diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/52821-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/52821-0.txt | 5378 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 5378 deletions
diff --git a/old/52821-0.txt b/old/52821-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 622705c..0000000 --- a/old/52821-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5378 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Kant's Prolegomena, by Immanuel Kant - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Kant's Prolegomena - To Any Future Metaphysics - -Author: Immanuel Kant - -Translator: Paul Carus - -Release Date: September 5, 2016 [EBook #52821] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - - - - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi - - - - -KANT'S PROLEGOMENA - - -TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS - - -EDITED IN ENGLISH -BY -DR. PAUL CARUS - - -THIRD EDITION - - -CHICAGO -THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY -1912 - -TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED -BY -The Open Court Publishing Co. -1902. - - -[Transcriber's note: ** Supplemental material and table of contents -are omitted from this etext. ** ] - - - -Contents - -PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. -INTRODUCTION. -PROLEGOMENA. - PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. -FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? -SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? -THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? -SCHOLIA. - SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS - METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?" -APPENDIX. - ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE. - - - - -PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. - -Kant's Prolegomena,{1} although a small book, is indubitably the most -important of his writings. It furnishes us with a key to his main -work, The Critique of Pure Reason; in fact, it is an extract -containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It approaches the -subject in the simplest and most direct way, and is therefore best -adapted as an introduction into his philosophy. For this reason, The -Open Court Publishing Company has deemed it advisable to bring out a -new edition of the work, keeping in view its broader use as a -preliminary survey and explanation of Kant's philosophy in general. In -order to make the book useful for this broader purpose, the editor has -not only stated his own views concerning the problem underlying the -Prolegomena (see page 167 et seq.), but has also collected the most -important materials which have reference to Kant's philosophy, or to -the reception which was accorded to it in various quarters (see page -241 et seq.). The selections have not been made from a partisan -standpoint, but have been chosen with a view to characterising the -attitude of different minds, and to directing the student to the best -literature on the subject. - -=================================== -{1} Prolegomena means literally prefatory or introductory remarks. It is -the neuter plural of the present passive participle of -προλέγειν, to speak before, i.e., to make introductory -remarks before beginning one's regular discourse. -=================================== - -It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the Critique of -Pure Reason is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the history -of philosophy; and so it seems that a comprehension of Kant's -position, whether we accept or reject it, is indispensable to the -student of philosophy. It is not his solution which makes the sage of -Königsberg the initiator of modern thought, but his formulation of -the problem. - -* * * - -The present translation is practically new, but it goes without saying -that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors, among whom -Prof. John P. Mahaffy and John H. Bernard deserve special credit. -Richardson's translation of 1818 may be regarded as superseded and has -not been consulted, but occasional reference has been made to that of -Prof. Ernest Belfort Bax. Considering the difficulties under which -even these translators labored we must recognise the fact that they -did their work well, with painstaking diligence, great love of the -subject, and good judgment. The editor of the present translation has -the advantage of being to the manor born; moreover, he is pretty well -versed in Kant's style; and wherever he differs from his predecessors -in the interpretation of a construction, he has deviated from them not -without good reasons. Nevertheless there are some passages which will -still remain doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence. - -As a curiosum in Richardson's translation Professor Mahaffy mentions -that the words widersinnig gewundene Schnecken, which simply means -"symmetric helices,"{2} are rendered by "snails rolled up contrary to -all sense"—a wording that is itself contrary to all sense and makes -the whole paragraph unintelligible. We may add an instance of another -mistake that misses the mark. Kant employs in the Appendix a word that -is no longer used in German. He speaks of the Cento der Metaphysik as -having neue Lappen and einen veränderten Zuschnitt. Mr. Bax -translates Cento by "body," Lappen by "outgrowths," and Zuschnitt by -"figure." His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than Richardson's; -it is certainly not less comical, and it also destroys the sense, -which in the present case is a very striking simile. Cento is a Latin -word[3] derived from the Greek κεντρων,[4] meaning "a garment of -many patches sewed together," or, as we might now say, "a crazy -quilt." - -=================================== -{2} Mahaffy not incorrectly translates "spirals winding opposite ways," -and Mr. Bax follows him verbatim even to the repetition of the -footnote. - -{3} The French cento is still in use. - -{4} κέντρων, (1) one that bears the marks of the κέντρο, -goad; a rogue, (2) a patched cloth; (3) any kind of patchwork, -especially verses made up of scraps from other authors. -=================================== - -* * * - -In the hope that this book will prove useful, The Open Court -Publishing Company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy. - -P.C. - -INTRODUCTION. - -These Prolegomena are destined for the use, not of pupils, but of -future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will -be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, -but merely for the discovery of the science itself. - -There are scholarly men, to whom the history of philosophy (both -ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; for these the present -Prolegomena are not written. They must wait till those who endeavor to -draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work; it -will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been -done. Unfortunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion has -not been said before, and truly the same prophecy applies to all -future time; for since the human reason has for many centuries -speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to -be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every -new idea among the old sayings of past ages. - -My object is to persuade all those who think Metaphysics worth -studying, that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment, and, -neglecting all that has been done, to propose first the preliminary -question, ‘Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all -possible?’ - -If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot, like other sciences, -obtain universal and permanent recognition? If not, how can it -maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with -hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether then we demonstrate -our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come once for -all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called -science, which cannot possibly remain on its present footing. It seems -almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, -that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle -every one inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, -without gaining a single step. And so its followers having melted -away, we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other -sciences venturing their reputation here, where everybody, however -ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final verdict, as in this -domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish -sound knowledge from shallow talk. - -After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, -when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question -should at last occur, whether and how such a science is possible? -Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has several times -built up a tower, and then razed it to examine the nature of the -foundation. It is never too late to become wise; but if the change -comes late, there is always more difficulty in starting a reform. - -The question whether a science be possible, presupposes a doubt as to -its actuality. But such a doubt offends the men whose whole -possessions consist of this supposed jewel; hence he who raises the -doubt must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the proud -consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient, and therefore -considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their -hands, and look down on him with contempt; others, who never see -anything except it be identical with what they have seen before, will -not understand him, and everything will remain for a time, as if -nothing had happened to excite the concern, or the hope, for an -impending change. - -Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of -these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but -ultimately be fully persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands -here stated on which its possibility depends, be satisfied; and, as -this has never been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as -Metaphysics. But as it can never cease to be in demand,{5}—since the -interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he must -confess that a radical reform, or rather a new birth of the science -after an original plan, are unavoidable, however men may struggle -against it for a while. - -=================================== -{5} Says Horace: -"Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at ille -Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum;" -"A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore -For the river to flow away, -But the river flows, and flows on as before, -And it flows forever and aye." -=================================== - -Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the origin of -metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing has ever happened -which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by -David Hume. He threw no light on this species of knowledge, but he -certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained, -had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire -been carefully nursed and developed. - -Hume started from a single but important concept in Metaphysics, viz., -that of Cause and Effect (including its derivatives force and action, -etc.). He challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth to -this idea from herself, to answer him by what right she thinks -anything to be so constituted, that if that thing be posited, -something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the -meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it -was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of -concepts a combination involving necessity. We cannot at all see why, -in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily -exist, or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. -Hence he inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference -to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her -children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of -imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain -representations under the Law of Association, and mistook the -subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from -insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such -combinations, even generally, because her concepts would then be -purely fictitious, and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing -but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language -there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics at all.{6} - -=================================== -{6} Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics -and attached to it great value. Metaphysics and morals [he declares in -the fourth part of his Essays] are the most important branches of -science; mathematics and physics are not nearly so important. But the -acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation -of extravagant claims of speculative reason, and the complete -settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that -mislead mankind. He overlooked the positive injury which results, if -reason be deprived of its most important prospects, which can alone -supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor. -=================================== - -However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion may appear, it was at -least founded upon investigation, and this investigation deserved the -concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as -determined efforts on their part to discover, if possible, a happier -solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him, all of which -would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science. - -But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being -understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, -Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the -problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he -doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that -which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable -suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if -nothing had happened. - -The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, -and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had -never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a -priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, -independent of all experience, implying a wider application than -merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was a -question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need -of the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and -the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a -matter of course. - -But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the -great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of -reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,—a task which -did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being -defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to common sense. It is -indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (as they now call it) -plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically, -by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing -to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To -appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no -sooner—this is one of the subtile discoveries of modern times, by -means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists -with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a -particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to -this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the -multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the -popular charlatan glories and confides in it? I should think that Hume -might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie, and -in addition to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess), -which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating, -or, if speculations are under discussion, restrains the desire to -decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments. -By this means alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and hammers -may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for steel-engraving we -require an engraver's needle. Thus common sense and speculative -understanding are each serviceable in their own way, the former in -judgments which apply immediately to experience, the latter when we -judge universally from mere concepts, as in metaphysics, where sound -common sense, so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, -has no right to judge at all. - -I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the very thing, -which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave -my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new -direction. I was far from following him in the conclusions at which he -arrived by regarding, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which -by itself can give us no information. If we start from a well-founded, -but undeveloped, thought, which another has bequeathed to us, we may -well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute -man, to whom we owe the first spark of light. - -I therefore first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into -a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of -cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the -understanding thinks the connexion of things a priori, but rather that -metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions. I sought to -ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in -this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction -of these concepts, which I was now certain were not deduced from -experience, as Hume had apprehended, but sprang from the pure -understanding. This deduction (which seemed impossible to my acute -predecessor, which had never even occurred to any one else, though no -one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis -of their objective validity) was the most difficult task ever -undertaken in the service of metaphysics; and the worst was that -metaphysics, such as it then existed, could not assist me in the -least, because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible. -But as soon as I had succeeded in solving Hume's problem not merely in -a particular case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure -reason, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine the whole -sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles, in its -circumference as well as in its contents. This was required for -metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable -method. - -But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem in its widest extent -(viz., my Critique of the Pure Reason) will fare as the problem itself -fared, when first proposed. It will be misjudged because it is -misunderstood, and misunderstood because men choose to skim through -the book, and not to think through it—a disagreeable task, because -the work is dry, obscure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and -moreover long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect to hear -from philosophers complaints of want of popularity, entertainment, and -facility, when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable -cognition is at stake, which cannot be established otherwise than by -the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity may follow, but -is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet as regards a certain obscurity, -arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan, owing to which the -principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the -complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the present -Prolegomena. - -The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure faculty of reason -in its whole compass and bounds, will remain the foundation, to which -the Prolegomena, as a preliminary exercise, refer; for our critique -must first be established as a complete and perfected science, before -we can think of letting Metaphysics appear on the scene, or even have -the most distant hope of attaining it. - -We have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced -as new by taking it out of its former context, and reducing it to -system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most -readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the Critique; but -these Prolegomena may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science, -of which no one has ever even thought, the very idea of which was -unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the -smallest use, except it be the suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet ever, -he did not suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore, for -safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let it lie and rot; -whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe -astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and -provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer the ship safely, -whither he listeth. - -If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind, -we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of -our previously acquired knowledge, which is precisely what has first -to be called in question, we should only fancy we saw everywhere what -we had already known, the expressions, having a similar sound, only -that all would appear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and -unintelligible, because we should have as a foundation our own -notions, made by long habit a second nature, instead of the author's. -But the longwindedness of the work, so far as it depends on the -subject, and not the exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness -and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the -science, though they may discredit the book. - -Few writers are gifted with the subtilty, and at the same time with -the grace, of David Hume, or with the depth, as well as the elegance, -of Moses Mendelssohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my own -exposition popular, had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and -leave its completion to others, instead of having my heart in the -welfare of the science, to which I had devoted myself so long; in -truth, it required no little constancy, and even self-denial, to -postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a -slower, but more lasting, reputation. - -Making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful mind, -which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius, by demanding -what it cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot improve; -and by proposing, what it knows not where to find. And yet something -more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure -reason than mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the -usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure reason is a sphere -so separate and self-contained, that we cannot touch a part without -affecting all the rest. We can therefore do nothing without first -determining the position of each part, and its relation to the rest; -for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without, the -validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it -stands to all the rest within the domain of reason. - -So in the structure of an organized body, the end of each member can -only be deduced from the full conception of the whole. It may, then, -be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be -perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements of pure reason. In -the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or -nothing. - -But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique of Pure Reason, -would be unintelligible, unreliable, and useless, it is all the more -useful as a sequel. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine -in detail the chief points of importance in the science, and to -improve in many respects our exposition, as compared with the first -execution of the work. - -After the completion of the work I offer here such a plan which is -sketched out after an analytical method, while the work itself had to -be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may -present all its articulations, as the structure of a peculiar -cognitive faculty, in their natural combination. But should any reader -find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future -Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is -bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in -the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to practical -experience,{7} while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing -exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply -their talents to other subjects. But he who undertakes to judge, or -still more, to construct, a system of Metaphysics, must satisfy the -demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thoroughly -refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible. - -=================================== -{7} The term Anschauung here used means sense-perception. It is that -which is given to the senses and apprehended immediately, as an object -is seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuition, though -etymologically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term -is not used in its technical significance but means "practical -experience."—Ed. -=================================== - -In conclusion, let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity -(frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their -own indolence or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other -sciences observe a judicious silence, speak authoritatively in -metaphysics and make bold decisions, because their ignorance is not -here contrasted with the knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast -with sound critical principles, which we may therefore commend in the -words of Virgil: - -"Ignavum, fucos, pecus a praesepibus arcent." -"Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent -creatures." - -PROLEGOMENA. - -PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. - -§ 1. Of the Sources of Metaphysics. - -If it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science, it will -be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features -which no other science has in common with it, constituting its -characteristics; otherwise the boundaries of all sciences become -confused, and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its -nature. - -The characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of -object, or of the sources of cognition, or of the kind of cognition, -or perhaps of all three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the -idea of a possible science and its territory. - -First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very -concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles -(including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be -derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical -knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore -have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of -physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical -psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure -Understanding and pure Reason. - -But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish able from pure -Mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition; -and for the meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the Pure -Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism," Chap. I., Sec. i), where -the distinction between these two employments of the reason is -sufficiently explained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysical -cognition. - -§ 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called -Metaphysical. - -a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments in -general.—The peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical -cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But whatever -be their origin, or their logical form, there is a distinction in -judgments, as to their content, according to which they are either -merely explicative, adding nothing to the content of the cognition, or -expansive, increasing the given cognition: the former may be called -analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments. - -Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has -been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though -not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. When I say: -All bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least my concept -of body, but have only analysed it, as extension was really thought to -belong to that concept before the judgment was made, though it was not -expressed; this judgment is therefore analytical. On the contrary, -this judgment, All bodies have weight, contains in its predicate -something not actually thought in the general concept of the body; it -amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept, and must -therefore be called synthetical. - -b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments is the Law of -Contradiction.—All analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of -Contradiction, and are in their nature a priori cognitions, whether -the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the -predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained -in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denied without -contradiction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of -the subject in an analytical, but negative, judgment, by the same law -of contradiction. Such is the nature of the judgments: all bodies are -extended, and no bodies are unextended (i.e., simple). - -For this very reason all analytical judgments are a priori even when -the concepts are empirical, as, for example, Gold is a yellow metal; -for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as -a yellow metal: it is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only -analyse it, without looking beyond it elsewhere. - -c. Synthetical Judgments require a different Principle from the Law of -Contradiction.—There are synthetical a posteriori judgments of -empirical origin; but there are also others which are proved to be -certain a priori, and which spring from pure Understanding and Reason. -Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot possibly spring from the -principle of analysis, viz., the law of contradiction, alone; they -require a quite different principle, though, from whatever they may be -deduced, they must be subject to the law of contradiction, which must -never be violated, even though everything cannot be deduced from it. I -shall first classify synthetical judgments. - -1. Empirical Judgments are always synthetical. For it would be absurd -to base an analytical judgment on experience, as our concept suffices -for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience. That -body is extended, is a judgment established a priori, and not an -empirical judgment. For before appealing to experience, we already -have all the conditions of the judgment in the concept, from which we -have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of -contradiction, and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the -judgment, which experience could not even teach us. - -2. Mathematical Judgments are all synthetical. This fact seems -hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have -analysed human reason; it even seems directly opposed to all their -conjectures, though incontestably certain, and most important in its -consequences. For as it was found that the conclusions of -mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction (as -is demanded by all apodeictic certainty), men persuaded themselves -that the fundamental principles were known from the same law. This was -a great mistake, for a synthetical proposition can indeed be -comprehended according to the law of contradiction, but only by -presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows, -but never in itself. - -First of all, we must observe that all proper mathematical judgments -are a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them -necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience. But if this be -not conceded to me, very good; I shall confine my assertion to pure -Mathematics, the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a -priori and not empirical cognitions. - -It might at first be thought that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a mere -analytical judgment, following from the concept of the sum of seven -and five, according to the law of contradiction. But on closer -examination it appears that the concept of the sum of 7 + 5 contains -merely their union in a single number, without its being at all -thought what the particular number is that unites them. The concept of -twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of -seven and five; and analyse this possible sum as we may, we shall not -discover twelve in the concept. We must go beyond these concepts, by -calling to our aid some concrete image (Anschauung), i.e., either our -five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his Arithmetic), and -we must add successively the units of the five, given in some concrete -image (Anschauung), to the concept of seven. Hence our concept is -really amplified by the proposition 7 + 5 = 12, and we add to the -first a second, not thought in it. Arithmetical judgments are -therefore synthetical, and the more plainly according as we take -larger numbers; for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we -analyse our concepts without calling visual images (Anschauung) to our -aid, we can never find the sum by such mere dissection. - -All principles of geometry are no less analytical. That a straight -line is the shortest path between two points, is a synthetical -proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, -but only a quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore altogether -additional, and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept. -Here, too, visualisation (Anschauung) must come to aid us. It alone -makes the synthesis possible. - -Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are indeed actually -analytical, and depend on the law of contradiction; but they only -serve, as identical propositions, as a method of concatenation, and -not as principles, e.g., a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or a + b -> a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these, though -they are recognised as valid from mere concepts, are only admitted in -mathematics, because they can be represented in some visual form -(Anschauung). What usually makes us believe that the predicate of such -apodeictic{8} judgments is already contained in our concept, and that -the judgment is therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the -expression, requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity -implied in the thought of a given concept, which necessity attaches to -the concept. But the question is not what we are requested to join in -thought to the given concept, but what we actually think together with -and in it, though obscurely; and so it appears that the predicate -belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed, yet not directly but -indirectly by an added visualisation (Anschauung). - -=================================== -{8} The term apodeictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it -in the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from -ἀποδείκνυμι (= I show) and is contrasted to dialectic -propositions, i.e., such statements as admit of controversy.