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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5237d52 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #52821 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52821) diff --git a/old/52821-0.txt b/old/52821-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 622705c..0000000 --- a/old/52821-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5378 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Kant's Prolegomena, by Immanuel Kant - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Kant's Prolegomena - To Any Future Metaphysics - -Author: Immanuel Kant - -Translator: Paul Carus - -Release Date: September 5, 2016 [EBook #52821] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - - - - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi - - - - -KANT'S PROLEGOMENA - - -TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS - - -EDITED IN ENGLISH -BY -DR. PAUL CARUS - - -THIRD EDITION - - -CHICAGO -THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY -1912 - -TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED -BY -The Open Court Publishing Co. -1902. - - -[Transcriber's note: ** Supplemental material and table of contents -are omitted from this etext. ** ] - - - -Contents - -PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. -INTRODUCTION. -PROLEGOMENA. - PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. -FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? -SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? -THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? -SCHOLIA. - SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS - METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?" -APPENDIX. - ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE. - - - - -PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. - -Kant's Prolegomena,{1} although a small book, is indubitably the most -important of his writings. It furnishes us with a key to his main -work, The Critique of Pure Reason; in fact, it is an extract -containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It approaches the -subject in the simplest and most direct way, and is therefore best -adapted as an introduction into his philosophy. For this reason, The -Open Court Publishing Company has deemed it advisable to bring out a -new edition of the work, keeping in view its broader use as a -preliminary survey and explanation of Kant's philosophy in general. In -order to make the book useful for this broader purpose, the editor has -not only stated his own views concerning the problem underlying the -Prolegomena (see page 167 et seq.), but has also collected the most -important materials which have reference to Kant's philosophy, or to -the reception which was accorded to it in various quarters (see page -241 et seq.). The selections have not been made from a partisan -standpoint, but have been chosen with a view to characterising the -attitude of different minds, and to directing the student to the best -literature on the subject. - -=================================== -{1} Prolegomena means literally prefatory or introductory remarks. It is -the neuter plural of the present passive participle of -προλέγειν, to speak before, i.e., to make introductory -remarks before beginning one's regular discourse. -=================================== - -It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the Critique of -Pure Reason is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the history -of philosophy; and so it seems that a comprehension of Kant's -position, whether we accept or reject it, is indispensable to the -student of philosophy. It is not his solution which makes the sage of -Königsberg the initiator of modern thought, but his formulation of -the problem. - -* * * - -The present translation is practically new, but it goes without saying -that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors, among whom -Prof. John P. Mahaffy and John H. Bernard deserve special credit. -Richardson's translation of 1818 may be regarded as superseded and has -not been consulted, but occasional reference has been made to that of -Prof. Ernest Belfort Bax. Considering the difficulties under which -even these translators labored we must recognise the fact that they -did their work well, with painstaking diligence, great love of the -subject, and good judgment. The editor of the present translation has -the advantage of being to the manor born; moreover, he is pretty well -versed in Kant's style; and wherever he differs from his predecessors -in the interpretation of a construction, he has deviated from them not -without good reasons. Nevertheless there are some passages which will -still remain doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence. - -As a curiosum in Richardson's translation Professor Mahaffy mentions -that the words widersinnig gewundene Schnecken, which simply means -"symmetric helices,"{2} are rendered by "snails rolled up contrary to -all sense"—a wording that is itself contrary to all sense and makes -the whole paragraph unintelligible. We may add an instance of another -mistake that misses the mark. Kant employs in the Appendix a word that -is no longer used in German. He speaks of the Cento der Metaphysik as -having neue Lappen and einen veränderten Zuschnitt. Mr. Bax -translates Cento by "body," Lappen by "outgrowths," and Zuschnitt by -"figure." His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than Richardson's; -it is certainly not less comical, and it also destroys the sense, -which in the present case is a very striking simile. Cento is a Latin -word[3] derived from the Greek κεντρων,[4] meaning "a garment of -many patches sewed together," or, as we might now say, "a crazy -quilt." - -=================================== -{2} Mahaffy not incorrectly translates "spirals winding opposite ways," -and Mr. Bax follows him verbatim even to the repetition of the -footnote. - -{3} The French cento is still in use. - -{4} κέντρων, (1) one that bears the marks of the κέντρο, -goad; a rogue, (2) a patched cloth; (3) any kind of patchwork, -especially verses made up of scraps from other authors. -=================================== - -* * * - -In the hope that this book will prove useful, The Open Court -Publishing Company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy. - -P.C. - -INTRODUCTION. - -These Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of -future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will -be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, -but merely for the discovery of the science itself. - -There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both -ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present -Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to -draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work; it -will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been -done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has -not been said before, and truly the same prophecy applies to all -future time; for since the human reason has for many centuries -speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to -be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every -new idea among the old sayings of past ages. - -My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysics worth -studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, -neglecting all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary -question, ‘Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all -possible?’ - -If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, -obtain universal and permanent recognition? If not, how can it -maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with -hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate -our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for -all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called -science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems -almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, -that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle -every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, -without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted -away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other -sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however -ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this -domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish -sound knowledge from shallow talk. - -After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, -when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question -should at last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? -Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has several times -built up a tower, and then razed it to examine the nature of the -foundation. It is never too late to become wise; but if the change -comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform. - -The question whether a science be possible, presupposes a doubt as to -its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whose whole -possessions consist of this supposed jewel; hence he who raises the -doubt must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud -consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and therefore -considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their -hands, and look down on him with contempt; others, who never see -anything except it be identical with what they have seen before, will -not understand him, and everything will remain for a time, as if -nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for an -impending change. - -Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of -these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but -ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands -here stated on which its possibility depends, be satisfied; and, as -this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as -Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand,{5}—since the -interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must -confess that a radical reform, or rather a new birth of the science -after an original plan, are unavoidable, however men may struggle -against it for a while. - -=================================== -{5} Says Horace: -"Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille -Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum;" -"A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore -For the river to flow away, -But the river flows, and flows on as before, -And it flows forever and aye." -=================================== - -Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the origin of -metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened -which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by -David Hume. He threw no light on this species of knowledge, but he -certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, -had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire -been carefully nursed and developed. - -Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., -that of Cause and Effect (including its derivatives force and action, -etc.). He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to -this idea from herself, to answer him by what right she thinks -anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, -something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the -meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it -was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of -concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, -in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily -exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. -Hence he inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference -to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her -children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of -imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain -representations under the Law of Association, and mistook the -subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from -insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such -combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be -purely fictitious, and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing -but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language -there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics at all.{6} - -=================================== -{6} Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics -and attached to it great value. Metaphysics and morals [he declares in -the fourth part of his Essays] are the most important branches of -science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so important. But the -acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation -of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete -settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that -mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if -reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone -supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor. -=================================== - -However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at -least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the -concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as -determined efforts on their part to discover, if possible, a happier -solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which -would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science. - -But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being -understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, -Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the -problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he -doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that -which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable -suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if -nothing had happened. - -The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, -and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had -never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a -priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, -independent of all experience, implying a wider application than -merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a -question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need -of the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and -the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a -matter of course. - -But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the -great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of -reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,—a task which -did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being -defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to common sense. It is -indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (as they now call it) -plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically, -by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing -to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To -appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no -sooner—this is one of the subtile discoveries of modern times, by -means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists -with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a -particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to -this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the -multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the -popular charlatan glories and confides in it? I should think that Hume -might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and -in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), -which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, -or, if speculations are under discussion, restrains the desire to -decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. -By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers -may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel-engraving we -require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative -understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in -judgments which apply immediately to experience, the latter when we -judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound -common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, -has no right to judge at all. - -I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, -which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave -my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new -direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he -arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which -by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well-founded, -but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may -well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute -man, to whom we owe the first spark of light. - -I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into -a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of -cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the -understanding thinks the connexion of things a priori, but rather that -metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions. I sought to -ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in -this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction -of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from -experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure -understanding. This deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute -predecessor, which had never even occurred to any one else, though no -one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis -of their objective validity) was the most difficult task ever -undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that -metaphysics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the -least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. -But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in -a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure -reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole -sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its -circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for -metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable -method. - -But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent -(viz., my Critique of the Pure Reason) will fare as the problem itself -fared, when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is -misunderstood, and misunderstood because men choose to skim through -the book, and not to think through it—a disagreeable task, because -the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and -moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect to hear -from philosophers complaints of want of popularity, entertainment, and -facility, when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable -cognition is at stake, which cannot be established otherwise than by -the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may follow, but -is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, -arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which the -principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the -complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the present -Prolegomena. - -The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of reason -in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which -the Prolegomena, as a preliminary exercise, refer; for our critique -must first be established as a complete and perfected science, before -we can think of letting Metaphysics appear on the scene, or even have -the most distant hope of attaining it. - -We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced -as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to -system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most -readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the Critique; but -these Prolegomena may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science, -of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which was -unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the -smallest use, except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet ever, -he did not suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for -safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let it lie and rot; -whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe -astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and -provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, -whither he listeth. - -If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind, -we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of -our previously acquired knowledge, which is precisely what has first -to be called in question, we should only fancy we saw everywhere what -we had already known, the expressions, having a similar sound, only -that all would appear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and -unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation our own -notions, made by long habit a second nature, instead of the author's. -But the longwindedness of the work, so far as it depends on the -subject, and not the exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness -and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the -science, though they may discredit the book. - -Few writers are gifted with the subtilty, and at the same time with -the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, -of Moses Mendelssohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my own -exposition popular, had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and -leave its completion to others, instead of having my heart in the -welfare of the science, to which I had devoted myself so long; in -truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to -postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a -slower, but more lasting, reputation. - -Making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful mind, -which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius, by demanding -what it cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve; -and by proposing, what it knows not where to find. And yet something -more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure -reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the -usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere -so separate and self-contained, that we cannot touch a part without -affecting all the rest. We can therefore do nothing without first -determining the position of each part, and its relation to the rest; -for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the -validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it -stands to all the rest within the domain of reason. - -So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can -only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, -be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be -perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In -the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or -nothing. - -But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, -would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more -useful as a sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine -in detail the chief points of importance in the science, and to -improve in many respects our exposition, as compared with the first -execution of the work. - -After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is -sketched out after an analytical method, while the work itself had to -be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may -present all its articulations, as the structure of a peculiar -cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader -find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future -Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is -bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in -the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to practical -experience,{7} while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing -exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply -their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or -still more, to construct, a system of Metaphysics, must satisfy the -demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thoroughly -refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible. - -=================================== -{7} The term Anschauung here used means sense-perception. It is that -which is given to the senses and apprehended immediately, as an object -is seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuition, though -etymologically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term -is not used in its technical significance but means "practical -experience."—Ed. -=================================== - -In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity -(frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their -own indolence or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other -sciences observe a judicious silence, speak authoritatively in -metaphysics and make bold decisions, because their ignorance is not -here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast -with sound critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the -words of Virgil: - -"Ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent." -"Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent -creatures." - -PROLEGOMENA. - -PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. - -§ 1. Of the Sources of Metaphysics. - -If it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it will -be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features -which no other science has in common with it, constituting its -characteristics; otherwise the boundaries of all sciences become -confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its -nature. - -The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of -object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, -or perhaps of all three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the -idea of a possible science and its territory. - -First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very -concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles -(including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be -derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical -knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore -have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of -physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical -psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure -Understanding and pure Reason. - -But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish able from pure -Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; -and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure -Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. i), where -the distinction between these two employments of the reason is -sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysical -cognition. - -§ 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called -Metaphysical. - -a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments in -general.—The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical -cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But whatever -be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in -judgments, as to their content, according to which they are either -merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the cognition, or -expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called -analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments. - -Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has -been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though -not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: -All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept -of body, but have only analysed it, as extension was really thought to -belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not -expressed; this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, -this judgment, All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate -something not actually thought in the general concept of the body; it -amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and must -therefore be called synthetical. - -b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of -Contradiction.—All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of -Contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether -the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the -predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained -in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without -contradiction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of -the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law -of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are -extended, and no bodies are unextended (i.e., simple). - -For this very reason all analytical judgments are a priori even when -the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a yellow metal; -for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as -a yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only -analyse it, without looking beyond it elsewhere. - -c. Synthetical Judgments require a different Principle from the Law of -Contradiction.—There are synthetical a posteriori judgments of -empirical origin; but there are also others which are proved to be -certain a priori, and which spring from pure Understanding and Reason. -Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring from the -principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone; they -require a quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be -deduced, they must be subject to the law of contradiction, which must -never be violated, even though everything cannot be deduced from it. I -shall first classify synthetical judgments. - -1. Empirical Judgments are always synthetical. For it would be absurd -to base an analytical judgment on experience, as our concept suffices -for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. That -body is extended, is a judgment established a priori, and not an -empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already -have all the conditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we -have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of -contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the -judgment, which experience could not even teach us. - -2. Mathematical Judgments are all synthetical. This fact seems -hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have -analysed human reason; it even seems directly opposed to all their -conjectures, though incontestably certain, and most important in its -consequences. For as it was found that the conclusions of -mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction (as -is demanded by all apodeictic certainty), men persuaded themselves -that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was -a great mistake, for a synthetical proposition can indeed be -comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by -presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows, -but never in itself. - -First of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical judgments -are a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them -necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be -not conceded to me, very good; I shall confine my assertion to pure -Mathematics, the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a -priori and not empirical cognitions. - -It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a mere -analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven -and five, according to the law of contradiction. But on closer -examination it appears that the concept of the sum of 7 + 5 contains -merely their union in a single number, without its being at all -thought what the particular number is that unites them. The concept of -twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of -seven and five; and analyse this possible sum as we may, we shall not -discover twelve in the concept. We must go beyond these concepts, by -calling to our aid some concrete image (Anschauung), i.e., either our -five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and -we must add successively the units of the five, given in some concrete -image (Anschauung), to the concept of seven. Hence our concept is -really amplified by the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, and we add to the -first a second, not thought in it. Arithmetical judgments are -therefore synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take -larger numbers; for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we -analyse our concepts without calling visual images (Anschauung) to our -aid, we can never find the sum by such mere dissection. - -All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight -line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical -proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, -but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore altogether -additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept. -Here, too, visualisation (Anschauung) must come to aid us. It alone -makes the synthesis possible. - -Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually -analytical, and depend on the law of contradiction; but they only -serve, as identical propositions, as a method of concatenation, and -not as principles, e.g., a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or a + b -> a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, though -they are recognised as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in -mathematics, because they can be represented in some visual form -(Anschauung). What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such -apodeictic{8} judgments is already contained in our concept, and that -the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the -expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity -implied in the thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to -the concept. But the question is not what we are requested to join in -thought to the given concept, but what we actually think together with -and in it, though obscurely; and so it appears that the predicate -belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed, yet not directly but -indirectly by an added visualisation (Anschauung). - -=================================== -{8} The term apodeictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it -in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from -ἀποδείκνυμι (= I show) and is contrasted to dialectic -propositions, i.e., such statements as admit of controversy.—Ed. -=================================== - -§ 3. A Remark on the General Division of Judgments into Analytical -and Synthetical. - -This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human -understanding, and therefore deserves to be called classical, though -otherwise it is of little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic -philosophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in -Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the pure laws of reason -generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction. -Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baumgarten, came to -seek the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly -synthetical, in the principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, -however, I find an indication of my division. For in the fourth book -(chap. iii. § 9, seq.), having discussed the various connexions of -representations in judgments, and their sources, one of which he makes -"identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the -coexistence of representations in a subject, he confesses (§ 10) that -our a priori knowledge of the latter is very narrow, and almost -nothing. But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there is so -little of what is definite, and reduced to rules, that we cannot -wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make investigations -concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite -principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them -obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our own -reflexion, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly -have found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know -that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who -never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover -everything, after it has been once shown them, in what was said long -since, though no one ever saw it there before. - -§ 4. The General Question of the Prolegomena.—Is Metaphysics at all -Possible? - -Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, -really in existence; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and -it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth: this -question would be useless, and there would only remain that other -question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness, than a proof -of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science possible, -and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been -so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can -point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may -find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest -Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure -reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, -and never questioned; but these are all analytical, and rather concern -the materials and the scaffolding for Metaphysics, than the extension -of knowledge, which is our proper object in studying it (§ 2). Even -supposing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the law of -Sufficient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, from -pure reason a priori, though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse -when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such -doubtful assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted -another, either in its assertions, or their proofs, and thus has -itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very -attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early -appearance of scepticism, a mental attitude in which reason treats -itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from -complete despair of ever satisfying our most important aspirations. -For long before men began to inquire into nature methodically, they -consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised by -means of ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while laws -of nature must usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics -floated to the surface, like foam, which dissolved the moment it was -scooped off. But immediately there appeared a new supply on the -surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead -of seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon, thought they -showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors. - -The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical -cognition among all other a priori cognitions is, that it cannot at -all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of -concepts (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, chap. I., -sect. 1). As therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the -concept to that which its corresponding visualisation (Anschauung) -contains, these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise -analytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all synthetical. - -I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to -philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant -observation. Hume being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to -cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions in which -human understanding claims such mighty possessions, heedlessly severed -from it a whole, and indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure -mathematics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the -state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different -principles, namely, on the law of contradiction alone; and although he -did not divide Judgments in this manner formally and universally as I -have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that mathematics -contains only analytical, but metaphysics synthetical, a priori -judgments. In this, however, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake -had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for -this, he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our -synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of -Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori -also, for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical. -And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere -experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to -experience, a thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company -into which metaphysics would thus have been brought, would have saved -it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the thrust -intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could -not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been -led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now -occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably -elegant style. - -Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We -must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical -judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but -they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments, which are the -whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if -there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of -substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also -pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only -exists as subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments, -we seek to approach the definition of the concept. But as the analysis -of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does -not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other, -even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air -is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any -known degree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the -analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has -something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions, which -must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common -with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the -substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly -metaphysical judgment. - -If the a priori principles, which constitute the materials of -metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed principles, -then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a -particular part (as a philosophia definitiva), containing nothing but -analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated -separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. -For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in -metaphysics, i.e., as regards the synthetical judgments, which are to -be generated by these previously analysed concepts. - -The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is -properly concerned with synethetical propositions a priori, and these -alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various -dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but -wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind -of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our concepts distinct -by analysis. But the generation of a priori cognition by concrete -images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions a -priori in philosophical cognition, constitutes the essential subject -of Metaphysics. - -Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as of -scepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the -quiet state of a contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance of -knowledge so much needed; and lastly, rendered suspicious by long -experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess, or which -offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one -critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, -viz., Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this question must be -answered not by sceptical objections to the asseverations of some -actual system of metaphysics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing -to exist), but from the conception, as yet only problematical, of a -science of this sort. - -In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this question -synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and -endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the -laws of its pure use according to principles. The task is difficult, -and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, -based on no data except reason itself, and which therefore seeks, -without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original -germs. Prolegomena, however, are designed for preparatory exercises; -they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if -possible to actualise a science, than to propound it. They must -therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which -we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown, -the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but -exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same -sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of those designed as a -preparation for future metaphysics, is consequently analytical. - -But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics -to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure -a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are -actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly -recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by -general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of -experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical -knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is -actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the -principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of -all the rest. - -The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible? - -§ 5. We have above learned the significant distinction between -analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical -propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the -law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a posteriori -judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires -no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual -synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical -propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or -investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the -law of contradiction. - -But here we need not first establish the possibility of such -propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are -enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our -present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such -synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must -now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such -cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its -possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its -sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when -expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore: - -How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible? - -For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem -somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, -which I could do for once without detriment to the desired -comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics -and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore going -remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, -we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.{9} - -=================================== -{9} It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions -which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy -of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and -more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. -[This is the case with the term "analytical."] The analytical method, -so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from -that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it -signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, -and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this -method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in -mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive -method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A -principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, -which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, -without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are -analytical or synthetical. -=================================== - -Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its -very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical -assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with -conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this -question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all vain -baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, -and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only -dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do -not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you -conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at -this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the -consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is -a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace: - -"Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi." - -"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence." - -The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and -though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the -possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet -another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one -question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking -reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its -first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every -intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem -requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would -regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually -exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to -David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire -universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer -be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that -acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and -connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a -manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing -but experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he concluded -from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all -that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition -assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting -something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for -objective. - -Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I -occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to -solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under -obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so -profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with -which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been -attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its -whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., -for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it -in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here. - -All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from -their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory -manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" -For the answer contains which they must show when they have anything -to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these -credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who -have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado. - -If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a -science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense -of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the -modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are -not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies -beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not -for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical -purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even -indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in -life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and -the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the -latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when -judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be -admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby -announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with -conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth -nothing at all. - -It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which -necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete -solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and -completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental -philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of -metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to -constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede -all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, -deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself -quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we -should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in -obscurity. - -As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, -in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually -exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition -(which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure -natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects -in a definite and actualisable form (in der Anschauung), and -consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can -show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in -concreto, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the -reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our -work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to -facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they -must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts. - -But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time -well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of -the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must -comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in -spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at -the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any -critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called -metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of -such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental -problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions: - -1. How is pure mathematics possible? -2. How is pure natural science possible? -3. How is metaphysics in general possible? -4. How is metaphysics as a science possible? - -It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly -designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet -something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is -the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that -its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be -investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if -not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and -while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common -origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain -their own nature. - -FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? - -§ 6. - -Here is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing even -now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in -the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodeictical certainty, -i.e., absolute necessity, which therefore rests upon no empirical -grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of reason, and moreover is -thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises:] - -"How then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of -this nature entirely a priori?" - -Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it neither is -nor can be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition -a priori, which lies deeply hidden, but which might reveal itself by -these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently -ferreted out? - -§ 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this -peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form -(Anschauung) and indeed a priori, therefore in a visual form which is -not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single -step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz., "intuitive"; -whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from -mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a -visual figure, can never derive them from it. This observation on the -nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest -condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous -visualisation (called pure intuition, or reine Anschauung) must form -its basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, -in concreto and yet a priori. If we can find out this pure intuition -and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical -propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics, and -consequently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition -[viz., sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the -concept which we frame of an object of intuition [or -sense-perception], by new predicates, which intuition [i.e., -sense-perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure -intuition [viz., the visualisation of forms in our imagination, from -which every thing sensual, i.e., every thought of material qualities, -is excluded] does so likewise, only with this difference, that in the -latter case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and -apodeictical, in the former, only a posteriori and empirically -certain; because this latter contains only that which occurs in -contingent empirical intuition, but the former, that which must -necessarily be discovered in pure intuition. Here intuition, being an -intuition a priori, is before all experience, viz., before any -perception of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its -concept. - -§ 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than -to lessen. For the question now is, "How is it possible to intuite [in -a visual form] anything a priori?" An intuition [viz., a visual -sense-perception] is such a representation as immediately depends upon -the presence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuite from -the outset a priori, because intuition would in that event take place -without either a former or a present object to refer to, and by -consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed are such, that we -can easily form some of them a priori, viz., such as contain nothing -but the thought of an object in general; and we need not find -ourselves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, -the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in -order to make them under stood, a certain concrete use—that is, an -application to some sense-experience (Anschauung), by which an object -of them is given us. But how can the intuition of the object [its -visualisation] precede the object itself? - -§ 9. If our intuition [i.e., our sense-experience] were perforce of -such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there -would not be any intuition a priori, but intuition would be always -empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in -itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then -incomprehensible how the visualising (Anschauung) of a present thing -should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties -cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. But even granting -this possibility, a visualising of that sort would not take place a -priori, that is, before the object were presented to me; for without -this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and -the object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct -inspiration. - -Therefore in one way only can my intuition (Anschauung) anticipate the -actuality of the object, and be a cognition a priori, viz.: if my -intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, antedating in -my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which I am affected -by objects. - -For that objects of sense can only be intuited according to this form -of sensibility I can know a priori. Hence it follows: that -propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are -possible and valid for objects of the senses; as also, conversely, -that intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any -other things than objects of our senses.{10} - -=================================== -{10} This whole paragraph (§ 9) will be better understood when compared -with Remark I., following this section, appearing in the present -edition on page 40.—Ed. -=================================== - -§ 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of the sensuous intuition by -which we can intuite things a priori, but by which we can know objects -only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in -themselves; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical -propositions a priori be granted as possible, or if, in case they -actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined -beforehand. - -Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of -all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and -necessary are Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its -concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition, that -is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any other way, it would -be impossible to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not -analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetically, and if pure -intuition be wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for -synthetical judgments a priori can be given. Geometry is based upon -the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of -number by the successive addition of units in time; and pure mechanics -especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the -representation of time. Both representations, however, are only -intuitions; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and -their alterations (motion) everything empirical, or belonging to -sensation, space and time still remain, which are therefore pure -intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical. Hence they -can never be omitted, but at the same time, by their being pure -intuitions a priori, they prove that they are mere forms of our -sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, or perception -of actual objects, and conformably to which objects can be known a -priori, but only as they appear to us. - -§ 11. The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure -mathematics, as synthetical cognition a priori, is only possible by -referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis -of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of -time) which is a priori. This is possible, because the latter -intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes -the actual appearance of the objects, in that it, in fact, makes them -possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the -matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense-element in it, for this -constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., space and -time. Should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations -adhering not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our -sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know -the constitution of things a priori, viz., before we have any -acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us. Such, -however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite -comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal -conditions of our sensibility, while the objects count merely as -phenomena; for then the form of the phenomenon, i.e., pure intuition, -can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, -a priori. - -§ 12. In order to add something by way of illustration and -confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure -of geometers. All proofs of the complete congruence of two given -figures (where the one can in every respect be substituted for the -other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide; -which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting -upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given a -priori, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodeictically -certain, but would have empirical certainty only. In that case, it -could only be said that it is always found to be so, and holds good -only as far as our perception reaches. That everywhere space (which -[in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another space) -has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is -based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect -at right angles in one point; but this proposition cannot by any means -be shown from concepts, but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed -on pure and a priori intuition, because it is apodeictically certain. -That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity (in indefinitum), -or that a series of changes (for example, spaces traversed by motion) -shall be infinitely continued, presupposes a representation of space -and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as it in -itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be -inferred. Consequently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure -intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodeictically valid -propositions possible. Hence our transcendental deduction of the -notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility -of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be -granted, but its existence could by no means be understood, and we -must assume "that everything which can be given to our senses (to the -external senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuited by -us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself." - -§ 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space -and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves, may -exercise their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain -attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices at least for a -few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and of -time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well -founded. - -If two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be -ascertained by all means possible, quantitatively and qualitatively, -it must follow, that the one can in all cases and under all -circumstances replace the other, and this substitution would not -occasion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true of -plane figures in geometry; but some spherical figures exhibit, -notwithstanding a complete internal agreement, such a contrast in -their external relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in -the place of the other. For instance, two spherical triangles on -opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common -base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that -nothing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself alone -and completed, that would not equally be applicable to both; and yet -the one cannot be put in the place of the other (being situated upon -the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference between -the two triangles, which difference our understanding cannot describe -as internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in -space. - -But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more -obvious still. - -What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike -to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I -cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its -archetype; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left -one, and the image or reflexion of the right ear is a left one which -never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case -no internal differences which our understanding could determine by -thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, -for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left -hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one (they are -not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. -What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things -as they are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would cognise -them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility -of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in -themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. Space is the -form of the external intuition of this sensibility, and the internal -determination of every space is only possible by the determination of -its external relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in -other words, by its relation to the external sense). That is to say, -the part is only possible through the whole, which is never the case -with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but -with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal -things, which are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric -helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the -relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to -intuition. - -Remark I. - -Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have -objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense. -But in regard to the latter the principle holds good, that our sense -representation is not a representation of things in themselves, but of -the way in which they appear to us. Hence it follows, that the -propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our -poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with -assurance to actual objects; but rather that they are necessarily -valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, -because space is nothing else than the form of all external -appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can -be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is -that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends. -Therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what -geometry prescribes to them. - -It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to -represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by -any means follow from the conception of space, which with all its -properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foundation, together -with what is thence inferred, must be so in nature. The space of the -geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be -credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things -must of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make -spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them. But if this -image, or rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of -our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, and -if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their -appearances: we shall easily comprehend, and at the same time -indisputably prove, that all external objects of our world of sense -must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the -propositions of geometry; because sensibility by means of its form of -external intuition, viz., by space, the same with which the geometer -is occupied, makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances. - -It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of -philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at -the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy -of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space, but -of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept -itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much -concern whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points, -and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple -[discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind -[being continuous] cannot be such. They did not recognise that this -mental space renders possible the physical space, i.e., the extension -of matter; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in -themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and -that all objects in space are mere appearances, i.e., not things in -themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition. But such is -the case, for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of -sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us, and contains the -ground of the possibility of all external appearances (according to -their form), and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree -with the propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any -fictitious concept, but from the subjective basis of all external -phenomena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other way can -geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its -propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which -is surprised at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has -not traced them to the sources of their concepts. - -Remark II. - -Whatever is given us as object, must be given us in intuition. All our -intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the -understanding intuites nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just -shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things -in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere -representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, -together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing -but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our -thoughts.' You will say: Is not this manifest idealism? - -Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking -beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, -being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no -object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that -things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we -know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their -appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by -affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are -bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us -as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations -which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we -call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing -which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be -termed idealism? It is the very contrary. - -Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been -generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual -existence of external things, that many of their predicates may be -said to belong not to the things in themselves, but to their -appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our -representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this -kind. Now, if I go farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere -appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called -primary, such as extension, place, and in general space, with all that -which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.)