it had retreated by the coast-road towards Santander, and only a -fraction of it had rejoined the commander-in-chief[441]. The total of -Blake’s forces would have been nearly 40,000[442], if his army had been -still at the strength with which each corps started on the campaign. -But for its decisive battle he had no more than 23,000 in hand. - - [439] This engagement, unmentioned by Napier, Thiers, and most - other historians, will be found in detail in Carroll’s dispatch - and Arteche (iii. 273, 274). - - [440] Indeed they were only saved from starvation by receiving - at Espinosa 250 mules laden with biscuit, from English ships at - Santander, which General Leith had pushed across the mountains. - Blake in a letter of Nov. 9 to Leith (Record Office) acknowledges - that this kept his men alive. - - [441] I gather from a comparison of the muster-rolls of the - Galician army in October and in December, that four battalions - rejoined Blake and six escaped towards Santander. - - [442] He had originally (see the table on p. 403)-- - Galician troops (four divisions and two brigades) 23,313 - The Asturian Division of Acevedo 7,633 - La Romana’s troops from the Baltic (the infantry only) 5,294 - Cavalry and artillery (400 and 1,000 respectively) 1,400 - ------ - 37,640 - - From this have to be deducted-- - Losses in battle and by desertion 6,000 - The cavalry, all the artillery save one battery, and - two battalions guarding the same, all still to the - rear towards Reynosa 2,400 - Two battalions of regiment Del Rey with Malaspina, - at Villarcayo 1,000 - Part of the 4th Division, cut off and retreating on - Santander 2,200 - ------ - 11,600 - - This leaves 26,040 available at Espinosa; the real figure was - probably somewhat smaller. - -Beyond Valmaceda he had been pursued no longer by Lefebvre, but by -Victor. The latter, soundly rebuked by the Emperor for his inactivity -on November 5, had advanced again from Orduña, had picked up the -division of Villatte--which properly belonged to his corps--and had -then taken the lead in pressing Blake. Lefebvre, reduced to his -original force--the 13,000 men of Sebastiani and Leval, followed as -far as the end of the defile of El Berron, and then turned off by a -flanking road which reaches the upper valley of the Ebro at Medina -de Pomar. He intended to strike at Villarcayo and Reynosa, and to -intercept Blake’s retreat at one of these two points. If he arrived -there before the Galicians, who would be delayed by the necessity of -fighting continual rearguard actions with Victor, he hoped that the -whole of the Spanish army might be surrounded and captured. - - [Illustration: Battle of Espinosa. November 11th, 1808.] - -In this expectation he was disappointed, for matters came to a head -before he was near enough to exercise any influence on the approaching -battle. On November 10 Blake turned to bay: his rearguard, composed of -the troops from the Baltic, had been so much harassed and detained by -the incessant attacks of Victor’s leading division, that its commander, -the Conde de San Roman, sent to the general to ask for aid. Unless -supported by more troops he would be surrounded and cut off. Tempted -by the strong defensive position in front of the picturesque old town -of Espinosa de los Monteros, Blake directed the rearguard to take -post there, and brought up the whole of the rest of his army into -line with them. At this point the high-road along the river Trueba, -after passing through a small plain (the Campo de Pedralva), reaches a -defile almost blocked by the little town of Espinosa, for steep hills -descending from each flank narrow the breadth of the passage to half -a mile. Here Blake occupied a semicircular position of considerable -strength. The troops of San Roman took post at its southern end, on -a hill above the high-road, and close to the river’s edge. The line -was prolonged to the north of them, across the narrow space of level -ground, by the Vanguard Brigade (Mendizabal) and the 3rd Division -(Riquelme). Where the ground begins to rise again lay the 1st Division -(Figueroa), and on the extreme left, far to the north, the Asturians -of Acevedo occupied a lofty ridge called Las Peñucas. Here they were -so strongly placed that it seemed unlikely that they could either be -turned or dislodged by a frontal attack. The rest of the army formed a -second line: the Reserve Brigade (Mahy) was in the rear of the centre, -in the suburb of Espinosa. The 2nd Division (Martinengo) and the small -remains of the 4th Division lay behind San Roman, near the Trueba, to -support the right wing, along the line of the high-road. The whole -amounted to something between 22,000 and 23,000 men, but there were -only six guns with the army--the same light battery which had fought -at Zornoza. They were posted on the right-centre, with Mendizabal’s -brigade, in a position from which they could sweep the level ground in -front of Espinosa. Blake also called up to his aid the one outlying -force that was within reach, a brigade under General Malaspina, which -lay at Villarcayo, guarding the dépôt which had been there established. -But these 2,500 men and the six guns which they had with them were -prevented, as we shall see, from reaching the field[443]. - - [443] Malaspina had two battalions of Del Rey, and the Betanzos - and Monterrey militia. (Journal of Blake’s Operations in the - _Vaughan Papers_.) - -The position of Espinosa was most defensible: its projecting wings -were each strong, and its centre, drawn far back, could not prudently -be attacked as long as the flanking heights were in the hands of the -Spaniards. But the pursuing French were under the impression that the -Galician army was so thoroughly demoralized, and worn out by hunger -and cold, that it would not stand. Victor had with him the infantry of -his own corps, some 21,000 strong: Villatte’s division, which led the -pursuit, dashed at the enemy as soon as it came upon the field. Six -battalions drew up opposite the Spanish centre, to contain any sally -that it might make, while the other six swerved to the left and made -a desperate attack on the division from the Baltic, which held the -heights immediately above the banks of the Trueba[444]. San Roman’s -troops, the pick of the Spanish army, made a fine defence, and after -two hours of hard fighting retained their position. - - [444] Puthod’s brigade of Villatte’s division, the 94th and 95th - of the Line. - -At this moment--it was about three o’clock in the short winter -afternoon--Victor himself came on the scene, bringing with him -his other two divisions, the twenty-two battalions of Ruffin and -Lapisse. The Marshal was anxious to vindicate himself from the -charge of slackness which his master had made against him for his -conduct on November 5, and pushed his men hastily to the front. Nine -fresh battalions--a brigade of Ruffin’s and a regiment of Lapisse’s -division--attacked again the heights from which Villatte had been -repulsed[445]. There followed a very fierce fight, and Blake only -succeeded in holding his ground by bringing up to the aid of the -regiments from the Baltic the whole of his 3rd Division and part of -his 2nd. At dusk the heights were still in Spanish hands, and Victor’s -corps was obliged to draw back into the woods at the foot of the -position. - - [445] The 9th Léger and 24th of the Line from Ruffin’s division, - and the 54th from that of Lapisse, each three battalions strong. - -This engagement was most creditable to Blake’s army: the lie of -the ground was in their favour, but considering their fatigue and -semi-starvation they did very well in repulsing equal numbers of the -best French troops. They were aided by the reckless manner in which -Villatte and Victor attacked: it was not consonant with true military -principles that the van should commit itself to a desperate fight -before the main body came up, or that a strong position should be -assailed without the least attempt at a preliminary reconnaissance. - -Next day the Marshal, taught caution by his repulse, resumed the -action in a more scientific fashion. He came to the conclusion that -Blake would have been induced by the battle of the previous day, -to strengthen his right, and in this he was perfectly correct. The -Spaniard had shifted all his reserves towards the high-road and the -banks of the Trueba, expecting to be attacked on the same ground as on -the previous day. But Victor, making no more than a demonstration on -this point, sent the greater part of Lapisse’s division to attack the -extreme left of Blake’s line--the Asturian troops who held the high -ridge to the north of Espinosa. Here the position was very strong, -but the troops were not equal in quality to the veteran battalions -from the Baltic[446]. When the French pressed up the hill covered -by a thick cloud of skirmishers, the Asturians fell into disorder. -Their general, Acevedo, and his brigadiers, Quiros and Valdes, were -all struck down while trying to lead forward their wavering troops. -Finally the whole division gave way and fled down the back of the hill -towards Espinosa. Their rout left the enemy in possession of the high -ground, which completely commanded the Spanish centre, and General -Maison, who had led the attack, fully used his advantage. He fell upon -the Galician 1st Division from the flank, while at the same moment -Victor ordered his entire line to advance, and assailed the whole of -Blake’s front. Such an assault could not fail, and the Spaniards gave -way in all directions, and escaped by fording the Trueba and flying -over the hillsides towards Reynosa. They had to abandon their six guns -and the whole of their baggage, which lay parked behind Espinosa. The -losses in killed and wounded were not very heavy--indeed many more were -hurt in the hard fighting of November 10 than in the rout of November -11: it is probable that the whole of the Spanish casualties did not -exceed 3,000 men: nor were many prisoners captured, for formed troops -cannot pursue fugitives who have broken their ranks and taken to the -hills. The main loss to Blake’s army came from straggling and desertion -after the battle, for the routed battalions, when once scattered over -the face of the country, did not easily rally to their colours. When -Blake reassembled his force at Reynosa he could only show some 12,000 -half-starved men out of the 23,000 who had stood in line at Espinosa. -The loss in battle had fallen most heavily on the division from the -Baltic--their commander, San Roman, with about 1,000 of his men had -fallen in their very creditable struggle on the first day of the -fight[447]. Victor’s triumph had not been bloodless: in the repulse of -the tenth the fifteen battalions which had tried to storm the heights -had all suffered appreciable losses: the total of French casualties on -the two days cannot have fallen below 1,000 killed and wounded. - - [446] It is fair to the Asturians to mention that eight of their - ten battalions were raw levies; there were among them only one - regular and one militia battalion of old formation. - - [447] It is necessary to protest against the groundless libel - upon this corps in which Napier indulges (i. 257) when he says: - ‘It has been said that Romana’s soldiers died Spartan-like, to - a man, in their ranks; yet in 1812 Captain Hill of the Royal - Navy, being at Cronstadt to receive Spaniards taken by the - Russians during Napoleon’s retreat, found the greater portion - were Romana’s men captured at Espinosa; they had served Napoleon - for four years, passed the ordeal of the Moscow retreat, and were - still 4,000 strong.’ This is ludicrous: the eight battalions of - the Baltic division landed in Spain 5,294 strong; a month after - Espinosa they still figured for 3,953 in the muster-rolls of the - army of Galicia (see the morning state in Arteche, iv. 532). - Only 1,300 were missing, so Victor, clearly, cannot have taken - 4,000 prisoners. Captain Hill’s (or Napier’s) mistake lies in not - seeing that the Russian prisoners of 1812 belonged to the 5,000 - men of La Romana’s army (regiments of Guadalajara, Asturias, and - the Infante) which did not succeed in escaping from Denmark in - 1808, and remained perforce in Napoleon’s ranks. - -To complete the story of Blake’s retreat, it is only necessary to -mention that the detached brigade under Malaspina, which he had called -up from Villarcayo to Espinosa, was never able to rejoin. On its way it -fell in with Marshal Lefebvre’s corps, marching to outflank the retreat -of the Galician army. Attacked by Sebastiani’s division, Malaspina had -to turn off and make a hasty and isolated retreat, sacrificing his six -guns. The driving away of his small force was the only practical work -done in this part of the campaign by the 4th Corps: its long turning -movement was rendered useless by Blake’s rapid retreat across its front -to Reynosa. - - - - -SECTION VII: CHAPTER IV - -NAPOLEON CROSSES THE EBRO: THE ROUT OF GAMONAL: SOULT’S PURSUIT OF BLAKE - - -After resting for only thirty-six hours at Bayonne the Emperor, as we -have already seen, pushed on to Vittoria, where he arrived on November -6. He found in and about that ancient city the bulk of the Imperial -Guard, his brother Joseph’s reserves, the light cavalry of Beaumont and -Franceschi, and the heavy cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and Milhaud. The -divisions of Marchand and Bisson, which were to complete the corps of -Ney, were close behind him, so that he had under his hand a mass of at -least 40,000 men. The 2nd Corps, which Bessières had so long commanded, -was in front of him at Pancorbo, just beyond the Ebro. Victor and -Lefebvre, very busy with Blake, lay on his right hand with some 35,000 -men. The troops which had hitherto been under Ney, with Moncey’s -3rd Corps, were on his right--the former at Logroño, the latter at -Caparrosa and Lodosa. They were in close touch with the armies of -Castaños and Palafox. - -All was ready for the great stroke, and on the day of his arrival the -Emperor gave orders for the general advance, bidding Bessières (whose -corps formed his vanguard) to march at once on Burgos and sweep out -of it whatever troops he might find in his front. Napoleon imagined -that the force in this section of the Spanish line would turn out -to be Pignatelli’s ‘Army of Castile,’ but that very untrustworthy -body had ceased to exist, and had been drafted into the ranks of the -army of Andalusia[448]. It was really with the newly arrived army of -Estremadura that the 2nd Corps had to deal. - - [448] See pp. 393-4, and _Nap. Corresp._, 14,443. - -Everything seemed to promise a successful issue to the Emperor’s plan: -the enemy had only a trifling force in front of him at Burgos. Palafox -and Castaños were still holding their dangerous advanced positions -at Sanguesa and Calahorra. Blake was being pursued by Victor, while -Lefebvre was marching to intercept him. The only _contretemps_ that had -occurred was the temporary check to Villatte’s division on November 5, -which had been caused by the carelessness of the Duke of Dantzig and -the unaccountable timidity of the Duke of Belluno. But by the seventh -their mistakes had been repaired, and Blake was once more on the run, -with both marshals in full cry behind him. The Emperor found time to -send to each of them a letter of bitter rebuke[449], but told them to -push on and catch up the army of Galicia at all hazards. Upon Moncey, -on the other hand, he imposed the duty of keeping absolutely quiet -in his present position: his share in the game would only begin when -Castaños and Palafox should have been turned and enveloped by troops -detached from the central mass of the army. - - [449] That to Victor will be found in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,445. - -The total stay of the Emperor in Vittoria covered parts of four days. -All this time he was anxiously expecting decisive news from Victor and -Lefebvre, but it had not yet arrived when he set forth. He waited, also -in vain, for the news that Bessières had occupied Burgos: but that -marshal did not show the decision and dash which Napoleon expected from -him: finding that there was infantry in the place, he would not risk -an action without his master’s presence, and merely contented himself -with pushing back the Spanish outposts, and extending his cavalry on -both flanks. It is possible that his slackness was due to chagrin -on receiving the intelligence that he was about to be superseded in -command of the 2nd Corps by Soult, whom the Emperor had summoned out -of Germany, and who was due at the front on the ninth. Bessières was -to be compensated by being given the command of the reserve-cavalry -of the army, five splendid divisions of dragoons, of which four were -already on the Ebro. But this post, which would always keep him at -the Emperor’s heels, was probably less attractive to him than the -more independent position of chief of a corps complete in all arms. -He was probably loth to leave the divisions with which he had won the -victory of Medina de Rio Seco. Be this as it may, he was told to attack -Burgos on the sixth, and on the ninth he had not yet done so. On the -morning of that day Soult arrived, alone and on a jaded post-horse, -having outridden even his aides-de-camp[450], who did not join him -till twenty-four hours later. He at once took over command of the 2nd -Corps, and proceeded next day to carry out the Emperor’s orders by -attacking the enemy. - - [450] For details of their ride against time, see the _Mémoires_ - of St. Chamans, his senior aide-de-camp (p. 107). - -The supersession of Bessières was not the only change which was made -during the few days while the Emperor lay at Vittoria. He rearranged -the internal organization of several of the corps, altered the -brigading of that of Moncey, and turned over to other corps most of the -troops which had hitherto served under Ney, leaving to that marshal -little more than the two newly arrived divisions from Germany (those of -Lagrange and Marchand). - -The troops destined for the march on Burgos counted some 70,000 men, -but only the 2nd Corps and the cavalry of Milhaud and Franceschi were -in the front line. These 18,000 bayonets and 6,500 sabres were amply -sufficient for the task. Behind followed fourteen battalions of the -Imperial Guard and the cavalry of that corps, the two divisions of -Ney’s 6th Corps, the division of Dessolles from King Joseph’s reserve, -and two and a half divisions of reserve cavalry--an enormous mass of -troops, of which nearly 20,000 were veteran cavalry from Germany, -a force invaluable for the sweeping of the great plains of Old -Castile[451]. - - [451] The figures here given are mainly those indicated by - Napoleon in his dispatch of Nov. 8 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,456), - supplemented from the morning state of the army on Oct. 10:-- - - 2nd Corps (Marshal Soult): - Division Mouton (Merle) 6,000 - Division Bonnet 4,500 - Division Merle (Verdier) 7,000 - Cavalry of Lasalle 2,000 - 6th Corps (Marshal Ney): - Division Marchand } - Division Lagrange (late Bisson) } 17,000 - Cavalry of Colbert (detached at this moment) 2,000 - From King Joseph’s Reserve, Division Dessolles 6,000 - Imperial Guard { fourteen battalions of infantry 8,000 - { cavalry 3,500 - Cavalry Brigade (Beaumont) belonging to the 1st Corps 1,200 - Latour-Maubourg’s Division of Dragoons (six regiments) 3,700 - Milhaud’s Division of Dragoons (three regiments) 2,500 - Franceschi’s Light Cavalry (four regiments) 2,000 - Lahoussaye’s Division of Dragoons (four regiments) 2,000 - ------ - Total 67,400 - -When we turn to enumerate the forces opposed to the Emperor at Burgos, -the disproportion between the two armies appears ludicrous. Down to -November 6 the only Spanish troops in that ancient city consisted of -two battalions, one from the reserves of the army of Galicia, the other -from the army of Castile[452]. They numbered 1,600 men, and had four -guns with them. If Bessières had attacked on the sixth, he would have -found no more than this miserable detachment to oppose him. But on -November 7 there arrived from Madrid the 1st Division of the army of -Estremadura under the Conde de Belvedere, 4,000 foot and 400 horse with -twelve guns. On the next day there came up the greater part of the 2nd -Division of the same army, about 3,000 infantry and two regiments of -hussars. On the tenth, therefore, when Soult attacked, Belvedere--who -took the command as the senior general present--had about 8,600 -bayonets, 1,100 sabres, and sixteen guns under his orders. - - [452] These battalions were those of Tuy and Benavente, the first - a militia battalion, the second a new volunteer corps. - -Down to November 2 the army of Estremadura had been commanded by Don -Joseph Galluzzo, Captain-General of that province--the officer who -had given so much trouble to Dalrymple by his refusal to desist from -the futile siege of Elvas. He had been repeatedly ordered to bring -his army up to Madrid, but did not arrive till the end of October. -On the twenty-ninth of that month he marched for Burgos, his three -divisions, 13,000 men in all, following each other at intervals of a -day. But on November 2 he received orders to lay down his command and -return to Aranjuez, to answer some charges brought against him by the -Supreme Junta. No successor was nominated to replace him, and hence -the conduct of the army fell into the hands of the Conde de Belvedere, -the chief of the 1st Division, a rash and headstrong young aristocrat -with no military experience whatever. His family influence had made -him a general at an age when he might reasonably have expected to lead -a company, and he found himself by chance the interim commander of an -army: hence came the astonishing series of blunders that led to the -combat of Gamonal. - -Belvedere’s army was still incomplete, for his 3rd Division had only -reached Lerma, thirty miles back on the Madrid road, when the French -cavalry came forward and began to press in his outposts. Clearly a -crisis was at hand, and the Count had to consider how he would face it. -Isolated with 10,000 men on the edge of the great plain of Old Castile, -and with an enemy of unknown strength in front of him, he should have -been cautious. If he attempted a stand, he should at least have taken -advantage of the ancient fortifications of Burgos and the broken ground -near the city. But with the most cheerful disregard of common military -precautions, the Count marched out of Burgos, advanced a few miles, -and drew up his army across the high-road in front of the village of -Gamonal. He was in an open plain, his right flank ill covered by the -river Arlanzon, which was fordable in many places, his left completely -‘in the air,’ near the village of Vellimar. In front of the line was a -large wood, which the road bisects: it gave the enemy every facility -for masking his movements till the last moment. Belvedere had ranged -his two Estremaduran batteries on the centre: he had six battalions -in his first line, including two of the Royal Guards--both very -weak[453]--with a cavalry regiment on each flank. His second line was -formed of four battalions--two of them Galician: two more battalions, -the four Galician guns, and his third cavalry regiment were coming up -from the rear, and had not yet taken their post in the second line when -the short and sudden battle was fought and lost[454]. - - [453] Each mustered less than 400 bayonets. - - [454] To show how strange is Napier’s statement (i. 254) that the - army of Estremadura consisted of ‘the best troops then in Spain,’ - and that it was therefore disgraceful that they ‘fought worse - than the half-starved peasants of Blake,’ we may perhaps give the - list of Belvedere’s little force: it consisted of-- - - 1st Division (General de Alos): - *4th battalion of the Spanish Guards } - One battalion of Provincial Grenadiers of Estremadura } - *Regiment of Majorca (two batts.) } 4,160 - *2nd Regiment of Catalonia (one batt.) } - One company of Sharpshooters } - 2nd Division (General Henestrosa): - *4th battalion of the Walloon Guards } - Volunteers of Badajoz (two batts.) } - Volunteers of Valencia de Alcantara (one batt.) } 3,300 - Volunteers of Zafra (one batt.) } - Galician troops: Battalions of Tuy and Benavente 1,600 - Cavalry: 2nd, 4th, and 5th Hussars (called respectively - ‘Lusitania,’ ‘Volunteers of Spain,’ and ‘Maria Luisa’) 1,100 - Artillery: two and a half batteries 250 - Sappers: one battalion 550 - ------ - Total 10,960 - - Only the cavalry and the five battalions marked with a star were - regulars. - -Soult came on the scene during the hours of the morning, with the -light-cavalry division of Lasalle deployed in his front. Then followed -the dragoons of Milhaud, and three infantry divisions of the 2nd -Corps--Mouton in front, then Merle, then Bonnet bringing up the rear. -When he came upon the Spaniards, arrayed on either side of the road, -the Marshal was able with a single glance to recognize the weakness of -their numbers and their position. He did not hesitate for a moment, and -rapidly formed his line of battle, under cover of the wood which lay -between the two armies. Milhaud’s division of dragoons rode southward -and formed up on the banks of the Arlanzon, facing the Spanish right: -Lasalle’s four regiments of light cavalry composed the French centre: -the twelve battalions of Mouton’s division deployed on the left, and -advanced through the wood preceded by a crowd of tirailleurs. There was -no need to wait for Merle and Bonnet, who were still some way to the -rear. - -The engagement opened by a discharge of the two Spanish batteries, -directed at those of Mouton’s men who were advancing across the -comparatively open ground on each side of the high-road. But they had -hardly time to fire three or four salvos before the enemy was upon -them. The seven regiments of cavalry which formed the left and centre -of the French army had delivered a smashing charge at the infantry -opposed to them in the plain. The regiment of Spanish hussars which -covered their flank was swept away like chaff before the wind, and -the unfortunate Estremaduran and Galician battalions had not even -time to throw themselves into squares before this torrent of nearly -5,000 horsemen swept over them. They received the attack in line, -with a wavering ill-directed fire which did not stop the enemy for a -moment. Five battalions were ridden down in the twinkling of an eye, -their colours were all taken, and half the men were hewn down or made -prisoners[455]. The remnant fled in disorder towards Burgos. Then -Milhaud’s dragoons continued the pursuit, while Lasalle’s chasseurs -swerved inwards and fell upon the flank of the surviving half of -Belvedere’s army. At the same moment the infantry of Mouton attacked -them vigorously from the front. The inevitable result was the complete -rout and dispersion of the whole: only the battalion of Walloon Guards -succeeded in forming square and going off the field in some order. The -rest broke their ranks and poured into Burgos, in a stream of fugitives -similar to that which was already rushing through the streets from the -other wing. The sixteen Spanish guns were all captured on the spot, -those of the second line before they had been unlimbered or fired a -single shot. - - [455] As ill luck would have it four of these five battalions in - the plain were raw levies, the Volunteers of Badajoz (two batts.) - and of Tuy and Benavente. They had not skill enough even to form - square. - -Belvedere, who was rash and incompetent but no coward, made two -desperate attempts to rally his troops, one at the bridge of the -Arlanzon, the other outside the city; but his men would not halt for a -moment: their only concern was to get clear of the baggage-train which -was blocking the road in the transpontine suburb. A little further on -the fugitives met the belated battalions of Valencia and Zafra, which -had been four or five miles from the field when the battle was lost. -The Commander-in-chief tried to form them across the road, and to rally -the broken troops upon them: but they cried ‘Treason,’ pretended that -their cartridge-boxes were empty, broke their ranks, and headed the -flight. Ere night they had reached Lerma, thirty miles to the rear, -where the 3rd Division of Estremadura had just arrived. - -Napoleon was probably using less than his customary exaggeration when -he declared in his _Bulletin_ that he had won the combat of Gamonal -at the cost of fifteen killed and fifty wounded. It is at any rate -unlikely that his total of casualties exceeded the figure of 200. -The army of Estremadura on the other hand had suffered terribly: -considering that its whole right wing had been ridden down by cavalry, -and that the pursuit had been urged across an open plain for nine -miles, it may well have lost the 2,500 killed and wounded and the -900 prisoners spoken of by the more moderate French narrators of the -fight[456]. It is certain that it left behind twelve of the twenty-four -regimental standards which it carried to the field, and every one of -its guns[457]. - - [456] It is fair to say, however, that Jourdan asserts that - their loss was only about 1,500 (_Mémoires_, p. 85). There is no - Spanish estimate of any authority. Napoleon in his _Bulletin_ - claimed 3,000 killed and 3,000 prisoners, one of his usual - exaggerations. - - [457] There were only sixteen field-guns with the army, yet - Napoleon says that he took twenty-five (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,478). - If this figure is correct (which we may doubt) there must have - been some guns of position taken in the city of Burgos. But of - the twelve flags there is no question: they were forwarded to - Paris two days later (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,463). - -The French army celebrated its not very glorious victory in the -usual fashion by sacking Burgos with every attendant circumstances -of misconduct. They were so much out of hand that the house next to -that in which the Emperor had taken up his quarters for the night was -pillaged and set on fire, so that he had to shift hastily into another -street[458]. - - [458] _Mémoires_ of St. Chamans (Soult’s senior aide-de-camp), - p. 110. Compare the _Journal_ of Fantin des Odoards (p. 189) - for the scenes of horror in and about the town. The scattered - corpses of Spaniards, cut down as they fled, covered the road for - half-a-day’s march beyond Burgos. - -The night of the tenth was devoted to plunder, but on the following -morning Bonaparte resumed without delay the execution of his great -plan, and hurried out to the south the heavy masses of cavalry which -were to sweep the plains of Old Castile. Lasalle’s division pushed on -to Lerma, from which the shattered remnants of the army of Belvedere -hastily retired. Milhaud’s dragoons were directed on Palencia, -Franceschi’s light cavalry more to the west, along the banks of the -Urbel and the Odra. Nowhere, save at Lerma, was a single Spanish -soldier seen, but it is said that some of Milhaud’s flying parties -obtained vague information of the advance of Sir John Moore’s English -army beyond the frontier of Portugal. His vanguard was reported to -be at Toro, an utter mistake, for the expeditionary force had not -really passed Salamanca on the day when the rumour was transmitted to -the Emperor[459]. There is no sign in his dispatches of any serious -expectation of a possible British diversion. - - [459] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,496, contains this false report. - -On the same day on which the cavalry poured down into the plains of -Castile, the Emperor began also to execute the great flanking movements -which were to circumvent the armies of Blake and Castaños and to drive -the one into the Bay of Biscay and the other against the Pyrenees. -On the afternoon of the eleventh Soult, with the three divisions -of Mouton, Merle, and Bonnet, and Debelle’s cavalry brigade[460], -was directed to make forced marches upon Reynosa, by the hilly road -that passes by Urbel and Olleros[461]. It was hoped that he might -reach Reynosa before Blake, whose retreat towards the west was being -closely pressed by Victor and Lefebvre. If he failed to catch the -army of Galicia, the Marshal was to push on across the mountains, and -occupy the important harbour-town of Santander, where it was known -that British stores had been landed in great quantities. Milhaud was -to co-operate in this movement by sending from Palencia one of his -brigades of dragoons, to cut the road from Reynosa to Saldaña, by which -the Emperor considered it likely that Blake would send off his heavy -baggage and guns when he heard of Soult’s approach[462]. Two days after -dispatching Soult to the north-west, the Emperor gave orders for the -other great turning movement, which was destined to cut off the army of -Castaños. On the thirteenth Marshal Ney, with one division of his own -corps (that of Marchand) and with the four regiments of Dessolles from -the central reserve, together with the light cavalry of Beaumont, had -marched from Burgos, in the wake of Lasalle’s advance. On the sixteenth -he reached Aranda de Duero, and, having halted there for two days, was -then directed to turn off from the high-road to Madrid, and march by -Osma and Soria so as to fall upon the rear of Castaños, who was still -reported to be in the neighbourhood of Tudela[463]. If he could succeed -in placing himself at Tarazona before the enemy moved, the Emperor -considered that the fate of the Spanish ‘Army of the Centre’ was sealed. - - [460] This brigade did not properly belong to the 2nd Corps, but - to Franceschi’s division of reserve cavalry. Lasalle, with the - proper cavalry division of the 2nd Corps, was being employed - elsewhere. - - [461] This was done on November 11, and not (as Arteche says) on - the thirteenth. The proof may be found in the itinerary given by - St. Chamans in his _Mémoires_ (p. 110). On the thirteenth the - Marshal was already at Canduelas, close to Reynosa. - - [462] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,467 and 14,477. Napoleon to Bessières, - Nov. 13 (at two, midnight), and to Milhaud, Nov. 16 (at three, - midnight). - - [463] These orders will be found in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,489. - -While the movements of Soult and Ney were developing, Napoleon remained -at Burgos. He stayed there in all for ten days, while his army passed -by, each corps that arrived pressing forward along the high-road to -Madrid by Lerma as far as Aranda. His advance on the Spanish capital -was not to begin till he was certain how Blake and Castaños had fared, -and whether there was any considerable body of the enemy interposed -between him and the point at which he was about to strike. Meanwhile -his correspondence shows a feverish activity devoted to subjects of the -most varied kind. A good many hours were devoted to drawing up a scheme -for the restoration of the citadel of Burgos: it was the Emperor’s own -brain which planned the fortifications that proved such an obstacle -to Wellington four years later in September, 1812. It was in these -days also that Napoleon dictated the last reply sent to Canning with -regard to the peace negotiations that had been started at Erfurt. At -the same moment he was commenting on the _Code Napoléon_, organizing -the grand-duchy of Berg, ordering the assembly of Neapolitan troops for -a descent on Sicily, regulating the university of Pisa, and drawing -up notes on the internal government of Spain for the benefit of his -brother Joseph[464]. But the most characteristic of all his actions -was a huge piece of ‘commandeering’ of private property. Burgos was -the great distributing centre for the wool-trade of Spain: here lay -the warehouses of the flock-masters, who owned the great herds of -merino sheep that feed upon the central plateaux of Castile. There -were 20,000 bales of wool in the city, not government stores but -purely private accumulations. The Emperor seized it all and sold it in -France, gloating over the fact that it was worth more than 15,000,000 -francs[465]. - - [464] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,465, 14,488-91, 14,472, 14,482, 14,503, - and 14,499 respectively. - - [465] For this barefaced robbery see the _Sixth Bulletin of the - Army of Spain_, published at Madrid on December 14, and also - Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, pp. 85, 86; cf. Arteche, iii. 325. - -Neither of the flanking expeditions which the Emperor sent out quite -fulfilled his expectations, but that of Soult was worked far more -successfully than that of Ney. The Duke of Dalmatia’s corps marched -sixty miles over bad Spanish roads in three days--a great feat for -infantry--and reached Canduelas close to Reynosa on November 13. If -Blake had not already been flying for his life before Victor, he must -have been intercepted. But he had made such headlong speed that he -had already reached Reynosa only twenty-four hours after his defeat -at Espinosa. He had hoped to refit and reorganize his army by means -of the vast accumulation of stores collected there, for he had left -both Victor and Lefebvre far behind, and calculated on getting several -days’ rest. His first act was to begin to evacuate his artillery, -baggage, and wounded on to Leon by the road of Aguilar del Campo and -Saldaña. He intended to follow with the infantry[466], but on the -morning of November 14 Soult’s advanced cavalry came upon the flank -of the great slow-moving convoy, and captured a considerable part of -it. The Asturian general, Acevedo, lying wounded in his carriage, -was slain, it is said, by Debelle’s dragoons, along with many other -unfortunates. Much of the artillery and all the baggage was taken. -The news of this disaster showed Blake that his only road into the -plain was cut: no retreat on Leon was any longer possible. At the same -moment the approach of Victor along the Espinosa road and of Lefebvre -along the Villarcayo road was reported to him. It seemed as if he was -doomed to destruction or capture, for all the practicable roads were -cut, and the army, though a little heartened up by two days of regular -rations at Reynosa, was in the most disorganized condition. But making -a desperate appeal to the patriotism of his men, Blake abandoned all -his stores, all his wheeled vehicles, even his horses, and struck up -by a wild mountain track into the heart of the Asturian hills. He went -by the gorge of Cabuerniga, along the rocky edge of the Saja torrent, -and finally reached the sea near Santillana. This forced march was -accomplished in two days of drenching rain, and without food of any -kind save a few chestnuts and heads of maize obtained in the villages -of this remote upland. If anything was needed to make Blake’s misery -complete it was to be met, at Renedo[467] [November 15], by the news -that he was superseded by La Romana, who came with a commission from -the Junta to take command of the army of Galicia. After the receipt of -the intelligence of Zornoza, the Government had disgraced the Irish -general, and given his place to the worthy Marquis. But the latter did -not assume the command for some days, and it was left to Blake to get -his army out of the terrible straits in which it now lay. On nearing -the coast he obtained a little more food for his men from the English -vessels that had escaped from Santander[468], waited for his stragglers -to come up, and, when he had 7,000 men collected, resumed his march. He -sent the wrecks of the Asturian division back to their own province, -but resolved to return with the rest of his army to the southern side -of the Cantabrian Mountains, so as to cover the direct road from Burgos -to Galicia. He had quite shaken off his pursuers, and had nothing to -fear save physical difficulties in his retreat. But these were severe -enough to try the best troops, and Blake’s men, under-fed, destitute -of great-coats and shoes, and harassed by endless marching, were in a -piteous state: although they had not thrown away their muskets, very -few had a dry cartridge left in their boxes[469]. An English officer -who accompanied them described them as ‘a half-starved and straggling -mob, without officers, and all mixed in utter confusion[470].’ The snow -was now lying deep on the mountains, and the road back to the plains of -Leon by Potes and Pedrosa was almost as bare and rough as that by which -the troops had saved themselves from the snare at Reynosa. Nevertheless -Blake’s miserable army straggled over the defile across the Peñas de -Europa, reached the upper valley of the Esla, and at last got a few -days of rest in cantonments around Leon. Here La Romana took up the -command, and by December 4 was at the head of 15,000 men. This total -was only reached by the junction of outlying troops, for there had -come into Leon a few detachments from the rear, and that part of the -artillery and its escort which had escaped Soult’s cavalry at Aguilar -del Campo. Of Blake’s original force, even after stragglers had come -up, there were not 10,000 left: that so many survived is astonishing -when we consider the awful march that they had accomplished[471]. -Between November 1 and 23 they had trudged for three hundred miles -over some of the roughest country in Europe, had crossed the watershed -of the Cantabrian Mountains thrice[472] (twice by mere mule-tracks), -wading through rain and snow for the greater part of the time, for the -weather had been abominable. For mere physical difficulty this retreat -far exceeded Moore’s celebrated march to Corunna, but it is fair to -remember that Blake had shaken off his pursuers at Reynosa, while the -English general was chased by an active enemy from first to last. - - [466] Leith, Nov. 16, from Cabezon de Sal (in the Record Office). - - [467] Not Arnedo as in Napier (i. 257). - - [468] See letter of General Leith (dated from San Vincente de la - Barquera, Nov. 17), in the Record Office. - - [469] General Leith to Sir John Moore, from Renedo on Nov. 15 (in - the Record Office). - - [470] It is from that officer’s dispatches alone that we glean - some details of this miserable retreat. There is nothing of the - kind in Toreño, Arteche, or any other Spanish authority that I - have found. - - [471] Of La Romana’s army of 15,626 men (Dec. 4) about 5,000 - belonged to regiments which had not been present at Espinosa, - including the battalions of Tuy, Betanzos, Monterrey, Santiago, - Salamanca, the 3rd Volunteers of Galicia, and the _Batallon - del General_, the artillery reserve, and a number of detached - companies that had been left behind at Reynosa, Astorga, and - Sahagun before Blake marched on Bilbao on October 11. - - [472] Once between Valmaceda and Espinosa, once between Reynosa - and Renedo, once between Potes and Pedrosa. - -While the unhappy army of Galicia was working out its salvation over -these rough paths, Soult’s corps had fared comparatively well. On -reaching Reynosa on November 14 the Duke of Dalmatia had come into -possession of an enormous mass of plunder, the whole of the stores -and munitions of Blake’s army. Among the trophies were no less than -15,000 new English muskets and thirty-five unhorsed field-guns. The -food secured maintained the 2nd Corps for many days: it included, as -an appreciative French consumer informs us, an enormous consignment of -excellent Cheshire cheese, newly landed at Santander[473]. At Reynosa -Soult’s arrival was followed by that of Victor and Lefebvre, who rode -in at the head of their corps the day after the place had been occupied -[November 15]. There was no longer any chance of catching Blake, and -the assembly of 50,000 men in this quarter was clearly unnecessary. -The Emperor sent orders to Victor to march on Burgos and join the main -army, and to Lefebvre to drop down into the plains as far as Carrion, -from whence he could threaten Benavente and Leon[474]. Soult, whose men -were much less exhausted than those of the other two corps, was charged -with the occupation of Santander and the pursuit of Blake. He marched -by the high-road to the sea, just in time to see seventeen British -ships laden with munitions of war sailing out of the harbour[475]. But -he captured, nevertheless, a large quantity of valuable stores, which -were too heavy to be removed in a hurry [November 16]. - - [473] _Mémoires_ of Gen. St. Chamans, p. 111. - - [474] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,496 (Napoleon to Berthier, from Burgos, - Nov. 20). - - [475] Leith mentions this in his letter from Cabezon de Sal, Nov. - 16. - -The Marshal left Bonnet’s division at Santander, with orders to clear -the surrounding district and to keep open the road to Burgos. With the -rest of his troops he marched eastward along the coast, trying to get -information about Blake’s movements. At San Vincente de la Barquera -he came upon the wrecks of the Asturian division which Blake had left -behind him when he turned south again into the mountains. They fled -in disorder the moment that they were attacked, and the principality -seemed exposed without any defence to the Marshal’s advance. But -Soult did not intend to lose touch with his master, or to embark on -any unauthorized expedition. When he learnt that the Galician army -had returned to the plains he followed their example, and crossed the -Cantabrian Mountains by a track over the Sierras Albas from Potes to -Cervera, almost as impracticable as the parallel defile over which -Blake had escaped. Coming down on to the upper valley of the Pisuerga -he reached Saldaña, where he was again in close communication with -Lefebvre. - -Blake and his army might now be considered as being out of the game; -they were so dispersed and demoralized that they required no more -attention. But there was as yet no news of Ney, who had been sent to -execute the turning movement against Castaños, which corresponded to -the one that Soult had carried out against the Galicians. Meanwhile -more troops continued to come up to Burgos, ready for the Emperor’s -great central march on Madrid. King Joseph and his Guards had arrived -there as early as the twelfth; Victor came down from Reynosa on the -twenty-first[476], and on the same day appeared the division of -dragoons commanded by Lahoussaye[477]. The belated corps of Mortier -and Junot were reported to be nearing Bayonne: both generals received -orders to march on Burgos, after equipping their men for a serious -winter campaign. Independent of the large bodies of men which were -still kept out on the two flanks under Soult and Lefebvre, Moncey and -Ney, there would soon be 100,000 bayonets and sabres ready for the -decisive blow at the Spanish capital. - - [476] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,502: on the twenty-first the 1st Corps - was at Tardajos, outside Burgos. - - [477] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,501. - - - - -SECTION VII: CHAPTER V - -TUDELA - - -Having narrated the misfortunes of Blake and of Belvedere, we must -now turn to the eastern end of the Spanish line, where Castaños and -Palafox had been enjoying a brief and treacherous interval of safety, -while their friends were being hunted over the Cantabrian Mountains -and the plains of Old Castile. From October 26-27--the days when Ney -and Moncey drove Castaños’ advanced troops back over the Ebro--down -to November 21, the French in Navarre made no further movement. We -have seen that it was essential to Napoleon’s plan of campaign that -the armies of Andalusia and Aragon should be left unmolested in the -dangerous advanced position which they were occupying, till measures -should have been taken to cut them off from Madrid and to drive them -back against the roots of the Pyrenees. The Emperor had left opposite -to them the whole of Moncey’s corps, one division of Ney’s corps (that -of Lagrange), and the cavalry of Colbert and Digeon[478]--in all about -27,000 bayonets and 4,500 sabres. They had strict orders to act merely -as a containing force: to repel any attack that the Spaniards might -make on the line of the Ebro or the Aragon, but not to advance till -they should receive the orders from head quarters. - - [478] Colbert’s brigade belonged to Ney’s corps; Digeon’s - dragoons were part of the reserve-cavalry of Latour-Maubourg. - -The initiative therefore had passed back to the Spanish generals: -it was open to them to advance once more against the enemy, if they -chose to be so foolish. Their troops were in very bad order for an -offensive campaign. Many of them (like Blake’s men) had never received -great-coats or winter clothing, and were facing the November frosts -and the incessant rain with the light linen garments in which they had -marched up from the south. An English observer, who passed through -the camps of Palafox and Castaños at this moment, reports that while -the regulars and the Valencian troops seemed fairly well clad, the -Aragonese, the Castilians, and the Murcians were suffering terribly -from exposure. The Murcians in especial were shivering in light -linen shirts and pantaloons, with nothing but a striped _poncho_ to -cover them against the rain[479]. Hence came a terrible epidemic of -dysentery, which thinned the ranks when once the autumn began to melt -into winter. The armies of Castaños and Palafox should have counted -53,000 men at least when the fighting at last began. It seems doubtful -whether they actually could put much over 40,000 into the field. -Castaños claims that at Tudela his own ‘Army of the Centre’ had only -26,000 men in line, and the Aragonese about 16,000. It is probable that -the figures are almost correct. - - [479] Unpublished diary of Sir Charles Vaughan, then riding with - the staff of Palafox. - -Nevertheless, the generals assumed the responsibility of ordering a -general advance. We have shown in an earlier chapter that after the -arrival of the three deputies from Madrid, and the stormy council of -war at Tudela on November 5, a new plan of offensive operations was -adopted. It was not quite so mad as the scheme that had been drafted -in October, for seizing the passes of the Pyrenees and surrounding the -whole French army. Castaños and Palafox, it will be remembered, were -to mass the bulk of their forces between Tudela and Caparrosa, cross -the Aragon, and deliver a frontal attack upon the scattered fractions -of the corps of Moncey at Peralta, Falces, and Lodosa. There would -have been something to say for this plan if it had been proposed in -September, or early in October; but on November 5 it was hopeless, for -it ignored the fact that 80,000 French troops had entered Biscay and -Navarre since the middle of October, and that Napoleon himself had -reached Vittoria. To advance now was to run into the lion’s mouth. - -The armies of Andalusia and Aragon were just beginning to concentrate -when, on November 8, a dispatch came in from Blake announcing his -disaster at Zornoza, and his hurried retreat beyond Bilbao. The same -day there arrived a correct report of the arrival of the Emperor and -great masses of French troops at Vittoria, with an inaccurate addition -to the effect that they were being directed on Logroño and Lodosa, as -if about to cross the Central Ebro and fall upon the left flank of the -army of Andalusia[480]. - - [480] The best picture of Castaños’ head quarters at this time is - to be found in the diary of General Graham, printed in his _Life_ - by Delavoye. - -Castaños, in his _Vindication_, published to explain and defend -his movements during this campaign, stated that his first impulse -was to march by Logroño and Haro to meet the enemy, or to hasten by -Agreda and Soria to interpose himself between the Emperor and Madrid. -But, on second thoughts, he resolved that it was more necessary to -endeavour to beat the French in his immediate front, and that it would -be better to persevere in the plan, drawn up on November 5, for a blow -at Moncey. A sharp thrust delivered on this point would distract the -attention of the Emperor from Blake, and draw him off the direct road -to Madrid. Meanwhile, however, on November 11 Castaños fell ill, and -took to his bed at Cintruenigo. While he was thus disabled, the deputy -Francisco Palafox took the astounding step of issuing orders in his -own name to the divisional generals both of the Andalusian and the -Aragonese armies. Nothing like this had been seen since the days in -the French Revolutionary War, when the ‘Representatives on Mission’ -used to overrule the commands of the unhappy generals of the Republic. -Before the concentration of the armies was complete, the Deputy ordered -the assumption of the offensive at all points in the line: he directed -O’Neille, whom he incorrectly supposed to be already at Caparrosa, -to attack Moncey at once; bade Grimarest, with the 2nd Andalusian -division, to cross the Ebro at Calahorra; La Peña to threaten Milagro; -and Cartaojal, with a small flanking brigade, to demonstrate against -the French troops who lay at Logroño. These orders produced utter -confusion, for some of the generals obeyed, while others sent the -answer that they would not move without the permission of their proper -chiefs, Castaños and Joseph Palafox. The former got his first notice of -the Deputy’s presumptuous action by letters from La Peña, delivered to -his bedside, in which he was asked whether he had given his sanction -to the project for crossing the Ebro[481]. As a matter of fact only -Grimarest and Cartaojal moved: the former was sharply repulsed at the -fords opposite Calahorra: the latter, more fortunate, skirmished with -Lagrange’s division, in front of Logroño, without coming to any harm -[November 13]. - - [481] See Graham’s _Diary_, p. 280. This is far the best - authority for the chaotic movements of the Spaniards during these - weeks. Some allowance, perhaps, should be made for Graham’s - dislike for the Palafox brothers. - -It was now three days since the Emperor had routed Belvedere at -Gamonal and entered Burgos, and two days since Blake had been beaten -at Espinosa. The conduct of the generals who had charge of the last -intact army that Spain possessed, seems all the more insane when we -reflect on the general condition of affairs. For on the fourteenth the -mad advance which Francisco Palafox advocated was resumed, Castaños -on his sick bed not having had sufficient energy to lay an embargo -on the moving forward of his own troops. On the fourteenth O’Neille -arrived at Caparrosa and drove out of it Moncey’s advanced posts, while -Grimarest and La Peña received new instructions--to push up the Ebro -and attack Lodosa, which O’Neille was at the same moment to assail from -the other side of the stream. Thus the great river was to be placed -between the two halves of the army, which had no communication except -by the bridge of Tudela, far to the rear of both. ‘This seems rather -a hazardous undertaking,’ wrote Graham in his diary, ‘affording the -enemy an opportunity of attacking on whichever side of the river he -chooses with superior force.’ But the only thing that prevented it from -being attempted was the sudden refusal of O’Neille to advance beyond -Caparrosa unless he were provided with 50,000 rations of biscuit, and -reinforced at once with 6,000 bayonets from the Army of the Centre -[November 18]. As if the situation were not already sufficiently -complicated, Castaños had on the preceding day received unofficial -intelligence[482] from Madrid, to the effect that the Central Junta -had determined to depose him, and to appoint the Marquis of La Romana -general-in-chief of the Army of the Centre as well as of the Army of -Galicia. This really made little difference, as the Marquis was at -this moment with Blake’s corps (he had joined it at Renedo on the -fifteenth), so that he could not issue any orders for the troops -on the Ebro, from whom he was separated by the whole French army. -Castaños remained at the head of the Andalusians till he was formally -superseded, and it was he who was destined to fight the great battle -that was now impending. It is hard to say what might have happened had -the French held back for a few days more, for now, at the last moment, -Joseph Palafox suddenly harked back to his old plan for an advance -on Pampeluna and the roots of the Pyrenees, and proposed to Castaños -that the whole of the Andalusian army save La Peña’s division should -assist him[483]. Castaños and Coupigny strongly opposed this mad idea, -and submitted an entirely different scheme to the Captain-General of -Aragon, inviting him to bring all his forces to Calahorra, and to join -the Army of the Centre in taking up a defensive position behind the -Ebro. - - [482] By a letter from Lord William Bentinck, at Madrid (see - Graham’s _Diary_, p. 281). - - [483] It is most difficult to unravel all these projects and - counter-projects: I have followed Graham, who was always at the - side of Castaños, supplementing him with that general’s own - vindication, and with Butron’s narrative. - -The two plans were being hotly debated, when news arrived which proved -decisive. The French were at last on the move, and their columns -were pouring out of Logroño and Lodosa along the southern bank of -the Ebro, heading for Calahorra and Tudela [November 21]. On the -same day a messenger arrived from the Bishop of Osma, bearing the -intelligence that a French corps (he called it that of Dessolles, -but it was really Ney) had marched up the head-waters of the Douro -to Almazan, and was heading for Soria and Agreda, with the obvious -intention of falling upon the rear of the Army of the Centre. If -Castaños remained for a moment longer at Calahorra, he would clearly -be caught between the two French armies. He should have retired at -once in the direction of Saragossa, before Ney could reach him: but -instead he took the dangerous half-measure of falling back only as far -as the line Tudela-Tarazona. This was a safer position than that of -Calahorra-Arnedo, but still sufficiently perilous, for the enveloping -corps from the south could still reach his rear by a long turning -movement through Xalon and Borja. - - [Illustration: Battle of Tudela. November 23, 1808.] - -If the position from Tudela, on the banks of the Ebro, to Tarazona at -the foot of the Sierra de Moncayo was to be held, the army of Castaños -needed strong reinforcements, for the line was ten miles long, and -there were but 26,000 men to occupy it. The Army of Aragon must be -brought up also, and Castaños wrote at once to O’Neille at Caparrosa, -inviting him to hasten to cross the Ebro and occupy Tudela and its -immediate vicinity. The dispatch reached the Irish general late on -the afternoon of the twenty-first, but he refused to obey without the -permission of his own commander, Joseph Palafox. Thus the night of -November 21-22 was lost, but next morning the Aragonese Captain-General -appeared from Saragossa, and met Castaños and Coupigny. They besought -him to bid O’Neille join the Army of the Centre, but at first he -refused, even when the forward march of Moncey and the flanking -movement of Ney had been explained to him. He still clung to his wild -proposal for a blow at Pampeluna, ‘talking,’ says Colonel Graham, ‘such -nonsense as under the present circumstances ought only to have come -from a madman[484].’ But at the last moment he yielded, and at noon on -the twenty-second wrote orders to O’Neille to bring his two divisions -to Tudela, and to form up on the right of the Army of Andalusia. When -the Aragonese host at last got under weigh, the hour was so late that -darkness was falling before the bridge of Tudela was passed. O’Neille -then had an unhappy inspiration: he ordered his men to defer the -crossing of the Ebro till the following morning, and to cook and encamp -on the northern bank. Half of the line which Castaños intended to hold -next day was still ungarnished with troops when the dawn broke, and -soon it was discovered that the French were close at hand. - - [484] Graham’s _Diary_, p. 284. - -The approaching enemy were not, as Castaños and Palafox supposed, -under the command of Moncey and Ney. The latter was carrying out his -turning movement by Soria: the former was for the moment superseded. -The Emperor regarded the Duke of Conegliano as somewhat slow and -overcautious, and for the sudden and smashing blow which he had -planned had chosen another instrument. This was Marshal Lannes, who -had crossed the Pyrenees with the ‘Grand Army,’ but had been detained -for a fortnight at Vittoria by an accident. His horse had fallen with -him over a precipice, and he had been so bruised and shaken that his -life was despaired of. It appears that the celebrated surgeon Larrey -cured him by the strange device of sewing up his battered frame in the -skin of a newly flayed sheep[485]. By November 20 he was again fit for -service, and set out from Logroño with Lagrange’s division of Ney’s -corps, Colbert’s light cavalry, and Digeon’s dragoons. Moncey joined -him by the bridge of Lodosa, bringing his whole corps--four divisions -of infantry and one of cavalry. The protection of Navarre had been -handed over to General Bisson, the governor of Pampeluna. - - [485] See Larrey’s _Mémoires de Chirurgie Militaire_. - -Lannes met with no opposition whatever in his march to Tudela, and -easily reached Alfaro on the twenty-second. Here he learnt that the -Spaniards were awaiting him beyond the river Queiles, drawn up on a -very long front between Tudela and Tarazona. On the morning of the -twenty-third he came in sight of them, and deployed for an attack: the -state of utter disorder in which the enemy lay gave the best auguries -for the success of the imperial arms. - -Castaños had placed the troops under his immediate command at Tarazona -and Cascante, which were destined to form the left and centre of his -position: the remainder of it, from Cascante to Tudela, was allotted -to the Aragonese and to the Murcian division of the Army of Andalusia, -which had been across the Ebro in O’Neille’s company, and was now -returning with him. Till they came up Castaños had only under his -hand two complete divisions of his ‘Army of the Centre,’ and some -small fragments of two others. The complete divisions were those of -Grimarest (No. 2) and La Peña (No. 4), each of which had been increased -in numbers but not in efficiency by having allotted to it some of the -battalions of the ‘Army of Castile,’ which had been dissolved for its -bad conduct at Logroño on October 26. There had at last begun to arrive -at the front a considerable part of the other two Andalusian divisions, -which had first been detained beyond the Sierra Morena by the Junta of -Seville, and then kept some time in Madrid to complete their equipment. -Two battalions of these belated troops had at last appeared on October -30, and ten more had since come up[486]. But the bulk of the 1st and -3rd Divisions was still absent, and no more than 5,500 men from them -had been added to Castaños’ army. The mixed brigade formed from these -late arrivals seems to have been under General Villariezo, of the 1st -Division. The whole force amounted to about 28,000 men, of whom 3,000 -were horsemen, for the army of Andalusia was stronger in the cavalry -arm than any other of the Spanish hosts. But of these the Murcian and -Valencian division of Roca (formerly that of Llamas) was with O’Neille, -and had not yet reached the field; while five battalions, from the -dissolved Castilian army, were far away on the left in the mountains of -Soria, whither Castaños had detached them under General Cartaojal, with -orders to observe the French corps which was coming up on his rear. - - [486] Of the 1st Division there seem to have arrived one - battalion each of the regiments Reina, Jaen, Irlanda, and - Barbastro, and the Jaen Militia. Of the 3rd Division one - battalion each of Campo Mayor, Volunteers of Valencia, and the - Militia of Plasencia, Guadix, Lorca, Toro, and Seville (No. 1). - -The other half of the Spanish army consisted of the missing division -of the Army of the Centre--that of Roca--and the two divisions -belonging to Palafox--those of O’Neille and Saint March--the former -composed mainly of Aragonese[487], the latter almost entirely of -Valencian troops. None of the Aragonese reserves from the great camp -at Saragossa had yet come upon the scene. But the two divisions in the -field were very strong--they must have had at least 17,000 men in their -ranks. On November 1 they were more than 18,000 strong, and, two months -after--when they had passed through the disaster of Tudela, and had -endured ten days of the murderous siege of Saragossa--they still showed -14,000 bayonets. We cannot calculate them at less than 17,000 men for -the battle of November 23. On the other hand, there were hardly 600 -cavalry in the whole corps. - - [487] But with one Valencian and two Murcian battalions: see - Appendix. - -It would appear then that Castaños must have had some 45,000 men -in line, between Tarazona and Tudela, when Lannes came up against -him[488]. The French marshal, on the other hand, had about 34,000. -On the difference in quality between the two armies we have no need -to dilate: even the two divisions of the conscripts of 1807, which -served in Moncey’s corps, were old soldiers compared to the armies of -Aragon and Castile, or a great part of that of Andalusia. Moreover, as -in all the earlier battles of the Peninsular War, the Spaniards were -hopelessly outmatched in the cavalry arm. There was no force that could -stop the 4,500 or 5,000 horsemen of Colbert, Digeon, and Wathier[489]. - - [488] The troops should have numbered-- - - 2nd Division of the Army of Andalusia [Grimarest] (five - battalions of regulars, four of militia, and four of new - levies) about 6,000 - 4th Division of the Army of Andalusia [La Peña] (seven - battalions of regulars, three of militia, and three of - new levies) about 7,500 - Mixed brigade of the 1st and 3rd Divisions [Villariezo] (six - battalions of regulars and six of militia) about 5,500 - 5th Division (Murcians and Valencians) [Roca] (eight - battalions of regulars, two of militia, and seven of new - levies) 6,500 - Castilian battalions distributed between the other divisions, - or detached on the left [Cartaojal] 8,000 - O’Neille’s Division of the Army of Aragon (three battalions - of regulars, five battalions of Aragonese, and three of - Valencian and Murcian new levies) 9,000 - Saint March’s Division of the Army of Aragon (three - battalions of regulars, one of militia, and ten of - Valencian new levies) 8,000 - Cavalry (3,000 Andalusians, 600 Aragonese) 3,600 - Artillery 1,800 - ------ - 55,900 - Minus the detachment of Cartaojal, about 3,000 3,000 - ------ - Total 52,900 - - But we must make large deductions for sickness (which had fallen - heavily on the ill-clothed men), for loss in previous actions, - desertion, and detachments; e.g. some of Roca’s division were on - the Lower Ebro. - - [489] The French army consisted of-- - Moncey’s Corps: - Maurice Mathieu’s Division (twelve battalions) 7,000 - Musnier’s Division (eight battalions) 5,500 - Morlot’s Division (six battalions) 4,000 - Grandjean’s (late Frère’s) Division (eight battalions) 5,000 - Cavalry of Wathier (three regiments) 1,600 - Ney’s Corps: - Lagrange’s Division 6,000 - Colbert’s Cavalry (three regiments) 2,200 - Reserve Cavalry: - Digeon’s Brigade of Dragoons (two regiments) 1,200 - Artillery, &c. 1,200 - ------ - Total 33,700 - - These figures are mainly taken from Napoleon’s dispatch, No. - 14,456, of Nov. 8. They do not include the Irish, Prussian, and - Westphalian battalions of Moncey’s corps garrisoning Pampeluna - and San Sebastian. - -The position Tudela-Tarazona, which Castaños intended to hold, is of -enormous length--about ten and a half miles in all. Clearly 45,000 -men in the close order that prevailed in the early nineteenth century -were inadequate to hold it all in proper strength. Yet if the points -on which the French were about to attack could be ascertained in -good time, the distances were not so great but that the army could -concentrate on any portion of the line within three hours. But to make -this practicable, it was necessary firstly that Castaños should keep -in close touch with the enemy by means of his cavalry--he had quite -enough for the purpose--and secondly that he should have all his men -massed at suitable points, from which they could march out to the -designated fighting-ground at short notice. The Spanish troops were, -now as always, so slow at manœuvring that the experiment would be a -dangerous one, but this was the only way in which the chosen position -could possibly be held. The ground was not unfavourable; it consisted -of a line of gentle hills along the south bank of the river Queiles, -which commanded a good view over the rolling plain across which the -French had to advance. On the extreme right was the town of Tudela, -covered by a bold hill--the Cerro de Santa Barbara--which overhangs the -Ebro. Thence two long ridges, the hills of Santa Quiteria and Cabezo -Malla, extend for some two and a half miles in a well-marked line: this -section formed the right of the position. From the left of the Cabezo -Malla as far as the little town of Cascante--four miles--the ground is -less favourable; indeed, it is fairly flat, and the line is indicated -mainly by the Queiles and its irrigation-cuts, behind which the Spanish -centre was to form[490]. From Cascante westward as far as Tarazona--a -distance of four miles or a little over--the position is better marked, -a spur of the Sierra de Moncayo coming down in a gentle slope all along -the southern bank of the little Queiles. The centre, between the Cabezo -Malla and Cascante, was obviously the weak point in the position, as -the only obstacle to the enemy’s advance was the river, which was -fordable by all arms at every point along this dangerous four miles. - - [490] The town and the hill, unlike the rest of the position, are - on the _north_ bank of the Queiles. - -The disaster which Castaños was to suffer may be ascribed to two -mistakes, one of which was entirely within his own control, while the -other was due to the stupidity of O’Neille. With 3,000 cavalry in -hand, the Commander-in-chief ought to have known of every movement -of the French for many hours before they drew near to the position. -It would then have been in his power to concentrate on those parts -of the line where the attack was about to be delivered. But instead -of sending out his horse ten miles to the front, Castaños kept them -with the infantry[491], and the first notice of the approach of Lannes -was only given when, at nine in the morning, a regiment of Wathier’s -cavalry rode right up to the town of Tudela, driving in the outposts -and causing great confusion. To the second cause of disaster we have -already had occasion to allude: on the night of the twenty-second -O’Neille had (contrary to his orders) encamped north of the Ebro. His -17,000 men began to defile over the bridge next morning in a leisurely -fashion, and were still only making their way to their designated -positions when Lannes attacked. In fact the Spanish line of battle was -never formed as had been planned: the various brigades of the Army of -Aragon were hurried one after another on to the heights south-west of -Tudela, but entirely without system or order: the lower ground to the -left of the Cabezo Malla was never occupied at all, and remained as a -gap in the centre of the line all through the battle. - - [491] It is impossible to acquit Castaños of the charge of - carelessness on this point. Doyle’s letter of the night of Nov. - 22 is conclusive: ‘Not one soldier has been left to observe the - motions of the enemy, or to check the progress of his advanced - guard, common pickets excepted, which are pushed a little outside - the town. I confess I have not a shade of doubt that the enemy - will attack at daybreak, and confusion must naturally ensue’ - (Doyle’s correspondence in the Record Office). It is seldom that - a military prophecy is so exactly fulfilled. - -Lannes, who was aware that the Spaniards were intending to fight at -Tudela, had marched at dawn from his camps in front of Alfaro in two -columns. One, composed of Moncey’s corps, with Wathier’s cavalry at -its head, came by the high-road near the Ebro. The other, composed of -the two independent cavalry brigades of Colbert and Digeon, and of -Lagrange’s division, was more to the west, and headed for Cascante. The -Marshal had no intention of attacking the left of the Spanish line in -the direction of Tarazona, which he left entirely to itself. He met not -a single Spanish vedette till Wathier’s cavalry ran into the pickets -immediately outside Tudela. - -Castaños was in the town, engaged in hurrying the march of the -Aragonese troops across the great bridge of the Ebro, when the -fusillade broke out. The unexpected sound of musketry threw the troops -into great excitement, for they were jammed in the narrow mediaeval -lanes of Tudela when the sounds of battle came rolling down from the -Cerro de Santa Barbara. The Commander-in-chief himself was caught -between two regiments and could not push his way out to the field for -some time. But the men were quite ready to fight, and hurried to the -front as fast as they were able. Roca’s Valencian division (the 5th -of the Andalusian army) had been the first to cross the Ebro: it was -pushed up to the Cerro de Santa Barbara, and reached its summit just in -time to beat off the leading brigade, one from Morlot’s division, which -was ascending the hill from the other side. Saint March’s battalions, -who had crossed the bridge next after Roca, were fortunate enough to -be able to deploy and occupy the hill of Santa Quiteria before they -were attacked. But O’Neille’s Aragonese and Murcians were less lucky: -they only succeeded in seizing the Cabezo Malla ridge after driving off -the skirmishers of Maurice Mathieu’s French division, which had come -up next in succession to Morlot, and was just preparing to mount the -slope. But the position was just saved, and the Army of Aragon was by -ten o’clock formed up along the hills, with its right overhanging the -Ebro and its left--quite in the air--established on the Cabezo Malla. -The front was somewhat over two miles in length, and quite defensible; -but the troops were in great disorder after their hurried march, and -the generals were appalled to find that the Army of the Centre had not -moved up to join them, and that there was a gap of three miles between -the Cabezo Malla and the nearest of the Andalusian divisions. Castaños -perceived this fact and rode off, too late, to bring up La Peña from -Cascante to fill the void. Palafox was not on the field: he had gone -off at daybreak (still in high dudgeon that his scheme for an attack by -Pampeluna had been overruled) and was far on the road to Saragossa. - -It is clear that Lannes’ first attack was unpremeditated and -ill-arranged: he had been tempted to strike when his vanguard only -had come up, because he saw the Spanish position half empty and the -Aragonese divisions struggling up in disorder to occupy it. Hence came -his first check: but the preliminary skirmish had revealed to him the -existence of the fatal gap between the two Spanish armies, and he was -now ready to utilize it. While Castaños was riding for Cascante, the -divisions of Musnier, Grandjean, and Lagrange were coming upon the -field, and Lannes was preparing for a second and more serious attack. - -Meanwhile the fortune of the day was being settled on the left. -When the army of Lannes appeared in the plain, La Peña at Cascante -should have marched at once towards the Aragonese, and Grimarest and -Villariezo from Tarazona should have moved on Cascante to replace La -Peña’s division at that place. Neither of them stirred, though the -situation was obvious, and though they presently received orders from -Castaños to close in to their right. La Peña was the most guilty, for -the whole battle-field was under his eye: he would not move because he -had before him Digeon’s and Colbert’s cavalry, and was afraid to march -across their front in the open plain, protected only by the shallow -Queiles. He had 8,000 or 9,000 Andalusian and Castilian infantry, and -1,500 horse, but allowed himself to be neutralized by two brigades of -dragoons. All that he did in response to the summons to move eastward -was to send two battalions to occupy the hamlet of Urzante, a mile to -his right. There was still a space of three miles between him and Saint -March. This scandalous and cowardly inaction is in keeping with the -man’s later career: it was he who in 1811 betrayed Graham at Barossa, -and fled back into safety instead of stopping to assist his allies. On -this occasion he lay for four hours motionless, while he watched the -French forming up for a second attack on the Army of Aragon. Cowed by -the 3,000 dragoons in his front, he made no attempt to march on the -Cabezo Malla to O’Neille’s assistance. Grimarest’s conduct was almost -equally bad: he was further from the scene of fighting, and could -not, like La Peña, see the field: but it is sufficient to say that he -received Castaños’ order to march on Cascante at noon, and that he did -not reach that place--four miles distant--till dusk. - -The Commander-in-chief himself was most unlucky: he started for -Cascante about noon, intending to force his divisional generals to draw -near the battle-field. But as he was crossing the gap between O’Neille -and La Peña he was sighted by some French cavalry, who were cautiously -pushing forward through the unoccupied ground. He and his staff were -chased far to the rear by this reconnoitring party, and only shook -them off by riding hard and scattering among the olive groves. Unable -to reach Cascante, he was returning towards Tudela, when he received a -hasty note from General Roca to the effect that the right wing of the -army had been broken, and the heights of Santa Barbara lost. - -When his three belated divisions had appeared Lannes had drawn up his -army in two lines, and flung the bulk of it against the Aragonese, -leaving only Colbert’s and Digeon’s dragoons and the single division of -Lagrange to look after La Peña and the rest of the Army of Andalusia. - -Instead of sending forward fresh troops, Lannes brought up to the -charge for a second time the regiments of Maurice Mathieu and Morlot. -Behind the latter Musnier deployed, behind the former Grandjean, but -neither of these divisions, as it turned out, was to fire a shot or to -lose a man. While Morlot with his six battalions once more attacked -the heights above the city, Maurice Mathieu with his twelve attempted -both to push back O’Neille and to turn his flank by way of the Cabezo -Malla. After a short but well-contested struggle both these attacks -succeeded. Morlot, though his leading brigade suffered heavily, -obtained a lodgement on top of the Cerro de Santa Barbara, by pushing -a battalion up a lateral ravine, which had been left unwatched on -account of its difficulty. Others followed, and Roca’s division broke, -poured down the hill into Tudela, and fled away by the Saragossa -road. Almost at the same moment O’Neille’s troops were beaten off -the Cabezo Malla by Maurice Mathieu, who had succeeded in slipping a -battalion and a cavalry regiment round their left flank, on the side of -the fatal gap. Seeing the line of the Aragonese reeling back, General -Lefebvre-Desnouettes, to whom Lannes had given the chief command of -his cavalry, charged with three regiments of Wathier’s division at the -very centre of the hostile army. He burst through between O’Neille and -Saint March’s troops, and then wheeling outward attacked both in flank. -This assault was decisive. The whole mass dispersed among the olive -groves, irrigation-cuts, and stone fences which cover the plain to the -south of Tudela. A few battalions kept their ranks and formed a sort of -rearguard, but the main part of Roca’s, Saint March’s, and O’Neille’s -levies fled straight before them till the dusk fell, and far into the -night. Some of them got to Saragossa next day, though the distance was -over fifty miles. - -Meanwhile La Peña’s futile operations in front of Cascante had gone -on all through the afternoon. He had at first nothing but cavalry in -front of him, but about three o’clock Lagrange’s division, which had -been the last to arrive on the field of all the French army, appeared -in his direction. Its leading brigade marched into the gap, wheeled -to its right, and drove out of Urzante the two isolated battalions -which La Peña had placed there in the morning. They made a gallant -resistance[492], but had to yield to superior numbers and to fall back -on the main body at Cascante[493]. Here they found not only La Peña but -also Grimarest, and Villariezo’s mixed brigade, for these officers had -at last deigned to obey Castaños’ orders and to close in to the right. -There was now an imposing mass of troops collected in this quarter, -at least 18,000 foot and 3,000 horse, but they allowed themselves to -be ‘contained’ by Lagrange’s single division and Digeon’s dragoons. -Colbert, with the rest of the cavalry, had ridden through the gap and -gone off in pursuit of the Aragonese. The remaining hour of daylight -was spent in futile skirmishing with Lagrange, and after dark La Peña -and Grimarest retired unmolested to Borja, by the road which skirts -the foot of the Sierra de Moncayo. They were only disturbed by a panic -caused by the blowing up of the reserve ammunition of the Army of the -Centre. Some of the troops took the explosion for a sudden discharge -of French artillery, broke their ranks, and were with difficulty -reassembled. - - [492] Graham witnessed this and reports in his _Diary_ (p. 285) - that ‘the two regiments that had been sent down into the plain - behaved uncommonly well.’ - - [493] I agree with Schepeler and the Spanish witnesses in holding - that on this side the French did very little; their great - advance, as Schepeler says, ‘ist nur Bulletinformel und weiter - nichts.’ - -It is impossible to speak too strongly of the shameful slackness and -timidity of La Peña and his colleagues. If they had been tried for -cowardice, and shot after the manner of Admiral Byng, they would not -have received more than their deserts. That 20,000 men, including the -greater part of the victors of Baylen, should assist, from a distance -of four miles only, at the rout of their comrades of the Army of -Aragon, was the most deplorable incident of all this unhappy campaign. - -From the astounding way in which the Andalusian army had been -mishandled, it resulted that practically no loss--200 killed and -wounded at the most--was suffered in this quarter, and the troops -marched off with their artillery and wagons, after blowing up their -reserve ammunition and abandoning their heavy baggage in their -camps[494]. The Aragonese had, of course, fared very differently. -They lost twenty-six guns--apparently all that they had brought -to the field--over 1,000 prisoners, and at least 3,000 killed and -wounded[495]. That the casualties were not more numerous was due -to the fact that the plain to the south of Tudela was covered with -olive-groves, and irrigation-cuts, which checked the French cavalry and -facilitated the flight of the fugitives. - - [494] The 3,000 men of Cartaojal’s troops, which had been - detached to watch Ney in the direction of Agreda, were cut off - from the rest of the Army of the Centre, and ran great risks. But - they ultimately escaped and rejoined the main body. - - [495] Only Saint March’s casualties are preserved. They amounted - to 1,328. Roca and O’Neille must have suffered in proportion. - -Lannes, it is clear, did not entirely fulfil Napoleon’s expectations. -He did not take full advantage of the gap between O’Neille and La Peña, -and wasted much force in frontal attacks which might have been avoided. -If he had thrust two divisions and all his horse between the fractions -of the Spanish army, before ordering the second attack of Maurice -Mathieu and Morlot, the victory would have been far more decisive, and -less costly. The loss of the 3rd Corps was 44 killed and 513 wounded; -that of Lagrange’s division and the dragoons has not been preserved, -but can have been but small--probably less than 100 in all--though -Lagrange himself received a severe hurt in the arm. The only regiment -that suffered heavily was the 117th, of Morlot’s division, which, -in turning Roca off the Cerro de Santa Barbara, lost 303 killed and -wounded, more than half the total casualties of the 3rd Corps. - -Lannes had carried out indifferently well the part of the Emperor’s -great plan that had been entrusted to him; but this, as we have seen, -was only half of the game. When Castaños and the Aragonese were routed, -they ought to have found Marshal Ney at their backs, intercepting their -retreat on Saragossa or Madrid. As a matter of fact he was more than -fifty miles away on the day of the battle, and arrived with a tardiness -which made his flanking march entirely futile. The orders for him to -march from Aranda on Soria and Tarazona had been issued on November -18[496], and he had been warned that Lannes would deliver his blow -on the twenty-second. But Ney did not receive his instructions till -the nineteenth, and only set out on the twentieth. When once he was -upon the move he made tremendous marches, for on the twenty-first he -had reached Almazan, more than sixty miles from his starting-point: -by dusk on the twenty-second he had pushed on to Soria[497], where -he halted for forty-eight hours on account of the utter exhaustion -of his troops. He had pushed them forward no less than seventy-eight -miles in three days, a rate which cannot be kept up. Hence he was -obliged to let them spend the twenty-third and twenty-fourth in Soria: -at dawn on the twenty-fifth they set out again, and executed another -terrible march. It is thirty miles from Soria to Agreda, in the heart -of the Sierra de Moncayo, where the 6th Corps slept on that night, and -every foot of the way was over villainous mountain roads. Hence Ney -only reached Tarazona early on the twenty-sixth, three days after the -battle; yet it cannot be said that he had been slow: he had covered 121 -miles in six and a half days, even when the halt at Soria is included. -This is very fair marching for infantry, when the difficulties of the -country are considered. Napoleon ungenerously ascribed the escape of -Castaños to the fact that ‘Ney had allowed himself to be imposed upon -by the Spaniards, and rested for the twenty-second and twenty-third -at Soria, because he chose to imagine that the enemy had 80,000 men, -and other follies. If he had reached Agreda on the twenty-third, -according to my orders, not a man would have escaped[498].’ But, as -Marshal Jourdan very truly remarks in his _Mémoires_, ‘Calculating the -distance from Aranda to Tarazona via Soria, one easily sees that even -if Ney had given no rest to his troops, it would have been impossible -for him to arrive before the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, that is -to say, twenty-four hours after the battle. It is not he who should be -reproached, but the Emperor, who ought to have started him from Aranda -two days earlier[499].’ - - [496] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,489. - - [497] Ibid., 14,504. - - [498] Napoleon to Joseph Napoleon, from Aranda, Nov. 27 (_Nap. - Corresp._, 14, 518). - - [499] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 92. - -Blind admirers of Bonaparte have endeavoured to make out a case against -Ney, by accusing him of having stopped at Soria for three days in -order to pillage it--which he did not, though he made a requisition -of shoes and cloth for great-coats from the municipality. If he is -really to blame, it is rather for having worked his men so hard on the -twentieth to the twenty-second that they were not fit to march on the -twenty-third: he had taken them seventy-eight miles on those three -days, with the natural result that they were dead beat. If he had -contented himself with doing sixteen or eighteen miles a day, he would -have reached Soria on the twenty-third, but his men would have been -comparatively fresh, and could have moved on next morning. Even then he -would have been late for the battle, as Jourdan clearly shows: the fact -was that the Emperor asked an impossibility of him when he expected -him to cover 121 miles in four days, with artillery and baggage, and a -difficult mountain range to climb[500]. - - [500] Ney’s march and its difficulties can be studied in the - _Mémoires_ of Roca, then a captain in the 2nd Hussars, who shared - this march with the 6th Corps. - -Meanwhile the routed forces of O’Neille, Roca, and Saint March joined -at Mallen, and retreated along the high-road to Saragossa, accompanied -for part of the way by Castaños; while those of La Peña, Grimarest, and -Villariezo marched by Borja to La Almunia on the Xalon, where their -General-in-chief joined them and directed them to take the road to -Madrid, not that which led to the Aragonese capital. On the night of -the twenty-fifth the Army of Andalusia, minus the greater part of the -wrecks of Roca’s division[501], was concentrated at Calatayud, not much -reduced in numbers, but already suffering from hunger--all their stores -having been lost at Cascante and Tarazona--and inclined to be mutinous. -The incredible mismanagement at Tudela was put down to treachery, and -the men were much inclined to disobey their chiefs. It was at this -unhappy moment that Castaños received a dispatch from the Central Junta -dated November 21, which authorized him to incorporate the divisions -of O’Neille and Saint March with the army of Andalusia, leaving only -the Aragonese under the control of Palafox. This order, if given a -month earlier, would have saved an enormous amount of wrangling and -mismanagement. But it was now too late: these divisions had retired on -Saragossa, and the enemy having interposed between them and Castaños, -the authorization remained perforce a dead letter. - - [501] Only 1,500 of them, with Roca himself, followed Castaños. - -Lannes had directed Maurice Mathieu, with the divisions of Lagrange and -Musnier, to follow the Andalusians by Borja, while Morlot and Grandjean -pursued the Aragonese on the road of Mallen. The chase does not seem -to have been very hotly urged, but on each road a certain number of -stragglers were picked up. Ney, reaching Borja on the twenty-sixth with -the head of his column, found himself in the rear of Maurice Mathieu, -and committed to the pursuit of Castaños. Their vanguard reached -Calatayud on the twenty-seventh, and learnt that the Army of the Centre -had evacuated that city on the same morning, and was pressing towards -Madrid, with the intention of taking part in the defence of the capital. - -Ney, taking with him Lagrange’s infantry and Digeon’s and Colbert’s -cavalry from the troops which fought at Tudela, and adding them to the -two divisions of Marchand and Dessolles, which had formed his turning -column, urged the pursuit as fast as he was able. Twice he came up with -the Spanish army: on each occasion Castaños sacrificed his rearguard, -which made a long stand and was terribly mauled, while he pushed ahead -with his main body. At this cost the army was saved, but it arrived in -New Castile half starved and exhausted, and almost as much demoralized -as if it had been beaten in a pitched battle. A few days later many of -the battalions burst into open mutiny, when they were ordered to retire -into the mountains of Cuenca. But at least they had escaped from Ney -by rapid marching, and still preserved the form and semblance of an -army. - -Meanwhile Napoleon, on his side, had begun to operate against Madrid -with a speed and sureness of stroke that made futile every attempt of -the Spaniards to intervene between him and his goal. The moment that -the news of Tudela reached him (November 26) he had hurled his main -body upon the capital, and within eight days it was in his hands. The -march of the army of Andalusia to cover Madrid was (though Castaños -could not know it) useless from the first. By hurrying to the aid of -the Junta, through Siguenza and Guadalajara, he was merely exposing -himself for a second time to destruction. His troops were destined to -escape from the peril in New Castile, by a stroke of fortune just as -notable as that which had saved them from being cut off on the day -after Tudela. But he, meanwhile, was separated from his troops, for on -arriving at Siguenza he was met by another dispatch from the Junta, -which relieved him of the command of the army of the Centre, and bade -him hasten to Head Quarters, where his aid was required by the Central -Committee for War. Handing over the troops to the incapable La Peña, -Castaños hastened southward in search of the Junta, whose whereabouts -in those days of flight and confusion it was not easy to find. - - - - -SECTION VII: CHAPTER VI - -PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA: NAPOLEON AT MADRID - - -After completing his arrangements for the two sweeping flank-movements -that were destined to entrap Blake and Castaños, the Emperor moved -forward from Burgos on November 22, along the great road to Madrid by -Lerma and Aranda de Duero. His advance was completely masked by the -broad screen of cavalry which had gone on in front of him. Lasalle -was ahead, Milhaud on the right flank, and covered by them he moved -with ease across the plain of Old Castile. He brought with him a very -substantial force, all the Imperial Guard, horse and foot, Victor -and his 1st Corps, and the reserve-cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and -Lahoussaye. King Joseph and his household troops were left behind -at Burgos, to preserve the line of communication with Vittoria and -Bayonne. The flanks were quite safe, with Ney and Moncey lying out -upon the left, and Soult and Lefebvre upon the right. In a few -days--supposing that the armies of Blake and Castaños fell into the -snare, or were at least broken and scattered--the Emperor hoped to -be able to draw in both Ney and Lefebvre to aid in his enveloping -attack upon Madrid. Nor was this all: the corps of Mortier and Junot -were now approaching the Pyrenees, and would soon be available as a -great central reserve. The whole force put in motion against Madrid -was enormous: the Emperor had 45,000 men under his own hand: Ney and -Lefebvre could dispose of 40,000 more: Mortier and Junot were bringing -up another 40,000 in the rear. Omitting the troops left behind on the -line of communication and the outlying corps of Soult and Moncey, not -less than 130,000 men were about to concentrate upon Madrid. - -The Emperor halted at Aranda from November 23 to 28, mainly (as -it would seem) to allow the two great flanking operations to work -themselves out. When Soult reported that Blake’s much-chased army had -dissolved into a mere mob, and taken refuge in the fastnesses of the -Asturias, and when Lannes sent in the news of Tudela, the Emperor saw -that it was time to move. On the twenty-eighth he marched on Madrid, -by the direct high-road that crosses the long and desolate pass of the -Somosierra. - -Meanwhile the Spaniards had been granted nineteen days since the rout -of Gamonal in which to organize the defence of their capital--a space -in which something might have been done had their resources been -properly applied and their commanders capable. It is true that even if -every available man had been hurried to Madrid, the Emperor must still -have prevailed: his numbers were too overwhelming to be withstood. But -this fact does not excuse the Junta for not having done their best -to hold him back. It is clear that when the news of Gamonal reached -them, on the morning of the twelfth, orders should have been sent to -Castaños to fall back on the capital by way of Calatayud and Siguenza, -leaving Palafox and the Aragonese to ‘contain’ Moncey as long as -might be possible. Nothing of the kind was done, and the army of the -Centre--as we have seen--was still at Tudela on the twenty-third. There -was another and a still more important source of aid available: the -English army from Portugal had begun to arrive at Salamanca on November -13: its rearguard had reached that city ten days later. With Sir John -Moore’s designs and plans of campaign we shall have to deal in another -chapter. It must suffice in this place to say that he was now within -150 miles of Madrid by a good high-road: the subsidiary column under -Hope, which had with it nearly the whole of the British artillery, was -at Talavera, still nearer to the capital. If the Junta had realized -and frankly avowed the perils of the situation, there can be no doubt -that they would have used every effort to bring Moore to the defence -of Madrid. Seven or eight good marches could have carried him thither. -But the Spaniards did nothing of the kind: refusing to realize the -imminence of the danger, they preferred to urge on Mr. Frere, the newly -arrived British minister, a scheme for the union of Moore’s forces with -Blake’s broken ‘Army of the Left[502].’ They suggested that Hope’s -division might be brought up to reinforce the capital, but that the -rest of the British troops should operate in the valley of the Douro. -This proposition was wholly inadmissible, for Hope had with him all -Moore’s cavalry and most of his guns. To have separated him from his -chief would have left the latter incapable of any offensive movement. -Hope declined to listen to the proposal, and marched via the Escurial -to join the main army[503]. - - [502] Mr. Frere to General Moore (from Aranjuez, Nov. 25); - compare the letter of Martin de Garay (secretary of the Junta) to - Mr. Frere, dated Nov. 24: ‘If the English troops form a junction - with the Army of the Left, we compose a formidable body of - 70,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, a force with which we shall - be certain of our blow, which we never could be by any different - conduct.’ - - [503] Morla used many arguments to induce Hope to direct his - men on Madrid, when the English general rode in from Talavera - to discuss the situation with the Spanish authorities. Hope, of - course, pleaded the duty of obedience to his chief. - -The fact was that the Junta still persisted in the foolish belief that -Napoleon had no more than 80,000 men disposable in Northern Spain, -instead of the 250,000 who were really at his command. They looked -on the French advance to Burgos as a mere reconnaissance in force -made by a single corps, and in this notion the imbecile Belvedere -did his best to confirm them, by stating in his dispatch that the -force which had routed him amounted to no more than 3,000 horse and -6,000 infantry[504]. Instead of calling in Castaños and making a -desperate appeal for aid to Moore, the Junta contented themselves with -endeavouring to reorganize the wrecks of the army of Estremadura, and -pushing forward the belated fragments of the 1st and 3rd Andalusian -divisions, which still lingered in Madrid, as well as the few Castilian -levies that were now available for service in the field. Nothing can -show their blind self-confidence more clearly than their proclamation -of November 15, put forward to attenuate the ill effects on the -public mind of the news of the rout of Gamonal. ‘The Supreme Junta -of Government’--so runs the document--‘in order to prevent any more -unhappy accidents of this kind, has already taken the most prudent -measures; it has nominated Don Joseph Heredia to the command of the -army of Estremadura: it has ordered all the other generals of the Army -of the Right to combine their movements: it has given stringent orders -for the prompt reinforcement of the above-named army.... There is every -hope that the enemy, who now boasts of having been able to advance as -far as Burgos, will soon be well chastised for his temerity. And if -it is certain--as the reports from the frontier assure us--that the -Emperor of the French has come in person to inspect the conduct of -his generals and his troops in Spain, we may hope that the valiant -defenders of our fatherland may aspire to the glory of making him -fly, with the same haste with which they forced his brother Joseph to -abandon the throne and the capital of which he vainly thought that he -had taken possession[505].’ - - [504] Belvedere’s dispatch to the Junta (_Madrid Gazette_ of Nov. - 15). - - [505] Proclamation of the Supreme Junta, published in the _Madrid - Gazette_ of Nov. 15, 1808. - -Since they systematically undervalued the number of Napoleon’s host, -and refused to believe that there was any danger of a serious attack on -Madrid during the next few days, it was natural that the Junta should -waste, in the most hopeless fashion, the short time of respite that -was granted to them between the rout of Gamonal and Napoleon’s advance -from Aranda. They hurried forward the troops that were close at hand to -hold the passes of the watershed between Old and New Castile, and then -resumed their usual constitutional debates. - -The forces available for the defence of Madrid appear absurdly small -when we consider the mighty mass of men that Bonaparte was leading -against them. Nearly half of the total was composed of the wrecks of -the Estremaduran army. Belvedere, as it will be remembered, had brought -back to Lerma the remains of his 1st and 2nd Divisions, and rallied -them on his intact 3rd Division. The approach of Lasalle’s cavalry on -November 11 scared them from Lerma, and the whole body, now perhaps -8,000 or 9,000 strong, fell back on Aranda. From thence we should have -expected that they would retire by the high-road on Madrid, and take -post in the pass of the Somosierra. But the Estremaduran officers -decided to retreat on Segovia, far to the left, leaving only a handful -of men[506] to cover the main line of access to the capital. It looks -as if a kind of ‘homing instinct’ had seized the whole army, and -compelled them to retire along the road that led to their own province. -The only explanation given by their commanders was that they hoped to -pick up in this direction many of the fugitives who had not rallied to -their main body (one cannot say to their colours, for most of them had -been captured by the French) on the day after Gamonal[507]. At Segovia -the unhappy Belvedere was superseded by Heredia, whom the Junta had -sent down from Aranjuez to reorganize the army. - - [506] Arteche says that ‘all the intact troops,’ i.e. the whole - 3rd Estremaduran division, fell back on the Somosierra. But - this is incorrect, for a dispatch of General Trias (_Madrid - Gazette_ of November 22) shows that he only took two or three - battalions to the pass, and even some of these must afterwards - have gone onto Segovia, for only one Estremaduran corps (the - Badajoz Regiment) is found in the list of San Juan’s little army - (Arteche, iii. 496). - - [507] See Arteche, iii. 321. The fugitives fled so far and wide - that Blake rallied 157 of the regiment of Tuy at Leon! Leith Hay - found them all over the country-side on November 15. - -The other troops available for the defence of Madrid consisted mainly -of the belated fractions of the army of Andalusia, which Castaños had -summoned so many times to join him on the Ebro, but which were still, -on November 15, in or about Madrid. They were supposed to be completing -their clothing and equipment, and to be incorporating recruits. But -considering the enormous space of time that had elapsed since Baylen, -it is not unfair to believe that the true reason for their detention in -the capital had been the Junta’s wish to keep a considerable body of -troops in its own immediate neighbourhood. It was convenient to have -regiments near at hand which had not passed under the control of any -of the generals commanding the provincial armies. There were in Madrid -no less than nine battalions of the original division of Reding--all -regulars and all corps who had distinguished themselves at Baylen[508]. -Of the 3rd Division there were two regular and two old militia -battalions[509]. The remainder of the available force in the capital -consisted of four battalions of new levies raised in the capital (the -1st and 2nd Regiments of the ‘Volunteers of Madrid’), of one new corps -from Andalusia (the 3rd Volunteers of Seville), and of fragments of -four regiments of cavalry[510]. The whole division, twelve thousand -strong, was placed under the charge of General San Juan, a veteran -of good reputation[511]. But he was only a subordinate: the supreme -command in Madrid was at this moment in dispute between General Eguia, -who had just been appointed as head of the whole ‘Army of Reserve,’ and -the Marquis of Castelar, Captain-General of New Castile. The existence -of two rival authorities on the spot did not tend to facilitate the -organization of the army, or the formation of a regular plan of -defence. Eguia, succeeding at last in asserting his authority, ordered -San Juan with his 12,000 men to defend the Somosierra, while Heredia -with the 9,000 Estremadurans was to hold the pass of the Guadarrama, -the alternative road from Old Castile to Madrid via Segovia and San -Ildefonso. These 21,000 men were all that could be brought up to resist -Napoleon’s attack, since the Junta had neglected to call in its more -distant resources. It is clear that from the first they were doomed to -failure, for mountain chains are not like perpendicular walls: they -cannot be maintained merely by blocking the roads in the defiles. Small -bodies of troops, entrenched across the actual summit of the pass, can -always be turned by an enemy of superior numbers; for infantry can -easily scramble up the flanking heights on each side of the high-road. -These heights must be held by adequate forces, arranged in a continuous -line for many miles on each side of the defile, if the position is -not to be outflanked. Neither Heredia nor San Juan had the numbers -necessary for this purpose. - - [508] These corps were the Walloon Guards (3rd batt.), Reina (two - batts.), Jaen (two batts.), Corona (two batts.), Irlanda (two - batts.)--much the larger half of the original 1st Division of - Andalusia, and all old corps (see the lists in Arteche, iii. 496). - - [509] The regiment of Cordova (two batts.) and the provincial - militia of Alcazar and Toledo. - - [510] Two squadrons each of ‘Principe’ and ‘Voluntarios de - Madrid,’ one each of Alcantara and Montesa. The whole amounted to - no more than 600 sabres. - - [511] Napier’s description of the ‘Army of Reserve’ is very - incomplete: he says that ‘Belvedere’s army rallied part in the - Somosierra and part on the side of Segovia. The troops which - had been detained in Madrid from Castaños’ army were forwarded - to the Somosierra; those left behind from Cuesta’s levies (the - Castilians) went to Segovia’ (i. 259). But, as we have seen, only - one regiment of Belvedere’s men went to the Somosierra, and the - Castilians (Madrid Volunteers) marched thither and not to Segovia. - -It was open to Napoleon to attack both the passes, or to demonstrate -against one while concentrating his main force on the other, or to -completely ignore the one and to turn every man against the other. He -chose the last-named alternative: a few cavalry only were told off -to watch the Estremadurans at Segovia, though Lefebvre and the 4th -Corps were ultimately sent in that direction. The main mass of the -army marched from Aranda against the Somosierra. San Juan had not -made the best of his opportunities: he had done no more than range -his whole artillery across the pass at its culminating point, with a -shallow earthwork to protect it. This only covered the little plateau -at the head of the defile: the flanking heights on either side were -not prepared or entrenched. They were steep, especially on the right -side of the road, but nowhere inaccessible to infantry moving in -skirmishing order. At the northern foot of the pass lies the little -town of Sepulveda, which is reached by a road that branches off from -the Madrid _chaussée_ before it commences to mount the defile. To this -place San Juan pushed forward a vanguard, consisting of five battalions -of veteran line troops[512], a battery, and half his available cavalry. -It is hard to see why he risked the flower of his little army in this -advanced position: they were placed (it is true) so as to flank any -attempt of the French to advance up the high-road. But what use could -there be in threatening the flank of Napoleon’s 40,000 men with a small -detached brigade of 3,500 bayonets? And how were the troops to join -their main body, if the Emperor simply ‘contained’ them with a small -force, and pushed up the pass? - - [512] One battalion of Walloon Guards, two each of the regiments - of Jaen and Irlanda, and three squadrons of the regiments of - Montesa and Alcantara, with six guns, all under Colonel Sarden - (colonel of the Montesa Regiment). - -Napoleon left Aranda on November 28: on the twenty-ninth he reached -Boceguillas, near the foot of the mountains, where the Sepulveda -road joins the great _chaussée_, at the bottom of the pass. After -reconnoitring the Spanish position, he sent a brigade of fusiliers of -the Guard, under Savary, to turn the enemy out of Sepulveda. Meanwhile -he pushed his vanguard up the defile, to look for the position of San -Juan. Savary’s battalions failed to dislodge Sarden’s detachment before -nightfall: behind the walls of the town the Spaniards stood firm, and -after losing sixty or seventy men Savary drew off. His attack was not -really necessary, for the moment that the Emperor had seized the exit -of the defile, the force at Sepulveda, on its cross-road, was cut off -from any possibility of rejoining its commander-in-chief, and stood -in a very compromised position. Realizing this fact, Colonel Sarden -retreated in the night, passed cautiously along the foot of the hills, -and fell back on the Estremaduran army at Segovia. The only result, -therefore, of San Juan’s having made this detachment to threaten the -Emperor’s flank, was that he had deprived himself of the services of a -quarter of his troops--and those the best in his army--when it became -necessary to defend the actual pass. He had now left to oppose Napoleon -only six battalions of regulars, two of militia, and seven of raw -Castilian and Estremaduran levies: the guns which he had established in -line across the little plateau, at the crest of the pass, seem to have -been sixteen in number. The Emperor could bring against him about five -men to one. - -The high-road advances by a series of curves up the side of the -mountain, with the ravine of the little river Duraton always on its -right hand. The ground on either flank is steep but not inaccessible. -Cavalry and guns must stick to the _chaussée_, but infantry can push -ahead with more or less ease in every direction. There were several -rough side-tracks on which the French could have turned San Juan’s -position, by making a long circling movement. But Bonaparte disdained -to use cautious measures: he knew that he had in front of him a very -small force, and he had an exaggerated contempt for the Spanish levies. -Accordingly, at dawn on the thirtieth, he pushed up the main defile, -merely taking the precaution of keeping strong pickets of infantry out -upon the flanking heights. - -When, after a march of about seventeen miles up the defile, the French -reached the front of San Juan’s position, the morning was very far -spent. It was a dull November day with occasional showers of rain, and -fogs and mists hung close to the slopes of the mountains. No general -view of the ground could be obtained, but the Emperor made out the -Spanish guns placed across the high-road, and could see that the -heights for some little way on either hand were occupied. He at once -deployed the division of Ruffin, belonging to Victor’s corps, which -headed his line of march. The four battalions of the 96th moved up the -road towards the battery: the 9th Léger spread out in skirmishing order -to the right, the 24th of the Line to the left. They pressed forward -up the steep slopes, taking cover behind rocks and in undulations -of the ground: their progress was in no small degree helped by the -mist, which prevented the Spaniards from getting any full view of -their assailants. Presently, for half a mile on each flank of the -high-road, the mountain-side was alive with the crackling fire of -the long lines of tirailleurs. The ten French battalions were making -their way slowly but surely towards the crest, when the Emperor rode -to the front. He brought up with him a battery of artillery of the -Guard, which he directed against the Spanish line of guns, but with -small effect, for the enemy had the advantage in numbers and position. -Bonaparte grew impatient: if he had waited a little longer Ruffin’s -division would have cleared the flanking heights without asking for -aid. But he was anxious to press the combat to a decision, and had -the greatest contempt for the forces in front of him. His main idea -at the moment seems to have been to give his army and his generals -a sample of the liberties that might be taken with Spanish levies. -After noting that Victor’s infantry were drawing near the summit of -the crest, and seemed able to roll back all that lay in front of them, -he suddenly took a strange and unexpected step. He turned to the -squadron of Polish Light Horse, which formed his escort for the day, -and bade them prepare to charge the Spanish battery at the top of the -pass. It appeared a perfectly insane order, for the Poles were not 100 -strong[513]: they could only advance along the road four abreast, and -then they would be exposed for some 400 yards to the converging fire of -sixteen guns. Clearly the head of the charging column would be vowed to -destruction, and not a man would escape if the infantry supports of the -battery stood firm. But Bonaparte cared nothing for the lives of the -unfortunate troopers who would form the forlorn hope, if only he could -deliver one of those theatrical strokes with which he loved to adorn a -_Bulletin_. It would be tame and commonplace to allow Victor’s infantry -to clear the heights on either side, and to compel the retreat of the -Spanish guns by mere outflanking. On the other hand, it was certain -that the enemy must be growing very uncomfortable at the sight of the -steady progress of Ruffin’s battalions up the heights: the Emperor -calculated that San Juan’s artillerymen must already be looking over -their shoulders and expecting the order to retire, when the crests -above them should be lost. If enough of the Poles struggled through to -the guns to silence the battery for a moment, there was a large chance -that the whole Spanish line would break and fly down hill to Buitrago -and Madrid. To support the escort-squadron he ordered up the rest of -the Polish regiment and the _chasseurs à cheval_ of the Guard: if the -devoted vanguard could once reach the guns 1,000 sabres would support -them and sweep along the road. If, on the other hand, the Poles were -exterminated, the Guard cavalry would be held back, and nothing would -have been lost, save the lives of the forlorn hope. - - [513] Seven officers and eighty men, to be exact (see Ségur, - _Mémoires_, iii. 282). It does not seem to be generally known - that the Poles were not yet lancers. They were only armed with - the lance three months later (see _Nap. Corresp._, 14,819, giving - the order to that effect), and were at this moment properly - styled _Chevaux-Légers Polonais_ only. Almost every narrative of - the Somosierra that I have read calls them lancers; Napier is an - exception. - -General Montbrun led the Polish squadron forward for about half the -distance that separated them from the guns: so many saddles were -emptied that the men hesitated, and sought refuge in a dip of the -ground where some rocks gave them more or less cover from the Spanish -balls. This sight exasperated the Emperor: when Walther, the general -commanding the Imperial Guard, rode up to him, and suggested that he -should wait a moment longer till Victor’s tirailleurs should have -carried the heights on each side of the road, he smote the pommel of -his saddle and shouted, ‘My Guard must not be stopped by peasants, mere -armed banditti[514].’ Then he sent forward his aide-de-camp, Philippe -de Ségur, to tell the Poles that they must quit their cover and charge -home. Ségur galloped on and gave his message to the _chef d’escadron_ -Korjietulski: the Emperor’s eye was upon them, and the Polish officers -did not shrink. Placing themselves at the head of the survivors of -their devoted band they broke out of their cover and charged in upon -the guns, Ségur riding two horses’ lengths in front of the rest. -There were only 200 yards to cross, but the task was impossible; one -blasting discharge of the Spanish guns, aided by the fire of infantry -skirmishers from the flanks, practically exterminated the unhappy -squadron. Of the eighty-eight who charged four officers and forty men -were killed, four officers (one of them was Ségur) and twelve men -wounded[515]. The foremost of these bold riders got within thirty yards -of the guns before he fell. - - [514] All this narrative comes from Philippe de Ségur, who must - be followed in preference to the 13th _Bulletin_ and all the - witnesses who allege that the Poles did reach the battery. He, if - any one, knew what really happened (_Mémoires_, iii. 281-5). His - account of the whole business is in close accord with that of De - Pradt, who was also an eye-witness. - - [515] The frightful proportion of killed to wounded came, - of course, from the fact that the casualties were caused by - artillery fire. - -Having thus sacrificed in vain this little band of heroes, Bonaparte -found himself forced, after all, to wait for the infantry. General -Barrois with the 96th Regiment, following in the wake of the lost -squadron, seized the line of rocks behind which the Poles had taken -refuge before their charge, and began to exchange a lively musketry -fire with the Spanish battalions which flanked and guarded the guns. -Meanwhile the 9th and 24th Regiments on either side had nearly reached -the crest of the heights. The enemy were already wavering, and -falling back before the advance of Barrois’ brigade, whose skirmishers -had struggled to the summit just to the right of the grand battery -on the high-road, when the Emperor ordered a second cavalry charge. -This time he sent up Montbrun with the remaining squadrons of the -Polish regiment, supported by the _chasseurs à cheval_ of the Guard. -The conditions were completely changed, and this second attack was -delivered at the right moment: the Spaniards, all along the line, -were now heavily engaged with Victor’s infantry. When, therefore, the -horsemen rode furiously in upon the guns, it is not wonderful that they -succeeded in closing with them, and seized the whole battery with small -loss. The defenders of the pass gave way so suddenly, and scattered -among the rocks with such speed, that only 200 of them were caught and -ridden down. The Poles pursued those of them who retired down the road -as far as Buitrago, at the southern foot of the defile, but without -inflicting on them any very severe loss; for the fugitives swerved off -the path, and could not be hunted down by mounted men among the steep -slopes whereon they sought refuge. The larger part of the Spaniards, -being posted to the left of the _chaussée_, fled westward along the -side of the mountain and arrived at Segovia, where they joined the army -of Estremadura. With them went San Juan, who had vainly tried to make -his reserve stand firm behind the guns, and had received two sword-cuts -on the head from a Polish officer. Only a small part of the army fled -to the direct rear and entered Madrid. - -The story of the passage of the Somosierra has often been told as if -it was an example of the successful frontal attack of cavalry on guns, -and as if the Poles had actually defeated the whole Spanish army. -Nothing of the kind occurred: Napoleon, as we have seen, in a moment -of impatience and rage called upon the leading squadron to perform an -impossibility, and caused them to be exterminated. The second charge -was quite a different matter: here the horsemen fell upon shaken troops -already closely engaged with infantry, and broke through them. But if -they had not charged at all, the pass would have been forced none the -less, and only five minutes later than was actually the case[516]. In -short, it was Ruffin’s division, and not the cavalry, which really -did the work. Napoleon, with his habitual love of the theatrical and -his customary disregard of truth, wrote in the 13th _Bulletin_ that -the charge of the Polish Light Horse decided the action, and that -they had lost only eight killed and sixteen wounded! This legend has -slipped into history, and traces of its influence will be found even in -Napier[517] and other serious authors. - - [516] The real course of events is best given by Ségur (iii. - 295), who writes as follows: ‘Pendant que notre charge avait - attiré sur elle les feux de l’ennemi, le général Barrois avait - profité de cette diversion. Il s’était avancé jusqu’à le rocher, - notre point de départ. Là, poussés en avant par l’empereur pour - recommencer ma charge, treize de ses grenadiers avaient été - abattus par le feu de la redoute. Alors, rétrogradant derrière - le roc, il avait envoyé quelques compagnies à l’escalade des - hauteurs à notre droite, puis lui-même, à la tête de sa brigade, - y était monté.... Les Espagnols, se voyant près d’être abordés, - avaient déchargé leurs armes, et, se débandant aussitôt, ils - s’étaient mis a fuir à toutes jambes. Au même moment à sa gauche - le bruit de la canonnade avait cessé. C’était alors que le - régiment entier de lanciers Polonais, recommençant la charge - prématurée de notre escadron détruit, avait achevé, sans autre - perte, d’enlever la position. Les canons, quelques officiers - et 150 à 200 Espagnols seulement purent être atteints, tant la - dispersion de l’armée devant les quatre bataillons de Barrois - avait été subite et rapide.’ - - [517] He describes it as if ‘a position nearly impregnable, and - defended by 12,000 men, had been abandoned to the wild charge of - a few squadrons, whom two companies of steady infantry could have - stopped’ (i. 268). - -The combat of the Somosierra, in short, is only an example of the -well-known fact that defiles with accessible flank-slopes cannot be -held by a small army against fourfold numbers. To state the matter -shortly, fifteen battalions of Spaniards (five of them regular -battalions which had been present at Baylen) were turned off the -heights by the ten battalions of Ruffin: the cavalry action was only -a spectacular interlude. The Spanish infantry, considering that there -were so many veteran corps among them, might have behaved better. -But they did not suffer the disgrace of being routed by a single -squadron of horse as Napoleon asserted; and if they fought feebly their -discouragement was due, we cannot doubt, to the fact that they saw the -pass packed for miles to the rear with the advancing columns of the -French, and knew that Ruffin’s division was only the skirmishing line -(so to speak) of a great army. - -On the night of November 30, Napoleon descended the pass and fixed -his head quarters at Buitrago. On the afternoon of December 1 the -advanced parties of Latour-Maubourg’s and Lasalle’s cavalry rode up to -the northern suburbs of Madrid: on the second the French appeared in -force, and the attack on the city began. - -The Spanish capital was, and is, a place incapable of any regular -defence. It had not even, like Valencia and Saragossa, the remains of -a mediaeval wall: its development had taken place in the sixteenth -century, when serious fortifications had gone out of date. Its streets -were broad and regular, unlike the tortuous lanes which had been the -real strength of Saragossa. Nothing separates the city from its suburbs -save ornamental gates, whose only use was for the levy of octroi -duties. Madrid is built in a level upland, but there is a rising ground -which dominates the whole place: it lies just outside the eastern limit -of the city. On it stood the palace of the Buen Retiro (which gives its -name to the height), and several other public buildings, among them the -Observatory and the royal porcelain manufactory, known as La China. -The latter occupied the more commanding and important section of the -summit of the hill. Between the Retiro and the eastern side of the city -lies the public park known as the Prado, a low-lying open space laid -out with fountains, statues, and long avenues of trees. Three broad and -handsome streets[518] run eastward and terminate in the Prado, just -opposite the Retiro, so that cannon planted either by the palace or -by La China can search them from end to end. This was so obvious that -Murat, during his occupation of Madrid in April and May, had built -three redoubts, one large and two small, facing down into the city -and armed with guns of position. The inhabitants of Madrid had partly -dismantled them after the departure of the French--and did themselves -no harm thereby, for these earthworks were useless for defence against -an enemy from without: they could be employed to overawe the city but -not to protect it[519]. - - [518] The Calle de Alcala, Calle de Atocha, and Carrera de San - Geronimo. - - [519] This description is mainly from Vaughan’s unpublished diary - (p. 230). - -Ever since the rout of Gamonal, those members of the Junta who were -gifted with ordinary foresight must have realized that it was probable -that the Emperor would appear ere long before the gates of the capital. -But to avoid alarming the excitable populace, the fact was concealed as -long as possible, and it was given out that Madrid would be defended -at the impregnable Somosierra. It was not till November 25 that any -public measures for the fortification of the capital were spoken of. -On that day the Junta issued a proclamation placing the charge of the -capital in the hands of the Marquis of Castelar, Captain-General of New -Castile, and of Don Tomas de Morla, the officer who had won a name by -bombarding and capturing the French fleet at Cadiz in June. Under their -directions, preparations were begun for putting the city in a state -of defence. But the military men had a strong and well-founded belief -that the place was indefensible, and that all efforts made to fortify -it were labour thrown away: the fight must be made at the Somosierra, -not at the gates of Madrid. It was not till the news of the rout of San -Juan’s army on the thirtieth came to hand, that any very serious work -was executed. But when this disaster was known there was a sudden and -splendid outburst of energy. The populace, full of vindictive memories -of May 2, were ready and willing to fight, and had no conception of -the military weakness of their situation. If Saragossa had defended -itself street by street, why, they asked, should not Madrid do the -same? Their spirits were so high and their temper so ferocious, that -the authorities realized that they must place themselves at the head of -the multitude, or be torn to pieces as traitors. On December 1 a Junta -of Defence was formed, under the presidency of the Duke of Infantado, -in which Morla and Castelar were given a large and heterogeneous mass -of colleagues--magistrates, officers, and prominent citizens forming -an unwieldy body very unfit to act as an executive council of war. The -military resources at their disposal were insignificant: there was -a handful of the fugitives from the Somosierra--Castelar estimated -them as not more than 300 or 400 in all[520]--and two battalions of -new levies from the south, which had arrived only on the morning of -December 1. The organized forces then were not more than 2,500 or 3,000 -in all. But there was a vast and unruly mob of citizens of Madrid and -of peasants, who had flocked into the city to aid in its defence. -Weapons rather than men were wanting, for when 8,000 muskets from the -Arsenal had been served out, the supply ran short. All private persons -owning firearms of any description were invited to hand them in to the -Junta: but this resource soon failed, and finally pikes were served -out, and even mediaeval weapons from the royal armoury and the family -collections of certain grandees. How many men, armed in one way or -another, took part in the defence of Madrid will never be known--it -cannot have been less than 20,000, and may have amounted to much more. - - [520] This must have been an under-estimate. More than 1,500 of - the Somosierra troops had joined the army of Infantado by the New - Year. - -Not merely the combatants, but the whole population of both sexes -turned themselves with absolute frenzy to the work of fortification. -In the two days which they had at their disposal they carried out an -enormous and ill-compacted scheme for surrounding the whole city with -lines. In front of each of the gates a battery was established, formed -of earth reveted with paving-stones: to connect these a continuous -wall was made, by joining together all the exterior houses of the town -with earthworks, or with piles of stones and bricks pulled down from -buildings in the suburbs. On several fronts ditches were excavated: -the more important streets were blocked with barricades, and the -windows and doors of exposed buildings were built up. There were -very few engineers at the disposal of the Junta of Defence, and the -populace in many places worked not under skilled guidance but by the -light of nature, executing enormous but perfectly useless works. ‘The -batteries,’ wrote a prominent Spanish witness, ‘were all too small: -they were so low that they did not prevent the gates and streets which -they defended from being enfiladed: the guns being placed _en barbette_ -were much exposed, and were dominated by the artillery which the enemy -afterwards placed on the high ground [i.e. the Retiro heights]. The low -parapets and the want of proportion between them and their banquettes -left the infantry unsheltered: indeed they were harmed rather than -helped by the works, for the splinters of the paving-stones which -formed the parapets proved more deadly to the garrison than did the -enemy’s cannon-balls. The batteries were too low at the flanks, and -placed so close to the buildings in their rear that the guns could -not easily be worked nor the infantry supports move freely. The gates -behind being all of hewn stone, every ball that struck them sent such -a shower of fragments flying that the effect was like grape: it forced -the defenders to lie flat, and even then caused terrible loss[521].’ It -may be added that not only were the works unscientifically executed, -but that the most tiresome results were produced by the misguided -energy of persons who threw up barricades, or dug cuttings, behind -them, so that it was very hard to send up reinforcements, and quite -impossible to withdraw the guns from one battery for use in another. - - [521] Report on the defences of Madrid, by the Duke of Infantado, - quoted in Arteche (iii. 400, 401). - -It was natural that these self-taught engineers should neglect the one -most important point in the defences of Madrid. The Retiro heights were -the key of the city: if they were lost, the whole place lay open to -bombardment from the dominating ground. But nothing was done here, save -that the old French works round the factory of La China were repaired, -the buildings of the palace, barracks, and hospital in the vicinity -barricaded, and a low continuous earthwork constructed round the summit -of the hill. It should have been turned into a regular entrenched camp, -if the city was really to be defended. - -The Junta of Defence did its best to preserve order and introduce -discipline: all the armed men were paraded in the Prado, told off -into bands, and allotted their posts around the circumference of the -city. But there were many idle hands, and much confusion: it was -inevitable that mobs should collect, with the usual consequences. Cries -of ‘Treason’ were raised, some houses were sacked, and at least one -atrocious murder was committed. The Marquis of Perales was president -of the sub-committee which the Junta had appointed to superintend the -manufacture and distribution of ammunition. Among the cartridges given -out to the people some were found in which sand had been substituted -for powder--probably they were relics of some petty piece of peculation -dating back to the times of Godoy. When this was discovered, a furious -mob ran to the house of the marquis, beat him to death, and dragged his -corpse through the streets on a hurdle[522]. - - [522] Napier calls Perales ‘a respectable old general’; but as - Toreño remarks (i. 305), he was neither old, nor a military - officer of any rank, nor respectable. He was a man of fashion - noted for his licentious life, and the mob which murdered him - is said to have been headed by his discarded mistress. Arteche - suggests that the sand-cartridges were constructed for the - purpose of ruining him, and that the whole business was a piece - of private vengeance. The marquis had once been a very popular - character among the lower classes, but had lost credit by showing - politeness to Murat. - -If the populace of Madrid was full of blind self-confidence, and -imagined that it had the power to beat off the assault of Napoleon, its -leaders were in a much more despondent frame of mind. Morla was one of -those who had joined the patriotic party merely because he thought it -was the winning side: he was deeply disgusted with himself, and was -already contemplating the traitorous desertion to the enemy which has -covered his name with eternal disgrace. Castelar seems to have been -weak and downhearted. The Duke of Infantado was enough of a soldier -to see the hopeless inefficiency of the measures of defence which had -been adopted. The only chance of saving Madrid was to hurry up to its -aid the two field-armies which were within touch--the old Andalusian -divisions (now under La Peña), which, by orders of the Supreme Junta, -were marching from Calatayud on the capital, and the routed bands of -Heredia and San Juan at Segovia. Urgent appeals were sent to both of -these hosts to press forward without delay: Infantado himself rode out -to meet the army of the Centre, which on this day [Dec. 1] had not long -passed Siguenza in its retreat, and was still nearly eighty miles from -the capital. He met it at Guadalajara on the next day, in very bad -condition, and much reduced by long marches and starvation: with the -colours there were only 9,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and these were in -a state of half-developed mutiny. The rest of the 20,000 men who had -escaped from Tudela were ranging in small bands over the country-side, -in search of food, and were not rallied for many days. There was not -much to be hoped for from the army of the Centre, and it was evident -that it could not reach Madrid till December 3 or 4. The troops of San -Juan and Heredia were not so far distant, but even they had fifty-five -miles to march from Segovia, and--as it turned out--the capital had -fallen before either of the field-armies could possibly come to its -aid. Still more fruitless were the attempts made at the last moment to -induce Sir John Moore to bring up the British expeditionary force from -Salamanca--he was 150 miles away, and could not have arrived before -December 7, three days after the capitulation had been signed. - -Napoleon dealt with the insurgents of Madrid in a very summary manner. -On December 1--as we have already seen--his vedettes appeared before -the city: on the morning of the second the dragoons of Lahoussaye and -Latour-Maubourg came up in force and invested the northern and eastern -fronts of the city. At noon the Emperor himself appeared, and late in -the afternoon the infantry columns of Victor’s corps. December 2 was -one of Bonaparte’s lucky days, being the anniversary of Austerlitz, and -he had indulged in a faint hope that an open town like the Spanish -capital might do him the courtesy of surrendering without a blow, -like Vienna in 1805, or Berlin in 1806. Accordingly he sent a summons -to the Junta in the afternoon; but the Spaniards were in no mood for -yielding. General Montbrun, who rode up to the gates with the white -flag, was nearly mobbed by enraged peasants, and the aide-de-camp who -took the dispatch into the city was only saved from certain death by -the exertions of some Spanish officers of the line. The Junta sent him -back with the haughty reply that ‘the people of Madrid were resolved to -bury themselves under the ruins of their houses rather than to permit -the French troops to enter their city.’ - -Since the ‘sun of Austerlitz’ was not destined to set upon the -triumphal entry of the Emperor into the Spanish capital, it became -necessary to prepare for the use of force. As a preliminary for an -attack on the following morning, Lapisse’s division of Victor’s corps -was sent forward to turn the Spaniards out of many isolated houses in -front of their line of entrenchments, which were being held as advanced -posts. The ground being cleared, preparations could be made for the -assault. The moment that Bonaparte cast eyes on the place, he realized -that the heights of the Retiro were the key of the position. Under -cover of the night, therefore, thirty guns were ranged in line opposite -the weak earthworks which crowned the eminence. Artillery in smaller -force was placed in front of several of the northern and eastern -gates of the city, to distract the attention of the garrison from the -critical point. Before dawn the Emperor sent in another summons to -surrender, by the hands of an artillery officer who had been captured -at the Somosierra. It is clear that he wished, if possible, to enter -Madrid without being obliged to deliver up the city to fire and sword: -it would be unfortunate if his brother’s second reign were to begin -under such unhappy conditions. But it is hard to understand how he -could suppose that the warlike frenzy of the Spaniards would have died -down between the afternoon of December 2 and the dawn of December 3. -All the reply that he obtained was a proposal from the Captain-General -Castelar, that there should be a suspension of arms for twelve hours. -The sole object of this delay was to allow the Spanish field-armies -time to draw nearer to Madrid. Recognizing the fact--which was obvious -enough--the Emperor gave orders for an immediate assault. A cannonade -was opened against the gates of Los Pozos, the Recoletos, Fuencarral, -and several others on the northern and eastern sides of the city. -Considerable damage was done to the Spanish defences, but these -attacks were all subsidiary. The real assault was delivered against -the Retiro heights. The heavy cannonade which was directed against the -Spanish works soon opened several breaches. Then Villatte’s division -of Victor’s corps was sent in to storm the position, a feat which it -accomplished with the greatest ease. The garrison of this all-important -section of the defences consisted of a single battalion of new -levies--the Regiment of Mazzaredo--and a mass of armed citizens. They -were swept out of their works, and pursued downhill into the Prado. -Pressing onward among the avenues and fountains, Villatte’s division -took in the rear the defenders of the three neighbouring gates, and -then, pushing in among the houses of the city, made a lodgement in the -palace of the Duke of Medina Celi, and several other large buildings. -There was now nothing between the French army and the heart of Madrid -save the street-barricades, which the populace had thrown up behind the -original lines of defence. - -If Napoleon had chosen to send into the fight the rest of Victor’s -corps, and had pushed forward the whole of his artillery to the edge -of the captured heights, with orders to shell the city, there can be -little doubt that Madrid might have been stormed ere nightfall. Its -broad streets did not give the facilities of defence that Saragossa -had possessed, and the Emperor had at his disposal not a weak and -heterogeneous army, such as Verdier had commanded, but more than 40,000 -veteran troops. His artillery, too, had on the Retiro a vantage-ground -such as did not exist outside the Aragonese capital. Nevertheless the -Emperor did not press the attack, and once more sent in a demand for -the surrender of the place, at about eleven in the morning of December -3. - -The populace of Madrid did not yet recognize its own forlorn state, -and was keeping up a vigorous fusillade at the gates and behind the -barricades. It had suffered severe loss from the French artillery, -owing to the unscientific construction of the defences, but was not -yet ready to yield. But the Junta was in a very different frame of -mind: the military men thoroughly understood the situation, and -were expecting to see a hundred guns open from the crest of the -Retiro within the next few minutes. Their civilian colleagues, the -magistrates, and local notables were looking forward with no enviable -feelings to the conflagration and the general sack that seemed to be -at hand. In short the idea of rivalling Saragossa was far from their -thoughts. When Napoleon’s letter, offering ‘pardon to the city of -Madrid, protection and security for the peaceful inhabitants, respect -for the churches and the clergy, oblivion for the past,’ was delivered -to the Junta, the majority decided to treat with him. They sent out as -negotiators General Morla, representing the military element, and Don -Bernardo Iriarte[523], on behalf of the civil authorities. Napoleon -treated these delegates to one of those scenes of simulated rage which -he was such an adept at producing--his harangue was quite in the style -of the famous allocutions to Lord Whitworth and to Metternich. It was -necessary, he thought, to terrify the delegates. Accordingly he let -loose on Morla a storm of largely irrelevant abuse, stringing together -accusations concerning the bombardment of the French fleet at Cadiz, -the violation of the Convention of Baylen, the escape of La Romana’s -troops from the Baltic, and (strangest of all!) the misconduct of the -Spanish troops in Roussillon during the war of 1793-5. He ended by -declaring that unless the city had been surrendered by six o’clock on -the following morning, every man taken in arms should be put to the -sword. - - [523] Not ‘another military officer,’ as Napier says. - -Morla was a very timid man[524], moreover he was already meditating -submission to King Joseph: he returned to the Junta in a state of -absolute collapse, and gave such a highly coloured account of the -Emperor’s wrath, and of the number of the French army, that there -was no further talk of resistance. The main difficulty was to stop -the promiscuous firing which was still going on at the outposts, and -to induce the more exasperated section of the mob to quit the city -or to lay down their arms. Many of them took the former alternative: -the Marquis of Castelar, resolved to avoid captivity, got together -his handful of regular troops, and fled in haste by the road towards -Estremadura: he was followed by some thousands of peasants, and by -a considerable number of persons who thought themselves too much -compromised to be able to remain behind. Having got rid of the -recalcitrants, the Junta drew up a form of capitulation in eleven -articles, and sent it out to the French camp. Napoleon, anxious above -all things to get possession of the city as soon as possible, accepted -it almost without discussion, though it contained many clauses entirely -inappropriate to such a document. As he did not intend to observe -any of the inconvenient stipulations, he did not care to waste time -in discussing them[525]. Morla and Fernando de Vera, governor of the -city, came back with the capitulation duly ratified by Berthier, and -next morning the gates were opened, a division under General Belliard -marched in, and the Spaniards gave up their artillery and laid down -their muskets without further trouble. After the spasmodic burst of -energy which they had displayed during the last four days, the citizens -showed a melancholy apathy which surprised the conquerors. There was -no riot or confusion, nor were any isolated attempts at resistance -made. Hence the occupation of Madrid took place without any scenes of -bloodshed or pillage, the Emperor for his part keeping a very stern -hand upon the soldiery, and sending in as small a garrison as could -safely be allotted to the task. - - [524] ‘Hombre de corazon pusilánime, aunque de fiera y africana - figura,’ says Toreño (i. 307). - - [525] The first clause of the Capitulation was to the effect - that no religion save the Catholic Apostolic Roman faith should - be tolerated! The second provided that all government officials - should be continued in the tenure of their offices. Clearly such - articles were absurd in a military capitulation, and the second - was impossible to execute, as the conqueror must necessarily - place in office such persons as he could trust. But the amnesty - articles (Nos. 4 and 11) could have been observed, and were not. - -Madrid having fallen after no more than two days of resistance, the -two Spanish field-armies which were marching to its aid were far too -late to be of any use. The army of the Centre under La Peña had reached -Guadalajara at nightfall on December 2: there it was met by the Duke -of Infantado, who had come out from Madrid to hurry on the troops. At -his solicitation the wearied and disorganized host, with Ney’s corps -pressing hard on its heels, marched for San Torcaz and Arganda, thus -placing itself in a most dangerous position between the Emperor and the -corps that was in pursuit. Fortunately La Peña got early news of the -capitulation, and swerving southward from Arganda, made for the passage -of the Tagus at Aranjuez. But Bonaparte had sent out part of Victor’s -corps to seize that place, and when the army of the Centre drew near, -it found French troops in possession [December 6]. With Ney behind, -Victor in front, and Bessières’ cavalry ranging all over the plain of -New Castile, the Spaniards were in grave danger. But they escaped by -way of Estremera, crossed the ferries on the Upper Tagus, and finally -rallied--in a most miserable and disorganized condition--at Cuenca. -The artillery, unable to leave the high-road, had been sent off three -days before, from Guadalajara towards the kingdom of Murcia, almost -without an escort: by a piece of extraordinary luck it escaped without -seeing an enemy. - -The doings of the disorganized divisions of San Juan and Heredia, which -had marched from Segovia on December 2, were much more discreditable. -Late on the third they reached the Escurial, some thirty miles from -Madrid, and were met by fugitives from the capital, who reported that -the Retiro had been stormed, and that the Junta of Defence was debating -about a surrender. The two commanders were doubting whether they ought -not to turn back, when their troops broke out into mutiny, insisting -that the march on Madrid must be continued. After a scene of great -disorder the generals gave in, and resumed their advance on the morning -of the fourth, just at the moment when Morla was opening the gates -to Napoleon. They had only gone a few miles when certain news of the -capitulation was received. There followed a disgraceful scene; the cry -of treason ran down the ranks: some battalions disbanded themselves, -others attacked their own officers, and the whole mass dissolved and -went off in panic to Talavera, leaving its artillery abandoned by the -wayside. They had not even seen a French vedette, or fired a single -shot, yet they fled in utter rout for sixty miles, and only halted -when they could run no further. Seven or eight thousand men out of the -two armies were got together at Talavera, on the sixth; but when, next -morning, San Juan attempted to take up the command again, they raised -the idiotic cry that he wished to lead them forward into the midst of -Napoleon’s armies in order to force them to surrender! The unfortunate -general was hunted down, shot as he was trying to escape from a window, -and hung from a large elm-tree just outside the town. This was the most -disgraceful scene of the whole campaign in 1808. It was not for some -days later that the remnants of this miserable army were reduced to -some shadow of discipline, and consented to march under the command of -new generals. - -It is clear that even if Madrid had held out for a day or two more, by -dint of desperate street-fighting, it would have got no effective aid -from the armies in the field. We cannot therefore say that the Junta of -Defence did much harm by its tame surrender. From the military point -of view Madrid was indefensible: on the other hand it was eminently -desirable, from the political point of view, that Napoleon should not -enter the place unopposed, to be received, as at Vienna or Berlin, by -obsequious deputations mouthing compliments, and bearing the keys of -the city on silver salvers. It was far better, in the long run, for -Spain and for Europe that he should be received with cannon-balls, and -forced to fight his way in. This simple fact made all his fictions -to the effect that he was only opposed by the rabble, the monks, -and the agents of England appear absurd. He could not, after this, -pretend to introduce his brother Joseph as a legitimate sovereign -quietly returning to his loyal capital. So much was secured by the two -days’ resistance of Madrid: on the other hand, when once the French -were inside the city, and further resistance would have ended merely -in general pillage and conflagration, it would have required more -than Spartan resolution for the Junta to go on fighting. If Madrid -had been burnt like Moscow, the moral effect on Spain and on Europe -would, no doubt, have been enormous. But the heterogeneous council -of war, composed of dispirited officers and local notables trembling -for their homes, could hardly be expected to see this. They yielded, -considering that they had already done enough by way of protest--and -even with Saragossa in our mind we should be loth to say that their -capitulation was culpable. The one shameful thing about the surrender -was that within a few days both Morla, the military head of the -defence, and several of the chief civil officials, swore allegiance to -Joseph Bonaparte, and took service under him. Such treason on the part -of prominent men did more to encourage the invader and to dishearten -Spain and her allies than the loss of half a dozen battles. For, when -once desertion begins, no one knows where it will stop, and every man -distrusts his neighbour as a possible traitor. Madrid, as we have -already said, was not a true national capital, nor was its loss a -fatal blow; but that its chief defenders should shamelessly throw over -the cause of their country, and join the enemy, was a symptom of the -most dire and deadly sort. But, fortunately, the fate of the country -was not in the hands of its corrupt bureaucracy, but in those of its -much-enduring people. - - - - -SECTION VIII - -THE CAMPAIGN OF SIR JOHN MOORE - - - - -CHAPTER I - -NAPOLEON AT MADRID - - -From December 4 to December 22 the Emperor remained fixed in the -neighbourhood of Madrid. He did not settle down in the royal palace, -and it would seem that he made no more than one or two hurried visits -of inspection to the city[526]. He established himself outside the -gates, at Chamartin, a desolate and uncomfortable country house of the -Duke of Infantado, and devoted himself to incessant desk-work[527]. -It was here that he drew up his projects for the reorganization of -the kingdom of Spain, and at the same time set himself to the task of -constructing his plans of campaign against those parts of the Peninsula -which still remained unsubdued. In seventeen days, uninterrupted by -the cares of travel, Bonaparte could get through an enormous amount of -business. His words and deeds at this period are well worth studying, -for the light that they throw alike on his own character and on his -conceptions of the state and the needs of Spain. - - [526] Not, as the Spaniards whispered, because he feared the - stiletto of some fanatical monk, but because he wished to leave - the place clear for his brother Joseph. For the curious story of - his visit to the royal palace, and long study of the portrait of - Philip II, see Toreño, i. 309. - - [527] For the discomforts of Chamartin see the _Mémoires sur la - Révolution d’Espagne_ of De Pradt. Though belonging to one of - the richest nobles of Spain, it had not a single fireplace, and - the imperial courtiers and aides-de-camp had to shiver in the - ante-rooms over miserable _braseros_. - -His first act was to annul the capitulation which he had granted to the -inhabitants of Madrid. Having served its purpose in inducing the Junta -to yield, it was promptly violated. ‘The Spaniards have failed to carry -it out,’ he wrote, ‘and I consider the whole thing void[528].’ Looking -at the preposterous clauses which he had allowed to be inserted in the -document, there can be no doubt that this was his intention at the very -moment when he ratified it. It was a small thing that he should break -engagements, such as those in which he had promised not to quarter -troops in the monasteries (Article 7), or to maintain all existing -officials in their places (Article 2). But having guaranteed security -for their life and property, freedom from arrest, and free exit at -their pleasure, to such persons as chose to remain behind in the city, -it was shameless to commence his proceedings with a proscription and -a long series of arrests. The list of persons declared traitors and -condemned to loss of life and goods was not very long: only ten persons -were named, and seven of these were absent from Madrid. But the three -others, the Prince of Castelfranco, the Marquis of Santa Cruz, and the -Count of Altamira, were seized and dispatched into France, sentenced to -imprisonment for life. - - [528] ‘La capitulation, n’ayant pas été tenue par les habitants - de Madrid, est nulle,’ Napoleon to Belliard, Dec. 5 (_Nap. - Corresp._, 14,534). He scolds Belliard for having allowed the - document to be printed and placarded on the walls. Every copy was - to be torn down at once. In what respect the Spaniards had broken - the treaty he does not state. He may have referred to the evasion - of Castelar’s troops. - -The arrests were a much more serious matter. In flagrant contravention -of the terms of surrender, Bonaparte put under lock and key all the -members of the Council of the Inquisition on whom he could lay hands, -irrespective of what their conduct had been during the reign of the -Supreme Junta. He also declared all the superior officers of the army -resident in Madrid, even retired veterans, to be prisoners of war, -and liable to answer with their necks for the safety of the captives -of Dupont’s corps. Among them was discovered an old French _émigré_, -the Marquis de Saint-Simon, who had entered the service of Charles -IV as far back as 1793, and had taken part in the last campaign. The -Emperor refused to consider him as a Spaniard, declared that he was -one of his own subjects, had him tried by court-martial, and condemned -him to death. All this was to lead up to one of those odious comedies -of magnanimity which Bonaparte sometimes practised for the benefit of -the editor of the _Moniteur_. Saint-Simon’s daughter was admitted to -the imperial presence to beg for her father’s life, and the master -of the world deigned to commute the punishment of the ‘traitor’ to -imprisonment for life in the mountain-fortress of Joux[529]. This was -a repetition of the Hatzfeldt affairs at Berlin, and Saint-Simon was -treated even worse than the unfortunate Prussian nobleman of 1806. -Truly the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel! - - [529] Cf. _Nap. Corresp._, 14,708, with De Pradt (p. 205-6) and - Arteche (iii. 432). - -Among other persons who were arrested were Don Arias Mon, president of -the Council of Castile, the Duke of Sotomayor, and about thirty other -notables: some were ultimately sent away to France, others allowed to -go free after swearing allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte. - -All these measures were designed to strike terror into the hearts of -the Spaniards. But at the same time the Emperor issued a series of -decrees--in his own name and not in that of his brother, the titular -king--which were intended to conciliate them by bestowing upon them -certain tangible benefits. He knew that there existed the nucleus of -a Liberal party in Spain, and hoped to draw it over to his side by -introducing certain much-needed reforms in the administration of the -country. With this object he removed the tiresome inter-provincial -octroi duties, abolished all feudal dues and all rights of private -jurisdiction, declared that all monopolies should be annulled, and -forbade all assignments of public revenues to individuals. Such -measures would have seemed excellent to many good Spaniards, if they -had been introduced by a legitimate ruler: but coming from the hand -of a foreign conqueror they were without effect. Moreover there -was hardly a square mile of Spanish territory, outside Madrid and -the other towns held by the French, where Napoleon’s writs could -run. Every village which was unoccupied was passively or actively -disobedient. The reforms, therefore, were but on paper. Another series -of decrees, which appeared at the same time, were in themselves quite -as justifiable as those which were concerned with administrative -changes, but were certain to offend nine-tenths of the Spanish nation. -They dealt with the Church and its ministers. The most important was -one which declared (with perfect truth) that there were far too many -monasteries and nunneries in Spain, and that it was necessary to cut -them down to one-third of their existing number. The names of those -which were destined to survive were published: to them the inmates of -the remaining institutions were to be transferred, as vacancies arose. -The suppressed convents were to become the property of the state. Part -of their revenues was to be devoted to raising the salaries of the -secular clergy, so that every parish priest should have an income of -2,400 reals (about £25). Monks or nuns who might choose to leave the -monastic life were to be granted a small pension[530]. At the same -time the Inquisition was abolished ‘as dangerous to the crown and to -civil authority,’ and all its property confiscated. In Madrid there was -seized 2,453,972 reals in hard cash--about £25,000; the smallness of -the amount much surprised the French, who had vague ideas concerning -the fabulous wealth of the institution[531]. - - [530] For details see the decree in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,528. The - last-named clause curiously resembles a provision of Henry VIII - of England, at the Dissolution of 1536. - - [531] Cf. _Nap. Corresp._, 14,563, and De Pradt, _Mémoires_, &c., - p. 205. - -The only results of these measures were that every Spaniard was -confirmed in his belief that Napoleon was a concealed atheist and an -irreconcilable enemy of all religion. Could anything else be expected -of one who (in spite of his _Concordats_ and _Te Deums_) was after -all a child of the Revolution? The man who had persecuted the Pope -in January, 1808, would naturally persecute the monks of Spain in -December. As to the Inquisition, its fate inspired no rejoicing: it -had been effete for many years: there was not a prisoner in any of -its dungeons. Indeed it had enjoyed a feeble popularity of late, for -having refused to lend itself as a tool to Godoy. The only result of -Napoleon’s decree for its abolition was that it acquired (grotesque -as the idea may seem) considerable credit in the eyes of the majority -of the Spanish people, as one of the usurper’s victims. Never was -work more wasted than that which the Emperor spent on his reforms of -December, 1808. They actually tended to make old abuses popular with -the masses, merely because he had attempted to remove them. As to the -possibility of conciliating the comparatively small body of Liberals, -he was equally in error: they agreed with the views of Jovellanos: -reforms were necessary, but they must come from within, and not be -imposed by force from without. They were Spaniards first and reformers -afterwards. The only recruits whom Bonaparte succeeded in enrolling -for his brother’s court were the purely selfish bureaucrats who would -accept any government--who would serve Godoy, Ferdinand, Joseph, a red -republic, or the Sultan of Turkey with equal equanimity, so long as -they could keep their places or gain better ones. - -The Emperor had a curious belief in the power of oaths and phrases over -other men, though he was entirely free himself from any feebleness of -the kind. He took considerable pains to get up a semblance of national -acceptance of his brother’s authority, now that his second reign was -about to begin. Joseph had appeared at Chamartin on December 2[532]: -but he was not allowed to re-enter Madrid for many days. The Emperor -told him to stay outside, at the royal palace of the Pardo, till things -were ready for his reception. This was not at all to the mind of the -King, who took his position seriously, and was deeply wounded at being -ordered about in such an arbitrary fashion. He sent in a formal protest -against the publication of the decrees of December 4: his own name, -he complained, not that of his brother, ought to have appeared at -the bottom of all these projects of reform. He had never coveted any -crown, and least of all that of Spain: but having once accepted the -position he could not consent to be relegated into a corner, while all -the acts of sovereignty were being exercised by his brother. He was -ready to resign his crown into the hands from which he had received -it: but if he was not allowed to abdicate, he must be allowed to reign -in the true sense of the word. It made him blush with shame before his -subjects[533] when he saw them invited to obey laws which he had never -seen, much less sanctioned. Napoleon refused to accept this abdication: -he looked at matters from an entirely different point of view. He was -master of Spain, as he considered, not merely by the cession made at -Bayonne, but by the new title of conquest. He intended to restore -Joseph to the throne, but till he had done so he saw no reason why he -should not exercise all the rights of sovereignty at Madrid. If, in -a moment of pique, he said that his brother might exchange the crown -of Spain for that of Italy, or for the position of lieutenant of the -Emperor in France during his own numerous absences, there is clear -evidence that these were empty words. His dispatches show not the least -sign of any project for the future of Spain other than the restoration -of Joseph; and while the latter was at the Pardo he was continually -receiving notes concerning the reorganization of the Spanish army and -finances, which presuppose his confirmation on the throne within the -next few days[534]. - - [532] Napier (i. 273) makes a curious blunder in saying that he - remained at Burgos. - - [533] This odd phrase is used by Joseph himself in his letter of - Dec. 8, sent from the Pardo, after he had received the decrees - issued on Dec. 4 by his brother. - - [534] There is a complete _catena_ of letters and dispatches - from Dec. 4 to Dec. 22, in which the retention of Joseph as - king is presupposed: (1) 14,531 [Dec. 5] advises him to raise a - Spanish army; (2) 14,537 [Dec. 7] advises the Spaniards to ‘make - their King certain of their love and confidence’; (3) 14,543 - [Dec. 9], the allocution to the Corregidor, bids the Madrileños - swear fidelity on the Sacrament to their King; (4) 14,558 [Dec. - 13] speaks of the knitting up again of the bonds which attach - Joseph’s subjects to their sovereign; (5) 14,593 [Dec. 18] gives - the King advice as to the reorganization of his finances. None of - them could have been written if there had been any real intention - of ousting Joseph from the throne. - -It would seem that Napoleon’s real object in keeping his brother off -the scene, and acting as if he intended to annex Spain to France as -a vassal province, was merely to frighten the inhabitants of Madrid -into a proper frame of mind. If they remained recalcitrant, and -refused to come before him with petitions for pardon, they were to be -threatened with a purely French military government. If they bowed the -knee, they should have back King Joseph and the mockery of liberal -and constitutional monarchy which he represented. So much we gather -from the Emperor’s celebrated proclamation of December 7, and his -allocution to the Corregidor and magistrates of Madrid two days later. -Both of these addresses are in the true Napoleonesque vein. In the -first we read that if the people of Spain prefer ‘the poisons which the -English have ministered to them’ to the wholesome régime introduced -from France, they shall be treated as a conquered province, and Joseph -shall be removed to another throne. ‘I will place the crown of Spain on -my own brow, and I will make it respected by evil-doers, for God has -given me the strength and the force of will necessary to surmount all -obstacles.’ In the second, which is written in a mood of less rigour, -the inhabitants of Madrid are told that nothing could be easier than to -cut up Spain into provinces, each governed by a separate viceroy. But -if the clergy, nobles, merchants, and magistrates of the capital will -swear a solemn oath upon the Blessed Sacrament to be true and loyal for -the future to King Joseph, he shall be restored to them and the Emperor -will make over to him all his rights of conquest. We cannot stop to -linger over the other details of these addresses: one of the most -astounding statements in them is that the quarrel between King Charles -and King Ferdinand had been hatched by the English ministry[535], and -that the Duke of Infantado, acting as their tool, was plotting to make -Spain England’s vassal, ‘an insensate project which would have made -blood run in torrents’! But this mattered little, as within a few weeks -every English soldier would have been cast out of the Peninsula, and -Lisbon no less than Saragossa, Valencia, and Seville would be flying -the French flag[536]. - - [535] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,547, p. 108. - - [536] Napier (i. 273) prints Bonaparte’s allocution in full, - with the astonishing comment that it ‘was an exposition of the - principles upon which Spain was to be governed, and it forces - reflection upon the passionate violence with which men resist - positive good, to seek danger, misery, and death rather than - resign their prejudices.’ Is the desire for national independence - a prejudice? And should it be easily resigned for ‘positive - good,’ e.g. administrative reform? - -In accordance with the Emperor’s command, the notables of Madrid, -civil and ecclesiastical, were compelled to go through the ceremony of -swearing allegiance to King Joseph on the Holy Sacrament, which was -exposed for several days in every church for this purpose. Apparently -a very large number of persons were induced, by terror or despair, to -give in their formal submission to the intrusive King. Three pages of -the _Madrid Gazette_ for December 15 are filled with the names of the -deputies of the ten quarters and sixty-four _barrios_ of the city, who -joined in the formal petition for the restoration to them of ‘that -sovereign who unites so much kindness of heart with such an interest in -the welfare of his subjects, and whose presence will be their joy.’ - -Satisfied with this declaration, and pretending to take it as the -expression of the wishes of every Spaniard who was not the paid agent -of England or the slave of the Inquisition, the Emperor was graciously -pleased to restore Joseph to all his rights. Great preparations were -made for his solemn entry, which was celebrated with considerable state -in the month of January. - -But his plans for the reorganization of Spain only formed a part -of the Emperor’s work at Chamartin. He was also busied in the -reconcentration of his armies, for the purpose of overrunning those -parts of the Peninsula which still remained unconquered. On the very -morrow of the fall of Madrid he had pushed out detachments in all -directions, to cover all the approaches to the capital, and to hunt -down any remnants of the Spanish armies which might still be within -reach[537]. He was particularly hopeful that he might catch the army -of the Centre, which, with Ney and Maurice Mathieu at its heels, was -coming in from the direction of Siguenza and Calatayud. To intercept -it the fusiliers of the Guard marched for Alcala, one of Victor’s -divisions for Guadalajara, and another for Aranjuez; while Bessières -with the Guard cavalry, and one of Latour-Maubourg’s brigades of -dragoons, swept all the country around the Tajuna and the Tagus. -But, as we have already seen, La Peña’s famishing men ultimately got -away in the direction of Cuenca. When it was certain that they had -escaped from the net, Napoleon rearranged his forces on the eastern -side of Madrid. Bessières, with Latour-Maubourg’s whole division of -dragoons[538], occupied cantonments facing at once towards Cuenca and -towards La Mancha: the Marshal’s head quarters, on December 11, were -at Tarancon. Of Victor’s infantry, one division (Ruffin) marched on -Toledo, which opened its gates without resistance; another, that of -Villatte, remained at Aranjuez with an advanced guard at Ocaña, a few -miles further south. The third division of the 1st Corps, that of -Lapisse, remained at Madrid. Ney’s troops were also at hand in this -quarter: when La Peña had finally escaped from him, he was told to -leave the division of Dessolles at Guadalajara and Siguenza. These -forces were destined to keep open the communications between Madrid and -Aragon, where the siege of Saragossa was just about to begin. With his -other two divisions, those of Marchand and Maurice Mathieu[539], Ney -was directed to march into Madrid: he was to form part of the mass of -troops which the Emperor was collecting, in and about the capital, for -new offensive operations. For this same purpose the 4th Corps, that of -Lefebvre, was brought up from Old Castile: the Marshal with his two -leading divisions, those of Sebastiani and Leval, arrived in Madrid on -December 9: his third division, that of Valence, composed of Poles, -was some way to the rear, having only reached Burgos on December 1. -But by the thirteenth the whole corps was concentrated at Madrid. A -few days later the divisions of Sebastiani and Valence were pushed on -to Talavera, as if to form the advanced guard of an expedition against -Estremadura, while that of Leval remained in Madrid[540]. Talavera had -been occupied, before the Duke of Dantzig’s arrival, by the cavalry -of Lasalle and Milhaud, who drove out of it without difficulty the -demoralized troops that had murdered San Juan. This mob, now under the -orders of Galluzzo, the Captain-General of Estremadura, fled behind the -Tagus and barricaded the bridges of Arzobispo and Almaraz, to cover its -front. - - [537] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,525. - - [538] I cannot speak for certain as to the moment at which - Digeon’s brigade of dragoons, which had been lent to Lannes for - the Tudela campaign, rejoined Latour-Maubourg. But probably it - came across with Ney, as it was with its division by Dec. 28 - (Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 138). - - [539] The latter had taken over Lagrange’s division after Tudela. - - [540] This division was incomplete, having left behind in Biscay - two Dutch and one German battalions. - -It will thus be seen that the troops of Victor, Lefebvre, and -Dessolles, with the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, Lasalle, and Milhaud -thrown out in front of them, formed a semicircle protecting Madrid to -the east, the south, and the south-west. On the north-west, in the -direction of the Guadarrama and the roads towards the kingdom of Leon, -the circle was completed by a brigade of Lahoussaye’s division of -dragoons, who lay in and about Avila[541]. In the centre, available for -a blow in any direction, were the whole of the Imperial Guard (horse -and foot), Ney’s corps, Lapisse’s division of Victor’s corps, and -Leval’s division of Lefebvre’s corps, besides King Joseph’s Guards--a -total of at least 40,000 men. It only needed the word to be given, -and these troops (after deducting a garrison for Madrid) could march -forward, either to join Lefebvre for a blow at Lisbon, or Victor for a -blow at Seville. - - [541] The other brigade was astray near Toledo, contrary to the - Emperor’s intention: _Nap. Corresp._, 14,594, orders it to march - on Talavera. - -Meanwhile there were still reinforcements coming up from the rear: -the belated corps of Mortier, the last great instalment of the army -of Germany, had at last reached Vittoria, accompanied by the division -of dragoons of Lorges. The Marshal was directed to take his corps to -Saragossa, in order to assist Lannes and Moncey in the siege of that -city; but the dragoons were sent to Burgos on the road to Madrid. -Moreover Junot’s corps, after having been refitted and reorganized -since its return from Portugal, was also available. Its leading -division, that of Delaborde, had crossed the Bidassoa on December 4, -and had now reached Burgos. The other two divisions, those of Loison -and Heudelet (who had replaced Travot at the head of the 3rd Division) -were not far behind. They could all be brought up to Madrid by the -first day of January. The last division of reserve cavalry, Millet’s -four regiments of dragoons, was due a little later, and had not yet -crossed the frontier. - -That the Emperor believed that there was no serious danger to be -apprehended from the side of Leon and Old Castile, is shown by the -fact that he allotted to these regions only the single corps of Soult. -Nor had the Duke of Dalmatia even the whole of his troops in hand, for -the division of Bonnet was immobilized in Santander, and only those of -Merle and Mermet were near his head quarters at Carrion. The cavalry -that properly belonged to his corps were detached, under Lasalle, in -New Castile. Instead of them he had been assigned the four regiments -forming the division of Franceschi[542]. He was promised the aid of -Millet’s dragoons when they should arrive, but this would not be for -some three weeks at the least. Nevertheless, with the 15,000 foot and -1,800 or 2,000 light cavalry at his disposal, Soult was told that he -commanded everything from the Douro to the Bay of Biscay, and that he -might advance at once into Leon, as there was nothing in his way that -could withstand him[543]. As far as the Emperor knew, the only hostile -force in this direction was the miserable wreck of Blake’s army, which -had been rallied by La Romana on the Esla. In making this supposition -he was gravely mistaken, and if Soult had obeyed his orders without -delay, and advanced westward from Carrion, he would have found himself -in serious trouble; for, as we shall presently see, the English from -Salamanca were in full march against him at the moment when the Emperor -dispatched these instructions. It was in the valley of the Douro, -and not (as Bonaparte intended) in that of the Tagus that the next -developments of the winter campaign of 1808 were to take place. - - [542] 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs, 1st Supplementary regiment of - Chasseurs, and Hanoverian Chasseurs. - - [543] Cf. _Nap. Corresp._, 14,581 (of Dec. 10, 1808, but wrongly - dated Dec. 17 in the collection), the rough draft of the - dispatch to be sent to Soult, with the full document, which was - fortunately captured on its way to Carrion, and fell into the - hands of Sir John Moore. It is printed in the original French in - James Moore’s account of his brother’s campaign (London, 1809). - The documents tally accurately, but Berthier has expanded, as was - his wont, Napoleon’s short phrases. - -It remains only to speak of the north-east. The Emperor was determined -that Saragossa should pay dearly for the renown that it had won during -its first siege. He directed against it not only Moncey’s force, the -troops which had won Tudela, but the whole of Mortier’s 5th Corps. One -of its divisions was to take post at Calatayud, relieving Musnier’s -eight battalions at that point, and to keep open (with the aid of -Dessolles) the road from Saragossa to Madrid: but the rest would be -available to aid in the siege. More than 40,000 men were to be turned -against Palafox and the stubborn Aragonese. With Catalonia we need not -deal in this place: the operations in the principality had little or no -connexion with those in the rest of Spain. St. Cyr and Duhesme, with -the 7th Corps, had to work out their own salvation. They were not to -expect help from the Emperor, nor on the other hand were they expected -to assist him for the present, though it was hoped that some day they -might invade Aragon from the side of Lerida. - -Looking at the disposition of the French troops on December 15-20, we -can see that the Emperor had it in his power to push the central mass -at Madrid, supported by the oncoming reserves under Junot and Lorges, -either to support Lefebvre on the road to Lisbon, or Victor on the road -to Seville. As a matter of fact there can be no doubt that the former -was his intention. He was fully under the impression that the English -army was at this moment executing a hasty retreat upon Portugal, and -he had announced that his next move was to hurl them into the sea. -‘Tout porte à penser que les Anglais sont en pleine marche rétrograde,’ -he wrote to Soult on December 10. On December 12 he issued in his -_Bulletin_ the statement that the ‘English are in full flight towards -Lisbon, and if they do not make good speed the French army may enter -that capital before them[544].’ If anything was wanted to confirm the -Emperor in his idea that the English were not likely to be heard of in -the north, it was the capture by Lasalle’s cavalry of eight stragglers -belonging to the King’s German Legion near Talavera. ‘When we catch -Hanoverians the English cannot be far off,’ he observed[545], and made -all his arrangements on the hypothesis that Moore would be met in the -valley of the Tagus, and not in that of the Douro. In so doing he was -breaking one of his own precepts, that censuring generals ‘qui se font -des tableaux’ concerning their enemy’s position and intentions, before -they have sufficient data upon which to form a sound conclusion. All -that he really knew about Moore and his army was that they had reached -Salamanca in the middle of November, and had been joined towards the -end of the month by Hope’s column that marched--as we shall presently -relate--via Badajoz and the Escurial. Of the existence of this last -division we have clear proof that Bonaparte was aware, for he inserted -a silly taunt in the _Bulletin_ of December 5 to the effect that ‘the -conduct of the British had been dishonourable. Six thousand of them -were at the Escurial on November 20: the Spaniards hoped that they -would aid in the defence of the capital of their allies. But they did -not know the English: as soon as the latter heard that the Emperor -was at the Somosierra they beat a retreat, joined the division at -Salamanca, and retired towards the sea-coast.’ There is also no doubt -that the Emperor had received intelligence of a more or less definite -sort concerning the landing of Baird’s division at Corunna. It is -vaguely alluded to in the 10th _Bulletin_, and clearly spoken of in -the _Madrid Gazette_ of December 17[546]. But though aware of the -existence of all the three fractions of the British army, Bonaparte -could draw no other deduction from the facts at his disposal than -that the whole of them would promptly retreat to Portugal, when the -passage of the Somosierra and the fall of Madrid became known to -their commander-in-chief. Lisbon, he thought, must be their base of -operations, and on it they must retire: he had forgotten that one of -the advantages of sea-power is that the combatant who possesses it can -transfer his base to any port that he may choose. So far from being -tied to Lisbon was Moore, that he at one moment contemplated making -Cadiz his base, and finally moved it to Corunna. - - [544] See the statement in the _Madrid Gazette_ for Dec. 12 - (p. 1576). It is not in the _Correspondance de Napoléon_, and - contains invaluable details as to the placing of the French army - on that day. - - [545] ‘Le général Lasalle a pris huit Hanovriens.... Puisqu’il a - pris des Hanovriens, cela sent la proximité des Anglais’ (_Nap. - Corresp._, 14,551, Dec. 12). These must have been stragglers from - Hope’s division, which had passed Talavera at least a fortnight - before. The Germans with it were the 3rd Light Dragoons, K.G.L. - - [546] Napoleon seems to have got the knowledge of Baird’s arrival - from the London newspapers. An English brigantine, called the - _Ferret_, ran into Santander, under the impression that it was - still in Spanish hands. On board were many journals, with details - about the Cintra Court of Inquiry, and about the reinforcements - for Spain. Long extracts from them were reprinted in the _Madrid - Gazette_ for the second half of December. The danger of the press - already existed! - -With pre-conceived ideas of this sort in his head, the Emperor was -preparing to push on his main body in support of the advanced troops -under Lefebvre and Lasalle on the road to Estremadura and Portugal. -Victor meanwhile was to guard against the unlikely chance of any move -being made on Madrid by the shattered ‘Army of the Centre’ from Cuenca, -or by new Andalusian levies. Already Lasalle’s horsemen were pushing on -to Truxillo and Plasencia, almost to the gates of Badajoz and to the -Portuguese frontier, when unexpected news arrived, and the whole plan -of campaign was upset. - -Instead of retiring on Lisbon, Sir John Moore had pushed forward -into the plains of Old Castile, and was advancing by forced marches -to attack the isolated corps of Marshal Soult. Bonaparte was keenly -alive, now as always, to the danger of a defeat in the valley of the -Douro. Moreover the sight of a British army in the field, and within -striking distance, acted on him as the red rag acts upon the bull. -No toil or trouble would be too great that ended in its destruction, -and looking at his maps the Emperor thought that he saw the way to -surround and annihilate Moore’s host. Throwing up without a moment’s -delay the whole plan for the invasion of Portugal, he marched for the -passes of the Guadarrama with every man that was disposable at Madrid. -His spirits were high, and the event seemed to him certain. He sent -back to his brother Joseph the command to put in the Madrid newspapers -and circulate everywhere the news that 36,000 English troops were -surrounded and doomed to destruction[547]. Meanwhile, with 50,000 men -at his back, he was marching hard for Arevalo and Benavente. - - [547] I know no better way of displaying the Napoleonesque method - than the printing opposite each other of his dispatches 14,620 - and 14,626, both addressed to Joseph Bonaparte. For the benefit - of the newspapers the English army was to be overstated by 10,000 - or 12,000 men! - - 14,620. 14,626. - - Faites mettre dans les journaux Leur force _réelle_ est de 20,000 - et répandre partout que 36,000 à 21,000 infanterie, et de 4,000 - Anglais sont cernés. Je suis à 5,000 de cavalerie avec une - sur leurs derrières tandis que quarantaine de pièces de canon. - le maréchal Soult est devant - eux. - - - - -SECTION VIII: CHAPTER II - -MOORE AT SALAMANCA - - -It will be remembered that on October 6, 1808, the command of the -British forces in Portugal had passed into the hands of Sir John Moore, -to the entire satisfaction of Wellesley and the other officers who had -served under those slow and cautious generals Sir Hew Dalrymple and -Sir Harry Burrard. The moment that the news of Vimiero was received, -and long before the details of the Convention of Cintra could come to -hand, the Government had determined to send on the victorious British -army into Spain, and to assist it with heavy reinforcements from home. -Dalrymple was even informed that he might cross the frontier at once, -if he chose, without waiting for any detailed instructions from the War -Office[548]. Wellesley, as we have seen, thought that his chief should -have done so without delay, and observed that if _he_ had charge of -affairs the army would be at Madrid by October 1[549]. - - [548] Castlereagh to Dalrymple, Sept. 2, 1808: ‘As circumstances - may come to your knowledge which might render the immediate - employment of your disposable forces in the north of Spain of the - utmost importance to the common cause, without waiting for orders - from hence, I am to inform you that you should not consider - the present instructions as depriving you of the latitude of - discretion which you now possess, without waiting for express - orders from hence.’ - - [549] See p. 274. - -Yet when Moore took over the command, he found that little or nothing -had been done to carry out this design. The delay was partly occasioned -by the tardy evacuation of Portugal by Junot’s troops: the last of -them, as we have seen[550], did not leave the Tagus till the month -of October had begun. But it was still more due to the leisurely and -feeble management of Dalrymple, who would not march without detailed -and definite orders from home. He might well have begun to move his -brigades eastward long before the last small detachments of the French -had disappeared. But when on October 6 Dalrymple’s successor looked -around him, he found that the whole army was still concentrated in the -neighbourhood of Lisbon, save Hope’s two brigades, and these had been -sent forward to the frontier not so much for the purpose of entering -Spain, as for that of bringing moral force to bear on General Galluzzo, -and compelling him to abandon his ridiculous siege of Elvas. Two things -had been especially neglected by Dalrymple--the exploration of the -roads that lead from Portugal into Spain, and the pressing on of the -formation of a proper divisional and regimental transport for the army. -It is strange to find that he had remembered the existence of both of -these needs: his dispatches speak of his intention to send officers -both towards Badajoz and into Beira, and he asserts that ‘the army is -in high order and fit to move when required[551].’ Yet his successor -had to state that as a matter of fact no body of information about the -routes and resources of Portugal and Spain had been collected, and that -the scheme for moving and feeding the army had not been drawn up. ‘When -I shall pass the frontier of Portugal,’ wrote Moore to Castlereagh, -‘it is impossible for me at this instant to say: it depends on a -knowledge of the country which I am still without, and on commissariat -arrangements yet unmade[552].’ We may grant that Dalrymple had been -somewhat handicapped by the fact that his army had been landed, -in the old haphazard British fashion, without any proper military -train. We may also concede that no one could have foreseen that the -Portuguese and Spanish governments would be unable to supply any useful -information concerning the main roads and the resources of their own -countries. But the whole month of September had been at the disposal of -the late commander-in-chief, and he, with his quartermaster-general, -Murray, must take the blame of having failed to accomplish in it all -that might have been done. Within a fortnight after the Convention of -Cintra had been signed, British officers ought to have explored every -road to the frontier, and to have reported on their facilities. Yet -on October 6 Moore could not find any one who could tell him whether -the roads Lisbon-Sabugal-Almeida, and Lisbon-Abrantes-Castello Branco -were or were not practicable for artillery! And this was in spite of -the fact that a British detachment had actually marched from Lisbon -to Almeida, in order to receive the surrender of the garrison of -that fortress. The fact would seem to be that Dalrymple had placed -his confidence in the native governments of the Peninsula. He vainly -imagined that the Portuguese engineers could supply him with accurate -details concerning the roads and resources of Beira and the Alemtejo. -He sent a very capable officer--Lord William Bentinck--to Madrid, and -entered into communication with the Spanish government. From them -he hoped that he might get some account of the plan of campaign in -which his army was to join, a list of the routes which it would be -convenient for him to use, and details as to the way in which he could -collect and carry provisions. As a matter of fact he could only obtain -a quantity of vague and generally useless suggestions, some of which -argued an astonishing ignorance of military affairs in those who made -them. If there had been a Spanish commander-in-chief, Dalrymple might -have extracted from him his views about the campaign that must shortly -begin. But the Junta had steadfastly refused to unite the charge of -their many armies in the hands of a single general: they told Lord -William that he might make inquiries from Castaños: but the Andalusian -general could only speak for himself. It was not he, but a council -of war, that would settle the plan of operations: he could only give -Bentinck the conclusions that had been arrived at after the abortive -meeting of generals that had taken place on September 5. In answer to -a string of questions administered to him by Dalrymple’s emissary, -as to the routes that the British army had better follow, and the -methods of supply that it had better adopt, he could only reply that -he was at present without good maps, and could not give the necessary -information in detail. He could only refer Bentinck to the newly formed -Commissariat Board (_Junta de Víveres_), which ought to be able to -designate the best routes with reference to the feeding of the army and -the establishment of magazines[553]. Of course this board turned out -to know even less than Castaños himself. Nothing whatever was done for -the British army, with the exception that a certain Colonel Lopez was -sent to its head quarters to act as the representative of the _Junta -de Víveres_. It does not seem that he was able to do anything for the -expeditionary force that they could not have done for themselves. In -this way the whole time that Dalrymple had at his disposal had been -wasted in the long correspondence with Madrid, and not a soldier had -passed the frontier when Moore took up the command. - - [550] See p. 283, dealing with the garrison of Elvas. - - [551] Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Sept. 27. - - [552] Moore to Castlereagh from Lisbon, Oct. 9, 1808. - - [553] The very interesting (and sometimes very sensible) replies - of Castaños to Bentinck will be found in the latter’s letter to - Dalrymple (Oct. 2). - -Meanwhile, it ought at least to have been possible to make preparations -in Portugal, even if nothing could be done in Spain. But the question -of transport and commissariat was a very difficult one. The British -army had struggled from Mondego Bay to Lisbon with the aid of the -small ox-wagons of the country-side, requisitioned and dismissed from -village to village. But clearly a long campaign in Spain could not -be managed on these lines. A permanent provision of draught and pack -animals was required, and natives must be hired to drive them. The few -regular enlisted men of the Royal Wagon Train who had reached Portugal -were only enough to take care of the more important military stores. -Moreover their wagons turned out to be much too heavy for the roads of -the Peninsula, and had to be gradually replaced by country carts[554]. -The great mass of the regimental baggage and the food had always to be -transported on mules, or vehicles bought or hired from the peasantry. -The Portuguese did not care to contract to take their animals over the -frontier, and it was most difficult to collect transport of any kind, -even with the aid of the local authorities. When once Moore’s dreadful -retreat began, his drivers and muleteers deserted their wagons and -beasts, and fled home, resolved that if they must lose their property -they would not lose their lives also[555]. - - [554] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808. - - [555] A good account of the difficulties of transport in Moore’s - army will be found in Quartermaster Surtees’s _Twenty-five Years - in the Rifle Brigade_. Placed in charge of the baggage and beasts - of the 2/95th, he found it absolutely impossible to keep the - native drivers from absconding, even when they had to sacrifice - their beasts to do so (pages 81-82). - -In later years Wellington gradually succeeded in collecting a large -and invaluable army of Spanish and Portuguese employés, who--in their -own fashion--were as good campaigners as his soldiery, and served him -with exemplary fidelity even when their pay was many months in arrear. -But in 1808 this body of trained camp-followers did not exist, and -Moore had the greatest difficulty in scraping together the transport -that took him forward to Salamanca. As to commissariat arrangements, -he found that even though he divided his army into several small -columns, and utilized as many separate routes as possible, it was not -easy for the troops to live. The commissariat officers, sent on to -collect magazines at the various halting-places, were so inexperienced -and so uniformly ignorant of the Portuguese tongue, that even where -they were energetic they had the greatest difficulty in catering for -the army. Wellesley, as we have already seen[@repeated 556 note], -had been complaining bitterly of their inefficiency during the short -Vimiero campaign. Moore, more gracious in his phrases, wrote that ‘we -have a Commissariat extremely zealous, but quite new and inexperienced -in the important duties which it falls to their lot to perform.’ This -was but one of the many penalties which England had to pay for her long -abstention from continental warfare on a large scale. It is easy to -blame the ministry, the permanent officials in London, or the executive -officials on the spot[556]. But in reality mere want of knowledge of -the needs of a great land-war accounts for most of the mistakes that -were committed. To lavish angry criticism on individuals, as did the -Opposition papers in England at the time, was almost as unjust as it -was useless. The art of war, in this as in its other branches, had to -be learnt; it was not possible to pick it up by intuition. Nothing can -be more interesting than to look through the long series of orders and -directions drawn up by the quartermaster-general’s department between -1809 and 1813, in which the gradual evolution of order out of chaos by -dint of practical experience can be traced. But in October, 1808, the -process was yet in its infancy. - - [556] See p. 231. - -It was with the greatest difficulty, therefore, that Moore got his -army under weigh. He found it, as he wrote to Castlereagh, ‘without -equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage -of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other -appendage of an army, and without a magazine formed on any of the -routes by which we are to march[557].’ Within ten days, however, the -whole force was on the move. The heavy impedimenta were placed in store -in Lisbon: it was a thousand pities that the troops did not leave -behind their women and children, whose presence with the regiments was -destined to cause so many harrowing scenes during the forced marches -of the ensuing winter. They were offered a passage to England, but the -greater part refused it, and the colonels (from mistaken kindness) -generally allowed them to march with their corps. - - [557] Moore to Castlereagh, Oct. 9, 1808. - -The direction in which the army was to move had been settled in a -general way by the dispatches sent from Castlereagh to Dalrymple in -September[558]. It was to be held together in a single mass and sent -forward to the Ebro, there to be put in line with Blake and Castaños. -An attempt on the part of the Junta to distract part of it to Catalonia -had been firmly and very wisely rejected. The French were still on -the defensive when the plan was drawn out, and Burgos had been named -as the point at which the British troops might aim. It was very close -to the enemy, but in September neither English nor Spanish statesmen -were taking into consideration the probability of the advent of the -Emperor, and his immediate assumption of the offensive. They were -rather dreaming of an advance towards the Pyrenees by the allied -armies. If the large reinforcements which were promised to Moore were -destined to land at Corunna, rather than at Gihon or Santander, it was -merely because these latter ports were known to be small and destitute -of resources, not because they were considered to be dangerously -near to the French. La Romana’s division, it will be remembered, was -actually put ashore at Santander: it is quite possible that Sir David -Baird’s troops might have been sent to the same destination, but for -the fortunate fact that it was believed that it would be impossible -to supply him with transport from the bare and rugged region of -the Montaña. Corunna was selected as the landing-place for all the -regiments that were to join Moore, partly on account of its safe and -spacious port, partly because it was believed that food and draught -animals could be collected with comparative ease from Galicia. - - [558] Castlereagh to Dalrymple, Sept. 2, 1808. - -More than 12,000 men, including three regiments of cavalry (the arm -in which the force in Portugal was most deficient) and a brigade of -the Guards, had been drawn from the home garrisons. The charge of this -fine division had been given to Sir David Baird[559], an officer with -a great Indian reputation, but comparatively unpractised in European -warfare. They were embarked at Harwich, Portsmouth, Ramsgate, and Cork -at various dates during September and October, and on the thirteenth -of the latter month the main body of the force reached Corunna. By -some stupid mismanagement at home the cavalry, the most important part -of the expedition, were shipped off the last, and did not arrive till -three weeks[560] after the rest of the troops had reached Spain. - - [559] It is fair to this distinguished officer to state that his - dispatches and letters show no trace whatever of the irascible - and impracticable temper that has been attributed to him. They - are most sensible, cautious, and prudent, and not at all what - might have been expected from the hero of the story of ‘the lad - that was chained to our Davie.’ - - [560] The 7th and 10th Hussars apparently on Nov. 7, the 15th - Hussars on Nov. 12. See Baird to Castlereagh, Nov. 8 and 13, 1808. - -By October 18 Moore reported that the greater part of his troops -were already in motion, and as Baird’s infantry had reached Corunna -on the thirteenth, it might have been expected that the junction -of their forces would have taken place in time to enable them to -play a part in the defensive campaign against Napoleon which ended -in the fall of Madrid on December 4. If the troops had marched -promptly, and by the best and shortest routes, they might have easily -concentrated at Salamanca by the middle of November: Napier suggests -the thirteenth[561] as a probable day, and considering the distances -the date seems a very reasonable one. At that moment Gamonal and -Espinosa had only just been fought and lost: Tudela was yet ten days -in the future: sixteen days were to elapse before the Somosierra was -forced. It is clear that the British army, which at Salamanca would -have been only seven marches (150 miles) from Madrid, and four marches -(eighty miles) from Valladolid, might have intervened in the struggle: -whether its intervention might not have ended in disaster, considering -the enormous forces of the French[562], is another matter. But the -British Government intended that Moore and Baird should take part in -the campaign: the Junta had been told to expect their help: and for the -consolidation of the alliance between the two nations it was desirable -that the help should be given in the most prompt and effective fashion. - - [561] Napier, i. 347. - - [562] It is to be remembered that Baird’s cavalry would not have - been up till Nov. 20-25, owing to its tardy start from England. - Nothing could have been more unlucky. - -There is no possibility of asserting that this was done. Moore and -Baird did not join till December 20: no British soldier fired a single -shot at a Frenchman before December 12[563]. The whole army was so -much out of the campaign that Bonaparte never could learn what had -become of it, and formed the most erroneous hypotheses concerning -its position and intentions. We may frankly say that not one of his -movements, down to the fall of Madrid, was in the least influenced by -the fact that there was a British force in Spain. - - [563] At the skirmish at Rueda on that date. - -That this circumstance was most unfortunate from the political point -of view it would be childish to deny. It gave discontented Spaniards -the opportunity of asserting that they had been deserted and betrayed -by their allies[564]. It afforded Bonaparte the chance, which he did -not fail to take, of enlarging upon the invariable selfishness and -timidity of the British[565]. It furnished the critics of the ministry -in London with a text for declamations against the imbecility of its -arrangements. It is true that after the fall of Madrid Moore was -enabled, by the new situation of affairs, to make that demonstration -against the French lines of communication in Castile which wrecked -Napoleon’s original plan of campaign, and saved Lisbon and Seville. But -this tardy though effective intervention in the struggle was a mere -afterthought. Moore’s original plan had been to make a tame retreat -on Lisbon, when he discovered that he was too late to save Madrid. It -was a mere chance that an intercepted dispatch and an unfounded rumour -caused him to throw up the idea of retiring into Portugal, and to -strike at the Emperor’s flank and rear by his famous march on Sahagun. -Without this piece of good fortune he would never have repaired the -mischief caused by the lateness of his original arrival on the scene. -How that late arrival came to pass it is now our duty to investigate. - - [564] See the letters from Spanish officers in the _Madrid - Gazette_ for Dec. 19, 1808. - - [565] See the Dec. 5 _Bulletin_, and the inspired articles in the - _Madrid Gazette_ for Dec. 14. - -As far as Moore’s own army was concerned, the loss of time may be -ascribed to a single cause--a mistake made in the choice of the roads -by which the advance into Spain was conducted. It was the original -intention of the British general to march on Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo -by three parallel routes, those by Coimbra and Celorico, by Abrantes, -Castello Branco, and Guarda, and by Elvas, Alcantara, and Coria[566]. -He was compelled to utilize the last-named road, which was rather -circuitous and notoriously bad, by the fact that Dalrymple had left -Hope’s two brigades at Elvas, and that any advance from that place -into the kingdom of Leon could only be directed across the bridge -of Alcantara. If Moore had stuck to this original resolve, and used -none but these three roads, his army might have been concentrated at -Salamanca on or about November 13. This could have been done with -ease if all the reserve artillery and heavy baggage had taken the -Coimbra-Celorico road, the easiest of the three, and nothing but an -irreducible minimum had been allowed to follow the columns which went -by the other routes. It would have been necessary also to move the -troops in masses of not less than a brigade, and to keep them well -closed up. - - [566] Moore to Castlereagh, Oct. 9: ‘The march from this will be - by the three roads Coimbra, Guarda, and Alcantara.’ - -Moore had the best intentions: he cut down the baggage to what -he considered the smallest practicable bulk, and started off the -leading regiments on the Coimbra route as easily as October 11, two -days after he had taken over the command[567]. ‘I am sufficiently -aware,’ he wrote, ‘of the importance of even the name of a British -army in Spain, and I am hurrying as much as possible[568].’ Then -followed an irreparable mistake: it was all-important to find -out which of the roads was most suitable for artillery and heavy -baggage. Moore consulted the available officers of the old Portuguese -army, and received from them the almost incredibly erroneous -information that neither the Coimbra-Celorico-Almeida road nor the -Abrantes-Guarda-Almeida road was practicable for artillery. It would -seem that he also sought information from the officers whom Dalrymple -had sent out into the province of Beira, and that their answers tallied -with those of the Portuguese[569], for he wrote to Castlereagh that -‘every information agreed that neither of them was fit for artillery or -could be recommended for cavalry.’ General Anstruther, then in command -at Almeida, must take a considerable share in the blame that has to be -distributed to those who failed to give the Commander-in-chief accurate -information, for he more than any one else had been given the chance -of trying these roads. But whatever may be the proportion in which the -censure must be distributed, a certain amount must be reserved for -Moore himself. He ought on first principles to have refused to believe -the strange news that was brought to him. It might have occurred to -him to ask how heavy guns of position had found their way to the -ramparts of Almeida, the second fortress of Portugal, if there was -no practicable road leading to it. A few minutes spent in consulting -any book dealing with Portuguese history would have shown that in the -great wars of the Spanish Succession, and again in that of 1762[570], -forces of all arms had moved freely up and down the Spanish frontier, -in the direction of Celorico, Guarda, Sabugal, and Castello Branco. -Even a glance at Dumouriez’s _Account of the Kingdom of Portugal_, the -one modern military book on the subject then available, would have -enabled Moore to correct the ignorant reports of the natives. Strangest -of all, there seems to have been no one to tell him that, only four -months before, Loison, in his campaign against the insurgents of Beira, -had taken guns first from Lisbon to Almeida, then from Almeida to -Pezo-de-Ragoa and Vizeu, and finally from Almeida to Abrantes[571]. -It is simply astounding that no one seems to have remembered this -simple fact. In short, it was not easily pardonable in any competent -general that he should accept as possible the statement that there -was no road for artillery connecting the capital of Portugal and the -main stronghold of its north-eastern frontier. Moore did so, and in a -fortnight was bitterly regretting his credulity. ‘If anything adverse -happens,’ he wrote to his subordinate Hope, ‘I have not necessity to -plead: the road we are now travelling [Abrantes-Villa Velha-Guarda] -reached Guarda, and as far as I have already seen the road presents -few obstacles, and those easily surmounted. This knowledge was only -acquired by our own officers: when the brigade was at Castello Branco, -it was still not certain that it could proceed[572].’ What made the -case worse was that another of the three roads, the one by Coimbra -and Celorico, was far easier than that by Guarda. Both Wellesley and -Masséna took enormous trains of artillery and baggage over it in 1810, -without any particular difficulty[573]. - - [567] Moore to Castlereagh, Oct. 9. - - [568] Ibid., Oct. 11. - - [569] Moore also consulted Colonel Lopez, the Spanish officer - who had been sent to his head quarters by the Junta, as being - specially skilled in roads and topography. But Lopez disclaimed - any knowledge, and could only say that Junot’s artillery had been - nearly ruined by the roads between Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes. - - [570] e.g. in 1706 Lord Galway took over forty guns, twelve of - which were heavy siege-pieces, from Elvas by Alcantara and Coria - to Ciudad Rodrigo. In 1762 the Spaniards took no less than ninety - guns from Ciudad Rodrigo by Celorico and Sabugal to Castello - Branco, and thence back into Spain. - - [571] Napier does not seem to know this, and distinctly states - (i. 102) that Loison had no guns. - - [572] Moore to Hope, from Almeida, Nov. 8. - - [573] In endeavouring to excuse Moore, Napier takes the strange - course of making out that the Guarda road, though usable, as - experience showed, was ‘in a military sense, non-practicable’ - from its difficulties. This will not stand in face of Moore’s - words quoted above. Of the Coimbra-Celorico road he omits all - mention (i. 345). - -Misled by the erroneous reports as to the impracticability of the -Portuguese roads, Moore took the unhappy step of sending six of the -seven batteries of his corps, his only two cavalry regiments, and -four battalions of infantry to act as escort[574], by the circuitous -high-road from Elvas to Madrid. In order to reach Salamanca they were -to advance almost to the gates of the Spanish capital, only turning -off at Talavera, in order to take the route by the Escurial, Espinar, -and Arevalo. To show the result of this lamentable divagation, it is -only necessary to remark that from Lisbon to Salamanca via Coimbra -is about 250 miles: from Lisbon to Salamanca via Elvas, Talavera, -and Arevalo is about 380 miles: i.e. it was certain that the column -containing all Moore’s cavalry and nearly all his guns would be at -least seven or eight days late at the rendezvous, in a crisis when -every moment was of vital importance. As a matter of fact the head of -the main column reached Salamanca on November 13: the cavalry and guns -turned up on December 4. It would not be fair, however, to say that -the absence of Hope’s column delayed the advance of the whole army for -so much as three weeks. It was only the leading regiments from Lisbon -that appeared on November 13. However carefully the march of the rest -had been arranged, the rear could not have come in till several days -later: indeed the last brigade did not appear till the twenty-third: -this delay, however, was owing to bad arrangements and preventable -accidents. But it cannot be denied that the twelve days Nov. 23-Dec. 4 -were completely sacrificed by the non-arrival of the cavalry and guns, -without which Moore very wisely refused to move forward. If the army -had been concentrated--Baird could easily have arrived from Corunna -ere this--it would have been able to advance on November 23, and the -campaign would undoubtedly have been modified in its character, for -the Emperor would have learnt of the arrival of Moore upon the scene -some days before he crossed the Somosierra and started on his march for -Madrid. There can be no doubt that he would have changed his plans on -receiving such news, for the sight of a British army within striking -distance would have caused him to turn aside at once with a large part -of his army. Very probably he might have directed Lefebvre, Victor, and -the Imperial Guard--all the disposable forces under his hand--against -Moore, and have left Madrid alone for the present as a mere secondary -object. It is impossible to deny that disaster to the British arms -might have followed: on the other hand Moore was a cautious general, as -his operations in December showed. He would probably have retired at -once to the mountains, and left the Emperor a fruitless stern-chase, -such as that which actually took place a month later. But whether -he would have fallen back on the route to Portugal, or on the route -to Galicia, it is impossible to say: everything would have depended -on the exact development of Napoleon’s advance, but the first-named -alternative is the more probable[575]. - - [574] These were the 2nd, 36th, 71st, and 92nd Foot. - - [575] Napier has a long note, in justification of Moore, to the - effect that if the concentration point of the British army had - been Burgos instead of Salamanca, Hope’s detour would have cost - no waste of time, and would have been rather profitable than - otherwise. But Moore distinctly looked upon the movement as a - deplorable necessity, not as a proper strategical proceeding. - ‘It is a great round,’ he wrote to Castlereagh on October 27, - when announcing this modification of his original plan, ‘and - will separate the corps, for a time, from the rest of the army: - _but there is no help for it_.’ Moreover he stated, in this same - letter, that he would not move forward an inch from Salamanca - till Hope should have reached Espinar, on the northern side of - the Guadarrama Pass. At a later date he announced that he should - not advance till Hope had got even nearer to him, and made his - way as far as Arevalo [letter of Nov. 24]. He was too good a - general to dream of a concentration at Burgos, when once he had - ascertained the relative positions of the Spanish and the French - armies, for that place was within a couple of marches of the - enemy’s outposts at Miranda and Logroño. There is, in short, no - way of justifying Hope’s circular march, when once it is granted - that the roads of Northern Portugal were not impracticable for - artillery. Moore knew this perfectly well, as his letter to Hope, - which we have quoted on p. 495 shows. No arguments are worth - anything in his justification when he himself writes ‘if anything - adverse happens, I have not necessity to plead.’ This is the - language of an honest man, conscious that he has made a mistake, - and prepared to take the responsibility. Napier’s apology for him - (i. 345-7) is but ingenious and eloquent casuistry. - -The erroneous direction given to Moore’s cavalry and guns, however, -was not the only reason for the late appearance of the British army -upon the theatre of war. Almost as much delay was caused by a piece -of egregious folly and procrastination, for which the Spaniards -were wholly responsible. When Sir David Baird and the bulk of his -great convoy arrived in the harbour of Corunna on October 13, he was -astonished to find that the Junta of Galicia raised serious objections -to allowing him to land. Their real reason for so doing was that -they wished the British troops to disembark further east, at Gihon -or Santander. They did not realize the military danger of throwing -them ashore in places so close to the French army, nor did it affect -them in the least when they were told that the equipment of Baird’s -force in those barren regions would be almost impossible. All that -they cared for was to preserve Galicia from the strain of having to -make provisions for the feeding and transport of a second army, when -all its resources had been sorely tried in supplying (and supplying -most indifferently) the troops of Blake. They did not, however, make -mention of their real objections to Baird’s disembarkation in their -correspondence with him, but assumed an attitude of very suspicious -humility, stating that they considered their functions to have come -to an end now that the Central Junta had met, and that they thought -it beyond their competence to give consent to the landing of such a -large body of men without explicit directions from Aranjuez. Baird -could not offer to land by force, in face of this opposition. He did -not, however, move off to Santander (as the Galicians had hoped), but -insisted that an officer should be promptly dispatched to the Supreme -Junta. This was done, but the delay in receiving an answer was so -great that thirteen days were wasted: the Galician officer bearing -the consent of the central government travelled (so Moore complained) -with the greatest deliberation, as if he were carrying an unimportant -message in full time of peace[576]. The first regiments, therefore, -only landed on October 26, and it was not till November 4 that all -the infantry were ashore. Thus they were certain to be late at the -rendezvous in the plains of Leon. Nor was this all: the Supreme Junta -had suggested that, in order to facilitate the feeding of the division, -Baird should send it forward not in large masses but in bodies of 2,000 -men, with a considerable interval between them. The advice was taken, -and in consequence the troops were soon spread out over the whole -length of road between Corunna and Astorga. The greatest difficulty was -found in equipping them for the march: Galicia, always a poor country, -had been almost stripped of mules and carts to supply Blake. It was -absolutely impossible to procure a sufficient train for the transport -of Baird’s food and baggage. He was only able to gather enough beasts -to carry his lighter impedimenta from stage to stage, by the offer of -exorbitant rates of hire. He vainly hoped to complete his equipment -when he should have reached the plains. Part of his difficulties was -caused by lack of money: the Government at home had not realized that -only hard cash would circulate in Spain: dollars in abundance were -to come out in the _Tigre_ frigate in a few weeks: meanwhile it was -expected that the Spaniards would gladly accept British Government -bills. But so little was paper liked in the Peninsula that only £5,000 -or £6,000 in dollars could be raised at Corunna[577]: without further -resources it would have been impossible to begin to push the army -forward. The feat was only accomplished by borrowing 92,000 dollars -from the Galician Junta. For this act, carefully ignored by Napier, -they deserve a proper recognition: it shows a much better spirit than -might have been expected after their foolish behaviour about the -disembarkation. Shortly after, Baird succeeded in getting £40,000 from -Mr. Frere, the new minister to Madrid, who chanced to arrive at Corunna -with £410,000 in cash destined for the Spanish government. Finally on -November 9 the expected ship came in with the 500,000 dollars that had -been originally intended to be divided between Corunna and Lisbon, -and Baird had as much money as he could possibly require, even when -mules and draught-oxen had risen to famine prices in Galicia[578]. If -he still found it hard to move, it was because this poor and desolate -province was really drained dry of resources[579]. - - [576] Moore to Bentinck from Salamanca, Nov. 13, 1808. - - [577] Baird to Castlereagh, Oct. 14, 1808. - - [578] Napier knew the correspondence of Baird by heart. It is - therefore most unfair in him to suppress the loan made by the - Galician Junta, which appears in Sir David’s letters of Oct. 22, - 29, and Nov. 13, as also the receipt of the 500,000 dollars sent - by the British Government in the _Tigre_, which is acknowledged - in the letter of Nov. 9. He implies that the only sums received - were £40,000 from Mr. Frere and £8,000 from Sir John Moore. The - simple fact is that no good act done by a Spanish Junta or a Tory - minister is ever acknowledged by Napier. - - [579] After reading Sir Charles Vaughan’s diary, showing how hard - he and Mr. Stuart found it to procure enough draught animals to - take their small party from Corunna to Madrid, in September, - 1808, I cannot doubt that by October the collecting of the - transport for a whole army was an almost impossible task in - Galicia. - -But what between the Junta’s folly in hindering the landing of the -troops, and the unfortunate lack of money in the second half of -October, all-important time was lost. Baird ought to have been near -Salamanca by November 13: as a matter of fact he had only reached -Astorga with three brigades of infantry and some artillery, but without -a single mounted man to cover his march, on November 22. There he -received, to his infinite dismay, the news that Blake had been routed -at Espinosa on November 11, and Belvedere at Gamonal on November 10. -There was now no Spanish army between him and the French: the latter -might be advancing, for all he knew, upon Leon. He heard of Soult being -at Reynosa, and Lefebvre at Carrion: if they continued their advance -westward, they would catch him, with the 9,000 infantry of the Corunna -column, marching across their front on the way to Salamanca. Appalled -at the prospect, he halted at Astorga, and, after sending news of his -situation to Moore, began to prepare to retreat on Corunna, if the -marshals should continue their movement in his direction. This, as -we have already seen, they did not: Napoleon had no knowledge of the -position of the British troops, and instead of ordering the dukes of -Dalmatia and Dantzig to push westward, moved them both in a southerly -direction. Soult came down to Sahagun and Carrion: Lefebvre, on being -relieved by the 2nd Corps, moved on Madrid by way of Segovia. Thus -Baird, left entirely unmolested, was in the end able to join Moore. - -It is time to turn to the movements of that general. After sending -off Sir John Hope on his unhappy circular march by Badajoz and the -Escurial, he set out from Lisbon on October 26. He took with him the -whole force in Portugal, save a single division which was left behind -to protect Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida while a new native army was -being reorganized. This detachment was to be commanded by Sir John -Cradock, who was just due from England: it comprised four battalions -of the German Legion, a battalion each of the 9th, 27th, 29th, 31st, -40th, 45th, and 97th Foot, the wrecks of the 20th Light Dragoons, -and six batteries of artillery--about 9,000 men in all. The rest, -twenty-five battalions of infantry, two cavalry regiments and seven -batteries, marched for Spain. Two brigades under Beresford took the -good road by Coimbra and Celorico to Almeida: three under Fraser went -by Abrantes and Guarda, taking with them the single battery which Moore -had retained with his main body, in order to try whether the roads of -Eastern Portugal were as bad as his advisers had reported. Two brigades -under General Paget, starting from Elvas, not from Lisbon, separated -themselves from Hope and marched on Ciudad Rodrigo by Alcantara and -Coria. The general himself followed in the track of Fraser, whom he -overtook and passed in the neighbourhood of Castello Branco[580]. - - [580] It may perhaps be worth while to give the composition and - brigading of Moore’s army on the march from Lisbon and Elvas to - Salamanca. - - There marched by Coimbra and Almeida, Beresford [1/9th, 2/43rd, - 2/52nd] #/ and Fane [1/38th, 1/79th, 2/95th]. By Abrantes and - Guarda went Bentinck [1/4th, 1/28th, 1/42nd, and four companies - 5/60th] and Hill [1/5th, 1/32nd, 1/91st]: this column took with - it one battery: it was followed by two isolated regiments, - the 1/6th and 1/50th. The corps which marched from Elvas by - Alcantara, under Paget, was composed of the brigades of Alten - (1st and 2nd Light Battalions of the K. G. L.) and Anstruther - 20th, 1/52nd, 1/95th. The 3rd Regiment joined the army from - Almeida, where it was in garrison, and the 1/82nd came up - late from Lisbon. It was originally intended that Bentinck - and Beresford should form a division under Fraser, Anstruther - and Alten a division under Paget. Of the troops which reached - Salamanca the 3rd and 5/60th were sent back to Portugal. - -The original brigading of Baird’s force was:--Cavalry Brigade (Lord -Paget) 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars. 1st Brigade (Warde) 1st and 3rd -batts. of the 1st Foot Guards. 2nd Brigade (Manningham) 3/1st, 1/26th, -2/81st. 3rd Brigade (Leith) 51st, 2/59th, 76th. Light Brigade (R. -Crawfurd) 2/43rd, 1/95th, 2/95th (detachments). The 2/14th and 2/23rd -were also present, perhaps as a brigade under Mackenzie. - -All these arrangements were temporary, and at Sahagun, as we shall see, -the whole army was recast. A complete table of Moore’s army, with its -final organization, force, and losses, will be found in the Appendix. - -The march was a most unpleasant one, for the autumn rains surprised -the troops in their passage through the mountains. Moreover some of -the regiments were badly fed, as Sataro, the Portuguese contractor who -had undertaken to supply them with meat, went bankrupt at this moment -and failed to fulfil his obligations. Nevertheless the advance was -carried out with complete success: the men were in good heart, marched -well, and generally maintained their[581] discipline. On November -13 the leading regiments began to file into Salamanca, whither the -Commander-in-chief had already preceded them. The concentration would -have been a little more rapid but for a strange mistake of General -Anstruther, commanding at Almeida, who detained some of the troops for -a few days, contrary to the orders which had been sent him. But by the -twenty-third the three columns had all joined at Salamanca[582], where -Moore now had 15,000 infantry and the solitary battery that had marched -with Fraser’s division. The guns had met with some tiresome obstacles, -but had surmounted them with no great difficulty, and Moore now saw -(as we have already shown) that he might have brought the whole of his -artillery with him, if only he had been given correct information as to -the state of the roads. - - [581] Moore names one regiment only as an exception. - - [582] Save two stray battalions, which had started last from - Lisbon. - -On November 23, then, the British commander-in-chief lay at Salamanca, -with six infantry brigades and one battery. Baird lay at Astorga, with -four brigades and three batteries: a few of his battalions were still -on the march from Galicia. Hope, with Moore’s cavalry and guns, was -near the Escurial. Lord Paget with Baird’s equally belated cavalry, -which had left Corunna on the fifteenth, was between Lugo and Astorga. -The situation was deplorable, for it was clear that the army would -require ten days more to concentrate and get into full fighting order, -and it was by no means certain that those ten days would be granted -to it. Such were the unhappy results of the false direction given to -Hope’s column, and of the enforced delay of Baird at Corunna, owing to -the folly of the Galician Junta. - -It may easily be guessed that Moore’s state of mind at this moment -was most unenviable. He had received, much at the same time as did -Baird, the news of Gamonal and Espinosa. He was aware that no screen -of Spanish troops now lay between him and the enemy. He had heard of -the arrival of Milhaud’s dragoons at Valladolid, and of Lefebvre’s -corps at Carrion, and he expected every moment to hear that they were -marching forward against himself. Yet he could not possibly advance -without cavalry or guns, and if attacked he must fly at once towards -Portugal, for it would be mad to attempt to fight in the plains with no -force at his disposition save a mass of foot-soldiery. If the French -moved forward from Valladolid to Zamora on the one side, or to Avila -on the other, he would inevitably be cut off from Baird and Hope. -There was no serious danger that any one of the three columns might be -caught by the enemy, if they halted at once, for each had a clear and -safe line of retreat, on Lisbon, Corunna, and Talavera respectively. -But if they continued their movement of concentration the case was -otherwise. To any one unacquainted with Bonaparte’s actual design of -throwing all his forces on Madrid by the Somosierra road, it looked -not only possible, but probable, that the enemy would advance westward -as well as southward from his present positions, and if he did so the -game was up. The British army, utterly unable to concentrate, must fly -in three separate directions. Moore and Hope might ultimately unite in -front of Lisbon: Baird might be shipped round from Corunna to the same -point. But this movement would take many weeks, and its moral effect -would be deplorable. What would be thought of the general who marched -forward till he was within eighty miles of the French, and then ordered -a precipitate retreat, without even succeeding in concentrating his -army or firing a single shot? The thought filled Moore’s heart with -bitterness: must he, with all his ability and with his well-earned -reputation, swell the list of the failures, and be reckoned with the -Duke of York, Dalrymple, and Hutchinson among the generals who were -too late--who had their chance of fame, and lost it by being an hour, -or a week, or a month behind the decisive moment? But on one point he -was clear: he must run no unnecessary risk with the forces committed -to him: they were, as was once remarked, not _a_ British field-army, -but the only British field-army. Supposing they were destroyed, no -such second host existed: it would take years to make another. There -were still many regiments on home service, but those which now lay at -Salamanca and Astorga were the pick of the whole, the corps chosen for -foreign service because they were the fittest for it. - -The question, then, which Moore had to put to himself was whether he -should persist in attempting to complete the concentration of his army, -and in case of success take an active part in the campaign, or whether -he should simply order each fraction of the British forces to retreat -at once towards some safe base. The way in which the question should be -answered depended mainly on two points--what would be the movements of -the French during the next few days, and what Spanish troops existed -to co-operate with the British army, in case it were determined to -commence active operations. For clearly the 30,000 men of Moore and -Baird could not hope to struggle unaided against the whole French army -in Spain. - -To explain Moore’s action, it is necessary to remember that he started -with a strong prejudice against trusting the British army to the mercy -of Spanish co-operation. He had been receiving very gloomy reports both -from Mr. Stuart, the temporary representative of the British Government -at Aranjuez, and from Lord William Bentinck, the military agent whom -Dalrymple had sent to Madrid. The latter was one of the few British -officers who (like Wellesley) foresaw from the first a catastrophe -whenever the French reinforcements should cross the Ebro[583]. Moreover -the character of Moore’s correspondence with the Central Junta, before -and during his advance, had conspired with the reports of Stuart -and Bentinck to give him a very unfavourable idea of the energy and -administrative capacity of our allies. He had been vexed that the -Junta refused to put him in direct communication with the Spanish -generals[584]. He complained that he got from them tardy, unfrequent, -and inaccurate news of the enemy’s movements. He was disgusted that -Lopez, the officer sent to aid him in moving his troops, turned out -to know even less about the roads of the Spanish frontier than he -did himself. But above all he professed that he was terrified by the -apathy which he found both among the officials and the people of the -kingdom of Leon and Old Castile. He had been politely received by the -authorities both at Ciudad Rodrigo and at Salamanca, but he complained -that he got little but empty compliments from them. - - [583] There is an undertone of gloom in most of Bentinck’s very - capable letters, which contrasts sharply with the very optimistic - views expressed by Doyle and most of the other military agents. - On Oct. 2 he ‘feels the danger forcibly’ of the want of a single - commander for the Spanish armies. On Sept. 30 he remarks that - ‘the Spanish troops consider themselves invincible, but that the - Spanish Government ought not to be deluded by the same opinion.’ - On Nov. 14 ‘he must not disguise that he thinks very unfavourably - of the affairs of Spain: the Spaniards have not the means to - repel the danger that threatens’: most of his letters are in more - or less the same strain. - - [584] Except with Castaños, from whom some sensible but rather - vague advice was procured. - -There was some truth in this allegation, though certain facts can be -quoted against it[585], even from Moore’s own correspondence. Leon and -Old Castile had, as we have already had occasion to remark, been far -less energetic than other parts of the Peninsula in raising new troops -and coming forward with contributions to the national exchequer. They -had done no more than furnish the 10,000 men of Cuesta’s disorderly -‘Army of Castile,’ a contingent utterly out of proportion with their -population and resources. Nor did they seem to realize the scandal of -their own sloth and procrastination. Moore had expected to see every -town full of new levies undergoing drill before marching to the Ebro, -to discover magazines accumulated in important places like Ciudad -Rodrigo and Salamanca, to find the military and civil officials working -busily for the armies at the front. Instead he found an unaccountable -apathy. Even after the reports of Espinosa and Gamonal had come to -hand, the people and the authorities alike seemed to be living in a -sort of fools’ paradise, disbelieving the gloomy news that arrived, or -at least refusing to recognize that the war was now at their own doors. -Moore feared that this came from want of patriotism or of courage. - - [585] e.g. in his letter of Nov. 19 Moore speaks of the town of - Salamanca as doing its best for him: the clergy were exerting - themselves, and a convent of nuns had promised him £5,000. In his - _Journal_ he has a testimonial to the fidelity with which the - people of Tordesillas protected an English officer from a raiding - party of French cavalry. There are some similar notes in British - memoirs: e.g. ‘T.S.’ of the 71st expresses much gratitude for the - kindness of the people of Peñaranda, who, when Hope’s division - arrived in a drenched and frozen condition, rolled out barrels of - spirits into the streets and gave every man a good dram before - the regiments marched on. Some towns, e.g. Zamora and Alba de - Tormes, behaved well in opposing (though without any hope of - success) the French, when they did appear. - -As a matter of fact, the people’s hearts were sound enough[586], but -they had still got ‘Baylen on the brain’: they simply failed to -recognize the full horror of the situation. That their armies were -not merely beaten but dispersed, that the way to Madrid was open to -Bonaparte, escaped them. This attitude of mind enraged Moore. ‘In these -provinces,’ he wrote, ‘no armed force whatever exists, either for -immediate protection or to reinforce the armies. The French cavalry -from Burgos, in small detachments, are overrunning the province of -Leon, and raising contributions to which the inhabitants submit without -the least resistance: the enthusiasm of which we heard so much nowhere -appears. Whatever good-will there is (and among the lower orders I -believe there is a good deal) is taken no advantage of. I am at this -moment in no communication with any of their generals. I am ignorant -of their plans, or those of their government[587].’ And again, he adds -in despair, ‘I hope a better spirit exists in the southern provinces: -here no one stirs--and yet they are well inclined[588].’ While Leon -and Old Castile were in this state of apathy, it was maddening to -Moore to receive constant appeals from the Supreme Junta, begging that -the British army might move forward at once. Their dispatches were -accompanied by representations, which Moore knew to be inaccurate, -concerning the numbers and enthusiasm of the Spanish armies still in -the field, and by misrepresentations of the force of the French. They -were also backed by urgent letters from Mr. Frere, the new ambassador -at Madrid, urging him to give help at all costs. - - [586] As to the conduct of the Spaniards I think that the - best commentary on it is that of Leith Hay (i. 80-1), who was - riding all over Castile and Leon in these unhappy weeks. ‘Thus - terminated a journey of about 900 miles, in which a considerable - portion of the country had been traversed, under circumstances - which enabled me to ascertain the sincere feeling of the people. - It is but justice to say that I met with but one sentiment as to - the war: that I was everywhere treated with kindness. I mention - this as a creditable circumstance to the inhabitants of the - Peninsula, and in contradiction to the statements often recorded, - unjustly in my opinion, as to the want of faith, supineness, and - perfidy of the Spanish people.... Their conduct was throughout - distinguished by good faith, if it was at the same time rendered - apparently equivocal from characteristic negligence, want of - energy, and the deficiency of that moral power that can alone be - derived from free institutions and an enlightened aristocracy.’ - - [587] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24. - - [588] Ibid., Dec. 8. - -These appeals were intolerable to a man who dared not advance because -his army (partly by his own fault, partly owing to circumstances that -had not been under his control) was not concentrated. From the point -of view of policy, Moore knew that it was all-important that he should -take the field: but, from the point of view of strategy, he saw that -an advance with the 15,000 men that he had at Salamanca might very -probably lead to instant and complete disaster. He refused to move, but -all the time he knew that his refusal was having the worst effect, and -would certainly be represented by his critics as the result of timidity -and selfishness. It was this consciousness that caused him to fill -his dispatches with the bitterest comments on the Spanish government -and people. He had been induced to advance to Salamanca, he said, by -false pretences. He had been told that there was a large army in front -of him, ready to cover his concentration. He had been informed that -the whole country-side was full of enthusiasm, that he might look for -ready help from every official, that when once he had crossed the -frontier transport and food would be readily provided for him. Instead, -he found nothing but apathy and disasters. ‘Had the real strength and -composition of the Spanish armies been known, and the defenceless state -of the country, I conceive that Cadiz, not Corunna, would have been -chosen for the disembarkation of the troops from England: and Seville -or Cordova, not Salamanca, would have been selected as the proper place -for the assembling of this army[589].’ Thus he wrote to Castlereagh: -to Frere, in reponse to constant invitations to strike a blow of some -sort in behalf of Spain, he replied in more vigorous terms[590]. -‘Madrid is threatened; the French have destroyed one army (Blake’s), -have passed the Ebro, and are advancing in superior numbers against -another (Castaños’), which from its composition promises no resistance, -but must retire or be overwhelmed. No other armed force exists in -this country: I perceive no enthusiasm or determined spirit among the -people. This is a state of affairs quite different from that conceived -by the British Government, when they determined to send troops to the -assistance of Spain. It was not expected that these were to cope alone -with the whole force of France: as auxiliaries they were to aid a -people who were believed to be enthusiastic, determined, and prepared -for resistance. It becomes therefore a question whether the British -army should remain to be attacked in its turn, or should retire from -a country where the contest, from whatever circumstances, is become -unequal.’ - - [589] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24. - - [590] Moore to Frere from Salamanca, Nov. 27. - -All that Moore wrote was true: yet, granting the accuracy of every -premise, his conclusion that he ought to retire to Portugal was -not necessarily correct. The British Government had undoubtedly -over-estimated the power and resources of Spain: the Supreme Junta had -shown no capacity for organization or command: most of the Spanish -generals had committed gross military blunders. But none of these -facts were enough to justify Moore in washing his hands of the whole -business, and marching out of Spain without firing a shot. He had -not been sent to help the patriots only if they were powerful and -victorious, to desert them if they proved weak and unlucky. If these -had been the orders issued to him by Castlereagh, all Bonaparte’s -taunts about the selfishness and timidity of the British Government -would have been justified. It was true that on his arrival at Salamanca -he found the aspect of the war very different from what he had expected -at the moment of his quitting Lisbon. Instead of aiding the victorious -Spanish armies to press up to the Pyrenees, he would have to cover -their retreat and gain time for the reorganization of the scattered -remnants of their first line of defence. To reject this task because -the Supreme Junta had been incapable, or Blake and Palafox rash and -unskilful, would have been unworthy of a man of Moore’s talents and -courage. - -Yet in a moment of irritation at the mismanagement that he saw before -him, and of anger at the continual importunities that he was receiving -from the Central Junta and from Mr. Frere, Moore nearly committed this -fault. The last piece of news which broke down his resolution and drove -him to order a retreat was the account of the battle of Tudela. If he -had been forced to wait for the notification of this disaster through -Spanish official sources, he might have remained ignorant of it for -many days. But Charles Vaughan, the secretary of Mr. Stuart, had been -in the camp of Palafox, and had ridden straight from Tudela to Madrid, -and from Madrid to Salamanca--476 miles in six days[591]. He brought -the intelligence of Castaños’ defeat to the English commander-in-chief -on the night of November 28. Moore lost not a moment in dictating -orders of retreat to the whole army. In the few hours that elapsed -before midnight he gave his own troops directions to prepare to -retire on Portugal, sent Hope a dispatch bidding him turn off on to -cross-roads and move by Peñaranda on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and -wrote to Baird that he must return to Corunna, re-embark his army, and -bring it round by sea to Lisbon. - - [591] The notes and diaries of this ancient member of my own - College have been of enormous use to me for side-lights on - Spanish politics during 1808. His summary of his great ride from - Caparrosa in Navarre to Corunna, between November 21 and December - 2, is perhaps worth quoting. ‘From Caparrosa to Madrid and from - Madrid to Salamanca, with the dispatches for Sir John Moore, - containing the defeat of the army commanded by General Castaños, - I rode post. I stayed the night at Salamanca, and at two o’clock - on the following day (Nov. 29) I set out for Astorga with - dispatches for Sir D. Baird, and with Sir J. Moore’s dispatches - for England. I was detained only six hours at Astorga, and after - riding two days and two nights on end arrived at Corunna the - evening of Dec. 2. The post-horses at every relay in Spain were - at this time so overworked that the journey was tiresome and - painful. I had ridden 790 miles from Caparrosa to Corunna in - eleven days (Nov. 21 to Dec. 2). I had a night’s rest at Agreda, - Cetina, and Salamanca, and two at Madrid.’ Deducting two days in - Madrid, the ride was really one of 790 miles in nine days. - -The spirit in which Moore acted is shown by the wording of his letter -to Hope:--‘I have determined to give the thing up, and to retire. It -was my wish to have run great risks to fulfil what I conceive to be -the wishes of the people of England, and to give every aid to the -Spanish cause. But they have shown themselves equal to do so little for -themselves, that it would only be sacrificing this army, without doing -any good to Spain, to oppose it to such numbers as must now be brought -against us. A junction with Baird is out of the question, and with you, -perhaps, problematical.... This is a cruel determination for me to -make--I mean to retreat: but I hope you will think the circumstances -such as demand it[592].’ - - [592] Moore to Hope from Salamanca, Nov. 28. - -To Moore, weighed down by the burden of responsibility, and worried by -the constant pressure of the Spaniards at Madrid, ‘who expected every -one to fly but themselves,’ this resolve to retreat seemed reasonable, -and even inevitable. But it was clearly wrong: when he gave the order -he was overwrought by irritation and despondency. He was sent to -aid the Spaniards, and till he was sure that he could do absolutely -nothing in their behalf, it was his duty not to abandon them. The -British army was intended to be used freely in their cause, not to be -laid up--like the talent in the napkin--lest anything might happen to -it. Its mere presence at Salamanca was valuable as an encouragement -to the Spaniards, and a check on the free movement of the French. -Above all, it was not yet proved that the concentration with Baird -and Hope was impossible: indeed, the events of the last few days were -rendering it more and more likely that the junction might, after all, -take place. The French cavalry which had appeared at Valladolid had -gone off southward, without any attempt to move in the direction of -Salamanca. Soult and Lefebvre were also moving in a direction which -would not bring them anywhere near the British army. Hope had crossed -the Guadarrama unhindered, and was now near Villacastin, only seventy -miles from Moore’s head quarters. Under these circumstances it was most -impolitic to order an instant retreat. What would have been thought of -Moore if this movement had been carried out, and if after the British -columns had reached Corunna and Almeida the news had come that no -French infantry had ever been nearer than fifty miles to them, that -their concentration had been perfectly feasible, and that Napoleon had -possessed no knowledge of their whereabouts? All these facts chanced -to be true--as we have seen. The Emperor’s advance on Madrid was made -without any reference to the British army, by roads that took him -very far from Salamanca: he was marching past Moore’s front in serene -unconsciousness of his proximity. If, at the same moment, the British -had been hurrying back to Portugal, pursued only by phantoms hatched in -their general’s imagination, it is easy to guess what military critics -would have said, and what historians would have written. Moore would -have been pronounced a selfish and timid officer, who in a moment of -pique and despondency deliberately abandoned his unhappy allies. - -Fortunately for his own reputation and for that of England, his -original intentions of the night of November 28 were not fully carried -out. Only Baird’s column actually commenced its retrograde movement. -That general received Moore’s letter from Vaughan on the thirtieth, and -immediately began to retire on Galicia. Leaving his cavalry and his -light brigade at Astorga, to cover his retreat, he fell back with the -rest of his division to Villafranca, fifty miles on the road towards -Corunna. Here (as we shall see) he received on December 6 a complete -new set of orders, countermanding his retreat and bidding him return to -the plains of Leon. - -Hope also had heard from Moore on the thirtieth, had been informed -that the army was to retire on Portugal, and was told to make forced -marches by Peñaranda and Ciudad Rodrigo to join his chief--unless -indeed he were forced to go back by the way that he had come, owing to -the appearance of French troops in his path. Fortunately no such danger -occurred: Hope arranged his two cavalry regiments as a screen in front -of his right, in the direction of Arevalo and Madrigal. He hurried his -infantry and guns by Fontiveros and Peñaranda, along the road that -had been pointed out to him. The cavalry obtained news that patrols -of French dragoons coming from the north had pushed as far as Olmedo -and La Nava--some sixteen or eighteen miles from their outposts--but -did not actually see a single hostile vedette. This was lucky, as, -if Napoleon had heard of a British force hovering on the flank of his -advancing columns, he would certainly have turned against it the troops -that were covering the right flank of his advance on Madrid--Lefebvre’s -corps and the dragoons of Milhaud. But, as it chanced, Hope was -entirely unmolested: he moved, as was right, with his troops closed -up and ready for a fight: on the night of the thirtieth his infantry -actually slept in square without piling arms: during the ensuing -thirty-six hours they marched forty-seven miles before they were -allowed to encamp at Peñaranda. There they were practically in safety: -slackening the pace for the exhausted infantry and for the over-driven -oxen of the convoy, Hope drew in to Alba de Tormes, where he was only -fifteen miles from Salamanca[593]. Here he received orders not to push -for Ciudad Rodrigo, but to turn northward and join the main body of the -army, which was still--as it turned out--in its old positions. Thus on -December 3 Moore could at last dispose of his long-lost cavalry and -guns, and possessed an army of 20,000 men complete in all arms. This -very much changed the aspect of affairs for him, and removed one of his -main justifications for the projected retreat on Portugal. Hope also -brought information as to the movements of the French which was of the -highest importance. He reported that their columns were all trending -southward, none of them to the west of Segovia. He had also heard of -the infantry of the 4th Corps, and could report that it had marched -by Valladolid and Olmedo on Segovia, evidently with the intention of -driving Heredia’s Estremaduran troops out of the last-named city, and -of opening the Guadarrama Pass[594]. There was no sign whatever of any -movement of the French in this quarter towards Salamanca. Thus the -Emperor’s plan for a concentration of his whole army on Madrid became -clear to Moore’s discerning eyes. - - [593] There is a good, but short, account of this forced march, - in bitter cold, to be found in the memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st, - one of Hope’s four infantry regiments. He speaks of a curious - fact that I have nowhere else seen mentioned, viz. that at - Peñaranda the artillery horses were so done up that Hope buried - six guns, and turned their teams to help the other batteries. - Apparently they were dug up a few days after by troops sent out - from Salamanca, as the tale of batteries is complete when Moore - resumed his march. - - [594] I think that Napier (i. 287-8) somewhat exaggerates the - danger which Hope ran in his march from Villacastin to Alba de - Tormes. Of course if Lefebvre had been marching on Salamanca, - the situation would have been dangerous: but as a matter of - fact he was marching on the Guadarrama, which Hope had safely - passed on the twenty-eighth. Every mile that the British moved - took them further from Lefebvre’s route: his infantry was never - within fifty miles of Hope’s convoy: and supposing his brigade - of cavalry had got in touch with the British, it could have done - nothing serious against a force of all arms in the hands of a - very capable general. The ‘4,000 cavalry’ of which Napier speaks - were in reality only 1,500. - - - - -SECTION VIII: CHAPTER III - -MOORE’S ADVANCE TO SAHAGUN - - -Moore’s determination to retreat on Portugal lasted just seven days. -It was at midnight on November 28-29 that he wrote his orders to Baird -and Hope, bidding the one to fall back on Corunna and the other on -Ciudad Rodrigo. On the afternoon of December 5 he abandoned his scheme, -and wrote to recall Baird from Galicia: on the tenth he set out on a -very different sort of enterprise, and advanced into the plains of Old -Castile with the object of striking at the communications of the French -army. We have now to investigate the curious mixture of motives which -led him to make such a complete and dramatic change in his plan of -campaign. - -Having sent off his dispatches to Hope and Baird, the -Commander-in-chief had announced next morning to the generals who -commanded his divisions and brigades his intention of retreating to -Portugal. The news evoked manifestations of surprise and anger that -could not be concealed. Even Moore’s own staff did not succeed in -disguising their dismay and regret[595]. The army was looking forward -with eagerness to another campaign against the French under a general -of such well-earned reputation as their present chief: a sudden order -to retreat, when the enemy had not even been seen, and when his -nearest cavalry vedettes were still three or four marches away, seemed -astounding. There would have been remonstrances, had not Moore curtly -informed his subordinates that ‘he had not called them together to -request their counsel, or to induce them to commit themselves to giving -any opinion on the subject. He was taking the whole responsibility -entirely upon himself: and he only required that they would immediately -prepare to carry it into effect.’ In face of this speech there could be -no argument or opposition: but there was murmuring in every quarter: -of all the officers of the army of Portugal Hope is said to have been -the only one who approved of the Commander-in-chief’s resolve. The -consciousness of the criticism that he was undergoing from his own -subordinates did not tend to soften Moore’s temper, which was already -sufficiently tried by the existing situation of affairs. - - [595] See James Moore’s memoir of his brother, p. 72; compare - Napier, i. 292, and Lord Londonderry’s account of his own - observations at Salamanca, in his _History of the Peninsular - War_, i. 220, 221. - -After announcing this determination, it might have been expected that -Moore would fall back at once on Almeida. But while beginning to send -back his stores and his sick[596], he did not move his fighting-men: -the reason (as he wrote to Castlereagh[597]) was that he still hoped -that he might succeed in picking up Hope’s division, if the French did -not press him. Accordingly he lingered on, waiting for that general’s -approach, and much surprised that the enemy was making no advance in -his direction. It was owing to the fact that he delayed his departure -for five days, on the chance that his lost cavalry and guns might after -all come in, that Moore finally gained the opportunity of striking his -great blow and saving his reputation. - - [596] The heavy ammunition and all the sick who could be moved - were sent off on Dec. 5, under the escort of the 5/60th. See - Moore’s ‘General Orders’ for that day, and Ormsby, ii. 54. - - [597] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Nov. 29. - -During this period of waiting and of preparation to depart, appeals -from many quarters came pouring in upon Moore, begging him to advance -at all costs and make his presence felt by the French. The first -dispatches which he received were written before his determination -to retreat was known: after it was divulged, his correspondents only -became the more importunate and clamorous. Simultaneous pressure was -brought to bear upon him by the British ambassador at Aranjuez, by -the Supreme Junta, by the general who now commanded the wrecks of the -Spanish army of Galicia, and by the military authorities at Madrid. -Each one of them had many and serious considerations to set before the -harassed Commander-in-chief. - -Moore had been so constantly asserting that Blake’s old ‘Army of the -Left’ had been completely dispersed and ruined, that it must have been -somewhat of a surprise to him when the Marquis of La Romana wrote -from Leon, on November 30, to say that he was now at the head of a -considerable force, and hoped to co-operate in the oncoming campaign. -The Galicians had rallied in much greater numbers than had been -expected: their losses in battle had not been very great, and the -men had dispersed from sheer want of food rather than from a desire -to desert their colours. Their equipment was in the most wretched -condition, and their shoes worn out: but their spirit was not broken, -and if they could get food and clothing, they were quite prepared to -do their duty. La Romana enclosed a dispatch of Soult’s which had been -intercepted, and remarked that the news in it (apparently a statement -of the marshal’s intention to move westward) made it advisable that -the English and Spanish armies should at once concert measures for a -junction[598]. - - [598] La Romana to Moore, from Leon, Nov. 30. - -All that the Marquis stated was perfectly true: his army was growing -rapidly, for his muster-rolls of December 4 showed that he had already -15,600 men with the colours, exclusive of sick and wounded: ten days -later the number had gone up to 22,800[599]. This was a force that -could not be entirely neglected, even though the men were in a dire -state of nakedness, and were only just recovering from the effects of -their dreadful march from Reynosa across the Cantabrian hills. Moore -had always stated, in his dispatches to Castlereagh, that there was no -Spanish army with which he could co-operate. He was now offered the aid -of 15,000 men, under a veteran officer of high reputation and undoubted -patriotism. The proposal to retreat on Portugal seemed even less -honourable than before, when it involved the desertion of the Marquis -and his much-tried host. - - [599] See the ‘morning states’ for the army of Galicia on Dec. 4 - and Dec. 14, in Arteche (iv. 532, 533). - -Not long after the moment at which La Romana’s dispatch came to hand, -there arrived at Salamanca two officers deputed by the Central Junta -to make a final appeal to Moore. These were Don Ventura Escalante, -Captain-General of the kingdom of Granada, and the Brigadier-General -Augustin Bueno. They had started from Aranjuez on November 28, and -seem to have arrived at the British head quarters on December 3 or -4. They brought a letter from Don Martin de Garay, the secretary to -the Junta, stating that they were authorized to treat with Moore for -the drawing up of a plan of campaign, ‘by which the troops of his -Britannic Majesty may act in concert with those of Spain, accelerating -a combined movement, and avoiding the delays that are so prejudicial -to the noble enterprise in which the two nations are engaged[600].’ -The proposal that the two generals made would appear to have been -that Moore should march on Madrid by the Guadarrama Pass, picking up -Hope’s division on the way, and ordering Baird to follow as best he -could. They wished to demonstrate to their despondent ally that it was -possible to concentrate for the defence of Madrid a force sufficient -to hold the Emperor at bay. If the British came up, they hoped even -to be able to repulse him with decisive effect. They alleged that -Castaños had escaped from Tudela with the Andalusian divisions almost -intact, and must now be at Guadalajara, quite close to the capital, -with 25,000 good troops. Heredia, with the rallied Estremaduran army, -was at Segovia, and had 10,000 bayonets: San Juan with 12,000 men -was occupying the impregnable Somosierra. Andalusian and Castilian -levies were coming in to Madrid every day--they believed that 10,000 -men must already be collected. This would constitute when united a -mass of nearly 60,000 men: if Moore brought up 20,000 British troops -all must go well, for Napoleon had only 80,000 men in the north of -Spain. After deducting the army sent against Saragossa, and the -detachments at Burgos and in Biscay, as also the corps of Soult, he -could not have much more than 20,000 men concentrated for the attack -on Madrid. All this ingenious calculation was based on the fundamental -misconception that the French armies were only one-third of their -actual strength--which far exceeded 200,000 men. But on this point -Moore was as ill informed as the Spaniards themselves, and the causes -which he alleged for refusing to march on Madrid had nothing to do with -statistics. He informed them that his reasons for proposing to retreat -on Portugal were that the Spanish armies were too much demoralized to -offer successful resistance to the Emperor, and that the road to the -capital was now in the possession of the French. He then introduced -Colonel Graham, who had just returned from a meeting with San Juan, -and had heard from him the story of the forcing of the Somosierra on -November 29. Of this disaster Escalante and Bueno were still ignorant: -they had to learn from English lips that the French were actually -before the gates of Madrid, that Heredia and San Juan were in flight, -and that their junction with Castaños (wherever that general might -now be) had become impossible. This appalling news deeply affected -Escalante and Bueno, but they then turned to urging Moore to unite -with La Romana, and march to the relief of Madrid. The British general -replied that he did not believe that the Marquis had 5,000 men fit to -take the field along with the British[601], and that any such scheme -would be chimerical. His whole bearing towards the emissaries of the -Junta seems to have been frigid to the verge of discourtesy. How much -they irritated him may be gathered from the account of the interview -which he sent to Mr. Frere two days later. In language that seems very -inappropriate in an official dispatch--destined ere long to be printed -as a ‘Parliamentary Paper’--he wrote: ‘The two generals seemed to me -to be two weak old men, or rather women, with whom it was impossible -for me to concert any military operations, even had I been so inclined. -Their conferences with me consisted in questions, and in assertions -with regard to the strength of different Spanish corps, all of which I -knew to be erroneous. They neither knew that Segovia or the Somosierra -were in the hands of the enemy. I shall be obliged to you to save me -from such visits, which are very painful[602].’ - - [600] Martin de Garay to Moore, from Aranjuez, Nov. 28, 1808. - - [601] This answer is recorded in the despairing appeal which - Escalante wrote to Moore from Calzada de Baños on Nov. 7, after - having started back to join the Junta. The rest of Moore’s - arguments can be gathered from his own dispatches. - - [602] Moore to Frere, from Salamanca, Dec. 6, 1808. - -It is clear that the mission of Escalante and Bueno had no great -share in determining Sir John to abandon his projected retreat on -Portugal, though it may possibly have had some cumulative effect when -taken in conjunction with other appeals that were coming in to him -at the same moment. It was quite otherwise with the dispatches which -he received from the authorities at Madrid, and from the British -ambassador at Aranjuez: in them we may find the chief causes of his -changed attitude. The Madrid dispatch was written by Morla and the -Prince of Castelfranco--the two military heads of the Junta of Defence -which had been created on December 1--in behalf of themselves and -their colleagues. It was sent off early on December 2, before Napoleon -had begun to press in upon the suburbs, for it speaks of the city as -menaced, not as actually attacked by the enemy. It amounted to an -appeal to Moore to do something to help Madrid--not necessarily (as has -been often stated) to throw himself into the city, but, if he judged -it best, to manœuvre on the flank and rear of the Emperor’s army, so -as to distract him from his present design. The writers stated, in -much the same terms that Escalante and Bueno had used, that Castaños -with 25,000 men from Tudela and San Juan with 10,000 men from the -Somosierra were converging on the capital, and added that the Junta had -got together 40,000 men for its defence. With this mass of new levies -they thought that they could hold off for the moment the forces that -Napoleon had displayed in front of them; but when his reserves and -reinforcements came up the situation would be more dangerous. Wherefore -they made no doubt that the British general would move with the -rapidity that was required in the interests of the allied nations. They -supposed it probable that Moore had already united with La Romana’s -army, and that the two forces would be able to act together. - -There is no reason to think, with Napier and with Moore’s -biographer[603], that this dispatch was written by Morla with the -treacherous intent of involving the British army in the catastrophe -that was impending over the capital. Morla ultimately betrayed his -country and joined King Joseph, but there is no real proof that he -contemplated doing so before the fall of Madrid. The letter was signed -not only by him but by Castelfranco, of whose loyalty there is no -doubt, and who was actually arrested and imprisoned by Bonaparte. -Moreover, if it had been designed to draw Moore into the Emperor’s -clutches, it would not have given him the perfectly sound advice to -fall upon the communications of the French army after uniting with La -Romana--the precise move that the British general made ten days later -with such effect. It would have begged him to enter Madrid, without -suggesting any other alternative. - - [603] See James Moore (p. 86-7), where he vilely mistranslates - the letter--even rendering _corte_ by ‘country’; and Napier (i. - 291), where the same accusation is formulated. - -Moore had always stated that his reluctance to advance into Spain had -been due, in no small degree, to the apathy which he had found there: -but now the capital, as it seemed, was about to imitate Saragossa and -to stand at bay behind its barricades. He had no great confidence -in its power to hold out. ‘I own,’ he wrote to Castlereagh, ‘that I -cannot derive much hope from the resistance of one town against forces -so formidable, unless the spark catches and the flame becomes pretty -general[604].’ But he could realize the dishonour that would rest -upon his own head if, as now seemed possible, Madrid were to make a -desperate resistance, and at the same moment the British army were to -be seen executing unmolested a tame retreat on Portugal. The letter of -Morla and Castelfranco he might perhaps have disregarded, suspecting -the usual Spanish exaggerations, if it had stood alone. But it was -backed up by an appeal from the most important British sources. Mr. -Stuart, whose forecasts Moore had always respected because they were -far from optimistic[605], had written him to the effect that ‘the -retrograde movements of the British divisions were likely to produce -an effect not less serious than the most decisive victory on the part -of the enemy.’ Frere, the newly arrived ambassador to the Central -Junta, launched out into language of the strongest kind. He had already -discovered that his opinions were fundamentally opposed to those of -Moore: this was but natural, as the general looked upon the problem -that lay before him from a military point of view, while the ambassador -could only regard its political aspect. Any impartial observer can now -see that the advance of the British army into Spain was likely to be -a hazardous matter, even if Hope and Baird succeeded in joining the -main body at Salamanca. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the -Spanish government would have every reason to regard itself as having -been abandoned and betrayed, if that advance were not made. Balancing -the one danger against the other, it seems evident that Frere was -right, and that it was Moore’s duty to make a diversion of some sort -against the French. Executed on any day before Madrid fell, such a -movement would have disturbed Bonaparte and distracted him from his -main plan of operations. Nor would the operation have been so hazardous -as Moore supposed, since his junction with Hope had become certain -when that general reached Peñaranda, while Baird had never had any -French troops in his neighbourhood. The retreat on Galicia was always -open: that on Portugal was equally available till the moment when the -capitulation of Madrid set free great masses of Bonaparte’s central -reserve. - - [604] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5. - - [605] Stuart to Moore, from Madrid, Nov. 30. - -In his earlier epistles to Moore Frere had deprecated the idea of a -retreat, and had suggested that if for military reasons an advance -should be impracticable, it would at least be possible that the British -army might remain on Spanish ground. He had soon learnt that the -general entertained very different views, and his penultimate letter, -that of November 30, shows signs of pique at the small impression that -his arguments had made upon his correspondent[606]. Now on December -3 he wrote from Talavera, whither he had followed the Supreme Junta -in their flight, to try his last effort. To his previous arguments he -had only one more to add, the fact that on December 1-2 the people of -Madrid were showing that spirit of fanatical patriotism which Moore -had sought in vain hitherto among the Spaniards. The populace, as he -had learnt, was barricading the streets and throwing up batteries: -30,000 citizens and peasants were now under arms. Considering their -spirit, he had no hesitation in taking upon himself the responsibility -of representing the propriety, not to say the necessity, of doing -something in their behalf. The fate of Spain depended absolutely, for -the moment, on some help being given by the British army. Frere had -first-hand evidence of the enthusiasm which was reigning in Madrid -on the first day of December, having spoken to several persons who -had just left the capital, including a French _émigré_ colonel, -one Charmilly, to whose care he entrusted his last letter to the -Commander-in-chief. But so convinced was he that no argument of his -would affect Sir John Moore, that he took a most improper step, and -endeavoured to appeal to the public opinion of the army over the head -of its general. He entrusted Charmilly with a second letter, which he -was only to deliver if Moore refused to countermand his retreat after -reading the first. This document was a request that in case Sir John -remained fixed in his original determination, he would allow the bearer -of these letters to be examined before a Council of War. Frere thought -that Charmilly’s account of what was going on in Madrid would appeal -to the Brigadiers, if it had no effect on the Lieutenant-General--and -probably he was not far wrong. Such a plan struck at the roots of all -military obedience: it could only have occurred to a civilian. If -anything could have made the matter worse, it was that the document -should be entrusted not to a British officer but to a foreign -adventurer, a kind of person to whom the breach between the civil and -military representatives of Great Britain ought never to have been -divulged. Moreover Charmilly (though Frere was not aware of this fact) -chanced to be personally known to Moore, who had a very bad opinion -of him[607]. The _émigré_ was said to have been implicated in the San -Domingo massacres of 1794, and to have been engaged of late in doubtful -financial speculations in London. To send him to Salamanca with such an -errand seemed like a deliberate insult to the Commander-in-chief. Frere -was innocent of this intention, but the whole business, even without -this aggravation, was most unwise and improper. - - [606] ‘I do not know that I can in any way express with less - offence the entire difference of our opinions on this subject, - than by forwarding what I had already written, in ignorance of - the determination [to retreat] which you had already taken’ - (Aranjuez, Nov. 30). - - [607] He had called on Sir John a few days before, while on his - way to Madrid to solicit a military post from the Junta. Moore - wrote on Nov. 27 to Mr. Stuart, to say that he had seen him and - that ‘he never could help having a dislike to people of this - description.’ - -Charmilly handed in his first document on the evening of December 5, a -few hours after Morla’s messenger had delivered the appeal from Madrid. -Moore received him in the most formal way, dismissed him, and began -to compare Frere’s information with that of the Junta of Defence, of -the emissaries from Aranjuez, and of his other English correspondents. -Putting all together, he felt his determination much shaken: Madrid, as -it seemed, was really about to defend itself: the preparations which -were reported to him bore out the words of Morla and Castelfranco. -His own army was seething with discontent at the projected retreat: -Hope being now only one march away, at Alba de Tormes, he could no -longer plead that he was unable to advance because he was destitute -of cavalry and guns. Moreover, he was now so far informed as to the -position--though not as to the numbers--of the French, that he was -aware that there was no very serious force in front of himself or of -Baird: everything had been turned on to Madrid. Even the 4th Corps, of -which Hope had heard during his march, was evidently moving on Segovia -and the Guadarrama. - -Contemplating the situation, Moore’s resolution broke down: he knew -what his army was saying about him at the present moment: he guessed -what his government would say, if it should chance that Madrid made a -heroic defence while he was retreating unpursued on Lisbon and Almeida. -A man of keen ambition and soldierly feeling, he could not bear to -think that he might be sacrificing his life’s work and reputation to -an over-conscientious caution. Somewhere between eight o’clock and -midnight on the night of December 5 he made up his mind to countermand -the retreat. He dashed off a short note to Castlereagh, and a dispatch -to Baird, and the thing was done. To the war-minister he wrote that -‘considerable hopes were entertained from the enthusiastic manner in -which the people of Madrid resist the French.’ This hope he did not -share himself, but ‘in consequence of the general opinion, which is -also Mr. Frere’s, I have ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his march -[to Corunna] and shall myself continue at this place until I see -further, and shall be guided by circumstances.’ To Madrid he would not -go till he was certain that the town was making a firm defence, and -that the spirit of resistance was spreading all over Spain: but the -plan of instant retreat on Portugal was definitely abandoned[608]. The -dispatch to Baird shows even more of the General’s mind, for he and -his subordinate were personal friends, and spoke out freely to each -other. The people of Madrid, Moore wrote, had taken up arms, refused -to capitulate, and were barricading their streets--they said that they -would suffer anything rather than submit. Probably all this came too -late, and Bonaparte was too strong to be resisted. ‘There is, however, -no saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, as -Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this -evening. All this appears very strange and unsteady--but if the spirit -of enthusiasm _does_ arise in Spain, and the people _will_ be martyrs, -there is no saying what our force may do.’ Baird therefore was to stay -his march on Corunna, to make arrangements to return to Astorga, and to -send off at once to join the main army one of his three regiments of -hussars[609]. All this was written ere midnight: at early dawn Moore’s -mind was still further made up. He sent to Sir David orders to push his -cavalry to Zamora, his infantry, brigade by brigade, to Benavente, in -the plains of Leon. ‘What is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the -fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to take advantage of whatever -happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand it of us, with -whatever risk it may be attended.... But if the bubble bursts, and -Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.... Both you and me, though -we may look big, and determine to get everything forward, yet we must -never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take the turn -that will render it necessary to retreat[610].’ - - [608] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5. - - [609] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 5. - - [610] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6. The strange grammar - would seem to show that the letter was dashed off in a hurry, and - never revised. - -If only Moore had discovered on November 13, instead of on December 5, -that events at Madrid were important, and that his country’s wishes and -his duty required him to take a practical interest in them, the winter -campaign of 1808 would have taken--for good or evil--a very different -shape from that which it actually assumed. Meanwhile his resolve came -too late. Madrid had actually capitulated thirty-six hours before he -received the letters of Morla and of Frere. Moreover the offensive -could not be assumed till Baird should have retraced his steps from -Villafranca, and returned to the position at Astorga from which his -wholly unnecessary retreat had removed him. - -A painful and rather grotesque scene had to be gone through on the -morning of December 6. Colonel Charmilly had been received by Moore -on the previous night in such a dry and formal manner, that it never -occurred to him that the letter which he had delivered was likely to -have had any effect. Accordingly he presented himself for the second -time next morning, with Frere’s supplementary epistle, taking it for -granted that retreat was still the order of the day, and making the -demand for the assembly of a Council of War. Moore, fresh from the -severe mental struggle which attended the reversal of all his plans, -was in no mood for politeness. Righteously indignant at what seemed to -him both a deliberate personal insult, and an intrigue to undermine -his authority with his subordinates, he burst out into words of anger -and contempt, and told his provost-marshal to expel Charmilly from the -camp without a moment’s delay[611]. When this had been done, he sat -down to write a dispatch to Frere, in which his conscientious desire -to avoid hard words with a British minister struggled in vain with -his natural resentment. He began by justifying his original resolve -to retreat; and then informed his correspondent that ‘I should never -have thought of asking your opinion or advice, as the determination was -founded on circumstances with which you could not be acquainted, and -was a question purely military, of which I thought myself the best -judge.’ When he made up his mind, the army had been hopelessly divided -into fractions, and there was good reason at that moment to fear that -the French would prevent their concentration. But as the resistance -made by the people of Madrid had deterred Bonaparte from detaching -any corps against him, and the junction of the British divisions now -seemed possible, the situation was changed. ‘Without being able to say -exactly in what manner, everything shall be done for the assistance -of Madrid, and the Spanish cause, that can be expected from an army -such as I command.’ But Moore would not move till Baird came up, and -even then, he said, he would only have 26,000 men fit for duty[612]. -Believing that Frere’s conduct had been inspired by a regard for the -public welfare, he should abstain from any comment on the two letters -brought by Colonel Charmilly. But he must confess that he both felt -and expressed much indignation at a person of that sort being made the -channel of communication between them. ‘I have prejudices against all -that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him. I -shall therefore thank you not to employ him in any communication with -me[613].’ - - [611] Charmilly, greatly indignant, published a narrative of the - whole, in which he justified himself and his character. It does - not alter the main facts of the case. - - [612] His muster-rolls show 33,000 troops in all, with 29,000 - actually present with the colours, but Leith’s brigade and the - 82nd, 2,539 men, were not up. - - [613] Moore to Frere, Dec. 6. The version presented to Parliament - has been somewhat expurgated: I quote from that given by James - Moore. - -Moore had kept his temper more in hand than might have been expected, -considering the provocation that he had received: the same cannot be -said for Frere, whose next letter, written from Truxillo on December 9, -ended by informing the general that ‘if the British army had been sent -abroad for the express object of doing the utmost possible mischief -to the cause of Spain, short of actually firing upon the Spanish -troops, they would have most completely fulfilled their purpose by -carrying out exactly the measures which they have taken[614].’ This -was unpardonable language from one official writing a state paper -to another, and it is regrettable to find that Frere made no formal -apology for it in his later dispatches. Even when he discovered that -Moore was actually executing a diversion against the communications of -the French army, he only wrote that he was ‘highly gratified’ to find -that they were at last agreed on the advisability of such a move[615]. -Frere’s uncontrolled expressions showed that he was entirely unfit for -a diplomatic post, and cannot be too strongly reprobated. At the same -time we are forced to concede that his main thesis was perfectly true: -nothing could have been more unhappy than that the aid of a British -army of 33,000 men should have been promised to Spain: that the army -should have marched late, in isolated divisions and by the wrong roads: -that after its van had reached Salamanca on November 13, it should not -have taken one step in advance up to December 5: that just as Madrid -was attacked it should tamely begin to retreat on Corunna and Lisbon. -Moore was only partly responsible for all this: but it is certain -that the whole series of movements had in truth been calculated to do -the utmost possible mischief to the cause of Spain and of England. -If Moore had died or been superseded on December 4, 1808, he would -have been written down as wellnigh the worst failure in all the long -list of incompetent British commanders since the commencement of the -Revolutionary War. - - [614] Frere to Moore, from Truxillo, Dec. 9. - - [615] Frere to Moore, from Merida, Dec. 14. - -It is, therefore, with all the greater satisfaction that we now pass -on to the second part of the campaign of the British army in Spain, -wherein Moore showed himself as resourceful, rapid, and enterprising as -he had hitherto appeared slow and hesitating. Having once got rid of -the over-caution which had hitherto governed his movements, and having -made up his mind that it was right to run risks, he showed that the -high reputation which he enjoyed in the British army was well deserved. - -Moore’s first intention, as is shown by his orders to Baird and his -letters to Castlereagh, was merely to disturb the French communications -by a sudden raid on Valladolid, or even on Burgos. If Madrid was really -holding out, the Emperor would not be able to send any large detachment -against him, unless he made up his mind to raise the siege of the -capital. It was probable that Bonaparte would consider the destruction -of an English army of even more importance than the prosecution of the -siege, and that he would come rushing northward with all his army. In -that case, as Moore wrote to Baird, ‘we shall have a run for it,’ but -Madrid would be saved. In short, Napoleon was to be treated like the -bull in the arena, who is lured away from a fallen adversary by having -a red cloak dangled before his eyes. Supposing that the main force of -the French were turned upon him, Moore was perfectly well aware that -his line of retreat on Portugal would be cut, for troops marching from -the neighbourhood of Madrid, via the Guadarrama Pass, might easily -seize Salamanca. But it is one of the privileges of the possessor of -sea-power that he can change his base whenever he chooses, and Moore -wrote to Castlereagh to request that transports might be massed at -Corunna for the reception of his army. If forced to fall back on that -place he intended to sail round to Lisbon or to Cadiz, as circumstances -might dictate. - -In the unlikely event of Bonaparte’s persisting in the siege of Madrid, -and sending only small detachments against the British army, Moore -thought that he would be strong enough to make matters very unpleasant -for the enemy in Old Castile. If he beat the forces immediately -opposed to him, and seized Valladolid and Burgos, the Emperor would be -compelled to come north, whether he wished it or no. - -All these plans were perfectly reasonable and well concerted, -considering the information that was at Moore’s disposition on December -6. But that information was based on two false premises: the one was -that Madrid was likely to hold out for some little time--Moore never -supposed that it could be for very long, for he remained fixed in his -distrust of Spanish civic virtues: the second was that the French army -in the north of Spain did not amount to more than 80,000 or 100,000 -men, an estimate which had been repeated to him by every Spaniard with -whom he had communicated, and which had been confirmed, not only by -Frere, but by Stuart and other English correspondents in whom he had -some confidence. If he had known that the French had entered Madrid -on December 4, and that they numbered more than 250,000 bayonets and -sabres, his plans would have been profoundly modified[616]. - - [616] Moore’s plans between Dec. 6 and 10, the day on which he - got news of the fall of Madrid, must be gathered from his rather - meagre dispatches to Castlereagh of midnight, Dec. 5, and of Dec. - 8; from his much more explicit letters to Frere on Dec. 6 and 10; - from that to La Romana on Dec. 8; and most of all from the very - interesting and confidential letters to Baird on Dec. 6 and 8. - - His doubts as to the permanence of the outburst of enthusiasm - in Madrid are plainly expressed in nearly every one of these - epistles. The terrible under-estimate of Napoleon’s disposable - forces is to be found in that to Castlereagh on Dec. 12, where - he writes that ‘the French force in Spain may fairly be set down - at 80,000 men, besides what is in Catalonia.’ Acting upon this - hypothesis, it is no wonder that he was convinced that Bonaparte - could not both besiege Madrid and hunt the British army. - -Moore’s original intention was to move on Valladolid, a great centre -of roads, and a sort of halfway-house between Burgos and Madrid. -Meanwhile, Baird was to come down from Astorga via Benavente, and to -converge on the same point. A cavalry screen in front of the combined -force was formed, by pushing the two regiments which belonged to -Moore’s own corps towards Alaejos and Tordesillas, on the south bank -of the Douro; while Baird’s cavalry brigade, under Lord Paget, made a -forced march from Astorga to Toro, and extended itself north of the -river. Moore’s infantry was not to move till the tenth, but that of -Baird was already returning as fast as it could manage from Villafranca -to Astorga. The unfortunate orders of retreat, issued on November 29, -had cost Sir David six marches, three from Astorga to Villafranca and -three from Villafranca to Astorga--time lost in the most miserable and -unnecessary fashion. One of his brigades, that of General Leith[617], -was now so far off that it never managed to overtake the army, and was -out of the game for something like a fortnight. But the rest, which had -only to return from Villafranca[618], succeeded in joining the main -body in much better time than might have been expected. The fact was -that the news of an advance had restored the high spirits of the whole -army, and the men stepped out splendidly through the cold and rainy -winter days, and easily accomplished their twenty miles between dawn -and dusk. - - [617] Consisting of the 51st Regiment, 59th (2nd batt.), and 76th. - - [618] Except the ‘Light Brigade’ of Baird’s army which had never - left Astorga, having been intended to act with the cavalry as a - rearguard. - -Moore, meanwhile, was occupied at Salamanca in making the last -preparations for his advance. He had already sent back into Portugal -one large convoy on December 5, escorted by the fifth battalion -of the 60th Regiment. He now dispatched another which marched by -Ciudad Rodrigo, where it picked up the 3rd Foot, who guarded it -back to Portugal[619]. The two between them contained all his heavy -baggage, and all the sick from his base hospital who could bear -transport--probably more than 1,500 invalids: for the total number of -the sick of the army was very nearly 4,000, and the larger half of them -must have belonged to Moore’s own corps, which was in worse trim than -that of Baird. The loss of the regiments sent off on escort duty was -partly made up a few days later by the arrival of the 82nd, which came -up by forced marches from Oporto, and reached Benavente on December -26. It was the leading battalion of a brigade which the government -had resolved to add to Moore’s force from the slender division of -Cradock: the other two battalions of the brigade were too far behind, -and never succeeded in joining the field-army[620]. Allowing for these -final changes we find that Moore and Baird started forth with 29,946 -effective sabres and bayonets--in which are included 1,687 men on -detachment: they left behind them nearly 4,000 sick[621]. If we deduct -2,539 for Leith’s brigade, which was still far beyond Villafranca, and -for the belated 82nd, the actual force which carried out the great raid -into the plain of Old Castile must have been just over 25,000 strong: -of these 2,450 were cavalry, and there were 1,297 artillery gunners and -drivers with sixty-six guns. - - [619] The 3rd had been at Ciudad Rodrigo since Oct. 29 guarding - communications. - - [620] They were the 45th (1st batt.) and the 97th. - - [621] See the tables in the Appendix. It seems to result that the - gross total who marched from Corunna and Lisbon was 33,884, that - the deduction of 3,938 sick leaves 29,946. Leith’s battalions and - the 82nd were 2,539 strong, the men on detachment 1,687: this - leaves 25,720 for the actual marching force. - -Moore had, of course, given notice to La Romana of his change of plan: -in response to his letter of December 6 the Marquis expressed his -pleasure at the prospect of the union of the allied armies, and his -wish to co-operate to the best of his power[622]. He had now collected -20,000 men--a formidable army on paper--and was certain to do his best, -but what that might amount to was very doubtful. It was well known that -a great part of his troops were not fit to move: but it was not till -a few days later that Moore received definite intelligence as to the -exact amount of military aid that might be furnished by the army of the -Left. - - [622] As Arteche very truly observes, the letter of La Romana - cannot be safely quoted (after the fashion of James Moore on his - p. 122) as approving of the retreat on Portugal. He is answering - the dispatch of Dec. 6, not that of Nov. 28. - -The British troops were fully committed to their new plan of -campaign--Baird was hastening back to Astorga, the sick and the -convoys had started for Portugal, the cavalry had pushed well to the -front--when Moore suddenly received a piece of intelligence which -profoundly modified the situation. Madrid had fallen into the hands of -Bonaparte: the news was brought by Colonel Graham, who had been sent -off with the reply to Morla and Castelfranco. Forced to make a long -detour, because all the direct roads were known to be in the hands of -the French, he had fallen in at Talavera with the fugitive army from -the Escurial, and had almost witnessed the murder of San Juan. From -information given him by various persons, and especially by two belated -members of the Central Junta, he learnt that Napoleon had stormed the -Retiro and the Prado, and that Morla had signed a capitulation. The -populace were said to be still in possession of their arms, and it was -supposed that there would be much trouble in pacifying the city; but -there was no doubt that, from a military point of view, it was in the -Emperor’s power[623]. - - [623] Graham to Moore, from Talavera, Dec. 7-8. - -Considering Moore’s earlier doubts and hesitations, we should almost -have expected that this news would have induced him to throw up his -whole plan for an advance into Old Castile, and once more to order -a retreat on Almeida. But he evidently considered that he was now -committed to the raid on Bonaparte’s lines of communication, and -thought that, even if he could not save Madrid, he could at least -distract the enemy from an attempt to push further south, and give -the Spanish armies time to rally. There was a chance, as he wrote to -Castlereagh[624], that he might effect something, and he should take -it, committing himself to Fortune: ‘If she smiles we may do some good: -if not, we shall still I hope have the merit of having done all that we -could. The army, for its numbers, is excellent, and is (I am confident) -quite determined to do its duty.’ - - [624] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 10. - -On December 11 the infantry at last began to move forward from -Salamanca--a month all but two days had elapsed since its vanguard -reached that city. On that day the reserve division, under General -E. Paget, and Beresford’s brigade of Fraser’s division marched for -Toro, where they found Lord Paget with Baird’s cavalry, ready to -cover their advance. These troops were to form the left-hand column -of the advance on Valladolid. On the next day Hope’s detachment from -Alba de Tormes, and the brigades of Bentinck, Fane, Hill, and Charles -Alten from Salamanca, which formed the right-hand column, marched -for Alaejos and Tordesillas. In front of them was Charles Stewart’s -cavalry brigade, which, on the same evening (December 12), fell upon -a French cavalry patrol at Rueda and captured it whole, only one man -escaping. The prisoners turned out to belong to the 22nd Chasseurs -cf Franceschi’s cavalry division, which, as it was discovered, lay -at Valladolid without any infantry supports[625]. They expressed the -greatest surprise at finding themselves assailed by English cavalry, -as they were under the impression that Moore had retired on Lisbon -some days before. This side-light on the general ignorance prevailing -in the French army as to the position and designs of the British was -very valuable: the first meeting with the enemy, trifling as was the -success, promised well for the future. - - [625] There were thirty of these dragoons: with them were fifty - infantry, apparently a belated detail or foraging party from - Lefebvre’s corps. - -On the thirteenth Moore himself came up from Salamanca to Alaejos, -where he overtook the infantry. Stewart’s cavalry meanwhile pushed on -to Tordesillas and Medina del Campo, without coming across any traces -of the French. At Tordesillas they found themselves in touch with Lord -Paget’s horsemen on the other side of the Douro, who had also met -with no opposition whatever. On the fifteenth the whole army would -have converged on Valladolid, if Moore’s original intention had been -carried out. But a fortunate accident intervened to prevent this march, -which would have placed the British troops nearer to Madrid and to the -Emperor than did the route which they finally adopted. - -There was brought to Moore at Alaejos an intercepted dispatch from -Berthier to Soult, containing the most valuable information. The -officer bearing it had been sent off from Madrid without an escort, -according to the Emperor’s usual habit--a habit that cost the lives -of some scores of unfortunate aides-de-camp during the first year of -the Peninsular War. It was only by experience that Napoleon and his -marshals learnt that isolated officers travelling in this fashion were -devoted in Spain to probable death and possible torture, as Marbot -(after a personal experience of the kind) bitterly observed. The bearer -of this particular dispatch had been murdered by peasants at the -post-house of Valdestillos, near Segovia. - -The document was full of invaluable facts and details. It informed -Soult that with his existing force--the two infantry divisions of -Merle and Mouton, and the four cavalry regiments of Franceschi’s -division[626]--he was strong enough to march straight before him from -Saldaña, and to overrun the whole kingdom of Leon. He was to seize the -towns of Leon, Zamora, and Benavente, and to sweep the débris of the -army of Galicia into its native mountains. He would find nothing else -to oppose him; for the English, as all accounts agreed, were in full -retreat on Lisbon. They had last been heard of at Salamanca and the -Escurial. A knowledge of this plan was valuable to Moore, but still -more so was what followed--a sketch of the position of the French army -at the moment when the dispatch was written. The advanced guard of the -‘Grand Army’ (Lefebvre’s corps) was at Talavera, and would shortly be -at Badajoz: Bessières was chasing Castaños beyond the Upper Tagus, on -the road to Valencia. Mortier’s and Junot’s corps had reached Spain: -the former had been ordered off to aid in the siege of Saragossa: the -latter was on the march to Burgos, and its leading division had reached -Vittoria. The chief omission was that Berthier did not mention the -Imperial Guard or the corps of Ney, which were in or about Madrid when -he wrote, and were probably destined to follow Lefebvre’s march on -Badajoz and Lisbon. The dispatch ends with the curious note that ‘His -Majesty is in the best of health. The city of Madrid is quite tranquil: -the shops are open, theatrical amusements have been resumed, and you -would never suppose that our first addresses to the place had been -emphasized by 4,000 cannon-balls[627].’ - - [626] Berthier speaks as if Mouton were still commanding one of - Soult’s divisions, but he was now gone, and Mermet’s name ought - to appear. - - [627] This dispatch, though often published, has been - deliberately omitted (like some others) in the _Correspondance de - Napoléon_, vol. xviii, probably because it shows the Emperor in - one of his least omniscient moods. - -Moore was thus placed in possession of the Emperor’s plan of campaign, -and of the dislocation of the greater part of his army. Most important -of all, he discovered that his own position and designs were wholly -unsuspected. His mind was soon made up: Soult, as it seemed, with his -15,000 or 16,000 men at Saldaña and Carrion, was about to move forward -into Leon. He would thus be placed at an enormous distance from the -Emperor, and would have no solid supports save the leading division -of Junot’s corps, which must now be drawing near to Burgos. If he -advanced, the whole British army, aided by whatever troops La Romana -could produce, might be hurled upon him. The results could not be -doubtful, and a severe defeat inflicted on the 2nd Corps would shake -the hold of the French on Northern Spain, and ruin all the Emperor’s -plans. Moreover the region where Soult might be looked for, about -Carrion, Sahagun, and Mayorga, was far more remote from Madrid than the -Valladolid country, where Moore was originally intending to strike his -blow, so that several days would be gained before the Emperor could -interfere. - -Accordingly, on December 15, the whole army suddenly changed its -direction from eastward to northward. The left-hand column of the -infantry crossed the Douro at Zamora, the right-hand column at -Toro. The cavalry, screening the march of both, went northward from -Tordesillas to the banks of the Sequillo, pushing its advanced parties -right up to Valladolid, and driving back the dragoons of Franceschi, -several of whose detachments they cut off, capturing a colonel and -more than a hundred men. They intercepted the communications between -Burgos and Madrid to such effect that Bonaparte believed that the whole -British army was moving on Valladolid, and drew up his first plan of -operations under that hypothesis[628]. - - [628] It is clear from _Nap. Corresp._, 14,614, 14,616-7, that - Franceschi actually evacuated Valladolid and retired northwards. - Napoleon at first believed that Moore had occupied the place: - but 14,620 mentions that no more happened than that 100 hussars - swooped down on it on Dec. 19, and carried off the intendant - of the province and 300,000 reals (£3,000) from the treasury. - This exploit is omitted by nearly every English writer. Only - Vivian mentions it in his diary, and says that the lucky captors - belonged to the 18th Hussars (_Memoirs_, p. 94). What became of - the money? - -Meanwhile four good marches [December 16-20] carried Moore’s infantry -from Zamora and Toro by the route Villalpando-Valderas to Mayorga. -The weather was bitterly cold, which in one way favoured the movement, -for the frost hardened the country roads, which would otherwise have -been mere sloughs of mud. A little snow fell from time to time, but -not enough to incommode the troops. They marched well, kept their -discipline, and left few sick or stragglers behind. This was the result -of good spirits, for they had been told that they would meet the French -before the week was out. At Mayorga the junction with Baird’s column -was safely effected. - -When the army had thus completed its concentration, Sir John Moore, -for reasons which it is not quite easy to understand, rearranged all -its units. He formed it into four divisions and two independent -light brigades. The 1st Division was given to Sir David Baird, the -2nd to Sir John Hope, the 3rd to General Fraser, the 4th (or Reserve) -to General E. Paget. The two light brigades were under Charles Alten -and Robert Crawfurd (now as always to be carefully distinguished from -Catlin Crawfurd, who commanded a brigade of Hope’s division). All the -old arrangements of the army of Portugal were broken up: Baird was -given three regiments which had come from Lisbon: on the other hand -he had to make over four of his Corunna battalions to Hope and two to -Fraser. Apparently the idea of the Commander-in-chief was to mix the -corps who had already had experience of the French in Portugal with -the comparatively raw troops who had landed in Galicia. Otherwise it -is impossible to understand the gratuitous divorce of regiments which -had been for some time accustomed to act together. The cavalry was -formed as a division of two brigades under Lord Paget: the three hussar -regiments from Corunna formed one, under General Slade; the two corps -from Lisbon the other, under Charles Stewart, the brother of Lord -Castlereagh. Of the whole army only the 82nd and Leith’s brigade were -still missing: the former had not yet reached Benavente. The belated -regiments of the latter were still on the further side of Astorga, and -never took any part in the advance. - -During this march Moore at last got full information as to the state -of La Romana’s troops, and the aid that might be expected from them. -The Marquis himself, writing to contradict a false report that he -was retiring on Galicia, confessed that two-thirds of his 20,000 men -wanted reclothing from head to foot, and that there was a terrible -want of haversacks, cartridge-boxes, and shoes. He complained bitterly -that the provinces (i.e. Asturias and Galicia) were slack and tardy -in forwarding him supplies, and laid much of the blame on them[629]. -But he would move forward the moment he could be assisted by Baird’s -troops in pressing the French in his front. He reported that Soult had -10,000 infantry at Saldaña, Carrion, and Almanza, with cavalry out in -advance at Sahagun: he dared not move across their front southward, for -to do so would uncover the high-road through Leon to the Asturias. But -the appearance of Baird on the Benavente-Palencia road should be the -signal for him to advance against the French in conjunction with his -allies[630]. - - [629] Toreño, being an Asturian, is rather indignant at Romana’s - reflection on the Junta of his province, and observes (i. 324) - that the Marquis did not take the trouble to ask for help from - them, only writing them a single letter during his stay at Leon. - But they sent him some tents, and took in some of his sick. From - Galicia there was coming for him an enormous convoy with 100 - wagons of English boots and clothes: but it was three weeks too - late, and had only reached Lugo by Jan. 1. - - [630] Romana to Moore, from Leon, Dec. 14. - -Romana’s description of his army did not sound very promising. But -a confidential report from an English officer who had visited his -cantonments gave an even less favourable account of the Galicians. -Colonel Symes had seen four of the seven divisions which formed the -‘Army of the Left.’ He wrote that the soldiers were ‘in general, stout -young men, without order or discipline, but not at all turbulent -or ferocious. Their clothing was motley, and some were half-naked. -Their manœuvres were very confusedly performed, and the officers were -comparatively inferior to the men. The equipment was miserable: of -sixteen men of General Figueroa’s guard only six had bayonets. The -springs and locks of the muskets often did not correspond. A portion -of them--at least one-third--would not explode, and a French soldier -could load and fire his piece with precision thrice, before a Spaniard -could fire his twice.’ Of the three divisions which he saw reviewed at -Leon, one (the 5th, the old troops from the Baltic) seemed superior to -the rest, and was armed with good English firelocks: there was also -a corps of light troops, 1,000 men in uniform, who might be called -respectable[631].... Without undervaluing the spirit of patriotism of -the Spaniards, which might in the end effect their deliverance, the -writer of the report could only say that they were not, and for a very -long time could not be, sufficiently improved in the art of war to -be coadjutors in a general action with the British: if any reliance -were placed on Spanish aid in the field, terrible disappointment must -result: ‘we must stand or fall through our own means[632].’ Colonel -Symes doubted whether La Romana would even dare to take his troops into -the field at all--wherein he did the Marquis grave injustice: he had -every intention of doing his best--though that best turned out to be -merely the bringing to the front of the 7,000 or 8,000 men out of his -22,000, who were more or less armed and equipped, while the rest were -left behind as wholly unserviceable. - - [631] Possibly the two light infantry battalions (Catalonia and - Barcelona) of the Baltic division. - - [632] Symes to Baird, from Leon, Dec. 14. Baird, of course, - forwarded the letter to Moore. I have cut down the report to - one-third of its bulk, by omitting the less important parts. - -With this document before him, Moore must have found a certain grim -humour in the perusal of a letter from the Supreme Junta, which reached -him at Toro on December 16, informing him that La Romana would join him -with 14,000 ‘picked men,’ and that within a month 30,000 more Asturian -and Galician levies should be at his disposal. This communication was -brought to him by Francisco Xavier Caro, the brother of the Marquis, -who was himself a member of the Junta. With him came Mr. Stuart, as -an emissary from the British minister, bringing the last of those -unhappy epistles which Frere had written before he knew that the plan -of retreating on Portugal had been given up. We have already quoted one -of its insulting phrases on page 524: the rest was in the same strain. -Fortunately, it could be disregarded, as Moore was actually advancing -on the enemy, with a definite promise of help from La Romana. Caro -professed to be much delighted that the Junta’s hopes were at last -obtaining fruition. Stuart expressed surprise and grief at the tone of -Frere’s letters, and ‘seemed not much pleased at his mission[633].’ -This was the last of the many troubles with the British and Spanish -civil authorities which were destined to harass the Commander-in-chief. -For the future it was only military cares that were to weigh upon his -mind. - - [633] Moore’s diary, quoted in his brother’s memoir of him, pp. - 141, 142. - -On December 20 the army had concentrated at Mayorga. Somewhat to his -disappointment Moore discovered that Soult had not begun the advance -on Leon which Berthier’s intercepted dispatch had ordered. Either -no duplicate of it had been received by the Marshal, or he had been -disconcerted by the report that the English were on the move for -Valladolid. That they were coming against his own force he can as yet -hardly have guessed. He was still in his old position, one infantry -division at Saldaña, the other at Carrion. Debelle’s light-cavalry -brigade lay in front as a screen, with its head quarters at Sahagun, -only nine miles from the English advanced pickets, which had reached -the abbey of Melgar Abaxo. - -The proximity of the enemy led Lord Paget, who showed himself -throughout the campaign a most admirable and enterprising cavalry -commander, to attempt a surprise. Marching long ere dawn with the -10th and 15th Hussars, he reached the vicinity of Sahagun without -being discovered. Debelle had no outlying vedettes, and his main-guard -on the high-road was suddenly surrounded and captured before it was -aware that an enemy was near. Only a single trooper escaped, but he -aroused the town, and Paget, hearing the French trumpets sounding in -the streets, saw that he must lose no time. He sent General Slade with -the 10th Hussars by the straight road into Sahagun, while he himself -galloped around it with the 15th to cut off the enemy’s retreat. As he -reached the suburb he found Debelle forming up his two regiments--the -8th Dragoons and the 1st Provisional Chasseurs--among the snow-covered -stumps of a vineyard. Nothing could be seen of the 10th, which was -scouring the town, but Paget formed up the 15th for a charge. His first -movement was checked by an unexpected ditch; but moving rapidly down -it he crossed at a place where it was practicable, and found Debelle -changing front to meet him. Catching the French before they had begun -to move--their new formation was not yet quite completed--Paget charged -into them without hesitation, though they outnumbered him by nearly two -to one. He completely rode down the front regiment, the provisional -chasseurs, and flung it back on to the dragoons, who broke and fled. -The chasseurs, who were commanded by Colonel Tascher, a cousin of -the Empress Josephine, were half destroyed: two lieutenant-colonels, -eleven other officers, and 157 men were taken prisoners, twenty were -killed, many were wounded[634]. The regiment indeed was so mauled that -Bonaparte dissolved it soon after, and replaced it in Franceschi’s -division by the 1st Hussars, which had just arrived from France. - - [634] Compare Lord Londonderry (a participator in the charge), - Vivian, Adam Neale, and on the French side, Colonel St. Chamans, - Soult’s aide-de-camp. The British lost only 14 men (Vivian, p. - 97). - -This was perhaps the most brilliant exploit of the British cavalry -during the whole six years of the war. When the Peninsular medals were -distributed, nearly forty years after, a special clasp was very rightly -given for it, though many combats in which a much larger number of men -were engaged received no such notice. While reading the records of -later stages of the war the historian must often regret that Wellington -never, till Waterloo, had the services of Paget as commander of his -light cavalry. There were unfortunate personal reasons which rendered -the presence of the victor of Sahagun and Benavente impossible in the -camp of the victor of Vimiero[635]. - - [635] After his return from Spain in January, 1809, Paget - eloped with the wife of Henry Wellesley, the younger brother of - Wellington. Naturally they could not be placed together for many - years, and Paget lost his chance of seeing any more of the war. - But at Waterloo he gloriously vindicated his reputation as the - best living British cavalry-officer. - -The scared survivors of Debelle’s brigade rode back to give Soult -notice that the enemy was upon him, and might close in on the very -next day. Meanwhile Moore’s infantry, following in the wake of Paget’s -horse, reached Sahagun on the evening of the twenty-first. It was to -be almost their last step in advance. The general allowed one day’s -rest to enable the rear divisions to close up to the van, so that all -might advance on Saldaña and Carrion in a compact mass. He intended to -deliver his much-desired blow at Soult upon the twenty-third. - -The Duke of Dalmatia, though he had heard nothing as yet of the British -infantry, made the right inference from the vigorous way in which his -cavalry had been driven in, and concluded that Moore was not far off. -He drew down his second infantry division from Saldaña to Carrion, -thus concentrating his corps, and sent aides-de-camp to Burgos and -Palencia to hurry up to his support every regiment that could be found. -The disposable troops turned out to be Lorges’s division of dragoons, -and Delaborde’s division of the 8th Corps, which were both on their -way from Burgos to Madrid. The rest of Junot’s infantry was two days -off, on the road from Vittoria to Burgos. The brigade of Franceschi’s -cavalry which had evacuated Valladolid, was also heard of on the -Palencia road. No news or orders had been received from Madrid, with -which place communication was now only possible by the route of Aranda, -that by Valladolid being closed. - -If Moore, allowing his infantry the night of the twenty-first and the -morning of the twenty-second to recruit their strength, had marched -on Carrion on the afternoon of the latter day, he would have caught -Soult at a disadvantage at dawn on the twenty-third, for none of the -supporting forces had yet got into touch with the Marshal. If the -latter had dared to make a stand, he would have been crushed: but it is -more probable that--being a prudent general--he would have fallen back -a march in the direction of Burgos. But, as it chanced, Moore resolved -to give his men forty-eight hours instead of thirty-six at Sahagun--and -twelve hours often suffice to change the whole situation. The army was -told to rest as long as daylight lasted on the twenty-third, and to -march at nightfall, so as to appear in front of the bridge of Carrion -at dawn on the twenty-fourth. Attacked at daybreak, the Marshal would, -as Moore hoped, find no time to organize his retreat and would thus be -forced to fight. - -While waiting at Sahagun for the sun to set, Moore received a dispatch -from La Romana to say that, in accordance with his promise, he had -marched from Leon to aid his allies. But he could only put into the -field some 8,000 men and a single battery--with which he had advanced -to Mansilla, with his vanguard at Villarminio, on the road to Saldaña. -He was thus but eighteen miles from Sahagun, and though he had only -brought a third of his army with him, could be utilized in the oncoming -operations. - -But this was not the only news which reached Moore on the afternoon -of the twenty-third. Only two short hours before he received the -dispatch from Mansilla, another note from La Romana had come in, with -information of very much greater importance. A confidential agent of -the Marquis, beyond the Douro, had sent him a messenger with news that -all the French forces in the direction of the Escurial were turning -northward and crossing the Guadarrama. Putting this intelligence side -by side with rumours brought in by peasants, to the effect that great -quantities of food and forage had been ordered to be collected in the -villages west of Palencia, Moore drew the right inference. What he -had always expected had come to pass. Napoleon had turned north from -Madrid, and was hastening across the mountains to overwhelm the British -army[636]. - - [636] From Moore’s dispatch to La Romana, written on the - twenty-third, we gather that the letter with the news about the - French movements came in about six p.m., and the second one with - the report that the Spaniards had reached Mansilla about eight. - The latter is acknowledged in a postscript to Moore’s reply to - the former. The resolve to retreat was made between six and eight - o’clock. - -Without losing a moment, Moore countermanded his advance on Carrion. -The orders went out at nine o’clock, when the leading brigades had -already started. As the men were tramping over the frozen snow, in -full expectation of a fight at dawn, they were suddenly told to halt. -A moment later came the command to turn back by the road that they had -come, and to retire to their bivouacs of the previous day. Utterly -puzzled and much disgusted the troops returned to Sahagun. - - - - -SECTION VIII: CHAPTER IV - -NAPOLEON’S PURSUIT OF MOORE: SAHAGUN TO ASTORGA - - -We have many times had occasion in this narrative to wonder at the -extreme tardiness with which news reached the Spanish and the English -generals. It is now at the inefficiency of Napoleon’s intelligence -department that we must express our surprise. Considering that Moore -had moved forward from Salamanca as far back as December 12, and had -made his existence manifest to the French on that same day by the -successful skirmish at Rueda, it is astonishing to find that the -Emperor did not grasp the situation for nine days. Under the influence -of his pre-conceived idea that the British must be retiring on Lisbon, -he was looking for them in every other quarter rather than the banks -of the Upper Douro. On the seventeenth he was ordering reconnaissances -to be made in the direction of Plasencia[637] in Estremadura (of all -places in the world) to get news of Moore, and was still pushing -troops towards Talavera on the road to Portugal. The general tendency -of all his movements was in this direction, and there can be no doubt -that in a few days his great central reserve would have followed in -the wake of Lasalle and Lefebvre, and started for Badajoz and Elvas. -On the nineteenth he reviewed outside Madrid the troops that were -available for instant movement--the Imperial Guard, the corps of Ney, -the divisions of Leval and Lapisse--about 40,000 men with 150 guns, -all in excellent order, and with fifteen days’ biscuit stored in -their wagons[638]. Of the direction they were to take we can have no -doubt, when we read in the imperial correspondence orders for naval -officers to be hurried up to reorganize the arsenal of Lisbon[639], -and a private note to Bessières--the commander-in-chief of the -cavalry--bidding him start his spare horses and his personal baggage -for Talavera[640]. - - [637] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,577 [Dec. 17], orders Lasalle’s cavalry - to push for Plasencia in order to get news of the British army. - - [638] Napier (i. 304) says that there were 60,000 men present, - but it is hard to see how such a number could have been collected - on that day at Madrid; and the official account of the review in - the _Madrid Gazette_ for Dec. 23 says that 40,000 men appeared, - ‘all in beautiful order, and testifying their enthusiasm by their - shouts as His Majesty rode past the front of each regiment.’ - The Emperor never understated his forces on such occasions: the - tendency was the other way. - - [639] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,514, to Admiral Decrès. Cf. De Pradt, - p. 211. - - [640] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,553, to Bessières, Dec. 12. - -The Emperor’s obstinate refusal to look in the right direction is very -curious when we remember that Moore’s cavalry was sweeping the plains -as far as Valladolid from December 12 to 16, and that on the eighteenth -Franceschi had abandoned that important city, while Soult had got news -of Moore’s being on the move two days earlier. Clearly either there -was grave neglect in sending information on the part of the French -cavalry generals in Old Castile, or else the Emperor had so convinced -himself that the British were somewhere on the road to Lisbon, that -he did not read the true meaning of the dispatches from the north. Be -this as it may, it is evident that there was a serious failure in the -imperial intelligence department, and that a week or more was wasted. -Bonaparte ought to have been astir two or three days after Stewart and -Paget drove in Franceschi’s screen of vedettes. As a matter of fact it -was nine days before any move was made at the French head quarters: yet -Rueda is only ninety-five miles from Madrid. - -The first definite intelligence as to the English being on the move in -Old Castile reached the Emperor on the evening of December 19. Yet it -was only on the twenty-first that he really awoke to the full meaning -of the reports that reached him from Soult and Franceschi[641]. But -when he did at last realize the situation, he acted with a sudden -and spasmodic energy which was never surpassed in any of his earlier -campaigns. He hurled on to Moore’s track not only the central reserve -at Madrid, but troops gathered in from all directions, till he had -set at least 80,000 men on the march, to encompass the British corps -which had so hardily thrown itself upon his communications. Moore had -been perfectly right when he stated his belief that the sight of the -redcoats within reach would stir the Emperor up to such wrath, that -he would abandon every other enterprise and rush upon them with every -available man. - - [641] In _Nap. Corresp._ there is no trace of movement till the - twenty-second. - -On the evening of the twenty-first the French troops from every -camp around Madrid were pouring out towards the Escurial and the two -passes over the Guadarrama. The cavalry of Ney’s corps and of the -Imperial Guard was in front, then came the masses of their infantry. -Lapisse’s division fell in behind: an express was sent to Dessolles, -who was guarding the road to Calatayud and Saragossa, to leave only -two battalions and a battery behind, and to make forced marches on the -Escurial with the rest of his men. Another aide-de-camp rode to set -Lahoussaye’s division of dragoons on the move from Avila[642]. Finally -messengers rode north to bid Lorges’s dragoons, and all the fractions -of Junot’s corps, to place themselves under the orders of Soult. -Millet’s belated division of dragoons was to do the same, if it had yet -crossed the Ebro. - - [642] All this can be studied in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,609, - 14,611, 14,614. The march out towards the Escurial is fixed, by - the _Madrid Gazette_ of Dec. 23, as having begun late on the - twenty-first. - -The Emperor, once more committing the error of arguing from -insufficient data, had made up his mind that the English were at -Valladolid[643]. He had no news from that place since Franceschi -had abandoned it, and chose to assume that Moore, or at any rate -some portion of the British army, was there established. Under this -hypothesis it would be easy to cut off the raiders from a retreat on -Portugal, or even on Galicia, by carrying troops with extreme speed -to Tordesillas and Medina de Rio Seco. This comparatively easy task -was all that Napoleon aimed at in his first directions. Villacastin, -Arevalo, Olmedo, and Medina del Campo are the points to which his -orders of December 21 and 22 require that the advancing columns should -be pushed. - - [643] This error appears in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,614 [Dec. 22], - ‘si les Anglais veulent tenir à Valladolid’; 14,616 [Dec. 23] - says, ‘Les Anglais paraissent être à Valladolid, probablement - avec une avant-garde.’ It is only on Dec. 27 that he writes to - King Joseph that they had never been there at all, save with a - flying party of 100 light cavalry. - -For the maintenance of Madrid, and the ‘containing’ of the Spanish -armies at Cuenca and Almaraz, the Emperor left nothing behind but the -corps of Lefebvre, two-thirds of the corps of Victor, and the three -cavalry divisions of Lasalle, Milhaud, and Latour-Maubourg--8,000 horse -and 28,000 foot in all, with ninety guns[644]. King Joseph was left -in nominal command of the whole. Such a force was amply sufficient to -hold back the disorganized troops of Galluzzo and Infantado, but not to -advance on Seville or on Lisbon. It was impossible that any blow should -be dealt to the west or the south, till the Emperor should send back -some of the enormous masses of men that he had hurled upon Moore. Thus -the English general’s intention was fully carried out: his raid into -Old Castile had completely disarranged all Bonaparte’s plans. It gave -the Spaniards at least two months in which to rally and recover their -spirits, and it drew the field-army of the Emperor into a remote and -desolate corner of Spain, so that the main centres of resistance were -left unmolested. - - [644] This is Napoleon’s own estimate (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,615). - Marshal Jourdan, who was more or less in charge of the whole, - as chief of the staff to King Joseph, says that there were in - reality only 30,000 men in all (_Mémoires Militaires_, p. 130). - Not only was Victor’s corps short of the division of Lapisse - (which the Emperor had carried off), but Lefebvre’s was also - incomplete, as two Dutch and one German battalions of Leval’s - division were behind in Biscay, garrisoning Bilbao and other - points. King Joseph’s Guards had also left some detachments - behind, and were not up to full strength (_Nap. Corresp._, - 14,615). - -Napoleon had guessed part, but by no means all, of Moore’s design. -‘The manœuvre of the English is very strange,’ he wrote to his brother -Joseph; ‘it is proved that they have evacuated Salamanca. Probably -they have brought their transports round to Ferrol, because they think -that the retreat on Lisbon is no longer safe, as we could push on -from Talavera by the left bank of the Tagus and shut the mouth of the -river.... Probably they have evacuated Portugal and transferred their -base to Ferrol, because it offers advantages for a safe embarkation. -But while retreating, they might hope to inflict a check on the corps -of Soult, and may not have made up their mind to try it till they -had got upon their new line of retreat, and moved to the right bank -of the Douro. They may have argued as follows: “If the French commit -themselves to a march on Lisbon, we can evacuate on Oporto, and while -doing so are still on our line of communications with Ferrol. Or, -possibly, they may be expecting fresh reinforcements. But whatever -their plan may be, their move will have a great influence on the end of -this whole business.”’ - -The Emperor thought therefore that Moore’s main object had been to -change an unsafe base at Lisbon for a safe one in Galicia, and that the -demonstration against Soult was incidental and secondary. It does not -seem to have struck him that the real design was to lure the central -field-army of the French from Madrid, and to postpone the invasion -of the south. Many of his apologists and admirers have excused his -blindness, by saying that Moore’s plan was so rash and hazardous that -no sensible man could have guessed it. But this is a complete mistake: -the plan, if properly carried out, was perfectly sound. Sir John knew -precisely what he was doing, and was prepared to turn on his heel and -go back at full speed, the instant that he saw the least movement on -the side of Madrid. It was in no rash spirit that he acted, but rather -the reverse: ‘I mean to proceed bridle in hand,’ he said; ‘and if the -bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it.’[645] And on this principle -he acted: three hours after he got notice that Napoleon was on the -march, he started to ‘make a run for it’ to Astorga, and his promptness -was such that his main body was never in the slightest danger from -the Emperor’s rush on Benavente, fierce and sudden though it was. The -disasters of the second part of the retreat were not in the least -caused by Napoleon’s intercepting movement, which proved an absolute -and complete failure. - - [645] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6. - -But to proceed: Ney’s corps, which led the advance against Moore, -crossed the Guadarrama on the night of December 21, and had arrived -safely at Villacastin, on the northern side of the passes, on the -morning of the twenty-second. As if to contradict the Emperor’s -statement--made as he was setting out--that ‘the weather could not -be better,’ a dreadful tempest arose that day. When Bonaparte rode -up from Chamartin, to place himself at the head of his Guard, which -was to cross the mountains on the twenty-second, he found the whole -column stopped by a howling blizzard, which swept down the pass with -irresistible strength and piled the snow in large drifts at every -inconvenient corner of the defile. It is said that several horsemen -were flung over precipices by the mere force of the wind. The whole -train of cannon and caissons stuck halfway up the ascent, and could -neither advance nor retreat. Violently irritated at the long delay, -Napoleon turned on every pioneer that could be found to clear away the -drifts, set masses of men to trample down the snow into a beaten track, -forced the officers and all the cavalry to dismount and lead their -horses, and unharnessed half the artillery so as to give double teams -to the rest. In this way the Guard, with the Emperor walking on foot in -its midst, succeeded at last in crawling through to Villacastin by the -night of December 23. A considerable number of men died of cold and -fatigue, and the passage had occupied some sixteen hours more than had -been calculated by the Emperor. The troops which followed him had less -trouble in their passage, the tempest having abated its fury, and the -path cleared by the Guard being available for their use. - -At the very moment at which Moore was countermanding the -advance on Sahagun--about seven o’clock on the evening of the -twenty-third--Napoleon was throwing himself on his couch at -Villacastin, after a day of fatigue which had tried even his iron -frame. For the next week the two armies were contending with their -feet and not their arms, in the competition which the French officers -called the ‘race to Benavente[646].’ Napoleon was at last beginning to -understand that he had not before him the comparatively simple task of -cutting the road between Valladolid and Astorga, but the much harder -one of intercepting that between Sahagun and Astorga. For the first -three days of his march he was still under some hopes of catching the -English before they could cross the Esla--and if any of them had been -at Valladolid this would certainly have been possible. On December 24 -he was at Arevalo: on Christmas Day he reached Tordesillas, where he -waited twenty-four hours to allow his infantry to come up with his -cavalry. On the twenty-seventh he at last understood--mainly through a -letter from Soult--that the English were much further north than he had -at first believed. But he was still in high spirits: he did not think -it probable that Moore also might have been making forced marches, and -having seized Medina de Rio Seco with Ney’s corps, he imagined that he -was close on the flank of the retreating enemy. ‘To-day or to-morrow,’ -he wrote to his brother Joseph on that morning, ‘it is probable that -great events will take place. If the English have not already retreated -they are lost: even if they have already moved they shall be pursued -to the water’s edge, and not half of them shall re-embark. Put in your -newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am at Benavente -in their rear, while Soult is in their front[647].’ The announcement -was duly made in the _Madrid Gazette_, but the Emperor had been -deceived as to the condition of affairs, which never in actual fact -resembled the picture that he had drawn for himself[648]. - - [646] The phrase will be found in De Pradt, p. 211. - - [647] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,620 (Napoleon to King Joseph, Dec. 27). - - [648] Oddly enough Joseph had anticipated his brother’s orders, - by putting in the _Madrid Gazette_ of that very day a notice - that a British corps was in the most critical position, that its - retreat was cut off, and that ‘London, so long insensible to the - woes of Spain, will soon grieve over a disaster that is her own - and not that of another.’ - -Sir John had commenced his retreat from Sahagun on the twenty-fourth, -with the intention of retiring to Astorga, and of taking up a position -on the mountains behind it that might cover Galicia. He did not -intend to retire any further unless he were obliged[649]. If Soult -should follow him closely, while the Emperor was still two or three -marches away, he announced his intention of turning upon the Marshal -and offering him battle. He wrote to La Romana asking him to hold the -bridge of Mansilla (the most northerly passage over the Esla) as long -as might be prudent, and then to retire on the Asturias, leaving the -road to Galicia clear for the English army[650]. - - [649] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, night of Dec. 23-4. - - [650] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, Dec. 24. - -At noon on the twenty-fourth Moore started off in two columns: Baird’s -division marched by the northern road to Valencia de Don Juan, where -the Esla is passable by a ford and a ferry: Hope and Fraser took the -more southern route by Mayorga and the bridge of Castro Gonzalo. The -reserve division under E. Paget, and the two light brigades, remained -behind at Sahagun for twenty-four hours to cover the retreat. The five -cavalry regiments were ordered to press in closely upon Soult, and to -keep him as long as possible in doubt as to whether he was not himself -about to be attacked. - -This demonstration seems to have served its purpose, for the Marshal -made no move either on the twenty-fourth or the twenty-fifth. Yet by -the latter day his army was growing very formidable, as all the corps -from Burgos and Palencia were reporting themselves to him: Lorges’s -dragoons had reached Frechilla, and Delaborde with the head of the -infantry of Junot’s corps was at Paredes, only thirteen miles from -Soult’s head quarters at Carrion. Loison and Heudelet were not far -behind. Yet the English columns marched for two days wholly unmolested. - -On the twenty-sixth Baird crossed the Esla at Valencia: the ford was -dangerous, for the river was rising: a sudden thaw on the twenty-fourth -had turned the roads into mud, and loosened the snows. But the guns -and baggage crossed without loss, as did also some of the infantry, -the rest using the two ferry-boats[651]. Hope and Fraser, on the -Mayorga road, had nothing but the badness of their route to contend -against. The soil of this part of the kingdom of Leon is a soft rich -loam, and the cross-roads were knee-deep in clay: for the whole of -the twenty-sixth it rained without intermission: the troops plodded -on in very surly mood, but as yet there was no straggling. It was -still believed that Moore would fight at Astorga, and, though the men -grumbled that ‘the General intended to march them to death first and to -fight after[652],’ they still kept together. - - [651] There is a good account of this dangerous passage in Adam - Neale’s _Spanish Campaign of 1808_. - - [652] Memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st Highlanders, p. 53. - -But already signs were beginning to be visible that their discipline -was about to break down. A good deal of wanton damage and a -certain amount of plunder took place at the halting-places for the -night--Mayorga, Valderas, and Benavente. A voice from the ranks -explains the situation. ‘Our sufferings were so great that many of the -men lost their natural activity and spirits, and became savage in their -dispositions. The idea of running away, without even firing a shot, -from the enemy we had beaten so easily at Vimiero, was too galling to -their feelings. Each spoke to his fellow, even in common conversation, -with bitterness: rage flashed out on the most trifling occasion of -disagreement. The poor Spaniards had little to expect from such men as -these, who blamed them for their inactivity. Every man found at home -was looked upon as a traitor to his country. “Why is not every Spaniard -under arms and fighting? The cause is not ours: are we to be the only -sufferers?” Such was the common language, and from these feelings -pillage and outrage naturally arose[653].’ The men began to seize food -in the towns and villages without waiting for the regular distribution, -forced their way into houses, and (the country being singularly -destitute of wood) tore down sheds and doors to build up their bivouac -fires. The most deplorable mischief took place at Benavente, where -the regiment quartered in the picturesque old castle belonging to the -Duchess of Osuna burnt much of the mediaeval furniture, tore down the -sixteenth-century tapestry to make bed-clothes, and lighted fires on -the floors of the rooms, to the destruction of the porcelain friezes -and alcoves[654]. Moore issued a strongly-worded proclamation against -these excesses on December 27, blaming the officers for not keeping -an eye upon the men, and pointing out that ‘not bravery alone, but -patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship were military -virtues[655].’ Unfortunately, such arguments had little effect on the -tired and surly rank and file. Things were ere long to grow much worse. - - [653] I am again quoting from the admirable narrative of ‘T.S.’, - the private in the 71st. Compare Ormsby’s _Letters_, ii. 92-3, - for the wanton plundering. - - [654] The French did worse, as they burnt the whole castle when - they occupied it during the first days of the new year. But - that is no justification for the conduct of the British. For a - description of the damage done see Ormsby, ii. 102, 103. - - [655] General Order, issued at Benavente on Dec. 27. - -The infantry, as we have seen, accomplished their march to Benavente -without molestation, and all, including the rearguard, were across the -Esla by the twenty-seventh. Paget’s cavalry, however, had a much more -exciting time on the last two days. Finding that he was not attacked, -Soult began to bestir himself on the twenty-sixth: he sent Lorges’s -dragoons after the British army, in the direction of Mayorga, while -with Franceschi’s cavalry and the whole of his infantry he marched by -the direct road on Astorga, via the bridge of Mansilla. - -Lorges’s four regiments were in touch with the rearguard of Paget’s -hussars on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, but they were not the -only or the most important enemies who were now striving to drive in -Moore’s cavalry screen. The advanced guard of the Emperor’s army had -just come up, and first Colbert’s brigade of Ney’s corps and then -the cavalry of the Guard began to press in upon Paget: Lahoussaye’s -dragoons arrived on the scene a little later. It is a splendid -testimonial to the way in which the British horsemen were handled, that -they held their own for three days against nearly triple forces on a -front of thirty miles[656]. No better certificate could be given to -them than the fact that the Emperor estimated them, when the fighting -was over, at 4,000 or 5,000 sabres, their real force being only 2,400. -He wrote, too, in a moment of chagrin when Moore’s army had just -escaped from him, so that he was not at all inclined to exaggerate -their numbers, and as a matter of fact rated the infantry too low. - -But under the admirable leading of Paget the British cavalry held its -own in every direction. Moore was not exaggerating when he wrote on the -twenty-eighth that ‘they have obtained by their spirit and enterprise -an ascendency over the French which nothing but great superiority of -numbers on their part can get the better of[657].’ The 18th Light -Dragoons turned back to clear their rear six times on December 27, and -on each occasion drove in the leading squadrons of their pursuers with -such effect that they secured themselves an unmolested retreat for the -next few miles. At one charge, near Valencia de Don Juan, a troop of -thirty-eight sabres of this regiment charged a French squadron of 105 -men, and broke through them, killing twelve and capturing twenty. The -10th Hussars, while fending off Lorges’s dragoons near Mayorga, found -that a regiment of the light cavalry of Ney had got into their rear and -had drawn itself up on a rising ground flanking the high-road. Charging -up the slope, and over soil deep in the slush of half-melted snow, -they broke through the enemy’s line, and got off in safety with 100 -prisoners. Every one of Paget’s five regiments had its full share of -fighting on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, yet they closed in on -to Benavente in perfect order, with insignificant losses, and exulting -in a complete consciousness of their superiority to the enemy’s horse. -Since the start from Salamanca they had in twelve days taken no less -than 500 prisoners, besides inflicting considerable losses in killed -and wounded on the French. They had still one more success before them, -ere they found themselves condemned to comparative uselessness among -the mountains of Galicia. - - [656] Five regiments (7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, 18th Light - Dragoons, 3rd K. G. L.) were being pressed by thirteen French - regiments--four each of Lorges’s and Lahoussaye’s, two of - Colbert’s, and three of the Guard. - - [657] Moore to Castlereagh, from Benavente, Dec. 28. - -On the twenty-eighth Robert Crawfurd’s brigade had waited behind in -the mud and rain, drawn up in front of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, -‘standing for many hours with arms posted, and staring the French -cavalry in the face, while the water actually ran out of the muzzles -of their muskets[658].’ At last our hussars retired, and Crawfurd blew -up two arches of the bridge when Paget had passed over, and moved back -on Benavente, after some trifling skirmishing with the cavalry of the -Imperial Guard, who had come up in force and tried to interrupt his -work. The indefatigable British horsemen left pickets all along the -river on each side of the broken bridge, ready to report and oppose any -attempt to cross. - - [658] _Recollections of Rifleman Harris_, p. 171. - -After resting for a day in Benavente Moore had sent on the divisions -of Fraser and Hope to Astorga, by the highway through La Baneza. The -division of Baird, marching from Valencia by villainous cross-roads, -converged on the same point, where the three corps met upon December -29. Their march was wholly unmolested by the French, who were being -successfully held back by Moore’s rearguard under the two Pagets--the -cavalry general and the commander of the reserve division--and by -Crawfurd and Alten’s light brigades. On the same morning that the main -body reached Astorga, the infantry of the rearguard marched out of -Benavente, leaving behind only the horsemen, who were watching all the -fords, with their supports three miles behind in the town of Benavente. -Seeing that all the infantry had disappeared, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, -who commanded the cavalry of the Guard, thought it high time to press -beyond the Esla: it was absurd, he thought, that the mass of French -horsemen, now gathered opposite the broken bridge of Castro Gonzalo, -should allow themselves to be kept in check by a mere chain of vedettes -unsupported by infantry or guns. Accordingly he searched for fords, -and when one was found a few hundred yards from the bridge, crossed -it at the head of the four squadrons of the chasseurs of the Guard, -between 500 and 600 sabres[659]. The rest of his troops, after vainly -seeking for other passages, were about to follow him. The moment that -he had got over the water Lefebvre found himself withstood by the -pickets, mainly belonging to the 18th Light Dragoons, who came riding -in from their posts along the river to mass themselves opposite to -him. When about 130 men were collected, under Colonel Otway, they -ventured to charge the leading squadrons of the chasseurs, of course -with indifferent success. After retiring a few hundred yards more, -they were joined by a troop of the 3rd Dragoons of the King’s German -Legion, under Major Burgwedel, and again turned to fight. At this -second clash the front line of the pursuers was broken for a moment, -and the dragoons who had burst through the gap had a narrow escape of -being surrounded and captured by the second line, but finally fought -their way out of the _mêlée_ with no great loss. Charles Stewart, their -brigadier, now came up and rallied them for the second time: he retired -towards the town in good order, without allowing himself to be cowed -by Lefebvre’s rapid advance, for he knew that supports were at hand. -Lord Paget, warned in good time, had drawn out the 10th Hussars under -cover of the houses of the southern suburb of Benavente. He waited till -the chasseurs drew quite near to him, and were too remote from the -ford they had crossed to be able to retire with ease: then he suddenly -sallied out from his cover and swooped down upon them. The pickets at -the same moment wheeled about, cheered, and charged. The enemy, now -slightly outnumbered--for the 10th were fully 450 sabres strong, and -the pickets at least 200--made a good fight. A British witness observes -that these ‘fine big fellows in fur caps and long green coats’ were -far better than the line regiments with which the hussars had hitherto -been engaged. But in a few minutes they were broken, and chased for -two miles right back to the ford by which they had crossed. Lefebvre -himself was captured by a private of the 10th named Grisdale, his -wounded horse having refused to swim the river[660]. With him there -were taken two captains and seventy unwounded prisoners. The chasseurs -left fifty-five men dead or hurt upon the field, and many of those who -got away were much cut about[661]. The British casualties were fifty, -almost all from the men who had furnished the pickets, for the 10th -suffered little: Burgwedel, who had led the Germans of the 3rd K. G. -L., was the only officer hurt[662]. - - [659] Napoleon (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,623) says that the regiment - of chasseurs was only 300 strong, and their loss only sixty. But - the splendid regiments of the Guard cavalry had not yet fallen to - this small number of sabres. - - [660] He was sent to England, and long lived on parole at - Cheltenham. While he was there Charles Vaughan called on him, and - got from him some valuable information about the first siege of - Saragossa, whose history he was then writing. In 1811 Lefebvre - broke his parole and escaped to France, where Napoleon welcomed - him and restored him to command. - - [661] Larrey, the Emperor’s surgeon, commenting on sabre-wounds, - says that no less than seventy wounded of the chasseurs came - under his care on this occasion. - - [662] In James Moore’s book this gallant officer appears under - the English disguise of Major Bagwell, under which I did not at - first recognize him (p. 181). Oddly enough Adam Neale makes the - same mistake (p. 179). - -The remnant of the chasseurs crossed the river, and were immediately -supported by other regiments, who (after failing to find another ford) -had come down to that which Lefebvre had used. They showed some -signs of attempting a second passage, but Lord Paget turned upon them -the guns of Downman’s horse-battery, which had just galloped up from -Benavente. After two rounds the enemy rode off hastily from the river, -and fell back inland. They had received such a sharp lesson that they -allowed the British cavalry to retreat without molestation in the -afternoon. Napoleon consoled himself with writing that the British were -‘flying in panic’--a statement which the circumstances hardly seemed to -justify[663]--and gave an exaggerated account of the disorders which -they had committed at Valderas and Benavente, to which he added an -imaginary outrage at Leon[664]. But there is no more talk of Moore’s -corps being surrounded--wherefore it suddenly shrinks in the Emperor’s -estimation, being no longer 36,000 strong, but only ‘21,000 infantry, -with 4,000 or 5,000 horse.’ Lefebvre’s affair he frankly owned, when -writing to King Joseph, was disgusting: ‘by evening I had 8,000 horse -on the spot, but the enemy was gone[665].’ - - [663] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,623 (Napoleon to Josephine, from - Benavente, Dec. 31), ‘Les Anglais fuient épouvantés.’ - - [664] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,626 (Napoleon to King Joseph). Joseph - is to insert in the Madrid papers letters written from these - three places with descriptions of the brigandage practised by the - English--‘à Leon ils ont chassé les moines.’ No English troops - had ever been within thirty miles of Leon! - - [665] ‘Cette affaire m’a coûté une soixantaine de mes chasseurs. - Vous sentez combien cela m’a été désagréable’ (ibid.). - -Paget indeed was so effectively gone, that though French cavalry by -the thousand crossed the ford that night they could do nothing. And -Crawfurd had so thoroughly destroyed the bridge of Castro Gonzalo--he -had blown up the central pier, and not merely cut the crowns of the -arches--that infantry and guns could not cross till the thirtieth. It -was only on that day that the heads of Ney’s corps and of the Imperial -Guard came up: Lapisse’s division was still far behind, at Toro. All -that the rapid forced marches of the Emperor had brought him was the -privilege of assisting at Paget’s departure, and of picking up in -Benavente some abandoned carts, which Moore had caused to be broken -after burning their contents. - -Napoleon still consoled himself with the idea that it was possible that -Soult might have been more fortunate than himself, and might perhaps -already be attacking the English at Astorga. This was not the case: -after learning that Moore had disappeared from his front, the Duke of -Dalmatia had taken the road Sahagun-Mansilla, as the shortest line -which would bring him to Astorga, the place where any army intending -to defend Galicia would make its first stand. This choice brought him -upon the tracks of La Romana’s army, not of the British. The Marquis, -when Moore retired, had moved back on Leon, but had sent to his ally a -message to the effect that he could not accept the suggestion to make -the Asturias his base, and would be forced, when the enemy advanced, to -join the British at Astorga. It was absolutely impossible, he said, to -repair to the Asturias, for the pass of Pajares, the only coach-road -thither, was impassable on account of the snow[666]. La Romana left as -a rearguard at the all-important bridge of Mansilla, his 2nd Division, -3,000 strong, with two guns. Contrary to Moore’s advice he would not -blow up the bridge, giving as his reason that the Esla was fordable -in several places in its immediate neighbourhood. This was a blunder; -but the officer in command of the 2nd Division committed a greater -one, by drawing up his main body in front of the bridge and not behind -it--a repetition of Cuesta’s old error at Cabezon. Soult did not come -in contact with the Spanish rearguard till four days after he had left -Carrion: so heavy had been the rain, and so vile the road, that it took -him from the twenty-sixth to the twenty-ninth to cover the forty-five -miles between Carrion and Mansilla. But on the morning of December 30 -he delivered his attack: a tremendous cavalry-charge by the chasseurs -and dragoons of Franceschi broke the Spanish line, and pursuers -and pursued went pell-mell over the bridge, which was not defended -for a moment. The French captured 1,500 men--who were cut off from -re-crossing the river--two guns, and two standards. Hearing of this -disaster La Romana at once evacuated Leon, which Soult seized on the -thirty-first. The place had been hastily fortified, and there had been -much talk of the possibility of defending it[667]; but at the first -summons it opened its gates without firing a shot. The Marquis--leaving -2,000 sick in the hospitals, and a considerable accumulation of food in -his magazines--fell back on Astorga, much to the discontent of Moore, -who had not desired to see him in that direction. Soult at Leon was -only twenty-five miles from Astorga: he was now but one march from -Moore’s rearguard, and in close touch with the Emperor, who coming up -from the south reached La Baneza on the same day--the last of the old -year, 1808. - - [666] Symes to Moore, from La Romana’s camp at Mansilla, Dec. 25. - - [667] Ibid. - -The divisions of Baird, Hope, and Fraser, as we have already seen, -had reached Astorga on the twenty-ninth, the reserve division and the -light brigades (after a most fatiguing march from Benavente) on the -thirtieth, while the cavalry was, as always, to the rear, keeping -back the advancing squadrons of Bessières. Thus on the thirtieth the -English and Spanish armies were concentrated at Astorga with every -available man present--the British still 25,000 strong; for they had -suffered little in the fighting, and had not yet begun to straggle--but -Romana with no more than 9,000 or 10,000 of the nominal 22,000 which -had been shown in his returns of ten days before. His 2nd Division -had been practically destroyed at Mansilla: he had left 2,000 sick at -Leon, and many more had fallen out of the ranks in the march from that -place--some because they wished to desert their colours, but more from -cold, disease, and misery; for the army was not merely half naked, -but infected with a malignant typhus fever which was making terrible -ravages in its ranks[668]. - - [668] All witnesses agree that the army of Galicia was in a most - distressing condition. ‘This army was literally half naked and - half starved,’ says Adam Neale. ‘A malignant fever was raging - among them, and long fatigues, privation, and this mortal - distemper made them appear like spectres issuing from a hospital - rather than an army’ (p. 181). ‘T.S.’ describes them as ‘looking - more like a large body of peasants driven from their homes, and - in want of everything, than a regular army ’ (p. 56). The men fit - for service are described as being no more than 5,000 strong. - -Moore had told La Romana on the twenty-fourth that he hoped to make -a stand at Astorga. The same statement had been passed round the -army, and had kept up the spirits of the men to some extent, though -many had begun to believe that ‘Moore would never fight[669].’ There -were magazines of food at Astorga, and much more considerable ones of -military equipment: a large convoy of shoes, blankets, and muskets -had lately come in from Corunna, and Baird’s heavy baggage had been -stacked in the place before he marched for Sahagun. The town itself was -surrounded with ancient walls, and had some possibilities of defence: -just behind it rises the first range of the Galician mountains, a steep -and forbidding chain pierced only by the two passes which contain -the old and the new high-roads to Corunna. The former--the shorter, -but by far the more rugged--is called the defile of Foncebadon; the -latter--longer and easier--is the defile of Manzanal. - - [669] ‘We all wished it, but none believed it,’ writes ‘T.S.’ - ‘We had been told the same at Benavente, but our movement had - no appearance of a retreat in which we were to face about and - make a stand: it was more like a shameful flight’ (p. 56). This - undoubtedly was the prevailing view in the ranks. - -The question was at once raised as to whether the position in rear -of Astorga should not be seriously defended. The town itself would -naturally have to be given up, if the French chose to press on in -force; but the two defiles might be fortified and held against very -superior numbers. To turn 25,000 British troops out of them would have -been a very serious task, and the Spaniards meanwhile could have been -used for diversions on the enemy’s flank and rear. La Romana called -upon Moore, at the moment of the latter’s arrival at Astorga, and -proposed that they should join in defending the passes. To give them -up meant, he said, to give up also the great upland valley behind -them--the Vierzo--where lay his own dépôts and his park of artillery at -Ponferrada, and where Moore also had considerable stores and magazines -at Villafranca. The proposal was well worthy of being taken into -account, and was far from being--as Napier calls it--‘wilder than the -dreams of Don Quixote!’ for the positions were very strong, and there -was no convenient route by which they could be turned. The only other -way into Galicia, that by Puebla de Sanabria, is not only far away, but -almost impassable at midwinter from the badness of the road and the -deep snow. Moreover it leads not into the main valley of the Minho, but -into that of the Tamega on the Portuguese frontier, from which another -series of difficult defiles have to be crossed in order to get into the -heart of Galicia. La Romana thought that this road might practically be -disregarded as an element of danger in a January campaign. - -The suggestion of the Marquis deserved serious consideration. Moore’s -reasons for a summary rejection of the proposal are not stated by him -at any length[670]. He wrote to Castlereagh merely that there was only -two days’ bread at Astorga, that his means of carriage were melting -away by the death of draught beasts and the desertion of drivers, and -that he feared that the enemy might use the road upon his flank--i.e. -the Puebla de Sanabria route--to turn his position. He purposed -therefore to fall back at once to the coast as fast as he could, and -trusted that the French, for want of food, would not be able to follow -him further than Villafranca. To these reasons may be added another, -which Moore cited in his conversation with La Romana, that the troops -required rest, and could not get it in the bleak positions above -Astorga[671]. - - [670] Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808. - - [671] This plea is not to be found in any of Moore’s dispatches, - but only in La Romana’s account of the interview which he sent to - the Junta. - -Some of these reasons are not quite convincing: though there were only -two days’ rations at Astorga, there were fourteen days’ at Villafranca, -and large dépôts had also been gathered at Lugo and Corunna. These -could be rendered available with no great trouble, if real energy were -displayed, for there was still (as the disasters of the retreat were to -show) a good deal of wheeled transport with the army. The flanking road -by Puebla de Sanabria was (as we have said) so difficult and so remote -that any turning corps that tried it would be heard of long before it -became dangerous. There would be great political advantage in checking -Bonaparte at the passes, even if it were only for a week or ten days. -Moreover, to show a bold front would raise the spirits of the army, -whose growing disorders were the marks of discontent at the retreat, -and whose one wish was to fight the French as soon as possible. As to -the rest which Moore declared to be necessary for the troops, this -could surely have been better given by halting them and offering to -defend the passes, than by taking them over the long and desolate road -that separated them from Corunna. The experiences of the next eleven -days can hardly be called ‘rest.’ - -Though clearly possible, a stand behind Astorga may not have been the -best policy. Napoleon had a vast force in hand after his junction with -Soult, and he was a dangerous foe to brave, even in such a formidable -position as that which the British occupied. But it is doubtful whether -this fact was the cause of Moore’s determination to retreat to the -sea. If we may judge from the tone of his dispatches, his thought was -merely that he had promised to make a diversion, under strong pressure -from Frere and the rest; that he had successfully carried out his -engagement, and lured the Emperor and the bulk of the French forces -away from Madrid; and that he considered his task completed. In his -letter of December 31 to Castlereagh, he harks back once more to his -old depreciation of the Spaniards--they had taken no advantage of the -chance he had given them, they were as apathetic as ever, his exertions -had been wasted, and so forth[672]. In so writing he made a mistake: -his campaign was so far from being wasted that he had actually saved -Spain. He had caused the Emperor to lose the psychological moment -for striking at Seville and Lisbon, when the spirits of the patriots -were at their lowest, and had given them three months to rally. By -the time that the southward move from Madrid was once more possible -to the French, Spain had again got armies in the field, and the awful -disasters of November and December, 1808, had been half forgotten. - - [672] ‘Abandoned from the beginning by everything Spanish, we - were equal to nothing by ourselves. From a desire to do what I - could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion it has - answered completely: but as there is nothing to take advantage of - it, I have risked the loss of an army to no purpose. I find no - option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able.... - The army would, there cannot be a doubt, have distinguished - itself, had the Spaniards been able to offer any resistance. But - from the first it was placed in situations in which, without the - possibility of doing any good, it was itself constantly risked’ - (Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31). - -It seems improbable, from Moore’s tone in his dispatch of December 31, -that he ever had any serious intention of standing behind Astorga. -He had fallen back upon his old desponding views of the last days -of November, and was simply set on bringing off the British army in -safety, without much care for the fate of the Spaniards whom he so -much disliked and contemned. The only sign of his ever having studied -the intermediate positions between Astorga and Corunna lies in a -report addressed to him on December 26, by Carmichael Smith of the -Royal Engineers. This speaks of the Manzanal--Rodrigatos position as -presenting an appearance of strong ground, but having the defect of -possessing a down-slope to the rear for six miles, so that if the line -were forced, a long retreat downhill would be necessary in face of the -pursuing enemy. The engineer then proceeded to recommend the position -of Cacabellos, a league in front of Villafranca, as being very strong -and safe from any turning movement. But Moore, as we shall see, refused -to stand at the one place as much as at the other, only halting a -rearguard at Cacabellos to keep off the pursuing horse for a few hours, -and never offering a pitched battle upon that ground. It is probable -that nothing would have induced him to fight at either position, after -he had once resolved that a straight march to the sea was the best -policy. - -So little time did Moore take in making up his mind as to the -desirability of holding the passes above Astorga, that he pushed on -Baird’s, Fraser’s, and Hope’s divisions towards Villafranca on the -thirtieth, while Paget’s reserve with the two light brigades followed -on the thirty-first. The whole British army was on the other side of -Astorga, and across the passes, when Soult and Bonaparte’s columns -converged on La Baneza. Their infantry did not enter Astorga till the -first day of the new year, thirty-six hours after Moore’s main body had -evacuated the place. - -But this easy escape from the Emperor’s clutches had been bought -at considerable sacrifices. Astorga was crammed with stores of all -kinds, as we have already had occasion to mention: food was the only -thing that was at all short. But there was not sufficient transport -in the place, and the retreating army was already losing wagons and -beasts so fast that it could not carry off much of the accumulated -material that lay before it. A hasty attempt was made to serve out to -the troops the things that could be immediately utilized. La Romana’s -Spaniards received several thousand new English muskets to replace -their dilapidated weapons, and a quantity of blankets. Some of the -British regiments had shoes issued to them; but out of mere hurry and -mismanagement several thousand pairs more were destroyed instead of -distributed, though many men were already almost barefoot. There were -abandoned all the heavy baggage of Baird’s division (which had been -stacked at Astorga before the march to Sahagun), an entire dépôt of -entrenching tools, several hundred barrels of rum, and many scores of -carts and wagons for which draught animals were wanting. A quantity -of small-arms ammunition was blown up. But the most distressing thing -of all was that those of the sick of the army who could not bear to -be taken on through the January cold in open wagons had to be left -behind: some four hundred invalids, it would seem, were abandoned in -the hospital and fell into the hands of the French[673]. - - [673] Compare Moore to Castlereagh (from Astorga, Dec. 31) with - _Nap. Corresp._, 14,637, and with James Moore’s memoir (p. 184), - and ‘T.S.’s autobiography (p. 57). - -The most deplorable thing about these losses was that all the -evacuation and destruction was carried out under difficulties, owing to -the gross state of disorder and indiscipline into which the army was -falling. The news that they were to retreat once more without fighting -had exasperated the men to the last degree. Thousands of them got loose -in the streets, breaking into houses, maltreating the inhabitants, and -pillaging the stores, which were to be abandoned, for their private -profit. The rum was naturally a great attraction, and many stragglers -were left behind dead drunk, to be beaten out of the place by the -cavalry when they left it on the night of the thirty-first. La Romana -had to make formal complaint to Moore of the misbehaviour of the -troops, who had even tried to steal his artillery mules and insulted -his officers. There can be no doubt that if the rank and file had been -kept in hand many valuable stores could have been distributed instead -of destroyed, and the straggling which was to prove so fatal might -have been nipped in the bud. But the officers were as discontented as -the men, and in many regiments seem to have made little or no effort -to keep things together. Already several battalions were beginning to -march with an advanced guard of marauders and a rearguard of limping -stragglers, the sure signs of impending trouble. - -By the thirty-first, however, Astorga was clear of British and Spanish -troops. Moore marched by the new high-road, the route of Manzanal: La -Romana took the shorter but more rugged defile of Foncebadon. But he -sent his guns along with the British, in order to spare the beasts -the steeper ascents of the old _chaussée_. The terrible rain of the -last week was just passing into snow as the two columns, every man -desperately out of heart, began their long uphill climb across the -ridge of the Monte Teleno, towards the uplands of the Vierzo. - - -NOTE - -This account of the retreat from Sahagun is constructed from a -careful comparison of the official documents with the memoirs -and monographs of the following British eye-witnesses:--Robert -Blakeney (of the 28th), Rifleman Harris and Sergeant Surtees -(of the 2/95th), Lord Londonderry, and Lord Vivian of the -Cavalry Brigade, Leith Hay (Aide-de-Camp to General Leith), -Charles and William Napier, T.S. of the 71st, Steevens of -the 20th, the Surgeon Adam Neale, and the Chaplain Ormsby. -Bradford, another chaplain, has left a series of admirable -water-colour drawings of the chief points on the road as far as -Lugo, made under such difficulties as can be well imagined. Of -French eye-witnesses I have used the accounts of St. Chamans, -Fantin des Odoards, Naylies, De Gonneville, Lejeune, and the -detestably inaccurate Le Noble. - - - - -SECTION VIII: CHAPTER V - -SOULT’S PURSUIT OF MOORE: ASTORGA TO CORUNNA - - -When he found that Moore had escaped from him, Napoleon slackened down -from the high speed with which he had been moving for the last ten -days. He stayed at Benavente for two nights, occupying himself with -desk-work of all kinds, and abandoning the pursuit of the British to -Bessières and Soult. The great _coup_ had failed: instead of capturing -the expeditionary force he could but harass it on its way to the sea. -Such a task was beneath his own dignity: it would compromise the -imperial reputation for infallibility, if a campaign that had opened -with blows like Espinosa, Tudela, and the capture of Madrid ended in a -long and ineffectual stern-chase. If Bonaparte had continued the hunt -himself, with the mere result of arriving in time to see Moore embark -and depart, he would have felt that his prestige had been lowered. He -tacitly confessed as much himself long years after, when, in one of his -lucubrations at St. Helena, he remarked that he would have conducted -the pursuit in person, if he had but known that contrary winds had -prevented the fleet of British transports from reaching Corunna. But -of this he was unaware at the time; and since he calculated that Moore -could be harassed perhaps, but not destroyed or captured, he resolved -to halt and turn back. Soult should have the duty of escorting the -British to the sea: they were to be pressed vigorously and, with luck, -the Emperor trusted that half of them might never see England again. -But no complete success could be expected, and he did not wish to -appear personally in any enterprise that was but partially successful. - -Other reasons were assigned both by Napoleon himself and by his -admirers for his abandonment of the pursuit of Moore. He stated that -Galicia was too much in a corner of the world for him to adventure -himself in its mountains--he would be twenty days journey from Paris -and the heart of affairs. If Austria began to move again in the spring, -there would be an intolerable delay before he could receive news or -transmit orders[674]. He wished to take in hand the reorganization of -his armies in Italy, on the Rhine, and beyond the Adriatic. All this -was plausible enough, but the real reason of his return was that he -would not be present at a fiasco or a half-success. It would seem, -however, that there may have been another operating cause, which the -Emperor never chose to mention; the evidence for it has only cropped -up of late years[675]. It appears that he was somewhat disquieted by -secret intelligence from Paris, as to obscure intrigues among his -own ministers and courtiers. The Spanish War had given new occasions -to the malcontents who were always criticizing the Empire. Not much -could be learnt by the French public about the affair of Bayonne, but -all that had got abroad was well calculated to disgust even loyal -supporters of the Empire. The talk of the _salons_, which Napoleon -always affected to despise, but which he never disregarded, was more -bitter than ever. It is quite possible that some hint of the conspiracy -of the ‘Philadelphes,’ which four months later showed its hand in the -mysterious affair of D’Argenteau, may have reached him. But it is -certain that he had disquieting reports concerning the intrigues of -Fouché and Talleyrand. Both of those veteran plotters were at this -moment in more or less marked disgrace. For once in a way, therefore, -they were acting in concert. They were relieving their injured feelings -by making secret overtures in all directions, in search of allies -against their master. Incredible as it may appear, they had found a -ready hearer in Murat, who was much disgusted with his brother-in-law -for throwing upon him the blame for the disasters of the first Spanish -campaign. Other notable personages were being drawn into the cave -of malcontents, and discourses of more than doubtful loyalty were -being delivered. Like many other cabals of the period, this one was -destined to shrink into nothingness at the reappearance of the master -at Paris[676]. But while he was away his agents were troubled and -terrified: they seem to have sent him alarming hints, which had far -more to do with his return to France than any fear as to the intentions -of Austria[677]. - - [674] These reasons will be found set forth at length in _Nap. - Corresp._, 14,684 (to King Joseph, Jan. 11), and 14,692 (to - Clarke, Jan. 13). - - [675] There is a distinct allusion to the matter, however, in - Fouché’s _Mémoires_ (i. 385). - - [676] For a long account of all this intrigue see the _Mémoires_ - of Chancellor Pasquier (i. 355, &c.). He says that it was - discovered by Lavalette, the Postmaster-General, who sent - information to the Viceroy of Italy, in consequence of which - a compromising letter from Caroline Bonaparte (at Naples) - to Talleyrand was seized. The reproaches which he puts into - Napoleon’s mouth must, I fancy, be taken as about as authentic as - an oration in Thucydides. - - [677] There was also at this moment a slight recrudescence of the - old agitation of the _chouans_ in the west of France. Movable - columns had to be sent out in the departments of the Mayenne and - Sarthe. See _Nap. Corresp._, 14,871-2. - -An oft-repeated story says that the Emperor received a packet of -letters from Paris while riding from Benavente to Astorga on January -1, 1809, and, after reading them by the wayside with every sign of -anger, declared that he must return to France. If the tale be true, we -may be sure that the papers which so moved his wrath had no reference -to armaments on the Danube, but were concerned with the intrigues in -Paris. There was absolutely nothing in the state of European affairs -to make an instant departure from Spain necessary. On the other hand, -rumours of domestic plots always touched the Emperor to the quick, and -it must have been as irritating as it was unexpected to discover that -his own sister and brother-in-law were dabbling in such intrigues, -even though ostensibly they were but discussing what should be done if -something should happen in Spain to their august relative. - -Already ere leaving Benavente the Emperor had issued orders which -showed that he had abandoned his hope of surrounding and crushing -Moore. He had begun to send off, to the right and to the left, part of -the great mass of troops which he had brought with him. On December -31 he wrote to Dessolles, and ordered him to give his division a -short rest at Villacastin, and then to return to Madrid, where the -garrison was too weak. On January 1, the whole of the Imperial Guard -was directed to halt and return to Benavente, from whence it was soon -after told to march back to Valladolid. Lapisse’s division of Victor’s -corps, which had got no further than Benavente in its advance, was -turned off to subdue the southern parts of the kingdom of Leon. To the -same end were diverted D’Avenay’s[678] and Maupetit’s[679] brigades of -cavalry. Quite contrary to Moore’s expectations and prophecies, the -people of this part of Spain displayed a frantic patriotism, when once -the enemy was upon them. Toro, an open town[680], had to be stormed: -Zamora made a still better resistance, repulsed a first attack, and -had to be breached and assaulted by a brigade of Lapisse’s division. -The villagers of Penilla distinguished themselves by falling upon and -capturing a battery of the Imperial Guard, which was passing by with an -insufficient escort. Of course the guns were recovered, and the place -burnt, within a few days of the exploit[681]. - - [678] This was a temporary brigade, made up of the 3rd Dutch - Hussars and a provisional regiment of dragoons. - - [679] 5th Dragoons and part of the regiment of Westphalian - _Chevaux-Légers_; they belonged to the corps-cavalry of Lefebvre. - - [680] The defence of Toro was headed by a stray English officer. - The place was taken by D’Avenay, not by Maupetit as Arteche says. - See the _Mémoires_ of De Gonneville, i. 207. - - [681] For information on these rather obscure operations consult - the _Mémoires_ of De Gonneville (of D’Avenay’s brigade) and _Nap. - Corresp._, 14,685. - -Having sent off the Guards, Lapisse, Dessolles, and Maupetit’s and -D’Avenay’s cavalry, the Emperor had still a large force left in hand -for the pursuit of Moore. There remained Soult’s and Ney’s corps, -the horsemen of Lahoussaye, Lorges, and Franceschi, and the greater -part of Junot’s 8th Corps. The Emperor had resolved to break up this -last-named unit: it contained many third-battalions belonging to -regiments which were already in Spain: they were directed to rejoin -their respective head quarters. When this was done, there remained only -enough to make up two rather weak divisions of 5,000 men each. These -were given to Delaborde and Heudelet, and incorporated with Soult’s -2nd Corps. Loison’s division, the third of the original 8th Corps, -was suppressed[682]. Junot himself was sent off to take a command -under Lannes at the siege of Saragossa. When joined by Delaborde and -Heudelet, Soult had a corps of exceptional strength--five divisions -and nearly 30,000 bayonets. He could not use for the pursuit of Moore -Bonnet’s division, which had been left to garrison Santander. But -with the remainder, 25,000 strong, he pressed forward from Astorga in -pursuance of his master’s orders. His cavalry force was very large -in proportion: it consisted of 6,000 sabres, for not only were three -complete divisions of dragoons with him, but Ney’s corps-cavalry (the -brigade of Colbert) was up at the front and leading the pursuit. Ney -himself, with his two infantry divisions, those of Maurice Mathieu and -Marchand, was a march or two to the rear, some 16,000 bayonets strong. -If Soult should suffer any check, he was sure of prompt support within -three days. Thus the whole force sent in chase of Moore mustered some -47,000 men[683]. - - [682] There were only two battalions remaining with Loison by - Jan. 10. - - [683] A month after the pursuit of Moore had ended, and the - battle of Corunna had been fought, the four infantry divisions of - Soult’s corps which were in Galicia had still 19,000 effective - bayonets for the invasion of Portugal. The three cavalry - divisions were some 5,300 strong. Ney’s corps, which had hardly - been engaged, had 16,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. There were - still, therefore, 41,300 men in hand of the two corps. It is - impossible to make the losses from the long pursuit in the snow - and the battle of Corunna less than 4,500 or 5,000 men, when we - reflect that Moore lost 6,000, of whom only 2,000 were prisoners, - and that Soult suffered at least 1,500 casualties in the Corunna - fighting. - -The head of the pursuing column was formed by Lahoussaye’s dragoons and -Colbert’s light cavalry: in support of these, but always some miles to -the rear, came Merle’s infantry. This formed the French van: the rest -of Soult’s troops were a march behind, with Heudelet’s division for -rearguard. All the 2nd Corps followed the English on the Manzanal road: -only Franceschi’s four regiments of cavalry turned aside, to follow the -rugged pass of Foncebadon, by which La Romana’s dilapidated host had -retired. The exhausted Spaniards were making but slow progress through -the snow and the mountain torrents. Franceschi caught them up on -January 2, and scattered their rearguard under General Rengel, taking -a couple of flags and some 1,500 men: the prisoners are described as -being in the last extremity of misery and fatigue, and many of them -were infected with the typhus fever, which had been hanging about this -unfortunate corps ever since its awful experience in the Cantabrian -hills during the month of November[684]. - - [684] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,662. ‘Les hommes pris sur La Romana - étaient horribles à voir,’ says Napoleon, who saw them at Astorga. - -Moore’s army, as we have already seen, had marched out from -Astorga--the main body on December 30, the rearguard on the -thirty-first. After determining that he would not defend the passes -of Manzanal and Foncebadon, the general had doubted whether he should -make his retreat on Corunna by the great _chaussée_, or on Vigo, by -the minor road which goes via Orense and the valley of the Sil. It is -strange that he did not see that his mind must be promptly made up, and -that when once he had passed the mountains he must commit himself to -one or the other route. But his dispatches to Castlereagh show that it -was not till he had reached Lugo that he finally decided in favour of -the main road[685]. He must have formed the erroneous conclusion that -the French would not pursue him far beyond Astorga[686]: he thought -that they would be stopped by want of provisions and by fatigue. Having -formed this unsound hypothesis, he put off the final decision as to his -route till he should reach Lugo. Meanwhile, to protect the side-road -to Vigo he detached 3,500 of his best troops, Robert Crawfurd’s -light brigade [the 43rd (1st batt.), 52nd (2nd batt.), and 95th (2nd -batt.)], and Alten’s brigade of the German Legion. They diverged from -the main road after leaving Astorga, and marched, by Ponferrada and -La Rua, on Orense. How much they suffered on the miserable bypaths -of the valley of the Sil may be gathered in the interesting diaries -of Surtees and Harris: but it was only with the snow and the want of -food that they had to contend. They never saw a Frenchman, embarked -unmolested at Vigo, and were absolutely useless to Moore during the -rest of the campaign. It is impossible to understand how it came that -they were sent away in this fashion, and nothing can be said in favour -of the move. Unless the whole army were going by the Orense road, no -one should have been sent along it: and the difficulties of the track -were such that to have taken the main body over it would have been -practically impossible. As it was, 3,500 fine soldiers were wasted for -all fighting purposes. The duty of covering the rear of the army, which -had hitherto fallen to the lot of Crawfurd, was now transferred to -General Paget and the ‘Reserve Division[687].’ One regiment of hussars -[the 15th] was left with them: the other four cavalry corps pushed on -to the front, as there was no great opportunity for using them, now -that the army had plunged into the mountains. - - [685] This is made absolutely certain by his letter of Jan. - 13, in which he says that ‘at Lugo I became sensible of the - impossibility of reaching Vigo, which is at too great a - distance.’ On starting from Astorga, then, he still thought - that he might be able to embark at that port. A glance at the - map shows that the march Astorga-Lugo-Vigo is two sides of a - triangle. If the Vigo route was to be taken, the only rational - places to turn on to it are Astorga and Ponferrada. - - [686] ‘After a time the same difficulties which affect us must - affect him [Soult]: therefore the rear once past Villafranca, - I do not expect to be molested’ (Moore to Castlereagh, from - Astorga, Dec. 31). - - [687] Consisting of the 20th Foot, and the first battalions of - the 28th, 52nd, 91st, and 95th. - -Colbert and Lahoussaye took some little time, after leaving Astorga, -before they came upon the rear of Moore’s army. But they had no -difficulty in ascertaining the route that the English had taken: the -steep uphill road from Astorga into the Vierzo was strewn with wreckage -of all kinds, which had been abandoned by the retreating troops. The -long twelve-mile incline, deeply covered with snow, had proved fatal -to a vast number of draught animals, and wagon after wagon had to -be abandoned to the pursuers, for want of sufficient oxen and mules -to drag them further forward. Among the derelict baggage were lying -no small number of exhausted stragglers, dead or dying from cold or -dysentery. - -The whole _morale_ of Moore’s army had suffered a dreadful -deterioration from the moment that the order to evacuate Astorga was -issued. As long as there was any prospect of fighting, the men--though -surly and discontented--had stuck to their colours. Some regiments had -begun to maraud, but the majority were still in good order. But from -Astorga onward the discipline of the greater part of the corps began to -relax. There were about a dozen regiments[688] which behaved thoroughly -well, and came through the retreat with insignificant losses: on the -other hand there were many others which left from thirty to forty -per cent. of their men behind them. It cannot be disguised that the -enormous difference between the proportion of ‘missing’ in battalions -of the same brigade, which went through exactly identical experiences, -was simply due to the varying degrees of zeal and energy with which the -officers kept their men together. Where there was a strong controlling -will the stragglers were few, and no one fell behind save those who -were absolutely dying. The iron hand of Robert Crawfurd brought the -43rd and 95th through their troubles with a loss of eighty or ninety -men each. The splendid discipline of the Guards brigade carried them to -Corunna with even smaller proportional losses. There is no mistaking -the coincidence when we find that the battalion which Moore denounced -at Salamanca as being the worst commanded and the worst disciplined -in his force, was also the one which left a higher percentage of -stragglers behind than any other corps. The fact was that the toils -of the retreat tried the machinery of the regiments to the utmost, -and that where the management was weak or incompetent discipline broke -down. It was not the troops who had the longest marches or the most -fighting that suffered the heaviest losses: those of Paget’s division, -the rearguard of the whole army, which was constantly in touch with -the French advance, compare favourably with those of some corps which -never fired a shot between Benavente and Corunna. It is sad to have -to confess that half the horrors of the retreat were due to purely -preventible causes, and that if the badly-managed regiments had been up -to the disciplinary standard of the Guards or the Light Brigade, the -whole march would have been remembered as toilsome but not disastrous. -Moore himself wrote, in the last dispatch to which he ever set his -hand, that ‘he would not have believed, had he not witnessed it, -that a British army would in so short a time have been so completely -demoralized. Its conduct during the late marches was infamous beyond -belief. He could say nothing in its favour but that when there was a -prospect of fighting the men were at once steady, and seemed pleased -and determined to do their duty[689].’ This denunciation was far too -sweeping, for many corps kept good order throughout the whole campaign: -but there was only too much to justify Moore’s anger. - - [688] The reader should note, in the Appendix dealing with the - numbers of Moore’s army, the very small proportional losses - suffered by the two battalions of the Guards, the 43rd (1st - batt.), 4th, 42nd, 71st, 79th, 92nd, 95th (2nd batt.), and the - cavalry. - - [689] I quote from the original in the Record Office, not from - the mutilated version printed in the _Parliamentary Papers_ and - elsewhere. - -The serious trouble began at Bembibre, the first place beyond the pass -of Manzanal, where Hope’s, Baird’s, and Fraser’s divisions had encamped -on the night of the thirty-first. The village was unfortunately a -large local dépôt for wine: slinking off from their companies, many -hundreds of marauders made their way into the vaults and cellars. -When the divisions marched next morning they left nearly a thousand -men, in various stages of intoxication, lying about the houses and -streets. The officers of Paget’s Reserve, who came up that afternoon, -describe Bembibre as looking like a battle-field, so thickly were the -prostrate redcoats strewn in every corner. Vigorous endeavours were -made to rouse these bad soldiers, and to start them upon their way; -but even next morning there were multitudes who could not or would not -march[690]. When the Reserve evacuated the place on January 2, it -was still full of torpid stragglers. Suddenly there appeared on the -scene the leading brigade of Lahoussaye’s dragoons, pushing down from -the pass of Manzanal, and driving before them the last hussar picket -which Paget had left behind. The noise of the horsemen roused the -lingerers, who began at last to stagger away, but it was too late: ‘the -cavalry rode through the long line of these lame defenceless wretches, -slashing among them as a schoolboy does among thistles[691].’ Most of -the stragglers, it is said, were still so insensible from liquor that -they made no resistance, and did not even get out of the road[692]. A -few, with dreadful cuts about their heads and shoulders, succeeded in -overtaking the Reserve. Moore had the poor bleeding wretches paraded -along the front of the regiments, as a warning to drunkards and -malingerers. - - [690] Blakeney, of the 28th, says: ‘We employed the greater part - of Jan. 1 in turning or dragging the drunken men out of the - houses into the streets, and sending forward as many as could - be moved. Yet little could be effected with men incapable of - standing, much less of marching’ (p. 50). - - [691] ‘T.S.’ of the 71st (_Journal_, p. 58). - - [692] Adam Neale, p. 188. Both he and ‘T.S.’ mention the parading - of the wounded men along the lines. - -Meanwhile Baird and Hope’s divisions had reached Villafranca on the -first, and scenes almost as disgraceful as those of Bembibre were -occurring. The town was Moore’s most important dépôt: it contained -fourteen days’ rations of biscuit for the whole army, an immense amount -of salt-beef and pork, and some hundreds of barrels of rum. There -was no transport to carry off all this valuable provender, and Moore -ordered it to be given to the flames. Hearing of this the troops broke -into the magazines, and began to load themselves with all and more than -they could carry, arguing, not unnaturally, that so much good food -should not be burnt. Moore ordered one man--who was caught breaking -into the rum store--to be shot in the square. But it was no use; the -soldiers burst loose, though many of their officers cut and slashed at -them to keep them in the ranks, and snatched all that they could from -the fires. Some forced open private houses and plundered, and in a few -cases maltreated, or even murdered, the townsfolk who would not give -them drink. A great many got at the rum, and were left behind when the -divisions marched on January 3[693]. - - [693] Cf. Blakeney, Neale, Londonderry, and James Moore. - -While these orgies were going on at Villafranca, Paget and the Reserve -had been halted six miles away, at Cacabellos, where the high-road -passes over the little river Cua[694]. There was here a position in -which a whole army could stand at bay, and Moore’s engineers had -pointed it out to him as the post between Astorga and Lugo where there -was the most favourable fighting-ground. It is certain that if he had -chosen to offer battle to Soult on this front, the Marshal would have -been checked for many days--he could not have got forward without -calling up Ney from Astorga, and there is no good road by which the -British could have been outflanked. But Moore had no intention of -making a serious defence: he was fighting a rearguard action merely to -allow time for the stores at Villafranca to be destroyed. - - [694] Not the Guia, as the English generally call it. - -The forces which were halted at Cacabellos consisted of the five -battalions of the Reserve (under Paget), the 15th Hussars, and a -horse-artillery battery. A squadron of the cavalry and half of the -95th Rifles were left beyond the river, in observation along the road -towards Bembibre: the guns were placed on the western side of the Cua, -commanding the road up from the bridge. The 28th formed their escort, -while the other three battalions of the division were hidden behind a -line of vineyards and stone walls parallel with the winding stream[695]. - - [695] I take my account of the skirmish mainly from Blakeney, - whose narrative is admirable. Those of Londonderry, Napier, and - Neale do not give so many details. - -About one o’clock in the afternoon the French appeared, pushing -cautiously forward from Bembibre with Colbert’s cavalry brigade of -Ney’s corps now at their head, while Lahoussaye’s division of dragoons -was in support. The infantry were not yet in sight. Colbert, a young -and very dashing officer, currently reputed to be the most handsome man -in the whole French army, was burning to distinguish himself. He had -never before met the British, and had formed a poor opinion of them -from the numerous stragglers and drunkards whom he had seen upon the -road. He thought that the rearguard might be pushed, and the defile -forced with little loss. Accordingly he rode forward at the head of -his two regiments[696], and fell upon the squadron of the 15th Hussars -which was observing him. They had to fly in hot haste, and, coming in -suddenly to the bridge, rode into and over the last two companies of -the 95th Rifles, who had not yet crossed the stream. Colbert, sweeping -down close to their heels, came upon the disordered infantry and took -some forty or fifty prisoners before the riflemen could escape across -the water[697]. But, seeing the 28th and the guns holding the slope -above, he halted for a moment before attempting to proceed further. - - [696] They were the 15th Chasseurs and the 3rd Hussars. - - [697] Forty-eight is the number given in Cope’s excellent - _History of the Rifle Brigade_. - -Judging however, from a hasty survey, that there were no very great -numbers opposed to him, the young French general resolved to attempt to -carry the bridge of Cacabellos by a furious charge, just as Franceschi -had forced that of Mansilla five days before. This was a most hazardous -and ill-advised move: it could only succeed against demoralized troops, -and was bound to fail when tried against the steady battalions of -the Reserve division. But ranging his leading regiment four abreast, -Colbert charged for the bridge: the six guns opposite him tore the head -of the column to pieces, but the majority of the troopers got across -and tried to dash uphill and capture the position. They had fallen -into a dreadful trap, for the 28th blocked the road just beyond the -bridge, while the 95th and 52nd poured in a hot flanking fire from -behind the vineyard walls on either side. There was no getting forward: -Colbert himself was shot as he tried to urge on his men[698], and his -aide-de-camp Latour-Maubourg fell at his side. After staying for no -more than a few minutes on the further side of the water, the brigade -turned rein and plunged back across the bridge, leaving many scores of -dead and wounded behind them. - - [698] He was shot by Tom Plunket, a noted character in the 95th, - from a range that seemed extraordinary to the riflemen of that - day. - -Lahoussaye’s dragoons now came to the front: several squadrons of -them forded the river at different points, but, unable to charge -among the rocks and vines, they were forced to dismount and to act as -skirmishers, a capacity in which they competed to no great advantage -against the 52nd, with whom they found themselves engaged. It was -not till the leading infantry of Merle’s division came up, not long -before dusk, that the French were enabled to make any head against -the defenders. Their voltigeurs bickered with the 95th and 52nd for -an hour, but when the formed columns tried to cross the bridge, they -were so raked by the six guns opposite them that they gave back in -disorder. After dark the firing ceased, and Moore, who had come up in -person from Villafranca at the sound of the cannon, had no difficulty -in withdrawing his men under cover of the night. In this sharp skirmish -each side lost some 200 men: the French casualties were mainly in -Colbert’s cavalry, the British were distributed unequally between the -95th (who suffered most), the 28th, and 52nd: the other two regiments -present (the 20th and 91st) were hardly engaged[699]. - - [699] Napoleon’s not very convincing account of the combat (_Nap. - Corresp._, 14,647) runs as follows: ‘Trois mille Ecossais, - voulant défendre les gorges de Picros près de Villafranca, pour - donner le temps à beaucoup de choses à filer, ont été culbutés. - Mais le général Colbert pétillant de faire avancer sa cavalerie, - une balle l’a frappé au front, et l’a tué.’ - -Marching all through the night of 3rd-4th of January the Reserve -division passed through Villafranca, where stores of all kinds were -still blazing in huge bonfires, and did not halt till they reached -Nogales, eighteen miles further on. They found the road before them -strewn with one continuous line of wreckage from the regiments of -the main body. The country beyond Villafranca was far more bare and -desolate than the eastern half of the Vierzo: discipline grew worse -each day, and the surviving animals of the baggage-train were dying -off wholesale from cold and want of forage. The cavalry horses were -also beginning to perish very fast, mainly from losing their shoes on -the rough and stony road. As soon as a horse was unable to keep up -with the regiment, he was (by Lord Paget’s orders) shot by his rider, -in order to prevent him from falling into the hands of the French. -Many witnesses of the retreat state that the incessant cracking of the -hussars’ pistols, as the unfortunate chargers were shot, was the thing -that lingered longest in their memories of all the sounds of these -unhappy days. - -Beyond Villafranca the Corunna road passes through the picturesque -defile of Piedrafita, by which it reaches the head waters of the Nava -river, and then climbing the spurs of Monte Cebrero comes out into -the bleak upland plain of Lugo. This fifty miles contained the most -difficult and desolate country in the whole of Moore’s march, and -was the scene of more helpless and undeserved misery than any other -section of the retreat. It was not merely drunkards and marauders who -now began to fall to the rear, but steady old soldiers who could not -face the cold, the semi-starvation, and the forced marches. Moore -hurried his troops forward at a pace that, over such roads, could only -be kept up by the strongest men. On January 5 he compelled the whole -army to execute a forced march of no less than thirty-six continuous -hours, which was almost as deadly as a battle. This haste seems all -the less justifiable because the district abounded with positions -at which the enemy could be held back for many hours, whenever the -rearguard was told to stand at bay. At Nogales and Constantino, where -opposition was offered, the French were easily checked, and there were -many other points where similar stands could have been made. It would -seem that Moore, shocked at the state of indiscipline into which his -regiments were falling, thought only of getting to the sea as quickly -as possible. Certainly, the pursuit was not so vigorous as to make -such frantic haste necessary. Whenever the Reserve division halted and -offered battle, the French dragoons held off, and waited, often for -many hours, for their infantry to come up. - -‘All that had hitherto been suffered by our troops was but a prelude -to this time of horrors,’ wrote one British eye-witness. ‘It had still -been attempted to carry forward our sick and wounded: here (on Monte -Cebrero) the beasts which dragged them failed, and they were left in -their wagons, to perish among the snow. As we looked round on gaining -the highest point of these slippery precipices, and observed the rear -of the army winding along the narrow road, we could see the whole track -marked out by our own wretched people, who lay expiring from fatigue -and the severity of the cold--while their uniforms reddened in spots -the white surface of the ground. Our men had now become quite mad with -despair: excessive fatigue and the consciousness of disgrace, in thus -flying before an enemy whom they despised, excited in them a spirit -which was quite mutinous. A few hours’ pause was all they asked, an -opportunity of confronting the foe, and the certainty of making the -pursuers atone for all the miseries that they had suffered. Not allowed -to fight, they cast themselves down to perish by the wayside, giving -utterance to feelings of shame, anger, and grief. But too frequently -their dying groans were mingled with imprecations upon the General, who -chose rather to let them die like beasts than to take their chance on -the field of battle. That no degree of horror might be wanting, this -unfortunate army was accompanied by many women and children, of whom -some were frozen to death on the abandoned baggage-wagons, some died -of fatigue and cold, while their infants were seen vainly sucking at -their clay-cold breasts[700].’ It is shocking to have to add that the -miserable survivors of these poor women of the camp were abominably -maltreated by the French[701]. - - [700] From Adam Neale’s _Spanish Campaign of 1808_, pp. 190, 191. - - [701] For French evidence of this see the journal of Fantin des - Odoards of the 31st Léger: ‘Plusieurs jeunes Anglaises devenues - la proie de nos cavaliers étaient mises à l’encan en même temps - que les chevaux pris avec elles. J’ai vu, à mon grand scandale, - qu’elles n’avaient pas toujours la préférence’ (p. 196). Cf. the - miserable story of Mrs. Pullen in the _Recollections of Rifleman - Harris_, p. 142. - -Not only was the greater part of the baggage-train of the army lost -between Villafranca and Lugo, but other things of more importance. A -battery of Spanish guns was left behind on the crest of Monte Oribio -for want of draught animals, and the military chest of the army was -abandoned between Nogales and Cerezal. It contained about £25,000 in -dollars, and was drawn in two ox-wagons, which gradually fell behind -the main body as the beasts wore out. General Paget refused to fight -a rearguard action to cover its slow progress, and ordered the 28th -Regiment to hurl the small kegs containing the money over a precipice. -The silver shower lay scattered among the rocks at the bottom: part was -gathered up by Lahoussaye’s dragoons, but the bulk fell next spring, -when the snow melted, into the hands of the local peasantry [Jan. 4]. - -On the further side of the mountains, between Cerezal and Constantino, -the army was astounded to meet a long train of fifty bullock-carts -moving southward. It contained clothing and stores for La Romana’s -army, which the Junta of Galicia, with incredible carelessness, had -sent forward from Lugo, though it had heard that the British were -retreating. A few miles of further advance would have taken it into the -hands of the French. Very naturally, the soldiery stripped the wagons -and requisitioned the beasts for their own baggage. The shoes and -garments were a godsend to those of the ragged battalions who could lay -hands on them, and next day at Constantino many of the Reserve fought -in whole- or half-Spanish uniforms. - -The skirmish at Constantino, on the afternoon of January 5, was the -most important engagement, save that of Cacabellos, during the whole -retreat. It was a typical rearguard action to cover a bridge: the -British engineers having failed in their endeavour to blow up the -central arch, Paget placed his guns so as to command the passage, -extended the 28th and the 95th along the nearer bank of the deep-sunk -river, and held out with ease till nightfall. Lahoussaye’s dragoons -refused, very wisely, to attempt the position. Merle’s infantry tried -to force the passage by sending forward a regiment in dense column, -which suffered heavily from the guns, was much mauled by the British -light troops ranged along the water’s edge, and finally desisted from -the attack, allowing Paget to withdraw unmolested after dark. The -French were supposed to have lost about 300 men--a figure which was -probably exaggerated: the British casualties were insignificant. - -On January 6 Paget and the rearguard reached Lugo, where they found -the main body of the army drawn out in battle order on a favourable -position three miles outside the town. The fearful amount of straggling -which had taken place during the forced marches of the fourth and fifth -had induced Moore to halt on his march to the sea, in order to rest his -men, restore discipline, and allow the laggards to come up. A tiresome -_contretemps_ had made him still more anxious to allow the army time to -recruit itself. He had made up his mind at Herrerias (near Villafranca) -that the wild idea of retiring on Vigo must be given up. The reports -of the engineer officers whom he had sent to survey that port, as well -as Ferrol and Corunna, were all in favour of the last-named place. -Accordingly he had sent orders to the admiral at Vigo, bidding him -bring the fleet of transports round to Corunna. At the same time Baird -was directed to halt at Lugo, and not to take the side-road to Vigo -via Compostella. Baird duly received the dispatch, and should have -seen that it was sent on to his colleagues, Hope and Fraser. He gave -the letter for Fraser to a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost -the important document. Hence the 3rd Division started off on the -Compostella road, a bad bypath, and went many miles across the snow -before it was found and recalled. Baird’s negligence cost Fraser’s -battalions 400 men in stragglers, and having marched and countermarched -more than twenty miles, they returned to Lugo so thoroughly worn -out that they could not possibly have resumed their retreat on the -sixth[702]. - - [702] The whole of this story may be found in Londonderry (i. - 272), Ormsby (ii. 140), James Moore (p. 190), as well as in - Napier. - -Moore had found in Lugo a dépôt containing four or five -days’ provisions for the whole force, as well as a welcome -reinforcement--Leith’s brigade of Hope’s division, which had never -marched to Astorga, and had been preceding the army by easy stages -in its retreat. Including these 1,800 fresh bayonets, the army now -mustered about 19,000 combatants. Since it left Benavente it had been -diminished by the strength of the two Light Brigades detached to Vigo -(3,500 men), by 1,000 dismounted cavalry who had been sent on to -Corunna, by 500 or 600 sick too ill to be moved, who had been left in -the hospitals of Astorga and Villafranca, and by about 2,000 men lost -by the way between Astorga and Lugo. Moore imagined that the loss under -the last-named head had been even greater: but the moment that the -army halted and the news of approaching battle flew round, hundreds of -stragglers and marauders flocked in to the colours, sick men pulled -themselves together, and the regiments appeared far stronger than had -been anticipated. The Commander-in-chief issued a scathing ‘General -Order’ to the officers commanding corps with regard to this point. -‘They must be as sensible as himself of the complete disorganization -of the army. If they wished to give the troops a fair chance of -success, they must exert themselves to restore order and discipline. -The Commander of the Forces was tired of giving orders which were never -attended to: he therefore appealed to the honour and feelings of the -army: if those were not sufficient to induce them to do their duty, he -must despair of succeeding by any other means. He had been obliged to -order military executions, but there would have been no need for them -if only officers did their duty. It was chiefly from their negligence, -and from the want of proper regulations in the regiments, that crimes -and irregularities were committed[703].’ - - [703] General Orders (Lugo, Jan. 6, 1809). - -The Lugo position was very strong: on the right it touched the -unfordable river Minho, on the left it rested on rocky and inaccessible -hills. All along the front there was a line of low stone walls, the -boundaries of fields and vineyards. Below it there was a gentle -down-slope of a mile, up which the enemy would have to march in order -to attack. The army and the general alike were pleased with the -outlook: they hoped that Soult would fight, and knew that they could -give a good account of him. - -The Marshal turned out to be far too circumspect to run his head -against such a formidable line. He came up on the sixth, with the -dragoons of Lahoussaye and Franceschi and Merle’s infantry. On the -next morning Mermet’s and Delaborde’s divisions and Lorges’s cavalry -appeared. But the forced marches had tried them no less than they -had tried the British. French accounts say that the three infantry -divisions had only 13,000 bayonets with the eagles, instead of the -20,000 whom they should have shown, and that the cavalry instead of -6,000 sabres mustered only 4,000. Some men had fallen by the way in -the snow, others were limping along the road many miles to the rear: -many were marauding on the flanks, like the British who had gone before -them. Heudelet’s whole division was more than two marches to the rear, -at Villafranca. - -On the seventh, therefore, Soult did no more than feel the British -position. He had not at first been sure that Moore’s whole army was in -front of him, and imagined that he might have to deal with no more than -Paget’s Reserve division, with which he had bickered so much during -the last four days. He was soon undeceived: when he brought forward -a battery against Moore’s centre, it was immediately silenced by the -fire of fifteen guns. A feint opposite the British right, near the -river, was promptly opposed by the Brigade of Guards. A more serious -attack by Merle’s division, on the hill to the left, was beaten back by -Leith’s brigade, who drove back the 2nd Léger and 36th of the Line by a -bayonet-charge downhill, and inflicted on them a loss of 300 men. - -On the eighth many of Soult’s stragglers came up, but he still -considered himself too weak to attack, and sent back to hurry up -Heudelet’s division, and to request Ney to push forward his corps to -Villafranca. He remained quiescent all day, to the great disappointment -of Moore, who had issued orders to his army warning them that a -battle was at hand, and bidding them not to waste their fire on the -tirailleurs, but reserve it for the supporting columns. As the day wore -on, without any sign of movement on the part of the French, the British -commander began to grow anxious and depressed. If Soult would not move, -it must mean that he had resolved to draw up heavy reinforcements from -the rear. It would be mad to wait till they should come up: either the -Marshal must be attacked at once, before he could be strengthened, -or else the army must resume its retreat on Corunna before Soult was -ready. To take the offensive Moore considered very doubtful policy--the -French had about his own numbers, or perhaps even more, and they were -established in a commanding position almost as strong as his own. Even -if he beat them, they could fall back on Heudelet and Ney, and face -him again, in or about Villafranca. To win a second battle would be -hard work, and, even if all went well, the army would be so reduced in -numbers that practically nothing would remain for a descent into the -plains of Leon. - -Accordingly Moore resolved neither to attack nor to wait to be -attacked, but to resume his retreat towards the sea. It was not a very -enterprising course; but it was at least a safe one; and since the -troops were now somewhat rested, and (as he hoped) restored to good -spirits, by seeing that the enemy dared not face them, he considered -that he might withdraw without evil results. Accordingly the evening of -the eighth was spent in destroying impedimenta and making preparations -for retreat. Five hundred foundered cavalry and artillery horses were -shot, a number of caissons knocked to pieces, and the remainder of -the stores of food destroyed so far as was possible. At midnight on -January 8-9 the army silently slipped out of its lines, leaving its -bivouac fires burning, so as to delude the enemy with the idea that it -still lay before him. Elaborate precautions had been taken to guide -each division to the point from which it could fall with the greatest -ease into the Corunna road. But it is not easy to evacuate by night a -long position intersected with walls, enclosures, and suburban bypaths. -Moreover the fates were unpropitious: drenching rain had set in, and -it was impossible to see five yards in the stormy darkness. Whole -regiments and brigades got astray, and of all the four divisions only -Paget’s Reserve kept its bearings accurately and reached the _chaussée_ -exactly at the destined point. For miles on each side of the road -stray battalions were wandering in futile circles when the day dawned. -Instead of marching fifteen miles under cover of the night, many -corps had got no further than four or five from their starting-point. -Isolated men were scattered all over the face of the country-side, -some because they had lost their regiments, others because they had -deliberately sought shelter from the rain behind any convenient wall or -rock. - -Continuing their retreat for some hours after daybreak, the troops -reached the village of Valmeda, where their absolute exhaustion made -a halt necessary. The more prudent commanders made their men lie down -in their ranks, in spite of the downpour, and eat as they lay. But -Baird, from mistaken kindness, allowed his division to disperse and to -seek shelter in the cottages and barns of neighbouring hamlets: they -could not be got together again when the time to start had arrived, and -Bentinck and Manningham’s brigades left an enormous proportion of their -men behind. The same thing happened on a smaller scale with Hope’s -and Fraser’s divisions: only Paget’s regiments brought up the rear -in good order. But behind them trailed several thousand stragglers, -forming a sort of irregular rearguard. There was more dispersion, -disorder, and marauding in this march than in any other during the -whole retreat. The plundering during this stage seems to have been -particularly discreditable: the inhabitants of the villages along the -high-road had for the most part gone up into the hills, in spite of -the dreadful weather. The British seem to have imputed their absence -to them as a crime, and to have regarded every empty house as a fair -field for plunder. As a matter of fact it was not with the desire of -withholding aid from their friends that the Galicians had disappeared, -but from fear of the French. If they had remained behind they would -have been stripped and misused by the enemy. But the unreasoning -soldiery chose to regard the unfortunate peasants as hostile[704]: -they wantonly broke up doors and furniture, and stole all manner of -useless household stuff. Even worse outrages occasionally happened: -where the inhabitants, in outlying farms and hamlets, had remained -behind, they turned them out of their houses, robbed them by force, -and even shot those who resisted. In return, it was but natural that -isolated marauders should be killed by the angry country-folk. But the -good spirit of the Galicians was displayed in many places by the way -in which they fed stragglers[705], and saved them from the French by -showing them bypaths over the hills. No less than 500 men who had lost -their way were passed on from village to village by the peasants, till -they reached Portugal. - - [704] In defence of the unfortunate Galicians, whose patriotism - and good faith has been impugned by so many English narrators - of the retreat, it is only necessary to quote the reflections - of two dispassionate eye-witnesses. Leith Hay (i. 132) writes: - ‘To expect that the peasantry were to rush from their houses, - and supply the wants of our soldiers with the only provision - that they possessed for their own families--who might in - consequence be left in the midst of the mountains, at midwinter, - to starve--was imagining friendly feeling carried to an unnatural - extent, and just as likely to happen as it would have been - if, Napoleon having invaded Britain, an English yeoman should - have earnestly requested one of our own soldiers to accept the - last morsel of bread he had the means of obtaining for his - children.’ Ormsby (ii. 162) says, to much the same effect: ‘As - to their inhospitable reception of us, and the concealment of - provisions, in candour I must be their apologist, and declare - my conviction that the charge in many instances is unfounded - and in others exaggerated. Do those who are most loud in their - complaints honestly think that an army of 30,000 Spaniards would - be better received in England than we were in Spain? I doubt - it much. The people, dispirited and alarmed, began to look to - self-preservation as the primary or sole object of their care. - Add to this the horror and dismay which the excesses of our - soldiers struck, and you will not be surprised that villages and - houses were frequently deserted. Is it a matter of astonishment - that the peasantry fled into the recesses of their mountains, - intimidated by our presence and confounded by our crimes?’ - - [705] For instances of kindness shown by the peasantry see Ormsby - (ii. 139). On the other hand the educated classes were often - sulky, and even insolent, because they thought that Moore was - deliberately abandoning Spain from cowardice. See in Ormsby the - anecdotes of the Alcalde of Pinhalla (ii. 79) and the Alcalde of - Villafranca (ii. 127), as also of the abuse which he got from a - ‘furious canon of Lugo,’ on whom he was billeted (ii. 147, 148). - -What between deliberate marauding for food or plunder[706], and -genuine inability to keep up with the regiment on the part of weakly -men, Moore’s main body accomplished the march from Lugo to Betanzos -in the most disorderly style. Paget’s rearguard kept their ranks, but -the troops in front were marching in a drove, without any attempt -to preserve discipline. An observer counted one very distinguished -regiment in Manningham’s brigade of Baird’s division, and reports that -with the colours there were only nine officers, three sergeants, and -three privates when they reached the gates of Betanzos[707]. - - [706] Outside Betanzos Paget halted, stopped the marauding - stragglers, and had them stripped of their plunder. Blakeney of - the 28th saw 1,500 men searched. ‘It is impossible to enumerate - the different articles of plunder which they had crammed into - their packs and haversacks--brass candlesticks bent double, - bundles of common knives, copper saucepans, every kind of - domestic utensil, without regard to weight or value’ (p. 92). - - [707] Adam Neale, p. 196. The same battalion could show 500 - bayonets for the battle of Corunna, so the men were not far off, - as it would seem. - -Fortunately for Moore, the French pursued the retreating army with the -greatest slackness. It was late on the morning of the ninth before -Soult discovered that the British were gone: the drenching rain which -had so incommoded them had at least screened their retreat. After -occupying Lugo, which was full of dead horses, broken material, and -spoiled provisions, the Marshal pushed on Franceschi’s cavalry in -pursuit. But he had lost twelve hours, and Moore was far ahead: only -stragglers were captured on the road, and the British rearguard was -not sighted till the passage of the Ladra, nearly halfway from Lugo to -Betanzos[708]. This was late in the day, and Paget was not seriously -molested, though the engineers who accompanied him failed to blow up -the bridges over the Ladra and the Mendeo, partly because their powder -had been spoilt by the rain, partly (as it would seem) from unskilful -handiwork. - - [708] Le Noble (_Campagne du Maréchal Soult_, p. 24) says that - Franceschi made a ‘charge’ here and took 500 prisoners. The - number of prisoners is very probably correct, but it is hardly a - ‘charge’ when isolated stragglers are picked up. The rearguard - was never molested, and retired without having to fire a shot. - -The fatiguing retreat was continued through part of the night of -January 9-10, and on the following morning all the regiments reached -Betanzos, on the sea-coast. The indefatigable Reserve division took up -a position on a low range of heights outside the town, to cover the -incoming of the thousands of stragglers who were still to the rear. -From this vantage-ground they had the opportunity of witnessing a -curious incident which few of the narrators of the retreat have failed -to record. Franceschi’s cavalry had resumed the pursuit, and after -sweeping up some hundreds of prisoners from isolated parties, came to -the village at the foot of the hills where the stragglers had gathered -most thickly. At the noise of their approach, a good number of the more -able-bodied men ran together, hastily formed up in a solid mass across -the road, and beat off the French horsemen by a rolling fire. This had -been done more by instinct than by design: but a sergeant of the 43rd, -who assumed command over the assembly, skilfully brought order out of -the danger[709]. He divided the men into two parties, which retired -alternately down the road, the one facing the French while the other -pushed on. The chasseurs charged them several times, but could never -break in, and the whole body escaped to the English lines[710]. They -had covered the retreat of many other stragglers, who ran in from all -sides while the combat was going on. Yet in spite of this irregular -exploit, the army lost many men: on this day and the preceding ninth, -more than 1000 were left behind--some had died of cold and fatigue, -some had been cut down by the French. But the majority had been -captured as they straggled along, too dazed and worn out even to leave -the road and take to the hillside when the cavalry got among them[711]. - - [709] This sergeant’s name was William Newman. He was rewarded by - an ensign’s commission in the 1st West India Regiment. - - [710] I think that it must be to this combat that one of the - reminiscences of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st relates, though he is vague - in his dates. ‘Sleep was stealing over me when I perceived - a bustle around me. It was an advanced party of the French. - Unconscious of my action I started to my feet, levelled my - musket, which I still retained, fired and formed with the other - stragglers. There were more of them than of us, but the action - and the approach of danger in a shape which we could repel roused - our downcast feelings.... While we ran they pursued, the moment - we faced about they halted. We never fought but with success, - never were attacked but we forced them to retire’ (p. 60). - - [711] The stragglers’ battle in front of Betanzos is described by - Adam Neale (p. 196), Blakeney (pp. 90, 91), and Steevens of the - 20th (p. 70), as well as by Napier and the other historians. I - find no account of it in Le Noble or the other French narrators, - such as Naylies, St. Chamans, or Fantin des Odoards. Le Noble - gives instead a wholly fictitious account of an engagement of - Franceschi with English _cavalry_, in which the latter lost a - thousand men and five guns (p. 34). As the cavalry had marched - for Corunna before Franceschi came up, and lost only about 200 - men in the whole campaign, I am quite at a loss to understand - what can be the foundation of this romance. - -Soult had as yet no infantry to the front, and Moore remained for a day -at Betanzos, observed by Franceschi’s and Lahoussaye’s cavalry, which -dared not molest him. On January 11 he resumed his march to Corunna, -with his army in a far better condition than might have been expected. -The weather had turned mild and dry, and the climate of the coastland -was a pleasant change from that of the mountains[712]. The men had been -well fed at Betanzos with food sent on from Corunna, and, marching -along the friendly sea with their goal in sight, recovered themselves -in a surprising manner. Their general was not so cheerful: he had heard -that the fleet from Vigo had failed to double Cape Finisterre, and was -still beating about in the Atlantic. He had hoped to find it already in -harbour, and was much concerned to think that he might have to stand at -bay for some days in order to allow it time to arrive. - - [712] Fantin des Odoards gives a vivid and picturesque account of - the relief caused to the pursuers, by the sudden plunge into fine - spring-like weather, on descending from the snows of the interior - (p. 198). - -At Betanzos more sacrifices of war-material were made by the retiring -army. Moore found there a large quantity of stores intended for La -Romana, and had to spike and throw into the river five guns and some -thousands of muskets. A considerable amount of food was imperfectly -destroyed, but enough remained to give a welcome supply to the -famishing French. It had been intended to blow up Betanzos bridge, -but the mines were only partially successful, and the 28th Regiment -from Paget’s Reserve division had to stay behind and to guard the -half-ruined structure against Franceschi’s cavalry, till the main body -had nearly reached Corunna, and the French infantry had begun to appear. - -On the night of the eleventh, the divisions of Hope, Baird, and Fraser -reached Corunna, while that of Paget halted at El Burgo, four miles -outside the town, where the _chaussée_ crosses the tidal river Mero. -Here the bridge was successfully blown up: it was only the second -operation of the kind which had been carried out with efficiency during -the whole retreat. Another bridge at Cambria, a few miles further up -the stream, was also destroyed. Thus the French were for the moment -brought to a stand. On the twelfth their leading infantry column came -up, and bickered with Paget’s troops, across the impassable water, for -the whole day[713]. But it was not till the thirteenth that Franceschi -discovered a third passage at Celas, seven miles inland, across which -he conducted his division. Moore then ordered the Reserve to draw back -to the heights in front of Corunna. The French instantly came down to -the river, and began to reconstruct the broken bridge. On the night of -the thirteenth infantry could cross: on the fourteenth the artillery -also began to pass over. But Soult advanced with great caution: here, -as at Lugo, he was dismayed to see how much the fatigues of the march -had diminished his army: Delaborde’s division was not yet up: those -of Merle and Mermet were so thinned by straggling that the Marshal -resolved not to put his fortune to the test till the ranks were again -full. - - [713] There is a good account of the bickering in Blakeney, pp. - 102-5. - -This delay gave the British general ample time to arrange for his -departure. On the thirteenth, he blew up the great stores of powder -which the Junta of Galicia had left stowed away in a magazine three -miles outside the town. The quantity was not much less than 4,000 -barrels, and the explosion was so powerful that wellnigh every window -in Corunna was shattered. - -On the afternoon of the fourteenth the long-expected transports at -last ran into the harbour, and Moore began to get on board his sick -and wounded, his cavalry, and his guns. The horses were in such a -deplorable state that very few of them were worth reshipping: only -about 250 cavalry chargers and 700 artillery draught-cattle were -considered too good to be left behind[714]. The remainder of the poor -beasts, more than 2,000 in number, were shot or stabbed and flung into -the sea. Only enough were left to draw nine guns, which the general -intended to use if he was forced to give battle before the embarkation -was finished. The rest of the cannon, over fifty in number, were safely -got on board the fleet. The personnel of the cavalry and artillery went -on shipboard very little reduced by their casualties in the retreat. -The former was only short of 200 men, the latter of 250: they had come -off so easily because they had been sent to the rear since Cacabellos, -and had retreated to Corunna without any check or molestation. Along -with the hussars and the gunners some 2,500 or 3,000 invalids were -sent on board. A few hundred more, too sick to face a voyage, were -left behind in the hospitals of Corunna. Something like 5,000 men had -perished or been taken during the retreat; 3,500 had embarked at Vigo, -so that about 15,000 men, all infantry save some 200 gunners, remained -behind to oppose Soult. Considering all that they had gone through, -they were now in very good trim: all the sick and weakly men had -been sent off, those who remained in the ranks were all war-hardened -veterans. Before the battle they had enjoyed four days of rest and -good feeding in Corunna. Moreover, they had repaired their armament: -there were in the arsenal many thousand stand of arms, newly arrived -from England for the use of the Galician army. Moore made his men -change their rusty and battered muskets for new ones, before ordering -the store to be destroyed. He also distributed new cartridges, from an -enormous stock found in the place. The town was, in fact, crammed with -munitions of all sorts. Seeing that there would be no time to re-embark -them, Moore utilized what he could, and destroyed the rest. - - [714] I obtain these figures from the _Parliamentary Returns_ of - 1809. - - - - -SECTION VIII: CHAPTER VI - -THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA - - -When Sir John Moore found that the transports were not ready on the -twelfth, he had recognized that he might very probably have to fight -a defensive action in order to cover his retreat, for two days would -allow Soult to bring up his main-body. He refused to listen to the -timid proposal of certain of his officers that he should negotiate -for a quiet embarkation, in return for giving up Corunna and its -fortifications unharmed[715]. This would have been indeed a tame line -of conduct for a general and an army which had never been beaten in the -field. Instead he sought for a good position in which to hold back the -enemy till all his impedimenta were on shipboard. There were no less -than three lines of heights on which the army might range itself to -resist an enemy who had crossed the Mero. But the first two ranges, the -Monte Loureiro just above the river, and the plateaux of Palavea and -Peñasquedo two miles further north, were too extensive to be held by -an army of 15,000 men. Moore accordingly chose as his fighting-ground -the Monte Moro, a shorter and lower ridge, only two miles outside -the walls of Corunna. It is an excellent position, about 2,500 yards -long, but has two defects: its western and lower end is commanded at -long cannon-range by the heights of Peñasquedo. Moreover, beyond this -extreme point of the hill, there is open ground extending as far as -the gates of Corunna, by which the whole position can be turned. Fully -aware of this fact, Moore told off more than a third of his army to -serve as a flank-guard on this wing, and to prevent the enemy from -pushing in between the Monte Moro and the narrow neck of the peninsula -on which Corunna stands. - - [715] There can be no doubt that this strange suggestion was - made, as Moore himself mentions it in his dispatch of Jan. 13, - the last which he wrote. - -Soult, even after he had passed the Mero and repaired the bridges, was -very circumspect in his advances. He had too much respect for the -fighting power of the English army to attack before he had rallied his -whole force. When Delaborde’s division and a multitude of stragglers -had joined him on the fifteenth, he at last moved forward and seized -the heights of Palavea and Peñasquedo, overlooking the British -position. There was some slight skirmishing with the outposts which had -been left on these positions, and when the French brought down two guns -to the lower slopes by Palavea, and began to cannonade the opposite -hill, Colonel McKenzie, of the 5th Regiment, made an attempt to drive -them off, which failed with loss, and cost him his life. - -[Illustration: Battle of Corunna. January 16, 1809.] - -As the French pressed westward along these commanding heights, Moore -saw that he might very possibly be attacked on the following day, and -brought up his troops to their fighting-ground, though he was still -not certain that Soult would risk a battle. The divisions of Hope and -Baird were ranged along the upper slopes of the Monte Moro: the ten -battalions of the former on the eastern half of the ridge, nearest -the river, the eight battalions of the latter on its western half, -more towards the inland. Each division had two brigades in the first -line and a third in reserve. Counting from left to right, the brigades -were those of Hill and Leith from Hope’s division, and Manningham and -Bentinck from Baird’s. Behind the crest Catlin Crawfurd supported the -two former, and Warde’s battalions of Guards the two latter. Down in -the hollow behind the Monte Moro lay Paget’s division, close to the -village of Eiris[716]. He was invisible to the French, but so placed -that he could immediately move out to cover the right wing if the enemy -attempted a turning movement. Lastly, Fraser’s division lay under cover -in Corunna, ready to march forth to support Paget the moment that -fighting should begin[717]. Six of the nine guns (small six-pounders), -which Moore had left on shore, were distributed in pairs along the -front of Monte Moro: the other three were with Paget’s reserve. - - [716] Paget had just lost his senior brigadier, Anstruther, who - died of dysentery in Corunna that day. His second brigade was - commanded by Disney. - - [717] His two brigadiers were Beresford and Fane. - -After surveying the British position from the Peñasquedo heights, Soult -had resolved to attempt the manœuvre which Moore had thought most -probable--to assault the western end of the line, where the heights are -least formidable, and at the same moment to turn the Monte Moro by a -movement round its extreme right through the open ground. Nor had it -escaped him that the ground occupied by Baird’s division was within -cannon-shot of the opposite range. He ordered ten guns to be dragged -up to the westernmost crest of the French position, and to be placed -above the village of Elvina, facing Bentinck’s brigade. The rest of -his artillery was distributed along the front of the Peñasquedo and -Palavea heights, in situations that were less favourable, because they -were more remote from the British lines. The hills were steep, no road -ran along their summit, and the guns had to be dragged by hand to the -places which they were intended to occupy. It was only under cover -of the night that those opposite Elvina were finally got to their -destination. - -Soult’s force was now considerably superior to that which was opposed -to him, sufficiently so in his own estimation to compensate for the -strength of the defensive positions which he would have to assail. He -had three infantry divisions with thirty-nine battalions (Heudelet -was still far to the rear), and twelve regiments of cavalry, with -about forty guns[718]. The whole, even allowing for stragglers still -trailing in the rear, and for men who had perished in the snows of the -mountains, must have been over 20,000 strong. The cavalry had 4,500 -sabres, and the infantry battalions must still have averaged over 500 -men, for in November they had nearly all been up to 700 bayonets, and -even the toilsome march in pursuit of Moore cannot have destroyed so -much as a third of their numbers: only Merle’s division had done any -fighting. It is absurd of some of the French narrators of the battle to -pretend that Soult had only 13,000 infantry--a figure which would only -give 330 bayonets to each battalion[719]. - - [718] The force stood as follows:-- - - Infantry--1st Division, Merle (Brigades Reynaud, Sarrut, Thomières). - } Each of Merle’s regiments (of which - 2nd Léger (three batts.) } three were originally two battalions - 4th Léger (four batts.) } and one three battalions strong) had - 15th of the Line (three batts.) } received an additional battalion from - 36th of the Line (three batts.) } the dissolved corps of Junot, before - } leaving Astorga. - - 2nd Division, Mermet (Brigades Gaulois, Jardon, Lefebvre). - } The 47th had received two, and the - 31st Léger (four batts.) } 31st Léger and 2nd Swiss each one - 47th of the Line (four batts.) } battalion from Junot’s corps. The - 122nd of the Line (four batts.) } 122nd was a new regiment, - 2nd Swiss Regiment (two batts.) } consolidated from six battalions of - 3rd Swiss Regiment (one batt.) } the ‘Supplementary Legions of - } Reserve.’ - - 3rd Division, Delaborde (Brigades Foy and Arnaud). - } The 70th and 86th, from Portugal, - 17th Léger (three batts.) } had each received a battalion from - 70th of the Line (four batts.) } Merle’s division, where they had been - 86th of the Line (three batts.) } serving in the autumn. The 17th - 4th Swiss Regiment (one batt.) } Léger had been transferred from the - } 6th Corps to the 2nd. - - Cavalry--Lahoussaye’s Division of Dragoons (Brigades Marisy and - Caulaincourt). - 17th, 18th, 19th, and 27th Dragoons--four regiments. - - Lorges’s Division of Dragoons (Brigades Vialannes and Fournier). - 13th, 15th, 22nd, and 25th Dragoons--four regiments. - - Franceschi’s Mixed Division (Brigades Debelle and Girardin [?]). - 1st Hussars, 8th Dragoons, 22nd Chasseurs, and Hanoverian - Chasseurs--four regiments. - - Artillery--600 men (?): exact figures not available. - - [719] e.g. Le Noble in his _Campagne du Maréchal Soult_, 1808-9, - p. 41. - -Soult’s plan was to contain the British left and centre with two of his -divisions--those of Delaborde and Merle--while Mermet and the bulk of -the cavalry should attack Moore’s right, seize the western end of Monte -Moro, and push in between Baird’s flank and Corunna. If this movement -succeeded, the British retreat would be compromised: Delaborde and -Merle could then assail Hope and prevent him from going to the rear: if -all went right, two-thirds of the British army must be surrounded and -captured. - -The movement of masses of infantry, and still more of cavalry and -guns, along the rugged crest and slopes of the Peñasquedo heights, was -attended with so much difficulty, that noon was long passed before the -whole army was in position. It was indeed so late in the day, that -Sir John Moore had come to the conclusion that Soult did not intend -to attack, and had ordered Paget’s division, who were to be the first -troops to embark, to march down to the harbour[720]. The other corps -were to retire at dusk, and go on shipboard under cover of the night. - - [720] Blakeney, p. 114. - -But between 1.30 and 2 o’clock the French suddenly took the offensive: -the battery opposite Elvina began to play upon Baird’s division, -columns descending from each side of it commenced to pour down into the -valley, and the eight cavalry regiments of Lahoussaye and Franceschi, -pushing out from behind the Peñasquedo heights, rode northward along -the lower slopes of the hills of San Cristobal, with the obvious design -of cutting in between the Monte Moro and Corunna. - -Moore welcomed the approach of battle with joy: he had every confidence -in his men and his position, and saw that a victory won ere his -departure would silence the greater part of the inevitable criticism -for timidity and want of enterprise, to which he would be exposed -on his return to England. He rode up to the crest of his position, -behind Baird’s division, took in the situation of affairs at a glance, -and sent back orders to Paget to pay attention to the French turning -movement, and to Fraser to come out from Corunna and contain any -advance on the part of the enemy’s cavalry on the extreme right. - -For some time the English left and centre were scarcely engaged, for -Merle and Delaborde did no more than push tirailleurs out in front -of their line, to bicker with the skirmishers of Hill, Leith, and -Manningham. But Bentinck’s brigade was at once seriously assailed: not -only were its lines swept by the balls of Soult’s main battery, but a -heavy infantry attack was in progress. Gaulois and Jardon’s brigades of -Mermet’s division were coming forward in great strength: they turned -out of the village of Elvina the light company of the 50th, which had -been detached to hold that advanced position, and then came up the -slope of Monte Moro, with a dense crowd of tirailleurs covering the -advance of eight battalion columns. Meanwhile the third brigade of -Mermet’s division was hurrying past the flank of Bentinck’s line, in -the lower ground, with the obvious intention of turning the British -flank. Beyond them Lahoussaye’s dragoons were cautiously feeling their -way forward, much incommoded by walls and broken ground. - -All the stress of the first fighting fell on the three battalions of -Bentinck, on the hill above Elvina. Moore was there in person to direct -the fight: Baird, on whom the responsibility for this part of the -ground would naturally have fallen, was wounded early in the day, by -a cannon-ball which shattered his left arm[721], and was borne to the -rear. When the French came near the top of the slope, driving in before -them the British skirmishing line, the Commander-in-chief ordered the -42nd and 50th to charge down upon them. The 4th, the flank regiment -of the whole line, could not follow them: it was threatened by the -encircling movement of the French left, and Moore bade it throw back -its right wing so as to form an angle _en potence_ with the rest of the -brigade, while still keeping up its fire. The manœuvre was executed -with such precision as to win his outspoken approval--‘That is exactly -how it should be done,’ he shouted to Colonel Wynch, and then rode off -to attend to the 50th and 42nd, further to his left. - - [721] His dispatch to Castlereagh, of Jan. 18, proves that he was - wounded before Moore fell. - -Here a very heavy combat was raging. Advancing to meet the French -attack, these two battalions drove in the tirailleurs with the -crushing fire of their two-deep line, and then became engaged with the -supporting columns on the slopes above Elvina. For some time the battle -stood still, but Moore told the regiments that they must advance to -make their fire tell, and at last Colonel Sterling and Major Charles -Napier led their men over the line of stone walls behind which they -were standing, and pressed forward. The head of the French formation -melted away before their volleys, and the enemy rolled back into -Elvina. The 42nd halted just above the village, but Napier led the -50th in among the houses, and cleared out the defenders after a sharp -fight. He even passed through with part of his men, and became engaged -with the French supports on the further side of the place. Presently -Mermet sent down his reserves and drove out the 50th, who suffered very -heavily: Charles Napier was wounded and taken, and Stanhope the junior -major was killed[722]. While the 50th was reforming, Moore brought up -the divisional reserve, Warde’s two magnificent battalions of Guards, -each of which, in consequence of their splendid discipline during the -retreat, mustered over 800 bayonets. With these and the 42nd he held -the slope above Elvina in face of a very hot fire, not only from the -enemy’s infantry but from the battery on the opposite heights, which -swept the ground with a lateral and almost an enfilading fire. It was -while directing one of the Guards’ battalions to go forward and storm -a large house on the flank of the village that Moore received a mortal -wound. A cannon-ball struck him on the left shoulder, carrying it away -with part of the collar-bone, and leaving the arm hanging only by -the flesh and muscles above the armpit[723]. He was dashed from his -horse, but immediately raised himself on his sound arm and bade his -aide-de-camp Hardinge see that the 42nd should advance along with the -Guards. Then he was borne to the rear, fully realizing that his wound -was mortal: his consciousness never failed, in spite of the pain and -the loss of blood, and he found strength to send a message to Hope to -bid him take command of the army. When his bearers wished to unbuckle -his sword, which was jarring his wounded arm and side, he refused to -allow it, saying ‘in his usual tone and with a very distinct voice, -“It is well as it is. I had rather that it should go out of the field -with me.”’ He was borne back to Corunna in a blanket by six men of the -Guards and 42nd. Frequently he made them turn him round to view the -field of battle, and as he saw the French line of fire rolling back, he -several times expressed his pleasure at dying in the moment of victory, -when his much-tried army was at last faring as it deserved. - - [722] Every student of the Peninsular War should read Charles - Napier’s vivid and thrilling account of the storm of Elvina. - William Napier reprinted it in vol. i of his brother’s biography. - Charles was within an ace of being murdered after surrender, and - was saved by a gallant French drummer. - - [723] Letter of his aide-de-camp Hardinge in James Moore’s - _Life_, p. 220. - -While Bentinck’s brigade and the Guards were thus engaged with Mermet’s -right, a separate combat was going on more to the west, where Edward -Paget and the Reserve division had marched out to resist the French -turning movement. The instant that Moore’s first orders had been -received, Paget had sent forward the 95th Rifles in extended order to -cover the gap, half a mile in breadth, between the Monte Moro and the -heights of San Cristobal. Soon afterwards he pushed up the 52nd into -line with the riflemen. The other three battalions of the division -moved out soon after. Paget had in front of him a brigade--five -battalions--of Mermet’s division, which was trying to slip round the -corner of Monte Moro in order to take Baird in the flank. He had also -to guard against the charges of Lahoussaye’s cavalry more to his right, -and those of Franceschi’s chasseurs still further south. Fortunately -the ground was so much cut up with rough stone walls, dividing the -fields of the villages of San Cristobal and Elvina, that Soult’s -cavalry were unable to execute any general or vigorous advance. When -the British swept across the low ground, Lahoussaye’s dragoons made two -or three attempts to charge, but, forced to advance among walls and -ravines, they never even compelled Paget’s battalions to form square, -and were easily driven off by a rolling fire. The Reserve division -steadily advanced, with the 95th and 52nd in its front, and the -horsemen gave back. It was in vain that Lahoussaye dismounted the 27th -Dragoons and ranged them as _tirailleurs_ along the lower slopes of the -heights of San Cristobal. The deadly fire of Paget’s infantry thinned -their ranks, and forced them back. It would seem that the 95th, 28th, -and 91st had mainly to do with Lahoussaye, while the 52nd and 20th -became engaged with the infantry from the division of Mermet, which was -bickering with the 4th Regiment below the Monte Moro, and striving to -turn its flank. In both quarters the advance was completely successful, -and Paget pushed forward, taking numerous prisoners from the enemy’s -broken infantry. So far did he advance in his victorious onslaught that -he approached from the flank the main French battery on the heights of -Peñasquedo, and thought that (if leave had been given him) he would -have been able to capture it: for its infantry supports were broken, -and the cavalry had gone off far to the right. But Hope sent no orders -to his colleague, and the Reserve halted at dusk at the foot of the -French position. - -Franceschi’s horsemen meanwhile, on the extreme left of the French -line, had at first pushed cautiously towards Corunna, till they saw -Fraser’s division drawn up half a mile outside the gates, on the low -ridge of Santa Margarita, covering the whole neck of the peninsula. -This checked the cavalry, and presently, when Paget’s advance drove -in Lahoussaye, Franceschi conformed to the retreat of his colleague, -and drew back across the heights of San Cristobal till he had reached -the left rear of Soult’s position, and halted in the upland valley -somewhere near the village of Mesoiro. - -We left Bentinck’s and Warde’s brigades engaged on the slopes above -Elvina with Mermet’s right-hand column, at the moment of the fall of -Sir John Moore. The second advance on Elvina had begun just as the -British commander-in-chief fell: it was completely successful, and the -village was for the second time captured. Mermet now sent down his last -reserves, and Merle moved forward his left-hand brigade to attack the -village on its eastern side. This led to a corresponding movement on -the part of the British. Manningham’s brigade from the right-centre of -the British line came down the slope, and fell upon Merle’s columns as -they pressed in towards the village. This forced the French to halt, -and to turn aside to defend themselves: there was a long and fierce -strife, during the later hours of the afternoon, between Manningham’s -two right-hand regiments (the 3/1st and 2/81st) and the 2nd Léger and -36th of the Line of Reynaud’s brigade. It was prolonged till the -2/81st had exhausted all its ammunition, and had suffered a loss of 150 -men, when Hope sent down the 2/59th, the reserve regiment of Leith’s -brigade, to relieve it. Soon afterwards the French retired, and the -battle died away at dusk into mere distant bickering along the bottom -of the valley, as a few skirmishers of the victorious brigade pursued -the retreating columns to the foot of their position. - -Further eastward Delaborde had done nothing more than make a feeble -demonstration against Hope’s very strong position on the heights above -the Mero river. He drove in Hill’s pickets, and afterwards, late in -the afternoon, endeavoured to seize the village of Piedralonga[724], -at the bottom of the valley which lay between the hostile lines. Foy, -who was entrusted with this operation, took the voltigeur companies of -his brigade, and drove out from the hamlet the outposts of the 14th -Regiment. Thereupon Hill sent down Colonel Nicholls with three more -companies of that corps, supported by two of the 92nd from Hope’s -divisional reserve. They expelled the French, and broke the supports on -which the voltigeurs tried to rally, taking a few prisoners including -Foy’s brigade-major. Delaborde then sent down another battalion, -which recovered the southern end of the village, while Nicholls held -tightly to the rest of it. At dusk both parties ceased to push on, -and the firing died away. The engagement at this end of the line was -insignificant: Foy lost eighteen killed and fifty wounded from the 70th -of the Line, and a few more from the 86th. Nicholls’s casualties were -probably even smaller[725]. - - [724] Erroneously called in most British and French accounts - Palavea Abaxo. The latter village is at the foot of the French - line, a little to the north. - - [725] For an account of this combat from the French side see - Foy’s report to Delaborde, printed in Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie - militaire du Général Foy_ (appendix), where the losses of the - brigade are given. On the English side the 92nd lost three killed - and five wounded (see Gardyne’s _History of the 92nd Regiment_). - The 14th do not separate their battle-losses from those of the - retreat in their casualty-returns. They had sixty-six dead and - missing in the whole campaign, and put on board at Corunna - seventy-two sick and wounded. Probably not more than ten of - the former and thirty of the latter were hit in the battle; if - the casualties were any larger on January 16 the losses in the - retreat must have been abnormally small in the 14th Regiment. - -Soult had suffered such a decided reverse that he had no desire to -prolong the battle, while Hope--who so unexpectedly found himself in -command of the British army--showed no wish to make a counter-attack, -and was quite contented to have vindicated his position. He claimed, -in his dispatch, that at the end of the engagement the army was -holding a more advanced line than at its commencement: and this was -in part true, for Elvina was now occupied in force, and not merely -by a picket, and Paget on the right had cleared the ground below the -heights of San Cristobal, which Lahoussaye had been occupying during -the action. Some of the French writers have claimed that Soult also -had gained ground[726]: but the only fact that can be cited in favour -of their contention is that Foy was holding on to the southern end of -Piedralonga[727]. All the eye-witnesses on their side concede that -at the end of the action the marshal’s army had fallen back to its -original position[728]. - - [726] Of course the untrustworthy Le Noble does so, and falsifies - his map accordingly. - - [727] Foy’s brigade engaged two battalions of the 70th Regiment, - besides three companies of _voltigeurs_ of the 86th; this was all - that Delaborde sent forward. There were two _chefs de bataillon_ - among the wounded. - - [728] ‘Chaque armée resta sur son terrain,’ says St. Chamans, - Soult’s senior aide-de-camp (the man who so kindly entreated - Charles Napier, as the latter’s memoirs show). ‘A la nuit, qui - seule a pu terminer cette lutte opiniâtre, nous nous sommes - retrouvés au point d’où nous étions partis à 3 heures,’ says - Fantin des Odoards, of Mermet’s division (p. 200). ‘Nos troupes - furent obligées, par des forces supérieures, de rentrer dans - leurs premiers postes,’ says Naylies, of Lahoussaye’s dragoons - (p. 46). - -English critics have occasionally suggested that the success won by -Paget and Bentinck might have been pressed, and that if the division -of Fraser had been brought up to their support, the French left might -have been turned and crushed[729]. But considering that Soult had -fourteen or fifteen intact battalions left, in the divisions of Merle -and Delaborde[730], it would have been well in his power to fight a -successful defensive action on his heights, throwing back his left -wing, so as to keep it from being encircled. Hope was right to be -contented with his success: even if he had won a victory he could have -done no more than re-embark, for the army was not in a condition to -plunge once more into the Galician highlands in pursuit of Soult, who -would have been joined in a few days by Heudelet, and in a week by Ney. - - [729] Blakeney urges this very strongly (pp. 117, 118); Graham - also. - - [730] It would seem that only the 2nd Léger and 36th of the Line - of Merle, and the 70th of Delaborde, had been seriously engaged. - -The losses suffered by the two armies at the battle of Corunna are not -easy to estimate. The British regiments, embarking on the day after -the fight, did not send in any returns of their casualties till they -reached England. Then, most unfortunately, a majority of the colonels -lumped together the losses of the retreat and those of the battle. -It is lucky, however, to find that among the regiments which sent in -proper returns are nearly all those which fought the brunt of the -action. The 50th and 42nd of Bentinck’s brigade were by far the most -heavily tried, from the prolonged and desperate fighting in and about -Elvina. The former lost two officers killed and three wounded, with -180 rank and file: the Highland battalion thirty-nine rank and file -killed and 111 (including six officers) wounded. The Guards’ brigade, -on the other hand, which was brought up to support these regiments, -suffered very little; the first battalion of the 1st Regiment had -only five, the second only eight killed, with about forty wounded -between them. In Manningham’s brigade the 81st, with its loss of three -officers and twenty-seven men killed, and eleven officers and 112 men -wounded, was by far the heaviest sufferer: the Royals may also have -had a considerable casualty-list, but its figures are apparently not -to be found, except confused with those of the whole retreat. Paget’s -division in its flank march to ward off the French turning movement -suffered surprisingly little: of its two leading regiments the 1/95th -had but twelve killed and thirty-three wounded, the 1/52nd five killed -and thirty-three wounded. The other three battalions, which formed the -supports, must have had even fewer men disabled. Hope’s division, with -the exception of the 14th and the 59th, was not seriously engaged: the -few battalions which sent in their battle-losses, apart from those of -the retreat, show figures such as six or ten for their casualties on -January 16. Fraser’s whole division neither fired a shot nor lost a -man. It is probable then that Hope, when in his dispatch he estimated -the total loss of the British army at ‘something between 700 and 800,’ -was overstating rather than understating the total. - -Soult’s losses are even harder to discover than those of Moore’s army. -His chronicler, Le Noble[731], says that they amounted to no more -than 150 killed and 500 wounded. The ever inaccurate Thiers reduces -this figure to 400 or less. On the other hand Naylies, a combatant in -the battle, speaks of 800 casualties; and Marshal Jourdan, in his -_précis_ of the campaign, gives 1,000[732]. But all these figures -must be far below the truth. Fantin des Odoards has preserved the -exact loss of his own corps, the 31st Léger, one of the regiments of -Mermet’s division, which fought in Elvina. It amounted to no less -than 330 men[733]. The other four regiments of the division were not -less deeply engaged, and it is probable that Mermet alone must have -lost over 1,000 in killed and wounded. Two of his three brigadiers -went down in the fight: Gaulois was shot dead, Lefebvre badly hurt. -Of Merle’s division, one brigade was hotly engaged in the struggle -with Manningham’s battalions, in which our 2/81st lost so heavily. -The French cannot have suffered less, as they were the beaten party. -Lahoussaye’s dragoons must also have sustained appreciable loss: that -of Delaborde (as we have already seen) was limited to about eighteen -killed and fifty wounded. Of unwounded prisoners the British took seven -officers and 156 men. If we put the total of Soult’s casualties at -1,500, we probably shall not be far wrong. All the later experience of -the war showed that, when French troops delivered in column an uphill -attack on a British position and failed, they suffered twice or thrice -the loss of the defenders: we need only mention Vimiero and Busaco. -On this occasion there was the additional advantage that Moore’s army -had new muskets and good ammunition, while those of Soult’s corps -were much deteriorated. A loss of 1,500 men therefore seems a fair -and rational estimate. The impression left by the battle on Soult’s -mind was such that, in his first dispatch to the Emperor, he wrote -that he could do no more against the English till he should have -received large reinforcements[734]. But two days later, when Hope had -evacuated Corunna, he changed his tone and let it be understood that -he had gained ground during the battle, and had so far established -an advantage that his position forced the English to embark. This -allegation was wholly without foundation. Hope simply carried out the -arrangements which Moore had made for sending off the army to England, -and his resolve was dictated by the condition of his troops, who -urgently needed reorganization and repose, and not by any fear of what -the Marshal could do against him. - - [731] Belmas gives the same number, probably copying Le Noble. - - [732] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 126. - - [733] Fantin des Odoards, p. 201. - - [734] See Marshal Jourdan’s very judicious remark on Soult’s - bulletins in his _Mémoires militaires_ (p. 127). ‘His first - dispatch was not that of a general who imagined that he had been - successful.’ - -Moore, borne back to his quarters in Corunna, survived long enough to -realize that his army had completely beaten off Soult’s attack, and had -secured for itself a safe departure. In spite of his dreadful wound he -retained his consciousness to the last. Forgetful of his own pain, he -made inquiries as to the fate of his especial friends and dependants, -and found strength to dictate several messages, recommending for -promotion officers who had distinguished themselves, and sending -farewell greetings to his family. He repeatedly said that he was dying -in the way he had always desired, on the night of a victorious battle. -The only weight on his mind was the thought that public opinion at -home might bear hardly upon him, in consequence of the horrors of the -retreat. ‘I hope the people of England will be satisfied,’ he gasped; -‘I hope my country will do me justice.’ And then his memory wandered -back to those whom he loved: he tried in vain to frame a message to -his mother, but weakness and emotion overcame him, and a few minutes -later he died, with the name of Pitt’s niece (Lady Hester Stanhope) -on his lips. Moore had expressed a wish to be buried where he fell, -and his staff carried out his desire as far as was possible, by laying -him in a grave on the ramparts of Corunna. He was buried at early dawn -on the seventeenth, on the central bastion that looks out towards the -land-side and the battle-field. Hard by him lies General Anstruther, -who had died of dysentery on the day before the fight. Soult, with a -generosity that does him much credit, took care of Moore’s grave, and -ordered a monument to be erected over the spot where he fell[735]. La -Romana afterwards carried out the Marshal’s pious intentions. - - [735] The inscription was to run: ‘Hic cecidit Iohannes Moore dux - exercitus Britannici, in pugna Ianuarii xvi, 1809, contra Gallos - a duce Dalmatiae ductos.’ - -Little remains to be said about the embarkation of the army. At -nine o’clock on the night of the battle the troops were withdrawn -from the Monte Moro position, leaving only pickets along its front. -Many regiments were embarked that night, more on the morning of -the seventeenth. By the evening of that day all were aboard save -Beresford’s brigade of Fraser’s division, which remained to cover the -embarkation of the rest. - -Soult, when he found that the British had withdrawn, sent up some -field-pieces to the heights above Fort San Diego, on the southern end -of the bay. Their fire could reach the more outlying transports, and -created some confusion, as the masters hastily weighed anchor and -stood out to sea. Four vessels ran on shore, and three of them could -not be got off: the troops on board were hastily transferred to other -ships, with no appreciable loss: from the whole army only nine men of -the Royal Wagon Train are returned as having been ‘drowned in Corunna -harbour,’ no doubt from the sinking of the boat which was transhipping -them. General Leith records, in his diary, that on the vessel which -took him home there were fragments of no less than six regiments: we -can hardly doubt that this must have been one of those which picked up -the men from the stranded transports. - -Beresford’s brigade embarked from a safe point behind the citadel -on the eighteenth, leaving the town in charge of the small Spanish -garrison under General Alcedo, which maintained the works till all the -fleet were far out to sea, and then rather tamely surrendered. This was -entirely the doing of their commander, a shifty old man, who almost -immediately after took service with King Joseph[736]. - - [736] St. Chamans calls him ‘un vieux faible et sans moyens, mené - par une espèce de courtisane.’ Mr. Stuart (in a note to Vaughan) - describes him as an ‘unscrupulous old rascal.’ - -The returning fleet had a tempestuous but rapid passage: urged on by a -raging south-wester the vessels ran home in four or five days, and made -almost every harbour between Falmouth and Dover. Many transports had a -dangerous passage, but only two, the _Dispatch_ and the _Smallbridge_, -came to grief off the Cornish coast and were lost, the former with -three officers and fifty-six men of the 7th Hussars, the latter with -five officers and 209 men of the King’s German Legion[737]. So ended -the famous ‘Retreat from Sahagun.’ - - [737] Cf. for their losses the _Parliamentary Papers for 1809_ - (pp. 8, 9), and Beamish’s _History of the German Legion_. - -Moore’s memory met, as he had feared, with many unjust aspersions when -the results of his campaign were known in England. The aspect of the -26,000 ragged war-worn troops, who came ashore on the South Coast, -was so miserable that those who saw them were shocked. The state of -the mass of 3,000 invalids, racked with fever and dysentery, who were -cast into the hospitals was eminently distressing. It is seldom that -a nation sees its troops returning straight from the field, with the -grime and sweat of battle and march fresh upon them. The impression -made was a very unhappy one, and it was easy to blame the General. -Public discontent was roused both against Moore and against the -ministry, and some of the defenders of the latter took an ungenerous -opportunity of shifting all the blame upon the man who could no longer -vindicate himself. This provoked his numerous friends into asserting -that his whole conduct of the campaign had been absolutely blameless, -and that any misfortunes which occurred were simply and solely the -fault of maladministration and unwise councils at home. Moore was the -hero of the Whig party, and politics were dragged into the discussion -of the campaign to a lamentable extent. Long years after his death the -attitude of the critic or the historian, who dealt with the Corunna -retreat, was invariably coloured by his Whig or Tory predilections. - -The accepted view of the present generation is (though most men -are entirely unacquainted with the fact) strongly coloured by the -circumstance that William Napier, whose eloquent history has superseded -all other narratives of the Peninsular War, was a violent enemy of -the Tory ministry and a personal admirer of Moore. Ninety years and -more have now passed since the great retreat, and we can look upon the -campaign with impartial eyes. It is easy to point out mistakes made by -the home government, such as the tardy dispatch of Baird’s cavalry, -and the inadequate provision of money, both for the division which -started from Lisbon and for that which started from Corunna. But these -are not the most important causes of the misfortunes of the campaign. -Nor can it be pleaded that the ministry did not support Moore loyally, -or that they tied his hands by contradictory or over-explicit orders. -A glance at Castlereagh’s dispatches is sufficient to show that he -and his colleagues left everything that was possible to be settled by -the General, and that they approved each of his determinations as it -reached them without any cavilling or criticism[738]. - - [738] In fairness to the government Castlereagh’s dispatches, - 92-105 in the _Parliamentary Papers for 1809_, should be - carefully studied. - -Moore must take the main responsibility for all that happened. On -the whole, the impression left after a study of his campaign is -very favourable to him. His main conception when he marched from -Salamanca--that of gaining time for the rallying of the Spanish -armies, by directing a sudden raid upon the Emperor’s communications -in Castile--was as sound as it was enterprising. The French critics -who have charged him with rashness have never read his dispatches, -nor realized the care with which he had thought out the retreat, which -he knew would be inevitable when his movement became known at Madrid. -He was never for a moment in any serious danger of being surrounded by -the Emperor, because he was proceeding (as he himself wrote) ‘bridle in -hand,’ and with a full knowledge that he must ‘have a run for it’ on -the first receipt of news that Napoleon was upon the march. His plan -of making a diversion was a complete success: he drew the Emperor, -with the 70,000 men who would otherwise have marched on Lisbon, up -into the north-west of the Peninsula, quite out of the main centre -of operations. Napoleon himself halted at Astorga, but 45,000 men -marched on after the British, and were engulfed in the mountains of -Galicia, where they were useless for the main operations of the war. -Spain, in short, gained three months of respite, because the main -disposable field-army of her invaders had been drawn off into a corner -by the unexpected march of the British on Sahagun. ‘As a diversion the -movement has answered completely,’ wrote Moore to Castlereagh from -Astorga[739], and with justice. That the subsequent retreat to Corunna -was also advisable we must concede, though the arguments in favour of -attempting a defence of Galicia were more weighty than has generally -been allowed[740]. - - [739] Moore to Castlereagh, from Astorga, Dec. 31, 1808. - - [740] See the arguments stated on pp. 554-5. - -But when we turn to the weeks that preceded the advance from Salamanca, -and that followed the departure from Astorga, it is only a very -blind admirer of Moore who will contend that everything was arranged -and ordered for the best. That the army, which began to arrive at -Salamanca on November 13, did not make a forward move till December -12 is a fact which admits of explanation, but not of excuse. The main -governing fact of its inactivity was not, as Moore was always urging, -the disasters of the Spaniards, but the misdirection of the British -cavalry and artillery on the roundabout route by Elvas, Talavera, and -the Escurial. For this the British general was personally responsible: -we have already shown that he had good reasons for distrusting the -erroneous reports on the roads of Portugal which were sent in to him, -and that he should not have believed them[741]. He ought to have -marched on Almeida, with his troops distributed between the three -available roads, and should have had a compact force of all arms -concentrated at Salamanca by November 15. Even without Baird he could -then have exercised some influence on the course of events. As it was, -he condemned himself--by the unmilitary act of separating himself from -his guns and his horsemen--to a month of futile waiting, while the fate -of the campaign was being settled a hundred and fifty miles away. - - [741] See the facts stated on pp. 493-5. - -The chance that Napoleon turned his whole army upon Madrid, and did -not send a single corps in search of the British, gave Moore the grand -opportunity for striking at the French communications, which he turned -to such good account in the middle of December. But, though he so -splendidly vindicated his reputation by this blow, we cannot forget the -long hesitation at Salamanca by which it was preceded, nor the unhappy -project for instant retreat on Portugal, which was so nearly put into -execution. If it had been carried out, Moore’s name would have been -relegated to a very low place in the list of British commanders, for -he would undoubtedly have evacuated Lisbon, just as he had prepared -to evacuate Corunna on the day before he was slain. We have his own -words to that effect. On November 25 he put on paper his opinion as to -the defence of Portugal. ‘Its frontier,’ he wrote, ‘is not defensible -against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, -but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain, it -will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The British must -in that event immediately take steps to evacuate the country[742].’ -It is fortunate that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not of this opinion, or -the course of the Peninsular War, and of the whole struggle between -Bonaparte and Britain, might have been modified in a very unhappy -fashion. - - [742] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Nov. 25. - -So much must be said of Moore’s earlier faults. Of his later ones, -committed after his departure from Astorga, almost as much might be -made. His long hesitation, as to whether he should march on Vigo or on -Corunna, was inexcusable: at Astorga his mind should have been made -up, and the Vigo road (a bad cross-route on which he had not a single -magazine) should have been left out of consideration. By failing to -make up his mind, and taking useless half-measures, Moore deprived -himself of the services of Robert Crawfurd and 3,500 of the best -soldiers of his army. But, as we have shown elsewhere, the hesitation -was in its origin the result of the groundless hypothesis which Moore -had formed--one knows not from what premises--that the French would -not be able to pursue him beyond Villafranca. - -Still more open to criticism is the headlong pace at which Moore -conducted the last stages of the retreat. Napier has tried to represent -that the marches were not unreasonable: ‘in eleven days,’ he wrote, ‘a -small army passed over a hundred and fifty miles of good road[743].’ -But we have to deduct three days of rest, leaving an average of about -seventeen miles a day; and this for January marching, in a rugged -snow-clad country, is no trifle. For though the road was ‘good,’ in the -sense that it was well engineered, it was conducted over ridge after -ridge of one of the most mountainous lands in Europe. The desperate -uphill gradients between Astorga and Manzanal, and between Villafranca -and Cerezal, cannot be measured in mere miles when their difficulty is -being estimated. The marching should be calculated by hours, and not -by miles. Moreover, Moore repeatedly gave his men night-marches, and -even two night-marches on end. Half the horrors of the dreadful stage -between Lugo and Betanzos came from the fact that the army started -at midnight on January 8-9, only rested a few hours by day, and then -marched again at seven on the evening of the ninth, and through the -whole of the dark hours between the ninth and tenth. Flesh and blood -cannot endure such a trial even in good weather, and these were nights -of hurricane and downpour. Who can wonder that even well-disposed and -willing men lagged behind, sank down, and died by hundreds under such -stress? - - [743] Napier, i. 349. - -All this hurry was unnecessary: whenever the rearguard turned to face -the French, Soult was forced to wait for many hours before he could -even begin an attempt to evict it. For his infantry was always many -miles to the rear, and he could not effect anything with the horsemen -of his advanced guard against Paget’s steady battalions--as Cacabellos -sufficiently showed. Napier urges that any position that the British -took up could be turned by side-roads: this is true, but the flanking -movement would always take an inordinate time, and by the moment that -the French had started upon it, the British rearguard could have -got off in safety, after having delayed the enemy for the best part -of a day. If, instead of offering resistance only at Cacabellos, -Constantino, and Lugo, Moore had shown fight at three or four other -places--e.g. at the narrow pass of Piedrafita, the passage of the -Ladra, and the defile of Monte Falqueiro--he need not have hurried his -main body beyond their strength, and left the road strewn with so many -exhausted stragglers. French and English eye-witnesses alike repeatedly -express their surprise that such positions were left undefended. -While not disguising the fact that a great proportion of the British -losses were due to mere want of discipline and sullen discontent on -the part of the rank and file, we cannot fail to see that this was -not the sole cause of the disasters of the retreat. The General drove -his men beyond their strength, when he might, at the cost of a few -rearguard skirmishes, have given them four or five days more in which -to accomplish their retreat. Moore arrived at Corunna on January 11: it -was January 16 before Soult had so far collected his army that he could -venture to attack. At any other point, the result of offering battle -would have been much the same. No excuse for Moore can be made on the -ground of insufficient supplies: at Villafranca, Lugo, and Betanzos he -destroyed enormous quantities of food, and often so imperfectly that -the French succeeded in living for several days on what they could save -from the flames. - -In making these criticisms we are not in the least wishing to impugn -Moore’s reputation as a capable officer and a good general. He was -both, but his fault was an excessive sense of responsibility. He could -never forget that he had in his charge, as was said, ‘not _a_ British -army, but _the_ British army’--the one efficient force that the United -Kingdom could put into the field. He was loth to risk it, though -ultimately he did so in his admirably conceived march on Sahagun. He -had also to think of his own career: among his numerous friends and -admirers he had a reputation for military infallibility which he was -loth to hazard. Acting under a strong sense of duty he did so, but all -the while he was anxiously asking himself ‘What will they say at home?’ -It was this self-consciousness that was Moore’s weak point. Fortunately -he was a man of courage and honour, and at the critical moment -recovered the confidence and decision which was sometimes wanting in -the hours of doubt and waiting. - -Few men have been better loved by those who knew them best. To have -served in the regiments which Moore had trained at Shorncliffe in -1803-5, was to be his devoted friend and admirer for life and death. -Handsome, courteous, just, and benevolent, unsparing to himself, -considerate to his subordinates, he won all hearts. ‘He was a very king -of men,’ wrote Charles Napier; and Charles’s more eloquent brother has -left him a panegyric such as few generals have merited and fewer still -obtained[744]. - - [744] ‘Thus ended the career of Sir John Moore, a man whose - uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and - governed by a disinterested patriotism, more in keeping with - the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His - tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined - forehead, and singularly expressive mouth indicated a noble - disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of - honour habitual to his mind were adorned by a subtle playful wit, - which gave him in conversation the ascendency which he always - preserved by the decisive vigour of his action. He maintained - the right with a vehemence bordering on fierceness, and every - important transaction in which he was engaged increased his - reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern - enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful - servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest - feared him; he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, - and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he - was dead.... If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is - not a leveller!’ (_Peninsular War_, i. 333.) - - - - -APPENDICES - - - - -I - -GODOY’S PROCLAMATION OF OCT. 5, 1806 - - -ESPAÑOLES! - -En circunstancias menos arriesgadas que las presentes han procurado -los vasallos leales auxiliar á sus soberanos con dones y recursos -anticipados á las necesidades; pero en esta prevision tiene el mejor -lugar la generosa accion de súbdito hácia su señor. El reino de -Andalucía privilegiado por la naturaleza en la produccion de caballos -de guerra ligeros; la provincia de Extremadura que tantos servicios -de esta clase hizo al señor Felipe V. ¿verán con paciencia que la -caballería del rey de España esté reducida é incompleta por falta de -caballos? No, no lo creo; antes sí espero que del mismo modo que los -abuelos gloriosos de la generacion presente sirvieron al abuelo de -nuestro rey con hombres y caballos, asistan ahora los nietos de nuestro -suelo con regimientos ó compañías de hombres diestros en el manejo del -caballo, para que sirvan y defiendan à su patria todo el tiempo que -duren las urgencias actuales, volviendo despues llenos de gloria y con -mejor suerte al descanso entre su familia. Entonces sí que cada cual -se disputará los laureles de la victoria; cual dirá deberse á su brazo -la salvacion de su familia; cual la de su gefe; cual la de su pariente -ó amigo, y todos á una tendrán razon para atribuirse á sí mismos la -salvacion de la patria. Venid pues, amados compatriotas, venid á jurar -bajo las banderas del mas benéfico de los soberanos: venid y yo os -cubriré con el manto de la gratitud, cumpliéndoos cuanto desde ahora os -ofrezco, si el Dios de las victorias nos concede una paz tan feliz y -duradera cual le rogamos. No, no os detendrá el temor, no la perfidia: -vuestros pechos no abrigan tales vicios, ni dan lugar á la torpe -seduccion. Venid pues y si las cosas llegasen á punto de no enlazarse -las armas con las de nuestros enemigos, no incurriréis en la nota de -sospechosos, ni os tildaréis con un dictado impropio de vuestra lealtad -y pundonor por haber sido omisos á mi llamamiento. - -Pero si mi voz no alcanzase á despertar vuestros anhelos de gloria, -sea la de vuestros inmediatos tutores ó padres del pueblo á quienes me -dirijo, la que os haga entender lo que debeis á vuestra obligacion, á -vuestro honor, y á la sagrada religion que profesais. - - EL PRÍNCIPE DE LA PAZ. - -San Ildefonso, 5 de octubre de 1806. - - - - -II - -THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU - - -TRAITÉ SECRET ENTRE S.M.I. NAPOLÉON, EMPEREUR DES FRANÇAIS, ROI -D’ITALIE, ETC., ET SA MAJESTÉ CATHOLIQUE CHARLES IV, ROI D’ESPAGNE, ETC. - -Art. 1er. La province entre Minhô et Duero, la ville d’Oporto y -comprise, sera donnée en toute propriété et souveraineté à S. M. le roi -d’Etrurie, avec le titre de roi de la Lusitanie septentrionale. - -2. La province d’Alentéjo, et le royaume des Algarves, seront donnés en -toute propriété et souveraineté au prince de la Paix, dont il jouira -avec le titre de prince des Algarves. - -3. Les provinces de Beira, Tras-los-Montes et de l’Estramadure -portugaise, resteront en dépôt jusqu’à la paix générale, et alors on -disposera d’elles selon les circonstances, et conformément à ce qui -sera convenu entre les deux hautes parties contractantes. - -4. Le royaume de la Lusitanie septentrionale sera possédé par les -descendans de S. M. le roi d’Etrurie, héréditairement et suivant les -lois de succession qui sont en usage dans la famille régnante de S. M. -le roi d’Espagne. - -5. La principauté des Algarves sera possédée par les descendans du -prince de la Paix, héréditairement et d’après les lois de succession -qui sont en usage dans la famille régnante de S. M. le roi d’Espagne. - -6. A défaut de descendans ou héritiers légitimes du roi de la Lusitanie -septentrionale ou du prince des Algarves, ces pays seront donnés -moyennant l’investiture par S. M. le roi d’Espagne, pourvu qu’ils ne -puissent jamais être réunis sous une seule personne, ni à la couronne -d’Espagne. - -7. Le royaume de la Lusitanie septentrionale, et la principauté des -Algarves, reconnaîtront comme protecteur S. M. le roi d’Espagne, et les -souverains de ces pays ne pourront jamais faire la paix ni la guerre -sans le consentement du roi catholique. - -8. Si les provinces de Beira, de Tras-los-Montes et de l’Estramadure -portugaise, restant en dépôt, étaient rendues au tems de la paix -générale à la maison de Bragance, en échange de Gibraltar, la Trinité, -et d’autres colonies que les Anglais ont conquises sur l’Espagne et ses -alliés, le nouveau souverain de ces provinces aurait à l’égard de S. M. -C. le roi d’Espagne les mêmes soumissions que le roi de la Lusitanie -septentrionale, et le prince des Algarves, et il possédera sous les -mêmes conditions. - -9. S. M. le roi d’Etrurie cède en toute propriété et souveraineté le -royaume d’Etrurie à S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie. - -10. Quand l’occupation définitive des provinces du Portugal sera -effectuée, les différens princes qui doivent les posséder nommeront -d’accord les commissaires pour fixer les limites naturelles. - -11. S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, garantit à S. M. C. le -roi d’Espagne la possession de ses états du continent d’Europe, situés -au midi des Pyrénées. - -12. S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, s’oblige à reconnaître -S. M. C. le roi d’Espagne comme empereur des deux Amériques quand -tout sera prêt, afin que S. M. puisse prendre ce titre, ce qui pourra -arriver au tems de la paix générale, ou le plus tard, d’ici à trois ans. - -13. Les hautes puissances contractantes accorderont les moyens de faire -à l’amiable une division égale des îles, colonies et autres propriétés -d’outre-mer du Portugal. - -14. Le présent traité restera secret, il sera ratifié, et les -ratifications seront échangées à Madrid dans vingt jours. - -Fait à Fontainebleau, le 27 octobre 1807. - - DUROC. - - EUGENIO IZQUIERDO. - - -CONVENTION SECRÈTE. - -Art. 1er. Un corps de troupes impériales françaises, de vingt-cinq -mille hommes d’infanterie et de trois de cavalerie, entrera en Espagne, -il fera sa jonction avec un corps de troupes espagnoles, composé de -huit mille hommes d’infanterie, trois mille de cavalerie, et trente -pièces d’artillerie. - -2. Au même tems, une division de troupes espagnoles de dix mille hommes -prendra possession de la province d’entre Minhô et Duero, et de la -ville d’Oporto, et une autre division de six mille hommes, composée -pareillement de troupes espagnoles, prendra possession de l’Alentéjo et -du royaume des Algarves. - -3. Les troupes françaises seront nourries et entretenues par l’Espagne, -et leur solde payée par la France pendant tout le temps de leur passage -en Espagne. - -4. Depuis le moment où les troupes combinées seront entrées en -Portugal, les provinces de Beira, Tras-los-Montes et l’Estramadure -portugaise (qui doivent rester en dépôt), seront administrées et -gouvernées par le général commandant des troupes françaises, et -les contributions qui leur seront imposées seront au profit de la -France. Les provinces qui doivent composer le royaume de la Lusitanie -septentrionale et la principauté des Algarves seront administrées et -gouvernées par les généraux commandant les divisions espagnoles qui en -prendront possession, et les contributions qui leur seront imposées -resteront au bénéfice de l’Espagne. - -5. Le corps du centre sera sous les ordres du commandant des troupes -françaises, aussi bien que les troupes espagnoles qui lui seront -réunies. Cependant, si le roi d’Espagne ou le prince de la Paix -trouvaient convenable et jugeaient à propos de s’y rendre, le général -commandant des troupes françaises et elles-mêmes seront soumises aux -ordres du roi d’Espagne ou du prince de la Paix. - -6. Un autre corps de quarante mille hommes de troupes françaises sera -réuni à Bayonne le 20 novembre prochain ou avant ce temps-là, et il -devra être prêt à marcher sur le Portugal, en passant par l’Espagne, si -les Anglais envoient des renforts et menacent d’attaquer le premier. -Cependant, ce nouveau corps de troupes n’entrera que quand les deux -hautes parties contractantes se seront mises d’accord pour cet effet. - -7. La présente convention sera ratifiée, et l’échange des ratifications -sera faite au même temps que le traité d’aujourd’hui. - -Fait à Fontainebleau, le 27 octobre 1807. - - DUROC. - - EUGENIO IZQUIERDO. - - - - -III - -PAPERS RELATING TO THE ‘AFFAIR OF THE ESCURIAL’ - - -LETTER OF CHARLES IV TO NAPOLEON. - -MONSIEUR MON FRÈRE, - -Dans le moment où je ne m’occupais que des moyens de coopérer à la -destruction de notre ennemi commun; quand je croyais que tous les -complots de la ci-devant reine de Naples avaient été ensevelis avec -sa fille, je vois avec une horreur qui me fait frémir, que l’esprit -d’intrigue le plus horrible a pénétré jusque dans le sein de mon -palais. Hélas! mon cœur saigne en faisant le récit d’un attentat si -affreux! mon fils aîné, l’héritier présomptif de mon trône, avait formé -le complot horrible de me détrôner; il s’était porté jusqu’à l’excès -d’attenter contre la vie de sa mère! Un attentat si affreux doit être -puni avec la rigueur la plus exemplaire des lois. La loi qui l’appelait -à la succession doit être révoquée: un de ses frères sera plus digne de -le remplacer et dans mon cœur et sur le trône. Je suis dans ce moment à -la recherche de ses complices pour approfondir ce plan de la plus noire -scélératesse; et je ne veux perdre un seul moment pour en instruire V. -M. I. et R., en la priant de m’aider de ses lumières et de ses conseils. - -Sur quoi je prie Dieu, mon bon frère, qu’il daigne avoir V. M. I. et R. -en sa sainte et digne garde. - - CHARLES. - -A St.-Laurent, ce 29 octobre 1807. - - -LETTER OF PRINCE FERDINAND TO CHARLES IV. - -SEÑOR: - -Papá mio: he delinquido, he faltado á V. M. como rey y como padre; pero -me arrepiento, y ofrezco á V. M. la obediencia mas humilde. Nada debia -hacer sin noticia de V. M.; pero fui sorprendido. He delatado á los -culpables, y pido á V. M. me perdone por haberle mentido la otra noche, -permitiendo besar sus reales pies á su reconocido hijo. - - FERNANDO. - -San Lorenzo, 5 de noviembre de 1807. - - -PROCLAMATION OF CHARLES IV, PARDONING THE PRINCE. - -REAL DECRETO. - -La voz de la naturaleza desarma el brazo de la venganza, y cuando la -inadvertencia reclama la piedad, no puede negarse á ello un padre -amoroso. Mi hijo ha declarado ya los autores del plan horrible que -le habian hecho concebir unos malvados: todo lo ha manifestado en -forma de derecho, y todo consta con la escrupulosidad que exige la -ley en tales pruebas: su arrepentimiento y asombro le han dictado las -representaciones que me ha dirigido. - -En vista de ellos y á ruego de la reina mi amada esposa perdono á mi -hijo, y le volveré á mi gracia cuando con su conducta me dé pruebas -de una verdadera reforma en su frágil manejo; y mando que los mismos -jueces que han entendido en la causa desde su principio la sigan, -permitiéndoles asociados si los necesitaren, y que concluida me -consulten la sentencia ajustada á la ley, segun fuesen la gravedad -de delitos y calidad de personas en quienes recaigan; teniendo por -principio para la formacion de cargos las respuestas dadas por -el príncipe á las demandas que se le han hecho; pues todas estan -rubricadas y firmadas de mi puño, asi como los papeles aprehendidos en -sus mesas, escritos por su mano; y esta providencia se comunique á mis -consejos y tribunales, circulándola á mis pueblos, para que reconozcan -en ella mi piedad y justicia, y alivien la afliccion y cuidado en que -les puso mi primer decreto; pues en él verán el riesgo de su soberano -y padre que como á hijos los ama, y asi me corresponden. Tendreislo -entendido para su cumplimiento. - -San Lorenzo, 5 de noviembre de 1807. - - YO EL REY. - - - - -IV - -ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV - - -Como los achaques de que adolezco no me permiten soportar por mas -tiempo el grave peso del gobierno de mis reinos, y me sea preciso para -reparar mi salud gozar en un clima mas templado de la tranquilidad de -la vida privada, he determinado despues de la mas seria deliberacion -abdicar mi corona en mi heredero y mi muy caro hijo el príncipe de -Asturias. Por tanto es mi real voluntad que sea reconocido y obedecido -como rey y señor natural de todos mis reinos y dominios. Y para que -este mi real decreto de libre y espontánea abdicacion tenga su éxito -y debido cumplimiento, lo comunicareis al consejo y demas á quien -corresponda. - -Dado en Aranjuez, á 19 de marzo de 1808. - - YO EL REY. - -A Don Pedro Cevallos. - - - - -V - -THE SPANISH ARMY IN 1808 - -[Mainly from the table in Arteche, vol. i, Appendix 9.] - - -N.B.--The numbers are taken from returns made on various days between -March and June, 1808. They include only rank and file. The officers -should have been ninety-eight to a regiment of guards, seventy to a -line regiment, forty-one to a light battalion, thirty-four to a militia -battalion, forty-two to a cavalry regiment. But most corps were under -strength in officers, no less than in men, in June, 1808, and Arteche, -giving every regiment of infantry a complete staff of officers, is -clearly over-estimating them. He gives e.g. 2,450 officers of line -infantry, the possible maximum, while the _Estado Militar_ for 1808 -gives only 1,521 present; so with the militia he gives 1,887 officers, -while apparently there were only 1,230 actually existing. It would seem -that his gross total of 7,222 officers ought to be cut down to 5,911. -For the rank and file we get:-- - -ROYAL GUARD. - - CAVALRY. - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - Life Guards 615 } Old Castile - Royal Carabineers 540 } and Madrid. - ----- - Total 1,155 - - INFANTRY. - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - Halberdiers } - (one compy.) 152 } Madrid. - - Spanish Guards } 1, 2 Barcelona. - (three batts.) 3,294 } 3 New Castile. - - Walloon Guards } 1 Madrid. - (three } 2 Barcelona. - batts.) 2,58 } 3 Portugal. - ------ - Total 6,029 - -INFANTRY OF THE LINE. - -N.B.--Each regiment had three battalions of four companies, and should -have numbered 2,186 bayonets. - - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - Africa 898 { 1, 3 Andalusia. - { 2 S. Sebastian. - - America 808 { 1 New Castile. - { 2, 3 Valencia. - - Aragon 1,294 Galicia. - - Asturias 2,103 Denmark. - - Borbon 1,544 Balearic Isles. - - Burgos 1,264 Andalusia. - - Cantabria 1,024 Ceuta (Africa). - - Ceuta 1,235 ” ” - - Cordova 793 Andalusia. - - Corona 902 ” - - España 1,039 Ceuta (Africa). - - Estremadura 770 Catalonia. - - Granada 1,113 Balearic Isles. - - Guadalajara 2,069 Denmark. - - Jaen 1,755 { 1, 2 Andalusia. - { 3 Ceuta (Africa). - - Leon 1,195 Galicia. - - Majorca 1,749 { 1, 2 Portugal. - { 3 Estremadura. - - Malaga 854 Andalusia. - - Murcia 1,762 { 1, 2 Portugal - { 3 Andalusia. - - Navarre 822 Galicia. - - Ordenes Militares 708 } 1 Estremadura. - } 2, 3 Andalusia. - - Princesa 1,969 Denmark. - - Principe 1,267 Galicia. - - Reina 1,530 Andalusia. - - { 1 S. Sebastian. - Rey 1,353 { 2 Portugal. - { 3 Galicia. - - Saragossa 1,561 { 1, 2 Portugal. - { 3 Andalusia. - - Savoia 936 Valencia. - - Seville 1,168 Galicia. - - Soria 1,311 Balearic Isles. - - Toledo 1,058 { 1, 2 Galicia. - { 3 Portugal. - - Valencia 923 Murcia. - - Volunteers of } ” - Castile 1,487 } - - Voluntarios de } 1 Portugal. - la Corona 1,296 } 2, 3 Galicia. - - Voluntarios del } Madrid. - Estado 742 } - - Zamora 2,096 Denmark. - ------ - Total 44,398 - -LIGHT INFANTRY. - -N.B.--The regiment had only a single battalion of six companies. It -should have numbered 1,200 bayonets. - - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - 1st of Aragon 1,305 { Madrid and Saragossa. - - 2nd of Aragon 1,225 Balearic Isles. - - Barbastro 1,061 { ½ Andalusia. - { ½ Portugal. - - 1st of Barcelona 1,266 Denmark. - - 2nd of Barcelona 1,300 Balearic Isles. - - Campo Mayor 1,153 { ½ Portugal. - { ½ Andalusia. - - 1st of Catalonia 1,164 Denmark. - - 2nd of Catalonia 685 Galicia. - - Gerona 1,149 { ½ Portugal. - { ½ Andalusia. - - Tarragona 1,142 { ½ Pampeluna. - { ½ Estremadura. - - Volunteers of { ½ Portugal. - Navarre 963 { ½ Galicia. - - Volunteers of { ½ Portugal. - Valencia 1,242 { ½ Andalusia. - ------ - Total 13,655 - -FOREIGN INFANTRY. - -N.B.--The Swiss Regiments had two battalions, the others three. - - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - IRISH. - - Irlanda 513 { 1 Estremadura. - { 2, 3 Andalusia. - - Hibernia 852 { 1 Asturias. - { 2, 3 Galicia. - - Ultonia 351 Gerona. - - ITALIAN. - - Naples 288 Galicia. - - SWISS. - - 1. Wimpfen 2,079 Catalonia. - - 2. Reding Senior 1,573 New Castile. - - 3. Reding Junior 1,809 Andalusia. - - 4. Beschard 2,051 Balearic Isles. - - 5. Traxler 1,757 Murcia. - - 6. Preux 1,708 Madrid. - ------ - Total 12,981 - -MILITIA. - -N.B.--The four grenadier regiments had two battalions each, and should -have been 1,600 strong; the rest one battalion, 600 strong. - - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - Prov. Gren. of - Old Castile 1,605 Portugal. - New Castile 1,430 Portugal. - Andalusia 1,413 Andalusia. - Galicia 1,377 { 1 Galicia. - { 2 Portugal. - Alcazar 595 Andalusia. - Avila 574 Valencia. - Badajoz 589 Andalusia. - Betanzos 599 Galicia. - Burgos 577 Andalusia. - Bujalance 594 Andalusia. - Chinchilla 558 ” - Ciudad Real 575 ” - Ciudad Rodrigo 585 ” - Compostella 599 Galicia. - Cordova 584 Andalusia. - Cuenca 596 ” - Ecija 589 ” - Granada 553 ” - Guadix 588 ” - Jaen 584 ” - Jerez 574 ” - Laredo 571 Santander. - Leon 591 Galicia. - Logroño 558 Andalusia. - Lorca 562 ” - Lugo 589 Galicia. - Majorca 570 Balearic Isles. - Malaga 401 Andalusia. - Mondoñedo 591 Galicia. - Monterrey 591 ” - Murcia 564 Murcia. - Orense 584 Galicia. - Oviedo 543 Asturias. - Plasencia 593 Andalusia. - Pontevedra 568 Galicia. - Ronda 574 Andalusia. - Salamanca 600 Galicia. - Santiago 596 ” - Segovia 591 ” - Seville 547 Andalusia. - Siguenza 579 ” - Soria 582 Valencia. - Toledo 579 Andalusia. - Toro 553 ” - Truxillo 567 ” - Tuy 583 Galicia. - Valladolid 562 ” - ------ - Total 30,527 - -CAVALRY. - -N.B.--Each regiment had five squadrons, and should have numbered about -700 sabres. - -1. HEAVY CAVALRY. - - _Regiment._ _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - 1st Rey 634 Denmark. - 2nd Reina 668 Old Castile. - 3rd Principe 573 New Castile. - 4th Infante 615 Denmark. - 5th Borbon 616 Catalonia. - 6th Farnesio 517 Andalusia. - 7th Alcantara 589 Portugal. - 8th España 553 Andalusia. - 9th Algarve 572 Denmark. - 10th Calatrava 670 Andalusia. - 11th Santiago 549 Portugal. - 12th Montesa 667 Andalusia. - ------ - Total 7,232 - -2. LIGHT CAVALRY. - - CAZADORES. _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - 1st Rey 577 Madrid. - 2nd Reina 581 Portugal. - 3rd Almanza 598 Denmark. - 4th Pavia 663 Andalusia. - 5th Villaviciosa 628 Denmark. - 6th Sagunto 499 Andalusia. - - HUSSARS. - - 1st Numancia 630 Valencia. - 2nd Lusitania 554 Madrid. - 3rd Olivenza 558 Portugal. - 4th Voluntarios } New Castile. - de España 548 } - 5th Maria Luisa 680 Estremadura. - 6th Españoles 692 Balearic Isles. - ------ - Total 7,208 - -A scheme was on foot for converting eight of the light regiments -into dragoons. Several of them are designated sometimes as dragoons, -sometimes as cazadores or hussars. - -N.B.--The 14,440 troopers had only 9,526 horses! - -ARTILLERY. - -1. FIELD. - - _Numbers._ _Quartered in_ - - 1st Regiment 1,143 Catalonia. - 2nd ” 1,146 Valencia and Murcia. - 3rd ” 1,078 Andalusia. - 4th ” 1,043 Galicia. - ------ - Total 4,410 - -Each regiment consisted of ten batteries; of the whole forty, six were -horse-artillery. 477 men (four batteries) were in Denmark. - -2. GARRISON. - -Two ‘Brigades’ and fifteen ‘Compañias Fijas’ at various places, in all -1,934. - -Adding general staff, &c., the total of the artillery, field and -garrison, was 292 officers and 6,679 men. - -ENGINEERS. - -169 officers and a battalion of sappers. The latter was quartered at -Alcala de Henares, and had a strength of 922 men, besides 127 detached -in Denmark. - - -GENERAL TOTAL (Rank and File only). - - _Infantry._ - _Cavalry._ - _Artillery._ - _Engineers._ - Royal Guard 6,029 1,155 - Infantry of the Line 44,398 - Light Infantry 13,655 - Foreign Infantry 12,981 - Militia 30,527 - Cavalry 14,440 - Artillery 6,679 - Engineers 1,049 - -------- ------ ------ ------ - 107,590 15,595 6,679 1,049 = 130,913 - -Add 5,911 officers, and we get a gross total of 136,824. - - - - -VI - -THE FIRST FRENCH ‘ARMY OF SPAIN’ - - -1. ‘1ST CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE’ [ARMY OF PORTUGAL]. - -Commander, General JUNOT. Chief of the Staff, General Thiébault. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General DELABORDE (Brigades Avril and Brennier): - 15th of the Line (3rd batt.), 1,033; 47th ditto (2nd batt.), 1,210; - 70th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), 2,299; 86th ditto (1st and 2nd - batts.), 2,116; 4th Swiss (1st batt.), 1,190. - Total, seven battalions 7,848 - - 2nd Division, General LOISON (Brigades Charlot and Thomières): - 2nd Léger (3rd batt.), 1,255; 4th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,196; - 12th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,302; 15th ditto (3rd batt.), 1,314; - 32nd of the Line (3rd batt.), 1,265; 58th ditto (3rd batt.), - 1,394; 2nd Swiss (2nd batt.), 755. Total, seven battalions 8,481 - - 3rd Division, General TRAVOT (Brigades Graindorge and Fusier): - 31st Léger (3rd batt.), 653; 32nd ditto (3rd batt.) 983; 26th of - the Line (3rd batt.), 537; 66th ditto (3rd and 4th batts.), 1,004; - 82nd ditto (3rd batt.), 861; _Légion du Midi_ (1st batt.), 797; - Hanoverian Legion, 703. Total, eight battalions 5,538 - - Cavalry Division, General KELLERMANN (Brigades Margaron and Maurin): - 26th Chasseurs, 244; 1st Dragoons, 261; 3rd ditto, 236; 4th - ditto, 262; 5th ditto, 249; 9th ditto, 257; 15th ditto, 245. - Total seven squadrons 1,754 - - Artillery, Train, &c. 1,297 - ------ - Total of the Corps (twenty-two battalions, seven squadrons) 24,918 - -2. ‘2ND CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE GIRONDE.’ - -Commander, General DUPONT. Chief of the Staff, General Legendre. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General BARBOU (Brigades Pannetier and Chabert): - Garde de Paris (2nd batts. of 1st and 2nd Regiments), 1,454; - 3rd Legion of Reserve (1st and 2nd batts.), 2,057; 4th ditto - (1st, 2nd, and 3rd batts.), 3,084; Marines of the Guard, 532; - 4th Swiss (2nd batt.), 709. Total, nine battalions 7,836 - - 2nd Division, General VEDEL (Brigades Poinsot and Cassagne): - 1st Legion of Reserve (three batts.), 3,011; 5th ditto (three batts.), - 2,695; 3rd Swiss (1st batt.), 1,178. Total, seven battalions 6,884 - - 3rd Division, General FRERE (Brigades Laval and Rostolland): - 15th Léger (2nd batt.), 1,160; 2nd Legion of Reserve (three - batts.), 2,870; 2nd Swiss (1st batt.), 1,174. - Total, five battalions 5,204 - - Cavalry Division, General FRÉSIA (Brigades Rigaud and Dupré): - 1st Provisional Cuirassiers, 778; 2nd ditto, 681; 1st Provisional - Chasseurs, 556; 2nd ditto, 662; 6th Provisional Dragoons, 623. - Total, fifteen squadrons 3,300 - - Artillery, Train, &c. 1,204 - ------ - Total of the Corps (twenty-one battalions, fifteen squadrons) 24,428 - -3. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE OCEAN COAST.’ - -Commander, Marshal MONCEY. Chief of the Staff, General Harispe. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General MUSNIER (Brigades Brun and Isemburg): - 1st Provisional Regiment of Infantry (four batts.), 2,088; 2nd - ditto, 2,183; 3rd ditto, 2,118; 4th ditto, 2,232; Westphalian - battalion, 1,078. Total, seventeen battalions 9,699 - - 2nd Division, General GOBERT (Brigades Lefranc and Dufour): - 5th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,095; 6th ditto, 1,851; - 7th ditto, 1,872; 8th ditto, 1,921; Irish Legion, 654. - Total, seventeen battalions 8,393 - - 3rd Division, General MORLOT (Brigades Bujet and Lefebvre): - 9th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,448; 10th ditto, 2,146; - 11th ditto, 2,062; Prussian battalion, 493. - Total, thirteen battalions 7,149 - - Cavalry Division, General GROUCHY (Brigades Privé and Wathier): - 1st Provisional Dragoons, 660; 2nd ditto, 872; 1st Provisional - Hussars, 597; 2nd ditto, 721. Total, twelve squadrons 2,850 - - Artillery, Train, &c. 1,250 - ------ - Total of the Corps (forty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons) 29,341 - -4. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE PYRENEES.’ - -Commander, Marshal BESSIÈRES. Chief of the Staff, General -Lefebvre-Desnouettes. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General MERLE (Brigades Darmagnac and Gaulois): - 47th of the Line (1st batt.), 1,235; 86th ditto (two companies), - 231; 3rd Swiss (2nd batt.), 721; 1st _Régiment de Marche_ (two - batts.), 965; 1st Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of - Reserve (two batts.), 2,096. Total, six and a quarter battalions 5,248 - - 2nd Division, General VERDIER (Brigades Sabathier and Ducos): - 17th Provisional Regiment (four batts.), 2,110; 18th ditto, 1,928; - 13th ditto, 2,185; 14th ditto, 2,295. Total, sixteen battalions 8,518 - - Cavalry Division, General LASALLE: - 10th Chasseurs, 469; 22nd ditto, 460; _Escadron de Marche_ of - Cuirassiers, 153. Total, seven squadrons 1,082 - - Artillery, Train, &c. 408 - -Detached troops belonging to the Corps of Bessières. - - (1) Garrison of Pampeluna, General D’AGOULT: - 15th of the Line (4th batt.), 435; 47th ditto (3rd batt.), 297; - 70th ditto (3rd batt.), 488; 5th _Escadron de Marche_ of - Cuirassiers, 329; Artillery, 63 1,612 - - (2) Garrison of San Sebastian, General THOUVENOT: - 2nd Supplementary Regiment of the Legions of Reserve (4th - batt.), 890; Dépôt Battalion, 1,240; Cavalry Dépôt, 60; - Artillery, 28 2,218 - ------ - Total of the Corps (twenty-seven and a quarter battalions, nine - squadrons) 19,086 - -5. ‘CORPS OF OBSERVATION OF THE EASTERN PYRENEES.’ - -Commander, General DUHESME. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Fabre. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General CHABRAN (Brigades Goulas and Nicolas). - 2nd of the Line (3rd batt.), 610; 7th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.), - 1,785; 16th ditto (3rd batt.), 789; 37th ditto (3rd batt.), 656; - 56th ditto (4th batt.), 833; 93rd ditto (3rd batt.), 792; 2nd - Swiss (3rd batt.), 580. Total, eight battalions 6,045 - - 2nd Division, General LECCHI (Brigades Milosewitz and ?): - 2nd Italian Line (2nd batt.), 740; 4th ditto (3rd batt.), 587; - 5th ditto (2nd batt.), 806; Royal _Vélites_ (1st batt.), 519; - 1st Neapolitan Line (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,944. - Total, six battalions 4,596 - - Cavalry Brigade, General Bessières: - 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers, 409; 3rd Provisional Chasseurs, 416 825 - - Cavalry Brigade, General Schwartz: - Italian Chasseurs of the Prince Royal, 504; 2nd Neapolitan - Chasseurs, 388 892 - - Artillery, Train, &c. 356 - ------ - Total of the Corps (fourteen battalions, nine squadrons) 12,714 - -6. IMPERIAL GUARD. - -Commander, General DORSENNE. - - _Men._ - 1st Fusiliers (three batts.), 1,570; 2nd ditto, 1,499; Marines of - the Guard [detached to Dupont’s Corps]. Total, six battalions. 3,069 - - Dragoons, 252; Chasseurs and Mamelukes, 321; _Gendarmes - d’élite_, 304; Polish Light Horse, 737; Guard of the Duke of - Berg, 148 1,762 - - Artillery, &c. 1,581 - ------ - Total (six battalions, nine squadrons) 6,412 - -7. TROOPS WHICH ENTERED SPAIN AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, IN JUNE, -JULY, AND AUGUST. - - _Men._ - Division MOUTON (Brigades Rey and Reynaud): - 2nd Léger (1st and 2nd batts.); 4th ditto (1st, 2nd, and 4th - batts.); 12th ditto (1st and 2nd batts.); 15th of the Line (1st - and 2nd batts.); _Garde de Paris_ (one batt.) 5,100 - - Brigade of General BAZANCOURT: - 14th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.), 1,488; 44th ditto (1st and - 2nd batts.), 1,614 3,102 - - Polish Brigade (Colonel Chlopiski): - 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the Vistula (each of two batts.) 3,951 - - Four _Bataillons de Marche_ (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7) 2,281 - - Division of General REILLE at Perpignan [for details see p. 320] 8,370 - - Division of General CHABOT (‘Reserve of Perpignan’) 2,667 - - Portuguese Troops, before Saragossa (two batts.) 553 - - National Guards of the Pyrenees, before Saragossa (two batts.) 971 - - General Dépôt at Bayonne 7,659 - - Battalions, companies, and smaller drafts sent to join their corps - in June-August 8,687 - - _Escadrons de Marche_, Polish Lancers, Cavalry of the Imperial Guard 3,911 - - Artillery, drafts 851 - - Engineers, ditto 101 - ------ - Total 48,204 - -GENERAL TOTAL. - - _Men._ - Junot’s Corps 24,918 - Dupont’s Corps 24,428 - Moncey’s Corps 29,341 - Bessières’ Corps 19,086 - Duhesme’s Corps 12,714 - Imperial Guard 6,412 - Troops which entered Spain - in June, July, and August 48,204 - ------- - 165,103 - -N.B.--The organization and the greater part of the figures come from -the table at the end of vol. iv of Foy’s history of the Peninsular -War. But a few corrections are made where more detailed information is -available, especially in the seventh section, where Foy is incomplete -(e.g. he omits one of Mouton’s brigades). - - - - -VII - -PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREACHERY AT BAYONNE - - -PROTEST OF CHARLES IV AGAINST HIS ABDICATION. - -Protesto y declaro que todo lo que manifiesto en mi decreto del 19 de -marzo, abdicando la corona en mi hijo, fue forzado por precaver mayores -males y la efusion de sangre de mis queridos vasallos, y por tanto de -ningun valor. - - YO EL REY. - -Aranjuez, 21 de marzo de 1808. - - -LETTER OF NAPOLEON TO FERDINAND VII. - -MON FRÈRE, - -J’ai reçu la lettre de V. A. R. Elle doit avoir acquis la preuve, dans -les papiers qu’elle a eu du roi son père, de l’intérêt que je lui ai -toujours porté. Elle me permettra, dans la circonstance actuelle, de -lui parler avec franchise et loyauté. En arrivant à Madrid, j’espérais -porter mon illustre ami à quelques réformes nécessaires dans ses Etats, -et à donner quelque satisfaction à l’opinion publique. Le renvoi du -prince de la Paix me paraissait nécessaire pour son bonheur et celui de -ses peuples. Les affaires du Nord ont retardé mon voyage. Les événemens -d’Aranjuez ont eu lieu. Je ne suis point juge de ce qui s’est passé, -et de la conduite du prince de la Paix; mais ce que je sais bien, -c’est qu’il est dangereux pour les rois d’accoutumer les peuples à -répandre du sang et à se faire justice eux-mêmes. Je prie Dieu que V. -A. R. n’en fasse pas elle-même un jour l’expérience. Il n’est pas de -l’intérêt de l’Espagne de faire du mal à un prince qui a épousé une -princesse du sang royal, et qui a si long-temps régi le royaume. Il n’a -plus d’amis; V. A. R. n’en aura plus, si jamais elle est malheureuse. -Les peuples se vengent volontiers des hommages qu’ils nous rendent. -Comment, d’ailleurs, pourrait-on faire le procès au prince de la Paix, -sans le faire à la reine et au roi votre père? Ce procès alimentera -les haines et les passions factieuses; le résultat en sera funeste -pour votre couronne; V. A. R. déchire par là ses droits. Qu’elle ferme -l’oreille à des conseils faibles et perfides. Elle n’a pas le droit -de juger le prince de la Paix: ses crimes, si on lui en reproche, se -perdent dans les droits du trône. J’ai souvent manifesté le désir que -le prince de la Paix fût éloigné des affaires. L’amitié du roi Charles -m’a porté souvent à me taire, et à détourner les yeux des faiblesses -de son attachement. Misérables hommes que nous sommes! faiblesse et -erreur, c’est notre devise. Mais tout cela peut se concilier. Que le -prince de la Paix soit exilé d’Espagne, et je lui offre un refuge en -France. Quant à l’abdication de Charles IV, elle a eu lieu dans un -moment où mes armées couvraient les Espagnes; et, aux yeux de l’Europe -et de la postérité, je paraîtrais n’avoir envoyé tant de troupes que -pour précipiter du trône mon allié et mon ami. Comme souverain voisin, -il m’est permis de vouloir connaître, avant de reconnaître, cette -abdication. Je le dis à V. A. R., aux Espagnols, au monde entier: Si -l’abdication du roi Charles est de pur mouvement, s’il n’y a pas été -forcé par l’insurrection et l’émeute d’Aranjuez, je ne fais aucune -difficulté de l’admettre, et je reconnais V. A. R. comme roi d’Espagne. -Je désire donc causer avec elle sur cet objet. La circonspection que je -porte depuis un mois dans ces affaires doit lui être garant de l’appui -qu’elle trouvera en moi, si, à son tour, des factions, de quelque -nature qu’elles soient, venaient à l’inquiéter sur son trône. - -Quand le roi Charles me fit part de l’événement du mois d’octobre -dernier, j’en fus douloureusement affecté, et je pense avoir contribué, -par des insinuations que j’ai faites, à la bonne issue de l’affaire de -l’Escurial. V. A. R. avait bien des torts; je n’en veux pour preuve que -la lettre qu’elle m’a écrite, et que j’ai constamment voulu oublier. -Roi à son tour, elle saura combien les droits du trône sont sacrés. -Toute démarche près d’un souverain étranger, de la part d’un prince -héréditaire, est criminelle. V. A. R. doit se défier des écarts et des -émotions populaires. - -On pourra commettre quelques meurtres sur mes soldats isolés, mais la -ruine de l’Espagne en serait le résultat. J’ai déjà vu avec peine qu’à -Madrid on ait répandu des lettres du capitaine-général de la Catalogne, -et fait tout ce qui pouvait donner du mouvement aux têtes. V. A. R. -connaît ma pensée toute entière: elle voit que je flotte entre diverses -idées qui ont besoin d’être fixées. Elle peut être certaine que, -dans tous les cas, je me comporterai avec elle comme avec le roi son -père. Qu’elle croie à mon désir de tout concilier, et de trouver des -occasions de lui donner des preuves de mon affection et de ma parfaite -estime. - -Sur ce, je prie Dieu qu’il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde. - - NAPOLÉON. - -Bayonne, le 16 avril 1808. - - -SECOND ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV. - -Art. Ier. S. M. le roi Charles, n’ayant en vue pendant toute sa vie -que le bonheur de ses sujets, et constant dans le principe, que tous -les actes d’un souverain ne doivent être faits que pour arriver à ce -but; les circonstances actuelles ne pouvant être qu’une source de -dissensions d’autant plus funestes que les factions ont divisé sa -propre famille, a résolu de céder, comme il cède par le présent, à S. -M. l’empereur Napoléon, tous ses droits sur le trône des Espagnes et -des Indes, comme au seul qui, au point où en sont arrivées les choses, -peut rétablir l’ordre: entendant que ladite cession n’ait lieu qu’afin -de faire jouir ses sujets des deux conditions suivantes: - -1º. L’intégrité du royaume sera maintenue. Le prince que S. M. -l’empereur Napoléon jugera devoir placer sur le trône d’Espagne -sera indépendant, et les limites de l’Espagne ne souffriront aucune -altération. - -2º. La religion catholique, apostolique et romaine sera la seule en -Espagne. Il ne pourra y être toléré aucune religion réformée, et encore -moins infidèle, suivant l’usage établi jusqu’aujourd’hui. - -II. Tous actes faits contre ceux de nos fidèles sujets, depuis la -révolution d’Aranjuez, sont nuls et de nulle valeur, et leurs -propriétés leur seront rendues. - -III. Sa majesté le roi Charles ayant ainsi assuré la prospérité, -l’intégrité et l’indépendance de ses sujets, Sa Majesté l’Empereur -s’engage à donner refuge dans ses états au roi Charles, à la reine, à -sa famille, au prince de la Paix, ainsi qu’à ceux de leurs serviteurs -qui voudront les suivre, lesquels jouiront en France d’un rang -équivalent à celui qu’ils possédaient en Espagne. - - -The remaining seven articles have reference to the estates and revenues -in France, which the Emperor makes over to Charles IV and his family. - - -RESIGNATION OF HIS RIGHTS BY FERDINAND VII. - -Art. I. Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies adhère à la cession -faite par le roi Charles, de ses droits au trône d’Espagne et des -Indes, en faveur de Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, -et renonce, en tant que de besoin, aux droits qui lui sont acquis, -comme prince des Asturies, à la couronne des Espagnes et des Indes. - -II. Sa Majesté l’Empereur des Français, roi d’Italie, accorde en France -à Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies le titre d’Altesse Royale, -avec tous les honneurs et prérogatives dont jouissent les princes de -son rang. Les descendans de Son Altesse Royale le prince des Asturies -conserveront le titre de prince et celui d’Altesse Sérénissime, et -auront toujours le même rang en France, que les princes dignitaires de -l’Empire. - - -The remaining five articles have reference to the estates and revenues -in France, which the Emperor makes over to Ferdinand. - - - - -VIII - -THE CAPITULATION OF BAYLEN - - -1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF CASTAÑOS - -N.B.--* marks an old regiment of the regular army; † a militia -regiment; ‡ a regiment of new levies. - -Commander-in-chief, Lieut.-General FRANCISCO XAVIER CASTAÑOS. Chief -of the Staff, Major-General Tomas Moreno. - - _Men._ - 1st Division, General TEODORO REDING: - *Walloon Guards (3rd batt.), 852; *Reina, 795; *Corona, 824; - *Jaen, 922; *Irlanda, 1,824; *3rd Swiss, 1,100; *Barbastro - (half batt.), 331; †Jaen, 500; ‡1st of Granada, 526; - ‡Cazadores of Antequera, 343; ‡Tejas, 43 Total 8,453 - Cavalry attached to the 1st Division: - *Montesa, 120; *Farnesio, 213; *_Dragones de la Reina_, 213; - *Numancia, 100; *Olivenza, 140; ‡Lancers of Utrera and - Jerez, 114. Total 900 - One horse-battery (six guns), one field-battery (four guns) 200 - Two companies of sappers 166 - ----- - Total of the Division 9,719 - - 2nd Division, Major-General Marquis COUPIGNY: - *Ceuta, 1,208; *Ordenes Militares, 1,909; †Granada, 400; - †Truxillo, 290; †Bujalance, 403; †Cuenca, 501; †Ciudad - Real, 420; ‡2nd of Granada, 450; ‡3rd of Granada, 470; - ‡Volunteers of Catalonia, 1,178. Total 7,229 - Cavalry attached to 2nd Division: - *Borbon, 401; *España, 120. Total 521 - One horse-battery (six guns) 100 - One company of sappers 100 - ------ - Total of the Division 7,950 - - 3rd Division, Major-General FELIX JONES: - *Cordova, 1,106; *Light Infantry of Valencia (half - batt.), 359; *ditto of Campo-Mayor, 800; †Burgos, 415; - †Alcazar, 400; †Plasencia, 410; †Guadix, 459; †Lorca, 490; - †Seville, 267. - Total 4,706 - Cavalry attached to 3rd Division: - *Calatrava, 222; *Santiago, 86; *Sagunto, 101; - *Principe, 300. - Total 709 - ------ - Total of the Division 5,415 - - 4th Division (Reserve), Lieut.-General MANUEL LA PEÑA: - *Africa, 525; *Burgos, 2,089; *Saragossa (3rd batt.), 822; - *Murcia (3rd batt.), 420; *2nd Swiss, 243; *Marines, 50; - †Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia, 912; †Siguenza, 502. - Total 5,563 - Cavalry attached to 4th Division: - *Pavia, 541 541 - Artillery, two horse-batteries (twelve guns) (?) 302 - Sappers, one company 100 - ------ - Total of the Division 6,506 - -Total of the army, 29,590: viz. infantry, 25,951; cavalry, 2,671; -artillery, 602; sappers, 366, with twenty-eight guns. - -N.B.--The force of the two flying columns of Col. Cruz-Murgeon and the -Conde de Valdecañas is not ascertainable. They were both composed of -new levies: Arteche puts the former at 2,000 foot, and the latter at -1,800 foot and 400 horse. Other authorities give Cruz-Murgeon 3,000 men. - -It should be noted that Castaños’ field-army does not comprise the -whole number of men under arms in Andalusia. Most of the regular -regiments had left behind their third battalion, which was being -completed with recruits, and was not fit to take the field. Of all the -regiments only Burgos, Irlanda, and Ordenes Militares seem to have gone -forward three battalions strong. - - -2. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH GENERALS. - -(_a._) GENERAL DUPONT TO GENERAL VEDEL. - -Je vous prie, mon cher général, de vous porter le plus rapidement -possible sur Baylen, pour y faire votre jonction avec le corps qui a -combattu aujourd’hui à Mengibar et qui s’est replié sur cette ville. -Le sixième régiment provisoire et deux escadrons, l’un de dragons et -l’autre de chasseurs, sont réunis à votre division. - -J’espère que l’ennemi sera rejeté demain sur Mengibar, au delà du -fleuve, et que les postes de Guarraman et de la Caroline resteront en -sûreté; ils sont d’une grande importance. - -Lorsque vous aurez obtenu ce succès, je désire que vous réunissiez -à Andujar une partie de vos forces, afin de combattre l’ennemi qui -se trouve devant nous. Vous ne laisserez à Baylen que ce qui sera -nécessaire pour sa défense. - -Si l’ennemi occupe Baëza, il faut l’en chasser. - -Recevez mes assurances d’amitié. - - Le général DUPONT. - -Andujar, le 16 juillet 1808. - - -(_b._) GENERAL VEDEL TO GENERAL DUPONT. - -Mon général, - -Il est huit heures et demie. J’arrive à Baylen, où je n’ai trouvé -personne. Le général Dufour en est parti à minuit et a marché sur -Guarraman. Comme il n’a laissé personne pour m’instruire des motifs -de cette démarche, je ne puis rien dire de positif à cet égard; mais -le bruit commun étant que les troupes ennemies, qui out attaqué hier -le général Belair, se sont dirigées avec celles qui étaient à Ubeda, -vers les gorges, par Linharès et Sainte-Hélène, on doit penser que le -général Dufour s’est mis à leur poursuite, afin de les combattre. - -Comme les instructions de Votre Excellence portent que je dois faire -ma jonction avec le corps qui s’était replié sur Baylen, quoique -harassé et fatigué, je partirai d’ici pour me rendre encore aujourd’hui -à Guarraman, afin de regagner la journée que l’ennemi a sur moi, -l’atteindre, le battre, et déjouer ainsi ses projets sur les gorges. - -Je vais écrire au général Dufour, pour l’informer de mon mouvement, -savoir quelque chose de positif sur sa marche et sur les données qu’il -peut avoir de celle de l’ennemi. - -· · · · · · · · · - - Le général de division, - - VEDEL. - -Baylen, le 17 juillet 1808. - - -(_c._) GENERAL DUPONT TO GENERAL VEDEL. - -J’ai reçu votre lettre de Baylen; d’après le mouvement de l’ennemi, le -général Dufour a très-bien fait de le gagner de vitesse sur la Caroline -et sur Sainte-Hélène, pour occuper la tête des gorges; je vois avec -plaisir que vous vous hâtez de vous réunir à lui, afin de combattre -avec avantage, si l’ennemi se présente. Mais, au lieu de se rendre à -Sainte-Hélène, l’ennemi peut suivre la vieille route, qui de Baëza va à -Guëmada, et qui est parallèle à la grande route; s’il prend ce parti, -il faut le gagner encore de vitesse au débouché de cette route, afin de -l’empêcher de pénétrer dans la Manche. D’après ce que vous me dites, ce -corps ne serait que d’environ dix mille hommes, et vous êtes en mesure -de la battre complétement; s’il est plus considérable, manœuvrez pour -suspendre sa marche, ou pour le contenir dans les gorges, en attendant -que j’arrive à votre appui. - -· · · · · · · · · - -Si vous trouvez l’ennemi à la Caroline, ou sur tout autre point de la -grande route, tâchez de le battre, pour me venir rejoindre et repousser -ce qui est devant Andujar. - -· · · · · · · · · - - Mille amitiés. - - Le général DUPONT. - -Andujar, le 17 juillet 1808. - - -N.B.--It will be seen that by letter (_a_) Dupont deliberately divides -his army into two halves. By letter (_b_) Vedel shows that he made -no reconnaissances, but acted merely on ‘le bruit commun.’ By letter -(_c_) Dupont accepts Vedel’s erroneous views without suspicion, -and authorizes him to go off on the wild-goose chase which he was -projecting. - - -3. CAPITULATION. - -Leurs Excellences MM. le comte de Casa Tilly et le général don -Francisco Xavier Castaños, commandant en chef l’armée d’Espagne en -Andalousie, voulant donner une preuve de leur haute estime à Son -Excellence M. le général comte Dupont, grand aigle de la Légion -d’honneur, commandant en chef le corps d’observation de la Gironde, -ainsi qu’à l’armée sous ses ordres, pour la belle et glorieuse défense -qu’ils out faite contre une armée infiniment supérieure en nombre, et -qui les enveloppait de toutes parts; sur la demande de M. le général -de brigade Chabert, commandant de la Légion d’honneur, et chargé -des pleins pouvoirs de Son Excellence le général en chef de l’armée -française, en présence de Son Excellence M. le général comte Marescot, -grand aigle de la Légion d’honneur et premier inspecteur du génie, ont -arrêté les conventions suivantes: - -Art. 1er. Les troupes françaises sous les ordres de Son Excellence M. -le général Dupont sont prisonnières de guerre, la division Vedel et les -autres troupes françaises en Andalousie exceptées. - -2. La division de M. le général Vedel, et généralement toutes les -troupes françaises en Andalousie, qui ne sont pas dans la position de -celles comprises dans l’article 1er, évacueront l’Andalousie. - -3. Les troupes comprises dans l’article 2 conserveront généralement -tous leurs bagages, et, pour éviter tout sujet de trouble pendant la -marche, elles remettront leur artillerie, train et autres armes, à -l’armée espagnole, qui s’engage à les leur rendre au moment de leur -embarquement. - -4. Les troupes comprises dans l’article 1er du traité sortiront de -leur camp avec les honneurs de la guerre; chaque bataillon ayant deux -canons en tête; les soldats armés de leurs fusils, qui seront déposés à -quatre cents toises du camp. - -5. Les troupes de M. le général Vedel et autres, ne devant pas déposer -les armes, les placeront en faisceaux sur le front de bandière; elles -y laisseront aussi leur artillerie et leur train. Il en sera dressé -procès-verbal par des officiers des deux armées, et le tout leur sera -remis ainsi qu’il est convenu dans l’article 3. - -6. Toutes les troupes françaises en Andalousie se rendront à San-Lucar -et à Rota, par journées d’étape, qui ne pourront excéder quatre lieues -de poste, avec les séjours nécessaires, pour y être embarquées sur des -vaisseaux ayant équipage espagnol, et transportées en France au port de -Rochefort. - -7. Les troupes françaises seront embarquées aussitôt après leur -arrivée. L’armée espagnole assure leur traversée contre toute agression -hostile. - -8. MM. les officiers généraux, supérieurs et autres, conserveront leurs -armes, et les soldats leurs sacs. - -9. Les logements, vivres et fourrages, pendant la marche et la -traversée, seront fournis à MM. les officiers généraux et autres y -ayant droit, ainsi qu’à la troupe, dans la proportion de leur grade, et -sur le pied des troupes espagnoles en temps de guerre. - -10. Les chevaux de MM. les officiers généraux, supérieurs et -d’état-major, dans la proportion de leur grade, seront transportés en -France, et nourris sur le pied de guerre. - -11. MM. les officiers généraux conserveront chacun une voiture et un -fourgon; MM. les officiers supérieurs et d’état-major, une voiture -seulement, sans être soumis à aucun examen, _mais sans contrevenir aux -ordonnances et aux lois du royaume_. - -12. Sont exceptées de l’article précédent les voitures prises en -Andalousie, dont l’examen sera fait par M. le général Chabert. - -13. Pour éviter la difficulté d’embarquer les chevaux des corps de -cavalerie et d’artillerie, compris dans l’article 2, lesdits chevaux -seront laissés en Espagne, et seront payés, d’après l’estimation -de deux commissaires français et espagnol, et acquittés par le -gouvernement espagnol. - -14. Les blessés et malades de l’armée française, laissés dans les -hôpitaux, seront traités avec le plus grand soin, et seront transportés -en France sous bonne et sûre escorte, aussitôt après leur guérison. - -15. Comme, en diverses rencontres et particulièrement à la prise de -Cordoue, plusieurs soldats, au mépris des ordres des généraux et -malgré les efforts des officiers, se sont portés à des excès qui sont -inévitables dans les villes qui opposent encore de la résistance au -moment d’être prises, MM. les généraux et autres officiers prendront -les mesures nécessaires pour retrouver les vases sacrés qu’on pourrait -avoir enlevés, et les restituer, s’ils existent. - -16. Tous les employés civils, attachés à l’armée française, ne sont pas -considérés comme prisonniers de guerre; ils jouiront cependant, pour -leur transport en France, de tous les avantages de la troupe, dans la -proportion de leur emploi. - -17. Les troupes françaises commenceront à évacuer l’Andalousie le 23 -juillet, à quatre heures du matin. Pour éviter la grande chaleur, la -marche des troupes s’effectuera de nuit, et se conformera aux journées -d’étape qui seront réglées par MM. les officiers d’état-major français -et espagnols, en évitant le passage des villes de Cordoue et de Séville. - -18. Les troupes françaises, pendant leur marche, seront escortées par -la troupe de ligne espagnole, à raison de trois cents hommes d’escorte -par colonne de trois mille hommes, et MM. les officiers généraux seront -escortés par des détachements de cavalerie et d’infanterie de ligne. - -19. Les troupes, dans leur marche, seront toujours précédées par des -commissaires français et espagnols, qui devront assurer les logements -et les vivres nécessaires, d’après les états qui leur seront remis. - -20. La présente capitulation sera portée de suite à Son Excellence M. -le duc de Rovigo, commandant en chef les troupes françaises en Espagne, -par un officier français qui devra être escorté par des troupes de -ligne espagnoles. - -21. Il est convenu par les deux armées qu’il sera ajouté, comme -articles supplémentaires, à la capitulation, ce qui peut avoir été omis -et ce qui pourrait encore augmenter le bien-être des troupes françaises -pendant leur séjour en Espagne, et pendant la traversée. - - _Signé_, - - XAVIER CASTAÑOS. MARESCOT, Général de Division. - - CONDE DE TILLY. CHABERT, Général de Brigade. - - VENTURA ESCALANTE, Capitan-General de Granada. - - -SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES OF AUGUST 6. - -Art. 1er. On a déjà sollicité du roi d’Angleterre et de l’amirauté -anglaise des passe-ports pour la sûreté du passage des troupes -françaises. - -2. L’embarquement s’effectuera sur des vaisseaux de l’escadre -espagnole, ou sur tous autres bâtiments de transport qui seront -nécessaires pour conduire le total des troupes françaises, au moins par -division, à commencer par celle du général Dupont, et immédiatement -après, celle du général Vedel. - -3. Le débarquement s’effectuera sur les côtes du Languedoc ou de -Provence, ou bien au port de Lorient, selon que le voyage sera jugé -plus commode et plus court. - -4. On embarquera des vivres pour un mois et plus, afin de prévenir tous -les accidents de la navigation. - -5. Dans le cas qu’on n’obtînt pas de l’Angleterre les passe-ports de -sûreté qu’on a demandés, alors on traitera des moyens les plus propres -pour le passage par terre. - -6. Chaque division des troupes françaises sera cantonnée sur différents -points, dans un rayon de huit à dix lieues, en attendant que le susdit -embarquement ait son effet. - -Ainsi fait à Séville, le 6 août 1808. - - _Signé_, - - XAVIER CASTAÑOS. - - -LETTER OF THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF ANDALUSIA, REPUDIATING THE -CAPITULATION. - -Monsieur le général Dupont, - -Je n’ai jamais eu ni de mauvaise foi, ni de fausse dissimulation: de -là vient ce que j’écrivis à V. E., sous la date du 8, dicté, d’après -mon caractère, par la plus grande candeur, et je suis fâché de me voir -obligé, par votre réponse en date d’hier, de répéter en abrégé ce que -j’eus l’honneur de dire alors à V. E., et ce qui certainement ne peut -manquer de se vérifier. - -Ni la capitulation, ni l’approbation de la junte, ni un ordre exprès -de notre souverain chéri, ne peuvent rendre possible ce qui ne l’est -pas; il n’y a point de bâtiments, ni de moyens de s’en procurer pour -le transport de votre armée. Quelle plus grande preuve que celle de -retenir ici très-dispendieusement les prisonniers de votre corps, pour -n’avoir point de quoi les transporter sur d’autres points hors du -continent? - -Lorsque le général Castaños promit d’obtenir des Anglais des -passe-ports pour le passage de votre armée, il ne put s’obliger à autre -chose qu’à les demander avec instance, et c’est ce qu’il a fait. Mais -comment V. E. put-elle croire que la nation britannique accéderait à -la laisser passer, certaine qu’elle allait lui faire la guerre sur un -autre point, ou peut-être sur le même? - -_Je me persuade que ni le général Castaños, ni V. E. ne crurent que -ladite capitulation pût être exécutée: le but du premier fut de sortir -d’embarras, et celui de V. E. d’obtenir des conditions qui, quoique -impossibles, honorassent sa reddition indispensable. Chacun de vous -obtint ce qu’il désirait, et maintenant il est nécessaire que la loi -impérieuse de la nécessité commande._ - -Le caractère national ne permet d’en user avec les Français que d’après -cette loi, et non d’après celle des représailles; V. E. m’oblige de -lui exprimer des vérités qui doivent lui être amères. _Quel droit -a-t-elle d’exiger l’exécution impossible d’une capitulation avec une -armée qui est entrée en Espagne sous le voile de l’alliance intime et -de l’union, qui a emprisonné notre roi et sa famille royale, saccagé -ses palais, assassiné et volé ses sujets, détruit ses campagnes et -arraché sa couronne?_ Si V. E. ne veut s’attirer de plus en plus la -juste indignation des peuples, que je travaille tant à réprimer, -qu’elle cesse de semblables et d’aussi intolérables réclamations, et -qu’elle cherche, par sa conduite et sa résignation, à affaiblir la vive -sensation des horreurs qu’elle a commises récemment à Cordoue. V. E. -croit bien assurément que mon but, en lui faisant cet avertissement, -n’a d’autre objet que son propre bien: le vulgaire irréfléchi ne pense -qu’à payer le mal par le mal, sans apprécier les circonstances, et je -ne peux m’empêcher de rendre V. E. responsable des résultats funestes -que peut entraîner sa répugnance à ce qui ne peut manquer d’être. - -Les dispositions que j’ai données à D. Juan Creagh, et qui ont été -communiquées à V. E., sont les mêmes que celles de la junte suprême, -et sont, en outre, indispensables dans les circonstances actuelles: -le retard de leur exécution alarme les peuples et attire des -inconvénients: déjà ledit Creagh m’a fait part d’un accident qui me -donne les plus grandes craintes. _Quel stimulant pour la populace, de -savoir qu’un seul soldat était porteur de 2,180 livres tournois!_ - -C’est tout ce que j’ai à répondre à la dépêche de V. E., et j’espère -que celle-ci sera la dernière réponse relative à ces objets, demeurant, -sur toute autre chose, dans le désir de lui être agréable, étant son -affectionné et sincère serviteur, - - MORLA. - - - - -IX - -THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA - - -1. DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH -ARMY. - -The Generals commanding-in-chief of the British and French armies in -Portugal having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for -the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of -the agreement entered into on the 22nd instant for a suspension of -hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate -the same in their names: viz. on the part of the General-in-chief of -the British army, Lieut.-Col. Murray, Quartermaster-General, and on the -part of the French army, M. Kellermann, General of Division, to whom -they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a Convention to -that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of -the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. -These two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed -upon the articles which follow:-- - -I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the -French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in -which they are at the moment of the signature of the present Convention. - -II. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and -baggage: they shall not be considered prisoners of war: and on their -arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve. - -III. The English Government shall furnish the means of conveyance for -the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of -France between Rochefort and L’Orient inclusively. - -IV. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French -calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied -with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery arms and ammunition, as -also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British -army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the -ratification of the Convention. - -V. The French army shall carry away with it all its equipment, and -all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army, that -is to say its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field -commissariat and field hospital, or shall be allowed to dispose of such -part of the same on its account, as the Commander-in-chief may judge -it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army -shall be at liberty to dispose of all their private property of every -description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers. - -VI. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the Generals and -other officers of all ranks: it is, however, fully understood that the -means of conveyance[745] for horses at the disposal of the British -Commander-in-chief are very limited: some additional conveyance may be -procured in the port of Lisbon. - - [745] Of transports fitted for carrying horses Dalrymple only had - at this moment those which had brought 180 horses for the 20th - Light Dragoons, 300 of the Irish commissariat, and 560 of the 3rd - Light Dragoons of the German Legion, which had just arrived with - Moore. - -VII. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in -three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the -garrisons of the places, of the cavalry and artillery, the sick, and -the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven -days from the ratification of the Convention, or sooner if possible. - -VIII. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella will be embarked at -Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will -be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with -providing for their subsistence and accommodation. - -IX. All the French sick and wounded who cannot be embarked are -entrusted to the British army.... The English Government shall provide -for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of -150 or 200 men at a time[@ 746 repetido]. - -X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall -have disembarked it ... every facility shall be given them to return to -England without delay: they shall have security against capture until -their arrival in a friendly port[746]. - - [746] These articles are shortened of some unimportant verbiage - and details. - -XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, or within a -distance of about two leagues from it. The British army will approach -to within three leagues of the capital, so as to leave about one league -between the two armies. - -XII. The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes shall be occupied -by the British troops on the ratification of the Convention. Lisbon -and its forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria on -one side, and the Fort St. Joseph on the other inclusively, shall be -given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall be also -the harbour and all the armed vessels in it of every description, -with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of -Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmella shall be given up so soon as -British troops can arrive to occupy them: in the meantime the British -General-in-chief will give notice of the present Convention to the -garrisons of those places, as also to the troops in front of them, in -order to put a stop to further hostilities. - -XIII. Commissaries shall be appointed on both sides to regulate and -accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon. - -XIV. Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of any article, it -shall be explained favourably to the French army. - -XV. From the date of the ratification of the present Convention, all -arrears of contributions, requisitions, and claims of the French -Government against the subjects of Portugal, or other individuals -residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the -French troops since December, 1807, which may not have been paid up are -cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, movable or -immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored -to their proper owners. - -XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance -with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this -country, shall be protected. Their property of every kind, movable and -immovable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to -accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case -their property is guaranteed to them with the liberty of retaining or -disposing of it, and of passing the sale[747] of it into France or any -other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year -being allowed them for that purpose. - - [747] The meaning of this odd and crabbed phrase is shown by the - French duplicate of the Convention--‘d’en faire passer le produit - en France.’ Murray should have written ‘the proceeds’ instead of - ‘the sale.’ - -It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement; -only, however, as regards leaving the port, and that none of the -stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial -speculation. - -XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his -political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country -by the French army. And all those who have continued in the exercise -of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French -Government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders. -They shall suffer no injury in their persons or property, it not having -been at their option to be obedient or not to the French Government. -They are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the -sixteenth article. - -XVIII. The Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon -shall be given up to the General-in-chief of the British army, who -engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, -either military or civil, as may have been detained[748] in Spain, -without having been taken in battle or in consequence of military -operations, but on the occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of May -last, and the days immediately following. - - [748] Murray’s English does not here translate Kellermann’s - French: the latter has ‘détenus en Espagne,’ i.e. ‘at present - prisoners in Spain,’ not ‘who may have been detained in Spain.’ - For the persons intended were primarily General Quesnel, his - staff, and escort, who had been seized in Portugal and then taken - into Spain. The clause also covered some French officers and - commissaries who had been seized at Badajoz and elsewhere while - making their way to Lisbon, at the moment when the insurrection - broke out. - -XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks -of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present -hostilities. - -XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished -on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French -army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present Convention. - -The officer representing the British army to be restored on the -completion of the articles which concern the army, and the officer -of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own -country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army[749]. - - [749] The hostage for the English army was Col. Donkin. I cannot - find out who was the naval hostage. - -XXI. It shall be allowed to the General-in-chief of the French army to -send an officer to France with intelligence of the present Convention. -A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to carry him to -Bordeaux or Rochefort. - -XXII. The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate His Excellency -the Commander-in-chief[750] and the other principal French officers on -board of ships of war. - - [750] i.e. Junot and his chief officers preferred the - hospitalities of a man of war to the hard fare of a transport. - -Done and concluded at Lisbon this thirteenth day of August, 1808. - - GEORGE MURRAY, Quar.