—Ed. -=================================== - -§ 3. A Remark on the General Division of Judgments into Analytical -and Synthetical. - -This division is indispensable, as concerns the Critique of human -understanding, and therefore deserves to be called classical, though -otherwise it is of little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic -philosophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in -Metaphysics itself, and not apart from it, in the pure laws of reason -generally, altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction. -Thus the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baumgarten, came to -seek the proof of the principle of Sufficient Reason, which is clearly -synthetical, in the principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, -however, I find an indication of my division. For in the fourth book -(chap. iii. § 9, seq.), having discussed the various connexions of -representations in judgments, and their sources, one of which he makes -"identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments), and another the -coexistence of representations in a subject, he confesses (§ 10) that -our a priori knowledge of the latter is very narrow, and almost -nothing. But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there is so -little of what is definite, and reduced to rules, that we cannot -wonder if no one, not even Hume, was led to make investigations -concerning this sort of judgments. For such general and yet definite -principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them -obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our own -reflexion, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly -have found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know -that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations. Men who -never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover -everything, after it has been once shown them, in what was said long -since, though no one ever saw it there before. - -§ 4. The General Question of the Prolegomena.—Is Metaphysics at all -Possible? - -Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its place as a science, -really in existence; could we say, here is metaphysics, learn it, and -it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth: this -question would be useless, and there would only remain that other -question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness, than a proof -of the existence of the thing itself), "How is the science possible, -and how does reason come to attain it?" But human reason has not been -so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can -point as you do to Euclid, and say: This is Metaphysics; here you may -find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest -Being, and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure -reason. We can be shown indeed many judgments, demonstrably certain, -and never questioned; but these are all analytical, and rather concern -the materials and the scaffolding for Metaphysics, than the extension -of knowledge, which is our proper object in studying it (§ 2). Even -supposing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the law of -Sufficient Reason, which you have never proved, as you ought to, from -pure reason a priori, though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse -when they come to be employed for your principal object, into such -doubtful assertions, that in all ages one Metaphysics has contradicted -another, either in its assertions, or their proofs, and thus has -itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very -attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early -appearance of scepticism, a mental attitude in which reason treats -itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from -complete despair of ever satisfying our most important aspirations. -For long before men began to inquire into nature methodically, they -consulted abstract reason, which had to some extent been exercised by -means of ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while laws -of nature must usually be discovered with labor. So Metaphysics -floated to the surface, like foam, which dissolved the moment it was -scooped off. But immediately there appeared a new supply on the -surface, to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others, instead -of seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon, thought they -showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors. - -The essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical -cognition among all other a priori cognitions is, that it cannot at -all proceed from concepts, but only by means of the construction of -concepts (see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism, chap. I., -sect. 1). As therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the -concept to that which its corresponding visualisation (Anschauung) -contains, these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise -analytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all synthetical. - -I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to -philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant -observation. Hume being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to -cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions in which -human understanding claims such mighty possessions, heedlessly severed -from it a whole, and indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure -mathematics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak, the -state-constitution of this empire, depended on totally different -principles, namely, on the law of contradiction alone; and although he -did not divide Judgments in this manner formally and universally as I -have done here, what he said was equivalent to this: that mathematics -contains only analytical, but metaphysics synthetical, a priori -judgments. In this, however, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake -had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception. But for -this, he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our -synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of -Causality, and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori -also, for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical. -And then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere -experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to -experience, a thing which he was far too acute to do. The good company -into which metaphysics would thus have been brought, would have saved -it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the thrust -intended for it must have reached mathematics, which was not and could -not have been Hume's intention. Thus that acute man would have been -led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now -occupy us, but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably -elegant style. - -Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We -must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical -judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but -they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments, which are the -whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if -there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of -substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also -pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only -exists as subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments, -we seek to approach the definition of the concept. But as the analysis -of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does -not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other, -even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air -is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any -known degree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the -analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has -something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions, which -must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common -with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the -substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly -metaphysical judgment. - -If the a priori principles, which constitute the materials of -metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed principles, -then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a -particular part (as a philosophia definitiva), containing nothing but -analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated -separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper. -For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in -metaphysics, i.e., as regards the synthetical judgments, which are to -be generated by these previously analysed concepts. - -The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is -properly concerned with synethetical propositions a priori, and these -alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various -dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but -wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind -of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our concepts distinct -by analysis. But the generation of a priori cognition by concrete -images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions a -priori in philosophical cognition, constitutes the essential subject -of Metaphysics. - -Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which teaches us nothing, as of -scepticism, which does not even promise us anything, not even the -quiet state of a contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance of -knowledge so much needed; and lastly, rendered suspicious by long -experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess, or which -offers itself, under the title of pure reason: there remains but one -critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends, -viz., Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this question must be -answered not by sceptical objections to the asseverations of some -actual system of metaphysics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing -to exist), but from the conception, as yet only problematical, of a -science of this sort. - -In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this question -synthetically, by making inquiries into pure reason itself, and -endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the -laws of its pure use according to principles. The task is difficult, -and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system, -based on no data except reason itself, and which therefore seeks, -without resting upon any fact, to unfold knowledge from its original -germs. Prolegomena, however, are designed for preparatory exercises; -they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if -possible to actualise a science, than to propound it. They must -therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy, from which -we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources as yet unknown, -the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew, but -exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same -sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of those designed as a -preparation for future metaphysics, is consequently analytical. - -But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics -to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure -a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are -actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly -recognised as apodeictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by -general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of -experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical -knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is -actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the -principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of -all the rest. - -The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure Reason Possible? - -§ 5. We have above learned the significant distinction between -analytical and synthetical judgments. The possibility of analytical -propositions was easily comprehended, being entirely founded on the -law of Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a posteriori -judgments, of those which are gathered from experience, also requires -no particular explanation; for experience is nothing but a continual -synthesis of perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical -propositions a priori, of which the possibility must be sought or -investigated, because they must depend upon other principles than the -law of contradiction. - -But here we need not first establish the possibility of such -propositions so as to ask whether they are possible. For there are -enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty, and as our -present method is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such -synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists; but we must -now inquire into the reason of this possibility, and ask, how such -cognition is possible, in order that we may from the principles of its -possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use, its -sphere and its limits. The proper problem upon which all depends, when -expressed with scholastic precision, is therefore: - -How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible? - -For the sake of popularity I have above expressed this problem -somewhat differently, as an inquiry into purely rational cognition, -which I could do for once without detriment to the desired -comprehension, because, as we have only to do here with metaphysics -and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore going -remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition, -we do not mean analytical, but synthetical cognition.{9} - -=================================== -{9} It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions -which have become classical, after having been used since the infancy -of science, will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer and -more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion. -[This is the case with the term "analytical."] The analytical method, -so far as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from -that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions: it -signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, -and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible. In this -method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in -mathematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive -method, in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A -principal part of Logic too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, -which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to Dialectics, -without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are -analytical or synthetical. -=================================== - -Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem: its -very existence depends upon it. Let any one make metaphysical -assertions with ever so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with -conclusions, if he has not previously proved able to answer this -question satisfactorily, I have a right to say: this is all vain -baseless philosophy and false wisdom. You speak through pure reason, -and claim, as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only -dissecting given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which do -not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which you believe you -conceive quite independently of all experience; how do you arrive at -this, and how will you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the -consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed; for that is -a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor. Says Horace: - -"Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi." - -"To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give credence." - -The answer to this question, though indispensable, is difficult; and -though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is, that the -possibility of the question never occurred to anybody, there is yet -another reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one -question requires a much more persistent, profound, and painstaking -reflexion, than the most diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its -first appearance promised immortality to its author. And every -intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects what this problem -requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty, and would -regard it as insoluble and even impossible, did there not actually -exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened to -David Hume, though he did not conceive the question in its entire -universality as is done here, and as must be done, should the answer -be decisive for all Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that -acute man, that when a concept is given me, I can go beyond it and -connect with it another, which is not contained in it, in such a -manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former? Nothing -but experience can furnish us with such connexions (thus he concluded -from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility), and all -that vaunted necessity, or, what is the same thing, all cognition -assumed to be a priori, is nothing but a long habit of accepting -something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for -objective. - -Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I -occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to -solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under -obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so -profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with -which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been -attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its -whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz., -for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it -in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here. - -All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from -their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory -manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" -For the answer contains which they must show when they have anything -to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these -credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who -have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado. - -If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a -science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense -of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the -modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are -not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies -beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not -for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical -purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even -indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in -life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and -the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the -latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when -judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be -admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby -announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with -conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth -nothing at all. - -It may be said, that the entire transcendental philosophy, which -necessarily precedes all metaphysics, is nothing but the complete -solution of the problem here propounded, in systematical order and -completeness, and hitherto we have never had any transcendental -philosophy; for what goes by its name is properly a part of -metaphysics, whereas the former science is intended first to -constitute the possibility of the latter, and must therefore precede -all metaphysics. And it is not surprising that when a whole science, -deprived of all help from other sciences, and consequently in itself -quite new, is required to answer a single question satisfactorily, we -should find the answer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in -obscurity. - -As we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method, -in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually -exist, we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition -(which alone is under consideration here), pure mathematics and pure -natural science (physics). For these alone can exhibit to us objects -in a definite and actualisable form (in der Anschauung), and -consequently (if there should occur in them a cognition a priori) can -show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in -concreto, that is, its actuality, from which we could proceed to the -reason of its possibility by the analytic method. This facilitates our -work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to -facts, but even start from them, while in a synthetic procedure they -must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts. - -But, in order to rise from these actual and at the same time -well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of -the same as we are seeking, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must -comprehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere natural, though in -spite of its truth not unsuspected, cognition a priori which lies at -the bottom of that science, the elaboration of which without any -critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called -metaphysics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural conditions of -such a science as a part of our inquiry, and thus the transcendental -problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions: - -1. How is pure mathematics possible? -2. How is pure natural science possible? -3. How is metaphysics in general possible? -4. How is metaphysics as a science possible? - -It may be seen that the solution of these problems, though chiefly -designed to exhibit the essential matter of the Critique, has yet -something peculiar, which for itself alone deserves attention. This is -the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that -its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be -investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences gain, if -not with regard to their contents, yet as to their proper use, and -while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common -origin, they give, at the same time, an occasion better to explain -their own nature. - -FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? - -§ 6. - -Here is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing even -now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in -the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodeictical certainty, -i.e., absolute necessity, which therefore rests upon no empirical -grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of reason, and moreover is -thoroughly synthetical. [Here the question arises:] - -"How then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of -this nature entirely a priori?" - -Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it neither is -nor can be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition -a priori, which lies deeply hidden, but which might reveal itself by -these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently -ferreted out? - -§ 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition has this -peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form -(Anschauung) and indeed a priori, therefore in a visual form which is -not empirical, but pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single -step; hence its judgments are always visual, viz., "intuitive"; -whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from -mere concepts, and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a -visual figure, can never derive them from it. This observation on the -nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest -condition of its possibility, which is, that some non-sensuous -visualisation (called pure intuition, or reine Anschauung) must form -its basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed, -in concreto and yet a priori. If we can find out this pure intuition -and its possibility, we may thence easily explain how synthetical -propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics, and -consequently how this science itself is possible. Empirical intuition -[viz., sense-perception] enables us without difficulty to enlarge the -concept which we frame of an object of intuition [or -sense-perception], by new predicates, which intuition [i.e., -sense-perception] itself presents synthetically in experience. Pure -intuition [viz., the visualisation of forms in our imagination, from -which every thing sensual, i.e., every thought of material qualities, -is excluded] does so likewise, only with this difference, that in the -latter case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and -apodeictical, in the former, only a posteriori and empirically -certain; because this latter contains only that which occurs in -contingent empirical intuition, but the former, that which must -necessarily be discovered in pure intuition. Here intuition, being an -intuition a priori, is before all experience, viz., before any -perception of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with its -concept. - -§ 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than -to lessen. For the question now is, "How is it possible to intuite [in -a visual form] anything a priori?" An intuition [viz., a visual -sense-perception] is such a representation as immediately depends upon -the presence of the object. Hence it seems impossible to intuite from -the outset a priori, because intuition would in that event take place -without either a former or a present object to refer to, and by -consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed are such, that we -can easily form some of them a priori, viz., such as contain nothing -but the thought of an object in general; and we need not find -ourselves in an immediate relation to the object. Take, for instance, -the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc. But even these require, in -order to make them under stood, a certain concrete use—that is, an -application to some sense-experience (Anschauung), by which an object -of them is given us. But how can the intuition of the object [its -visualisation] precede the object itself? - -§ 9. If our intuition [i.e., our sense-experience] were perforce of -such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves, there -would not be any intuition a priori, but intuition would be always -empirical. For I can only know what is contained in the object in -itself when it is present and given to me. It is indeed even then -incomprehensible how the visualising (Anschauung) of a present thing -should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties -cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. But even granting -this possibility, a visualising of that sort would not take place a -priori, that is, before the object were presented to me; for without -this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and -the object can be imagined, unless it depend upon a direct -inspiration. - -Therefore in one way only can my intuition (Anschauung) anticipate the -actuality of the object, and be a cognition a priori, viz.: if my -intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility, antedating in -my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which I am affected -by objects. - -For that objects of sense can only be intuited according to this form -of sensibility I can know a priori. Hence it follows: that -propositions, which concern this form of sensuous intuition only, are -possible and valid for objects of the senses; as also, conversely, -that intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any -other things than objects of our senses.{10} - -=================================== -{10} This whole paragraph (§ 9) will be better understood when compared -with Remark I., following this section, appearing in the present -edition on page 40.—Ed. -=================================== - -§ 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of the sensuous intuition by -which we can intuite things a priori, but by which we can know objects -only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in -themselves; and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical -propositions a priori be granted as possible, or if, in case they -actually occur, their possibility is to be comprehended and determined -beforehand. - -Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of -all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and -necessary are Space and Time. For mathematics must first have all its -concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in pure intuition, that -is, it must construct them. If it proceeded in any other way, it would -be impossible to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not -analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetically, and if pure -intuition be wanting, there is nothing in which the matter for -synthetical judgments a priori can be given. Geometry is based upon -the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of -number by the successive addition of units in time; and pure mechanics -especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the -representation of time. Both representations, however, are only -intuitions; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and -their alterations (motion) everything empirical, or belonging to -sensation, space and time still remain, which are therefore pure -intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical. Hence they -can never be omitted, but at the same time, by their being pure -intuitions a priori, they prove that they are mere forms of our -sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, or perception -of actual objects, and conformably to which objects can be known a -priori, but only as they appear to us. - -§ 11. The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure -mathematics, as synthetical cognition a priori, is only possible by -referring to no other objects than those of the senses. At the basis -of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and of -time) which is a priori. This is possible, because the latter -intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility, which precedes -the actual appearance of the objects, in that it, in fact, makes them -possible. Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the -matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense-element in it, for this -constitutes that which is empirical), but its form, viz., space and -time. Should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations -adhering not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our -sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can be possible to know -the constitution of things a priori, viz., before we have any -acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us. Such, -however, is the case with space and time. But this is quite -comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal -conditions of our sensibility, while the objects count merely as -phenomena; for then the form of the phenomenon, i.e., pure intuition, -can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves, that is, -a priori. - -§ 12. In order to add something by way of illustration and -confirmation, we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure -of geometers. All proofs of the complete congruence of two given -figures (where the one can in every respect be substituted for the -other) come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide; -which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting -upon immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure, or given a -priori, otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodeictically -certain, but would have empirical certainty only. In that case, it -could only be said that it is always found to be so, and holds good -only as far as our perception reaches. That everywhere space (which -[in its entirety] is itself no longer the boundary of another space) -has three dimensions, and that space cannot in any way have more, is -based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect -at right angles in one point; but this proposition cannot by any means -be shown from concepts, but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed -on pure and a priori intuition, because it is apodeictically certain. -That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity (in indefinitum), -or that a series of changes (for example, spaces traversed by motion) -shall be infinitely continued, presupposes a representation of space -and time, which can only attach to intuition, namely, so far as it in -itself is bounded by nothing, for from concepts it could never be -inferred. Consequently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure -intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodeictically valid -propositions possible. Hence our transcendental deduction of the -notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility -of pure mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth may be -granted, but its existence could by no means be understood, and we -must assume "that everything which can be given to our senses (to the -external senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuited by -us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself." - -§ 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space -and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves, may -exercise their acumen on the following paradox. When they have in vain -attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices at least for a -few moments, they will suspect that the degradation of space and of -time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well -founded. - -If two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be -ascertained by all means possible, quantitatively and qualitatively, -it must follow, that the one can in all cases and under all -circumstances replace the other, and this substitution would not -occasion the least perceptible difference. This in fact is true of -plane figures in geometry; but some spherical figures exhibit, -notwithstanding a complete internal agreement, such a contrast in -their external relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in -the place of the other. For instance, two spherical triangles on -opposite hemispheres, which have an arc of the equator as their common -base, may be quite equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that -nothing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself alone -and completed, that would not equally be applicable to both; and yet -the one cannot be put in the place of the other (being situated upon -the opposite hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference between -the two triangles, which difference our understanding cannot describe -as internal, and which only manifests itself by external relations in -space. - -But I shall adduce examples, taken from common life, that are more -obvious still. - -What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike -to my hand and to my ear, than their images in a mirror? And yet I -cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its -archetype; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a left -one, and the image or reflexion of the right ear is a left one which -never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case -no internal differences which our understanding could determine by -thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, -for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left -hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one (they are -not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. -What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things -as they are in themselves, and as the pure understanding would cognise -them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, the possibility -of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in -themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. Space is the -form of the external intuition of this sensibility, and the internal -determination of every space is only possible by the determination of -its external relation to the whole space, of which it is a part (in -other words, by its relation to the external sense). That is to say, -the part is only possible through the whole, which is never the case -with things in themselves, as objects of the mere understanding, but -with appearances only. Hence the difference between similar and equal -things, which are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric -helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only by the -relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to -intuition. - -Remark I. - -Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can only have -objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense. -But in regard to the latter the principle holds good, that our sense -representation is not a representation of things in themselves, but of -the way in which they appear to us. Hence it follows, that the -propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our -poetic imagination, and that therefore they cannot be referred with -assurance to actual objects; but rather that they are necessarily -valid of space, and consequently of all that may be found in space, -because space is nothing else than the form of all external -appearances, and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can -be given. Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geometry, is -that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends. -Therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what -geometry prescribes to them. - -It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to -represent objects as they are in themselves. For then it would not by -any means follow from the conception of space, which with all its -properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foundation, together -with what is thence inferred, must be so in nature. The space of the -geometer would be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be -credited with objective validity, because we cannot see how things -must of necessity agree with an image of them, which we make -spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them. But if this -image, or rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of -our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are given to us, and -if this sensibility represents not things in themselves, but their -appearances: we shall easily comprehend, and at the same time -indisputably prove, that all external objects of our world of sense -must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the -propositions of geometry; because sensibility by means of its form of -external intuition, viz., by space, the same with which the geometer -is occupied, makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances. - -It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of -philosophy, that there was a time, when even mathematicians, who at -the same time were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy -of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space, but -of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept -itself, and of all its corollaries, to nature. They showed much -concern whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points, -and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple -[discrete] parts, while the space which the geometer has in his mind -[being continuous] cannot be such. They did not recognise that this -mental space renders possible the physical space, i.e., the extension -of matter; that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in -themselves, but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation; and -that all objects in space are mere appearances, i.e., not things in -themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition. But such is -the case, for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of -sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us, and contains the -ground of the possibility of all external appearances (according to -their form), and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree -with the propositions of the geometer, which he draws not from any -fictitious concept, but from the subjective basis of all external -phenomena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other way can -geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its -propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which -is surprised at them [the geometrical propositions], because it has -not traced them to the sources of their concepts. - -Remark II. - -Whatever is given us as object, must be given us in intuition. All our -intuition however takes place by means of the senses only; the -understanding intuites nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just -shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things -in themselves, but only their appearances, which are mere -representations of the sensibility, we conclude that 'all bodies, -together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing -but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our -thoughts.' You will say: Is not this manifest idealism? - -Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking -beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, -being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no -object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that -things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we -know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their -appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by -affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are -bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us -as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations -which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we -call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing -which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be -termed idealism? It is the very contrary. - -Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been -generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual -existence of external things, that many of their predicates may be -said to belong not to the things in themselves, but to their -appearances, and to have no proper existence outside our -representation. Heat, color, and taste, for instance, are of this -kind. Now, if I go farther, and for weighty reasons rank as mere -appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which are called -primary, such as extension, place, and in general space, with all that -which belongs to it (impenetrability or materiality, space, etc.)—no -one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible. As -little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object -in itself, but only as modifications of the sense of sight, should on -that account be called an idealist, so little can my system be named -idealistic, merely because I find that more, nay, - -All the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong -merely to its appearance. - -The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed, as -in genuine idealism, but it is only shown, that we cannot possibly -know it by the senses as it is in itself. - -I should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid -all idealism. Undoubtedly, I should say, that the representation of -space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our -sensibility has to objects—that I have said—but that it is quite -similar to the object,—an assertion in which I can find as little -meaning as if I said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the -property of vermilion, which in me excites this sensation. - -Remark III. - -Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection, -"that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole -sensible world would be turned into mere sham." At first all -philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was -spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of -representation, according to which we still know things as they are, -but without being able to reduce everything in this our representation -to a clear consciousness; whereas proof is offered by us that -sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of clearness and -obscurity, but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself. -For sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are, but -only the mode in which they affect our senses, and consequently by -sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are -given to the understanding for reflexion. After this necessary -corrective, an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost -intentional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the things of -the world of sense into mere illusion. - -When an appearance is given us, we are still quite free as to how we -should judge the matter. The appearance depends upon the senses, but -the judgment upon the understanding, and the only question is, whether -in the determination of the object there is truth or not. But the -difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature -of the representations, which are referred to objects (for they are -the same in both cases), but by their connexion according to those -rules, which determine the coherence of the representations in the -concept of an object, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist -together in experience or not. And it is not the fault of the -appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth, i.e., if the -intuition, by which an object is given us, is considered a concept of -the thing or of its existence also, which the understanding can only -think. The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now -progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is neither falsehood nor -truth, because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but -appearance, we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion. -But as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not -on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being -considered objective, we say they appear to move backward; it is not -the senses however which must be charged with the illusion, but the -understanding, whose province alone it is to give an objective -judgment on appearances. - -Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our -representations, whenever we connect our intuitions of sense (whatever -they may contain), in space and in time, according to the rules of the -coherence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth will arise -according as we are negligent or careful. It is merely a question of -the use of sensuous representations in the understanding, and not of -their origin. In the same way, if I consider all the representations -of the senses, together with their form, space and time, to be nothing -but appearances, and space and time to be a mere form of the -sensibility, which is not to be met with in objects out of it, and if -I make use of these representations in reference to possible -experience only, there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances -that can lead astray or cause illusion. For all that they can -correctly cohere according to rules of truth in experience. Thus all -the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the -objects of the senses, consequently of all possible experience, -whether I consider space as a mere form of the sensibility, or as -something cleaving to the things themselves. In the former case -however I comprehend how I can know a priori these propositions -concerning all the objects of external intuition. Otherwise, -everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if -I had not departed from the vulgar view. - -But if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions -of space and time, which I cannot refrain from doing if I proclaim -them qualities inherent in things in themselves (for what should -prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things, even though -my senses might be different, and unsuited to them?), then a grave -error may arise due to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be -universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the -intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense, viz., for -all possible experience; I would refer this condition to things in -themselves, and do not limit it to the conditions of experience. - -My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time, therefore, far from -reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion, is the only means -of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions -(that which mathematics propounds a priori) to actual objects, and of -preventing its being regarded as mere illusion. For without this -observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the -intuitions of space and time, which we borrow from no experience, and -which yet lie in our representation a priori, are not mere phantasms -of our brain, to which objects do not correspond, at least not -adequately, and consequently, whether we have been able to show its -unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible -world just because they are mere appearances. - -Secondly, though these my principles make appearances of the -representations of the senses, they are so far from turning the truth -of experience into mere illusion, that they are rather the only means -of preventing the transcendental illusion, by which metaphysics has -hitherto been deceived, leading to the childish endeavor of catching -at bubbles, because appearances, which are mere representations, were -taken for things in themselves. Here originated the remarkable event -of the antimony of Reason which I shall mention by and by, and which -is destroyed by the single observation, that appearance, as long as it -is employed in experience, produces truth, but the moment it -transgresses the bounds of experience, and consequently becomes -transcendent, produces nothing but illusion. - -Inasmuch, therefore, as I leave to things as we obtain them by the -senses their actuality, and only limit our sensuous intuition of these -things to this, that they represent in no respect, not even in the -pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more than mere -appearance of those things, but never their constitution in -themselves, this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me. -My protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and -clear as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompetent judges, -who, while they would have an old name for every deviation from their -perverse though common opinion, and never judge of the spirit of -philosophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are ready to -put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions, and -thereby deform and distort them. I have myself given this my theory -the name of transcendental idealism, but that cannot authorise any one -to confound it either with the empirical idealism of Descartes, -(indeed, his was only an insoluble problem, owing to which he thought -every one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world, -because it could never be proved satisfactorily), or with the mystical -and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar -phantasms our Critique contains the proper antidote. My idealism -concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, -constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into -my head to doubt it, but it concerns the sensuous representation of -things, to which space and time especially belong. Of these [viz., -space and time], consequently of all appearances in general, I have -only shown, that they are neither things (but mere modes of -representation), nor determinations belonging to things in themselves. -But the word "transcendental," which with me means a reference of our -cognition, i.e., not to things, but only to the cognitive faculty, was -meant to obviate this misconception. Yet rather than give further -occasion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire this -idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it be really an -objectionable idealism to convert actual things (not appearances) into -mere representations, by what name shall we call him who conversely -changes mere representations to things? It may, I think, be called -"dreaming idealism," in contradistinction to the former, which may be -called "visionary," both of which are to be refuted by my -transcendental, or, better, critical idealism. - -SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? - -§ 14. - -Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined -according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of -things in themselves, we could never cognise it either a priori or a -posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to things -in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our -concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is -contained in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes what] -belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the -thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is -determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, -and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of -things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things -themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must -conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order -to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be -cognised a priori. - -A cognition of the nature of things in themselves a posteriori would -be equally impossible. For, if experience is to teach us laws, to -which the existence of things is subject, these laws, if they regard -things in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even outside -our experience. But experience teaches us what exists and how it -exists, but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise. -Experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in -themselves. - -§ 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure science of nature in -which are propounded, a priori and with all the necessity requisite to -apodeictical propositions, laws to which nature is subject. I need -only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which, under -the title of the universal Science of Nature, precedes all Physics -(which is founded upon empirical principles). In it we have -Mathematics applied to appearance, and also merely discursive -principles (or those derived from concepts), which constitute the -philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature. But there are -several things in it, which are not quite pure and independent of -empirical sources: such as the concept of motion, that of -impenetrability (upon which the empirical concept of matter rests), -that of inertia, and many others, which prevent its being called a -perfectly pure science of nature. Besides, it only refers to objects -of the external sense, and therefore does not give an example of a -universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science -must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the -external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well -as Psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of this -universal physics there are a few which actually have the required -universality; for instance, the propositions that "substance is -permanent," and that "every event is determined by a cause according -to constant laws," etc. These are actually universal laws of nature, -which subsist completely a priori. There is then in fact a pure -science of nature, and the question arises, How is it possible? - -§ 16. The word "nature" assumes yet another meaning, which determines -the object, whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity -to law [Gesetzmässigkeit] of the determinations of the existence of -things generally. If we consider it materialiter (i.e., in the matter -that forms its objects) "nature is the complex of all the objects of -experience." And with this only are we now concerned, for besides, -things which can never be objects of experience, if they must be -cognised as to their nature, would oblige us to have recourse to -concepts whose meaning could never be given in concreto (by any -example of possible experience). Consequently we must form for -ourselves a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof -(i.e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are mere creations -of thought) could never be determined. The cognition of what cannot be -an object of experience would be hyperphysical, and with things -hyperphysical we are here not concerned, but only with the cognition -of nature, the actuality of which can be confirmed by experience, -though it [the cognition of nature] is possible a priori and precedes -all experience. - -§ 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this narrower sense is -therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience, and -so far as it is cognised a priori, their necessary conformity. But it -has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be cognised a -priori in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to -possible experience, but as things in themselves. And our inquiry here -extends not to things in themselves (the properties of which we pass -by), but to things as objects of possible experience, and the complex -of these is what we properly designate as nature. And now I ask, when -the possibility of a cognition of nature a priori is in question, -whether it is better to arrange the problem thus: How can we cognise a -priori that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to -law? or thus: How is it possible to cognise a priori the necessary -conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects -generally? - -Closely considered, the solution of the problem, represented in either -way, amounts, with regard to the pure cognition of nature (which is -the point of the question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For -the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition of -things is possible, hold good of these things, as Objects of possible -experience (not as things in themselves, which are not considered -here). Either of the following statements means quite the same: - -A judgment of observation can never rank as experience, without the -law, that "whenever an event is observed, it is always referred to -some antecedent, which it follows according to a universal rule." - -"Everything, of which experience teaches that it happens, must have a -cause." - -It is, however, more commendable to choose the first formula. For we -can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of -those conditions, on which alone experience is possible, but never of -the laws to which things may in themselves be subject, without -reference to possible experience. We cannot therefore study the nature -of things a priori otherwise than by investigating the conditions and -the universal (though subjective) laws, under which alone such a -cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible, and we -determine accordingly the possibility of things, as objects of -experience. For if I should choose the second formula, and seek the -conditions a priori, on which nature as an object of experience is -possible, I might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was -speaking of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round in -endless circles, in a vain search for laws concerning things of which -nothing is given me. - -Accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only, and the -universal conditions of its possibility which are given a priori. -Thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible -experience. I think it will be understood that I here do not mean the -rules of the observation of a nature that is already given, for these -already presuppose experience. I do not mean how (through experience) -we can study the laws of nature; for these would not then be laws a -priori, and would yield us no pure science of nature; but [I mean to -ask] how the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience are -at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of -nature must be derived. - -§ 18. In the first place we must state that, while all judgments of -experience (Erfahrungsurtheile) are empirical (i.e., have their ground -in immediate sense perception), vice versa, all empirical judgments -(empirische Urtheile) are not judgments of experience, but, besides -the empirical, and in general besides what is given to the sensuous -intuition, particular concepts must yet be superadded—concepts which -have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding, and under -which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their -means changed into experience.{11} - -=================================== -{11} Empirical judgments (empirische Urtheile) are either mere -statements of fact, viz., records of a perception, or statements of a -natural law, implying a causal connexion between two facts. The former -Kant calls "judgments of perception" (Wahrnehmungsurtheile) the latter -"judgments of experience" (Erhfahrungsurtheile).—Ed. -=================================== - -Empirical judgments, so far as they have objective validity, are -judgments of experience; but those which are only subjectively valid, -I name mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure -concept of the understanding, but only the logical connexion of -perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, -besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular -concepts originally begotten in the understanding, which produce the -objective validity of the judgment of experience. - -All our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception; they -hold good only for us (i.e., for our subject), and we do not till -afterwards give them a new reference (to an object), and desire that -they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody -else; for when a judgment agrees with an object, all judgments -concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves, and -thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies -nothing else than its necessary universality of application. And -conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily -universal (which never depends upon perception, but upon the pure -concept of the understanding, under which the perception is subsumed), -we must consider it objective also, that is, that it expresses not -merely a reference of our perception to a subject, but a quality of -the object. For there would be no reason for the judgments of other -men necessarily agreeing with mine, if it were not the unity of the -object to which they all refer, and with which they accord; hence they -must all agree with one another. - -§ 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary universality (for -everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object -in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also -necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. By this -judgment we cognise the object (though it remains unknown as it is in -itself) by the universal and necessary connexion of the given -perceptions. As this is the case with all objects of sense, judgments -of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate -cognition of the object (which is impossible), but from the condition -of universal validity in empirical judgments, which, as already said, -never rests upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but -upon a pure concept of the understanding. The object always remains -unknown in itself; but when by the concept of the understanding the -connexion of the representations of the object, which are given to our -sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the object is -determined by this relation, and it is the judgment that is objective. - -To illustrate the matter: When we say, "the room is warm, sugar sweet, -and wormwood bitter"{12}—we have only subjectively valid judgments. I -do not at all expect that I or any other person shall always find it -as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two -sensations to the same subject, to myself, and that only in my present -state of perception; consequently they are not valid of the object. -Such are judgments of perception. Judgments of experience are of quite -a different nature. What experience teaches me under certain -circumstances, it must always teach me and everybody; and its validity -is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time. -Hence I pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid. For -instance, when I say the air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a -judgment of perception only—I do nothing but refer two of my -sensations to one another. But, if I would have it called a judgment -of experience, I require this connexion to stand under a condition, -which makes it universally valid. I desire therefore that I and -everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions -under the same circumstances. - -=================================== -{12} I freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments -of perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even -though a concept of the understanding were superadded, because they -refer merely to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely -subjective, and which of course can never be attributed to the object, -and consequently never become objective. I only wished to give here an -example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid, containing no -ground for universal validity, and thereby for a relation to the -object. An example of the judgments of perception, which become -judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding, -will be given in the next note. -=================================== - -§ 20. We must consequently analyse experience in order to see what is -contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding, and -how the judgment of experience itself is possible. The foundation is -the intuition of which I become conscious, i.e., perception -(perceptio), which pertains merely to the senses. But in the next -place, there are acts of judging (which belong only to the -understanding). But this judging may be twofold—first, I may merely -compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my -consciousness; or, secondly, I may connect them in consciousness -generally. The former judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and -of subjective validity only: it is merely a connexion of perceptions -in my mental state, without reference to the object. Hence it is not, -as is commonly imagined, enough for experience to compare perceptions -and to connect them in consciousness through judgment; there arises no -universality and necessity, for which alone judgments can become -objectively valid and be called experience. - -Quite another judgment therefore is required before perception can -become experience. The given intuition must be subsumed under a -concept, which determines the form of judging in general relatively to -the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness -generally, and thereby procures universal validity for empirical -judgments. A concept of this nature is a pure a priori concept of the -Understanding, which does nothing but determine for an intuition the -general way in which it can be used for judgments. Let the concept be -that of cause, then it determines the intuition which is subsumed -under it, e.g., that of air, relative to judgments in general, viz., -the concept of air serves with regard to its expansion in the relation -of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment. The concept of -cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is -totally disparate from all possible perception, and only serves to -determine the representation subsumed under it, relatively to -judgments in general, and so to make a universally valid judgment -possible. - -Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can become a judgment of -experience, it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed -under some such a concept of the understanding; for instance, air -ranks under the concept of causes, which determines our judgment about -it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical.{13} Thereby the expansion -of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of -the air in my present state or in several states of mine, or in the -state of perception of others, but as belonging to it necessarily. The -judgment, "the air is elastic," becomes universally valid, and a -judgment of experience, only by certain judgments preceding it, which -subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect: -and they thereby determine the perceptions not merely as regards one -another in me, but relatively to the form of judging in general, which -is here hypothetical, and in this way they render the empirical -judgment universally valid. - -=================================== -{13} As an easier example, we may take the following: "When the sun -shines on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I -and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, -and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in -this manner. But if I say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the -perception a concept of the understanding, viz., that of cause, which -connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary -consequence, and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity -universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from a perception -into experience. -=================================== - -If all our synthetical judgments are analysed so far as they are -objectively valid, it will be found that they never consist of mere -intuitions connected only (as is commonly believed) by comparison into -a judgment; but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept -of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted from -intuition, under which concept these latter are subsumed, and in this -manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment. Even the -judgments of pure mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt -from this condition. The principle, "a straight line is the shortest -between two points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under the -concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere intuition, but has its -seat in the understanding alone, and serves to determine the intuition -(of the line) with regard to the judgments which may be made about it, -relatively to their quantity, that is, to plurality (as judicia -plurativa).{14} For under them it is understood that in a given -intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts. - -=================================== -{14} This name seems preferable to the term particularia, which is used -for these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that -they are not universal. But when I start from unity (in single -judgments) and so proceed to universality, I must not [even indirectly -and negatively] imply any reference to universality. I think plurality -merely without universality, and not the exception from universality. -This is necessary, if logical considerations shall form the basis of -the pure concepts of the understanding. However, there is no need of -making changes in logic. -=================================== - -§ 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience so far as it -rests upon pure concepts of the understanding a priori, we must first -represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various -functions of the understanding, in a complete table. For the pure -concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions, as -such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general, -so far as these are determined by one or other of these functions of -judging, in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally. Hereby -also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience, as -of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely -determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all -perception is (under certain universal conditions of intuition) -subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding. - - -Logical Table of Judgments. - - 1. 2. -As to Quantity. As to Quality. - Universal. Affirmative. - Particular. Negative. - Singular. Infinite. - - 3. 4. -As to Relation. As to Modality. - Categorical. Problematical. - Hypothetical. Assertorial. - Disjunctive. Apodeictical. - - -Transcendental Table of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. - - 1. 2. -As to Quantity. As to Quality. - Unity (the Measure). Reality. - Plurality (the Quantity). Negation. - Totality (the Whole). Limitation. - - 3. 