—no -one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As -little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object -in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on -that account be called an idealist, so little can my system be named -idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay, - -All the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong -merely to its appearance. - -The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as -in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly -know it by the senses as it is in itself. - -I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid -all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of -space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our -sensibility has to objects—that I have said—but that it is quite -similar to the object,—an assertion in which I can find as little -meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the -property of vermilion, which in me excites this sensation. - -Remark III. - -Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, -"that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole -sensible world would be turned into mere sham." At first all -philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was -spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of -representation, according to which we still know things as they are, -but without being able to reduce everything in this our representation -to a clear consciousness; whereas proof is offered by us that -sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and -obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself. -For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but -only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by -sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are -given to the understanding for reflexion. After this necessary -corrective, an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost -intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of -the world of sense into mere illusion. - -When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we -should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but -the judgment upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether -in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the -difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature -of the representations, which are referred to objects (for they are -the same in both cases), but by their connexion according to those -rules, which determine the coherence of the representations in the -concept of an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist -together in experience or not. And it is not the fault of the -appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i.e., if the -intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of -the thing or of its existence also, which the understanding can only -think. The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now -progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither falsehood nor -truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but -appearance, we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion. -But as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not -on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being -considered objective, we say they appear to move backward; it is not -the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but the -understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective -judgment on appearances. - -Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our -representations, whenever we connect our intuitions of sense (whatever -they may contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the -coherence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise -according as we are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of -the use of sensuous representations in the understanding, and not of -their origin. In the same way, if I consider all the representations -of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing -but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the -sensibility, which is not to be met with in objects out of it, and if -I make use of these representations in reference to possible -experience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances -that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can -correctly cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all -the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the -objects of the senses, consequently of all possible experience, -whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as -something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case -however I comprehend how I can know a priori these propositions -concerning all the objects of external intuition. Otherwise, -everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if -I had not departed from the vulgar view. - -But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions -of space and time, which I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim -them qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should -prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things, even though -my senses might be different, and unsuited to them?), then a grave -error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be -universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the -intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for -all possible experience; I would refer this condition to things in -themselves, and do not limit it to the conditions of experience. - -My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far from -reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means -of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions -(that which mathematics propounds a priori) to actual objects, and of -preventing its being regarded as mere illusion. For without this -observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the -intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from no experience, and -which yet lie in our representation a priori, are not mere phantasms -of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, at least not -adequately, and consequently, whether we have been able to show its -unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible -world just because they are mere appearances. - -Secondly, though these my principles make appearances of the -representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth -of experience into mere illusion, that they are rather the only means -of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has -hitherto been deceived, leading to the childish endeavor of catching -at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere representations, were -taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remarkable event -of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which -is destroyed by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it -is employed in experience, produces truth, but the moment it -transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes -transcendent, produces nothing but illusion. - -Inasmuch, therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the -senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these -things to this, that they represent in no respect, not even in the -pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more than mere -appearance of those things, but never their constitution in -themselves, this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me. -My protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and -clear as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompetent judges, -who, while they would have an old name for every deviation from their -perverse though common opinion, and never judge of the spirit of -philosophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to -put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions, and -thereby deform and distort them. I have myself given this my theory -the name of transcendental idealism, but that cannot authorise any one -to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes, -(indeed, his was only an insoluble problem, owing to which he thought -every one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, -because it could never be proved satisfactorily), or with the mystical -and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar -phantasms our Critique contains the proper antidote. My idealism -concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, -constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into -my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of -things, to which space and time especially belong. Of these [viz., -space and time], consequently of all appearances in general, I have -only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of -representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. -But the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our -cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was -meant to obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further -occasion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this -idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an -objectionable idealism to convert actual things (not appearances) into -mere representations, by what name shall we call him who conversely -changes mere representations to things? It may, I think, be called -"dreaming idealism," in contradistinction to the former, which may be -called "visionary," both of which are to be refuted by my -transcendental, or, better, critical idealism. - -SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? - -§ 14. - -Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined -according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of -things in themselves, we could never cognise it either a priori or a -posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to things -in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our -concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is -contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] -belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the -thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is -determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, -and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of -things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things -themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must -conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order -to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be -cognised a priori. - -A cognition of the nature of things in themselves a posteriori would -be equally impossible. For, if experience is to teach us laws, to -which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard -things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside -our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it -exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. -Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in -themselves. - -§ 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure science of nature in -which are propounded, a priori and with all the necessity requisite to -apodeictical propositions, laws to which nature is subject. I need -only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which, under -the title of the universal Science of Nature, precedes all Physics -(which is founded upon empirical principles). In it we have -Mathematics applied to appearance, and also merely discursive -principles (or those derived from concepts), which constitute the -philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are -several things in it, which are not quite pure and independent of -empirical sources: such as the concept of motion, that of -impenetrability (upon which the empirical concept of matter rests), -that of inertia, and many others, which prevent its being called a -perfectly pure science of nature. Besides, it only refers to objects -of the external sense, and therefore does not give an example of a -universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science -must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the -external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well -as Psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of this -universal physics there are a few which actually have the required -universality; for instance, the propositions that "substance is -permanent," and that "every event is determined by a cause according -to constant laws," etc. These are actually universal laws of nature, -which subsist completely a priori. There is then in fact a pure -science of nature, and the question arises, How is it possible? - -§ 16. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which determines -the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity -to law [Gesetzmässigkeit] of the determinations of the existence of -things generally. If we consider it materialiter (i.e., in the matter -that forms its objects) "nature is the complex of all the objects of -experience." And with this only are we now concerned, for besides, -things which can never be objects of experience, if they must be -cognised as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to -concepts whose meaning could never be given in concreto (by any -example of possible experience). Consequently we must form for -ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof -(i.e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are mere creations -of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be -an object of experience would be hyperphysical, and with things -hyperphysical we are here not concerned, but only with the cognition -of nature, the actuality of which can be confirmed by experience, -though it [the cognition of nature] is possible a priori and precedes -all experience. - -§ 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this narrower sense is -therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience, and -so far as it is cognised a priori, their necessary conformity. But it -has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be cognised a -priori in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to -possible experience, but as things in themselves. And our inquiry here -extends not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass -by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex -of these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when -the possibility of a cognition of nature a priori is in question, -whether it is better to arrange the problem thus: How can we cognise a -priori that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to -law? or thus: How is it possible to cognise a priori the necessary -conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects -generally? - -Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either -way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is -the point of the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For -the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of -things is possible, hold good of these things, as Objects of possible -experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered -here). Either of the following statements means quite the same: - -A judgment of observation can never rank as experience, without the -law, that "whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to -some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule." - -"Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have a -cause." - -It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For we -can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of -those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of -the laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without -reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature -of things a priori otherwise than by investigating the conditions and -the universal (though subjective) laws, under which alone such a -cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible, and we -determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of -experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the -conditions a priori, on which nature as an object of experience is -possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was -speaking of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round in -endless circles, in a vain search for laws concerning things of which -nothing is given me. - -Accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only, and the -universal conditions of its possibility which are given a priori. -Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible -experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the -rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for these -already presuppose experience. I do not mean how (through experience) -we can study the laws of nature; for these would not then be laws a -priori, and would yield us no pure science of nature; but [I mean to -ask] how the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience are -at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of -nature must be derived. - -§ 18. In the first place we must state that, while all judgments of -experience (Erfahrungsurtheile) are empirical (i.e., have their ground -in immediate sense perception), vice versa, all empirical judgments -(empirische Urtheile) are not judgments of experience, but, besides -the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the sensuous -intuition, particular concepts must yet be superadded—concepts which -have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding, and under -which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their -means changed into experience.{11} - -=================================== -{11} Empirical judgments (empirische Urtheile) are either mere -statements of fact, viz., records of a perception, or statements of a -natural law, implying a causal connexion between two facts. The former -Kant calls "judgments of perception" (Wahrnehmungsurtheile) the latter -"judgments of experience" (Erhfahrungsurtheile).—Ed. -=================================== - -Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are -judgments of experience; but those which are only subjectively valid, -I name mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure -concept of the understanding, but only the logical connexion of -perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, -besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular -concepts originally begotten in the understanding, which produce the -objective validity of the judgment of experience. - -All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they -hold good only for us (i.e., for our subject), and we do not till -afterwards give them a new reference (to an object), and desire that -they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody -else; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments -concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and -thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies -nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And -conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily -universal (which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure -concept of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumed), -we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not -merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of -the object. For there would be no reason for the judgments of other -men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the -object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they -must all agree with one another. - -§ 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for -everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object -in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also -necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this -judgment we cognise the object (though it remains unknown as it is in -itself) by the universal and necessary connexion of the given -perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments -of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate -cognition of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition -of universal validity in empirical judgments, which, as already said, -never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but -upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains -unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the -connexion of the representations of the object, which are given to our -sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is -determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective. - -To illustrate the matter: When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, -and wormwood bitter"{12}—we have only subjectively valid judgments. I -do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it -as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two -sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present -state of perception; consequently they are not valid of the object. -Such are judgments of perception. Judgments of experience are of quite -a different nature. What experience teaches me under certain -circumstances, it must always teach me and everybody; and its validity -is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time. -Hence I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For -instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a -judgment of perception only—I do nothing but refer two of my -sensations to one another. But, if I would have it called a judgment -of experience, I require this connexion to stand under a condition, -which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and -everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions -under the same circumstances. - -=================================== -{12} I freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments -of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even -though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they -refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely -subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, -and consequently never become objective. I only wished to give here an -example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no -ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the -object. An example of the judgments of perception, which become -judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding, -will be given in the next note. -=================================== - -§ 20. We must consequently analyse experience in order to see what is -contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding, and -how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is -the intuition of which I become conscious, i.e., perception -(perceptio), which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next -place, there are acts of judging (which belong only to the -understanding). But this judging may be twofold—first, I may merely -compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my -consciousness; or, secondly, I may connect them in consciousness -generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and -of subjective validity only: it is merely a connexion of perceptions -in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence it is not, -as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions -and to connect them in consciousness through judgment; there arises no -universality and necessity, for which alone judgments can become -objectively valid and be called experience. - -Quite another judgment therefore is required before perception can -become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a -concept, which determines the form of judging in general relatively to -the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness -generally, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical -judgments. A concept of this nature is a pure a priori concept of the -Understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the -general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be -that of cause, then it determines the intuition which is subsumed -under it, e.g., that of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., -the concept of air serves with regard to its expansion in the relation -of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of -cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is -totally disparate from all possible perception, and only serves to -determine the representation subsumed under it, relatively to -judgments in general, and so to make a universally valid judgment -possible. - -Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of -experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed -under some such a concept of the understanding; for instance, air -ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about -it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical.{13} Thereby the expansion -of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of -the air in my present state or in several states of mine, or in the -state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The -judgment, "the air is elastic," becomes universally valid, and a -judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which -subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect: -and they thereby determine the perceptions not merely as regards one -another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which -is here hypothetical, and in this way they render the empirical -judgment universally valid. - -=================================== -{13} As an easier example, we may take the following: "When the sun -shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I -and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, -and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in -this manner. But if I say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the -perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which -connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary -consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity -universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception -into experience. -=================================== - -If all our synthetical judgments are analysed so far as they are -objectively valid, it will be found that they never consist of mere -intuitions connected only (as is commonly believed) by comparison into -a judgment; but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept -of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted from -intuition, under which concept these latter are subsumed, and in this -manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment. Even the -judgments of pure mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt -from this condition. The principle, "a straight line is the shortest -between two points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under the -concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, but has its -seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition -(of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, -relatively to their quantity, that is, to plurality (as judicia -plurativa).{14} For under them it is understood that in a given -intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts. - -=================================== -{14} This name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used -for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that -they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single -judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly -and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality -merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. -This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of -the pure concepts of the understanding. However, there is no need of -making changes in logic. -=================================== - -§ 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it -rests upon pure concepts of the understanding a priori, we must first -represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various -functions of the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure -concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, as -such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general, -so far as these are determined by one or other of these functions of -judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby -also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience, as -of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely -determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all -perception is (under certain universal conditions of intuition) -subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding. - - -Logical Table of Judgments. - - 1. 2. -As to Quantity. As to Quality. - Universal. Affirmative. - Particular. Negative. - Singular. Infinite. - - 3. 4. -As to Relation. As to Modality. - Categorical. Problematical. - Hypothetical. Assertorial. - Disjunctive. Apodeictical. - - -Transcendental Table of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. - - 1. 2. -As to Quantity. As to Quality. - Unity (the Measure). Reality. - Plurality (the Quantity). Negation. - Totality (the Whole). Limitation. - - 3. 4. -As to Relation. As to Modality. - Substance. Possibility. - Cause. Existence. - Community. Necessity. - - -Pure Physiological Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature. - - 1. 2. -Axioms of Intuition. Anticipations of Perception. - - 3. 4. -Analogies of Experience. Postulates of Empirical Thinking - generally. - - -§ 21a. In order to comprise the whole matter in one idea, it is first -necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin -of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former -pertains to empirical psychology, and would even then never be -adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the Critique -of cognition, and particularly of the understanding. - -Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, -and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But -the judgments, which the understanding forms alone from sensuous -intuitions, are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one -case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in -the sensuous intuition, while in the other the judgments must express -what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which -possesses only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of -experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its -logical connexion in a judgment (after it has been rendered universal -by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as -necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else -than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in -itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another, viz., -a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be -represented by a given logical function of judgments. - -§ 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to -intuite—that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is -uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates -either merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and -subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objective. The union -of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking -therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to -judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, -when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject -only, and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a -consciousness generally, that is, necessarily. The logical functions -of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in -consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, they are concepts of -their necessary union in a consciousness, and so principles of -objectively valid judgments. This union in a consciousness is either -analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combination and -addition of various representations one to another. Experience -consists in the synthetical connexion of phenomena (perceptions) in -consciousness, so far as this connexion is necessary. Hence the pure -concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions -must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in -which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as -necessary and universally valid.{15} - -=================================== -{15} But how does this proposition, "that judgments of experience -contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my -statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a -posteriori can afford contingent judgments only?" When I say that -experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies -in experience,—for example, that heat always follows the shining of -the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is -always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the -shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience -(by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by -experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by -this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to -perception. How perception attains this addition may be seen by -referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental -faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first edition, Von dem Schematismus -der reinen Verstandsbegriffe]. -=================================== - -§ 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the -union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These -rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules a -priori, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are -fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all -experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no -conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which -bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, -under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical -judgment objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the a priori -principles of possible experience. - -The principles of possible experience are then at the same time -universal laws of nature, which can be cognised a priori. And thus the -problem in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature -possible?" is solved. For the system which is required for the form of -a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the -above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered -in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical -system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori -conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly -constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means -of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a -physical{16} system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all -empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence may -in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature. - -=================================== -{16} [Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as -"pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in general, not -as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living -body." Accordingly it has been translated "physical."—Ed.] -=================================== - -§ 24. The first one{17} of the physiological principles subsumes all -phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of -Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics -to experience. The second one subsumes the empirical element, viz., -sensation which denotes the real in intuitions, not indeed directly -under the concept of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition -that contains either space or time, though it places the respective -object into both. But still there is between reality -(sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in -time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every given -degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of heat and of -absolute cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute -lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void -space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as -between consciousness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a -psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is -no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it; for instance, -no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of -consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the -understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the -peculiar quality of empirical representations (appearances), by means -of the principle: "that they all have (consequently that what is real -in all phenomena has) a degree." Here is the second application of -mathematics (mathesis intensorum) to the science of nature. - -=================================== -{17} The three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless -reference be made to what the Critique itself says on the subject of -the Principles; they will, however, be of service in giving a general -view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention on the main -points. -=================================== - -§ 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their -existence, the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and -can never be objectively valid, consequently never fit for experience, -if it does not come under a priori principles by which the cognition -of experience relative to appearances becomes even possible. Hence -appearances must be subsumed under the concept of Substance, which is -the foundation of all determination of existence, as a concept of the -thing itself; or secondly—so far as, a succession is found among -phenomena, that is, an event—under the concept of an Effect with -reference to Cause; or lastly—so far as coexistence is to be known -objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience—under the concept -of Community (action and reaction).{18} Thus a priori principles form -the basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, -of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as -existing in nature. These principles are the proper laws of nature, -which may be termed dynamical. - -=================================== -{18} [Kant uses here the equivocal term Wechselwirkung.—Ed.] -=================================== - -Finally the cognition of the agreement and connexion not only of -appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to -experience in general, belongs to the judgments of experience. This -relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions, -which the understanding cognises, or their coherence with the -materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one -concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and -Necessity according to universal laws of nature; and this constitutes -the physical doctrine of method, or the distinction of truth and of -hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the latter. - -§ 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of the -understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent -perfection, which raises it far above every other table which has -hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analysing -the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all synthetical a -priori principles completely and according to one principle, viz., the -faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of experience -as regards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are -no more such principles, a satisfaction such as can never be attained -by the dogmatical method. Yet is this not all: there is a still -greater merit in it. - -We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility -of this cognition a priori, and at the same time limits all such -principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we -desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the -original sense which the understanding attaches to it. This limit is -that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in -general so far as it is subjected to laws a priori. Consequently I do -not say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that their -actuality possesses a degree, their existence a connexion of accidents -in a substance, etc. This nobody can prove, because such a synthetical -connexion from mere concepts, without any reference to sensuous -intuition on the one side, or connexion of it in a possible experience -on the other, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of -the concepts in these principles then is: That all things stand -necessarily a priori under the afore-mentioned conditions, as objects -of experience only. - -Hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of -these principles: they are not directly referred to appearances and to -their relations, but to the possibility of experience, of which -appearances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus they are -referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical -propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from -those of perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere -intuitions, occupying a part of space and time, come under the concept -of Quantity, which unites their multiplicity a priori according to -rules synthetically. Again, so far as the perception contains, besides -intuition, sensibility, and between the latter and nothing (i.e., the -total disappearance of sensibility), there is an ever decreasing -transition, it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have -a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy -any part of space or of time.{19} Still the transition to actuality from -empty time or empty space is only possible in time; consequently -though sensibility, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never -be cognised a priori, by its specific difference from other -sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a -quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other -similar perception. Hence the application of mathematics to nature, as -regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us, becomes -possible and is thus determined. - -=================================== -{19} Heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as -in a large one; in like manner the internal representations, pain, -consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long time, -need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point -and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great. -Degrees are therefore capable of increase, but not in intuition, -rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the degree of an -intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the -relation of 1 to 0, viz., by their capability of decreasing by -infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from -naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a -certain time. Quantitas qualitatis est gradus [i.e., the degrees of -quality must be measured by equality]. -=================================== - -Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the -principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For -these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the principles -of applied mathematics, but to the connexion of their existence in -experience; and this can be nothing but the determination of their -existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone the -connexion is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof -therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connexion of -things in themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these not in -regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the -relation of their existence in it, according to universal laws. If the -empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid -(i.e., experience), these universal laws contain the necessary -determination of existence in time generally (viz., according to a -rule of the understanding a priori). - -In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but my -reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a -mere empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not considered that -it goes much beyond them, as it imparts to empirical judgments -universal validity, and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori -unity of the understanding) is recommended to pay special attention to -this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions, -and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view. - -§ 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly -maintains, that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of -Causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to -the existence of another, which is necessitated by the former. I add, -that we comprehend just as little the concept of Subsistence, that is, -the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there -lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing; -nay, we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing -(though we can point out examples of its use in experience). The very -same in comprehensibility affects the Community of things, as we -cannot comprehend how from the state of one thing an inference to the -state of quite another thing beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, -and how substances which have each their own separate existence should -depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding -these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity -represented in them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in -us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown, that they and -the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori, or -before all experience, and have their undoubted objective value, -though only with regard to experience. - -§ 28. Though I have no notion of such a connexion of things in -themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as -causes, or stand in community with others (as parts of a real whole), -and I can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as -such (because those concepts contain nothing that lies in the -appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think): we -have yet a notion of such a connexion of representations in our -understanding, and in judgments generally; consisting in this that -representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation -to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, and -in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible -cognition. Besides we cognise a priori that without considering the -representation of an object as determined in some of these respects, -we can have no valid cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy -ourselves about the object in itself, there is no possible attribute, -by which I could know that it is determined under any of these -aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, -or (in relation to other substances) of community, for I have no -notion of the possibility of such a connexion of existence. But the -question is not how things in themselves, but how the empirical -cognition of things is determined, as regards the above aspects of -judgments in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, -can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding. -And then it is clear, that I completely comprehend not only the -possibility, but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under -these concepts, that is, of using them for principles of the -possibility of experience. - -§ 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept -(his crux metaphysicorum), the concept of cause, we have, in the first -place, given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional -judgment in general, i.e., we have one given cognition as antecedent -and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we -may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that a certain -phenomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), -and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment, and, for -instance, to say, it the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows -warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connexion, or -concept of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, -which is merely a subjective connexion of perceptions, is to be a -judgment of experience, it must be considered as necessary and -universally valid. Such a proposition would be, "the sun is by its -light the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a -law, and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the -purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and -therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend the -concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form -of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of -perceptions in consciousness generally; but I do not at all comprehend -the possibility of a thing generally as a cause, because the concept -of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things, but to -experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition -of appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can -be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical -judgments. - -§ 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to -objects of experience but to things in themselves (noumena), they have -no signification whatever. They serve, as it were, only to decipher -appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The -principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, -only serve our understanding for empirical use. Beyond this they are -arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and we can neither -cognise their possibility a priori, nor verify their reference to -objects, let alone make it intelligible by any example; because -examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, -consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in -a possible experience. - -This complete (though to its originator unexpected) solution of Hume's -problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their a -priori origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity, as -laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as to limit their use to -experience, because their possibility depends solely on the reference -of the understanding to experience, but with a completely reversed -mode of connexion which never occurred to Hume, not by deriving them -from experience, but by deriving experience from them. - -This is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All -synthetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of -possible experience, and can never be referred to things in -themselves, but to appearances as objects of experience. And hence -pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be -referred to anything more than mere appearances, and can only -represent either that which makes experience generally possible, or -else that which, as it is derived from these principles, must always -be capable of being represented in some possible experience. - -§ 31. And thus we have at last something definite, upon which to -depend in all metaphysical enterprises, which have hitherto, boldly -enough but always at random, attempted everything without -discrimination. That the aim of their exertions should be so near, -struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, confident in -their supposed sound common sense, started with concepts and -principles of pure reason (which were legitimate and natural, but -destined for mere empirical use) in quest of fields of knowledge, to -which they neither knew nor could know any determinate bounds, because -they had never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or -even on the possibility of such a pure understanding. - -Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes -he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may -pretend, that he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, -not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded -with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: -"that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of -experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles -individually, he must grant, that there are many of them which he has -not taken from experience, and which are therefore independent of it -and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both -himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and -principles beyond all possible experience, because they are recognised -to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in -spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt -from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the -field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in them, though -in announcing everything as mere probability, rational conjecture, or -analogy, he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless -pretensions. - -§ 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason -have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances -(phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of -the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should -constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were -by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an -undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of -thought. - -And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere -appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in -itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, -but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are -affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by -assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves -also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as -form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the -understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. - -Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort -(noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the -science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all -things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but -that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. -Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the -inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we -neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure -objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the -understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but -objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, -and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning -whatever." - -§ 33. There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the -understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent use, —a use which -transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts of -substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, quite -independent of experience, containing nothing of sense appearance, and -so apparently applicable to things in themselves (noumena), but, what -strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination -in themselves, which experience never attains. The concept of cause -implies a rule, according to which one state follows another -necessarily; but experience can only show us, that one state of things -often, or at most, commonly, follows another, and therefore affords -neither strict universality, nor necessity. - -Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can -be exhausted by their empirical use, and so the understanding -inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more -extensive wing, which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought, -without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise -lawful concepts the bounds of their use. - -§ 34. Two important, and even indispensable, though very dry, -investigations had therefore become indispensable in the Critique of -Pure Reason,—viz., the two chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen -Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der Unterscheidung aller -Verstandesbegriffe überhaupt in Phänomena und Noumena." In the -former it is shown, that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of -the understanding in concreto, but only the schedule for their use, -and that the object conformable to it occurs only in experience (as -the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility). -In the latter it is shown, that, although our pure concepts of the -understanding and our principles are independent of experience, and -despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use, still nothing -whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience, -because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of -the judgment relatively to given intuitions. But as there is no -intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility, these pure -concepts, as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concreto, are void -of all meaning; consequently all these noumena, together with their -complex, the intelligible world,{20} are nothing but representation of a -problem, of which the object in itself is possible, but the solution, -from the nature of our understanding, totally impossible. For our -understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of the connexion of -given intuitions in experience. Experience must therefore contain all -the objects for our concepts; but beyond it no concepts have any -significance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a -foundation. - -=================================== -{20} We speak of the "intelligible world," not (as the usual expression -is) "intellectual world." For cognitions are intellectual through the -understanding, and refer to our world of sense also; but objects, so -far as they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to -which none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed -"intelligible." But as some possible intuition must correspond to -every object, we would have to assume an understanding that intuites -things immediately; but of such we have not the least notion, nor have -we of the things of the understanding [Verstandeswesen], to which it -should be applied. -=================================== - -§ 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional -vagaries, and for not keeping carefully within the limits of -experience, since it gains life and vigor by such flights, and since -it is always easier to moderate its boldness, than to stimulate its -languor. But the understanding which ought to think can never be -forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend upon it alone for -assistance to set bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the -imagination. - -But the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and -modestly. It first elucidates the elementary cognitions, which inhere -in it prior to all experience, but yet must always have their -application in experience. It gradually drops these limits, and what -is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its principles -from itself? And then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in -nature, then to beings, outside nature; in short to a world, for whose -construction the materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction -furnishes them abundantly, and though not confirmed, is never refuted, -by experience. This is the reason that young thinkers are so partial -to metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often sacrifice to it -their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better -employed. - -But there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of -pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of -solving questions so occult, by complaints of the limits of our -reason, and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures. For if -their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and reason's cognition of -its own essence does not become a true science, in which the field of -its right use is distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty -from that of its worthless and idle use, these fruitless efforts will -never be abandoned for good. - -§ 36. How is Nature itself possible? - -This question—the highest point that transcendental philosophy can -ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must -proceed—properly contains two questions. - -First: How is nature at all possible in the material sense, by -intuition, considered as the totality of appearances; how are space, -time, and that which fills both—the object of sensation, in general -possible? The answer is: By means of the constitution of our -Sensibility, according to which it is specifically affected by -objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally distinct -from those phenomena. This answer is given in the Critique itself in -the transcendental Aesthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution -of the first general problem. - -Secondly: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality -of the rules, under which all phenomena must come, in order to be -thought as connected in experience? The answer must be this: It is -only possible by means of the constitution of our Understanding, -according to which all the above representations of the sensibility -are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar -way in which we think (viz., by rules), and hence experience also, are -possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the -objects in themselves. This answer is given in the Critique itself in -the transcendental Logic, and in these Prolegomena, in the course of -the solution of the second main problem. - -But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible, -or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is -necessarily its basis and that of all thinking, cannot be further -analysed or answered, because it is of them that we are in need for -all our answers and for all our thinking about objects. - -There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of -experience; but conformity to law in the connexion of appearances, -i.e., in nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, -because experience itself requires laws which are a priori at the -basis of its possibility. - -The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time -the universal law of nature, and the principles of the experience are -the very laws of nature. For we do not know nature but as the totality -of appearances, i.e., of representations in us, and hence we can only -derive the laws of its connexion from the principles of their -connexion in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary union -in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience. - -Even the main proposition expounded throughout this section—that -universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognised a priori—leads -naturally to the proposition: that the highest legislation of nature -must lie in ourselves, i.e., in our understanding, and that we must -not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of -experience, but conversely must seek nature, as to its universal -conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, -which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. For how were it -otherwise possible to know a priori these laws, as they are not rules -of analytical cognition, but truly synthetical extensions of it? - -Such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience -with the laws of the possibility of nature, can only proceed from one -of two reasons: either these laws are drawn from nature by means of -experience, or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the -possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as the -mere universal conformity to law of the latter. The former is -self-contradictory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be -cognised a priori (that is, independent of all experience), and be the -foundation of all empirical use of the understanding; the latter -alternative therefore alone remains.{21} - -=================================== -{21} Crusius alone thought of a compromise: that a Spirit, who can -neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But -since false principles often intrude themselves, as indeed the very -system of this man shows in not a few examples, we are involved in -difficulties as to the use of such a principle in the absence of sure -criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious, as we -never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth or the father of -lies may have instilled into us. -=================================== - -But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, which always -presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of -nature, which, without being based on particular perceptions, contain -merely the conditions of their necessary union in experience. In -relation to the latter, nature and possible experience are quite the -same, and as the conformity to law here depends upon the necessary -connexion of appearances in experience (without which we cannot -cognise any object whatever in the sensible world), consequently upon -the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but -is not the less certain, to say: - -The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but -prescribes them to, nature. - -§ 37. We shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by an -example, which will show, that laws, which we discover in objects of -sensuous intuition (especially when these laws are cognised as -necessary), are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed -there by the understanding, in spite of their being similar in all -points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience. - -§ 38. If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this -figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself, -at once in a universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a -constitution (eine Natur) to this geometrical thing. Two right lines, -for example, which intersect one another and the circle, howsoever -they may be drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle -constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed -with the segments of the other. The question now is: Does this law lie -in the circle or in the understanding, that is, Does this figure, -independently of the understanding, contain in itself the ground of -the law, or does the understanding, having constructed according to -its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the figure -itself, introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another -in geometrical proportion? When we follow the proofs of this law, we -soon perceive, that it can only be derived from the condition on which -the understanding founds the construction of this figure, and which is -that of the equality of the radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to -pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures -under common laws, and consider the circle as a conic section, which -of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of -construction as other conic sections, we shall find that all the -chords which intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola, -always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not -indeed equal, but always bear a constant ratio to one another. If we -proceed still farther, to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy, -we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all -material nature, the rule of which is: "that it decreases inversely as -the square of the distance from each attracting point, i.e., as the -spherical surfaces increase, over which this force spreads," which law -seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things, and -hence is usually propounded as cognisable a priori. Simple as the -sources of this law are, merely resting upon the relation of spherical -surfaces of different radii, its consequences are so valuable with -regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not -only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections, -but such a relation of these orbits to each other results, that no -other law of attraction, than that of the inverse square of the -distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system. - -Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the -understanding cognises a priori, and chiefly from the universal -principles of the determination of space. Now I ask: - -Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding learn -them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning -that lies in space; or do they inhere in the understanding and in the -way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the -synthetical unity in which its concepts are all centred? - -Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so -indeterminate, that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of -nature in it. Whereas that which determines space to assume the form -of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere, is the -understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their -constructions. - -The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be -the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects, -and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the -variety of these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is -entirely determined by the understanding, and on conditions which lie -in its own nature; and thus the understanding is the origin of the -universal order of nature, in that it comprehends all appearances -under its own laws, and thereby first constructs, a priori, experience -(as to its form), by means of which whatever is to be cognised only by -experience, is necessarily subjected to its laws. For we are not now -concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is -independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our -understanding, but with nature, as an object of possible experience, -and in this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience -possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an -object of experience at all, or must be nature [viz., an existence of -things, determined according to universal laws{22}]. - -=================================== -{22} The definition of nature is given in the beginning of the Second -Part of the "Transcendental Problem," in § 14. -=================================== - -APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE. - -§ 39. Of the System of the Categories. - -There can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher, than to be able -to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the -principles, which had occurred to him in concrete use, from a -principle a priori, and to unite everything in this way in one -cognition. He formerly only believed that those things, which remained -after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among one -another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were completely -collected; but this was only an Aggregate. Now he knows, that just so -many, neither more nor less, can constitute the mode of cognition, and -perceives the necessity of his division, which constitutes -comprehension; and now only he has attained a System. - -To search in our daily cognition for the concepts, which do not rest -upon particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of -experience, where they as it were constitute the mere form of -connexion, presupposes neither greater reflexion nor deeper insight, -than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words -generally, and thus to collect elements for a grammar. In fact both -researches are very nearly related, even though we are not able to -give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal -constitution, and still less why an exact number of such formal -determinations in general are found in it. - -Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of -Categories.