-Mas.-Gen. - KELLERMANN, Général de Division. - -Three unimportant supplementary articles were added, one stipulating -that French civilian prisoners in the hands of the English or -Portuguese should be released, another that the French army should -subsist on its own magazines till it embarked, a third that the British -should allow the free entry of provisions into Lisbon after the -signature of the Convention. - - -2. REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY. - -On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, -we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding -is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ -in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention in the -relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, -that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been -exhibited by Lieut.-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, -and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of -the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this -expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on -Your Majesty’s arms. - -All which is most dutifully submitted. - -(Signed) - - DAVID DUNDAS, General. - MOIRA, General. - PETER CRAIG, General. - HEATHFIELD, General. - PEMBROKE, Lieut.-Gen. - G. NUGENT, Lieut.-Gen. - OL. NICHOLLS, Lieut.-Gen. - -Dec. 22, 1808. - - -3. LORD MOIRA’S ‘OPINION.’ - -I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments -on the nature of the Convention, because that I have already joined -in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the Officers -concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a -question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much -more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that -point, somewhat painful. Military duty is, however, imperious on me not -to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this -investigation. - -An Armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir -Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore’s -division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension -of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the -Armistice involved, and in fact established, the whole principle of the -Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter. - -Sir Arthur Wellesley has stated that he considered his force, at the -commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to -drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is -subsequently joined by above 4,000 British troops, under Generals -Anstruther and Acland. The French make an attack with their whole -disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a -part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to -conceive that the prospects which Sir Arthur Wellesley entertained -could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the -certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed. - -It is urged, that, had the French been pushed to extremity, they would -have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a -manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British -Generals, namely, sending succours into Spain. - -This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no -victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance -of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew -Dalrymple notices what he calls ‘the critical and embarrassed state -of Junot,’ before that General has been pressed by the British army; -and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender -of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, -which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the -universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot -one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the -war into Alemtejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any -other representation give ground to suppose, that Junot could have -contemplated the measure, as holding forth any prospect but ultimate -ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of -all proofs as to Junot’s opinion, arises from his sending the very -morning after the battle of Vimiero, to propose the evacuation of -Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he -could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong -the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have -been without any real resource. - -I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation -of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the -expedition.--Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it -must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, -and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we -are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the -Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot’s army from -a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, -and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate -currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most -urgent and interesting concerns. - -Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its -arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified -time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been -prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to -prevent the possibility of their reinforcing (at least for a long -time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a -stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. -Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, -as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the -nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, -and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, -therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed -sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior -army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as -might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was -still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained -that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more -marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain -cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements -for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous -to the Convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts. - -I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of -presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed -by so many most respectable Officers; for, even if the reasons be -essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must -conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that -I must disapprove the Convention. - - MOIRA, General. - -December 27, 1808. - - - - -X - -THE CENTRAL JUNTA OF REGENCY - -LIST OF THE MEMBERS. - - -N.B.--The notes as to individuals are extracted from Arguelles. - -1. For ARAGON. Don Francisco PALAFOX, Brigadier-General -[younger brother of Joseph Palafox, the Captain-General]. -Don Lorenzo CALVO DE ROZAS [Intendant-General of the Army of -Aragon, long a banker in Madrid]. - -2. For ASTURIAS. Don Gaspar JOVELLANOS [Councillor of State, -sometime Minister of Justice]. The Marquis of CAMPO SAGRADO, -Lieut.-General. - -3. For the CANARY ISLANDS. The Marquis of VILLANUEVA DEL PRADO. - -4. For OLD CASTILE. Don Lorenzo BONIFAZ [Prior of Zamora]. -Don Francisco Xavier CARO [a Professor of the University of -Salamanca]. - -5. For CATALONIA. The Marquis of VILLEL [Grandee of Spain]. The -Baron de SABASONA. - -6. For CORDOVA. The Marquis DE LA PUEBLA [Grandee of Spain]. -Don Juan RABE [a merchant of Cordova]. - -7. For ESTREMADURA. Don Martin GARAY [Intendant-General of -Estremadura]. Don Felix OVALLE [Treasurer of the Army of -Estremadura]. - -8. For GALICIA. The Conde de GIMONDE. Don Antonio ABALLE [an -advocate]. - -9. For GRANADA. Don Rodrigo RIQUELME [Regent of the -Chancellery]. Don Luis FUNES [Canon of Santiago]. - -10. For JAEN. Don Francisco CASTANEDO [Canon of Jaen]. Don -Sebastian JOCANO [Accountant-General]. - -11. For LEON. Don Antonio VALDES [Bailiff of the Knights -of Malta, sometime Minister of Marine]. The Vizconde de -QUINTANILLA. - -12. For MADRID. The Marquis of ASTORGA [Grandee of Spain]. Don -Pedro SILVA [Patriarch of the Indies]. - -13. For the BALEARIC ISLES. Don Tomas VERI [Lieut.-Col. of -Militia]. The Conde de AYAMANS. - -14. For MURCIA. The Conde de FLORIDA BLANCA [sometime Secretary -of State]. The Marquis DEL VILLAR. - -15. For NAVARRE. Don Miguel BALANZA and Don Carlos AMATRIA -[formerly representatives in the Cortes of Navarre]. - -16. For SEVILLE. The Archbishop of LAODICEA [Coadjutor-Bishop -of Seville]. The Conde de TILLY. - -17. For TOLEDO. Don Pedro RIVERO [Canon of Toledo]. Don José -Garcia LATORRE [an advocate]. - -18. For VALENCIA. The Conde de CONTAMINA [Grandee of Spain]. -The Principe PIO [Grandee of Spain and a Lieut.-Col. of -Militia]. - - - - -XI - -THE SPANISH ARMIES, OCT.-NOV. 1808 - - -N.B.--* signifies an old line or light regiment; † a militia battalion; -‡ a newly raised corps. - -1. THE ARMY OF GALICIA [RETURN OF OCT. 31]. - -General BLAKE. - _Officers._ - _Men._ - Vanguard Brigade, General MENDIZABAL: - *2nd Catalonian Light Infantry (one batt.); *Volunteers - of Navarre (one batt.); *two batts. of United Grenadiers; - *Saragossa (one batt.); *one company of sappers 87 2,797 - - 1st Division, General FIGUEROA: - *Rey (two batts.); *Majorca (one batt.); *Hibernia (one - batt.); *one batt. of united light companies; †Mondoñedo; - ‡_Batallon Literario_; *one company of sappers 86 3,932 - - 2nd Division, General MARTINENGO: - *Navarre (two batts.); *Naples (two batts.); †Pontevedra; - †Segovia; ‡‘Volunteers of Victory’ (one batt.); sappers, - one company; Cavalry: *Reina (two squadrons); *Montesa - (one squadron); and one detachment of mixed regiments. - [The cavalry was 302 sabres in all.] 117 4,949 - - 3rd Division, General RIQUELME: - *Gerona Light Infantry (one batt.); *Seville (two batts.); - *Marines (three batts.); †Compostella (one batt.); one - company of sappers 119 4,677 - - 4th Division, General CARBAJAL: - *Barbastro Light Infantry (one batt.); *Principe (two - batts.); *Toledo (two batts.); *two batts. of United - Grenadiers; *Aragon (one batt.); †Lugo; †Santiago 143 3,388 - - 5th Division [from Denmark], General Conde de SAN ROMAN: - *Zamora (three batts.); *Princesa (three batts.); *1st - Barcelona Light Infantry (one batt.); *1st Catalonian - Light Infantry (one batt.); one company of sappers 159 5,135 - - Asturian Division: General ACEVEDO: - *Hibernia (two batts.); †Oviedo; ‡Castropol; ‡Grado; - ‡Cangas de Onis; ‡Cangas de Tineo; ‡Lena; ‡Luarca; - ‡Salas; ‡Villaviciosa 233 7,400 - - Reserve Brigade, General MAHY: - *Volunteers of the Crown (one batt.); *United Grenadiers - (one batt.); †Militia Grenadiers (two batts.); - ‡_Batallon del General_ (one batt.) 90 2,935 - - Detached Troops on the line of communications--Reynosa, - Burgos, Astorga: - *Saragossa (one batt.); *Buenos Ayres (one batt.); - *Volunteers of the Crown (one batt.); †Santiago; †Tuy; - †Salamanca; ‡_Batallon del General_ (one batt.); and seven - detached companies of various corps 181 5,577 - - Detached troops left with the Artillery Reserve: - †Betanzos; †Monterrey 40 900 - Artillery Reserve (thirty-eight guns) 33 1,000 - ----- ------ - Total 1,288 42,690 - -N.B.--The four cavalry regiments from Denmark, Rey, Infante, -Villaviciosa, and Almanza did not join Blake, being without horses, but -marched on foot to Estremadura to get mounted. They had 147 officers -and 2,252 men. - - -2. THE ARMY OF ARAGON. - -General Joseph PALAFOX. - - 1st Division, General O’NEILLE: - *Spanish Guards (one batt.), 609; *Estremadura (one batt.), 600; - *1st Volunteers of Aragon (one batt.), 1,141; ‡1st Light - Infantry of Saragossa, 614; ‡4th Tercio of Aragon, 1,144; ‡2nd - of Valencia, 869; ‡1st Volunteers of Murcia, 1,029; ‡2nd ditto, - 968; ‡Huesca, 1,219; ‡Cazadores de Fernando VII (Aragonese), - 386; ‡Suizos de Aragon, 825; ‡Escopeteros de Navarra, - 227; *Dragoons ‘del Rey,’ 169; artillery, 79; sappers, 47. - Total 9,926 - [From a return of Nov. 1, 1808, in the English Record Office.] - - 2nd Division, General SAINT MARCH: - *Volunteers of Castile (three batts.); †Soria; ‡Turia (three - batts.); ‡Volunteers of Borbon (one batt.); ‡Alicante (three - batts.); ‡Chelva (one batt.); ‡Cazadores de Fernando VII - (Valencian) (one batt.); ‡Segorbe (one batt.); *Dragoons of - Numancia (620 sabres); one company of sappers. - Total 9,060 - [This total is from Vaughan’s diary. He was present when Palafox - reviewed the division on Nov. 1, and took down the figures.] - - 3rd Division, General Conde de LAZAN [detached to Catalonia, - Nov. 10]: - ‡1st Volunteers of Saragossa, 638; ‡3rd Volunteers of Aragon, - 593; ‡Fernando VII de Aragon, 648; ‡Daroca, 503; ‡La - Reunion, 1,286; ‡Reserva del General, 934; artillery, 64; - one troop of cavalry (Cazadores de Fernando VII), 22. - Total 4,688 - [The figures are from a table in Arteche, iii. 469.] - - Reserve at Saragossa: - - There was a mass of troops in the Aragonese capital which had - not yet been brigaded, and in part had not even been armed - or clothed in October. They included the following regiments - _at least_: 2nd Volunteers of Aragon; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th - Tercios of Aragon; 2nd Light Battalion of Saragossa; and the - battalions of Calatayud, Doyle, Barbastro, Jaca, Tauste, - Teruel, and Torrero; besides (in all probability) some eight - or ten other corps which are found existing in December, when - the second siege began, though they cannot be proved to have - existed in October. In that month, however, there must have - been at least 10,000 armed men in the Aragonese reserve, - perhaps as many as 15,000. - -Total of the Army of Aragon, _at least_ 33,674 men, of which only 789 -were cavalry. - - -3. ARMY OF ESTREMADURA. - -General GALLUZZO [afterwards the Conde de BELVEDERE]. - _Men._ - 1st Division, Conde de BELVEDERE: [afterwards General DE ALOS] - *Spanish Guards (4th batt.); *Majorca (two batts.); *2nd Light - Infantry of Catalonia (one batt.); †Provincial Grenadiers (one - batt.); one company of tirailleurs 4,160 - Cavalry, *4th Hussars (‘Volunteers of Spain’) 360 - Sappers, two companies; artillery, two batteries 408 - - 2nd Division, General HENESTROSA: - *Walloon Guards (4th batt.); ‡Badajoz (two batts.); ‡Valencia - de Alcantara; ‡Zafra 3,300 - Cavalry, 5th Hussars (Maria Luisa) 298 - Sappers, two companies; artillery, two batteries 440 - - 3rd Division, General TRIAS: - †Badajoz; ‡Truxillo (one batt.); ‡Merida; ‡La Serena 3,580 - Cavalry, 2nd Hussars (Lusitania) 300 - -Total of the Army, 12,846, of which 958 were cavalry. - -[N.B.--From the _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 21, 1808, compared with the -table in Arteche, iii. 496.] - - -4. ARMY OF THE CENTRE. - -General CASTAÑOS. - _Men._ - 1st Division, Conde de VILLARIEZO: - *Walloon Guards (two batts.); *Reina (three batts.); *Corona - (two batts.); *Jaen (three batts.); *Irlanda (three batts.); - *Barbastro (one batt.); †Jaen (about) 8,500 - Out of these fifteen battalions nine were detached to the rear in - or about Madrid, and were not present on the Ebro. - - 2nd Division, General GRIMAREST: - *Ceuta (two batts.); Ordenes Militares (three batts.); †Truxillo; - †Bujalance; †Cuenca; †Ciudad Real; ‡Tiradores de España; - ‡Volunteers of Catalonia; ‡Tiradores de Cadiz; ‡Carmona (about) 6,000 - - 3rd Division, General RENGEL: - *Cordova (two batts.); *Volunteers of Valencia (one batt.); - *Campo Mayor (one batt.); †Toledo; †Burgos; †Alcazar; - †Plasencia; †Guadix; †Seville no. 1; †Lorca; †Toro. (about) 6,500 - Out of these thirteen battalions four were detached to the rear, - and were not present on the Ebro. - - 4th Division, General LA PEÑA: - *Africa (two batts.); *Burgos (two batts.); *Saragossa (one batt.); - *Murcia (two batts.); †Provincial Grenadiers of Andalusia - (two batts.); †Siguenza; ‡Navas de Tolosa; ‡Baylen; ‡5th - Battalion of Seville (about) 7,500 - - 5th [Murcian-Valencian] Division, General ROCA [_vice_ General LLAMAS]: - *Savoya (two batts.); *Valencia (three batts.); *America (three - batts.); †Murcia; †Avila; ‡Liria; ‡Cazadores de Valencia - (three batts.); ‡Orihuela (two batts.); Tiradores of Xativa and - Cartagena (two companies); ‡Peñas de San Pedro (about) 8,000 - [One regiment was left at Aranjuez as guard to the Junta, with - General Llamas in command.] - - ‘Army of Castile,’ General PIGNATELLI [after Oct. 30, General CARTAOJAL]: - *Cantabria (two batts.); †Leon Militia; ‡Grenadiers ‘del General’; - ‡Cazadores de Cuenca; ‡1st, 2nd, and 3rd Volunteers of Leon; - ‡1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tercios of Castile; ‡Tiradores de Castilla; - ‡Volunteers of Benavente; ‡Volunteers of Zamora; ‡Volunteers - of Ledesma Total (about) 11,000 - - The first-named four corps were made into a detached brigade - under Cartaojal on Oct. 30: the others (except ‡Benavente - in garrison at Burgos) were dispersed among the Andalusian - divisions for misbehaviour at Logroño on Oct. 26. - - Cavalry: *Farnesio; *Montesa; *Reina; *Olivenza; *Borbon; - *España; *Calatrava; *Santiago; *Sagunto; *Principe; - *Pavia; *Alcantara. Very few of these regiments had more - than three squadrons at the front, some only one. The total - was not more than 3,500 sabres, even including one or two - newly raised free-corps, of insignificant strength - (about) 3,500 - -Total of the Army of the Centre, about 51,000 men, of whom only about -42,000 were on the Ebro: the remaining 9,000 were in or about Madrid, -and were incorporated in San Juan’s ‘Army of Reserve.’ - - -5. ARMY OF CATALONIA. - -[Morning state of Nov. 5, 1808.] - -General VIVES. - _Men._ - Vanguard Division, Brigadier-General ALVAREZ: - *Ultonia, 300; *Borbon (one batt.), 500; *2nd of Barcelona, - 1,000; *1st Swiss (Wimpfen) (one batt.), 400; ‡1st Tercio of - Gerona, 900; ‡2nd ditto, 400; ‡Tercio of Igualada, 400; ‡ditto - of Cervera, 400; ‡1st ditto of Tarragona, 800; ‡ditto of - Figueras, 400 5,500 - Cavalry, ‡Hussars of San Narciso 100 - - 1st Division, General Conde de CALDAGUES: - *2nd Walloon Guards (one batt.), 314; *Soria (two batts.), 780; - *Borbon (detachment), 151; *2nd of Savoia (two batts.), 1,734; - *2nd Swiss (detachment), 270; ‡Tercio of Tortosa, 984; - ‡Igualada and Cervera (detachments), 245; *sappers, 50 4,528 - Cavalry: *Husares Españoles (two squadrons), 220; ‡Cazadores - de Cataluña, 180 400 - Artillery, one battery (six guns) 70 - - 2nd Division, General LAGUNA: - †Provincial Grenadiers of Old Castile (two batts.), 972; †ditto of - New Castile (two batts.), 924; ‡Volunteers of Saragossa, 150; - sappers, 30 2,076 - Cavalry, *Husares Españoles 200 - Artillery, one battery (seven guns) 84 - - 3rd Division, General LA SERNA: - *Granada (two batts.), 961; ‡2nd Tercio of Tarragona, 922; - ‡‘Division of Arzu,’ 325; ‡Compañias Sueltas, 250 2,458 - - 4th Division, General MILANS: - ‡1st Tercio of Lerida, 872; ‡ditto of Vich, 976; ‡ditto of Manresa, - 937; ‡ditto of Vallés, 925 3,710 - - Reserve: - *Spanish Guards, 60; *Grenadiers of Soria, 188; *ditto of - Wimpfen, 169; General’s bodyguard, 340; sappers, 20 777 - Cavalry, *Husares Españoles 80 - Artillery (four guns) 50 - -Total of the Army, 20,033, of which 780 are cavalry. - -These five armies formed the front line. Their total strength was -151,243, if the 9,000 men left behind at Madrid are deducted. - - -TROOPS IN THE SECOND LINE. - -1. ARMY OF GRANADA [MARCHING TOWARDS CATALONIA]. - -General REDING. - _Men._ - 1st Division: - *2nd Swiss (Reding), 1,000; ‡1st Regiment of Granada [alias - Iliberia] (two batts.), 2,400; ‡Baza (two batts.), 2,400; - ‡Almeria, (two batts.), 2,400 8,200 - 2nd Division: - ‡Santa Fé (two batts.), 2,400; ‡Antequera (one batt.), 1,200; - ‡Loxa (two batts.), 2,400 6,000 - Cavalry, ‡Hussars of Granada 670 - Artillery (six guns) 130 - ------ - Total of the Army 15,000 - -N.B.--This return is from a dispatch from Granada in the _Madrid -Gazette_ of Oct. 28, corroborated by another of Nov. 5, announcing the -arrival of the force at Murcia. - - -2. GALICIAN RESERVES. - _Officers._ - _Men._ - Detached Troops in garrison in Galicia: - *Majorca (one batt.); *Leon (one batt.); *Aragon (one - batt.) 77 2,010 - Detached troops on the Portuguese frontier: - *Leon (one batt.); †Orense; and four detached companies 48 1,600 - --- ----- - 125 3,610 - - - -3. ASTURIAN RESERVES. - -[N.B.--This force is exclusive of the troops under Acevedo in the Army -of Blake. The numbers are from a morning state of December.] - - _Men._ - ‡Covadonga,360; ‡Don Carlos, 335; ‡Ferdinand VII, 316; ‡Gihon, - 586; ‡Infiesto, 489; ‡Llanes, 420; ‡Luanco, 400; ‡Navia, 528; - ‡Pravia, 581; ‡Riva de Sella, 685; ‡Siero, 585. Total 5,285 - - -4. ARMY OF RESERVE OF MADRID. - -N.B.--This force, which fought at the Somosierra, consisted of parts of -the Armies of Andalusia and Estremadura; its numbers have already been -counted among the troops of those armies. - -General SAN JUAN. - _Men._ - From the 1st Division of Andalusia: - *Walloon Guards (one batt.), 500; *Reina (two batts.), 927; - *Jaen (two batts.), 1,300; *Irlanda (two batts.), 1,186; *Corona - (two batts.), 1,039 4,952 - - From the 3rd Division of Andalusia: - *Cordova (two batts.), 1,300; †Toledo, 500; †Alcazar, 500; - ‡3rd of Seville, 400 2,700 - - From the Army of Estremadura: - ‡Badajoz (remains of two batts.) 566 - - Castilian Levies: - ‡1st Volunteers of Madrid (two batts.), 1,500; ‡2nd - ditto, 1,500 3,000 - - Cavalry: *Principe, 200; *Alcantara, 100; *Montesa, 100; - ‡Volunteers of Madrid, 200 600 - - Artillery (twenty-two guns) 300 - ------ - Total 12,118 - -N.B.--Of this force the following battalions fled to Madrid, and -afterwards joined the Army of the Centre:--1st Volunteers of Madrid, -Corona, half 3rd of Seville, Reina, Alcazar. The following fled to -Segovia, and joined the Army of Estremadura:--Jaen, Irlanda, Toledo, -Badajoz, 2nd Volunteers of Madrid, Walloon Guards, and half 3rd of -Seville. - - -5. ESTREMADURAN RESERVES. - -[Left in garrison at Badajoz, when the three divisions of Galluzzo -marched to Madrid.] - - _Men._ - ‡Leales de Fernando VII (three batts.), 2,256; ‡Plasencia (one - batt.), 1,200; ‡Badajoz (one batt.), 752 4,208 - - Cavalry: ‡Cazadores of Llerena, 200? Cazadores of Toledo, 200? 400 - ------ - Total 4,608 - -[For these forces compare _Madrid Gazette_ of Oct. 21, giving -organization of the Army of Estremadura, with the list of troops which -marched forward to Burgos in first section of this Appendix. The above -regiments remained behind, and are found in existence in Cuesta’s army -next spring. See Appendix to vol. ii giving his forces.] - - -6. BALEARIC ISLES. - -There apparently remained in garrison in the Balearic Isles, in -November, the following troops:-- - - _Men._ - *4th Swiss (Beschard) (two batts.), 2,121; *Granada (one - batt.), 222; *Soria (one batt.), 413; †Majorca, 604 Total 3,360 - - -7. MURCIAN AND VALENCIAN RESERVES. - -[Mostly on the march to Saragossa in November, 1808. The figures mainly -from a return of Jan. 1 are too low for the November strength.] - - _Men._ - *5th Swiss (Traxler), 1,757; ‡1st Tiradores de Murcia, 813; ‡2nd - ditto, 124; ‡3rd Volunteers of Murcia, 1,151; ‡5th ditto, 1,077; - ‡Florida-Blanca, 352; ‡3rd of Valencia (figures wanting;? 500) - Total 5,774 - - -8. ANDALUSIAN RESERVES. - - _Men._ - *España (three batts.), 1,039; †Jerez, 574; †Malaga, 401; - †Ronda, 574; †Ecija, 589 Total 3,177 - - ‡2nd of Seville, 500; ‡4th ditto, 433; ‡Cazadores of Malaga (one - batt.), 1,200; ‡Velez Malaga (three batts.), 2,400; ‡2nd of - Antequera (one batt.), 1,200; ‡Osuna (two batts.), 1,061 Total 6,794 - -In addition, the following regular regiments had each, as it would -seem, left the _cadre_ of one battalion behind in Andalusia to recruit, -before marching to the Ebro to join Castaños:--Africa, Burgos, -Cantabria, Ceuta, Corona, Cordova, Murcia. What the total of their -numbers may have been in November and December, it is impossible to -say--perhaps 400 each may be allowed, giving a total of 2,800. Of -cavalry regiments there must have been in existence in Andalusia the -nucleus of the following new regiments:--‡Tejas; ‡Montañas de Cordova; -‡Granada. Their force was trifling--a single squadron, or at most two. -If we give them 600 men in all, we shall probably be not far wrong. -Several regular cavalry regiments had left the _cadre_ of one or two -squadrons behind. - -The existence of all these regiments in November--December can be -proved. The 2nd and 4th of Seville reached Madrid in time to join in -its defence against Napoleon, and then fled to join the Army of the -Centre. The figures given are their January strengths, when they had -already suffered severely. The Malaga regiment’s figure is from _Madrid -Gazette_ of Nov. 29, recording its march out to Granada. The militia -battalions Jerez, Malaga, Ronda, Ecija were all in existence in June, -they did not march to the Ebro, and are found in the Army of the Centre -in the spring of 1809. España was apparently in garrison at Ceuta, -and only brought up to the front early in 1809. Velez Malaga, 2nd of -Antequera, and Osuna are first heard of under Del Palacio in January, -1809. They must have been raised by December at the latest. - -The total of the Andalusian reserves accounted for in this table is -13,371, but no such number could have been sent forward in December, as -many of the battalions were not properly armed, much less uniformed. -But some of the volunteers, all the militia, and the regular regiment -España--perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 in all--should have been at Madrid by -Dec. 1. Only 1,000 bayonets actually reached it before Napoleon’s -arrival. - -It would seem then that the second line of the Spanish Army consisted -of something like the following numbers:-- - - _Men._ - Army of Reserve of Madrid 12,118 - Reding’s Granadan Divisions 15,000 - Galician Reserves 3,610 - Asturian Reserves 5,285 - Estremaduran Reserves 4,608 - Balearic Isles Reserves 3,360 - Murcian and Valencian Reserves 5,774 - Andalusian Reserves 13,371 - Cavalry from Denmark, in march for Estremadura 2,252 - ------ - Total 65,378 - -Some of the battalions (e.g. the Valencians and Murcians who went to -Saragossa) must have been much stronger in December; on the other hand, -others (e.g. the Estremadurans) are probably over-estimated: they -showed no such figures as those given above, when they took the field -early in 1809. - -N.B.--In several armies, notably in those of Aragon and the Centre, -there are doubtful points. It is impossible to speak with certainty of -the number of battalions which some corps took to the front. It will be -noted that all the numbers given are much larger than those attributed -by Napier (i. 504) to the Spanish armies. I have worked from detailed -official figures, the greater part of which seem perfectly trustworthy. - - - - -XII - -THE FRENCH ARMY OF SPAIN - -IN NOVEMBER, 1808. - -N.B.--The distribution of the regiments is that of November. The -detailed strength of the corps, however, comes from an October return, -and there had been several changes at the end of that month. - - -1ST CORPS. Marshal VICTOR, Duke of Belluno. - - 1st Division (Ruffin): - 9th Léger, three batts. - 24th of the Line, three batts. - 96th ” four batts. - - 2nd Division (Lapisse): - 16th Léger, three batts. - 8th of the Line, three batts. - 45th ” three batts. - 54th ” three batts. - - 3rd Division (Villatte): - 27th Léger, three batts. - 63rd of the Line, three batts. - 94th ” three batts. - 95th ” three batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Brigade Beaumont): - 2nd Hussars. - 26th Chasseurs. - -The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,937 men, of whom 2,201 -were detached, and 2,939 in hospital. The 4th Hussars, originally -belonging to this corps, was transferred to the 3rd Corps by November. - -2ND CORPS. Marshal BESSIÈRES: after Nov. 9, Marshal SOULT. - - 1st Division (Mouton, afterwards Merle): - 2nd Léger, three batts. - 4th ” three batts. - 15th of the Line, three batts. - 36th ” three batts. - [Garde de Paris, one batt.] - - 2nd Division (Merle, afterwards Mermet): - 31st Léger, three batts. - 47th of the Line, two batts. - 70th ” one batt. - 86th ” one batt. - 1st Supply. Regt. } - of the Legions } = 122nd of the - of Reserve } Line, four batts. - 2nd ditto } - 2nd Swiss Regiment, one batt. - 3rd ” ” one batt. - - 3rd Division (Bonnet): - 13th Prov. Regt. } = 119th of the - 14th ” } Line, four batts. - - 17th ” } = 120th of the - 18th ” } Line, four batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Division Lasalle): - 9th Dragoons (transferred from Milhaud). - 10th Chasseurs. - 22nd ” - -Lasalle, with the 9th Dragoons and 10th Chasseurs, was detached after -Gamonal (Nov. 10) and replaced by Franceschi’s division. The corps -received in January a reinforcement of twenty-two battalions from the -dissolved 8th Corps, which formed two new divisions under Delaborde and -Heudelet. - -The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 33,054 men, of whom 7,394 -were detached and 5,536 in hospital. - -3RD CORPS. Marshal MONCEY, Duke of Conegliano. - - 1st Division (Maurice Mathieu, afterwards Grandjean): - 14th of the Line, four batts. - 44th ” three batts. - 70th ” one batt. - 2nd of the Vistula, two batts. - 3rd ” two batts. - - 2nd Division (Musnier): - 1st Prov. Regt. } = 114th of the - 2nd ” } Line, four batts. - - 3rd ” } = 115th of the - 4th ” } Line, four batts. - [One Westphalian batt.] - - 3rd Division (Morlot): - 5th Prov. Regt. { = 116th of the - { Line, two batts. - - 9th ” } = 117th of the - 10th ” } Line, four batts. - [One Prussian batt.] - [One Irish batt.] - - 4th Division (Grandjean): - 5th Léger, three batts. - 2nd Legion of Reserve, four batts. - 1st of the Vistula, two batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Brigade Wathier): - 1st Provisional Cuirassiers (= 13th Cuirassiers). - 1st Provisional Hussars. - 2nd Provisional Light Cavalry (Hussars and Chasseurs). - -Grandjean’s division (No. 4) was afterwards absorbed in Morlot’s -[December], with the exception of the 1st of the Vistula, sent to join -Musnier. The cavalry was afterwards strengthened by the 4th Hussars -from the 1st Corps. The 121st of the Line (four batts.) arrived in -December, and joined Morlot. The battalions in square brackets were -left behind in the garrisons of Biscay and Navarre. - -The gross total of the corps on Oct. 10 was 37,690 men, of whom 11,082 -were detached in garrisons, &c. and 7,522 in hospital. - -4TH CORPS. Marshal LEFEBVRE, Duke of Dantzig. - - 1st Division (Sebastiani): - 28th of the Line, three batts. - 32nd ” three batts. - 58th ” three batts. - 75th ” three batts. - - 2nd Division (Leval): - Nassau Contingent, two batts. - Baden ” two batts. - Hesse-Darmstadt ” two batts. - Frankfort ” one batt. - Dutch ” two batts. - - 3rd Division (Valence): - 4th of the Vistula, two batts. - 7th ” two batts. - 9th ” two batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Brigade Maupetit): - 5th Dragoons. - 3rd Dutch Hussars. - Westphalian _Chevaux-Légers_. - -The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 22,895 men, of whom 955 -were detached and 2,170 in hospital. - -5TH CORPS. Marshal MORTIER, Duke of Treviso. - - 1st Division (Suchet): - 17th Léger, three batts. - 34th of the Line, four batts. - 40th ” three batts. - 64th ” three batts. - 88th ” three batts. - - 2nd Division (Gazan): - 21st Léger, three batts. - 28th ” three batts. - 100th of the Line, three batts. - 103rd ” three batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Brigade Delaage): - 10th Hussars. - 21st Chasseurs. - -The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 24,552 men, of whom 188 -were detached and 1,971 in hospital. - -6TH CORPS. Marshal NEY, Duke of Elchingen. - - 1st Division (Marchand): - 6th of the Line, three batts. - 39th ” three batts. - 69th ” three batts. - 76th ” three batts. - - 2nd Division (Lagrange, afterwards Maurice Mathieu): - 25th Léger, four batts. - 27th of the Line, three batts. - 50th ” four batts. - 59th ” three batts. - - Corps Cavalry (Brigade Colbert): - 3rd Hussars. - 15th Chasseurs. - -The gross total on Oct. 10 was 38,033 men, of whom 3,381 were detached -and 5,051 in hospital. This total, however, includes a division under -Mermet, whose battalions were transferred to the 2nd and 3rd Corps, -when the campaign began in November. The 6th Corps, including its -cavalry and artillery, had probably not more than 20,000 net when it -took the field in its final form. - -7TH CORPS. General GOUVION ST. CYR. - - 1st Division (Chabran): - 2nd of the Line, one batt. - 7th ” two batts. - 10th ” one batt. - 37th ” one batt. - 56th ” one batt. - 93rd ” one batt. - 2nd Swiss, one batt. - - 2nd Division (General Lecchi): - 2nd Italian Line Regt., one batt. - 4th ” ” one batt. - 5th ” ” one batt. - Italian Chasseurs (_Velites_), one batt. - 1st Neapolitan Line Regt., two batts. - - 3rd Division (Reille): - 32nd Léger, one batt. - 16th of the Line, one batt. - 56th ” one batt. - 113th ” two batts. - Prov. Regt. of Perpignan, four batts. - 5th Legion of Reserve, one batt. - _Chasseurs des Montagnes_, one batt. - Battalion of the Valais, one batt. - - 4th Division (Souham): - 1st Léger, three batts. - 3rd ” one batt. - 7th of the Line, two batts. - 42nd ” three batts. - 67th ” one batt. - - 5th Division (Pino): - 1st Italian Light Regt., three batts. - 2nd ” ” three batts. - 4th Italian Line Regt., two batts. - 5th ” ” one batt. - 6th ” ” three batts. - 7th ” ” one batt. - - 6th Division (Chabot): - 2nd Neapolitan Line Regt., two batts. - Chasseurs of the Pyrénées Orientales, one batt. - - Corps Cavalry: - Brigade Bessières: - 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers. - 3rd ” Chasseurs. - - Brigade Schwartz: - Italian Chasseurs of the Prince Royal. - 2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs. - - Brigade Fontane: - Italian Royal Chasseurs. - 7th Italian Dragoons. - - Unattached Regiment: - 24th Dragoons. - -The gross total of this corps on Oct. 10 was 42,382 men, of whom 1,302 -were detached and 4,948 in hospital. But this does not include several -regiments which did not join St. Cyr from Italy till long after the -date of the return. In January, 1809, he had 41,386 men present with -the colours, and 6,589 in hospital, besides 543 prisoners. There had -also been considerable losses in the fighting. Probably the corps in -November--December was well over 50,000 strong. - -8TH CORPS. General JUNOT, Duke of Abrantes. - -Dissolved in December, 1808. The troops were drafted as follows:-- - - 1st Division (Delaborde): - 15th of the Line, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Merle’s Div., 2nd Corps. - 47th ” two batts. ” Mermet’s ” - 70th ” three batts., received one more batt. from Mermet’s Div. - 86th ” two batts. ” ” ” - 4th Swiss, one batt. - -This division, therefore, in January, 1809, consisted of four -battalions 70th, three battalions 86th, and one battalion 4th Swiss. -It was sent to join Soult, and strengthened by three battalions of the -17th Léger, thus having eleven battalions at Corunna. - - 2nd Division (Loison): - 2nd Léger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Merle’s Div., 2nd Corps. - 4th ” one batt. ” ” ” ” - 12th ” one batt. ” ” Dessolles’ Div. - 15th ” one batt. - 32nd of the Line, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Sebastiani’s Div., 4th Corps. - 58th ” one batt. ” ” ” ” - 2nd Swiss, one batt., drafted to join the batt. in Mermet’s Div., 2nd Corps. - -The remaining battalion of this division, that of the 15th Léger, was -drafted to join Heudelet’s Division, and became part of the 2nd Corps. - - 3rd Division (Heudelet): - 31st Léger, one batt., drafted to join its regt. in Mermet’s Div. of 2nd Corps. - 32nd ” one batt. - 26th of the Line, two batts. - 66th ” two batts. - 82nd ” one batt. - _Légion du Midi_, one batt. - Hanoverian Legion, one batt. - -N.B.--The last-named eight battalions, afterwards joined by one from -Loison’s Division, were formed into the 4th Division of the 2nd Corps. - -The whole corps cavalry of the 8th Corps was composed of provisional -regiments, which were dissolved, and sent to join their units. - -The 8th Corps on Oct. 10 had a gross total of 25,730 men, of whom 2,137 -were detached, and 3,523 in hospital. - - -RESERVE. - - (1) Independent Reserve Division (General DESSOLLES): - 12th Léger, three batts. - 43rd of the Line, three batts. - 51st ” three batts. - 55th ” three batts. - - (2) Guards of the King of Spain (General SALIGNY): - Four battalions of Infantry. - One regiment of Cavalry. - (Two regiments, mainly Spanish deserters, were added in January.) - -The total is confused in the return of Oct. 10 with that of the -Imperial Guard, and includes also some regiments left in garrison in -the north, e.g. the 118th of the Line; including these the Reserve -amounted to 13,000 men. - - -RESERVE OF CAVALRY. - - Division of Dragoons, LATOUR-MAUBOURG: - Brigades Oldenbourg, Perreimond, Digeon. - 1st, 2nd, 4th, 14th, 20th, and 26th Dragoons. - The gross total of the division on Oct. 10 was 3,695 sabres. - - Division of Dragoons, MILHAUD: - The 12th, 16th, and 21st Dragoons. - -(The 5th and 9th Dragoons, originally belonging to this division, were -transferred to Lefebvre and Lasalle respectively.) - -The gross total of the division on Oct. 10 was 2,940 sabres, probably -including one of the transferred regiments. - - Division of Dragoons, LAHOUSSAYE: - Brigades D’Avenay and Marisy. (On D’Avenay being transferred to an - independent provisional brigade, Caulaincourt replaces him.) - 17th, 18th, 19th, and 27th Dragoons. - -The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 2,020 sabres. - - Division of Dragoons, LORGES: - Brigades Vialannes and Fournier. - 13th, 15th, 22nd, and 25th Dragoons. - -The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 3,101 sabres. - - Division of Dragoons, MILLET (KELLERMANN after Jan. 1809): - 3rd, 6th, 10th, and 11th Dragoons. - -The gross total of this division on Oct. 10 was 2,903 sabres. - - Division of Light Cavalry, FRANCESCHI: - Brigades Debelle and Girardin (?). - 8th Dragoons. - 22nd _Chasseurs à Cheval_. - ‘Supplementary Regiment’ of _Chasseurs à Cheval_. - Hanoverian _Chevaux-Légers_. - -The Provisional Chasseurs were dissolved in Jan. 1809, and replaced by -the 1st Hussars. The 22nd belonged to the original corps-cavalry of -Soult. - -The numbers of this division (which had not yet been put together -on October 10) seem unobtainable, save that the 1st Hussars was 712 -strong. Probably Franceschi’s total would be about 2,400 sabres. - - -IMPERIAL GUARD. - -Infantry: - -Two regiments of Grenadiers (four batts.), two regiments of Chasseurs -(four batts.), two regiments of Fusiliers (six batts.). - -Cavalry: - -One regiment each of _Chasseurs à Cheval_, Grenadiers, Dragoons, -_Gendarmes d’élite_, Polish Light Horse, one squadron of Mamelukes. 36 -guns. - -The total was about 8,000 infantry and 3,500 horse, with 600 gunners. - -N.B.--A few late-coming regiments, and a few units not attached to any -division, are not included in the above tables, e.g. the 118th, 121st, -and 122nd Regiments of the Line, and the 27th Chasseurs. Nor are there -included the dépôt of undistributed conscripts at Bayonne, nor the -battalions of National Guards forming movable columns inside the French -frontier. But the 19,371 artillery of the army are included in the -corps, divisions, and brigades. - - -GROSS TOTAL OF THE WHOLE ON OCTOBER 10. - - - _Total._ - _Detached._ - _Hospital or missing._ - _Effective present._ - - 1st Corps 33,937 2,201 2,939 28,797 - 2nd Corps 33,054 7,394 5,536 20,124 - 3rd Corps 37,690 11,082 7,522 19,086 - 4th Corps 22,895 955 2,170 19,770 - 5th Corps 24,552 188 1,971 22,393 - 6th Corps 38,033 3,381 5,051 29,601 - 7th Corps 42,382 1,302 4,948 36,132 - 8th Corps 25,730 2,137 3,523 20,070 - Reserve Cavalry 17,059 } - Imperial Guard 12,100 } 3,533 3,945 34,801 - Reserve of Infantry } - (Dessolles, Joseph’s } - Guards, &c.) 13,120 } - Troops on the march } - from Germany not } 5,200 363 4,763 - distributed to the } - corps } - Columns inside the } - French frontier } 8,860 107 165 8,588 - (National Guards) } - ------- ------ ------ ------- - 314,612 32,643 37,844 244,125 - - Exclusive of the dépôt of conscripts at Bayonne. - - - - -XIII - -SIR JOHN MOORE’S ARMY: - -ITS STRENGTH AND ITS LOSSES. - - -N.B.--The first column gives the strength of each of Baird’s regiments -on Oct. 2, and of Moore’s regiments on Oct. 15, deducting from the -latter men left behind in Portugal. The second column gives the men -present with the colours on Dec. 19, but not those in hospital or ‘on -command’ on that day. These last amounted on Dec. 19 to 3,938 and 1,687 -respectively. The third column gives the numbers disembarked in England -in January. - - -----------------------+------------+-------------+-------------+------------- - | _Total | _Effective | _Disembarked| - |strength in | strength |in England in|_Deficiency._ - |Oct. 1808._ | present on | Jan. 1809._ | - | | Dec. 19, | | - | | 1808._ | | - -----------------------+------------+-------------+-------------+------------- - Cavalry (Lord Paget).| | | | - 7th Hussars | 672 | 497 | 575 | 97[751] - 10th ” | 675 | 514 | 651 | 24 - 15th ” | 674 | 527 | 650 | 24 - 18th Light Dragoons | 624 | 565 | 547 | 77 - 3rd ” ” K.G.L. | 433 | 347 | 377 | 56 - | ---- 3,078 | ---- 2,450 | ---- 2,800 | ---- 278 - | | | | - 1st Division (Sir | | | | - D. Baird). | | | | - Warde’s Brigade: | | | | - 1st Foot Guards, | | | | - 1st batt. | 1,340 | 1,300 | 1,266 | 74 - ” ” | | | | - 2nd batt. | 1,102 | 1,027 | 1,036 | 66 - | | | | - Bentinck’s Brigade: | | | | - 4th Foot, 1st batt. | 889 | 754 | 740 | 149 - 42nd ” 1st batt. | 918 | 880 | 757 | 161 - 50th ” 1st batt. | 863 | 794 | 599 | 264 - | | | | - Manningham’s Brigade:| | | | - 1st Foot, 3rd batt. | 723 | 597 | 507 | 216 - 26th ” 1st batt. | 870 | 745 | 662 | 208 - 81st ” 2nd batt. | 719 | 615 | 478 | 241 - | ---- 7,424| ---- 6,712 | ---- 6,045 | ---- 1,379 - | | | | - 2nd Division (Sir J. | | | | - Hope). | | | | - Leith’s Brigade: | | | | - 51st Foot | 613 | 516 | 506 | 107 - 59th ” 2nd batt. | 640 | 557 | 497 | 143 - 76th ” | 784 | 654 | 614 | 170 - Hill’s Brigade: | | |[Estimate][752] - 2nd Foot | 666 | 616 | 461 | 205 - 5th ” 1st batt. | 893 | 833 | 654 | 239 - 14th ” 2nd batt. | 630 | 550 | 492 | 138 - 32nd ” 1st batt. | 806 | 756 | 619 | 187 - |---- 5,032 | ---- 4,482 | ---- 3,843 | ---- 1,189 - Catlin Crawfurd’s | | | | - Brigade: | | | | - 36th Foot, 1st batt. | 804 | 736 | 561 | 243 - 71st ” 1st batt. | 764 | 724 | 626 | 138 - 92nd ” 1st batt. | 912 | 900 | 783 | 129 - |---- 2,480 | ---- 2,360 | ---- 1,970 | ---- 510 - | | | | - 3rd Division | | | | - (Lt.-Gen. Fraser). | | | | - Beresford’s Brigade: | | | | - 6th Foot, 1st batt. | 882 | 783 | 491 | 391 - 9th ” 1st batt. | 945 | 607 | 572 | 373 - 23rd ” 2nd batt. | 590 | 496 | 418 | 172 - 43rd ” 2nd batt. | 598 | 411 | 368 | 230 - Fane’s Brigade: | | | | - 38th Foot, 1st batt. | 900 | 823 | 757 | 143 - 79th ” 1st batt. | 932 | 838 | 777 | 155 - 82nd ” 1st batt. | 830 | 812 | 602 | 228 - |---- 5,677 | ---- 4,770 | ---- 3,985 | ---- 1,692 - | | | | - Reserve Division | | | | - (Maj.-Gen. E. Paget).| | | | - Anstruther’s Brigade:| | | | - 20th Foot | 541 | 499 | 428 | 113 - 52nd ” 1st batt. | 862 | 828 | 719 | 143 - 95th ” 1st batt. | 863 | 820 | 706 | 157 - Disney’s Brigade: | | | | - 28th Foot, 1st batt. | 926 | 750 | 624 | 302 - 91st ” 1st batt. | 746 | 698 | 534 | 212 - |---- 3,938 | ---- 3,595 | ---- 3,011 | ---- 927 - | | | | - 1st Flank-Brigade | | | | - (Col. R. Crawfurd).| | | | - 43rd Foot, 1st batt. | 895 | 817 | 810 | 85 - 52nd ” 2nd batt. | 623 | 381 | 462 | 161 - 95th ” 2nd batt. | 744 | 702 | 648 | 96 - |---- 2,262 | ---- 1,900 | ---- 1,920 | ---- 342 - | | | | - 2nd Flank-Brigade | | | | - (Brig.-Gen. C. Alten).| | | | - 1st Lt. Batt. K.G.L. | 871 | 803 | 708 | 163[753] - 2nd ” ” | 880 | 855 | 618 | 262[754] - |---- 1,751 | ---- 1,658 | ---- 1,326 | ---- 425 - | | | | - Artillery, &c. | 1,455 | 1,297 | 1,200 | 255[755] - Staff Corps | 137 | 133 | 99 | 38 - | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ - Total | 33,234 | 29,357 | 26,199 | 7,035 - - [751] Includes fifty-six men drowned on return voyage to England. - - [752] The 76th Regiment failed to send in its disembarkation - return, so that its loss has to be averaged. - - [753] Includes twenty-two men drowned on return voyage to England. - - [754] Includes 187 men drowned on return voyage to England. - - [755] Includes twenty-two drowned on return voyage to England, - and nine drowned in Corunna harbour. - -It will be noted that if to the 29,357 of the second column there are -added the 3,938 sick and the 1,687 men ‘on command,’ the gross total -of the army on Dec. 19 must have been 34,982, a figure which exceeds -that at the bottom of the first column. It would seem, therefore, that -about 1,748 men in small detachments joined the army at Salamanca and -elsewhere before Dec. 19. They must represent drafts and convoy-escorts -coming up from Portugal. The apparent deficiency for the campaign -therefore is 8,783. But it must not be supposed that these 8,783 men -were all lost between Salamanca and Corunna: from them we must deduct -(1) the 296 casualties by shipwreck while returning to England; (2) -589 rank and file who escaped individually to Portugal, and were then -enrolled (along with the convalescent sick left behind by Moore’s -regiments) in the two ‘battalions of detachments’ which fought at -Talavera; (3) the number of sick discharged from Salamanca on to -Portugal in the convoys escorted by the 5/60th and 3rd Regiments. I can -nowhere find the number of these invalids stated, but it must have been -large, as the total of the sick belonging to the whole army was nearly -4,000 in December. It will be a very modest estimate if we give 1,500 -for those of them who were at Salamanca, the head quarters hospital of -the army, and were capable of being moved back to Portugal. - -We may therefore deduct under these three heads about 2,385 men. This -figure taken from 8,783 leaves 6,398 for the real loss in the campaign. - -But even from this total 400 more must be deducted, for 400 British -convalescents were released by the Galician insurgents from French -captivity and sent back to Lisbon in the spring of 1809. [‘Further -papers relative to Spain and Portugal,’ p. 7 in _Parliamentary Papers_ -for 1809.] - -On the whole, then, about 5,998 men were actually lost. Napier’s -estimate of 3,233 (i. 502) for the total loss is certainly too low. -Of these 2,189 were prisoners sent to France. [Schepeler, ‘Table of -prisoners sent to France, 1809-13’ on p. 150.] The remaining 3,809 -perished in battle, by the road, or in hospital. - - - - -INDEX - - - Acevedo, general, commands division under Blake, 408; - wounded at Espinosa, 415; - murdered by the French, 426. - - Acland, brigadier-general, arrives at Peniche, 241; - at Vimiero, 249-58; - gives evidence before the Court of Inquiry, 294. - - Afrancesados, party of the, in Spain, 97. - - Alagon, Palafox defeated at, 145. - - Alcedo, general, governor of Corunna, surrenders to Soult, 596. - - Alcolea, combat of, 129. - - Alexander, Emperor of Russia, - his meeting with Napoleon at Erfurt, 377. - - Andalusia, province of, rises against the French, 69; - its geography, 74, 80. - - Anstruther, brigadier-general, arrives in Portugal, 248; - at Vimiero, 250-61; - in command at Almeida, 494; - dies at Corunna, 595. - - Antonio, Don, brother of Charles IV, - appointed head of the Junta of Regency, 48; - goes to Bayonne, 62; - at Valençay, 56. - - Army, the Spanish, its character and organization, 89-95: - _see_ also Tables and Appendices v, viii, &c. - - Army of Spain, the French, character of the first, 103-7; - of the second, 107-13: - _see_ also Tables and Appendices vi, &c. - - Artillery, the, of the Spanish army, 94, 95; - of the French army, 112; - tactics of the, 120-2. - - Asturias, Prince of the: _see_ Ferdinand. - - Asturias, province of the, declares war on France, 65; - sends emissaries to England, 66; - sends troops to Blake’s army, 382, 384. - - - Baget, Juan, leader of Catalan _miqueletes_, 318, 322, 328. - - Baird, Sir David, general, lands at Corunna, 484, 491, 498; - advances to Astorga, 500; - joins Moore at Mayorga, 532; - wounded at Corunna, 584, 589. - - Barcelona, treacherously seized by Duhesme, 36; - operations round, 302, 318. - - Baylen, battle of, 187-92; - Convention of, 197-9; - text of the Convention, Appendix, 621-3. - - Bayonne, French troops at, 6-12, 34; - treachery of Napoleon at, 51-6. - - Beauharnais, Marquis of, French ambassador at Madrid, - his negotiations with Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, 19, 20; - refuses to acknowledge Ferdinand as King, 43, 46. - - Belesta, general, joins Blake with his division, 208. - - Belvedere, Conde de, defeated at Gamonal, 421-3. - - Bembibre, the British at, 566. - - Benavente, combat of, 549-51. - - Bentinck, Lord William, - British military representative in Madrid, 365; - endeavours to get information from the Junta, 488; - his correspondence with Moore, 504; - at Corunna, 584. - - Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste, marshal, Prince of Ponte Corvo, - in command on the Baltic, 368; - tricked by La Romana, 373. - - Bessières, Jean Baptiste, marshal, Duke of Istria, - leads a _corps d’armée_ into Spain, 40; - his first operations, 125, 126; - operations in Northern Spain, 140, 142, 166-72; - victory at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-72; - represses rising in Biscay, 356; - superseded by Soult, 418; - pursues Infantado, 470. - - Bessières, general, leads French cavalry in Catalonia, 309, 318. - - Betanzos, the stragglers’ battle at, during Moore’s retreat, 579. - - Bilbao, taken and sacked by Merlin, 356; - taken by Blake, 383; - taken by Lefebvre, 400. - - Biscay, rising in, 355, 356. - - Blake, Joachim, captain-general of the province of Galicia, 163; - his differences with Cuesta, 165; - defeated at Medina de Rio Seco, 168-72; - his operations in Biscay, 382, 384, 400; - defeated at Zornoza, 407; - at Valmaceda, 411; - at Espinosa, 413-6; - escapes into the Asturian hills, 427; - superseded by La Romana, 427. - - Bonaparte, Joseph: _see_ Joseph Napoleon. - - Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland, refuses the crown of Spain, 46. - - Bonnet, general, at Gamonal, 422; - occupies Santander, 429. - - Bowes, general, B. F., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Roliça, 237; - at Vimiero, 249-59. - - Brennier, general, at Roliça, 239; - at Vimiero, 253-9. - - Burgos, taken and sacked by Napoleon, 424. - - Burrard, Sir Harry, - second in command of British troops in Portugal, 226; - arrives at Maceira Bay, 250; - assumes command at Vimiero and refuses to advance, 260, 261; - joins in negotiations for the Convention of Cintra, 268; - summoned before the Court of Inquiry, 294. - - - Cabezon, combat of, 141. - - Cacabellos, combat of, 567-9. - - Caldagues, Count of, leader of Catalan levies, 327; - relieves Gerona, 328-30. - - Canning, George, Foreign Secretary, - gives assistance to the Asturians, 66; - permits the embarkation of Dupont’s troops after Baylen, 202; - his speech on the Spanish insurrection, 222; - sends Robertson to La Romana, 371; - his replies to the Notes of France and Russia, 378, 379. - - Caraffa, general, arrested by Junot, 208, 209; - released by Convention of Cintra, 273. - - Carlos, Don, brother of Ferdinand VII, - sent to Bayonne to meet Napoleon, 47, 48; - confined at Valençay, 55. - - Castaños, general, in command of Andalusian army, 127; - opposes Dupont at Andujar, 177; - receives capitulation of Dupont, 197; - marches on Madrid, 346; - commands the ‘Army of the Centre,’ 385-431; - defeated at Tudela, 441-4; - his retreat, 447-9; - superseded, 449. - - Castelar, Marquis of, defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463-9. - - Castlereagh, Robert, Stewart, viscount, his policy, 221, 223, 224; - his confidence in Wellesley, 225; - commends Wellesley to Dalrymple, 263; - receives Wellesley’s report on the Spanish War, 289, 290; - his correspondence with Moore, 487, 493, 506, 518, 522, 529, 548, - 554, 597, 599. - - Castro Gonzalo, combat of, 548. - - Catalonia, province of, revolts against the French, 70; - geography of, 82, 303-6; - the struggle in, 301-33. - - Cavalry, tactics of, in the Peninsular War, 117-20; - the Spanish, its weakness, 92, 93, 120; - the French, 105. - - Cervellon, Conde de, captain-general of Valencia, - his incapacity, 134-9. - - Cevallos, Don Pedro, minister of Foreign Affairs, - accompanies Ferdinand VII to Bayonne, 48; - his interview with Napoleon, 51, 52; - takes office under Joseph, 174; - reappointed minister by the Supreme Junta, 359. - - Chabert, general, at Baylen, 187, 189; - negotiates terms of surrender, 196, 197. - - Chabran, general, his expedition to Tarragona, 309; - recalled by Duhesme, 312; - checked at Granollers, 319. - - Charles IV, King of Spain, his character, 13; - arrests Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, for high treason, 21; - pardons him, 23; - compelled to disgrace Godoy, 41; - abdicates in favour of Ferdinand, 42; - withdraws his abdication, 45; - summoned to Bayonne by Napoleon, 53; - abdicates in favour of Napoleon, 55. - - Charlot, general, at Vimiero, 254, 255. - - Charmilly, colonel, emissary sent by Frere to Moore, 520-3. - - Cintra, Convention of, 268-72; - its terms, 272-8; - Court of Inquiry on, 291-300. - - Claros, Don Juan, leader of Catalan _miqueletes_, 321, 328. - - Cochrane, Lord, harasses Duhesme’s troops, 324, 331; - blockades Barcelona, 327. - - Colbert, general, at Tudela, 441-4; - slain at Cacabellos, 569. - - Colli, Baron, his attempt to release Ferdinand from Valençay, 18. - - Collingwood, Lord, commanding Mediterranean Fleet, - refuses to allow embarkation of Dupont’s troops, 201. - - Constantino, combat of, 572-3. - - Cordova, sack of, by Dupont’s troops, 130. - - Cortes, proposal to summon the, 362. - - Corunna, Baird lands at, 484, 491, 498; - arrival of Moore at, 581; - battle of, 583-95. - - Cotton, admiral, - resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 271, 272; - concludes an arrangement with Siniavin, 284, 285. - - Coupigny, general, commands a division in Castaños’ army, 177, 180; - at Baylen, 187, 191; - delegate to the Army of the Centre, 395. - - Crawfurd, Catlin, colonel, commands a brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Vimiero, 249-58; - at Corunna, 584. - - Crawfurd, Robert, colonel commanding Light Brigade, - blows up the bridge at Castro Gonzalo, 548; - retreats to Vigo, 564; - his excellent discipline, 565. - - Cruz-Murgeon, colonel, at Baylen, 191; - his defence of Lerin, 394. - - Cuesta, Gregorio de la, captain-general of Old Castile, - his reluctance to take arms against the French, 68; - his character and capacity, 141; - defeated at Cabezon, 141; - at Medina de Rio Seco, 165-72; - his extravagant claims, 347, 348, 357; - removed from his command, 359. - - - Dalrymple, Sir Hew, governor of Gibraltar, - receives command of British troops in Portugal, 226; - arrives at Vimiero, 263; - his lack of confidence in Wellesley, 263-5; - negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 268-72; - his want of consideration for Portuguese authorities, 279, 283, 285; - his dilatoriness, 287; - summoned before the Court of Inquiry, 294; - censured by the Commander-in-chief, 299. - - Debelle, general, surprised by Paget at Sahagun, 535, 536. - - Delaborde, general, marches against Wellesley, 236; - defeated at Roliça, 236-40; - at Vimiero, 246-62; - at Corunna, 586-91. - - Despeña Perros, pass of, 79, 80. - - Digeon, general, at Tudela, 441, 443. - - Duhesme, general, leads an army into Catalonia, 36; - at Barcelona, 302; - failure of expeditions against Catalan insurgents, 310, 312; - marches on Gerona, 314; - his repulse and retreat, 316-8; - besieges Gerona again unsuccessfully, 325-30; - retreats on Barcelona, 331. - - Dupont, general, - leads Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde into Spain, 34; - composition of his army, 104, 107, 126; - his first operations, 127; - combat of Alcolea, 129; - sacks Cordova, 130; - retreats to Andujar, 132; - defeated at Baylen, 190-2; - capitulates, 197; - imprisoned by Napoleon, 335. - - - Echávarri, Don Pedro de, defeated by Dupont at Alcolea, 128, 129. - - Escoiquiz, Juan, canon of Toledo, - his influence on Ferdinand VII, 16, 17; - prompts the negotiations with Napoleon, 19, 20; - accompanies Ferdinand to Bayonne, 48; - his interview with Napoleon, 52. - - Escurial, the affair of the, 23. - - Espinosa de los Monteros, battle of, 413-6. - - Etruria, King of, evicted by Napoleon, 35; - promised Northern Portugal, 9. - - Evora, defeat of the Portuguese at, 218. - - - Fane, general, H., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Roliça, 237, 238; - at Vimiero, 249-61. - - Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, accused of treason, 12, 21; - his character, 16-19; - his intrigue with Napoleon, 20; - his arrest and acquittal, 21, 23; - pacifies the mob at Aranjuez, 41; - becomes King on his father’s abdication, 42; - enters Madrid, 43; - his title not recognized by the French, 43, 46; - tries to propitiate Napoleon, 47; - meets Napoleon at Bayonne, 47-51; - is forced to abdicate, 54; - confined at Valençay, 55. - - Ferguson, general, R., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Roliça, 237, 239; - at Vimiero, 249-60; - gives evidence before the Court of Inquiry, 294, 295. - - Filanghieri, captain-general of Galicia, murdered by soldiery, 66, 67. - - Florida Blanca, Count, political influence of, 345; - president of the Junta General, 359. - - Fontainebleau, treaty of, 8-11. - - Foy, general, his opinion of English infantry, 115; - of English cavalry, 119; - at Vimiero, 255; - at Corunna, 591. - - Franceschi, general, - scatters La Romana’s troops at combat of Mansilla, 552; - in the pass of Foncebadon, 563; - pursues Moore’s army at Betanzos, 579; - at Corunna, 589. - - Francisco, Don, younger brother of Ferdinand VII, - arrested by Murat, 60. - - Freire, Bernardino, general, appointed head of Portuguese armies, 212; - quarrels with Wellesley, 233; - resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 270, 277, 278. - - Frere, John Hookham, British minister in Spain, - brings subsidies to Corunna, 365, 499; - urges Moore to advance, 506, 519, 520; - his controversy with Moore, 523, 524. - - Frère, general, meets Moncey with reinforcements, 138. - - - Galicia, province of, revolts against the French, 66; - its importance, 69; - geography of, 80, 81; - military operations in, 163-75. - - Galluzzo, captain-general of Estremadura, - attacks French garrison at Elvas, 276; - refuses to draw off his troops, 279; - recalled to Aranjuez, 420; - commands the army of San Juan, 481. - - Gamonal, combat of, 422, 423. - - George III, King, his reply to the Corporation of London about the - Convention of Cintra, 293. - - Gerona, fortress of, held by the Spanish, 70; - besieged by Duhesme, 316, 317; - second siege of, 325-31. - - Gironde, First Corps of Observation of the, 6, 7 (_see_ Junot); - Second Corps of Observation of the, 12 (_see_ Dupont). - - Gobert, general, reinforces Dupont, 179; - defeated and mortally wounded at Mengibar, 181, 182. - - Godoy, Manuel, Prince of the Peace, prime minister of Charles IV of - Spain, his proclamation of Oct. 5, 1806, 4; - his part in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 9, 10; - his character and policy, 12-5; - his enmity to Prince Ferdinand, 20, 21; - tries to propitiate Napoleon, 36; - proposes the flight of the Spanish Court, 40, 41; - disgraced and banished, 41; - summoned to Bayonne by Napoleon, 53; - his responsibility for the state of the Spanish army, 96-8. - - Goulas, general, repulsed at Hostalrich, 325. - - Graham, colonel, T., brings news of the fall of Madrid to Moore, 529. - - Grimarest, general, at Tudela, 442, 443. - - Guadarrama, the, Napoleon’s passage of, 543. - - - Heredia, Don Joseph, - commands the Army of Estremadura, 452, 455, 471, 516. - - Hill, general, R., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Roliça, 237, 238; - at Vimiero, 249, 253; - at Corunna, 591. - - Hope, Sir John, general, his advance on Elvas, 280, 487; - his circuitous march to join Moore, 510, 511; - at Corunna, 584; - takes command of the army on Moore’s death, 591. - - - Ibarnavarro, Justo, - brings the news of the treachery at Bayonne to Madrid, 59. - - Infantado, Duke of, - confidant of Ferdinand VII in the affair of the Escurial, 19, 22, 23; - in Biscay, 356; - defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463. - - Inquisition, the, Godoy’s attitude towards, 15; - abolished by Napoleon, 474-6. - - Izquierdo, Eugenio, agent of Godoy, - draws up the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 8; - sends disquieting reports from Paris, 36. - - - John, Prince-Regent of Portugal, - compelled to submit to the Continental System, 7; - attacked by Napoleon, 29; - his flight from Lisbon, 30. - - Jones, Felix, general, commands a division in Castaños’ army, 177. - - Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte, accepts the crown of Spain, 46; - enters Madrid, 173; - his character, 174; - his flight from Madrid, 175; - at Miranda, 340; - his return to Madrid, 479. - - Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, marshal, - commands the troops of King Joseph, 383, 384. - - Jovellanos, Gaspar de, - refuses the Ministry of the Interior under Joseph, 174; - a member of the Junta General, 354; - his Liberal views, 361, 362. - - Junot, general, Duke of Abrantes, leads French army into Spain, 8; - his invasion of Portugal, 26; - his march on Lisbon, 27-30; - his rule in Portugal, 206; - his difficulties in Lisbon, 213, 214; - defeated at Vimiero, 247-61; - negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 266-72; - evacuates Portugal, 280; - retires to Spain, 450, 481. - - Junta, or Council of Regency, appointed by Ferdinand VII, 48; - its dealings with Murat, 58, 59; - sends petition to Napoleon asking for Joseph Bonaparte as King, 63. - - Junta General, creation of the, 352; - its composition, 354; - in session, 354-66; - flies to Seville. - - Juntas, the provincial: _see_ Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia, &c. - - - Keates, Sir Richard, admiral commanding the fleet in the Baltic, 370; - effects the escape of La Romana and his troops, 374. - - Kellermann, François Christophe, general, retires on Lisbon, 216; - his success at Alcacer do Sal, 242; - at Vimiero, 246-56; - negotiates the Convention of Cintra, 266-72. - - Kindelan, general, treachery of, 372, 374. - - - Lahoussaye, general, commands dragoons at Cacabellos, 569; - at Constantino, 572, 573; - at Corunna, 589. - - Lake, colonel, killed at Roliça, 238. - - Lannes, Jean, marshal, Duke of Montebello, - wins battle of Tudela, 436-44. - - Lapisse, general, at Espinosa, 414, 415; - sent against Salamanca, 561. - - Lasalle, general, at Cabezon, 141; - at Medina de Rio Seco, 167-71; - at Gamonal, 422. - - Lazan, Marquis of, defeated at Tudela, 144, 145; - at Mallen, 145; - sent to Catalonia to oppose Duhesme, 387. - - Lecchi, general, seizes fortress of Barcelona, 37; - besieged in Barcelona by Palacio, 327, 328; - with Duhesme at Barcelona, 318. - - Lefebvre, Francis Joseph, marshal, Duke of Dantzig, - defeats Blake at Zornoza, 407; - at Valmaceda, 411. - - Lefebvre, general, reinforces Bessières, 337; - wounded at Corunna, 594. - - Lefebvre-Desnouettes, general, sent against Saragossa, 125, 142; - victorious at Mallen, 144, 145; - his siege of Saragossa, 145-52; - superseded by Verdier, 152; - at battle of Tudela, 444; - taken prisoner at Benavente, 550. - - Leite, general, defeated by Loison at Evora, 218; - his difficulties with Galluzzo, 279. - - Leith, general, J., takes part in Blake’s retreat, 426-9; - commands a brigade under Moore, 501, 528, 533. - - Leith Hay, major, his views on Spanish patriotism, 505, 577. - - Leopold, Prince, of Sicily, intrigues for the Regency of Spain, 350. - - Liger-Belair, general, defeated at Mengibar, 181. - - Lisbon, seized by Junot, 30, 31; - its importance, 209; - condition of, under Junot, 213, 214; - surrendered to the British by the Convention of Cintra, 273. - - Llamas, Valencian general, at the council of war in Madrid, 357; - at Aranjuez, 385. - - Loison, general, in Northern Portugal, 213; - retires on Abrantes, 216; - his victory at Evora, 218; - recalled to Lisbon, 218; - at Vimiero, 246-52. - - Lopez, colonel, Spanish attaché with Moore, 488, 494. - - Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, - his intrigues about the Spanish Regency, 350. - - Lugo, combat of, 574, 575. - - - Madrid, description of, 75; - its lack of importance politically, 75; - its advantages as a centre of roads, 86; - Joseph Bonaparte enters, 173; - abandoned by Joseph, 175; - its resistance to Napoleon, 462-9; - Napoleon at, 473-85. - - Maison, general, at Espinosa, 415. - - Malaspina, general, defeated by Sebastiani, 416. - - Mansilla, combat of, 552. - - Maransin, general, evacuates Algarve, 212; - storms Beja, 215. - - Margaron, general, at Vimiero, 246-52. - - Maria Luisa, queen of Charles IV of Spain, her character, 14; - intrigues with Murat against Ferdinand VII, 44, 45; - at Bayonne, 53. - - Mataro, stormed and sacked by Duhesme, 315. - - Mathieu, Maurice, general, at Tudela, 441-3. - - Medina de Rio Seco, battle of, 168-72. - - Mengibar, combat of, 181. - - Merle, general, sent against Santander, 125, 142; - at Cabezon, 141; - at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71; - at Gamonal, 422; - at Cacabellos, 569; - at Constantino, 573; - at Corunna, 586-90. - - Milans, Francisco, - leader of Catalan _somatenes_, repulses Chabran, 319; - opposes Duhesme, 325, 328. - - Milhaud, general, at Gamonal, 422. - - _Miqueletes_, the, of Catalonia, 302, 306. - - Moira, Francis Rawdon, Lord, - on the Inquiry into the Convention of Cintra, 294-8. - - Moncey, Bon Adrien Jeannot de, marshal, Duke of Conegliano, - leads Corps of Observation of the Ocean Coast into Spain, 34; - composition of his army, 126; - his expedition against Valencia, 133; - his repulse at Valencia, 136; - retreats on Madrid, 138; - at Tudela, 441. - - Monteiro Mor, the (Conde de Castro Marim), - resents the terms of the Convention of Cintra, 279, 283. - - Montijo, Conde de, his operations on the Ebro, 381; - field-deputy of the Junta, 395. - - Moore, Sir John, general, returns from the Baltic, 224, 226; - lands in Portugal, 270, 486; - advances into Old Castile, 451, 485; - his difficulties of transport, 486-91; - at Salamanca, 486-512; - resolves to retreat, 509, 510; - his change of plans, 522, 523; - his quarrel with Frere, 523, 524; - advances to Sahagun, 537; - his retreat before Napoleon, 538-59; - is joined by La Romana at Astorga, 552; - retreats before Soult, 556-88; - wins battle of Corunna, 588, 589; - his death and burial, 595; - his character and achievements, 597-602. - - Morla, Don Tomas de, general, - repudiates the Capitulation of Baylen, 201; - defends Madrid against Napoleon, 463; - negotiates the surrender of the city, 469; - takes office under Joseph, 472; - his letter to Moore, 517, 518. - - Mortier, Edouard Adolphe Casimir Joseph, Duke of Treviso, - arrives in Spain, 481. - - Mouton, general, at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71; - at Gamonal, 422. - - Munster, George Earl of, his opinion of the Spanish army, 98. - - Murat, Joachim, Grand-Duke of Berg, - commands French forces in Spain, 38; - his character and capacity, 39; - enters Madrid, 43; - refuses to acknowledge Ferdinand VII as king, 43; - intrigues with Charles IV and Maria Luisa against Ferdinand, 44; - induces the old king to withdraw his abdication, 45; - his dealings with the Junta at Madrid, 58, 59; - quells insurrection in Madrid, 60, 61; - leaves Spain, 123; - his intrigues with Fouché and Talleyrand, 560. - - - Napier, Sir William, general, historian of the Peninsular War, - his strictures on the Spaniards, 89, 499; - errors in his estimates of numbers, 251, 421, 639; - his testimony to the Catalans, 302; - misinformed with regard to La Romana’s army, 416; - his defence of Moore’s strategy, 497, 597, 600; - his eulogy on Moore, 602. - - Napier, Major Charles, wounded and taken prisoner at Corunna, 588. - - Napoleon, his projects against Spain, 2-11; - intrigues with Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, 20-3; - his treachery at Bayonne, 51; - offers Joseph Bonaparte the kingdom of Spain, 46; - his original plan of campaign in Spain, 123-6; - his wrath at the Capitulation of Baylen, 334, 335; - his new scheme of operations in Spain, 337-40; - his treaty with the Czar Alexander, 377; - his letter to King George III, 378; - arrives in Spain, 397, 417; - defeats Belvedere at Gamonal, 422; - advances on Madrid, 449; - crosses the Somosierra, 453-61; - enters Madrid, 466-9; - his scheme of reforms for Spain, 475, 476; - his pursuit of Moore, 538-47; - halts at Benavente, 559; - returns to France, 561. - - Ney, Michel, marshal, Duke of Elchingen, arrives in Spain, 341; - fails to catch the retreating army of Castaños, 446, 448; - joins in the pursuit of Moore, 545, 547, 561, 562. - - Nightingale, general, M., commands brigade under Wellesley, 232; - at Roliça, 237; - at Vimiero, 249-59. - - - O’Farrill, general, Spanish Minister of War, - takes office under Joseph, 174. - - O’Neille, general, his blunders at Tudela, 435-44. - - Oporto, Bishop of, Dom Antonio de Castro, - head of the Portuguese Junta, 211; - his interview with Wellesley, 228; - resents the Convention of Cintra, 277, 278; - his letter of complaint, 291. - - O’Sullivan, Manuel, captain, repulses Goulas from Hostalrich, 325. - - - Paget, Edward, general, - commands Reserve Division of Moore’s army, 533, 564; - his success at Cacabellos, 568; - at Constantino, 573; - at Corunna, 589. - - Paget, Henry Lord, surprises the French at Sahagun, 536; - at Benavente, 550, 551. - - Palacio, Marquis del, - leads troops from Balearic Isles to Catalonia, 323; - Captain-General of Catalonia, 327; - invests Barcelona, 327. - - Palafox, Francisco, Deputy of the Supreme Junta, 355; - usurps command of the army of Castaños, 433. - - Palafox, Joseph, leads the revolt against the French in Saragossa, 67; - Captain-General of Aragon, 69; - his character, 143; - his defence of Saragossa, 143, 153-62; - defeated at Alagon, 145; - at Epila, 151; - his fantastic plans, 391, 434-5. - - Pampeluna, citadel of, seized by D’Armagnac, 36. - - Peña, Manuel La, general, commands division in Castaños’ army, 177; - arrives at Baylen, 192; - threatens Dupont, 195; - his cowardice at Tudela, 442-5; - escapes from Ney, 470. - - Pignatelli, general, commands Army of Castile, 385; - retreats before Ney, 393; - removed from his command, 385. - - Polish Light Horse, charge of the, at the Somosierra, 459. - - Portland Cabinet, the, - resolves to aid risings in Spain and Portugal, 221, 222. - - Portugal, kingdom of, - compelled to submit to the Continental System, 7; - conquest of, by French troops, 26-32; - its army dissolved, 31; - insurrection of, 205-18; - evacuated by the French, 279, 280. - - Pradt, Mgr. de, Archbishop of Malines, - his memoirs, 5, 16, 17, 459, 473. - - - Reding, Teodoro, general, commands division under Castaños, 177; - at Mengibar, 181, 182; - marches on Baylen, 185; - at battle of Baylen, 187-91; - marches for Catalonia, 387-8. - - Reille, general, succours Duhesme, 319; - repulsed from Rosas, 321. - - Roads, the, of Spain, 78-85. - - Robertson, Rev. James, emissary from Canning to La Romana, 371; - success of his mission, 372. - - Roca, general, commands Valencian division at Tudela, 441. - - Roliça, combat of, 236-40. - - Romana, La, Marquis of, - sent to the Baltic with Spanish troops, 90, 367; - escapes with his army on British vessels, 371-4; - supersedes Blake in command of the army of Galicia, 427; - proposes a junction with Moore, 515, - 528, 533, 534; - joins Moore at Astorga, 553; - retreats through the pass of Foncebadon, 563. - - Rosas, resists Reille’s attack, 321. - - - Sabathier, general, at Medina de Rio Seco, 169-71. - - Sahagun, combat of, 536. - - St. Cyr, Laurent Gouvion, general, - supersedes Duhesme in Catalonia, 332. - - Saint March, general, at Tudela, 441. - - San Juan, general, defeated at the Somosierra, 455-60; - murdered by his own troops, 471. - - San Roman, Count of, - commands division from the Baltic at Espinosa, 413-6. - - Santa Cruz, Marquis of, leads the revolt in the Asturias, 65. - - Saragossa, first siege of, 145-62; - story of the ‘Maid of,’ 154. - - Savary, Anne Jean Marie Réné, general, Duke of Rovigo, at Madrid, 48; - induces Ferdinand to meet Napoleon, 48; - takes command at Madrid on Murat’s departure, 123, 166, 175; - at the passage of the Somosierra, 456. - - Schwartz, general, sent against Lerida, 309; - retreats to Barcelona, 311. - - Sebastiani, general, at Zornoza, 407; - defeats Malaspina, 416. - - Ségur, Philippe de, - his description of the passage of the Somosierra, 459. - - Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, - his speech on the Spanish insurrection, 222. - - Siniavin, admiral commanding Russian fleet in the Tagus, - refuses to aid Junot, 209; - concludes terms with Admiral Cotton, 272, 284, 285. - - Smith, Sir Sydney, admiral, blockades Lisbon, 29. - - Solano, captain-general, murdered in Cadiz, 67. - - Solignac, general, at Vimiero, 253-9. - - _Somatenes_, irregular levies of Catalonia, 70, 306, 311. - - Somosierra, combat of the, 456-60. - - Soult, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, - arrives in Spain, 418; - victorious at Gamonal, 422, 423; - occupies Santander, 429; - successful at Mansilla, 552; - his pursuit of Moore, 557-83; - refuses battle at Lugo, 574; - fights at Corunna, 583-91; - places inscriptions over Moore’s grave, 595. - - Spencer, general B., - brings division from Sicily and Gibraltar to join Wellesley, 230; - his evidence at the Inquiry into the Convention of Cintra, 294, 295. - - Strangford, Lord, British ambassador at Lisbon, 29, 30. - - Stuart, Charles, British minister at Madrid, - his remarks on the inactivity of the Supreme Junta, 365, 504; - urges Moore to advance, 519; - comes as emissary from Frere to Moore, 535. - - Surtees, sergeant, his remarks on Spanish officers, 99. - - Symes, colonel, M., his report on La Romana’s force, 534. - - - Tactics, the, of the French, 114-9; - of the British, 114-22. - - Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of - Benevento, opposes the invasion of Spain, 11; - receives Ferdinand VII, Don Carlos, and Don Antonio at - Valençay, 55, 56. - - Taylor, lieut.-colonel, commands the 20th Regt. at Vimiero, 256. - - Thiébault, Paul, general, chief of the staff to Junot, - at the council of war at Torres Vedras, 266; - his interview with Napoleon, 269; - his evidence about the French peculations at Lisbon, 281. - - Thomières, general, at Vimiero, 254, 255. - - Toreño, historian of the Peninsular War, - goes to London as an emissary from the Asturias, 66. - - Trant, colonel, commands division of Portuguese under Wellesley, 234; - at Roliça, 237; - at Vimiero, 249. - - Tudela, combat of, 144, 145; - battle of, 439-44. - - - Valdez, don Antonio, imprisoned by Cuesta, 359. - - Valencia, massacre of the French colony in, 68; - Moncey’s expedition against, 133-6. - - Valmaceda, combat of, 411. - - Vaughan, Charles, secretary to the British minister in Madrid, - his papers, 24, 143, 154; - his opinion of the Central Junta, 365; - brings the news of Tudela to Moore, 508. - - Vedel, general, reinforces Dupont, 176; - marches on La Carolina, 183; - arrives late at Baylen, 193; - retreats on La Carolina, 198; - returns to Baylen, 199. - - Verdier, general, at the siege of Saragossa, 152; - retreats to Tudela, 161. - - Victor, Claude Perrin, marshal, Duke of Belluno, - his operations against Blake, 409, 413; - at Espinosa, 414-6. - - Villatte, general, at Zornoza, 407; - his escape from Acevedo, 410; - at Espinosa, 414. - - Villoutreys, captain, asks suspension of hostilities from Reding, 192; - imprisoned by Napoleon, 335. - - Vimiero, battle of, 247-61. - - Vives, general, neglects to help Catalonia, 323. - - - Wellesley, general, Sir Arthur, disembarks at Figueira, 218; - his interview with the Bishop of Oporto and the Supreme Junta, 228; - at Roliça, 236-40; - at Vimiero, 247-61; - his differences with Burrard and Dalrymple, 260-5; - his views on the future of the war, 288; - returns to England, 290; - summoned before the Court of Inquiry on the Convention of - Cintra, 294; - his evidence against Burrard and Dalrymple, 295; - returns to Lisbon, 300; - his tactics, 114-22. - - Wilson, Sir Robert, organizes the Lusitanian Legion, 280. - - - Zagalo, Bernard, the student, leader of revolt in Coimbra, - captures Figueira, 217. - - Zamora, resists Lapisse’s attack, 562. - - Zornoza, battle of, 407. - - - - -END OF VOL. I - - -Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press, by HORACE HART, M. A. - -[Illustration: Spain and Portugal, showing physical features and roads.] - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A History of the Peninsula war, Vol. I -1807-1809, by Charles Oman - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULA *** - -***** This file should be named 53264-0.txt or 53264-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/3/2/6/53264/ - -Produced by Brian Coe, readbueno, Ramon Pajares Box, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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