4. -As to Relation. As to Modality. - Substance. Possibility. - Cause. Existence. - Community. Necessity. - - -Pure Physiological Table of the Universal Principles of the Science of Nature. - - 1. 2. -Axioms of Intuition. Anticipations of Perception. - - 3. 4. -Analogies of Experience. Postulates of Empirical Thinking - generally. - - -§ 21a. In order to comprise the whole matter in one idea, it is first -necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin -of experience, but of that which lies in experience. The former -pertains to empirical psychology, and would even then never be -adequately explained without the latter, which belongs to the Critique -of cognition, and particularly of the understanding. - -Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, -and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But -the judgments, which the understanding forms alone from sensuous -intuitions, are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one -case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in -the sensuous intuition, while in the other the judgments must express -what experience in general, and not what the mere perception (which -possesses only subjective validity) contains. The judgment of -experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its -logical connexion in a judgment (after it has been rendered universal -by comparison) something that determines the synthetical judgment as -necessary and therefore as universally valid. This can be nothing else -than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in -itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another, viz., -a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be -represented by a given logical function of judgments. - -§ 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to -intuite—that of the understanding is to think. But thinking is -uniting representations in one consciousness. This union originates -either merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and -subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objective. The union -of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinking -therefore is the same as judging, or referring representations to -judgments in general. Hence judgments are either merely subjective, -when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject -only, and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a -consciousness generally, that is, necessarily. The logical functions -of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in -consciousness. But if they serve for concepts, they are concepts of -their necessary union in a consciousness, and so principles of -objectively valid judgments. This union in a consciousness is either -analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combination and -addition of various representations one to another. Experience -consists in the synthetical connexion of phenomena (perceptions) in -consciousness, so far as this connexion is necessary. Hence the pure -concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions -must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience, in -which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as -necessary and universally valid.{15} - -=================================== -{15} But how does this proposition, "that judgments of experience -contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my -statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a -posteriori can afford contingent judgments only?" When I say that -experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies -in experience,—for example, that heat always follows the shining of -the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is -always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the -shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience -(by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by -experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by -this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to -perception. How perception attains this addition may be seen by -referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental -faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first edition, Von dem Schematismus -der reinen Verstandsbegriffe]. -=================================== - -§ 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the -union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These -rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules a -priori, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are -fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all -experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no -conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which -bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, -under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical -judgment objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the a priori -principles of possible experience. - -The principles of possible experience are then at the same time -universal laws of nature, which can be cognised a priori. And thus the -problem in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature -possible?" is solved. For the system which is required for the form of -a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the -above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered -in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical -system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori -conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly -constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means -of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a -physical{16} system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all -empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence may -in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature. - -=================================== -{16} [Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as -"pertaining to the science of physics," i.e., nature in general, not -as we use the term now as "pertaining to the functions of the living -body." Accordingly it has been translated "physical."—Ed.] -=================================== - -§ 24. The first one{17} of the physiological principles subsumes all -phenomena, as intuitions in space and time, under the concept of -Quantity, and is so far a principle of the application of Mathematics -to experience. The second one subsumes the empirical element, viz., -sensation which denotes the real in intuitions, not indeed directly -under the concept of quantity, because sensation is not an intuition -that contains either space or time, though it places the respective -object into both. But still there is between reality -(sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in -time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every given -degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of heat and of -absolute cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute -lightness, between every degree of occupied space and of totally void -space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as -between consciousness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a -psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is -no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it; for instance, -no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of -consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation, and so the -understanding can anticipate even sensations, which constitute the -peculiar quality of empirical representations (appearances), by means -of the principle: "that they all have (consequently that what is real -in all phenomena has) a degree." Here is the second application of -mathematics (mathesis intensorum) to the science of nature. - -=================================== -{17} The three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless -reference be made to what the Critique itself says on the subject of -the Principles; they will, however, be of service in giving a general -view of the Principles, and in fixing the attention on the main -points. -=================================== - -§ 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their -existence, the determination is not mathematical but dynamical, and -can never be objectively valid, consequently never fit for experience, -if it does not come under a priori principles by which the cognition -of experience relative to appearances becomes even possible. Hence -appearances must be subsumed under the concept of Substance, which is -the foundation of all determination of existence, as a concept of the -thing itself; or secondly—so far as, a succession is found among -phenomena, that is, an event—under the concept of an Effect with -reference to Cause; or lastly—so far as coexistence is to be known -objectively, that is, by a judgment of experience—under the concept -of Community (action and reaction).{18} Thus a priori principles form -the basis of objectively valid, though empirical judgments, that is, -of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as -existing in nature. These principles are the proper laws of nature, -which may be termed dynamical. - -=================================== -{18} [Kant uses here the equivocal term Wechselwirkung.—Ed.] -=================================== - -Finally the cognition of the agreement and connexion not only of -appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to -experience in general, belongs to the judgments of experience. This -relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions, -which the understanding cognises, or their coherence with the -materials of the senses and of perception, or combines both into one -concept. Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and -Necessity according to universal laws of nature; and this constitutes -the physical doctrine of method, or the distinction of truth and of -hypotheses, and the bounds of the certainty of the latter. - -§ 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the nature of the -understanding itself after the critical method, shows an inherent -perfection, which raises it far above every other table which has -hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analysing -the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all synthetical a -priori principles completely and according to one principle, viz., the -faculty of judging in general, constituting the essence of experience -as regards the understanding, so that we can be certain that there are -no more such principles, a satisfaction such as can never be attained -by the dogmatical method. Yet is this not all: there is a still -greater merit in it. - -We must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility -of this cognition a priori, and at the same time limits all such -principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of, if we -desire it not to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the -original sense which the understanding attaches to it. This limit is -that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in -general so far as it is subjected to laws a priori. Consequently I do -not say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that their -actuality possesses a degree, their existence a connexion of accidents -in a substance, etc. This nobody can prove, because such a synthetical -connexion from mere concepts, without any reference to sensuous -intuition on the one side, or connexion of it in a possible experience -on the other, is absolutely impossible. The essential limitation of -the concepts in these principles then is: That all things stand -necessarily a priori under the afore-mentioned conditions, as objects -of experience only. - -Hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of -these principles: they are not directly referred to appearances and to -their relations, but to the possibility of experience, of which -appearances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus they are -referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical -propositions, in which we distinguish judgments of experience from -those of perception. This takes place because appearances, as mere -intuitions, occupying a part of space and time, come under the concept -of Quantity, which unites their multiplicity a priori according to -rules synthetically. Again, so far as the perception contains, besides -intuition, sensibility, and between the latter and nothing (i.e., the -total disappearance of sensibility), there is an ever decreasing -transition, it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have -a degree, so far as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy -any part of space or of time.{19} Still the transition to actuality from -empty time or empty space is only possible in time; consequently -though sensibility, as the quality of empirical intuition, can never -be cognised a priori, by its specific difference from other -sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in general, as a -quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other -similar perception. Hence the application of mathematics to nature, as -regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us, becomes -possible and is thus determined. - -=================================== -{19} Heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as -in a large one; in like manner the internal representations, pain, -consciousness in general, whether they last a short or a long time, -need not vary as to the degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point -and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great. -Degrees are therefore capable of increase, but not in intuition, -rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the degree of an -intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the -relation of 1 to 0, viz., by their capability of decreasing by -infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from -naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a -certain time. Quantitas qualitatis est gradus [i.e., the degrees of -quality must be measured by equality]. -=================================== - -Above all, the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the -principles which occur under the title of Analogies of experience. For -these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the principles -of applied mathematics, but to the connexion of their existence in -experience; and this can be nothing but the determination of their -existence in time according to necessary laws, under which alone the -connexion is objectively valid, and thus becomes experience. The proof -therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connexion of -things in themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these not in -regard to their matter, but to the determination of time and of the -relation of their existence in it, according to universal laws. If the -empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid -(i.e., experience), these universal laws contain the necessary -determination of existence in time generally (viz., according to a -rule of the understanding a priori). - -In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on the subject, but my -reader (who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a -mere empirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not considered that -it goes much beyond them, as it imparts to empirical judgments -universal validity, and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori -unity of the understanding) is recommended to pay special attention to -this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions, -and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view. - -§ 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's doubt. He justly -maintains, that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of -Causality, that is, of the reference of the existence of one thing to -the existence of another, which is necessitated by the former. I add, -that we comprehend just as little the concept of Subsistence, that is, -the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there -lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing; -nay, we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing -(though we can point out examples of its use in experience). The very -same in comprehensibility affects the Community of things, as we -cannot comprehend how from the state of one thing an inference to the -state of quite another thing beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, -and how substances which have each their own separate existence should -depend upon one another necessarily. But I am very far from holding -these concepts to be derived merely from experience, and the necessity -represented in them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in -us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply shown, that they and -the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori, or -before all experience, and have their undoubted objective value, -though only with regard to experience. - -§ 28. Though I have no notion of such a connexion of things in -themselves, that they can either exist as substances, or act as -causes, or stand in community with others (as parts of a real whole), -and I can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as -such (because those concepts contain nothing that lies in the -appearances, but only what the understanding alone must think): we -have yet a notion of such a connexion of representations in our -understanding, and in judgments generally; consisting in this that -representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation -to predicates, in another as reason in relation to consequences, and -in a third as parts, which constitute together a total possible -cognition. Besides we cognise a priori that without considering the -representation of an object as determined in some of these respects, -we can have no valid cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy -ourselves about the object in itself, there is no possible attribute, -by which I could know that it is determined under any of these -aspects, that is, under the concept either of substance, or of cause, -or (in relation to other substances) of community, for I have no -notion of the possibility of such a connexion of existence. But the -question is not how things in themselves, but how the empirical -cognition of things is determined, as regards the above aspects of -judgments in general, that is, how things, as objects of experience, -can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding. -And then it is clear, that I completely comprehend not only the -possibility, but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under -these concepts, that is, of using them for principles of the -possibility of experience. - -§ 29. When making an experiment with Hume's problematical concept -(his crux metaphysicorum), the concept of cause, we have, in the first -place, given a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional -judgment in general, i.e., we have one given cognition as antecedent -and another as consequence. But it is possible, that in perception we -may meet with a rule of relation, which runs thus: that a certain -phenomenon is constantly followed by another (though not conversely), -and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment, and, for -instance, to say, it the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows -warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connexion, or -concept of cause. But I proceed and say, that if this proposition, -which is merely a subjective connexion of perceptions, is to be a -judgment of experience, it must be considered as necessary and -universally valid. Such a proposition would be, "the sun is by its -light the cause of heat." The empirical rule is now considered as a -law, and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the -purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and -therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore easily comprehend the -concept of cause, as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form -of experience, and its possibility as a synthetical union of -perceptions in consciousness generally; but I do not at all comprehend -the possibility of a thing generally as a cause, because the concept -of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things, but to -experience. It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition -of appearances and of their succession, so far as the antecedent can -be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical -judgments. - -§ 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to -objects of experience but to things in themselves (noumena), they have -no signification whatever. They serve, as it were, only to decipher -appearances, that we may be able to read them as experience. The -principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world, -only serve our understanding for empirical use. Beyond this they are -arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and we can neither -cognise their possibility a priori, nor verify their reference to -objects, let alone make it intelligible by any example; because -examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience, -consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in -a possible experience. - -This complete (though to its originator unexpected) solution of Hume's -problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their a -priori origin, and for the universal laws of nature their validity, as -laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as to limit their use to -experience, because their possibility depends solely on the reference -of the understanding to experience, but with a completely reversed -mode of connexion which never occurred to Hume, not by deriving them -from experience, but by deriving experience from them. - -This is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries: "All -synthetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of -possible experience, and can never be referred to things in -themselves, but to appearances as objects of experience. And hence -pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be -referred to anything more than mere appearances, and can only -represent either that which makes experience generally possible, or -else that which, as it is derived from these principles, must always -be capable of being represented in some possible experience. - -§ 31. And thus we have at last something definite, upon which to -depend in all metaphysical enterprises, which have hitherto, boldly -enough but always at random, attempted everything without -discrimination. That the aim of their exertions should be so near, -struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who, confident in -their supposed sound common sense, started with concepts and -principles of pure reason (which were legitimate and natural, but -destined for mere empirical use) in quest of fields of knowledge, to -which they neither knew nor could know any determinate bounds, because -they had never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or -even on the possibility of such a pure understanding. - -Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes -he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may -pretend, that he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, -not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded -with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: -"that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of -experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles -individually, he must grant, that there are many of them which he has -not taken from experience, and which are therefore independent of it -and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both -himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and -principles beyond all possible experience, because they are recognised -to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in -spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt -from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the -field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in them, though -in announcing everything as mere probability, rational conjecture, or -analogy, he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless -pretensions. - -§ 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason -have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances -(phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of -the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should -constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were -by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an -undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of -thought. - -And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere -appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in -itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, -but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are -affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by -assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves -also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as -form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the -understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. - -Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort -(noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the -science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all -things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but -that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. -Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the -inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we -neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure -objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the -understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but -objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, -and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning -whatever." - -§ 33. There is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the -understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent use, —a use which -transcends all possible experience. Not only are our concepts of -substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others, quite -independent of experience, containing nothing of sense appearance, and -so apparently applicable to things in themselves (noumena), but, what -strengthens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of determination -in themselves, which experience never attains. The concept of cause -implies a rule, according to which one state follows another -necessarily; but experience can only show us, that one state of things -often, or at most, commonly, follows another, and therefore affords -neither strict universality, nor necessity. - -Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can -be exhausted by their empirical use, and so the understanding -inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more -extensive wing, which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought, -without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise -lawful concepts the bounds of their use. - -§ 34. Two important, and even indispensable, though very dry, -investigations had therefore become indispensable in the Critique of -Pure Reason,—viz., the two chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen -Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der Unterscheidung aller -Verstandesbegriffe überhaupt in Phänomena und Noumena." In the -former it is shown, that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of -the understanding in concreto, but only the schedule for their use, -and that the object conformable to it occurs only in experience (as -the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility). -In the latter it is shown, that, although our pure concepts of the -understanding and our principles are independent of experience, and -despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use, still nothing -whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience, -because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of -the judgment relatively to given intuitions. But as there is no -intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility, these pure -concepts, as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concreto, are void -of all meaning; consequently all these noumena, together with their -complex, the intelligible world,{20} are nothing but representation of a -problem, of which the object in itself is possible, but the solution, -from the nature of our understanding, totally impossible. For our -understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of the connexion of -given intuitions in experience. Experience must therefore contain all -the objects for our concepts; but beyond it no concepts have any -significance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a -foundation. - -=================================== -{20} We speak of the "intelligible world," not (as the usual expression -is) "intellectual world." For cognitions are intellectual through the -understanding, and refer to our world of sense also; but objects, so -far as they can be represented merely by the understanding, and to -which none of our sensible intuitions can refer, are termed -"intelligible." But as some possible intuition must correspond to -every object, we would have to assume an understanding that intuites -things immediately; but of such we have not the least notion, nor have -we of the things of the understanding [Verstandeswesen], to which it -should be applied. -=================================== - -§ 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional -vagaries, and for not keeping carefully within the limits of -experience, since it gains life and vigor by such flights, and since -it is always easier to moderate its boldness, than to stimulate its -languor. But the understanding which ought to think can never be -forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend upon it alone for -assistance to set bounds, when necessary, to the vagaries of the -imagination. - -But the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and -modestly. It first elucidates the elementary cognitions, which inhere -in it prior to all experience, but yet must always have their -application in experience. It gradually drops these limits, and what -is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its principles -from itself? And then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in -nature, then to beings, outside nature; in short to a world, for whose -construction the materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction -furnishes them abundantly, and though not confirmed, is never refuted, -by experience. This is the reason that young thinkers are so partial -to metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often sacrifice to it -their time and their talents, which might be otherwise better -employed. - -But there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of -pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of -solving questions so occult, by complaints of the limits of our -reason, and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures. For if -their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and reason's cognition of -its own essence does not become a true science, in which the field of -its right use is distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty -from that of its worthless and idle use, these fruitless efforts will -never be abandoned for good. - -§ 36. How is Nature itself possible? - -This question—the highest point that transcendental philosophy can -ever reach, and to which, as its boundary and completion, it must -proceed—properly contains two questions. - -First: How is nature at all possible in the material sense, by -intuition, considered as the totality of appearances; how are space, -time, and that which fills both—the object of sensation, in general -possible? The answer is: By means of the constitution of our -Sensibility, according to which it is specifically affected by -objects, which are in themselves unknown to it, and totally distinct -from those phenomena. This answer is given in the Critique itself in -the transcendental Aesthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution -of the first general problem. - -Secondly: How is nature possible in the formal sense, as the totality -of the rules, under which all phenomena must come, in order to be -thought as connected in experience? The answer must be this: It is -only possible by means of the constitution of our Understanding, -according to which all the above representations of the sensibility -are necessarily referred to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar -way in which we think (viz., by rules), and hence experience also, are -possible, but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the -objects in themselves. This answer is given in the Critique itself in -the transcendental Logic, and in these Prolegomena, in the course of -the solution of the second main problem. - -But how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible, -or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is -necessarily its basis and that of all thinking, cannot be further -analysed or answered, because it is of them that we are in need for -all our answers and for all our thinking about objects. - -There are many laws of nature, which we can only know by means of -experience; but conformity to law in the connexion of appearances, -i.e., in nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, -because experience itself requires laws which are a priori at the -basis of its possibility. - -The possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time -the universal law of nature, and the principles of the experience are -the very laws of nature. For we do not know nature but as the totality -of appearances, i.e., of representations in us, and hence we can only -derive the laws of its connexion from the principles of their -connexion in us, that is, from the conditions of their necessary union -in consciousness, which constitutes the possibility of experience. - -Even the main proposition expounded throughout this section—that -universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognised a priori—leads -naturally to the proposition: that the highest legislation of nature -must lie in ourselves, i.e., in our understanding, and that we must -not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of -experience, but conversely must seek nature, as to its universal -conformity to law, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, -which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. For how were it -otherwise possible to know a priori these laws, as they are not rules -of analytical cognition, but truly synthetical extensions of it? - -Such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience -with the laws of the possibility of nature, can only proceed from one -of two reasons: either these laws are drawn from nature by means of -experience, or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the -possibility of experience in general, and is quite the same as the -mere universal conformity to law of the latter. The former is -self-contradictory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be -cognised a priori (that is, independent of all experience), and be the -foundation of all empirical use of the understanding; the latter -alternative therefore alone remains.