{23} To these, which are also called predicaments, he found -himself obliged afterwards to add five post-predicaments,{24} some of -which however (prius, simul, and motus) are contained in the former; -but this random collection must be considered (and commended) as a -mere hint for future inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and -hence it has, in the present more advanced state of philosophy, been -rejected as quite useless. - -=================================== -{23} 1. Substantia. 2. Qualitas. 3. Quantitas. 4. Relatio, 5. Actio. -6. Passio. 7. Quando, 8. Ubi. 9. Situs. 10. Habitus. - -{24} Oppositum. Prius. Simul. Motus. Habere. -=================================== - -After long reflexion on the pure elements of human knowledge (those -which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in -distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary -notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from those of the -Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 9th Categories had to be -excluded from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; -because there was no principle [in them], on which the understanding -could be investigated, measured in its completion, and all the -functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined exhaustively and -with precision. - -But in order to discover such a principle, I looked about for an act -of the understanding which comprises all the rest, and is -distinguished only by various modifications or phases, in reducing the -multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general: I -found this act of the understanding to consist in judging. Here then -the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though not yet quite -free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a -complete table of the pure functions of the understanding, which are -however undetermined in regard to any object. I finally referred these -functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition -of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the -pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make -certain, that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole -cognition of things from pure understanding. I was justified in -calling them by their old name, Categories, while I reserved for -myself the liberty of adding, under the title of "Predicables," a -complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by combinations -whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the appearance, -i.e., space or time, or with its matter, so far as it is not yet -empirically determined (viz., the object of sensation in general), as -soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with -the construction of which I am engaged in the Critique of Pure Reason -itself. - -Now the essential point in this system of Categories, which -distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any -principle, and for which alone it deserves to be considered as -philosophy, consists in this: that by means of it the true -significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the -condition of their use could be precisely determined. For here it -became obvious that they are themselves nothing but logical functions, -and as such do not produce the least concept of an object, but require -some sensuous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve to -determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and -indifferent as regards all functions of judging, relatively to these -functions, thereby procuring them universal validity, and by means of -them making judgments of experience in general possible. - -Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them -at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either -to their first author, or to any of his successors; but without this -insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or -deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names, -without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients ever -conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure -rational knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has for -centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached us in quite -another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding, -instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations, -thereby rendering it unfit for true science. - -This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure -reason itself systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and -through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must -proceed, in order to be complete; for it exhausts all the possible -movements (momenta) of the understanding, among which every concept -must be classed. In like manner the table of Principles has been -formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the -system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts,{25} -which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding, it -is always the very same clue, which, as it must always be determined a -priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding, always -forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object of a pure -conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is -to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles, can in -this way be completely cognised. I could not therefore omit to make -use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological -divisions, viz., the various distinctions of "the notions of something -and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Critique, p. 207) a -regular and necessary table of their divisions.{26} - -=================================== -{25} See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogismen der reinen -Vernuuft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System -der kosmologischen Ideen. - -{26} On the table of the categories many neat observations may be made, -for instance: (1) that the third arises from the first and the second -joined in one concept; (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality -there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to -nothing (for this purpose the categories of Quality must stand thus: -reality, limitation, total negation), without correlata or opposita, -whereas those of Relation and of Modality have them; (3) that, as in -Logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others, so the -category of Substance is the basis of all concepts of actual things; -(4) that as Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so -by the modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things, -etc., etc. Such observations are of great use. If we besides enumerate -all the predicables, which we can find pretty completely in any good -ontology (for example, Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes -under the categories, in which operation we must not neglect to add as -complete a dissection of all these concepts as possible, there will -then arise a merely analytical part of metaphysics, which does not -contain a single synthetical proposition, which might precede the -second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and completeness -be not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some -extent elegant. -=================================== - -And this system, like every other true one founded on a universal -principle, shows its inestimable value in this, that it excludes all -foreign concepts, which might otherwise intrude among the pure -concepts of the understanding, and determines the place of every -cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of "concepts of -reflexion" have been likewise arranged in a table according to the -clue of the categories, intrude, without having any privilege or title -to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in Ontology. They -are concepts of connexion, and thereby of the objects themselves, -whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts -already given, hence of quite another nature and use. By my systematic -division{27} they are saved from this confusion. But the value of my -special table of the categories will be still more obvious, when we -separate the table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from the -concepts of the understanding. The latter being of quite another -nature and origin, they must have quite another form than the former. -This so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of -metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational concepts all mixed up with -the categories, like children of one family, which confusion was -unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories. - -=================================== -{27} See Critique of Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolie der Reflexbegriffe. -=================================== - -THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? - -§ 40. - -Pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a -deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and -certainty. For the former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter -(though sprung from pure sources of the understanding) upon experience -and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot altogether refuse and -dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its -certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both -sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, -but for the sake of another science, metaphysics. - -Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always -find their application in experience, but also with pure rational -concepts, which never can be given in any possible experience. -Consequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz., that they -are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of metaphysical -assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This -part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its -essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and thus this -science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake. The third -question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and -essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason -with itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately -from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed -being able to reach that knowledge through, experience.{28} - -=================================== -{28} If we can say, that a science is actual at least in the ideas of -all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are -proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that -therefore many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its -behalf, then we are bound to say that metaphysics is subjectively (and -indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we justly ask, how is it -(objectively) possible. -=================================== - -Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The empirical -use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully -satisfy the proper destination of the latter. Every single experience -is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the absolute -totality of all possible experience is itself not experience. Yet it -is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere representation -of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose -use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far as it can be -given. Whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e., -the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend -every given experience. Thus they become transcendent. - -As the understanding stands in need of categories for experience, -reason contains in itself the source of ideas, by which I mean -necessary concepts, whose object cannot be given in any experience. -The latter are inherent in the nature of reason, as the former are in -that of the understanding. While the former carry with them an -illusion likely to mislead, the illusion of the latter is inevitable, -though it certainly can be kept from misleading us. - -Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our -judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its -transcendent (exaggerated) use is the sole preservative from the -aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination, -and refers that to the object transcendently, which only regards its -own subject and its guidance in all immanent use. - -§ 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure concepts of reason, -from categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, as cognitions -of a quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a point -in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these a -priori cognitions, that without this distinction metaphysics is -absolutely impossible, or is at best a random, bungling attempt to -build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or of -their fitness for any purpose. Had the Critique of Pure Reason done -nothing but first point out this distinction, it had thereby -contributed more to clear up our conception of, and to guide our -inquiry in, the field of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which -have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure -reason, without ever surmising that we were in quite another field -than that of the understanding, and hence classing concepts of the -understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the -same kind. - -§ 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature, -that their concepts present themselves in experience, and their -principles can be confirmed by it; whereas the transcendent cognitions -of reason cannot, either as ideas, appear in experience, or as -propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it. Hence whatever errors -may slip in unawares, can only be discovered by pure reason itself—a -discovery of much difficulty, because this very reason naturally -becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable -illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researches -into things, but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a -source of ideas. - -§ 43. In the Critique of Pure Reason it was always my greatest care -to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the several species of -cognition, but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from -their common source. I did this in order that by knowing whence they -originated, I might determine their use with safety, and also have the -unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of -my enumeration, classification and specification of concepts a priori, -and therefore according to principles. Without this, metaphysics is -mere rhapsody, in which no one knows whether he has enough, or whether -and where something is still wanting. We can indeed have this -advantage only in pure philosophy, but of this philosophy it -constitutes the very essence. - -As I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical -functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it was quite -natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the -syllogisms of reason. For as soon as these pure concepts of reason -(the transcendental ideas) are given, they could hardly, except they -be held innate, be found anywhere else, than in the same activity of -reason, which, so far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical -element of the syllogisms of reason; but, so far as it represents -judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or to the other -form a priori, constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason. - -The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into -categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive necessary. The concepts of -reason founded on them contained therefore, first, the idea of the -complete subject (the substantial); secondly, the idea of the complete -series of conditions; thirdly, the determination of all concepts in -the idea of a complete complex of that which is possible.{29} The first -idea is psychological, the second cosmological, the third theological, -and, as all three give occasion to Dialectics, yet each in its own -way, the division of the whole Dialects of pure reason into its -Paralogism, its Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly. -Through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure -reason are completely represented, and that none can be wanting; -because the faculty of reason itself, whence they all take their -origin, is thereby completely surveyed. - -=================================== -{29} In disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility as divided in -respect to a particular concept. By the ontological principle of the -universal determination of a thing in general, I understand the -principle that either the one or the other of all possible -contradictory predicates must be assigned to any object. This is at -the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments, constituting -the foundation of our conception of possibility, and in it the -possibility of every object in general is considered as determined. -This may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition: that -the activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same -as that by which it fashions the idea of a universal conception of all -reality, containing in itself that which is positive in all -contradictory predicates. -=================================== - -§ 44. In these general considerations it is also remarkable that the -ideas of reason are unlike the categories, of no service to the use of -our understanding in experience, but quite dispensable, and become -even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature. -Yet in another aspect still to be determined they are necessary. -Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of no consequence -to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the -notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that -is sensuous or concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards -all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all -serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or -external experience supplies. So the cosmological ideas of the -beginning of the world or of its eternity (a parte ante) cannot be of -any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the -world itself. And finally we must, according to a right maxim of the -philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanations of the design of -nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; because this would not -be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that we have come to the -end of it. The use of these ideas, therefore, is quite different from -that of those categories by which (and by the principles built upon -which) experience itself first becomes possible. But our laborious -analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing -else in view than the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in -experience; for reason does its work, both in mathematics and in the -science of nature, quite safely and well without any of this subtle -deduction. Therefore our Critique of the Understanding combines with -the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical -use of the understanding; but this we have above declared to be in -this aspect totally inadmissible, and without any object or meaning. -Yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and -that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the -perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly upset it. - -The solution of this question is as follows: Pure reason does not in -its ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of -experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the -understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can -be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions (i.e., -concrete atsights or Anschauungen) and of objects. In order however to -represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the -fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition is as far as -these rules are concerned completely determined, but the object is -only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the -understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by -that idea. - -Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure Reason. - -§ 45. We have above shown in §§ 33 and 34 that the purity of the -categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead -reason into extending their use, quite beyond all experience, to -things in themselves; though as these categories themselves find no -intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concreto, they, as -mere logical functions, can represent a thing in general, but not give -by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything. Such -hyperbolical objects are distinguised by the appellation of Noümena, -or pure beings of the understanding (or better, beings of thought), -such as, for example, "substance," but conceived without permanence in -time, or "cause," but not acting in time, etc. Here predicates, that -only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible, are -applied to these concepts, and yet they are deprived of all the -conditions of intuition, on which alone experience is possible, and so -these concepts lose all significance. - -There is no danger, however, of the understanding spontaneously making -an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of -the mere creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. -But when reason, which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical -use of the rules of the understanding, as being always conditioned, -requires a completion of this chain of conditions, then the -understanding is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly -represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no -experience can grasp, partly even (with a view to complete the series) -it seeks entirely beyond it noumena, to which it can attach that -chain, and so, having at last escaped from the conditions of -experience, make its attitude as it were final. These are then the -transcendental ideas, which, though according to the true but hidden -ends of the natural determination of our reason, they may aim not at -extravagant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of their empirical -use, yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a -transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be restrained within -the bounds of experience by any resolution, but only by scientific -instruction and with much difficulty. - -I. The Psychological Idea.{30} - -=================================== -{30} See Critique of Pure Reason, Von den Paralogismen der reinen -Vernunft. -=================================== - -§ 46. People have long since observed, that in all substances the -proper subject, that which remains after all the accidents (as -predicates) are abstracted, consequently that which forms the -substance of things remains unknown, and various complaints have been -made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But it will be well to -consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its -inability to know the substance of things, that is, to determine it by -itself, but rather for requiring to cognise it which is a mere idea -definitely as though it were a given object. Pure reason requires us -to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject, and for -this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its -subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence -it follows, that we must not hold anything, at which we can arrive, to -be an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought -by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all -nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our -understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, -representing it by concepts, and so by mere predicates, to which -therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence all the -real properties, by which we cognise bodies, are mere accidents, not -excepting impenetrability, which we can only represent to ourselves as -the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us. - -Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves -(in the thinking subject), and indeed in an immediate intuition; for -all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego, as a -subject, and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other -subject. Hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as -predicates to a subject—not merely an idea, but an object—that is, -the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this -expectation is disappointed. For the ego is not a concept,{31} but only -the indication of the object of the internal sense, so far as we -cognise it by no further predicate. Consequently it cannot be in -itself a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can it be a -determinate concept of an absolute subject, but is, as in all other -cases, only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown -subject. Yet this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative -principle, totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the -internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a very natural -misunderstanding a very specious argument, which, from this supposed -cognition of the substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, -so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of -experience. - -=================================== -{31} Were the representation of the apperception (the Ego) a concept, by -which anything could be thought, it could be used as a predicate of -other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more -than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception -and is only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in -relation (relatione accidentis). -=================================== - -§ 47. But though we may call this thinking self (the soul) substance, -as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further -represented as the predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty -and without significance, if permanence—the quality which renders -the concept of substances in experience fruitful—cannot be proved of -it. - -But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance, as a -thing in itself, but for the purposes of experience only. This is -sufficiently shown by the first Analogy of Experience,{32} and who ever -will not yield to this proof may try for himself whether he can -succeed in proving, from the concept of a subject which does not exist -itself as the predicate of another thing, that its existence is -thoroughly permanent, and that it cannot either in itself or by any -natural cause originate or be annihilated. These synthetical a priori -propositions can never be proved in themselves, but only in reference -to things as objects of possible experience. - -=================================== -{32} Cf. Critique, Von den Analogien der Erfahrung. -=================================== - -§ 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance, we -would infer its permanence, this can hold good as regards possible -experience only, not [of the soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all -possible experience. But life is the subjective condition of all our -possible experience, consequently we can only infer the permanence of -the soul in life; for the death of man is the end of all experience -which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the -contrary be proved, which is the very question in hand. The permanence -of the soul can therefore only be proved (and no one cares for that) -during the life of man, but not, as we desire to do, after death; and -for this general reason, that the concept of substance, so far as it -is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of -permanence, can be so combined only according to the principles of -possible experience, and therefore for the purposes of experience -only.{33} - -=================================== -{33} It is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have -always passed over the principle of the permanence of substances -without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found -themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with -the concept of substance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that -without this presupposition do union of perceptions in experience is -possible, supplied the want by a postulate. From experience itself it -never could derive such a principle, partly because substances cannot -be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions, that the -matter can always be found undiminished, partly because the principle -contains necessity, which is always the sign of an a priori principle. -People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a -substance, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the -death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is -inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from -destruction by dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this -principle—a discovery which requires deeper researches than they -were ever inclined to make—they would have seen, that the law of the -permanence of substances has place for the purposes of experience -only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be -cognised and conjoined with others in experience, but never -independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot hold -good of the soul after death. -=================================== - -§ 49. That there is something real without us which not only -corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can -likewise be proved to be not a connexion of things in themselves, but -for the sake of experience. This means that there is something -empirical, i.e., some phenomenon in space without us, that admits of a -satisfactory proof, for we have nothing to do with other objects than -those which belong to possible experience; because objects which -cannot be given us in any experience, do not exist for us. Empirically -without me is that which appears in space, and space, together with -all the phenomena which it contains, belongs to the representations, -whose connexion according to laws of experience proves their objective -truth, just as the connexion of the phenomena of the internal sense -proves the actuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense). -By means of external experience I am conscious of the actuality of -bodies, as external phenomena in space, in the same manner as by means -of the internal experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul -in time, but this soul is only cognised as an object of the internal -sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and of which the -essence in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is -unknown. Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish -external experience from dreaming; and the conformity to law (as a -criterion of its truth) of the former, from the irregularity and the -false illusion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and time as -conditions of the existence of objects, and it only inquires whether -the objects of the external senses, which we when awake put in space, -are as actually to be found in it, as the object of the internal -sense, the soul, is in time; that is, whether experience carries with -it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination. This doubt, -however, may be easily disposed of, and we always do so in common life -by investigating the connexion of phenomena in both space and time -according to universal laws of experience, and we cannot doubt, when -the representation of external things throughout agrees therewith, -that they constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in which -phenomena are considered as such only according to their connexion in -experience, may accordingly be very easily refuted; and it is just as -sure an experience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that I -myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in -time): for the notion without us, only signifies existence in space. -However as the Ego in the proposition, "I am," means not only the -object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject of -consciousness, just as body means not only external intuition (in -space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this -phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as -phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies apart from my -thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the -question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the -soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of -representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must -likewise be answered in the negative. And in this manner everything, -when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The -formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes -the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a -form of my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual -as I myself am, and nothing but the empirical truth of the -representations in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not -the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing -without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception -can never prove the actuality of these objects without us. - -II. The Cosmological Idea.{34} - -=================================== -{34} Cf. Critique, Die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft. -=================================== - -§ 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most -remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse -philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the -arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself. - -I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object only -from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose -object is given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in -its native home, it does not become transcendent, and is therefore so -far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the soul as a simple -substance, already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as -cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends -the connexion of the conditioned with its condition (whether the -connexion is mathematical or dynamical) so far, that experience never -can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always -an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience. - -§ 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories becomes -here so obvious and unmistakable, that even if there were not several -other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it -indispensable in the system of pure reason. There are only four such -transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes of categories; in -each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness -of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to -these cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical -assertions of pure reason, which, as they are dialectical, thereby -prove, that to each of them, on equally specious principles of pure -reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all the -metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction cannot prevent this -opposition, it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources -of pure reason itself. This Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but -founded in the nature of human reason, and hence unavoidable and never -ceasing, contains the following four theses together with their -antitheses: - - - 1. - - Thesis. - The World has, as to Time and Space, a Beginning (limit). - - Antithesis. - The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite. - - 2. - - Thesis. - Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple. - - Antithesis. - There is nothing simple, but everything is composite. - - 3. - - Thesis. - There are in the World Causes through Freedom. - - Antithesis. - There is no Liberty, but all is Nature. - - 4. - - Thesis. - In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being. - - Antithesis. -There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is - incidental. - - -§ 52.a. Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no -other instance of which can be shown in any other use. If we, as is -commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible -world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their -combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves -and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, -unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict, which never can -be removed in the common dogmatical way; because the thesis, as well -as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, and -irresistible proofs—for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all -these proofs—and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with -itself, a state at which the sceptic rejoices, but which must make the -critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease. - -§ 52.b. We may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any -fear of being detected in falsehood. For we never can be refuted by -experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical, -though purely fictitious propositions, may be done whenever the -concepts, which we connect, are mere ideas, that cannot be given (in -their whole content) in experience. For how can we make out by -experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, -whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? -Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so -extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or -the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touch-stone. - -The only possible way in which reason could have revealed -unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely announced as Dogmatics, -would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally -admitted principle, and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest -accuracy of inference from another which is equally granted. This is -actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reason, -whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions -on the other arise, each consistently following from -universally-acknowledged principles. Thus they reveal by the use of -these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would -otherwise forever remain concealed. - -This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose -any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason.{35} Contradictory -propositions cannot both be false, except the concept, which is the -subject of both, is self-contradictory; for example, the propositions, -"a square circle is round, and a square circle is not round," are both -false. For, as to the former it is false, that the circle is round, -because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is not -round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For the logical -criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this, that if -we presuppose it, two contradictory propositions both become false; -consequently, as no middle between them is conceivable, nothing at all -is thought by that concept. - -=================================== -{35} I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote -to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature -itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in -its daring pretentions, and to force it to self-examination. For every -proof, which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, -I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of -the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this -curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon -which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the -ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more -thoroughly. -=================================== - -§ 52.c. The first two antinomies, which I call mathematical, because -they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous, -are founded on such a self-contradictory concept; and hence I explain -how it happens, that both the Thesis and Antithesis of the two are -false. - -When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things in -themselves, of which I know nothing, but of things in appearance, that -is, of experience, as the particular way of cognising objects which is -afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in time or in space, -that in itself, and independent of these my thoughts, it exists in -space and in time; for in that case I should contradict myself; -because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are -nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations, but -are themselves only modes of representation, and it is palpably -contradictory to say, that a mere mode of representation exists -without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only -in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart -from experience or before it, is merely to represent to ourselves that -experience actually exists apart from experience or before it. - -Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as to space and -time, it is equally impossible, as regards all my notions, to declare -it infinite or to declare it finite. For neither assertion can be -contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite -space, or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the boundary of -the world by a void space, or by an antecedent void time, is -impossible; these are mere ideas. This quantity of the world, which is -determined in either way, should therefore exist in the world itself -apart from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a world of -sense, which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence -and connexion occur only in our representations, that is, in -experience, since this latter is not an object in itself, but a mere -mode of representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept of an -absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory, the solution -of the problem concerning its quantity, whether attempted -affirmatively or negatively, is always false. - -The same holds good of the second antinomy, which relates to the -division of phenomena. For these are mere representations, and the -parts exist merely in their representation, consequently in the -division, or in a possible experience where they are given, and the -division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To assume that an -appearance, e.g., that of body, contains in itself before all -experience all the parts, which any possible experience can ever -reach, is to impute to a mere appearance, which can exist only in -experience, an existence previous to experience. In other words, it -would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in -our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is -self-contradictory, as also every solution of our misunderstood -problem, whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves consist of an -infinite number of parts, or of a finite number of simple parts. - -§ 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of antinomies the -falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept -something self-contradictory as if it were compatible (i.e., an -appearance as an object in itself). But, as to the second (the -dynamical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of the representation -consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible; so that, -as in the former case, the opposed assertions are both false, in this -case, on the other hand, where they are opposed to one another by mere -misunderstanding, they may both be true. - -Any mathematical connexion necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what -is connected (in the concept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by -no means requires the same. When we have to deal with extended -magnitudes, all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and -with the whole; whereas, in the connexion of cause and effect, -homogeneity may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary; for -the concept of causality (by means of which something is posited -through something else quite different from it), at all events, does -not require it. - -If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in -themselves, and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in -themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the -subject of freedom were, like other objects, represented as mere -appearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoidable, for the -same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind -of object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred -merely to appearances, and freedom merely to things in themselves, no -contradiction arises, if we at once assume, or admit both kinds of -causality, however difficult or impossible it may be to make the -latter kind conceivable. - -As appearance every effect is an event, or something that happens in -time; it must, according to the universal law of nature, be preceded -by a determination of the causality of its cause (a state), which -follows according to a constant law. But this determination of the -cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or -happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession -between it and the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as -well as the causality of the cause, would have always existed. -Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have -originated among appearances, and must consequently, as well as its -effect, be an event, which must again have its cause, and so on; hence -natural necessity must be the condition, on which effective causes are -determined. Whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes -of appearances, it must, as regards these, which are events, be a -faculty of starting them spontaneously, that is, without the causality -of the cause itself, and hence without requiring any other ground to -determine its start. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not -rank under time-determinations of its state, that is, it cannot be an -appearance, and must be considered a thing in itself, while its -effects would be only appearances.{36} If without contradiction we can -think of the beings of understanding [Verstandeswesen] as exercising -such an influence on appearances, then natural necessity will attach -to all connexions of cause and effect in the sensuous world, though on -the other hand, freedom can be granted to such cause, as is itself not -an appearance (but the foundation of appearance). Nature therefore and -freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same -thing, but in different relations—on one side as a phenomenon, on -the other as a thing in itself. - -=================================== -{36} The idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the -intellectual, as cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we cannot -attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which -it fills its space, though this action takes place from an internal -principle. We can likewise find no notion of freedom suitable to -purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so far as his action is -immanent. For his action, though independent of external determining -causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the divine -nature. It is only, if something is to start by an action, and so the -effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the world of sense (e.g., -the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the -causality of the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether -the cause can originate an effect without its causality itself -beginning. In the former case the concept of this causality is a -concept of natural necessity, in the latter, that of freedom. From -this the reader will see, that, as I explained freedom to be the -faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the -notion which is the problem of metaphysics. -=================================== - -We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connexion with its -subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its -actions, and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to -appearances, but is also referred to objective grounds, that are only -ideas, so far as they can determine this faculty, a connexion which is -expressed by the word ought. This faculty is called reason, and, so -far as we consider a being (man) entirely according to this -objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as a being of -sense, but this property is that of a thing in itself, of which we -cannot comprehend the possibility—I mean how the ought (which -however has never yet taken place) should determine its activity, and -can become the cause of actions, whose effect is an appearance in the -sensible world. Yet the causality of reason would be freedom with -regard to the effects in the sensuous world, so far as we can consider -objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, as their determinants. -For its action in that case would not depend upon subjective -conditions, consequently not upon those of time, and of course not -upon the law of nature, which serves to determine them, because -grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally, according to -principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time -or place. - -What I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing -intelligible, and does not necessarily belong to our problem, which -must be decided from mere concepts, independently of the properties -which we meet in the actual world. - -Now I may say without contradiction: that all the actions of rational -beings, so far as they are appearances (occurring in any experience), -are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as -regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting -according to mere reason, are free. For what is required for the -necessity of nature? Nothing more than the determinability of every -event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a -reference to cause in the appearance; in this process the thing in -itself at its foundation and its causality remain unknown. But I say, -that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the -cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason, that is, -through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of -reason. For, if the former is the case, the action is performed -according to maxims, the effect of which as appearance is always -conform able to constant laws; if the latter is the case, and the -action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the -empirical laws of the sensibility, and in both cases the effects are -connected according to constant laws; more than this we do not require -or know concerning natural necessity. But in the former case reason is -the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; in the latter -the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, -because reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not -determined on that account by the sensibility, and is therefore free -in this case too. Freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in -appearance, neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the -practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves, -as determining grounds. - -Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses -causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued and -yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the -very same effects, as appearances. The same remarks will serve to -explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its -compatibility with natural necessity (in the same subject, but not -taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the -action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining -grounds, is always a first start, though the same action is in the -series of appearances only a subordinate start, which must be preceded -by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is itself determined -in the same manner by another immediately preceding. Thus we are able, -in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality -is determined in them as things in themselves, to imagine a faculty of -beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into -contradiction with the laws of nature. For the relation of the action -to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation; in this case -that which determines the causality does not precede in time the -action, because such determining grounds represent not a reference to -objects of sense, e.g., to causes in the appearances, but to -determining causes, as things in themselves, which do not rank under -conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the -causality of reason, can be considered as a first start in respect to -the series of appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate -beginning. We may therefore without contradiction consider it in the -former aspect as free, but in the latter (in so far as it is merely -appearance) as subject to natural necessity. - -As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same way as the -conflict of reason with itself in the third. For, provided the cause -in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance -(so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions -are perfectly reconcilable: the one, that there is nowhere in the -sensuous world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose -existence is absolutely necessary; the other, that this world is -nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause (but of -another kind and according to another law). The incompatibility of -these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what -is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves, and in general -confusing both in one concept. - -§ 54. This then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole -antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of -its principles to the sensible world. The former alone (the mere -proposition) would be a considerable service in the cause of our -knowledge of human reason, even though the solution might fail to -fully satisfy the reader, who has here to combat a natural illusion, -which has been but recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto -always regarded as genuine. For one result at least is unavoidable. As -it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with -itself—so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for -things in themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they are in -fact—the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the -deduction of all our a priori cognition and the proof which I have -given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question. -This is all I require at present; for when in this occupation he shall -have thought himself deep enough into the nature of pure reason, those -concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is -possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him. Without this -preparation I cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most -attentive reader. - -III. The Theological Idea.{37} - -=================================== -{37} Cf. Critique, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals." -=================================== - -§ 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords matter for the -most important, but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and -thereby dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason -in this case does not, as with the psychological and the cosmological -Ideas, begin from experience, and err by exaggerating its grounds, in -striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness of their -series. It rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere -concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in -general, consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal -Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the -actuality of all other things. And so the mere presupposition of a -Being, who is conceived not in the series of experience, yet for the -purposes of experience—for the sake of comprehending its connexion, -order, and unity—i.e., the idea [the notion of it], is more easily -distinguished from the concept of the understanding here, than in the -former cases. Hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion -which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking -objective conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis -necessary for the satisfaction of our reason, a dogma. As the -observations of the Critique on the pretensions of transcendental -theology are intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to -add on the subject. - -General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas. - -§ 56. The objects, which are given us by experience, are in many -respects incomprehensible, and many questions, to which the law of -nature leads us, when carried beyond a certain point (though quite -conformably to the laws of nature), admit of no answer; as for example -the question: why substances attract one another? But if we entirely -quit nature, or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible -experience, and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say -that the object is incomprehensible, and that the nature of things -proposes to us insoluble problems. For we are not then concerned with -nature or in general with given objects, but with concepts, which have -their origin merely in our reason, and with mere creations of thought; -and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be -solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of -its own procedure.{38} As the psychological, cosmological, and -theological Ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason, which -cannot be given in any experience, the questions which reason asks us -about them are put to us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of our -reason for the sake of its own satisfaction. They must all be capable -of satisfactory answers, which is done by showing that they are -principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough -agreement, completeness, and synthetical unity, and that they so far -hold good of experience only, but of experience as a whole. - -=================================== -{38} Herr Platner in his Aphorisms acutely says (§§ 728, 729), "If -reason be a criterion, no concept, which is incomprehensible to human -reason, can be possible. Incomprehensibility has place in what is -actual only. Here in comprehensibility arises from the insufficiency -of the acquired ideas." It sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not -strange to say, that in nature there is much incomprehensible (e.g., -the faculty of generation) but if we mount still higher, and even go -beyond nature, everything again becomes comprehensible; for we then -quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves -merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the -law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in -experience, because the law is the reason's own production. -=================================== - -Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a -whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our -knowledge a peculiar kind of unity, that of a system, without which it -is nothing but piecework, and cannot be used for proving the existence -of a highest purpose (which can only be the general system of all -purposes), I do not here refer only to the practical, but also to the -highest purpose of the speculative use of reason. - -The transcendental Ideas therefore express the peculiar application of -reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the -understanding. Yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to -be attached to the object of cognition, if we regard that which is -merely regulative to be constitutive, and if we persuade ourselves -that we can by means of these Ideas enlarge our cognition -transcendently, or far beyond all possible experience, while it only -serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as -possible, i.e., to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to -experience: we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of -the proper application of our reason and of its principles, and from a -Dialectic, which both confuses the empirical use of reason, and also -sets reason at variance with itself. - -Conclusion. - -On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason. - -§ 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it would be absurd for -us to hope that we can know more of any object, than belongs to the -possible experience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge -about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience, -which would determine it according to the constitution it has in -itself. For how could we determine anything in this way, since time, -space, and the categories, and still more all the concepts formed by -empirical experience or perception in the sensible world (Anschauung), -have and can have no other use, than to make experience possible. And -if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the -understanding, they do not determine any object, and have no meaning -whatever. - -But it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we -conceded no things in themselves, or set up our experience for the -only possible mode of knowing things, our way of beholding -(Anschauung) them in space and in time for the only possible way, and -our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible -understanding; in fact if we wished to have the principles of the -possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in -themselves. - -Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible experience, -might in this way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason be -set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as Hume's -dialogues may illustrate), if a careful critique did not guard the -bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use, and set a -limit to its pretensions. Scepticism originally arose from metaphysics -and its licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor the -empirical use of reason, announce everything that transcends this use -as worthless and deceitful; but by and by, when it was perceived that -the very same principles that are used in experience, insensibly, and -apparently with the same right, led still further than experience -extends, then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience. -But here there is no danger; for common sense will doubtless always -assert its rights. A certain confusion, however, arose in science -which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted, and why only -so far and no further, and this confusion can only be cleared up and -all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principle, -of the boundary of the use of our reason. - -We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite -notion of what things in themselves may be. Yet we are not at liberty -to abstain entirely from inquiring into them; for experience never -satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us further -and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their -complete solution. This any one may gather from the Dialectics of pure -reason, which therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having -acquired, as regards the nature of our soul, a clear conception of the -subject, and having come to the conviction, that its manifestations -cannot be explained materialistically, who can refrain from asking -what the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience suffices for -the purpose, from accounting for it by a concept of reason (that of a -simple immaterial being), though we cannot by any means prove its -objective reality? Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical -knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the -quantity of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since every -answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, -which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the -insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? -Finally, who does not see in the thorough-going contingency and -dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of -experience, the impossibility of stopping there? And who does not feel -himself compelled, notwithstanding all interdictions against losing -himself in transcendent ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all -the concepts which he can vindicate by experience, in the concept of a -Being, the possibility of which we cannot conceive, but at the same -time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the -understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever -dissatisfied? - -Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside -a certain definite place, and in closing it; limits do not require -this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is -not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its -surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves, though -we can never have definite notions of them, and are limited to -appearances only. - -As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds to -it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human -reason admits of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something -indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it -will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The -enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new -discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery -of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued -experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken -here, for mathematics refers to appearances only, and what cannot be -an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of -metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it -can never lead to them; neither does it require them. It is therefore -not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences, -and there is not, as it were, any point or line of contact. Natural -science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things, -which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of -explaining appearance. Nor does that science require this for its -physical explanations. Nay even if such grounds should be offered from -other sources (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they -must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations. For -these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object -of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connexion with -our actual perceptions and empirical laws. - -But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts of -pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated -thereto by the nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas, -as they do not admit of evasion, and are never capable of realisation, -serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use -of reason, but also the way to determine them. Such is the end and the -use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought -forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every -other in the world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an -original germ, wisely organised for great ends. For metaphysics, in -its fundamental features, perhaps more than any other science, is -placed in us by nature itself, and cannot be considered the production -of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of -experience from which it is quite disparate. - -Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, which -suffice for empirical use, i.e., within the sensible world, finds in -itself no satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of -all hope of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas, which -have that completion in view, are such problems of reason. But it sees -clearly, that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion, -neither consequently can all the concepts, which serve merely for -understanding the world of sense, such as space and time, and whatever -we have adduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding. -The sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected -according to universal laws; it has therefore no subsistence by -itself; it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to -that which contains the basis of this experience, to beings which -cannot be cognised merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. -In the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire -of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions. - -We have above (§§ 33, 34) indicated the limits of reason with regard -to all cognition of mere creations of thought. Now, since the -transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them, and thus have led -us, as it were, to the spot where the occupied space (viz., -experience) touches the void (that of which we can know nothing, viz., -noumena), we can determine the bounds of pure reason. For in all -bounds there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of -corporeal space, and is therefore itself a space, a line is a space, -which is the boundary of the surface, a point the boundary of the -line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits contain mere -negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough -after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something -(though we can never cognise what it is in itself). For the question -now is, What is the attitude of our reason in this connexion of what -we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? This is an actual -connexion of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will -always remain so), and though what is unknown should not become the -least more known—which we cannot even hope—yet the notion of this -connexion must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct. - -We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of -understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them -only, as things in themselves, reason finds that completion and -satisfaction, which it can never hope for in the derivation of -appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually -have reference to something distinct from them (and totally -heterogeneous), as appearances always presuppose an object in itself, -and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or -not. - -But as we can never cognise these beings of understanding as they are -in themselves, that is, definitely, yet must assume them as regards -the sensible world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at -least able to think this connexion by means of such concepts as -express their relation to the world of sense. Yet if we represent to -ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of -the understanding, we then indeed represent nothing definite to -ourselves, consequently our concept has no significance; but if we -think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world, it is no -longer a being of understanding, but is conceived as an appearance, -and belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an instance from the -notion of the Supreme Being. - -Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason, but -represents only a thing containing all realities, without being able -to determine any one of them; because for that purpose an example must -be taken from the world of sense, in which case we should have an -object of sense only, not something quite heterogeneous, which can -never be an object of sense. Suppose I attribute to the Supreme Being -understanding, for instance; I have no concept of an understanding -other than my own, one that must receive its perceptions (Anschauung) -by the senses, and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of -the unity of consciousness. Then the elements of my concept would -always lie in the appearance; I should however by the insufficiency of -the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a -being which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound up with them -as conditions of its determination. But if I separate understanding -from sensibility to obtain a pure understanding, then nothing remains -but the mere form of thinking without perception (Anschauung), by -which form alone I can cognise nothing definite, and consequently no -object. For that purpose I should conceive another understanding, such -as would directly perceive its objects,{39} but of which I have not the -least notion; because the human understanding is discursive, and can -[not directly perceive, it can] only cognise by means of general -concepts. And the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will -to the Supreme Being; for we have this concept only by drawing it from -our internal experience, and therefore from our dependence for -satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require; and so the -notion rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible with -the pure concept of the Supreme Being. - -=================================== -{39} Der die Gegenstände anschaute. -=================================== - -Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect only the proofs, and -not the deistic assertion itself. But as regards theism, which depends -on a stricter determination of the concept of the Supreme Being which -in deism is merely transcendent, they are very strong, and as this -concept is formed, in certain (in fact in all common) cases -irrefutable. Hume always insists, that by the mere concept of an -original being, to which we apply only ontological predicates -(eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence), we think nothing definite, and -that properties which can yield a concept in concreto must be -superadded; that it is not enough to say, it is Cause, but we must -explain the nature of its causality, for example, that of an -understanding and of a will. He then begins his attacks on the -essential point itself, i.e., theism, as he had previously directed -his battery only against the proofs of deism, an attack which is not -very dangerous to it in its consequences. All his dangerous arguments -refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be inseparable from -theism, and to make it absurd in itself; but if the former be -abandoned, the latter must vanish with it, and nothing remain but -deism, of which nothing can come, which is of no value, and which -cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals. If this -anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no proofs whatever of the -existence of a Supreme Being, even were they all granted, could -determine for us the concept of this Being without involving us in -contradictions. - -If we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of -pure reason, the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to -proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent -(empirical) use, we discover that both can subsist together, but only -at the boundary of all lawful use of reason. For this boundary belongs -as well to the field of experience, as to that of the creations of -thought, and we are thereby taught, as well, how these so remarkable -ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason. On the one -hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of -experience, as if nothing but world{40} remained for us to cognise, and -yet, on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds of experience, -and to think of judging about things beyond them, as things in -themselves. - -=================================== -{40} The use of the word "world" without article, though odd, seems to -be the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint.— Ed. -=================================== - -But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the -relation which the world may have to a Being whose very concept lies -beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the world. For we -then do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of the properties in -themselves, by which we represent objects of experience, and thereby -avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his relation -to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which -in fact concerns language only, and not the object itself. - -If I say that we are compelled to consider the world, as if it were -the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing -more, than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation -to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer, as the -world of sense (or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex -of appearances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby cognise as -it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of -which I am a part. - -§ 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does not signify (as is -commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a -perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.{41} -By means of this analogy, however, there remains a concept of the -Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out -everything that could deter mine it absolutely or in itself; for we -determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves, and more -do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes upon those who would -determine this concept absolutely, by taking the materials for so -doing from themselves and the world, do not affect us; and he cannot -object to us, that we have nothing left if we give up the objective -anthropomorphism of the concept of the Supreme Being. - -=================================== -{41} There is, e.g., an analogy between the juridical relation of human -actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I never can do -anything to another man without giving him a right to do the same to -me on the same conditions; just as no mass can act with its motive -power on another mass without thereby occasioning the other to react -equally against it. Here right and motive power are quite dissimilar -things, but in their relation there is complete similarity. By means -of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things -which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of -the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the -welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown [quantity which -is] in God (= x), which we call love; not as if it had the least -similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its -relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world -bear one another. But the concept of relation in this case is a mere -category, viz., the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with -sensibility. -=================================== - -For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo -grant Cleanthes), as a necessary hypothesis, the deistical concept of -the First Being, in which this Being is thought by the mere -ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc. This must be done, -because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions, -which are themselves always conditional, cannot otherwise have any -satisfaction, and it therefore can be done without falling into -anthropomorphism (which transfers predicates from the world of sense -to a Being quite distinct from the world), because those predicates -are mere categories, which, though they do not give a determinate -concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of -sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a -causality through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to -theism, without being obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind -of reason, as a property inhering in him. For as to the former, the -only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason (as regards all -possible experience, in complete harmony with itself) in the world of -sense to the highest point, is to assume a supreme reason as a cause -of all the connexions in the world. Such a principle must be quite -advantageous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its application to -nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby not transferred as a -property to the First Being in himself, but only to his relation to -the world of sense, and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For -nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which -is perceived everywhere in the world, and reason is attributed to the -Supreme Being, so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason -in the world, but according to analogy only, that is, so far as this -expression shows merely the relation, which the Supreme Cause unknown -to us has to the world, in order to determine everything in it -conformably to reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from -using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving God, but -instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is necessary to -have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle. We -thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and -even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself. We -are thereby kept, on the one hand, from making a transcendent use of -the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause (by means -of the will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by properties, -which are only borrowed from human nature, and from losing ourselves -in gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand from deluging -the contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation -according to our notions of human reason, which we transfer to God, -and so losing for this contemplation its proper application, according -to which it should be a rational study of mere nature, and not a -presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The -expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world -as if it came, as to its existence and internal plan, from a Supreme -Reason, by which notion we both cognise the constitution, which -belongs to the world itself, yet without pretending to determine the -nature of its cause in itself, and on the other hand, we transfer the -ground of this constitution (of the form of reason in the world) upon -the relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the -world sufficient by itself for that purpose.{42} - -=================================== -{42} I may say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same -place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to -its works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains -unknown to me: I only compare its effects (the order of the world) -which I know, and their conformity to reason, to the effects of human -reason which I also know; and hence I term the former reason, without -attributing to it on that account what I understand in man by this -term, or attaching to it anything else known to me, as its property. -=================================== - -Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear by -combining with Hume's principle—"not to carry the use of reason -dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience"—this other -principle, which he quite overlooked: "not to consider the field of -experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason." The -Critique of Pure Reason here points out the true mean between -dogmatism, which Hume combats, and skepticism, which he would -substitute for it—a mean which is not like other means that we find -advisable to determine for ourselves as it were mechanically (by -adopting something from one side and something from the other), and by -which nobody is taught a better way, but such a one as can be -accurately determined on principles. - -§ 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made use of the metaphor -of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to -its suitable use. The world of sense contains merely appearances, -which are not things in themselves, but the understanding must assume -these latter ones, viz., noumena. In our reason both are comprised, -and the question is, How does reason proceed to set boundaries to the -understanding as regards both these fields? Experience, which contains -all that belongs to the sensuous world, does not bound itself; it only -proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally -conditioned object. Its boundary must lie quite without it, and this -field is that of the pure beings of the understanding. But this field, -so far as the determination of the nature of these beings is -concerned, is an empty space for us, and if dogmatically-determined -concepts alone are in question, we cannot pass out of the field of -possible experience. But as a boundary itself is something positive, -which belongs as well to that which lies within, as to the space that -lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive -cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this -boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds -itself in the presence of an empty space, in which it can conceive -forms of things, but not things themselves. But the setting of a -boundary to the field of the understanding by something, which is -otherwise unknown to it, is still a cognition which belongs to reason -even at this standpoint, and by which it is neither confined within -the sensible, nor straying without it, but only refers, as befits the -knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies -without it, and that which is contained within it. - -Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason, -being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the Idea of a -Supreme Being (and, for practical purposes to that of an intelligible -world also), not in order to determine anything relatively to this -pure creation of the understanding, which lies beyond the world of -sense, but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to -principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) -unity. For this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of -sense to an independent reason, as the cause of all its connexions. -Thereby we do not purely invent a being, but, as beyond the sensible -world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure -understanding, we determine that something in this particular way, -though only of course according to analogy. - -And thus there remains our original proposition, which is the résumé -of the whole Critique: "that reason by all its a priori principles -never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, -and even of these nothing more than can be cognised in experience." -But this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the -objective boundary of experience, viz., to the reference to something -which is not itself an object of experience, but is the ground of all -experience. Reason does not however teach us anything concerning the -thing in itself: it only instructs us as regards its own complete and -highest use in the field of possible experience. But this is all that -can be reasonably desired in the present case, and with which we have -cause to be satisfied. - -§ 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as it is actually -given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and in that which -constitutes the essential end of its pursuit, according to its -subjective possibility. Though we have found, that this merely natural -use of such a predisposition of our reason, if no discipline arising -only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it, -involves us in transcendent, either apparently or really conflicting, -dialectical syllogisms; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only -unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature, but -even disadvantageous to it: there yet remains a problem worthy of -solution, which is to find out the natural ends intended by this -disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason, because everything -that lies in nature must be originally intended for some useful -purpose. - -Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I acknowledge, that what -I can say about it is conjecture only, like every speculation about -the first ends of nature. The question does not concern the objective -validity of metaphysical judgments, but our natural predisposition to -them, and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but -to anthropology. - -When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which -constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling -it to quit the mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible -experience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge -or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of -this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of -experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so -far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the -pure understanding, which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the -purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them (for there we -can find no ground to stand on), but because practical principles, -which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation -and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason -unavoidably requires from a moral point of view. - -So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal to -me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of -experience), shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough, -and thereby deters me from materialism, the psychological notion of -which is unfit for any explanation of nature, and besides confines -reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious -insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in -its lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from -naturalism, which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, -all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional, as it -always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, and -unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause -different from the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, -in its turn, were it merely nature, could never render the existence -of the contingent (as its consequent) comprehensible, reason frees -itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a -blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a -first principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself), -and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom, or of a -Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to -instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of -Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope -for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These -considerations, I should think, explain in some measure the natural -predisposition of which I spoke. - -The practical value, which a merely speculative science may have, lies -without the bounds of this science, and can therefore be considered as -a scholion merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the -science itself. This application however surely lies within the bounds -of philosophy, especially of philosophy drawn from the pure sources of -reason, where its speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be -at unity with its practical use in morals. Hence the unavoidable -dialectics of pure reason, considered in metaphysics, as a natural -tendency, deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely, which is -to be removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision as -regards its end, though this duty, a work of supererogation, cannot -justly be assigned to metaphysics proper. - -The solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on -the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason{43} should be considered -a second scholion which however has a greater affinity with the -subject of metaphysics. For there certain rational principles are -expounded which determine a priori the order of nature or rather of -the understanding, which seeks nature's laws through experience. They -seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience, -though they spring from pure reason, which cannot be considered, like -the understanding, as a principle of possible experience. Now whether -or not this harmony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not -inhere in appearances or in their source (the sensibility) itself, but -only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding, as -also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about -an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the -understanding when in relation to reason; and whether or not -experience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of -reason: may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of -reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general principles -of a history of nature; I have represented this task as important, but -not attempted its solution, in the book itself.{44} - -=================================== -{43} Critique of Pure Reason, II., chap. III., section 7. - -{44} Throughout in the Critique I never lost sight of the plan not to -neglect anything, were it ever so recondite, that could render the -inquiry into the nature of pure reason complete. Everybody may -afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases, when he has been -merely shown what yet remains to be done. It is this a duty which must -reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey -the whole field, in order to consign it to others for future -cultivation and allotment. And to this branch both the scholia belong, -which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness to amateurs, -and hence are added here for connoisseurs only. -=================================== - -And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question which -I had proposed: How is metaphysics in general possible? by ascending -from the data of its actual use in its consequences, to the grounds of -its possibility. - -SCHOLIA. - -SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS -METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?" - -Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual, but if -considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third -principal question showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of -taking principles from it, and in using them follow the natural, but -on that account not less false, illusion, we can never produce -science, but only a vain dialectical art, in which one school may -outdo another, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting -approbation. - -In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not -mere fallacious plausibility, but in sight and conviction, a Critique -of Reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts, -their division according to their various sources (Sensibility, -Understanding, and Reason), together with a complete table of them, -the analysis of all these concepts, with all their consequences, -especially by means of the deduction of these concepts, the -possibility of synthetical cognition a priori, the principles of its -application and finally its bounds, all in a complete system. -Critique, therefore, and critique alone, contains in itself the whole -well-proved and well-tested plan, and even all the means required to -accomplish metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is -impossible. The question here therefore is not so much how this -performance is possible, as how to set it going, and induce men of -clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation -for one that will not deceive, and how such a union for the common end -may best be directed. - -This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted Critique will be -ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which he formerly put -up with, because his reason must have something, and could find -nothing better for its support. - -Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the -schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the -astrology of the fortune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has -read through and through, and grasped the principles of, the Critique -even in these Prolegomena only, will ever return to that old and -sophistical pseudo-science; but will rather with a certain delight -look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, -requiring no more preparatory discoveries, and now at last affording -permanent satisfaction to reason. For here is an advantage upon which, -of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon: -that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be -incapable of further change, or of any augmentation by new -discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in -itself, not in objects and their observation (Anschauung), by which -latter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased. When -therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty -completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there -remains nothing for pure reason to cognise a priori, nay, there is -even no ground to raise further questions. The sure prospect of -knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm, even though -we should set aside all its advantages, of which I shall hereafter -speak. - -All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but finally destroys -itself, and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay. That -this time is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it -has fallen among all learned nations, despite of all the zeal with -which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted. The old arrangement -of our university studies still preserves its shadow; now and then an -Academy of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on -it, but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences; and let any -one judge for himself how a man of genius, if he were called a great -metaphysician, would receive the compliment, which may be well-meant, -but is scarce envied by anybody. - -Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics -has undoubtedly arrived, we are yet far from being able to say that -the period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and -complete Critique of Reason. All transitions from a tendency to its -contrary pass through the stage of indifference, and this moment is -the most dangerous for an author, but, in my opinion, the most -favorable for the science. For, when party spirit has died out by a -total dissolution of former connexions, minds are in the best state to -listen to several proposals for an organisation according to a new -plan. - -When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in -the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain -the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side -to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand, that every one, whom the -thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor, will ask -me, upon what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irresistible -law of necessity. - -That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as -little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing -altogether, to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always -be metaphysics in the world; nay, every one, especially every man of -reflexion, will have it, and for want of a recognised standard, will -shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been -called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it -entirely is impossible; therefore a Critique of Pure Reason itself -must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to -the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this -pressing want, which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge. - -Ever since I have come to know critique, whenever I finish reading a -book of metaphysical contents, which, by the preciseness of its -notions, by variety, order, and an easy style, was not only -entertaining but also helpful, I cannot help asking, "Has this author -indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?" The learned men, whose -works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed -to the culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me for -saying, that I have never been able to find either their essays or my -own less important ones (though self-love may recommend them to me) to -have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and why? - -Here is the very obvious reason: metaphysics did not then exist as a -science, nor can it be gathered piecemeal, but its germ must be fully -preformed in the Critique. But in order to prevent all misconception, -we must remember what has been already said, that by the analytical -treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal, -but the science (of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least advanced, -because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials -from which the intention is to carpenter our science. Let the concepts -of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined, -all this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we -cannot prove, that in all which exists the substance endures, and only -the accidents vary, our science is not the least advanced by all our -analyses. - -Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori either this -proposition, or that of sufficient reason, still, less any more -complex theorem, such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed -any synthetical proposition. By all its analysing therefore nothing is -affected, nothing obtained or forwarded, and the science, after all -this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the days of -Aristotle, though far better preparations were made for it than of -old, if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered. - -If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my -charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to -metaphysics, which he would prove dogmatically a priori, for until he -has actually performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly -advanced the science; even should this proposition be sufficiently -confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more -equitable, and in the (inevitably certain) event of its -non-performance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto -metaphysics has never existed as a science. - -But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I -must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, -which are suited as little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and -secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense, which -does not convince every one, but which accommodates itself to personal -peculiarities. - -For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in metaphysics, -a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon -probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be cognised a -priori, is thereby announced as apodeictically certain, and must -therefore be proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding -geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures. As to the doctrine of chances -in the latter, it does not contain probable, but perfectly certain, -judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases, -under given uniform conditions, which, in the sum of all possible -cases, infallibly happen according to the rule, though it is not -sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance. Conjectures -(by means of induction and of analogy) can be suffered in an empirical -science of nature only, yet even there the possibility at least of -what we assume must be quite certain. - -The appeal to common sense is even more absurd, when concept and -principles are announced as valid, not in so far as they hold with -regard to experience, but even beyond the conditions of experience. -For what is common sense? It is normal good sense, so far it judges -right. But what is normal good sense? It is the faculty of the -knowledge and use of rules in concreto, as distinguished from the -speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules in -abstracto. Common sense can hardly understand the rule, "that every -event is determined by means of its cause," and can never comprehend -it thus generally. It therefore demands an example from experience, -and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always -thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen-utensil missing, it then -understands the principle and grants it. Common sense therefore is -only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are a -priori) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them a -priori, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative -understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. But -the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of -knowledge, and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal -to it as a witness, for it cannot here form any opinion whatever, and -men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties, -and can find in their speculation neither in nor out. - -It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense (who -occasionally prize it highly, but usually despise it) to say, that -there must surely be at all events some propositions which are -immediately certain, and of which there is no occasion to give any -proof, or even any account at all, because we otherwise could never -stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments. But if we except the -principle of contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth -of synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in proof of this -privilege, anything else indubitable, which they can immediately -ascribe to common sense, except mathematical propositions, such as -twice two make four, between two points there is but one straight -line, etc. But these judgments are radically different from those of -metaphysics. For in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct -whatever I represent to myself as possible by a concept: I add to the -first two the other two, one by one, and myself make the number four, -or I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines, -equal as well as unequal; yet I can draw one only, which is like -itself in all its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, -extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else, -whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, but I must -call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori -(yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of -such a connexion (i.e., causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the -concepts of mathematics, by (Anschauung) visualising them, a priori, -and so show its possibility a priori. This concept, together with the -principles of its application, always requires, if it shall hold a -priori—as is requisite in metaphysics—a justification and -deduction of its possibility, because we cannot otherwise know how far -it holds good, and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond -it also. - -Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, we -can never appeal to common sense, but may do so only when we are -forced to surrender it, and to renounce all purely speculative -cognition, which must always be knowledge, and consequently when we -forego metaphysics itself and its instruction, for the sake of -adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, and -sufficient to our wants, perhaps even more salutary than knowledge -itself. For in this case the attitude of the question is quite -altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in all -its parts, otherwise it is nothing; because, as a speculation of pure -reason, it finds a hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, -however, probability and common sense may be used with advantage and -justly, but on quite special principles, of which the importance -always depends on the reference to practical life. - -This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility -of metaphysics as a science. - -APPENDIX. - -ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE. - -Since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, -and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely -ever to be attained, the present essay now before the public has a -fair title to an accurate and careful investigation, except it be -thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics, to -which, if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose, no -objection can be made. - -If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, there -are two sorts of judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes -investigation (in our case one in which the reader from his own -metaphysics pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason which -was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics); (2) the -other a judgment subsequent to investigation. In the latter the reader -is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical -researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics, -and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived. -If what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain, as for -instance the theorems of geometry, the former way of judging would -hold good. For if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant -to established truths, these principles are false and without further -inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock -of indisputably certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even -be the case that there are a number of them, which, though among the -most specious, are by their consequences in mutual collision, and if -no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical -(synthetical) propositions is to be met with in it, then the former -way of judging is not admissible, but the investigation of the -principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value. - -ON A SPECIMEN OF A JUDGMENT OF THE CRITIQUE PRIOR TO ITS EXAMINATION. - -This judgment is to be found in the Göttingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, -in the supplement to the third division, of January 19, 1782, -pages 40 et seq. - -When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and -endeavors to present his independent reflexions in its elaboration, -falls into the hands of a reviewer who, in his turn, is keen enough to -discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book -rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to the heart of the -subject, sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the -author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the judgment -may indeed displease the latter, but the public does not care, as it -gains thereby; and the author himself may be contented, as an -opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to -him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge, in such -a manner, that if he believes himself fundamentally right, he can -remove in time any stone of offence that might hurt the success of his -work. - -I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another position. He seems -not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which -(successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either -impatience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened -reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to -perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real -narrowmindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts -beyond his school-metaphysics. In short, he passes impatiently in -review a long series of propositions, by which, without knowing their -premises, we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his -censure, the reason of which the reader understands just as little as -the propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] -can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the judgment of -experts. I should, for these reasons, have passed over this judgment -altogether, were it not that it may afford me occasion for some -explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these -Prolegomena from a misconception. - -In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily -set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to -trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by -saying: - -"This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he translates it, of -higher) Idealism."{45} - -=================================== -{45} By no means "higher." High towers, and metaphysically-great men -resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are -not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos, the bottom-land, of -experience; and the word transcendental, the meaning of which is so -often explained by me, but not once grasped by my reviewer (so -carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something -passing beyond all experience, but something that indeed precedes it a -priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience -possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment -is termed transcendent, a word which must be distinguished from -transcendental, the latter being limited to the immanent use, that is, -to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been -sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found -his advantage in misunderstanding me. -=================================== - -A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had -to expect, much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or -heard of geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various -figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being asked his -opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of drawing; the author -introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, -incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than -what every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc." - -Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an idealism it is that goes -through my whole work, although it does not by a long way constitute -the soul of the system. - -The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop -Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the -senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the -ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." - -The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is -on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure -understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only -in experience is there truth." - -But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then to -use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my -reviewer to see it everywhere? - -The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have -been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if -the reader had only desired to do so. Space and time, together with -all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but -belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am -one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst -them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical -presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to -us by means of experience or perception, together with its -determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that -space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its -determinations a priori, can be cognised by us, because, no less than -time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all -perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and -therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as -truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, -experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, -because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing a priori at -their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer -illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the -pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all -possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain -criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein.{46} - -=================================== -{46} Idealism proper always has a mystical tendency, and can have no -other, but mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending -the possibility of our cognition a priori as to objects of experience, -which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested. In this -way all mystical idealism falls to the ground, for (as may be seen -already in Plato) it inferred from our cognitions a priori (even from -those of geometry) another intuition different from that of the senses -(namely, an intellectual intuition), because it never occurred to any -one that the senses themselves might intuite a priori. -=================================== - -My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special -character, in that it subverts the ordinary idealism, and that through -it all cognition a priori, even that of geometry, first receives -objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space -and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This -being the state of the case, I could have wished, in order to avoid -all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine otherwise, -but to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be permitted me -however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the -formal, or better still, the critical Idealism, to distinguish it from -the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from the sceptical Idealism of -Descartes. - -Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my -book. The reviewer criticises here and there, makes sweeping -criticisms, a mode prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's -own knowledge or ignorance; a single thorough criticism in detail, had -it touched the main question, as is only fair, would have exposed, it -may be my error, or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into -this species of research. It was, moreover, not a badly conceived -plan, in order at once to take from readers (who are accustomed to -form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports) the desire to -read the book itself, to pour out in one breath a number of passages -in succession, torn from their connexion, and their grounds of proof -and explanations, and which must necessarily sound senseless, -especially considering how antipathetic they are to all -school-metaphysics; to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam, and -then, after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition -that persistent illusion is truth, to conclude with the crude paternal -moralisation: to what end, then, the quarrel with accepted language, -to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction? A judgment which -seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be -metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, -proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the -subject, and in addition, has not understood himself.{47} - -=================================== -{47} The reviewer often fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the -truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am here speaking -simply of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the Wolffian -philosophy, which is merely formal, and with which the distinction -between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned, and in a -transcendental philosophy indeed can have no place. For the rest, he -calls my deduction of the categories and table of the principles of -the understanding, "common well-known axioms of logic and ontology, -expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only consult these -Prolegomena upon this point, to convince himself that a more miserable -and historically incorrect, judgment, could hardly be made. -=================================== - -My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and -superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing -recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he -should not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there are -doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to find in all the -fine things that have for long past been written in this department, -anything that has advanced the science by so much as a fingerbreadth; -we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of -lame proofs with new crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of -metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but all this is not -what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical -assertions; it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from -which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which -it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth. -To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he would never -have spoken out in such a high tone. - -But I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science -has ever entered his thoughts, for in that case he would have directed -his judgment to this point, and even a mistaken attempt in such an -important matter, would have won his respect. If that be the case, we -are once more good friends. He may penetrate as deeply as he likes -into metaphysics, without any one hindering him; only as concerns that -which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are to be found in -reason, he cannot form a judgment. That my suspicion is not without -foundation, is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word -about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, the special -problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly -rests, and upon which my Critique (as well as the present Prolegomena) -entirely hinges. The Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon, -was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the -above problem (although it received its confirmation on other -grounds), and hence he must have shown either that the above problem -does not possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these -Prolegomena), or that by my conception of appearances, it is either -not solved at all, or can be better solved in another way; but I do -not find a word of this in the criticism. The reviewer, then, -understands nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the -spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and it is not, what -I would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of -plodding through so many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow -over the work lying before him, and made its fundamental features -unrecognisable. - -There is a good deal to be done before a learned journal, it matters -not with what care its writers may be selected, can maintain its -otherwise well-merited reputation, in the field of metaphysics as -elsewhere. Other sciences and branches of knowledge have their -standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and theology, in -profane or sacred books; natural science and the art of medicine, in -mathematics and experience; jurisprudence, in law books; and even -matters of taste in the examples of the ancients. But for the judgment -of the thing called metaphysics, the standard has yet to be found. I -have made an attempt to determine it, as well as its use. What is to -be done, then, until it be found, when works of this kind have to be -judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character, one may do what one -likes; no one will play the master over others here for long, before -someone else appears to deal with him in the same manner. If, however, -they are critical in their character, not indeed with reference to -other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment -cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though -objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of -leniency is indispensable, since the need is common to us all, and the -lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge -unwarranted. - -In order, however, to connect my defence with the interest of the -philosophical commonwealth, I propose a test, which must be decisive -as to the mode, whereby all metaphysical investigations may be -directed to their common purpose. This is nothing more than what -formerly mathematicians have done, in establishing the advantage of -their methods by competition. I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as -is only just, on a priori grounds, in his way, a single really -metaphysical principle asserted by him. Being metaphysical it must be -synthetic and cognised a priori from conceptions, but it may also be -any one of the most indispensable principles, as for instance, the -principle of the persistence of substance, or of the necessary -determination of events in the world by their causes. If he cannot do -this (silence however is confession), he must admit, that as -metaphysics without apodeictic certainty of propositions of this kind -is nothing at all, its possibility or impossibility must before all -things be established in a critique of the pure reason. Thus he is -bound either to confess that my principles in the Critique are -correct, or he must prove their invalidity. But as I can already -foresee, that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the certainty -of his principles, when it comes to a strict test he will not find a -single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward, I -will concede to him an advantageous condition, which can only be -expected in such a competition, and will relieve him of the onus -probandi by laying it on myself. - -He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique (chapter on the -"Theses and Antitheses of the Four Antinomies") eight propositions, of -which two and two contradict one another, but each of which -necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be -accepted or rejected (although there is not one that has not in this -time been held by some philosopher). Now he has the liberty of -selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure, and -accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a present, -but only one (for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to -him as to me), and then of attacking my proof of the opposite -proposition. If I can save this one, and at the same time show, that -according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must -necessarily recognise, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him -can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that -metaphysics has an hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less -set aside, until we ascend to its birth-place, pure reason itself, and -thus my Critique must either be accepted or a better one take its -place; it must at least be studied, which is the only thing I now -require. If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a -synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be -reckoned to the score of my opponent, then also I will deem my -impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust, and pledge myself to -recognise his stricture on my Critique as justified (although this -would not be the consequence by a long way). To this end it would be -necessary, it seems to me, that he should step out of his incognito. -Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that instead of -dealing with one, I should be honored by several problems coming from -anonymous and unqualified opponents. - -PROPOSALS AS TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CRITIQUE UPON WHICH A JUDGMENT -MAY FOLLOW. - -I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which -it for a long time favored my Critique, for this proves at least a -postponement of judgment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving -all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in which one cannot -at once perhaps so easily find one's way, something may perchance lie, -from which an important but at present dead branch of human knowledge -may derive new life and productiveness. Hence may have originated a -solicitude for the as yet tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a -hasty judgment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above reasons, -is now before my eye in the Gothaischen gelehrten Zeitung, the -thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive, from the -clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first -principles of my work, without taking into consideration my own -suspicious praise. - -And now I propose, since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as -a whole from a hurried glance, to test it piece by piece from its -foundations, so thereby the present Prolegomena may fitly be used as a -general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be -compared. This notion, if it were founded on nothing more than my -conceit of importance, such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own -productions, would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with -disgust. But now, the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived -at the point of total extinction, while human reason hangs upon them -with inextinguishable affection, and only after having been -ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into -indifference. - -In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many deserving -men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest -of the more and more enlightened reason, if there were only some hope -of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even -morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a -space left over, reserved for pure and speculative reason, the vacuity -of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries, and myticism -for what seems to be employment and entertainment, but what actually -is mere pastime; in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason, -which in accordance with its nature requires something that can -satisfy it, and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our -inclinations. A consideration, therefore, which is concerned only with -reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reasonably suppose a -great fascination for every one who has attempted thus to extend his -conceptions, and I may even say a greater than any other theoretical -branch of knowledge, for which he would not willingly exchange it, -because here all other cognitions, and even purposes, must meet and -unite themselves in a whole. - -I offer, therefore, these Prolegomena as a sketch and text-book for -this investigation, and not the work itself. Although I am even now -perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and -mode of presentation, and the care that I have expended in weighing -and testing every sentence before writing it down, are concerned (for -it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully, not only as regards the -whole, but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular -proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some -sections of the doctrine of elements, as for instance in the deduction -of the conceptions of the Understanding, or in that on the paralogisms -of pure reason, because a certain diffuseness takes away from their -clearness, and in place of them, what is here said in the Prolegomena -respecting these sections, may be made the basis of the test. - -It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and continuous -industry are requisite, they can carry things farther than other -nations. If this opinion be well founded, an opportunity, a business, -presents itself, the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt, -and in which all thinking men can equally take part, though they have -hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming -the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in -question is of so peculiar a kind, that it can be at once brought to -completion and to that enduring state that it will never be able to be -brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries, -or even changed (leaving here out of account adornment by greater -clearness in some places, or additional uses), and this is an -advantage no other science has or can have, because there is none so -fully isolated and independent of others, and which is concerned with -the faculty of cognition pure and simple. And the present moment -seems, moreover, not to be unfavorable to my expectation, for just -now, in Germany, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself, -apart from the so-called useful sciences, so as to pursue not mere -play, but a business possessing an enduring purpose. - -To discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united -in such a purpose, I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is my -intention to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions, or -even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so; but attacks, -repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, completion, and extension, -as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but -investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit -not my own, shall be erected, that shall be a possession for future -generations for which they may have reason to be grateful. - -It would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be -expected, when only the principles of criticism have been perfected, -and how, because the old false feathers have been pulled out, she need -by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure, but -may be in other respects richly and respectably adorned. But other and -great uses which would result from such a reform, strike one -immediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses, in that it sought -out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to -make them clear through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this -way it was a training for reason, in whatever direction it might be -turned; but this was all the good it did; service was subsequently -effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions, sophistry -by subtle distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the ease with -which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little -school-wisdom, which is only the more seductive the more it has the -choice, on the one hand, of taking something from the language of -science, and on the other from that of popular discourse, thus being -everything to everybody, but in reality nothing at all. By criticism, -however, a standard is given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be -with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and firmly founded, -being brought into full operation in metaphysics; a mode of thought -extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of -reason, at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit. But -the service also that metaphysics performs for theology, by making it -independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring -it completely against the attacks of all such opponents, is certainly -not to be valued lightly. For ordinary metaphysics, although it -promised the latter much advantage, could not keep this promise, and -moreover, by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance, did -nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysticism, which can prosper -in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of -school-metaphysics, under the protection of which it may venture to -rave with a semblance of rationality, is driven from this, its last -hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last, but not least, it cannot -be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to -say with universal assent, that what he expounds is Science, and that -thereby genuine services will be rendered to the commonweal. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Kant's Prolegomena, by Immanuel Kant - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - -***** This file should be named 52821-0.txt or 52821-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/8/2/52821/ - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Kant's Prolegomena - To Any Future Metaphysics - -Author: Immanuel Kant - -Translator: Paul Carus - -Release Date: September 5, 2016 [EBook #52821] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - - - - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi - - - - - -</pre> - - - - <p class="TI1-2pt1">KANT'S PROLEGOMENA</p> - - <p class="TI2-1pt25">TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS</p> - - <p class="TI3-0pt8">EDITED IN ENGLISH</p> - - <p class="TI3-0pt8">BY</p> - - <p class="TI4-1pt3">DR. PAUL CARUS</p> - - <p class="TI5-0pt8">THIRD EDITION</p> - - <p class="TI6-1pt25">CHICAGO</p> - - <p class="TI7-1">THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY</p> - - <p class="TI8-1">1912</p> - - <p class="TI9-1pt1">TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED</p> - - <p class="TI9-1pt1">BY</p> - - <p class="TI9-1pt1">The Open Court Publishing Co.</p> - - <p class="TI9-1pt1">1902.</p> - - <p class="TI10-0pt75">[Transcriber's note: ** Supplemental material and - table of contents are omitted from this etext. **]</p> - - <p class="TOCTitle">Contents</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3097" class="Index_20_Link">PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3099" class="Index_20_Link">INTRODUCTION.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3101" class="Index_20_Link">PROLEGOMENA.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL - COGNITION.</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3103" - class="Index_20_Link">FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3105" - class="Index_20_Link">SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3107" - class="Index_20_Link">THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3109" class="Index_20_Link">SCHOLIA.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, - "HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"</p> - - <p class="TOC1"><a href="#__RefHeading___Toc3111" class="Index_20_Link">APPENDIX.</a></p> - - <p class="TOC2">ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A - SCIENCE.</p> - - <hr></hr> - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3097" name="__RefHeading___Toc3097"></a>PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.</h1> - - - <p class="Standard"> - KANT'S <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>,<sup><a href="#ftn1" id="body_ftn1">1</a></sup> although - a small book, is indubitably - the most important of his writings. It furnishes us with a key to his main work, - <span class="T6">The Critique of Pure Reason</span>; in fact, it is an extract - containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It approaches the subject in the - simplest and most direct way, and is therefore best adapted as an introduction into - his philosophy. For this reason, The Open Court Publishing Company has deemed it - advisable to bring out a new edition of the work, keeping in view its broader use as - a preliminary survey and explanation of Kant's philosophy in general. In order to - make the book useful for this broader purpose, the editor has not only stated his own - views concerning the problem underlying the <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> (see - page 167 et seq.), but has also collected the most important materials which have - reference to Kant's philosophy, or to the reception which was accorded to it in - various quarters (see page 241 et seq.). The selections have not been made from a - partisan standpoint, but have been chosen with a view to characterising the attitude - of different minds, and to directing the student to the best literature on the - subject. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the <span class="T6">Critique - of Pure Reason</span> is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the - history of philosophy; and so it seems that a comprehension of Kant's position, whether - we accept or reject it, is indispensable to the student of philosophy. It is not his - solution which makes the sage of Königsberg the initiator of - modern thought, but his formulation of the problem.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">* * *</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The present translation is practically new, but it goes without - saying that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors, among whom Prof. John - P. Mahaffy and John H. Bernard deserve special credit. Richardson's translation of 1818 - may be regarded as superseded and has not been consulted, but occasional reference has - been made to that of Prof. Ernest Belfort Bax. Considering the difficulties under which - even these translators labored we must recognise the fact that they did their work - well, with painstaking diligence, great love of the subject, and good judgment. The - editor of the present translation has the advantage of being to the manor born; - moreover, he is pretty well versed in Kant's style; and wherever he differs from his - predecessors in the interpretation of a construction, he has deviated from them not - without good reasons. Nevertheless there are some passages which will still remain - doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - As a <span class="T6">curiosum</span> in Richardson's translation Professor Mahaffy - mentions that the words <span class="T6">widersinnig gewundene Schnecken</span>, - which simply means "symmetric helices,"<sup><a href="#ftn2" id="body_ftn2">2</a></sup> are rendered by "snails rolled up - contrary to all sense"—a wording that is itself contrary to all sense and makes the - whole paragraph unintelligible. We may add an instance of another mistake that misses - the mark. Kant employs in the Appendix a word that is no longer used in German. He - speaks of the <span class="T6">Cento der Metaphysik</span> as having <span class="T6">neue Lappen</span> and <span class="T6">einen - veränderten Zuschnitt</span>. Mr. Bax translates <span class="T6">Cento</span> by "body," <span class="T6">Lappen</span> by "outgrowths," - and <span class="T6">Zuschnitt</span> by "figure." His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than Richardson's; it is certainly not less comical, - and it also destroys the sense, which in the present case is a very striking simile. <span class="T6">Cento</span> is a Latin - word<sup><a href="#ftn3" id="body_ftn3">3</a></sup> derived from the Greek κεντρων,<sup><a href="#ftn4" id="body_ftn4">4</a></sup> meaning - "a garment of many patches sewed together," or, as we might now say, "a crazy quilt." - </p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">* * *</p> - - - <p class="Standard">In the hope that this book will prove useful, The Open Court - Publishing Company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy.</p> - - - - <p class="EditorInitials"> - P.C.</p> - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3099" name="__RefHeading___Toc3099"></a>INTRODUCTION.</h1> - - - - <p class="Standard">THESE Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of - future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable - for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of - the science itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both - ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not - written. They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason - itself have completed their work; it will then be the historian's turn to inform the - world of what has been done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion - has not been said before, and truly the same prophecy applies to all future time; for - since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in - various ways, it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover - analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysics worth - studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, neglecting all that - has been done, to propose first the preliminary question, ‘Whether such a thing as - metaphysics be at all possible?’</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other - sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition? If not, how can it maintain its - pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, never ceasing, yet never - fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we - must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called - science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems almost - ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which - pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle every one inquires, we should - constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step. And so its - followers having melted away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in - other sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however ignorant in - other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no - standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a - science, when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at - last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? Human reason so delights in - constructions, that it has several times built up a tower, and then razed it to examine - the nature of the foundation. It is never too late to become wise; but if the change - comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The question whether a science be possible, presupposes a doubt as - to its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whose whole possessions consist of - this supposed jewel; hence he who raises the doubt must expect opposition from all - sides. Some, in the proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and - therefore considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands, - and look down on him with contempt; others, who never see anything except it be - identical with what they have seen before, will not understand him, and everything will - remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for - an impending change.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of these Prolegomena - will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded, that it - cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends, be - satisfied; and, as this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as - Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand,<sup><a href="#ftn5" id="body_ftn5">5</a></sup>—since the interests of common sense are - intimately interwoven with it, he must confess that a radical reform, or rather a new - birth of the science after an original plan, are unavoidable, however men may - struggle against it for a while. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the origin - of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened which was more - decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume. He threw no light on - this species of knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have - been obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire - been carefully nursed and developed.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., that of Cause - and Effect (including its derivatives force and action, etc.). He challenges reason, - which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself, to answer him by what - right she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, - something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the - concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for - reason to think <span class="T6">a priori</span> and by means of concepts a - combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the - existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist, or how the concept of such a - combination can arise <span class="T6">a priori</span>. Hence he inferred, that - reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously - considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of - imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under - the Law of Association, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit for an - objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power - to think such combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be purely - fictitious, and all her pretended <span class="T6">a priori</span> cognitions nothing - but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language there is not, and - cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics at all.<sup><a href="#ftn6" id="body_ftn6">6</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at - least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the concentrated - attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as determined efforts on their - part to discover, if possible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed - by him, all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the - science.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not - being understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, - Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they - were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and - often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his - valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had - happened.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, - useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never - doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all - experience, implying a wider application than merely to the objects of experience. This - was Hume's problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the - indispensable need of the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use - and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of - course.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the - great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as - it is concerned with pure thinking,—a task which did not suit them. They found a more - convenient method of being defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to - <span class="T6">common sense</span>. It is indeed a great gift of God, to possess - right, or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown - practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to - it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common - sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner—this is one of the subtile - discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely - enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a - particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. - For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the - philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it? I - should think that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, - and in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), which keeps - common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, or, if speculations are under - discussion, restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning - its own arguments. By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and - hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel-engraving we require an - engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable - in their own way, the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience, the - latter when we judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound - common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has no right to - judge at all.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, - which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations - in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I was far from following - him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, - but a part, which by itself can give us no information. If we start from a - well-founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may well - hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to whom we owe the - first spark of light.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put - into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and - effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connexion of - things <span class="T6">a priori</span>, but rather that metaphysics consists - altogether of such connexions. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had - satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to - the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from - experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure understanding. This - deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor, which had never even - occurred to any one else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without - investigating the basis of their objective validity) was the most difficult task ever - undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that metaphysics, such as - it then existed, could not assist me in the least, because this deduction alone can - render metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem - not merely in a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason, - I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole sphere of pure reason - completely and from general principles, in its circumference as well as in its - contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according - to a reliable method.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest - extent (viz., my Critique of the Pure Reason) will fare as the problem itself fared, - when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is misunderstood, and - misunderstood because men choose to skim through the book, and not to think through - it—a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary - notions, and moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect to hear from - philosophers complaints of want of popularity, entertainment, and facility, when the - existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake, which cannot be - established otherwise than by the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may - follow, but is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, - arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which the principal points of - the investigation are easily lost sight of, the complaint is just, and I intend to - remove it by the present Prolegomena.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of - reason in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which the - Prolegomena, as a preliminary exercise, refer; for our critique must first be - established as a complete and perfected science, before we can think of letting - Metaphysics appear on the scene, or even have the most distant hope of attaining - it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge - produced as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to system in a - new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most readers will set out by expecting - nothing else from the Critique; but these Prolegomena may persuade him that it is a - perfectly new science, of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which - was unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use, - except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet ever, he did not suspect such a - formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on scepticism, - there to let it lie and rot; whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by - means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and provided - with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, whither he listeth.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its - kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our - previously acquired knowledge, which is precisely what has first to be called in - question, we should only fancy we saw everywhere what we had already known, the - expressions, having a similar sound, only that all would appear utterly metamorphosed, - senseless and unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation our own notions, - made by long habit a second nature, instead of the author's. But the longwindedness of - the work, so far as it depends on the subject, and not the exposition, its consequent - unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit - the science, though they may discredit the book.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Few writers are gifted with the subtilty, and at the same time with - the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, of Moses - Mendelssohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my own exposition popular, had my - object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others, instead of - having my heart in the welfare of the science, to which I had devoted myself so long; - in truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to postpone the sweets - of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower, but more lasting, reputation.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful - mind, which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius, by demanding what it - cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve; and by proposing, what it - knows not where to find. And yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a - general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than - the usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere so separate - and self-contained, that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can - therefore do nothing without first determining the position of each part, and its - relation to the rest; for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the - validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the - rest within the domain of reason.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member - can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of - such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down to - the smallest elements of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can determine - either everything or nothing.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, - would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more useful as a - sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in detail the chief points of - importance in the science, and to improve in many respects our exposition, as compared - with the first execution of the work.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is sketched out after - an analytical method, while the work itself had to be executed in the synthetical - style, in order that the science may present all its articulations, as the structure - of a peculiar cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader - find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still - obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many - minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely - allied to practical experience,<sup><a href="#ftn7" id="body_ftn7">7</a></sup> while they cannot succeed in - investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should - apply their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or still more, - to construct, a system of Metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here made, either by - adopting my solution, or by thoroughly refuting it, and substituting another. To - evade it is impossible. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity - (frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or - dullness) has its uses, since all who in other sciences observe a judicious silence, - speak authoritatively in metaphysics and make bold decisions, because their ignorance - is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast with sound - critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the words of Virgil:</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">"Ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent."</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">"Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent - creatures."</p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3101" name="__RefHeading___Toc3101"></a>PROLEGOMENA.</h1> - - <h2>PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION.</h2> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 1. <span class="T6">Of the - Sources of Metaphysics</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">IF it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it - will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other - science has in common with it, constituting its characteristics; otherwise the - boundaries of all sciences become confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly - according to its nature.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference - of object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of - all three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the idea of a possible science and - its territory.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very - concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its - maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be - physical but metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can - therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of - physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is - therefore <span class="T6">a priori</span> knowledge, coming from pure Understanding - and pure Reason.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish able from pure - Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; and for the - meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure Reason (II. "Method of - Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. i), where the distinction between these two - employments of the reason is sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of - metaphysical cognition.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 2. <span class="T6">Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can - alone be called Metaphysical.</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">a.</span> <span class="T6">Of the - Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments in general.</span>—The - peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing - but <span class="T6">a priori</span> judgments. But whatever be their origin, or their - logical form, there is a distinction in judgments, as to their content, according to - which they are either merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the - cognition, or expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called - analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has - been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly - or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: All bodies are extended, I have not - amplified in the least my concept of body, but have only analysed it, as extension was - really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was - not expressed; this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, this judgment, - All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the - general concept of the body; it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my - concept, and must therefore be called synthetical.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">b. The Common Principle of all Analytical - Judgments is the Law of Contradiction.</span>—All analytical judgments depend wholly on - the law of Contradiction, and are in their nature <span class="T6">a priori</span> - cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For - the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept - of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction. In the same way its - opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, - by the same law of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are - extended, and no bodies are unextended (i.e., simple).</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">For this very reason all analytical judgments are <span class="T6">a priori</span> even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a - yellow metal; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a - yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only analyse it, without - looking beyond it elsewhere.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">c. Synthetical Judgments require a different - Principle from the Law of Contradiction.</span>—There are synthetical <span class="T6">a posteriori</span> judgments of empirical origin; but there are also others which - are proved to be certain <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and which spring from pure - Understanding and Reason. Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring - from the principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone; they require a - quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be deduced, they must be - subject to the law of contradiction, which must never be violated, even though - everything cannot be deduced from it. I shall first classify synthetical judgments.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">1. <span class="T6">Empirical Judgments</span> are always - synthetical. For it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience, as - our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. - That body is extended, is a judgment established <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and - not an empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already have all the - conditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we have but to elicit the - predicate according to the law of contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the - necessity of the judgment, which experience could not even teach us.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">2. <span class="T6">Mathematical Judgments</span> are all - synthetical. This fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of - those who have analysed human reason; it even seems directly opposed to all their - conjectures, though incontestably certain, and most important in its consequences. For - as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed according to the law - of contradiction (as is demanded by all apodeictic certainty), men persuaded themselves - that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was a great mistake, - for a synthetical proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of - contradiction, but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it - follows, but never in itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">First of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical - judgments are <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and not empirical, because they carry - with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be not - conceded to me, very good; I shall confine my assertion to <span class="T6">pure - Mathematics</span>, the very notion of which implies that it contains pure <span class="T6">a priori</span> and not empirical cognitions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a - mere analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven and five, - according to the law of contradiction. But on closer examination it appears that the - concept of the sum of 7 + 5 contains merely their union in a single number, without its - being at all thought what the particular number is that unites them. The concept of - twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven and five; - and analyse this possible sum as we may, we shall not discover twelve in the concept. - We must go beyond these concepts, by calling to our aid some concrete image - (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), i.e., either our five fingers, or five points (as - Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and we must add successively the units of the five, - given in some concrete image (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), to the concept of - seven. Hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, and we add - to the first a second, not thought in it. Arithmetical judgments are therefore - synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take larger numbers; for in such - cases it is clear that, however closely we analyse our concepts without calling visual - images (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) to our aid, we can never find the sum by - such mere dissection.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight - line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical proposition. For my - concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The attribute of - shortness is therefore altogether additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of - the concept. Here, too, visualisation (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) must come to - aid us. It alone makes the synthesis possible.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually analytical, and - depend on the law of contradiction; but they only serve, as identical propositions, - as a method of concatenation, and not as principles, e.g., a = a, the whole is equal - to itself, or a + b > a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, - though they are recognised as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in - mathematics, because they can be represented in some visual form (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>). What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such - apodeictic<sup><a href="#ftn8" id="body_ftn8">8</a></sup> judgments is already contained in our - concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the - expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity implied in the - thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to the concept. But the question - is not what we are requested to join in thought <span class="T6">to</span> the given - concept, but what we actually think together with and in it, though obscurely; and so - it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed, yet not - directly but indirectly by an added visualisation (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>). - </p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 3. <span class="T6">A Remark on the General Division of - Judgments into Analytical and Synthetical.</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human - understanding, and therefore deserves to be called classical, though otherwise it is of - little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic philosophers, who always seek the - sources of metaphysical judgments in Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the - pure laws of reason generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious - distinction. Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baumgarten, came to seek - the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly synthetical, in the - principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, however, I find an indication of my - division. For in the fourth book (chap. iii. § 9, seq.), having discussed the - various connexions of representations in judgments, and their sources, one of which he - makes "identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the coexistence - of representations in a subject, he confesses (§ 10) that our <span class="T6">a - priori</span> knowledge of the latter is very narrow, and almost nothing. But in his - remarks on this species of cognition, there is so little of what is definite, and - reduced to rules, that we cannot wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make - investigations concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite - principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them obscurely in their - minds. We must hit on them first by our own reflexion, then we find them elsewhere, - where we could not possibly have found them at first, because the authors themselves - did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who never - think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover everything, after it - has been once shown them, in what was said long since, though no one ever saw it there - before.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 4. <span class="T6">The General Question of the - Prolegomena.—Is Metaphysics at all Possible?</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, - really in existence; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and it will convince - you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth: this question would be useless, and - there would only remain that other question (which would rather be a test of our - acuteness, than a proof of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science - possible, and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been so - fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can point as you do to - Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of this - science, the knowledge of a highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from - principles of pure reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, - and never questioned; but these are all analytical, and rather concern the materials - and the scaffolding for Metaphysics, than the extension of knowledge, which is our - proper object in studying it (§ 2). Even supposing you produce synthetical judgments - (such as the law of Sufficient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, - from pure reason <span class="T6">a priori</span>, though we gladly concede its truth), - you lapse when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such doubtful - assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted another, either in its - assertions, or their proofs, and thus has itself destroyed its own claim to lasting - assent. Nay, the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early - appearance of scepticism, a mental attitude in which reason treats itself with such - violence that it could never have arisen save from complete despair of ever satisfying - our most important aspirations. For long before men began to inquire into nature - methodically, they consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised - by means of ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while laws of nature must - usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics floated to the surface, like foam, - which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But immediately there appeared a new - supply on the surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead of - seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon, thought they showed their wisdom by - ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical - cognition among all other <span class="T6">a priori</span> cognitions is, that it - cannot at all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of concepts - (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, chap. I., sect. 1). As therefore in its - judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding - visualisation (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) contains, these judgments neither - can, nor ought to, arise analytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all - synthetical.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to - philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant observation. Hume - being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to cast his eye over the whole field of - <span class="T6">a priori</span> cognitions in which human understanding claims such - mighty possessions, heedlessly severed from it a whole, and indeed its most valuable, - province, viz., pure mathematics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the - state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different principles, namely, on - the law of contradiction alone; and although he did not divide Judgments in this manner - formally and universally as I have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that - mathematics contains only analytical, but metaphysics synthetical, <span class="T6">a - priori</span> judgments. In this, however, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake had - a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for this, he would have - extended his question concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments far beyond the - metaphysical concept of Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics - <span class="T6">a priori</span> also, for this latter he must have assumed to be - equally synthetical. And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on - mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience, a - thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company into which metaphysics would - thus have been brought, would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous - ill-treatment, for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was - not and could not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been led - into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us, but which - would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We - must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments - properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but they only afford the means - for metaphysical judgments, which are the whole end of the science, and which are - always synthetical. For if there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for - example, that of substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also - pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only exists as - subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments, we seek to approach the - definition of the concept. But as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding - pertaining to metaphysics, does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection - of any other, even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air is - an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known degree of - cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the analytical judgment, is properly - metaphysical. This science has something peculiar in the production of its <span class="T6">a priori</span> cognitions, which must therefore be distinguished from the - features it has in common with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all - the substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly metaphysical - judgment.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If the <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles, which - constitute the materials of metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed - principles, then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a - particular part (as a <span class="T6">philosophia definitiva</span>), containing - nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated - separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. For indeed these - analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in metaphysics, i.e., as regards the - synthetical judgments, which are to be generated by these previously analysed - concepts.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is - properly concerned with synethetical propositions <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and - these alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various dissections of its - concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but wherein the procedure is not different - from that in every other kind of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our - concepts distinct by analysis. But the generation of <span class="T6">a priori</span> - cognition by concrete images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical - propositions <span class="T6">a priori</span> in philosophical cognition, constitutes - the essential subject of Metaphysics.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as - of scepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the quiet state of a - contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance of knowledge so much needed; and - lastly, rendered suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we - possess, or which offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one - critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, viz., - <span class="T6">Is Metaphysics at all possible</span>? But this question must be - answered not by sceptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of - metaphysics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist), but from the - conception, as yet only problematical, of a science of this sort.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In the <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> I have - treated this question synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and - endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure - use according to principles. The task is difficult, and requires a resolute reader to - penetrate by degrees into a system, based on no data except reason itself, and which - therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original - germs. <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>, however, are designed for preparatory - exercises; they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if - possible to actualise a science, than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon - something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with confidence, and - ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only explain to us - what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same - sources. The method of <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>, especially of those - designed as a preparation for future metaphysics, is consequently analytical.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume - metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure - <span class="T6">a priori</span> synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure - Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly - recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent - arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some - at least uncontested synthetical knowledge <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and need - not ask <span class="T6">whether</span> it be possible, for it is actual, but - <span class="T6">how</span> it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the - principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the - rest.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"><span class="T6">The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible?</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 5. We have above learned the significant distinction - between analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical - propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the law of - Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical <span class="T6">a posteriori</span> - judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires no particular - explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions. There - remain therefore only synthetical propositions <span class="T6">a priori</span>, of - which the possibility must be sought or investigated, because they must depend upon - other principles than the law of contradiction.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But here we need not first establish the possibility of such - propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are enough of them which - indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method is analytical, we shall - start from the fact, that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually - exists; but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, - <span class="T6">how</span> such cognition is possible, in order that we may from the - principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its - sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when expressed with - scholastic precision, is therefore:</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible?</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem somewhat differently, - as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, which I could do for once without - detriment to the desired comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with - metaphysics and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore going remarks, - keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, we do not mean - analytical, but synthetical cognition.<sup><a href="#ftn9" id="body_ftn9">9</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its - very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so - much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with conclusions, if he has not previously - proved able to answer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all - vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, and claim, as - it were to create cognitions <span class="T6">a priori</span> by not only dissecting - given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do not rest upon the law of - contradiction, and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all - experience; how do you arrive at this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An - appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is a - witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">"Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."</p> - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give - credence."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; - and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the possibility - of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet another reason, which is this - that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent, - profound, and painstaking reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which - on its first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every intelligent - reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem requires, must at first be struck - with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there - not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions <span class="T6">a priori</span>. This - actually happened to David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire - universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer be decisive for - all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is - given me, I can go beyond it and connect with it another, which is not contained in it, - in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing but - experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he concluded from the difficulty - which he took to be an impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or, what is the - same thing, all cognition assumed to be <span class="T6">a priori</span>, is nothing - but a long habit of accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective - necessity for objective.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I - occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in - an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has - undertaken for him a labor of so profound research, and will rather be surprised at the - facility with which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been - attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality - (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., for that which is sufficient for all - cases), and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the reader finds it - here.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended - from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the - question, "How are synthetic cognitions <span class="T6">a priori</span> possible?" For - the answer contains which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name - of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing - else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed - without further ado.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as - a science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man, they - cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the modest language of a rational - belief, they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, - anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume - (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical purposes only) the - existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the - understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful - and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the - latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments <span class="T6">a priori</span> are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for - what is declared to be known <span class="T6">a priori</span> is thereby announced as - necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions - must be either science, or are worth nothing at all.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which - necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete solution of the - problem here propounded, in systematical order and completeness, and hitherto we have - never had any transcendental philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part - of metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to constitute the - possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics. And it is not - surprising that when a whole science, deprived of all help from other sciences, and - consequently in itself quite new, is required to answer a single question - satisfactorily, we should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded - in obscurity.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical - method, in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we - can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition (which alone is under - consideration here), pure mathematics and pure natural science (physics). For these - alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualisable form (<span class="T6">in der Anschauung</span>), and consequently (if there should occur in them a - cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span>) can show the truth or conformity of the - cognition to the object <span class="T6">in concreto</span>, that is, its actuality, - from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method. - This facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only - applied to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they must - strictly be derived <span class="T6">in abstracto</span> from concepts.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time - well-grounded pure cognitions <span class="T6">a priori</span> to such a possible - cognition of the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must - comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in spite of its - truth not unsuspected, cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span> which lies at the - bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of - its possibility is commonly called metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the - natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the - transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four - questions:</p> - - - - <p class="StandardNoSpaceFirst">1. <span class="T6">How is pure mathematics - possible?</span></p> - - <p class="StandardNoSpace">2. <span class="T6">How is pure natural science - possible?</span></p> - - <p class="StandardNoSpace">3. <span class="T6">How is metaphysics in general - possible?</span></p> - - <p class="StandardNoSpaceLast">4. <span class="T6">How is metaphysics as a science - possible?</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly - designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, - which for itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for the sources of given - sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing something <span class="T6">a - priori</span> may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure - these sciences gain, if not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, - and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin, they - give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain their own nature.</p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3103" name="__RefHeading___Toc3103"></a>FIRST - PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</h1> - - <h2>HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?</h2> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">§ 6.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">HERE is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing - even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in the future. - Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodeictical certainty, i.e., absolute necessity, - which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of - reason, and moreover is thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises:]</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">"How then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of - this nature entirely <span class="T6">a priori</span>?"</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it neither - is nor can be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span>, which lies deeply hidden, but which might reveal itself by these - its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently ferreted out?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this - peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) and indeed <span class="T6">a priori</span>, therefore in a - visual form which is not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a - single step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz., "intuitive"; whereas - philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts, and though - it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure, can never derive them from it. - This observation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest - condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous visualisation (called - pure intuition, or <span class="T6">reine Anschauung</span>) must form its basis, in - which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, <span class="T6">in - concreto</span> and yet <span class="T6">a priori</span>. If we can find out this pure - intuition and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical - propositions <span class="T6">a priori</span> are possible in pure mathematics, and - consequently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition [viz., - sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame - of an object of intuition [or sense-perception], by new predicates, which intuition - [i.e., sense-perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure intuition - [viz., the visualisation of forms in our imagination, from which every thing sensual, - i.e., every thought of material qualities, is excluded] does so likewise, only with - this difference, that in the latter case the synthetical judgment is <span class="T6">a - priori</span> certain and apodeictical, in the former, only <span class="T6">a - posteriori</span> and empirically certain; because this latter contains only that which - occurs in contingent empirical intuition, but the former, that which must necessarily - be discovered in pure intuition. Here intuition, being an intuition <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, is <span class="T6">before all experience</span>, viz., before any - perception of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its concept.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to - increase than to lessen. For the question now is, "How is it possible to intuite [in a - visual form] anything <span class="T6">a priori</span>?" An intuition [viz., a visual - sense-perception] is such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of - the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuite from the outset <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, because intuition would in that event take place without either a former - or a present object to refer to, and by consequence could not be intuition. Concepts - indeed are such, that we can easily form some of them <span class="T6">a priori</span>, - viz., such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general; and we need not - find ourselves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, the concepts - of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in order to make them under stood, - a certain concrete use—that is, an application to some sense-experience (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), by which an object of them is given us. But how can the - intuition of the object [its visualisation] precede the object itself?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 9. If our intuition [i.e., our sense-experience] were - perforce of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there would - not be any intuition <span class="T6">a priori</span>, but intuition would be always - empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is - present and given to me. It is indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualising - (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) of a present thing should make me know this thing - as it is in itself, as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. - But even granting this possibility, a visualising of that sort would not take place - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, that is, before the object were presented to me; for - without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and the - object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct inspiration.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Therefore in one way only can my intuition (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) anticipate the actuality of the object, and be a cognition - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, viz.: if my intuition contains nothing but the form - of sensibility, antedating in my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which - I am affected by objects.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - For that objects of sense can only be intuited according to this form of sensibility - I can know <span class="T6">a priori</span>. Hence it follows: that - propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and - valid for objects of the senses; as also, conversely, that intuitions which are - possible <span class="T6">a priori</span> can never concern any other things than - objects of our senses.<sup><a href="#ftn10" id="body_ftn10">10</a></sup></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of the sensuous - intuition by which we can intuite things <span class="T6">a priori</span>, but by which - we can know objects only as they <span class="T6">appear</span> to us (to our senses), - not as they are in themselves; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if - synthetical propositions <span class="T6">a priori</span> be granted as possible, or - if, in case they actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined - beforehand.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation - of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and necessary are - Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its concepts in intuition, and pure - mathematics in pure intuition, that is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any - other way, it would be impossible to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not - analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetically, and if pure intuition be - wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments <span class="T6">a priori</span> can be given. Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. - Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in - time; and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without - employing the representation of time. Both representations, however, are only - intuitions; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their - alterations (motion) everything empirical, or belonging to sensation, space and time - still remain, which are therefore pure intuitions that lie <span class="T6">a - priori</span> at the basis of the empirical. Hence they can never be omitted, but at - the same time, by their being pure intuitions <span class="T6">a priori</span>, they - prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical - intuition, or perception of actual objects, and conformably to which objects can be - known <span class="T6">a priori</span>, but only as they appear to us.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 11. The problem of the present section is therefore solved. - Pure mathematics, as synthetical cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span>, is only - possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis of - their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of time) which is - <span class="T6">a priori</span>. This is possible, because the latter intuition is - nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of the - objects, in that it, in fact, makes them possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting - <span class="T6">a priori</span> affects not the matter of the phenomenon (that is, the - sense-element in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., - space and time. Should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations adhering - not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our sensibility, I should be glad - to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, viz., before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are - presented to us. Such, however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite - comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our - sensibility, while the objects count merely as phenomena; for then the form of the - phenomenon, i.e., pure intuition, can by all means be represented as proceeding from - ourselves, that is, <span class="T6">a priori</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 12. In order to add something by way of illustration and - confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers. All - proofs of the complete congruence of two given figures (where the one can in every - respect be substituted for the other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to - coincide; which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon - immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodeictically certain, but - would have empirical certainty only. In that case, it could only be said that it is - always found to be so, and holds good only as far as our perception reaches. That - everywhere space (which [in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another - space) has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is based on - the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one - point; but this proposition cannot by any means be shown from concepts, but rests - immediately on intuition, and indeed on pure and <span class="T6">a priori</span> - intuition, because it is apodeictically certain. That we can require a line to be drawn - to infinity (<span class="T6">in indefinitum</span>), or that a series of changes (for - example, spaces traversed by motion) shall be infinitely continued, presupposes a - representation of space and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as - it in itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be inferred. - Consequently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions, which make its - synthetical and apodeictically valid propositions possible. Hence our transcendental - deduction of the notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility - of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be granted, but its - existence could by no means be understood, and we must assume "that everything which - can be given to our senses (to the external senses in space, to the internal one in - time) is intuited by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that - space and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves, may exercise - their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain attempted its solution, - and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the - degradation of space and of time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be - well founded.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be - ascertained by all means possible, quantitatively and qualitatively, it must follow, - that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other, and this - substitution would not occasion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true - of plane figures in geometry; but some spherical figures exhibit, notwithstanding a - complete internal agreement, such a contrast in their external relation, that the one - figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other. For instance, two spherical - triangles on opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common - base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that nothing is to be - found in either, if it be described for itself alone and completed, that would not - equally be applicable to both; and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other - (being situated upon the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference - between the two triangles, which difference our understanding cannot describe as - internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in space.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more - obvious still.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more - alike to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put - such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype; for if this is a - right hand, that in the glass is a left one, and the image or reflexion of the right - ear is a left one which never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in - this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking - alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their - complete equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds - as the right one (they are not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the - other. What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they - are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would cognise them, but sensuous - intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility of which rests upon the relation of - certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. Space - is the form of the external intuition of this sensibility, and the internal - determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external - relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in other words, by its relation to - the external sense). That is to say, the part is only possible through the whole, which - is never the case with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but - with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal things, which are - yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric helices), cannot be made intelligible by - any concept, but only by the relation to the right and the left hands which immediately - refers to intuition.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"><a id="Page40" name="Page40"></a>Remark I.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have - objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense. But in regard to - the latter the principle holds good, that our sense representation is not a - representation of things in themselves, but of the way in which they appear to us. - Hence it follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere - creation of our poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with - assurance to actual objects; but rather that they are necessarily valid of space, and - consequently of all that may be found in space, because space is nothing else than the - form of all external appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense - can be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is that upon - which the possibility of external appearance depends. Therefore these appearances can - never contain anything but what geometry prescribes to them.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to - represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by any means follow - from the conception of space, which with all its properties serves to the geometer as - an <span class="T6">a priori</span> foundation, together with what is thence inferred, - must be so in nature. The space of the geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and - it would not be credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things must - of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make spontaneously and previous to - our acquaintance with them. But if this image, or rather this formal intuition, is the - essential property of our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, - and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their appearances: we - shall easily comprehend, and at the same time indisputably prove, that all external - objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with - the propositions of geometry; because sensibility by means of its form of external - intuition, viz., by space, the same with which the geometer is occupied, makes those - objects at all possible as mere appearances.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of - philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at the same time were - philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so - far as they concerned space, but of their objective validity and the applicability of - this concept itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much concern - whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points, and consequently that - true space in the object might consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space - which the geometer has in his mind [being continuous] cannot be such. They did not - recognise that this mental space renders possible the physical space, i.e., the - extension of matter; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in - themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and that all objects - in space are mere appearances, i.e., not things in themselves but representations of - our sensuous intuition. But such is the case, for the space of the geometer is exactly - the form of sensuous intuition which we find <span class="T6">a priori</span> in us, - and contains the ground of the possibility of all external appearances (according to - their form), and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree with the - propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any fictitious concept, but from - the subjective basis of all external phenomena, which is sensibility itself. In this - and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of - its propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which is surprised - at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has not traced them to the sources - of their concepts.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">Remark II.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Whatever is given us as object, must be given us in intuition. All - our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the understanding - intuites nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just shown that the senses never - and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves, but only their appearances, - which are mere representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, - together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere - representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts.' You will say: Is not - this manifest idealism?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but - thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being - nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them - corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing - outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing - only their appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting - our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that - is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet - know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and - which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is - unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the - very contrary.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been - generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external - things, that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in - themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our - representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this kind. Now, if I go - farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of - bodies also, which are called primary, such as extension, place, and in general space, - with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.)—no one - in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little as the man who - admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself, but only as modifications - of the sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, so little can my - system be named idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay,</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">All the properties which constitute the intuition - of a body belong merely to its appearance</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, - as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the - senses as it is in itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to - avoid all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of space is not - only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects—that I - have said—but that it is quite similar to the object,—an assertion in which I can find - as little meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the - property of vermilion, which in me excites this sensation.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">Remark III.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile - objection, "that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible - world would be turned into mere sham." At first all philosophical insight into the - nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused - mode of representation, according to which we still know things as they are, but - without being able to reduce everything in this our representation to a clear - consciousness; whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists, not in this - logical distinction of clearness and obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin - of cognition itself. For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, - but only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by sensuous - perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding - for reflexion. After this necessary corrective, an objection rises from an unpardonable - and almost intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of the - world of sense into mere illusion.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how - we should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment - upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether in the determination of the - object there is truth or not. But the difference between truth and dreaming is not - ascertained by the nature of the representations, which are referred to objects (for - they are the same in both cases), but by their connexion according to those rules, - which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object, and - by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in experience or not. And it is not - the fault of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i.e., if the - intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of the thing or of - its existence also, which the understanding can only think. The senses represent to us - the paths of the planets as now progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither - falsehood nor truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance, - we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion. But as a false judgment may - easily arise when the understanding is not on its guard against this subjective mode of - representation being considered objective, we say they appear to move backward; it is - not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but the understanding, - whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our - representations, whenever we connect our intuitions of sense (whatever they may - contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the coherence of all - cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or - careful. It is merely a question of the use of sensuous representations in the - understanding, and not of their origin. In the same way, if I consider all the - representations of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing - but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the sensibility, which is not - to be met with in objects out of it, and if I make use of these representations in - reference to possible experience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as - appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can correctly - cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all the propositions of geometry - hold good of space as well as of all the objects of the senses, consequently of all - possible experience, whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as - something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case however I comprehend - how I can know <span class="T6">a priori</span> these propositions concerning all the - objects of external intuition. Otherwise, everything else as regards all possible - experience remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar view.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my - notions of space and time, which I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim them - qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should prevent me from letting - them hold good of the same things, even though my senses might be different, and - unsuited to them?), then a grave error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would - proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition - of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for all possible experience; I - would refer this condition to things in themselves, and do not limit it to the - conditions of experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far - from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means of securing - the application of one of the most important cognitions (that which mathematics - propounds <span class="T6">a priori</span>) to actual objects, and of preventing its - being regarded as mere illusion. For without this observation it would be quite - impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from - no experience, and which yet lie in our representation <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, are not mere phantasms of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, - at least not adequately, and consequently, whether we have been able to show its - unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just - because they are mere appearances.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Secondly, though these my principles make appearances of the - representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth of experience - into mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of preventing the - transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived, leading to - the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere - representations, were taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remarkable - event of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which is destroyed - by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it is employed in experience, - produces truth, but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and - consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing but illusion.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Inasmuch, therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the - senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this, - that they represent in no respect, not even in the pure intuitions of space and of - time, anything more than mere appearance of those things, but never their constitution - in themselves, this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me. My - protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem - superfluous, were there not incompetent judges, who, while they would have an old name - for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion, and never judge of the - spirit of philosophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to put - their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions, and thereby deform and distort - them. I have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism, but that - cannot authorise any one to confound it either with the empirical idealism of - Descartes, (indeed, his was only an insoluble problem, owing to which he thought every - one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because it could never be - proved satisfactorily), or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, - against which and other similar phantasms our Critique contains the proper antidote. My - idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, - constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt - it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of things, to which space and time - especially belong. Of these [viz., space and time], consequently of all appearances in - general, I have only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of - representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. But the word - "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our cognition, i.e., not to - things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate this misconception. Yet - rather than give further occasion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this - idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an objectionable idealism - to convert actual things (not appearances) into mere representations, by what name - shall we call him who conversely changes mere representations to things? It may, I - think, be called "dreaming idealism," in contradistinction to the former, which may be - called "visionary," both of which are to be refuted by my transcendental, or, better, - critical idealism.</p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3105" name="__RefHeading___Toc3105"></a>SECOND - PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</h1> - - <h2>HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?</h2> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">§ 14.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">NATURE is the existence of things, so far as it is determined - according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in - themselves, we could never cognise it either <span class="T6">a priori</span> or - <span class="T6">a posteriori</span>. Not <span class="T6">a priori</span>, for how can - we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the - dissection of our concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is - contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] belongs to its - logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, - and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our - understanding, and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of - things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not - conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they must therefore - be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they - would not be cognised <span class="T6">a priori</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">A cognition of the nature of things in themselves <span class="T6">a posteriori</span> would be equally impossible. For, if experience is to teach us - laws, to which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things in - themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience. But - experience teaches us what exists and how it exists, but never that it must necessarily - exist so and not otherwise. Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of - things in themselves.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure science of - nature in which are propounded, <span class="T6">a priori</span> and with all the - necessity requisite to apodeictical propositions, laws to which nature is subject. I - need only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which, under the title - of the universal Science of Nature, precedes all Physics (which is founded upon - empirical principles). In it we have Mathematics applied to appearance, and also merely - discursive principles (or those derived from concepts), which constitute the - philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are several things in it, - which are not quite pure and independent of empirical sources: such as the concept of - <span class="T6">motion</span>, that of <span class="T6">impenetrability</span> (upon - which the empirical concept of matter rests), that of <span class="T6">inertia</span>, - and many others, which prevent its being called a perfectly pure science of nature. - Besides, it only refers to objects of the external sense, and therefore does not give - an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science - must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of - the internal sense (the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to universal laws. - But among the principles of this universal physics there are a few which actually have - the required universality; for instance, the propositions that "substance is - permanent," and that "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws," - etc. These are actually universal laws of nature, which subsist completely <span class="T6">a priori</span>. There is then in fact a pure science of nature, and the question - arises, <span class="T6">How is it possible?</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 16. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which - determines the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity to - law [<span class="T6">Gesetzmässigkeit</span>] of the determinations of the existence of things generally. If we - consider it <span class="T6">materialiter</span> (i.e., in the matter that forms its - objects) "nature is the complex of all the objects of experience." And with this only - are we now concerned, for besides, things which can never be objects of experience, if - they must be cognised as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to concepts - whose meaning could never be given <span class="T6">in concreto</span> (by any example - of possible experience). Consequently we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of - their nature, the reality whereof (i.e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are - mere creations of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be - an object of experience would be hyperphysical, and with things hyperphysical we are - here not concerned, but only with the cognition of nature, the actuality of which can - be confirmed by experience, though it [the cognition of nature] is possible - <span class="T6">a priori</span> and precedes all experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this narrower sense is - therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience, and so far as it is - cognised <span class="T6">a priori</span>, their necessary conformity. But it has just - been shown that the laws of nature can never be cognised a priori in objects so far as - they are considered not in reference to possible experience, but as things in - themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves (the properties of - which we pass by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex of - these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility of a - cognition of nature <span class="T6">a priori</span> is in question, whether it is - better to arrange the problem thus: How can we cognise <span class="T6">a priori</span> - that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to law? or thus: How is it - possible to cognise <span class="T6">a priori</span> the necessary conformity to law of - experience itself as regards all its objects generally?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in - either way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is the point of - the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For the subjective laws, under - which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible, hold good of these things, as - Objects of possible experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered - here). Either of the following statements means quite the same:</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">A judgment of observation can never rank as experience, without the - law, that "whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent, - which it follows according to a universal rule."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">"Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have - a cause."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For - we can <span class="T6">a priori</span> and previous to all given objects have a - cognition of those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of the - laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without reference to possible - experience. We cannot therefore study the nature of things <span class="T6">a - priori</span> otherwise than by investigating the conditions and the universal (though - subjective) laws, under which alone such a cognition as experience (as to mere form) is - possible, and we determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of - experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the conditions - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, on which nature as an object of experience is - possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was speaking of nature as a - thing in itself, and then move round in endless circles, in a vain search for laws - concerning things of which nothing is given me.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only, and - the universal conditions of its possibility which are given <span class="T6">a - priori</span>. Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible - experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the rules of the - observation of a nature that is already given, for these already presuppose experience. - I do not mean how (through experience) we can study the laws of nature; for these would - not then be laws <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and would yield us no pure science - of nature; but [I mean to ask] how the conditions <span class="T6">a priori</span> of - the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the - universal laws of nature must be derived.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 18. In the first place we must state that, while all judgments of experience - (<span class="T6">Erfahrungsurtheile</span>) are empirical (i.e., have their ground - in immediate sense perception), <span class="T6">vice versa</span>, all empirical - judgments (<span class="T6">empirische Urtheile</span>) are not judgments of - experience, but, besides the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the - sensuous intuition, particular concepts must yet be superadded—concepts which have - their origin quite <span class="T6">a priori</span> in the pure understanding, and - under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means - changed into experience.<sup><a href="#ftn11" id="body_ftn11">11</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are - <span class="T11">judgments of experience</span>; but those which are only subjectively - valid, I name mere <span class="T11">judgments of perception</span>. The latter require - no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connexion of perception in a - thinking subject. But the former always require, besides the representation of the - sensuous intuition, particular <span class="T6">concepts originally begotten in the - understanding</span>, which produce the objective validity of the judgment of - experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they - hold good only for us (i.e., for our subject), and we do not till afterwards give them - a new reference (to an object), and desire that they shall always hold good for us and - in the same way for everybody else; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all - judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the - objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its - necessary universality of application. And conversely when we have reason to consider a - judgment necessarily universal (which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure - concept of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumed), we must consider - it objective also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception - to a subject, but a quality of the object. For there would be no reason for the - judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the - object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they must all agree - with one another.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality - (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object in itself, - yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also necessary, we understand it to - have objective validity. By this judgment we cognise the object (though it remains - unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and necessary connexion of the given - perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments of experience - take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object (which is - impossible), but from the condition of universal validity in empirical judgments, - which, as already said, never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, - but upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains unknown in - itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the connexion of the - representations of the object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as - universally valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment - that is objective.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - To illustrate the matter: When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood - bitter"<sup><a href="#ftn12" id="body_ftn12">12</a></sup>—we have only subjectively valid - judgments. I do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it as - I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the - same subject, to myself, and that only in my present state of perception; - consequently they are not valid of the object. Such are judgments of perception. - Judgments of experience are of quite a different nature. What experience teaches me - under certain circumstances, it must always teach me and everybody; and its validity - is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time. Hence I - pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the - air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only—I do nothing - but refer two of my sensations to one another. But, if I would have it called a - judgment of experience, I require this connexion to stand under a condition, which - makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and everybody else should - always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 20. We must consequently analyse experience in order to see - what is contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding, and how the - judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is the intuition of - which I become conscious, i.e., perception (<span class="T6">perceptio</span>), which - pertains merely to the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of judging (which - belong only to the understanding). But this judging may be twofold—first, I may merely - compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my consciousness; or, - secondly, I may connect them in consciousness generally. The former judgment is merely - a judgment of perception, and of subjective validity only: it is merely a connexion of - perceptions in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence it is not, as is - commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in - consciousness through judgment; there arises no universality and necessity, for which - alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Quite another judgment therefore is required before perception can - become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which - determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition, connects its - empirical consciousness in consciousness generally, and thereby procures universal - validity for empirical judgments. A concept of this nature is a pure <span class="T6">a - priori</span> concept of the Understanding, which does nothing but determine for an - intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be - that of cause, then it determines the intuition which is subsumed under it, e.g., that - of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., the concept of air serves with regard - to its expansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical - judgment. The concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, - which is totally disparate from all possible perception, and only serves to determine - the representation subsumed under it, relatively to judgments in general, and so to - make a universally valid judgment possible.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience, it - is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the - understanding; for instance, air ranks under the concept of causes, which determines - our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical.<sup><a href="#ftn13" id="body_ftn13">13</a></sup> Thereby the expansion of the air is - represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my present state - or in several states of mine, or in the state of perception of others, but as - belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, "the air is elastic," becomes universally - valid, and a judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which - subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect: and they thereby - determine the perceptions not merely as regards one another in me, but relatively to - the form of judging in general, which is here hypothetical, and in this way they - render the empirical judgment universally valid. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - If all our synthetical judgments are analysed so far as they are objectively valid, - it will be found that they never consist of mere intuitions connected only (as is - commonly believed) by comparison into a judgment; but that they would be impossible - were not a pure concept of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted - from intuition, under which concept these latter are subsumed, and in this manner - only combined into an objectively valid judgment. Even the judgments of pure - mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The - principle, "a straight line is the shortest between two points," presupposes that the - line is subsumed under the concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, - but has its seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition - (of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, relatively to - their quantity, that is, to plurality (as <span class="T6">judicia - plurativa</span>).<sup><a href="#ftn14" id="body_ftn14">14</a></sup> For under them it is understood that - in a given intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as - it rests upon pure concepts of the understanding <span class="T6">a priori</span>, we - must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of - the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure concepts of the understanding must - run parallel to these functions, as such concepts are nothing more than concepts of - intuitions in general, so far as these are determined by one or other of these - functions of judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby also - the <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles of the possibility of all experience, - as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they - are nothing but propositions by which all perception is (under certain universal - conditions of intuition) subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding.</p> - - -<table class="table_1"> - - <tr> - <td class="td_1" colspan="2"> - <span class="T6">Logical Table of Judgments</span>. - </td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">1.</td> - <td class="td_2">2.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Quantity</span>.</td> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Quality</span>.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Universal.</td> - <td class="td_2">Affirmative.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Particular.</td> - <td class="td_2">Negative.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Singular.</td> - <td class="td_3">Infinite.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">3.</td> - <td class="td_2">4.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Relation</span>.</td> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Modality</span>.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Categorical.</td> - <td class="td_2">Problematical.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Hypothetical.</td> - <td class="td_2">Assertorial.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Disjunctive.</td> - <td class="td_3">Apodeictical.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_1" colspan="2"> - <span class="T6">Transcendental Table of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding</span>. - </td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">1.</td> - <td class="td_2">2.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Quantity</span>.</td> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Quality</span>.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Unity (the Measure).</td> - <td class="td_2">Reality.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Plurality (the Quantity).</td> - <td class="td_2">Negation.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Totality (the Whole).</td> - <td class="td_3">Limitation.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">3.</td> - <td class="td_2">4.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Relation</span>.</td> - <td class="td_2"><span class="T6">As to Modality</span>.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Substance.</td> - <td class="td_2">Possibility.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">Cause.</td> - <td class="td_2">Existence.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Community.</td> - <td class="td_3">Necessity.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_1" colspan="2"> - <span class="T6">Pure Physiological Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature</span>. - </td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">1.</td> - <td class="td_2">2.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Axioms of Intuition.</td> - <td class="td_3">Anticipations of Perception.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_2">3.</td> - <td class="td_2">4.</td> - </tr> - - <tr> - <td class="td_3">Analogies of Experience.</td> - <td class="td_3">Postulates of Empirical Thinking generally.</td> - </tr> - -</table> - - <p class="Standard">§ 21<span class="T6">a</span>. In order to comprise the whole - matter in one idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing - not the origin of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former pertains - to empirical psychology, and would even then never be adequately explained without the - latter, which belongs to the Critique of cognition, and particularly of the - understanding.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, - and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments, - which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions, are far from being - judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions - as they are given in the sensuous intuition, while in the other the judgments must - express what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which possesses - only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of experience must therefore add to - the sensuous intuition and its logical connexion in a judgment (after it has been - rendered universal by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as - necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else than that - concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form - of judgment rather than another, viz., a concept of that synthetical unity of - intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to - intuite—that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is uniting - representations in one consciousness. This union originates either merely relative to - the subject, and is accidental and subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or - objective. The union of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking - therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to judgments in - general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, when representations are - referred to a consciousness in one subject only, and united in it, or objective, when - they are united in a consciousness generally, that is, necessarily. The logical - functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in - consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, they are concepts of their necessary - union in a consciousness, and so principles of objectively valid judgments. This - union in a consciousness is either analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the - combination and addition of various representations one to another. Experience - consists in the synthetical connexion of phenomena (perceptions) in consciousness, so - far as this connexion is necessary. Hence the pure concepts of the understanding are - those under which all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments - of experience, in which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as - necessary and universally valid.<sup><a href="#ftn15" id="body_ftn15">15</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the condition - of the union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These rules, so - far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are fundamental - principles. But in regard to the possibility of all experience, merely in relation to - the form of thinking in it, no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than - those which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, - under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical judgment objectively - valid. These concepts are therefore the <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles of - possible experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - The principles of possible experience are then at the same time universal laws of - nature, which can be cognised <span class="T6">a priori</span>. And thus the problem - in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature possible?" is solved. For - the system which is required for the form of a science is to be met with in - perfection here, because, beyond the above-mentioned formal conditions of all - judgments in general offered in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a - logical system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the <span class="T6">a - priori</span> conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly - constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means of which all - phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical<sup><a href="#ftn16" id="body_ftn16">16</a></sup> system, that is, a system of nature, - which precedes all empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence - may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 24. The first one<sup><a href="#ftn17" id="body_ftn17">17</a></sup> of the physiological principles - subsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of - Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics to experience. - The second one subsumes the empirical element, viz., sensation which denotes the real - in intuitions, not indeed directly under the concept of quantity, because sensation - is not an intuition that contains either space or time, though it places the - respective object into both. But still there is between reality - (sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference - which has a quantity. For between every given degree of light and of darkness, - between every degree of heat and of absolute cold, between every degree of weight and - of absolute lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void - space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between - consciousness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a psychological blank) ever - diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute - absence of it; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a - kind of consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the - understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the peculiar quality - of empirical representations (appearances), by means of the principle: "that they all - have (consequently that what is real in all phenomena has) a degree." Here is the - second application of mathematics (<span class="T6">mathesis intensorum</span>) to - the science of nature. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence, - the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and can never be objectively - valid, consequently never fit for experience, if it does not come under <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles by which the cognition of experience relative to - appearances becomes even possible. Hence appearances must be subsumed under the - concept of Substance, which is the foundation of all determination of existence, as a - concept of the thing itself; or secondly—so far as, a succession is found among - phenomena, that is, an event—under the concept of an Effect with reference to Cause; - or lastly—so far as coexistence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judgment of - experience—under the concept of Community (action and reaction).<sup><a href="#ftn18" id="body_ftn18">18</a></sup> Thus a priori principles form the - basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, of the possibility - of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature. These - principles are the proper laws of nature, which may be termed dynamical. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Finally the cognition of the agreement and connexion not only of - appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to experience in - general, belongs to the judgments of experience. This relation contains either their - agreement with the formal conditions, which the understanding cognises, or their - coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one - concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity according to - universal laws of nature; and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method, or the - distinction of truth and of hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the - latter.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of - the understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent perfection, which - raises it far above every other table which has hitherto though in vain been tried or - may yet be tried by analysing the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all - synthetical <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles completely and according to one - principle, viz., the faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of - experience as regards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are no - more such principles, a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the dogmatical - method. Yet is this not all: there is a still greater merit in it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the - possibility of this cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and at the same time - limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we - desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the original sense which - the understanding attaches to it. This limit is that they contain nothing but the - conditions of possible experience in general so far as it is subjected to laws - <span class="T6">a priori</span>. Consequently I do not say, that things <span class="T6">in themselves</span> possess a quantity, that their actuality possesses a degree, - their existence a connexion of accidents in a substance, etc. This nobody can prove, - because such a synthetical connexion from mere concepts, without any reference to - sensuous intuition on the one side, or connexion of it in a possible experience on the - other, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of the concepts in these - principles then is: That all things stand necessarily <span class="T6">a priori</span> - under the afore-mentioned conditions, as objects of experience only.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these - principles: they are not directly referred to appearances and to their relations, but - to the possibility of experience, of which appearances constitute the matter only, - not the form. Thus they are referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical - propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of - perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere intuitions, occupying a - part of space and time, come under the concept of Quantity, which unites their - multiplicity <span class="T6">a priori</span> according to rules synthetically. - Again, so far as the perception contains, besides intuition, sensibility, and between - the latter and nothing (i.e., the total disappearance of sensibility), there is an - ever decreasing transition, it is apparent that that which is in appearances must - have a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy any part of - space or of time.<sup><a href="#ftn19" id="body_ftn19">19</a></sup> Still the transition to actuality - from empty time or empty space is only possible in time; consequently though - sensibility, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never be cognised - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, by its specific difference from other - sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a quantity of - perception be intensely distinguished from every other similar perception. Hence the - application of mathematics to nature, as regards the sensuous intuition by which - nature is given to us, becomes possible and is thus determined. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of - the principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For these do not - refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the principles of applied mathematics, but to - the connexion of their existence in experience; and this can be nothing but the - determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone - the connexion is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof therefore - does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connexion of things in themselves, but - merely of perceptions, and of these not in regard to their matter, but to the - determination of time and of the relation of their existence in it, according to - universal laws. If the empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively - valid (i.e., experience), these universal laws contain the necessary determination of - existence in time generally (viz., according to a rule of the understanding - <span class="T6">a priori</span>).</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but - my reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere - empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not considered that it goes much beyond - them, as it imparts to empirical judgments universal validity, and for that purpose - requires a pure and <span class="T6">a priori</span> unity of the understanding) is - recommended to pay special attention to this distinction of experience from a mere - aggregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly - maintains, that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of Causality, that is, - of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another, which is - necessitated by the former. I add, that we comprehend just as little the concept of - Subsistence, that is, the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things - there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing; nay, we - cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing (though we can point out - examples of its use in experience). The very same in comprehensibility affects the - Community of things, as we cannot comprehend how from the state of one thing an - inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it, and <span class="T6">vice - versa</span>, can be drawn, and how substances which have each their own separate - existence should depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding - these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity represented in - them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit. On the - contrary, I have amply shown, that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly - established <span class="T6">a priori</span>, or before all experience, and have their - undoubted objective value, though only with regard to experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 28. Though I have no notion of such a connexion of things in - themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as causes, or stand in - community with others (as parts of a real whole), and I can just as little conceive - such properties in appearances as such (because those concepts contain nothing that - lies in the appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think): we have yet - a notion of such a connexion of representations in our understanding, and in judgments - generally; consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judgments as - subject in relation to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, - and in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible cognition. Besides - we cognise <span class="T6">a priori</span> that without considering the representation - of an object as determined in some of these respects, we can have no valid cognition of - the object, and, if we should occupy ourselves about the object in itself, there is no - possible attribute, by which I could know that it is determined under any of these - aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation - to other substances) of community, for I have no notion of the possibility of such a - connexion of existence. But the question is not how things in themselves, but how the - empirical cognition of things is determined, as regards the above aspects of judgments - in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and shall be subsumed - under these concepts of the understanding. And then it is clear, that I completely - comprehend not only the possibility, but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena - under these concepts, that is, of using them for principles of the possibility of - experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical - concept (his <span class="T6">crux metaphysicorum</span>), the concept of cause, we - have, in the first place, given <span class="T6">a priori</span>, by means of logic, - the form of a conditional judgment in general, i.e., we have one given cognition as - antecedent and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we may - meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that a certain phenomenon is constantly - followed by another (though not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the - hypothetical judgment, and, for instance, to say, it the sun shines long enough upon a - body, it grows warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connexion, or concept - of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, which is merely a subjective - connexion of perceptions, is to be a judgment of experience, it must be considered as - necessary and universally valid. Such a proposition would be, "the sun is by its light - the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a law, and as valid not - merely of appearances but valid of them for the purposes of a possible experience which - requires universal and therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend - the concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of - experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of perceptions in consciousness - generally; but I do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a - cause, because the concept of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things, - but to experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition of - appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the - consequent according to the rule of hypothetical judgments.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not - refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves (<span class="T6">noumena</span>), they have no signification whatever. They serve, as it were, only - to decipher appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The principles - which arise from their reference to the sensible world, only serve our understanding - for empirical use. Beyond this they are arbitrary combinations, without objective - reality, and we can neither cognise their possibility <span class="T6">a priori</span>, - nor verify their reference to objects, let alone make it intelligible by any example; - because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, consequently the - objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This complete (though to its originator unexpected) solution of - Hume's problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their <span class="T6">a priori</span> origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity, as - laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as to limit their use to experience, - because their possibility depends solely on the reference of the understanding to - experience, but with a completely reversed mode of connexion which never occurred to - Hume, not by deriving them from experience, but by deriving experience from them.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All - synthetical principles <span class="T6">a priori</span> are nothing more than - principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to things in themselves, - but to appearances as objects of experience. And hence pure mathematics as well as a - pure science of nature can never be referred to anything more than mere appearances, - and can only represent either that which makes experience generally possible, or else - that which, as it is derived from these principles, must always be capable of being - represented in some possible experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 31. And thus we have at last something definite, upon which - to depend in all metaphysical enterprises, which have hitherto, boldly enough but - always at random, attempted everything without discrimination. That the aim of their - exertions should be so near, struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, - confident in their supposed sound common sense, started with concepts and principles of - pure reason (which were legitimate and natural, but destined for mere empirical use) in - quest of fields of knowledge, to which they neither knew nor could know any determinate - bounds, because they had never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or even - on the possibility of such a pure understanding.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who - believes he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may pretend, that - he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, not only suspected, but knew - and comprehended, what is here propounded with so much ado, or, if he likes, with - prolix and pedantic pomp: "that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field - of experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles individually, - he must grant, that there are many of them which he has not taken from experience, and - which are therefore independent of it and valid <span class="T6">a priori</span>. How - then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist, who makes use - of these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience, because they are - recognised to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in spite of - all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt from wandering inadvertently - beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough - involved in them, though in announcing everything as mere probability, rational - conjecture, or analogy, he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless - pretensions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure - reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which - make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (<span class="T6">Verstandeswesen</span>), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible - world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we - may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations - of thought.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere - appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know - not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the - way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding - therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, - and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of - phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, - but unavoidable.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort - (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the - sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would - then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of - possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the - inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can - know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our - pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but - objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we - leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 33. There is indeed something seductive in our pure - concepts of the understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent use, —a use which - transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts of substance, of power, - of action, of reality, and others, quite independent of experience, containing nothing - of sense appearance, and so apparently applicable to things in themselves (noumena), - but, what strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination in - themselves, which experience never attains. The concept of cause implies a rule, - according to which one state follows another necessarily; but experience can only show - us, that one state of things often, or at most, commonly, follows another, and - therefore affords neither strict universality, nor necessity.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than - can be exhausted by their empirical use, and so the understanding inadvertently adds - for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing, which it fills with - nothing but creatures of thought, without ever observing that it has transgressed with - its otherwise lawful concepts the bounds of their use.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 34. Two important, and even indispensable, though very dry, investigations - had therefore become indispensable in the Critique of Pure Reason,—viz., the two - chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der - Unterscheidung aller Verstandesbegriffe überhaupt in - Phänomena und Noumena." In the former it is shown, that the - senses furnish not the pure concepts of the understanding <span class="T6">in - concreto</span>, but only the schedule for their use, and that the object conformable - to it occurs only in experience (as the product of the understanding from materials - of the sensibility). In the latter it is shown, that, although our pure concepts of - the understanding and our principles are independent of experience, and despite of - the apparently greater sphere of their use, still nothing whatever can be thought by - them beyond the field of experience, because they can do nothing but merely determine - the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions. But as there is no - intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility, these pure concepts, as they - cannot possibly be exhibited <span class="T6">in concreto</span>, are void of all - meaning; consequently all these noumena, together with their complex, the - intelligible world,<sup><a href="#ftn20" id="body_ftn20">20</a></sup> are nothing but representation of a - problem, of which the object in itself is possible, but the solution, from the nature - of our understanding, totally impossible. For our understanding is not a faculty of - intuition, but of the connexion of given intuitions in experience. Experience must - therefore contain all the objects for our concepts; but beyond it no concepts have - any significance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a foundation. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional - vagaries, and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience, since it gains - life and vigor by such flights, and since it is always easier to moderate its boldness, - than to stimulate its languor. But the understanding which ought to think can never be - forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend upon it alone for assistance to set - bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the imagination.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and - modestly. It first elucidates the elementary cognitions, which inhere in it prior to - all experience, but yet must always have their application in experience. It gradually - drops these limits, and what is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its - principles from itself? And then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in nature, - then to beings, outside nature; in short to a world, for whose construction the - materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly, and - though not confirmed, is never refuted, by experience. This is the reason that young - thinkers are so partial to metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often - sacrifice to it their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better - employed.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors - of pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so - occult, by complaints of the limits of our reason, and by degrading our assertions into - mere conjectures. For if their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and reason's - cognition of its own essence does not become a true science, in which the field of its - right use is distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty from that of its - worthless and idle use, these fruitless efforts will never be abandoned for good.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 36. How is Nature itself possible?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This question—the highest point that transcendental philosophy can - ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must proceed—properly - contains two questions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">First: How is nature at all possible in - the material sense, by intuition, considered as the totality of appearances; how are - space, time, and that which fills both—the object of sensation, in general possible? - The answer is: By means of the constitution of our Sensibility, according to which it - is specifically affected by objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally - distinct from those phenomena. This answer is given in the <span class="T6">Critique</span> itself in the transcendental Aesthetic, and in these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> by the solution of the first general problem.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Secondly: How is nature possible in the - formal sense, as the totality of the rules, under which all phenomena must come, in - order to be thought as connected in experience? The answer must be this: It is only - possible by means of the constitution of our Understanding, according to which all the - above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, - and by which the peculiar way in which we think (viz., by rules), and hence experience - also, are possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects - in themselves. This answer is given in the <span class="T6">Critique</span> itself in - the transcendental Logic, and in these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>, in the - course of the solution of the second main problem.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is - possible, or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is necessarily its - basis and that of all thinking, cannot be further analysed or answered, because it is - of them that we are in need for all our answers and for all our thinking about - objects.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of - experience; but conformity to law in the connexion of appearances, i.e., in nature in - general, we cannot discover by any experience, because experience itself requires laws - which are <span class="T6">a priori</span> at the basis of its possibility.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same - time the universal law of nature, and the principles of the experience are the very - laws of nature. For we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances, i.e., of - representations in us, and hence we can only derive the laws of its connexion from the - principles of their connexion in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary - union in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Even the main proposition expounded throughout this section—that - universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognised <span class="T6">a - priori</span>—leads naturally to the proposition: that the highest legislation of - nature must lie in ourselves, i.e., in our understanding, and that we must not seek the - universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience, but conversely must seek - nature, as to its universal conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of - experience, which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. For how were it - otherwise possible to know <span class="T6">a priori</span> these laws, as they are not - rules of analytical cognition, but truly synthetical extensions of it?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of - the possibility of nature, can only proceed from one of two reasons: either these - laws are drawn from nature by means of experience, or conversely nature is derived - from the laws of the possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as - the mere universal conformity to law of the latter. The former is self-contradictory, - for the universal laws of nature can and must be cognised <span class="T6">a - priori</span> (that is, independent of all experience), and be the foundation of all - empirical use of the understanding; the latter alternative therefore alone - remains.<sup><a href="#ftn21" id="body_ftn21">21</a></sup></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, which always - presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of nature, which, - without being based on particular perceptions, contain merely the conditions of their - necessary union in experience. In relation to the latter, nature and possible - experience are quite the same, and as the conformity to law here depends upon the - necessary connexion of appearances in experience (without which we cannot cognise any - object whatever in the sensible world), consequently upon the original laws of the - understanding, it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say:</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"><span class="T6">The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but - prescribes them to, nature.</span></p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 37. We shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by - an example, which will show, that laws, which we discover in objects of sensuous - intuition (especially when these laws are cognised as necessary), are commonly held by - us to be such as have been placed there by the understanding, in spite of their being - similar in all points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 38. If we consider the properties of the circle, by which - this figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself, at once in a - universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a constitution (<span class="T6">eine - Natur</span>) to this geometrical thing. Two right lines, for example, which intersect - one another and the circle, howsoever they may be drawn, are always divided so that the - rectangle constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with - the segments of the other. The question now is: Does this law lie in the circle or in - the understanding, that is, Does this figure, independently of the understanding, - contain in itself the ground of the law, or does the understanding, having constructed - according to its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the figure itself, - introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another in geometrical proportion? - When we follow the proofs of this law, we soon perceive, that it can only be derived - from the condition on which the understanding founds the construction of this figure, - and which is that of the equality of the radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to - pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common - laws, and consider the circle as a conic section, which of course is subject to the - same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections, we shall find that - all the chords which intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola, always - intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not indeed equal, but always - bear a constant ratio to one another. If we proceed still farther, to the fundamental - laws of physical astronomy, we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused - over all material nature, the rule of which is: "that it decreases inversely as the - square of the distance from each attracting point, i.e., as the spherical surfaces - increase, over which this force spreads," which law seems to be necessarily inherent in - the very nature of things, and hence is usually propounded as cognisable <span class="T6">a priori</span>. Simple as the sources of this law are, merely resting upon the - relation of spherical surfaces of different radii, its consequences are so valuable - with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not only are all - possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections, but such a relation of these - orbits to each other results, that no other law of attraction, than that of the inverse - square of the distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the - understanding cognises <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and chiefly from the universal - principles of the determination of space. Now I ask:</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding - learn them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies - in space; or do they inhere in the understanding and in the way in which it determines - space according to the conditions of the synthetical unity in which its concepts are - all centred?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties - so indeterminate, that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it. - Whereas that which determines space to assume the form of a circle or the figures of a - cone and a sphere, is the understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity - of their constructions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be the substratum - of all intuitions determinable to particular objects, and in it of course the - condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies. But the - unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding, and on conditions - which lie in its own nature; and thus the understanding is the origin of the - universal order of nature, in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws, - and thereby first constructs, <span class="T6">a priori</span>, experience (as to its - form), by means of which whatever is to be cognised only by experience, is - necessarily subjected to its laws. For we are not now concerned with the nature of - things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility - and our understanding, but with nature, as an object of possible experience, and in - this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience possible, thereby insists - that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all, or must be - nature [viz., an existence of things, determined according to universal - laws<sup><a href="#ftn22" id="body_ftn22">22</a></sup>]. -</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">§ 39. <span class="T6">Of the System of the - Categories</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">There can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher, than to be - able to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles, which had - occurred to him in concrete use, from a principle <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and - to unite everything in this way in one cognition. He formerly only believed that those - things, which remained after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among one - another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were completely collected; but - this was only an Aggregate. Now he knows, that just so many, neither more nor less, can - constitute the mode of cognition, and perceives the necessity of his division, which - constitutes comprehension; and now only he has attained a <span class="T6">System</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">To search in our daily cognition for the concepts, which do not - rest upon particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of experience, where - they as it were constitute the mere form of connexion, presupposes neither greater - reflexion nor deeper insight, than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use - of words generally, and thus to collect elements for a grammar. In fact both researches - are very nearly related, even though we are not able to give a reason why each language - has just this and no other formal constitution, and still less why an exact number of - such formal determinations in general are found in it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of - Categories.<sup><a href="#ftn23" id="body_ftn23">23</a></sup> To these, which are also called - predicaments, he found himself obliged afterwards to add five - post-predicaments,<sup><a href="#ftn24" id="body_ftn24">24</a></sup> some of which however (<span class="T6">prius</span>, - <span class="T6">simul</span>, and <span class="T6">motus</span>) are contained in - the former; but this random collection must be considered (and commended) as a mere - hint for future inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and hence it has, in - the present more advanced state of philosophy, been rejected as quite useless. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">After long reflexion on the pure elements of human knowledge (those - which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty - and in separating the pure elementary notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from - those of the Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 9th Categories had to be excluded - from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; because there was no - principle [in them], on which the understanding could be investigated, measured in its - completion, and all the functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined - exhaustively and with precision.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But in order to discover such a principle, I looked about for an - act of the understanding which comprises all the rest, and is distinguished only by - various modifications or phases, in reducing the multiplicity of representation to the - unity of thinking in general: I found this act of the understanding to consist in - judging. Here then the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though not yet quite - free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the - pure functions of the understanding, which are however undetermined in regard to any - object. I finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather - to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the - pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make certain, that these, - and this exact number only, constitute our whole cognition of things from pure - understanding. I was justified in calling them by their old name, <span class="T6">Categories</span>, while I reserved for myself the liberty of adding, under the - title of "Predicables," a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by - combinations whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the appearance, i.e., - space or time, or with its matter, so far as it is not yet empirically determined - (viz., the object of sensation in general), as soon as a system of transcendental - philosophy should be completed with the construction of which I am engaged in the - <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Now the essential point in this system of Categories, which - distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any principle, and for - which alone it deserves to be considered as philosophy, consists in this: that by means - of it the true significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition - of their use could be precisely determined. For here it became obvious that they are - themselves nothing but logical functions, and as such do not produce the least concept - of an object, but require some sensuous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve - to determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as - regards all functions of judging, relatively to these functions, thereby procuring them - universal validity, and by means of them making judgments of experience in general - possible.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits - them at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either to their - first author, or to any of his successors; but without this insight (which immediately - depends upon their derivation or deduction), they are quite useless and only a - miserable list of names, without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients - ever conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge, - which under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would - have reached us in quite another shape, and would have enlightened the human - understanding, instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations, - thereby rendering it unfit for true science.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself - systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and through what points of inquiry - every metaphysical consideration must proceed, in order to be complete; for it - exhausts all the possible movements (<span class="T6">momenta</span>) of the - understanding, among which every concept must be classed. In like manner the table of - Principles has been formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by - the system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts,<sup><a href="#ftn25" - id="body_ftn25">25</a></sup> which must go beyond the physical - application of the understanding, it is always the very same clue, which, as it must - always be determined <span class="T6">a priori</span> by the same fixed points of the - human understanding, always forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object - of a pure conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is to be - estimated philosophically and on <span class="T6">a priori</span> principles, can in - this way be completely cognised. I could not therefore omit to make use of this clue - with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, viz., the various - distinctions of "the notions of something and of nothing," and to construct - accordingly (<span class="T6">Critique</span>, p. 207) a regular and necessary - table of their divisions.<sup><a href="#ftn26" id="body_ftn26">26</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - And this system, like every other true one founded on a universal principle, shows - its inestimable value in this, that it excludes all foreign concepts, which might - otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of the understanding, and determines the - place of every cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of "concepts of - reflexion" have been likewise arranged in a table according to the clue of the - categories, intrude, without having any privilege or title to be among the pure - concepts of the understanding in Ontology. They are concepts of connexion, and - thereby of the objects themselves, whereas the former are only concepts of a mere - comparison of concepts already given, hence of quite another nature and use. By my - systematic division<sup><a href="#ftn27" id="body_ftn27">27</a></sup> - they are saved from this confusion. - But the value of my special table of the categories will be still more obvious, when - we separate the table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from the concepts of - the understanding. The latter being of quite another nature and origin, they must - have quite another form than the former. This so necessary separation has never yet - been made in any system of metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational concepts all - mixed up with the categories, like children of one family, which confusion was - unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories. - </p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3107" name="__RefHeading___Toc3107"></a>THIRD - PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM.</h1> - - <h2>HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?</h2> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">§ 40.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">PURE mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for - such a deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and certainty. For the - former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter (though sprung from pure sources of - the understanding) upon experience and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot - altogether refuse and dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its - certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both sciences therefore - stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another science, - metaphysics.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always find their - application in experience, but also with pure rational concepts, which never can be - given in any possible experience. Consequently the objective reality of these - concepts (viz., that they are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of - metaphysical assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This - part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end, to which - the rest is only a means, and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for - its own sake. The third question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the - root and essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason with - itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this - incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed being able to reach that - knowledge through, experience.<sup><a href="#ftn28" id="body_ftn28">28</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The - empirical use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully satisfy the - proper destination of the latter. Every single experience is only a part of the whole - sphere of its domain, but the absolute totality of all possible experience is itself - not experience. Yet it is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere - representation of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose - use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far as it can be given. Whereas the - concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e., the collective unity of all possible - experience, and thereby transcend every given experience. Thus they become <span class="T6">transcendent</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">As the understanding stands in need of categories for experience, reason - contains in itself the source of ideas, by which I mean necessary concepts, whose - object cannot be given in any experience. The latter are inherent in the nature of - reason, as the former are in that of the understanding. While the former carry with - them an illusion likely to mislead, the illusion of the latter is inevitable, though it - certainly can be kept from misleading us.</p> - - - <p class="Standard">Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our - judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent - (exaggerated) use is the sole preservative from the aberrations into which reason falls - when it mistakes its destination, and refers that to the object transcendently, which - only regards its own subject and its guidance in all immanent use.</p> - - - <p class="Standard">§ 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure concepts of - reason, from categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, as cognitions of a - quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a point in founding a science - which is to contain the system of all these <span class="T6">a priori</span> - cognitions, that without this distinction metaphysics is absolutely impossible, or is - at best a random, bungling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of - the materials or of their fitness for any purpose. Had the <span class="T6">Critique of - Pure Reason</span> done nothing but first point out this distinction, it had thereby - contributed more to clear up our conception of, and to guide our inquiry in, the field - of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which have hitherto been made to satisfy the - transcendent problems of pure reason, without ever surmising that we were in quite - another field than that of the understanding, and hence classing concepts of the - understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the same kind.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this - feature, that their concepts present themselves in experience, and their principles can - be confirmed by it; whereas the transcendent cognitions of reason cannot, either as - ideas, appear in experience, or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it. - Hence whatever errors may slip in unawares, can only be discovered by pure reason - itself—a discovery of much difficulty, because this very reason naturally becomes - dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by - any objective and dogmatical researches into things, but by a subjective investigation - of reason itself as a source of ideas.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 43. In the <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> - it was always my greatest care to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the - several species of cognition, but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from - their common source. I did this in order that by knowing whence they originated, I - might determine their use with safety, and also have the unanticipated but invaluable - advantage of knowing the completeness of my enumeration, classification and - specification of concepts <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and therefore according to - principles. Without this, metaphysics is mere rhapsody, in which no one knows whether - he has enough, or whether and where something is still wanting. We can indeed have this - advantage only in pure philosophy, but of this philosophy it constitutes the very - essence.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">As I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical - functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it was quite natural to seek the - origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason. For as soon as - these pure concepts of reason (the transcendental ideas) are given, they could hardly, - except they be held innate, be found anywhere else, than in the same activity of - reason, which, so far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical element of the - syllogisms of reason; but, so far as it represents judgments of the understanding with - respect to the one or to the other form <span class="T6">a priori</span>, constitutes - transcendental concepts of pure reason.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into categorical, - hypothetical, and disjunctive necessary. The concepts of reason founded on them - contained therefore, first, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial); - secondly, the idea of the complete series of conditions; thirdly, the determination - of all concepts in the idea of a complete complex of that which is - possible.<sup><a href="#ftn29" id="body_ftn29" name="body_ftn29">29</a></sup> - The first idea is psychological, the - second cosmological, the third theological, and, as all three give occasion to - Dialectics, yet each in its own way, the division of the whole Dialects of pure - reason into its Paralogism, its Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly. - Through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure reason are - completely represented, and that none can be wanting; because the faculty of reason - itself, whence they all take their origin, is thereby completely surveyed. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 44. In these general considerations it is also remarkable - that the ideas of reason are unlike the categories, of no service to the use of our - understanding in experience, but quite dispensable, and become even an impediment to - the maxims of a rational cognition of nature. Yet in another aspect still to be - determined they are necessary. Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of - no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the - notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that is sensuous or - concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for insight into the - cause of phenomena, and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that - which internal or external experience supplies. So the cosmological ideas of the - beginning of the world or of its eternity (<span class="T6">a parte ante</span>) cannot - be of any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the world itself. - And finally we must, according to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature, refrain - from all explanations of the design of nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; - because this would not be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that we have come - to the end of it. The use of these ideas, therefore, is quite different from that of - those categories by which (and by the principles built upon which) experience itself - first becomes possible. But our laborious analytics of the understanding would be - superfluous if we had nothing else in view than the mere cognition of nature as it can - be given in experience; for reason does its work, both in mathematics and in the - science of nature, quite safely and well without any of this subtle deduction. - Therefore our Critique of the Understanding combines with the ideas of pure reason for - a purpose which lies beyond the empirical use of the understanding; but this we have - above declared to be in this aspect totally inadmissible, and without any object or - meaning. Yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and that of - the understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and - cannot possibly upset it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The solution of this question is as follows: Pure reason does not - in its ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but - only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience. - But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions - (i.e., concrete atsights or <span class="T6">Anschauungen</span>) and of objects. In - order however to represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the - fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition is as far as these rules are - concerned completely determined, but the object is only an idea invented for the - purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the - completeness represented by that idea.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"><span class="T6">Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure - Reason</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 45. We have above shown in §§ 33 and 34 that the purity of - the categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead reason into - extending their use, quite beyond all experience, to things in themselves; though as - these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense - <span class="T6">in concreto</span>, they, as mere logical functions, can represent a - thing in general, but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything. - Such hyperbolical objects are distinguised by the appellation of <span class="T6">Noümena</span>, or pure beings of - the understanding (or better, beings of thought), such as, for example, "substance," - but conceived without permanence in time, or "cause," but not acting in time, etc. Here - predicates, that only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible, are - applied to these concepts, and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of - intuition, on which alone experience is possible, and so these concepts lose all - significance.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">There is no danger, however, of the understanding spontaneously - making an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere - creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. But when reason, which - cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical use of the rules of the understanding, as - being always conditioned, requires a completion of this chain of conditions, then the - understanding is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly represents objects of - experience in a series so extended that no experience can grasp, partly even (with a - view to complete the series) it seeks entirely beyond it noumena, to which it can - attach that chain, and so, having at last escaped from the conditions of experience, - make its attitude as it were final. These are then the transcendental ideas, which, - though according to the true but hidden ends of the natural determination of our - reason, they may aim not at extravagant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of - their empirical use, yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a - transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be restrained within the bounds of - experience by any resolution, but only by scientific instruction and with much - difficulty.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"> - I. <span class="T6">The Psychological Idea</span>.<sup><a href="#ftn30" id="body_ftn30">30</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 46. People have long since observed, that in all substances - the proper subject, that which remains after all the accidents (as predicates) are - abstracted, consequently that which forms the substance of things remains unknown, and - various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But it will - be well to consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability - to know the substance of things, that is, to determine it by itself, but rather for - requiring to cognise it which is a mere idea definitely as though it were a given - object. Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper - subject, and for this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its - subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence it follows, that - we must not hold anything, at which we can arrive, to be an ultimate subject, and that - substance itself never can be thought by our understanding, however deep we may - penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our - understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, representing it by - concepts, and so by mere predicates, to which therefore the absolute subject must - always be wanting. Hence all the real properties, by which we cognise bodies, are mere - accidents, not excepting impenetrability, which we can only represent to ourselves as - the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves (in the - thinking subject), and indeed in an immediate intuition; for all the predicates of an - internal sense refer to the ego, as a subject, and I cannot conceive myself as the - predicate of any other subject. Hence completeness in the reference of the given - concepts as predicates to a subject—not merely an idea, but an object—that is, the - absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this expectation is - disappointed. For the ego is not a concept,<sup><a href="#ftn31" id="body_ftn31">31</a></sup> - but only the indication of the object - of the internal sense, so far as we cognise it by no further predicate. Consequently - it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can it be a - determinate concept of an absolute subject, but is, as in all other cases, only the - reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject. Yet this idea (which - serves very well, as a regulative principle, totally to destroy all materialistic - explanations of the internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a very natural - misunderstanding a very specious argument, which, from this supposed cognition of the - substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, so far as the knowledge of it - falls quite without the complex of experience. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 47. But though we may call this thinking self (the soul) - substance, as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further - represented as the predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty and without - significance, if permanence—the quality which renders the concept of substances in - experience fruitful—cannot be proved of it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance, as a thing in - itself, but for the purposes of experience only. This is sufficiently shown by the - first Analogy of Experience,<sup><a href="#ftn32" id="body_ftn32">32</a></sup> and who ever will not yield to this - proof may try for himself whether he can succeed in proving, from the concept of a - subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing, that its - existence is thoroughly permanent, and that it cannot either in itself or by any - natural cause originate or be annihilated. These synthetical <span class="T6">a - priori</span> propositions can never be proved in themselves, but only in reference - to things as objects of possible experience. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance, we would infer - its permanence, this can hold good as regards possible experience only, not [of the - soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience. But life is the - subjective condition of all our possible experience, consequently we can only infer - the permanence of the soul in life; for the death of man is the end of all experience - which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the contrary be proved, - which is the very question in hand. The permanence of the soul can therefore only be - proved (and no one cares for that) during the life of man, but not, as we desire to - do, after death; and for this general reason, that the concept of substance, so far - as it is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of permanence, can be - so combined only according to the principles of possible experience, and therefore - for the purposes of experience only.<sup><a href="#ftn33" id="body_ftn33">33</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 49. That there is something real without us which not - only corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can likewise be - proved to be not a connexion of things in themselves, but for the sake of experience. - This means that there is something empirical, i.e., some phenomenon in space without - us, that admits of a satisfactory proof, for we have nothing to do with other objects - than those which belong to possible experience; because objects which cannot be given - us in any experience, do not exist for us. Empirically without me is that which appears - in space, and space, together with all the phenomena which it contains, belongs to the - representations, whose connexion according to laws of experience proves their objective - truth, just as the connexion of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the - actuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense). By means of external - experience I am conscious of the actuality of bodies, as external phenomena in space, - in the same manner as by means of the internal experience I am conscious of the - existence of my soul in time, but this soul is only cognised as an object of the - internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and of which the essence - in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is unknown. Cartesian idealism - therefore does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming; and the - conformity to law (as a criterion of its truth) of the former, from the irregularity - and the false illusion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and time as - conditions of the existence of objects, and it only inquires whether the objects of the - external senses, which we when awake put in space, are as actually to be found in it, - as the object of the internal sense, the soul, is in time; that is, whether experience - carries with it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination. This doubt, however, - may be easily disposed of, and we always do so in common life by investigating the - connexion of phenomena in both space and time according to universal laws of - experience, and we cannot doubt, when the representation of external things throughout - agrees therewith, that they constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in which - phenomena are considered as such only according to their connexion in experience, may - accordingly be very easily refuted; and it is just as sure an experience, that bodies - exist without us (in space), as that I myself exist according to the representation of - the internal sense (in time): for the notion without us, only signifies existence in - space. However as the Ego in the proposition, "I am," means not only the object of - internal intuition (in time), but the subject of consciousness, just as body means not - only external intuition (in space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this - phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as phenomena of the - external sense) exist as bodies apart from my thoughts, may without any hesitation be - denied in nature. But the question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal - sense (the soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of - representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must likewise be answered in - the negative. And in this manner everything, when it is reduced to its true meaning, is - decided and certain. The formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually - abolishes the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a form of - my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual as I myself am, and - nothing but the empirical truth of the representations in it remains for consideration. - But, if this is not the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing - without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove - the actuality of these objects without us.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"> - II. <span class="T6">The Cosmological Idea</span>.<sup><a href="#ftn34" id="body_ftn34">34</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is - its most remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy - from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a - <span class="T6">Critique of Reason</span> itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object - only from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose object is - given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in its native home, it does not - become transcendent, and is therefore so far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the - soul as a simple substance, already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as - cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends the connexion of - the conditioned with its condition (whether the connexion is mathematical or dynamical) - so far, that experience never can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this - point always an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories - becomes here so obvious and unmistakable, that even if there were not several other - proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in the system of - pure reason. There are only four such transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes - of categories; in each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness - of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to these - cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical assertions of pure reason, - which, as they are dialectical, thereby prove, that to each of them, on equally - specious principles of pure reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all - the metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction cannot prevent this opposition, it - compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself. This - Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but founded in the nature of human reason, and - hence unavoidable and never ceasing, contains the following four theses together with - their antitheses:</p> - - - - <p class="P8">1.</p> - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Thesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">The World has, as to Time and Space, a Beginning (limit).</p> - - - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Antithesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite.</p> - - - <p class="NormCent">2.</p> - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Thesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Antithesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">There is nothing simple, but everything is composite.</p> - - <p class="NormCent">3.</p> - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Thesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">There are in the World Causes through Freedom.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Antithesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">There is no Liberty, but all is Nature.</p> - - <p class="NormCent">4.</p> - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Thesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCent"><span class="T6">Antithesis</span>.</p> - - <p class="NormCentSpaceAfter">There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is - incidental.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 52.<span class="T6">a</span>. Here is the most singular - phenomenon of human reason, no other instance of which can be shown in any other use. - If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible - world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as - principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience, as - is usually, nay without our <span class="T6">Critique</span>, unavoidably done, there - arises an unexpected conflict, which never can be removed in the common dogmatical way; - because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, - and irresistible proofs—for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all these - proofs—and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself, a state at which - the sceptic rejoices, but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill - at ease.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 52.<span class="T6">b</span>. We may blunder in various - ways in metaphysics without any fear of being detected in falsehood. For we never can - be refuted by experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical, - though purely fictitious propositions, may be done whenever the concepts, which we - connect, are mere ideas, that cannot be given (in their whole content) in experience. - For how can we make out by experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a - beginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Such - concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and consequently - the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered - by this touch-stone.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The only possible way in which reason could have revealed - unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely announced as Dogmatics, would be when it - were made to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted principle, and to deduce - the exact contrary with the greatest accuracy of inference from another which is - equally granted. This is actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of - reason, whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions on the - other arise, each consistently following from universally-acknowledged principles. Thus - they reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason - which would otherwise forever remain concealed.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose any error - lying hidden in the assumptions of reason.<sup><a href="#ftn35" id="body_ftn35">35</a></sup> Contradictory propositions cannot - both be false, except the concept, which is the subject of both, is - self-contradictory; for example, the propositions, "a square circle is round, and a - square circle is not round," are both false. For, as to the former it is false, that - the circle is round, because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is - not round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For the logical criterion of the - impossibility of a concept consists in this, that if we presuppose it, two - contradictory propositions both become false; consequently, as no middle between them - is conceivable, nothing at all is thought by that concept. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 52.<span class="T6">c</span>. The first two antinomies, which I - call mathematical, because they are concerned with the addition or division of the - homogeneous, are founded on such a self-contradictory concept; and hence I explain how - it happens, that both the Thesis and Antithesis of the two are false.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things - in themselves, of which I know nothing, but of things in appearance, that is, of - experience, as the particular way of cognising objects which is afforded to man. I must - not say of what I think in time or in space, that in itself, and independent of these - my thoughts, it exists in space and in time; for in that case I should contradict - myself; because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are nothing - existing in themselves and outside of my representations, but are themselves only modes - of representation, and it is palpably contradictory to say, that a mere mode of - representation exists without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist - only in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart from - experience or before it, is merely to represent to ourselves that experience actually - exists apart from experience or before it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as to space and - time, it is equally impossible, as regards all my notions, to declare it infinite or to - declare it finite. For neither assertion can be contained in experience, because - experience either of an infinite space, or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of - the boundary of the world by a void space, or by an antecedent void time, is - impossible; these are mere ideas. This quantity of the world, which is determined in - either way, should therefore exist in the world itself apart from all experience. This - contradicts the notion of a world of sense, which is merely a complex of the - appearances whose existence and connexion occur only in our representations, that is, - in experience, since this latter is not an object in itself, but a mere mode of - representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept of an absolutely existing world - of sense is self-contradictory, the solution of the problem concerning its quantity, - whether attempted affirmatively or negatively, is always false.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The same holds good of the second antinomy, which relates to the - division of phenomena. For these are mere representations, and the parts exist merely - in their representation, consequently in the division, or in a possible experience - where they are given, and the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To - assume that an appearance, e.g., that of body, contains in itself before all experience - all the parts, which any possible experience can ever reach, is to impute to a mere - appearance, which can exist only in experience, an existence previous to experience. In - other words, it would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in - our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, as also every - solution of our misunderstood problem, whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves - consist of an infinite number of parts, or of a finite number of simple parts.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of antinomies the - falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept something - self-contradictory as if it were compatible (i.e., an appearance as an object in - itself). But, as to the second (the dynamical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of - the representation consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible; so - that, as in the former case, the opposed assertions are both false, in this case, on - the other hand, where they are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding, they - may both be true.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Any mathematical connexion necessarily presupposes homogeneity of - what is connected (in the concept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by no means - requires the same. When we have to deal with extended magnitudes, all the parts must be - homogeneous with one another and with the whole; whereas, in the connexion of cause and - effect, homogeneity may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary; for the concept - of causality (by means of which something is posited through something else quite - different from it), at all events, does not require it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in - themselves, and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves, the - contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the subject of freedom were, like other - objects, represented as mere appearance, the contradiction would be just as - unavoidable, for the same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same - kind of object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred merely to - appearances, and freedom merely to things in themselves, no contradiction arises, if we - at once assume, or admit both kinds of causality, however difficult or impossible it - may be to make the latter kind conceivable.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - As appearance every effect is an event, or something that happens in time; it must, - according to the universal law of nature, be preceded by a determination of the - causality of its cause (a state), which follows according to a constant law. But this - determination of the cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place - or happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession between it and - the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as well as the causality of the - cause, would have always existed. Therefore the determination of the cause to act - must also have originated among appearances, and must consequently, as well as its - effect, be an event, which must again have its cause, and so on; hence natural - necessity must be the condition, on which effective causes are determined. Whereas if - freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances, it must, as regards - these, which are events, be a faculty of starting them spontaneously, that is, - without the causality of the cause itself, and hence without requiring any other - ground to determine its start. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not rank - under time-determinations of its state, that is, it cannot be an appearance, and must - be considered a thing in itself, while its effects would be only - appearances.<sup><a href="#ftn36" id="body_ftn36">36</a></sup> If without contradiction we can think - of the beings of understanding [<span class="T6">Verstandeswesen</span>] as - exercising such an influence on appearances, then natural necessity will attach to - all connexions of cause and effect in the sensuous world, though on the other hand, - freedom can be granted to such cause, as is itself not an appearance (but the - foundation of appearance). Nature therefore and freedom can without contradiction be - attributed to the very same thing, but in different relations—on one side as a - phenomenon, on the other as a thing in itself. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connexion with - its subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its actions, and is - so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appearances, but is also referred - to objective grounds, that are only ideas, so far as they can determine this faculty, a - connexion which is expressed by the word <span class="T6">ought</span>. This faculty is - called <span class="T6">reason</span>, and, so far as we consider a being (man) - entirely according to this objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as - a being of sense, but this property is that of a thing in itself, of which we cannot - comprehend the possibility—I mean how the <span class="T6">ought</span> (which however - has never yet taken place) should determine its activity, and can become the cause of - actions, whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world. Yet the causality of - reason would be freedom with regard to the effects in the sensuous world, so far as we - can consider objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, as their determinants. For - its action in that case would not depend upon subjective conditions, consequently not - upon those of time, and of course not upon the law of nature, which serves to determine - them, because grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally, according to - principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time or place.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">What I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing - intelligible, and does not necessarily belong to our problem, which must be decided - from mere concepts, independently of the properties which we meet in the actual - world.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Now I may say without contradiction: that all the actions of - rational beings, so far as they are appearances (occurring in any experience), are - subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the - rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free. For what - is required for the necessity of nature? Nothing more than the determinability of every - event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a reference to cause - in the appearance; in this process the thing in itself at its foundation and its - causality remain unknown. But I say, that the law of nature remains, whether the - rational being is the cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason, that is, - through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason. For, if - the former is the case, the action is performed according to maxims, the effect of - which as appearance is always conform able to constant laws; if the latter is the case, - and the action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the empirical - laws of the sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to - constant laws; more than this we do not require or know concerning natural necessity. - But in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; - in the latter the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because - reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not determined on that account by - the sensibility, and is therefore free in this case too. Freedom is therefore no - hindrance to natural law in appearance, neither does this law abrogate the freedom of - the practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves, as - determining grounds.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses - causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued and yet natural - necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects, as - appearances. The same remarks will serve to explain what we had to say concerning - transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity (in the same - subject, but not taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the - action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds, is always a - first start, though the same action is in the series of appearances only a subordinate - start, which must be preceded by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is - itself determined in the same manner by another immediately preceding. Thus we are - able, in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is - determined in them as things in themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from - itself a series of states, without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature. - For the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation; - in this case that which determines the causality does not precede in time the action, - because such determining grounds represent not a reference to objects of sense, e.g., - to causes in the appearances, but to determining causes, as things in themselves, which - do not rank under conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the - causality of reason, can be considered as a first start in respect to the series of - appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate beginning. We may therefore without - contradiction consider it in the former aspect as free, but in the latter (in so far as - it is merely appearance) as subject to natural necessity.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same way as the - conflict of reason with itself in the third. For, provided the cause <span class="T6">in</span> the appearance is distinguished from the cause <span class="T6">of</span> the appearance (so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both - propositions are perfectly reconcilable: the one, that there is nowhere in the sensuous - world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose existence is absolutely - necessary; the other, that this world is nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being - as its cause (but of another kind and according to another law). The incompatibility of - these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely of - appearances to things in themselves, and in general confusing both in one concept.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 54. This then is the proposition and this the solution of - the whole antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its - principles to the sensible world. The former alone (the mere proposition) would be a - considerable service in the cause of our knowledge of human reason, even though the - solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader, who has here to combat a natural - illusion, which has been but recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto always - regarded as genuine. For one result at least is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible - to prevent this conflict of reason with itself—so long as the objects of the sensible - world are taken for things in themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they are - in fact—the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the deduction of all our - <span class="T6">a priori</span> cognition and the proof which I have given of my - deduction in order to come to a decision on the question. This is all I require at - present; for when in this occupation he shall have thought himself deep enough into the - nature of pure reason, those concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of - reason is possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him. Without this preparation - I cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most attentive reader.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"> - III. <span class="T6">The Theological Idea</span>.<sup><a href="#ftn37" id="body_ftn37">37</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords matter for - the most important, but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and thereby - dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason in this case does not, - as with the psychological and the cosmological Ideas, begin from experience, and err by - exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness - of their series. It rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere concepts of - what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in general, consequently by means - of the idea of a most perfect primal Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility - and therefore the actuality of all other things. And so the mere presupposition of a - Being, who is conceived not in the series of experience, yet for the purposes of - experience—for the sake of comprehending its connexion, order, and unity—i.e., the idea - [the notion of it], is more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding - here, than in the former cases. Hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion - which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking objective - conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis necessary for the satisfaction of - our reason, a dogma. As the observations of the Critique on the pretensions of - transcendental theology are intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to - add on the subject.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"><span class="T6">General Remark on the - Transcendental Ideas</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 56. The objects, which are given us by experience, are in many respects - incomprehensible, and many questions, to which the law of nature leads us, when - carried beyond a certain point (though quite conformably to the laws of nature), - admit of no answer; as for example the question: why substances attract one another? - But if we entirely quit nature, or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible - experience, and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object - is incomprehensible, and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems. - For we are not then concerned with nature or in general with given objects, but with - concepts, which have their origin merely in our reason, and with mere creations of - thought; and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be solved, - because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own - procedure.<sup><a href="#ftn38" id="body_ftn38">38</a></sup> As the psychological, cosmological, - and theological Ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason, which cannot be given - in any experience, the questions which reason asks us about them are put to us not by - the objects, but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction. - They must all be capable of satisfactory answers, which is done by showing that they - are principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough agreement, - completeness, and synthetical unity, and that they so far hold good of experience - only, but of experience as a whole. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of - a whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar - kind of unity, that of a system, without which it is nothing but piecework, and cannot - be used for proving the existence of a highest purpose (which can only be the general - system of all purposes), I do not here refer only to the practical, but also to the - highest purpose of the speculative use of reason.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The transcendental Ideas therefore express the peculiar application - of reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the understanding. Yet if we - assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be attached to the object of cognition, - if we regard that which is merely regulative to be constitutive, and if we persuade - ourselves that we can by means of these Ideas enlarge our cognition transcendently, or - far beyond all possible experience, while it only serves to render experience within - itself as nearly complete as possible, i.e., to limit its progress by nothing that - cannot belong to experience: we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of - the proper application of our reason and of its principles, and from a Dialectic, which - both confuses the empirical use of reason, and also sets reason at variance with - itself.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">Conclusion.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter"><span class="T6">On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure - Reason</span>.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it would be - absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object, than belongs to the possible - experience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge about anything not - assumed to be an object of possible experience, which would determine it according to - the constitution it has in itself. For how could we determine anything in this way, - since time, space, and the categories, and still more all the concepts formed by - empirical experience or perception in the sensible world (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), have and can have no other use, than to make experience - possible. And if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the understanding, - they do not determine any object, and have no meaning whatever.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we - conceded no things in themselves, or set up our experience for the only possible mode - of knowing things, our way of beholding (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) them in - space and in time for the only possible way, and our discursive understanding for the - archetype of every possible understanding; in fact if we wished to have the principles - of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in - themselves.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible - experience, might in this way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason be set - up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as Hume's dialogues may - illustrate), if a careful critique did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect - to its empirical use, and set a limit to its pretensions. Scepticism originally arose - from metaphysics and its licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor the - empirical use of reason, announce everything that transcends this use as worthless and - deceitful; but by and by, when it was perceived that the very same principles that are - used in experience, insensibly, and apparently with the same right, led still further - than experience extends, then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience. - But here there is no danger; for common sense will doubtless always assert its rights. - A certain confusion, however, arose in science which cannot determine how far reason is - to be trusted, and why only so far and no further, and this confusion can only be - cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principle, of - the boundary of the use of our reason.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite - notion of what things in themselves may be. Yet we are not at liberty to abstain - entirely from inquiring into them; for experience never satisfies reason fully, but in - answering questions, refers us further and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied - with regard to their complete solution. This any one may gather from the Dialectics of - pure reason, which therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having acquired, as - regards the nature of our soul, a clear conception of the subject, and having come to - the conviction, that its manifestations cannot be explained materialistically, who can - refrain from asking what the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience suffices - for the purpose, from accounting for it by a concept of reason (that of a simple - immaterial being), though we cannot by any means prove its objective reality? Who can - satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the - duration and of the quantity of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since - every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise - requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes - of explanation to satisfy reason? Finally, who does not see in the thorough-going - contingency and dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of - experience, the impossibility of stopping there? And who does not feel himself - compelled, notwithstanding all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent - ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all the concepts which he can vindicate by - experience, in the concept of a Being, the possibility of which we cannot conceive, but - at the same time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the - understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever dissatisfied?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing - outside a certain definite place, and in closing it; limits do not require this, but - are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete. - But our reason, as it were, sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of - things in themselves, though we can never have definite notions of them, and are - limited to appearances only.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds - to it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits - of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something indeed lies without it, at which it - can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal - progress. The enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new - discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery of new - properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued experience and its rational - combination. But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematics refers to appearances - only, and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of - metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to - them; neither does it require them. It is therefore not a continual progress and an - approximation towards these sciences, and there is not, as it were, any point or line - of contact. Natural science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of - things, which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explaining - appearance. Nor does that science require this for its physical explanations. Nay even - if such grounds should be offered from other sources (for instance, the influence of - immaterial beings), they must be rejected and not used in the progress of its - explanations. For these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object - of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connexion with our actual - perceptions and empirical laws.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts - of pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated thereto by the - nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas, as they do not admit of - evasion, and are never capable of realisation, serve to point out to us actually not - only the bounds of the pure use of reason, but also the way to determine them. Such is - the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought - forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every other in the - world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an original germ, wisely organised - for great ends. For metaphysics, in its fundamental features, perhaps more than any - other science, is placed in us by nature itself, and cannot be considered the - production of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of experience - from which it is quite disparate.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, which - suffice for empirical use, i.e., within the sensible world, finds in itself no - satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete - solution. The transcendental ideas, which have that completion in view, are such - problems of reason. But it sees clearly, that the sensuous world cannot contain this - completion, neither consequently can all the concepts, which serve merely for - understanding the world of sense, such as space and time, and whatever we have adduced - under the name of pure concepts of the understanding. The sensuous world is nothing but - a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws; it has therefore no - subsistence by itself; it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to - that which contains the basis of this experience, to beings which cannot be cognised - merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. In the cognition of them alone reason - can hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to - its conditions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We have above (§§ 33, 34) indicated the limits of reason with - regard to all cognition of mere creations of thought. Now, since the transcendental - ideas have urged us to approach them, and thus have led us, as it were, to the spot - where the occupied space (viz., experience) touches the void (that of which we can know - nothing, viz., noumena), we can determine the bounds of pure reason. For in all bounds - there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of corporeal space, and is - therefore itself a space, a line is a space, which is the boundary of the surface, a - point the boundary of the line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits - contain mere negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough after - we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something (though we can never - cognise what it is in itself). For the question now is, What is the attitude of our - reason in this connexion of what we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? - This is an actual connexion of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will - always remain so), and though what is unknown should not become the least more - known—which we cannot even hope—yet the notion of this connexion must be definite, and - capable of being rendered distinct.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of - understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them only, as things - in themselves, reason finds that completion and satisfaction, which it can never hope - for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these - actually have reference to something distinct from them (and totally heterogeneous), as - appearances always presuppose an object in itself, and therefore suggest its existence - whether we can know more of it or not.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But as we can never cognise these beings of understanding as they - are in themselves, that is, definitely, yet must assume them as regards the sensible - world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at least able to think this connexion - by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. Yet if we - represent to ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of the - understanding, we then indeed represent nothing definite to ourselves, consequently our - concept has no significance; but if we think it by properties borrowed from the - sensuous world, it is no longer a being of understanding, but is conceived as an - appearance, and belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an instance from the notion - of the Supreme Being.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason, but represents only a thing - containing all realities, without being able to determine any one of them; because - for that purpose an example must be taken from the world of sense, in which case we - should have an object of sense only, not something quite heterogeneous, which can - never be an object of sense. Suppose I attribute to the Supreme Being understanding, - for instance; I have no concept of an understanding other than my own, one that must - receive its perceptions (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) by the senses, and which - is occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness. Then the - elements of my concept would always lie in the appearance; I should however by the - insufficiency of the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a - being which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound up with them as conditions - of its determination. But if I separate understanding from sensibility to obtain a - pure understanding, then nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without - perception (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), by which form alone I can cognise - nothing definite, and consequently no object. For that purpose I should conceive - another understanding, such as would directly perceive its objects,<sup><a href="#ftn39" - id="body_ftn39">39</a></sup> but of which I have not the least - notion; because the human understanding is discursive, and can [not directly - perceive, it can] only cognise by means of general concepts. And the very same - difficulties arise if we attribute a will to the Supreme Being; for we have this - concept only by drawing it from our internal experience, and therefore from our - dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require; and so the - notion rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible with the pure concept - of the Supreme Being. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect only the proofs, - and not the deistic assertion itself. But as regards theism, which depends on a - stricter determination of the concept of the Supreme Being which in deism is merely - transcendent, they are very strong, and as this concept is formed, in certain (in fact - in all common) cases irrefutable. Hume always insists, that by the mere concept of an - original being, to which we apply only ontological predicates (eternity, omnipresence, - omnipotence), we think nothing definite, and that properties which can yield a concept - <span class="T6">in concreto</span> must be superadded; that it is not enough to say, - it is Cause, but we must explain the nature of its causality, for example, that of an - understanding and of a will. He then begins his attacks on the essential point itself, - i.e., theism, as he had previously directed his battery only against the proofs of - deism, an attack which is not very dangerous to it in its consequences. All his - dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be inseparable from - theism, and to make it absurd in itself; but if the former be abandoned, the latter - must vanish with it, and nothing remain but deism, of which nothing can come, which is - of no value, and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals. If this - anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no proofs whatever of the existence of a - Supreme Being, even were they all granted, could determine for us the concept of this - Being without involving us in contradictions.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - If we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason, - the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to proceed to concepts that lie - beyond the field of its immanent (empirical) use, we discover that both can subsist - together, but only at the boundary of all lawful use of reason. For this boundary - belongs as well to the field of experience, as to that of the creations of thought, - and we are thereby taught, as well, how these so remarkable ideas serve merely for - marking the bounds of human reason. On the one hand they give warning not boundlessly - to extend cognition of experience, as if nothing but - world<sup><a href="#ftn40" id="body_ftn40">40</a></sup> remained for us to cognise, and yet, - on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds of experience, and to think of - judging about things beyond them, as things in themselves. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the - relation which the world may have to a Being whose very concept lies beyond all the - knowledge which we can attain within the world. For we then do not attribute to the - Supreme Being any of the properties in themselves, by which we represent objects of - experience, and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his - relation to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which in fact - concerns language only, and not the object itself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If I say that we are compelled to consider the world, as if it were - the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing more, than that a - watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, - the commanding officer, as the world of sense (or whatever constitutes the substratum - of this complex of appearances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby cognise as - it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of which I am a - part.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - § 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does not signify (as is commonly - understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of - relations between two quite dissimilar things.<sup><a href="#ftn41" id="body_ftn41">41</a></sup> By means of this - analogy, however, there remains a concept of the Supreme Being sufficiently determined - <span class="T6">for us</span>, though we have left out everything that could deter mine it - absolutely or in itself; for we determine it as regards the world and as regards - ourselves, and more do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes upon those who - would determine this concept absolutely, by taking the materials for so doing from - themselves and the world, do not affect us; and he cannot object to us, that we have - nothing left if we give up the objective anthropomorphism of the concept of the - Supreme Being. - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo grant - Cleanthes), as a necessary hypothesis, the deistical concept of the First Being, in - which this Being is thought by the mere ontological predicates of substance, of - cause, etc. This must be done, because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere - conditions, which are themselves always conditional, cannot otherwise have any - satisfaction, and it therefore can be done without falling into anthropomorphism - (which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a Being quite distinct from - the world), because those predicates are mere categories, which, though they do not - give a determinate concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any conditions - of sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a causality - through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to theism, without being - obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind of reason, as a property inhering in - him. For as to the former, the only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason (as - regards all possible experience, in complete harmony with itself) in the world of - sense to the highest point, is to assume a supreme reason as a cause of all the - connexions in the world. Such a principle must be quite advantageous to reason and - can hurt it nowhere in its application to nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby - not transferred as a property to the First Being in himself, but only to his relation - to the world of sense, and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For nothing is - considered here but the cause of the form of reason which is perceived everywhere in - the world, and reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, so far as it contains the - ground of this form of reason in the world, but according to analogy only, that is, - so far as this expression shows merely the relation, which the Supreme Cause unknown - to us has to the world, in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason - in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from using reason as an attribute for the - purpose of conceiving God, but instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is - necessary to have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle. We - thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and even unthinkable - in any definite way as to what he is in himself. We are thereby kept, on the one - hand, from making a transcendent use of the concepts which we have of reason as an - efficient cause (by means of the will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by - properties, which are only borrowed from human nature, and from losing ourselves in - gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand from deluging the contemplation - of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our notions of - human reason, which we transfer to God, and so losing for this contemplation its - proper application, according to which it should be a rational study of mere nature, - and not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The - expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world as if it came, - as to its existence and internal plan, from a Supreme Reason, by which notion we both - cognise the constitution, which belongs to the world itself, yet without pretending - to determine the nature of its cause in itself, and on the other hand, we transfer - the ground of this constitution (of the form of reason in the world) upon the - relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient by - itself for that purpose.<sup><a href="#ftn42" id="body_ftn42">42</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear by - combining with Hume's principle—"not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the - field of all possible experience"—this other principle, which he quite overlooked: "not - to consider the field of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our - reason." The <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> here points out the true - mean between dogmatism, which Hume combats, and skepticism, which he would substitute - for it—a mean which is not like other means that we find advisable to determine for - ourselves as it were mechanically (by adopting something from one side and something - from the other), and by which nobody is taught a better way, but such a one as can be - accurately determined on principles.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made use of the - metaphor of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to its - suitable use. The world of sense contains merely appearances, which are not things in - themselves, but the understanding must assume these latter ones, viz., noumena. In our - reason both are comprised, and the question is, How does reason proceed to set - boundaries to the understanding as regards both these fields? Experience, which - contains all that belongs to the sensuous world, does not bound itself; it only - proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally conditioned object. - Its boundary must lie quite without it, and this field is that of the pure beings of - the understanding. But this field, so far as the determination of the nature of these - beings is concerned, is an empty space for us, and if dogmatically-determined concepts - alone are in question, we cannot pass out of the field of possible experience. But as a - boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that which lies within, - as to the space that lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive - cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary, yet without - attempting to pass it; because it there finds itself in the presence of an empty space, - in which it can conceive forms of things, but not things themselves. But the setting of - a boundary to the field of the understanding by something, which is otherwise unknown - to it, is still a cognition which belongs to reason even at this standpoint, and by - which it is neither confined within the sensible, nor straying without it, but only - refers, as befits the knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies - without it, and that which is contained within it.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason, - being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the Idea of a Supreme Being (and, for - practical purposes to that of an intelligible world also), not in order to determine - anything relatively to this pure creation of the understanding, which lies beyond the - world of sense, but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to - principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity. For this - purpose we make use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason, as - the cause of all its connexions. Thereby we do not purely invent a being, but, as - beyond the sensible world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure - understanding, we determine that something in this particular way, though only of - course according to analogy.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">And thus there remains our original proposition, which is the - <span class="T6">résumé</span> of the whole <span class="T6">Critique</span>: "that reason by all its <span class="T6">a priori</span> - principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even - of these nothing more than can be cognised in experience." But this limitation does not - prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of experience, viz., to the - reference to something which is not itself an object of experience, but is the ground - of all experience. Reason does not however teach us anything concerning the thing in - itself: it only instructs us as regards its own complete and highest use in the field - of possible experience. But this is all that can be reasonably desired in the present - case, and with which we have cause to be satisfied.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">§ 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as it is actually - given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and in that which constitutes the - essential end of its pursuit, according to its subjective possibility. Though we have - found, that this merely natural use of such a predisposition of our reason, if no - discipline arising only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it, - involves us in transcendent, either apparently or really conflicting, dialectical - syllogisms; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only unnecessary as regards the - promotion of our knowledge of nature, but even disadvantageous to it: there yet remains - a problem worthy of solution, which is to find out the natural ends intended by this - disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason, because everything that lies in - nature must be originally intended for some useful purpose.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I acknowledge, that - what I can say about it is conjecture only, like every speculation about the first ends - of nature. The question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical - judgments, but our natural predisposition to them, and therefore does not belong to the - system of metaphysics but to anthropology.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which - constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling it to quit the - mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible experience, and in this - endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge or fiction) called metaphysics, I think - I perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the - fetters of experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as - at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding, - which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the purpose of speculatively occupying - ourselves with them (for there we can find no ground to stand on), but because - practical principles, which, without finding some such scope for their necessary - expectation and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably - requires from a moral point of view.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal - to me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of experience), - shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough, and thereby deters me from - materialism, the psychological notion of which is unfit for any explanation of nature, - and besides confines reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the - obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its - lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism, which asserts - nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, all natural necessity in the sensible - world is conditional, as it always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, - and unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause different from - the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, in its turn, were it merely - nature, could never render the existence of the contingent (as its consequent) - comprehensible, reason frees itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, - (both as a blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a first - principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself), and leads to the concept - of a cause possessing freedom, or of a Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental - Ideas serve, if not to instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions - of Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope for the moral - Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These considerations, I should think, explain in - some measure the natural predisposition of which I spoke.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The practical value, which a merely speculative science may have, - lies without the bounds of this science, and can therefore be considered as a scholion - merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the science itself. This application - however surely lies within the bounds of philosophy, especially of philosophy drawn - from the pure sources of reason, where its speculative use in metaphysics must - necessarily be at unity with its practical use in morals. Hence the unavoidable - dialectics of pure reason, considered in metaphysics, as a natural tendency, deserves - to be explained not as an illusion merely, which is to be removed, but also, if - possible, as a natural provision as regards its end, though this duty, a work of - supererogation, cannot justly be assigned to metaphysics proper.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - The solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on the Regulative - Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason<sup><a href="#ftn43" id="body_ftn43">43</a></sup> should - be considered a second scholion - which however has a greater affinity with the subject of metaphysics. For there - certain rational principles are expounded which determine <span class="T6">a - priori</span> the order of nature or rather of the understanding, which seeks - nature's laws through experience. They seem to be constitutive and legislative with - regard to experience, though they spring from pure reason, which cannot be - considered, like the understanding, as a principle of possible experience. Now - whether or not this harmony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not inhere - in appearances or in their source (the sensibility) itself, but only in so far as the - latter is in relation to the understanding, as also a systematic unity in applying - the understanding to bring about an entirety of all possible experience can only - belong to the understanding when in relation to reason; and whether or not experience - is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason: may be discussed - by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, - into the general principles of a history of nature; I have represented this task as - important, but not attempted its solution, in the book itself.<sup><a href="#ftn44" id="body_ftn44">44</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question - which I had proposed: How is metaphysics in general possible? by ascending from the - data of its actual use in its consequences, to the grounds of its possibility.</p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3109" name="__RefHeading___Toc3109"></a>SCHOLIA.</h1> - - <h2>SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"</h2> - - - - <p class="Standard">METAPHYSICS, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual, but if - considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third principal question - showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of taking principles from it, and in - using them follow the natural, but on that account not less false, illusion, we can - never produce science, but only a vain dialectical art, in which one school may outdo - another, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not - mere fallacious plausibility, but in sight and conviction, a <span class="T6">Critique - of Reason</span> must itself exhibit the whole stock of <span class="T6">a - priori</span> concepts, their division according to their various sources (Sensibility, - Understanding, and Reason), together with a complete table of them, the analysis of all - these concepts, with all their consequences, especially by means of the deduction of - these concepts, the possibility of synthetical cognition <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, the principles of its application and finally its bounds, all in a - complete system. Critique, therefore, and critique alone, contains in itself the whole - well-proved and well-tested plan, and even all the means required to accomplish - metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is impossible. The question here - therefore is not so much how this performance is possible, as how to set it going, and - induce men of clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation - for one that will not deceive, and how such a union for the common end may best be - directed.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted Critique will be - ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which he formerly put up with, because - his reason must have something, and could find nothing better for its support.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of - the schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the astrology of the - fortune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has read through and through, and - grasped the principles of, the Critique even in these Prolegomena only, will ever - return to that old and sophistical pseudo-science; but will rather with a certain - delight look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, requiring no more - preparatory discoveries, and now at last affording permanent satisfaction to reason. - For here is an advantage upon which, of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can - with certainty reckon: that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be - incapable of further change, or of any augmentation by new discoveries; because here - reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself, not in objects and their observation - (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>), by which latter its stock of knowledge cannot be - further increased. When therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty - completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there remains nothing - for pure reason to cognise <span class="T6">a priori</span>, nay, there is even no - ground to raise further questions. The sure prospect of knowledge so definite and so - compact has a peculiar charm, even though we should set aside all its advantages, of - which I shall hereafter speak.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but finally - destroys itself, and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay. That this time - is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it has fallen among all - learned nations, despite of all the zeal with which other sciences of every kind are - prosecuted. The old arrangement of our university studies still preserves its shadow; - now and then an Academy of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on it, - but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences; and let any one judge for himself - how a man of genius, if he were called a great metaphysician, would receive the - compliment, which may be well-meant, but is scarce envied by anybody.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical - metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived, we are yet far from being able to say that the - period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and - complete <span class="T6">Critique of Reason</span>. All transitions from - a tendency to its contrary pass - through the stage of indifference, and this moment is the most dangerous for an author, - but, in my opinion, the most favorable for the science. For, when party spirit has died - out by a total dissolution of former connexions, minds are in the best state to listen - to several proposals for an organisation according to a new plan.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">When I say, that I hope these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> - will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising - object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side - to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand, that every one, whom the thorny paths of - my <span class="T6">Critique</span> have tired and put out of humor, will ask me, upon - what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irresistible law of necessity.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as - little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether, to - avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be metaphysics in the world; - nay, every one, especially every man of reflexion, will have it, and for want of a - recognised standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto - been called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is - impossible; therefore a <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> itself must now - be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to the full test, because - there is no other means of supplying this pressing want, which is something more than - mere thirst for knowledge.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Ever since I have come to know critique, whenever I finish reading - a book of metaphysical contents, which, by the preciseness of its notions, by variety, - order, and an easy style, was not only entertaining but also helpful, I cannot help - asking, "Has this author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?" The learned men, - whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the - culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me for saying, that I have never - been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones (though self-love - may recommend them to me) to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and - why?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Here is the very obvious reason: metaphysics did not then exist as - a science, nor can it be gathered piecemeal, but its germ must be fully preformed in - the <span class="T6">Critique</span>. But in order to prevent all misconception, we - must remember what has been already said, that by the analytical treatment of our - concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal, but the science (of metaphysics) - is thereby not in the least advanced, because these dissections of concepts are nothing - but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science. Let the - concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined, all - this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we cannot prove, that in - all which exists the substance endures, and only the accidents vary, our science is not - the least advanced by all our analyses.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to - prove <span class="T6">a priori</span> either this proposition, - or that of sufficient reason, still, less - any more complex theorem, such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any - synthetical proposition. By all its analysing therefore nothing is affected, nothing - obtained or forwarded, and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still remains - as it was in the days of Aristotle, though far better preparations were made for it - than of old, if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my - charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics, which he - would prove dogmatically <span class="T6">a priori</span>, for until he has actually - performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science; even - should this proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No demand can - be more moderate or more equitable, and in the (inevitably certain) event of its - non-performance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto metaphysics has never - existed as a science.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, - I must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, which are suited as - little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic - wand of common sense, which does not convince every one, but which accommodates itself - to personal peculiarities.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in - metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon - probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be cognised <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, is thereby announced as apodeictically certain, and must therefore be - proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon - conjectures. As to the doctrine of chances in the latter, it does not contain probable, - but perfectly certain, judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain - cases, under given uniform conditions, which, in the sum of all possible cases, - infallibly happen according to the rule, though it is not sufficiently determined in - respect to every single chance. Conjectures (by means of induction and of analogy) can - be suffered in an empirical science of nature only, yet even there the possibility at - least of what we assume must be quite certain.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The appeal to common sense is even more absurd, when concept and - principles are announced as valid, not in so far as they hold with regard to - experience, but even beyond the conditions of experience. For what is common sense? It - is normal good sense, so far it judges right. But what is normal good sense? It is the - faculty of the knowledge and use of rules <span class="T6">in concreto</span>, as - distinguished from the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules - <span class="T6">in abstracto</span>. Common sense can hardly understand the rule, - "that every event is determined by means of its cause," and can never comprehend it - thus generally. It therefore demands an example from experience, and when it hears that - this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pane was broken or a - kitchen-utensil missing, it then understands the principle and grants it. Common sense - therefore is only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are - <span class="T6">a priori</span>) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend - them <span class="T6">a priori</span>, or independently of experience, belongs to the - speculative understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. But the - province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of knowledge, and it is - certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as a witness, for it cannot here - form any opinion whatever, and men look down upon it with contempt until they are in - difficulties, and can find in their speculation neither in nor out.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense - (who occasionally prize it highly, but usually despise it) to say, that there must - surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain, and of which - there is no occasion to give any proof, or even any account at all, because we - otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments. But if we - except the principle of contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth of - synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in proof of this privilege, anything else - indubitable, which they can immediately ascribe to common sense, except mathematical - propositions, such as twice two make four, between two points there is but one straight - line, etc. But these judgments are radically different from those of metaphysics. For - in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct whatever I represent to myself as - possible by a concept: I add to the first two the other two, one by one, and myself - make the number four, or I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of - lines, equal as well as unequal; yet I can draw one only, which is like itself in all - its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a - thing the concept of something else, whose existence is necessarily connected with the - former, but I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me - <span class="T6">a priori</span> (yet only in reference to possible experience) with - the concept of such a connexion (i.e., causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the - concepts of mathematics, by (<span class="T6">Anschauung</span>) visualising them, - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, and so show its possibility <span class="T6">a - priori</span>. This concept, together with the principles of its application, always - requires, if it shall hold <span class="T6">a priori</span>—as is requisite in - metaphysics—a justification and deduction of its possibility, because we cannot - otherwise know how far it holds good, and whether it can be used in experience only or - beyond it also.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, - we can never appeal to common sense, but may do so only when we are forced to surrender - it, and to renounce all purely speculative cognition, which must always be knowledge, - and consequently when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction, for the sake of - adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, and sufficient to our - wants, perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself. For in this case the attitude - of the question is quite altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but - in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing; because, as a speculation of pure reason, it - finds a hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, however, probability and - common sense may be used with advantage and justly, but on quite special principles, of - which the importance always depends on the reference to practical life.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the - possibility of metaphysics as a science.</p> - - - - <h1><a id="__RefHeading___Toc3111" name="__RefHeading___Toc3111"></a>APPENDIX.</h1> - - <h2>ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE.</h2> - - - <p class="Standard">SINCE all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, - and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be - attained, the present essay now before the public has a fair title to an accurate and - careful investigation, except it be thought more advisable to give up all pretensions - to metaphysics, to which, if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose, no - objection can be made.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, - there are two sorts of judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes investigation (in - our case one in which the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the - <span class="T6">Critique of Pure Reason</span> which was intended to discuss the very - possibility of metaphysics); (2) the other a judgment subsequent to investigation. In - the latter the reader is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical - researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics, and first - examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived. If what common metaphysics - propounds were demonstrably certain, as for instance the theorems of geometry, the - former way of judging would hold good. For if the consequences of certain principles - are repugnant to established truths, these principles are false and without further - inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock of indisputably - certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even be the case that there are a - number of them, which, though among the most specious, are by their consequences in - mutual collision, and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical - (synthetical) propositions is to be met with in it, then the former way of judging is - not admissible, but the investigation of the principles of the critique must precede - all judgments as to its value.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">ON A SPECIMEN OF A JUDGMENT OF THE - CRITIQUE PRIOR TO ITS EXAMINATION.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">This judgment is to be found in the <span class="T6">Göttingischen gelehrten - Anzeigen</span>, in the supplement to the third division, of January 19, 1782, - pages 40 et seq.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and - endeavors to present his independent reflexions in its elaboration, falls into the - hands of a reviewer who, in his turn, is keen enough to discern the points on which the - worth or worthlessness of the book rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to the - heart of the subject, sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the - author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the judgment may indeed - displease the latter, but the public does not care, as it gains thereby; and the author - himself may be contented, as an opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions - is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge, in such a - manner, that if he believes himself fundamentally right, he can remove in time any - stone of offence that might hurt the success of his work.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another position. He - seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which (successfully - or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either impatience at thinking out a - lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he - had brought everything to perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real - narrowmindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his - school-metaphysics. In short, he passes impatiently in review a long series of - propositions, by which, without knowing their premises, we can think nothing, - intersperses here and there his censure, the reason of which the reader understands - just as little as the propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] - can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the judgment of experts. I should, for - these reasons, have passed over this judgment altogether, were it not that it may - afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of - these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> from a misconception.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most - easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to trouble - himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by saying:</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - "This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he translates it, of higher) - Idealism."<sup><a href="#ftn45" id="body_ftn45" name="body_ftn45">45</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I - had to expect, much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of - geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various figures in turning over its - leaves, were to say, on being asked his opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of - drawing; the author introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, - incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than what every one - can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an idealism it is that - goes through my whole work, although it does not by a long way constitute the soul of - the system.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to - Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and - experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure - understanding and reason there is truth."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, - is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure - reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth."</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then - to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my reviewer to see - it everywhere?</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily - understood from the general bearing of the work, if the reader had only desired to do - so. Space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities - in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I - am one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst them more - particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that, like the - phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception, - together with its determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that - space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its determinations - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, can be cognised by us, because, no less than time, - it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and - makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its phenomena, possible. It - follows from this, that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its - criteria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, because - its phenomena (according to him) have nothing <span class="T6">a priori</span> at - their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion; - whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the - understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, and at the same time afford the <span class="T17">certain</span> - criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein.<sup><a href="#ftn46" id="body_ftn46">46</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special - character, in that it subverts the ordinary idealism, and that through it all cognition - <span class="T6">a priori</span>, even that of geometry, first receives objective - reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and time, could not be - maintained by the most zealous realists. This being the state of the case, I could have - wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine - otherwise, but to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be permitted me however, - in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the formal, or better still, the - critical Idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from - the sceptical Idealism of Descartes.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard"> - Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my book. The - reviewer criticises here and there, makes sweeping criticisms, a mode prudently - chosen, since it does not betray one's own knowledge or ignorance; a single thorough - criticism in detail, had it touched the main question, as is only fair, would have - exposed, it may be my error, or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this - species of research. It was, moreover, not a badly conceived plan, in order at once - to take from readers (who are accustomed to form their conceptions of books from - newspaper reports) the desire to read the book itself, to pour out in one breath a - number of passages in succession, torn from their connexion, and their grounds of - proof and explanations, and which must necessarily sound senseless, especially - considering how antipathetic they are to all school-metaphysics; to exhaust the - reader's patience <span class="T6">ad nauseam</span>, and then, after having made me - acquainted with the sensible proposition that persistent illusion is truth, to - conclude with the crude paternal moralisation: to what end, then, the quarrel with - accepted language, to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction? A judgment - which seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be - metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, proves clearly - that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the subject, and in addition, has - not understood himself.<sup><a href="#ftn47" id="body_ftn47">47</a></sup> - </p> - - - - <p class="Standard">My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and - superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing recent with respect - to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he should not withhold his discoveries - from the world, for there are doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to - find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department, - anything that has advanced the science by so much as a fingerbreadth; we find indeed - the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches, - the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but - all this is not what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; - it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from which certainty therein can - be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion - of pure reason from truth. To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he - would never have spoken out in such a high tone.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">But I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the - science has ever entered his thoughts, for in that case he would have directed his - judgment to this point, and even a mistaken attempt in such an important matter, would - have won his respect. If that be the case, we are once more good friends. He may - penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics, without any one hindering him; only - as concerns that which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are to be found in - reason, he cannot form a judgment. That my suspicion is not without foundation, is - proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic - knowledge <span class="T6">a priori</span>, the special problem upon the solution of - which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests, and upon which my <span class="T6">Critique</span> (as well - as the present <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>) - entirely hinges. The Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon, was only taken up - in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the above problem (although it received - its confirmation on other grounds), and hence he must have shown either that the above - problem does not possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span>), or - that by my conception of appearances, it is either not - solved at all, or can be better solved in another way; but I do not find a word of this - in the criticism. The reviewer, then, understands nothing of my work, and possibly also - nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and it is not, what I - would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of plodding through so - many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him, and - made its fundamental features unrecognisable.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">There is a good deal to be done before a learned journal, it - matters not with what care its writers may be selected, can maintain its otherwise - well-merited reputation, in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere. Other sciences and - branches of knowledge have their standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and - theology, in profane or sacred books; natural science and the art of medicine, in - mathematics and experience; jurisprudence, in law books; and even matters of taste in - the examples of the ancients. But for the judgment of the thing called metaphysics, the - standard has yet to be found. I have made an attempt to determine it, as well as its - use. What is to be done, then, until it be found, when works of this kind have to be - judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character, one may do what one likes; no one will - play the master over others here for long, before someone else appears to deal with him - in the same manner. If, however, they are critical in their character, not indeed with - reference to other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment cannot - be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though objection and blame may - indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable, since the need - is common to us all, and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed - attitude of judge unwarranted.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In order, however, to connect my defence with the interest of the - philosophical commonwealth, I propose a test, which must be decisive as to the mode, - whereby all metaphysical investigations may be directed to their common purpose. This - is nothing more than what formerly mathematicians have done, in establishing the - advantage of their methods by competition. I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is - only just, on <span class="T6">a priori</span> grounds, in his way, a single really - metaphysical principle asserted by him. Being metaphysical it must be synthetic and - cognised <span class="T6">a priori</span> from conceptions, but it may also be any one - of the most indispensable principles, as for instance, the principle of the persistence - of substance, or of the necessary determination of events in the world by their causes. - If he cannot do this (silence however is confession), he must admit, that as - metaphysics without apodeictic certainty of propositions of this kind is nothing at - all, its possibility or impossibility must before all things be established in a - critique of the pure reason. Thus he is bound either to confess that my principles in - the <span class="T6">Critique</span> are correct, or he must prove their invalidity. - But as I can already foresee, that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the - certainty of his principles, when it comes to a strict test he will not find a single - one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward, I will concede to him an - advantageous condition, which can only be expected in such a competition, and will - relieve him of the <span class="T6">onus probandi</span> by laying it on myself.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">He finds in these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> and in my - <span class="T6">Critique</span> (chapter on the "Theses and Antitheses of the Four - Antinomies") eight propositions, of which two and two contradict one another, but each - of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be accepted or - rejected (although there is not one that has not in this time been held by some - philosopher). Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions - at his pleasure, and accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a - present, but only one (for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to him as - to me), and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this - one, and at the same time show, that according to principles which every dogmatic - metaphysics must necessarily recognise, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him - can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an - hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less set aside, until we ascend to its - birth-place, pure reason itself, and thus my <span class="T6">Critique</span> must - either be accepted or a better one take its place; it must at least be studied, which - is the only thing I now require. If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, - then a synthetic proposition <span class="T6">a priori</span> from dogmatic principles - is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, then also I will deem my impeachment of - ordinary metaphysics as unjust, and pledge myself to recognise his stricture on my - <span class="T6">Critique</span> as justified (although this would not be the - consequence by a long way). To this end it would be necessary, it seems to me, that he - should step out of his incognito. Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that - instead of dealing with one, I should be honored by several problems coming from - anonymous and unqualified opponents.</p> - - - - <p class="NormCentSpaceBeforeAfter">PROPOSALS AS TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CRITIQUE UPON WHICH A - JUDGMENT MAY FOLLOW.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with - which it for a long time favored my <span class="T6">Critique</span>, for this proves - at least a postponement of judgment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving all - beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in which one cannot at once perhaps so - easily find one's way, something may perchance lie, from which an important but at - present dead branch of human knowledge may derive new life and productiveness. Hence - may have originated a solicitude for the as yet tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a - hasty judgment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above reasons, is now before my - eye in the <span class="T6">Gothaischen gelehrten Zeitung</span>, the thoroughness of - which every reader will himself perceive, from the clear and unperverted presentation - of a fragment of one of the first principles of my work, without taking into - consideration my own suspicious praise.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">And now I propose, since an extensive structure cannot be judged of - as a whole from a hurried glance, to test it piece by piece from its foundations, so - thereby the present <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> may fitly be used as a general - outline with which the work itself may occasionally be compared. This notion, if it - were founded on nothing more than my conceit of importance, such as vanity commonly - attributes to one's own productions, would be immodest and would deserve to be - repudiated with disgust. But now, the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived - at the point of total extinction, while human reason hangs upon them with - inextinguishable affection, and only after having been ceaselessly deceived does it - vainly attempt to change this into indifference.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many - deserving men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest of the - more and more enlightened reason, if there were only some hope of attaining the goal. - Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill - the soul; there is always a space left over, reserved for pure and speculative reason, - the vacuity of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries, and myticism for - what seems to be employment and entertainment, but what actually is mere pastime; in - order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason, which in accordance with its nature - requires something that can satisfy it, and not merely subserve other ends or the - interests of our inclinations. A consideration, therefore, which is concerned only with - reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reasonably suppose a great fascination - for every one who has attempted thus to extend his conceptions, and I may even say a - greater than any other theoretical branch of knowledge, for which he would not - willingly exchange it, because here all other cognitions, and even purposes, must meet - and unite themselves in a whole.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">I offer, therefore, these <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> as a - sketch and text-book for this investigation, and not the work itself. Although I am - even now perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and mode of - presentation, and the care that I have expended in weighing and testing every sentence - before writing it down, are concerned (for it has taken me years to satisfy myself - fully, not only as regards the whole, but in some cases even as to the sources of one - particular proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some - sections of the doctrine of elements, as for instance in the deduction of the - conceptions of the Understanding, or in that on the paralogisms of pure reason, because - a certain diffuseness takes away from their clearness, and in place of them, what is - here said in the <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> respecting these sections, may be - made the basis of the test.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and continuous - industry are requisite, they can carry things farther than other nations. If this - opinion be well founded, an opportunity, a business, presents itself, the successful - issue of which we can scarcely doubt, and in which all thinking men can equally take - part, though they have hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus - confirming the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in question - is of so peculiar a kind, that it can be at once brought to completion and to that - enduring state that it will never be able to be brought in the least degree farther or - increased by later discoveries, or even changed (leaving here out of account adornment - by greater clearness in some places, or additional uses), and this is an advantage no - other science has or can have, because there is none so fully isolated and independent - of others, and which is concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple. And - the present moment seems, moreover, not to be unfavorable to my expectation, for just - now, in Germany, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself, apart from the - so-called useful sciences, so as to pursue not mere play, but a business possessing an - enduring purpose.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">To discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be - united in such a purpose, I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is my intention - to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions, or even to flatter me with the - hope that he will do so; but attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, - completion, and extension, as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but - investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit not my own, - shall be erected, that shall be a possession for future generations for which they may - have reason to be grateful.</p> - - - - <p class="Standard">It would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may - be expected, when only the principles of criticism have been perfected, and how, - because the old false feathers have been pulled out, she need by no means appear poor - and reduced to an insignificant figure, but may be in other respects richly and - respectably adorned. But other and great uses which would result from such a reform, - strike one immediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses, in that it sought out - the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to make them clear - through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this way it was a training for - reason, in whatever direction it might be turned; but this was all the good it did; - service was subsequently effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions, - sophistry by subtle distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the ease with which - it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little school-wisdom, which is - only the more seductive the more it has the choice, on the one hand, of taking - something from the language of science, and on the other from that of popular - discourse, thus being everything to everybody, but in reality nothing at all. By - criticism, however, a standard is given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be with - certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and firmly founded, being brought into - full operation in metaphysics; a mode of thought extending by degrees its beneficial - influence over every other use of reason, at once infusing into it the true - philosophical spirit. But the service also that metaphysics performs for theology, by - making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring it - completely against the attacks of all such opponents, is certainly not to be valued - lightly. For ordinary metaphysics, although it promised the latter much advantage, - could not keep this promise, and moreover, by summoning speculative dogmatics to its - assistance, did nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysticism, which can prosper in - a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of school-metaphysics, - under the protection of which it may venture to rave with a semblance of rationality, - is driven from this, its last hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last, but not - least, it cannot be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to - say with universal assent, that what he expounds is Science, and that thereby genuine - services will be rendered to the commonweal.</p> - - -<hr></hr> - - - <p id="ftn1" class="Standard"><sup>1</sup> Prolegomena means literally prefatory - or introductory remarks. It is the neuter plural of the present passive participle - of προλέγειν, to speak before, i.e., to make introductory remarks before beginning one's regular - discourse. <a href="#body_ftn1">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn2" class="Standard"><sup>2</sup> Mahaffy not incorrectly translates - "spirals winding opposite ways," and Mr. Bax follows him verbatim even to the - repetition of the footnote. <a href="#body_ftn2">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn3" class="Standard"><sup>3</sup> The French <span class="T6">cento</span> is still - in use. <a href="#body_ftn3">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn4" class="Standard"><sup>4</sup> κέντρων, (1) - one that bears the marks of the κέντρο, goad; a rogue, (2) a - patched cloth; (3) any kind of patchwork, especially verses made up of scraps from - other authors. <a href="#body_ftn4">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn5" class="StandardFullEmBelow"><sup>5</sup> Says Horace:</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushNoSpace">"Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushNoSpace">Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum;"</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushNoSpace">"A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushNoSpace">For the river to flow away,</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushNoSpace">But the river flows, and flows on as before,</p> - - <p class="StandardIndentFlushSpaceBelow">And it flows forever and aye." <a href="#body_ftn5">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn6" class="Standard"><sup>6</sup> Nevertheless Hume - called this very destructive science metaphysics and attached to it great value. - Metaphysics and morals [he declares in the fourth part of his Essays] are the most - important branches of science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so - important. But the acute man merely - regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of - speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome - controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if - reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone supply to the will - the highest aim for all its endeavor. <a href="#body_ftn6">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn7" class="Standard"><sup>7</sup> The term <span class="T6">Anschauung</span> here - used means sense-perception. It is that which is given to the senses and apprehended - immediately, as an object is seen by merely looking at it. The translation <span class="T6">intuition</span>, - though etymologically correct, is misleading. In the present - passage the term is not used in its technical significance but means "practical - experience."—<span class="T6">Ed</span>. <a href="#body_ftn7">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn8" class="Standard"><sup>8</sup> The term <span class="T6">apodeictic</span> is - borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." - The word is derived from ἀποδείκνυμι (= <span class="T6">I - show</span>) and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i.e., such statements as - admit of controversy.—<span class="T6">Ed</span>. <a href="#body_ftn8">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn9" class="Standard"><sup>9</sup> It is unavoidable that as knowledge - advances, certain expressions which have become classical, after having been used since - the infancy of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and more - appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case - with the term "analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the - synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical - propositions: it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, - and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this method we often - use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis, and it were - better to term it the regressive method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or - progressive. A principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, - which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering - whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical. <a href="#body_ftn9">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn10" class="Standard"><sup>10</sup> This whole paragraph (§ 9) - will be better understood when compared with <a href="#Page40">Remark I.</a>, following - this section, appearing in the present edition on page 40.—<span class="T6">Ed</span>. - <a href="#body_ftn10">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn11" class="Standard"><sup>11</sup> Empirical judgments (<span class="T6">empirische Urtheile</span>) - are either mere statements of fact, viz., records of a - perception, or statements of a natural law, implying a causal connexion between two - facts. The former Kant calls "judgments of perception" (<span class="T6">Wahrnehmungsurtheile</span>) the latter "judgments of experience" (<span class="T6">Erhfahrungsurtheile</span>).—<span class="T6">Ed.</span> <a href="#body_ftn11">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn12" class="Standard"><sup>12</sup> I freely grant that these examples - do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of - experience, even though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they - refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of - course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become objective. - I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, - containing no ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the object. - An example of the judgments of perception, which become judgments of experience by - superadded concepts of the understanding, will be given in the next note. <a href="#body_ftn12">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn13" class="Standard"><sup>13</sup> As an easier example, we may take - the following: "When the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, - however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and - contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I - say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, - viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a - necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally - valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception into experience. <a href="#body_ftn13">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn14" class="Standard"><sup>14</sup> This name seems preferable to the - term <span class="T6">particularia</span>, which is used for these judgments in logic. - For the latter implies the idea that they are not universal. But when I start from - unity (in single judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly - and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality merely without - universality, and not the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical - considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However, - there is no need of making changes in logic. <a href="#body_ftn14">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn15" class="Standard"><sup>15</sup> But how does this proposition, - "that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree - with my statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition - <span class="T6">a posteriori</span> can afford contingent judgments only?" When I say - that experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies in - experience,—for example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; - consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat - necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of - experience (by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by experience; - for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of - the understanding (of cause) to perception. How perception attains this addition may be - seen by referring in the <span class="T6">Critique</span> itself to the section on the - Transcendental faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first edition, <span class="T6">Von - dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandsbegriffe</span>]. <a href="#body_ftn15">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn16" class="Standard"><sup>16</sup> [Kant uses the term physiological - in its etymological meaning as "pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in - general, not as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living - body." Accordingly it has been translated "physical."—<span class="T6">Ed.</span>] <a href="#body_ftn16">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn17" class="Standard"><sup>17</sup> The three following paragraphs will - hardly be understood unless reference be made to what the <span class="T6">Critique</span> itself - says on the subject of the Principles; they will, however, - be of service in giving a general view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention - on the main points. <a href="#body_ftn17">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn18" class="Standard"><sup>18</sup> [Kant uses here the equivocal term - <span class="T6">Wechselwirkung</span>.—<span class="T6">Ed</span>.] <a href="#body_ftn18">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn19" class="Standard"><sup>19</sup> Heat and light are in a small space - just as large as to degree as in a large one; in like manner the internal - representations, pain, consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long - time, need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point and in a - moment just as great as in any space or time however great. Degrees are therefore - capable of increase, but not in intuition, rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of - the degree of an intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the - relation of 1 to 0, viz., by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate - degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through infinite gradations to a - determinate sensation in a certain time. <span class="T6">Quantitas qualitatis est - gradus</span> [i.e., the degrees of quality must be measured by equality]. <a href="#body_ftn19">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn20" class="Standard"><sup>20</sup> We speak of the "intelligible - world," not (as the usual expression is) "intellectual world." For cognitions are - intellectual through the understanding, and refer to our world of sense also; but - objects, so far as they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to which - none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed "intelligible." But as some - possible intuition must correspond to every object, we would have to assume an - understanding that intuites things immediately; but of such we have not the least - notion, nor have we of the <span class="T6">things of the understanding</span> - [Verstandeswesen], to which it should be applied. <a href="#body_ftn20">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn21" class="Standard"><sup>21</sup> Crusius alone thought of a - compromise: that a Spirit, who can neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us - originally. But since false principles often intrude themselves, as indeed the very - system of this man shows in not a few examples, we are involved in difficulties as to - the use of such a principle in the absence of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine - origin from the spurious, as we never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth or - the father of lies may have instilled into us. <a href="#body_ftn21">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn22" class="Standard"><sup>22</sup> The definition of nature is given - in the beginning of the Second Part of the "Transcendental Problem," in § 14. <a href="#body_ftn22">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn23" class="Standard"><sup>23</sup> 1. <span class="T6">Substantia</span>. 2. <span class="T6">Qualitas</span>. 3. <span class="T6">Quantitas</span>. 4. <span class="T6">Relatio</span>, 5. <span class="T6">Actio</span>. 6. <span class="T6">Passio</span>. 7. <span class="T6">Quando</span>, 8. <span class="T6">Ubi</span>. 9. <span class="T6">Situs</span>. - 10. <span class="T6">Habitus</span>. <a href="#body_ftn23">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn24" class="Standard"><sup>24</sup> <span class="T6">Oppositum</span>. - <span class="T6">Prius</span>. <span class="T6">Simul</span>. <span class="T6">Motus</span>. <span class="T6">Habere</span>. - <a href="#body_ftn24">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn25" class="Standard"><sup>25</sup> See the two tables in the chapters - <span class="T6">Von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernuuft</span> and the first division - of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, <span class="T6">System der kosmologischen - Ideen</span>. <a href="#body_ftn25">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn26" class="Standard"><sup>26</sup> On the table of the categories many - neat observations may be made, for instance: (1) that the third arises from the first - and the second joined in one concept; (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality - there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to nothing (for - this purpose the categories of Quality must stand thus: reality, limitation, total - negation), without <span class="T6">correlata</span> or <span class="T6">opposita</span>, whereas - those of Relation and of Modality have them; (3) that, as - in <span class="T6">Logic</span> categorical judgments are the basis of all others, so - the category of Substance is the basis of all concepts of actual things; (4) that as - Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so by the modal concepts a - determination is not superadded to things, etc., etc. Such observations are of great - use. If we besides enumerate all the predicables, which we can find pretty completely - in any good ontology (for example, Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes under the - categories, in which operation we must not neglect to add as complete a dissection of - all these concepts as possible, there will then arise a merely analytical part of - metaphysics, which does not contain a single synthetical proposition, which might - precede the second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and completeness be - not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some extent elegant. <a href="#body_ftn26">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn27" class="Standard"><sup>27</sup> See <span class="T6">Critique of - Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolie der Reflexbegriffe</span>. <a href="#body_ftn27">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn28" class="Standard"><sup>28</sup> If we can say, that a science is - actual at least in the ideas of all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which - lead to it are proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that therefore - many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its behalf, then we are bound to - say that metaphysics is subjectively (and indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we - justly ask, how is it (objectively) possible. <a href="#body_ftn28">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn29" class="Standard"><sup>29</sup> In disjunctive judgments we - consider all possibility as divided in respect to a particular concept. By the - ontological principle of the universal determination of a thing in general, I - understand the principle that either the one or the other of all possible contradictory - predicates must be assigned to any object. This is at the same time the principle of - all disjunctive judgments, constituting the foundation of our conception of - possibility, and in it the possibility of every object in general is considered as - determined. This may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition: that the - activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same as that by which it - fashions the idea of a universal conception of all reality, containing in itself that - which is positive in all contradictory predicates. <a href="#body_ftn29">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn30" class="Standard"><sup>30</sup> See <span class="T6">Critique of - Pure Reason, Von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft.</span> <a href="#body_ftn30">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn31" class="Standard"><sup>31</sup> Were the representation of the - apperception (the Ego) a concept, by which anything could be thought, it could be used - as a predicate of other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more - than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception and is only the - representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation (<span class="T6">relatione accidentis</span>). - <a href="#body_ftn31">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn32" class="Standard"><sup>32</sup> Cf. <span class="T6">Critique, Von den - Analogien der Erfahrung</span>. <a href="#body_ftn32">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn33" class="Standard"><sup>33</sup> It is indeed very remarkable how - carelessly metaphysicians have always passed over the principle of the permanence of - substances without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found - themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with the concept of - substance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that without this presupposition do - union of perceptions in experience is possible, supplied the want by a postulate. From - experience itself it never could derive such a principle, partly because substances - cannot be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions, that the matter can - always be found undiminished, partly because the principle contains - <span class="T6">necessity</span>, which is always the sign of an <span class="T6">a priori</span> - principle. People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a - <span class="T6">substance</span>, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul - after the death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is - inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from destruction by - dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this principle—a discovery which - requires deeper researches than they were ever inclined to make—they would have seen, - that the law of the permanence of substances has place for the purposes of experience - only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be cognised and conjoined - with others in experience, but never independently of all possible experience, and - consequently cannot hold good of the soul after death. <a href="#body_ftn33">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn34" class="Standard"><sup>34</sup> Cf. <span class="T6">Critique, Die - Antinomie der reinen Vernunft</span>. <a href="#body_ftn34">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn35" class="Standard"><sup>35</sup> I therefore would be pleased to - have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, - because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its - daring pretentions, and to force it to self-examination. For every proof, which I have - given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I undertake to be responsible, and - thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is - brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon - which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of - all the cognition of pure reason with me more thoroughly. <a href="#body_ftn35">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn36" class="Standard"><sup>36</sup> The idea of freedom occurs only in - the relation of the intellectual, as cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we - cannot attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which it fills - its space, though this action takes place from an internal principle. We can likewise - find no notion of freedom suitable to purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so - far as his action is immanent. For his action, though independent of external - determining causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the divine - <span class="T6">nature</span>. It is only, if <span class="T6">something is to - start</span> by an action, and so the effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the - world of sense (e.g., the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, - whether the causality of the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether the - cause can originate an effect without its causality itself beginning. In the former - case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the latter, - that of freedom. From this the reader will see, that, as I explained freedom to be the - faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the notion which is the - problem of metaphysics. <a href="#body_ftn36">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn37" class="Standard"><sup>37</sup> Cf. <span class="T6">Critique</span>, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals." - <a href="#body_ftn37">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn38" class="Standard"><sup>38</sup> Herr Platner in his Aphorisms - acutely says (§§ 728, 729), "If reason be a criterion, no concept, which is - incomprehensible to human reason, can be possible. Incomprehensibility has place in - what is actual only. Here in comprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the - acquired ideas." It sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not strange to say, that in - nature there is much incomprehensible (e.g., the faculty of generation) but if we mount - still higher, and even go beyond nature, everything again becomes comprehensible; for - we then quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves merely - about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the law that reason - prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in experience, because the law is - the reason's own production. <a href="#body_ftn38">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn39" class="Standard"><sup>39</sup> <span class="T6">Der die - Gegenstände anschaute</span>. <a href="#body_ftn39">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn40" class="Standard"><sup>40</sup> The use of the word "world" without - article, though odd, seems to be the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint.— - <span class="T6">Ed</span>. <a href="#body_ftn40">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn41" class="Standard"><sup>41</sup> There is, e.g., an analogy between - the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I - never can do anything to another man without giving him a right to do the same to me on - the same conditions; just as no mass can act with its motive power on another mass - without thereby occasioning the other to react equally against it. Here right and - motive power are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation there is complete - similarity. By means of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things - which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of - children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the welfare of the human species (= - c) is to that unknown [quantity which is] in God (= x), which we call love; not as if - it had the least similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its - relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another. - But the concept of relation in this case is a mere category, viz., the concept of - cause, which has nothing to do with sensibility. <a href="#body_ftn41">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn42" class="Standard"><sup>42</sup> I may say, that the causality of - the Supreme Cause holds the same place with regard to the world that human reason does - with regard to its works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains - unknown to me: I only compare its effects (the order of the world) which I know, and - their conformity to reason, to the effects of human reason which I also know; and hence - I term the former reason, without attributing to it on that account what I understand - in man by this term, or attaching to it anything else known to me, as its property. - <a href="#body_ftn42">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn43" class="Standard"><sup>43</sup> <span class="T6">Critique of Pure - Reason</span>, II., chap. III., section 7. <a href="#body_ftn43">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn44" class="Standard"><sup>44</sup> Throughout in the <span class="T6">Critique</span> - I never lost sight of the plan not to neglect anything, were it - ever so recondite, that could render the inquiry into the nature of pure reason - complete. Everybody may afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases, when he - has been merely shown what yet remains to be done. It is this a duty which must - reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey the whole field, - in order to consign it to others for future cultivation and allotment. And to this - branch both the scholia belong, which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness - to amateurs, and hence are added here for connoisseurs only. <a href="#body_ftn44">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn45" class="Standard"><sup>45</sup> By no means "<span class="T6">higher</span>." - High towers, and metaphysically-great men resembling them, round - both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful - <span class="T6">bathos</span>, the bottom-land, of experience; and the word - transcendental, the meaning of which is so often explained by me, but not once grasped - by my reviewer (so carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something - passing beyond all experience, but something that indeed precedes it <span class="T6">a - priori</span>, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible. If - these conceptions overstep experience, their employment is termed transcendent, a word - which must be distinguished from transcendental, the latter being limited to the - immanent use, that is, to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been - sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found his advantage in - misunderstanding me. <a href="#body_ftn45">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn46" class="Standard"><sup>46</sup> Idealism proper always has a - mystical tendency, and can have no other, but mine is solely designed for the purpose - of comprehending the possibility of our cognition <span class="T6">a priori</span> as - to objects of experience, which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested. - In this way all mystical idealism falls to the ground, for (as may be seen already in - Plato) it inferred from our cognitions <span class="T6">a priori</span> (even from - those of geometry) another intuition different from that of the senses (namely, an - intellectual intuition), because it never occurred to any one that the senses - themselves might intuite <span class="T6">a priori</span>. <a href="#body_ftn46">↩</a></p> - - <p id="ftn47" class="Standard"><sup>47</sup> The reviewer often fights with his - own shadow. When I oppose the truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am - here speaking simply of the well-known <span class="T6">somnio objective sumto</span> - of the Wolffian philosophy, which is merely formal, and with which the distinction - between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned, and in a transcendental philosophy - indeed can have no place. For the rest, he calls my deduction of the categories and - table of the principles of the understanding, "common well-known axioms of logic and - ontology, expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only consult these - <span class="T6">Prolegomena</span> upon this point, to convince himself that a more - miserable and historically incorrect, judgment, could hardly be made. - <a href="#body_ftn47">↩</a></p> - - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Kant's Prolegomena, by Immanuel Kant - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - -***** This file should be named 52821-h.htm or 52821-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/8/2/52821/ - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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