{21} - -=================================== -{21} Crusius alone thought of a compromise: that a Spirit, who can -neither err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But -since false principles often intrude themselves, as indeed the very -system of this man shows in not a few examples, we are involved in -difficulties as to the use of such a principle in the absence of sure -criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious, as we -never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth or the father of -lies may have instilled into us. -=================================== - -But we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature, which always -presuppose particular perceptions, from the pure or universal laws of -nature, which, without being based on particular perceptions, contain -merely the conditions of their necessary union in experience. In -relation to the latter, nature and possible experience are quite the -same, and as the conformity to law here depends upon the necessary -connexion of appearances in experience (without which we cannot -cognise any object whatever in the sensible world), consequently upon -the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but -is not the less certain, to say: - -The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but -prescribes them to, nature. - -§ 37. We shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by an -example, which will show, that laws, which we discover in objects of -sensuous intuition (especially when these laws are cognised as -necessary), are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed -there by the understanding, in spite of their being similar in all -points to the laws of nature, which we ascribe to experience. - -§ 38. If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this -figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself, -at once in a universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a -constitution (eine Natur) to this geometrical thing. Two right lines, -for example, which intersect one another and the circle, howsoever -they may be drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle -constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed -with the segments of the other. The question now is: Does this law lie -in the circle or in the understanding, that is, Does this figure, -independently of the understanding, contain in itself the ground of -the law, or does the understanding, having constructed according to -its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the figure -itself, introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another -in geometrical proportion? When we follow the proofs of this law, we -soon perceive, that it can only be derived from the condition on which -the understanding founds the construction of this figure, and which is -that of the equality of the radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to -pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures -under common laws, and consider the circle as a conic section, which -of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of -construction as other conic sections, we shall find that all the -chords which intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola, -always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not -indeed equal, but always bear a constant ratio to one another. If we -proceed still farther, to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy, -we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all -material nature, the rule of which is: "that it decreases inversely as -the square of the distance from each attracting point, i.e., as the -spherical surfaces increase, over which this force spreads," which law -seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things, and -hence is usually propounded as cognisable a priori. Simple as the -sources of this law are, merely resting upon the relation of spherical -surfaces of different radii, its consequences are so valuable with -regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity, that not -only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections, -but such a relation of these orbits to each other results, that no -other law of attraction, than that of the inverse square of the -distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system. - -Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the -understanding cognises a priori, and chiefly from the universal -principles of the determination of space. Now I ask: - -Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the understanding learn -them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning -that lies in space; or do they inhere in the understanding and in the -way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the -synthetical unity in which its concepts are all centred? - -Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so -indeterminate, that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of -nature in it. Whereas that which determines space to assume the form -of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere, is the -understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their -constructions. - -The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be -the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects, -and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the -variety of these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is -entirely determined by the understanding, and on conditions which lie -in its own nature; and thus the understanding is the origin of the -universal order of nature, in that it comprehends all appearances -under its own laws, and thereby first constructs, a priori, experience -(as to its form), by means of which whatever is to be cognised only by -experience, is necessarily subjected to its laws. For we are not now -concerned with the nature of things in themselves, which is -independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our -understanding, but with nature, as an object of possible experience, -and in this case the understanding, whilst it makes experience -possible, thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an -object of experience at all, or must be nature [viz., an existence of -things, determined according to universal laws{22}]. - -=================================== -{22} The definition of nature is given in the beginning of the Second -Part of the "Transcendental Problem," in § 14. -=================================== - -APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE. - -§ 39. Of the System of the Categories. - -There can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher, than to be able -to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the -principles, which had occurred to him in concrete use, from a -principle a priori, and to unite everything in this way in one -cognition. He formerly only believed that those things, which remained -after a certain abstraction, and seemed by comparison among one -another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were completely -collected; but this was only an Aggregate. Now he knows, that just so -many, neither more nor less, can constitute the mode of cognition, and -perceives the necessity of his division, which constitutes -comprehension; and now only he has attained a System. - -To search in our daily cognition for the concepts, which do not rest -upon particular experience, and yet occur in all cognition of -experience, where they as it were constitute the mere form of -connexion, presupposes neither greater reflexion nor deeper insight, -than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words -generally, and thus to collect elements for a grammar. In fact both -researches are very nearly related, even though we are not able to -give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal -constitution, and still less why an exact number of such formal -determinations in general are found in it. - -Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of -Categories.{23} To these, which are also called predicaments, he found -himself obliged afterwards to add five post-predicaments,{24} some of -which however (prius, simul, and motus) are contained in the former; -but this random collection must be considered (and commended) as a -mere hint for future inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and -hence it has, in the present more advanced state of philosophy, been -rejected as quite useless. - -=================================== -{23} 1. Substantia. 2. Qualitas. 3. Quantitas. 4. Relatio, 5. Actio. -6. Passio. 7. Quando, 8. Ubi. 9. Situs. 10. Habitus. - -{24} Oppositum. Prius. Simul. Motus. Habere. -=================================== - -After long reflexion on the pure elements of human knowledge (those -which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in -distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary -notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from those of the -Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 9th Categories had to be -excluded from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; -because there was no principle [in them], on which the understanding -could be investigated, measured in its completion, and all the -functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined exhaustively and -with precision. - -But in order to discover such a principle, I looked about for an act -of the understanding which comprises all the rest, and is -distinguished only by various modifications or phases, in reducing the -multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general: I -found this act of the understanding to consist in judging. Here then -the labors of the logicians were ready at hand, though not yet quite -free from defects, and with this help I was enabled to exhibit a -complete table of the pure functions of the understanding, which are -however undetermined in regard to any object. I finally referred these -functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition -of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the -pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make -certain, that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole -cognition of things from pure understanding. I was justified in -calling them by their old name, Categories, while I reserved for -myself the liberty of adding, under the title of "Predicables," a -complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by combinations -whether among themselves, or with the pure form of the appearance, -i.e., space or time, or with its matter, so far as it is not yet -empirically determined (viz., the object of sensation in general), as -soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with -the construction of which I am engaged in the Critique of Pure Reason -itself. - -Now the essential point in this system of Categories, which -distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any -principle, and for which alone it deserves to be considered as -philosophy, consists in this: that by means of it the true -significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the -condition of their use could be precisely determined. For here it -became obvious that they are themselves nothing but logical functions, -and as such do not produce the least concept of an object, but require -some sensuous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve to -determine empirical judgments, which are otherwise undetermined and -indifferent as regards all functions of judging, relatively to these -functions, thereby procuring them universal validity, and by means of -them making judgments of experience in general possible. - -Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which limits them -at the same time to the mere use of experience, never occurred either -to their first author, or to any of his successors; but without this -insight (which immediately depends upon their derivation or -deduction), they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names, -without explanation or rule for their use. Had the ancients ever -conceived such a notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure -rational knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has for -centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached us in quite -another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding, -instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations, -thereby rendering it unfit for true science. - -This system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure -reason itself systematic, and affords a direction or clue how and -through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must -proceed, in order to be complete; for it exhausts all the possible -movements (momenta) of the understanding, among which every concept -must be classed. In like manner the table of Principles has been -formulated, the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the -system of the categories. Even in the division of the concepts,{25} -which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding, it -is always the very same clue, which, as it must always be determined a -priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding, always -forms a closed circle. There is no doubt that the object of a pure -conception either of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is -to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles, can in -this way be completely cognised. I could not therefore omit to make -use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological -divisions, viz., the various distinctions of "the notions of something -and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Critique, p. 207) a -regular and necessary table of their divisions.{26} - -=================================== -{25} See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogismen der reinen -Vernuuft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System -der kosmologischen Ideen. - -{26} On the table of the categories many neat observations may be made, -for instance: (1) that the third arises from the first and the second -joined in one concept; (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality -there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to -nothing (for this purpose the categories of Quality must stand thus: -reality, limitation, total negation), without correlata or opposita, -whereas those of Relation and of Modality have them; (3) that, as in -Logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others, so the -category of Substance is the basis of all concepts of actual things; -(4) that as Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, so -by the modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things, -etc., etc. Such observations are of great use. If we besides enumerate -all the predicables, which we can find pretty completely in any good -ontology (for example, Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes -under the categories, in which operation we must not neglect to add as -complete a dissection of all these concepts as possible, there will -then arise a merely analytical part of metaphysics, which does not -contain a single synthetical proposition, which might precede the -second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and completeness -be not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some -extent elegant. -=================================== - -And this system, like every other true one founded on a universal -principle, shows its inestimable value in this, that it excludes all -foreign concepts, which might otherwise intrude among the pure -concepts of the understanding, and determines the place of every -cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of "concepts of -reflexion" have been likewise arranged in a table according to the -clue of the categories, intrude, without having any privilege or title -to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in Ontology. They -are concepts of connexion, and thereby of the objects themselves, -whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts -already given, hence of quite another nature and use. By my systematic -division{27} they are saved from this confusion. But the value of my -special table of the categories will be still more obvious, when we -separate the table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from the -concepts of the understanding. The latter being of quite another -nature and origin, they must have quite another form than the former. -This so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of -metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational concepts all mixed up with -the categories, like children of one family, which confusion was -unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories. - -=================================== -{27} See Critique of Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolie der Reflexbegriffe. -=================================== - -THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM. - -HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? - -§ 40. - -Pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a -deduction, as we have made of both, for their own safety and -certainty. For the former rests upon its own evidence; and the latter -(though sprung from pure sources of the understanding) upon experience -and its thorough confirmation. Physics cannot altogether refuse and -dispense with the testimony of the latter; because with all its -certainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathematics. Both -sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, -but for the sake of another science, metaphysics. - -Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature, which always -find their application in experience, but also with pure rational -concepts, which never can be given in any possible experience. -Consequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz., that they -are not mere chimeras), and the truth or falsity of metaphysical -assertions, cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience. This -part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its -essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and thus this -science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake. The third -question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and -essential difference of metaphysics, i.e., the occupation of Reason -with itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately -from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring, or indeed -being able to reach that knowledge through, experience.{28} - -=================================== -{28} If we can say, that a science is actual at least in the ideas of -all men, as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are -proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason, and that -therefore many (though faulty) endeavors are unavoidably made in its -behalf, then we are bound to say that metaphysics is subjectively (and -indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore we justly ask, how is it -(objectively) possible. -=================================== - -Without solving this problem reason never is justified. The empirical -use to which reason limits the pure understanding, does not fully -satisfy the proper destination of the latter. Every single experience -is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the absolute -totality of all possible experience is itself not experience. Yet it -is a necessary [concrete] problem for reason, the mere representation -of which requires concepts quite different from the categories, whose -use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far as it can be -given. Whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness, i.e., -the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend -every given experience. Thus they become transcendent. - -As the understanding stands in need of categories for experience, -reason contains in itself the source of ideas, by which I mean -necessary concepts, whose object cannot be given in any experience. -The latter are inherent in the nature of reason, as the former are in -that of the understanding. While the former carry with them an -illusion likely to mislead, the illusion of the latter is inevitable, -though it certainly can be kept from misleading us. - -Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our -judgments to be objective, a self-knowledge of pure reason in its -transcendent (exaggerated) use is the sole preservative from the -aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination, -and refers that to the object transcendently, which only regards its -own subject and its guidance in all immanent use. - -§ 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure concepts of reason, -from categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, as cognitions -of a quite distinct species, origin and use, is so important a point -in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these a -priori cognitions, that without this distinction metaphysics is -absolutely impossible, or is at best a random, bungling attempt to -build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or of -their fitness for any purpose. Had the Critique of Pure Reason done -nothing but first point out this distinction, it had thereby -contributed more to clear up our conception of, and to guide our -inquiry in, the field of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which -have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure -reason, without ever surmising that we were in quite another field -than that of the understanding, and hence classing concepts of the -understanding and those of reason together, as if they were of the -same kind. - -§ 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature, -that their concepts present themselves in experience, and their -principles can be confirmed by it; whereas the transcendent cognitions -of reason cannot, either as ideas, appear in experience, or as -propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it. Hence whatever errors -may slip in unawares, can only be discovered by pure reason itself—a -discovery of much difficulty, because this very reason naturally -becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this unavoidable -illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researches -into things, but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a -source of ideas. - -§ 43. In the Critique of Pure Reason it was always my greatest care -to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the several species of -cognition, but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from -their common source. I did this in order that by knowing whence they -originated, I might determine their use with safety, and also have the -unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of -my enumeration, classification and specification of concepts a priori, -and therefore according to principles. Without this, metaphysics is -mere rhapsody, in which no one knows whether he has enough, or whether -and where something is still wanting. We can indeed have this -advantage only in pure philosophy, but of this philosophy it -constitutes the very essence. - -As I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical -functions of all the judgments of the understanding, it was quite -natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the -syllogisms of reason. For as soon as these pure concepts of reason -(the transcendental ideas) are given, they could hardly, except they -be held innate, be found anywhere else, than in the same activity of -reason, which, so far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical -element of the syllogisms of reason; but, so far as it represents -judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or to the other -form a priori, constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason. - -The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into -categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive necessary. The concepts of -reason founded on them contained therefore, first, the idea of the -complete subject (the substantial); secondly, the idea of the complete -series of conditions; thirdly, the determination of all concepts in -the idea of a complete complex of that which is possible.{29} The first -idea is psychological, the second cosmological, the third theological, -and, as all three give occasion to Dialectics, yet each in its own -way, the division of the whole Dialects of pure reason into its -Paralogism, its Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly. -Through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure -reason are completely represented, and that none can be wanting; -because the faculty of reason itself, whence they all take their -origin, is thereby completely surveyed. - -=================================== -{29} In disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility as divided in -respect to a particular concept. By the ontological principle of the -universal determination of a thing in general, I understand the -principle that either the one or the other of all possible -contradictory predicates must be assigned to any object. This is at -the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments, constituting -the foundation of our conception of possibility, and in it the -possibility of every object in general is considered as determined. -This may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition: that -the activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same -as that by which it fashions the idea of a universal conception of all -reality, containing in itself that which is positive in all -contradictory predicates. -=================================== - -§ 44. In these general considerations it is also remarkable that the -ideas of reason are unlike the categories, of no service to the use of -our understanding in experience, but quite dispensable, and become -even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature. -Yet in another aspect still to be determined they are necessary. -Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance, is of no consequence -to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the -notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that -is sensuous or concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards -all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all -serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or -external experience supplies. So the cosmological ideas of the -beginning of the world or of its eternity (a parte ante) cannot be of -any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the -world itself. And finally we must, according to a right maxim of the -philosophy of nature, refrain from all explanations of the design of -nature, drawn from the will of a Supreme Being; because this would not -be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that we have come to the -end of it. The use of these ideas, therefore, is quite different from -that of those categories by which (and by the principles built upon -which) experience itself first becomes possible. But our laborious -analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing -else in view than the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in -experience; for reason does its work, both in mathematics and in the -science of nature, quite safely and well without any of this subtle -deduction. Therefore our Critique of the Understanding combines with -the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical -use of the understanding; but this we have above declared to be in -this aspect totally inadmissible, and without any object or meaning. -Yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and -that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the -perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly upset it. - -The solution of this question is as follows: Pure reason does not in -its ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of -experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the -understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can -be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions (i.e., -concrete atsights or Anschauungen) and of objects. In order however to -represent the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the -fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition is as far as -these rules are concerned completely determined, but the object is -only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the -understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by -that idea. - -Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure Reason. - -§ 45. We have above shown in §§ 33 and 34 that the purity of the -categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead -reason into extending their use, quite beyond all experience, to -things in themselves; though as these categories themselves find no -intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concreto, they, as -mere logical functions, can represent a thing in general, but not give -by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything. Such -hyperbolical objects are distinguised by the appellation of Noümena, -or pure beings of the understanding (or better, beings of thought), -such as, for example, "substance," but conceived without permanence in -time, or "cause," but not acting in time, etc. Here predicates, that -only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible, are -applied to these concepts, and yet they are deprived of all the -conditions of intuition, on which alone experience is possible, and so -these concepts lose all significance. - -There is no danger, however, of the understanding spontaneously making -an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of -the mere creatures of thought, without being impelled by foreign laws. -But when reason, which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical -use of the rules of the understanding, as being always conditioned, -requires a completion of this chain of conditions, then the -understanding is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly -represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no -experience can grasp, partly even (with a view to complete the series) -it seeks entirely beyond it noumena, to which it can attach that -chain, and so, having at last escaped from the conditions of -experience, make its attitude as it were final. These are then the -transcendental ideas, which, though according to the true but hidden -ends of the natural determination of our reason, they may aim not at -extravagant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of their empirical -use, yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a -transcendent use, which, though deceitful, cannot be restrained within -the bounds of experience by any resolution, but only by scientific -instruction and with much difficulty. - -I. The Psychological Idea.{30} - -=================================== -{30} See Critique of Pure Reason, Von den Paralogismen der reinen -Vernunft. -=================================== - -§ 46. People have long since observed, that in all substances the -proper subject, that which remains after all the accidents (as -predicates) are abstracted, consequently that which forms the -substance of things remains unknown, and various complaints have been -made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But it will be well to -consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its -inability to know the substance of things, that is, to determine it by -itself, but rather for requiring to cognise it which is a mere idea -definitely as though it were a given object. Pure reason requires us -to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject, and for -this subject, which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its -subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach). But hence -it follows, that we must not hold anything, at which we can arrive, to -be an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought -by our understanding, however deep we may penetrate, even if all -nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our -understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, that is, -representing it by concepts, and so by mere predicates, to which -therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence all the -real properties, by which we cognise bodies, are mere accidents, not -excepting impenetrability, which we can only represent to ourselves as -the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us. - -Now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves -(in the thinking subject), and indeed in an immediate intuition; for -all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego, as a -subject, and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other -subject. Hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as -predicates to a subject—not merely an idea, but an object—that is, -the absolute subject itself, seems to be given in experience. But this -expectation is disappointed. For the ego is not a concept,{31} but only -the indication of the object of the internal sense, so far as we -cognise it by no further predicate. Consequently it cannot be in -itself a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can it be a -determinate concept of an absolute subject, but is, as in all other -cases, only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown -subject. Yet this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative -principle, totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the -internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a very natural -misunderstanding a very specious argument, which, from this supposed -cognition of the substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, -so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of -experience. - -=================================== -{31} Were the representation of the apperception (the Ego) a concept, by -which anything could be thought, it could be used as a predicate of -other things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more -than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception -and is only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in -relation (relatione accidentis). -=================================== - -§ 47. But though we may call this thinking self (the soul) substance, -as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further -represented as the predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty -and without significance, if permanence—the quality which renders -the concept of substances in experience fruitful—cannot be proved of -it. - -But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance, as a -thing in itself, but for the purposes of experience only. This is -sufficiently shown by the first Analogy of Experience,{32} and who ever -will not yield to this proof may try for himself whether he can -succeed in proving, from the concept of a subject which does not exist -itself as the predicate of another thing, that its existence is -thoroughly permanent, and that it cannot either in itself or by any -natural cause originate or be annihilated. These synthetical a priori -propositions can never be proved in themselves, but only in reference -to things as objects of possible experience. - -=================================== -{32} Cf. Critique, Von den Analogien der Erfahrung. -=================================== - -§ 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance, we -would infer its permanence, this can hold good as regards possible -experience only, not [of the soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all -possible experience. But life is the subjective condition of all our -possible experience, consequently we can only infer the permanence of -the soul in life; for the death of man is the end of all experience -which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the -contrary be proved, which is the very question in hand. The permanence -of the soul can therefore only be proved (and no one cares for that) -during the life of man, but not, as we desire to do, after death; and -for this general reason, that the concept of substance, so far as it -is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of -permanence, can be so combined only according to the principles of -possible experience, and therefore for the purposes of experience -only.{33} - -=================================== -{33} It is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have -always passed over the principle of the permanence of substances -without ever attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found -themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with -the concept of substance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that -without this presupposition do union of perceptions in experience is -possible, supplied the want by a postulate. From experience itself it -never could derive such a principle, partly because substances cannot -be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions, that the -matter can always be found undiminished, partly because the principle -contains necessity, which is always the sign of an a priori principle. -People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a -substance, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the -death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is -inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from -destruction by dissolution). Had they found the genuine source of this -principle—a discovery which requires deeper researches than they -were ever inclined to make—they would have seen, that the law of the -permanence of substances has place for the purposes of experience -only, and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be -cognised and conjoined with others in experience, but never -independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot hold -good of the soul after death. -=================================== - -§ 49. That there is something real without us which not only -corresponds, but must correspond, to our external perceptions, can -likewise be proved to be not a connexion of things in themselves, but -for the sake of experience. This means that there is something -empirical, i.e., some phenomenon in space without us, that admits of a -satisfactory proof, for we have nothing to do with other objects than -those which belong to possible experience; because objects which -cannot be given us in any experience, do not exist for us. Empirically -without me is that which appears in space, and space, together with -all the phenomena which it contains, belongs to the representations, -whose connexion according to laws of experience proves their objective -truth, just as the connexion of the phenomena of the internal sense -proves the actuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense). -By means of external experience I am conscious of the actuality of -bodies, as external phenomena in space, in the same manner as by means -of the internal experience I am conscious of the existence of my soul -in time, but this soul is only cognised as an object of the internal -sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state, and of which the -essence in itself, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is -unknown. Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish -external experience from dreaming; and the conformity to law (as a -criterion of its truth) of the former, from the irregularity and the -false illusion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and time as -conditions of the existence of objects, and it only inquires whether -the objects of the external senses, which we when awake put in space, -are as actually to be found in it, as the object of the internal -sense, the soul, is in time; that is, whether experience carries with -it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination. This doubt, -however, may be easily disposed of, and we always do so in common life -by investigating the connexion of phenomena in both space and time -according to universal laws of experience, and we cannot doubt, when -the representation of external things throughout agrees therewith, -that they constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in which -phenomena are considered as such only according to their connexion in -experience, may accordingly be very easily refuted; and it is just as -sure an experience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that I -myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in -time): for the notion without us, only signifies existence in space. -However as the Ego in the proposition, "I am," means not only the -object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject of -consciousness, just as body means not only external intuition (in -space), but the thing-in-itself, which is the basis of this -phenomenon; [as this is the case] the question, whether bodies (as -phenomena of the external sense) exist as bodies apart from my -thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the -question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the -soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of -representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must -likewise be answered in the negative. And in this manner everything, -when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The -formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes -the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a -form of my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual -as I myself am, and nothing but the empirical truth of the -representations in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not -the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing -without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception -can never prove the actuality of these objects without us. - -II. The Cosmological Idea.{34} - -=================================== -{34} Cf. Critique, Die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft. -=================================== - -§ 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most -remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse -philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the -arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself. - -I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object only -from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose -object is given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in -its native home, it does not become transcendent, and is therefore so -far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the soul as a simple -substance, already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as -cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends -the connexion of the conditioned with its condition (whether the -connexion is mathematical or dynamical) so far, that experience never -can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always -an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience. - -§ 51. In the first place, the use of a system of categories becomes -here so obvious and unmistakable, that even if there were not several -other proofs of it, this alone would sufficiently prove it -indispensable in the system of pure reason. There are only four such -transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes of categories; in -each of which, however, they refer only to the absolute completeness -of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to -these cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical -assertions of pure reason, which, as they are dialectical, thereby -prove, that to each of them, on equally specious principles of pure -reason, a contradictory assertion stands opposed. As all the -metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction cannot prevent this -opposition, it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources -of pure reason itself. This Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but -founded in the nature of human reason, and hence unavoidable and never -ceasing, contains the following four theses together with their -antitheses: - - - 1. - - Thesis. - The World has, as to Time and Space, a Beginning (limit). - - Antithesis. - The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite. - - 2. - - Thesis. - Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple. - - Antithesis. - There is nothing simple, but everything is composite. - - 3. - - Thesis. - There are in the World Causes through Freedom. - - Antithesis. - There is no Liberty, but all is Nature. - - 4. - - Thesis. - In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being. - - Antithesis. -There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is - incidental. - - -§ 52.a. Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason, no -other instance of which can be shown in any other use. If we, as is -commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible -world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their -combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves -and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, -unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict, which never can -be removed in the common dogmatical way; because the thesis, as well -as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, and -irresistible proofs—for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all -these proofs—and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with -itself, a state at which the sceptic rejoices, but which must make the -critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease. - -§ 52.b. We may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any -fear of being detected in falsehood. For we never can be refuted by -experience if we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical, -though purely fictitious propositions, may be done whenever the -concepts, which we connect, are mere ideas, that cannot be given (in -their whole content) in experience. For how can we make out by -experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, -whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? -Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so -extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or -the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touch-stone. - -The only possible way in which reason could have revealed -unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely announced as Dogmatics, -would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally -admitted principle, and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest -accuracy of inference from another which is equally granted. This is -actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reason, -whence four assertions on the one side, and as many counter-assertions -on the other arise, each consistently following from -universally-acknowledged principles. Thus they reveal by the use of -these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would -otherwise forever remain concealed. - -This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose -any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason.{35} Contradictory -propositions cannot both be false, except the concept, which is the -subject of both, is self-contradictory; for example, the propositions, -"a square circle is round, and a square circle is not round," are both -false. For, as to the former it is false, that the circle is round, -because it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that it is not -round, that is, angular, because it is a circle. For the logical -criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this, that if -we presuppose it, two contradictory propositions both become false; -consequently, as no middle between them is conceivable, nothing at all -is thought by that concept. - -=================================== -{35} I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote -to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature -itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in -its daring pretentions, and to force it to self-examination. For every -proof, which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, -I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of -the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this -curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon -which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the -ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more -thoroughly. -=================================== - -§ 52.c. The first two antinomies, which I call mathematical, because -they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous, -are founded on such a self-contradictory concept; and hence I explain -how it happens, that both the Thesis and Antithesis of the two are -false. - -When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is not of things in -themselves, of which I know nothing, but of things in appearance, that -is, of experience, as the particular way of cognising objects which is -afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in time or in space, -that in itself, and independent of these my thoughts, it exists in -space and in time; for in that case I should contradict myself; -because space and time, together with the appearances in them, are -nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations, but -are themselves only modes of representation, and it is palpably -contradictory to say, that a mere mode of representation exists -without our representation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only -in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart -from experience or before it, is merely to represent to ourselves that -experience actually exists apart from experience or before it. - -Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as to space and -time, it is equally impossible, as regards all my notions, to declare -it infinite or to declare it finite. For neither assertion can be -contained in experience, because experience either of an infinite -space, or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the boundary of -the world by a void space, or by an antecedent void time, is -impossible; these are mere ideas. This quantity of the world, which is -determined in either way, should therefore exist in the world itself -apart from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a world of -sense, which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence -and connexion occur only in our representations, that is, in -experience, since this latter is not an object in itself, but a mere -mode of representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept of an -absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory, the solution -of the problem concerning its quantity, whether attempted -affirmatively or negatively, is always false. - -The same holds good of the second antinomy, which relates to the -division of phenomena. For these are mere representations, and the -parts exist merely in their representation, consequently in the -division, or in a possible experience where they are given, and the -division reaches only as far as this latter reaches. To assume that an -appearance, e.g., that of body, contains in itself before all -experience all the parts, which any possible experience can ever -reach, is to impute to a mere appearance, which can exist only in -experience, an existence previous to experience. In other words, it -would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in -our faculty of representation. Such an assertion is -self-contradictory, as also every solution of our misunderstood -problem, whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves consist of an -infinite number of parts, or of a finite number of simple parts. - -§ 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of antinomies the -falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept -something self-contradictory as if it were compatible (i.e., an -appearance as an object in itself). But, as to the second (the -dynamical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of the representation -consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible; so that, -as in the former case, the opposed assertions are both false, in this -case, on the other hand, where they are opposed to one another by mere -misunderstanding, they may both be true. - -Any mathematical connexion necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what -is connected (in the concept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by -no means requires the same. When we have to deal with extended -magnitudes, all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and -with the whole; whereas, in the connexion of cause and effect, -homogeneity may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary; for -the concept of causality (by means of which something is posited -through something else quite different from it), at all events, does -not require it. - -If the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in -themselves, and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in -themselves, the contradiction would be unavoidable. So also, if the -subject of freedom were, like other objects, represented as mere -appearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoidable, for the -same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind -of object in the same sense. But if natural necessity is referred -merely to appearances, and freedom merely to things in themselves, no -contradiction arises, if we at once assume, or admit both kinds of -causality, however difficult or impossible it may be to make the -latter kind conceivable. - -As appearance every effect is an event, or something that happens in -time; it must, according to the universal law of nature, be preceded -by a determination of the causality of its cause (a state), which -follows according to a constant law. But this determination of the -cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or -happens; the cause must have begun to act, otherwise no succession -between it and the effect could be conceived. Otherwise the effect, as -well as the causality of the cause, would have always existed. -Therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have -originated among appearances, and must consequently, as well as its -effect, be an event, which must again have its cause, and so on; hence -natural necessity must be the condition, on which effective causes are -determined. Whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes -of appearances, it must, as regards these, which are events, be a -faculty of starting them spontaneously, that is, without the causality -of the cause itself, and hence without requiring any other ground to -determine its start. But then the cause, as to its causality, must not -rank under time-determinations of its state, that is, it cannot be an -appearance, and must be considered a thing in itself, while its -effects would be only appearances.{36} If without contradiction we can -think of the beings of understanding [Verstandeswesen] as exercising -such an influence on appearances, then natural necessity will attach -to all connexions of cause and effect in the sensuous world, though on -the other hand, freedom can be granted to such cause, as is itself not -an appearance (but the foundation of appearance). Nature therefore and -freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same -thing, but in different relations—on one side as a phenomenon, on -the other as a thing in itself. - -=================================== -{36} The idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the -intellectual, as cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we cannot -attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which -it fills its space, though this action takes place from an internal -principle. We can likewise find no notion of freedom suitable to -purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so far as his action is -immanent. For his action, though independent of external determining -causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the divine -nature. It is only, if something is to start by an action, and so the -effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the world of sense (e.g., -the beginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the -causality of the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether -the cause can originate an effect without its causality itself -beginning. In the former case the concept of this causality is a -concept of natural necessity, in the latter, that of freedom. From -this the reader will see, that, as I explained freedom to be the -faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the -notion which is the problem of metaphysics. -=================================== - -We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in connexion with its -subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its -actions, and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to -appearances, but is also referred to objective grounds, that are only -ideas, so far as they can determine this faculty, a connexion which is -expressed by the word ought. This faculty is called reason, and, so -far as we consider a being (man) entirely according to this -objectively determinable reason, he cannot be considered as a being of -sense, but this property is that of a thing in itself, of which we -cannot comprehend the possibility—I mean how the ought (which -however has never yet taken place) should determine its activity, and -can become the cause of actions, whose effect is an appearance in the -sensible world. Yet the causality of reason would be freedom with -regard to the effects in the sensuous world, so far as we can consider -objective grounds, which are themselves ideas, as their determinants. -For its action in that case would not depend upon subjective -conditions, consequently not upon those of time, and of course not -upon the law of nature, which serves to determine them, because -grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally, according to -principles, without the influence of the circumstances of either time -or place. - -What I adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing -intelligible, and does not necessarily belong to our problem, which -must be decided from mere concepts, independently of the properties -which we meet in the actual world. - -Now I may say without contradiction: that all the actions of rational -beings, so far as they are appearances (occurring in any experience), -are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as -regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting -according to mere reason, are free. For what is required for the -necessity of nature? Nothing more than the determinability of every -event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a -reference to cause in the appearance; in this process the thing in -itself at its foundation and its causality remain unknown. But I say, -that the law of nature remains, whether the rational being is the -cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason, that is, -through freedom, or whether it does not determine them on grounds of -reason. For, if the former is the case, the action is performed -according to maxims, the effect of which as appearance is always -conform able to constant laws; if the latter is the case, and the -action not performed on principles of reason, it is subjected to the -empirical laws of the sensibility, and in both cases the effects are -connected according to constant laws; more than this we do not require -or know concerning natural necessity. But in the former case reason is -the cause of these laws of nature, and therefore free; in the latter -the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, -because reason does not influence it; but reason itself is not -determined on that account by the sensibility, and is therefore free -in this case too. Freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in -appearance, neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the -practical use of reason, which is connected with things in themselves, -as determining grounds. - -Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which reason possesses -causality according to objectively determining grounds, is rescued and -yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the -very same effects, as appearances. The same remarks will serve to -explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its -compatibility with natural necessity (in the same subject, but not -taken in the same reference). For, as to this, every beginning of the -action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining -grounds, is always a first start, though the same action is in the -series of appearances only a subordinate start, which must be preceded -by a state of the cause, which determines it, and is itself determined -in the same manner by another immediately preceding. Thus we are able, -in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality -is determined in them as things in themselves, to imagine a faculty of -beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into -contradiction with the laws of nature. For the relation of the action -to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation; in this case -that which determines the causality does not precede in time the -action, because such determining grounds represent not a reference to -objects of sense, e.g., to causes in the appearances, but to -determining causes, as things in themselves, which do not rank under -conditions of time. And in this way the action, with regard to the -causality of reason, can be considered as a first start in respect to -the series of appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate -beginning. We may therefore without contradiction consider it in the -former aspect as free, but in the latter (in so far as it is merely -appearance) as subject to natural necessity. - -As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same way as the -conflict of reason with itself in the third. For, provided the cause -in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance -(so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions -are perfectly reconcilable: the one, that there is nowhere in the -sensuous world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose -existence is absolutely necessary; the other, that this world is -nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause (but of -another kind and according to another law). The incompatibility of -these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what -is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves, and in general -confusing both in one concept. - -§ 54. This then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole -antinomy, in which reason finds itself involved in the application of -its principles to the sensible world. The former alone (the mere -proposition) would be a considerable service in the cause of our -knowledge of human reason, even though the solution might fail to -fully satisfy the reader, who has here to combat a natural illusion, -which has been but recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto -always regarded as genuine. For one result at least is unavoidable. As -it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with -itself—so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for -things in themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they are in -fact—the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the -deduction of all our a priori cognition and the proof which I have -given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question. -This is all I require at present; for when in this occupation he shall -have thought himself deep enough into the nature of pure reason, those -concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is -possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him. Without this -preparation I cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most -attentive reader. - -III. The Theological Idea.{37} - -=================================== -{37} Cf. Critique, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals." -=================================== - -§ 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords matter for the -most important, but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and -thereby dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason -in this case does not, as with the psychological and the cosmological -Ideas, begin from experience, and err by exaggerating its grounds, in -striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness of their -series. It rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere -concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in -general, consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal -Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the -actuality of all other things. And so the mere presupposition of a -Being, who is conceived not in the series of experience, yet for the -purposes of experience—for the sake of comprehending its connexion, -order, and unity—i.e., the idea [the notion of it], is more easily -distinguished from the concept of the understanding here, than in the -former cases. Hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion -which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking -objective conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis -necessary for the satisfaction of our reason, a dogma. As the -observations of the Critique on the pretensions of transcendental -theology are intelligible, clear, and decisive, I have nothing more to -add on the subject. - -General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas. - -§ 56. The objects, which are given us by experience, are in many -respects incomprehensible, and many questions, to which the law of -nature leads us, when carried beyond a certain point (though quite -conformably to the laws of nature), admit of no answer; as for example -the question: why substances attract one another? But if we entirely -quit nature, or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible -experience, and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we cannot then say -that the object is incomprehensible, and that the nature of things -proposes to us insoluble problems. For we are not then concerned with -nature or in general with given objects, but with concepts, which have -their origin merely in our reason, and with mere creations of thought; -and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be -solved, because of course reason can and must give a full account of -its own procedure.{38} As the psychological, cosmological, and -theological Ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason, which -cannot be given in any experience, the questions which reason asks us -about them are put to us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of our -reason for the sake of its own satisfaction. They must all be capable -of satisfactory answers, which is done by showing that they are -principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough -agreement, completeness, and synthetical unity, and that they so far -hold good of experience only, but of experience as a whole. - -=================================== -{38} Herr Platner in his Aphorisms acutely says (§§ 728, 729), "If -reason be a criterion, no concept, which is incomprehensible to human -reason, can be possible. Incomprehensibility has place in what is -actual only. Here in comprehensibility arises from the insufficiency -of the acquired ideas." It sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not -strange to say, that in nature there is much incomprehensible (e.g., -the faculty of generation) but if we mount still higher, and even go -beyond nature, everything again becomes comprehensible; for we then -quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and occupy ourselves -merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily comprehend the -law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in -experience, because the law is the reason's own production. -=================================== - -Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a -whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our -knowledge a peculiar kind of unity, that of a system, without which it -is nothing but piecework, and cannot be used for proving the existence -of a highest purpose (which can only be the general system of all -purposes), I do not here refer only to the practical, but also to the -highest purpose of the speculative use of reason. - -The transcendental Ideas therefore express the peculiar application of -reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the -understanding. Yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to -be attached to the object of cognition, if we regard that which is -merely regulative to be constitutive, and if we persuade ourselves -that we can by means of these Ideas enlarge our cognition -transcendently, or far beyond all possible experience, while it only -serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as -possible, i.e., to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to -experience: we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of -the proper application of our reason and of its principles, and from a -Dialectic, which both confuses the empirical use of reason, and also -sets reason at variance with itself. - -Conclusion. - -On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason. - -§ 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it would be absurd for -us to hope that we can know more of any object, than belongs to the -possible experience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge -about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience, -which would determine it according to the constitution it has in -itself. For how could we determine anything in this way, since time, -space, and the categories, and still more all the concepts formed by -empirical experience or perception in the sensible world (Anschauung), -have and can have no other use, than to make experience possible. And -if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the -understanding, they do not determine any object, and have no meaning -whatever. - -But it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we -conceded no things in themselves, or set up our experience for the -only possible mode of knowing things, our way of beholding -(Anschauung) them in space and in time for the only possible way, and -our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible -understanding; in fact if we wished to have the principles of the -possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in -themselves. - -Our principles, which limit the use of reason to possible experience, -might in this way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason be -set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as Hume's -dialogues may illustrate), if a careful critique did not guard the -bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use, and set a -limit to its pretensions. Scepticism originally arose from metaphysics -and its licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor the -empirical use of reason, announce everything that transcends this use -as worthless and deceitful; but by and by, when it was perceived that -the very same principles that are used in experience, insensibly, and -apparently with the same right, led still further than experience -extends, then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience. -But here there is no danger; for common sense will doubtless always -assert its rights. A certain confusion, however, arose in science -which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted, and why only -so far and no further, and this confusion can only be cleared up and -all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principle, -of the boundary of the use of our reason. - -We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience, form a definite -notion of what things in themselves may be. Yet we are not at liberty -to abstain entirely from inquiring into them; for experience never -satisfies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us further -and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their -complete solution. This any one may gather from the Dialectics of pure -reason, which therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having -acquired, as regards the nature of our soul, a clear conception of the -subject, and having come to the conviction, that its manifestations -cannot be explained materialistically, who can refrain from asking -what the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience suffices for -the purpose, from accounting for it by a concept of reason (that of a -simple immaterial being), though we cannot by any means prove its -objective reality? Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical -knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the -quantity of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since every -answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, -which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the -insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? -Finally, who does not see in the thorough-going contingency and -dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of -experience, the impossibility of stopping there? And who does not feel -himself compelled, notwithstanding all interdictions against losing -himself in transcendent ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all -the concepts which he can vindicate by experience, in the concept of a -Being, the possibility of which we cannot conceive, but at the same -time cannot be refuted, because it relates to a mere being of the -understanding, and without it reason must needs remain forever -dissatisfied? - -Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside -a certain definite place, and in closing it; limits do not require -this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is -not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its -surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves, though -we can never have definite notions of them, and are limited to -appearances only. - -As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, definite bounds to -it are inconceivable. In mathematics and in natural philosophy human -reason admits of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something -indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it -will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The -enlarging of our views in mathematics, and the possibility of new -discoveries, are infinite; and the same is the case with the discovery -of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued -experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken -here, for mathematics refers to appearances only, and what cannot be -an object of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts of -metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its sphere, and it -can never lead to them; neither does it require them. It is therefore -not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences, -and there is not, as it were, any point or line of contact. Natural -science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things, -which though not appearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of -explaining appearance. Nor does that science require this for its -physical explanations. Nay even if such grounds should be offered from -other sources (for instance, the influence of immaterial beings), they -must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations. For -these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object -of sense can belong to experience, and be brought into connexion with -our actual perceptions and empirical laws. - -But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts of -pure reason (not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated -thereto by the nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas, -as they do not admit of evasion, and are never capable of realisation, -serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use -of reason, but also the way to determine them. Such is the end and the -use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which has brought -forth metaphysics as its favorite child, whose generation, like every -other in the world, is not to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an -original germ, wisely organised for great ends. For metaphysics, in -its fundamental features, perhaps more than any other science, is -placed in us by nature itself, and cannot be considered the production -of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of -experience from which it is quite disparate. - -Reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding, which -suffice for empirical use, i.e., within the sensible world, finds in -itself no satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of -all hope of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas, which -have that completion in view, are such problems of reason. But it sees -clearly, that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion, -neither consequently can all the concepts, which serve merely for -understanding the world of sense, such as space and time, and whatever -we have adduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding. -The sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected -according to universal laws; it has therefore no subsistence by -itself; it is not the thing in itself, and consequently must point to -that which contains the basis of this experience, to beings which -cannot be cognised merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves. -In the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire -of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions. - -We have above (§§ 33, 34) indicated the limits of reason with regard -to all cognition of mere creations of thought. Now, since the -transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them, and thus have led -us, as it were, to the spot where the occupied space (viz., -experience) touches the void (that of which we can know nothing, viz., -noumena), we can determine the bounds of pure reason. For in all -bounds there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the boundary of -corporeal space, and is therefore itself a space, a line is a space, -which is the boundary of the surface, a point the boundary of the -line, but yet always a place in space), whereas limits contain mere -negations. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough -after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something -(though we can never cognise what it is in itself). For the question -now is, What is the attitude of our reason in this connexion of what -we know with what we do not, and never shall, know? This is an actual -connexion of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will -always remain so), and though what is unknown should not become the -least more known—which we cannot even hope—yet the notion of this -connexion must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct. - -We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a world of -understanding, and a Supreme Being (all mere noumena), because in them -only, as things in themselves, reason finds that completion and -satisfaction, which it can never hope for in the derivation of -appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and because these actually -have reference to something distinct from them (and totally -heterogeneous), as appearances always presuppose an object in itself, -and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or -not. - -But as we can never cognise these beings of understanding as they are -in themselves, that is, definitely, yet must assume them as regards -the sensible world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at -least able to think this connexion by means of such concepts as -express their relation to the world of sense. Yet if we represent to -ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of -the understanding, we then indeed represent nothing definite to -ourselves, consequently our concept has no significance; but if we -think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world, it is no -longer a being of understanding, but is conceived as an appearance, -and belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an instance from the -notion of the Supreme Being. - -Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason, but -represents only a thing containing all realities, without being able -to determine any one of them; because for that purpose an example must -be taken from the world of sense, in which case we should have an -object of sense only, not something quite heterogeneous, which can -never be an object of sense. Suppose I attribute to the Supreme Being -understanding, for instance; I have no concept of an understanding -other than my own, one that must receive its perceptions (Anschauung) -by the senses, and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of -the unity of consciousness. Then the elements of my concept would -always lie in the appearance; I should however by the insufficiency of -the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a -being which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound up with them -as conditions of its determination. But if I separate understanding -from sensibility to obtain a pure understanding, then nothing remains -but the mere form of thinking without perception (Anschauung), by -which form alone I can cognise nothing definite, and consequently no -object. For that purpose I should conceive another understanding, such -as would directly perceive its objects,{39} but of which I have not the -least notion; because the human understanding is discursive, and can -[not directly perceive, it can] only cognise by means of general -concepts. And the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will -to the Supreme Being; for we have this concept only by drawing it from -our internal experience, and therefore from our dependence for -satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require; and so the -notion rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible with -the pure concept of the Supreme Being. - -=================================== -{39} Der die Gegenstände anschaute. -=================================== - -Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect only the proofs, and -not the deistic assertion itself. But as regards theism, which depends -on a stricter determination of the concept of the Supreme Being which -in deism is merely transcendent, they are very strong, and as this -concept is formed, in certain (in fact in all common) cases -irrefutable. Hume always insists, that by the mere concept of an -original being, to which we apply only ontological predicates -(eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence), we think nothing definite, and -that properties which can yield a concept in concreto must be -superadded; that it is not enough to say, it is Cause, but we must -explain the nature of its causality, for example, that of an -understanding and of a will. He then begins his attacks on the -essential point itself, i.e., theism, as he had previously directed -his battery only against the proofs of deism, an attack which is not -very dangerous to it in its consequences. All his dangerous arguments -refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be inseparable from -theism, and to make it absurd in itself; but if the former be -abandoned, the latter must vanish with it, and nothing remain but -deism, of which nothing can come, which is of no value, and which -cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals. If this -anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no proofs whatever of the -existence of a Supreme Being, even were they all granted, could -determine for us the concept of this Being without involving us in -contradictions. - -If we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of -pure reason, the command (which apparently conflicts with it) to -proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent -(empirical) use, we discover that both can subsist together, but only -at the boundary of all lawful use of reason. For this boundary belongs -as well to the field of experience, as to that of the creations of -thought, and we are thereby taught, as well, how these so remarkable -ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason. On the one -hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of -experience, as if nothing but world{40} remained for us to cognise, and -yet, on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds of experience, -and to think of judging about things beyond them, as things in -themselves. - -=================================== -{40} The use of the word "world" without article, though odd, seems to -be the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint.— Ed. -=================================== - -But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the -relation which the world may have to a Being whose very concept lies -beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the world. For we -then do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of the properties in -themselves, by which we represent objects of experience, and thereby -avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his relation -to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which -in fact concerns language only, and not the object itself. - -If I say that we are compelled to consider the world, as if it were -the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing -more, than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation -to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer, as the -world of sense (or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex -of appearances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby cognise as -it is in itself, but as it is for me or in relation to the world, of -which I am a part. - -§ 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does not signify (as is -commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a -perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.{41} -By means of this analogy, however, there remains a concept of the -Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us, though we have left out -everything that could deter mine it absolutely or in itself; for we -determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves, and more -do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes upon those who would -determine this concept absolutely, by taking the materials for so -doing from themselves and the world, do not affect us; and he cannot -object to us, that we have nothing left if we give up the objective -anthropomorphism of the concept of the Supreme Being. - -=================================== -{41} There is, e.g., an analogy between the juridical relation of human -actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I never can do -anything to another man without giving him a right to do the same to -me on the same conditions; just as no mass can act with its motive -power on another mass without thereby occasioning the other to react -equally against it. Here right and motive power are quite dissimilar -things, but in their relation there is complete similarity. By means -of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the relation of things -which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of -the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so the -welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown [quantity which -is] in God (= x), which we call love; not as if it had the least -similarity to any human inclination, but because we can suppose its -relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world -bear one another. But the concept of relation in this case is a mere -category, viz., the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with -sensibility. -=================================== - -For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his dialogues makes Philo -grant Cleanthes), as a necessary hypothesis, the deistical concept of -the First Being, in which this Being is thought by the mere -ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc. This must be done, -because reason, actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions, -which are themselves always conditional, cannot otherwise have any -satisfaction, and it therefore can be done without falling into -anthropomorphism (which transfers predicates from the world of sense -to a Being quite distinct from the world), because those predicates -are mere categories, which, though they do not give a determinate -concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of -sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this Being a -causality through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing to -theism, without being obliged to attribute to God in himself this kind -of reason, as a property inhering in him. For as to the former, the -only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason (as regards all -possible experience, in complete harmony with itself) in the world of -sense to the highest point, is to assume a supreme reason as a cause -of all the connexions in the world. Such a principle must be quite -advantageous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its application to -nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby not transferred as a -property to the First Being in himself, but only to his relation to -the world of sense, and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For -nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which -is perceived everywhere in the world, and reason is attributed to the -Supreme Being, so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason -in the world, but according to analogy only, that is, so far as this -expression shows merely the relation, which the Supreme Cause unknown -to us has to the world, in order to determine everything in it -conformably to reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept from -using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving God, but -instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is necessary to -have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle. We -thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable and -even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself. We -are thereby kept, on the one hand, from making a transcendent use of -the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause (by means -of the will), in order to determine the Divine Nature by properties, -which are only borrowed from human nature, and from losing ourselves -in gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand from deluging -the contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation -according to our notions of human reason, which we transfer to God, -and so losing for this contemplation its proper application, according -to which it should be a rational study of mere nature, and not a -presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The -expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we conceive the world -as if it came, as to its existence and internal plan, from a Supreme -Reason, by which notion we both cognise the constitution, which -belongs to the world itself, yet without pretending to determine the -nature of its cause in itself, and on the other hand, we transfer the -ground of this constitution (of the form of reason in the world) upon -the relation of the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the -world sufficient by itself for that purpose.{42} - -=================================== -{42} I may say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same -place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to -its works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains -unknown to me: I only compare its effects (the order of the world) -which I know, and their conformity to reason, to the effects of human -reason which I also know; and hence I term the former reason, without -attributing to it on that account what I understand in man by this -term, or attaching to it anything else known to me, as its property. -=================================== - -Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear by -combining with Hume's principle—"not to carry the use of reason -dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience"—this other -principle, which he quite overlooked: "not to consider the field of -experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason." The -Critique of Pure Reason here points out the true mean between -dogmatism, which Hume combats, and skepticism, which he would -substitute for it—a mean which is not like other means that we find -advisable to determine for ourselves as it were mechanically (by -adopting something from one side and something from the other), and by -which nobody is taught a better way, but such a one as can be -accurately determined on principles. - -§ 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made use of the metaphor -of a boundary, in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to -its suitable use. The world of sense contains merely appearances, -which are not things in themselves, but the understanding must assume -these latter ones, viz., noumena. In our reason both are comprised, -and the question is, How does reason proceed to set boundaries to the -understanding as regards both these fields? Experience, which contains -all that belongs to the sensuous world, does not bound itself; it only -proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally -conditioned object. Its boundary must lie quite without it, and this -field is that of the pure beings of the understanding. But this field, -so far as the determination of the nature of these beings is -concerned, is an empty space for us, and if dogmatically-determined -concepts alone are in question, we cannot pass out of the field of -possible experience. But as a boundary itself is something positive, -which belongs as well to that which lies within, as to the space that -lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive -cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this -boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds -itself in the presence of an empty space, in which it can conceive -forms of things, but not things themselves. But the setting of a -boundary to the field of the understanding by something, which is -otherwise unknown to it, is still a cognition which belongs to reason -even at this standpoint, and by which it is neither confined within -the sensible, nor straying without it, but only refers, as befits the -knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that which lies -without it, and that which is contained within it. - -Natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason, -being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the Idea of a -Supreme Being (and, for practical purposes to that of an intelligible -world also), not in order to determine anything relatively to this -pure creation of the understanding, which lies beyond the world of -sense, but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to -principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) -unity. For this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of -sense to an independent reason, as the cause of all its connexions. -Thereby we do not purely invent a being, but, as beyond the sensible -world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure -understanding, we determine that something in this particular way, -though only of course according to analogy. - -And thus there remains our original proposition, which is the résumé -of the whole Critique: "that reason by all its a priori principles -never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, -and even of these nothing more than can be cognised in experience." -But this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the -objective boundary of experience, viz., to the reference to something -which is not itself an object of experience, but is the ground of all -experience. Reason does not however teach us anything concerning the -thing in itself: it only instructs us as regards its own complete and -highest use in the field of possible experience. But this is all that -can be reasonably desired in the present case, and with which we have -cause to be satisfied. - -§ 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as it is actually -given in the natural predisposition of human reason, and in that which -constitutes the essential end of its pursuit, according to its -subjective possibility. Though we have found, that this merely natural -use of such a predisposition of our reason, if no discipline arising -only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it, -involves us in transcendent, either apparently or really conflicting, -dialectical syllogisms; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only -unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature, but -even disadvantageous to it: there yet remains a problem worthy of -solution, which is to find out the natural ends intended by this -disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason, because everything -that lies in nature must be originally intended for some useful -purpose. - -Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I acknowledge, that what -I can say about it is conjecture only, like every speculation about -the first ends of nature. The question does not concern the objective -validity of metaphysical judgments, but our natural predisposition to -them, and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but -to anthropology. - -When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which -constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling -it to quit the mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible -experience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge -or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of -this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of -experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so -far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the -pure understanding, which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the -purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them (for there we -can find no ground to stand on), but because practical principles, -which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation -and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason -unavoidably requires from a moral point of view. - -So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal to -me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of -experience), shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough, -and thereby deters me from materialism, the psychological notion of -which is unfit for any explanation of nature, and besides confines -reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious -insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in -its lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from -naturalism, which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, -all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional, as it -always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, and -unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause -different from the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, -in its turn, were it merely nature, could never render the existence -of the contingent (as its consequent) comprehensible, reason frees -itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a -blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a -first principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself), -and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom, or of a -Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to -instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of -Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope -for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These -considerations, I should think, explain in some measure the natural -predisposition of which I spoke. - -The practical value, which a merely speculative science may have, lies -without the bounds of this science, and can therefore be considered as -a scholion merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the -science itself. This application however surely lies within the bounds -of philosophy, especially of philosophy drawn from the pure sources of -reason, where its speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be -at unity with its practical use in morals. Hence the unavoidable -dialectics of pure reason, considered in metaphysics, as a natural -tendency, deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely, which is -to be removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision as -regards its end, though this duty, a work of supererogation, cannot -justly be assigned to metaphysics proper. - -The solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on -the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason{43} should be considered -a second scholion which however has a greater affinity with the -subject of metaphysics. For there certain rational principles are -expounded which determine a priori the order of nature or rather of -the understanding, which seeks nature's laws through experience. They -seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience, -though they spring from pure reason, which cannot be considered, like -the understanding, as a principle of possible experience. Now whether -or not this harmony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not -inhere in appearances or in their source (the sensibility) itself, but -only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding, as -also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about -an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the -understanding when in relation to reason; and whether or not -experience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of -reason: may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of -reason even beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general principles -of a history of nature; I have represented this task as important, but -not attempted its solution, in the book itself.{44} - -=================================== -{43} Critique of Pure Reason, II., chap. III., section 7. - -{44} Throughout in the Critique I never lost sight of the plan not to -neglect anything, were it ever so recondite, that could render the -inquiry into the nature of pure reason complete. Everybody may -afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases, when he has been -merely shown what yet remains to be done. It is this a duty which must -reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey -the whole field, in order to consign it to others for future -cultivation and allotment. And to this branch both the scholia belong, -which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness to amateurs, -and hence are added here for connoisseurs only. -=================================== - -And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the main question which -I had proposed: How is metaphysics in general possible? by ascending -from the data of its actual use in its consequences, to the grounds of -its possibility. - -SCHOLIA. - -SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS -METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?" - -Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual, but if -considered by itself alone (as the analytical solution of the third -principal question showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of -taking principles from it, and in using them follow the natural, but -on that account not less false, illusion, we can never produce -science, but only a vain dialectical art, in which one school may -outdo another, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting -approbation. - -In order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not -mere fallacious plausibility, but in sight and conviction, a Critique -of Reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts, -their division according to their various sources (Sensibility, -Understanding, and Reason), together with a complete table of them, -the analysis of all these concepts, with all their consequences, -especially by means of the deduction of these concepts, the -possibility of synthetical cognition a priori, the principles of its -application and finally its bounds, all in a complete system. -Critique, therefore, and critique alone, contains in itself the whole -well-proved and well-tested plan, and even all the means required to -accomplish metaphysics, as a science; by other ways and means it is -impossible. The question here therefore is not so much how this -performance is possible, as how to set it going, and induce men of -clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation -for one that will not deceive, and how such a union for the common end -may best be directed. - -This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted Critique will be -ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which he formerly put -up with, because his reason must have something, and could find -nothing better for its support. - -Critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the -schools, as chemistry does to alchemy, or as astronomy to the -astrology of the fortune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has -read through and through, and grasped the principles of, the Critique -even in these Prolegomena only, will ever return to that old and -sophistical pseudo-science; but will rather with a certain delight -look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, -requiring no more preparatory discoveries, and now at last affording -permanent satisfaction to reason. For here is an advantage upon which, -of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon: -that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be -incapable of further change, or of any augmentation by new -discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in -itself, not in objects and their observation (Anschauung), by which -latter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased. When -therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty -completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there -remains nothing for pure reason to cognise a priori, nay, there is -even no ground to raise further questions. The sure prospect of -knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm, even though -we should set aside all its advantages, of which I shall hereafter -speak. - -All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but finally destroys -itself, and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay. That -this time is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it -has fallen among all learned nations, despite of all the zeal with -which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted. The old arrangement -of our university studies still preserves its shadow; now and then an -Academy of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on -it, but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences; and let any -one judge for himself how a man of genius, if he were called a great -metaphysician, would receive the compliment, which may be well-meant, -but is scarce envied by anybody. - -Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics -has undoubtedly arrived, we are yet far from being able to say that -the period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and -complete Critique of Reason. All transitions from a tendency to its -contrary pass through the stage of indifference, and this moment is -the most dangerous for an author, but, in my opinion, the most -favorable for the science. For, when party spirit has died out by a -total dissolution of former connexions, minds are in the best state to -listen to several proposals for an organisation according to a new -plan. - -When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in -the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain -the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side -to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand, that every one, whom the -thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor, will ask -me, upon what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irresistible -law of necessity. - -That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as -little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing -altogether, to avoid inhaling impure air. There will therefore always -be metaphysics in the world; nay, every one, especially every man of -reflexion, will have it, and for want of a recognised standard, will -shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been -called metaphysics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it -entirely is impossible; therefore a Critique of Pure Reason itself -must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated, and brought to -the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this -pressing want, which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge. - -Ever since I have come to know critique, whenever I finish reading a -book of metaphysical contents, which, by the preciseness of its -notions, by variety, order, and an easy style, was not only -entertaining but also helpful, I cannot help asking, "Has this author -indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?" The learned men, whose -works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed -to the culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me for -saying, that I have never been able to find either their essays or my -own less important ones (though self-love may recommend them to me) to -have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and why? - -Here is the very obvious reason: metaphysics did not then exist as a -science, nor can it be gathered piecemeal, but its germ must be fully -preformed in the Critique. But in order to prevent all misconception, -we must remember what has been already said, that by the analytical -treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal, -but the science (of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least advanced, -because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials -from which the intention is to carpenter our science. Let the concepts -of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined, -all this is very well as a preparation for some future use. But if we -cannot prove, that in all which exists the substance endures, and only -the accidents vary, our science is not the least advanced by all our -analyses. - -Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori either this -proposition, or that of sufficient reason, still, less any more -complex theorem, such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed -any synthetical proposition. By all its analysing therefore nothing is -affected, nothing obtained or forwarded, and the science, after all -this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the days of -Aristotle, though far better preparations were made for it than of -old, if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered. - -If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my -charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to -metaphysics, which he would prove dogmatically a priori, for until he -has actually performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly -advanced the science; even should this proposition be sufficiently -confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more -equitable, and in the (inevitably certain) event of its -non-performance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto -metaphysics has never existed as a science. - -But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I -must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, -which are suited as little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and -secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense, which -does not convince every one, but which accommodates itself to personal -peculiarities. - -For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd, than in metaphysics, -a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon -probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be cognised a -priori, is thereby announced as apodeictically certain, and must -therefore be proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding -geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures. As to the doctrine of chances -in the latter, it does not contain probable, but perfectly certain, -judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases, -under given uniform conditions, which, in the sum of all possible -cases, infallibly happen according to the rule, though it is not -sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance. Conjectures -(by means of induction and of analogy) can be suffered in an empirical -science of nature only, yet even there the possibility at least of -what we assume must be quite certain. - -The appeal to common sense is even more absurd, when concept and -principles are announced as valid, not in so far as they hold with -regard to experience, but even beyond the conditions of experience. -For what is common sense? It is normal good sense, so far it judges -right. But what is normal good sense? It is the faculty of the -knowledge and use of rules in concreto, as distinguished from the -speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules in -abstracto. Common sense can hardly understand the rule, "that every -event is determined by means of its cause," and can never comprehend -it thus generally. It therefore demands an example from experience, -and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always -thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen-utensil missing, it then -understands the principle and grants it. Common sense therefore is -only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are a -priori) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them a -priori, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative -understanding, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. But -the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of -knowledge, and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal -to it as a witness, for it cannot here form any opinion whatever, and -men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties, -and can find in their speculation neither in nor out. - -It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense (who -occasionally prize it highly, but usually despise it) to say, that -there must surely be at all events some propositions which are -immediately certain, and of which there is no occasion to give any -proof, or even any account at all, because we otherwise could never -stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments. But if we except the -principle of contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth -of synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in proof of this -privilege, anything else indubitable, which they can immediately -ascribe to common sense, except mathematical propositions, such as -twice two make four, between two points there is but one straight -line, etc. But these judgments are radically different from those of -metaphysics. For in mathematics I myself can by thinking construct -whatever I represent to myself as possible by a concept: I add to the -first two the other two, one by one, and myself make the number four, -or I draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines, -equal as well as unequal; yet I can draw one only, which is like -itself in all its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, -extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else, -whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, but I must -call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori -(yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of -such a connexion (i.e., causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the -concepts of mathematics, by (Anschauung) visualising them, a priori, -and so show its possibility a priori. This concept, together with the -principles of its application, always requires, if it shall hold a -priori—as is requisite in metaphysics—a justification and -deduction of its possibility, because we cannot otherwise know how far -it holds good, and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond -it also. - -Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science of pure reason, we -can never appeal to common sense, but may do so only when we are -forced to surrender it, and to renounce all purely speculative -cognition, which must always be knowledge, and consequently when we -forego metaphysics itself and its instruction, for the sake of -adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us, and -sufficient to our wants, perhaps even more salutary than knowledge -itself. For in this case the attitude of the question is quite -altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in all -its parts, otherwise it is nothing; because, as a speculation of pure -reason, it finds a hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, -however, probability and common sense may be used with advantage and -justly, but on quite special principles, of which the importance -always depends on the reference to practical life. - -This is what I hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility -of metaphysics as a science. - -APPENDIX. - -ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE. - -Since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal, -and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely -ever to be attained, the present essay now before the public has a -fair title to an accurate and careful investigation, except it be -thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics, to -which, if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose, no -objection can be made. - -If we take the course of things as it is, not as it ought to be, there -are two sorts of judgments: (1) one a judgment which precedes -investigation (in our case one in which the reader from his own -metaphysics pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason which -was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics); (2) the -other a judgment subsequent to investigation. In the latter the reader -is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical -researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics, -and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived. -If what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain, as for -instance the theorems of geometry, the former way of judging would -hold good. For if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant -to established truths, these principles are false and without further -inquiry to be repudiated. But if metaphysics does not possess a stock -of indisputably certain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even -be the case that there are a number of them, which, though among the -most specious, are by their consequences in mutual collision, and if -no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical -(synthetical) propositions is to be met with in it, then the former -way of judging is not admissible, but the investigation of the -principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value. - -ON A SPECIMEN OF A JUDGMENT OF THE CRITIQUE PRIOR TO ITS EXAMINATION. - -This judgment is to be found in the Göttingischen gelehrten Anzeigen, -in the supplement to the third division, of January 19, 1782, -pages 40 et seq. - -When an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and -endeavors to present his independent reflexions in its elaboration, -falls into the hands of a reviewer who, in his turn, is keen enough to -discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book -rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to the heart of the -subject, sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the -author takes as his point of departure, the severity of the judgment -may indeed displease the latter, but the public does not care, as it -gains thereby; and the author himself may be contented, as an -opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to -him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge, in such -a manner, that if he believes himself fundamentally right, he can -remove in time any stone of offence that might hurt the success of his -work. - -I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another position. He seems -not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which -(successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either -impatience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened -reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to -perfection long ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real -narrowmindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts -beyond his school-metaphysics. In short, he passes impatiently in -review a long series of propositions, by which, without knowing their -premises, we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his -censure, the reason of which the reader understands just as little as -the propositions against which it is directed; and hence [his report] -can neither serve the public nor damage me, in the judgment of -experts. I should, for these reasons, have passed over this judgment -altogether, were it not that it may afford me occasion for some -explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these -Prolegomena from a misconception. - -In order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily -set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to -trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by -saying: - -"This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he translates it, of -higher) Idealism."{45} - -=================================== -{45} By no means "higher." High towers, and metaphysically-great men -resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are -not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos, the bottom-land, of -experience; and the word transcendental, the meaning of which is so -often explained by me, but not once grasped by my reviewer (so -carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something -passing beyond all experience, but something that indeed precedes it a -priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience -possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment -is termed transcendent, a word which must be distinguished from -transcendental, the latter being limited to the immanent use, that is, -to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been -sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found -his advantage in misunderstanding me. -=================================== - -A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that I had -to expect, much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or -heard of geometry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various -figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being asked his -opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of drawing; the author -introduces a peculiar terminology, in order to give dark, -incomprehensible directions, which in the end teach nothing more than -what every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye, etc." - -Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an idealism it is that goes -through my whole work, although it does not by a long way constitute -the soul of the system. - -The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop -Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the -senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the -ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." - -The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is -on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure -understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only -in experience is there truth." - -But this is directly contrary to idealism proper. How came I then to -use this expression for quite an opposite purpose, and how came my -reviewer to see it everywhere? - -The solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have -been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work, if -the reader had only desired to do so. Space and time, together with -all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but -belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am -one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst -them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical -presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to -us by means of experience or perception, together with its -determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that -space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its -determinations a priori, can be cognised by us, because, no less than -time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all -perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and -therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as -truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, -experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, -because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing a priori at -their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer -illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the -pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all -possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain -criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein.{46} - -=================================== -{46} Idealism proper always has a mystical tendency, and can have no -other, but mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending -the possibility of our cognition a priori as to objects of experience, -which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested. In this -way all mystical idealism falls to the ground, for (as may be seen -already in Plato) it inferred from our cognitions a priori (even from -those of geometry) another intuition different from that of the senses -(namely, an intellectual intuition), because it never occurred to any -one that the senses themselves might intuite a priori. -=================================== - -My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special -character, in that it subverts the ordinary idealism, and that through -it all cognition a priori, even that of geometry, first receives -objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space -and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This -being the state of the case, I could have wished, in order to avoid -all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine otherwise, -but to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be permitted me -however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the -formal, or better still, the critical Idealism, to distinguish it from -the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and from the sceptical Idealism of -Descartes. - -Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my -book. The reviewer criticises here and there, makes sweeping -criticisms, a mode prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's -own knowledge or ignorance; a single thorough criticism in detail, had -it touched the main question, as is only fair, would have exposed, it -may be my error, or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into -this species of research. It was, moreover, not a badly conceived -plan, in order at once to take from readers (who are accustomed to -form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports) the desire to -read the book itself, to pour out in one breath a number of passages -in succession, torn from their connexion, and their grounds of proof -and explanations, and which must necessarily sound senseless, -especially considering how antipathetic they are to all -school-metaphysics; to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam, and -then, after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition -that persistent illusion is truth, to conclude with the crude paternal -moralisation: to what end, then, the quarrel with accepted language, -to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction? A judgment which -seeks all that is characteristic of my book, first supposed to be -metaphysically heterodox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, -proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the -subject, and in addition, has not understood himself.{47} - -=================================== -{47} The reviewer often fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the -truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am here speaking -simply of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the Wolffian -philosophy, which is merely formal, and with which the distinction -between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned, and in a -transcendental philosophy indeed can have no place. For the rest, he -calls my deduction of the categories and table of the principles of -the understanding, "common well-known axioms of logic and ontology, -expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only consult these -Prolegomena upon this point, to convince himself that a more miserable -and historically incorrect, judgment, could hardly be made. -=================================== - -My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and -superior insight which he keeps hidden; for I am aware of nothing -recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he -should not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there are -doubtless many who, like myself, have not been able to find in all the -fine things that have for long past been written in this department, -anything that has advanced the science by so much as a fingerbreadth; -we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions, the supplying of -lame proofs with new crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of -metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern; but all this is not -what the world requires. The world is tired of metaphysical -assertions; it wants the possibility of the science, the sources from -which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which -it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth. -To this the critic seems to possess a key, otherwise he would never -have spoken out in such a high tone. - -But I am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science -has ever entered his thoughts, for in that case he would have directed -his judgment to this point, and even a mistaken attempt in such an -important matter, would have won his respect. If that be the case, we -are once more good friends. He may penetrate as deeply as he likes -into metaphysics, without any one hindering him; only as concerns that -which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are to be found in -reason, he cannot form a judgment. That my suspicion is not without -foundation, is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word -about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, the special -problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly -rests, and upon which my Critique (as well as the present Prolegomena) -entirely hinges. The Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon, -was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the -above problem (although it received its confirmation on other -grounds), and hence he must have shown either that the above problem -does not possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these -Prolegomena), or that by my conception of appearances, it is either -not solved at all, or can be better solved in another way; but I do -not find a word of this in the criticism. The reviewer, then, -understands nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the -spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and it is not, what -I would rather assume, the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of -plodding through so many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow -over the work lying before him, and made its fundamental features -unrecognisable. - -There is a good deal to be done before a learned journal, it matters -not with what care its writers may be selected, can maintain its -otherwise well-merited reputation, in the field of metaphysics as -elsewhere. Other sciences and branches of knowledge have their -standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and theology, in -profane or sacred books; natural science and the art of medicine, in -mathematics and experience; jurisprudence, in law books; and even -matters of taste in the examples of the ancients. But for the judgment -of the thing called metaphysics, the standard has yet to be found. I -have made an attempt to determine it, as well as its use. What is to -be done, then, until it be found, when works of this kind have to be -judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character, one may do what one -likes; no one will play the master over others here for long, before -someone else appears to deal with him in the same manner. If, however, -they are critical in their character, not indeed with reference to -other works, but to reason itself, so that the standard of judgment -cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though -objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a certain degree of -leniency is indispensable, since the need is common to us all, and the -lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge -unwarranted. - -In order, however, to connect my defence with the interest of the -philosophical commonwealth, I propose a test, which must be decisive -as to the mode, whereby all metaphysical investigations may be -directed to their common purpose. This is nothing more than what -formerly mathematicians have done, in establishing the advantage of -their methods by competition. I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as -is only just, on a priori grounds, in his way, a single really -metaphysical principle asserted by him. Being metaphysical it must be -synthetic and cognised a priori from conceptions, but it may also be -any one of the most indispensable principles, as for instance, the -principle of the persistence of substance, or of the necessary -determination of events in the world by their causes. If he cannot do -this (silence however is confession), he must admit, that as -metaphysics without apodeictic certainty of propositions of this kind -is nothing at all, its possibility or impossibility must before all -things be established in a critique of the pure reason. Thus he is -bound either to confess that my principles in the Critique are -correct, or he must prove their invalidity. But as I can already -foresee, that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the certainty -of his principles, when it comes to a strict test he will not find a -single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward, I -will concede to him an advantageous condition, which can only be -expected in such a competition, and will relieve him of the onus -probandi by laying it on myself. - -He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique (chapter on the -"Theses and Antitheses of the Four Antinomies") eight propositions, of -which two and two contradict one another, but each of which -necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be -accepted or rejected (although there is not one that has not in this -time been held by some philosopher). Now he has the liberty of -selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure, and -accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a present, -but only one (for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to -him as to me), and then of attacking my proof of the opposite -proposition. If I can save this one, and at the same time show, that -according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must -necessarily recognise, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him -can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that -metaphysics has an hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less -set aside, until we ascend to its birth-place, pure reason itself, and -thus my Critique must either be accepted or a better one take its -place; it must at least be studied, which is the only thing I now -require. If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a -synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be -reckoned to the score of my opponent, then also I will deem my -impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust, and pledge myself to -recognise his stricture on my Critique as justified (although this -would not be the consequence by a long way). To this end it would be -necessary, it seems to me, that he should step out of his incognito. -Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that instead of -dealing with one, I should be honored by several problems coming from -anonymous and unqualified opponents. - -PROPOSALS AS TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CRITIQUE UPON WHICH A JUDGMENT -MAY FOLLOW. - -I feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which -it for a long time favored my Critique, for this proves at least a -postponement of judgment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving -all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in which one cannot -at once perhaps so easily find one's way, something may perchance lie, -from which an important but at present dead branch of human knowledge -may derive new life and productiveness. Hence may have originated a -solicitude for the as yet tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a -hasty judgment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above reasons, -is now before my eye in the Gothaischen gelehrten Zeitung, the -thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive, from the -clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first -principles of my work, without taking into consideration my own -suspicious praise. - -And now I propose, since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as -a whole from a hurried glance, to test it piece by piece from its -foundations, so thereby the present Prolegomena may fitly be used as a -general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be -compared. This notion, if it were founded on nothing more than my -conceit of importance, such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own -productions, would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with -disgust. But now, the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived -at the point of total extinction, while human reason hangs upon them -with inextinguishable affection, and only after having been -ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into -indifference. - -In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many deserving -men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest -of the more and more enlightened reason, if there were only some hope -of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even -morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a -space left over, reserved for pure and speculative reason, the vacuity -of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries, and myticism -for what seems to be employment and entertainment, but what actually -is mere pastime; in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason, -which in accordance with its nature requires something that can -satisfy it, and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our -inclinations. A consideration, therefore, which is concerned only with -reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reasonably suppose a -great fascination for every one who has attempted thus to extend his -conceptions, and I may even say a greater than any other theoretical -branch of knowledge, for which he would not willingly exchange it, -because here all other cognitions, and even purposes, must meet and -unite themselves in a whole. - -I offer, therefore, these Prolegomena as a sketch and text-book for -this investigation, and not the work itself. Although I am even now -perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents, order, and -mode of presentation, and the care that I have expended in weighing -and testing every sentence before writing it down, are concerned (for -it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully, not only as regards the -whole, but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular -proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some -sections of the doctrine of elements, as for instance in the deduction -of the conceptions of the Understanding, or in that on the paralogisms -of pure reason, because a certain diffuseness takes away from their -clearness, and in place of them, what is here said in the Prolegomena -respecting these sections, may be made the basis of the test. - -It is the boast of the Germans that where steady and continuous -industry are requisite, they can carry things farther than other -nations. If this opinion be well founded, an opportunity, a business, -presents itself, the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt, -and in which all thinking men can equally take part, though they have -hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming -the above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the science in -question is of so peculiar a kind, that it can be at once brought to -completion and to that enduring state that it will never be able to be -brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries, -or even changed (leaving here out of account adornment by greater -clearness in some places, or additional uses), and this is an -advantage no other science has or can have, because there is none so -fully isolated and independent of others, and which is concerned with -the faculty of cognition pure and simple. And the present moment -seems, moreover, not to be unfavorable to my expectation, for just -now, in Germany, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself, -apart from the so-called useful sciences, so as to pursue not mere -play, but a business possessing an enduring purpose. - -To discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united -in such a purpose, I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is my -intention to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions, or -even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so; but attacks, -repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, completion, and extension, -as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but -investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit -not my own, shall be erected, that shall be a possession for future -generations for which they may have reason to be grateful. - -It would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be -expected, when only the principles of criticism have been perfected, -and how, because the old false feathers have been pulled out, she need -by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure, but -may be in other respects richly and respectably adorned. But other and -great uses which would result from such a reform, strike one -immediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses, in that it sought -out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to -make them clear through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this -way it was a training for reason, in whatever direction it might be -turned; but this was all the good it did; service was subsequently -effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions, sophistry -by subtle distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the ease with -which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little -school-wisdom, which is only the more seductive the more it has the -choice, on the one hand, of taking something from the language of -science, and on the other from that of popular discourse, thus being -everything to everybody, but in reality nothing at all. By criticism, -however, a standard is given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be -with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and firmly founded, -being brought into full operation in metaphysics; a mode of thought -extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of -reason, at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit. But -the service also that metaphysics performs for theology, by making it -independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring -it completely against the attacks of all such opponents, is certainly -not to be valued lightly. For ordinary metaphysics, although it -promised the latter much advantage, could not keep this promise, and -moreover, by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance, did -nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysticism, which can prosper -in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of -school-metaphysics, under the protection of which it may venture to -rave with a semblance of rationality, is driven from this, its last -hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last, but not least, it cannot -be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to -say with universal assent, that what he expounds is Science, and that -thereby genuine services will be rendered to the commonweal. - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Kant's Prolegomena, by Immanuel Kant - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KANT'S PROLEGOMENA *** - -***** This file should be named 52821-0.txt or 52821-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/8/2/52821/ - -Produced by Kevin C. Lombardi -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |