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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19b12b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #52814 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52814) diff --git a/old/52814-0.txt b/old/52814-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 37b8c01..0000000 --- a/old/52814-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10586 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, by Benedetto Croce - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Editor: R. G. Collingwood - -Release Date: August 15, 2016 [EBook #52814] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe (and FreeLitOrg online gains -some more weight, incl. free education worldwide: moocs, -educational resources,...) - - - - - -THE PHILOSOPHY - -OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO. - -BY BENEDETTO CROCE - - -TRANSLATED BY R. G. COLLINGWOOD - -FELLOW AND LECTURER OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD - - -NEW YORK - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -1913 - - - -TO - -WILHELM WINDELBAND - - - - -PREFACE - - -My reasons for believing that a new exposition of Vico's philosophy is -required may easily be inferred from the observations on the effects of -his work and the biographical notes which form respectively the second -and fourth appendices to this volume. - -Here I merely wish to state that my exposition is not meant for a -summary of Vico's writings work by work and part by part. It rather -presupposes an acquaintance with these writings, and, where that is -lacking, is intended to induce the reader to procure them in order to -follow better and to check the interpretation and estimate of them here -offered. - -On this supposition, though I have made free use of my author's actual -words, especially in the chapters dealing with history, I have not -thought it desirable to mark them as quotations except where it was -important to emphasise the precise phrase of the original. I have in -general combined such passages from fragments scattered over a wide -field, sometimes abbreviating, sometimes amplifying, and always freely -adding words and phrases of my own by way of commentary: and the -continual use of quotation marks would merely have shown up in a manner -more wearisome than valuable the reverse side of my embroidery, which -any reader who so desires can study by the help of the references given -at the end of the book. - -In my anxiety to show in every detail of my work, so far as I could, -the veneration due to the great name of Vico, I have endeavoured to -be brief with the brevity at which he himself aimed as the hall-mark -of sterling scientific thought. With this in view I have refrained -even from controversy with his various interpreters, and have either -contented myself with mere remarks, or more often left my details -to be justified by the coherence of my view as a whole. Some of the -interpretations supported by me I believe to be the mature fruit of -the investigations and controversies which form the greater part -of the literature on Vico: all the rest, for which I am personally -responsible, and the general idea of my book, I will defend against -alternative and contradictory views when occasion arises, should it -ever do so, in the detailed and direct manner which I have not thought -it necessary to adopt in the course of my exposition. I hope, in fact, -that the present work will rekindle rather than quench the discussion -of Vico's philosophy: since in him we have, as Goethe calls him, the -_Altvater_ whom a nation is happy to possess, and to him we must hark -back for a time in order to imbue our modern philosophy with an Italian -feeling, however cosmopolitan it may be in thought. - -The dedication of my book, besides being a token of respect to one of -the greatest modern teachers of the history of philosophy, is intended -to express the expectation and hope that the gap in this history to -which I have called attention more than once, especially on page 277 of -the present volume, may soon be filled. - -B. C. - -RAIANO (AQUILA), - -_September_ 1910. - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - -This volume represents the author's _La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico_ -(Bari, 1911) forming vol. ii. of his _Saggi filosofici_; and also -contains a paper read before the Accademia Pontaniana in March 1912 -entitled "Le Fonti della gnoseologia vichiana," which figures here as -Appendix III. The whole of the translation has been revised by the -Author. - -R. G. C. - -OXFORD, 1913. - - - -CONTENTS - - - I. VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE - II. VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE - III. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE - IV. THE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (POETRY AND LANGUAGE) - V. THE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (MYTH AND RELIGION) - VI. THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS - VII. MORALITY AND RELIGION - VIII. MORALITY AND LAW - IX. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW - X. PROVIDENCE - XI. THE LAW OF REFLUX - XII. METAPHYSICS - XIII. TRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY - XIV. NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS - XV. HEROIC SOCIETY - XVI. HOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY - XVII. THE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY - XVIII. THE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES - XIX. VICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE - XX. CONCLUSION: VICO AND LATER THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL - -APPENDICES - - I. ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO - II. THE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT - III. THE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE - IV. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES - -NOTE.--PASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL -REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE -EXPOSITION - -INDEX OF NAMES - - - -CHAPTER I - - -VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE - - -The earliest phase of Vico's theory of knowledge takes the form of a -direct criticism of and antithesis to the Cartesianism which had guided -European thought for more than half a century, and was to maintain its -supremacy over mind and spirit for another hundred years. - -Descartes, as is well known, had placed the ideal of perfect science in -geometry, and endeavoured to reform philosophy and every other branch -of knowledge upon this model. Now the geometrical method proceeds -analytically till it reaches a self-evident truth, and thence by -synthetic deduction it advances to more and more complex propositions. -Accordingly, if philosophy were to adopt a rigorous scientific method, -it also (thought Descartes) must look for a solid foundation in the -shape of an elementary and self-evident truth from which to deduce all -its subsequent statements, whether theological, metaphysical, physical, -or ethical. Thus self-evidence--the "clear and distinct perception -or idea"--was the supreme test: immediate inference--the intuitive -connexion of thought with existence, _cogito_ with _sum--_ provided the -elementary truth and the foundation of knowledge. By means of the clear -and distinct perception, together with the systematic doubt which led -him to the _cogito,_ Descartes persuaded himself that he had once and -for all made an end of scepticism. - -But, by the same argument, all knowledge which had not been or could -not be reduced to clear and distinct perception and geometrical -deduction was bound to lose in his eyes all value and importance. This -included history, as founded upon testimony; observation of nature, -when not within the sphere of mathematics; practical wisdom and -eloquence, which draw their validity from empirical knowledge of human -character; and poetry, with its world of imaginary presentations. Such -products of the mind were for Descartes illusions, chaotic visions, -rather than knowledge: confused ideas, destined either to become clear -and distinct and so no longer to exist in their original nature, or -else to drag on a miserable existence unworthy of a philosopher's -consideration. The daylight of the mathematical method rendered useless -the lamps which, while they guide us in the darkness, throw deceptive -shadows. - -Vico, unlike the other opponents of Descartes, did not confine himself -to or waste time in scandalised outcries at the danger to religion -entailed by the subjective method. He did not inquire, like the -schoolmen, whether the _cogito_ was or was not a syllogism, and if so -whether it was or was not defective. He did not join in the protest -of outraged common-sense against the Cartesian contempt of history, -rhetoric, and poetry. He went straight to the heart of the question, -to Descartes' criterion of scientific truth itself, the principle of -self-evidence. While the French philosopher believed himself to have -satisfied all the demands of the strictest science, Vico saw that as -a matter of fact, in view of the need which he set out to meet, his -proposed method gave little or no assistance. - -Fine knowledge, says Vico, this of the clear and distinct idea! That -I think what I think is certainly an indubitable fact; but it has by -no means the appearance of a scientific statement. Any idea, however -false, may seem self-evident: that I think it so does not give it -the force of knowledge. That "he who thinks, exists" was a fact well -known to Plautus's Sosia, who expressed this conviction in almost -the identical words of the Cartesian philosophy: "but when I think, -I certainly exist" (_sed quom cogito, equidem certo sum_). But the -sceptic will always reply to a Sosia or a Descartes that he has no -doubt as to thought; he will even strongly maintain that whatever seems -to him cogent is certain, and will uphold it against all objections; -and that he has no doubt as to existence: in fact, he is seeking -after it in the right way by suspending judgment and not adding to -the obscurity of facts other obscurities arising from opinions. But -while asserting all this he will still maintain that the certitude -of his thought and of his existence is the certitude not of science -but of consciousness, and of common consciousness at that. Clear and -distinct perception is so far from being science that since, owing to -Cartesianism, the principle has been applied to physics, our knowledge -of nature has become no more certain. Descartes tried to leap from the -plane of common consciousness to that of science: he fell back into -common consciousness again without having touched his scientific ideal. - -But in what does scientific truth consist, if not in immediate -consciousness? How does science differ from simple consciousness? What -is the criterion, or, in other words, what is the condition which makes -science possible? Clearness and distinctness do not take us a step -forward. The formulation of an elementary truth does not solve the -problem. The question concerns not a primary truth, but the form which -truth must have to enable us to recognise it for scientific or real -truth. - -In meeting this question, Vico justified his criticism of the -inadequacy of the Cartesian criterion by appealing to a principle -which at first sight may seem trite and obvious. It is trite not -because of the historic theory with which Vico associated it, a theory -later refuted by himself: not, that is, because it belongs to one of -the earliest strata of Italian philosophy; but in the sense that it -was common to and practically inseparable from Christian thought. -To a Christian who declares every day his belief in a God Almighty, -Omniscient, Maker of heaven and earth, nothing is more familiar than -the assertion that God alone can fully know all things, because he -alone is their creator. The primal truth, Vico repeats, is in God, -because God is the primal creator. It is an infinite truth because he -is the maker of all things, and absolute because it displays to him the -internal and external qualities of things, all of which he contains in -himself. - -This same principle of religion and theology had been already invoked -in a philosophical context by certain sceptics, as a weapon against -the presumptuous claims of human knowledge. Francisco Sanchez, for -example, in his _Quod nihil scitur_ (1581), in discussing the difficulty -of knowing the nature and powers of the soul, had observed that if man -could have this knowledge in a perfect degree he would be like God, -or rather he would be God himself: since it is impossible "that one -should know perfectly things which he has not created, nor could God -have created things of which he had not perfect foreknowledge, nor -ruled them when created: he himself therefore, being alone the perfect -wisdom, knowledge, and intellect, penetrates all things, is wise -concerning all things, knows all things, and understands all things, -because he is all things and in all things, and all things are he and -in him" (_perfecte cognoscere quis quae non creavit, nec Deus creare -potuisset nec creata regere quae non perfecte praecognovisset: ipse -ergo solus sapientia cognitio intellectus perfectus omnia penetrat -omnia sapit omnia cognoscit omnia intelligit, quia ipse omnia est et -in omnibus, omniaque ipse sunt et in ipso_).[1] But Sanchez appeals to -this thought only in passing, and without grasping its philosophical -import or realising that his hand was resting upon a treasure; while -Vico for the first time drew from the praise of the infinite power -and wisdom of God, and from their contrast with the limited faculties -of man, the universal principle of his theory of knowledge, that the -condition under which a thing can be known is that the knower should -have made it, that the true is identical with the created: _verum ipsum -factum._ - -This, he explained, is precisely what is meant by saying that science -is to know by causes, _per causas scire._ Since a cause is that which -has no need of anything external in order to produce its effect, it -is the genus or mode of a thing: to know the cause is to be able to -realise the thing, to deduce it from its cause and create it. In other -words, it is an ideal repetition of a process which has been or is -being practically performed. Cognition and action must be convertible -and identical, just as with God intellect and will are convertible and -form one single unity. - -Now once this connexion of the true with the created is recognised as -the ideal, and indeed, since the ideal is the truly real, as the true -nature of science, the first consequence of such a recognition must be -that science is unattainable to man. If God created the world, he alone -knows it _per causas,_ he alone knows its genera or modes, he alone -possesses scientific knowledge of it. Did man make the world? Did he -make his own soul? - -To man is vouchsafed, not science, but only consciousness, which -merely traverses objects without being able to show the genus or form -whence they proceed. The truth of consciousness is the human side -of divine wisdom, related to it as the surface to the solid: rather -than truth, we ought to call it certitude. For God, _intellegere,_ -understanding; for man only _cogitare,_ thought, the faculty that -gleans elements of reality, but can never gather them all. For -God, true demonstration; for man, observations undemonstrated and -unscientific, but either certain through indubitable evidence, probable -through sound reasoning, or convincing because of a plausible guess. - -Certitude, the truth of consciousness, is not science; but it is not -on that account false. Vico was careful not to call the theories of -Descartes false: his intention was only to lower them from complete -truth to fragmentary truth, from science to consciousness. _Cogito ergo -sum_ is very far from false. That we find it expressed by Plautus's -Sosia is an argument not for rejecting it, but for accepting it; only, -as a truth of simple consciousness. Thought is not the cause of my -existence, and as such is not the ground of scientific knowledge of -that existence. If it were, since man, as the Cartesians admitted, -consists of body and mind, thought would be the cause of the body: a -doctrine which would plunge us into all the mazes of the controversy on -the mutual effects of mind and matter. The _cogito,_ then, is a mere -sign or indication of my existence, and nothing more. The clear and -distinct idea cannot serve as a criterion even of the mind itself, to -say nothing of other things; since the mind, though it knows itself, -does not create itself, and accordingly is ignorant of the genus or -mode by which it has this knowledge. But the clear and distinct idea -is all that is granted to human thought, and, as the only wealth -it possesses, is beyond price. For Vico, too, metaphysic holds the -highest place among the human sciences, and all others depend upon -it; but while for Descartes it can proceed by a method of absolute -demonstration parallel to that of geometry, for Vico it must be -satisfied with probabilities. It is a science not by causes, but of -causes. And with probabilities it has been content in its greatest -periods, in ancient Greece and in Italy at the Renaissance. Whenever, -intoxicated by the arrogance that declares that "a wise man has no -opinions" (_sapientem nihil opinati_), it has sought to abandon the -probable, it has set its feet upon the path of confusion and decadence. -The existence of God is certain, but not scientifically demonstrable; -and any attempt at such a demonstration must be considered a proof not -so much of piety as of impiety, since to demonstrate God we must create -him: man must become the creator of God. Similarly we must accept as -true all that God has revealed; but we must not ask how it comes to be -true. That we can never understand. Human science bases itself upon -revealed truth and the consciousness of God, and finds there its test -of truth; but the foundation itself is not science, but consciousness. - -Just as Vico depreciated metaphysics, theology, and physics, the -sciences upon which Descartes had bestowed honour and attention, so -he reinstated those branches of knowledge which Descartes had in -turn despised; namely, history, observation of nature, empirical -knowledge of man and society, eloquence and poetry. Or rather, he could -vindicate them without reinstating them. Once he had shown that the -lofty truths of a geometrically deduced philosophy were themselves -brought down to mere probability, to statements having the validity of -simple consciousness, the other forms of knowledge were _ipso facto_ -conclusively vindicated. All now found themselves upon an equality -in the position, whether high or low, which we have described. The -idea of a perfect human science, holding itself aloof from another -science unworthy of the title, as founded not on reason but on -authority, was shown to be illusory. The authority of observations -and beliefs, whether one's own or others', public opinion, tradition, -the consciousness of mankind, were restored to the position which -they had always held: a position which they held even for Descartes -himself, who, as often happens, despised the resources in which he was -richest and of which he made the greatest use. A conspicuously learned -man, he depreciated learning and scholarship, as one who has received -nourishment from it might give himself the luxury of speaking with -contempt of the common food which by now forms the very blood in his -veins. - -The Cartesian polemic against authority had proved in some respects -beneficial. It put an end to the servile attitude, all too common, of -continual appeals to authority. But this error was not more prevalent -than that of private judgment, which presumed to reorganise knowledge -from top to bottom on the strength of the individual consciousness: -a tendency which ultimately, as in the case of Malebranche, leads to -prophesying the immolation of all the ancient philosophers and poets, -and a return to the nakedness of Adam. It is a fallacy, or at least -an excess, which should be avoided by adopting a sound middle course. -This course consists in following private judgment with due regard to -authority; in a true catholic union of faith with a criticism limited -by and helpful to faith; bearing in mind the necessary character of -mere probability which is proper to human knowledge or science, and -avoiding the tendency of the Reformation which elevates each man's -inner consciousness into a divine guide in matters of belief. - -To another group of the Cartesian sciences, however, Vico seems to -grant a privileged position, one, that is, not of consciousness but -of science strictly so called, in the sphere not of certitude but -of truth; namely, the mathematical sciences. These, according to -him, form the only region in which man's knowledge is identical in -character with God's, perfect and demonstrative. This is not due, as -Descartes supposed, to their self-evident character. Self-evidence, -when employed in physical science and in matters of action, does -not yield truth of the same conclusiveness as in mathematics. Nor -is mathematics in itself self-evident. What clear and distinct idea -can lead, for instance, to the conception of a line as composed of -points having no parts? But the indivisible point which cannot be -conceived in the world of reality, can be nevertheless denned. By -defining certain names, man creates the elements of mathematics; by -the postulates, he carries them on to infinity; by the axioms, he -establishes certain eternal truths; and, disposing these elements with -the help of these infinities and this eternity, he creates the truth -which he teaches. The validity of mathematics then arises not from the -Cartesian principle, but precisely from Vico's other proposition, the -conversion of knowledge with creation. "We demonstrate mathematics, -because we create their truth" (_mathematica demonstramus, quia verum -facimus_). Man assumes unity and multiplicity, points and figures, and -creates numbers and quantities which he knows perfectly because they -are his own work. Mathematics is a constructive science; not only in -its problems, but even in its theorems, which are commonly supposed -to be mere objects of contemplation. For this reason it is a science -which demonstrates _per causas,_ in opposition to that other common -view which excludes from mathematics the concept of causation. It is in -fact the only one among all the human sciences which truly demonstrates -by causes. Hence its extraordinary accuracy. The whole secret of the -geometrical method lies first in defining the terms, that is, creating -the concepts which are to be the subject matter of our reasoning; -secondly, in establishing certain common principles by mutual -consent of the disputants; and lastly, if required, in making certain -postulates of such a nature that they can be granted, to enable us to -proceed with our deductions, which without such an agreement could -make no progress; then, upon these principles, to advance by degrees -from the demonstration of the simplest truths to the most complex, and -not to affirm the complex propositions before examining singly their -component parts. - -It might be said that, as to the validity of mathematics, Vico is in -agreement with Descartes; he differs from him only in his reason for -this validity. And, admitting that Vico's reason must be thought the -more profound, this would only enhance and strengthen the mathematical -ideal which Descartes had set before science. If mathematics is the one -perfect form of knowledge attained by the human mind, obviously we must -found the others upon it, and either remodel or condemn them according -to its pattern. Vico, in short, was hasty in declaring Descartes wrong: -he had found a better argument whose existence the latter had not -suspected. But, however strongly this may appear at first sight (and so -it has appeared to some commentators), on a closer examination it is -seen that the high perfection attributed by Vico to mathematics is more -apparent than real; that the vaunted conclusiveness of its method is by -his own confession gained at the expense of truth: in a word, that the -stress of his theory falls less on the truth of mathematics than on its -arbitrary nature. - -The fact is, that man, while occupying himself with the investigation -of the nature of things, and ultimately realising his total inability -to attain it, not having in himself the elements of which they are -composed, which are indeed all external to his nature, is led by -degrees to the intention of profiting by this very fault of his -mind. By means of abstraction--not, be it remembered, abstraction -from material things, for Vico is opposed to the empirical origin -of mathematics, but abstraction brought to bear on metaphysical -entities--he creates two fictions, _duo sibi confingit_: the point in -geometrical figures, and unity in multiplication. Each is a fiction, -_utrumque fictum,_ because the point when drawn is no longer a point, -and the unit when multiplied is no longer one. Then, from these -fictions, by his own arbitrary fiat, _proprio iure,_ he assumes an -infinite process, so that lines may be produced or the unit multiplied -_ad infinitum._ Thus he constructs for his own purposes a world of -forms and numbers, all of which he embraces within himself; and by -lengthening, shortening, and combining the lines and adding and -subtracting the numbers, he performs infinite operations and learns -infinite truths. Since he cannot define things, he defines names; since -he cannot reach the elements of reality he satisfies himself with -imaginary elements, the ideas arising from which admit of no dispute. -Like God, _ad Dei instar,_ from no material substrate and, as it were, -out of nothing he creates the point, the line, and the surface; the -point, assumed as that which has no parts; the line, as the locus of -a point, or as length without breadth or depth; and the surface, as -the meeting of two different lines in one point, that is, length and -breadth without depth. Thus mathematics overcomes the failing of human -knowledge, that its objects are always external to itself, and that the -mind which endeavours to know them has not created them. Mathematics -creates what it knows; it contains in itself its own elements, and -thus forms a perfect copy of the divine knowledge (_scientiae divinae -similes evadunt_). - -The reader of these and other similar descriptions and praises by Vico -of the processes of mathematics seems to observe in them something like -a tinge of irony; which, if not actually intentional, certainly results -from the facts of the case. The brilliant truth of mathematics arises, -it appears, from despair of attaining truth; its tremendous power -from the knowledge of impotence. The similarity of the mathematician -to God is not altogether unlike that of the imitator of an object to -its creator. What God is in the universe of reality, man is in the -universe of quantity and number,--a universe indeed, but one peopled by -abstractions and fictions. The divinity which has been conferred upon -man is only, so to speak, a Twelfth-night Godhead. - -The different origin assigned by Vico to mathematics results in -a correspondingly profound change in the validity of its truth. -Mathematics no longer, as with Descartes, stands at the summit of human -knowledge, an aristocratic science, destined to reclaim and to rule -over the inferior sciences. It occupies a field as strictly limited as -it is unique, beyond which if it ever attempts to pass it loses in a -moment its magical virtue. - -The power of mathematics is met by obstacles both _a parte ante_ and -_a parte post,_ in its foundations and in the superstructure which in -its turn it is to support. In its foundations, because if it creates -its own elements, that is to say, the initial fictions, it does not -create the matter of which they are formed, which is given to it no -less than to the other human sciences by metaphysics, which while -it cannot supply it with its true subject matter, supplies it with -definite images of it. From metaphysics, geometry takes the point by -drawing it, that is by annihilating it as a point, and arithmetic the -unit by multiplying it, that is by destroying it _qua_ unit. But since -metaphysical truth, however certain it may seem to consciousness, -is indemonstrable, mathematics itself rests in the last resort upon -authority and probability. This is enough to expose the fallaciousness -of any mathematical treatise which makes use of metaphysics. Vico seems -to be involved in a kind of circle between geometry and metaphysics, -of which the former, according to him, owes its truth to the latter, -and after receiving it gives it back again to metaphysics, thus in -turn supporting the human science by the divine. But this conception, -the truth of which is more than doubtful, indeed we may frankly call -it inconsistent and contradictory, recalls, whatever its value, the -metaphysical or rather poetical or symbolic use made of mathematics by -Pythagoras and other philosophers of antiquity and the Renaissance, -and has no resemblance to a mathematically-treated philosophy like the -Cartesian. Geometry in Vico's opinion is the one hypothesis by which -metaphysics passes over into physical science. But while making this -advance it remains a hypothesis, a probability, something intermediate -between faith and criticism, imagination and reason; which indeed is -the eternal character of metaphysics and human science in general -according to Vico's point of view in this first phase of his theory of -knowledge. - -Just as mathematics cannot be the basis of metaphysics, the science -from which it is itself derived, so it cannot provide a foundation for -the other sciences, although they follow it in order of derivation. -All objects other than number and size are beyond the reach of the -geometrical method. Physical science is indemonstrable: if we could -demonstrate the physical world, we should be creating it (_si physica -demonstrare possemus, faceremus_): but we do not create it, and -are accordingly unable to demonstrate it. The introduction of the -mathematical method into natural science has not helped it. Without the -mathematical method, science makes great discoveries; by its means it -has made none, whether great or small. The physical science of to-day -is in fact like a house, sumptuously furnished by former owners, to -which their heirs have added nothing, but have occupied themselves -merely in moving and rearranging the furniture. Accordingly, we must -reintroduce and maintain the experimental method in physical science, -as opposed to this mathematical method; the English tendency as -opposed to the French; the cautious use made of mathematics by Galileo -and his school, as against the Cartesians' reckless and presumptuous -employment of it. The English are right in not allowing physical -science to be taught in the mathematical style. Such a style admits of -progress only when the terms are defined, the axioms established, and -the postulates granted. In physical science we have to define not terms -but things: we can make no unchallenged statements; and the complexity -of nature forbids our forming any postulates. Thus in the more -favourable instances this method results in a mere harmless verbalism. -Observations of nature are expounded with the phrases: "By definition -IV.," "By postulate II.," "By axiom III.," and concluded with the -pompous abbreviation "Q.E.D." But all this carries no demonstrative -conviction. The mind retains as much freedom of opinion as it had -before listening to such noisy methods. In these circumstances Vico -could not refrain from satirical comparisons. The geometrical method, -he says, in its proper sphere works unnoticed; when it makes a noise, -it shows that it is doing no work; just as a coward's attack consists -of much shouting and no blows, while a brave man holds his tongue and -strikes home. Again, the man who upholds the geometrical method in -subjects where it fails to carry conviction, when he pronounces this -to be an axiom, or that to be a demonstrated truth, is like a man who -draws amorphous pictures, quite unrecognisable without assistance, -and then writes underneath "This is a man," or "This is a satyr," or -"This is a lion," or the like. Hence it happens that the very same -geometrical method served Proclus to demonstrate the principles of -Aristotelian science, and Descartes to demonstrate his own, though -totally distinct from, if not diametrically opposed to them. Yet each -was a great geometrician, whom no one could accuse of inability to -use the method. What ought to be introduced into natural science is -not the method of geometry, but its conclusiveness; which is precisely -what can never be done. Still less is it possible in other sciences, -in proportion as they are more material and concrete; least of all in -ethical science. For this reason, where the reality cannot be used, -the name is misused instead; till, just as the title "Master," which -Tiberius once refused as too haughty, is given to-day to the humblest -man, so the name "demonstration," applied as it is to arguments at best -probable, sometimes patently fallacious, has impaired the respect due -to truth. - -Even for mathematics itself Vico apprehends danger from the -substitution of analytic for geometrical or synthetic methods. He -doubts whether modern mechanics is really a product of analysis; for -analysis blunts the inventive faculty or talent, and though infallible -in, its results (_opere_) is confused in its processes (_opera_); while -the synthetic method is _turn opere cum opera_ infallible. Analysis -presents its grounds by inquiring whether the equations of which it is -in search happen to be present; it appears to be an art of guessing, -a kind of mechanism rather than thought. For similar reasons Vico -attached no value, to the more or less mechanical topics and arts of -discovery and memory invented by Lulle and Kircher. - -The sympathy with experimental methods which as we have seen estranged -Vico from the French tendency of thought, that is from Cartesianism, -and directed him towards the Italian and English schools of Galileo -and Bacon, led him on the other hand to a hostile attitude towards -Aristotelianism and scholasticism. Inculcating as he did the pursuit -of the particular and the use of inductive methods, asserting that -man possessed an inexhaustible wealth of physical knowledge which, -thanks to fire, machinery, and tools, was able to issue in the -creation of objects resembling the special products of nature, and -praising his own metaphysic as one subservient to (_ancillantem_) -the ends of experimental science, he was bound to realise how well -deserved was the too universal discredit, as he calls it, into which -Aristotelian science had fallen. If he disapproved of the introduction -by Descartes of physical forms into metaphysics, and of his resulting -materialistic tendencies, he accused Aristotle and the schoolmen of the -opposite error of introducing metaphysical forms into natural science. -Like Bacon he held that the syllogism and sorites produce nothing -new, and only repeat what was already contained in their premisses. -He emphasised the many ill effects of the Aristotelian universal -in every department of knowledge; in jurisprudence, where empty -generalities crush legislative wisdom; in medicine, which aims rather -at propping up systems than at healing the sick; and in practical -life, in which he describes the abusers of universals by the mocking -title of "Thematists." The use of universals results in homonymies -or equivocations which cause all kinds of errors. As against this -distrust of universals in the sense of general or abstract conceptions, -Vico showed a corresponding reverence for the Platonic ideas, the -metaphysical forms, or as he also called them, kinds; the eternal and -infinitely perfect patterns of things. A nominalist in mathematics, -Vico was suspicious of nominalism in all other fields of knowledge. He -asserts the reality of the forms or ideas, and tells how from his youth -up he was attracted by this doctrine, which he learnt from a teacher of -his, who as a Scotist was a follower of the scholastic system most akin -to Plato's. - -Taken as a whole Vico's first theory of knowledge is neither -intellectualistic, sensationalistic, nor truly speculative. It contains -all these three elements, harmonised to a certain extent, not by -a hierarchical subordination of any two to the third, but by the -subjection of all three to a recognition of the inadequacy of human -knowledge. Its intention may have been to meet by a tactical manoeuvre -dogmatics and sceptics at once, the former by denying that we can know -everything, the latter by denying that we can know nothing at all. -But its actual outcome is an assertion of scepticism or agnosticism, -tinged, however, with a trace of mysticism. God's knowledge is the -complete sphere of knowledge, the unity of which man's is but a series -of fragments. God knows all things because he contains in himself all -the elements of which he makes them: man tries to understand them by -taking them to pieces. Human science is a sort of anatomy of the world -of nature; it divides man into body and soul, and soul into intellect -and will: from body it abstracts figure and motion, and from these -existence and unity. Of these metaphysics studies existence, arithmetic -unity and multiplication, geometry figure and its measurements, -mechanics the motion of the circumference, physical science the motion -of the centre, medicine the body, logic the reason, and ethics the -will. But this anatomy meets with the same fate as that of the human -body. In the latter case, the greatest physiologists doubt whether, -owing to the effects of death and of dissection itself, it is possible -at all to discover the true position, structure, and function of the -organs. Existence, unity, figure, motion, body, intellect, and will -are one thing for God, for whom they coalesce into one, and another -for man, to whom they remain distinct. For God they live, for man they -are dead. The clear and distinct perception is a proof not of the -strength but of the weakness of the human understanding. Physical laws -appear self-evident just until they are subjected to comparison with -metaphysical. The _Cogito ergo sum_ is absolutely conclusive when man -considers himself as a finite being; but when he includes himself in -God, the one true being, he realises that in truth he does not exist -at all. By means of extension and its three dimensions we believe -ourselves to establish eternal truths; but in fact _coelum ipsum -petimus stultitia,_ since the eternal truths exist in God alone. The -axiom that the whole is greater than the part may seem eternal, but if -we go back to the beginning, we find that it is false: we see that the -centre of the circle contains in itself as much capacity for extension -as the whole circumference. Wherefore, Vico concludes, "he has advanced -in metaphysics who in the study of this science has lost himself." - -To hold, as some have done, that these words show Vico a simple -Platonist or a follower of the traditional Christian philosophy, -would entail denying any importance whatever to his first theory of -knowledge. It would be a confession of adherence to the fallacious -method of philosophical criticism and history which looks only at the -general conclusions of a system and ignores the particular content -which alone gives it its true individuality. No doubt, any philosophy -must always in its ultimate conclusions be either agnostic, mystical, -materialistic, spiritualistic, or the like: in other words, it must -have its place in one or other of the eternal categories in which -thought and philosophical inquiry move. But to expound philosophers -in this one-sided manner can only serve to perpetuate the mistakes -repeated over and over again in the history of thought, when it passes -fruitlessly from one error to another, leaving the old only to adopt -the new, itself perhaps an old one born again or painted with the -colours of youth. The Platonismi agnosticism, or mysticism of Vico -is in the fullest sense of the word original, because it forms the -accompaniment of doctrines not only not inferior to the average of -contemporary thought, but greatly in advance of it. - -The first of these doctrines is the theory of knowledge as the -conversion of the true with the created, Vico's substitute for the -otiose criterion of the clear and distinct perception. Though this -conversion represents for Vico an ideal unattainable to man, it yet -does not bring with it an exact definition of the condition and -character of knowledge, the identity of thought and being, without -which knowledge is inconceivable. - -The second is the revelation of the nature of mathematics, as unique -among the forms of human knowledge in origin, rigorous because -arbitrary, wonderful but unfit to rule over and transform the rest of -our knowledge. - -Finally, the third doctrine is the vindication of the world of -intuition, empirical knowledge, probability, and authority, all those -forms of experience which intellectualism ignored or denied. - -In these points Vico the agnostic, the Platonist, the mystic, was -neither agnostic nor mystic nor Platonist. He achieved a threefold -advance upon Descartes, and upon all these three heads criticised him -conclusively. - -The one thing in which Descartes was still in advance of Vico was -precisely that dogmatism of which Vico would have none. Descartes, -whether he succeeded or not, projected a perfect human science -deduced from the internal consciousness. Vico, on the other hand, -considering the French philosopher too confident and despairing of -the success of his project, proclaimed the transcendent nature of -truth, took his stand upon revelation, and contented himself with -producing a metaphysic worthy of man's weakness, _humana imbecillitate -dignam._ His was a philosophy of humility, as the Cartesian was one of -self-confidence. - -Now Vico could not advance even to this position without relaxing -to some extent part of his humility, and taking over something of -Descartes's confidence: without introducing into his Catholic turn of -mind some trace of the leaven of that Protestantism he thought so -dangerous, and venturing to conceive a philosophy rather less worthy of -man's weakness and correspondingly more worthy of man, a creature at -once strong and weak, at once man and God. This advance is to be seen -in the next phase of his thought. - - -[Footnote 1: In the appendix to his _Opera Medica_ (Tolosae Tectosagum, -1636, p. 110). Windelband draws attention to this thought, _Gesch. der -neueren Philosophie,_ 3rd ed. i. p. 23.] - - - - -CHAPTER II - - -VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE - - -The will to believe, which in Vico's case was very strong, and the -complete sway which the Catholicism of his country and age held over -his mind, bound him firmly down to the Christian Platonic metaphysic -and theory of knowledge; a theory whose inherent contradictions were -prevented by the above psychological facts from coming explicitly -before his mind. The idea of God at once dominated and supported him; -he neither had the audacity nor realised the necessity to probe to the -bottom such problems as the validity of revelation, the conceivability -of a God apart from the world, or the possibility of affirming the -existence of God without in some sense demonstrating and therefore -creating him. For Vico to open up and partially traverse a new path, -which should lead the human mind to transcend that of the Christian -Platonists, providence--to use for the moment an idea of his own which -we shall explain later on--had perforce to deceive him; to lead him by -a long and circuitous way to the commencement of the new path without -letting him suspect where it would end. - -The writings in which Vico expounds his first theory of knowledge, _De -ratione studiorum_ and _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia,_ together -with the polemical works bearing upon them, belong to the four years -from 1708 to 1712. In the following decade Vico was gradually led -to devote himself more and more to research in the history of law -and of the State. He read Grotius as a preparation for writing the -life of Antonio Carafa, and plunged into the controversy on Natural -Rights. He pursued his studies of Roman law and the science of law in -general, in order to fit himself for a chair of jurisprudence at Naples -University. He pondered upon the origins of languages, religions, and -states, out of dissatisfaction with his own historical theories as -set forth in the _Be antiquissima_; perhaps also his convictions were -shaken by a well-directed criticism by the editor of the _Giornale -dei letterati._ His profession, the teaching of rhetoric, gave him -continual opportunities for meditating upon the nature and relations -of poetry and the forms of language. Thus even if it is inaccurate to -say that Vico was led to his later position culminating in the _Scienza -Nuova_ by a philological, not a philosophical process (since clearly -a philosophical position can only come into being through a process -no less philosophical), it is at least certain that the material and -stimulus for his new thought were supplied by philological studies. - -These studies seem to have impressed upon him a fact of great -importance; namely, that this subject-matter could only be and had -actually been worked over by his thought through the aid of certain -necessary principles, appearing on every page of the history which -he had chosen for investigation. He had once believed that the moral -sciences, as compared with the mathematical method, took the lowest -place as regards certainty. But now, in his daily acquaintance with -these sciences, he had come to hold the opposite view; namely, that -nothing could be firmer than the foundation of the moral sciences! - -This certainty was not the simple self-evidence of Descartes, in which -the object, however internal it is said to be, remains extrinsic to -the subject. It was a truly internal certainty, reached by an internal -process. In the assimilation of historical facts, Vico felt himself -to be making more truly his own something that already belonged to -him; to be entering into possession of what was his by right. He was -reconstructing the history of man; and what was the history of man but -a product of man himself? Is not the creator of history simply man, -with his ideas, his passions, his will, and his actions? And is not the -mind of man, the creator of history, identical with the mind which is -at work in thinking it and knowing it? The truth of the constructive -principles of history then comes not from the validity of the clear and -distinct idea, but from the indissoluble connexion of the subject and -object of knowledge. - -The importance of this new discovery, the discovery of the truth which -Vico now recognised in the moral sciences, lay in the realisation of -a new implication of the theory of knowledge laid down by himself in -the former period of his speculations; namely, the criterion of truth -consisting in the "convertibility of the true with the created." The -reason why man could have perfect knowledge of man's world was simply -that he had himself made that world. "When it happens that he who -creates things also describes them, then the history is certain in the -highest degree." - -Connected as it thus was with his earlier view, the assertion of the -possibility of the moral sciences did not, to Vico's own mind, present -the importance and bring with it the consequences of a revolution -entirely overthrowing the structure of his ideas, and compelling him -to adjust them afresh. On the one hand, this assertion seemed to him a -confirmation of his former doctrine, a new example to be added to those -he had already collected of perfect knowledge; namely, God's knowledge -of the universe and man's of the world of mathematics. On the other -hand, it seemed to be an extension of the field of knowledge, whose -boundaries (for definite boundaries still existed) had at first been -too narrowly drawn. Formerly he had described a small luminous sphere -in the centre of a vast and dimly lighted field; now the luminous -sphere underwent a definite increase in size, and the penumbral region -a corresponding diminution. This increase involved no sort of conflict -with his religious beliefs; in fact, it seemed to support them and to -gain support from them in turn. For did not religion teach the liberty, -responsibility, and consciousness which man has in respect of his own -acts and creations? - -Thus Vico did not feel obliged to write a new treatise on metaphysics. -It seemed enough to add a mere post-script to his former work, and -to correct to some extent his earlier assertions. His new theory of -knowledge, while adhering strictly to the criterion of truth enunciated -by him in opposition to that of Descartes--the principle, that is, that -only the creator of a thing can know it--divided the whole of reality -into the world of nature and the world of man. But, while it laid down -that the world of nature is created by God and that therefore God alone -knows it, it restricted its agnosticism to this field. It asserted, -on the other hand, that the human world, being man's creation, is -known by man. In this way it raised the knowledge of human affairs, -formerly considered merely approximate and probable, to the rank of -perfect science; and it expressed surprise that philosophers should -so laboriously endeavour to attain to science of the world of nature, -which is a sealed book to mankind, while passing over the world of man, -the science of which is attainable. The cause of this error he traced -to the ease with which man's mind, involved and buried as it is in the -body, feels bodily things, and the labour and pains it costs it to -understand itself, as the bodily eye sees all objects outside itself, -but in order to see itself requires the help of the mirror. - -In everything else his system remained unchanged. Beyond the world -of man lay the supernatural world, inaccessible to man, and the world -of nature, itself also in a sense supernatural. Beyond the perfect -knowledge which man could have of himself lay the metaphysic of -Christian Platonism, now reduced to impotence, but continuing none -the less to embarrass mankind. The natural sciences were now, as -before, regarded as incomplete forms of knowledge: mathematics as a -system of abstractions, absolutely valid in the abstract but in face -of reality powerless. The Aristotelian syllogism, the Stoic sorites, -and the Cartesian geometrical method were pursued with the same hatred -as before; and the same enthusiastic praise was lavished upon the -induction advocated and illustrated in his _Organum_ by Bacon, that -"great philosopher and great statesman," and fruitfully employed by his -countrymen in experimental philosophy. - -Vico's frequent claim to have constructed the science of human affairs -on "a strict geometric method" might seem to indicate a change of -opinion as to the applicability of that method. But his continual -warnings, during the same period and in the same works, against the -use in physical and moral questions of the mathematical method, which, -"where there are no figures either of lines or numbers, either gives -us no conclusiveness, or else, instead of demonstrating the truth, -may often give an appearance of demonstration to falsehood," would -flatly contradict the supposed change of front were it not that we -could interpret it so as completely to restore the coherence of Vico's -thought. This interpretation is quite simple. Once the power of -converting the true with the created is seen to attach to the moral -sciences no less than to geometry, these sciences could and indeed must -develop on a method analogous to the synthetic method of geometry, -the method which proceeds from a truth to its immediate consequence. -In this manner they follow the progress of the world of man from its -ideal origin to its perfect development; so that the student must -not hope to be able to investigate these sciences _per saltum,_ but -must traverse them from beginning to end in detail, without refusing -to accept unforeseen conclusions any more than he can refuse to do -so in geometry; but concentrating his attention on the firmness of -the bond between premisses and conclusion. Thus the method could be -called geometric by analogy or synecdoche; in fact, however, it was -essentially speculative, and not to be confused with the application of -mathematics to questions of morals, of which the Cartesians and Spinoza -have left examples. - -Nor can we agree without reservation to the opinion of certain -commentators that Vico, in asserting the existence of a single science -of man, to be studied in the modifications of the human mind, was -retreating to the position of a follower of Descartes. This opinion -is often reinforced by another statement of Vico's, namely, that -to conceive his New Science it would be well to return to a state -of absolute ignorance, as if no philosophers, philologists, nor -books had even existed in the world. It is true that with the new -form of his theory of knowledge Vico himself joined the ranks of -modern subjectivism, initiated by Descartes. In a sense, indeed, -he had already done so in his activistic doctrine of truth as the -reconstruction of the created. In this quite general sense Vico might -himself be called a Cartesian. Nevertheless, if he was still behind -Descartes in making his subjectivism a principle not of the whole of -knowledge but of the knowledge of the world of man only, in another -way he was ahead of the French philosopher, in that for him the -truth attained in the world of man was not static but dynamic, not a -discovery but a product, not consciousness but science. - -As for the advice that one should proceed as if there were no books, -no philosophical or philological doctrines in the world, its meaning -is merely the necessity of ridding oneself of all prejudice, of all -common habitual assumptions, of all accretions of memory and fancy, -in order to attain "the state of pure understanding, empty of every -particular form," which is necessary for the discovery and apprehension -of any new truth. So far removed is this advice from the Cartesian or -Malebranchian renunciation of learning and authority, that--to mention -one fact only--in the very passage to which we have just referred we -find the warning that the New Science presupposes a comprehensive and -varied mass both of doctrine and of learning, the truths of which -it takes over as already known, and uses them as terms in its new -propositions. - -In a word, Vico in his new theory of knowledge became not more -Cartesian but more Vician--more himself. Descartes seemed to him not -even a serviceable path by which to attain proof of the possibility -of constructing the science of mind by means of the mind. The true -path was Vico's own criterion of truth, brought into relation with its -author's observations made in the course of his historical studies. -If we wish to look for precedents in the history of philosophy for -Vico's theory of knowledge in its second form, the division between the -two worlds of reality and the two spheres of consciousness, and the -preference for moral as compared with natural studies, would lead us -back to the position adopted by Socrates as against the "Physiologists" -of his time, and the feeling of religious mystery which brought the -Athenian philosopher to a standstill in face of the natural world and -directed his efforts to the study of the mind of man. Again, as to the -superior transparency of the moral sciences, as dealing with objects -created by man himself, we might recall the Aristotelian division of -the sciences into physical, treating of motion external to man, and -practical and "poietic," which deal with man's own creations. The -distinction passed into the philosophy of the schools: Thomas Aquinas -speaks of nature as "an order which reason contemplates but does not -create" (_ordo quem ratio considerat sed non facit_), and of the world -of human activity as "an order which reason creates by contemplation" -(_ordo quem ratio considerando facit_). But no such reference is made -by Vico, fond as he was of expressing the debt of his own thought to -the ancient philosophers; and admitting that the doctrine had some -force before his time, the divergence between this earlier view and -that of Vico on the knowableness of the world of man is as great as -that between the assertion of the omniscience of God the Creator and -the theory of knowledge which Vico was able to draw from it. - -Of this theory, his doctrine of the moral sciences was neither more -nor less than the first legitimate application. Both its author and -the majority of his commentators are using inaccurate language in -describing it as a simple extension of the previous applications--a -second instance, added to that of the mathematical sciences, already -examined. - -In the mathematical sciences, the principle of the conversion of -the true with the created had been applied in appearance only. -The principle itself was original and sound: so was the theory of -mathematics. But the connexion between the two truths was altogether -artificial and false. What was lacking was, unless we are mistaken, -an effective relation between the concept of God who creates the -world and, as creating it, knows it, and that of the man who -arbitrarily constructs a world of abstractions, and in doing so either -knows nothing at all, or else, when he ceases to be a geometer or -arithmetician and becomes a philosopher, when he is composing not -Euclid's Elements but the theory of knowledge in the _De antiquissima,_ -knows merely that his procedure is arbitrary. If the mathematical -sciences construct their concepts as they please, if they produce not -truth but definitions, they are as a matter of fact not sciences at -all, nor any form of knowledge, and cannot be compared with the divine -knowledge, the knowledge of actual reality. In mathematics, says Vico, -"man, holding within himself an imaginary world of lines and numbers, -operates in this world by abstraction just as God operates in the -universe by reality." It is a luminous comparison; but perhaps its -light is that of metaphor rather than logic. - -In the moral sciences, on the other hand, the comparison is so entirely -logical that it should frankly be called coincidence. Human knowledge -is qualitatively identical with divine, and knows the world of man -equally well; it is, however, quantitatively more restricted, and -does not extend like the divine to the world of nature. In the human -field we no longer find the expedients of weakness, definitions and -falsifications; knowledge is here at its highest point of concreteness. -Man creates the human world, creates it by transforming himself into -the facts of society: by thinking it he re-creates his own creations, -traverses over again the paths he has already traversed, reconstructs -the whole ideally, and thus knows it with full and true knowledge. Here -is a real world; and of this world man is truly the God. - -It seems undeniable, then, that the application of the _"verum-factum"_ -made in the New Science is the only one which corresponds to the -criterion previously formulated. The earlier attempt at an application -of it to mathematics, though important in other respects and well -calculated to free the mind from mathematical prejudice, cannot be -considered a true or strict use of it. It is possible that Vico -was sometimes vaguely conscious of the difference between the two -applications, the strict and the metaphorical, which as a rule he -confused and treated as identical. The science of the world of man, he -says, proceeds exactly as does geometry, which while it constructs -out of its elements or contemplates the world of quantity, itself -creates it; but with proportionately greater reality, since order has -no connexion with human affairs, containing as they do neither points, -lines, surfaces, nor figures. Another indication of his gradually -dawning consciousness that he had now for the first time in his -doctrine of the world of man discovered a true and proper knowledge, -not a mere fiction of knowledge, may perhaps be seen in the much -greater conviction, warmth, and enthusiasm with which he now uses the -epithet "divine": quite a different thing from the chilly, if not -absolutely ironical, _ad Dei instar_ of the _De antiquissima._ The -proofs of the New Science, he says more than once, with fervour, "are -divine in their nature, and should give thee, Reader, a divine joy: -since in God knowledge and creation are one." - -The conversion of the true with the created was bound to react upon -the treatment of certitude in one, perhaps the chief, of the various -meanings in which Vico uses the word, namely, historical fact: the -_peculiare, certum,_ as opposed to the _commune_ or _verum._ This forms -the other important section of Vico's second theory of knowledge. In -the former theory these cognitions were, as we saw, legitimised and -protected by being put on a level with all other kinds of knowledge, -all of them equally weak or equally strong, being all alike founded on -probability or authority, whether of the individual (autopsy) or of -mankind. - -But now that the knowledge of the human mind and its laws was rescued -from the region of authority and probability, historical fact, although -still in a sense, by its very nature, founded upon authority, was -placed in a new light. The certain must enter into a new relation, -confronted as it now was not by another certainty, that is, mere -probable knowledge of the human mind, but by a truth, a piece of -philosophical knowledge. - -This relation is also called by Vico the relation between philosophy -and philology: the former dealing with necessities of nature, -_necessaria naturae,_ and contemplating the reason from which issues -the science of truth; the latter with decisions of the human will, -_placita humani arbitrii,_ and following the authority whence comes -knowledge of the certain. The one considers the universal, the other -the individual; the one, as Leibniz would have said, the _vérités de -raison,_ the other the _vérités de fait._ With Vico the distinction -is not so clearly expressed: in fact, authority as opposed to reason -sometimes, according to him, becomes a part of reason itself, or is -confused with the knowledge of the human will as opposed to that of -rational volition; but the general sense is none the less quite plain. -By philology Vico means not only the study of words and their history, -but, since words are bound up with the ideas of things, he means also -the history of things. Thus philologists should deal with war, peace, -alliances, travels, commerce, customs, laws and coinage, geography and -chronology, and every other subject connected with man's life on earth. -Philology in a word, in Vico's sense, which is also the true sense, -embraces not only the history of language or literature, but also that -of events, philosophy, and politics. - -It is true that philology, the truth of fact or certitude, had not -always been so brutally treated as it was by the Cartesians. Grotius -had given evidence of immense historical learning employed on behalf -of his doctrine of natural right. Gravina, Vico's contemporary and -fellow-countryman, demanded as necessary to the student of law not -only "the art of reasoning" (_ratiocinandi ars_) but "skill in the -Latin tongue" (_Latinae linguae peritia_) and "knowledge of history" -(_notitia temporum_). And Leibniz, whom we have just named, reasserted -the value of learning as against the Cartesians, and extended his -patronage, _en grand seigneur,_ to the varied collection of historical -anecdotes which he scattered freely over his pages. But Vico observed -that the philosophy and philology of his time always remained external -to one another, as they had been almost entirely in Greece and Rome. -All the quotations from historians, orators, philosophers, and poets -accumulated by Grotius were a mere embellishment. Perhaps Vico would -have passed the same judgment upon the liberal use made of history by -Leibniz, if he had known of it and expressed his opinion. In reading -the works of philologists he was conscious of such a sense of vacuity -and weariness in the unintelligent jumble of historical observations, -that he was almost led to agree with Descartes and Malebranche in their -hatred of scholarship: for a time, in fact, he did entirely agree with -them. But these two philosophers--so his later thought ran--ought, -instead of despising erudition, rather to have asked whether it were -possible to reclaim philology to philosophical principles; and the -philologists for their part, instead of marshalling facts for a display -of learning, ought to strive to make them the aim of science. Philology -must be reduced to a science. This was Vico's idea of the relation of -certitude to truth, or philology to philosophy. - -What was the meaning of reducing philology, or history, which is -the same thing, to a science or philosophy? Strictly speaking, the -reduction is impossible: not because they deal with subject-matter -different in kind, but because their subject-matter is in point of -fact homogeneous. History is already essentially philosophy. It -is impossible to make the most insignificant historical statement -without moulding it with thought, that is with philosophy. But since -the existence of this philosophical basis of philology was not at -that time realised, indeed it was none too often realised in later -times, and in consequence easily denied; and since most people, as we -have seen, imagined either an aristocratic geometrical philosophy, -hating and avoiding the "profane mob" of facts, or else, as at first -Vico did, a philosophy and a history equally devoid of cogency, and -merely matters of opinion: for these reasons Vico, after the change -of his philosophical point of view, now that he had attained to the -consciousness of the speculative method in the science of man, and -understood more deeply the human mind, was bound to see how much -current history stood in need of reform and extension; to feel the lack -of an improved philology as a consequence of the improved philosophy, -and to express it in terms of the theory of knowledge by the formula -reuniting philology to philosophy: "that this second science, as is -fair, should be the consequence of the first" (_ut haec posterior, ut -par est, prioris sit consequentia_). He was bound, in other words, to -rescue history from its condition of inferiority, where it was a mere -slave to caprice, vanity, moralising and precept-making, and other -irrelevant aims, and to recognise its own true end as a necessary -complement of eternal truth. Philosophy nowadays is full of and -intimate with historical fact: and this gives it greater breadth and a -more lively sense of dealing with concrete reality. This is no doubt -one meaning of Vico's formula concerning the union of philosophy and -philology, and the reduction of the latter to a science. - -It is, however, certain that in propounding this formula he had in -view a further and, as often happened, a different meaning. This other -meaning might be most simply illustrated by comparing it, as Vico -himself did with Bacon and his "more certain method of philosophising": -that method which Bacon expressed in the title of his work by the words -_Cogitata et visa,_ and Vico proposed to "transfer from the natural to -the human or political world." In a word, he demanded the construction -of a typical history of human society (_cogitare_) which was then to be -discovered in the facts (_videre_). Thus the ideal construction would -acquire certainty from the facts, and the facts truth from the ideal -construction: authority would be confirmed by reason and reason by -authority. He demanded a science which should be at once a philosophy -of man and a universal history of nations. Now this structure which -he required--something intermediate between _cogitare_ and _videre,_ -thought and experience, this mixture of the two processes--is -intrinsically different from the unity of philosophy and philology, in -so far as that is a philosophical interpretation of factual data. Such -an interpretation is living history: the other is neither philosophy -nor history, but an empirical science of man and society, drawing its -materials from schemata which are neither the extra-temporal categories -of philosophy nor the individual facts of history: although it can -never be constructed without philosophical categories and historical -facts. It is an empirical science; and as such, neither exact nor true, -but only approximative and probable, and subject to verification and -correction from the side both of philosophy and of history. - -It would be impossible to decide either which of these two meanings -of philology reduced to history is that of Vico himself, since both -are included in his thought: or which is the prevailing one, since in -point of fact now one, now the other prevails: although the second, or -empirical, signification is the more often formulated. We might even -say that when Vico entitled his treatise _Scienza Nuova,_ the principal -meaning he attached to this "invidious" name referred precisely to this -empirical science, the science, that is, which was to be at once a -philosophy and a history of man: the ideal history of the eternal laws -which govern the course of all nations' deeds in their rise, progress, -points of rest, decline and fall. The fact is, Vico did not and could -not unify the two different meanings; he maintained the duality which, -simply because it was never made explicit, presented an appearance -of unity. Thus each of the tendencies shown by his interpreters is -partially justified: one group of whom maintain that Vico laid down -and employed the speculative method; another, that his procedure was -both in intention and in effect empirical, inductive and psychological: -the former believing that he aimed at a systematic philosophy of man, -the latter that he was bent upon a scheme of sociology or social -psychology. Both views are one-sided, but the second more so than the -first. If there actually were in Vico elements both of Bacon and of -Plato, of the empiricist and the philosopher, yet when we look at his -intellectual personality as a whole, when we penetrate into the depths -of his mind and share in his difficulties and his colossal labours, -we must recognise that whatever he meant and believed Vico was of the -stuff of a Plato and not a Bacon: that even the Bacon of whom he speaks -is in part his own invention, a Bacon tinged with Platonism: and that -the New Science seemed so new to him fundamentally, not because it -was an empirical structure on Bacon's lines--indeed in that case no -science could be older: we need only cite Aristotle's _Politics_ and -Machiavelli's _Discourses,_ --but because it was impregnated throughout -by a new philosophy, which did in truth break into it on every side, -through all his empiricism. - - - - -CHAPTER III - - -INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE - - -The lack of clearness on the relation of philosophy to philology, and -the failure to distinguish between the two quite different ways of -conceiving the reduction of philology to a science, are at once the -consequences and the causes of the obscurity which prevails in the -"New Science." By this name we refer to the whole mass of research and -theory which Vico was producing from 1720 to 1730, elaborated above all -in three works, the _De uno universi iuris principio et fine uno_ and -the first and second _Scienza Nuova_; it attains its maturest and most -developed form in the last of these, and this is the most important for -reference. - -The New Science, agreeably to the various meanings of the terms -philosophy and philology and of the relation between them, consists -of three groups of investigations, philosophical, historical and -empirical. Altogether it contains a philosophy of mind, a history, or -group of histories, and a social science. To the first named belong -the ideas expressed in various axioms or aphorisms scattered up and -down the work, on imagination and the imaginative universal, on the -intellect and the logical universal, on myth, religion, the moral -judgment, force and law, certitude and truth, the passions, providence, -and all the other determinations affecting the course or development -of the thought or mind of man. To the second, namely history, belong -the sketch of a universal history of primitive peoples from the time -of the Flood, and of the origins of the various civilisations: the -description of the ancient barbaric or heroic society in Greece and -especially in Rome, with regard to religion, customs, law, language and -political constitution: the study of primitive poetry, concentrating -upon the determination of the genesis and character of the Homeric -poems: the history of the social struggles between the patricians and -plebeians and the origin of democracy, also studied chiefly in Rome: -and the description of the return of barbarism or the Middle Ages, also -studied in all aspects of life and compared with primitive barbaric -society. Finally, to empirical science belongs the attempt to establish -a uniform course of national history, dealing with the succession both -of political forms and of other correlative manifestations of life -both theoretical and practical, and the series of types successively -drawn by Vico of the patriciate, the plebs, feudalism, the patriarchal -family, symbolic law, metaphorical language, hieroglyphic writing and -so forth. - -Now if these three classes of inquiry and theory had been logically -distinct in Vico's mind and united and compressed within the limits of -a single book for literary reasons alone, the result might have been -confused, ill-proportioned, out of harmony, and therefore fatiguing -to the reader, but not obscure. But in point of fact it cannot be -said that the _Scienza Nuova,_ at least in its second form, the final -exposition of his thought given by Vico, lacks a general plan, well -enough conceived. The treatise is divided into five books. The first -is intended to summarise general principles, that is, philosophy. The -second, in addition to a short note on the most ancient universal -history, describes the life of barbaric society, to which the third, -on the discovery of the true Homer, the most conspicuous example of -barbaric poetry, forms an appendix. The fourth is meant to sketch -the empirical science of the movement of national history: and the -fifth to exemplify the movement of "reflux" in the particular case of -the Middle Ages. And yet, in spite of this fine architectonic scheme, -the second _Scienza Nuova_ is the most obscure, just as it is the -most rich and complete of Vico's works. If on the other hand, while -keeping his ideas clear in his mind, Vico had used an unfamiliar -terminology or a style of exposition either too compressed or too full -of allusions or implicit presuppositions, he would certainly have been -a difficult writer, but in this case, as in the other, not obscure. -But such a hypothesis does not suit the facts. Vico is very sparing -of scholastic language; he prefers living and popular terminology. -He is not compressed: in fact, he is fond of repeating his ideas, -emphasising them by repetition with great insistence. And he lays all -his cards on the table: that is to say, he shows all the material by -which his doctrines have been suggested. Finally, it amounts to very -little to say that Vico was not fully conscious of his own discoveries: -such consciousness is more or less deficient in every thinker, and in -fact none could have it more fully. The obscurity, the real obscurity -which we find in Vico is not superficial. It does not come either from -merely general or from secondary causes. It really consists in the -obscurity of his ideas; in his insufficient understanding of certain -connections, and the substitution for them of fallacious ones; in the -arbitrary element, that is, which he introduces into his thought, or -to put it more simply in his own downright errors. One might rewrite -the New Science, recasting the order and changing and elucidating the -terminology--the present writer has made the attempt for himself--and -still the obscurity would remain, or even increase; for in such a -translation the work in losing its original form would lose also the -turbid but powerful strength which may at times take the place of -clarity, and, while it does not illuminate, stirs the reader's mind and -generates waves of thought as it were by sympathetic vibrations. - -That Vico's obscurity, his mistake or mistakes, is due to the confusion -or lack of distinction in his theory of knowledge mentioned above, on -the question of the relations between philosophy, history and empirical -science--a confusion which exists no less in his actual thought on -the problems of the mind and history of man--that this is so can be -seen by observing how philosophy, history and empirical science pass -into each other by turns in Vico's mind, and vitiating each other in -turn produce the perplexities, ambiguities, exaggerations and hasty -statements which perturb the reader of the New Science. The philosophy -of mind masquerades now as empirical science, now as history: empirical -science now as philosophy, now as history: and historical propositions -assume the universality of philosophical principles or the generality -of empirical schemata. For example, the philosophy of man undertakes -to determine the forms, categories or ideal moments of mind in their -necessary succession, and in this aspect it well deserves the title or -definition of "eternal ideal history" according to which particular -histories proceed in time; while no fragment however small of actual -history can be conceived in which this ideal history is not present. -But, since ideal history is also for Vico the empirical determination -of the order in which the forms of civilisations, states, languages, -styles, and kinds of poetry succeed one another, it comes about that he -conceives the empirical series as identical with the ideal series, and -as deriving validity from it. Hence he asserts that this series must -always be exactly reproduced in the facts, "even if infinite worlds -were produced from time to time through eternity": an assertion which -is plainly false, since there is no reason why the empirical fact of -Greek or Roman aristocracy should be repeated for ever, with a "must -have been, must be now, must be hereafter"; or why civilisations -should rise and fall precisely as did those of antiquity. And this -very treatment of the empirical course of events as absolute threw -a shadow of empiricism over their ideal course; since the latter -once identified with the former took over its empirical and temporal -character instead of the eternal and extra--temporal character which it -had as originally conceived. The same must be said of the various forms -of mind which, as ideal and extra--temporal, are always all present -in every fact; but Vico, by confusing them with the real and concrete -facts which empirical science splits up into its schemata, destroyed -them in their ideal form and distinction as soon as he had stated -them. It is true that the moment of force is not that of justice; but -the empirical type of barbaric society founded upon force, precisely -because it is a representative and approximative determination, and is -referred to a concrete and total state of things, contains not only -force but justice as well; and when this ideal moment and this type -of society are interchanged and treated as identical, on the one hand -the philosophical concept of force is confused with that of justice -and becomes impure, contradictory and incoherent, and finally annuls -itself: on the other, the empirical type of barbaric society becomes -exaggerated and unduly rigid. The confusion between the philosophic -and the empirical is clearly expressed in Vico's aphorism defining -the nature of things. "Nature of things is nothing else than their -production at certain times and in certain manners: and whenever these -latter are of such a kind, then the things produced are of such a kind -and no other." Here we see the confusion between time and manner, -between ideal and empirical genesis. Similarly, it is perfectly true -that history ought to proceed in harmony with philosophy, and that a -philosophical absurdity can never be a historical event: but, since -the distinction between philosophy and empirical science was not -drawn by Vico, when evidence was lacking and philosophy therefore -inapplicable he felt no less sure of attaining truth. He merely filled -the gap with a conjecture supplied by the schema of empirical science, -and persuaded himself that he had fallen back on a "metaphysical -proof." Or again, if he found himself faced by uncertain facts, -instead of patiently waiting till the discovery of further evidence -should dispel the doubt, he cut the knot by accepting the facts, as -he put it, in conformity with laws: which always means the empirical -schema. A legitimate method, doubtless, when treated as hypothetical. -But this hypothesis became in its turn, for Vico, a "truth meditated -in the idea": so that the comparison with facts, which none the less -he recommends for the sake of confirmation, became strictly speaking -superfluous: or, if the comparison showed that the facts disagreed -with it, the facts, as mere appearance, must be in the wrong, rather -than the hypothesis, which is laid down as philosophical truth, and -therefore indubitable. Hence arises the tendency observed in Vico to do -violence to the facts. - -These examples are enough to indicate the deep-seated fault in the -structure of the New Science, and to establish one point in our -exposition and criticism of Vico's thought, in the course of which -many other examples of the same point will arise of themselves, and -those already given will become more clear. But another point which -must be well established is that this fault is the fault of an organism -in the highest degree healthy, and that the different species of -inquiry between which Vico failed to distinguish were composed of -investigations of extraordinary originality, truth, and importance. -It is in fact the fault often found in highly original and inventive -intellects, which seldom work out their discoveries in accurate detail, -while less inventive minds are generally more precise and logical. -Depth and acuteness do not always flourish equally side by side: and -Vico, however much he fell short in acuteness, was always profoundly -deep. - -Light and shade, truth and error, which alternate and interweave at -almost every point in the New Science, are variously distinguished -according to the various temperaments of readers and critics: and in -conspicuous cases, like that of Vico, such variations assume the most -sharply defined form. Some minds are self-willed and suspicious, quick -to mark any trifling contradiction, merciless in demanding proof of -every statement, and indefatigable in wielding the forceps of dilemma -to dismember an unfortunate great man. For them Vico's work, like many -others of the same kind, is a closed book. At most, it will provide -them with a theme for what is known as a "refutation": an easy and -congenial task, yet hardly a successful one, since the man they have -demolished generally emerges from the slaughter more alive than before. -But there is another type of mind, which, at the first word which -reaches the heart, at the first ray of truth which dawns upon the eyes, -opens its whole self in desire, abandons itself in faith, and grows -wild with enthusiasm; which refuses to hear of faults and never sees -difficulties, or the difficulties at once vanish, and the faults find -the easiest of justifications: and when it commits itself to writing, -its writings appear in the guise of "defences." For such a mind we fear -that the New Science is a book all too open. No doubt, if these two -attitudes were the only alternatives, if no third choice were open, -one would have to choose the fault of love rather than that of cold -indifference; the excess of faith, which may yet enrich us by one or -two aspects of the truth, rather than the absence of faith which never -lets us realise one. But a third attitude is possible to, and indeed -incumbent on the critic; namely, that which never takes its eyes off -the light, but yet does not conceal the shade; which transcends the -letter to attain the spirit, yet not ignoring the letter, but always -returning to it, always endeavouring to play the part of a free but not -a fanciful interpreter, a warm lover but not a blind one. - -The two points above established, the strength and weakness essential -to Vico's intellect, his tendency to confusion or his confusion of -tendencies, supply us with a kind of general canon of interpretation; -namely, that of separating analytically at every step his pure -philosophy from the empiricism and history with which he mixes, and -in which so to speak he embodies it, and on the other hand separating -the latter from the former: and of observing, in the process, the -causes and effects of the mixture. The dross cannot be treated as -non-existent, bound up as it is with the gold in its natural state: but -it must not hinder us from recognising and purifying the gold. Or, to -drop the metaphor, the history must be indeed a history, but that it -can only be if guided by intelligence. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - - -THE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE - -(POETRY AND LANGUAGE) - - -The chief, almost indeed the only, forms of the mind studied by Vico in -the New Science are the inferior, individualising activities to which -he gives the general name of "certitude." These are, in the region of -theoretic mind, imagination: in that of the practical mind, power or -will: and in the empirical science corresponding to the philosophy -of mind, the barbaric society and poetic wisdom whose examination -occupies, in his own words, "almost the whole bulk of the work." - -His deep interest in these lower forms, and in the primitive societies -and barbaric histories which display them, is further illustrated -and explained, among his external circumstances, by the studies he -undertook in Roman law and its expressions and rhetorical figures: -by the still living tradition of Italian humanism: by the recently -stimulated pursuit of the archaeological sciences: by his own desire -to investigate the earliest civilisation of Italy, and so forth. But -many of his contemporaries and countrymen were handling the same -materials without acquiring any of his taste for and comprehension of -imagination, simplicity and force: indeed Vico himself, when he wrote -the _De antiquissima,_ had the taste for these things but as yet no -comprehension of them. The full reason for this interest is seen when -we consider the development of Vico as a philosopher, without losing -sight of the complexity of his nature in all its opposition to the -Cartesian type of mind. Cartesianism, with its attention confined to -the universalising and abstractive forms, ignored the individualising: -and this necessarily attracted Vico all the more towards them as -towards a mysterious problem. Cartesianism shrank in horror from -the tangled forest of history: Vico plunged eagerly into that very -department of history where the historical flavour, so to speak, is -strongest; namely, that which is furthest and psychologically most -different from civilised periods. Cartesianism extended the psychology -of civilisation to all periods and nations: Vico was led to investigate -in all their profound divergencies and contradictions the modes of -feeling and thought proper to various times. - -The great effort which had to be made, and actually was made by Vico, -in order to penetrate through modern intellectualism and recapture the -point of view of primitive psychology, is expressed in his language -about the "grave difficulties" entailed by his "labour of fully -twenty-five years" in the attempt to "stoop from these civilised -natures of ours to those absolutely wild and savage minds, which we -cannot picture to ourselves at all, and can only understand with great -toil." It is expressed again, rather differently, by his insistence -on the impossibility, now that, even with the common people, the -mind of man is too completely separated from the senses, accustomed -to the free use of abstract terms, sharpened by the art of writing, -and spiritualised so to speak by the employment of numbers,--the -impossibility of entering into the chaotic fancy of primitive man, -whose mind was the very reverse of abstract, acute or spiritual; but -rather sunk in the senses, blunted by passion, and buried in the body: -and of grasping such ideas as that of the "sympathy of nature." This -necessary effort--a painful one, but successful--was another reason -for his feeling that his science was "new." He says indeed that this -study of the ideal form and the historic period of certitude was -entirely lacking to Greek philosophy as a whole. Plato had attempted it -in the _Cratylus,_ but unsuccessfully, because he knew nothing of the -language of the first legislators, the heroic poets, and was deceived -by the altered and modernised forms under which the laws existed in -his time after continual revision at Athens. Among the moderns, J. C. -Scaliger, Francisco Sanchez and Gaspar Schopp had fallen into a similar -mistake when they attempted to explain language by the principles of -logic, and indeed of Aristotelian logic, in spite of its having arisen -centuries after language itself. Grotius, Selden, Puffendorf and the -other writers on natural rights also studied human nature as civilised -by religion and law; so that in retracing the course of history they -began in the middle: that is to say, they confined themselves to the -intellect, ignoring the imagination, and to the will under moral -restraint, passing over the undisciplined passions. Vico himself, while -he had shown his interest in this problem by undertaking to investigate -the "most ancient wisdom of Italy," was yet led astray in his study by -following the lead of the author of the _Cratylus._ - -In its philosophical aspect, the New Science might, owing to this -prominence given to the study of the individualising forms, above all -the imagination (since the doctrine that primitive man is a poet and -thinks in poetic images is in Vico's words the "master key" of the -work) be called, without undue paradox, a philosophy of Mind with -special attention to the Philosophy of Imagination or Aesthetic. - -Aesthetic may in fact be considered as a discovery of Vico's, though -with the reservations to which the determination of discoveries and -discoverers is always subject; and although he did not deal with it in -a separate treatise or give it the happy title with which Baumgarten -christened it ten years or so later. It is interesting however to -notice that the terminology of the New Science lights upon a name -similar to one of the equivalents for Aesthetic which Baumgarten passes -in review; namely that of "the Logic of Poetry." But ultimately the -name matters little: what does matter is the fact: and the fact is that -Vico adopted a theory of poetry which was then and was still for a time -to be a bold and revolutionary innovation. At that time, as is well -known, the old practical or didactic theory held the field: the theory -which, starting late in the history of the ancient world, persisting -through the Middle Ages, and transplanted into the Renaissance, -regarded poetry as an ingenious disguise for the popularising of -lofty philosophical and theological ideas. Beside this theory, though -inferior in authority, stood another, which considered poetry as the -product of or means to diversion and pleasure. These views had come -to alter the original meaning of the Aristotelian treatise on poetry, -so as to be at last introduced into it and discovered there as if -Aristotle himself had held and written them. Nor was this mistake -corrected by Cartesianism, which, as we should expect from its general -direction, rather tended to enfeeble and annul the very object of -these definitions, as a thing of no value, or practically none. At a -time when philosophers were trying to reduce metaphysics and ethics to -a mathematical form, and despised concrete intuition: when men were -devising a literature and a poetry suited to disseminate science among -the common people or the world of fashion: when experiments were being -made in the construction of artificial, logical languages, superior to -those of past or present usage: when, finally, it was thought possible -to lay down rules for composing musical airs without being a musician, -and poems without being a poet: in this atmosphere of detachment, -coolness, hostility and mockery, only a miracle could arouse a -different and indeed opposite feeling--a warm and vivid consciousness -of the real nature of poetry in its original function: and this miracle -was worked by the keen, restless and stormy mind of Giambattista Vico. - -He criticised at once the three doctrines of poetry as a means of -adorning and communicating intellectual truth, as merely subservient -to pleasure, and as a harmless mental exercise for those who can do -it. Poetry is not esoteric wisdom: it does not presuppose the logic -of the intellect: it does not contain philosophical judgments. The -philosophers, in finding these things in poetry, have simply put them -there themselves without realising it. Poetry is produced not by the -mere caprice of pleasure, but by natural necessity. It is so far -from being superfluous and capable of elimination, that without it -thought cannot arise: it is the primary activity of the human mind. -Man, before he has arrived at the stage of forming universals, forms -imaginary ideas. Before he reflects with a clear mind, he apprehends -with faculties confused and disturbed: before he can articulate, he -sings: before speaking in prose, he speaks in verse: before using -technical terms, he uses metaphors, and the metaphorical use of words -is as natural to him as that which we call "natural." So far from being -a fashion of expounding metaphysics poetry is distinct from and opposed -to metaphysics. The one frees the intellect from the senses, the other -submerges and overwhelms it in them: the one reaches perfection in -proportion as it rises to universality, the other, as it confines -itself to the particular: the one enfeebles the imagination, the other -strengthens it. The one takes precautions against turning the mind into -body, the other delights in giving body to the mind. The judgments -of poetry are composed of sense and emotion, those of philosophy are -composed of reflection, which if introduced into poetry makes it frigid -and unreal: and no one in the whole course of history has ever been at -once a great poet and a great metaphysician. Poets and philosophers -may be called respectively the senses and the intellect of mankind: and -in this sense we may retain as true the scholastic saying "there is -nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses." Without -sense, we cannot have intellect: without poetry, we cannot have -philosophy, nor indeed any civilisation. - -Almost more miraculous than this conception of poetry is the fact -that Vico saw into the true nature of language, a problem much less -canvassed and investigated, and no more satisfactorily solved, by -ancient and modern philosophy down to the present day. Language was -as a rule alternately confused with logic and debased into a mere -external and conventional sign, or else in despair referred to a -divine origin. Vico realised that the divine origin was in this -case a mere refuge of indolence; that language is neither logic nor -convention, and, like poetry, is neither esoteric wisdom nor due to -a decision or agreement. Language arises naturally. In its first -form, men express themselves "by mute actions," or by signs, and -"by bodies having natural connexions with the ideas which they wish -to indicate," _i.e._ by means of symbolic objects. But in the case -both of articulated languages and of common speech, all philologists -have, "with an excess of good faith," which means a deficiency of -insight, accepted the view that meanings are decided at pleasure: -whereas at the so-called origin of language meanings must have been -natural, and every common word must certainly have started from one -single individual of one nation, and been derived from the primitive -language of gestures and objects. In Latin, as in other tongues, it -is to be noticed that almost all the words are formed to express -natural properties, or used by transference: and the greater part of -every language, in every nation, is metaphorical. The opposite opinion -was due to the ignorance of grammarians, who, meeting with a great -number of words expressing confused and indistinct ideas, and not -knowing their origin, which had formerly made them lucid and distinct, -invented for their own peace of mind the conventional theory; and -dragged in Aristotle and Galen as against Plato and Iamblichus. The -serious objection generally brought against the natural origin of -language and in favour of the conventional, namely the variations in -the common speech among different nations, is solved by considering -that owing to diversities of climate, temperament and custom nations -looked at the same useful or necessary objects in different aspects, -and hence produced different languages. This is also seen in the case -of proverbs; which are substantially identical maxims of human life, -but expressed in as many different forms as there are, or have been, -different nations. The insistence, then, with which Vico claims to have -discovered the true origin of languages "in the principles of poetry" -is of especial importance. On the one hand, it entails the assertion of -the spontaneous and imaginative origin of language, and on the other -it tends implicitly if not explicitly to suppress the dualism between -poetry and language. - -In these principles of poetry Vico found not only the origin of -languages, but also that of letters or writing. He pronounced the -separation of the two Origins, connected as they were by nature and -appearing, in the primitive dumb language of signs and objects, as -identical, to be a mere mistake of the grammarians. Here again, it -is no case of esoteric wisdom or convention. Hieroglyphics were not -invented by philosophers as a means of concealing the mysteries of -their lofty thoughts: they were a universal and natural necessity to -all primitive peoples: and only the alphabetic scripts arose among -nations by a free agreement. In other words Vico drew a distinction -(though in a confused manner) within the so-called scripts, between -those which are true scripts and therefore conventional, and -others which are directly expressive and are therefore language, -story-telling, poetry and painting. These expressive scripts or -languages are characterised by the inseparability of content from -form. They are poetical just in the sense that the story and its -expression are one and the same thing, namely a metaphor common to -poetry and painting, so that it could be depicted by a dumb man without -verbal expression. As examples, Vico quotes traditional anecdotes; -for instance, the five "real words" (the frog, the mouse, the bird, -the ploughshare and the bow) sent by Idanturas king of the Scythians -to Darius when the latter had declared war on him: and the parable of -the tall poppies which King Tarquin enacted before the eyes of his son -Sextus's ambassador, concerning the means of ruling Gabii--methods -of expression parallel to practices still found among savages and -the lower classes:--and in addition to these, heraldry, flags, and -the emblems upon medals and coins. There is a frivolous legend which -belittles and degrades the true value of heraldry by asserting it to -have been invented in German tournaments as a custom of gallantry -by young men seeking to win the love of noble maidens. But in the -Middle Ages heraldry was a serious thing. It was, so to speak, the -hieroglyphic script of the period: a wordless language to eke out the -poverty of ordinary speech and alphabetic writing. It was only later, -in times of culture, that it became a sport and a pleasure, and gallant -and learned blazonings were adopted which had to be enlivened by means -of mottoes because their own meaning was now merely analogical; while -primitive and natural heraldry was dumb, or rather spoke without -needing an interpreter. Even in the days of culture a few such -expressive forms retained this simplicity and naturalness. Flags or -ensigns for instance form a kind of armed language with which nations, -as if deprived of speech, make themselves understood in the wider -affairs of the natural rights of peoples; wars, alliances and commerce. - -Thus in the light of Vico's aesthetical idea poetry, words, metaphors, -writing and graphic symbols are all illuminated and spring to life: -great things and small, epic poetry and heraldry. The doctrine of -imaginary forms was quite a new departure in the history of ideas: for -while Vico opposed his own conceptions to those of the contemporary -schools, especially the Cartesian, he by no means attached himself to -any other more or less remote school or tradition. He himself felt -that he was opposed not to a particular school but to all who had ever -formulated doctrines on the subject. He says that he has "overturned" -all the theories about poetry held by Plato, Aristotle, and so on down -to Patrizio, Scaliger and Castelvetro in modern times, all of whom -had lost themselves in ineptitudes which "even to mention makes one -ashamed." Patrizio made poetry begin with the songs of birds and the -whistling of the wind! As regards language, he had been ultimately -dissatisfied both with Plato and with the moderns Wolfgang Latius, -Scaliger and Sanchez. As regards writing, once the theory of divine -origin supported by Mallinkrot and Ingewald Eling was refuted, or -rather interpreted in his own way, which came to the same thing, he -made an attempt to discredit the futile, vague, ill-founded, misshapen, -pompous and absurd opinions which derived it from the Goths and through -them from Adam and personal instruction from God, or more directly from -the Earthly Paradise, or from a Gothic Mercury as inventor. Finally, -as to heraldry, he remarks that the writers on the subject have never -understood anything about it, and have only by a mere random guess let -fall a hint of the truth in calling it "heroic." - -In fact it would be hard to find real and true precedents for Vico's -aesthetic conceptions. At most, we might indicate vague suggestions -contained in various scattered statements which he collects: a certain -immediate stimulus in the discussions of the seventeenth century on -the distinctions between intellect and genius, reason and imagination, -dialectic and rhetoric: and a certain convergence of external -particulars, such as the collection of rhetorical subtleties expressed -in subtleties of language, made by Tesauro, a rhetorician of the time. - -These conceptions, however, produced as they were by a remarkable -stroke of originality, no sooner passed from general outline to -particular determinations, from the first idea or inspiration to -concrete development, than they appear to become confused, fluctuating -and unstable. We may set aside the various opinions successively held -by Vico, and bound up with the historical growth of his mind, upon -the subjects of poetry, language or metaphor, beginning with his -academic orations, passing thence by way of the _De ratione_ and _De -antiquissima_ to the _Diritto universale,_ from these to the first and -thence to the second _Scienza Nuova_: a study of these might supply -subject-matter for a special essay, but does not come within the scope -of our treatise. But even in the final form of his aesthetic thought, -contradictory doctrines exist side by side. He is not content with -saying, as he does say, that poetical form is the primary activity of -the mind; that it is composed of feelings of emotion; and that it is -entirely imaginative and devoid of concepts and reflection. He goes on -to add that poetry, as opposed to history, "represents reality in its -best idea," and therefore fulfils the justice and gives every man the -reward or punishment which he does not always get in history, governed -as the latter often is by caprice, necessity and chance. Again, he -says that the end of poetry is "to give life to the lifeless," since -its most sublime task is the attempt to give life and sensation to -insensible objects. He says that poetry is "nothing but imitation"; -that children, with their great imitative powers, are poets; and that -primitive races, the children of mankind, were also sublime poets. He -says that poetry has for its special subject-matter "the impossible -made credible": for instance, it is impossible that body should be -mind, and yet it was believed that the thundering sky was Jupiter. -Hence the miracles performed by magicians by means of incantations -were a favourite subject of poetry. He says that poetry is due to -"poverty," that is, that it is a pathological product of the mind. -Since uncivilised man is of low brain-power and cannot satisfy the -thirst he feels for the general and the universal, he fills their place -by inventing imaginary genera, poetical universals or characters. -Consequently the truth of the poet is identical with the truth of the -philosopher: the one abstract, the other clothed in images: the one -a metaphysic of reason, the other a metaphysic of feeling and fancy, -suited to the understanding of the people. From poverty also, that is -from inability to articulate, arises song, and therefore mutes and -stammerers utter sounds which are songs: and metaphor arises from -inability to express things in an accurate manner. He says, finally, -that the aim of poetry is to teach the people to act virtuously. - -These sayings indicate very various ideas about poetry, of which -some are compatible with the central doctrine but thrown out in a -disconnected manner and therefore not in fact reconciled with it: -others are quite incompatible. Vico might have been cited in turn, on -the testimony of single passages, as a supporter of the moralistic -theory of art, the didactic theory, the abstract or typical theory, the -mythological theory, the animistic theory, and so on. And if he neither -falls back into the old theories he hated, nor loses himself among -the new fallacies which followed him, it is due to the fact that all -these waverings and inconsistencies were continually submerged by the -thought that poetry is the primary form of the mind, prior to intellect -and free from reflection and reasoning. - -Just as he was unable by the use of his leading principle to -distinguish and reconcile the other theories on the nature of poetry -which already existed or had been invented by himself, so he did -not succeed in escaping from the tyranny of old or new empirical -classifications. He struggled to reduce these in their turn to -philosophical form, and tried to deduce successively the various kinds -of poetry, epic, lyric and dramatic: the kinds of verse and metre, -spondaic, iambic and prose: the kinds of figurative language, metaphor, -metonymy, synecdoche and irony: the parts of speech, onomatopoeism, -interjection, pronoun, particle, noun and verb: the moods and tenses of -the verb (in which connexion he refers to a case of aphasia observed -by himself in Naples, "a gentleman seized with a severe apoplexy, -who utters nouns but has completely forgotten verbs"): the kinds of -writing, hieroglyphic, symbolic and alphabetical: and of languages, -according to their increasing complexity, from monosyllables to -compound words and from a preponderance of vowels and diphthongs -to a preponderance of consonants. In the course of these attempts -he frequently offered new and sometimes correct interpretations of -isolated facts: but he did not and could not connect them into a -scientific system. Moreover he never realised the relation between -poetry and the other arts. On the one hand, he unites them, as when he -considers painting and poetry to be fundamentally identical and notes -a number of analogies between the poetry and painting of the Middle -Ages: on the other, he separates them sharply, as when he asserts -that delicacy in art is the outcome of philosophy, and that painting, -sculpture, casting and intaglio are the most delicate arts because they -are compelled to abstract the surface of the material objects they -represent. - -These inconsistencies and errors which we have briefly reviewed are due -partly to Vico's insufficient power of distinguishing and elaborating, -partly--and this is the greater part--to that fundamental fault which -we have already seen to exist in the structure of the New Science. In -this case the fault is, more precisely, Vico's confusion between the -philosophical concept of the poetic form of the mind, and the empirical -concept of the barbaric form of civilisation. "This earliest age of the -world," as he himself says, "can be truly said to have concerned itself -exclusively with the primary activity of the mind." But the earliest -age of the world, composed as it was of men of flesh and blood, not of -philosophical categories, cannot have been concerned with one solitary -activity of the mind. This single activity may have preponderated, -as we generally say: the very word reveals the quantitative and -approximative nature of the conception: but all the others must have -been at work simultaneously, imagination and intellect, perception and -abstraction, will and morality, song and arithmetic. Vico could not -shut his eyes to this obvious fact, and introduced into this phase of -civilisation not only the poet, but also the theologian, the physicist, -the astronomer, the _pater-familias,_ the warrior, the politician, -and the lawgiver; but he tried to regard the activities of all these -as "poetical" in character, as he called it, by a metaphor drawn from -the alleged preponderance of the imaginative form of the mind; and -the whole system he called "poetic wisdom." The metaphorical nature -of the terminology is suggested, in fact leaps to the eye, in certain -characteristic passages, as where the "arts," that is, the mechanical -crafts which produce objects of practical utility, are called "poetry -with a certain kind of reality," and where ancient Roman law, because -of the abundance of formulae and ceremonies with which it was adorned, -is said to be a "serious dramatic poem." But the metaphors are -dangerous, since, as in the case of the New Science, they light upon -a soil favourable to their growth into concepts: and in point of fact -the historical phase of barbarism, metaphorically expressed as poetic -wisdom, soon turned in Vico's mind into the ideal phase of poetry, and -transferred all its own attributes to this ideal phase. The former -included theologians, and accordingly Vico regarded poetry as theology, -but an imaginative theology: teachers, and poetry became a teacher, -but of the common people: natural scientists, and it became science, -but the science of an imaginary world. And since these barbarians, -uncultivated as they were and confined to the world of images, could -not think in concepts, the imaginations of poetry, individualised and -particular, and its judgments, always expressed in material form, -were falsely interpreted as "imaginative universals," supposed to be -something intermediate between the individualising intuition and the -universalising concept. Poetry, which ought to represent sense and -nothing else, came to represent a sense already intellectualised; and -the saying that nothing is found in the intellect that has not already -been in the sense, acquired the meaning, that the intellect is nothing -but the sense clarified, and the sense nothing but the intellect -confused. Thus there was no further need for the added caution -"except the intellect itself" (_nisi intellectus ipse_). Conversely, -barbaric civilisation became a kind of mythological or allegorical -representation of the ideal phase of poetry, and primitive tribes were -transformed into crowds of "sublime poets" just as, in the ontogenesis -corresponding to this philogenesis, children had been made into poets. -The concept of the "imaginative universal" unites in itself the double -contradiction of the doctrine; since to the imaginative element must -be joined, in this mental construction, the element of universality -which taken by itself would be a true and proper universal, rational -and not imaginative. Hence arises a _petitio principii_ by which the -origin of the rational universal, the point requiring explanation, is -already presupposed. On the other hand, if the imaginative universal is -interpreted as freed from the element of universality, that is, as a -mere imagination, Vico's aesthetic doctrine would certainly become once -more consistent: but his "poetic wisdom" or barbaric civilisation would -be deprived of an indispensable portion of its organism in parting with -every kind of concept: for concepts are, so to speak, the skeleton of -the body. - -To resolve the contradiction it was necessary to separate poetry from -poetic wisdom: and we do find some signs of this separation in Vico. He -sometimes admits, almost against his will, the lack of correspondence -between the philosophical category and the type of society, and in -dealing with the latter is compelled to fall back upon such phrases -as "very nearly" and "more or less." He says, for instance, that -primitive man consisted "exclusively of strong imagination, with no, -or very little, reason": that he was "almost all body, with hardly -any reflection": or again, after making a show of philosophical -distinction between the three languages of gods, heroes and men, he -goes on to observe that "the language of the gods was almost all dumb, -and very little articulate; the language of heroes was composed of -equal quantities of articulation and dumb-show; the language of men -was almost all articulated, and very little in dumb-show." He admits -again in a fine simile that poetic speech out-lived poetic wisdom and -survived far into the historic and civilised period, "as great and -rapid rivers run far out into the sea and keep their waters fresh as -they bear them along with the force of their flow." Even in modern -times we cannot afford entirely to neglect imaginative speech: "to -describe the operations of the pure mind, we must avail ourselves of -poetic language, of metaphors drawn from the senses." It appears that -poetry does not end with barbarism, for poets arise even in civilised -times: and if it is said that the poets of the earliest times were -naturally imaginative, those of later days artificially so, that is, -according to Vico, by deliberately forgetting the proper use of words, -freeing themselves from philosophy, filling their minds with childish -and vulgar prejudices and submitting to the bondage of conventions like -the use of rhyme--all these restrictions, besides being easily refuted, -are merely an unsuccessful attempt to diminish the weight of the fact -above mentioned, namely that poetry belongs to all ages, not merely to -that of barbarism: it is an ideal category, not a historic fact. But -the restrictions prove, as also do the infrequency and the unemphatic -nature of the passages quoted, that Vico was not in a position to -effect the separation of poetry from poetic wisdom, hampered as he was -by the hybrid character of the concept and of the actual method of the -New Science. - -If, on the other hand, the idea of poetry as pure imagination had not -remained firmly at the foundation of Vico's thought, in spite of all -the confusions and inconsistencies in which it became involved, and -had not been at work underground, so to speak, in the New Science, -it would have been difficult or perhaps impossible to understand the -leading conception which dominates his philosophy of mind, closely -connected as it is with that idea. This is the conception of the mind -as a development, or, to use Vico's own words, a progress or unfolding -(_corso, spiegamento_); a conception which improved upon, though it -did not explicitly contradict, the ordinary view which was almost -exclusively confined to the enumeration and classification of the -mind's faculties. The doctrine of imaginative universals as spontaneous -mental products, rudimentary universals but not without an element of -truth in them, was at least an adequate weapon against the empirical -theory which made civilisation the outcome of a highly developed and -rational practical wisdom and the personal labour of God or of wise -men who must have sprung from the earth or fallen from heaven in some -unaccountable manner. - -Vico clearly stated the dilemma between the two, and only two, possible -explanations of the origin of society. Either it came from the -reflection of wise men, or from a certain human feeling and instinct -among brutish men. He accepted the latter solution, that of "brutes" -which gradually became human: the theory, that is, of the evolution -of thought from the imaginative to the rational universal, and the -progress of social relations from force to equity. But was this an -adequate foundation for "ideal history" or the philosophy of mind? In -the philosophy of mind, it could be translated into a similar if not -identical view--the doctrine which, owing to Cartesianism and a certain -recrudescence of the Scholasticism of Duns Scotus, lasted down to -Vico's own times and expressed the life of the mind by the successive -stages of the concept, obscurity, confusion, clarity and distinctness. -Leibniz, as is well known, made a special study of obscure and -confused perceptions, the _"petites perceptions."_ The doctrine was -essentially intellectualistic, since the concepts, however confused -or obscure, were never anything else than concepts: and hence it was -unable to account either for poetry or even for mental development, -the dialectic of which cannot be understood if it is regarded as -consisting of merely quantitative differences. Such differences are -in reality not differences at all, but identities and therefore the -negation of change: and in fact the whole of this school of thought was -anti-aesthetic and static, devoid both of a true theory of imagination -and a true theory of development. Vico's thought, on the other hand, -was averse to intellectualism and in sympathy with imagination: it was -entirely dynamic and evolutionary. For Vico, mind is an eternal drama: -and since drama demands antithesis, his philosophy of mind is rooted -in antithesis, that is in the real distinction and opposition between -imagination and thought, poetry and metaphysic, force and equity, -passion and morality; although he seems sometimes, for the reasons -given above, to mistake its nature; or rather, although he actually -does sometimes confuse it with empirical inquiries and doctrines, and -with the determinations of history. - - - - -CHAPTER V - - -THE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE - -(MYTH AND RELIGION) - - -Vico's doctrine of mythology, while no less original and profound than -that of poetry, is also, like the latter, not entirely lucid: for the -relations between poetry and myth are so close that the shadow cast -upon the one must of necessity extend to some degree over the other. - -In proceeding to inquire, as we have hitherto done and shall -continue to do, into the state of contemporary knowledge of the -several sciences and problems with which Vico set out to deal, we -may briefly recall _à propos_ of the study of mythology not only the -great literary collections of myths formed during the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, of which Boccaccio had already given an example -in the fourteenth century, but also the learned defences of the two -explanatory theories, already known to classical antiquity and not -entirely unknown in the Middle Ages. These were, first, the theory -of myth as allegory of philosophical truths (moral, political and so -forth), and secondly, the theory of myth as the history of actual -persons and events, adorned by the fancy which made heroes into gods -(Euhemerism). The former tendency inspired among other works the -_Mythologiae sive explanationis fabularum libri decem_ of Natale Conti -(1568) and Bacon's _De sapientia veterum_ (1609); in which, however, -this system had been advanced with a certain hesitation, and with -the explicit caution that, even if it were not valid as historical -interpretation, it would always be of value as moralisation (_aut -antiquitatem illustrabimus aut res ipsas:_ "we shall explain either -antiquity or the facts themselves"). The latter was authoritatively -represented by John Leclerc (Clericus), the learned Dutch Genevese for -whom Vico expressed so much respect and gratitude for the attention he -had deigned to bestow upon his _Diritto universale._ His edition of -Hesiod's _Theogony_ marked an epoch in the study of mythology, and he -was followed among others by Banier, author of the work _Les Fables -expliquées par l'histoire_(1735). A third system, also not without some -ancient precedent, derived myths from particular nations, the Egyptians -or the Hebrews, or from the original works of individual philosophers -and poets. This view, when it neither resolved itself into a pure and -simple historical supposition as to the origin of some or all myths, -nor appealed to divine revelation, clearly involved the theory that -myth is not an eternal form but a contingent product of the mind, born -at a certain time and capable of dying or already dead. - -Vico strongly opposed the first and third of these views of mythology, -namely the allegorical theory and that of historical derivation. -On the allegorical view, he mentions Bacon's treatise, which had -stimulated him to the study of the subject, out which he considered -"more ingenious than sound": on the other school, which regarded myths -as sacred history altered and corrupted by the Gentiles and especially -by the Greeks, he refers to Vossius's _De theologia gentili_ (1642) -and to a dissertation by Daniel Huet. Myths or fables do not contain -esoteric wisdom, that is to say, rational concepts, subtly concealed by -the veil of fable: hence they are not allegorical. Allegory implies on -the one hand the concept or thing signified, on the other the fable -or medium of concealment, and between the two, the art by which both -are kept in equilibrium. But myths cannot be split up into these three -moments, nor even into a thing signified and a thing which signifies -it: their meaning is univocal. The theory also implies that a believer -in the content does not believe in the form: but the makers of myths -believed fully and ingenuously in their own work. Once, for instance, -that first divine fable was created, the myth than which none greater -was ever afterwards invented, that of Jupiter, king and father of gods -and men, in the act of thundering, the very men who had invented him -believed in him, and with their religion of terror feared, reverenced -and worshipped him. - -Myth, in a word, is not fable but history of such a kind as could -be constructed by primitive minds, and strictly considered by them -as an account of actual fact. The philosophers who arose later made -use of myths to expound their doctrines in an allegorical manner; or -deceived themselves into thinking that they found them there owing to -the feeling of veneration which attaches to antiquity, and increases -as our comprehension of it diminishes; or thought it expedient to make -use of such things for political purposes, like Plato Homerising, and -at the same time Platonising Homer: and in doing this they turned the -myths into fables, which they were not originally, and are essentially -not. Thus we may say that the philosophers and students of mythology -who indulged in such strange fancies about the legends were the real -poets, while the primitive poets or myth-makers were the true students, -and intended to narrate the actual facts of their time. For the same -reason, namely, because myth is an essential part of poetic or barbaric -wisdom, and, as such, a spontaneous product of all times and places, -it cannot be attributed to one single nation as its inventor, from -which it passed to others; as if it were a particular discovery of a -particular man or the object of revelation. - -This doctrine, superior as it is to the allegorical and historical -theories, is another aspect of Vico's vindication of the non-logical -forms of knowledge as against the intellectualism which denied -them and merely represented them either as artificial forms or as -due to supernatural causes. Nor does the opinion seem acceptable -which attaches Vico to the Neo-Euhemeristic school. He does not -indeed explicitly combat this school, and we may even grant that he -presents certain superficial resemblances to it: but together with -the resemblances there is this radical difference, that for Vico the -stories are not alterations of actual history, but are essentially -history; their supposed alteration is the actual truth as it appeared -to the primitive mind. - -Vico did not and could not give a more precise determination of the -nature of myth, precisely because owing to the fluctuating character -of his concept of poetry, itself he was not in a position to lay down -the boundary between the two forms. He talks generally of poetry and -myth as distinct things, but he does not establish the distinction. -And yet Vico was familiar enough with the concept which supplies -this distinctive criterion, and had enunciated it: but instead of -using it for his doctrine of mythology, he had made of it one or -more of his various definitions of poetry. That "poetic character," -that "imaginative universal" whose introduction into aesthetic as -the explanatory principle of poetry causes so many insuperable -difficulties, is really the definition of mythology, and as such -provides the science of mythology with the true principle that is -required. If the concept of accomplishing great labours for the common -welfare cannot be disengaged from the idea of a particular man who -accomplished one of these labours, this concept becomes for instance -the myth of Hercules: and Hercules is at once an individual man who -does individual actions, and kills the Lernaean hydra and the Nemean -lion or cleanses the stables of Augeas, and also a concept: just as -the concept of beneficent and glorious labour is at once a concept and -Hercules: a universal and an imaginary idea: an imaginative universal. - -Again, that sublime task which Vico declared proper to poetry, the task -of giving life to inanimate objects, belongs properly not to poetry -but to myth. Mythology, embodying its concepts in images, which are -always individual things, at last animates them like living beings. -Thus primitive man, ignorant of the cause of lightning and therefore -not possessing the scientific definition of it, was led by the -mythological tendency to conceive the sky as a vast living being, who, -like man himself when, in the grip of his fierce passions, he shouted, -muttered or roared, spoke and meant something by his speech. It is -mythology again, not poetry, whose origin must be traced to "poverty," -to the weakness of men's minds and their inability to deal with the -problems they would solve, in their incapacity for thinking in rational -universals and expressing themselves in accurate language, whence -arose imaginative universals and metonymy, synecdoche and metaphor -of all kinds. The contradictions we have seen in the imaginative -universal which make it incapable of acting as the foundation of an -aesthetic doctrine are quite in keeping in the doctrine of myth: for -myth consists precisely of these contradictions: it is a concept -trying to be an image and an image trying to be a concept, and hence a -kind of poverty, or even of powerful impotence,--a contrast, a mental -transition where white no longer exists and black has not yet come -into being. Finally, poetic wisdom, that is, the theology, science, -cosmography, geography, astronomy and the whole system of other ideas -and beliefs of primitive nations as Vico describes them, was really -mythology, not, as he says, poetry, for the good reason, given by -himself, that these things were their history: and poetry is poetry and -not history, even more or less imaginary history. The Homeric poems are -poetry in so far as they express the aspirations of Hellenism: the same -poems, in so far as they were recited and heard as accounts of actual -facts, are history: the two things being forms of mental products -which, though they seem to be materially united in a single work, are -not for that reason to be identified. - -All this was both seen and not seen, or rather, sometimes realised and -sometimes overlooked, by Vico: and hence he cannot be said to have -succeeded in determining satisfactorily the distinction, and solving -the problem of the relation, between mythology and poetry. Another -problem of importance relating to the science of mythology, and still -the subject of controversy, namely, the question whether myth belongs -to philosophy or to history, might be supposed to have been decisively -solved by Vico: since he repeats over and over again that myths contain -the historical judgments of primitive peoples, not the philosophical. -But in reality when we examine the point closely it appears that he -neither solved the problem nor even propounded it. The historical -judgments of which Vico is speaking are contrasted strictly not with -philosophical judgments in general but with the "mystical judgments -of the earliest philosophy" and the "judgments of analogy" which the -writers criticised by Vico found in mythology. Thus on the one hand his -words repeat the criticism of the allegorical theory and, on the other, -controvert that fallacious method of historical interpretation which -ascribes the ideas and customs of to-day to the nations of antiquity. -The fact is that Vico's theory is just as much in agreement with the -theory connecting myth with philosophy as with that which connects it -with history; and as much with the eclecticism which admits both these -elements as with the speculative view which also admits them both, but -because philosophy and history both in themselves and as constituents -of myth are at bottom one and the same. - -Considered as "poverty," myth must be superseded. In the natural -effort of the human mind to rejoin God, the true One, from whom it -has come, and its inability owing to the exuberant animal nature of -primitive man to make use of the faculty, buried as it is beneath his -too keen senses, of abstracting from subjects their properties and -universal forms,--in these circumstances, it constructs for itself -fanciful unities, imaginary genera or myths: but in its subsequent -progress and development, it gradually resolves the imaginary genera -into intelligible genera, poetic universals into rational, and sets -itself free from mythology. Thus the error of myth passes into the -truth of philosophy. Vico knew and employed a concept of error, error -properly so called, which proceeds from the will, not from thought, -which is never in error as regards itself, "for the mind is always -put under compulsion by truth, since we can never lose sight of God" -(_mens enim semper a vero urgetur quia numquam aspectu amittere -possumus Deum_); the error which consists in the arbitrary conjunction -of unmeaning words, "but words very often, by the will of him who -is lying, escape the force of truth and desert the mind, or even do -violence to the mind and turn away from God" (_verba autem saepissime -veri vim voluntate mentientis eludunt ac mentem deserunt, immo menti -vim aciunt et Deo absistunt_); the error, in a word, which exists when, -in his own powerful language, "though men speak with their mouth, -they have nothing in their minds; since within their minds there is -falsity, which is nothing." But he also knows that error is never -pure error, simply because there is no such thing as a false idea and -falsity consists only in the wrong combination of ideas, and therefore -it always contains truth, and every fable has a certain element of -truth. Hence, far from despising fables, Vico recognised their value -as embryonic forms so to speak of stored-up knowledge or of what will -one day develop into philosophy. The poets (which means, in Vico's new -sense of the word, myth-makers) are the senses (that is, in its new -meaning, rudimentary and imperfect philosophy): the philosophers are -the intellect of mankind, that is the more highly developed philosophy -which derives from the former. The idea of God evolves by degrees from -the God who strikes the imagination of the isolated man, to the God -of the family, _divi parentum,_ the God of a social class or country, -_divi patrii,_ the God of nations, and finally to the God "who is -Jupiter to all men," the God of humanity. The fables stimulated Plato -to understand the three divine punishments which not men but only gods -could inflict, oblivion, infamy and remorse: the passage through the -lower world suggested to him the concept of the purgatorial journey -by which the soul is purified of passions, and the arrival in Elysium -suggested the journey of union by which the mind comes to unite itself -with God by the contemplation of the eternal divine ideas. - -From the similes and metaphors of the poets Aesop drew the examples -and fables by which he gave advice: and the instance founded upon -a single case which satisfies an untutored mind developed into -induction, drawing its validity from several similar cases, as taught -dialectically by Socrates, and thence the syllogism invented by -Aristotle, which cannot exist without a universal. The etymologies -of words reveal the truths observed by primitive man and deposited -by him in his language: for instance the fact, laboriously proved by -modern philosophers, that the senses themselves create the so-called -sensible qualities is already suggested in the Latin word _olfacere,_ -which implies the idea that the sense of smell "makes" the odour. Vico -attaches such importance to this connexion between poetic universals -and rational universals, between myth and philosophy, that he is led -to assert that such judgments of philosophers as cannot find parallel -or precedent in poetic and popular wisdom must be wrong. Here we have -another meaning sometimes assigned by him to the relation of philosophy -to philology: namely, a reciprocal confirmation of common wisdom by -esoteric wisdom and _vice versa,_ both of which are united in the idea -of an everlasting philosophy of man. - -Simultaneously with his theory of myth and its relation to philosophy, -Vico expounds his theory of religion, and the relation it bears to -philosophy. Two thoughts on this subject are to be found up and down -the New Science. The first is, that religion arises in the phase of -weakness and savagery from the mind's need to allay its desire to -understand more or less the phenomena of nature and man; for instance, -to explain lightning. The second is, that religion is produced in -the mind by fear of the person who threatens by lightning. We might -describe these two views as theories respectively of the theoretical -and practical origin of religion; and since according to Vico's -doctrine man consists of nothing but intellect and will, clearly -religion can have no other origin than these two. Now, setting aside -religion in its practical aspect, to be discussed later, religion in -its theoretical aspect is surely nothing else than the imaginative -universal, poetic animism, or myth. To it belongs the institution -which Vico calls divination; that is, the methods of collecting and -interpreting the language of Jupiter, the "real words," gestures and -signs of God, formed as imaginative universals and created by the -animating fancy. And as from myth come science and philosophy, so in -like manner from divination comes the knowledge of ground and cause, -philosophic or scientific prediction. - -In this way Vico escaped the prejudice which was beginning to prevail -in his time--we may recall Van Dale's history of ancient oracles, -popularised by Fontenelle, and Banier's book already mentioned--and -was to be so powerful for a century, of considering religions as -"some one else's imposture": whereas, he says, they were really due -to "one's own credulity." The man who refused to admit the artificial -origin of myth could not admit it of religion. But just as he denied -no less the supernatural or revealed origin of myth, so at the same -time he proclaimed neither more nor less than the natural, even -the human, origin of religions; and--a fact especially worthy of -notice--placed this origin in an inadequate form of the mind, namely -the semi-imaginative form identical with mythology. Nor need we -attach weight to certain brief and incidental remarks which seem to -contradict this theory, as when he says that religion precedes not only -philosophy but language itself, which presupposes the consciousness -of some community between man and man: such equivocations are due to -the invariable confusedness of his method and his habitual lack of -clearness. The identification of religion with myth, and its human -origin, are ideas not only emphatically expressed, but essential to -Vico's whole system. It is a human origin which in his own words -does not exclude a different concept of religion, namely as revealed -and hence of supernatural origin. In fact he always separates -poetic theology, which is mythology, and natural theology, which is -metaphysics or philosophy, from revealed theology. But this last -concept is admitted by him not because it is connected with the others -and derived from a principle common to them, but simply because Vico -asserted its existence no less than theirs. The human origin, poetic -theology, followed by metaphysical theology, is the form valid for -the Gentile portion of mankind, that is the whole human race except -the Hebrew people with its privilege of revelation. The motives that -led Vico to maintain this dualism and the annoying inconsistencies -in which it compelled him to rest will be seen later on in their own -place. But precisely because Vico left this dualism without mediation, -we must in expounding his thought hold fast both terms of the dualism: -and for the time being we will confine ourselves to the merely human -origin--religion as a product of the theoretical needs of man in a -condition of comparative moral poverty. This conception has only an -indirect connexion with Bruno's view of religion as a thing necessary -to the ignorant and undeveloped mob, and with Campanula's theory -of natural or permanent religion, an eternal rational philosophy -coinciding with a Christianity freed from its abuses. Its parallels -in contemporary authors are few and distant: even when they mention -it in passing, they grasp it only in a superficial way and propound -it without connecting it at all with their other ideas: they attack -religion as a form of ignorance, and omit the wisdom of the ignorance, -or religion as truth. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - - -THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS - - -Vico's other doctrines on the theoretical reason, that is to say on -the logic of philosophy, of physical and mathematical science and of -historical study, have been expounded above in the statement of his -theory of knowledge, and are drawn almost entirely from his early -works, since in the New Science the phase of the "completely developed -mind" hardly appears except as a limit of the field of study. Here it -will suffice to mention that he also touches upon the problem of the -relation of poetry to history: but, still because of the confusion -of philosophy with social science, he fails fully to solve it. From -one point of view it seems to Vico that history is prior to poetry, -because the latter, as he says, presupposes reality and contains an -"imitation of the second degree": from another, poetry is the primary -form, because among primitive peoples history is poetry, and the first -historians are poets. At any rate he insists upon the poetic element -essential to history: of Herodotus, the father of Greek history, -he observes that not only are "his books full, for the most part, -of fables," but "the style retains a very great Homeric element, a -feature which all subsequent historians retained, using as they did -a phraseology intermediate between the poetic and the colloquial": -"almost the words of the poets," _verba ferme poetarum,_ as he says -elsewhere in a phrase borrowed from Cicero. - -Nor are the relations between theory and practice, intellect and -will, explained in detail by Vico, although on the whole he suggests -the general idea that as in God intellect and will coincide, so it -is in man, God's image; whose mind is not divided into thought and -will--thought proceeding according to one method and will according to -another--but his thought and will interpenetrate and form one single -whole: a view far superior to that of the contemporary philosophy -of Leibniz, which retained the idea of a divine arbitrament and -therefore of irrationality. Another view, peculiar to Vico, might -be taken by a hasty interpreter to imply the priority of practice -to theory. He says that philosophers arrive at their conceptions -thanks to experience of social institutions and laws in which men -agree as a kind of universals: that Socrates and Plato, for instance, -presupposed the Athenian democracy and law-courts. But the succession -of religions producing republics, republics producing laws, and laws -producing philosophical ideas, which he calls "a fragment of the -history of philosophy philosophically narrated," is really a theory of -sociological, not of philosophical value. - -As regards his doctrines of practical reason, which we are here -beginning to consider, it might be thought that Vico, unlike his -attitude with regard to the theoretical reason, did not stand in sharp -opposition to the thought of his time, but actually united himself with -a contemporary movement, namely the school of natural rights. The head -of the school and leader of the movement, Hugo Grotius, was called by -Vico one of his "four authors," together with Plato, from whom he had -drawn his aspirations towards an idealistic philosophy, Bacon, who had -aroused in his mind the idea of a positive and historical science of -society, and Tacitus, his debt to whom, or at least the debt which he -believed he owed him, we shall examine later on. Along with Grotius he -frequently mentions the other chief authorities on natural rights, -Selden and Puffendorf, omitting their innumerable followers, whom he -considers less as scientific authorities than as "adorners" of the -Grotian system. - -His adherence to the school, in a certain sense, is clear, and is -admitted and proclaimed by Vico himself. But it is also beyond doubt -that he was no mere adherent: he was not a follower of the kind that -retains the general or leading ideas while developing and correcting -details. He was a follower in the dialectical sense only, that is, -in so far as he thought it necessary to contest the primary theses, -or to accept them only in a profoundly modified form. Natural right -offered him not solutions but problems: and of these, while some came -before him already clearly formulated, others, and these were the more -important, arose only in his own mind: problems either unsolved or -unrealised, till Vico propounded and in part solved them. - -Natural rights presented many aspects and many tendencies: and it -would be well to begin by distinguishing and enumerating these. In -the first place, the school taken as a whole and in its essential -character expressed the social progress by which Europe, on emerging -from feudalism and religious warfare, acquired a new consciousness, -distinctively bourgeois and non-clerical in character; and it -observed that the growth of this consciousness was contemporaneous -with the anti-clerical and bourgeois institution of "masonry." The -word "natural" meant, among other things, "not supernatural": and -hence implied hostility or indifference towards the supernatural, -the institutions representing it, and the social conflicts resulting -from it. It was not by accident that Grotius was an Arminian; that -Puffendorf went to law with theologians; that Thomasius is remembered -as one of the champions of freedom of conscience. The protestations of -respect for religion and the church, habitually and liberally inserted -by these publicists in their works,--which are draped, so to speak, -with a veil of piety,--were merely politic safeguards, enabling the -author to threaten the enemy unobserved and to strike from under cover. -This caution is praised, in Grotius's case for example, by a follower -of the school (the author of _Pauco plenior iuris naturalis historia,_ -1719), who extols the master as "the instrument of divine providence," -coming like Messiah to redeem the "natural light" from its bondage to -the "supernatural," and as such gifted with all the power and ability -he could need: so that after tasting the persecutions of Scholasticism, -"he behaved with caution, to avoid further irritating the jealousy -against his natural and reasonable prudence that had issued forth from -its lair at his threats" (_caute versabatur ... ne maius bilem adversus -prudentiam naturalem et rationalem ex latebris productam tam minis -irritaret_), and in proceeding to separate human from divine laws, -did not execute a frontal assault on the theological school when he -attacked its fundamental errors, but even praised it in the preface to -his work. The word "natural" also denoted what is common to individuals -of different nations and ranks: and hence from a practical point of -view provided an admirable war-cry for uniting the bourgeoisie of -different countries in definite common aspirations and struggles. The -treatises of natural rights were for the bourgeoisie of the seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries what the "Manifesto of the communists" and the -cry "Proletariates of the world, unite" attempted to be for the working -classes of the nineteenth. - -In so far as this school and this publicism were signs of a practical -movement, the philosophical interest held in them a secondary place -and discharged a function of minor importance: so that, secondly, the -works on natural right, philosophically considered, did not as a rule -rise above a simple popular empiricism. The principles on which they -rest are not examined and often not even superficially reconciled: the -concepts which they use are less concepts than general representations: -and the form of the writing is systematic in appearance only. Some -of these writers endeavoured to harmonise their doctrines of natural -right with the Platonic, Stoic or Cartesian philosophies, or appealed -to logical or metaphysical axioms, or made use of deduction and the -mathematical method. But all this was mere aggregation, not fusion; -ornament, not reinforcement: at most, it was of value as a proof of -diligence and earnest intentions. - -The philosophy, however, which was more or less implicit in the -pamphleteers of natural rights, and explicit in the philosophers who -set out to elaborate the doctrine, agreed with the spirit of the -time, whose general characteristics are well known. Thus arose the -third or ethical aspect of natural right, namely its utilitarianism; -sometimes more or less concealed, sometimes openly declared, and -worked out from time to time by a philosophy of mathematical or -sensationalistic methods, and of materialistic or rationalistic -tendencies: or else, what comes practically to the same thing, an -abstract and intellectualistic morality, threatening at any moment to -fall into utilitarianism. From this intellectualism and utilitarianism, -combined with the practical and revolutionary character of this mental -movement,--which was bent rather upon bringing about the triumph of -an abstract system of right than upon recognising that which really -develops in history, in all the complexity of its many forms and -vicissitudes--derived its fourth characteristic, the lack of historical -sense, or the anti-historical attitude of the school, which set up the -abstract ideal of a human nature apart from human history instead of -fused with and living in it. - -Finally, bourgeois, anticlerical, utilitarian and materialistic as it -was, the movement of natural right had a fifth important trait, namely -its aversion to transcendence and its tendency towards an immanental -conception of man and of society. This characteristic is neither fully -explained nor fully worked out in the doctrines, but is none the less -easily recognised among the total views of the school. - -Now Vico's genius was truly and indeed exclusively theoretical, and not -at all practical or reformatory: his method was profoundly speculative -and contemptuous of empiricism, his mind idealistic and opposed to -materialism and utilitarianism: his theory of knowledge eager for the -concrete, for "certitude," and, as such, of historical sympathies. -Consequently his doctrine of the practical reason, though deriving its -impetus from the theory of natural rights, was bound to emerge in a -shape different from or even contrary to that theory in all the first -four characteristics enumerated above. And if it did in one respect -coincide--which it only does in the conclusion, not in the path by -which the conclusion is reached--it did so in the very point in which -Vico would least have wished it: in its immanental or anti-religious -tendency. - -But since our subject is not the criticisms and modifications which the -theory of natural right received from Vico's thought, but rather that -thought itself, it is time to pick up the thread of the exposition, -following an order somewhat different from that in which we have -summed up the various characteristics of the theory, and beginning by -observing Vico's opposition to the professed or implicit utilitarianism -of the school, and the ethical doctrine by which he replaced it. - -The two chief representatives of utilitarianism in the seventeenth -century, whom Vico always keeps in view, are Hobbes and Spinoza: but in -addition to them, he refers to Locke and Bayle and, in the preceding -century, Machiavelli; and going back to the ancients, the Stoics with -their conception of faith and the Epicureans with that of chance, -Carneades and his scepticism, and finally the unconscious theory -contained in the saying "_Vae victis_" attributed to Brennus, chief -of the Gauls who took Rome. He admired Hobbes's splendid attempt to -enrich philosophy by a theory which had been lacking to the greatest -days of Greece, the theory of man considered in the whole society -of the human race: but he pronounced the result unsatisfactory, and -the attempt, whose outcome, like that of Locke's system, was hardly -distinguishable from Epicureanism, a failure. Hobbes did not observe -that he could never have propounded his problem of the natural rights -of mankind had not his motive been supplied by the Christian religion -itself, which commands not indeed justice but charity to all mankind. -With the Stoics on the other hand, with the fatalism and determinism -which made it impossible for them to reason soundly about the state and -laws, with the so-called "Spinozists of antiquity," he ideally united -Spinoza; the uniqueness of whose utilitarianism, equally removed from -the Lockian spirit and the Hobbist, since Spinoza "judges of the truth -of things by the mind, not by sense" (_mente non sensu de veris rerum -diiudicat_), did not escape Vico's notice. But unique though it was, -it led Spinoza to think of the state in a somewhat undignified way -"as of a mere society of shopkeepers." These utilitarian doctrines, -with their libels upon human nature, seemed to Vico only fit for men -without hope, too insignificant ever to have a share in the state or -proud enough to believe themselves repressed and denied access to the -positions of which in their arrogance they thought themselves worthy. -Among these he counted the unfortunate Spinoza, who, he thinks, having -as a Jew no country of his own, was moved by envy to devote himself to -the construction of a metaphysic "intended to overthrow all the nations -of the world." He passes stern judgment upon the state of contemporary -ethics, which was all that it could be on the basis of a mechanistic -and materialistic metaphysic without a gleam of finalism. Descartes -produced nothing at all in this field, since his few written remains -on the subject do not amount to a doctrine, and his treatise of the -Passions belongs rather to medicine than to morals. Malebranche and -Nicole were equally sterile, and Pascal's _Pensées,_ the one exception, -are "but scattered lights." Of the Italians, Pallavicino's treatise -_Del bene_ offers no very profound depths of ethics: and Muratori's -attempt in his _Filosofia Morale_ was a very unsuccessful one. - -Utility is not the explanatory principle of morality, because it -proceeds from man's bodily nature, and on that account is subject to -change, while morality, _honestas,_ is eternal. To derive morality -from utility is to confound the occasion with the cause, to confine -oneself to the surface and to offer no explanation at all of the facts. -None of the various modes in which philosophers have successively -called the utilitarian principle to life, fraud or imposture, force, -desire,--none of these accounts for differentiation, that is, for the -social organism. What fraud could ever have seduced and deceived the -supposed simple and frugal first owners of the land, living as they did -perfectly contented with their lot? What force could have succeeded, -if the rich, the alleged usurpers, were few, and the poor, the -robbed, were many? Such explanations are ridiculous, and unworthy of -a serious problem. These strong and powerful men were really powerful -with something other than mere strength: thus they became protectors -of the weak and enemies of destructive and anti-social tendencies: -their rule was one of force, it is true, but "imposed by a more -powerful character" (_a natura praestantiori dictata_); a fact which -the barbarian Brennus may be pardoned for not knowing, but not so a -philosopher. The force which created and organised the earliest states -was nothing but "noble human nature," to which states must always hark -back, although they may have been won by fraud and force, in order -to subsist and maintain themselves: which agrees with Machiavelli's -advice to hark back to the beginnings, but with the implication that -the deepest beginnings are to be found in mercy and justice. Men are -held together by something stouter than utility. Human society cannot -originate and endure without mutual trust; unless people accept each -other's promises and take each other's word for facts they cannot -examine. Could this trust be perhaps ensured by strict penal laws -against falsehood? But laws are a product of society, and this mutual -trust is necessary that society may arise. It may be said, as it is by -Locke, that we are dealing with a psychological process, by which men -gradually acquired the habit of believing when some one spoke to them -and promised to tell the truth. But in that case these men already -understood the idea of a truth which by mere disclosure compelled -assent without any personal teaching; and the psychological principle -of habituation is transcended. - -The true cause of human society then is not utility, which only assists -the action of the cause as its occasion, and brings it about that men, -with all the weakness and poverty of their nature, and the divisions -among them due to original sin, are led to extol their social nature -"under compulsion of facts" (_rebus ipsis dictantibus_), in the phrase -of the jurist Pomponius, quoted with approval by Vico. Objects, facts -and circumstances in morality change, though morality itself does not -change: and hence arises the illusion of the utilitarians, who cling -to the external, confine themselves to the appearance and see the -change but not the permanence. Murder is forbidden: but the approval, -bestowed upon the man who when his life is threatened and he cannot -otherwise save himself kills his unjust aggressor, does not imply that -the moral judgment upon homicide varies; since in these particular -circumstances the case is really one not of homicide but of capital -punishment inflicted by the unjustly attacked person finding himself -alone: a power tacitly delegated to him so to speak by society. Theft -is forbidden: but the man who in order to preserve his life steals a -loaf from another does not violate morality because he is exercising a -right founded upon equity. - -The only philosophy which carries with it a true ethic seems to Vico -to be the Platonic, resting as it does upon a metaphysical principle, -the eternal idea which draws out of itself and creates matter: while -the Aristotelian ethic is founded upon a metaphysic leading to a -physical principle, that of the matter from which particular forms are -drawn, a principle which makes God a potter shaping objects external -to himself. The ethic of the Roman lawyers was doubtless rich in fine -aphorisms: but it was nothing but a mere art of equity, conveyed by -means of endless minute maxims of natural justice, sought for by the -writers in the reason of the laws and the will of the lawgiver. Hence -it cannot be regarded as a moral philosophy, in which the best method -is to proceed from a very small number of eternal truths, established -by ideal justice in the fabric of metaphysic. For analogous reasons -Vico could not rest satisfied with Grotius and the school of natural -rights: of which in general he makes the perfectly just remark that -their ponderous tomes, in spite of the impressive titles they bear, -contain nothing that is not universally known. If Grotius's principles -be weighed in the accurate balance of criticism, they are all found to -be probable or plausible rather than necessary and incontestable. In -dealing with the question of utility, Grotius missed the exact point by -failing to distinguish the occasion from the cause: nor did he "nail -down"--that is, he did not end--the ancient dispute as to whether right -is a question of nature or of human opinion only, the same controversy -as that carried on by philosophers and theologians with Carneades the -sceptic and Epicurus: he advances the hypothesis of primitive men -who were "simpletons," but quite omits to give reasons for it. And -since these "simpletons" of his, after suffering injuries from their -beast-like isolation, initiated a sociable life, a step to which they -were determined by utility, Grotius himself slipped unawares into -utilitarianism and Epicureanism. - -Vico on the other hand answered the question, whether right is natural -or conventional, by the grave aphorism "except in their natural -condition, things neither progress nor endure." To the question, -whence society arises, he replies by mentioning the common feeling of -humanity, the conscience, the need which man feels of escaping from -the internal enemy, which tortures his heart. The origin of society -certainly lies in fear, but it is fear of oneself, not of another's -violence: it lies in the agonies of remorse, the shame whose tinge -suffusing the cheeks of the earliest men lit the first beacon of -morality upon earth. Shame is the mother of all virtues, honour, -frugality, honesty, loyalty to the pledged word, truthfulness in -speech, abstention from others' property, and chastity. In extolling -society, man is extolling human nature. - -Shame or the moral consciousness, translated into terms of the -corresponding empirical science, becomes that common consciousness of -man upon matters of human necessity or utility which is the source of -the natural right of nations. This common consciousness, says Vico, -is an unreflective judgment, felt in common by a whole class, a whole -people, a whole nation and the whole of mankind. An unreflective -judgment is not strictly a judgment at all, since reflection is -inseparable from judgment: it is not judgment, because it is felt -and not thought. But on the other hand it is not what is called a -"feeling,"--a vague term unknown to Vico, as it is to traditional -philosophy. It is rather a practical attitude of mind, similar on the -whole in persons living in similar conditions and producing similar -customs in the various social groups, from the customs of a particular -class to those of all mankind. The attitude is quite spontaneous, and -for this very reason unreflective; so that customs arise from within, -not from without, and their similarity does not depend upon imitation -("without one nation taking example from another"). Through this -_sensus communis_ the moral consciousness embodies itself in compact -and unyielding institutions: and thus the _sensus communis_ reduces to -certitude the free will of man, which is in itself quite uncertain. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - - -MORALITY AND RELIGION - - -But this internal fear, shame or moral consciousness is aroused in man -by religion. The fear is the fear of God, the shame is abasement before -his face. Primitive man wanders over the earth alone, wild, fierce, -without articulate speech, without a permanent mate, at the mercy of -his unbridled and violent passions, a "brute" rather than a man. What -can restrain him? what can rescue him from at last destroying himself? -Wise men cannot direct him, for we cannot say whence or how they can -reach him. The intervention of God cannot save him: God has withdrawn -himself to his chosen people, and has no dealings with the rest of -mankind, the Gentiles. But this "brute" is still a man: God, while -abandoning him, has left a spark of his own essence at the bottom of -his heart. See! the sky lightens: the wild creature stands awestruck -and afraid: in his mind arises the shadowy idea of something greater -than he, something divine. So he conceives or rather imagines a first -God, a Sky-god, a thundering Jupiter: and to this deity he turns to -appease his wrath or invoke his aid. But in order to conciliate him and -secure his help, he must shape his own life conformably to his purpose: -he must humble himself before his God, overcome his own pride and -arrogance, abstain from certain actions and perform others. Thus the -conception of a deity lends power to that peculiar possession of the -human will, the attempt, that is, the liberty, to control the movements -communicated to the mind by the body and to annul or to redirect them -simultaneously. With these acts of self-control, with freedom, morality -comes into existence: the fear of God has laid the foundations of human -life. Altars arise all over the earth: the caves of her mountains, -whither the man now bears the woman, ashamed as he is of gratifying his -desires before the face of the sky, which is the face of God, preside -at the first marriage-rites and shelter the first families: her bosom -opens to receive the sacred trust of the bodies of the dead. The first -and fundamental ethical institutions--worship, wedlock and burial--have -arisen. - -This social and ethical power of the idea of God appears again in the -course of subsequent history: since when nations have relapsed into -savagery through warfare, and human laws have no more power over them, -religion is the only means of subduing them. It reappears again in the -individual development of human life: children indeed cannot learn -piety except through the fear of some deity; and when all natural help -fails him man requires a superior being to save him, and this being is -God. All nations believe in a divine providence: tribes living in a -society without any consciousness of God, for instance in some parts of -Brazil, among the Kafirs, and in the Antilles, are travellers' tales, -an attempt to increase the sale of their books by the narration of -portents. - -If this is so,--and doubtless it is--then no doctrine can be more -foolish than that which claims to conceive a morality and civilisation -without religion. Just as no well-established physical science is -possible without the guidance of abstract mathematical truth, so -no knowledge of morality can arise except together with abstract -metaphysical truths, without, that is, the idea of God. When the -religious consciousness is extinguished or obscured the conception -of society and the state is extinguished or obscured with it. Jews, -Christians, Gentiles and Mahommedans possess this conception because -all alike believe in some deity, whether as an infinite free spirit, -or as several gods consisting of mind and body, or as one single God, -an infinite free spirit in an infinite body. The Epicureans did not -possess such a conception, attributing to God as they did body alone, -and chance together with body: nor did the Stoics, who made him subject -to fate. And Cicero made the admirable remark to the Epicurean Atticus, -that he could not discuss laws with him unless he first granted the -existence of the divine providence. Hobbes, who revived Epicureanism, -and Spinoza, who revived Stoicism, as we have seen entirely failed to -understand the nature of society and the state. One must consort with -primitive man, stupid, hirsute, unclean and dishevelled, to refute -those learned authors of "desiccated literature," with Peter Bayle at -their head, who maintain that human society can and indeed does live -without religion. - -The absence of the idea of God supplied the chief argument in Vico's -criticism of Grotius and Puffendorf, two of these authors whom he held -in great honour as "princes" of the school of natural rights. Neither -of these writers, he says, lays down the principle of divine providence -as primary and essential. Grotius does not expressly deny it: but on -account of his very attachment to truth, he endeavours to exclude it, -and asserts that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be -removed. Hence Vico accuses him of Socinianism, since he makes human -innocence consist in the simplicity of human nature. Puffendorf is -still worse: he seems to ignore providential direction, and begins -with the scandalously Epicurean supposition that man is thrown into -this world with no help or attention from God, without even that spark -within his heart which is destined to grow into the flame of morality: -and having been reproved for this, he tries to justify himself in a -special essay, but does not succeed in discovering the true principle -on which alone society can be explained. - -Now why, in face of all these energetic declarations and arguments -of Vico's on the necessity of religion to morality, did we say above -that the only point of real resemblance between him and Grotius, -Puffendorf and the natural-right school generally was his purely -immanental conception of ethics? Because, if we examine the point -closely, Vico is not in opposition to the method of that school. Like -them, in constructing his science of human society he excludes with -Grotius all idea of God, and with Puffendorf considers man as without -help or attention from God, excluding him, that is, from revealed -religion and its God. As for these two writers, so for Vico the subject -under consideration is natural rights, not supernatural: the law -of the Gentiles, not of the chosen people: the law which arises of -itself among the caves, not that which comes down from Sinai. Vico's -opposition, which he expresses with his accustomed confusion and -obscurity, turns not upon assertions like these, but upon the actual -conception of religion. In one word, the religion of which he speaks is -not the same as that of which Grotius and Puffendorf spoke, or rather -did not speak. - -Religion, as we have already seen, means for Vico not necessarily -revelation, but conception of reality: either that which expresses -itself as it does in the period of fully developed mind in the form -of intelligible metaphysic, which passes from the thought of God to -explain logic by its reasoning and to condescend to purify the human -heart by morality: or that which takes concrete shape, as it does in -the earliest stage of humanity, in the form of poetical metaphysics. -One may easily ignore revealed religion when inquiring into the -foundations of morality: but how can one ever ignore this natural -religion, identical as it is with knowledge of the truth? Plutarch, -discussing the primitive religions of terror, asks the question whether -it would not have been better, instead of worshipping the gods in so -impious a manner, that there should be no religion at all: but he -forgot that from these cruel superstitions brilliant civilisations -developed, and no civilisation could ever have grown from atheism. -Without a religion, whether gentle or fierce, rational or fantastic, to -give the idea, more or less clearly defined, more or less elevated, of -something superior to the individual and uniting all individuals, the -moral will would have no object for its volition. - -At this point we see the meaning of what we have described as the -second, practical or ethical, signification of the word "religion" in -Vico. In this signification, Vico justifies and vindicates the impious -saying that "fear creates the gods": he even places the source of -religion in the longing for eternal life which man feels when stirred -by a universal sense of immortality hidden in the depths of the mind. -In this second signification, religion is a practical fact, indeed it -is morality itself, as in the first meaning it was truth itself. - -If the meaning of religion for Vico, either as the condition of -morality, in the first sense of the word, or as synonymous with it, -in the second, is once understood, it is clear that when he condemned -Grotius and Puffendorf for their omission of this most important -concept, he was substantially doing nothing but clenching his criticism -of the insipid moralising and the concealed utilitarianism of these -two thinkers. On other occasions also he resorted to the valuable -weapon of the concept of religion, with the same end in view. Because -if he sometimes credited philosophy with the task of assisting -mankind by raising and directing fallen human nature, at other times -he decided that philosophy is rather adapted to reasoning, and that -the moral philosophers with the greatest powers of reasoning are of -value only to stimulate the senses by their eloquence to perform the -duties of virtue, while religion alone has the power of making men act -virtuously. Then in the empirical science corresponding to this part of -the philosophy of mind, Vico turns religion (or poetical metaphysic) -and philosophy into two historical epochs, making the former -characteristic of the barbaric period and the latter of the civilised. -He maintains, as he is clearly bound to do, that religion is the sole -foundation of all civilisation and of philosophy itself, and rejects -Polybius's saying that if there had been philosophers in the world -religion would have been unnecessary. How could philosophy have arisen, -he objects, had not states, that is, civilisation, arisen first? and -how could states have arisen without the aid of religion? Thus the -saying ought to be reversed: without religion there is no philosophy. -It was religion, it was the divine providence that tamed the sons of -Polyphemus and reduced them to the humanity of Aristides and Socrates, -of Laelius and Scipio Africanus. - -The conception again of the "state of nature," which served in the -treatises of the school of natural rights as an hypothesis and a -means of exposition with a view either to developing the argument -independently of mystical theology without evoking too many protests, -or to conveying implicitly their utilitarian theories, acquired in -Vico's hands a new function and a new content. A perfectly honest -Catholic, having satisfied his conscience by separating revealed from -human religion, he was in a position to assume the state of nature -as a literal and actual reality. It is an ideal reality, in so far -as it represents in the dialectic of the practical consciousness a -moment necessary for the genesis of reality, the pre-moral moment: a -historical and empirical reality, as the approximately actual condition -of those periods of anarchy and disturbance which precede the rise of -civilisations or follow upon their fall. The natural-right school -acquiesced more or less in the traditional doctrine of the church, -namely that the Gentiles, in the dispersion following on the confusion -of Babel, had taken away with them a residuum of revealed religion, a -vague memory of the true God, and that hence arose the possibility of -social life and of false gods, shadows of the true God: and thus the -"state of nature" had been put forward in their system as something -abstract and unreal. Vico worked out strictly the distinction between -Jews and Gentiles, and conceived the state of nature as devoid of -any help coming from previous revelation: as a state in which man -stood alone, so to speak, face to face with his own chaotic and -turbulent passions. It was a state actually without morality, but--in -contradistinction to the utilitarian hypothesis--pregnant with moral -requirements, and was transcended by this implicit character becoming -explicit. But this transcendence was brought about naturally, not by -means of divine grace: the true divine grace is human nature itself, -shared by Gentiles no less than Jews, all equally illuminated by a -divine light. - -Man's will is free, weak though it is, to make his passions into -virtues; and in his struggle towards virtue he is helped in a natural -manner by God through providence. Certainly Vico did not intend to deny -the efficacy of direct and personal divine grace as well: but following -his usual method he separates the latter from the natural operation of -providence, which is the only question of importance for him and the -only one he considers. So far as concerns the controversies on grace, -he always likes to maintain a middle position between two extremes -represented typically, according to him, by Pelagianism and Calvinism: -and ever since as a young man he studied the works of Richard, the -theologian of the Sorbonne, he had accepted his demonstration of -the superiority of the Augustinian doctrine, just because it was -intermediate between these extremes. A moderate doctrine of this -kind seemed to him, as he says, to provide a suitable foundation for -a principle of the natural rights of nations which should explain the -origin of Roman and other Gentile law, while at the same time remaining -in agreement with the Catholic religion. He was inclined to admit that -there was a privileged nation, namely the Jewish; and that in the -struggle against the passions the Christian had an advantage over the -non-Christian, because in cases where natural grace failed he might be -helped by supernatural. But, in a word, miracles are miracles, and the -New Science is not a science of the miraculous. - -That it is not, is proved by Vico's criticism on the third of the -"principles" of natural rights, against John Selden, a famous man in -his day though forgotten later, and author of _De iure naturali et -gentium iuxta disciplinant Hebraeorum_ (1640). Selden disagreed with -Grotius, in this as in certain other questions, in not denying, and -even in exalting, the value of religion: he conceived moral and civil -life impossible for mankind except through revelation. This revelation, -made by God to the Jewish people, passed from them according to Selden -by several channels to the Gentiles: Pythagoras for instance had learnt -from Ezekiel; Aristotle, at the time of the campaigns of Alexander in -Asia, formed a friendship with Simon the Just; Numa Pompilius acquired -some knowledge of the Bible and the prophets. This was enough to -reassure any believer who had been frightened away from the works of -the natural-right school by their heterodox tendencies. But Vico will -have none of this ultra-religious system. If Grotius ignored providence -and Puffendorf denied it, Selden was wrong, said Vico, in supplying it, -making it a _deus ex machina,_ without explaining it by the essential -character of the human mind. It was a system not only unphilosophical -but incompatible with sacred history, which admits to a certain extent -even in the case of the Jews a natural, not revealed, law: and it was -only because, during the captivity in Egypt, they lost sight of this -that the direct intervention of God with the laws given to Moses took -place. Nor did the theory agree, as to the alleged dissemination of -Jewish knowledge and laws among the Gentiles, with the words of the Jew -Josephus and of Lactantius; and in general, it was unsupported by even -the smallest documentary evidence. Vico's conclusion therefore remains -unaltered. The Jews enjoyed in addition the extraordinary aid of the -true God: but the other nations attained civilisation solely through -the ordinary light of providence. - -Whether or no Vico quoted and interpreted Grotius and Puffendorf -accurately is for us a question of small importance. His exposition -and estimate of other philosophers matter less than his own doctrines, -whatever their historical relations, which, to tell the truth, are many -in number. Nevertheless it will be as well to indicate briefly, as -regards the difficulties which may arise upon this point, the answer -which we think plausible. Any one who after reading Vico's censures -opened the _De iure belli et pacis_ and found that Grotius explicitly -includes among his three fundamental principles, with reason and the -social nature, the divine will, and that this ignoring of God amounts -to little more than a mere phrase laying emphasis on the power of the -social nature and reason, which would take effect "even if we were -to grant that God does not exist" (_etiamsi dar emus non esse Deum_) -or that he does not care for human affairs, "which cannot be granted -without the grossest impiety" (_quod sine summo scelere dari nequit_): -any one who opened Puffendorf and read a most solemn denunciation of -the Grotian hypothesis as impious and absurd, and a declaration that -natural laws would remain hanging in the air devoid of force apart -from the will of God as legislator; any one who read these words might -be led to accuse Vico of negligence or even of insincerity in his -criticisms of his predecessors. But in truth Vico did not know what to -make of a God set side by side with other sources of morality, or set -above them as a superfluous source for the sources: he, searching for -God as he did in the heart of man, saw and felt the gulf fixed between -him and those who no longer had him in their hearts and barely kept -him on their lips through habit or prudence. A more subtle question -would be to ask why,--if Vico agreed with the natural-right school in -ignoring revelation, and if he instead of rejecting it deepened their -superficial immanental doctrine,--why he put himself forward as their -implacable enemy and persisted in boasting loudly before prelates and -pontiffs of having formulated a system of natural rights different from -that of the three Protestant authors and adapted to the Roman church. -The supposition that he acted thus through politic caution might be -advanced if instead of Vico we were dealing with, for instance, a -passionate and powerful but deceitful friar like Tommaso Campanella: -but the spotless character of Vico entirely precludes it, and we can -only suppose that, lacking as his ideas always were in clarity, on -this occasion he indulged his tendency to confusion and nourished his -illusions, to the extent of conferring upon himself the flattering -style and title of _Defensor Ecclesiae_ at the very moment when he -was destroying the religion of the church by means of the religion of -humanity. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - - - -MORALITY AND LAW - -With the dazzling light of his originality still shining before our -eyes, it is impossible to fix our attention upon those doctrines and -classifications which Vico drew from the traditional philosophy and -placed especially in the first book of the _Diritto universale_: though -it is precisely these that have become favourites with many readers, -and are now almost common property through the frequent quotation of -them. That God is "infinite power knowledge and will" (_posse nosse -velle infinitum_) and man "finite power knowledge and will struggling -towards the infinite" (_posse nosse velle finitum quod tendit ad -infinitum_): that the state is the image of God, and because "it has -all things beneath it, nothing above" (_omnia infra se, nil superius -habet_), therefore "it renders account to God alone and to no one else" -(_uni Deo, praeterea reddat rationem nemini_), and that just as in God -freedom is inherent in his eternal reason, so the state freely obeys -the laws it has itself established: that justice "directs and equates -utilities" (_utilitates dirigit et exaequat_), directing, like an -architect, in the building-up of the state, the two particular kinds -of justice, commutative and distributive, the two divine artisans that -measure utility with the two divine measures, arithmetic and geometry, -so that "what is equal when you measure is also just when you choose" -(_quod est aequum cum metiris, idem est iustum quum eligis_), these -and similar assertions seem not merely lacking in originality but -even false or meaningless, adorned though they may be with the name -either of Aristotle or of Campanella or of other philosophers of the -ancient world or the Renaissance. If, to take one, justice consisted -in measuring, a philosophy of justice would be unnecessary, for the -science of calculation and measurement would be enough. Vico himself at -one point involuntarily and ingenuously discloses the vicious circle -of this metaphor substituted for a concept, by saying that men ought -"to share utility equally among themselves, only preserving a _just_ -difference where it is a question of desert, and that to preserve the -equality." - -More profitable than collecting these second-hand formulae would be to -collect the many acute observations of moral psychology found here and -there in his writings, expressed in his gem-like style; or to recall -his little-known theory of laughter, which he derives from disappointed -expectation and from the weakness of the mind, and therefore denies -the faculty both to animals and to the perfect man, considering a man -who laughs to be a satyr or faun, intermediate between a brute and a -man. But abstaining from such a collection, which forms no part of our -plan, we would rather observe that even in the commonplace distinctions -and classifications mentioned above Vico shows a certain merit: he -recognises, even while he propounds them, the necessary confusion -and identification of all or many of these distinctions. Thus after -distinguishing the two kinds of justice, the three kinds of virtue and -the three kinds of law, he ends by declaring that these dualities, -triplicities and multiplicities each form a unity. - -Justice and virtue also, for Vico, form a unity, since that power of -truth, or human reason, which is virtue in so far as it struggles -with selfishness, is also justice in so far as it directs or equates -utilities. This implies that Vico does not distinguish, at least in the -systematic exposition of the _Diritto universale,_ between law and -morality: a distinction which indeed received little emphasis in the -doctrine of natural rights, and is barely indicated in Grotius, for -instance, as one between a greater and less degree of morality. Vico's -doctrine of punishment is also purely moral, and deduced from the -ethical concept of remorse. It is inflicted, he says, by the law, and -is nothing but a social reinforcement of the individual conscience, in -the case where the offender does not himself expiate his crime by means -of remorse and internal punishment. - -But the more the problem of the relation between law and morality is -absent in Vico's theoretical formulation and systematic treatment, -the more present it is in his particular observations; indeed it may -be said to pervade the whole of the New Science. Nor could it be -otherwise, seeing that this relation refers to the distinction between -the moral will and the inferior or earlier forms of will; and we know -that all Vico's tendencies were towards exploring the lower and obscure -region of the mind, both cognitive and practical, in the sphere alike -of imagination, will and passion. - -He always realised the supreme importance of the passions; and if -he could not approve of giving them the upper hand, if he always -considered the Epicurean morality a morality "of idlers shut up in -their pleasure-gardens," he did not at all approve of excessively -severe moralities such as that of the Stoics, which was no less than -the other a morality of "solitaries," not one for men living in a -state. Stoicism certainly preaches an eternal and immutable justice, -and makes honour the criterion of human action; but it does violence -to human nature, dehumanises it, annuls it and drives it to despair by -pretending that it is quite insensible to the passions, by ignoring -the utility and necessity of the bodily nature, by inculcating that -rule--a rule "harder than iron"--that sins are all equal and that he -who strikes a slave is as guilty as he who kills his father. The -same doubts must have been aroused in Vico's mind by Jansenism, as he -complains that "out of hatred of probability, Christian morality in -France is becoming rigidified." We ought to follow not these solitary -philosophers but rather those political ones, especially the Platonic -type, which recognises that the passions should be not eradicated but -moderated and "converted into human virtues." Thus out of cruelty, -avarice and ambition, the three universal faults of mankind, Providence -elicits the warrior, the merchant and the judge; the bravery, wealth -and wisdom of states. From these three failings, which would destroy -mankind on the earth, civil prosperity is formed. - -Concerning matters of utility, Vico observes that "in themselves," _ex -se,_ they are neither good nor bad (_neque turpes neque honestae_) but -become so merely through their relation to the moral consciousness -("but their unfairness is baseness, their fairness, honour: _sed -earum inaequalitas est turpitudo, acqualitas autem honestas_"). In -the empirical science of utility, he defends against Grotius a "prior -natural law," _ius naturale prius,_ to which belong self-defence and -the procreation and upbringing of children: and this right he connects -with the Stoic _ἀδιάφορον._ That it has no moral authority is proved -by the fact that the law which follows it in the historical order, the -"posterior natural law," _ius naturale posterius,_ defined by Justinian -as "that which is established among all men by natural reason and is -preserved by all nations alike" (_quod naturalis ratio inter omnes -homines constituit et apud omnes gentes per aeque custoditur_), is -prior in the order of right, _prius iure,_ overcomes the former when -they conflict and sets upon it the seal of immutability. Now, although -this first natural law is defined and exemplified in a merely empirical -manner, it is surely at bottom nothing but pure law, law not yet -moralised. - -But it is upon the concept of "certitude" that law as distinct from -morality properly, according to Vico, rests. The word certitude is used -by him in many senses, neither clearly distinguished nor harmonised nor -deduced one from another: though they all as we have seen unite, rather -confusedly, in the general idea of the spontaneous as distinguished, -from the reflective form of the mind. Certitude in its practical -signification implies among other things an opposition to the "truth" -of volition, and is, in a word, force as against equity and justice, -authority as against reason, mere will as against the moral will. -These are distinctions occurring to our own thoughts, rather than -stated by Vico, who both distinguishes and fails to distinguish. For -instance, he affirms that "certitude proceeds from authority, truth -from reason" (_certuni ab auctoritate est, verum a ratione_) and -immediately afterwards adds that "it is quite impossible for authority -to conflict with reason, for in that case there would be not laws but -abortive laws" (_auctoritas cum ratione omnino pugnare non potest, -nam ita non leges essent, sed monstra legum_). At any rate, the New -Science seems to him, by reason of this treatment of certitude, to -contain a philosophy of authority, which, he adds, "is the source of -what theological moralists call external justice." That is to say, he -connected the concept of certitude with the distinction and terminology -of external and internal, already employed by the scholastic morality, -which, used about this time by Christianus Thomasius, were destined -without any great philosophical merit on his part to give an impetus -to the investigation of the philosophical relations between law and -morality. - -Another and kindred meaning of practical certitude in Vico is the -so-called letter of the law, _formula legum;_ which may stand in -opposition to reason and the moral consciousness, but none the less -has its own peculiar value: "_dura lex, sed certa: durum sed scriptum -est_--the law is harsh, but it is certain; it is harsh, but so it is -written." It is in a word the value of law simply as law, which though -devoid of any real ethical content yet has always the value that comes -from a command over the will. "The certitude of law" (writes Vico) "is -a darkening of the reason supported merely by authority, and makes the -law harsh in practical experience by laying down their certitude, which -in good Latin (_certuni_) means particularised, or in the scholastic -terminology individualised." To a certain extent Vico grasped the -individual character which lies at the root of every law. That one -must "judge according to law, not according to example" (_legibus non -exemplis iudicandum_) is a comparatively late principle: the first laws -were strictly _"exempta,"_ exemplary punishments. From real examples -were derived the ideal examples employed by logic and rhetoric: and -when the intelligible universal was understood, it was recognised that -law had a certain universal character. - -The primitive society sketched by Vico is, in its juristic aspect, -the myth so to speak of pure law or practical force. Once upon a time -men lived possessed of immense bodily strength, and proportionately -feeble in understanding, who thought all strength greater than their -own divine, and this belief constituted their law. They thought of -the gods simply as beings stronger than themselves, whom they were -compelled to obey, though with a bad grace: like Polyphemus, who if he -had been strong enough would have fought Zeus himself, or Achilles, -who told Apollo that if only they were equally matched he would not -hesitate to try his strength against him. The wisdom of providence -decreed that these fierce men, not tamed as yet by the rule of reason, -should at least fear the divine nature of force and measure reason by -its standard. This is the foundation of the principle of the "external -justice of war." But the myth of the period of force cannot have the -strictness of a philosophical concept, and consequently these strong -men are considered by Vico from another point of view as ethically the -best: "strongest" and "best," _fortissimi_ and _optimi,_ are regarded -as synonymous terms: and their law, though not truth or rational law, -is not pure certitude, but truth "mixed with certitude," _ex certo -mixtum._ But the very mixture of certitude with, and its preponderance -over, truth, which is here asserted, postulates the concept of pure -certitude as presupposed by Vico. - -When Vico accused Grotius and the school of natural rights of -commencing their history half-way, with the civilised ages, and -overlooking the earlier periods, the accusation, in its bearing upon -the philosophy of practice, may be translated into a charge of ignoring -the ideal moment of force and confining the attention to justice, -equity and morality. The moment of force, constituting the other -and earlier "half," was the field chosen by Hobbes, before him by -Machiavelli, and still earlier by Epicurus, all of whom treated of this -moment alone, "with impiety towards God, infamy to rulers and injustice -towards nations." Hence the conclusion is easy, that in refuting the -utilitarians and the theorists of force, Vico was at the same time -recognising and absorbing the need which they represented, their only -mistake having been that they developed this need in an abstract and -one-sided way. His "state of nature" is in some respects like that of -Hobbes, with the difference that mankind transcends the latter owing to -the recognition of utility, the former owing to the religious and moral -consciousness. But Vico does not on this account express any gratitude -to Hobbes or Spinoza, Machiavelli or Epicurus, since he believed -himself to have found in a classical author all the materials and the -stimulus he required, all the counter-poise necessary to the Platonic -philosophy. This was one of his "four authors," the one of whom we -said earlier that we had still to see the use which Vico made, namely -Tacitus. This writer for his part contemplates with his unequalled -metaphysical powers man as he is, while Plato contemplates him as he -ought to be. Just as Plato in his universal science explores every -corner of nobility, so Tacitus "descends into every scheme of utility," -in order that among the infinite chaotic chances of malice and fortune -the man of practical wisdom may act well. To the union in his mind -of Greek philosopher and Roman historian, which he interprets, as is -easily seen, in the manner usual among the "Tacitean" politicians of -the seventeenth century, Vico attributes his own success in sketching -a real idea of eternal history, "which the wise man would construct -both of esoteric wisdom such as Plato's, and of common wisdom such as -that of Tacitus." To Tacitus, finally, he owed the impulse towards the -supreme task of making concrete his ideal, and realising the republic -of Plato in the "dregs of Romulus." - - - - -CHAPTER IX - - -THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW - -As the cognitive mind passes from feeling without noticing to noticing -with disturbed and confused faculties, and thence to the reflection -of the clear mind, so analogously the volitional mind passes from -the state of nature to practical certitude and thence to practical -truth. In the correlative empirical science, the transition is more -or less that from the savage to the heroic or barbaric condition and -from the latter to the civilised. In these three types of society, all -the manifestations of life correspond: thus there are three kinds of -character, three kinds of manners and customs, three kinds of law and -therefore of states, three kinds of language and writing, three kinds -of authority, reason and justice, and three divisions of history. -Confused and sometimes self-contradictory though Vico may be in fixing -the particulars of these various correspondences, his general idea is -plain. Where reflection is at a low ebb and imagination flourishes, the -passions also flourish, habits are violent, governments aristocratic -or feudal, families subjected to strict paternal rule, laws severe, -legal procedure symbolical, language couched in metaphor and writing in -hieroglyphics. Where on the other hand reflection predominates, poetry -becomes either separate from or charged with philosophy, manners and -customs lose their violence, the passions are brought into subjection, -the people take the government into their own hands, all members of -the family are alike citizens of the state, law is mitigated by equity -and its procedure simplified, language loses its metaphorical clothing -and writing becomes alphabetical. Mixed forms, which some politicians -aim at producing artificially, would be abortions: and though we do -find natural hybrid forms which retain a tinge of the earlier, each -one, by reason of its own unity, always tries so far as possible to -divest its subject of every property belonging to other forms. - -Which of the various social types forms the foundation of the others -and supplies the criterion for judging them? or what is the criterion -and standard by which they must all alike be judged? For Vico, such a -question is meaningless. Governments, he says, must adapt themselves -to the nature of the people governed: the school of princes is the -morality of nations. We may shudder at war, at the law of the stronger, -at the reduction of the conquered to slavery, that is, to chattels: -but the society which expressed itself in these customs was necessary -and therefore good. The worship of strength, as we have said, occupied -the position and discharged the function of the as yet impossible rule -of reason. Later came the period of fully developed human reason, when -men no longer valued each other by the standard of force, but by virtue -of their rational nature, which is the true and eternal human nature, -recognised one another as equals. The change of time brought change of -customs: and the new were no less good, but no more so, than the old. - -It would be as useless to seek the common measure of these various -social types, as to ask what is the real age of the individual life, -the common measure of childhood, youth, maturity and old age. The -comparison is one presented by Vico himself. As children shape all -their ideas according to their whims and carry them out with violence, -as youths animate everything by their imagination, as grown men guide -their affairs rather by pure reason and old men by sound prudence; -so it is with the human race, which after its feeble, isolated and -poverty-stricken origins, grows at first in unrestrained liberty, then -rediscovers the necessaries, utilities and comforts of life by genius -and imagination (the age of poetry), and finally cultivates wisdom by -means of reason (the age of philosophy). Similarly, natural right arose -first in laws so to speak of just passion and just violence: then it -was clothed in various myths of just reason: and finally it was openly -proclaimed in its pure rationality and noble truth. - -By such a method of handling and passing judgment upon governments, -laws and customs, Vico, escaped another of the leading doctrines or -suppositions of the school of natural rights, the abstraction and -anti-historicism we mentioned in its own place, which resulted in the -conception of a natural law standing above positive law and therefore -constituting a kind of eternal code, a perfect scheme of legislation, -not yet fully actual but to be actualised, whose outlines show up -clearly in the works of the school through their veil of doctrine and -philosophy. But this eternal code was in its most important part a -contingent and transitory code; or at least it advocated a code in -agreement with the reformatory and revolutionary tendencies of these -writers, publicists as they were rather than philosophers. - -Vico rids himself of the ideal eternal code without seeming to do -so: though he is quite ready to recognise that the "philosophers' -natural right," _ius naturale philosophorum,_ is in idea eternal, and -inexorably laid down "in accordance with eternal reason," _ad rationis -aeternae libellam._ But from this verbal concession of eternity made -out of respect for the old traditional scholastic philosophy, whose -influence he felt now and then, he goes on to deny its real eternity -and supra-historical character; since instead of placing it above -and outside history he puts it in the place which belongs to it, -within history. The law of violence or heroic law, after passing into -the law of uncivilised society, gradually attains a certain limit of -clarity, in which state the only thing wanting to its perfection is -that some school of philosophers should complete it by establishing it -with reasoned principles, upon the idea of eternal justice: and this -reasoning and systematisation is the _"ius naturale philosophorum"_ the -extreme form of the historical development of law, not its unchanging -rule; a product, not a standard. Hence Vico's charge against Grotius -of confusing the _"ius naturale philosophorum,"_ the law composed of -reasoned principles derived from moralists, theologians and, in part, -jurists, with the natural law of nations, _ius naturale gentium_ (in -Grotius's language, confusing natural law with an arbitrary or positive -form of law): of misunderstanding the Roman jurists, who intended to -speak solely of the latter: and of offering to correct and venturing to -criticise writers whose faults on inspection vanish. - -The eternal code, considered in its essentials, is a Utopia: and since -the first and greatest of Utopias is Plato's Republic, it is important, -in order better to decide the point at issue, to examine Vico's -attitude towards the political scheme of Plato. If we may listen to -his own words, the _Republic_ was another of his many incentives and -examples when he conceived the New Science. With the study of Plato -began the unconscious awakening in him of "the thought of conceiving -an ideal eternal law, to be expressed in a universal state built on -the idea or plan of providence, on which idea, indeed, are founded -all the states of every period and race: an ideal Republic like that -which Plato ought, as a consequence of his divine metaphysic, to have -conceived." He ought, but could not, owing to his "ignorance of the -first man's fall"; ignorance, that is, of the original state of nature -and of the exclusively poetic or "common" wisdom which followed it: -an ignorance maintained by the error, common to the minds of all men, -of measuring by oneself the almost unknown nature of other people, -as Plato exalted the rude and barbaric beginnings of Gentile man to -the perfect state of his loftiest esoteric knowledge of the divine, -and fancied these earliest men to possess a high degree of this -esoteric wisdom, whereas on the contrary they were really "brutes, -all stupidity and ferocity." In consequence of this learned error -Plato, instead of conceiving an eternal Republic and the laws of an -eternal justice by which Providence governs the nations of the world -and directs it by means of the common needs of mankind, by which it is -led to the common consciousness of the whole human race, "conceived -an ideal Republic and a merely ideal justice, by which nations are -not guided at all." In fact, they ought not to be guided by it: since -among the determinations of the perfect state there are some which are -dishonourable and detestable, such as the community of wives. Thus Vico -took from Plato the idea of an eternal state, but entirely inverted it -by the reservation which he added to it, that the true eternal republic -is not the abstract state of Plato, but the course of history in all -its phases, including the brutes at one end and Plato at the other. -This is the "republic of mankind," the "great state of mankind," the -"universal republic" (_generis humani respublica, magna generis humani -civitas, respublica universa_) of which he means to investigate the -"form, ranks, societies, occupations, laws, crimes, punishments, and -science of jurisprudence" (_formam ordines societates negotia leges -peccata poenas et scientiam in ea tractandi iuris_) and to follow -the development of all these "from their origin, the beginnings of -humanity, under the control of divine Providence, national custom -and authority" (_a suis usque primis humanitatis originibus, divina -providentia moderante, moribus gentium ac proinde auctoritate_), that -is to say, "by means of the various elements of human utility and -necessity, or even by means of opportunities arising by the spontaneous -action of circumstances" (_per varia utilitatum et necessitatum, -humanarum rudimenta, sive adeo per ipsarum sponte rerum oblatas -occasiones_). The "great state of the nations founded and governed by -God" is thus nothing else than History. - -While refusing a fixed code and the draft of a model society, we do -not mean to deny the possibility of a practical aspect of the science -conceived by Vico, the New Science in its triple form of ideal history, -typical history and historical history. Every truth has its practical -side, that is to say, its practical consequences: and thinking in this -or that way of the nature and development of mankind involves this or -that practical line of conduct. A man who believes for instance in -the docile innocence of savage races will approach them with a smile -on his face, kindly words on his lips and the alphabet and catechism -of rights and duties in his hand: one who believes in Vico's "brutes" -will adopt somewhat sterner methods, perhaps even fire and the sword. -One who, like Vico, believes that "custom is more potent than law" and -that "custom changes not at a blow, but gradually and slowly" will -not be inclined to hasty legislation, and will not delude himself -into thinking he can remodel human nature after an ideal of his own -devising. Such conduct in any case is not theory, but practice: and -when the attempt is made to reduce it to theory, either a chaotic -confusion of necessary and contingent determinations results, or else -if we avoid these errors and strive to attain a strictly doctrinal form -of conduct, we get neither more nor less than the scientific theory -itself, from which our conduct derived. - -The thought of following up the New Science with a practical theory -appropriate to it evidently occurred to Vico. Even in the first -Italian edition of the work he stated two "practical" corollaries: -first, a new art of criticism, to serve as a light to distinguish -the truth in obscure and legendary history; and secondly an art of -diagnosis, so to speak, for determining the degrees of necessity or -utility in human affairs, and as its ultimate consequence, the chief -end of this science, consisting in the recognition of indubitable -symptoms of the conditions of nations. Properly considered, these arts -of criticism and diagnosis unite into one, namely the better knowledge -which it was possible, owing to the principles laid down by Vico, to -obtain concerning the past and present life of nations. - -This idea is repeated and explained in other parts of the same work. -The sciences, studies and arts developed up to now, says Vico, -deal with particular objects: the New Science, on the other hand, -investigating as it does the principles themselves which lie at the -source of all studies, is able to establish the ἀκμή or state of -perfection of the entire system, and the degrees and extremes by which -and within which human nature like all other mortal things must run -its course and come to an end: so that through this science we can -answer the practical questions how a nation in its rise may come to its -state of perfection, and how in its decadence it may be stimulated to -new life. The state of perfection would consist in a nation's resting -upon fixed principles both demonstrated by unchanging reason and put -into practice by human habits; principles in which the esoteric wisdom -of the philosopher would extend a helping hand to the common wisdom -of nations, thus uniting men of the greatest academic reputation with -all those of wisdom in the state, the philosophers with the statesmen; -and the science of civil matters divine and human, religion and law, a -theology and morality imposed by command and acquired by habituation, -would be supplemented by the science of natural laws divine and -human, a theology and morality imposed by reason and acquired by -ratiocination: so that to transgress such principles would be true -error, the wandering not of men but of wild animals. - -The practical aspect of the New Science, then, was simply a summary or -duplicate of the science itself, emphasising the two leading elements -of spontaneous and reflective wisdom, certitude and truth, and the -necessity of bearing both in mind. - -Years later, in one of the elaborations of the second _Scienza -Nuova_ made by Vico, we again meet with the idea and the phrase of a -practical aspect of this science, in the title of a special concluding -paragraph which he proposed to add to his work. It begins thus: "The -whole of this work has now been thought out as a mere contemplative -science dealing with the common character of nations: for this reason -it may seem to offer no assistance to human prudence in order either -to prevent or to delay the entire ruin of nations on the path of -decadence, and thus to lack the practical side which every science must -have whose subject-matter is dependent upon the human will, all such -sciences being called practical." Now in what could such a practical -side consist? "This practical application can easily be found from the -contemplation itself of the course of the history of nations: which the -wise men (statesmen) and princes of states observing, could by means -of good ordinances, laws and examples recall peoples to their ἀκμή -or state of perfection." In other words: a man warned is half saved. -Contemplation is the only principle of conduct which the New Science -can supply. The other half of salvation depends not on the person -warning, namely thought, but upon the person warned, upon action. It -does not occur to Vico to try to determine the "ordinances, laws and -examples" whose adoption would be of value in this or that crisis -or situation. This would not be a philosopher's task, as in fact -he himself clearly recognises next moment, when he says: "The only -practical principles we philosophers can supply are ones which can be -confined to the academic sphere." - -It would certainly be rash to claim precise knowledge of Vico's -reasons for omitting this note on practical principles in the final -manuscript of the last edition of the _Scienza Nuova,_ just as he had -omitted in the second work of that title the assertions on the subject -which had appeared in the first. But we may at least venture to guess -that the principal reason was the obvious emptiness of this passage, -promising as it did a practical application which it failed to provide, -and finally confessing that such a practical application was either -impossible or already included in the theory itself. - - - - -CHAPTER X - - - -PROVIDENCE - - - -The true and only reality then, in the world of nations, is the course -of their history: and the principle which regulates this course is -Providence. From this point of view the New Science may be defined as -a "rational civil theology of the divine providence." Bacon, among his -historical sciences, had named a _Historia Nemeseos_ (history of Divine -Retribution). What for Bacon was little more than a mere name was for -Vico a clearly stated problem and a developed theory. Philosophers, -according to him, when they did not ignore Providence entirely, as -materialists and determinists, considered it solely in the sphere of -natural law, calling metaphysic by the name of "natural theology," and -supporting the identification of God with the natural order observed -in the motions of bodies, such as the spheres and the elements, and -with the final cause which was seen to exist over and above the other -natural causes. As against all this it was important to work out the -doctrine of Providence "in the economy of matters civil." - -It was observed by some of his earliest commentators, and the -observation has been frequently repeated since, that Vico used the -word "providence" indifferently in a subjective and an objective -sense: sometimes to indicate the human belief in a provident deity -controlling their doctrine, sometimes to denote the actual operation -of this providence. The double or triple meaning of a single word in -Vico's terminology is a thing which by now need cause no astonishment. -We have often already been obliged to take pains to distinguish his -homonyms and unite his synonyms. Hence we may at once recognise that -one meaning of "Providence" for Vico might be and indeed is the -belief in Providence, man's idea of God, first in the form of myth -and later in the pure and rational form of philosophy. The Gentile -nations of antiquity, he says, "began their metaphysical poetic wisdom -by contemplating God in the attribute of his providence," upon which -rested augury and divination. Without this idea, then, wisdom, the -consciousness of the infinite, cannot take shape within man, nor can -morality, the fear of and respect for the higher power which governs -the affairs of men, arise. But in this sense of the word a further -discussion of providence is unnecessary, after what we have said on the -subjects of mythology and of the relation between morality and religion. - -We therefore pass at once to Providence in its second sense, the real -and strict conception of it; and here it seems advisable to leave Vico -for a moment and to clear up certain points of doctrine. - -It is a common observation that to create a given fact is one thing, to -know it when created quite another. The knowledge of what a fact really -is often comes in the life of the individual years later, in the life -of mankind centuries later, than the fact itself. The very persons who -are directly responsible for a given fact as a rule do not know it, or -know it in a very imperfect and fallacious manner; so much so that the -illusions which are said to accompany human activity have passed into -a proverb. The poet thinks he is singing of purity when he is really -singing of sensuality, and of strength while he is really singing of -weakness; he believes himself to be a dreadful pessimist and is really -childishly optimistic: imagines himself a devil, when he is a good -fellow without an ounce of vice in him. Philosophers deceive themselves -no less. We need not go far to find examples. The philosopher we are -studying supplies a whole series of them; few have been more in the -dark as to the real tendencies of their own thought. The politician -also deceives himself; very often he believes and declares himself -to be fighting for liberty while he is a mere reactionary, or while -believing himself to be serving the cause of reaction is really -inciting to revolt and aiding the cause of freedom: and so on. Such -illusions are easy to understand. Individuals and nations in the heat -of creation, or scarcely yet passing out of such a state, can perhaps -express their state of mind, but cannot treat it in the critical spirit -of historical narration: and accordingly, when they cannot reconcile -themselves to waiting in silence, they compose imaginary histories of -themselves, _Wahrheiten und Dichtungen_ at once. In fact this proved -difficulty of understanding one's actions while acting is one motive -of the wise advice to speak of oneself as little as possible and of -the suspicion with which autobiographies and memoirs are regarded. -Such works are interesting and possibly even valuable; but they never -present the strict historical truth of the facts they narrate. - -Human labours are thus veiled in the mists of illusion which arise from -individuals. The superficial historian clings to the veil, and in his -attempt to describe the course of events, uses these illusions to make -his voice carry. In this way the history of poetry takes the form of a -narration of the intentions, opinions and aims of poets, or of those -attributed to them by their contemporaries; the history of philosophy -becomes a series of anecdotes concerning the sentiments, whims and -practical aims of philosophers: the history of politics, a tissue -of intrigue, base interests, gossip and greed. But a more careful -historian, or one of a different type, will have nothing to do with -history of this kind. His first act is to dispel the mists, to sweep -away the individual and his illusions, and to look facts in the face as -they appeared in their objective succession and their supra-individual -origin. Real, true history arises independently of individuals, as a -product growing to completion behind their backs, the product of a -force apart from individual agents, which may be called Fate, Chance, -Fortune or God. The individual, who at first was everything, and filled -the whole stage with his posturing and declamation, is now, in this -second aspect of history, less than nothing; his actions and cries, -stripped of all serious potency, provoke laughter or pity. We look in -terror at the Fate that dominates him, we stand aghast at the strange -coincidence of chance or the caprices of Fortune, we bow before the -inscrutable designs of the divine providence. The individual appears -in turn as the inert material, the powerless plaything and the blind -instrument of these forces. But deeper thought leads us beyond even -this second view of history. The pity which the individual seems to -arouse and the amusement he evokes are in reality deserved not by him -but by his fancies, or rather, by those individuals who mistake fancy -for truth. Real history is composed of actions, not of fancies and -illusions: but actions are the work of individuals, not indeed in so -far as they dream, but in the inspiration of genius, the divine madness -of truth, the holy enthusiasm of the hero. Fate, Chance, Fortune, -God--all these explanations have the same defect: they separate the -individual from his product, and instead of eliminating the capricious -element, the individual will in history, as they claim to do, they -immensely reinforce and increase it. Blind Fate, irresponsible chance, -and tyrannical God are all alike capricious: and hence Fate passes into -Chance and God, Chance into Fate and God, and God into both the others, -all three being equivalent and identical. - -The idea which transcends and corrects alike the individualistic -and supra-individualistic views of history is the idea of history -as rational. History is made by individuals: but individuality is -nothing but the concreteness of the universal, and every individual -action, simply because it is individual, is supra-individual. Neither -the individual nor the universal exists as a distinct thing: the real -thing is the one single course of history, whose abstract aspects -are individuality without universality and universality without -individuality. This one course of history is coherent in all its many -determinations, like a work of art which is at the same time manifold -and single, in which every word is inseparable from the rest, every -shade of colour related to all the others, every line connected -with every other line. On this understanding alone history can be -understood. Otherwise it must remain unintelligible, like a string of -words without meaning or the incoherent actions of a madman. - -History then is the work neither of Fate nor of Chance but of the -necessity which is not determination and the liberty which is not -chance. And since the religious view, that history is the work of God, -has this advantage and superiority over the others, that it introduces -a cause for history other than fate or chance, and therefore not -properly speaking a cause at all, but a creative activity, a free and -intelligent mind, it is natural that out of gratitude to this higher -view no less than by the suitability of the language we should be led -to give to the rationality of history the name of God who rules and -governs all things, and to call it the Divine Providence. In so naming -it, we at the same time purge the title of its mythical dross which -debased God and his providence afresh into a fate or a chance. Thus -providence in history, in this final logical form, has double value -as a criticism of individual illusions, when they come forward as -the entire and only reality of history, and as a criticism of divine -transcendence. And we may say that this is the point of view which -always has been and always is adopted, as if instinctively, without the -profession of an explicit theory, by all minds naturally gifted with -that particular faculty which we call the historic sense. - -If now, to return to Vico, we ask how he solved the problem of the -motive force of history, and what was the precise content for him of -the concept of providence in the objective sense, it is perfectly easy -to exclude the supposition that his was the transcendent or miraculous -Providence which had formed the subject of Bossuet's eloquent -_Discours._ It is easy both because in all his philosophy he invariably -reduces the transcendent to the immanent, and repeats over and over -again here that his providence operates by natural means or (using -scholastic phraseology) by secondary causes: and because upon this -point his interpreters are practically unanimous. - -No less insistent is his criticism of fate and chance, or according -to his threefold division fortune, fate and chance. He observes that -the doctrine of fate moves in a vicious circle, because the eternal -series of causes in which it holds the world bound and chained, depends -upon the will of Jupiter, and at the same time Jupiter is subject to -fate; whence it results that the Stoics are themselves entangled in -that "chain of Jupiter" with which they would imprison all things -human. These three concepts, corresponding to that of opportunity when -an object of desire is in question, to that of good luck in the case -of unhoped-for events, and to that of accident in the case of the -unexpected, are distinctions of the subjective understanding rather -than anything else: objectively they come under one single law which -may also be called fortune, if with Plato we recognise opportunity -as the mistress of human affairs: and all three are manifestations -and paths of the divine Providence which is intelligence, liberty and -necessity. The creator of the world of nations "was indeed Mind, since -men made it by their intelligence: it was not Fate, because they made -it by free choice, nor yet Chance, since to all eternity on doing thus -the same results follow." - -Vico lights up in the most fanciful ways the comedy of errors formed -by man's illusions as to the end of his own actions. Men thought they -were escaping the threats of the thundering sky by carrying their -women into caves to satisfy their animal passions out of God's sight: -and by thus keeping them safely secluded they founded the first -chaste unions and the first societies; marriage and the family. They -fortified themselves in suitable places with the intention of defending -themselves and their families: and in reality, by thus fortifying -themselves in fixed places they put an end to their nomadic life and -primitive wanderings, and began to learn agriculture. The weak and -disorderly, reduced to the extremity of hunger and mutual slaughter, -to save their lives took refuge in these fortified places, and became -servants to the heroes: and thus without knowing it they raised the -family to an aristocratic or feudal status. The aristocrats, feudal -chiefs or patricians, their rule once established, hoped to defend and -secure it by the strictest treatment of their servants the plebeians: -but in this way they awoke in the servants a consciousness of their -own power and made the plebeians into men, and the more the patricians -prided themselves on their patriciate and struggled to preserve it, -the more effectively they worked to destroy the patrician state and to -create democracy. Thus, says Vico, the world of nations issues "from a -mind widely different from, sometimes quite opposed, always superior, -to the particular ends set before themselves by men: which restricted -ends have been made means to wider ends, and employed to preserve the -human race upon this earth." - -It may be gathered from some of our quotations from Vico that he -sometimes tended to conceive men as conscious of their own utilitarian -ends but unconscious of moral ends. This would logically lead to -explaining social life on exclusively utilitarian principles, and to -considering morality as an accident relatively to the human will and -therefore not really moral: an external accretion more or less capable -of holding mankind together, or the obscure work of a supramundane -providence. This utilitarianism especially creeps into a passage where -he says that man, on account of his corrupt nature, being under the -tyranny of self-love which compels him to make private utility his -chief guide and to want every useful thing for himself and nothing for -his fellow, unable to hold his passions in check so as to direct them -by justice, in the state of nature desires only his own safety; after -taking a wife and begetting children, desires his safety and the safety -of his family; after attaining civil life, desires his own safety -together with the safety of his city; after extending his rule over -other peoples, he desires the safety of the nation; after joining with -other nations in wars, treaties, alliances and commerce, he desires -his safety and that of all mankind: and "in all these circumstances -he principally desires his own interest." For this reason "it can be -nothing else than divine providence that binds him down within such -ordinances as to maintain by justice the society of the family, the -state and ultimately of mankind; by which ordinances since man cannot -attain what he wants, at least he wants to attain as much utility as -is permitted: and this is what is called justice." The public virtue -of Rome, he writes elsewhere, "was nothing but a good use made by -providence of grave, unsightly and cruel private faults, that states -might be preserved at a time when human minds, being in a state of -extreme particularity, could not naturally understand a common good." - -Utilitarianism was however, as we know, strongly repugnant to Vico's -observed ethics, founded as the latter is upon the moral consciousness -or shame; and hence these statements, which unconsciously tend in that -direction, can only be explained as resulting from the disturbance -sometimes produced in his mind by the lingering remains of the -transcendent or theological conception of providence, and also from the -confused character of his thought, which prevented him from keeping -the idea of individual illusions clearly distinguished from that of -individual aims; so that he sometimes substituted the second when he -ought to have been dealing solely with the first. If the provident -deity is "the unity of the spirit which informs and animates the -world of nations," these do not fail to obtain their particular ends -in order that it may move on to its universal ones, but both alike -are realised in them: and man is at every moment both utilitarian and -moral, or at least supposes himself to be moral when he is utilitarian -or utilitarian when he is really moral. - -In any case, and in spite of these vacillations or rather confusions, -the conception of particular ends as the vehicle of universal and -of illusion as accompanying and co-operating with action implies a -dialectical conception of the movement of history, and the transcending -of the problem of evil. This problem is in fact very little emphasised -by Vico, owing to the strength of his belief in the universal -government of providence and of his persuasion that so-called evil is -not only willed by man under the appearance of good, but is itself -essentially a good. In a few rare passages in his earliest writings, -where he encounters the problem of evil, Vico solves it simply in the -sense that we men because of our iniquity which leads us to "regard -ourselves, not this universe of things" (_nosmetipsos, non hanc rerum -universitatem spectamus_) consider as evil those things which run -counter to us, "which yet, since they contribute to the common nature -of the world, are good" (_quae tamen, quia in mundi commune conferunt, -bona sunt_). - -Vico's conception of history thus became truly objective, freed from -divine arbitrament, but freed equally from the rule of trifling causes -and gossiping explanations, and acquiring a knowledge of its own -essential end, which is to understand the nexus of facts, the logic -of events; to be the rational reconstruction of a rational fact. -Historical study at this time suffered less from the first of these -errors (the theological conception had been ever since the beginning of -the Italian Renaissance falling into universal decay) than from that -form of history which was just then acquiring the name of "pragmatic," -which restricted itself to the personal aspect of events, and failing -by these means to reach full historical truth tried to gain warmth -and life by means of political and moral instruction. A monument of -pragmatic history arose in Vico's own country and contemporaneously -with the _Scienza Nuova:_ Pietro Giannone's _Civil History of the -Kingdom of Naples._ The author was a man of his own district and age, -and wrote a great work in the sphere of polemic, and even in certain -respects of history: but such that all its greatness only serves to -emphasise the greatness of Vico's book. If Vico had had to describe -the origins of ecclesiastical property and power in the Middle Ages, -he would have been able to write of something very different from the -guile of popes, bishops and abbots, and the simplicity of dukes and -emperors. And as we shall see, whenever he undertook to investigate any -part of history he actually did discover in it something very different -from these things. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - - - -THE LAW OF REFLUX - - - -The mind, after traversing its course of progress, after rising from -sensation successively to the imaginative and the rational universal -and from violence to equity, is bound in conformity with its eternal -nature to re-traverse the course, to relapse into violence and -sensation, and thence to renew its upward movement, to commence a -reflux. - -This is the philosophical meaning of Vico's "reflux," but not the exact -manner in which we find it expressed in his writings, where the eternal -circle is considered almost exclusively as exemplified in the history -of nations, as a reflux in the civil affairs of man. Civilisation -comes to an end in the "barbarism of reflection," which is worse than -the primitive barbarism of sensation; for while the latter was not -without a wild nobility, the former is contemptible, untrustworthy -and treacherous; and thus it is necessary that this evil subtlety of -malicious intellect should rust away through the long centuries of a -new barbarism of sensation. We must however withdraw and purge the -conception of "reflux" from historical facts and the sociological -scheme, not only to explain the absolute and eternal character -which Vico attributes to it, but also to justify the historical -representation and sociological law founded upon it, and drawing their -cogency primarily from it. - -The laws of flux and reflux, laid down by the philosophers and -politicians of Greece and of the Italian Renaissance, were founded no -less than Vico's upon a philosophy, but upon a very superficial one; -they assumed their object to possess external and empty political -forms, and endeavoured to fix the succession of these forms upon data -of experience or by vague reasonings. But Vico's object is the forms of -culture, including in themselves all the activities of life, economy -and law, religion and art, science and language, and referring them -back to their inmost source, the human mind, he establishes their -succession "according to the rhythm of the elementary forms of the -mind." Thus all the learning which has been expended in comparing the -Vician reflux with the theories of Plato or Polybius, Machiavelli or -Campanella, is practically wasted: the more so that Vico (who, as we -know, though often misunderstanding his predecessors cannot be accused -of wishing to pass them over: in fact, where he thought he found -parallel or identical ideas in them, he was apt to boast of the fact) -felt no need of mentioning this point, or thought it unimportant. The -"circular movement" (ἀνακύκλωσις) of Polybius, the economy of nature -by which states alter, change and return to the same point, has been -thought almost an anticipation of the eternal ideal history; but Vico -sets Polybius with the others, when he asks the reader to consider "how -(little) philosophers have thought with knowledge upon their principles -of civil government, and with what (little) truth Polybius has reasoned -upon its changes." Campanella connected his historical cycles with -astrological laws; and Machiavelli conceives the catastrophe which -opens the reflux thus: "When human craft and malignity have gone as far -as they can go, it happens of necessity that the world purifies itself -by one of the three methods (pestilence, famine and deluge, beside -the human methods of new religions and languages) in order that men, -having become few and chastened, may live more conveniently and become -better." The one precedent to which Vico refers, but only to interpret -it in a way altogether his own and in fact to give it a totally new -content, is the ancient Egyptian tradition of the three successive ages -of gods, heroes and men. - -If the philosophy lying at its root gives strength to Vico's -sociological theory of reflux, the historical element with which it is -leavened to some degree weakens it. Vico was especially versed in and -attached to Roman history, which had been the first of his historical -studies and the object of many years' devotion. The history of Rome -accordingly, whether because of his deeper study of it or because of -its complexity, impressiveness and long duration, came to stand in -Vico's mind as the typical or normal history, to serve as a standard -for all others, and be confused with the law of flux and reflux itself. -Rome showed him the asylum of Romulus, that is, the transition from the -state of nature to the political organism: aristocracies, monarchical -at first in appearance only, later not even in appearance: democracy, -issuing from its struggle with aristocracy and ending in real monarchy, -the perfect form of civil life; thence by a process of degeneration, -the barbarism of reflection or civilisation, incomparably worse than -the primitive noble barbarism, and following in its train a second -condition of wandering in a state of nature and a new barbarism, a new -youth, the Middle Ages. It is the history of Rome hardly generalised -at all and supplemented here and there by that of Greece, that appears -in the Vician aphorisms formulating the laws of social dynamics. Men -first feel the prick of necessity, then the attraction of utility: -next they become aware of convenience, and after that take delight in -pleasure; then dissipate themselves in luxury and finally fall victims -to the madness of abusing their resources. There must at first be men -of brute strength like Polyphemus, that man may obey man in the state -of family life, and to induce him to obey the law in the future state -of civil life. There must be noble and proud men like Achilles, not -inclined by nature to yield to their equals, in order to establish -over the family the aristocratic type of republic. Then valiant and -just men like Aristides and Scipio Africanus are necessary, to open -the path to popular liberty. After this arise men of great apparent -virtues accompanied by faults no less great, like Alexander or Caesar, -acquiring immense popular reputations and introducing monarchy. Later -still there must be serious reflective natures like Tiberius to -consolidate the monarchy; and lastly wild, dissolute and shameless -characters like Caligula, Nero and Domitian to overthrow it. - -Owing to this rarefaction of Roman history into typical history, and -the simultaneous consolidation of typical history into the history of -Rome, Vico's law of reflux is riddled with exceptions, much more common -and serious than those of the corresponding empirical laws; so that if -as he believes his empirical science is identical with the ideal laws -of the mind, its alleged permanency throughout all eternity and the -whole universe seems the merest irony. He says that Carthage, Capua and -Numantia, the three cities which threatened to dispute with Rome the -empire of the world, failed to accomplish the ordained course of human -affairs: since the Carthaginians were thwarted by the acuteness of the -native African temperament, which by maritime commerce they increased -still further: the Capuans by the soft climate and fertility of rich -Campania: and the Numantines by their suppression in the first burst -of heroism at the hands of Rome, led by Scipio Africanus the conqueror -of Carthage, and aided by the forces of the world. And passing from -ancient to modern times, America would now be traversing the path of -human affairs but for its discovery by Europeans: Poland and England -are still aristocratic, but would have arrived at perfect monarchy had -not the natural course of civil affairs been hindered by extraordinary -causes. As for the Middle Ages, they cannot be considered as in Vico's -estimation a true return to the state of nature, if they open with -the establishment of Christianity, the religion of the true God; nor -in any case does the return to the state of nature and to barbarism -seem the only path open to a nation that has attained its ἀκμή, its -culmination. The alternative is that a decadent nation should lose -its independence and fall under the rule of a better. Nor, lastly, is -decadence inevitable if statesmen and philosophers working in harmony -can preserve the perfection that has been reached and check the -threatened destruction, and if in point of fact, as he observes, the -aristocratic republics which survived his own day as remnants of the -Middle Ages succeeded in preserving themselves by arts of "superfine -wisdom." His own time Vico thought to be one of high civilisation. -A complete humanity, he says, seems to be scattered to-day over -all nations. A few great monarchs rule the world of nations, and -those barbarian monarchs who still exist do so either owing to the -persistence of the "common wisdom" of imaginative and cruel religions, -or because of the natural temperaments of their respective peoples. The -nations which form the empire of the Czar of Russia are of a sluggish -disposition; those of the Khan of Tartary are an effeminate race; the -subjects of the Negus of Ethiopia and the King of Fez and of Morocco -are few and weak. In the temperate zone Japan maintains a heroic -character not unlike that of Rome in the period of the Punic wars; -her people are warlike, her language resembling Latin, her religion -a fierce one of terrible gods all loaded with formidable weapons. -The Chinese on the other hand, whose religion is mild, cultivate -literature and are humane in the highest degree: the peoples of the -Indies are also humane and practise the arts of peace; the Persians -and Turks mingle the rude doctrine of their religion with an Asiatic -softness, the Turks especially tempering their arrogance with pomp, -magnificence, liberality and gratitude. Europe is above all humane, -composed as it is of great monarchies and universally professing the -Christian faith which inculcates an infinitely pure and perfect idea -of God and commands charity to the whole human race. Vico fixed his -attention upon the confederacy of the Swiss cantons and the united -provinces of Holland, which reminded him of the Aetolian and Achaean -leagues, and on the composition of the German Empire, a system of free -states and sovereign princes, which seemed to him a kind of attempt -in the direction of a great aristocratic state; the most perfect -of all, and the ultimate form of civil life, since no other can be -conceived superior to it, reproducing as it does the earliest form, the -aristocracy of patricians each supreme in his own family and all united -in the ruling class of the first state; but reproducing it in a form -not of barbarism but of the highest civilisation. Such is the humanity -by which Europe is on every hand distinguished, that it abounds with -every element contributory to human happiness, mental pleasures no -less than bodily comforts, and all this in virtue of the Christian -religion, teaching as it does sublime truths, supported by the most -learned philosophers of the Gentile races and of the three greatest -languages of the world, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and thus uniting the -wisdom of authority with that of reason, the choicest philosophical -doctrine with the most highly developed philological learning. Can this -lofty civilisation, safeguarded as it is by Christianity, be moving, -or ever likely to move towards a new state of nature? It is difficult -to discover Vico's real opinion on this point. Among his verses there -is a poem of a profoundly pessimistic tone, but this is a youthful -effusion, and in any case refers to the end of the world as imminent, -rather than to a future social decadence. In his letters there is a -melancholy picture of the condition of learning in his time: but it -applies to this restricted field only, not to the sphere of social and -political life. On the other hand, in his last philosophical work, the -_De mente heroica,_ referring to those who declared that all things -were now perfect and that no new tasks could arise, he says that the -tide of progress is flowing at its strongest. "The world is still -young: for only in the last seven hundred years, four hundred of which -were spent in barbarism, how many new discoveries have been made! How -many new arts have arisen! How many new sciences have been developed!" -(_Mundus iuvenescit adhuc; nam septingentis non ultra abhinc annis, -quorum tamen quadringentos barbaries percurrit, quot nova inventa! quot -novae artes! quot novae scientiae excogitatae!_) But we may observe -that the _De mente heroica_ is an official oration, and that Vico may -on that account have suppressed for the occasion his doubts or his -deepest convictions. In any case, how can we reconcile the prophecy of -an imminent collapse with the rise of that creation of providence, the -New Science, shedding upon the life of nations a light which rendered -possible the diagnosis and cure of their ailments? On the whole it is -probable that the difficulty of determining Vico's opinion as to the -fate of contemporary society is due to the fact that he had really no -settled conviction on the subject, and was led hither and thither in -various and contrary directions by the influence of hopes and fears. - -If it had not been disturbed by the scheme of Roman history, the -empirical theory of the reflux would never have been forced to admit -so many and serious exceptions; nor would it have fallen into such -painful confusions. It would have accommodated its author's historical -observations with greater ease, and its general characteristics would -have been much simpler and more general. It would have consisted -primarily in the determination and illustration of the connexion -between predominantly imaginative and predominantly intellectual, -spontaneous and reflective, periods, the latter periods issuing out -of the former by an increase of energy, and returning to them by -degeneration and decomposition. Political history shows over and -over again the spectacle of aristocracies declining from their first -strength to a debased and contemptible state and yielding before the -onset of classes less refined or even absolutely uncultured, but of -stouter moral fibre; while these again, after becoming civilised in -their turn and attaining the highest development of the historical -idea whose germ they bear within themselves, enter upon a new period -of decay and fermentation, from which issues a new ruling class in the -vigour of a youthful barbarism. The history of philosophy again shows -positive and speculative periods; philosophical solutions congeal into -scholastic theory and dogma, the mind reverts to the mere unthinking -observation of particular fact, and the speculative process arises once -more. Literary history, too, speaks of periods of realism and idealism, -romantic and classical periods: of a corrupt classicism, Alexandrian or -decadent art, and of a romantic barbarism which arises from it. These -are true cases of Vico's reflux. But since the nature of the mind which -underlies these cycles is outside time and therefore exists in every -moment of time, we must not exaggerate the difference of the periods: -and if on the one hand the outline of the law must be distinct, it -must on the other hand not lose a certain elasticity. We must never -forget that at every period, aristocratic or democratic, romantic or -classical, positive or speculative, and even in every individual and -every fact, moments both aristocratic and democratic, romantic and -classical, positive and speculative can be observed; and that these -distinctions are to a great extent quantitative and made for the sake -of convenience. These facts should lead us to avoid alike maintaining -the law at all costs and so falling into artificiality, and rejecting -it entirely and so refusing the help which may be derived from general -and approximative views. - -Thus understood and amended, not only is the theory free from the -great and striking exceptions which are necessary when it is modelled -upon the history and final catastrophe of Rome, but the accusations of -undue uniformity lodged against Vico disappear. Vincenzo Cuoco, one -of the first, if not the first intelligent student of Vico's works, -remarks concerning and in criticism of the law of reflux, that "nature -never resembles itself; it is man who by compounding his observations -forms classes and names." This is perfectly true; but if applied to -this case it would be an argument not against the Vician reflux but -against every sort of empirical human science. Others accused Vico -of overlooking groups of causes of great historical weight, such as -climate, racial and national character, and exceptional occurrences. -But, omitting the fact that he often mentions these things, for he -connects national character and climate with the forms and changes -of states, and mentions events and circumstances which upset the -natural and ordinary course of national history, for example in his -discussion of Greek history, the truth is that he was bound to ignore -them and could not waste time over such things, since his concern was -with uniformities and not with divergences, or rather with certain -uniformities and not with certain others which compared with the -former were negligible divergences. Similarly--the parallel is an -obvious one, and indeed is more than a parallel--any one who attempts -to trace the general characteristics of the different periods of -life, infancy, childhood, adolescence and so forth, will ignore the -comparative rapidity and slowness of development due to differences -of climate, race or accidental circumstances. Another of these -true but irrelevant charges is that Vico denied the communication -and interpenetration of civilisations, and insisted that they arise -separately in different nations without any mutual knowledge and -therefore without reciprocal imitation. This charge has been met by the -observation that Vico does not fail to record cases of the influence -of one people upon another and of the transmission of civilisations -and their products; the transmission for example of alphabetic writing -from the Chaldaeans to the Phoenicians and from them to the Egyptians; -and that in any case his law is not empirical but philosophical and -refers to the spontaneous creative activity of the human mind. The -point at issue is however precisely the empirical aspect of this law, -not the philosophical: and the true reply seems to us to be, as we have -already suggested, that Vico could not take and ought not to have taken -other circumstances into account, just as--to recall one instance--any -one who in studying the various phases of life describes the first -manifestations of the sexual craving in the vague imaginations and -similar phenomena of puberty, does not take into account the ways in -which the less experienced may be initiated into love by the more -experienced, since he is setting out to deal not with the social laws -of imitation but with the physiological laws of organic development. -If it is said that even without imitation or sophistication the sexual -craving arises no less and demands satisfaction, such a statement -doubtless merely asserts the incontrovertible truth of a certain very -ancient Eastern tale included by Boccaccio in the _Decameron_: but at -the same time it supplies the most complete parallel to the famous and -much controverted aphorism of Vico. - -Nor is the Vician law of reflux necessarily opposed, as has often been -thought, to the conception of social progress. It would be so opposed -if instead of being a law of mere uniformity it were one of identity, -in agreement with the idea of an unending cyclical repetition of single -individual facts which has been adopted by certain extravagant minds -of both ancient and modern times. The reflux of history, the eternal -cycle of the mind, can and must be conceived, even if Vico does not -so express it, as not merely diverse in its uniform movements, but -as perpetually increasing in richness and outgrowing itself, so that -the new period of sense is in reality enriched by all the intellect -and all the development that preceded it, and the same is true of the -new period of the imagination or of the developed mind. The return of -barbarism in the Middle Ages was in some respects uniform with ancient -barbarism; but it must not for that reason be considered as identical -with it, since it contains in itself Christianity, which summarises and -transcends ancient thought. - -Whether the conception of progress is formulated and thrown into relief -by Vico is quite another question. Vico does not deny progress; he -even refers to it in speaking of the conditions of his own time as an -actual fact: but he has no conception of it and still less does he -throw such a conception into relief. His philosophy, while it attains -the lofty vision of the process of mind in obedience to its own laws, -nevertheless retains by reason of this failure to apprehend the -progressive enrichment of reality an element of sadness and desolation. -The individual character of men and events is obliterated in Vico; -individuals and events are represented merely as particular cases of -one aspect of the mind or of one phase of civilisation. Hence we always -find Aristides alongside of Scipio and Alexander alongside of Caesar: -never Aristides simply as Aristides, Scipio as Scipio, and Alexander -and Caesar as Alexander and as Caesar. Progress implies that each fact -and each individual has its own unique function; each makes its own -contribution, for which no other can be substituted, to the poem of -history; and each responds with a deeper voice to the one that went -before. - -But the reason why Vico was bound to miss the idea of progress and -why his studies in history were inevitably one-sided can be clearly -perceived only after a review of his metaphysics. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - - - -METAPHYSICS - - - -By "metaphysics" we understand Vico's conception of reality as a -whole, not of the world of man by itself; and we also include in the -meaning of the word his ultimate negative conclusion asserting the -unknowability or the imperfect knowability of one or more spheres of -reality, or of that highest sphere in which the others reunite. - -In point of fact, as we observed in considering the second and latest -form of his theory of knowledge, Vico drew a sharp line between the -world of man and the world of nature: the former transparent to man -because created by him, the latter opaque, because only God its -Creator has knowledge of it. And his conception of the total and -ultimate reality, the metaphysic which he expounds together with his -earlier theory of knowledge, retains the value granted to it by that -theory and no other: it is a probable conjecture, but one incapable -of verification, and reaches completion in the certitude of revealed -theology. Hence this metaphysic remains out of all possible connexion -with the New Science, which proceeds by the certain method of truth and -cuts itself off from revelation. Vico never rejected it. He discusses -it in his autobiography of 1725, the year of the first _Scienza Nuova;_ -he refers to it with satisfaction in 1737, seven years after the -second _Scienza Nuova,_ when his scientific life was, as he himself -considered, at an end. But though he never rejected it he always kept -it aside, so to speak, in a corner of his mind. - -This point established, it might seem that there can be nothing more to -be said of any philosophical importance about Vico's metaphysics. But -this is not the case. Since every department of philosophy implies in -itself every other, and since we can therefore always deduce from the -treatment of one of the so-called particular philosophical sciences the -character of the whole, it is legitimate to examine the New Science -and to consider what metaphysic is implicit therein; to determine what -philosophical complement is logically supported and demanded by this -science. - -The New Science, which asserted the full knowability of human affairs, -not merely on the surface, like a psychological treatment, but in -the depths of their nature: the New Science, which transcended the -individual to attain the conception of the mind which informs all -things and is Providence: the Science which with divine pleasure -contemplated the eternal cycle of the mind, elevated as it was to such -a height, necessarily tended to interpret the whole of reality, both -Nature and God, as Mind. That this tendency was objective to the New -Science, and not subjective to Vico, in whose mind the science so to -speak thought itself out, need hardly be repeated. Vico personally not -only did not encourage it but actually curtailed and repressed it so -energetically as to leave no trace of it in his works. There was no -philosophical doctrine of which he had such terror and against which -he so frequently waged war as that of pantheism; and perhaps this -polemical preoccupation is the only trace, though quite an involuntary -trace, visible in his writings of the tendency which he must have -observed in himself. He was, and wished to remain, a Christian and a -Catholic; transcendence, the personality of God, the substantiality -of the soul, though his science did not lead him towards them, were -uncontrollable necessities to his consciousness. But just as this fact -allowed Vico to repress but not to eradicate the essential logical -tendency of his thought, so it enables us to recognise that tendency -in the facts themselves. An Italian critic, Spaventa, is right when he -says that in Vico the necessity of a new metaphysic makes itself felt; -another, a German Catholic, is equally right in denning his system -as "semi-pantheistic." It would perhaps be more dangerous to go on -to say, with the Italian above mentioned, that Vico makes an advance -on the Cartesian idea of two substances and the Spinozistic of two -attributes, and even on the Leibnitian doctrine of the monad, and that -he transcends parallelism and pre-established harmony by distinguishing -the two providences, the two attributes, nature and mind, in such a way -that the one is a step to the other, and by conceiving the point of -union and the origin of the opposition as an unfolding or development, -so that nature is regarded as the phenomenon and proper basis of -mind, the pre-supposition which mind creates to itself in order to be -really mind, to be a true unity. For while we may doubt whether the -distinction of the two attributes or two providences, the natural and -the human, is a well-grounded and inevitable consequence of conceiving -substance as mind and thought, it is impossible to deduce the -evolutionary transition from one to the other as a tendency implicit in -Vico's conception of thought. There is certainly particular documentary -evidence for this latter particular tendency: but it is scanty and -unconvincing, and occurs not in the system of the New Science but -rather in the chronologically earlier system. - -For the metaphysic laid down by Vico in the earlier phase of his -thought is not, as it has seemed to some, and as it may at first sight -appear, entirely devoid of significance and value. It shows the same -aversion to materialism and the same love of idealism which inspire -the meditations of the New Science. The philosophy of Epicurus, which -takes as its starting-point matter already formed and divided into -ultimate particles of various shapes, composed of other parts which -are supposed to be indivisible owing to the absence of void between -them, seemed to him a philosophy such as to satisfy the naïve mind of -a child or the uncritical mind of a woman; and the delight with which -he followed the explanation of the forms of material nature according -to this philosopher, in the poem of Lucretius, was equalled by the -amusement and pity with which he watched him forced by stern necessity -to lose himself in countless ineptitudes and follies in trying to -explain the phenomena of thought. Vico accused the Cartesian physics -no less than the Epicurean of a "false position," since it also takes -ready-formed matter as its starting-point, differing from the Epicurean -matter in that, while the latter limits the divisibility of matter at -the atoms, the former makes its elements infinitely divisible; that -the one places motion in the void, the other in the solid; the one -initiates the shaping of its infinite worlds by a casual declination -of atoms from the downward path of their own weight and gravitation, -the other generates its indefinite vortices from an impetus imparted -to a section of inert and therefore not yet divided matter, which on -receiving this motion divides into fragments, and, hampered by its -mass, necessarily makes an effort to move in a straight line, and -being unable to do so through its solidity begins, divided as it is -into fragments, to move about the centre of each fragment. In this way -while Epicurus entrusted the world to chance, Descartes subjected it -to fate; and it was in vain that to save himself from materialism he -superimposed upon his physics a quasi-Platonic metaphysic, by which he -attempted to establish two substances, the one extended and the other -intelligent, and to make room for an immaterial agent; for these two -parts were not reconciled in his system, since his mechanical physics -included in itself a metaphysic like the Epicurean, establishing -one kind and one only of active material substance. For similar -or analogous reasons Vico rejected the philosophies of Gassendi, -Spinoza and Locke; and the physical science of other authors such as -Robert Boyle seemed to him valuable for purposes of medicine and the -"spargiric art," but useless for philosophy. Galileo he considered to -have looked at physical science with the eye of a great geometrician, -but without the aid of the full light of metaphysics. He had sympathy -with philosophers who were also geometricians, and therefore with the -Pythagorean or Timaean physics, according to which the world consists -of numbers; with the Platonic metaphysics, which from the form of our -minds without any other hypothesis establishes, upon our knowledge -and consciousness of certain eternal truths which are in our mind and -cannot be ignored or denied, the eternal idea as the principle of all -things; with the doctrine of metaphysical points, attributed by him -to Zeno the Stoic; and finally with the philosophy of the Italian -Renaissance, the period adorned by Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, -Steuco, Nifo, Mazzoni, Piccolomini, Acquaviva and Patrizio. - -The fundamental concept of his cosmology was supplied by the -metaphysical point, in which the employment of mathematics in -metaphysics, a process admitted by Vico as analogous to that of -construction, found expression. Just as from the geometrical point -proceed the line and the surface, and the point which is defined as -having no parts supplies the proof that lines otherwise incommensurable -can be divided equally into their component points, so it is legitimate -to postulate points not geometrical but metaphysical, which though not -extended generate extension. Between God, who is rest, and matter, -which is motion, the intermediate place is taken by the metaphysical -point, whose attribute is conation, the indefinite energy and attempt -on the part of the universe to bring into being and sustain each -particular thing. The existence of matter is nothing but an indefinite -power of keeping the universe extended, which underlies all extended -objects equally however unequal they may be, and also an indefinite -power of motion underlying all particular motions, however unequal. -Behind a grain of sand lies something which when this particle is -divided gives to it and preserves in it an infinite extension and -magnitude; so that the whole mass of the universe is included in the -grain of sand, if not actually, yet potentially and in capacity. This -effort of the universe, underlying each smallest particle of matter, -is neither the extension of the particle nor the extension of the -universe: it is the thought of God, which, free from all materiality, -gives motion and impulse to the whole. Every particular determination -of reality agrees with this fundamental truth. Time is divisible, -eternity indivisible; disturbances of the mind wax and wane, its -quiescence has no degrees; extended things are corruptible, unextended -things permanent in their indivisibility; body can be divided, mind -cannot; possibilities are at a single point, accidents are everywhere; -science is one, while opinion produces differences; virtue is neither -in one place nor another, vice walks up and down in every direction; -the good is one, the bad is innumerable; in every kind of thing in a -word the best occurs in the category of the indivisible. - -Substance in general, which underlies and sustains things, is divided -into two species, extended substance or that which equally supports -unequal extensions, and thinking substance which equally supports -unequal thoughts. And just as one part of extension is divided from -another but indivisible in the substance of the body, so one part of -thought, that is to say a determinate thought, is divided from another -but indivisible in the substance of the soul. Activity or freedom is -peculiar to the soul, and entirely denied to body: and Descartes, in -making a conation of body the beginning of his physics, was strictly -adopting the methods of a poet and falling into the anthropomorphic -conceptions of primitive races. The phenomena which students of -mechanics call activities, forms, or powers, are insensible movements -by which bodies move either, as the ancients said, towards their -centres of gravity, or, as the modern theory of mechanics asserts, away -from their centre of motion. The communication of motion, moreover, -is just as inconceivable in body as is activity. To grant it would be -equivalent to granting the interpenetration of bodies, since motion -is nothing but matter in motion; the blow given to a ball is only the -occasion for the energy of the universe, which was so weak in the ball -as to make it seem at rest, to expand and thus to give it an appearance -of more sensible motion. On the other hand, Vico agreed with the -Cartesians, especially Malebranche, as to the origin of ideas, which -he inclined to believe that God creates in us from time to time. He -also held with the Cartesians that the lower animals are automata; -and he agreed with all contemporary thought as to the subjectivity of -secondary qualities. - -Setting aside these last doctrines, which are not Vico's own, indeed -he scarcely refers to them, the fundamental doctrine of metaphysical -points is all his own. His attribution of it to an imaginary Zeno, -in whose person were combined and confused the Eleatic and the Stoic -(a mistake common in the philosophical literature of the time), can -deceive nobody, and did not even deceive Vico himself, who when pressed -explained how he had been led to that interpretation of Aristotle's -statements about Zeno, and finally says that if the doctrine cannot -be accepted as that of Zeno, he will adopt it as his own, without -the patronage of any great names. Nor on the other hand can it be -traced to the Leibnitian monadology. We cannot be sure that Vico -was acquainted with this doctrine. In any case he does not mention -it, while Leibniz he does mention in terms of deep respect: and the -resemblance is very vague, for the metaphysical points are not monads. -The discovery by Leibniz and Newton of the differential calculus may -however be said to have influenced him. It was then for the first time -becoming known in Italy; and its terminology of maximum infinities, -greater and less infinities, and so on would, says Vico, completely -baffle the human understanding, since the infinite admits neither of -degrees nor of multiplication, but for the help of a metaphysic which -shows that all actual extension and actual movement is a power or -capacity for extension and motion always equal to itself and infinite. -The contributions of Platonic lines of thought (the Platonism of the -Renaissance) and those of Galileo, especially the latter, to Vico's -conception have been worked out with even more justice: his originality -however is in no degree impaired by these facts. - -The idea in which his originality found expression was, no doubt, -fantastic and arbitrary, and in consequence bound to remain undeveloped -and without influence on Vico's other conceptions. To the reviewer -in the _Giornale dei letterati,_ who called this metaphysic a mere -sketch, the author replied that it was quite complete: an abortion in -fact, rather than a sketch, and, as such, complete. And in the _Scienza -Nuova,_ beside a few references to the refusal to attribute activity to -matter, there is one fugitive but interesting attempt at a connexion -with a geometrical or arithmetical metaphysic on the model of that -described above. In this passage it is stated that upon the order of -material and complex civil affairs the order of numbers, which are -abstract and absolutely simple, is imposed: and the fact is noted that -governments begin with the one, in domestic monarchy, pass to the few -in aristocracy, advance to the many and the all in popular republics, -and finally return to the one in civil monarchies, so that humanity -moves perpetually from the one to the one, from domestic monarchy to -civil monarchy. - -But if we can and must deny all value to Vico's cosmology, if the -contradictions and obscurities in which he involves himself are -manifest, and were observed by critics of his own time, still we cannot -deny its dynamic nature as opposed to the mechanicism of contemporary -philosophy. The theory of metaphysical points, in which God appears as -the great geometrician who creates by knowing and knows by creating the -realities of the universe, is as it were a symbol of the necessity of -interpreting nature in idealistic language. We find here and there a -theologian Vico, an agnostic Vico, or even a fanciful Vico composing -cosmological and physical romances: but look where we will among his -works, we shall never find a materialistic Vico. - -Even this by no means overbold metaphysic aroused suspicions of -pantheism, though the author insisted upon the theological doctrine -that God's activity is convertible _ab intra_ with the thing created -and _ab extra_ with the fact, and that therefore the world was created -in time; that the human soul, which as a mirror of the divine thinks -infinity and eternity, is not bounded by the body and therefore not -by time, and is therefore immortal; and that man, even if God were to -reveal it to him, cannot understand how the infinite enters into finite -objects. However, he thought it necessary to conclude his replies to -his critics by collecting statements demonstrating his orthodoxy, and -clinching the matter with the remark that "since God is in one sense -substance and in another His creatures, and since the _ratio essendi_ -or essence is proper to substance, the created substances even as -regards their essence are diverse and distinct from the substance of -God." - -Vico's thought was limited by the idea of transcendence, which -prevented him from attaining not only the unity of reality, but also -a truly complete knowledge of that world of man which he had so -powerfully explained by means of the opposite principle. We now see why -Vico, though he did not deny the fact of progress, could have no real -conception of it. It has been observed that the conception of progress -is foreign to Catholicism and dates from the Protestant Reformation, -and that therefore the Catholic Vico was bound to deny himself the -use of it. But the conception of an immanent providence is no less -irreconcilable with Catholicism, and yet Vico is saturated with this -idea. This means that he did not lack the impulse: rather he was unable -to pass a certain point beyond which his faith would have been too -obviously defeated. Progress, deduced from the immanent providence and -introduced into the New Science, would have accentuated the difference -within the uniformity, the origin at every moment of something new, -the perpetual enrichment of the flux at every reflux: it would have -changed history from an orderly traversing and retraversing of the line -drawn by God under the eye of God to a drama whose _ratio essendi_ is -contained within itself: it would have enmeshed and drawn with it the -whole universe and realised the thought of infinite worlds. In face -of this vision Vico paused in apprehension and stubbornly refused to -proceed: the philosopher in him had yielded to the Catholic. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - - -TRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY - -It is clear from the facts above discussed that the historical portion -of the New Science could not take the shape of a history of the human -race in which peoples and individuals were recognised as playing each -its own unique part in the whole course of events. To enable it to -fulfil such a function Vico would have had to close up his system of -thought, which was still at one point incomplete and not impervious -to the religious idea, and to elevate his provident deity into a -progressive deity, determining flux and reflux as the eternal rhythm -of the process. Or on the other hand in order to attain the vision of -individuality, in the diametrically opposite sense, in history, he -would have had to abandon his rudimentary idealistic philosophy, break -down the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary providence, -and trace the history of man on the plan which God had revealed or -permitted him to discover. Vico's orthodoxy rebelled against the former -alternative, while his philosophy kept him from the second: and the -result of his dilemma was that the history he reconstructed was not and -could not be a universal history. - -In consequence, it was not what is called a philosophy of history, if -that phrase is taken in its original sense of a "universal history -"--one which concentrates its attention upon the broadest and -least obvious connexions of facts--"philosophically narrated," more -philosophically, that is, than is usual with annalists, anecdotists and -compilers dealing with courts, politics and nations. The controversy -as to whether Vico or Herder can claim to be the founder of the -philosophy of history must be frankly decided in favour of Herder, -whose work shows just that procedure of universal history which is -lacking in the New Science. On the other hand it would be easy to -find numerous predecessors for Herder, beginning with the Hebrew -prophets and the scheme of the Four Monarchies, which remained not -only in the Middle Ages but well into modern times the constructive -scheme of universal history. Nor would it be out of place to add that -the so-called philosophy of history, in so far as it is a universal -history, constitutes neither a special philosophical science nor a form -of history capable of sharp distinction from the rest, except when the -passion for making it self-subsistent gives it the appearance of an -abstract history or a historicised philosophy. Thus when Vico or Herder -is credited with the foundation of a new science in the philosophy of -history, the compliment is a doubtful one: a fact which especially in -the case of Vico has gone far to obscure the value of their work. In -fact, the "New Science of the common character of nations," understood -as the equivocal science of the philosophy of history, has eclipsed the -New Science as a new philosophy of mind and a rudimentary metaphysic of -thought. - -The conflict which for the general consciousness existed between -science and faith reappears in Vico's treatment of history as a -distinction and opposition between Jewish and Gentile history, sacred -history and profane. Jewish history was not subjected, he believed, -to the laws of history in general. Its course was unique, and its -development proceeded on principles peculiar to itself, namely, the -direct action of God. The New Science, which in its philosophical -part did not give the explanatory principles of this process, was in -consequence not compelled to deal with it in its historical part. -This is perhaps what Vico would have wished. But the wish was met, -setting aside the necessity of guarding against the charge of impiety, -which was certainly a danger, by his scruples as a believer, and a -conscientious believer; which urged him to look for some kind of -harmony between the two histories, since however sharply distinguished -(he recalled how even a Gentile writer, Tacitus, had described the Jews -as "unsociable"), both alike developed under terrestrial conditions -and had points of mutual contact, at least in the origin of mankind -and its regeneration by means of Christianity. Following the inherent -tendencies of his thought, Vico ought to and would willingly have -avoided the narration of universal history and confined himself -exclusively to questions of philosophy and philology. But as it -happened, he was compelled now and then to depart from his programme -and to attempt at once a unification of the two histories and a defence -of sacred history based on arguments supplied by science and profane -history. - -This is the least successful, but a profoundly significant part of -his work. He was forced to admit, though the admission was opposed by -all his discoveries and outraged his whole system of thought, that -the Hebrews had enjoyed the privilege of always keeping intact their -memories of the beginning of the world, a memory which other nations -claimed in vain; and hence sacred history must supply the true origin -and succession of universal history. The necessity of connecting his -views on primitive civilisation with Biblical chronology, with the date -usually assigned to the creation of the world, with the traditions of -a universal deluge and of a race of giants--the necessity of finding, -as he says, the "continuity of sacred with profane history"--led him -to the most extravagant flights of fancy. After the flood, in the year -1656 from the creation, at the separation of the sons of Noah, while -the Hebrews began or continued their sacred history with Abraham and -the other patriarchs and then with the laws given to Moses by God, all -the other descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, the first race more -slowly and for a shorter period, the second and third with greater -rapidity and for a longer time, lapsed into the state of nature and -wandered over the earth as insensible and savage brutes. And while the -Hebrews, subjected to their theocratic government, strictly educated -and practising ablution, remained of normal stature, the members of -the other races, living without either physical or moral discipline, -wallowing in dirt and excrement and absorbing nitrogenous salts (just -as the earth is enriched and made fertile by excrement), grew to -monstrous and gigantic size. The state of nature lasted a hundred years -for the Semites and two hundred for the other two races; at the end of -which the earth which had long been sodden with the moisture of the -universal deluge began to dry up and emit dry exhalations or fiery -matter into the air so as to generate lightning. With lightning, as -we already know, and with the mythology of the thundering sky, which -is Jupiter, arose in these brutes the consciousness of God and of -themselves, by which they became human. Thus begins the "age of the -gods," which, socially, is that of domestic monarchy where the father -is king and priest. In the course of this age the system of greater -deities was gradually established, and the giants, by means of their -religions of terror and their domestic education taming the flesh -and developing the spiritual element in them, and by the practice of -washing, shrank by degrees to the normal size of the men whom we find -at the beginning of the next or heroic age. - -Such are the chief points in Vico's quaint reconstruction of the -earliest history of man upon the earth, harmonised with the account -in sacred history. We shall be less inclined to amusement or ridicule -if we reflect upon the tragedy underlying the comedy: the tormented -conscience of the believer which in its struggle with the philosopher -seeks refuge in these extravagant ideas. At any rate, they gave Vico -a series of insecure stepping-stones--the flood, the giants, the dry -exhalations--which enabled him to cross the torrent of religious -tradition and reach the dry land of critical history, where he found -the primary starting-point of his philosophy of mind, the state of -nature. It may further be suggested that the contact with Hebrew -history--the only one which presented itself to him as a history in the -strict sense, a _unicum,_ something absolutely individualised even if -in a miraculous manner--suggested to him the few attempts met with in -his works to assign to various peoples a special function or mission; -thus it sometimes appeared to him that the Hebrews represented _mens,_ -the Chaldeans _ratio,_ and the Japhetic races _phantasia._ - -Parallel to this imaginary history of the origin of the human race -on the earth is Vico's attempt at Biblical apologetics. He lost no -opportunity of adducing proofs from profane sources to confirm the -statements of sacred history. For instance, a confirmation of the flood -and the giants is supplied by the similar traditions of Greek and other -nations. The theocratic government, which is not definitely mentioned -by any profane history but merely alluded to obscurely by poets in -their tales, is met with in the government of the Hebrews before and -after the flood. The Hebrews again knew nothing of divination because -they lived in direct contact with the true God, while the Chaldees -had a system of magic or divination according to the movements of the -stars, and the European peoples a system of augury. One certainly -feels in all this something of an effort, a will to see or not to -see: a kind of self-interruption and stimulation to belief. It is not -infrequent among cultured and scientifically educated believers. Again, -in his exposition of the historical genesis of grammatical forms, where -he says that verbs began with the imperative, the monosyllabic command -given by the father to wife, child or slave (_es, sta, i, da, fac,_ -etc.), Vico draws from this an indirect demonstration of the truth of -Christianity, because the roots of Hebrew verbs are always found in -the third person singular of the past tense; a clear proof that the -patriarchs must have given their commands to their families in the -name of a single God (_Deus dixit_). This, in Vico's opinion, is "a -lightning to confound all those writers who have believed the Hebrews -to be a colony proceeding from Egypt; since from the beginning of its -foundation the Hebrew tongue had its origin in a single God." But in -truth these lightnings instead of descending upon the head of the -unbeliever serve only to illuminate the poverty of the arguments upon -which apologetics rest, even with a man like Vico; and, objectively -considered, the division introduced by religious scruple between sacred -and profane history, and the consequent dogmatic treatment of the one, -with its strange hypotheses and defences, and critical treatment of the -other, produced and still produces an irresistible impression that the -seclusion of sacred history from human science is due to the impotence -not of the human science but of the sacred history; its impotence, that -is, to preserve itself intact within the limits of science. Seldom has -a religious scruple so endangered the cause of religion. - -But Vico had far too genuine and exacting a scientific sense added -to his natural antipathies to permit him ever to become a Selden -or a Bossuet; and hence this apologetic for and harmonisation of -sacred history remains in him a mere episode, which it is possible to -ignore. And since on the other hand he was not permitted to treat -philosophy and history as entirely profane and to represent the -complex movement of history according to the fundamental criterion of -progress, his only course was to look at the facts from the point of -view which his philosophy left open to him, that of flux and reflux, -the eternal process and the eternal phases of the mind. Here lay his -strength. Here he could recognise the specific, if not strictly the -individual, character of laws, customs, poetry and myth, of whole -social and cultural formations which history down to his own time -had entirely misunderstood. For this reason, in narrating history he -was bound to confine himself to emphasising the common aspects of -certain groups of facts belonging to various nations and periods. In -the New Science, he says, "the whole history of the laws and deeds of -Rome and Greece is set forth, not in its particularity and in time, -but following the substantial identity of intention and diversity of -the modes of expression." Elsewhere he says, "the facts are adduced -after the fashion of examples, because they are understood by means of -principles," for "to see the principles confirmed by the innumerable -host of their consequences is a thing which must await certain other -works of ours, which are either as yet unpublished or now in process -of publication." In other words, as we know, this science contains on -the one hand a philosophical side, and on the other a descriptive or -empirical, exemplified in history, in which the Romans figure not as -Romans but in virtue of the common nature which they share with Greeks -and possibly with Japanese; the history of Rome under the kings or in -the early Republican period demonstrates its affinity with that of the -earlier centuries of the Middle Ages; and Homer stands not as Homer but -as an example of primitive poetry, and across the centuries finds and -greets his brother in Dante. It is at once a strength and a limitation, -because history emphatically does not fundamentally consist of these -resemblances; but without the perception of the resemblances how could -we ever determine the differences? Dante is not Homer, the barons -are not the "patres," the Athenian Solon is not the Roman Publilius -Philo; but certainly Dante is in some respects more closely related to -Homer than to Petrarch, the early barons are nearer to the "patres" -than to the later courtier-nobles, and Solon is more akin to a Roman -tribune or dictator than to any other of the seven sages among whom -he is usually placed. To observe these resemblances means denying -or rejecting other more superficial ones, and preparing the way for -knowledge of individuality by indicating the approximate place where -the truth is to be found. Vico classifies, rather than narrates and -represents; but there is classification and classification; it may be -pressed into the service of a superficial thought or of a profound one. -And the historical side of the New Science is one great substitution of -profound for superficial classifications. - -In this process, which constitutes the strength of Vico's treatment -of history, the deficiencies and errors come not from outside the -limits of the process but from causes at work within these limits -themselves. It has been alleged in defence of Vico that a great part -of his errors is due to the scantiness and inadequacy of the materials -at his disposal. But the materials for any study are always scanty -and inadequate compared to our thirst for knowledge; and in judging -a historian the question is not this, but the method, cautious or -incautious, on which he employs the materials that are at his disposal. -Again, it has been said that Vico has the faults of his age; but this -is to forget that he was born in the century which saw the development -of the highly critical philology of Joseph Scaliger and the whole Dutch -school, and that Zeno, Maffei and Muratori were his contemporaries -in Italy. The truth is that just as the attitude of thought already -described in Vico confused pure philosophical method with the -determinations of empirical science and historical data, so it confused -historical research with the mixture of philosophy and empirical -science. Vico was in a state similar to that of drunkenness; confusing -categories with facts, he felt absolutely certain _a priori_ of what -the facts would say: instead of letting them speak for themselves he -put his own words into their mouth. A common illusion with him was to -seem to see connexions between things where there was really none. This -made him turn every hypothetical conjunction into a certainty, and read -in other writers instead of their actual words things that they had -never written, but which were internally spoken by himself unawares -and projected into the writings of others. Exactitude was for him an -impossibility, and in his mental excitement and exaltation he almost -despised it: what harm can ten, twenty, a hundred errors do to what is -substantially true? Exactitude, "diligence," as he says, "must lose -itself in arguments of any size, because it is a minute, and because -minute also a slow-footed virtue." Fanciful etymologies, daring and -groundless mythological interpretations, changes of name and date, -exaggerations of fact, false quotations are met with throughout his -pages, and many may be found noted in the fine edition of the second -_Scienza Nuova_ by Nicolini. Thus, as we observed in speaking of his -philosophy that Vico's was not an acute mind, so now in speaking of his -historical work we must say that it was not critical. But as while we -denied him acuteness on a small scale we acknowledged his profundity -or acuteness on a large scale, so here also we ought to add that if -Vico lacked the critical sense in small matters, in great matters he -had abundance of it. Careless, headstrong and confused in detail; -cautious, logical and penetrative in essentials; he exposes his flank -or rather his whole body to the attacks of the most miserable and -mechanical pedant, and over-awes and inspires respect in every critic -and historian however great. And, _totus mens_ though he is and all -absorbed by his own discoveries, often he does not give his power of -investigation and observation time and room to develop, and instead of -history he invents myths and investigates romances; but when he allows -the power free play, it does wonders in the field of history too, as we -shall try to show in the following chapters. - -But to judge the historical views of Vico by confronting them, as many -have done, with those of modern historical research and praising or -depreciating them accordingly would hardly be conclusive. Where the -two terms of the comparison agreed the agreement might be fortuitous: -where they diverged, the later doctrine might be but a development or -consequence of the earlier attempt, and in any case the modern state -of historical knowledge by no means provides an absolute standard. On -the other hand it would be out of place, as well as beyond our power, -to rehandle all the problems dealt with by Vico to see what there is of -truth and falsehood in his conclusions. That would mean no less than -writing a third _Scienza Nuova_ more adapted to our own times. Our task -is merely to indicate the principal historical problems which Vico set -before himself, to state the solutions he gave, and always to keep in -mind the state of knowledge not in our own day but in Vico's, so as -to determine what progress in historical study may be set down to his -influence. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - - -NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS - - -The period of historical research which preceded the life of Vico -was, as we have said, by no means credulous or uncritical. The day -was past when "chronicles of the world" were compiled, when any fable -and any falsification however gross was accepted as history: and the -seed sown by a few humanists had borne fruit in the Italian men of -learning, the French juridical school, the school of Scaliger mentioned -above, and all the great chronologists, epigraphists, archaeologists, -topographers and geographers who in the seventeenth century formed -the first immense critical collections of sources for ancient -history. While the philologists were thus improving and perfecting -their methods, detecting impostures and bridging lacunae, Bayle, -Fontenelle, Saint-Évremond and many others were engaged in spreading a -scepticism or historical Pyrrhonism as it was also called, due to the -intellectualistic philosophy; and thus anticipating the polemic against -the truth and utility of history which was to arise with immense vigour -in the following century. - -This latter tendency was hypercritical rather than critical, its end -being the destruction of history in general: and since historical -scepticism was very apt to assume the character of a paradox adapted -to the needs of elegant society and the wits, its influence on the -progress of research was very small, or at most it succeeded in -producing strong reactions, one of which is represented by Vico, in -favour of tradition and authority. It is on the other hand only proper -to observe the failings of the first seriously scientific efforts -of philologists and antiquaries. They rehabilitated witnesses, laid -bare falsifications, reconstructed lists of rulers and magistrates, -connected chronology and contradicted certain legends: but, whether -owing to the tendencies of thought usual among pure scholars and -philologists or because of the general atmosphere of their century's -culture, they neither had nor conveyed a feeling for the antique and -the primitive. Strong in detail, they were weak in essentials. When -one of the most brilliant grasped, for instance, the importance of -ballad-literature as a means of transmitting history at a period when -the use of writing was unknown or uncommon, he did not receive from -this observation and others like it such a shock as might stimulate him -to recast from top to bottom his intuition and conception of primitive -life, as was the case with Vico, who almost in a flash grasped the -philosophical form of certitude and the two periods of mental and -social life corresponding to it in actual history: the periods of -obscurity and of legend. - -Vico himself started from a kind of scepticism, a scepticism as -regards the prejudices of scholars and nations generally about the -character and facts of antiquity: and in combating these prejudices -he drew up a series of principles or "aphorisms," inspired apparently -by Bacon's "idola," to which they present an analogy in the field -of historical research. Vico puts the student on his guard first -against the "magnificent opinions" which have been held up to his own -day "concerning the most remote and least known antiquity": a naïve -illusion whose origin he traces to the fact that man when in a state of -entire ignorance erects himself into a rule for the universe. Here is -the closest analogy with Bacon: for this statement is precisely like -the class of "_idola tribus,_" in which thought makes itself the rule -of things "on the analogy of man, not of the universe" (_ex analogia -hominis, non ex analogia universi_). On the same observation is founded -the remark that "rumour grows in its course," _fama crescit eundo,_ and -Tacitus's _omne ignotum pro magnifico est,_ everything unknown is taken -for something great. Hence arises the habit of interpreting ancient -customs in the expectation of finding them similar or superior to those -of modern civilised life. Thus Cicero admired the humanity of the early -Romans in calling enemies in war "guests": not realising that the fact -was precisely the opposite of this, and that guests were _hostes,_ -strangers and enemies. In the same way Seneca, by way of proving the -duty of kindness to slaves, recalled that masters were anciently called -"fathers of the family"; as if _"patres familias"_ might not have been -the very reverse of kind not only to slaves and servants but to their -own children, regarded as on the level of slaves. The same prejudice -led Grotius, in his desire to show the gentleness of the ancient -Germans, to collect a great number of barbaric laws in which homicide -was punished by a fine of a few pence: which is on the contrary really -a proof of the cheapness of the blood of poor rustic vassals, who are -precisely the "_homines_" mentioned by these laws. - -In the second place, he warns us not to trust to the "conceit of -nations," all of which, Greek or barbarian, Chaldean, Scythian, -Egyptian, or Chinese, claimed, as Diodorus Siculus observes, to have -founded humanity, discovered the amenities of life, and preserved their -memory intact from the beginning of the world. Each of them, having -for several thousand years had no communication with the others which -might have led to the sharing of ideas, resembled in the obscurity of -its chronology a man who sleeping in a very small chamber is misled by -the darkness into believing it much too large ever to touch it with -his hand. He who accepts these dreamer's boasts for certain knowledge -finds himself in the difficulty of having to choose between the various -memories of various nations, all of which with equal justification -claim to be original. - -By the side of national conceit Vico placed the "conceit of the -learned," who desire their own knowledge to be as old as the world, -and consequently delight in fancying an inaccessible esoteric wisdom -among the ancients, coinciding miraculously with the opinions professed -by each one of themselves, which they dress in the garb of antiquity -in order to enforce their acceptance. Such was the mistake not only -of Plato, especially in the researches of the _Cratylus,_ but of all -historians, ancient and modern: Vico himself had fallen into it, and -was therefore able to study it closely in his own case, when in the _De -antiquissima_ he believed himself to have found in the etymologies of -Latin words the proof of an Italian metaphysic exactly agreeing with -his own doctrines of the conversion of the _veruni_ with the _factum_ -and of metaphysical points. - -From these three prejudices, especially from the conceit of the -learned, follows the fourth, here called that of the "sources" or -"channels of culture," ironically called by Vico the theory of -"scholastic succession among nations." Upon this theory Zoroaster for -instance instructed Berosus for Chaldaea, Berosus in his turn Mercurius -Trimegistus for Egypt, Mercurius taught Atlas the Ethiopian lawgiver, -Atlas Orpheus the Thracian missionary, and finally Orpheus established -his school in Greece. Long journeys these, and easy forsooth to those -primitive nations which, scarcely out of the state of savagery, lived -perched on mountains in almost inaccessible situations, unknown even -to their neighbours! And these long journeys were undertaken with -the object of spreading discoveries, which any nation could make -for itself. If, when nations came to know each other through wars -and treaties, they were found to agree, that was because they all -contained some motive of truth and sprang from the same needs of man. -Was it necessary to suppose the Athenian or Mosaic law to have affected -that of the Romans, as did these "comparers" or delivers of laws, in -order to explain the origin of the right recognised in Palestine, -Athens and Rome to kill the thief by night? Was it necessary for -Pythagoras to travel spreading the doctrine of the transmigration of -souls, which we find as far afield as India? - -There remained the prejudice of considering the ancient historians -as best informed about primitive times: whereas in the history of -origins they knew as little as, or less than, ourselves. As for Greek -history, Vico found, or rather imagined that he found, in Thucydides, -a confession that the Greeks up to the generation preceding that -historian knew nothing of their own antiquity: and he also observed -that it was only in the time of Xenophon that Greek historians began -to have any precise information upon Persian affairs. Roman historians -commonly began with the foundation of Rome: but the beginning of Rome -was certainly not the beginning of the world. Rome was a new city -founded in the midst of a large number of small and more ancient -peoples in Latium: and even in the case of Rome Livy refuses to -guarantee the truth of the facts of the earlier centuries of its -history up to the Punic wars, which he is in a position to describe -more accurately. He even confesses frankly that he does not know at -what point Hannibal made his great and memorable entry into Italy, -whether by the Cottian Alps or the Apennines. So well informed were the -ancient historians! - -Owing to these and similar sceptical principles, the whole of Greek -history to the time of Herodotus and of Roman down to the second Punic -war seemed to Vico quite uncertain, an unclaimed territory, so to -speak, where one might enter and take possession by squatter's right. -He entered armed with positive principles directly issuing from the -negative ones we have enumerated. For if Vico denied the credibility -of historians distant in time from the facts they described, if -he discounted national pride, if he laid bare the illusions and -charlatanism of the learned, he nevertheless did not rest content with -this work of destruction. In place of the old untrustworthy method -he had banished, he endeavoured to supply a new, of better qualities -and greater tenacity; a system of methods by which it was possible to -acquire new historical documents and also to improve the study of those -already known. No advance in historical knowledge is in fact ever made -except by thus turning from the received narrative to the document -underlying it, which alone has the power of confirming, correcting and -enriching the narrative. - -The first of Vico's contributions to historical method, the first -source for the knowledge of the earliest civilisations which he -exposed, is the etymology of language. The usual methods of this study -in his time were purely arbitrary: it proceeded by considering the -sound of each syllable or letter and looking for other superficial -resemblances, and inferring from these facts the derivation of a word -from this or that language, Latin, Greek or Hebrew. But etymology -becomes a fruitful study only when it is remembered that language is -the best evidence for the ancient life of a people, the life lived -by them while the language was in the making: and when the student -accordingly never ceases to explain language by customs and customs -by language. Thus the etymology of abstract words leads us into the -heart of a purely rustic society; for _intellegere,_ to understand, -for example, recalls _legere,_ to collect the produce of the fields -(hence _legumina,_ vegetables); _disserere,_ to discuss, refers to -scattering seed; and the majority of words for inanimate things reveal -relations with the human body and its members, and the sensations -and passions of man; thus "mouth" means any aperture, "lip" the edge -of a pot, "forehead" and "back" are used for before and behind; and -so on. Vico aimed at one science of etymology common to all native -languages, composed of monosyllabic, and largely onomatopoeic roots: -another of foreign loan-words, introduced after nations became mutually -acquainted: a third, of universal application, for the science of -international law, from which it should appear how the same men, facts -or objects, looked at from the different points of view of different -nations, received different names; and finally a dictionary of mental -words, common to all nations, which should explain the uniform ideas of -substances and the different modifications of them in national thought -concerning the human needs and utilities common to all, according to -the differences of their situation, climate, character and customs, and -should thus narrate the origins of the various vocal languages, all -converging in an ideal common language. - -The second source revealed by Vico is the interpretation of myths or -fables, which agreeably to his doctrine were not allegories, fictions -or impostures, but the science of primitive man. In the _Diritto -universale_ Vico distinguished four different and successive characters -of the gods. At first they represented natural facts, Jupiter the sky, -Diana the flowing water, Dis or Pluto the lower earth, Neptune the sea, -and so on; secondly, natural human affairs, for instance, Vulcan fire, -Ceres corn, Saturn the seed; thirdly, social facts; and finally they -rose to heaven and were translated to the stars, and terrestrial and -human things were distinguished from divine. But in the two _Scienze -Nuove_ he emphasised almost exclusively the third or social meaning, -which became in his eyes the original; since, he appears to have -thought, the earliest nations were too much intent upon themselves, -too much immersed in their hard and difficult life, to speculate in -abstraction from social matters. Hence he found reflected in mythology -the institutions, inventions, social cleavages, class-struggles, -travels and warfare of primitive nations. Even in considerably advanced -periods Vico was hostile to naturalistic or philosophical explanations. -The saying "know thyself" attributed to the ancient sage seemed to him -merely a piece of advice to the Athenian democracy, to know its own -strength, later transferred to a metaphysical and moral sense. Beside -this principle of social interpretation he established another of great -importance: namely, that indecent meanings were inserted in myths at a -late and corrupt period when men interpreted early customs in the light -of their own, or tried to justify their own lusts by fancying that the -gods had set them the example. Hence arose the adulterous Jupiter, -Juno as the implacable enemy of Hercules' virtue, the chaste Diana -soliciting the embraces of the sleeping Endymion, Apollo persecuting -modest maidens even to their death, Mars, not content with committing -adultery with Venus by land, but pursuing her even into the sea, and, -worst of all, the love of Jupiter for Ganymede and of Jupiter again, -transformed into a swan, for Leda. Such representations can only result -in unrestrained vice, as happened in the case of the young Chaereas in -Terence's comedy. But in their original shape and meaning all myths -were serious and austere, worthy of the founders of nations. The -pursuit of Daphne by Apollo for instance referred to the magicians or -diviners who arranged weddings and followed women through the woods -where they were still liable to promiscuous ravishing; Venus, covering -her nakedness with the cestus, was a modest symbol of solemn matrimony; -the heroes, sons of Jupiter, were not the offspring of adultery, but -born of permanent and solemn marriages celebrated according to the will -of Jupiter as revealed by the diviners. To the pure all things are -pure, and impure to the impure: the forests and mountain-tops could -never beget the fancies of the closet and the brothel. - -Beside these two rich sources, language and mythology, Vico names and -employs a third, which he calls the "great fragments of the ancient -world," that is to say, the memories preserved by historians and poets, -such as the Egyptian tradition of the three ages of gods, heroes -and men; the language of the gods mentioned in Homer; the thirty -thousand names of the gods collected by Varro and referring to a like -number of needs in the natural, moral, economic and civil life of the -earliest times; the grove of Romulus, which Livy calls "the ancient -plan of founding cities," and a few other golden sayings of ancient -historians. Till now these fragments had been useless for the purposes -of science, lying as they did in dirt, confusion and incompleteness: -but when cleaned, restored and fitted together they conveyed valuable -information. Nor did he overlook the monuments of architecture and -sculpture, though the use he made of them was slight, and he saw that -they were in the long run of little practical value. He declared that -as for the historic period the most certain documents are the public -coins, so for the legendary and obscure period their place is taken by -"certain traces remaining in marble," as proofs of ancient customs, -like the Egyptian pyramids with their hieroglyphic inscriptions and -other fragments of the ancient world found in every region and bearing -similar pictographic characters. It is also worthy of remark that he -gives examples of arguments founded on technical observations and -leading to conclusions in the sphere of prehistoric archaeology: as -for instance when he says that one early period of human life is -distinguished by the eating of roasted flesh, the simplest and least -elaborate kind of food, because it requires nothing except the fire: a -later period by boiled flesh, which also requires water, caldron and -tripod. - -One powerful method of investigation in Vico's hands is the -comparative method, consisting in the comparison of better-known -processes of development with those known imperfectly or in parts only, -and the consequent reconstruction of the latter on the basis of the -former. So for instance the principle of heroism, revealed by evidence -found in Roman history, helps to explain the legendary history of the -Greeks, to supply the deficiencies of that of Egypt and to shed light -on the unknown history of all other nations of antiquity. Without -denying the fact of transmission from one nation to another, Vico -poured scorn upon the abuse of this conception, and minimised its value -in the case of primitive societies: using in its place the idea of -spontaneous development and endeavouring to reconstruct the process by -the comparative method. But he took this method in a very broad sense, -and made use in it of materials drawn from the most widely varying -countries and periods. To explain for example how the thundering sky -suggested to primitive man the idea of a god, he mentions the fact that -the natives of America, when first they heard the noise and recognised -the deadly effects of firearms in the hands of the Spaniards, believed -them to be gods: the rhapsodists of the Homeric poems reminded him of -the singers on the quay at Naples with their ballads of Roland and the -paladins: the transformations or metamorphoses described by the ancient -poets resembled the tales of goblins and fairies still told by mothers -to amuse little children, or the widely-scattered mediaeval legends of -the magician Merlin: he traces the mythology of the hearth down to the -custom of the log which in Boccaccio's time at Florence the head of -the family used to light upon the hearth at the new year, sprinkling -incense and wine on it, and the Christmas-eve log among the lower -classes at Naples; not to mention the custom in the Neapolitan kingdom -of counting families by "hearths." He brought the serpent Python and -all other mythical serpents into relation with the viper of the -Visconti "che i milanesi accampa" ("which calls to arms the Milanese") -and the hieroglyphic script with the _"rébus de Picardie"_ used in the -north of France. - -It would be useless to look in earlier or contemporary philology -for clear general precedents for these principles, negative and -positive, established by Vico for the history of obscure and legendary -periods. They are too closely bound up with and essential to his whole -philosophical thought ever to have originated apart from this thought -itself. The rude fragments of ancient Roman laws, customs and formulae, -the Homeric poems, the words of the Latin language, when examined with -unprejudiced eyes--the power which enables a man of genius to see -things without distortion--and worked over by a mind ready to accept -them in their true nature, were bound to excite in Vico, compared with -the learned but colourless or falsely-coloured historical research of -his day, a rebellion and upheaval like that which took place a century -later in the mind of Augustin Thierry when he saw, depicted in the -pages of Chateaubriand's poetical prose, Pharamond and his Franks, -with their unrestrained movements, their rude and savage arms, their -terrible war-cries and their barbaric songs. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - - - -HEROIC SOCIETY - - - -As the Franks, in the compilations of national history made by the -Jesuit colleges and other French schools, appear stripped of all -their characteristic features and reduced to wise monarchs, pious -queens and devoted warriors of the Church, so ancient and primitive -history, thanks to the rhetoric and the naïve ideas of scholars, has -been painted in brilliant and untrue colours of the same kind as -those with which Lebrun or Luca Giordano painted their pompous and -theatrical pictures. Kings who devoted themselves to sage counsel in -order to aid their subjects while at the same time not diminishing the -splendour of their courts and the brilliancy of their happy nobles, -philosopher kings such as made Plato sigh for the day when philosophers -should rule or kings philosophise; loyal and valiant knights, eager -to sacrifice themselves for the common welfare; statesmen who used to -accomplish pilgrimages at speed in order to bring back from afar to -their waiting citizens laws more wise than their own; good fathers of -families, admirable mothers, brave and obedient young men, loving and -modest maidens, every one a personification of some virtue or even of -all virtues at once, models of human perfection: such are the figures -which sanctified by their venerable antiquity fill alike volumes -and imaginations. These are the heroes of Greek and Roman history: -and all this splendid cloth-of-gold decoration must be torn off and -cleared away if we would attempt to discover in the deepest recesses -of the memory of mankind the true heroes, the heroes of reality, not -of literature, of life, not of the stage: ignorant, superstitious, -fierce, selfish, harsh to their families, cruel to their inferiors, -avaricious, grasping, and yet, in spite of or even because of these -same characteristics of barbarism, heroes: virtuous with the one kind -of virtue possible and necessary in primitive times, the virtue of -strength, discipline, and a deep and uncompromising sense of religion. - -The misrepresentation of the primitive hero as a wise and virtuous -member of a civilised society reaches its height, so far as political -history is concerned, in the failure to understand the three chief -words which sum up the constitution of the state: king, people and -freedom. By a misunderstanding of the first, it is believed that the -original form of the state was monarchy, the absolute monarchy which -rests on the strength of the people and keeps in check the nobles: -which is really a late development in history, if not the latest. -Into this error had fallen Jean Bodin, whom Vico chose as the object -of his polemic. But Bodin, more acute than other political writers, -involved himself in a contradiction, because though he accepted the -common error he nevertheless, observing the effects of an aristocratic -republic in the supposed freedom of ancient Rome, propped up his system -by distinguishing between state and government, and asserting that -Rome in the earliest period was popular in state but aristocratically -governed; and since this prop was too weak to bear the whole weight -of the facts he at last confessed that this republic was aristocratic -both in government and in state, thus contradicting the whole of his -own doctrine as to the necessary succession of states. The truth is -that the kings of these earliest periods were at Rome, as at Sparta and -elsewhere, not monarchs at all. The fathers, patricians or heroes were -monarchical kings only in the period of domestic monarchy, when each -family lived separately; but they were kings of a special kind, subject -to no one but God, armed with religions of terror and consecrated with -the most cruel penalties. On emerging from this first state, when -the fathers united into a patrician order, their king was simply one -or more of themselves, the mere magistrate of the order. Hence Rome, -after expelling the Tarquins by a purely aristocratic revolution, did -not change her state at all. She preserved her kings in the shape of -two consuls, "annual kings," two aristocratic kings who were "deprived -of no single detail of the royal power." The two kings of Sparta had -the same character; they were liable like the consuls to be held -accountable for their actions and could be condemned to death by the -ephors. - -As these states had been falsely considered monarchical, so, no less -falsely, they had been taken as popular in character. The people -referred to in this way does not coincide with, in fact it excludes, -the plebs: the _"populus"_ was simply the patrician order, and freedom -meant simply the freedom of the patricians, the liberty of the master: -and the "_patria_" was appropriately so called, because it really was -_res patrum,_ the property of a few fathers. It is absurd to think that -the plebs, a horde of the most worthless labourers treated as slaves, -could possess the right of electing the king, and that the fathers -confined themselves to merely approving this election in the senate. -The relations between fathers and plebeians were quite other than -neighbourly peace, mutual trust and hearty co-operation. The heroes, -according to a passage of Aristotle, took a solemn oath to be eternal -enemies of the plebs: that was the form their democratic spirit took. -And the "Roman virtue" which sets before us so many and such glorious -examples, gives no example of kindliness to the common people. Brutus, -who dedicated his house in the persons of his two sons to the cause of -freedom: Scaevola, who terrified Porsena by punishing his own right -hand in the fire: the stern Manlius, who executed his own son when he -returned victorious through a successful breach of military discipline: -Curtius, who leapt in full armour with his horse into the fatal chasm: -Decius, who devoted himself for the safety of his army: Fabricius -and Curius, who refused the Samnite gold and the kingdom of Pyrrhus: -Attilius Regulus, who went to certain death to preserve the sanctity -of a Roman's oath: what did these men ever do for the commons, except -increase their miseries by war, plunge them deeper into the waters of -usury, and immure them more closely in the private dungeons of the -nobles where they were flogged bare-backed like the vilest slaves? -And woe to any aristocrat who allowed himself the slightest desire -to alleviate these miseries! He was promptly accused of sedition and -treason and sent to his death; the fate that in Rome befel Manlius -Capitolinus, who saved the Capitol from the fires of the Gaul, and -yet for his democratic sympathies was thrown from the Tarpeian rock; -the fate that came in Sparta, the hero-city of Greece as Rome was the -hero-city of the world, to the great-souled king Agis, the Manlius -Capitolinus of Lacedaemon, who, for trying to lighten the burden of the -unhappy commons by a law abolishing debts and to aid them by another -giving them testamentary rights, was strangled by the ephors. The -famous "Roman virtue" amazes any one who is obsessed by the modern idea -of a virtue consisting in justice and benevolence to all mankind. What -virtue could live with such pride? What moderation with such avarice? -What mercy with such cruelty? What justice with such inequality? - -The heroes treated their own families no less harshly than the plebs. -The education of children was stern, rough and cruel. The Spartans, in -order that their sons might not fear pain and death, beat them within -an inch of their lives in the temple of Diana, so that they often fell -dead in agonies of pain beneath their father's blows. In Greece as in -Rome it was lawful to kill innocent new-born children, a custom the -reverse of the modern, by which the delights which surround little -children shape the softer side of human nature. Wives were bought by -the dowries of the heroic period, a survival of which was the practice -solemnly observed in Rome of marriage _"coemptione et farre"_ (a -similar custom is ascribed by Tacitus to the ancient Germans and must -be considered universal among barbarous peoples), and were maintained -simply as a necessity of nature for the procreation of children and in -other respects treated like slaves; as can still be seen in many parts -of the old world and almost everywhere in the new. The acquisition of -children and the thrift of the wife were simply reckoned as so much -profit to the father and husband. - -The counterpart of this political and domestic system is found in -the ordinary life of the period, which was innocent of all luxury, -refinement and ease. Pastimes were arduous, such as wrestling and -hunting, to harden body and mind, or else dangerous, like jousting or -hunting big game, to accustom men to think lightly of wounds and death. -Wars were carried on under a religious aspect and were always therefore -extremely bitter. From such wars resulted the system of heroic slavery, -by which the conquered were held to be men without God, so that they -lost civil and natural liberty at once. Foreigners were considered -enemies: the earliest nations were intensely inhospitable. Brigandage -and piracy were recognised; and Plutarch says that the heroes -considered it a great honour and prize of valour to be called "robbers." - -It was, in fine, a society immediately proceeding out of that of the -gods, which as we know was the climax of the state of nature. In its -passage from the prehistoric age as we should say in modern language -into the dawn of history it still retained much of the earlier customs, -those customs which Vico thinking of the lonely Polyphemus in his -cave called "Cyclopean rules." The age of gold out of which it came, -innocent, kindly, humane, tolerant and dutiful, as scholars and poets -believed, was in reality one perpetual "superstitious fanaticism," -tormented by a continual terror of the gods, to placate whom men used -to offer human sacrifice, traces of which remain among the historic -Phoenicians, Scyths and Germans, the tribes of America and even the -Romans themselves, who afterwards substituted for it the ceremony -of throwing straw puppets into the Tiber. Even the sacrifice of -children was not unknown; memories of it are preserved in Agamemnon's -sacrifice of Iphigenia and elsewhere. But in this age of the gods, -in spite of or by means of this cruel superstition, were founded -the great institutions of humanity; religious cults together with -augurial divination, marriage and burial. Weddings, judgment-seats -and altars, and the removal of the bodies of the dead from the reach -of the malignant air and the wild beasts "taught the human brutes to -be pious" as Foscolo says in his _Sepolcri,_ merely versifying Vico's -prose. These "Cyclopes" who conjoined and confused in themselves the -functions of king, wise man (that is divination) and priest, at first -placed their dwellings on the heights of mountains, in places airy and -therefore healthy, naturally fortified, and near the perennial springs, -where were the nests of eagles and vultures, the birds with which -augury dealt. Hence the importance of water and fire, which became -symbols of the family; the earliest marriages were solemnised _"aqua -et igni"_ between parties who shared a common spring and hearth, and -therefore belonged to the same household; so that they must have been -between brothers and sisters. The period of the cyclopes was a strongly -moral period. It was not true of it that "pleasure and law were one" -in the sense fancied by later effeminate poets; for these men, whose -minds like those which we may still find among the peasants of to-day -were insensible to the refinements of vice, found that alone pleasant -which was lawful and that alone lawful which was useful. They were -just with the justice of a savage towards his god; continent, for they -had made an end of promiscuous intercourse; brave, hard-working and -high-spirited, as they were bound to be, surrounded as they were by -hardships and perils. It was only later that these primeval groups of -humanity descended into the plains and began to till them, and then, -from living inland as they did at first, travelled gradually to the -sea, learnt the art of navigation and founded colonies. - -In this way families or _gentes_ existed before states. States were in -fact formed of families grouped into an order of _gentes maiores_ or -"ancient noble houses" as they were afterwards called to distinguish -them from others added later to the order (for instance at the time -of Junius Brutus, to fill the vacancies in the Roman senate after -the expulsion of the kings) and called _"gentes minores."_ But these -_gentes_ had within themselves an element of differentiation and -strife. Families were not composed, as is generally believed owing -to the common mistake of giving modern meanings to ancient words, of -wives and children alone; but also of slaves, _famuli,_ those who, -being less strong and remaining longer in the nomadic state of nature, -finally "as sometimes wild animals, driven either by extreme cold or by -hunters, to save their life betake themselves to inhabited places" had -sought refuge with the stronger, in the fortresses of the fathers. In -return for the protection thus granted they tilled the father's land, -and were bound and as it were tied to them, and hence called _nexi_; -they followed them and served them, and therefore gained the name of -_clientes._ The relation of slaves to fathers was the second form -of human relation, the first being the natural one of matrimony; it -constituted the feudal status, which has wrongly been believed peculiar -to a certain definite period of barbarism, the Middle Ages, whereas it -existed in all heroic societies, and was the eternal feudal principle -whence sprang all the republics of the world. As Tacitus says, speaking -of the Germans, the chief oath of these slaves and clients was to -guard and defend each his own master and to assign to his master's -glory his own deeds of valour (_suum principem defendere et tueri, -sua quoque fortia facta gloriae eius adsignare, praecipuum iuramentum -erat_); which is one of the severest conditions of the feudal system. -Moreover the father's children are rather confused with the slaves -than distinguished from them. They are distinguished by their title of -_liberi,_ but are identified by their similar position of obedience and -lack of separate personality. - -The need felt by the fathers of securing themselves against the -frequent mutinies of the slaves led to the mutual alliance of fathers, -the patrician order and the heroic state. Of this state the slaves -constituted the first plebs. They had no citizen's rights, since they -were not citizens; no solemnities of marriage, since the auspices -were a monopoly of the fathers; nor the right of making wills, since -that right had and always kept the political character of a command. -They were therefore excluded from the _comitia curiata_ held by the -patricians under arms, which survived later for dealing with sacred -questions; profane matters being everywhere in the earliest times, at -Rome as in Greece and Egypt, considered as sacred. The king of the -patricians, whom we have called the magistrate of the order, was thus -especially their leader and general in their resistance to the slaves -or plebeians. - -But the heroes did not provide for the stability of their order by -means of forcible resistance alone. Just as, when they abdicated -their position of sovereignty in their respective families for one of -subordination to the higher sovereignty of the order, they formed a -kind of noble or armed feudal system, so to keep their slaves more or -less reconciled to obedience they granted them, without admitting them -to citizenship, a kind of rustic feudalism. The origin of property is -thus explained in a way entirely different on the one hand from the -charmingly poetical theory according to which men adorned with all -the virtues of the golden age when justice dwelt on earth, foreseeing -the disorder that might result from communism, themselves with kindly -arbitration marked out the limits of fields, endeavouring not to assign -to one nothing but fertile, to another nothing but barren ground; to -one a waterless portion, to another one abounding in perennial streams: -and different on the other hand from the "philosophical" origin by -a voluntary submission to the wise, or that invented by "politician -kings" who derived property from violence. The granting of this rustic -feudalism, which might be called the first agrarian law, distinguished -three kinds of land-tenure: bonitary for the people, quiritary or -noble, supported by arms, for the fathers, and eminent, belonging -to the whole order. And since the strength of the order rested upon -its wealth, it did all in its power to prevent the enrichment of -the plebs; and in war--here we see the social motive of the "Roman -clemency"--deprived the conquered of their arms only, leaving them in -bonitary possession of their lands and imposing upon them a suitable -tribute. For the same reason the patricians were very reluctant to go -to war, for then the plebeian multitude gained experience of warfare -and became dangerous. - -The detachment of law from force was slow, and traces of the latter -remained in every part of the former. In the heroic republic there -were at first no laws providing for the punishment of offences and -the restitution of private injuries; hence, failing judiciary laws, -arose the need of duels and reprisals, which perpetuated the customs -of the age of innocence or of the gods. Poetry and history describe -some of these duels, which were armed judgments: for instance, that of -Menelaus and Paris under the walls of Troy, and that of the Horatii and -Curiatii, between Rome and Alba. It was a plan of divine providence, -in order that between barbaric nations of scanty understanding and -incapable of listening to reason war should not always beget war: that -right and wrong might be to some degree determined by a belief in the -favour or disfavour of the gods as the cause of victory or defeat. - -These ordeals by battle were accompanied and superseded by ordeals by -verbal formulae, used in their religious habit of mind with the most -minute and scrupulous exactitude and with care not to alter a single -letter (_religio verborum_). Horatius, who by killing his sister fell -under the law "_horrendi carminis,_" could never have been acquitted -by the decemvirs, however free from blame they thought him; and the -people acquitted him, says Livy, "more through admiration of his valour -than the justice of his cause" (_magis admiratione virtutis quant iure -causae_). In later days Roman law still retained this character of -verbal precision to such a degree that it forms the crux of several -of Plautus's comedies, in which panders are at the mercy of enamoured -young men who have led them to violate some legal formula. - -The private law of this society corresponded closely with its economic -constitution. It was an entirely natural society, confined to the -necessaries of life, and did not use money; hence the law knew nothing -of contracts formed, according to the law of a later period, by mere -consent. All obligations were ratified by giving the hand; the first -buying and selling was barter; the rent of a house consisted in a -mortgage on the soil for building it, the rent of land in planting it; -companies and credit were unknown. - -The material character of the first contracts and the forcible -character of early legal processes were gradually modified as time went -on, and became symbolic. As the fiction of force in marriage-rites -recalled the actual force with which the giants dragged the first women -into caves, so no less the ceremonies of _mancipatio, usucapio_ and -vengeance had formerly been acts really performed. _Mancipatio_ was -performed as we said with the actual hand, that is with real force; -for instance, in occupation, the original source of all rights of -possession; _usucapio_ by the permanent planting of the body upon the -thing possessed; vengeance was originally a duel or a _"conditio,"_ -private retaliation. Then they became ceremonies or fictions: -_mancipatio_ became a civil transference with solemn acts and phrases -(_si quis nexum faciet mancipiumque uti lingua nuncupassit ita ius -esto_--"If any one makes a thing bond to him and his possession, let -the law be so that he publish it with his tongue"); _usucapio_ a tenure -which is supposed to last as long as life; retaliation a series of -personal actions accompanied by a solemn declaration of them to the -debtor. There were worn in the forum as many masks as there were legal -personalities, and under the "person" or mask of a paterfamilias were -hidden all the children and all the slaves of the house. Instead of -abstract forms, which were not yet thought of, living bodily forms were -used. Heredity for instance was invented as mistress of hereditary -property, and imagined to exist completely in every particular piece of -inherited goods; the idea of indivisible right again, was materialised -in the glebe or clod of earth presented to the judge with the formula -_"hunc fundum"_ This ancient jurisprudence was throughout poetical; -its fictions turned facts into falsehoods and falsehoods into facts, -made the unborn live, the living dead, and the dead to survive in their -posterity. It created numbers of empty legal personalities without -subjects (_iura imaginaria_), rights invented by the imagination; and -the formulae in which the laws were expressed were called because of -their strict rhythm of such and so many words "verses"_--carmina._ -The fragments of the Twelve Tables, if carefully considered, end their -sentences for the most part in an Adonian verse, which is ultimately -a fragment of the hexameter metre; and Cicero, realising this, begins -his "Laws" with the sentence _Deos caste adeunto pietatem adhibento._ -Cicero also tells us that the Roman boys used to sing the laws of the -twelve tables "like a regular song" (_tanquam necessarium carmen_), and -Aelian says the same of the Cretan children and the laws of Minos. The -Egyptian laws according to one tradition were "poems of the goddess -Isis," and those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans and by Draco to the -Athenians were formulated in verse. The whole of the ancient Roman -law was a "serious poem," or as Vico says elsewhere a "kind of Roman -drama," _poema quoddam dramaticum Romanum,_ performed by the Romans in -the forum; and ancient jurisprudence was a "severe poetry." - -This poetic atmosphere in heroic society and this metrical tendency -in its language are facts borne out by many witnesses and proofs, by -the observations and conjectures of scholars and by the narrations of -travellers and missionaries. Hebraists are divided upon the question -whether Hebrew poetry is metrical or rhythmical; but Josephus, Origen -and Eusebius are in favour of metre, and St. Jerome asserts that a -great part of the book of Job is in hexameter verse. The Arabs, who had -no knowledge of writing, preserved their language down to the time when -they overran the eastern provinces of the Greek empire by handing on -the memory of their national poems. The Egyptians wrote the lives of -the dead in verse; the Persians and Chinese committed to verse their -earliest history, as also, according to Tacitus, the Germans and, -according to Justus Lipsius, the Americans. And since of these two last -nations the former was only known to the Romans late in their history -and the latter to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century, there -is good reason to suppose that the same is true of all other barbaric -nations ancient and modern. - -The earliest metre, found not only in Greece but in Assyria, Phoenicia -and Egypt, was the heroic or hexameter. Owing to the slowness of -thought and the difficulties of pronunciation it was bound at first -to have a spondaic character (hence the final foot in the line was -always a spondee) and only later when mind and tongue became more -active did it admit the dactyl. Then, when this activity still further -increased, arose the iambic (_pede praesto_ as Horace calls it) which -approximates most nearly to prose; so much so, indeed, that the early -prose writers before Gorgias practically used the iambic metre of -poetry, and prose frequently passed over into iambic verse. Tragedy was -composed in iambics, a metre which is naturally adapted to it, produced -as it was to give expression to wrath, according to the story which -makes Archilochus invent it to express his anger against Lycambus; -and if comedy afterwards adopted the same metre, it was only by the -"meaningless following of example," not because the iambic metre was -naturally suited to it as it was to tragedy. - -The primitive language of these societies was poetical not only -through its use of metre but also by being composed through and -through of lively metaphors, vivid fancies, striking resemblances, -apt comparisons, expressions by means of cause or effect, whole or -part, elliptic or pleonastic figures of speech, onomatopoeisms or -imitations of sounds by words, abbreviations, compound words, minute -circumlocutions, characteristic epithets, contortions in syntax and -episodes. All these are ways of making oneself understood devised -by men ignorant of the precise words required, or of a word, if in -conversation, understood by both parties. The episode is characteristic -of women and peasants, who are unable to select what they need and -omit what is alien to their subject; contorted language is the result -of inability to express oneself directly, or of being prevented from -doing so, as may be seen in the case of irascible or contemptuous -persons, who make use of the nominative and oblique cases but do not -utter verbs. The very words of these languages taken one by one reveal -in the frequency of their diphthongs a trace of the song out of which -speech arose; and this abundance of diphthongs still remains in the -Greek and French languages, which passed rapidly and prematurely from -the age of spontaneity to that of reflection. The German language -would certainly offer a rich store of heroic forms, with its abundance -of compound words which so happily translate those of Greek, and its -syntax which exceeds Latin in complexity as Latin does Greek. If German -scholars, says Vico several times with a wistful glance at a field of -study closed to himself, would use the principles of the New Science in -research upon the origins of their language, they would certainly make -wonderful discoveries. - -The conception of the universe prevalent among the men of this period, -and the histories of themselves which they related, of their origins, -warfare and fortunes, were also poetical, or rather mythical. It was -even the case as we have seen that their conceptions in the sphere -of social history preceded those of a cosmological, physical or -psychological character. By a rigid application of this principle Vico -developed his doctrine of "natural theogony," arising naturally in the -imagination on the occasion of certain human needs and utilities: the -genesis of the twelve greater Gods, _Di maiores,_ that is to say, -the gods invented by the _gentes maiores_ and, to a great extent, -brought by them to the foundation of the state. Jupiter or the sky, -with his language of lightning, was the author of the first laws of the -family; Juno symbolised marriage, Diana matrimonial chastity, Apollo -the light of civilisation; Vulcan, Saturn and Cybele were respectively -the fire with which the forests were burnt to make clearings, the -sowing of seed and the tilling of land; Mars symbolised the warfare -of the heroes _"pro aris et focis,"_ and Venus civilised beauty. In -addition to this celestial Venus arose a plebeian Venus to whom was -given the attribute of doves; not as typifying the passion of love, but -because they were _"degeneres"_ common birds in comparison with the -eagle. A double signification, patrician and plebeian, was given in -the same way to Vulcan and Mars. The stormy relations of the fathers -with the slaves, the struggles and penalties referred to in the myths -of Tantalus and Sisyphus, begin to be reflected in the twelve greater -gods. Hercules, struggling with Antaeus, signifies the nobles of the -heroic cities, and Antaeus the mutinied slaves led back into the -primitive cities on the mountain-tops (Antaeus lifted up into the air) -and overcome and bound down to the earth, that is to say forced back -to their servile labour. The birth of the tenth divinity, Minerva, -expresses the weakening and diminution of the heroic power, since the -plebeian Vulcan (the mutinied slaves) strikes the head of Jupiter with -an axe, the tool of a servile art. Mercury represents the granting of -bonitary rights to the plebs and the maintenance of quiritary rights -by the fathers. The last of the twelve deities, Neptune, arose when -the peoples descended to the sea-coast; and the legends of Minos, the -Argonauts, the Trojan war, the return of Ulysses, Europa and the bull, -the Minotaur, Perseus and Theseus refer to colonisation and piracy. -The mythological interpretation of history does not cease with the -foundation of states. The founders of civilisation, Zoroaster and -Mercurius Trimegistus, Orpheus and Confucius, even if they are not -strictly gods, are at least poetical characters. Aesop is typical of -the _"socii"_ or slaves of the heroes and hence is represented as ugly, -that is, devoid of civilised beauty (_honestas_); and his fable of the -lions' society shows to perfection the real relation of the heroes to -their slaves, in which the latter share the toils, but not the spoils. -Draco, of whom Greek historians tell us nothing but that he imposed -a stern code of laws, symbolises the cruelty of the heroes to their -slaves. Solon was either a party-leader of the Athenian plebs, or else -a simple personification of the plebs itself, considered from the point -of view of its vengeance. In the history of Rome we find poetical -figures in Romulus, to whom were ascribed all the laws of the orders; -in Numa, author of the laws dealing with sacred matters and religious -ceremonies; in Tullus Hostilius, who organised and legislated for the -military system; in Servius Tullius the author of the census (which -has been imagined, contrary to all historical truth, the foundation -of a popular republic, whereas it was really the foundation of an -aristocratic); and in Tarquinius Priscus, who invented insignia of rank -and military uniforms; lastly, the Decemvirs and the Twelve Tables are -turned into poetical figures, since to these events and persons were -ascribed a great number of laws favourable to liberty and really dating -from a later period. - -Thus, before philosophers began to elaborate the system of myths by -creating new ones when they believed they were interpreting the old -(Plato for instance introduced into the myth of Jupiter the idea of -the omnipresent and all-pervading ether, his own invention, and other -philosophers saw in the birth of Minerva from the head of Jupiter a -description of the divine wisdom, or in Chaos and Orcus the confused -mass of the universal seeds of nature and the primitive matter of -the world), poet-theologians had expressed their ideas in mythology, -ideas in which the metaphysical and physical elements were very small, -but containing a large nucleus of human and political fact. The Chaos -of these theologian-poets was the confusion of human seed during the -period of brutal community of women; it was confused because devoid of -human regulation, obscure because devoid of the light of civilisation. -The misshapen monster Orcus devoured everything because men in this -community had no human shape, and were absolved by the void, because -through the impossibility of knowing their offspring they left no trace -of themselves behind. The four elements of the world corresponded to -the four elements of social life: the air where Jupiter lightened, -the water of the perennial springs, the fire that burnt the forests, -and the earth, the scene of man's labours. Being and subsisting were -conceived the former as the act of eating (peasants still say of a -sick man, meaning that he is not dead yet, that he is "still eating") -and the latter as "standing upon one's feet." The composition of the -body was analysed into solids and liquids, that of the soul into -air: generation into the act of _"concipere"_ or _"concapere,"_ that -is, taking hold of neighbouring material bodies, overcoming their -resistance and adapting and assimilating them to one's own nature: and -all the internal functions of the soul were ascribed to the head, the -breast or the heart. - -Cosmographical ideas were narrow, confined as they were to the life -of these societies. The first heaven was placed no farther off than -the tops of the mountains, where the giants saw the lightning play: -the lower world was no deeper than a ditch, and was only by degrees -enlarged and sunk into the valleys as opposed to the sky, that is to -say to the mountain-tops; the earth was identified with the limits -of the cultivated fields. In the course of time the sky, the object -of contemplation from which auguries were drawn, was lifted to a -greater height, and with it the gods and heroes who were attached to -the planets and constellations; and thus arose poetical astronomy. -Geographical knowledge extended no farther than the country inhabited -by each nation; and this is the reason why peoples travelling into -foreign and distant lands gave to the new cities and to the mountains, -hills, passes, islands and promontories the same names which were -borne by those of their native land. Asia or India was at first for -the Greeks the eastern part of Greece itself, Europe or Hesperia its -western, and Thrace or Scythia its northern district. - -But we will not enter into further details; indeed we have omitted much -already. It is not the detail that gives its value to Vico's picture -of the heroic age. His etymologies, his mythical interpretations, the -genesis and chronological succession of his gods, the genesis and -succession of his phonetic, metrical and stylistic forms--each, taken -by itself, may be contested; but taken as a whole they are rich with -a truth which transcends the single propositions. This truth is the -mighty effort to recall a form of humanity and society still doubtless -living in surviving records and monuments, still recognisable here and -there in a fragmentary form in various parts of the modern world; but -for centuries, even in Vico's days, buried beneath a mass of irrelevant -fancies, conventional types, and prejudices of every kind, which -prevented its true characteristics from appearing. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - - -HOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY - - -The poet of primitive society was Homer: and if such was his character, -he could not have enjoyed the profound wisdom, the delicate and lofty -sense of morality, and the supreme knowledge of all the sublimest -arts and sciences which ancient philosophers and writers fancied him -to possess, and the common opinion of literary men and critics still -attributed to him in the seventeenth century. - -What an extravagant philosopher Homer would have been, if he had -indeed been a philosopher: how miserably, had he set out to do so, -would he have organised Greek civilisation! His Jupiter indicates -force, brute force, as the standard of the respect due to him; his -Minerva despoils Venus, knocks Mars down with a stone, strikes Diana -and is in turn insulted by Mars; and both Venus and Mars are wounded -by Diomed, a mere mortal. The heroes Achilles and Agamemnon exchange -insults such as would hardly be used by servants in a comedy to-day: -they call each other "dogs" and quarrel in the most uncivil manner for -the possession of Briseis and Chryseis. Ferocious in their customs, -they leave the bodies of their enemies to dogs and crows: intemperate -in their pleasures, they drink to excess. Lofty intelligence, kindness -of heart, balance of mind may be sought in vain in all their actions -and sentiments. The fact is, these heroes show themselves men of the -scantiest understanding, the wildest imagination, the most violent -passions; boorish, barbarous, intractable, fierce, arrogant, defiant -and obstinate in their resolves and at the same time flighty in the -extreme, at the mercy of any new object that presents itself to -their eyes. Here again, the most striking parallel may be found in -the psychology of the peasant, who as may be seen every day embraces -any reasonable motive proposed to him but owing to the weakness of -his intellect soon abandons the idea he has been persuaded to adopt -and slips naturally back to his first intention. In the same way the -Homeric heroes sometimes acquiesce in the first word of opposition -offered to them; sometimes at a sudden mournful recollection they burst -into bitter lamentation in the midst of their anger: or else, if while -in the greatest misery they meet with something pleasant, like Ulysses -at the feast of Alcinous, they lose all memory of their sorrows and -become completely cheerful; or else, when in a calm and peaceful state -of mind, they take offence at a harmless word and flying into a blind -passion threaten the speaker with a cruel death. Even the virtues which -they possess in an eminent degree, their frankness, vigour, magnanimity -and generosity, are tinged with this same character of unreflective -passion. - -The hero of heroes, Achilles, who bears on his shoulders the destinies -of Troy, owing to a private wrong he had received from Agamemnon--a -grave wrong, but an insufficient motive for the ruin of his country and -his whole nation--condemned all the Greeks to defeat and destruction -at the hands of Hector; and he only determined to aid them in order -to assuage the personal grief caused by Hector's slaying his friend -Patroclus. If only this extreme aloofness had been due to passion and -jealousy! But though when Agamemnon deprived him of Briseis he made -enough noise to fill heaven and earth and supply the plot of the entire -_Iliad,_ yet he never in the whole course of the poem shows a spark -of real love: just as Menelaus mustered the whole of Greece against -Troy to avenge the rape of Helen but never suffers the least pang of -jealousy against Paris who is enjoying her. So devoid is Achilles of -common humanity, that when Hector wishes to arrange that the victor in -the fight shall bury the vanquished, he forgets that they are equals in -rank and that death levels all, and savagely answers: "When have men -ever made a truce with lions, and when have wolves and lambs had the -same wish?" and he adds, "If I slay thee, I will drag thee bound naked -to my chariot round the walls of Troy three days" (as he actually did -in the sequel) and finally, "I will give thee to my hounds to devour." -And he would have carried out his threat, had not the unhappy father -Priam come to him to ransom the corpse. But even in this deeply-moving -interview, when he has received Priam in his tent after the latter has, -escorted by Mercury, passed alone through the midst of the Greek camp, -when he has welcomed him to his table, at a single involuntary word -that falls from the lips of the unhappy old man as he bewails the loss -of so valiant a son Achilles forgets the sacred law of hospitality; -and, ignoring the full and complete trust which Priam had placed in -him, untouched by the terrible misfortunes of such a king, by the -respect due to a father and the veneration due to so old a man, without -reflecting on the reversal of his fortunes, of all things the most apt -to excite pity, flies into a bestial rage and shouts a threat that he -"will cut off his head"! Death itself does not end his anger at the -loss of Briseis, were it not that the beautiful and unhappy princess -Polyxena, daughter of the once rich and powerful Priam and now a -wretched slave, is sacrificed on his tomb, that the shade glutted with -revenge may drink the last drop of her innocent blood; and in the lower -world, when Ulysses asks him what state he prefers, Achilles answers -that he "would rather be the commonest slave, but alive"! Such is the -hero whom Homer adorns with the permanent epithet of "without reproach" -(ἀμύμων) and celebrates in the hearing of Greece as a pattern of -heroic virtue. Such a hero, whose reasoning powers are concentrated in -his spear-point, can only be classed with those self-satisfied persons -of whom we say nowadays that they are too fine to breathe the common -air. - -If Homer's greatest characters are so discordant with our civilised -nature, the similes which he uses are drawn from savage beasts and wild -nature generally. If the life which he represents--a life of children -in its intellectual futility, of women in its imaginative vigour, and -of headstrong youths in the violence of its passion--and the tales -of which the _Odyssey_ is full, tales worthy of an old woman engaged -in amusing children, prevent our attributing any esoteric wisdom to -Homer, the striking success of these wild similes is certainly not -characteristic of a mind tamed and civilised by philosophy of any sort. -Nor could that truculent and savage style in which he describes the -various sanguinary battles, the diverse and extravagantly bloodthirsty -species of butchery which especially go to make the sublimity of the -_Iliad,_ have originated in a mind humanised and softened by philosophy. - -But who was Homer? What opinions as to him can we find in ancient -writers, and what facts can we draw from his poems? An unprejudiced -reader of the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_ is at every step aware of and -baffled by extravagant and inconsistent statements. The life portrayed -is inconsistent: it takes us now here, now there, over a long period -of time; on the one hand we find Achilles the hero of force, on the -other Ulysses the hero of wisdom: on the one hand, cruelty, barbarism, -ferocity and brutality, on the other the luxury of Alcinous, the -delights of Calypso, the pleasures of Circe, the songs of the Sirens -and the pastimes of suitors who tempt and even win over the chaste -Penelope. On the one hand we are shown boorish and uncivilised -manners, on the other jewels, magnificent clothing, exquisite foods -and the arts of sculpture in bas-relief and metal-founding; on the one -hand a strictly heroic society, on the other some signs of popular -liberty. This delicate life fits ill with the savage and cruel life -which especially in the _Iliad_ is ascribed to the same heroes at the -same time. To regard them thus as contemporaneous is an impossibility. -From the customs of the Trojan period we have leapt abruptly into -those of the time of Numa, to such an extent that "_ne placidis coeant -inmitia_" we are compelled to suppose that the two poems were the work -of many hands extending over many ages. The geographical allusions are -equally inconsistent. These, no less, bring us into varied and distant -physical surroundings. The scene of the _Iliad_ lies to the east of -Greece, inclining to the northward: that of the _Odyssey_ in the west, -inclining to the southward. The language, again, is inconsistent. The -confusion of dialects persists in spite of the revision of Aristarchus, -and has been explained by the most extraordinary hypotheses, such as -the theory that Homer drew the elements of his vocabulary from all the -various Greek nationalities. - -Passing from the poems to the traditions of their author, the lives -of Homer by Herodotus (if Herodotus really wrote it) and Plutarch -are valueless. The most elementary facts about Homer are unknown: it -is precisely concerning the man whom they considered the greatest -luminary of Greece that the ancients leave us most completely in the -dark. We know neither Homer's date nor his birthplace: each one of -the Greek peoples claimed him as their citizen. It is said indeed -that he was poor and blind, but it is just these details which excite -our suspicion, as our laughter is aroused by the argument of Longinus -which makes the _Iliad_ the work of his youth and the _Odyssey_ that -of his old age. It would be indeed remarkable if such knowledge were -current concerning a man in whose case the two trifling details of -time and place were unknown! Above all, criticism must ask how a single -man could ever have composed two poems of such a length at a time when -writing was not in existence: since the three inscriptions of heroic -age, one of Amphitryon, another of Hippocoön and a third of Laomedon -mentioned with an excess of good faith by Vossius are mere forgeries -like those made by the strikers of false coins. - -All these considerations led Vico to suspect that Homer himself was not -a real person but one of those poetic characters to whom the ancient -world ascribed long series of actions, works and events. If we try to -conceive the Homeric poems not as the work of an individual but as -two great storehouses of the manners and customs of earliest Greece, -containing the history of its natural law and heroic period; if instead -of a single poet we imagine a whole nation of poets, and instead of a -single act of creation, a national poetry developing in the course of -centuries, everything falls into its place and finds an explanation. -The extravagance of the legends is explained by the fact that the -composition of the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_ falls in the third period of -their existence. In the hands of the theological poets they were true -and severe, by the heroic poets they were altered and corrupted, and -in this corrupt state they were incorporated in the two poems. The -variety of customs is explained if we consider the various periods of -composition, and so also the "young Homer" and "old Homer," which are -symbolic of the earlier and later periods of primitive Greece. The -diversity of sites assigned to his birth and death and the variety -of his dialects are accounted for by the fact that different peoples -produced the lays. Finally, it is explained why every Greek people -claimed him as a citizen, just because these peoples were themselves -Homer; and why he was called blind and a beggar, because such were -as a rule the singers who went about from fair to fair reciting their -tales. Thus in order to be rightly understood Homer must lose himself -in the crowd of Greek peoples and be considered an idea or heroic -character; a type of the Greeks in so far as they narrated tales in -ballad form. Thus facts which had only caused confusion and lacked -plausibility in Homer as then understood became natural and necessary -elements of the Homer now rediscovered. Above all, this latter Homer -deserves the high praise of being the first of all historians of -Greece known to us. In Homer we have a proof of the original identity -of history and poetry, and a confirmation of Strabo's assertion that -before Herodotus, before even Hecataeus of Miletus, the history of the -Greek peoples was written by their poets. In two golden passages of the -_Odyssey_ a man is praised for having told a story well and said to -have "told it as a musician and a singer." - -Vico did not undertake a detailed investigation into the way in which -the Homeric poems were elaborated. He seems however to incline towards -two chief poet-authors, one, a native of the east of Greece, towards -the north, for the _Iliad,_ the other for the _Odyssey,_ a native of -the west towards the south: and by the title "Homer" he understands a -composer and compiler of legends. But on the other hand, owing to the -purely ideal meaning which this name has for him, we must not rule out -the interpretation that the two Homers in their turn may be two streams -of poetry and two groups of peoples or of popular singers. The historic -figures whom Vico finds before him are the rhapsodes, men of the people -who wandered independently about the fairs and festivals of the Greek -cities reciting the songs of Homer. From the time of their primitive -composition long ages elapsed before the Pisistratidae had them -divided and arranged into two groups, the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey,_ a -fact which shows clearly that in their time only a confused mass of -material was to be found, and decreed that they should henceforth be -sung by the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea. - -It is however certainly not in the resolution, materially understood, -of the individual Homer into a myth or poetic character that the -importance of Vico's theory lies: and the same is perhaps the case -with its truth. From the inconsistencies observed by him, and not -always accurately observed (which are moreover unimportant, since -the inaccuracies he notes might easily be balanced by the correct -statements he omits), there was no strictly logical passage to the -denial of the existence of an individual Homer, the principal author -of one or both poems. These inconsistencies might serve to demonstrate -that the poet or poets were working upon a rich fund of traditional -material, of origin very various both as to time and place, and not -regularly stratified according to origin, but having its strata -confused and contorted. One or more poets, or even many poets and an -able compiler of their lays, or a society of able compilers: these and -similar hypotheses might equally well have been suggested, as happened -later, and supported, as was later the case, by arguments neither more -nor less cogent, because incapable of documentary proof. But underlying -this resolution of Homer into a poetic character, as it underlay other -resolutions made or attempted by Vico, lay the discovery of the long -and laborious historical genesis through which the matter of these -poems had passed, so that in this sense they might really be called a -product of collaboration on the part of the whole Greek people. The -substitution of a nation of Homers for a single Homer was only another -case of mythology constructed according to the principles discovered -by Vico himself: mythology which must be retranslated into scientific -prose. In the same way Vico's analysis of the customs described in the -Homeric poems may be, and is, not only here and there adulterated with -a few inaccuracies, but is on the whole exaggerated and one-sided. -Still, this analysis taken as a whole was a great advance and opened -new paths to Homeric criticism. How could the stubborn illusion of the -noble Homeric hero, a great lord and a good ruler, a shining example -of all civil, military and domestic virtues, be dispelled except by -setting against it the picture of a boorish Achilles, full of elemental -passions, violent, stubborn, unreasoning, quick to a generous impulse -but no less quick to outbursts of brutal wrath? - -Vico's progress in artistic appreciation of the Homeric poetry was -no less marked. The recognition that a sound and rational philosophy -was not to be found in the poet Homer would, in the mouth of any -other critic of the time, have amounted to a slur on the poet: as -expressed by Vico and as the consequence of his new aesthetic ideas it -was a compliment. The errors which intellectualism and neo-classical -criticism discovered in Homer led the critics to repeat freely the -saying of Horace that "good Homer nods at times": whereas Vico on -the contrary exclaims "if he had not nodded so often he would never -have been good!" (_nisi ita saepe dormitasset, nunquam bonus fuisset -Homerus_). Homer was a great poet precisely because he was not a -philosopher. He had a retentive memory, a strong imagination and a -sublime mind; and neither the philosophies nor the arts of poetry -and criticism which came after him could ever produce a poet at all -like him. He was the only poet who could conceive heroic characters: -his comparisons are incomparable, his speeches sublime, expressive -of the individuality of the speaker, and created by the power of a -vivid imagination: his diction is clear and splendid, his language -composed entirely of similes, images and comparisons, and has none of -those ideas of genus and species by which things are intellectually -defined. He is not delicate but grand, for delicacy is a small virtue -and grandeur naturally despises small things: or even, just as a great -and rushing torrent cannot help the turbidness of its water, and must -perforce sweep rocks and trees with it in the violence of its course, -so too in Homer we may find things of no value. But the torrent with -all its impurities sweeps on its way superb and impetuous; and Homer in -spite of and partly because of his ruggedness is for ever the father -and prince of all sublime poets. - -This new departure in Homeric criticism brought with it implicitly a -complete revolution in the history of ancient literature. But on this -subject Vico made only a few scattered remarks. He was no specialist: -he did not write from a specialist's point of view, and too often when -documentary evidence and thought were unable to solve a difficulty he -solved it by means of his fancy, a faculty which was however in his -case radiant with gleams of insight. Thus, the cyclic poets were not -so called because of the circle of listeners in the centre of which -they declaimed their poems, like the "Rinaldi" or ballad-singers whom -Vico saw on the quay at Naples, and this circle had no connexion with -the _vilem patulumque orbem_ of Horace: but the observation that they -differed little from these ballad-singers was sound. In the same way, -we need not linger on his guesses at the dates of Homer and Hesiod, -nor need we take literally his division of lyric poetry into three -periods, namely those respectively of religious hymns, funeral chants -for dead heroes and melic lyrics or "musical airs," the last including -Pindar, and admired, flourishing as it did at the epoch of the "pompous -virtue" of Greece, at the Olympic games where these poets sang. But -still Vico has here put his finger on the difference between primitive -and refined or cultured lyric poetry. The origin of tragedy he ascribes -to the dithyramb or dramatic satire, of which no example has come down -to us, and in rural customs compared by him to those which were still -in evidence during his own lifetime in Campania at vintage season; and -he notes the relation between tragedy and the epic. Tragedy had its -rude beginnings at a time when the heroic spirit was already dead: -it perfected itself by becoming subordinate to the Homeric poetry, -deriving its inspiration from Homeric characters and avoiding original -ones. The old comedy was closely related to tragedy. Like the latter -it was derived from a chorus, and it preserved its archaic character -in that it displayed living persons and real actions. The new comedy -on the other hand was marked off by a profound change of spirit. Here -the effects of philosophy were directly felt. Imaginative genera were -superseded by intelligible and rational universals: and Menander and -the other poets of the new comedy, living in the most humane period -of Greek history, took their intelligible genera from human life and -depicted them in their comedies, over which one feels that the breath -of Socratic philosophy has passed. The persons of the new comedy were -cast in a mould, and were not public but private characters: and as -the chorus represents the public and argues about public affairs only, -there is no room for it in the new comedy. About this time began the -practice of inserting idealised heroes of perfect morals into poetry. -Aristotle, remembering the strongly individualised characters of -Homer, still maintained as a principle of poetic composition that -the heroes of tragedy should be neither very good nor very bad, but -rather a mixture of great virtues and great faults. But the poets of -the late period, making use of the idea originated by philosophers, -formed a "heroism of virtue": a heroism which may be called "gallant." -Accordingly they either invented entirely new legends or else used old -legends which had originally presented themselves to the founders of -the nation in an appropriately stern and severe form, but softened them -by adapting them to the softening of manners. Equally gallant is the -"shepherd" of the Greek Bucolic poets, Bion and Moschus, "wasting away -with the most delicate love," He makes the general observation on Greek -and Latin literature, that the boundary between verse and prose was so -strictly guarded on both sides that no ancient writer ever composed -both orations and poems--a rule to which perhaps the only exception -is the wretched verses (_ridenda poemata_) of Cicero: and Vico tried -to explain this fact by the democratic habits which compelled orators -studiously to avoid the cultivation of lofty and fanciful modes of -expression, which would have puzzled the people and hindered their full -and clear comprehension of the point at issue. - -Vico does not treat Roman literature so fully as Greek, which provided -him with much more primitive documents. But he detected certain -analogies between the origins of Latin and Greek literature. The first -poets and authors in the Latin language were the Salii, sacred poets; -and this was natural in the beginning of a nation's culture; for in the -primitive religious period the gods are the only object of praise. And -just as the earliest fragments of Latin known to us, the remains of -the hymns of the Salii, give an impression of hexameter verse, so the -same metre is felt in the records of Romans who celebrated triumphs, -such as the _"duello magno dirimendo, regibus subiugandis"_ of Lucius -Aemilius Regillus and the _"fudit fugat prosternit maximas legiones"_ -of Acilius Glabrio. The first Roman poets, too, sang true stories: this -was the case with Livius Andronicus and his Romanid containing the -annals of early Rome, and with Naevius, and later Ennius, who described -the Punic wars. Satire also was levelled against real and for the most -part notorious persons. The Romans however differed from the Greeks -in advancing with a more measured step and not making the swift and -abrupt transition from barbarism to effeminacy: so that they entirely -lost the history of their gods (which Varro called the "obscure period" -of Rome) and preserved their heroic history, extending down to the -Publilian and Petelian laws, in common speech only. In its greatest -manifestations the literature of Rome is the work of cultivated poets -like Virgil, whom Vico admires for his profound knowledge of heroic -antiquity, but says of him that so far as poetical power is concerned -he is not to be compared with Homer; a verdict agreeing with that of -Plutarch and Longinus, but in opposition to the view of neo-classical -criticism. Another example of cultivated and reflective poetry is to -be found in Horace, who like Pindar in the pompous period of Greece -composed his odes at the most "ostentatious" epoch of Roman history, -the Augustan age. - -The Biblical literature would have given Vico materials of great value -for the study of primitive poetry; and he actually did move a few steps -towards it when he observed that poetry was the primitive language of -all nations "including the Hebrews"; and that Moses made no use of the -esoteric wisdom of the Egyptian priests and wrote his history "in a -style which has much in common with that of Homer and often surpasses -him in sublimity of expression." But Vico drops the subject at once, as -if he instinctively guessed what might come of treating the Pentateuch -as he had done the _Iliad,_ and Moses like Homer. So he prefers to wax -enthusiastic over the phrase in which God describes himself to Moses -_"Ego sum qui sum,"_ to which he ascribes a metaphysical profundity -only attained by the Greeks when Plato conceived God as to_ on,_ and -unknown to the Latins down to the latest period, for the word _ens_ is -not pure Latin but belongs to debased Latin. Or he contents himself -with emphatically pointing out that at a time when Greece was under -the sway of a superstitious and natural law, God gave to his people a -code "so full of weight as regards the dogmas of divinity and so full -of humanity as regards the practice of justice, that not even in the -humanest period of Greek history could a Plato have conceived or an -Aristides executed it"; a code "whose ten chief enactments contain an -eternal and universal justice founded upon the excellent conception -of a purified human nature, and are capable of forming by habituation -a character such as the maxims of the greatest philosophers could -only with great difficulty form by ratiocination; whence Theophrastus -called the Hebrews philosophers by nature." The success that attended -the "will to believe" was all the more striking if as we suspect Vico -had read the abhorred Spinoza's _Tractatus Theologico-politicus,_ -where the Hebrew prophets, while their "piety" is recognised, are -said to be entirely devoid of "sublime thoughts." Spinoza maintains -that they only taught "very simple things which any one could easily -discover, and adorned these with a style and supported them by reasons -most calculated to move the mind of the multitude to devotion towards -God"; and that the laws revealed by God to Moses were "nothing but -the laws of the particular government of the Jews": and he sets out -to examine the text of the Bible and the problem of the authenticity -of the Pentateuch and the respective authors of its various books. We -might almost venture to say that it was Spinoza's Biblical criticism -that suggested to Vico his criticism of the composition and spirit of -the Homeric poems; but that the latter, after passing in this way from -sacred to profane history, from Moses to Homer, set his face stubbornly -against the opposite transition from Homer to Moses, from profane -history to sacred. - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - - -THE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY - - -Heroic society in the period of youthful vigour above described -contains within itself, rigorously repressed, and in fact made into a -support, the element of opposition; the slaves, clients or vassals, -that is to say the plebs. But this element little by little succeeds in -detaching itself from and opposing itself to the society, engaging it -in a continual and undisguised conflict, so as by degrees to overthrow -this old society and give life and form to a new society of which it -is itself the material: a democratic society, the popular republic. -Vico believes this process to be uniform in all peoples; but since -references to histories other than that of Rome are either absent or -very vague (he hardly mentions the origin of the Athenian democracy) -the description of this process appears in the pages of the New Science -as a fragment of Roman history, or as we should nowadays call it the -social history of Rome. - -Vico's guesses about the population and primitive culture of Italy are -of no great importance. The subject belongs rather to archaeology and -ethnography than to history, and Vico did not make a special study -of it. In the _De antiquissima sapientia Italorum_ he had provided -the origins of Rome with a basis in an Italian civilisation of high -antiquity, earlier than the Greek and derived from Egypt, which -the Romans absorbed in a manner agreeing with their character; by -rejecting, that is to say, its theoretical hypotheses while taking over -their practical results, just as they adopted from the Etruscans their -tragic religion and their art of tactics, and as they later adopted -laws from Athens and Sparta. In this way their ignorance and savagery -remained unchanged, and hence they spoke the language of philosophers -without being philosophical. In his later writings Vico still for a -time maintained the priority and independence of the earliest Italian -civilisation as regards that of Greece, and considered Pythagoras less -as the founder than as the student of Italian wisdom. Finally, however, -he seems to have given up this view, just as he definitely abandoned -that which explained the origins of Roman religion, language, customs -and law by the imitation of foreign peoples and "frankly confessed that -he had been in error here" owing to the example of Plato's _Cratylus._ -What conditions brought about the rise of Rome Vico does not precisely -say. He is certain that if Rome and the world did not begin together, -at least the foundation of Rome was a new beginning. The point of -departure which he assumes is the asylum of Romulus, consisting of -the "families" of fathers who gave their hospitality to wanderers -and made them into _famuli._ There was no Trojan colonisation; Vico -knows Bochart's treatise (1663) criticising the legend of Aeneas's -arrival in Italy and accepts its conclusions, which only confirm the -doubts already entertained by certain ancient historians. For Vico, -the Trojan origin of Rome is a legend sprung from the union of two -different examples of national arrogance: that of the Greeks, who made -such a noise about the Trojan war and forced their Aeneas into the -history of Rome, and that of the Romans, who accepted him in order to -boast of a distinguished foreign origin. The legend moreover could -not have arisen much before the time of the war with Pyrrhus, when -Rome began to acquire a taste for things Greek. In order to explain -the infusion of Greek names and myths into the story of primitive Rome -and the similarity of the Roman alphabet to the ancient Greek, Vico -would incline rather to the hypothesis that early in their history the -Romans conquered and destroyed some Greek colony on the Latin coast, of -which all trace has since been lost in the mists of antiquity; and that -through receiving its inhabitants in Rome as refugees and allies, they -came under the influence of several Hellenic traditions and customs. - -Vico does not spend much time over the historical events of the royal -period. Here in fact lay one of the chief differences between his -criticism and that which had already been originated and was continued -after his time dealing with the first centuries of Roman history. Vico -aims not at substituting historical for legendary anecdotes but at -understanding the essence of institutions and the ways in which they -change. He uses two guiding principles, as we have seen in considering -the royal period: first, that it was a period not of monarchy but -of aristocracy and that therefore the type of heroic society or the -patriarchal republic is applicable to it: secondly, that the names -of the kings are symbols or "poetic characters" for the institutions -of this society. In Vico's judgment, as we have had occasion to -observe, the constitution of Servius Tullius should not be considered -the basis of popular liberty, as the later Romans considered it; it -was really the basis of the liberty of the feudal lords, since by it -the patricians granted to the plebeians the bonitary tenure of their -land together with the duty of paying rent to and serving at their -own expense in war themselves, the patricians. And Junius Brutus, in -driving out the Tarquins and replacing them by two consuls or annual -aristocratic kings, restored to the Roman republic its primitive form; -that is to say, he delivered the lords from the domination of their -tyrants but left the people under the domination of their lords. - -The patricians' oppression of the plebeians after the restoration -of Junius Brutus and the struggles and resistance caused by it -constitute the soul of the new development and contain the secret of -the greatness of Rome, the "key to universal Roman history," _clavis -historiae Romanae universae._ Polybius's explanation of this greatness -is too vague. He describes it as due to the virtue or the religion -of the patricians and relates the facts of this virtue rather than -their cause. Vico also criticises Machiavelli, at one time because he -adduces certain civil and military institutions as the cause of Rome's -greatness without investigating the cause of those institutions, that -is to say the character of Roman society: at another time for adducing -what was only a partial cause, the high spirit of the plebeians. He -thinks Plutarch worst of all, since envy of the virtue and wisdom -of Rome leads him to ascribe her greatness to fortune. The fact was -that Rome subjugated the other cities of Latium and then Italy and -the world because her heroism was still young, while among the other -Latin peoples it had begun to decay. Thanks to this youthful vigour -the patricians were strong enough to preserve their order and the -religion which formed its foundation and safeguard (the nobles, Vico -observes at this point, were always and everywhere religious, so that -the first sign of contempt for religion among them is a symptom of -national decadence); the plebeians were spirited enough to demand a -share in religion, auspices and all civil rights; the lawyers, lastly, -were wise enough to interpret the old laws and apply them to any new -case that might arise, and strove with all their might to alter the -text of these laws as little and as slowly as possible. These were the -chief causes of the growth and permanence of the Roman empire; for -in all its political changes it contrived to remain faithful to its -principles. Prowess in war was another result of the rivalry of the -orders; since the nobles were naturally consecrated to the safety of -their country, as the only means of preserving the civil privileges of -their order, and the plebeians accomplished brilliant deeds in order -to prove themselves worthy of patrician honours. And when the Romans -extended their conquests and their victories over the whole world, they -made use of four rules which they had already applied to the plebeians -within Rome itself. They reduced barbarian provinces to the position of -clients by planting colonies in them: they granted civilised provinces -bonitary tenure of their land: to Italy they gave the quiritary tenure: -and to the municipia, the towns which had earned better treatment, they -accorded the same equality with themselves which the plebs had finally -won. - -The result of the first struggles, in which the point at issue was -according to Vico the bonitary possession of land (a right already -recognised in the constitution of Servius, but cancelled by the -nobles in return for arrears of rent), is seen in the tribunate, and -later, when the plebeians claimed the right of quiritary tenure, in -the laws of the Twelve Tables, ratifying this plebeian victory. But -the law of the Twelve Tables represented at the same time the victory -of written law, the end of the secrecy with which the laws had been -fenced round by the patricians, who alone knew, understood, interpreted -and therefore applied them as they thought fit. This publication and -codification of a written law cannot have been benevolently granted by -the patricians out of that anxiety "not to despise the wishes of the -plebs" of which Livy speaks; rather they must have resisted it with -all the stubbornness which Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes and -expresses in the phrase "_mores patrios servandos, leges ferri non -oportere_" (our fathers' customs must be preserved, and laws must not -be passed). - -Later historians decorated the origin of the Twelve Tables with -various legends. They told, among other things, of the mission sent -by the decemvirs to Athens to bring back new laws: a tale given by -Livy and Dionysius, but unknown to Polybius and discredited by Cicero. -How, in the savage aloofness of primitive nations, between whom oral -communication could only have been instituted by the necessities of -warfare, alliances and commerce, could the fame of Solon's wisdom have -crossed the seas from distant Attica to Rome? How could the Romans of -that time have possessed such accurate knowledge of the quality of -Athenian law as to believe it capable of setting at rest the strife -between their plebeians and their nobles? How could ambassadors have -travelled between Greece and those Romans whom seventy-two years later -the Greeks of Tarentum could still maltreat as strangers? And what -shall we say of ambassadors who returned carrying with them the Greek -laws from Athens but without knowing what they meant; so that but -for the coincidence by which Hermodorus the pupil of Heraclitus, an -exile from his country, happened to be in Rome, the Romans would have -been unable to make any use of this unintelligible and inaccessible -treasure? Again, how could Hermodorus have translated the laws into -Latin of such purity that Diodorus Siculus pronounced it devoid of the -slightest taint of Hellenism, and with a perfection unattained by any -subsequent writer of any period in a translation from the Greek? How -did he contrive to clothe Greek ideas in Latin words so appropriate -(for instance, _auctoritas_) that Greeks, Dio Cassius among them, -declare that their own language has no corresponding words by which -to explain them? Heraclitus's letter to Hermodorus must have been -conveyed by the same mail that served Pythagoras in his distant -voyages up and down the world: it is, in fact, an imposture of the -first quality, and the whole story of the Athenian origin of these laws -is due to the arrogance of scholars, who derived them first from the -other Latin peoples (such as the Aequi), then from the Greek cities -of Italy, then from Sparta and finally from Athens, with whose name, -thanks to the renown of the Athenian philosophers, they were at last -satisfied. No doubt, the laws of the Twelve Tables present resemblances -not only to Athenian or Spartan laws but to those of various nations, -the Mosaic code among others; but this is due to the uniformity of -national history. No doubt, the decemvirs were in antiquity supposed -to have originated laws bearing clear traces of Greek influence, such -as that prohibiting the Greek style of mourning at funerals: but this -is because as we have seen the decemviral legislation, like the names -of the various kings, became a "poetic character," and to it were -referred all laws later recorded in the public archives which tended -to the equalisation of liberty. But the original law of the Twelve -Tables, with its primitive rudeness, inhumanity, cruelty and ferocity, -which agrees so ill with the period of highly-developed civilisation at -Athens, is a document of the greatest value for the ancient natural law -of the Latin peoples, and the customs which had existed among them from -the age of Saturn. - -Quiritary tenure of land and a written code of law once gained, the -struggle recommenced over the question of the right of marriage. The -true meaning of this contest has been lost among the absurdities -written on the subject by the ancient historians themselves, in the -belief that its basis was the desire on the part of the plebeians (who -were little more than wretched and common slaves) to be allowed to form -connexions with the nobles. This error has made Roman history even less -credible than the legendary history of Greece; for if we do not know -the meaning of the latter, the former is in opposition to the true -order of human desires. It shows us a plebs aspiring first to nobility, -secondly to offices and magistracies, and finally to wealth: whereas -men desire first of all wealth, then offices in the state, and lastly -nobility. What the Roman plebs really claimed was not _"connubio, cum -patribus"_ but _"connubio, patrum"_: not the right of connexion by -marriage with the nobles--a claim which they would not have wished -to make, and was at bottom unimportant--but the right of contracting -solemn marriages as the nobles did. For without such solemn marriages, -without privilege of the auspices, the plebeians were in fact unable -to enjoy the quiritary tenure of land and to transmit it to their -families, deprived as they were of descent, kindred and relatives. The -demand for _connubio_ was, in a word, simply equivalent to a demand for -the rights of citizens, and it was satisfied by the Canuleian law. - -The next demand of the plebeians was for privileges depending on -public rights. Of these they gained first the _imperium_ together -with the consulship, and lastly the offices of priest and pontifex, -which carried with them knowledge of the law. In this way the system -of seigneurial liberty planned by Servius Tullius grew into a system -of popular liberty, and the census, which was originally paid to the -patricians, was paid hereafter into the public treasury, out of which -the expenses of the plebeians in war were paid. The tribunes now -proceeded to demand the power of legislation; for the previous laws, -the Horatian and Hortensian, had not made plebiscites binding on the -whole people, except upon the two special occasions which led to the -secession of the plebs to the Aventine and Janiculum respectively. -This new victory, which established the superiority of the plebs and -transformed the aristocratic into a popular republic, was the Publilian -law due to the Dictator Publilius Philo and decreeing that plebiscites -should "be binding on all the Quirites" (_omnes quirites tenerent_). -The authority of the senate came out of the struggle somewhat -impaired, for while formerly the fathers had acted as "_auctores_" -for the deliberations of the people, they were now the proposers of -law to the people, which the latter then approved according to the -formula submitted to them by the senate, or else "antiquated" the -proposal (_antiquo,_ to vote against a measure) and decided to make no -innovation. Besides this, the plebs won the last office to be conceded -to them, that of censor. The Petelian law, a few years later, abolished -the last remnant of feudalism, the bond (_nexus_) which made the -plebeians the bondmen of the nobles for debt and often compelled them -to spend their lives working in their private prisons. - -Some time later, when the division between patriciate and plebs with -the corresponding _comitia curiata_ and _tributa_ was replaced by -Fabius Maximus's division according to the property of citizens, who -were now grouped into three classes of senators, knights and plebeians, -the order of the nobles disappeared entirely: "senator" and "knight" -were no longer synonymous with "patrician," nor "plebeian" with -"base-born." The Senate however preserved sovereign dominion over the -finances of the Roman Empire, though the Empire itself had passed to -the plebeians; and thanks to the so-called "_senatusconsultum ultimum_" -it maintained this dominion by force of arms as long as Rome remained -a popular republic. Whenever the people attempted to take it into -their own hands, the Senate armed the Consuls, who forthwith declared -traitors and put to death plebeian tribunes who had originated these -attempts. This may be explained as a right of feudal sovereignty -subject to a higher sovereign, a view confirmed by the language of -Scipio Nasica when he armed the people against Tiberius Gracchus: -"whoever wishes for the safety of the republic, let him follow the -consul" (_qui rempublicam salvam velit, consulem sequatur_). And -indeed, once the road to office was opened by law to the multitude -which rules in a popular republic, there was nothing left in time of -peace but to contest its rule not by laws but by force of arms, and -for those in power to pass laws for self-enrichment like the Gracchan -agrarian measures, resulting at once in civil wars at home and unjust -wars abroad. - -With the triumph of the plebs and the change of constitution from -aristocratic to popular, the whole face of society changed. In the -first place, the aspect of the family changed. Here, during the rule -of the patriciate, testamentary succession was admitted only at a late -date and was easily cancelled, in order to keep wealth in patrician -hands: kindred even in the seventh degree excluded the emancipated son -from the paternal heritage: emancipation had the effect of a penalty: -legitimising was not allowed: and it is doubtful whether a woman could -inherit. But in the democratic society, since for the plebs wealth, -strength and power all depended on the number of their children, family -feeling began to grow up, and the praetors began to consider its claims -and to satisfy them by means of the _"honorum possessiones,"_ thus -remedying the faults or shortcomings of wills and facilitating the -diffusion of wealth, the only thing desired by the common people. - -A change took place, again, in the meaning of the institutions of -property. The civil tenure was no longer a matter of public right, -but was dispersed among the various private tenures of the citizens -now forming the body of the popular state. "Eminent" tenure no longer -signifies the strongest kind of tenure, unencumbered by any actual -charge, even a public charge, but applies simply to an estate free -from any private charge. Quiritary tenure is no longer that of which -the noble was feudal lord and under the obligation to aid his client, -the plebeian, if ousted from it: it has become a private civil tenure, -capable of being defended by a civil suit as opposed to the bonitary -which could be maintained by possession only. - -The forms of legal process were pruned of the luxurious growth -of fictions, solemn formulae and symbolic acts, simplified and -rationalised: the intellect, the thought of the legislator was -brought into play and the citizens conformed to an idea of a common -rational utility, understood as spiritual in value. Causes, which were -originally formulae safeguarded by accurate and precise language, -became affairs or negotiations solemnised by agreement and, in the -case of transference of tenure, by natural tradition; and it was only -in contracts said to be completed by word of mouth, that is to say -in stipulations, that the safeguards remained "causes" in the strict -ancient meaning of the word. Thus the certitude of the law, when the -human reason was fully developed, passed into the truth of ideas -determined by the circumstances of fact, a "formula devoid of any -particular form" (_formula naturae,_ as Varro calls it) which, like -a light, informs in all the minutest details of their surface the -details of fact over which it extends. In popular republics the ruling -principle is the _aequum bonum,_ natural equity. - -The harsh punishments of the periods of domestic monarchy and heroic -society (the laws of the Twelve Tables condemned those who set fire -to another's crops to be burnt alive, perjurers to be thrown from the -Tarpeian rock, and insolvent debtors to be cut in pieces while living) -were replaced by milder penalties, since the multitude, whose members -are weak, is naturally disposed to clemency. - -Laws, which under the aristocracy were few, inflexible and religiously -observed, multiplied under the democracy and became liable to change -and modification. The Spartans, who preserved their aristocracy, -said that at Athens they had many laws and wrote them; at Sparta few, -but they obeyed them. The Roman plebs, like the Athenian, passed new -laws every day, and the attempt by Sulla, the leader of the noble -party, to reduce them by the institution of "_quaestiones perpetuae_" -or permanent courts was in vain, for after his time laws were again -multiplied. - -War itself, which was under the aristocratic republics very cruel -and resulted in the destruction of conquered towns and the reduction -of the vanquished to the condition of labourers scattered over the -country-side and cultivating it on behalf of the victors, was mitigated -by the popular republics, which while they deprived the conquered of -the rights of heroic society left them in possession of the natural -rights of the human race. Empires grew, since a popular republic is -much more adapted to conquest than an aristocratic, and a monarchy most -of all. - -But with all this humanisation of customs, the power of wise rule, -political virtue, diminished. The ancient patricians enforced a rigid -respect for law; and each, possessing a large share of the public -utility, set his own minor personal interests below this greater -particular interest, guaranteed as it was by the state. Hence all -courageously defended and wisely consulted for the good of the state. -In a popular state on the other hand since the citizens controlled -the state property by dividing it among themselves into as many small -portions as there were citizens in the body of the people, and through -the causes which produced that form of state, ease, paternal affection, -conjugal love and desire of life, men were led to consider the smallest -details favourable to their own private interest; that is to regard -nothing but the _aequum bonum,_ the only interest of which a multitude -is capable. - -At this point arises spontaneously a new form of government, which has -long been preparing and has now become inevitable, namely monarchy. -The ordinary political writers make monarchy originate, without any of -the numerous and complex causes which are necessary to produce it, at -the very outset of human history, "as a frog," says Vico, "is born of a -summer shower." Still less did it originate artificially by the royal -law which Tribonian believes to have deprived the Roman people of its -free and sovereign power and conferred it upon Octavius Augustus. The -law which brought monarchy into being was a natural law whose formula -of eternal validity is as follows: when in a popular republic every one -seeks his private interest only and presses the public forces into its -service at risk of destruction to the state, to preserve the latter -from ruin a man must arise, as Augustus did at Rome (who as Tacitus -says "received under his sovereign power the whole state, worn out with -civil wars, taking the title of Princeps": _qui cuncta bellis civilibus -fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit):_ a single man, who by -force of arms takes in hand all the affairs of the state and leaves his -subjects to look after their own affairs or after any public business -he may entrust to them; surrounding himself with a small number of -statesmen as a cabinet to discuss public questions or principles of -civil equity. Such a monarch is welcomed by nobles and plebeians alike: -by the nobles, who after having been already humiliated by their -subjection to plebeian rule abandon their ancient aristocratic claim -to sovereignty and think only of securing a comfortable life; and by -the plebeians, who after an experiment in anarchy or unbridled demagogy -(than which no tyranny is worse, since it produces as many tyrants as -there are bold and dissolute men in the state) are led by their own -misfortunes to welcome peace and protection. - -Monarchy is then a new form of popular government. In order that a -powerful man may become sovereign, it is necessary that the people -shall take his side, and that he should rule in a popular manner; -making all his subjects equal, humiliating the great to protect the -multitude against their oppression, keeping the people satisfied -and content as regards the necessaries of life and the enjoyment of -natural liberty, and employing a well-balanced system of concessions -and privileges granted sometimes to whole classes (in which case they -are called "privileges of liberty") sometimes to particular persons, -by promoting into a higher class men of unusual merit and exceptional -virtues. - -In monarchy, a "humane" government no less than democracy, the -process of humanisation or softening of customs and laws, already -begun under popular republics, still continues. The rigid bonds of -the patriarchal family and kinship relax further. The Emperors, who -tended to be overshadowed by the splendours of the nobility, made -efforts to promote the rights of human nature common to nobles and -plebeians. Augustus strove to safeguard the trusteeships by which -formerly property had passed to persons incapable of inheritance thanks -only to the conscientiousness of the injured heir; he transformed -such understandings from a right into a necessity, by obliging heirs -to execute them. A number of senatusconsulta followed which placed -_cognati_ (relations generally) on a level with _agnati_ (relations -through the father). Finally, Justinian abolished the difference -between property inherited and property in the hands of trustees, -confused the Falcidian quarter with the Trebellian and put _cognati_ -and _agnati_ on precisely the same footing as regards inheritance -_"ab intestato."_ The latest Roman law was so entirely on the side -of testaments that, while originally these could be broken for the -slightest cause, they now had to be interpreted in the way most -adapted to secure their validity. Once the "cyclopean" right of the -father over the persons of his children had disappeared, his economic -right over property acquired by them disappeared also; and hence -the emperors first introduced the _peculium castrense_ (property -obtained during military service) to attract young men to war, then the -_peculium quasicastrense,_ to attract them into the praetorian guard, -and finally to satisfy those who were neither soldiers nor scholars -the _peculium adventitium._ They deprived the _patria potestas_ of -its influence over adoptions, now no longer restricted to the small -circle of relations; they uniformly countenanced formal adoption -(_arrogatio_) which was somewhat difficult owing to the difficulty -of a father's becoming a subordinate member of another family; they -considered emancipation as a benefit and gave to legitimization "by a -subsequent marriage" all the efficacy of solemn wedlock. The _imperium -paternum,_ as an arrogant title seeming to detract from the imperial -majesty, was altered into _patria potestas._ The humane tendencies of -the monarchs extended moreover to that part of the ancient "family" -which consisted of slaves: for the emperors restrained the cruelty of -masters towards these, and benefited them by increasing the force and -decreasing the solemnity of manumission; and citizen rights, which were -given originally only to distinguished foreigners who had deserved well -of the Roman people, were granted to every one born in Rome, even of a -slave father provided his mother were free or enfranchised. Punishments -were also made milder, and the monarchs distinguished themselves by -the gracious title of "clement." The letter of the law always tended -to be more freely interpreted in the light of natural equity, and it -may be said that Constantine absolutely cancelled the letter when he -laid down the principle that any particular motive of equity should -override the law. Thus was attained the precise opposite of the -_"privilegia ne irroganto"_ of the Twelve Tables ("that no exceptions -be made"): all privileges were exceptions to the law dictated by some -particular merit in the facts which lifted them out of the sphere of -legal generalisations. The restriction of rights to particular peoples -was by degrees abolished: under Caracalla the whole Roman world was -converted into a single Rome, since great monarchs desire the whole -world to become one city, according to the thought of Alexander the -Great, when he said that for him all the world was a single city of -which his phalanx was the citadel. The praetor's edict gives place, -under Hadrian, to the "perpetual edict" of Salvius Julianus, almost -exclusively composed of provincial edicts. - -With monarchy, the natural law of races gives place to the natural law -of nations; and hence this political, social and juridical form is the -most suitable to human nature at its fullest rational development. Here -too, as we have already had occasion to remark, we reach again after -a long process the unity which existed in the person of the primitive -father under domestic monarchy; and the course of national history must -be considered as absolutely complete. To go further is impossible: the -only possibility, at this stage of the highest human civilisation and -refinement, is corruption, the return of barbarism as a "barbarism of -reflection" and a relapse into a kind of new state of nature, to return -once more into a new and heroic barbarism. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - - -THE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES - - -Of this kind of "reflux" Vico mentions and examines only one instance: -the period of European history which had in his own days for the first -time been marked out definitely by historians and given the name -(though Vico does not use it) of the "Middle Ages." - -That this was a period of decadence and barbarism was certainly not -a new thought for consciousness: for, especially in the humanistic -period, a general feeling of estrangement and repulsion had been felt -towards these centuries of "middle and low Latinity" in which the -treasures of the classical literatures were neglected and scattered, -and humane studies either lost their vigour or disappeared completely. -This consciousness, general on the part of cultivated Europe, was -especially full and vivid in Italy; for that country could never forget -that though for other peoples the Middle Ages had seen the rise of -their fortunes, power and civilisation, for her they had meant the end -of Rome's greatness, the humiliation of her name before the arrogant -Vandal, Visigoth and Lombard, the devastation of rich cities, and -the destruction of majestic monuments whose miserable wreckage could -be seen on every hand. Machiavelli had opened his _Histories_ with -a famous and striking picture of the general change which followed -the fall of the Western Empire. But to pass in review the ruins or -to collect the antiquities of the Middle Ages was not the way to -penetrate into the spirit of the period, any more than to note a -man's faults and the marks which distinguish him from another is the -same thing as understanding the soul of either. Vico was the first to -understand the soul of the Middle Ages, that is to say, the mental, -social and cultural constitution of the period. - -Though living in a part of Italy rich not only in documents but in -survivals of the Middle Age, Vico confesses that this second period -of barbarism is much more obscure to him than the first, and that -it is only the first that has enabled him to throw light upon the -second. This he expressed by the mere fact that he named the period -"the second barbarism," or the "return" or "reflux" of barbarism, -and thus considered it as an instance of his ideal law of reflux. -The Middle Ages seemed to him both a representation of the primitive -conditions of life, and in consequence a reproduction of the social -process developing out of them. It was a view as original as it was -rich in truth: and it is no objection to it to say that Vico reveals -the generic characters rather than the particular traits of the Middle -Ages, because we know that the problem he set before himself was -precisely the investigation of generic characters or uniformities, and -that he avoided history properly so called in order to escape a dilemma -between science and faith, between the purely immanental conception of -history, excluding revelation and miracle, and the purely transcendent -conception, miraculous and therefore difficult to treat in a scientific -manner. Even in our own times, it is a fact worth noticing that we have -seen a recrudescence of this attempt to harmonise religion and history -by abstracting from the individual aspect of events and reducing -history to a history of institutions and uniformities.[1] In this -position assumed by the problem in Vico's mind we may see the reason -for the fact, which some have thought very strange in a Catholic, that -he lays no stress on Christianity, and when he encounters it at the -outset of the Middle Ages dismisses it in a few words; saying that God, -having by superhuman ways shown clearly the truth of the Christian -religion, when he opposed the virtue of the martyrs to the power of -Rome, and the doctrine of the Fathers, together with the miracles, -to the empty wisdom of Greece, and knowing that armed nations must -arise on every hand ready to fight for the divinity of that religion's -author, permitted the birth of a new order of civilisation among the -nations, in order that the true religion might be established according -to the natural course of human affairs. - -We must be content then with the resemblances observed by Vico between -mediaeval society and that of the early centuries of Greece and Rome, -and not take offence if his exemplifications and proofs very often seem -fallacious and fanciful. His main historical thought as we know already -is robust enough to pass over the errors or to live in the midst of -them unimpaired. - -We see (to reconstruct his story or picture, with some rearrangement) -in the Middle Ages groups of dwellings everywhere springing up on the -mountains, each dominated by its fortress as in the divine age of -the "Cyclopes"; for the unhappy people, ground down by the violence -of barbarian invasions and intestine strife, had no other means of -defence. The most ancient cities built in the Middle Ages and almost -all capitals of states are as a matter of fact placed upon heights; -all new seigneuries formed at the time were called "castella" by the -Italians; and this perhaps is also the reason why nobles were called -men "born in a high or conspicuous position" (_summo, illustri loco -nati_) while the plebeians living in the plains below were "born in a -low or obscure place" (_imo, obscuro loco nati_). We find asyla or -sanctuaries again open especially with the ecclesiastical lords, who -were in humanity in advance of their savage times; here took refuge the -oppressed and the terrified, to seek protection for person or property. -Hence in Germany, a country which must have been wilder than the other -parts of Europe, there remained almost more ecclesiastical than secular -lords. A famous example of these political formations was the Abbey -of St. Laurence at Aversa in the kingdom of Naples, with which was -incorporated that of St. Laurence at Capua. This monastery governed -either directly or by abbots or monks dependent upon it no less than a -hundred and ten churches in Campania, Samnium, Apulia and the ancient -Calabria, from the river Volturnus to the gulf of Tarentum; the abbots -of St. Laurence were lords or barons of almost the whole of this -country. The small chapels which they built in mountainous and remote -places for the celebration of the mass and other religious offices -became natural sanctuaries for the population, and they built their -houses round them: and this is the reason why in Europe so many cities, -lands and castles bear the names of saints, and why the churches are -the most ancient monuments of this period. Consequently we also find -feudalism, not establishing itself in Europe for the first time, but -appearing once more. It has been mistakenly believed to be a relic of -Roman law after its destruction by the barbarians (such is the theory -of Oldenorp and all other jurists) whereas really Roman law itself -arose out of the ruins of the feudalism of early Latin barbarism, and -mediaeval feudalism was not a new law of the European nations, but -a very ancient law renewed by the last barbarism. This feudalism is -far from being the "vile matter" which Cujas calls it: it is a heroic -matter, one worthy to be celebrated by the most erudite and profound -learning of Greece and Rome. And to what is it due, if not to this -essential unity of nature, that the choicest expressions of Roman law, -which Cujas himself allows to mitigate the barbarism of feudalistic -learning, are so precisely adequate to express the properties and -attributes of the system that no better terminology could be desired? - -With the Middle Ages, then, we return to the fundamental division -between heroes and slaves, between _"viri"_ or "barons" ("_varones_" is -the word still used for men, _"viri"_ in Spanish) and mere "_homines_" -as the vassals were called: between _"patres"_ or "patrons" and -serfs. The learned students of feudalism who translate _"feudum"_ -by _"clientela"_ are really giving something, much more than a good -linguistical equivalent; they are unawares giving a historical -definition of the feoff. The first feoffs of the Middle Ages were -necessarily personal, like the first _clientelae_ of Romulus: a form -of vassalage still extant in Vico's time in the north, especially in -Poland, where the _"kmet"_ were a kind of slaves who were often used -as stakes in their lord's games, and passed with their families into -the hands of the winner. Then came rustic feoffs, real in character -and consisting in uncultivated land assigned by the victors to the -conquered for their sustenance, while they themselves kept the -cultivated land: these feoffs were called by the feudalists, with -a new elegance of Latinity and an equally sound historical truth, -_"beneficia."_ The ancient "_next_" were the new "liege" or bound men, -who were compelled to join in all the friendships and quarrels of their -lord, and supplied what in Rome was called _"opera militaris,"_ and in -the Middle Ages _"militare servitium."_ The feudal bond extended itself -to larger political relations, and just as conquered kings became -allies or _socii_ of Rome and "upheld the majesty of the Roman people," -so there were sovereign feoffs subordinated to higher sovereignties -whose representatives, the great kings and lords of large kingdoms and -numerous provinces, took the title of "majesty." - -Republics became aristocratic once more in government if not in -constitution: this is admitted by political writers, among others -by Bodin, who even says that his own kingdom of France was purely -aristocratic in constitution under the Merovingian and Capetian -dynasties. Till the end of the sixteenth century living witnesses -to the past remained in the aristocratic kingdoms of Sweden and -Denmark; and Poland, mentioned above, preserved the same constitution -down to Vico's own time. The first state parliaments of Europe must -have consisted like Romulus's senate of the elders of the nobility -(_seniores,_ hence _seigneurs_); and were armed courts of barons -or peers like the _comitia curiata_ of old. In these parliaments -were decided feudal causes concerning rights or successions or the -devolution of feoffs through felony or default of heirs: which causes, -confirmed many times by these judgments, formed the customs of -feudalism. Vico saw a relic of these parliaments in the Sacred Royal -Council at Naples, the president of which assumed the title of "Sacred -Royal Majesty," as the councillors did the title of _"milites,"_ and -whose sentences admitted of no appeal to any other tribunal, but only a -request for revision by the Council itself. - -The governments, beside being aristocratic, were enveloped in an -atmosphere of religion to such an extent that not only were bishops -and abbots very often, as we saw, feudatories, but feudatories and -sovereigns adorned themselves freely with religious insignia; Catholic -kings everywhere, in order to defend the Christian religion whose -protectors they were, wore the dalmatic of the diaconate, consecrated -their persons (whence the title "Sacred Royal Majesty"), and took -rank in the church, as Hugh Capet took the title of Count and Abbot -of Paris; thus as we see from the earliest documents the French lords -called themselves dukes and abbots or counts and abbots simultaneously. -These early Christian kings were the first to institute armed -religious orders, by the help of which they defended Catholicism -against Arians, Saracens and other infidels. _"Pura et pin bella"_ -returned once more as in the heroic period; the globe surmounted by -the cross worn by the Christian potentates on their crowns recalls -the cross upon the standards in the holy wars or crusades. Heroic -slavery returns, and lasts a long time among Christian nations because, -considering war as the judgment of God, the victors believed the -vanquished to be abandoned by God and held them no better than beasts -(thus the Christians called the Turks "dogs" and were in turn called -"pigs" by them). The ancients deprived the conquered of all things -human and divine. The new barbarians on occupying a city endeavoured -above everything to search out and carry off the tombs or relics of -saints, which the peoples of that time buried and concealed with all -possible care; and thus almost all translations of relics took place -at this time. A trace of this custom survives in the rule by which a -conquered nation must buy back from the victorious generals all the -bells in the cities they have taken. - -Analogous resemblances may be found in the juridical regulation of -property. The primary division of property in feudal law is that -into feudal goods and allodial goods. Allodial tenure was in origin -a highly secure right, unencumbered by any external charge, even a -public one; and applied to property directly acquired or conquered by -the patricians or barons. Feudal tenure required the approval of the -lord by whom it had been granted. Allodial tenure thus corresponded to -quiritary _ex optimo iure,_ and feudal to bonitary; and it was only -when later in modern Europe as previously in ancient Rome a new census -and treasury were formed, and when allodial property was made subject -to public charges, that it could be contemptuously described as "goods -of the spindle" as opposed to feudal, "goods of the lance." Thus, to -take an example, the provinces which were later incorporated into the -French kingdom had formerly been sovereign principalities feudally -dependent upon the ruler of the said kingdom; their sovereign princes -being free from all public charge in the tenure of their (allodial) -possessions. Later, when through succession, rebellion or failure of -heirs these provinces became part of the kingdom, the property was -made liable to taxation and tribute; the tenure _ex optimo iure_ was -confused with private non-feudal tenure subject to these charges, and -allodials in the noble sense of the word were identified with allodials -in the common sense. The later students of feudalism missed the point -of the primitive distinction just as the late Roman jurists forgot -the meaning of tenure _ex optimo iure._ To the feudal tenure belonged -emphyteosis (so that the allodial right ultimately signified both what -the vassal paid to the sovereign and the planter to his immediate -lord): "commendations," identical with the ancient _clientela_: the -"census" by which the vassals were bound to serve their lords in war -(the tributaries, _angarii_ or _perangarii,_ being equivalent to the -Roman _assidui_): the _"precaria,"_ which must originally have been -land granted by lords in response to the prayers of the poor: and -"_libelli_" or transferences of non-movable property which in this -agricultural economy took the place of commerce. The exclusion of women -from inheritance, which went back to the beginnings of Roman law, was -renewed in the form of the "salic law" in Germany and among all the -early barbarian nations of Europe, though it preserved its force only -in France and Savoy. - -Punishments were cruel; death was called the "ordinary penalty." But -there was in the Middle Ages no real penal law and procedure dealing -with private offences. The murder of a plebeian was committed either -by his own lord, whom nobody could accuse, or by another lord, who -could indemnify the man's own lord for his loss as if he had been a -slave. This custom was still in force in Poland, Lithuania, Denmark, -Sweden and Norway. Under the name of "canonical purgations" (though -unrecognised by canon law) certain kinds of divine judgments or duels -were practised throughout Europe; and private vengeance flourished down -to the time of Bartolo. In judgments concerned with allodial rights, -the lords met in arms; and in the kingdom of Naples even in Vico's own -days barons avenged intrusions upon their own feoffs on the part of -other barons not by civil suits but by duels. In a society ruled by -force, what wonder that the robbers of the heroic age returned, and -that "pirate" became a title of nobility? Never has the fortune of -kingdoms been so various or so inconstant. - -The Roman law of Justinian, penetrated as it was by the idea of equity, -was abandoned and fell into oblivion. In France and Spain any one who -dared to appeal to it in a cause was severely punished; in Italy it -is certain that the nobles considered it dishonourable to regulate -their affairs by Roman law, and professed to live according to that -of the Lombards; while the plebeians, slower in throwing off ancient -customs, continued to practise certain parts of the Roman law by force -of habit. In fact the law of the period consisted rather of habits than -of statutes: rigid formulae and solemn ceremonial once more acquired -importance, and a distinction was made between _pacta nuda,_ naked -agreements, and _pacta vestita,_ agreements clothed and reinforced -by these formulae and ceremonies. An example of the respect in which -formulae were held is afforded by the action of the Emperor Conrad -III. On taking Weinsberg, a town which had supported his rival for the -empire, he condemned it to extermination, making an exception only -in favour of the women and all they could bring out with them. The -women came out of the doomed city carrying on their backs their sons, -husbands and fathers: and the Emperor, standing before the gate at the -head of his army with swords drawn and lances in rest to satisfy their -leader's terrible wrath, watched them and allowed them to pass safe and -sound out of respect for the letter of his own decree. - -It was an illiterate period, a fact expressed by Vico in the statement -that languages again became "mute" or hieroglyphic. The common tongues, -Italian, French, Spanish and German, were not written down: only a few -ecclesiastics wrote a barbarous Latin, and hence "cleric" and "scholar" -became synonymous terms; but among the very priests such ignorance -prevailed that we find documents signed by bishops with the sign of -the cross, as they were unable to write their own names. Owing to this -paucity of learning an English law laid down that a man condemned to -death should be reprieved if he could write, as a valuable craftsman; -and "man of letters" as well as "cleric" or "clerk" remained a name for -a learned man. Hence the value and general employment of family arms -to indicate the owners of a house, a tomb, land or livestock, and the -frequency with which coats-of-arms are found on buildings of the time. - -With barbarism returned the predominance of verse over prose. The prose -of the Fathers of the Latin Church--and the same is true of those -of the Greek--is full of poetic rhythms, so as to resemble a chant. -The first modern lyric poetry was religious; and if there was not -strictly a Christian religious poetry, this was because the subjects -of our theology transcend all intelligence and imagination and crush -the poetic faculty. Poetry and history were once more confounded; the -romantic poets, the heroic poets of the return to barbarism, believed -their own stories to be true, and thus Boiardo and Ariosto took as -subject for their poems Turpin, Bishop of Paris. And just as the French -language, when owing to the famous Parisian school and the highly -subtle scholastic theology it passed at a stroke from spontaneity to -reflection, preserved pure diphthongs in great number while adopting -abstract terms, so the story of Turpin survived in France like a -Homeric poem. These authors of Latin poems confined themselves entirely -to history, for instance, William of Apulia's _De gestis Normannorum in -Italia_ and Gunther's _Carmen heroicum de rebus a Frederico Barbarossa -gestis._ The first writers in the vernacular were in Italy poets no -less than in Provence and France. A punctilious virtue like that of -Achilles again appeared, the complete morality of the duellist; hence -arose the proud laws, the lofty duties and the vindictive satisfactions -of the knight-errants sung by the romantic poets. Does not Cola di -Rienzo seem to be a real Homeric character in his swift outburst of -emotion when, as we read in his life, while speaking of the unhappy -state of Rome he excited both himself and his listeners to unrestrained -tears? Hyperbole was a common type of thought, as in children; for "I -often remember," writes Vico, "when walking abroad that the gentle -slopes which unfold themselves before my eyes appeared when I was a -child to be steep and lofty mountains." Thus in the Middle Ages Roland -and the other paladins were represented as gigantic in stature: and -images of divine beings, the eternal Father, Christ, or the Virgin, -painted or sculptured, were of colossal dimensions. - -But the human mind is like land which, after lying waste for long -centuries, when first cultivated bears crops of wonderful quality, -size and abundance. Thus at the close of barbarism in Italy after four -savage and stormy centuries, arose Dante, the Homer of the second -barbarism, just as somewhat later flourished the delicate verse of -Petrarch and the gallant and graceful prose of Boccaccio; all three -incomparable in their way. And since barbarism is, as we have already -indicated, truthful, frank, faithful, generous and magnanimous by -nature, Dante puts on the stage real persons and real actions of the -dead; and his poem is called a "comedy" in allusion to the ancient -comedy which followed the same principle. It is a poem in which both -the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey_ find parallels; the former in the -_Inferno,_ where Dante employs his choleric genius and all his vast -imagination in describing the effects of implacable wrath and recalling -numbers of merciless punishments, a worthy companion-picture to the -horrid slaughters of Homer (whose descriptions of them inspire pity in -us, but gave nothing but pleasure to his own audience); the latter, -the _Odyssey,_ which celebrates the heroic endurance of Ulysses, is -paralleled by the _Purgatorio,_ a spectacle of severe punishments -borne with immovable patience, and the _Paradiso_ where infinite -joy is experienced with an infinite tranquillity of mind. Another -similarity between Dante and Homer lies in the physiognomy of the -former's language, which is so varied that some suppose him to have -collected it like Homer from all the dialects of his nation; an opinion -of sixteenth-century scholars which will not stand criticism, for it -is certain that when Dante used them these expressions must have been -current at Florence, and that a lifetime would have been insufficient -to collect them from this side and from that when there were no writers -in the various dialects. But the most important resemblance of Dante -to Homer is in poetic sublimity. Dante is a divine poet who to the -delicate imaginations of to-day seems rough and uncivilised, and often -shocks by unwonted harmonies an ear that has become morbidly sensitive -through effeminate music. But he is received very differently by men -of severe tastes who refuse to be satisfied with flowers, ornaments -and graces. Like Homer too he is great not in esoteric wisdom but in -the vigour of his imagination. Dante was undoubtedly a very learned -theologian, but that was his weakness rather than his strength. If he -had known neither Scholasticism nor Latin, he would have been a still -greater poet, and perhaps the Tuscan language would have had what Latin -never had, a poet who could in everything bear comparison with Homer. - -The man who wrote this page of criticism on Dante and vindicated him -once more after centuries of anti-Dantesque taste (or mere Dantesque -grammar or Dantesque scholasticism) and vindicated him in the very -height of the prosperity of the Arcadianism so hostile to him, deserved -to have made the acquaintance of William Shakespeare genius, which he -was perhaps the only man alive capable of understanding. But in Italy, -as in most countries outside England, nothing was known of Shakespear -at this time, and Vico has only the vague and belated remark about him -that the English, untouched by the prevailing delicacy of the century, -took no pleasure in tragedies which had not an element of atrocity in -them, just as the earliest taste of Greek drama was for the abominable -feast of Thyestes and Medea's impious slaughter of her brother and -children. The tendency towards Teutonic poetry and literature remained -in Vico as we know an aspiration only; he was unable to get a clear -view of it however closely he tried to examine it; and when he does -mention it upon the strength of second-hand information, it is only to -say that in the German nation, especially in the purely agricultural -province of Silesia, "poets arose naturally"; in his search for -an unsophisticated popular poetry he had in fact stumbled without -realising his mistake upon the Silesian school of Hoffmanswaldau and -Löhenstein, the German imitators of the Neapolitan Marino. But the only -value of the anecdote is to illustrate anew the tricks played upon Vico -by his lively fancy. - -How the world emerged from the second barbarismi and the feudal -constitution, Vico does not say. He does not seem to have fixed his -attention upon the communal movement which presents so many analogies -with the struggles of the Roman plebs and the formation of ancient -democracy. He makes game, here again, of those who traced the genesis -of modern monarchies such as the French to a simple law like that of -Tribonian by which, he explains ironically, the paladins of France -deprived themselves of their power and conferred it upon the kings of -the Capetian dynasty. He also observes that the baronial power, being -dispersed and dissipated by reason of civil wars in which they were -obliged to depend upon the people, was the more easily gathered up -by sovereign monarchs; and that thus the "_obsequium_" of vassals to -their baron passed into the "_obsequium principis._" But he gives quite -a special importance to the rediscovery of Roman law (that "natural -law of the European nations" as Grotius had called it) by the studies -undertaken in the Italian universities. Men thus learnt anew the -principles of natural equity; the nobles and plebeians became equal in -the eyes of civil law as they are already in human nature, the secrets -of the laws passed out of the hands of the feudatories, whose power -consequently diminished by degrees, and the humane government of free -republics and perfect monarchies came into being. The reflux of heroic -society had now undergone a contrary reflux; it was no longer possible, -under the conditions of modern civilisation, to recall it to life, -just as it was impossible for the attempts of the Pythagoreans and -Dion of Syracuse to restore the ancient aristocracies. The plebeians, -once recognised as naturally equals of the nobles, no longer submitted -to remaining inferior to them in civil life. And the few aristocratic -republics which here and there survived in Europe were compelled to -take infinite pains and all manner of wise measures in order to keep -quiet and contented the multitudes whom they governed. - - -[Footnote 1: See my preface to Sorel's _Reflections on Violence_ -(Italian tr., Bari, 1909). pp. xxii-xxvii.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - - -VICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE - - -Having reached, in his review of the course of history, his own time, -a time of civilisation spread over all nations, Vico gives a rapid -description of the contemporary world and then says no more: perhaps -unsatisfied, at any rate uncertain or cautious. As he was not led to -embark upon the New Science by the direct call of political problems,1 -at least in the ordinary meaning of the phrase, he never descends from -the contemplations of the New Science to: the practical life, even -in the form which it most usually takes with a philosopher, a work -or short treatise criticising laws and institutions or suggesting -improvements. Even when he does dimly conceive the idea of a "practical -aspect" of his science, he never supposes that so far as he is -concerned it could ever exist except "within the academies." - -Practical philosophy "within the academies," that is to say, within the -sphere of culture, is however still practical and political; and it is -assuredly not the least important branch of politics. And a historian -or philosopher can never entirely avoid it, though he can emphasise it -more or less and develop it more or less fully. - -Vico does emphasise and develop it freely. The first expression of -his scientific life was precisely an examination of modern methods -of study and education as compared with those of the ancients: an -examination which after various attempts and uncertainties in his first -discoveries, took form in his University inaugural lecture of 1708, _De -nostri temporis studiorum ratione._ In the following years, engaged as -he was upon the New Science, he gave no further public demonstration -of his discontent with the prevailing tendency of studies; but he -expressed his feelings on the subject all the more often and all the -more strongly in private letters, and did not wish to pass over the -question in his autobiography. We need not then infer his polemical -attitude from hints and chance phrases of his chief work; since he has -himself more than once converted these hints into explicit statements -and these chance phrases into leading propositions. - -This polemic occupies two closely-related spheres corresponding to -the double aspect of the New Science as a Philosophy of Mind and a -Generalising Science. Under the first aspect Vico had vindicated -the claims of imagination, the imaginative universal, probability, -certitude, experience and authority, and therefore also of poetry, -religion, history, observation of nature, scholarship and tradition. -Under the second, he had traced a scheme of the natural development of -the mind both in the history of mankind and in that of the individual, -which he brings into constant relation with the phases of history. -Hence his examination was bound to extend on the one hand to the mental -condition of his own time and on the other to the way in which the -education of children and young people was conceived and undertaken. -In both spheres Vico saw the same defects; he was met by the same and -intellectualism which had made impossible the process of thought and -had mutilated and falsified the truth of human history. - -On emerging from grammar-schools, boys were immediately plunged into -logic. The logic studied might be, according to the teacher's taste, -either the scholastic or more often that composed by Arnauld and -called the Port-Royal Logic, itself in substance Aristotelian and -Scholastic, but full of dry judgments concerning abstruse subjects in -advanced sciences and far removed from common knowledge; overloaded -in fact with examples drawn from such sciences. Such a discipline was -meant to make boys critical and to eradicate from their minds not -only false, but even probable and plausible opinions. As a matter of -fact it eradicated nothing, since their minds were still empty or -scantily furnished, and unable to make any use of criticism for lack -of matter to criticise. They were to be taught to judge before being -taught to apprehend, an order false to the natural course of ideas, -which are first apprehended, then judged, and finally reasoned. The -result was that minds educated in this way became arid and unfruitful -in development, and believed themselves capable of judging everything, -while able to create nothing. They remained all their lives intensely -acute in formal thinking, but incapable of any great labour; critical, -in fact, but sterile. This caused not only unsoundness and arrogance of -judgment but incapacity in practical life, dealings with men, and civil -eloquence, which is founded less upon criticism than upon plausibility, -and attains its end by making opportune remarks, understanding the -psychology of one's inter-locutor and acting in a manner adapted to it. -Vico himself had suffered from the logico-critical method of education. -One of his first teachers, the Jesuit Del Balzo, had put into his hands -the works of the epitomist Paulus Venetus: and his mind, being too weak -as yet to cope with this kind of Chrysippean logic, almost broke down -under the strain; so that having given up his studies in despair it was -eighteen months before he resumed them. He preserved a happier memory -of his youthful essays in poetry in the wildest style of the Neapolitan -school of Marino: a form of diversion, he says, almost necessary to -the mind of the young when metaphysic has rendered it too subtle and -too rigid in precisely those years when the ardour of youth ought to -lead the mind into errors, so as to save it from becoming chilly and -dry. This age, the "barbarism of intellect," vigorous in imagination -and also, through the close connexion that exists between the two, -in memory, requires to be nourished and exercised by the reading of -poetry, history and rhetoric as well as by the study of languages. The -art which it ought to learn is not criticism but "topic," the true -art of the "_ingenium_" or faculty of invention. By means of this art -children acquire materials which enable them to form sound judgments in -later life; for sound judgment depends upon a complete knowledge of its -subject-matter, and "topic" is the art of discovering the whole content -of any given thing. In this way young people simply by following the -course of nature become at once philosophers and good speakers. - -Some antidote is doubtless necessary to the exuberance of the -imagination. But this must be sought in linear geometry rather than in -logic: for geometry is to some extent pictorial in character, while it -strengthens the memory by the great number of its elements, ennobles -the imagination by the delicacy of its figures and stimulates the -inventive faculty by forcing it to review all these figures in order to -choose those suitable to the demonstration of the quantity required. -But the whole value of geometry also was annulled by the method then -in favour with the schools, the algebraic method; which like the -scholastic logic numbs all the vigour of youthful faculties, obscures -the imagination, enfeebles the memory, and renders the inventive power -and the understanding sluggish; thus damaging the liberal arts in four -distinct ways, in the knowledge of languages and history, in invention -and in prudence. More particularly algebra is fatal to the inventive -faculty, because in using the algebraic method one is conscious only of -the immediate field of vision; it weakens the memory because once the -second sign is found the first need no longer be remembered; it blinds -the imagination, because that faculty is not used at all; it destroys -the understanding, because it lays claim to the power of divination. -Young men who have devoted their time to it on proceeding to deal with -the affairs of civil life find themselves, to their great grief and -remorse, unfitted for such a life. Hence, to make it useful in some -degree and to prevent these ill effects, it should be studied for a -short time only at the close of the mathematical course, and employed -only as a means of abbreviation. The habit of reasoning is formed much -better by metaphysical analysis, which in all questions begins by -taking truth in the infinity of being, and then descends by degrees; -through the genera of the substance, eliminating in every species that -which the thing is not, till it arrives at the ultimate differentia -constituting the essence of the thing we wish to know. - -Education as a whole was suffering from an excess of mathematics and -a lack of concreteness. As if boys, on emerging from academic life, -were to enter a human world composed of lines, numbers and algebraic -symbols, their heads were crammed with the magnificent phrases -"demonstration," "demonstrative truth," and "evidence," and the rule -of probability was condemned; though this rule is the only guide of -statesmen in their counsels, generals in their campaigns, orators in -their treatment of a cause, judges in giving a decision, physicians in -treating bodily diseases, and moralistic theologians in treating those -of the conscience; the rule which the world accepts, and upon which -it rests in all disputes and controversies, in all measures, and in -all elections; which are universally determined by unanimity or the -majority of votes. Such an education bred up an empty and inflated -generation, pedantry without wisdom and argument without truth. - -The educators themselves, that is to say, the general atmosphere of -culture, resembled this scheme of education. Poetry was dead. The -analytic methods had "numbed" (to repeat once more a word which Vico -uses with great frequency and force) "all the generosity of the better -poetry." And indeed Europe was never so entirely barren of all poetic -growth as it was in the first half of the eighteenth century. Italy -was reduced to the drama of Metastasio; France had produced no one to -succeed Corneille and Molière; in Spain the national drama, that great -outburst of the national spirit, was dead, and a rationalism imitating -that of France was taking its place; England seemed to have entirely -forgotten that she once gave birth to Shakespear, and even Germany was -wasting her time over neo-classical imitations. Not only did nobody -create new poetry, but nobody wanted it. The philosophers, following -Descartes and Malebranche, had declared a war of extermination against -all the faculties of the mind which depend upon sense, and especially -against the imagination, which they hated as the source of every -error. They condemned the poets on the false pretext that they told -"fables," as if the fables they told were not those eternal properties -of the human mind which to the political philosophers, economists and -moralists are the subject-matter of reasoning, and to the poets that of -representation. - -The Cartesians also used their authority to belittle the study of -languages. Did not Descartes say that the knowledge of Latin was no -greater knowledge than was possessed by Cicero's servant-girl? Serious -scholarship in Latin and Greek had come to an end with the writers -of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the study of oriental -languages was confined to the Protestants; and Holland was the only -country in which law was still a subject of research. The famous -library of Valletta at Naples, rich in the finest editions of Greek -and Latin works, was generously bought by the fathers of the Oratory, -but for less than half its original value owing to the depreciation -of books. In France the library of Cardinal Dubois found no purchaser -and was sold in small lots. Princes no longer loved good Latin, and -none of them thought of preserving to posterity by the pen of pure -Latin scholarship even an event so weighty as the War of the Spanish -Succession, comparable only to the second Punic war. - -New methods were in great favour: but none of these could point to new -facts discovered by their help. New formulae, old facts; and instead of -facts, a futile hope of attaining universal knowledge in the shortest -time and with the smallest effort. Civil and political learning was -neglected for physical science, and physical science for mathematical; -experience was almost ignored; the inventive thought of the previous -century all but entirely exhausted. Scepticism, the result of the -Cartesian method, invaded the field of knowledge. - -The whole of Europe was during this period still under the dominion -of the French language, a language which differs from the Italian in -its hostility to poetry and eloquence; rich, says Vico, in terms of -substance, and consequently, since substance is a brutal and immobile -thing and does not admit of comparisons, incapable of giving colour, -amplitude or weight to its statements; it resists inversion and is -barren of metaphor. The French have no periods but only members -of periods: their prosody has no verse better than the so-called -Alexandrine, a system of couplets more thin and lifeless than the -elegiac: and their words admit of no accent except those on the last -two syllables. French is a language incapable of the sublime, but well -adapted to the petty: owing to its abundance of terms of substance or -abstract terms it is adapted also to the didactic style, and instead of -eloquence it offers _esprit._ It was not unfitting that criticism and -analysis originated in France and made use of the French tongue. - -The only possession of value which grew up day by day in all this -poverty was the abstracts, the encyclopaedias, the dictionaries of -science which bore the names of such men as Bayle, Hoffmann and Moreri: -the idlest and most casual method of learning that could possibly -be devised. The genius of the age was more drawn towards expounding -second-hand knowledge in an abbreviated form than towards attempting to -enlarge its bounds. That seemed impossible: so men went on compiling -dictionaries of mathematics. Every one felt a thirst for cheap science. -To be thought good, a book must be clear and simple, capable of being -discussed with ladies as a pastime; if it demanded wide and copious -erudition of the reader, and forced upon him the unpleasant exercise of -thought and synthesis, it was condemned as unintelligible. - -These dictionaries and abstracts recalled to Vico's mind the similar -products of the Greek decadence, the anthologies, lexicons and -encyclopaedias of Suidas, Stobaeus and Photius. The whole culture -of his time seemed to him to be repeating the downfall of Greek -science, exhausting itself in a metaphysic either useless or harmful -to civilisation and a mathematics engaged in investigating quantities -intangible by rule and compass, and incapable of application. Like -others among the best minds of his country he was persuaded that -the republic of letters was approaching dissolution, if the divine -providence failed by one of its innumerable secret paths to infuse -new vigour into it. Where was now the wise man, the real "_sapiens_" -whom Vico had found in history, first in the barbaric figure of the -theologian-poet, then in the civilised and rational figure of Greek -philosopher and Roman jurist, the man whom for to-day he hoped to find -in the master of eloquence like himself, called to give unity, life and -power to all knowledge? Wisdom is indeed not this or that science, nor -yet the sum total of science; it is the faculty which rules over all -studies and by which all the sciences and arts that go to make humanity -are acquired. And since man is both thought and spirit, intellect and -will, it must satisfy both these sides of man, the second as a result -of the first: it must teach the knowledge of divine things, to bring -to perfection things human. The wise man is man in his totality and -entirety, the whole man. - -The ideal is no doubt lofty, and the criticism upon the educational -method and tendencies of thought current in his age are, no doubt, -perfectly just. And yet among all these admirable truths, far in -advance of the eighteenth century as they are, we feel in Vico the -educationalist and critic something of the reactionary. We feel -that, in his exclusive care for the fate of the highest and most -austere science and his exclusive attention to the most complete -form of human life, he failed to grasp the revolutionary importance -of this scepticism or rationalism, this rebellion against the past, -the necessary weapon of a warfare against kings, nobles and priests; -of these abstracts and dictionaries which were to develop into the -Encyclopaedia; of this popular science, the forerunner of journalism, -and these booklets for the use of ladies in fashionable conversation -which were the nourishment of the eighteenth-century salons and -prepared men's minds for the radicalism of the Jacobins. We feel in -him here as in his philosophical system, the Catholic chained to the -philosopher, the Christian pessimist weighing down the dialectic -of immanence. Unable to realise his adversaries' progress, he does -not comprehend their real nature as lower than himself, but yet -constituting steps leading up to himself, steps which he ought to -have traversed in order to attain a truer understanding and grasp -of himself. His polemical attitude towards the culture of his time -completes and confirms the analysis already given of the merits and -defects of his philosophy. - - - - -CHAPTER XX - - -CONCLUSION: VICO AND THE LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND -HISTORICAL THOUGHT - - -The reader need not expect that having brought our exposition to -a close we shall add a verdict upon Vico's work, or what is known -as an "appreciation" of it. If the verdict has not already emerged -as a result of the exposition itself, or as identical with it, if -description and criticism have been not one and same, the fault lies -either with ourselves or with the reader's lack of attention; and -in either case it cannot now be repaired by ornamental additions or -redundant repetitions. - -We confess also that we feel no sympathy with the chapters commonly -placed at the conclusion of critical works upon philosophers and -narrating the later history of their ideas. For if these "ideas" are -understood in an extrinsic sense, in their influence upon society and -culture, such a review may indeed have a value of its own,[1] but is -foreign to the history of philosophy properly so called: if on the -other hand they are considered as real and living philosophical ideas, -their later history amounts to neither more nor less than the history -of subsequent philosophy, and there is no reason for appending it to a -study of one philosopher rather than another. Any other method implies -the uncritical theory that ideas are something solid and crystallised, -like precious stones handed on from one generation to another, whose -shape and glitter can always be recognised unaltered in the new diadems -they compose and the new brows they adorn. But in reality ideas are -nothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them -is nothing less than transformation. - -It is nevertheless a fact that no one has written on Vico without -feeling a need of casting his eyes over later years and noting the -resemblances and analogies between the Neapolitan philosopher's -doctrines and those of fifty or a hundred years after. And further, -we ourselves, in spite of the antipathy we admittedly feel, and the -methodical criteria we professedly employ, yet recognise now the -same necessity. Why is this? Because Vico in his own day passed for -an eccentric and lived as a recluse; because the later development of -thought was almost entirely untouched by his direct influence; because -even to-day, though well enough known in certain restricted circles, -he has not taken the place he deserves in the general history of -thought. How then can we show the manner in which his doctrines, true -or false, respond to the deepest needs of the mind, more simply than by -recording the similarity of the ideas and attempts which later appeared -in such profusion and intensity as to stamp their individuality upon -the philosophical and historical labours of a whole century? And even -if after our intrinsic examination of his thought this comparison with -the facts of later history seems unnecessary, it will at least be -granted that if our discourse like any other must have its rhetorical -conclusion, no peroration occurs more naturally than one consisting in -a rapid review of subsequent philosophy and philology and emphasising -their points of contact with the thought of Vico. - -We might even adopt the method by which he compares the second -barbarism with the first, and present the later history of thought -as a "reflux" of Vico's ideas. In the first place his criticism of -Descartes' immediate knowledge recurs, together with his conversion -of the true with the created, in the speculative movement beginning -with Kant and Hegel and culminating in the doctrine of the identity of -truth and reality, thought and existence. His unity of philosophy and -philology recurs in the vindication of history against the scepticism -and intellectualism of the eighteenth century due to Cartesianism; -in the à priori synthesis of Kant which reconciles the real and the -ideal, experience and the categories; and in the historical philosophy -of Hegel, the greatest exponent of nineteenth-century historical -tendencies. This unity of philosophy and philology, a unity with Vico -sometimes confused and impure in method, recurred in its faulty aspects -also in the Hegelian school; so that this mental tendency might with -justice be entitled "Vicianism." The limitation which Vico tried to -impose on the value of mathematics and exact science recurred, as -did his criticism of the mathematical and naturalistic conception of -philosophy, in Jacobi's critique of Spinozistic determinism and Hegel's -of the abstract intellect; and in the case of mathematics in particular -Dugald Stewart and others recognised that its validity lay not in the -postulates but in the definitions, and the "fictions" of which Vico -speaks reappear in the modern terminology of the philosophy of these -sciences. His poetical logic or science of the imagination passes -into Aesthetic, so ardently studied by the philosophers, literary men -and artists of Germany in the eighteenth century, brought by Kant -into great prominence by his criticism of the Leibnitian doctrine of -intuition as confused conception, and further advanced by Schelling and -Hegel, who place art among the pure forms of the mind and so approach -the position of Vico. Romanticism too, especially in Germany but also -more or less in other countries, was Vician, emphasising as it did -the original function of the imagination. His doctrines of language -recurred when Herder and Humboldt treated it not intellectualistically -as an artificial system of symbols, but as a free and poetic creation -of the mind. The theory of religion and mythology abandoned the -hypotheses of allegory and deception, and with David Hume recognised -that religion is a natural fact, corresponding to the beginnings of -human life in its passionate and imaginative state; with Heyne, that -mythology is "symbolic speech," a product not of arbitrary invention -but of necessity and poverty, of the "lack of words," which finds -expression "in comparisons with things already known" (_per rerum iam -tum notarum similitudines);_ and with Ottfried Müller, that it is -impossible to understand mythology without entering into the very heart -of the human soul, where we may see its necessity and spontaneity. -Religion was regarded no longer as something extraneous or hostile to -philosophy, as a piece of stupidity or of deception practised by the -unscrupulous upon the simple, but according to Vico's own doctrine -as a rudimentary philosophy; so that the whole content of reasoned -metaphysic was already to a certain extent implicit in poetical or -religious metaphysic. Similarly, poetry and history were no longer kept -distinct or set face to face to destroy each other; and as one of the -great inspirers of the new German literature, Hamann (who in many ways -resembles Vico in tendency, though unequal to him in mental power), -had already foreseen when he uttered the warning, "if our poetry -is worthless, our history will become leaner than Pharaoh's kine," -a breath of poetry revived the historical study of the nineteenth -century; once colourless, it became picturesque: once frigid, it -regained warmth and life. The criticism of Hobbes' and Locke's -utilitarianism, and the affirmation of the moral consciousness as a -spontaneous sense of shame and a judgment entirely free from reflection -reappeared in full panoply with the Critique of the Practical Reason; -and that of their social atomism and consequent contractualism in -Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The liberty of conscience and religious -indifferentism professed and inculcated by the publicists of the -seventeenth century were negated as a philosophical doctrine; and a -nation without God seemed to Hegel, as it did to Vico, a phenomenon not -to be found in history and existing only in the gossip of travellers in -unknown or little-known lands. Carrying on the work of the Reformation, -which Vico could neither grasp nor truly appreciate, the idealistic -philosophy of Germany aimed not at exterminating religion, but at -refining it, and at giving philosophy itself the spiritual value of -religion. The certitude, the hard certitude which Vico distinguished -from truth in the sphere of law, formed the subject of thought from -Thomasius to Kant and Fichte and so on to the most recent writers, who -have sought even if they have never found the distinctive criterion -of the two forms; all or nearly all show a vivid consciousness of -what is called "constraint" or "compulsion," a fact which had been -almost forgotten in the old superficial and rhetorical moral theory. -The historical school of law, in its reaction against the abstract -revolutionary and reformatory tendencies of the eighteenth century, -was bound to recall Vico's polemic against the Platonic or Grotian -theory of an ideal republic or a natural law above and outside history -and serving as a standard for history, and to recognise with Vico that -law is correlative to the whole social life of a people at a given -moment of its history and capable of being judged only in relation to -it; a living and plastic reality, in a continual process of change -like that of language. Finally, Vico's providence, the rationality -and objectivity of history, which obeys a logic different from that -attributed to it by the fancies and illusions of the individual, -acquires a more prosaic name, but without changing its nature, in -the "cunning of the reason" formulated by Hegel: it appeared again, -ingeniously but perversely treated, in Schopenhauer's "cunning of -the species," and again, treated with little ingenuity on a purely -psychological method, in Wundt's so-called law of the "heterogenesis of -ends." - -Almost all the leading doctrines of nineteenth-century idealism, we -have seen, may be regarded as refluxes of Vician doctrines. Almost -all; for there is one of which we find in Vico not the premonition but -the necessity, not a temporary filling but a gap to be filled. Here -the nineteenth century is no longer a reflux of, but an advance upon -Vico; and discordant voices of warning or reproach rise up against -him. His distinction of the two worlds of mind and nature, to both of -which the criterion of his theory of knowledge, the conversion of the -truth with the thing created, was applicable, but applicable to the -former by man himself because that world is a world created by man, -and therefore knowable by him, to the second by God the Creator, so -that this world is unknowable by man; this distinction was not accepted -by the new philosophy, which, more Vician than Vico, made the demigod -Man into a God, lifted human thought to the level of universal mind or -the idea, spiritualised or idealised nature, and tried to understand -it speculatively in the "Philosophy of Nature" as itself a product of -mind. As soon as the last remnant of transcendence was in this way -destroyed, the concept of progress overlooked by Vico and grasped and -affirmed to some extent by the Cartesians and their eighteenth-century -followers in their superficial and rationalistic manner shone out in -its full splendour. - -But if in this point Vico cannot stand the comparison with later -philosophy, the failure is amply atoned by the full agreement -between his historical discoveries and the criticism and research -of the nineteenth century. Above all, he agrees with his successors -in his rules of method, his scepticism as regards the narrative of -ancient historians, his recognition of the superiority of documents -and monuments over narrative, his investigation of language as a -store-house of primitive beliefs and customs, his social interpretation -of mythology, his emphasis on spontaneous development rather than -external communication of civilisation, his care not to interpret -primitive psychology in the light of modern psychology; and so on. -In his actual solutions of historical problems he also agrees with -later historians. These restated the archaic and barbaric character -of primitive Greek and Roman civilisation, and the aristocratic and -feudal tendency of its political constitution: they took up the view -of ancient legal ceremonial as a dramatic poem containing allusions to -the actions of fighting: the transformation of the Roman heroes into -heroes of democracy came to an end with the Jacobins in France and -their imitators in Italy and elsewhere; Homer was considered great in -proportion to his ruggedness; the history of Rome was reconstructed -chiefly on the basis of Roman law, and the names of the seven kings -appeared as symbols of institutions and the traditional origin of -Rome as a late invention derived from Greece or from Greek models: -the substance of this history was seen to consist in the economic and -juridical struggle between patriciate and plebs, and the plebs was -derived from the _famuli_ or clients: the struggle of the classes, -which Vico was the first to illuminate clearly, was recognised as a -criterion of wide application to the history of all time and serving -as an explanation of the most sweeping social revolutions: the Middle -Ages, especially during the Restoration which followed the Napoleonic -period, exercised a powerful appeal to sentiment and influence -on thought, being admired and regretted as the antithesis of the -rationalistic bourgeois society, and understood in consequence as the -religious, aristocratic and poetical period discovered by Vico, the -youth of modern Europe. Thus Italy rediscovered the greatness of her -own Dante, and the criticism of that poet which Vico had initiated -was carried to completion by De Sanctis. In the same way, Niebuhr and -Mommsen brought to maturity his view of Roman history; Wolf, his theory -of Homer; Heyne, Müller and Bachhofen, his interpretation of mythology; -Grimm and other philologists his projected reconstruction of ancient -life by means of etymology; Savigny and the historical school, his -study of the spontaneous development of law, and his preference for -custom rather than statute and code: Thierry and Fustel de Coulanges in -France, Troya in Italy and a host of scholars in Germany his conception -of the Middle Ages and of feudalism: Marx and Sorel his idea of the -struggle of classes and the rejuvenation of society by a return to a -primitive state of mind and a new barbarism: and lastly the superman -of Nietzsche recalls in some degree Vico's hero. These are merely a -few names picked without care and almost at random; for to mention -all, and each in his right place, would mean writing the whole history -of the latest phase of European thought, a history which is not yet -finished, though it has undergone, under the name of "positivism," a -parenthetical recurrence of the abstract and materialistic thought of -the eighteenth century, a parenthesis which now however seems to be at -an end. - -These innumerable reappearances of the work of an individual in the -work of several generations, this parallelism between a man and a -century, justify a fanciful phrase with which we might draw from the -later developments in order to describe Vico; namely that he is neither -more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ. The description may -serve to summarise our reconstruction and exposition of his doctrines, -and to contribute towards a right understanding of his place in the -history of modern philosophy. He may rightly be placed side by side -with Leibniz, with whom he has so often been compared; but not, as -has been believed, because of any resemblance (the comparisons made in -this belief have been shown to be false or superficial) but precisely -because he is unlike him and in fact his very opposite. Leibniz is -Cartesianism raised to its highest power; an intellectualist, in spite -of the _petites perceptions_ and the confused knowledge; a mechanicist, -in spite of his dynamism, which perhaps exists in his fancy rather than -in his actual thought; hostile to history, in spite of his immense -historical erudition; blind to any knowledge of the true nature of -language, though deeply interested in language all his life; devoid of -dialectic, in spite of his attempt to explain the evil in the universe. -In relation to later idealism, the Leibnitian philosophy stands as -the most complete expression of the old metaphysic which had to be -transcended: that of Vico is the sketch of the new metaphysic, only -needing further development and determination. The one spoke to his own -century, and his century crowded round him and echoed his words far and -wide. The other spoke to a century yet to come; and the place in which -he cried was a wilderness that gave no answer. But the crowd and the -wilderness add nothing to and take nothing from the intrinsic character -of a thought. - - -[Footnote 1: See Appendix II.] - - - - -APPENDICES - - - - -APPENDIX I - - -ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO[1] - - -I - -The transformation, half rhetorical, half mythical, which the heat of -the national reawakening effected in poets, philosophers, and almost -every character of any importance in Italian history, representing -them as patriots, liberals, and in open rebellion or secret revolt -against the throne and the altar, tried for a time to touch with its -magic wand and to work its will upon Giambattista Vico. It was said, -among other things, that Vico, conscious of the severe blow dealt by -his thought to the traditional beliefs of religion, and warned by his -friends, took pains to plunge the New Science into such obscurity -that only the finest intellects could perceive its tendencies. But -though this legend, energetically spread as it was by the patriots and -republicans of 1799, was believed here and there, it could not long -stand out against criticism or even against common sense; and Cataldo -Iannelli was right to pass over it with a few words of contemptuous -irony.[2] It is certain from an objective point of view that Vico's -doctrines implicitly contained a criticism of Christian transcendence -and theology as well as of the history of Christianity. From the -subjective point of view it may be that Vico during his youth (of which -we know very little) was the victim of religious doubts. Such doubts -may have been suggested to him not only by his reading, but by the -society of young men of his own age, among whom "libertines," or as -contemporary literature still called them "epicureans" or "atheists," -were not uncommon.[3] In a letter of 1720 to Father Giacchi, he says -that at Naples the "weaknesses and errors dating from his early youth" -are remembered against him, and that these, fixed in the memory, became -as often happens "eternal criteria for the judgment of everything -beautiful and complete which he subsequently succeeded in doing."[4] -What can these errors and weaknesses have been? - -Again when the _De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno_ appeared, -or rather the "Synopsis" which announced its programme, "the first -voices" which Vico heard raised against him "were tinged with an -assumed piety." He found protection and consolation in the face of -such criticism in religion itself, that is to say in the approval of -Giacchi, "the leading light of the strictest and most holy order of -religious."[5] But just as we possess no detailed information as to the -criticisms levelled against him on this head, so we have no certain -knowledge even of the most general kind as to the religious doubts that -may have troubled him. All Vico's writings show the Catholic religion -established in his heart, grave, solid and immovable as a pillar of -adamant; so solid and so strong that it remained absolutely untouched -by the criticism of mythology inaugurated by himself. Nor was Vico -an irreproachable Catholic in external demonstration only. He not -only submitted every word he ever printed to the double censorship, -public and private, of ecclesiastical friends, and led his life as a -philosopher and writer among priestly vestments and monastic cowls no -less than among legal gowns; he was even scrupulous enough to desist -from his commentary on Grotius, thinking it unseemly that a Catholic -should annotate a Protestant writer;[6] and so delicate was his sense -of Catholic honour that he refused to admit polemic upon matters of -religious feeling. "As to this difficulty," he says to his critics -of the _Giornale dei letterati_, "like that which you propound to me -concerning the immortality of the soul, where it appears that you have -in hand seven distinct arguments, if they had not been prepared for me -by you, I should judge that they go deeper and penetrate to a region -which is not only protected and secured by my life and conduct, but -which to defend is to outrage. But let us return to our subject."[7] -His Catholicism was untainted by the superstition so general and so -deeply rooted at the time, especially at Naples, where St. Januarius -intervened as an actor and director in every event of public and -private life. It was the Catholicism of a lofty soul and mind, not the -faith of a charcoal-burner. But Vico never assumed the part of censor -of superstitions. He was content with not speaking of them, as one -keeps silence concerning the failings of persons or institutions which -command one's respect. - - -[Footnote 1: Since the preceding portions of this work are strictly -confined to the analysis of Vico's philosophy and give no information -as to his life and personal character, the reader will not be -displeased to find in this appendix a lecture delivered by myself upon -the latter subject before the Neapolitan _Società di storia patria_ on -April 14, 1909, and later written down and published in the Florence -_Voce_(1st year, No. 43, October 7, 1909). I add for convenience of -memory that Vico was born at Naples on June 23, 1668 (not 1670 as he -says in his autobiography), and died on January 23 (not 20 as all -his biographers say), 1744: the new edition of the _Autobiografia, -carteggio e poesie varie_ (Bari, Laterza, 1911), pp. 101, 123, 124.] - -[Footnote 2: See for the whole question Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana,_ -pp. 91-5.] - -[Footnote 3: In the _Giornali_ of Confuorto (MSS. in the library of -the Neapolitan Historical Soc. xx. c. 22, vol. iii. f. 111) under -August 1692, we find "certain civil persons were imprisoned in the -prisons of St. Dominic by the tribunal of the Holy Office; among them -the doctor Giacinto de Cristofaro, son of the doctor Bernardo; many -others escaped, members of the Epicurean or Atheist sect, who believe -the soul to perish with the body." This De Cristofaro is the famous -Neapolitan mathematician and jurisconsult, for whom see F. Amodeo, -_Vita matematica napoletana,_ part iii. (Naples, Giannini, 1905), pp. -31-44; he was Vico's friend. For other notices of the "Epicureans" at -Naples at this time see Carducci, _Opere,_ vol. ii. pp. 235-6.] - -[Footnote 4: Letter of October 12, 1720.] - -[Footnote 5: _Ibid._] - -[Footnote 6: _Autobiografia,_ in _Opere,_ ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. iv. p. -367.] - -[Footnote 7: The "subject" is therefore not the religious objections, -which he regarded as a personal insult (_Riposta al Giornale dei -letterati,_ in _Opp._ ii. p. 160).] - - - -II - - -Vico's attitude towards social and political life resembles in more -than one respect his attitude towards religion. There is in him -no trace of the missionary, the propagandist, the agitator or the -conspirator as there was in some of the Renaissance philosophers, -notably Giordano Bruno and Campanella, whom although--perhaps -because--a Neapolitan, Vico never mentions. Certainly, his age and his -country were not the time or place for heroes; there was none of that -rapid social change and revolution from which heroes spring. Political -parties however were active in favour of Austria and France, and men -were arising who devoted their labours and their lives to one or other -of these parties, or were persecuted and fled into exile: and above all -this was the period in which culminated the struggle between Church -and State, between Naples and Rome, in the person of Pietro Giannone, -a man of whom Vico never speaks, just as he never mentions and in fact -seems to ignore the entire movement. Political life rolled past over -his head, like the sky and its stars, and he never wasted his strength -in a vain attempt to reach it. Political and social controversy, like -religious, was outside the sphere of his activity. He was indeed a -non-political person. We cannot describe it as a fault or a weakness, -for every one has his limitations; one struggle excludes another, and -one labour makes others impossible. - -Not that he avoided all contact with political life and its -representatives. Only too often he was compelled to pay his respects -to both, in the form of histories, speeches, verses and epigrams in -Latin and Italian; and these alone would be sufficient material for the -reconstruction of Neapolitan history in all its vicissitudes from the -end of the seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth: the -Spanish viceregency, the conspiracy and revolution attempted by the -partisans of Austria, the reaction and re-establishment of the Spanish -viceregency, the Austrian conquest, the Austrian viceregency, the -Spanish reconquest and the reign of Charles Bourbon. But Vico, "very -pliant because of his necessity"[8] and as professor of eloquence in -the royal university, was compelled to supply the literary compositions -required by the solemnities of the day, just as the draper supplied -hangings and the plasterer volutes and arabesques. And what hangings -and arabesques he produced! The Spanish style of the seventeenth -century was still predominant in literature; and this fact is alone -almost enough to explain the extravagance and ornateness, as it seems -to us, of Vico's flood of panegyrics. The indifference and innocence of -his own attitude may be illustrated by the passage in his autobiography -where after mentioning the _Panegyricus Philippo V inscriptus_ composed -by himself to the order of the Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Ascalona, -he goes on as if it was a mere nothing, with no connexion but a simple -"soon after": "soon after, this kingdom having passed under the rule of -Austria, the lord Count Wirrigo of Daun, at that time governor of the -imperial armies in this country, _ordered me_" to compose inscriptions -for the expiatory monuments to Guiseppe Capece and Carlo di Sangro,[9] -the two rebels against Philip V. executed by the previous government -some years before in the suppression of the conspiracy of Macchia -described by Vico from the Bourbon point of view in his _De Parthenopea -coniuratione._ - -But this implies no baseness of character on Vico's part. It must -be said that in these writings of his, orator and panegyrist though -he is, he can never be called a flatterer. The flatterer, the man -without a conscience, reviles and calumniates the enemies of the man -he is praising, or even strikes the conquered: and this is servility. -But Vico, who though he knew who the Italian or Neapolitan was that -sent to the _Acta Lipsiensia_ the note injurious to himself, and -might easily have ruined him, since the note was anti-Catholic in -tendency, generously refused to reveal his name,[10] gave no doubt his -services as professor of eloquence but refrained from trafficking in -the interests of the patrons whom he praised. Of the _Life of Antonio -Carafa_ which he composed for a commission and married one of his -daughters on the proceeds, he says that the work was "tempered by -honour towards the subject, reverence towards princes and the just -claims of truth."[11] And to return to the case of Capece and Sangro -mentioned above, when he spoke in the _De Parthenopea coniuratione_ -of the death of these two enemies to the triumphant party, he shows -here too in various details the nobility of his spirit: of Capece, who -refused to surrender to the Spanish soldiers, he writes "exposing his -breast to death, and demanding death with his warlike arms, he fell -unrepentant, a most valiant manner of death, were it only honoured in -its cause" (_ostentans pectus neci eamque infensis armis efflagitans, -inexoratus occubuit, fortissimum mortis genus si causa cohonestasset_). -Of Sangro too, having reported the rumour that Louis XIV. sent him a -reprieve which arrived too late, he adds: "whence the condemned man, -who had already suffered the penalty, is the more to be pitied" (_unde -maior damnati qui iam poenas persolverat, miseratio_).[12] - -He must have known, and doubtless did know, that most of the persons -whose praises he composed were of very little worth. To read his -panegyrics, one would suppose that Naples was adorned with a nobility -resplendent in its virtue, cultivation and learning: and yet, in -giving Father De Vitry the information he desired upon the condition -of studies in Naples, Vico did not conceal the facts: "the nobles -slumber amid the enjoyments of a life of pleasure."[13] His pupil -Antonio Genovesi has preserved to us one of his satirical expressions -upon this nobility, often in extreme poverty but always proud and -ready to go hungry at home in order to drive abroad in coaches -sumptuously dressed.[14] With reference to the literary duke of -Laurenzano, he formulated the theory that "noble" writers could not -fail of excellence:[15] and yet I have discovered among his papers -the manuscript of a book by this duke, rewritten from end to end by -the same Vico.[16] Such are the contradictions and the transactions -into which a poor man falls when the pressure of want has made him -timid and cautious; so that it is not easy to determine how far his -admiration was merely assumed at command or by complaisance, or how -far his feeling of social inferiority developed into a real admiration -for those above him in the scale, who possessed riches and dignity and -everything he lacked and were the "seigneurs." - -[Footnote 8: _Opp._ vi. p. 20.] - -[Footnote 9: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 394.] - -[Footnote 10: Letter of December 4, 1729: in _Opp._ vi. p. 32.] - -[Footnote 11: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 366.] - -[Footnote 12: _Opp._ i. pp. 367, 368.] - -[Footnote 13: _Opp._ vi. p. 9.] - -[Footnote 14: He said that many of them "dragged their carriages with -their own guts" (_Suppl. alla Bibl. vich._ p. 10).] - -[Footnote 15: _Opp._ vi. p. 95.] - -[Footnote 16: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 27-8.] - - - -III - - -For, as is well known, his financial state was always of the gloomiest. -The son of a small Neapolitan bookseller, he was at first compelled to -go as a private tutor to a wild town of the Cilento; later, returning -to Naples, he tried in vain to obtain the position of secretary of the -city, and having in 1699 been elected to the chair of rhetoric, he held -that position for thirty-six years at an annual stipend of a hundred -ducats (_£17_). His attempt to pass to a chair of greater importance in -1723 failed, whether owing to ill-luck or to inability--he recognised -that he was a "man of little spirit in matters of utility,"[17]--he was -compelled to give up hopes of academic advancement. He was therefore -obliged to eke out his resources by literary work such as we have -mentioned, and still more by private lessons; he not only kept school -at his own house as well as at the university, but he went up and down -other men's steps to teach grammar to youths or even to children. His -family fife was not a happy one. His wife was illiterate, and had not -the qualities with which her sex sometimes compensates the defect; -she was incapable of any domestic employment whatever, so that her -husband had to take her place. Of his children, one girl died after a -long illness and the heavy expenses which embitter the diseases of the -poor; one boy showed such strong vicious tendencies that the father was -compelled to seek the intervention of the police and place him in a -house of correction. So sublimely irrational was his fatherly affection -that upon this occasion when he saw from the window the police officers -he had called in, coming to take his miserable and beloved son away, he -ran to him crying, "my son, flee!"[18] - -He was indeed of an extremely affectionate disposition; a fact which -may be gathered for instance from the noble and touching speech he -composed on the death of his friend Donna Angela Cimini, from the -tone of pity and indignation with which in the _Scienza Nuova_ he -spoke of the oppressed plebeians whose history he is investigating or -of the tragic figures of Priam and Polyxena, the romance of which he -feels keenly; and finally, from certain stylistic details scattered -here and there, such as the aphorism (no. xl.) where he says that -witches in order to solemnise their rites "slay without pity and -cut in pieces most lovely and innocent children," quite upset, in -the most inopportune but significant fashion, by the fate of these -little persons, whom his excited imagination adorns with a superlative -loveliness. His greatest domestic happiness came from his daughter -Luisa, a cultured and poetical soul, and his son Gennaro, who shared -with him and ultimately succeeded to his chair. When, in his panegyric -on the Countess of Althann, he calls ironically upon the philosophers -who dispute as they walk in pleasant gardens or beneath painted -porticoes, free from the agony and weariness of "wives in travail" and -"children wasting away with disease,"[19] we feel that he is speaking -from his own experience and smarting under the memory of domestic -troubles. - -We often meet, especially in these days, with men of some talent who -consider themselves freed from this or that humble duty: and we ought -the more to admire this man of genius who on the contrary accepted -them every one, and (to use a phrase of Flaubert's) while thinking the -thought of a demigod lived the life of a townsman or even that of a man -of the people. He had acquired the habit of reading, writing, thinking -and composing his works "while discussing matters with his friends -amid the uproar of his children."[20] - -His health was never very good: his friends called him "Mastro -Tisicuzzo":[21] very weak in youth, he was in his old age afflicted -with ulcers in the throat and pains in his thighs and legs. In a word, -the repose, the peace, the tranquillity which other philosophers enjoy -all their life or for long periods together was always lacking to Vico. -He was forced to play both Martha and Mary: working at every moment for -his own and his family's practical needs and working at the same time -to fulfil the mission to which he was devoted from his birth and to -give concrete form to the spiritual world that moved within him. - - -[Footnote 17: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 349.] - -[Footnote 18: Villarosa in the additions to the _Autobiography (Opp._ -iv. p. 420).] - -[Footnote 19: _Opp._ vi. p. 235.] - -[Footnote 20: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 366.] - -[Footnote 21: "Mr. Skin-and-bones": cf. _Bibl. vich._ p. 87.] - - - -IV - - -Thus we need not invent or demand a heroic Vico, looking for him -in the life of religion, society or politics. The true hero is the -Vico who stands before us, the hero of the philosophic life. Others -beside ourselves have noticed his love for the word "hero" and all -its derivatives, "heroism," "heroic," and so on: and the continual -use and varied application he makes of it. Heroism was for him the -mighty virgin force which appears in the beginning and reappears in the -reflux of history. This force he must surely have felt in himself as -he laboured for the truth and, overthrowing obstacles of every kind, -opened up new paths of science. It was this force that enabled him to -overcome the youthful uncertainties, fears and defeats which sometimes -plunged him in a profound individual and cosmic pessimism, visible -in the poem entitled "Feelings of One in Despair," to rise to the -certainty of scientific method enunciated in the _De nostri temporis -studiorum ratione_ and his first attempt at philosophico-historical -research represented by the _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia_; -and from this point, abandoning in part his own thought and weaving -a new tissue of what remained, led him to the _De uno universi iuris -principio et fine uno_ and to the _Scienza Nuova_ "after twenty-five -years," as he says of the discoveries contained in that work, "of -unremitting and toilsome thought." - -The work completed by this poor teacher of grammar and rhetoric, by -this pedagogue whom a contemporary satirist saw "lean, with a rolling -eye, ferule in hand,"[22] by this unhappy _paterfamilias,_ is amazing -and almost terrifying; such is the mass of mental power compressed into -it. It is a work at once reactionary and revolutionary: reactionary in -relation to the present, by its attachment to the traditions of the -ancient world and the Renaissance; revolutionary as against the present -and the past in laying the foundations of that future later to be known -as the Nineteenth century. - -Within the domain of science, this humble man of the people became an -aristocrat: and the "lordly style"[23] which he falsely ascribed to the -wretched writings of the proud nobles and pompous prelates of his day -was in reality his own. He loathed the polite and social literature -which was gradually spreading in France and Italy and other European -countries, the "ladies' books."[24] But he avoided no less that other -class of treatise which we nowadays call "handbooks," which explain in -detail elementary definitions and facts ascertained by others; books -useless except to the young.[25] Vico, who suffered quite enough from -the young within the circle of his school, saw no need to sacrifice to -them any part of his own inviolable life of science. The public towards -which he looked was not composed of boys, lords and ladies. When he -wrote, his first practical thought was, "what would a Plato, a Varro -or a Quintus Mucius Scaevola think of the fruits of his thought?" and -secondly, "what will posterity think?"[26] Among his contemporaries he -looked only at the republic of letters, the brotherhood of scholars, -the Academies of Europe: a public which did not require him to -repeat what had been already discovered and stated in the course of -the history of science, and was perfectly familiar to him, but only -demanded the exposition of such thoughts as constituted a real advance -of knowledge: not voluminous works, but "little books, all full of -original things."[27] His public was an ideal one, which sometimes -in his simplicity he confused with the actual professional scholars -and the critics of literary reviews: and the mistake often caused him -surprise. Short books on metaphysical subjects seemed to him to have -a peculiar power, as in fact they have; he compares them very justly -with religious meditations "which briefly set forth a small number of -points" and are more valuable for the development of the Christian -spirit than "the most eloquent and lucid sermons of the most gifted -preachers."[28] This love of brevity inspires his refusal to burden -with many books the republic of letters, which, he says, is already -sinking beneath the weight. He left his discourses unpublished, only -printed his _De ratione_ out of a sense of duty, and often expressed a -desire that the _Scienza Nuova_ alone should survive him, as the work -which summed up in itself the concentrated and perfected fruits of all -his earlier efforts. - -His aristocratic ideal was accompanied by the loftiest dignity and the -profoundest loyalty in his conception of the life of science. From his -polemics we might compile a whole catechism on the right method of -conducting literary controversy. We must aim at victory, he says, not -in the controversy but in the truth; hence he desires that it should -be conducted "in the calmest manner of reasoning," because "he who is -strong does not threaten, and he who is right does not use insults"; -the dispute must at any rate be interspersed with peaceful words -"showing that the minds of the disputants are placid and tranquil, not -excited and perturbed." To opponents whose objections are vague he -replies, "the judgment is in too general terms: and serious men never -deign to reply except to particular and determinate criticisms made -upon them." When these same opponents appeal to the "refined taste of -the age, which has banished," etc., etc., he replies contemptuously, -"a grave criticism this, in truth: it is no criticism at all. In thus -taking refuge from one's opponents before the tribunal of one's own -judgment, by saying that what they say is a thing of which one has no -idea, from an opponent one becomes the judge." He refused to rely upon -his authorities, but yet did not undervalue them; authority ought to -"make us attentive to seek the causes which could have induced authors, -especially the most weighty, to adopt such and such opinions." Again, -accused of attributing errors to philosophers so as to be able to -refute them with ease, like Aristotle, he protests with dignity: "I -would rather enjoy my own small and simple stock of knowledge than be -compared in bad faith with a great philosopher." His moderation may be -illustrated by his splendid eulogy of Descartes, though he spent the -best part of his mental powers in opposing him. His loyalty is shown -by his prompt recognition of his own errors: "I admit," he says at -one point to the critics of the _Giornale dei letterati_, "that my -distinction is faulty."[29] "The reader must not think it ostentatious -in us" (he writes in the second _Scienza Nuova_), "that not satisfied -with the favourable judgments of such men as these upon our works, -we yet disapprove and reject these works. On the contrary, it is a -proof of the high veneration and respect in which we hold these men. -For rude and haughty writers uphold their works even against the just -accusations and reasonable corrections of others: some, who by chance -are of a small spirit, sate themselves with the favourable judgments -they receive and because of these go no further towards perfection: -but in our case the praise of great minds has increased our courage to -amend, to complete, and even to recast in a better form this work of -ours."[30] - -His scientific life was upright, worthy of a serious searcher after -truth; his emotional life disturbed and restless, worthy of one who -sees face to face the truth he has long sought and desired, and -rejoices in the power of laying it before mankind. Hence his lofty -poetry, expressed not in verse but in prose, and especially in the -_Scienza Nuova_. "Vico is a poet," writes Tommaseo: "he brings -fire from smoke, and lively images from metaphysical abstractions: -he reasons as he narrates and depicts while he reasons: over the -mountain-tops of thought he does not walk, he flies; and in one -sentence he often compresses more lyrical feeling than may be found in -many an ode."[31] De Sanctis saw in the _Scienza Nuova_ the progress -of a poem, almost a new _Divina commedia._ Sublime like Dante, he was -more severe than Dante himself; if the lips of the Ghibelline show at -times the flicker of "a passing smile," Vico looks at history with -a face "that never smiles." Moreover, the man whose style has been -so often criticised is not a commonplace writer; he was as careful a -student of pure Tuscan[32] as he was a fine connoisseur, according to -Capasso, of Latin phraseology.[33] But he was faulty in the arrangement -of his books, because his mind did not master all the philosophical and -historical material it had accumulated; he wrote carelessly because -wildly and as if possessed by a demon: and hence arise the lack of -proportion and the confusion in the various parts of his work, within -single pages and single paragraphs. He often gives the impression of -a bottle of water quickly inverted, in which the liquid trying to -issue forth so presses against the narrow opening "that it comes out -painfully, drop by drop." Painfully, by fragments, and disjointedly. -One idea while he is expressing it recalls another, that a fact, and -that another fact: he tries to say everything at once, and parenthesis -branches off into parenthesis in a manner to make one's brain reel. But -these chaotic periods, weighted as they are with original thoughts, are -no less woven of striking phrases, statuesque words, phrases full of -emotion, and picturesque images. A bad writer, if you will, but his is -the kind of bad writing of which only great writers possess the secret. - - -[Footnote 22: _Bill. vich._ p. 82.] - -[Footnote 23: _Opp._ vi. p. 93.] - -[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ vi. p. 5.] - -[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ v. p. 50 (note).] - -[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ ii. p. 123.] - -[Footnote 27: _Ibid._ ii. p. 148.] - -[Footnote 28: For instance in his letter to Saliani, November 18, -1725, published in _Bibl. vich._ pp. 97-8, the autograph being in my -possession.] - -[Footnote 29: See the _Riposte_ in _Opp._ ii. _passim._] - -[Footnote 30: _Opp._ v. p. 10.] - -[Footnote 31: _G. B. Vico e il suo secolo_ in the volume _La Storia -civile nella letteratura_ (Turin, Loescher, 1872), p. 104: cf. a -judgment on Vico as a writer, _ibid._ pp. 9-10.] - -[Footnote 32: _Opp._ iv. pp. 333-4; vi. pp. 41, 140.] - -[Footnote 33: _Bibl. vich._ p. 87.] - - - -V - - -The philosophical heroism of Vico asserts itself not only in the -internal struggle with himself for the elaboration of his science. -It was exposed to other and sterner trials. The position reached by -his thought, opposed as it was to the present, and while apparently -reactionary turned in reality towards the future, inevitably prevented -him from being understood. No doubt this is the fate of every man -of genius: his inmost thought is never understood, even when social -fortune seems to favour him, even when he arouses enthusiasm and finds -a host of disciples and imitators. The words which Hegel is said -to have uttered on his deathbed--"one only of my pupils understood -me, and he misunderstood me"--admirably express this historical -necessity: the man whom his age fully understands dies with his age. -And yet the disproportion between the value of a man's thought and -his contemporaries' failure to understand it has seldom if ever been -greater than in Vico's case. If he had been free from other causes of -discontent, this alone would have been sufficient. The "desire for -praise," which in other than commonplace minds is a desire to see what -they think true and good shared, approved and universalised among other -minds, was always with him a "vain desire." - -He was the more afflicted by this misunderstanding and indifference -because, as we may well suppose, he was fully conscious of the -importance of his own discoveries. He knew that Providence had -entrusted to him a lofty mission: he knew himself to be "born for -the glory of his country, and therefore in Italy; since, being born -there and not in Morocco, he became a scholar."[34] When he published -the _Scienza Nuova,_ he believed that he had fired a mine whose -loud explosion he expected every minute. Nothing happened: nobody -mentioned it to him: so that he wrote some days later, to a friend: -"In publishing my work in this city I seem to have launched it upon a -desert. I avoid all public places, so as not to meet the persons to -whom I have sent it, and if by chance I do meet them, I greet them -without stopping; for when this happens, these people give me not -the faintest sign that they have received my book, and so confirm my -impression of having published it in a wilderness."[35] He had frankly -expected a swift and immediate effect: he had hoped to find, among his -contemporaries and acquaintances at Naples, minds ready and intellects -open to receive and bear fruit of his thoughts: and he hoped this -of monks engaged in composing and learning by rote wordy sermons, -poetasters rhyming in sonnets and advocates compiling second-hand -speeches! - -Instead of this, he found many sceptical and indifferent, and several -inclined to laugh. His _Diritto universale_ had been as Metastasio -informs us[36] generally "blamed for obscurity" on its publication; it -was not widely read and was hastily criticised for the extravagances -which an inattentive and superficial reading revealed at every -point.[37] Father Paoli, to whom the author had given a copy, wrote in -it a couplet making a joke of its unintelligibility.[38] The _Scienza -Nuova_ was in an even worse case. We know that Nicola Capasso, a -scholar and well disposed towards Vico, on trying to read it fancied -he had lost his wits, and by way of a joke hurried off to his doctor -Cirillo, to have his pulse felt.[39] A Neapolitan nobleman when asked -by Finetti at Venice what opinion was held of Vico at Naples, said that -for a time he had passed for a really learned man, but that later his -strange opinions had won him the reputation of an eccentric. "And when -he published the _Scienza Nuova_?" insisted Finetti. "Oh, by then," -replied the other, "he was quite mad!"[40] His detractors even attacked -him in the modest profession by which he earned his living; they said -he was "good at teaching youths who had completed their course, that -is to say when they already knew all they needed," or again, more -insidiously, that he was fitted less for teaching than for "giving good -advice to the teachers themselves;"[41] so that they recognised his -superiority only to use it in damaging his private interests. - - -[Footnote 34: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 385.] - -[Footnote 35: Letter to Giacchi, November 25, 1725, in _Opp._ vi. p. -28.] - -[Footnote 36: _Bibl. vich._ p. 40.] - -[Footnote 37: _Opp._ vi. p. 20.] - -[Footnote 38: _Bibl. vich._ p. 26.] - -[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p. 87.] - -[Footnote 40: _Bibl. vich._ p. 86: cf. _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.] - -[Footnote 41: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.] - - - -VI - - -The indifference of the public and the insincerity or malignity -of critics could not for Vico be compensated by the friends and -appreciative readers of whom Vico had a certain number. How indeed -could it have been otherwise, when he cultivated them artificially -with such care and anxiety? Consider for instance the way in which -he cultivated the friendship of Giacchi the Capucin. He praised his -"admirable works," his "most divine talents," the "rare sublimity" of -his "marvellous and divine ideas." He tells him that he has given to -the scholars of the city the eulogistic letter sent to him by Giacchi -and that they all admire "the sublime workmanship of the conception"; -and yet he himself used to rewrite in scholar's Latin the inscriptions -Giacchi composed in monk's Latin![42] On another occasion he wrote that -the praises of a Giacchi had excited envy and had in certain quarters -been described as flatteries. He took no less pains to propitiate -the Archbishop of Bari, Muzio di Gaeta, a conceited creature full -of his own merits and incapable of speaking except about himself. -Muzio wrote a panegyric on Pope Benedict XIII., a work of which, -though Vico praised it again and again, he had never heard enough, -and was always covertly or openly demanding new praises. So Vico used -to besprinkle him patiently with the desired fluid: "the marvellous -work of Your Excellency"; his "lordly diction"; his "demosthenic -digressions"; his eloquence, that philosophic speech employed in -Greece by the Academic school, in Rome by Cicero, and "among the -Italians by none but Your Excellency!" To the advocate Francesco -Solla, who had been his pupil and had subsequently retired into the -country, he hinted that the _Scienza Nuova_ looked towards him as one -of the few men in the world possessed of a mind penetrating enough -to receive it unhampered by any prejudices concerning the origin of -mankind.[43] Such were the guileless artifices and the pitiful little -schemes by which he contrived to give an illusory satisfaction to his -thirst for recognition and praise, and a narcotic to his overwrought -nerves. But the final results were miserable enough. Giacchi's -letters contain not a word to show that he had ever grasped one of -Vico's doctrines or even that he had examined them with any serious -interest. Monsignor di Gaeta, after a labyrinth of circumlocutions, -admits that he "admired more than he understood" of Vico's works;[44] -and possibly he was so much occupied in admiring his own prose that -he never read them at all. Solla, in whom Vico placed such hopes, -thought the discourse on the death of Angela Cimini superior to all -the author's other works, including the _Scienza Nuova_ itself. Vico -received a no less incautious compliment from another admirer; though -a warm and affectionate one,--Esteban.[45] Compliments of a vague and -unintelligent kind sometimes reached him in return for the copies of -his works which he sent not only to Neapolitan scholars but to those -of Rome, Pisa, Padua and even Germany, Holland and England: he sent a -copy to Isaac Newton.[46] Generally, however, these gifts were received -in contemptuous silence. At most, Vico acquired the reputation of a -scholar among hundreds of scholars, a man of letters among thousands of -similar men; a learned man, but nothing more. - -Among the modest, the insignificant, and the young, Vico no doubt had -strong admirers. Among these were the poet, later a sacred orator, -Gherardo de Angelis, Solla and Esteban whom we have mentioned, the monk -Nicola Concina of Padua, and some more. But though their affection -was strong their intelligence was weak. Even Concina admitted while -rhapsodising his enthusiasm that he did not very clearly comprehend -his master: "Oh, what fruitful and sublime lights are here! If only -I had the talent to make use of them, to comprehend their depth and -the wonderful art of which I seem to catch a glimpse!"[47] The best -service that these friends could do him was to soothe with kindly words -Vico's embittered spirit, if they could not do so by following his -inmost thoughts. This is what Esteban does at the close of the letter -in which he excuses himself for his foolish remark on the funeral -speech of Angela Cimini in phrases he must have gathered from the -master's lips: "Be confident, Sir, that Providence, through channels -unimagined by yourself, will cause to spring up for you a perennial -fountain of immortal glory!"[48] The Jesuit Father Domenico Lodovico, -who wrote the couplet inscribed beneath Vico's portrait, on receiving -the _Scienza Nuova_ sent to the author with much sound sense a little -wine from the cellar and a little bread from the oven of the Jesuit -house of the Nunziatella, together with a graceful letter begging -the author to accept "these trifles, simple as they are, since the -infant Jesus himself did not refuse the rude offerings of pastoral -peasants." He suggested too that at the side of the alphabet in the -symbolic frontispiece to the work a little dwarf should be added in the -posture of one dumb with astonishment like Dante's mountaineer, and -that beneath him should be written, "with a significant diaeresis," -the name Lodo-vico![49] Among the young men of his school there were -some who, nourished upon his doctrines, were ready to defend their -master with their swords;[50] but we all know the value of these -youthful enthusiasms. If these scholars had really assimilated Vico's -doctrines or any part of them, we should have found traces of it in -the literature or culture of the next generation after Vico; but such -traces are entirely absent. Hardly a single one of his formulae, his -historical statements, or conceptions even superficially understood -is to be found in Conti at Venice, Concina at Padua, Ignazio Luzan -in Spain--though the last named was living at Naples when the -_Scienza Nuova_ was published;[51] or even, within the author's own -neighbourhood, in Genovesi or Galiani. - -Envy, insincerity, gossip, calumny and stupidity provoked violent -outbursts of anger on Vico's part. He confesses this fault in his -autobiography where he says that he inveighed in too severe a manner -against the errors of conception or doctrine or the incivility of his -literary rivals, when in Christian charity and as a true philosopher -he ought to have ignored or pardoned them.[52] But as a matter of fact -this fault did not greatly distress him: he thought it rather an -ornament. The funeral speech for Angela Cimini contained a kind of hymn -to anger, the "heroic wrath which in noble spirits disturbs and shakes -to the depths by its boiling all those evil thoughts of the mind, -which beget the vile swarm of fraud, deceit and falsehood, and renders -the hero frank, truthful and loyal; and thus making him a partisan of -truth, arms him as the valiant knight of reason to do battle with wrong -and offence."[53] - -Although in his writings he guards "with all his power" against falling -into this passion[54] we feel a scarcely repressed torrent of wrath in -his private letters whenever he denounces the "miserable pedants" who -"love learning more than truth," or the common tendency of man to be -"all memory and imagination," and so forth. In conversation also, it -seems, he could be very violent. When in 1736 Damiano Romano published -a work controverting his theory of the Twelve Tables, Vico, although -according to Romano himself he had been spoken of as "most learned" -and "most famous," together with other titles of respect, "tore the -book to pieces with his teeth in a way that made every one present -tremble with horror," rinding a sign of the deepest malignity in the -fact that "a lad like myself should join issue with him."[55] But his -outbursts of wrath were succeeded by fits of the deepest dejection. In -a sonnet he speaks of himself as over-whelmed by that fate "which the -unjust hate of others often creates," and says that for this reason he -has separated himself from human society to live with himself alone. -Sometimes he shakes off this torpor for a moment: then, he says: - -I draw within myself again, and pressed -By heavy cares, return to where I stood:[56] -My fate and not my fault I do lament. - -[Footnote 42: Published by me in _Napoli nobilis,_ xiii. (1904), f. 1., -and again in _Secondo suppl. alla Bibl. vich._ pp. 70-2.] - -[Footnote 43: _Opp._ vi. p. 17.] - -[Footnote 44: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 103-5.] - -[Footnote 45: _Opp._ vi. p. 145.] - -[Footnote 46: _Ibid._ p. 110.] - -[Footnote 47: _Opusc.,_ ed. Villarosa, ii. p. 277.] - -[Footnote 48: _Bibl. vich._ p. 105.] - -[Footnote 49: "I praise Vico." Letter published by me in _Bibl. vich._ -p. 107.] - -[Footnote 50: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 87-8.] - -[Footnote 51: _Ibid._ p. 44.] - -[Footnote 52: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416: cf. the evidence of a -pupil in _Bibl. vich._ p. 89.] - -[Footnote 53: _Opp._ vi. p. 254.] - -[Footnote 54: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.] - -[Footnote 55: _Bibl. vich._ p. 88.] - -[Footnote 56: Sonnet published by G. Gentile, _Il Figlio di G. B. Vico_ -(Naples, Pierro, 1905), p. 173.] - - - -VII - - -But among all these troubles, obstacles and disappointments, in -the midst of this sadness which often draped his life in black, -Vico enjoyed one of the loftiest joys accessible to man; the "life -of meditation" freed and purified from passion, lived by man in -solitude without the turbulent and grievous company of the body: -the life of security, because it is "made one with the soul always -ready and present which shows man his being rooted in the Eternal -that measures all times and walking in the Infinite that comprehends -all finite things; it crowns him with an eternal and immeasurable -joy not restricted invidiously to certain places nor grudgingly to -certain times; but it can grow up within himself only if without envy -of rivalry or fear of diminution it spreads and communicates itself -unceasingly to more and more human minds."[57] That he has attained -truth he never doubts, though he never ceases to elaborate it further; -with the system presented in the work on _Universal Law,_ his mind, -he says, "rested content."[58] The weariness and even the pain he -had suffered were dear to him, because through them he arrived at -his discoveries: "I bless the twenty-five full years I have spent -in meditation upon this subject, in the midst of the adversities of -fortune and the checks I have often received from the unhappy example -of great thinkers who have attempted new and weighty discoveries."[59] -How could he have done anything but bless these fatigues, pains and -adversities, if, whenever he rose above the passionate perturbations -of the empirical man and the struggles of the practical man, his mind -showed him the inevitable necessity of his toil and of his sufferings, -two necessities fused into one another so as to become one and -indivisible? - -His own philosophical doctrine then brought him the remedy for his -ills, and worked in his spirit the _catharsis_ of liberation; the -doctrine of the immanent Providence, or as it was later called, -historical necessity, which was his central thought. "Praise be to -Providence for ever, which, when the weak sight of mortals sees in it -nothing but stern justice, then most of all is at work on a crowning -mercy! For by this task I see that I am clothed upon with a new man; -I feel that everything that goaded me to bewail my hard lot and to -denounce the corruption of literature that has caused that lot, has -vanished; for this corruption and this lot have strengthened me and -enabled me to perfect my task. And more, it may perhaps not be true, -but it would please me, were it true, that this labour has filled me -with a certain spirit of heroism, through which no fear of death any -longer disturbs me and my mind feels no disquietude at the words of my -rivals. Lastly, it has established me as upon a mighty rock of adamant -before the judgment of God, who rewards the work of creation by the -approval of the wise, who are always and everywhere few in numbers ... -men of the loftiest intellect, of a learning all their own, generous -and great-hearted, whose only labour is to enrich with deathless works -the commonwealth of letters."[60] Thus Providence showed him the -necessity of all that had befallen or should befall him in his life, -taught him resignation and promised him glory. - - -[Footnote 57: _Opp._ vi. p. 287.] - -[Footnote 58: _Ibid._ p. 18.] - -[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ pp. 153-4.] - -[Footnote 60: _Opp._ vi. pp. 29-30.] - - - -VIII - - -So the hot-tempered man became at last tolerant: tolerant with that -tolerance, that lofty indulgence which must not be confused with common -toleration. The University, in which he had hoped for advancement and -towards which he directed the thought of his earlier works, would -have none of him; he retired within himself to think out the _Scienza -Nuova._ Now, says he with a smile in which we may still see a trace of -bitterness, I owe this work to the University, which, by judging me -unworthy of the chair and not wishing me to be "occupied in treating -paragraphs," gave me leisure for meditation: "what greater obligation -could I have?"[61] A friend, Sostegni the Florentine, in a sonnet to -Vico, let slip some words in condemnation of the city of Naples for -making so little of her distinguished son. Vico in his reply justifies -his native place in noble words, as being stern towards him because she -expected and desired much of him: - -Stern mother, she caresses not her son, -Lest so she fall into obscurity, -But gravely listens, watching as he speaks.[62] - -This was the spirit that found expression in the Autobiography, a -work which has been misjudged and in fact entirely misunderstood by -Ferrari, who censures its prevailing teleological tendency and laments -the absence of a "psychological" explanation of Vico's life;[63] -as if Vico had not himself explained that he was writing it from a -"philosophical" point of view.[64] And what is the meaning of a -philosophical treatment of a philosopher's life but an understanding -of the objective necessity of his thought and a perception of the -scaffolding it involves even where the author at the moment of thinking -did not clearly perceive it? Vico "meditates upon the causes, natural -and moral, and upon the occasions of his fortunes; he meditates upon -the inclinations or aversions he felt from childhood towards this or -that branch of study; he meditates upon the opportunities or hindrances -which assisted or retarded his progress; he meditates, lastly, upon -certain efforts of his own in right directions which bore fruit in the -reflections upon which he built his final work, the _Scienza Nuova,_ -which work was to demonstrate that his literary life was bound to have -been what it was and not different."[65] Vico's _Autobiography_ is, -in a word, the application of the _Scienza Nuova_ to the life of its -author, the course of his own individual history: and its method is as -just and true as it is original. Vico succeeded in part only of his -attempt, and could not form a criticism and history of himself to the -same extent to which a modern critic and historian is in a position -to do--whose efforts will again be improved upon by those of the -future--is too obvious to need emphasising. The _Autobiography_ itself -concludes with a blessing upon the author's hardships, a profession of -faith in Providence and a sure expectation of fame and glory. - - -[Footnote 61: _Ibid._ p. 29.] - -[Footnote 62: _Ibid._ p. 446.] - -[Footnote 63: In the Introduction to vol. iv. of the _Opere._] - -[Footnote 64: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 402.] - -[Footnote 65: _Ibid._] - - - -IX - - -In the last years of his life Vico, enfeebled by age, domestic trouble -and illness, "entirely gave up his studies":[66] - - My pen is slipping from my palsied grasp; - The door of my thought's treasury is closed,[67] - -he cries in two mournful lines of a sonnet in 1735. He prepared at -this time additions and corrections for a possible reprint of the -second _Scienza Nuova,_ and incorporated them in the final manuscript -of the work; he thought for a time of printing his small work "on the -Equilibrium of the Living Body" (_De aequilibrio corporis animantis_) -composed many years earlier and now lost;[68] he still discharged -some of the duties of his office, such as the speech on the marriage -of the king, Charles Bourbon, in 1738. But from 1736 or 1737 his son -began to assist him in his professional work, and in January 1741 he -was definitely appointed to the chair on his father's resignation.[69] -Vico henceforth lived among his family like an old soldier _exacta -militia,_ thinking over his past battles and conscious of having -done his life's work. His good son read to him for some hours every -day out of the Latin classics he had once loved and studied so well. -And in this evening of his life he was at least spared the crowning -agony suffered in his last years by a philosopher more fortunate than -himself, Immanuel Kant; the agony of continuing and completing his -system of philosophy, and wearing himself out in a fruitless struggle -with thoughts that eluded his grasp and words that no longer obeyed -him. Vico had said all he had to say; a great historian of his own -life, he knew the moment at which Providence had finished its work in -him, closed the door of thought it had so freely opened, and ordered -him to lay down his pen.[70] - - -[Footnote 66: _Ibid._ p. 415.] - -[Footnote 67: _Opp._ vi. p. 425 (Sonnet on the marriage of Raimondo di -Sangro, 1735).] - -[Footnote 68: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 38-9.] - -[Footnote 69: Gentile, _Il Figlio di G. B. Vico,_ pp. 30-48.] - -[Footnote 70: The documents and the scattered notes used in this -lecture and quoted from the contents of my _Bibliografia vichiana_ are -now all collected in my edition of the _Autobiografia, carteggio e -poesie varie:_ cf. the present vol. _infra,_ p. 308.] - - - - -APPENDIX II - - -THE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT[1] - - -The history of the vicissitudes of Vico's reputation must not be -allowed to replace or be confused with the exposition and valuation of -his thought, by losing sight of the history of philosophy properly so -called or confusing it with the history of culture.[2] But even when -we pass to this second history, we must guard against another kind of -error, namely the pretence of determining by its means whether Vico's -work was or was not of use in the advancement of culture, and what -degree of utility we should grant it. The inquiry is meaningless, and -the degree cannot be measured: for rightly considered one disciple may -be worth tens or hundreds, one effect produced after centuries may -compensate its age-long delay, one point undeservedly forgotten may -become as notable and instructive as the best-deserved reputation, -and one single truth twice discovered independently may from this -re-discovery and seeming superfluity receive a confirmation of its -inevitable necessity. The work of Vico--such is the usual verdict--was -entirely useless, because it appeared out of its due time and -prematurely, and remained unknown or was known only because it could -convey nothing new. Such language is a blasphemy against history, which -allows nothing to be useless and is always and throughout the work of -Providence, whose vast utilities must not be measured by the pettiness -of the human span. - -Was Vico appreciated in the course of the eighteenth century? Did any -one read him, understand him and follow his lead? The question has -been answered with equal decision in the affirmative and the negative. -The affirmative answer has been supported by a diligent collection of -scattered passages up and down the writers of the century mentioning -his name and doctrines and an accumulation of possible or apparent -traces of his thoughts visible though unacknowledged in Italian and -foreign literature. But a thinker like Vico can only be said to be -known when his fundamental thought has been grasped and the spirit -that animated him has been felt. Now the majority of the facts alleged -as proof of the efficacy of his work concerns particular doctrines -detached from the whole and accepted or contested just like those of -any other scholar and critic or any paradox-monger of his time. This -is true in the first place of his theory on the origin of the Twelve -Tables, discussed in the controversy between Bernardo Tanucci and Guido -Grandi from 1728 to 1731, contested in 1736 by Damiano Romano, accepted -in France by Bonamy in 1735 and recalled in 1750 by Terrasson; of the -views on the history and primitive government of Rome, mentioned by -Chastellux, adopted and expanded by Duni, and used by Du Bignon who -learnt them from Duni; of the hypotheses as to the prehistoric period -and the origins of humanity, employed and modified by Boulanger in -France and Mario Pagano in Italy; and lastly, of some conceptions upon -poetry and language which reappear in Pagano, Cesarotti and some others. - -A more essential question was that of the method of studying and -judging political institutions and laws; a question upon which -Montesquieu has been compared with Vico and accused of freely using the -_Scienza Nuova_ without acknowledging his debt. It is now established -through Montesquieu's journal that in 1728 Antonio Conti at Venice -advised the future author of the _Esprit des Lois_ to buy Vico's book -at Naples; and Montesquieu must have followed this advice on reaching -Naples in the following year; for a copy of the 1725 edition of the -_Scienza Nuova_ is still preserved in the library at the château of La -Brède. But the mind of the French writer was too different from and -inferior to that of Vico to draw vital nourishment from a work such as -the _Scienza Nuova;_ and the traces of imitation alleged to have been -discovered in the _Esprit des Lois_ are very doubtful and in any case -of minor importance. It must be said on the other hand that the merit -generally attributed to Montesquieu of having introduced the historical -element into positive laws and thus considering legislation in a truly -philosophical manner (as Hegel said later), that is, as a moment -depending upon a totality relative to all the other determinations -which go to form the character of a people or a period; this merit, in -order both of time and of excellence, belongs in reality to Vico. - -Like Montesquieu in the science of legislation, so Wolf in the Homeric -question has been suspected of tacitly deriving help from Vico's -speculations. But at the time when he published the _Prolegomena ad -Homerum_ in 1795 Wolf did not know the _Scienza Nuova_; which he -knew in name only in 1801 and in fact the year after, when Cesarotti -presented him with the book. We must observe that Vico's judgment as -to the barbaric nature of the Homeric epos and the absence in it of -esoteric wisdom had been published in 1765 by the _Gazette littéraire -de l'Europe_; and further, that the _Scienza Nuova_ was known and -used by the Danish philologist and archaeologist Zoega, who quotes it -in an essay on Homer composed in 1788 though not published till long -afterwards; and that Zoega corresponded with Heyne, who afterwards -accused Wolf of having derived from his own lectures the theory set -forth in the _Prolegomena._ Heyne had in fact expressed the idea of -a gradual genesis of the Homeric poems in 1790. In a word we may say -that Vico's views had to some extent penetrated into the atmosphere of -German philology: in which case Wolf may have originally had a certain -indirect knowledge of them. Even apart from this indirect communication -the fact remains, and is recognised by all students of the question, -that the Homeric theory conceived by Wolf must really be called -not Wolfian but Vician, since such it truly is in its fundamental -characteristics. Moreover, Wolf, as a philologist far superior to Vico -but much less great as a thinker, was not in a position to understand -the ideas which had led his predecessor to the doctrine he held -concerning Homer: a fact which is clear from the somewhat superficial -article he wrote on the subject in 1807. - -There was certainly at Naples during the eighteenth century a vague -consciousness in many minds of the greatness of Vico's work; but in -what precisely this greatness consisted nobody could determine, owing -to the lack of adequate experience and preparation. Outside Italy, -especially in Germany, where this preparation existed or at least was -much greater, Vico's work remained generally unknown, partly through -the discredit into which Italian books had fallen since the end of the -seventeenth century, and partly through the dimculties which Vico's -style presented to a foreign reader. When the _Scienza Nuova_ did -fall into the hands of men competent to understand it, a series of -insignificant accidents interposed to prevent such an understanding. -Hamann procured the _Scienza Nuova_ from Florence in 1777, at which -time he was engaged upon economics and physiocracy, fancying that it -dealt with these subjects; and the delusion was not dispelled when in -glancing over it he found himself faced by a collection of philological -studies and studies carried out with considerable carelessness. Goethe -received it at Naples in 1787 from Filangieri, who warmly recommended -it, took it back to Germany and lent it in 1792 to Jacobi; but it was -a happy coincidence rather than a true knowledge or a clear intuition -that led him to couple Vico's name with that of Hamann. Herder, who may -also have known Vico's work less through his correspondence with Hamann -in 1777 than by his travels in Italy in 1789, speaks of it in 1797 -in quite general terms, without noticing one of the many connexions -between Vico and himself, especially as regards the theory of language -and poetry. - -The only men in the eighteenth century who really to some extent -penetrated into the fundamental thought of Vico and proclaimed though -unwillingly his genuine greatness were--and this is another proof of -the solid mental fibre of Catholicism--his Catholic opponents, of whom -there were plenty: Romano, Lami, Rogadei, and above all Finetti. They -saw that in spite of his stubborn protestations of religious orthodoxy -Vico held a conception of Providence very different from that of -Christian theology; and that though he continually used the name of God -he never allowed him to operate effectively in history as a personal -God; that he made so sharp a distinction between sacred and profane -history as to reach a purely natural and human theory of the origin of -civilisation, by means of the state of nature, and of the origin of -religion, by means of fear, shame and the imaginative universal; while -the traditional Catholic doctrine admitted a certain communication -between sacred and profane history, and recognised in pagan religion -and civilisation the leaven of some kind of vague recollection of the -primitive revealed truth; that though protesting that he accepted and -reinforced the authority of the Bible, he threatened and shook it on -many points; and that his criticism of profane historical tradition, -conducted in a haughty spirit of rebellion against the past, might -open the road to the most dangerous abuses, since it provoked the -application of the same spirit and method to sacred history, which -happened in the case of Boulanger.[3] In this accusation are faithfully -indicated all the points destined later to enter into the nineteenth -century's solemn eulogy of Vico. Thus churchmen began to be suspicious -of him; and this bore fruit later in the restoration period, in the -anti-Vician polemic of Bishop Colangelo, and somewhat earlier in a -verdict of the royal censor Lorenzo Giustiniani, who pronounced the -_Scienza Nuova_ "a work marking a most unfortunate crisis in European -history." - -This tendency was opposed by the enthusiastic young students of -social and political matters at Naples at the end of the eighteenth -century, preparing themselves for an active part in the imminent -revolution. Among them Vico came to be considered as an anti-clerical -and anti-Catholic, and the legend arose, mentioned elsewhere in this -volume, that Vico purposely and deliberately made his work obscure -in order to escape ecclesiastical censure. These young men applied -themselves to the study and praise of the _Scienza Nuova;_ they -proposed to reprint it, since it had become rare, together with the -other works and unpublished manuscripts of the author; they prepared -expositions and criticisms of Vico's philosophical and historical -system; some like Pagano tried to work it up afresh by adding to it -the ideas of French sensationalism, others like Filangieri did not let -their admiration of it dispel their rosy dreams of reform. In 1797 -the German Gerning on coming to Naples noted the zeal with which Vico -was studied, and projected a translation or at least a summary of the -_Scienza Nuova_ in German. When the fall of the Neapolitan Republic -in 1799 drove these young men, or rather those of them who escaped -the massacres and the gallows of the Bourbon reaction, into exile in -Northern Italy and especially in Lombardy, the cult of Vico was for the -first time ardently propagated. Vincenzo Cuoco, Francesco Lomonaco, -Francesco Salfi and other southern patriots passed the knowledge of the -_Scienza Nuova_ to Monti, who mentioned it in his inaugural lecture -at Pavia in 1803, to Ugo Foscolo, who absorbed many of its ideas into -his poem the _Sepolcri_ and his critical essays: to Alessandro Manzoni, -who was later to institute in his _Discorso sulla storia longobarda_ -a famous comparison between Vico and Muratori: and to others of less -importance. Cuoco introduced Vico's work to Degérando, then at work on -his _Histoire comparée des systèmes philosophiques_; another exile, -De Angelis, put the _Scienza Nuova_ into the hands of Jules Michelet; -Salfi mentioned Vico in articles in the _Revue Encyclopédique_ and in -books and minor works in French. It was also through the suggestion -of these Neapolitans that the _Scienza Nuova_ was reprinted at Milan -in 1801; and other editions and collections of Vico's smaller works -were not long in appearing. Thus in the first decade of the nineteenth -century Vico's reputation, which had till then been merely local to -Naples, spread over the whole of Italy. - -But, suitably to their personal disposition and to the spirit of the -times, the first and chief debt which the patriotic students of Vico -owed to his thought was political in character or rather belonging to -political philosophy; and consisted in a criticism of that Jacobinism -and philo-Gallicism of which they had had such unhappy experience -in the events of 1799.[4] Vico's thought led them to more concrete -concepts; and this is particularly visible in Vincenzo Cuoco's -admirable _Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana_ (1800). -Similarly Ballanche some decades later in his _Essais de palingénésie -sociale_ (1827) wrote that if Vico had been known in France in the -eighteenth century he would have exercised a beneficial influence on -the subsequent social revolutions. Another particular aspect of Vico's -work, the reform undertaken by him of historical methodology and social -science as an aid to history, was observed and emphasised by the -archaeologist Cataldo Iannelli in his work _Sulla natura e necessità -della scienza delle cose e delle storie umane_ (1818). Foscolo and -those who drew their inspiration from him chiefly introduced into -literary criticism and history something of Vico's conceptions on the -historical interpretation of poetry. - -In Germany on the other hand Jacobi, who had read the _De -antiquissima,_ immediately placed himself in the centre of the Vician -philosophy by discovering and pointing out in 1811, in his work _Über -den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung,_ the close connexion -between the principle of the convertibility of the true and the -created and the Kantian theory that one can perfectly conceive and -understand only what one is able to construct: a single step from -which position leads, as he observes, to the system of identity. The -same fact was recognised by Baader, who found in this system the -confirmation and foundation of the principle enunciated by Vico. But -the translation of the _Scienza Nuova_ made by Weber in 1822 seems to -have been unsuccessful; and it does not appear that Vico was known to -Hegel, with whom he has so many substantial and formal affinities, -especially in the _Phenomenology_; and whose mania for triads might be -blamed just as the Catholic Finetti had blamed Vico for always standing -"upon rule of three." The resemblances again of Vico's theories to the -new German philological doctrines of Niebuhr, Müller, Böckh and many -others were not at all willingly admitted. The attitude of Niebuhr is -characteristic. Whether he knew Vico's work or not when he published -the first edition of his _Römische Geschichte,_ he certainly knew -it later through Savigny and through the article entitled _Vico und -Niebuhr_ published in 1816 by the Swiss Orelli; and yet he continued to -ignore him, through some kind of contempt or depreciation; an attitude -hardly praiseworthy but imitated by Mommsen. - -In France, the spread of knowledge concerning Vico's thought was due -to Michelet, who translated his works and in his last years described -Italy as "the second mother and nurse who in my youth suckled me upon -Virgil, and in my maturity nourished me with Vico; potent cordials that -have many times renewed my heart." Michelet was the first or one of the -first to proclaim, in his introduction, that Vico was not understood -in the eighteenth century because he wrote for the nineteenth. -Michelet was joined by Ballanche, of whom we spoke above, and also by -Jouffroy, Lerminier, Chateaubriand, and Cousin, some of whom grasped -the connexion between Vico and the German philosophy that Cousin was -at this time propagating in France; and later by Laurent, Vacherot, -De Ferron, Franck, Cournot and many others. Vico was read and admired -by Comte, who mentioned him in a letter to John Stuart Mill in 1844, -and lastly Léon Gambetta conceived in his youth a general history of -commerce upon the scheme of the Vician "reflux." The popularity of -Vico's name in France at this period was so great that it is several -times mentioned in joke in passages of Balzac's novels and in -Flaubert's _Bouvard et Pécuchet._ But thought of the quality of Vico's -could never have a very deep or lasting influence in the persistently -intellectualistic and spiritualistic atmosphere of France. Perhaps the -most conspicuous results it produced were the theories of Fustel de -Coulanges on the ancient city and the origin of feudalism. - -But, to return to Italy, if the aspirations towards a national -uprising, which tended to vindicate and glorify all the ornaments -Italy could boast, raised Vico's name almost to a level with that of -Dante, the simultaneous renaissance of philosophy, which was shaking -off the sensationalism and materialism of the eighteenth century, was -bound to attach itself to the last great idealistic philosopher, to -use his thoughts and to shelter itself behind his authority. Vico's -complete works were now collected and editions of the single treatises -multiplied. And since in the national uprising two currents could be -distinguished, partly successive and partly fused, the neo-Guelphian -and the radical, and since this distinction was represented in -the philosophical awakening by that between Catholic idealism and -rationalistic idealism, the schools of Rosmini and Gioberti on the one -hand and Bruno and Hegel on the other; Vico, at once a Catholic and a -free philosopher, lent himself admirably, as is easy to understand, to -the contrary sympathies and interpretations of the two schools. Thus -originated two different pictures of him, both historically justified, -though the one painted him as he would have wished to be, the other as -he was. The Vico of the liberal Catholics was above all the Vico of -the metaphysical points, the Platonist, the mystic of the unknowable -God, the traditionalist of the prologues to the _Diritto universale,_ -and hence the strictly Italian philosopher as opposed to those of -the rest of Europe, sons of the Reformation: whereas the Vico of the -rationalists, the bold and heretical author of the _Scienza Nuova,_ -is a European philosopher to be set side by side with Descartes and -Spinoza, Kant and Hegel. The former picture may be seen in the works -of Rosmini, Gioberti, Tommaseo and many others, among which we must -not forget those of a Neapolitan writer of lofty spirit, Enrico Cenni, -perhaps the best of all, who draws a loving picture of the Vico of -the Catholics. The latter portrait is found in the philosophers and -critics who from 1840 onwards acquired their education in the school -of German idealism; especially Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco de -Sanctis, who were the first to see clearly Vico's relations to earlier -and later European thought and to substitute for mere observations -and vague impressions on the subject a scientific interpretation and -a determinate judgment. That the second school of interpreters and -critics were in the right, and that the liberal or idealistic Catholics -had taken up an untenable position and reproduced in their irresolution -and incoherence the irresolution and incoherence of Vico himself, was -proved by the fact, among others, that less liberal but more consistent -Catholics like the Spaniard Jaime Balmes show an inflexible distrust -and hostility towards the author of the _Scienza Nuova._ - -The study of history in Italy during this period was less deeply -modified by Vico's influence; chiefly perhaps because the impulse of -the national uprising led to the neglect of primitive and Roman history -and the devotion of all its best energies to research into the origin -and vicissitudes of the Italian republics, a subject Vico had entirely -ignored. On the other hand, jurisprudence especially in the south was -dominated by his thought; and though it produced in this field no great -scientific results, it gave to the jurists a loftiness and breadth of -judgment and a concreteness of view which were long remembered and -regretted. - -After 1870, with the decay of philosophy in Italy and elsewhere, the -study of Vico also decayed: and for more than forty years there was no -demand for a reprint of his works. The monograph by Cantoni in the year -1867, in spite of some valuable passages, already shows unmistakable -signs of the decadence, founded as it is upon the idea that Vico's -value is greater according as he is less of a metaphysician and more -of a psychologist and historian: a position due not so much to the -intrinsic weakness ascribed to him by Cantoni in philosophical matters -as to the implicit conviction on the critic's part that metaphysic -in general is a valueless thing, useful only for rousing enthusiasm -in the addled heads of southern Italians. The great idealist of the -New Science was subjected, as a final insult, to the praises of the -positivists, who in their astonishing ignorance almost amounting -to innocence did not--and still do not--hesitate to allege as a -confirmation of their formal profession of faith the words "verum ipsum -factum," which according to them means that the truth is the fact -which we see and touch. Writings making any serious contribution to -the knowledge of any particular point on Vico's doctrines were rare. -Interest in Vico only reawoke within the last decade with the general -reawakening of philosophical studies. - -Of the two best comprehensive works on Vico published towards the end -of last century one is due to the German Catholic Karl Werner (1881) -who expounds his philosophical and historical doctrines with great -care, judging them from the point of view of speculative theism, a -theory evolved under the influence of Baader and the second philosophy -of Schelling, and tending much more to the comprehension of Vico than -the psychology of Cantoni. The other is the work of an Englishman, -Robert Flint (1884), who wrote for the collection of Philosophical -Classics a brief monograph upon the subject, accurate in detail, and -if not profound at least guided by clear and sound sense. Recently -Sorel in France has shown the fruitfulness of certain views of Vico's, -especially that of the reflux, by applying them to the history of -primitive Christianity and the theory of the modern proletarian -movement, while in Germany Biese and Mauthner have brought his -conceptions of metaphor and language once more into favour. - -But in spite of all this Vico has never had justice done him in works -devoted to the history of modern philosophy. These, in the case both -of Höffding's book and of the greatly superior work of Windelband, and -in fact of all others, either pass over the Italian philosopher in -complete silence or else merely mention him as an experimenter, later -than Bossuet and earlier than Herder, in the dubious science of the -"philosophy of history." This lack of attention arises partly from an -insufficient knowledge of Vico's real nature; his fertile activities -in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, in aesthetic, in law and in -religion are all hidden behind that one label "philosopher of history." -Partly however it is due to the reaction of the history of politics -and culture on the history of philosophy; which produces the effect -that thinkers whose social influence came to an end with the fall of -the peoples or states to which they belonged, or who for some reason -or other had no considerable influence on European civilisation, are -sacrificed to others much less important from a philosophical point of -view but more influential or better known as exponents of social life -and representatives of cultural tendencies; so that where it would -be thought impossible to ignore, for example, Paley or d'Holbach or -Mendelssohn, it seems natural to pass over Giambattista Vico, though in -such company he is a giant among pigmies. The historical injustice of -this course has been already shown theoretically by the distinction we -have emphasised between the history of philosophy and the history of -culture; and in Vico's special case by our whole work, which clearly -shows the lacuna left by the omission of Vico in the general history of -European thought at the beginning of the eighteenth century. - - -[Footnote 1: This appendix briefly recapitulates the chief results of -my researches into the subject set forth in the _Bibliografia vichiana_ -and its two supplements (cf. the present volume, _infra,_ p. 310, -to which work I refer for fuller details and for the evidence for the -facts here laid down.] - -[Footnote 2: See above, pp. 236, 237.] - -[Footnote 3: Labanca has devoted a highly instructive volume to the -Catholic criticisms of Vico: see the present volume, _infra,_ p. 309.] - -[Footnote 4: See above, pp. 247-9.] - - - - -APPENDIX III - - -THE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE[1] - - -My statement, that the criterion of knowledge contained in Vico's -formula of the conversion of the true with the created is an original -and modern principle, has been contradicted by certain Catholic -editors; who state that this doctrine, however true, is not original -to Vico, and is indeed far from modern, being a purely Scholastic -doctrine. If I thought otherwise, this was only due to my insufficient -knowledge of Scholasticism. - -I might indeed ask at the outset how such complete ignorance of -scholasticism were possible: an ignorance not of its manifold -varieties and the tangled forest of its distinctions--that would be -comprehensible: but of no less a matter than the fundamental criterion -of its theory of knowledge, the starting-point of modern thought and -as such, it would seem, inevitably familiar to every student of the -elements of philosophy. But since it is always useful to suspect -oneself of ignorance, or even to believe oneself more ignorant than -one really is, I will make so far as concerns myself a voluntary -display of humility. I find it less easy, I confess, to extend the -accusation of ignorance to all who, like myself, have failed to run -Vico's criterion to earth in the scholastic lumber-room: Jacobi for -instance, who on reading it as expressed in the _De antiquissima,_ sees -in it the first manifestation of Kantianism and absolute idealism:[2] -or the Catholic theologian Baader, who finds its later development -in Schelling's philosophy of identity:[3] or the learned and subtle -Spanish Thomist, Jaime Balmes, who treats it as a unique idea and -attacks it from the scholastic point of view:[4] or the equally learned -Catholic Bertini, who accepts and develops Jacobi's observation:[5] -or the eminent historian of philosophy Wilhelm Windelband, who, while -unacquainted with Vico's doctrines, on coming across indications of a -similar thought in Sanchez's _Quod nihil scitur_ was greatly struck by -it and endorsed its value by the assertion that it was to bear fruit -at a later date and in the hands of a greater philosopher, Immanuel -Kant:[6] or again the specialist in the history of scholasticism, Karl -Werner, the author of a careful monograph on Vico,[7] who nowhere -notices the alleged scholastic character of Vico's theory of knowledge. -Scholasticism must indeed be a difficult and mysterious doctrine, if it -is inaccessible to all these students, qualified and bound though they -are to understand it. - -But we cannot pause on the threshold to speculate: we must plunge -straight into the argument. In what part of scholasticism can we find -Vico's criterion converting knowledge with creation? - -The Thomistic saying, "truth and reality are convertible," _ens et -verum convertuntur,_ has been quoted:[8] but quotations of this kind -are perhaps more calculated to confuse by words than to convince by -facts. The same value attaches to the statement that Vico himself -confessed the scholastic origin of his principle, since the very first -chapter of the _De antiquissima_ begins with the words "in Latin, -the truth and the fact reciprocate, or, as the scholastic mob says, -convert," _"Latinis verum et factum reciprocantur, seu, ut scholarum -vulgus loquitur, convertuntur."_ Here it is perfectly clear to any -one on a moment's thought that Vico, Latinist as he was, meant -simply to substitute the Ciceronian "_reciprocari_" for the barbarous -"_converti._" - -St. Thomas explained the meaning of his formula quite clearly, -especially in the Summa Theologica, Part I. question xvi. art. 3. -Here he asks whether the truth and the reality are convertible, -_utrum verum et ens convertantur;_ to which he replies as follows: -"that as the good is of the nature of the desirable, so the truth -has the nature of knowledge. But in so far as a thing has existence -in itself, thus far it is knowable. And for this reason it is said -in _De anima,_ Bk. III. text. 37 (431 b 21) that 'the soul is in a -sense all things' according to sense and intellect. And hence as the -good is convertible with the existent, so is the true. But yet as the -good adds to existence the nature of the desirable, so also the truth -adds a reference to the intellect." (_Quod sicut bonum habet rationem -appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem cognitionis. Unumquodque autem -in quantum habet de esse, in tantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc -dicitur in_ 3 _de Anima, text._ 37, _quod 'anima est quodammodo omnia' -secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo sicut bonum convertitur cum -ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis -supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum._) Nothing then -can be known except what exists, and nothing can exist but what is -good: existence, truth and goodness are all convertible. Thus, too, -things are called good in so far as they correspond to the idea in -their Creator's mind. "Each single thing partakes of the truth of -its own nature in so far as it imitates the knowledge of God, like -an artefact in so far as it agrees with the art": "the knowledge of -God is the cause of things": "the knowledge of God is the measure of -things." (_Unumquodque in tantum habet de veritate suae natura, in -quantum imitatur Dei scientiam sicut artificiatum in quantum concordat -arti_ I. xiv. 12. _Scientia Dei est causa rerum_ I. xiv. 12. _Scientia -Dei est mensura rerum_ I. xiv. 12.) But truth and goodness, the -objects of intellect and will respectively, if on the one hand they -are "convertible in reality," _convertentur secundum rem,_ on the -other they are "distinguishable in thought," _diversificantur secundum -rationem_ (I. lix. 2). What have these thoughts in common with Vico's -idea that the condition of knowing a truth is to create it? In fact, -what is here stated is that the condition of making a thing is to -know it, or as St. Thomas says in the same place (I. xiv. 8) in St. -Augustine's words (_De Trinitate_ xv. 13) "_Universas creaturas et -spirituelles et corporales non quia sunt ideo novit Deus, sed ideo -sunt quia novit._" (God does not know all His creatures corporeal and -spiritual because they exist: but they exist because He knows them.) - -Vico makes no kind of mention of the formula _ens et verum -convertuntur,_ though he knows and quotes--a fact which has escaped my -critics--the analogous phrase "the true and the good are convertible," -_verum et bonum convertuntur:_[9] a formula which he diverts to his -own purposes, or rather unites it with his own. "In the first place," -he writes, "I establish a truth which is convertible with the created, -and in this sense I understand the good of the schools, convertible -with existence: and hence I infer that the one and only truth is in -God, since in Him is contained all Creation."[10] This union is reached -quite openly by identifying _verum_ with _factum,_ then _factum_ -with _ens,_ and finally the _verum-factum-ens_ with the _bonum_: by -substituting the doctrine of Vico for that of the schools. By such a -method of interpretation one could reduce all doctrines to a single -one, a _perennis philosophia._ I do not say that it would be a method -entirely devoid of truth; but it is certainly not a historical method. - -That Vico's criterion is not only different from but inconsistent -with Thomism was shown, as I have already said, by Balmes; who -pronounced it "specious but devoid of solid foundation." He uses St. -Thomas's statements to controvert Vico's theological doctrine that God -understands because He creates, opposing to it the Scholastic view -that He creates because He understands. He denies, that the Word was -conceived by the mere knowledge of what is contained in the divine -omnipotence, for it is conceived not simply by creatures but also and -chiefly by the cognition of the divine essence ("for the Father by -understanding himself and the Son and the Holy Ghost and all other -things embraced by His knowledge conceives the Word, so that thus -the whole Trinity is implied in the Word, and also every creature": -_Pater enim intellegendo se et Filium et Spiritum sanctum et omnia -alia quae ejus scientia continentur concipit Verbum, ut sic tota -Trinitas Verbo dicatur, et etiam omnis creatura);_ he objects that, -granting this criterion, God could never know himself, because He -is not His own cause. He denies that intelligence is only possible -through causality, inasmuch as it is also possible through identity. -He accuses Vico's criterion of involving scepticism: in a word he -maintains that the facts of knowledge are known by reason, even if they -are not the products of reason.[11] I am not concerned to ask whether -Balmes is right, or whether Vico's criterion can be reconciled with -Christian theology. I am concerned merely with establishing, not only -by quotation from St. Thomas but also by the help of the judgment of -an authoritative interpreter of his system that this doctrine is not -Thomistic. - -Even granting that the criterion in question is irreconcilable with -Thomism but not with an improved Christian theology, it is certainly -irreconcilable with both in the form it adopts in what I have called -"Vico's second theory of knowledge," in the _Scienza Nuova,_ which -Balmes either did not know or omitted to mention, and is passed over by -my critics with a light-heartedness that is not particularly enviable. -One of them asserts that "the alleged distinction" (the distinction -that is drawn by myself) "between Vico's first and second theories of -knowledge does not in point of fact exist, and produces no effects of -any kind." What? Has it no effects, when those historical studies and -sciences of mind, which in the _De antiquissima_ occupied the lowest -position among mere probabilities became in the _Scienza Nuova_ the -truest of all--true even in a higher degree than mathematics itself -as dealing with the human world which "is man's creation?" when their -form is found "in the modifications of the actual human mind itself?" -when they have "a reality as much greater, as the reality of the laws -of human affairs is greater than that of points, lines, areas and -figures?"[12] Is there no distinction, when we pass from the scepticism -of the _De antiquissima_ to the rationalism of the statement that these -"proofs are of a divine nature," and must produce "a divine pleasure, -since in God to know and to create are one and the same"?[13] - -It is true that upon this point my attention has been recalled to a -well-known passage of Galileo (_Dialogo dei massimi sistemi_), an -especial favourite of our own Spaventa,[14] where we find the thought -that the human intellect differs from the divine _extensivè,_ but -not _intensivè,_ and that if the divine intellect knows infinitely -more about mathematical propositions because it knows them all, yet -"of these few facts known by the human intellect, its knowledge is -equal to that of the divine in objective certainty, since it attains -comprehension of the necessity than which no greater certainty, it -seems, can exist." But in any case Galileo was not a Schoolman, and -moreover this pronouncement of his seemed so dangerous to the Christian -theory of ideas, that he himself was obliged to alter it by admitting -that while "so far as the truth of which mathematical proof gives no -knowledge is concerned, this is identical with that which the divine -wisdom knows," yet "the manner, in which God knows the infinitely -numerous propositions of which we know a few, is immensely superior to -our own, which proceeds discursively from one conclusion to another, -while His is simple intuition." It is important too not to forget -that this very statement figures among the heads of the accusation in -Galileo's trial.[15] - -If the formula of the conversion of the true with the created is not -found in Thomism, it may perhaps be found, at least in its original, -sceptical or mystical, intention, in other tendencies of scholasticism -or mediaeval philosophy generally. With Thomism Vico seems to have had -neither acquaintance nor sympathy: but from his autobiography it is -plain that he studied nominalism and the summaries of Petrus Hispanus -and Paulus Venetus, though with little profit,[16] and later also, -much more profitably, the Scotist philosophy; which he considered the -most Platonic of the Scholastic systems.[17] Traces of this appear in -several views expressed in the _De antiquissima,_ especially in those -dealing with universals and ideas. In this direction, the direction -that is to say of the Scotist system and the closely allied system of -Occamism, I have attempted various researches, without attaining any -remarkable results: further, I have applied for assistance to various -specialists in Scholasticism, but in vain; they would do nothing -but express their own superficial impressions or lose themselves -in idle disputation. In general it seems possible to say that Duns -Scotus's theory of knowledge presents points of affinity to that of -Vico: for example, in the polemic against the Thomistic doctrine of -the _adaequatio intellectus et rei,_ which he refutes by applying it -to the divine knowledge, since God knows objects as willed by Him, -and they exist because He wills their existence without His being -necessitated by them.[18] For Occam again the thought of objects has -no reality and objectivity (or subjectivity according to the usage of -Scholastic terminology, which is the reverse of modern) in God, and is -nothing else than the objects themselves, known by God according to the -possibility of creating them, in virtue of which they are thinkable -to the divine mind.[19] But the question for Vico is not merely the -priority of creation to knowledge or knowledge to creation, but the -convertibility or identity of knowledge and creation. - -In certain recently published philosophical observations by Paolo -Sarpi,[20] a nominalist of Occam's school,[21] the following statements -are to be found. They are the more notable because standing as they -do without any results in Sarpi's thought and being undeveloped in -subsequent philosophy, they seem to be not his own invention but a -mere repetition of scholastic dicta. "We have certain knowledge both -of the existence and of the cause of those things which we understand -fully how to create: of those which we know by experience, we know the -existence, but not the cause. We can however guess at it, and look -simply for a possible cause: but out of many found to be possible -we cannot be certain which is the true one. This fact may be seen -in descriptions of astronomical theories, and would also be true in -the case of a man who saw a clock for the first time. Of the various -guesses, that of a man who knew how to make similar objects would -be nearest the truth, _e.g._ one who understood the construction of -machinery when he saw a different kind of machine: but none the less -he will never on that account[22] know for certain. There are then -three kinds of knowledge: first, knowledge how to make the object: -secondly, experience of it: and thirdly, guessing at possibilities." -This thought, then, namely that objects are known by their creator, -and that God knows objects because He creates them, seems to have been -current in the schools: and this explains the fact of its reappearing -in an incidental manner and as an obvious truth in Francesco Sanchez's -_Quod nihil scitur_ (1581) where it is declared impossible "_perfecte -cognoscere quis quae non creavit; nec Deus creare potuisset nec creata -regere quae non perfecte precognovisset_"[23] (that one should know -perfectly things which he has not created: nor could God have been able -to create nor after creating them to control things which He had not -perfectly foreknown). - -But need we continue to look for it in the guise of a casual remark -or an isolated proposition, devoid of philosophical connexion, in the -works of philosophers or the lecture-rooms of the schools? Did it not -simply form a part of the common thought which daily declares that the -man who has made a thing knows it better than he who has not made it? -Probably a little attention would reveal it in many and dissimilar -treatises; and for my own part, while reading the _Chronicon_ of Otto -of Freising the other day, I came across it in the introduction to -the third book, where the chronicler, writing as is well known under -the influence of St. Augustine's _Civitas Dei,_ is arrested by the -objection that God's designs in history are inscrutable, and delivers -himself of the following reflections: "What then shall we do? If we -cannot understand, shall we hold our peace? Then who will reply to -those who flatter, repel those who attack, and by the reason and might -of his words confute those who would destroy the faith that is in us? -So we cannot understand the secret counsels of God, and yet we are -often compelled to give a reasonable account of these things. What? -Shall we reason about things which we do not understand? We can give -reasons, but human reasons, when yet we cannot understand the divine -reasons. And thus it happens that when we speak of theological matters, -lacking the right words for them, we being men use our own words; and -in speaking of so great a God in human language, we use our words the -more boldly _quo ipsum figmentum nostrum cognoscere non dubitamus,_ -because we never doubt that we know the thing we have ourselves formed: -_quis enim melius cognoscit quam qui creavit?_ for who knows a thing -better than he who has created it?"[24] The logic of the Abbot of -Freising at this point may be thought a trifle sophistical: but the -fact remains that he refers to a common opinion that he knows things -who has made them. - -But probably Vico was stimulated to the establishment of his criterion -less by certain tendencies of Scotism or by current opinions than by -the philosophers of the Renaissance, which he considered the golden -age of metaphysical study, when shone, as he says, "Marsilio Ficino, -Pico della Mirandola, Augustino Nifo and Augustino Steuco, Jacopo -Mazzoni, Alessandro Piccolomini, Matteo Acquaviva and Francesco -Patrizio."[25] In Ficino, whose name he couples with those of Plato -and Plotinus,[26] and especially in his _Theologia Platonica,_ Vico -could read a magnificent description of the productive character of -the divine wisdom and its parallelism with that of the geometrician. -Nature, says Ficino, which is divine art, differs from human art in -that it produces its creations from within, by living reasons: and "it -does not touch the surface of matter by means of a hand or any other -external instrument, as the soul of a geometer touches the dust when -he describes figures upon the earth, but _perinde ut geometrica mens -materiam intrinsecus phantasticam fabricat,_ it operates like the mind -of a geometer creating an imaginary matter from within itself. For -as the geometer's mind, while it considers within itself the nature -of figures, forms internally by pictures the image of figures, and -by means of this image forms an imaginary spirit without any toil or -design, so in the divine art of nature a wisdom of some kind by means -of intellectual processes endows with natural seeds the life-giving -and motive force itself which is its companion."[27] Vico must have -recalled this passage in Ficino when in his inaugural lecture of 1699 -he compared God, "the artist of nature," to the human mind which -"we may without impiety call the God of art," just as he must have -remembered it in the _De antiquissima_ where he compares God to the -geometrician.[28] Vico might however have found thoughts of this -kind in various Renaissance philosophers, not only in Ficino: among -others, in Girolamo Cardano, who contrasts divine and human knowledge, -though with a different conclusion; and restricts the one to finite -objects ("for understanding is brought about by a kind of proportion, -_proportione quaderni fit,_ and there is no proportion between the -infinite and the finite"), denying that man can know God, for as Vico -said later in almost the same words, "if I knew God, I should be God," -_si scirem Deus essem._ Thus he postulated "other sciences, and other -modes of understanding, entirely different from this of ours; more -true, more solid, more firm, as a body is than its shadow: and again -other principles which we can by no reason apprehend." And not only did -he postulate them, but among the human sciences he observed one which -as opposed to the natural sciences reached not merely the surfaces of -things but almost the things themselves, namely mathematics. "The human -soul, situated in the body, cannot attain to the substances of things, -but wanders about upon their surfaces by the help of the senses, -examining measurements, actions, resemblances and doctrines. But the -knowledge of the mind, which creates the fact, is in a sense itself the -fact, just as even among human sciences the knowledge of a triangle, -that it has three angles equal to two right angles, is practically -identical with the truth itself (_scientia vero mentis, quae res -facit, est quasi ipsa res, veluti etiam in humanis scientia trigoni, -quod habeat tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, eadem ferme est ipsi -veritati_), whence it is clear that there is in us a natural science -of a different kind from true science."[29] Here, in the definition of -divine knowledge and of the procedure of human knowledge in the case of -mathematics, as opposed to that of physical science, is implicit the -principle that true knowledge consists in the identity of thought with -its object. - -The idea of the opposition of mathematics to physical science, in the -certainty of the one and the uncertainty of the other, persisted in the -Neapolitan philosophers and scientists of Vico's youth, even if they -lost sight of the reason of this opposition. Tommaso Cornelio in his -"progymnasma" _De ratione philosophandi_ (1661) after reviewing the -errors produced by the illusions of sense in physical science, says, -"the contemplations of mathematics are not subjected to errors of this -kind, dealing as they do with things whose images are not introduced -into the mind by the senses; for the mind can by itself adequately -conceive figures and numbers, whose properties and analogies are -examined by mathematicians, without aid from sense."[30] This ought to -be emphasised, since it seems highly probable that Vico was stimulated -to the establishment of his general theory of knowledge by reflection -upon mathematics and the contrast between it and physical science. -In fact the Latin speeches, our earliest documents for his studies, -though they show the influence of Ficino and a certain amount of -Cartesianism,[31] are never dominated by this general criterion. It is -only in the last of these speeches, that of 1707, that the distinction -between mathematics and natural science begins to appear; in the next -year it is clearly stated in the _De ratione studiorum,_ where it takes -the form of a general criterion. "We demonstrate geometry because we -make it: if we could demonstrate physical facts, we should be creating -them. For the true forms of things exist only in God the greatest -and best, and to these the nature of them conforms" (_geometrica -demonstramus quia facimus: si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus. -In uno enim Deo Opt. Max. sunt verae rerum formae, quibus earundem est -conformata natura_). And this theory attained its full development in -1710 in the _De antiquissima._ - -Such are the probable precedents, or as the common but inaccurate -metaphor expresses it, "sources" of Vico's theory of knowledge. I do -not think that the formation of this theory can have been influenced by -the propositions of Geulinx and Malebranche which have been pointed out -to me,[32] namely that "no one can make that which he does not know," -and that "God alone knows his works, because he foreknows his action." -In these propositions the old Thomistic doctrine is substantially -summarised. Much more tenable would be a connexion or at least a -comparison with Spinoza; we may recall the Spinozistic identification -of the _ordo et connexio idearum_ and the _ordo et connexio rerum._ -Another ingenious, but I think, inaccurate view is that "the analytic -geometry of Descartes was the introduction of the genetic principle -into the study of geometrical objects," so that the principle _verum -ipsum factum_ "before being formulated by Vico had been practised by -Descartes"; and Vico in the _De antiquissima_ "adopted the scientific -method of Descartes, which he stated as the convertibility of the true -with the created," raising it "from a certitude to a criterion."[33] -We are dealing here not with practice, but simply with the theory of -method: for this method, conceived in its universality, just so far as -it is practical has always been practised; not by Descartes alone, and -not only by analytic geometry. - -We should certainly be better informed as to the precedents of Vico's -criterion if we knew more of his studies preparatory to the _De -antiquissima,_ and if in general we had more literary evidence about -his youth. Perhaps even the precedents I have indicated, which I only -called probable, are not quite free from an element of chance; they -may be connexions only imagined by myself and non-existent for Vico's -mind, while others not accidental may perhaps be still unknown, or -await discovery by a student more fortunate than myself. But it may -not be out of place to remark that the search for "precedents" does -nothing to explain the new thought that followed them; much less does -it detract from the value of that thought. Such information, though on -the one hand it enriches our knowledge of the history of philosophy, on -the other hand has absolutely no effect upon the determinate thought -under examination. It is valuable in the biography of a philosopher, -but valueless for the comprehension of the proper meaning of the new -theory, which must be sought essentially in the new problem which it -faces and attempts to solve. In the history of philosophy the same -principles hold good as in that of literature. Take for example the -episode of Argante and Tancred in canto xix. of "Jerusalem Delivered"; -Argante, while taking up his position for the fight with his adversary, -turns "as if in doubt" to the "afflicted city," towards Jerusalem -attacked by the crusaders; and when Tancred brutally mocks him, asking -whether he does this out of fear, he replies:-- - - I was but thinking how this city, - The immemorial green of Juda's realm, - Is falling, vanquished; whose unhappy fate - I have in vain endeavoured to repel. - -Here the precedents are easily found; Hector parting from Andromache -and foreseeing the unhappy fate of Ilion, Priam and all his people -(ἒσσεται ἧμαρ, etc., _II._ vi. 448-9); or Aeneas as he gazes upon its -downfall (_ruit alto a culmine Troia: ... si Pergama dextra,_ etc., -_Aen._ ii. 290-92). And yet the tragic melancholy of Argante is an -entirely new creation, and altogether original to Tasso. - -Ficino, Cardano, Tommaso Cornelio, Scotus and Occam, and any others who -have been or shall be added to the list, have or may have anticipated -this or that element of Vico's formula: and yet when we turn from their -statements to the _De antiquissima_ and the polemics that follow it, -and read the definition of science, of true science, as the conversion -of the true with the created, it strikes us as an entirely original -theory. The fact is that Vico had not to face the same opponents and to -solve the same problems that were faced and solved by the schoolmen, -nominalists and mystics of the Middle Ages or by the Platonists and -naturalists of the Renaissance, nor yet those of Descartes in his -_Discours sur la méthode;_ and the saying that "he alone knows things -who creates them" acquires a new value, a new meaning (and this is its -proper meaning) from its being used to refute the Cartesian _cogito_ -and the doctrine of immediate knowledge. Vico takes an old rusty -sword and makes of it at least a glittering and trenchant weapon. For -the same reason the phrase is no longer a mere accident or incident, -but the starting-point of a special study, the foundation of a new -philosophy, and Vico could quite well describe it as something not -learnt from another but thought out and established by himself. And -when he wants to find some original for it, he invents a history which -is really a fiction or a myth; namely the history of ancient Italian -wisdom which used this criterion as its supreme guide and left a trace -of it in the Latin language in the synonymity of the words _verum_ and -_factum._ - -The refutation of the Cartesian criterion (which De Sanctis thought -"complete," the "last word of criticism"[34]) is the negative aspect -of Vico's theory of knowledge. Its positive side, absent in the _De -antiquissima,_ is developed as we have said in the _Scienza Nuova,_ -where the human knowledge of the mind and of history is raised to -the level of divine knowledge. And since some critics have not only -chosen to ignore the obvious difference between these two phases of -Vico's thought but have spoken of a too easy transition from the -one to the other, it will be well to observe that this transition -was for Vico if not entirely conscious at least very slow and very -difficult. He must at one time have shared Descartes' and Malebranche's -contempt for history; in the speech of 1701 he even echoed a saying -of Descartes against philologists:--"You, Philologist, boast of -knowing everything about the furniture and clothing of the Romans -and of being more intimate with the quarters, tribes and streets of -Rome than with those of your own city. Why this pride? You know no -more than did the potter, the cook, the cobbler, the summoner, the -auctioneer of Rome."[35] But eleven years later, in the second reply -to the _Giornale dei letterati,_ Vico refers to the same phrase with -the contrary conclusion, and deplores that "the study of languages is -to-day considered profitless, thanks to the authority of Descartes, -who says that to know Latin is to know no more than did Cicero's -servant-girl."[36] Vico had in the meantime become conscious of the -importance of the "probable" knowledge of history and politics. He -refers to his former anti-historical Cartesianism in a passage of -the _De constantia philologiae_ which has generally escaped notice. -Speaking of philology he says: "I, who have all my life delighted -in the use of reason more than in memory, seem to myself the more -ignorant the more facts I know in philology. Whence René Descartes and -Malebranche were not far wrong when they said that it was alien to the -philosopher to work much and for long at philology." But he adds that -later he perceived that "these two most notable philosophers ought, -it they had been zealous for the common glory of Christendom, not for -the private glory of philosophers, so to have pressed forward the -study of philology as to see whether philology could be attached to -the principles of philosophy (_ut viderent philosophi an philologiam -ad philosophiae principia revocare possent_)."[37] The elevation of -philology to the rank of philosophy, of the knowledge of the world of -man to the level of divine knowledge, is the positive aspect of Vico's -theory of knowledge. It is this that is developed in the _Scienza -Nuova,_ towards which the _De antiquissima,_ with the indication of the -historical sciences as against Cartesianism, only prepared the way. - -Thus of the three points in which I placed the originality and value -of Vico's first theory of knowledge, two, namely the criterion of -knowledge opposed to that of Descartes and the defence of concrete as -opposed to abstract sciences, are not only left intact by the inquiries -into their sources which I have just described, but are actually -reinforced. - -There remains the third of my points: the Vician theory of the -arbitrary nature of mathematics, the originality of which has also been -impugned by arguments which seem to me to have even less foundation -than those I have examined above. - -Do we find the doctrine that the fundamental objects of mathematics, -the unit of arithmetic and the point of geometry, are unreal or -fictitious, propounded before Vico's time? Do we find it--this is the -chief point--propounded not as a casual remark or an intuition of a -truth, but as a consciously reasoned concept from which legitimate -consequences are drawn as to the limitations of mathematics and its -inability to furnish real knowledge of mind, nature and history? - -All through the Middle Ages the Aristotelian theory of mathematics is -continually enunciated. According to this theory mathematics is the -most certain of the sciences because the simplest; it abstracts from -all sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter (ὖλη νοητή) which -exists in sensible objects but not qua sensible (ἐν τοῑς ἀἰσθητοῑς -ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾖ ἀἰσθητά)[38] According to Cassiodorus it constituted the -body of _doctrinalis_ as opposed to _naturalis_ (physical) science and -_divina._ Albertus Magnus followed Aristotle in defining mathematical -entities as separable "in imagination," "in thought" but not "in -reality" (_in phantasmate, secundum rationem, non secundum esse_) -from the sensible matter to which "they are conjoined by existence" -(_per esse sunt coniunctae_); and St. Thomas said that mathematics -"though the objects it considers are not separate, yet considers them -in so far as they are separate" (_etsi sunt non separata ea quae -considerat, tamen considerat ea in quantum sunt separata_).[39] The -arbitrary character of its foundations was never suspected. Dante, when -he wished to indicate "the things which not being subject to our power -we can only contemplate and not create," enumerated "the objects of -mathematics, physical science and divinity" (_mathematica, physica et -divina_).[40] - -Just as mathematics was not always equally valued in antiquity, so, -and much more so, after the Renaissance of learning, it was variously -exalted or despised. Giordano Bruno satirised the abuse of it, and -said that without physical science "to be able to calculate and -measure, to understand geometry and perspective, is but a pastime of -ingenious fools," and warned his readers against confusing mathematical -"signs" and real "causes": "a reflected or direct ray, an acute or -obtuse angle, a perpendicular, incident or straight line, a greater -or smaller are of a circle, such and such an aspect, are mathematical -circumstances and not natural causes. To play with geometry is one -thing, to prove by means of nature is another. It is not lines -and angles that make the fire more or less hot, but near and far -situations, short and long spaces of time."[41] Campanella flatly -denied Aristotle's assertion of the superiority of mathematics to -physical science, declaring that its alleged purity was really weakness -(_debilitas_), its simplicity was inability to include more things -(_plura accipere_), its universality a contradiction against the nature -of true science which is always of particulars (_de singularibus_), -its demonstrative method by signs not by causes (_per signa, non per -causas_); and finally that it is not a science investigated for its -own sake and is valueless unless it is applied to physical matters -(_nisi applicentur physicis rebus_).[42] Bacon is of the same opinion, -that mathematics taken by itself is useless, and is useful only as an -"auxiliary science," a "great appendix" to the physical sciences.[43] -These definitions and restrictions, and others like them, might have -yielded as a conclusion the entirely instrumental and practical -character of mathematical science: but the conclusion was not drawn, so -far as I know; and Bacon himself considered mathematics as in itself -too exclusively and uselessly theoretical. "For since," he goes on in -the passage above quoted, "it is a fact of human nature, no doubt to -the great detriment of science, that it rejoices in the open plains -of generalities, so to speak, rather than in the forests and closes -of the particular, no discovery is more pleasant and gratifying than -mathematics wherewith to sate this love of wandering and of meditation." - -The "creation" of mathematics spoken of by Ficino, Cardano and -others signified a mental production entirely free from material -presuppositions, and for that reason not less true but true in a -higher sense. It is almost the same sense as that found in Descartes -and his followers. Locke asserts the reality of mathematical truths, -though he admits that there are in nature no figures corresponding -to the archetypes existing in the mind of the geometrician;[44] and -Leibniz, commenting on this passage, says that "the ideas of justice -and temperance are no more our own invention than those of the circle -and the square."[45] Tommaso Cornelio, whom we have quoted on the -contrast between physical science and mathematics, also believed that -mathematics rested on "certain notions and understandings which nature -has put into the minds of men as foundations of science."[46] - -Another kind of "creation," and one which seems to have more connexion -with Vico's _"fingere"_ is discussed in a passage of Aristotle's -_Metaphysics_ which has had a good deal of influence. "We find also," -Aristotle says, "geometrical figures by actualising them (ἐνεργεία), -because they are found by being divided: if they _were_ divided, they -would be obvious, but in reality they exist potentially. Why has the -triangle two right angles? Because the angles round one point are equal -to two right angles. If then we construct the angle along one side, it -would become plain to any one looking at it. Why is the angle in the -semicircle equal to a right angle? Because if there are three equal -lines, two in the base and one drawn perpendicular to it, it is plain -to any one who sees it and knows that. Whence it is evident that we -discover things that exist potentially by reducing them to actuality. -This is because the actuality is understanding, and the potentiality -proceeds from the actuality; so we know by making (καὶ διὰ τοῡτο -ποιοῡντες γιγνώσκουσιν)."[47] But these observations belong to the -explanations given by Aristotle in this passage of the conceptions of -potentiality and actuality; they are not at all opposed to his theory -of mathematics as studying the intelligible matter which subsists -in sensible matter, and they only explain the difference between -potential and actual truth. In the same way we sometimes find in later -philosophers the assertion that mathematical truths are demonstrated -and problems resolved "by making them." Thus Sarpi writes in the -passage mentioned above: "in mathematics, he who constructs knows -because he makes, and he who analyses learns because he seeks how the -thing is made. The mode of composition then belongs to the inventive -faculty and that of analysis to the discursive: the former is that -of problems, the latter of theorems; the latter are demonstrated by -analysis, the former by composition."[48] - -It has also been recently asserted that the Vician philosophy of -mathematics reappears bodily in Galileo and his school;[49] an -astounding fact when baldly stated, since even though Vico opposes -and prefers the great Pisan to Descartes for the moderate use he makes -of mathematics in physical science, it is certain that for Galileo as -for Leonardo da Vinci mathematics had an objective validity, and the -book of nature is written in mathematical characters and geometrical -figures. In any case, the passage of Galileo which has been quoted -in this reference, on the intensive identity of human with divine -knowledge, has nothing to do with the present question, and another -passage which asserts that the explanations of terms are free, and it -is in the power of every workman to circumscribe and define in his own -way the things he is dealing with, without ever being led by this into -error or falsehood, and that for instance one may call the bow the -stern and the stern the bow, says nothing but a platitude hardly worth -saying except by way of adorning a page of controversial rhetoric.[50] -In controversy one is often obliged to insist upon platitudes, and -the controversy upon which I am now engaged itself presents too many -examples. - -A passage from the _Lezioni accademiche_ of Galileo's pupil Evangelista -Torricelli in which he speaks of the difference between physical and -mathematical definitions seems at first sight more convincing. But the -critic who has called attention to this passage[51] says too much when -he asserts that "it is beyond doubt that Vico had read it," since it is -unquestionable that Vico had _not_ read it. The _Lezioni accademiche_ -were published first posthumously in 1715[52] and Vico's theory of -mathematics is expounded in the _De ratione_ in 1708 and the _De -antiquissima,_ 1710. This, it is true, is of secondary importance, for -Vico may have known Torricelli's doctrine through indirect channels, -through other books or even orally through some Neapolitan friend or -pupil of Torricelli; in any case, if the latter's theory though unknown -to Vico was really identical with his own, the similarity of ideas -between the two would be of the greatest interest. Unfortunately the -critic has been too hasty, as it seems to me, even in his study and -interpretation of the pages of Torricelli. - -In the passage in question, a lecture _Della leggerezza,_ read to -the Accademia della Crusca, Torricelli controverts, as based on mere -appearances and not confirmed by facts and reasoning, Aristotle's -definition in the _De coelo_: "heavy is that which has a natural -property of going towards the centre." He remarks upon this: "The -definitions of Physics differ from those of Mathematics in that the -former are obliged to adapt and adjust themselves to the object -defined, while the latter mathematical definitions are free and can be -formed at the will of the geometrician who is defining. The reason is -perfectly plain: the things defined in Physics do not come into being -with the definition, they exist already by themselves and are found -in nature previously. But the things defined by geometry, that is by -the science of abstraction, have no existence in the universe of the -world other than that which definition gives to them in the universe -of intelligence. Thus whatever objects of Mathematics are defined, -the same objects will come into existence simultaneously with the -definition."[53] - -The arbitrary character of mathematics seems here to be clearly stated. -But let us reserve our judgment and read on. "If I were to say, the -circle is a plane figure with four equal sides and four right angles, -this is not at all a false definition; but for the rest of my book I -should have to mean, whenever I spoke of a circle, a certain figure -which others have called a square. But if a man should say in Physics, -'the horse is a rational animal,' should we not be justified in calling -him the horse? We must first look very carefully to see whether the -horse is a rational animal or not and then define it as it is, in -order that the physical definition may conform to the object and not -be counted defective." Here we see that what appeared to be a profound -thought has turned out to be a platitude; it is indifferent whether we -call the bow the stern or the stern the bow, said Galileo, or, says -Torricelli in his turn, whether we call a square a circle or a circle a -square; while it does not seem to him an indifferent matter whether we -call a horse a rational animal. But even this does not prevent him from -admitting later some degree of arbitrariness in physical terminology, -when he says, "since then it is not demonstrated that the intrinsic -principle of downward motion exists upon the earth, I will accept this -definition, if the tests will allow me, as the simple imposition of a -name, and, replacing the verb 'to be' by the verb 'to be called,' I -will adapt the definition to my own requirements thus: That is called -heavy which descends to the centre. Whenever any one says, the earth is -heavy, I will agree, but always with the interpretation that the word -'heavy' only signifies descending in a lighter medium."[54] - -It seems to me then that the difference which he begins by laying down -between mathematics and physical science is considerably obscured in -the sequel. And indeed how could Torricelli have seriously thought that -the foundation of mathematics was a "fiction," when among his lectures -one heard the title "in Praise of Mathematics"? In this lecture he -says, quite in the Galilean style: "That to read the great Book of the -Universe, the book on whose pages may be found the true philosophy -written by God, mathematics are indispensable, will be seen by any -one who with noble thoughts aspires to the science of the integral -parts and greatest members of this huge body we call the World. The -one alphabet, the only characters with which we can read the great -manuscript of the divine philosophy in the book of the Universe are -those poor figures you see in the text-books of geometry."[55] The most -we can see in these statements is a vague and hazy presentment of the -profound difference between physical truths and the so-called truths of -mathematics. - -In conclusion, until for the third of my three points we can discover -much more obvious "sources" than those suggested up till now, I shall -see no cause to modify my verdict upon the originality of Vico's -conception of mathematics. This originality is further proved by the -important consequences drawn by Vico from his theory of mathematics for -his philosophical method; for every one knows that a thought taken over -bodily from another remains inert and sterile, while an original idea -is always active and fruitful. - -_Note._--I have selected, of the various criticisms directed against -my book on Vico, that concerning his "originality," because this gave -me opportunities for researches and explanations of some value. But my -book has been subjected to two general criticisms which do not lend -themselves to the same treatment. - -It has been said that in my exposition of Vico's philosophy I have -followed my personal philosophical convictions: and sermons and -epistles have been showered upon me preaching the duty of casting -off prejudices, etc., and narrating the history of philosophy in an -objective manner, etc. But I should like my critics to believe that my -"convictions" cannot have, to my mind, the character of prejudices, -but precisely that of liberation from prejudice, which is what they -demand: that detachment and purity of understanding which is necessary -for the comprehension of historical facts, and is not, as some fancy, -a primeval innocence, but the fruit of laborious cultivation. To -grasp Vico historically in his strict reality I have been compelled -to undergo a _catharsis_ of prejudices, consisting in my case of -the philosophy to which my own efforts had led me. My ideas may be -untrue, but that is another question; and that means that if their -falsity is proved I am bound to clear and purify my mind by means -of less false ideas; but these in their turn must always be ideas -and become convictions. In point of abstract method, no objection at -all can be made to any one who looks at Vico through the spectacles -of scholasticism if he thinks they make his sight more distinct and -penetrating; the most we can do is to try and persuade him that -there are better spectacles on the market. But we certainly have -the right to smile if this same scholastic goes on to warn us that -"in studying a philosopher, in investigating and reconstructing his -thought, it is absolutely necessary to bring to the task a mind free -from preconceptions and hostile to prejudices"; while all the time he -is trying to pass off his scholastic opinions and religious beliefs -under the banner of objectivity, sincerity and freedom from prejudice. -"Philosophers"--I have seen this assertion too--"are unfitted for -writing the history of philosophy, because they have ideas of their -own." And who is fitted for it? People who are not philosophers? Does -not Vico teach us precisely this, that where he who makes the facts (as -the philosopher makes philosophy) himself narrates them, there history -reaches its highest certainty? - -The other criticism concerns the idealistic interpretation which I -have given to some of Vico's doctrines. It is contended that Vico -was a Catholic, and that fact is supposed to prove that he could not -have entertained the ideas which I find in his works. But that Vico -professed himself an entirely orthodox Catholic, and that he clung to -Catholicism with all the strength and zeal of his mind I have myself -said again and again: I have even defended him against the accusations -or praises dealt out to him by other critics for deceit or prudence in -his attitude to the Church. But is it really so amazing, so unheard-of -a thing, to find heterodox ideas in an orthodox writer? Are they not -found in the Early Fathers and the Schoolmen, in mediaeval and modern -theologians and mystics? To take an example of the many that occur, -an example for a double reason above suspicion: Nicholas of Cusa was -a Catholic and in fact a Cardinal of Holy Church, and in his lifetime -the intimate friend of three popes. And yet the Catholic historian of -Scholasticism, De Wulf, wrote of him "Le Cardinal catholique est-il -donc panthéiste?... Il s'en défend vivement dans son _Apologia doctae -ignorantiae,_ mais on peut dire de lui comme d'Eckehart: 'il fait -fléchir la logique au profit de son orthodoxie et retient de force les -conséquences de ses prémisses'" (_Hist. de la philos. médiévale,_ p. -389). If this happened to the Cardinal of Cusa or the Franciscan Master -Eckehart, could it not happen to the Catholic Vico? M. de Wulf the -Catholic historian is allowed to use this admirable method of criticism -and to distinguish intention and action, will and logic. Why should it -be denied to me? But enough. - - - -[Footnote 1: A lecture delivered before the _Accademia pontaniana_ on -March 10, 1912, and here reprinted from the _Atti_ of that society, -vol. xlii.] - -[Footnote 2: _Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung_ (1811), -W.W. iii. 351-354.] - -[Footnote 3: _Vorlesungen über religiose Philosophie,_ W.W. i. 195, and -_Vorles. über spekul. Dogmatik, ib._ ix. 106 (passages quoted by K. -Werner, G. B. Vico, p. 324).] - -[Footnote 4: _La Filosofia fondamentale,_ translated from the Spanish, -Naples, 1851, bk. i. ch. 30-31.] - -[Footnote 5: _Storia critica delle prove metafisiche di una realità -sovrasensibile (Atti dell' Accademia di Torino,_ i. 1866), pp. 640-41.] - -[Footnote 6: _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (1878), 5th edition, -i. 23.] - -[Footnote 7: _G. B. Vico als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher_ (Wien, -1881). It is well known that Werner has written upon St. Thomas, Duns -Scotus, late Scholasticism, Suarez, Augustinianism, nominalism, etc.] - -[Footnote 8: Th. Neal (A. Cecconi), _Vico e l'immanenza,_ in the Roman -_Cultura contemporanea,_ iii. (1911) parts 7-8, pp. 1-24.] - -[Footnote 9: Cf. _Summa Theol._ i. q. v. a. I: q. xxi. a. 1-2.] - -[Footnote 10: _Prima risposta al Giornale dei letterati (Opere,_ ed. -Ferrari, ii. 117).] - -[Footnote 11: Balmes, _loc. cit._] - -[Footnote 12: _Scienza Nuova,_ ed. Nicolini, i. 187-8.] - -[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ p. 188.] - -[Footnote 14: _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Gentile, pp. 383-7, and -_Esperienza e metafisica,_ p. 218 _sqq._] - -[Footnote 15: See Gentile's note, _loc. cit._] - -[Footnote 16: _L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le poesie varie,_ ed. -Croce, pp. 4-5. Mauthner's assertion (_Beiträge zu einer Kritik der -Sprache,_ Berlin, 1901, ii. 497-8) that Vico was a nominalist and -that the great discoveries of the _Scienza Nuova_ were due to his -nominalism, is quite arbitrary and not founded correctly on his -autobiography.] - -[Footnote 17: _Autobiography,_ ed. cit. pp. 5-6. Pietro Giannone was -also studying Scotism about 1690 (_Vita scritta da lui medesimo,_ ed. -Nicolini, pp. 6-7).] - -[Footnote 18: Werner, _Johannes Duns Scotus_ (Wien, 1881), p. 76.] - -[Footnote 19: Werner, _Die nachscotistische Scholastik_ (Wien, 1883), -p. 82.] - -[Footnote 20: _Scritti filosofici inediti,_ ed. Papini (Lanciano, -Carabba, 1910).] - -[Footnote 21: See Gentile's observations on Papini's edition, in the -_Critica,_ review viii. 62-5.] - -[Footnote 22: Papini's edition has "po'" (little): but his source, the -Marcian MS., has an abbreviation to be read as "però" (therefore).] - -[Footnote 23: Appendix to his _Opera medica_ (Tolosae Tectasogum, -1636), p. 10.] - -[Footnote 24: _Ottonis Episcopi Frisigensis Opera,_ ex recens. R. -Wilmans, i. _Chronicon_ (Hannoveriae, 1867), pp. 118-19.] - -[Footnote 25: _Autob._ ed. cit. p. 21.] - -[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ p. 25.] - -[Footnote 27: _Theologia Platonica_ (Bale, 1561), i. 123. This passage -of Ficino has been quoted and commented on by my friend Gentile, in a -highly important monograph on _La prima fase della filosofia di G. B. -Vico_ (viz. the "inaugural lectures"), published in the miscellany in -honour of Francesco Torraca (1912, see _infra,_ p. 310) and read in MS. -by myself, thanks to the courtesy of the author.] - -[Footnote 28: See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.] - -[Footnote 29: These passages of the _Tractatus de arcanis -aeternitatis,_ ch. iv., and of the _De subtilitate,_ bks. xi. and -xxi. are quoted and commented on by Fiorentino, _Bernardino Telesio -ossia studi storici su l' idea della natura nel risorgimento italiano_ -(Florence, Le Monnier, 1872), i. 212-13, who does not fail to observe -the relations with Vico's criterion.] - -[Footnote 30: Thomae Cornelii consentini _Progymnasmata physica_ -(Naples, MDCLXXXVIII.), p. 70: cf. also p. 64.] - -[Footnote 31: See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.] - -[Footnote 32: By A. Pastore in a review of my monograph on Vico in the -_Giorn. stor. d. left. ital._ lviii., cf. pp. 400-402.] - - -[Footnote 33: A. A. Zottoli, _G. B. Vico,_ in _Cultura,_ Rome, xxx. -(1911) pp. 422-3.] - -[Footnote 34: _Opp._ ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.] - -[Footnote 35: _Orazioni latine,_ ed. Galasso, p. 28.] - -[Footnote 36: _Opp._ ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.] - -[Footnote 37: _Ibid._ 232.] - -[Footnote 38: _Metaphys._ vi. 1036 a.] - -[Footnote 39: The passages of Cassiodorus, Albertus and St. Thomas may -be found collected in Mariétan, _Problème de la classification des -sciences d'Aristote à saint Thomas_ (Paris, 1901), see pp. 80, 168-9, -182-3, 185-6.] - -[Footnote 40: _De monarchia,_ i. c. 3.] - -[Footnote 41: _La Cena delle ceneri_ (1584) in his _Opere italiane,_ -ed. Gentile, i. 62, 107-8.] - -[Footnote 42: _Logicorum libri très,_ bk. ii. art. 7-10 (in the -_Philosophiae rationalis pars secunda,_ Parisiis, 1637, pp. 433-7).] - -[Footnote 43: _De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,_ bk. iii. c. 6.] - -[Footnote 44: _Essay,_ iv. ch. 4, § 6.] - -[Footnote 45: _Nouveaux essais,_ iv. ch. 4.] - -[Footnote 46: _Op. cit._ p. 64.] - -[Footnote 47: _Metaphys._ viii. 1051 b. I append the passage: -εὑρἰσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεἰᾳ · διαιροῡντες γὰρ -εὑρἰσκουσις. εὶ δ' ἧν διῃρημένα φανερὰ ἂν ἧν · νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει -δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τò τρίγωνον ὃτι αἱ περἱ μἱαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι -ἲσαι δύο ὀρθαῑς. εὶ oὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τἡν πλευρὰν ἰδόντι ἂν ἧν εὐθὺς -δῆλον. διὰ τί ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρΘὴ καΘόλου; διὀτι ἐὰν τρεῑς, ἤ τε βάσις -δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταΘεῑα ὀρΘὴ, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῑνο εἰδὀτι. ὤστε -φανερòv ὄτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργεἰαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρἰσκεται. αἴτιον -δ' ὄτι νὀησις ἡ ἐνεργεἰᾳ · ὤστ ἐξ ἐνεργεἰας ἡ δυνάμις. καὶ διὰ τοῡτο -ποιοῡντες γιγνώσκουσιν.] - -[Footnote 48: _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Papini, p. 7. In a passage of -the _Arte di ben pensare (Scritti,_ p. 72) Sarpi returns to mathematics -and, while agreeing that it is less uncertain than the other sciences -because in it "the mode and the proposition" are more clearly shown, -goes on to say "it is also made in the same manner (as the others): it -is not free from the suspicion of being not quite true." But clearly -he is here speaking of the application of mathematics, of the act of -counting and measuring physical objects: "this alone is certain: I -count and reason in this manner, just as in eating honey I feel the -effect which I call sweet; where I may be in error is the question -whether this effect comes from the object or from the disposition of my -taste: and there is no science where there are number and measurement, -for all we can know is that we measure or count like this, and that -the measure comes in or is used as many times as the thing seems to be -equal to one such part and that equality is a concept of ours by which -we express what then seems to happen."] - -[Footnote 49: G. Papini, _La Novità di Vico_ in _L'Anima,_ Florence, -September 1911, pp. 264-6; cf. on this article, _Critica,_ x. 56-8.] - -[Footnote 50: Papini probably owes this passage to a small anthology of -Galileo by Favaro (Florence, Barbèra, 1910), p, 303, which refers to -the national edition of his _Opere,_ iv. 631; here the passage occurs -in the _Considerazioni sopra il discorso di Colombo_ (1615).] - -[Footnote 51: G. Papini, _loc. cit._ pp. 265-6.] - -[Footnote 52: _Lezioni accademiche di Evangelista Torricelli, -mathematico e filosofo del serenissimo Ferdinando II Granduca di -Toscana, lettore delle matematiche nello studio di Firenze e accademico -della Crusca_ (Florence, MDCCXV.). The editor's preface shows that the -work had not been previously published.] - -[Footnote 53: _Op. cit._ pp. 31-2.] - -[Footnote 54: _Op. cit._ p. 33.] - -[Footnote 55: _Op. cit._ p. 66.] - - - - -APPENDIX IV - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES - - -I. WORKS OF VICO - - -Vico's earliest extant work is the poem entitled _Feelings of one in -despair,_ composed certainly before the author's twenty-fifth year at -Vatolla in the Cilento, where he lived for nine years as a tutor at -the Casa Rocca, printed by Gonzatti at Venice and dated 1693. This was -followed by verses and speeches of a merely rhetorical character. - -The philosophical characteristics are accentuated in the six speeches -read by Vico at Naples University, 1699-1707, not printed by him, and -rediscovered and published by Galasso (Naples, Morano, 1869). In these -speeches, though some tendencies of his thought show themselves, his -philosophy is still the traditional system, not without some traces of -Cartesianism. Vico's opposition to Cartesianism and formal adoption of -his own views are announced for the first time in the inaugural lecture -for the year 1708, entitled _De nostri temporis studiorum ratione,_ -published next year by the author himself (Naples, Mosca, 1709). A -long digression (§§ 12-15) contains a sketch of the history of Roman -jurisprudence, his first essay in the historical studies which led -later on to the _Diritto universale_ and the two _Scienze Nuove._ - -The following year appeared Vico's first constructively philosophical -and historical work: the _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia ex -linguae Latinae originibus eruenda,_ or rather the first book of that -work (Naples, Mosca, 1710): the other two were never written, but -we can form an idea of their intended contents from what is said in -the Autobiography. Beside Vico's theory of knowledge in its first -form and the metaphysic which he always maintained in its entirety, -the _De antiquissima_ contained an attempt to reconstitute for the -first time primitive wisdom, or rather one particular instance of -primitive wisdom, that of Italy; but as we have already said in the -text of our exposition the attempt was founded on the idea that this -wisdom was philosophical, and conducted according to the criterion -of the transmission of culture which Vico subsequently rejected, as -he rejected the traditional opinion, accepted in this work, of the -Athenian origin of the laws of the Twelve Tables. We must accordingly -refuse to accept Cantoni's verdict (_G. B. Vico,_ p. 38) that the -_De antiquissima_ forms "a strange anomaly in the history of Vico's -thought, being contrary to his whole scientific life, his tendencies, -his principles, and the method which later he almost universally -applies in his historical researches." The reverse is in fact the case: -namely that this work is the starting-point of his future developments -and that without it we cannot understand his later thought. - -The criticisms directed by the _Giornale dei letterati d' Italia_ -(1711, vols. v. and viii.) against the historical and some of the -philosophical positions of the _De antiquissima_ evoked Vico's two -important _Replies_ (Naples, Mosca, 1711 and 1712) in which he defends -and elucidates his views on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. -The part of the _De antiquissima_ that never went to the press included -his meditations on the philosophy of medicine, from which he extracted -an essay _De aequilibrio corporis animantis:_ this he thought of -publishing many years later, but it is now lost. Of these studies, -therefore, as of his speculations upon physics intended to constitute a -_Liber physicus,_ we know only what he tells us in his autobiography. - -Setting aside his rhetorical and occasional compositions, the largest -of which is the _De rebus gestis Antonii Caraphaei_ (Naples, Mosca, -1716), the continuation of his thought, now concentrating upon moral -and historical problems, is sketched in a lecture of 1719 (of which -an abstract is included in the autobiography) and developed first in -1720 in a printed prospectus of four double-columned pages known as the -_Sinopsi del diritto universale,_ and secondly in the vast treatise, -_De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno liber unus_ (Naples, -Mosca, 1720) completed next year with the _Liber alter qui est de -constantia iurisprudentis,_ and supplemented in 1722 by the _Notae in -duos libros,_ etc. (same publisher); a work which is usually referred -to briefly following the author's example as the _Diritto universale._ - -This book, according to Cantoni (_op. cit._ p. 243) represents the -culminating point of Vico's scientific activity. The verdict is no -more acceptable than that quoted above. The author (_Opp._ v. 10-11) -rejected the _Diritto universale_ because he seemed to find persisting -there the prejudice and the pretence of "descending" from the thought -of Plato and other philosophers to that of primitive man, a tendency -which led him astray "in certain matters"; but he also calls it, and -rightly, a "sketch for the _Scienza Nuova,_" which it really is. -The ideas about poetry are here still confused, Homer is not yet a -myth, the mythological canons have less unity than they acquired -later, the theory of reflux is only faintly adumbrated, and in a -word both the ideal eternal history and the theory of knowledge upon -which it is founded are as yet immature. The book is all contained, -under a new form, in his later work, except the general ethical and -juridical philosophy, which is not highly original, and some historical -developments which are merely alluded to in the later writings. - -The MS. of an Italian work in two books, in which Vico expounded his -doctrines "by a negative method," has been lost. But he expounds them -positively and at less length in the _Principi di una Scienza Nuova -intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, per la quale si ritrovano i -principi di altro sistema del diritto naturale delle genti_ (Naples, -Mosca, 1725) which is known by the title (again authorised by himself) -of First _Scienza Nuova._ - -In 1725, the year of the publication of the first _Scienza Nuova,_ Vico -related the history of his studies: _Vita di G. B. Vico scritta da -se medesimo,_ which was inserted in Calogerà's _Raccolta di opuscoli -scientifici e filologici_ (Venice, Zani, 1728, vol. i. pp. 145-256). -Among the minor writings of this period may be noted the two speeches -on the death of the Countess of Althann (1724) and the Marchesana della -Petrella Angiola Cimini (1727); the little volume _Vici vindiciae_ -(Naples, Mosca, 1729) containing a personal defence (together with an -important theoretical digression on "laughter") against a malevolent -notice inserted in the _Acta Lipsiensia_ of 1727, about the _Scienza -Nuova;_ and some fine letters to Giacchi, Degli Angioli, Esperti, De -Vitry and Solla on the contrast between his works and the state of -learning at this time. - -To the first _Scienza Nuova_ Vico thought of adding a long series of -_Annotations_ in a reprint of it which he was preparing at Venice -between 1728 and 1730. But since this scheme was not carried out, -and on the other hand he was dissatisfied with the book not so much -on account of the matter, he says, as on account of the arrangement -(_Opp._ vi. 11), he resolved to publish an entirely new exposition -of his doctrines in the _Cinque libri de' principi di una Scienza -Nuova d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, in questa seconda -impressione con più propia maniera condotti e di molto accresciuti_ -(Naples, Mosca, 1730), which form the second _Scienza Nuova._ While -Cantoni (_op. cit._ pp. 238-9) considers this work the dotage of -Vico's thought, it is really the necessary result and perfect form in -which his previous attempts issued; it is the book which with the _De -antiquissima_ and the autobiography supplies all the necessary material -for a knowledge of his thought. In the _Diritto universale_ and the -first _Scienza Nuova_ we can find a few details omitted in the later -work; but those treatises display the same doctrines as the second -_Scienza Nuova_ in a manner much less profound and solid, and certainly -less characteristic of the author. The detailed comparison of these -three works has been made with great care in the short summaries added -by Ferrari to his editions of the first and second _Scienza Nuova._ - -Even the 1730 edition was increased by the author from 1731 to about -1740 by many variations and additions, though without changing the -arrangement or the substance of the work. These additions were taken -for the most part incorporated in a final MS. on which was based the -edition of the _Principi di una Scienza Nuova intorno alla comune -natura delle nazioni,_ published the very year of Vico's death (Naples, -Stamperia Muziana, 1744). In the National Library at Naples are -preserved the autographs both of this MS. and of two earlier MSS. of -additions and corrections, unpublished fragments of which have been -published by Giordano (Naples, 1818) and Del Giudice (Naples, 1862). -All the unpublished fragments and variants have been now collected by -Nicolini in the edition hereafter mentioned (p. 307). - -After the second _Scienza Nuova_ Vico wrote hardly anything. We may -note among these few productions the speech _De mente heroica_ (Naples, -1732), the addition to the autobiography (1731), and a few sonnets -in which, composed though they were, like almost all his verses, by -request and as occasional pieces, a personal note may at times be felt. - - -II. REPRINTS, COLLECTIONS, AND TRANSLATIONS - -Two collections of Vico's minor works have been made, one of the -_Latinae orationes_ alone by F. Daniele (Naples, 1766), and the other, -rich in unpublished matter, of the Italian and Latin _Opuscoli,_ -in four volumes, by C. A. de Rosa, Marchese di Villarosa (Naples, -1818-23). Vico's son Gennaro furnished Villarosa with all his father's -extant papers; and these priceless autographs are still preserved at -Naples in the house of my intimate friends the engineers Tommaso and -Vincenzo de Rosa di Villarosa. - -The first and only edition as it may be called, since all others -are merely reproductions of it, of Vico's complete works is that of -Giuseppe Ferrari, in six volumes (Milan, _Classici italiani,_ 1835-37) -reprinted with improvements in 1852-54. The _Opere_ edited by N. M. -Corcia (Naples, Tipografia della Sibilla, 1834, 2 vols.) are only a -selection; and the _Opere_ edited by F. Predari (Milan, Bravetta, 1835) -never went beyond one ill-arranged volume. The edition which followed -that of Ferrari (Naples, Iovane, 1840-41) is also incomplete and -ill-arranged, but contains some small unpublished works. The Neapolitan -edition of the _Opere_ in eight volumes (i.-ii. 1858, iii. 1861, iv. -1859, v.-vi. 1860, vii. 1865, viii. 1869, the earlier volumes at the -Tipografia dei Classici Italiani, the others by the publisher Morano) -is based mainly upon Ferrari, but somewhat incorrect; it is however the -most complete of all, as containing the _Sinopsi,_ the _Istituzioni -oratorie,_ and the _Orazioni latine_ published by Galasso subsequently -to Ferrari's edition, as well as the Italian translations by the -advocate F. S. Pomodoro of the _De ratione, De antiquissima,_ and -_Diritto universale._ - -Unpublished or scattered works of Vico not appearing in any of these -editions have been collected by Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana_ and -_Primo_ and _Secondo supplemento_: see below. - -A critical edition of the second _Scienza Nuova_ is now being printed -in the _Collezione dei classici della filosofia modernadiretta da -B. Croce e G. Gentile_ (Bari, Laterza): the first volume is to be -published at the same time as the present monograph.[1] It is being -edited by Dr. Fausto Nicolini, who by using the autograph MSS. has -enriched Ferrari's edition, which contained the fragments suppressed in -the 1730 issue, by all the fragments of the intermediate redactions -down to the 1744 text; Vico's quotations have been checked and -references given in notes to the passages of classical and modern -authors to which he refers; and, finally, in deference to a wish -often expressed by men of letters as authoritative as Tommaseo, the -orthography and punctuation have been corrected. Ferrari's valuable -summaries are reproduced, with a few emendations, in Nicolini's edition. - -Nicolini is also at work on a new edition of the complete works, to -form part of Laterza's collection of _Scrittori d' Italia,_ the scheme -and detailed index of which may be seen in Croce, _Secondo supplemento -alla Bibliografia vichiana_ (pp. 102-13). The fifth volume of this -collection, edited by Croce, is also to appear with the present -monograph. - -Vico's Latin works have frequently been translated into Italian: the -_De antiquissima_ anonymously, perhaps by Vincenzo Monti (1816), and -later by Sarchi (1870): the first book of the _Diritto naturale_ by -Corcia (1839), Amante (1841), Giani (1855), and Sarchi (1866), and both -books, with the _De ratione_ and _De antiquissima,_ as we have said, by -Pomodoro. - -The second _Scienza Nuova_ was translated into French, much -abbreviated, by Jules Michelet, under the title of _Principes de la -philosophie de l'histoire_ (Paris, Renouard, 1827) and frequently -reprinted; and again, in full, by an anonymous translator described as -"l'Auteur de l'Essai sur la formation du dogme catholique," in reality -Cristina Trivulzi, Princess of Belgioioso (Paris, Renouard, 1844). -Michelet also translated some of Vico's minor works, published with -the _Scienza Nuova_ in the edition of the _Oeuvres choisies de Vico_ -(Paris, Hachette, 1835) and frequently reprinted. - -In German there is a translation in full with good notes by W. E. -Weber (Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1844). There is also a summary of the first -book of the _Diritto universale_ by K. H. Müller, forming the first -volume of a series of Vico's _Kleine Schriften_ which was not continued -(Neubrandenburg, Brunslow, 1854). - -The only English translation is a version of the book on Homer based -on Michelet's French translation and inserted in H. Nelson Coleridge's -_Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets_ (3rd ed., -London, Murray, 1846). - - -[Footnote 1: By now (1913) the second volume has appeared: the third -will appear next year.] - - -III. BIOGRAPHY OF VICO - -By way of supplement to the autobiography, Villarosa collected -information on Vico's last years and published it as a continuation of -that work in his edition of the _Opuscoli,_ vol. i. (1818). - -This supplement, together with everything else that has been published -in the way of documents or contemporary records of Vico, may be found -collected in the fifth volume of the new edition of his works above -mentioned (p. 307) and entitled: _L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le -poesie varie,_ ed. B. Croce (Bari, Laterza, 1911). - - -IV. LITERATURE ON VICO - -There are only three monographs on Vico which may still be read with -profit (that of Ferrari, _La Mente del Vico,_ admirable editor though -he was, may best be consigned to merciful oblivion); they are as -follows:-- - -1. Carlo Cantoni, _G.B.V., studi critici e comparativi_ (Turin, -Civelli, 1867). Cf. for certain reservations A. Faggi, in _Rivista -filosofica italiana,_ vol. ix., 1906, pp. 593-606, and G. Gentile, in -_Critica,_ vol. v., 1907, pp. 197-201. - -2. Karl Werner, _G.B.V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher,_ (Wien, -Braumüller, 1881). Cf. _Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philos. -Kritik,_ vol. lxxii., 1883, pp. 139-52. - -3. Robert Flint, _Vico_ (Edinburgh and London, 1884). (Italian -translation by F. Finocchietti, Florence, 1888). - -See what has been said of these above, p. 277. Of short and general -studies the following are the best:-- - -1. B. Spaventa, _G.B.V.,_ in _Prolusione è introduzione alle lezioni -di filosofia_ (Naples, Vitale, 1862), pp. 83-102, reprinted under the -title _La Filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia -europea,_ ed. G. Gentile (Bari, Laterza, 1908); see pp. 111-35 of this -reprint. - -2. F. de Sanctis, _Storia della letteratura italiana_ (Naples, Morano, -1870; new ed. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1912), vol. ii. pp. 342-62. - -3. F. Fiorentino, _Lettere sopra la "Scienza Nuova"_ (Florence, 1865), -reprinted in _Scritti vari_ (Naples, Morano, 1871), pp. 161-211. - -4. E. Cauer, _G.B.V. und seine Stellung zur modernen Wissenschaft_ -(in _Deutsches Museum,_ edited by R. Prutz and W. Woelfsohn, Leipzig, -Hinrichs, year I, 1851, vol. i. pp. 249-65). - -For special points the following may be consulted:-- - -1. F. A. Wolf, _G.B.V. über den Homer_ (in _Museum der -Alterthumswissenschaft,_ Berlin, 1807, vol. ii. pp. 555-70). - -2. J. K. von Orelli, _Vico und Niebuhr_ (in _Schweizerisches Museum,_ -Aarau, vol. i. p. 184 _sqq._). - -3. C. Iannelli, _Sulla natura e necessità della scienza delle cose e -delle storie umane_ (Naples, Porcelli, 1818, and Milan, Fontana, 1832). - -4. Emerico Amari, _Critica di una scienza della legislazione -comparata_ (Genoa, Istituto dei Sordomuti, 1857). Cf. on this book K. -Werner, _E.A. in seinem Verhältnis zu G.B.V._ (Wien, 1880; from the -_Sitzungsberichte der phil.-histor. Klasse_ of the Imperial Academy of -Vienna, vol. xcvi.). - -5. F. Acri, _Teoria del V. intorno alle idee O paradimmi_ (in _Abbozzo -di una teoria delle idee,_ Palermo, Lao, 1870; and with modifications -in the volume _Videbimus in aenigmate,_ Bologna, Mareggiane 1907, pp. -287-313). - -6. E. Cenni, an exposition of Vico's metaphysic in the volume entitled -_Considerazioni sull' Italia ad occasione del traforo del Gottardo_ -(Florence, Cellini, 1884), pp. 109-82. - -7. E. Bouvy, _De V. Cartesii adversario_ (Paris, Hachette, 1889). - -8. E. Bouvy, _La Critique dantesque au dix-huitième siècle: Dante et -V._ (Paris, Leroux, 1892). - -9. G. Sorel, _Étude sur V._ (in _Devenir social,_ Paris, vol. ii., -1896) and see esp. the same author's _Le Système historique de Renan_ -(Paris, Jacques, 1905), _passim._ - -10. B. Labanca, _G.B.V. e i suoi critici cattolici_ (Naples, Pierro, -1898). - -11. G. Rossi, _V. nei tempi di V._ (in _Rivista filosofica italiana,_ -vol. ii., 1899, pp. 294-319, and part 2, _ibid._ vol. x., 1907, pp. -602-34). - -12. A. Olivieri, _Gli studi omerici di G.B.V._ (in _Atti della r. -Accad. di archeologia, lettere e belle arti,_ Naples, vol. xxiv., 1905). - -13. C. Trabalza, _Storia della grammatica italiana_ (Milan, Hoepli, -1908), ch. xii. pp. 364-76. - -14. P. Garofalo, _Acrisia vichiana nella "Scienza Nuova,"_ critical -annotations (Naples, Detken, 1909): cf. F. Nicolini, in _Critica,_ vol. -viii., 1910, pp. 374-8. - -15. G. Maugain, _Étude sur l'évolution intellectuelle de l'Italie de -1657 à 1750 environ_ (Paris, Hachette, 1909). - -16. On my own previous work upon Vico, it should be observed that -the materials of the chapter on Vico's aesthetic doctrine in Croce, -_Estetica_ (4th ed., Bari, Laterza, 1912, ch. v. pp. 255-71), have been -worked up in a more mature form into ch. iv. of the present monograph: -the essay on Vico's Ethics (in _Critica,_ vi., 1908, pp. 71-7) has been -absorbed into chaps, vi.-viii.; and similarly that on the _Lineamenti -di storia letteraria in G.B.V._ (_ibid._ pp. 460-80) into chaps, xvi. -and xviii.; my other scattered writings have in general been only of -technical, philological, or polemical interest. In the miscellaneous -_Studi in onore di F. Torraca_ (Naples, Perrella, 1912) is a short -essay by me upon _La Dottrina del riso e dell' ironia in G.B.V._ - -The whole of the literature on Vico, together with extracts from rare -books, minor works, and articles, and with unpublished documents -together with fully detailed notes on the editions of Vico's writings, -is collected in the three works to which I have frequently referred, -namely: B. Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana contenente nella parte I -il catalogo delle edizioni, traduzioni e manoscritti delle opere di -G.B.V.; nella parte II, quello dei giudizi e lavori storico-critici -intorno al V. sino al-l' anno corrente; nella parte III lettere -inedite del V. e al V., documenti e altri scritti inediti o rari, e -varie appendici illustrative_ (Naples, 1904: reprinted from _Atti -dell' Accademia pontaniana,_ Naples, vol. xxxiv.; pp. xii. 127, -4to);--_Supplemento alla Bibliografia vichiana_ (Naples, 1907; -reprinted from _Atti,_ vol. xxxvii. pp. 34, 4to)--and _Secondo -Supplemento_ (Naples, 1911, reprinted from _Atti,_ vol. xl. pp. 116, -4to); the whole collected in one volume under the title: _Bibliografia -vichiana; raccolta di tre memorie presentate all' Accademia pontaniana -di Napoli nel 1903, 1907 e 1910,_ with an appendix by F. Nicolini -(Bari, Laterza, 1911).[1] - -[Footnote 1: Since the publication of the Italian edition of this work -in 1911 several studies of Vico have appeared. The following may be -noted:-- - -G. Gentile, _La Prima Fase della filosofia di G.B.V.,_ Naples, 1912 (in -the _Studi in onore di F. Torraca_), quoted _supra,_ p. 287 n. - -F. Pessico, _Ripensando la Scienza Nuova_ (in _Rassegna nazionale,_ -November 1, 1912). - -G. Folchieri, _Il Carattere dell' opera di G.B.V._ (Perugia, Bartelli, -1913). F. Nicolini, _Spigolature vichiane; sul testo delle Vindiciae_ -(in _Scritti vari in onore di R. Renier,_ Turin, 1912). - -B. Croce, _Il V. e la critica omerica_ (in the volume _Saggio sullo -Hegel e altri scritti di storia della filosofia,_ Bari, Laterza, 1913, -pp. 269-282). - -Cf. also W. Windelband, _Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,_ 5th -ed. Leipzig, 1911, vol. i. pp. 597-8.] - - -NOTE - -PASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE -COURSE OF THE EXPOSITION - -CHAPTER I.--For this chapter see the _De ratione,_ the _De -antiquissima,_ the two _Riposte al Giornale dei letterati,_ and the -first part of the Autobiography. For the note (p. 8) on the spirit of -the Reformation, see _Opere,_ ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. vi. 5. - -Chapter _II.--Opp._ v. 147, 239, 136-7, 51; iv. 33; v. 50-51, 147; -iv-33, 63-4; iii. 200; v. 17, 97, 103, 149-50, 174; iv. 20, 248; iii. -232; iv. 20; v. 562. - -Chapter III.--_Opp._ v. 147, 162, 99, 42; iv. 73, 81, 174-5; v. 91, 145. - -Chapter IV.--_Opp._ v. 141, 166, 42; iii. 232, 272-3; iv. 20; v. 175, -259, 107; iv. 22, 33; v. 180, 441, 209-10, 201; iv. 205, 206; iii. 274, -275; v. 230, 211, 169; iv. 201, 233, 365; v. 55, 82, 187, 196-7; iv. -224; v. 110, 112, 168, 212, 237, 217, 379, 440, 212, 238; iv. 24. - -Chapter V.--_Opp._ v. 80-81; iv. 20, 21, 74; v. 169; v. 161-7; iv. -191-3, 168-9, v. 18; iv. 169, 50-51; iii. 26; ii. 96-7; v. 166, 43, -169, 420-21, 387, 192, 379, 108. - -Chapter VI.--_Opp._ v. 437, 18; iv. 165; v. 109, 110, 534; vi. 15; v. -532; iii. 12; v. 106; v. 49; iv. 343; vi. 127; iii. 30; iv. 87; iii. -57; v. 490; iv. 40-41; iii. 30; iv. 334; iv. 35; iii. 12, 30; v. 97; -iii. 234-40; iv. 49; v. 98, 131; iv. 42-3. - -Chapter VII.--_Opp._ v. 142, 168, 173, 248, 250; iv. 291; v. 106, 242, -142, 137-8, 290; iv. 175-7, 42-3; v. 153, 241; iv. 9; v. 96, 242, 574; -iv. 332; v. 97; iv. 176-7, 43; v. 176, 131. - -Chapter _VIII.--Opp._ iv. 309-13; v. 185; iii. 55, 28, 43-4; v. 97; -iii. 47-52, 52-3; iv. 14, 45, 57; v. 148, 133; iii. 53, 85-7, 58; v. -240-41, 484; iv. 170-71, 180, 351. - -Chapter _IX.--Opp._ v. 462-3, 544; iv. 43-4, 46; iii. 94, 192-3, 85, -87; iv. 18, 335, 15; v. 129-30, 563, 564; iii. 55; v. 571; iv. 245, 13, -159-60; _Scritti inediti,_ Del Giudice, pp. 11-14. - -Chapter X.--_Opp._ v. 13-14, 128, 143-4, 172, 570; iii. 22; iv. 42; v. -97, 572, 45-6, 463. - -Chapter _XI.--Opp._ iv. 62; v. 116, 183, 558, 559, 561, 570; vi. 127; -iii. 95; iv. 249. - -Chapter XII.--Same sources as for Ch. I. and also vi. 105-6; v. 524-5. - -Chapter XIII.--_Opp._ v. 60; iii. 249; v. 157, 167-70, 108; iii. -251-61; iv. 17, 253; v. 103, 217-18, 562; _Scritti inediti,_ p. 9. - -Chapter XIV.--_Opp._ v. 94-6, 58, 79, 321, 63-4, 84-5, 96, 93, 100; iv. -27-8, 29-30, 97, 169, 200, 271; v. 182-3, 61-4; iii. 230; iv. 236-43, -184; iii. 450-59; v. 113, 115, 149, 211, 59, 74, 100, 183; iv. 75-6, -89; v. 206; iv. 99; iii. 273; v. 260; iii. 280; v. 430-31, 202-3, 98-9. - -Chapter XV.--_Opp._ v. 356, 357, 255, 355, 121, 361-3, 363-365. 340, -341, 253, 251-3, 259, 132, 118, 278, 311, 309, 307, 118-19, 120, 121, -481, 484-6, 293-4, 246, 526, 528, 530-31, 223-5, 444, 43, 114-15, -222-3, 460, 220, 194, 191-3, 186, 249, 369, 371, 372, 375, 382, 403, -69; iv. 54, 83-4, 225-6. - -Chapter XVI.--_Opp._ v. 380-81, 422-5, 452, 277, 360-61, 381, 426, -435-6, 465, 425, 427, 442, 427-32, 440-41, 445. 448-9, 451, 455, 428-9, -445, 449-56, 445-6, 448, 452, 378-81, 441-2, 453-4, 78, 446-7, 458-60, -433-4, 439; iv. 178; vi. 46; v. 100-101, 467-80, 381, 223-4, 457, 100. -102, 226, 438; iv. 163, 25, 63, 200, 128; iii. 295. - -Chapter XVII.--_Opp._ iv. 249-50, 228; v. 183, 188; iii. 306-10; iv. -93, 34, 155; v. 86, 277, 322-3, 416, 129, 413-416, 81, 326, 86; iii. -473; v. 509-10, 102; iii. 469-75, 87, 122-3; iv. 67-71; v. 123-4, 191, -85, 100, 88, 290-91, 310, 496, 88-92, 123, 495-505. 502, 327. 525-30, -531, 534, 596, 474-476, 401, 551, 555, 514, 476, 515, 537-8, 122, 503, -521, 508, 523, 503, 514. - -Chapter XVIII.--_Opp._ v. 550, 537, 259, 540-41. 546, 555-556; iv. 101, -545, 347-8, 552, 555, 544, 554, 537, 539, 538, 551, 328, 547, 552, -512, 553, 550, 508-9, 68, 488, 547, 538-9, 231, 233, 204, 222, 226, -361, 425, 428-39, 457; iii. 357. vi. 37, 45-6; iii. 270; vi. 35, 37-8, -42, 48; v. 429, 439; iv. 198-200; vi. 38; v. 43, 226, 555, 544, 508-9, -557-8; iv. 235-6, 71. - -Chapter XIX.--For this chapter see the _De ratione,_ the first pages of -the Autobiography and the letters to Esperti, De Vitry, and Solla. On -wisdom see also _Opp._ v. 153. - - - - -INDEX OF NAMES -(Not retained for this text version.) - - -THE END - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, by -Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO *** - -***** This file should be named 52814-0.txt or 52814-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/8/1/52814/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe (and FreeLitOrg online gains -some more weight, incl. free education worldwide: moocs, -educational resources,...) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Editor: R. G. Collingwood - -Release Date: August 15, 2016 [EBook #52814] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe (and FreeLitOrg online gains -some more weight, incl. free education worldwide: moocs, -educational resources,...) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> - -<h1>THE PHILOSOPHY</h1> - -<h1>OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO.</h1> - -<h3>BY</h3> - -<h2>BENEDETTO CROCE</h2> - - -<h4>TRANSLATED BY R. G. COLLINGWOOD</h4> -<h4>FELLOW AND LECTURER OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD</h4> - - -<h5>NEW YORK</h5> - -<h5>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</h5> - -<h5>1913</h5> - -<hr class="full" /> -<h5>TO</h5> - -<h4>WILHELM WINDELBAND</h4> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>My reasons for believing that a new exposition of Vico's philosophy is -required may easily be inferred from the observations on the effects of -his work and the biographical notes which form respectively the second -and fourth appendices to this volume.</p> - -<p>Here I merely wish to state that my exposition is not meant for a -summary of Vico's writings work by work and part by part. It rather -presupposes an acquaintance with these writings, and, where that is -lacking, is intended to induce the reader to procure them in order to -follow better and to check the interpretation and estimate of them here -offered.</p> - -<p>On this supposition, though I have made free use of my author's actual -words, especially in the chapters dealing with history, I have not -thought it desirable to mark them as quotations except where it was -important to emphasise the precise phrase of the original. I have in -general combined such passages from fragments scattered over a wide -field, sometimes abbreviating, sometimes amplifying, and always freely -adding words and phrases of my own by way of commentary: and the -continual use of quotation marks would merely have shown up in a manner -more wearisome than valuable the reverse side of my embroidery, which -any reader who so desires can study by the help of the references given -at the end of the book.</p> - -<p>In my anxiety to show in every detail of my work, so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a></span> far as I could, -the veneration due to the great name of Vico, I have endeavoured to -be brief with the brevity at which he himself aimed as the hall-mark -of sterling scientific thought. With this in view I have refrained -even from controversy with his various interpreters, and have either -contented myself with mere remarks, or more often left my details -to be justified by the coherence of my view as a whole. Some of the -interpretations supported by me I believe to be the mature fruit of -the investigations and controversies which form the greater part -of the literature on Vico: all the rest, for which I am personally -responsible, and the general idea of my book, I will defend against -alternative and contradictory views when occasion arises, should it -ever do so, in the detailed and direct manner which I have not thought -it necessary to adopt in the course of my exposition. I hope, in fact, -that the present work will rekindle rather than quench the discussion -of Vico's philosophy: since in him we have, as Goethe calls him, the -<i>Altvater</i> whom a nation is happy to possess, and to him we must hark -back for a time in order to imbue our modern philosophy with an Italian -feeling, however cosmopolitan it may be in thought.</p> - -<p>The dedication of my book, besides being a token of respect to one of -the greatest modern teachers of the history of philosophy, is intended -to express the expectation and hope that the gap in this history to -which I have called attention more than once, especially on page 277 of -the present volume, may soon be filled.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 75%; font-size: 0.8em;">B. C.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 5%; font-size: 0.8em;">RAIANO (AQUILA),</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%; font-size: 0.8em;"><i>September</i> 1910.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="TRANSLATORS_NOTE" id="TRANSLATORS_NOTE">TRANSLATOR'S NOTE</a></h4> - -<p>This volume represents the author's <i>La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico</i> -(Bari, 1911) forming vol. ii. of his <i>Saggi filosofici</i>; and also -contains a paper read before the Accademia Pontaniana in March 1912 -entitled "Le Fonti della gnoseologia vichiana," which figures here as -Appendix III. The whole of the translation has been revised by the -Author.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 75%; font-size: 0.8em;">R. G. C.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 15%; font-size: 0.8em;">OXFORD, 1913.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a><br /><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h4><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h4> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span></p> -<div class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary=""> -<tr><td align="right">I.</td><td align="left">VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">II.</td><td align="left">VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_21">21</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">III.</td><td align="left">INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IV.</td><td align="left">THE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (POETRY AND LANGUAGE)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_44">44</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">V.</td><td align="left">THE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (MYTH AND RELIGION)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VI.</td><td align="left">THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VII.</td><td align="left">MORALITY AND RELIGION</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">VIII.</td><td align="left">MORALITY AND LAW</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_95">95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IX.</td><td align="left">THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">X.</td><td align="left">PROVIDENCE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XI.</td><td align="left">THE LAW OF REFLUX</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_122">122</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XII.</td><td align="left">METAPHYSICS</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_134">134</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XIII.</td><td align="left">TRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XIV.</td><td align="left">NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_154">154</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XV.</td><td align="left">HEROIC SOCIETY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XVI.</td><td align="left">HOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XVII.</td><td align="left">THE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XVIII.</td><td align="left">THE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_213">213</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XIX.</td><td align="left">VICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_227">227</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">XX.</td><td align="left">CONCLUSION: VICO AND LATER THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="center">APPENDICES</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">I.</td><td align="left">ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_247">247</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">II.</td><td align="left">THE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_268">268</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">III.</td><td align="left">THE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="right">IV.</td><td align="left">BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_302">302</a></td></tr> - - -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="left">NOTE.—PASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL -REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE -EXPOSITION</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_311">311</a></td></tr> - -<tr><td align="left"></td><td align="left">INDEX OF NAMES</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_313">313</a></td></tr> -</table></div> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></h5> - - -<h4>VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE</h4> - - -<p>The earliest phase of Vico's theory of knowledge takes the form of a -direct criticism of and antithesis to the Cartesianism which had guided -European thought for more than half a century, and was to maintain its -supremacy over mind and spirit for another hundred years.</p> - -<p>Descartes, as is well known, had placed the ideal of perfect science in -geometry, and endeavoured to reform philosophy and every other branch -of knowledge upon this model. Now the geometrical method proceeds -analytically till it reaches a self-evident truth, and thence by -synthetic deduction it advances to more and more complex propositions. -Accordingly, if philosophy were to adopt a rigorous scientific method, -it also (thought Descartes) must look for a solid foundation in the -shape of an elementary and self-evident truth from which to deduce all -its subsequent statements, whether theological, metaphysical, physical, -or ethical. Thus self-evidence—the "clear and distinct perception -or idea"—was the supreme test: immediate inference—the intuitive -connexion of thought with existence, <i>cogito</i> with <i>sum—</i> provided the -elementary truth and the foundation of knowledge. By means of the clear -and distinct perception, together with the systematic doubt which led -him<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> to the <i>cogito,</i> Descartes persuaded himself that he had once and -for all made an end of scepticism.</p> - -<p>But, by the same argument, all knowledge which had not been or could -not be reduced to clear and distinct perception and geometrical -deduction was bound to lose in his eyes all value and importance. This -included history, as founded upon testimony; observation of nature, -when not within the sphere of mathematics; practical wisdom and -eloquence, which draw their validity from empirical knowledge of human -character; and poetry, with its world of imaginary presentations. Such -products of the mind were for Descartes illusions, chaotic visions, -rather than knowledge: confused ideas, destined either to become clear -and distinct and so no longer to exist in their original nature, or -else to drag on a miserable existence unworthy of a philosopher's -consideration. The daylight of the mathematical method rendered useless -the lamps which, while they guide us in the darkness, throw deceptive -shadows.</p> - -<p>Vico, unlike the other opponents of Descartes, did not confine himself -to or waste time in scandalised outcries at the danger to religion -entailed by the subjective method. He did not inquire, like the -schoolmen, whether the <i>cogito</i> was or was not a syllogism, and if so -whether it was or was not defective. He did not join in the protest -of outraged common-sense against the Cartesian contempt of history, -rhetoric, and poetry. He went straight to the heart of the question, -to Descartes' criterion of scientific truth itself, the principle of -self-evidence. While the French philosopher believed himself to have -satisfied all the demands of the strictest science, Vico saw that as -a matter of fact, in view of the need which he set out to meet, his -proposed method gave little or no assistance.</p> - -<p>Fine knowledge, says Vico, this of the clear and distinct idea! That -I think what I think is certainly an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> indubitable fact; but it has by -no means the appearance of a scientific statement. Any idea, however -false, may seem self-evident: that I think it so does not give it -the force of knowledge. That "he who thinks, exists" was a fact well -known to Plautus's Sosia, who expressed this conviction in almost -the identical words of the Cartesian philosophy: "but when I think, -I certainly exist" (<i>sed quom cogito, equidem certo sum</i>). But the -sceptic will always reply to a Sosia or a Descartes that he has no -doubt as to thought; he will even strongly maintain that whatever seems -to him cogent is certain, and will uphold it against all objections; -and that he has no doubt as to existence: in fact, he is seeking -after it in the right way by suspending judgment and not adding to -the obscurity of facts other obscurities arising from opinions. But -while asserting all this he will still maintain that the certitude -of his thought and of his existence is the certitude not of science -but of consciousness, and of common consciousness at that. Clear and -distinct perception is so far from being science that since, owing to -Cartesianism, the principle has been applied to physics, our knowledge -of nature has become no more certain. Descartes tried to leap from the -plane of common consciousness to that of science: he fell back into -common consciousness again without having touched his scientific ideal.</p> - -<p>But in what does scientific truth consist, if not in immediate -consciousness? How does science differ from simple consciousness? What -is the criterion, or, in other words, what is the condition which makes -science possible? Clearness and distinctness do not take us a step -forward. The formulation of an elementary truth does not solve the -problem. The question concerns not a primary truth, but the form which -truth must have to enable us to recognise it for scientific or real -truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p> - -<p>In meeting this question, Vico justified his criticism of the -inadequacy of the Cartesian criterion by appealing to a principle -which at first sight may seem trite and obvious. It is trite not -because of the historic theory with which Vico associated it, a theory -later refuted by himself: not, that is, because it belongs to one of -the earliest strata of Italian philosophy; but in the sense that it -was common to and practically inseparable from Christian thought. -To a Christian who declares every day his belief in a God Almighty, -Omniscient, Maker of heaven and earth, nothing is more familiar than -the assertion that God alone can fully know all things, because he -alone is their creator. The primal truth, Vico repeats, is in God, -because God is the primal creator. It is an infinite truth because he -is the maker of all things, and absolute because it displays to him the -internal and external qualities of things, all of which he contains in -himself.</p> - -<p>This same principle of religion and theology had been already invoked -in a philosophical context by certain sceptics, as a weapon against -the presumptuous claims of human knowledge. Francisco Sanchez, for -example, in his <i>Quod nihil scitur</i> (1581), in discussing the difficulty -of knowing the nature and powers of the soul, had observed that if man -could have this knowledge in a perfect degree he would be like God, -or rather he would be God himself: since it is impossible "that one -should know perfectly things which he has not created, nor could God -have created things of which he had not perfect foreknowledge, nor -ruled them when created: he himself therefore, being alone the perfect -wisdom, knowledge, and intellect, penetrates all things, is wise -concerning all things, knows all things, and understands all things, -because he is all things and in all things, and all things are he and -in him" (<i>perfecte cognoscere quis quae non creavit, nec Deus creare -potuisset nec creata regere quae non perfecte praecognovisset:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> ipse -ergo solus sapientia cognitio intellectus perfectus omnia penetrat -omnia sapit omnia cognoscit omnia intelligit, quia ipse omnia est et -in omnibus, omniaque ipse sunt et in ipso</i>).<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> But Sanchez appeals to -this thought only in passing, and without grasping its philosophical -import or realising that his hand was resting upon a treasure; while -Vico for the first time drew from the praise of the infinite power -and wisdom of God, and from their contrast with the limited faculties -of man, the universal principle of his theory of knowledge, that the -condition under which a thing can be known is that the knower should -have made it, that the true is identical with the created: <i>verum ipsum -factum.</i></p> - -<p>This, he explained, is precisely what is meant by saying that science -is to know by causes, <i>per causas scire.</i> Since a cause is that which -has no need of anything external in order to produce its effect, it -is the genus or mode of a thing: to know the cause is to be able to -realise the thing, to deduce it from its cause and create it. In other -words, it is an ideal repetition of a process which has been or is -being practically performed. Cognition and action must be convertible -and identical, just as with God intellect and will are convertible and -form one single unity.</p> - -<p>Now once this connexion of the true with the created is recognised as -the ideal, and indeed, since the ideal is the truly real, as the true -nature of science, the first consequence of such a recognition must be -that science is unattainable to man. If God created the world, he alone -knows it <i>per causas,</i> he alone knows its genera or modes, he alone -possesses scientific knowledge of it. Did man make the world? Did he -make his own soul?</p> - -<p>To man is vouchsafed, not science, but only consciousness,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> which -merely traverses objects without being able to show the genus or form -whence they proceed. The truth of consciousness is the human side -of divine wisdom, related to it as the surface to the solid: rather -than truth, we ought to call it certitude. For God, <i>intellegere,</i> -understanding; for man only <i>cogitare,</i> thought, the faculty that -gleans elements of reality, but can never gather them all. For -God, true demonstration; for man, observations undemonstrated and -unscientific, but either certain through indubitable evidence, probable -through sound reasoning, or convincing because of a plausible guess.</p> - -<p>Certitude, the truth of consciousness, is not science; but it is not -on that account false. Vico was careful not to call the theories of -Descartes false: his intention was only to lower them from complete -truth to fragmentary truth, from science to consciousness. <i>Cogito ergo -sum</i> is very far from false. That we find it expressed by Plautus's -Sosia is an argument not for rejecting it, but for accepting it; only, -as a truth of simple consciousness. Thought is not the cause of my -existence, and as such is not the ground of scientific knowledge of -that existence. If it were, since man, as the Cartesians admitted, -consists of body and mind, thought would be the cause of the body: a -doctrine which would plunge us into all the mazes of the controversy on -the mutual effects of mind and matter. The <i>cogito,</i> then, is a mere -sign or indication of my existence, and nothing more. The clear and -distinct idea cannot serve as a criterion even of the mind itself, to -say nothing of other things; since the mind, though it knows itself, -does not create itself, and accordingly is ignorant of the genus or -mode by which it has this knowledge. But the clear and distinct idea -is all that is granted to human thought, and, as the only wealth -it possesses, is beyond price. For Vico, too, metaphysic holds the -highest place among the human sciences, and all others depend upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> -it; but while for Descartes it can proceed by a method of absolute -demonstration parallel to that of geometry, for Vico it must be -satisfied with probabilities. It is a science not by causes, but of -causes. And with probabilities it has been content in its greatest -periods, in ancient Greece and in Italy at the Renaissance. Whenever, -intoxicated by the arrogance that declares that "a wise man has no -opinions" (<i>sapientem nihil opinati</i>), it has sought to abandon the -probable, it has set its feet upon the path of confusion and decadence. -The existence of God is certain, but not scientifically demonstrable; -and any attempt at such a demonstration must be considered a proof not -so much of piety as of impiety, since to demonstrate God we must create -him: man must become the creator of God. Similarly we must accept as -true all that God has revealed; but we must not ask how it comes to be -true. That we can never understand. Human science bases itself upon -revealed truth and the consciousness of God, and finds there its test -of truth; but the foundation itself is not science, but consciousness.</p> - -<p>Just as Vico depreciated metaphysics, theology, and physics, the -sciences upon which Descartes had bestowed honour and attention, so -he reinstated those branches of knowledge which Descartes had in -turn despised; namely, history, observation of nature, empirical -knowledge of man and society, eloquence and poetry. Or rather, he could -vindicate them without reinstating them. Once he had shown that the -lofty truths of a geometrically deduced philosophy were themselves -brought down to mere probability, to statements having the validity of -simple consciousness, the other forms of knowledge were <i>ipso facto</i> -conclusively vindicated. All now found themselves upon an equality -in the position, whether high or low, which we have described. The -idea of a perfect human science, holding itself aloof from another -science unworthy of the title, as founded not on reason but on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> -authority, was shown to be illusory. The authority of observations -and beliefs, whether one's own or others', public opinion, tradition, -the consciousness of mankind, were restored to the position which -they had always held: a position which they held even for Descartes -himself, who, as often happens, despised the resources in which he was -richest and of which he made the greatest use. A conspicuously learned -man, he depreciated learning and scholarship, as one who has received -nourishment from it might give himself the luxury of speaking with -contempt of the common food which by now forms the very blood in his -veins.</p> - -<p>The Cartesian polemic against authority had proved in some respects -beneficial. It put an end to the servile attitude, all too common, of -continual appeals to authority. But this error was not more prevalent -than that of private judgment, which presumed to reorganise knowledge -from top to bottom on the strength of the individual consciousness: -a tendency which ultimately, as in the case of Malebranche, leads to -prophesying the immolation of all the ancient philosophers and poets, -and a return to the nakedness of Adam. It is a fallacy, or at least -an excess, which should be avoided by adopting a sound middle course. -This course consists in following private judgment with due regard to -authority; in a true catholic union of faith with a criticism limited -by and helpful to faith; bearing in mind the necessary character of -mere probability which is proper to human knowledge or science, and -avoiding the tendency of the Reformation which elevates each man's -inner consciousness into a divine guide in matters of belief.</p> - -<p>To another group of the Cartesian sciences, however, Vico seems to -grant a privileged position, one, that is, not of consciousness but -of science strictly so called, in the sphere not of certitude but -of truth; namely, the mathematical sciences. These, according to -him, form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> the only region in which man's knowledge is identical in -character with God's, perfect and demonstrative. This is not due, as -Descartes supposed, to their self-evident character. Self-evidence, -when employed in physical science and in matters of action, does -not yield truth of the same conclusiveness as in mathematics. Nor -is mathematics in itself self-evident. What clear and distinct idea -can lead, for instance, to the conception of a line as composed of -points having no parts? But the indivisible point which cannot be -conceived in the world of reality, can be nevertheless denned. By -defining certain names, man creates the elements of mathematics; by -the postulates, he carries them on to infinity; by the axioms, he -establishes certain eternal truths; and, disposing these elements with -the help of these infinities and this eternity, he creates the truth -which he teaches. The validity of mathematics then arises not from the -Cartesian principle, but precisely from Vico's other proposition, the -conversion of knowledge with creation. "We demonstrate mathematics, -because we create their truth" (<i>mathematica demonstramus, quia verum -facimus</i>). Man assumes unity and multiplicity, points and figures, and -creates numbers and quantities which he knows perfectly because they -are his own work. Mathematics is a constructive science; not only in -its problems, but even in its theorems, which are commonly supposed -to be mere objects of contemplation. For this reason it is a science -which demonstrates <i>per causas,</i> in opposition to that other common -view which excludes from mathematics the concept of causation. It is in -fact the only one among all the human sciences which truly demonstrates -by causes. Hence its extraordinary accuracy. The whole secret of the -geometrical method lies first in defining the terms, that is, creating -the concepts which are to be the subject matter of our reasoning; -secondly, in establishing certain common principles by mutual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> -consent of the disputants; and lastly, if required, in making certain -postulates of such a nature that they can be granted, to enable us to -proceed with our deductions, which without such an agreement could -make no progress; then, upon these principles, to advance by degrees -from the demonstration of the simplest truths to the most complex, and -not to affirm the complex propositions before examining singly their -component parts.</p> - -<p>It might be said that, as to the validity of mathematics, Vico is in -agreement with Descartes; he differs from him only in his reason for -this validity. And, admitting that Vico's reason must be thought the -more profound, this would only enhance and strengthen the mathematical -ideal which Descartes had set before science. If mathematics is the one -perfect form of knowledge attained by the human mind, obviously we must -found the others upon it, and either remodel or condemn them according -to its pattern. Vico, in short, was hasty in declaring Descartes wrong: -he had found a better argument whose existence the latter had not -suspected. But, however strongly this may appear at first sight (and so -it has appeared to some commentators), on a closer examination it is -seen that the high perfection attributed by Vico to mathematics is more -apparent than real; that the vaunted conclusiveness of its method is by -his own confession gained at the expense of truth: in a word, that the -stress of his theory falls less on the truth of mathematics than on its -arbitrary nature.</p> - -<p>The fact is, that man, while occupying himself with the investigation -of the nature of things, and ultimately realising his total inability -to attain it, not having in himself the elements of which they are -composed, which are indeed all external to his nature, is led by -degrees to the intention of profiting by this very fault of his -mind. By means of abstraction—not, be it remembered, abstraction -from material things, for Vico is opposed to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> empirical origin -of mathematics, but abstraction brought to bear on metaphysical -entities—he creates two fictions, <i>duo sibi confingit</i>: the point in -geometrical figures, and unity in multiplication. Each is a fiction, -<i>utrumque fictum,</i> because the point when drawn is no longer a point, -and the unit when multiplied is no longer one. Then, from these -fictions, by his own arbitrary fiat, <i>proprio iure,</i> he assumes an -infinite process, so that lines may be produced or the unit multiplied -<i>ad infinitum.</i> Thus he constructs for his own purposes a world of -forms and numbers, all of which he embraces within himself; and by -lengthening, shortening, and combining the lines and adding and -subtracting the numbers, he performs infinite operations and learns -infinite truths. Since he cannot define things, he defines names; since -he cannot reach the elements of reality he satisfies himself with -imaginary elements, the ideas arising from which admit of no dispute. -Like God, <i>ad Dei instar,</i> from no material substrate and, as it were, -out of nothing he creates the point, the line, and the surface; the -point, assumed as that which has no parts; the line, as the locus of -a point, or as length without breadth or depth; and the surface, as -the meeting of two different lines in one point, that is, length and -breadth without depth. Thus mathematics overcomes the failing of human -knowledge, that its objects are always external to itself, and that the -mind which endeavours to know them has not created them. Mathematics -creates what it knows; it contains in itself its own elements, and -thus forms a perfect copy of the divine knowledge (<i>scientiae divinae -similes evadunt</i>).</p> - -<p>The reader of these and other similar descriptions and praises by Vico -of the processes of mathematics seems to observe in them something like -a tinge of irony; which, if not actually intentional, certainly results -from the facts of the case. The brilliant truth of mathematics arises, -it appears, from despair of attaining truth; its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> tremendous power -from the knowledge of impotence. The similarity of the mathematician -to God is not altogether unlike that of the imitator of an object to -its creator. What God is in the universe of reality, man is in the -universe of quantity and number,—a universe indeed, but one peopled by -abstractions and fictions. The divinity which has been conferred upon -man is only, so to speak, a Twelfth-night Godhead.</p> - -<p>The different origin assigned by Vico to mathematics results in -a correspondingly profound change in the validity of its truth. -Mathematics no longer, as with Descartes, stands at the summit of human -knowledge, an aristocratic science, destined to reclaim and to rule -over the inferior sciences. It occupies a field as strictly limited as -it is unique, beyond which if it ever attempts to pass it loses in a -moment its magical virtue.</p> - -<p>The power of mathematics is met by obstacles both <i>a parte ante</i> and -<i>a parte post,</i> in its foundations and in the superstructure which in -its turn it is to support. In its foundations, because if it creates -its own elements, that is to say, the initial fictions, it does not -create the matter of which they are formed, which is given to it no -less than to the other human sciences by metaphysics, which while -it cannot supply it with its true subject matter, supplies it with -definite images of it. From metaphysics, geometry takes the point by -drawing it, that is by annihilating it as a point, and arithmetic the -unit by multiplying it, that is by destroying it <i>qua</i> unit. But since -metaphysical truth, however certain it may seem to consciousness, -is indemonstrable, mathematics itself rests in the last resort upon -authority and probability. This is enough to expose the fallaciousness -of any mathematical treatise which makes use of metaphysics. Vico seems -to be involved in a kind of circle between geometry and metaphysics, -of which the former, according to him, owes its truth to the latter, -and after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> receiving it gives it back again to metaphysics, thus in -turn supporting the human science by the divine. But this conception, -the truth of which is more than doubtful, indeed we may frankly call -it inconsistent and contradictory, recalls, whatever its value, the -metaphysical or rather poetical or symbolic use made of mathematics by -Pythagoras and other philosophers of antiquity and the Renaissance, -and has no resemblance to a mathematically-treated philosophy like the -Cartesian. Geometry in Vico's opinion is the one hypothesis by which -metaphysics passes over into physical science. But while making this -advance it remains a hypothesis, a probability, something intermediate -between faith and criticism, imagination and reason; which indeed is -the eternal character of metaphysics and human science in general -according to Vico's point of view in this first phase of his theory of -knowledge.</p> - -<p>Just as mathematics cannot be the basis of metaphysics, the science -from which it is itself derived, so it cannot provide a foundation for -the other sciences, although they follow it in order of derivation. -All objects other than number and size are beyond the reach of the -geometrical method. Physical science is indemonstrable: if we could -demonstrate the physical world, we should be creating it (<i>si physica -demonstrare possemus, faceremus</i>): but we do not create it, and -are accordingly unable to demonstrate it. The introduction of the -mathematical method into natural science has not helped it. Without the -mathematical method, science makes great discoveries; by its means it -has made none, whether great or small. The physical science of to-day -is in fact like a house, sumptuously furnished by former owners, to -which their heirs have added nothing, but have occupied themselves -merely in moving and rearranging the furniture. Accordingly, we must -reintroduce and maintain the experimental method in physical science, -as opposed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> this mathematical method; the English tendency as -opposed to the French; the cautious use made of mathematics by Galileo -and his school, as against the Cartesians' reckless and presumptuous -employment of it. The English are right in not allowing physical -science to be taught in the mathematical style. Such a style admits of -progress only when the terms are defined, the axioms established, and -the postulates granted. In physical science we have to define not terms -but things: we can make no unchallenged statements; and the complexity -of nature forbids our forming any postulates. Thus in the more -favourable instances this method results in a mere harmless verbalism. -Observations of nature are expounded with the phrases: "By definition -IV.," "By postulate II.," "By axiom III.," and concluded with the -pompous abbreviation "Q.E.D." But all this carries no demonstrative -conviction. The mind retains as much freedom of opinion as it had -before listening to such noisy methods. In these circumstances Vico -could not refrain from satirical comparisons. The geometrical method, -he says, in its proper sphere works unnoticed; when it makes a noise, -it shows that it is doing no work; just as a coward's attack consists -of much shouting and no blows, while a brave man holds his tongue and -strikes home. Again, the man who upholds the geometrical method in -subjects where it fails to carry conviction, when he pronounces this -to be an axiom, or that to be a demonstrated truth, is like a man who -draws amorphous pictures, quite unrecognisable without assistance, -and then writes underneath "This is a man," or "This is a satyr," or -"This is a lion," or the like. Hence it happens that the very same -geometrical method served Proclus to demonstrate the principles of -Aristotelian science, and Descartes to demonstrate his own, though -totally distinct from, if not diametrically opposed to them. Yet each -was a great geometrician,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> whom no one could accuse of inability to -use the method. What ought to be introduced into natural science is -not the method of geometry, but its conclusiveness; which is precisely -what can never be done. Still less is it possible in other sciences, -in proportion as they are more material and concrete; least of all in -ethical science. For this reason, where the reality cannot be used, -the name is misused instead; till, just as the title "Master," which -Tiberius once refused as too haughty, is given to-day to the humblest -man, so the name "demonstration," applied as it is to arguments at best -probable, sometimes patently fallacious, has impaired the respect due -to truth.</p> - -<p>Even for mathematics itself Vico apprehends danger from the -substitution of analytic for geometrical or synthetic methods. He -doubts whether modern mechanics is really a product of analysis; for -analysis blunts the inventive faculty or talent, and though infallible -in, its results (<i>opere</i>) is confused in its processes (<i>opera);</i> while -the synthetic method is <i>turn opere cum opera</i> infallible. Analysis -presents its grounds by inquiring whether the equations of which it is -in search happen to be present; it appears to be an art of guessing, -a kind of mechanism rather than thought. For similar reasons Vico -attached no value, to the more or less mechanical topics and arts of -discovery and memory invented by Lulle and Kircher.</p> - -<p>The sympathy with experimental methods which as we have seen estranged -Vico from the French tendency of thought, that is from Cartesianism, -and directed him towards the Italian and English schools of Galileo -and Bacon, led him on the other hand to a hostile attitude towards -Aristotelianism and scholasticism. Inculcating as he did the pursuit -of the particular and the use of inductive methods, asserting that -man possessed an inexhaustible wealth of physical knowledge which, -thanks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> to fire, machinery, and tools, was able to issue in the -creation of objects resembling the special products of nature, and -praising his own metaphysic as one subservient to (<i>ancillantem</i>) -the ends of experimental science, he was bound to realise how well -deserved was the too universal discredit, as he calls it, into which -Aristotelian science had fallen. If he disapproved of the introduction -by Descartes of physical forms into metaphysics, and of his resulting -materialistic tendencies, he accused Aristotle and the schoolmen of the -opposite error of introducing metaphysical forms into natural science. -Like Bacon he held that the syllogism and sorites produce nothing -new, and only repeat what was already contained in their premisses. -He emphasised the many ill effects of the Aristotelian universal -in every department of knowledge; in jurisprudence, where empty -generalities crush legislative wisdom; in medicine, which aims rather -at propping up systems than at healing the sick; and in practical -life, in which he describes the abusers of universals by the mocking -title of "Thematists." The use of universals results in homonymies -or equivocations which cause all kinds of errors. As against this -distrust of universals in the sense of general or abstract conceptions, -Vico showed a corresponding reverence for the Platonic ideas, the -metaphysical forms, or as he also called them, kinds; the eternal and -infinitely perfect patterns of things. A nominalist in mathematics, -Vico was suspicious of nominalism in all other fields of knowledge. He -asserts the reality of the forms or ideas, and tells how from his youth -up he was attracted by this doctrine, which he learnt from a teacher of -his, who as a Scotist was a follower of the scholastic system most akin -to Plato's.</p> - -<p>Taken as a whole Vico's first theory of knowledge is neither -intellectualistic, sensationalistic, nor truly speculative. It contains -all these three elements, harmonised to a certain extent, not by -a hierarchical subordination<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> of any two to the third, but by the -subjection of all three to a recognition of the inadequacy of human -knowledge. Its intention may have been to meet by a tactical manoeuvre -dogmatics and sceptics at once, the former by denying that we can know -everything, the latter by denying that we can know nothing at all. -But its actual outcome is an assertion of scepticism or agnosticism, -tinged, however, with a trace of mysticism. God's knowledge is the -complete sphere of knowledge, the unity of which man's is but a series -of fragments. God knows all things because he contains in himself all -the elements of which he makes them: man tries to understand them by -taking them to pieces. Human science is a sort of anatomy of the world -of nature; it divides man into body and soul, and soul into intellect -and will: from body it abstracts figure and motion, and from these -existence and unity. Of these metaphysics studies existence, arithmetic -unity and multiplication, geometry figure and its measurements, -mechanics the motion of the circumference, physical science the motion -of the centre, medicine the body, logic the reason, and ethics the -will. But this anatomy meets with the same fate as that of the human -body. In the latter case, the greatest physiologists doubt whether, -owing to the effects of death and of dissection itself, it is possible -at all to discover the true position, structure, and function of the -organs. Existence, unity, figure, motion, body, intellect, and will -are one thing for God, for whom they coalesce into one, and another -for man, to whom they remain distinct. For God they live, for man they -are dead. The clear and distinct perception is a proof not of the -strength but of the weakness of the human understanding. Physical laws -appear self-evident just until they are subjected to comparison with -metaphysical. The <i>Cogito ergo sum</i> is absolutely conclusive when man -considers himself as a finite being; but when he includes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> himself in -God, the one true being, he realises that in truth he does not exist -at all. By means of extension and its three dimensions we believe -ourselves to establish eternal truths; but in fact <i>coelum ipsum -petimus stultitia,</i> since the eternal truths exist in God alone. The -axiom that the whole is greater than the part may seem eternal, but if -we go back to the beginning, we find that it is false: we see that the -centre of the circle contains in itself as much capacity for extension -as the whole circumference. Wherefore, Vico concludes, "he has advanced -in metaphysics who in the study of this science has lost himself."</p> - -<p>To hold, as some have done, that these words show Vico a simple -Platonist or a follower of the traditional Christian philosophy, -would entail denying any importance whatever to his first theory of -knowledge. It would be a confession of adherence to the fallacious -method of philosophical criticism and history which looks only at the -general conclusions of a system and ignores the particular content -which alone gives it its true individuality. No doubt, any philosophy -must always in its ultimate conclusions be either agnostic, mystical, -materialistic, spiritualistic, or the like: in other words, it must -have its place in one or other of the eternal categories in which -thought and philosophical inquiry move. But to expound philosophers -in this one-sided manner can only serve to perpetuate the mistakes -repeated over and over again in the history of thought, when it passes -fruitlessly from one error to another, leaving the old only to adopt -the new, itself perhaps an old one born again or painted with the -colours of youth. The Platonismi agnosticism, or mysticism of Vico -is in the fullest sense of the word original, because it forms the -accompaniment of doctrines not only not inferior to the average of -contemporary thought, but greatly in advance of it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> - -<p>The first of these doctrines is the theory of knowledge as the -conversion of the true with the created, Vico's substitute for the -otiose criterion of the clear and distinct perception. Though this -conversion represents for Vico an ideal unattainable to man, it yet -does not bring with it an exact definition of the condition and -character of knowledge, the identity of thought and being, without -which knowledge is inconceivable.</p> - -<p>The second is the revelation of the nature of mathematics, as unique -among the forms of human knowledge in origin, rigorous because -arbitrary, wonderful but unfit to rule over and transform the rest of -our knowledge.</p> - -<p>Finally, the third doctrine is the vindication of the world of -intuition, empirical knowledge, probability, and authority, all those -forms of experience which intellectualism ignored or denied.</p> - -<p>In these points Vico the agnostic, the Platonist, the mystic, was -neither agnostic nor mystic nor Platonist. He achieved a threefold -advance upon Descartes, and upon all these three heads criticised him -conclusively.</p> - -<p>The one thing in which Descartes was still in advance of Vico was -precisely that dogmatism of which Vico would have none. Descartes, -whether he succeeded or not, projected a perfect human science -deduced from the internal consciousness. Vico, on the other hand, -considering the French philosopher too confident and despairing of -the success of his project, proclaimed the transcendent nature of -truth, took his stand upon revelation, and contented himself with -producing a metaphysic worthy of man's weakness, <i>humana imbecillitate -dignam.</i> His was a philosophy of humility, as the Cartesian was one of -self-confidence.</p> - -<p>Now Vico could not advance even to this position without relaxing -to some extent part of his humility, and taking over something of -Descartes's confidence: without introducing into his Catholic turn of -mind some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> trace of the leaven of that Protestantism he thought so -dangerous, and venturing to conceive a philosophy rather less worthy of -man's weakness and correspondingly more worthy of man, a creature at -once strong and weak, at once man and God. This advance is to be seen -in the next phase of his thought.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> In the appendix to his <i>Opera Medica</i> (Tolosae Tectosagum, -1636, p. 110). Windelband draws attention to this thought, <i>Gesch. der -neueren Philosophie,</i> 3rd ed. i. p. 23.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></h5> - - -<h4>VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE</h4> - - -<p>The will to believe, which in Vico's case was very strong, and the -complete sway which the Catholicism of his country and age held over -his mind, bound him firmly down to the Christian Platonic metaphysic -and theory of knowledge; a theory whose inherent contradictions were -prevented by the above psychological facts from coming explicitly -before his mind. The idea of God at once dominated and supported him; -he neither had the audacity nor realised the necessity to probe to the -bottom such problems as the validity of revelation, the conceivability -of a God apart from the world, or the possibility of affirming the -existence of God without in some sense demonstrating and therefore -creating him. For Vico to open up and partially traverse a new path, -which should lead the human mind to transcend that of the Christian -Platonists, providence—to use for the moment an idea of his own which -we shall explain later on—had perforce to deceive him; to lead him by -a long and circuitous way to the commencement of the new path without -letting him suspect where it would end.</p> - -<p>The writings in which Vico expounds his first theory of knowledge, <i>De -ratione studiorum</i> and <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia,</i> together -with the polemical works bearing upon them, belong to the four years -from 1708 to 1712. In the following decade Vico was gradually led -to devote<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> himself more and more to research in the history of law -and of the State. He read Grotius as a preparation for writing the -life of Antonio Carafa, and plunged into the controversy on Natural -Rights. He pursued his studies of Roman law and the science of law in -general, in order to fit himself for a chair of jurisprudence at Naples -University. He pondered upon the origins of languages, religions, and -states, out of dissatisfaction with his own historical theories as -set forth in the <i>Be antiquissima</i>; perhaps also his convictions were -shaken by a well-directed criticism by the editor of the <i>Giornale -dei letterati.</i> His profession, the teaching of rhetoric, gave him -continual opportunities for meditating upon the nature and relations -of poetry and the forms of language. Thus even if it is inaccurate to -say that Vico was led to his later position culminating in the <i>Scienza -Nuova</i> by a philological, not a philosophical process (since clearly -a philosophical position can only come into being through a process -no less philosophical), it is at least certain that the material and -stimulus for his new thought were supplied by philological studies.</p> - -<p>These studies seem to have impressed upon him a fact of great -importance; namely, that this subject-matter could only be and had -actually been worked over by his thought through the aid of certain -necessary principles, appearing on every page of the history which -he had chosen for investigation. He had once believed that the moral -sciences, as compared with the mathematical method, took the lowest -place as regards certainty. But now, in his daily acquaintance with -these sciences, he had come to hold the opposite view; namely, that -nothing could be firmer than the foundation of the moral sciences!</p> - -<p>This certainty was not the simple self-evidence of Descartes, in which -the object, however internal it is said to be, remains extrinsic to -the subject. It was a truly internal certainty, reached by an internal -process. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> the assimilation of historical facts, Vico felt himself -to be making more truly his own something that already belonged to -him; to be entering into possession of what was his by right. He was -reconstructing the history of man; and what was the history of man but -a product of man himself? Is not the creator of history simply man, -with his ideas, his passions, his will, and his actions? And is not the -mind of man, the creator of history, identical with the mind which is -at work in thinking it and knowing it? The truth of the constructive -principles of history then comes not from the validity of the clear and -distinct idea, but from the indissoluble connexion of the subject and -object of knowledge.</p> - -<p>The importance of this new discovery, the discovery of the truth which -Vico now recognised in the moral sciences, lay in the realisation of -a new implication of the theory of knowledge laid down by himself in -the former period of his speculations; namely, the criterion of truth -consisting in the "convertibility of the true with the created." The -reason why man could have perfect knowledge of man's world was simply -that he had himself made that world. "When it happens that he who -creates things also describes them, then the history is certain in the -highest degree."</p> - -<p>Connected as it thus was with his earlier view, the assertion of the -possibility of the moral sciences did not, to Vico's own mind, present -the importance and bring with it the consequences of a revolution -entirely overthrowing the structure of his ideas, and compelling him -to adjust them afresh. On the one hand, this assertion seemed to him a -confirmation of his former doctrine, a new example to be added to those -he had already collected of perfect knowledge; namely, God's knowledge -of the universe and man's of the world of mathematics. On the other -hand, it seemed to be an extension of the field of knowledge, whose -boundaries (for definite boundaries still<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> existed) had at first been -too narrowly drawn. Formerly he had described a small luminous sphere -in the centre of a vast and dimly lighted field; now the luminous -sphere underwent a definite increase in size, and the penumbral region -a corresponding diminution. This increase involved no sort of conflict -with his religious beliefs; in fact, it seemed to support them and to -gain support from them in turn. For did not religion teach the liberty, -responsibility, and consciousness which man has in respect of his own -acts and creations?</p> - -<p>Thus Vico did not feel obliged to write a new treatise on metaphysics. -It seemed enough to add a mere post-script to his former work, and -to correct to some extent his earlier assertions. His new theory of -knowledge, while adhering strictly to the criterion of truth enunciated -by him in opposition to that of Descartes—the principle, that is, that -only the creator of a thing can know it—divided the whole of reality -into the world of nature and the world of man. But, while it laid down -that the world of nature is created by God and that therefore God alone -knows it, it restricted its agnosticism to this field. It asserted, -on the other hand, that the human world, being man's creation, is -known by man. In this way it raised the knowledge of human affairs, -formerly considered merely approximate and probable, to the rank of -perfect science; and it expressed surprise that philosophers should -so laboriously endeavour to attain to science of the world of nature, -which is a sealed book to mankind, while passing over the world of man, -the science of which is attainable. The cause of this error he traced -to the ease with which man's mind, involved and buried as it is in the -body, feels bodily things, and the labour and pains it costs it to -understand itself, as the bodily eye sees all objects outside itself, -but in order to see itself requires the help of the mirror.</p> - -<p>In everything else his system remained unchanged.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> Beyond the world -of man lay the supernatural world, inaccessible to man, and the world -of nature, itself also in a sense supernatural. Beyond the perfect -knowledge which man could have of himself lay the metaphysic of -Christian Platonism, now reduced to impotence, but continuing none -the less to embarrass mankind. The natural sciences were now, as -before, regarded as incomplete forms of knowledge: mathematics as a -system of abstractions, absolutely valid in the abstract but in face -of reality powerless. The Aristotelian syllogism, the Stoic sorites, -and the Cartesian geometrical method were pursued with the same hatred -as before; and the same enthusiastic praise was lavished upon the -induction advocated and illustrated in his <i>Organum</i> by Bacon, that -"great philosopher and great statesman," and fruitfully employed by his -countrymen in experimental philosophy.</p> - -<p>Vico's frequent claim to have constructed the science of human affairs -on "a strict geometric method" might seem to indicate a change of -opinion as to the applicability of that method. But his continual -warnings, during the same period and in the same works, against the -use in physical and moral questions of the mathematical method, which, -"where there are no figures either of lines or numbers, either gives -us no conclusiveness, or else, instead of demonstrating the truth, -may often give an appearance of demonstration to falsehood," would -flatly contradict the supposed change of front were it not that we -could interpret it so as completely to restore the coherence of Vico's -thought. This interpretation is quite simple. Once the power of -converting the true with the created is seen to attach to the moral -sciences no less than to geometry, these sciences could and indeed must -develop on a method analogous to the synthetic method of geometry, -the method which proceeds from a truth to its immediate consequence. -In this manner they follow the progress of the world of man from its -ideal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> origin to its perfect development; so that the student must -not hope to be able to investigate these sciences <i>per saltum,</i> but -must traverse them from beginning to end in detail, without refusing -to accept unforeseen conclusions any more than he can refuse to do -so in geometry; but concentrating his attention on the firmness of -the bond between premisses and conclusion. Thus the method could be -called geometric by analogy or synecdoche; in fact, however, it was -essentially speculative, and not to be confused with the application of -mathematics to questions of morals, of which the Cartesians and Spinoza -have left examples.</p> - -<p>Nor can we agree without reservation to the opinion of certain -commentators that Vico, in asserting the existence of a single science -of man, to be studied in the modifications of the human mind, was -retreating to the position of a follower of Descartes. This opinion -is often reinforced by another statement of Vico's, namely, that -to conceive his New Science it would be well to return to a state -of absolute ignorance, as if no philosophers, philologists, nor -books had even existed in the world. It is true that with the new -form of his theory of knowledge Vico himself joined the ranks of -modern subjectivism, initiated by Descartes. In a sense, indeed, -he had already done so in his activistic doctrine of truth as the -reconstruction of the created. In this quite general sense Vico might -himself be called a Cartesian. Nevertheless, if he was still behind -Descartes in making his subjectivism a principle not of the whole of -knowledge but of the knowledge of the world of man only, in another -way he was ahead of the French philosopher, in that for him the -truth attained in the world of man was not static but dynamic, not a -discovery but a product, not consciousness but science.</p> - -<p>As for the advice that one should proceed as if there were no books, -no philosophical or philological doctrines<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> in the world, its meaning -is merely the necessity of ridding oneself of all prejudice, of all -common habitual assumptions, of all accretions of memory and fancy, -in order to attain "the state of pure understanding, empty of every -particular form," which is necessary for the discovery and apprehension -of any new truth. So far removed is this advice from the Cartesian or -Malebranchian renunciation of learning and authority, that—to mention -one fact only—in the very passage to which we have just referred we -find the warning that the New Science presupposes a comprehensive and -varied mass both of doctrine and of learning, the truths of which -it takes over as already known, and uses them as terms in its new -propositions.</p> - -<p>In a word, Vico in his new theory of knowledge became not more -Cartesian but more Vician—more himself. Descartes seemed to him not -even a serviceable path by which to attain proof of the possibility -of constructing the science of mind by means of the mind. The true -path was Vico's own criterion of truth, brought into relation with its -author's observations made in the course of his historical studies. -If we wish to look for precedents in the history of philosophy for -Vico's theory of knowledge in its second form, the division between the -two worlds of reality and the two spheres of consciousness, and the -preference for moral as compared with natural studies, would lead us -back to the position adopted by Socrates as against the "Physiologists" -of his time, and the feeling of religious mystery which brought the -Athenian philosopher to a standstill in face of the natural world and -directed his efforts to the study of the mind of man. Again, as to the -superior transparency of the moral sciences, as dealing with objects -created by man himself, we might recall the Aristotelian division of -the sciences into physical, treating of motion external to man, and -practical and "poietic," which deal with man's own<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> creations. The -distinction passed into the philosophy of the schools: Thomas Aquinas -speaks of nature as "an order which reason contemplates but does not -create" (<i>ordo quem ratio considerat sed non facit</i>), and of the world -of human activity as "an order which reason creates by contemplation" -(<i>ordo quem ratio considerando facit</i>). But no such reference is made -by Vico, fond as he was of expressing the debt of his own thought to -the ancient philosophers; and admitting that the doctrine had some -force before his time, the divergence between this earlier view and -that of Vico on the knowableness of the world of man is as great as -that between the assertion of the omniscience of God the Creator and -the theory of knowledge which Vico was able to draw from it.</p> - -<p>Of this theory, his doctrine of the moral sciences was neither more -nor less than the first legitimate application. Both its author and -the majority of his commentators are using inaccurate language in -describing it as a simple extension of the previous applications—a -second instance, added to that of the mathematical sciences, already -examined.</p> - -<p>In the mathematical sciences, the principle of the conversion of -the true with the created had been applied in appearance only. -The principle itself was original and sound: so was the theory of -mathematics. But the connexion between the two truths was altogether -artificial and false. What was lacking was, unless we are mistaken, -an effective relation between the concept of God who creates the -world and, as creating it, knows it, and that of the man who -arbitrarily constructs a world of abstractions, and in doing so either -knows nothing at all, or else, when he ceases to be a geometer or -arithmetician and becomes a philosopher, when he is composing not -Euclid's Elements but the theory of knowledge in the <i>De antiquissima,</i> -knows merely that his procedure is arbitrary. If the mathematical -sciences construct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> their concepts as they please, if they produce not -truth but definitions, they are as a matter of fact not sciences at -all, nor any form of knowledge, and cannot be compared with the divine -knowledge, the knowledge of actual reality. In mathematics, says Vico, -"man, holding within himself an imaginary world of lines and numbers, -operates in this world by abstraction just as God operates in the -universe by reality." It is a luminous comparison; but perhaps its -light is that of metaphor rather than logic.</p> - -<p>In the moral sciences, on the other hand, the comparison is so entirely -logical that it should frankly be called coincidence. Human knowledge -is qualitatively identical with divine, and knows the world of man -equally well; it is, however, quantitatively more restricted, and -does not extend like the divine to the world of nature. In the human -field we no longer find the expedients of weakness, definitions and -falsifications; knowledge is here at its highest point of concreteness. -Man creates the human world, creates it by transforming himself into -the facts of society: by thinking it he re-creates his own creations, -traverses over again the paths he has already traversed, reconstructs -the whole ideally, and thus knows it with full and true knowledge. Here -is a real world; and of this world man is truly the God.</p> - -<p>It seems undeniable, then, that the application of the <i>"verum-factum"</i> -made in the New Science is the only one which corresponds to the -criterion previously formulated. The earlier attempt at an application -of it to mathematics, though important in other respects and well -calculated to free the mind from mathematical prejudice, cannot be -considered a true or strict use of it. It is possible that Vico -was sometimes vaguely conscious of the difference between the two -applications, the strict and the metaphorical, which as a rule he -confused and treated as identical. The science of the world of man, he -says, proceeds exactly as does geometry, which while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> it constructs -out of its elements or contemplates the world of quantity, itself -creates it; but with proportionately greater reality, since order has -no connexion with human affairs, containing as they do neither points, -lines, surfaces, nor figures. Another indication of his gradually -dawning consciousness that he had now for the first time in his -doctrine of the world of man discovered a true and proper knowledge, -not a mere fiction of knowledge, may perhaps be seen in the much -greater conviction, warmth, and enthusiasm with which he now uses the -epithet "divine": quite a different thing from the chilly, if not -absolutely ironical, <i>ad Dei instar</i> of the <i>De antiquissima.</i> The -proofs of the New Science, he says more than once, with fervour, "are -divine in their nature, and should give thee, Reader, a divine joy: -since in God knowledge and creation are one."</p> - -<p>The conversion of the true with the created was bound to react upon -the treatment of certitude in one, perhaps the chief, of the various -meanings in which Vico uses the word, namely, historical fact: the -<i>peculiare, certum,</i> as opposed to the <i>commune</i> or <i>verum.</i> This forms -the other important section of Vico's second theory of knowledge. In -the former theory these cognitions were, as we saw, legitimised and -protected by being put on a level with all other kinds of knowledge, -all of them equally weak or equally strong, being all alike founded on -probability or authority, whether of the individual (autopsy) or of -mankind.</p> - -<p>But now that the knowledge of the human mind and its laws was rescued -from the region of authority and probability, historical fact, although -still in a sense, by its very nature, founded upon authority, was -placed in a new light. The certain must enter into a new relation, -confronted as it now was not by another certainty, that is, mere -probable knowledge of the human mind, but by a truth, a piece of -philosophical knowledge.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span></p> - -<p>This relation is also called by Vico the relation between philosophy -and philology: the former dealing with necessities of nature, -<i>necessaria naturae,</i> and contemplating the reason from which issues -the science of truth; the latter with decisions of the human will, -<i>placita humani arbitrii,</i> and following the authority whence comes -knowledge of the certain. The one considers the universal, the other -the individual; the one, as Leibniz would have said, the <i>vérités de -raison,</i> the other the <i>vérités de fait.</i> With Vico the distinction -is not so clearly expressed: in fact, authority as opposed to reason -sometimes, according to him, becomes a part of reason itself, or is -confused with the knowledge of the human will as opposed to that of -rational volition; but the general sense is none the less quite plain. -By philology Vico means not only the study of words and their history, -but, since words are bound up with the ideas of things, he means also -the history of things. Thus philologists should deal with war, peace, -alliances, travels, commerce, customs, laws and coinage, geography and -chronology, and every other subject connected with man's life on earth. -Philology in a word, in Vico's sense, which is also the true sense, -embraces not only the history of language or literature, but also that -of events, philosophy, and politics.</p> - -<p>It is true that philology, the truth of fact or certitude, had not -always been so brutally treated as it was by the Cartesians. Grotius -had given evidence of immense historical learning employed on behalf -of his doctrine of natural right. Gravina, Vico's contemporary and -fellow-countryman, demanded as necessary to the student of law not -only "the art of reasoning" (<i>ratiocinandi ars</i>) but "skill in the -Latin tongue" (<i>Latinae linguae peritia</i>) and "knowledge of history" -(<i>notitia temporum</i>). And Leibniz, whom we have just named, reasserted -the value of learning as against the Cartesians, and extended his -patronage, <i>en grand seigneur,</i> to the varied collection of historical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -anecdotes which he scattered freely over his pages. But Vico observed -that the philosophy and philology of his time always remained external -to one another, as they had been almost entirely in Greece and Rome. -All the quotations from historians, orators, philosophers, and poets -accumulated by Grotius were a mere embellishment. Perhaps Vico would -have passed the same judgment upon the liberal use made of history by -Leibniz, if he had known of it and expressed his opinion. In reading -the works of philologists he was conscious of such a sense of vacuity -and weariness in the unintelligent jumble of historical observations, -that he was almost led to agree with Descartes and Malebranche in their -hatred of scholarship: for a time, in fact, he did entirely agree with -them. But these two philosophers—so his later thought ran—ought, -instead of despising erudition, rather to have asked whether it were -possible to reclaim philology to philosophical principles; and the -philologists for their part, instead of marshalling facts for a display -of learning, ought to strive to make them the aim of science. Philology -must be reduced to a science. This was Vico's idea of the relation of -certitude to truth, or philology to philosophy.</p> - -<p>What was the meaning of reducing philology, or history, which is -the same thing, to a science or philosophy? Strictly speaking, the -reduction is impossible: not because they deal with subject-matter -different in kind, but because their subject-matter is in point of -fact homogeneous. History is already essentially philosophy. It -is impossible to make the most insignificant historical statement -without moulding it with thought, that is with philosophy. But since -the existence of this philosophical basis of philology was not at -that time realised, indeed it was none too often realised in later -times, and in consequence easily denied; and since most people, as we -have seen, imagined either an aristocratic geometrical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> philosophy, -hating and avoiding the "profane mob" of facts, or else, as at first -Vico did, a philosophy and a history equally devoid of cogency, and -merely matters of opinion: for these reasons Vico, after the change -of his philosophical point of view, now that he had attained to the -consciousness of the speculative method in the science of man, and -understood more deeply the human mind, was bound to see how much -current history stood in need of reform and extension; to feel the lack -of an improved philology as a consequence of the improved philosophy, -and to express it in terms of the theory of knowledge by the formula -reuniting philology to philosophy: "that this second science, as is -fair, should be the consequence of the first" (<i>ut haec posterior, ut -par est, prioris sit consequentia</i>). He was bound, in other words, to -rescue history from its condition of inferiority, where it was a mere -slave to caprice, vanity, moralising and precept-making, and other -irrelevant aims, and to recognise its own true end as a necessary -complement of eternal truth. Philosophy nowadays is full of and -intimate with historical fact: and this gives it greater breadth and a -more lively sense of dealing with concrete reality. This is no doubt -one meaning of Vico's formula concerning the union of philosophy and -philology, and the reduction of the latter to a science.</p> - -<p>It is, however, certain that in propounding this formula he had in -view a further and, as often happened, a different meaning. This other -meaning might be most simply illustrated by comparing it, as Vico -himself did with Bacon and his "more certain method of philosophising": -that method which Bacon expressed in the title of his work by the words -<i>Cogitata et visa,</i> and Vico proposed to "transfer from the natural to -the human or political world." In a word, he demanded the construction -of a typical history of human society (<i>cogitare</i>) which was then to be -discovered in the facts (<i>videre</i>). Thus the ideal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> construction would -acquire certainty from the facts, and the facts truth from the ideal -construction: authority would be confirmed by reason and reason by -authority. He demanded a science which should be at once a philosophy -of man and a universal history of nations. Now this structure which -he required—something intermediate between <i>cogitare</i> and <i>videre,</i> -thought and experience, this mixture of the two processes—is -intrinsically different from the unity of philosophy and philology, in -so far as that is a philosophical interpretation of factual data. Such -an interpretation is living history: the other is neither philosophy -nor history, but an empirical science of man and society, drawing its -materials from schemata which are neither the extra-temporal categories -of philosophy nor the individual facts of history: although it can -never be constructed without philosophical categories and historical -facts. It is an empirical science; and as such, neither exact nor true, -but only approximative and probable, and subject to verification and -correction from the side both of philosophy and of history.</p> - -<p>It would be impossible to decide either which of these two meanings -of philology reduced to history is that of Vico himself, since both -are included in his thought: or which is the prevailing one, since in -point of fact now one, now the other prevails: although the second, or -empirical, signification is the more often formulated. We might even -say that when Vico entitled his treatise <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> the principal -meaning he attached to this "invidious" name referred precisely to this -empirical science, the science, that is, which was to be at once a -philosophy and a history of man: the ideal history of the eternal laws -which govern the course of all nations' deeds in their rise, progress, -points of rest, decline and fall. The fact is, Vico did not and could -not unify the two different meanings; he maintained the duality which, -simply because it was never made explicit,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> presented an appearance -of unity. Thus each of the tendencies shown by his interpreters is -partially justified: one group of whom maintain that Vico laid down -and employed the speculative method; another, that his procedure was -both in intention and in effect empirical, inductive and psychological: -the former believing that he aimed at a systematic philosophy of man, -the latter that he was bent upon a scheme of sociology or social -psychology. Both views are one-sided, but the second more so than the -first. If there actually were in Vico elements both of Bacon and of -Plato, of the empiricist and the philosopher, yet when we look at his -intellectual personality as a whole, when we penetrate into the depths -of his mind and share in his difficulties and his colossal labours, -we must recognise that whatever he meant and believed Vico was of the -stuff of a Plato and not a Bacon: that even the Bacon of whom he speaks -is in part his own invention, a Bacon tinged with Platonism: and that -the New Science seemed so new to him fundamentally, not because it -was an empirical structure on Bacon's lines—indeed in that case no -science could be older: we need only cite Aristotle's <i>Politics</i> and -Machiavelli's <i>Discourses,</i> —but because it was impregnated throughout -by a new philosophy, which did in truth break into it on every side, -through all his empiricism.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></h5> - - -<h4>INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE</h4> - - -<p>The lack of clearness on the relation of philosophy to philology, and -the failure to distinguish between the two quite different ways of -conceiving the reduction of philology to a science, are at once the -consequences and the causes of the obscurity which prevails in the -"New Science." By this name we refer to the whole mass of research and -theory which Vico was producing from 1720 to 1730, elaborated above all -in three works, the <i>De uno universi iuris principio et fine uno</i> and -the first and second <i>Scienza Nuova</i>; it attains its maturest and most -developed form in the last of these, and this is the most important for -reference.</p> - -<p>The New Science, agreeably to the various meanings of the terms -philosophy and philology and of the relation between them, consists -of three groups of investigations, philosophical, historical and -empirical. Altogether it contains a philosophy of mind, a history, or -group of histories, and a social science. To the first named belong -the ideas expressed in various axioms or aphorisms scattered up and -down the work, on imagination and the imaginative universal, on the -intellect and the logical universal, on myth, religion, the moral -judgment, force and law, certitude and truth, the passions, providence, -and all the other determinations affecting the course or development -of the thought or mind of man. To the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> second, namely history, belong -the sketch of a universal history of primitive peoples from the time -of the Flood, and of the origins of the various civilisations: the -description of the ancient barbaric or heroic society in Greece and -especially in Rome, with regard to religion, customs, law, language and -political constitution: the study of primitive poetry, concentrating -upon the determination of the genesis and character of the Homeric -poems: the history of the social struggles between the patricians and -plebeians and the origin of democracy, also studied chiefly in Rome: -and the description of the return of barbarism or the Middle Ages, also -studied in all aspects of life and compared with primitive barbaric -society. Finally, to empirical science belongs the attempt to establish -a uniform course of national history, dealing with the succession both -of political forms and of other correlative manifestations of life -both theoretical and practical, and the series of types successively -drawn by Vico of the patriciate, the plebs, feudalism, the patriarchal -family, symbolic law, metaphorical language, hieroglyphic writing and -so forth.</p> - -<p>Now if these three classes of inquiry and theory had been logically -distinct in Vico's mind and united and compressed within the limits of -a single book for literary reasons alone, the result might have been -confused, ill-proportioned, out of harmony, and therefore fatiguing -to the reader, but not obscure. But in point of fact it cannot be -said that the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> at least in its second form, the final -exposition of his thought given by Vico, lacks a general plan, well -enough conceived. The treatise is divided into five books. The first -is intended to summarise general principles, that is, philosophy. The -second, in addition to a short note on the most ancient universal -history, describes the life of barbaric society, to which the third, -on the discovery of the true Homer, the most conspicuous example of -barbaric poetry, forms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> an appendix. The fourth is meant to sketch -the empirical science of the movement of national history: and the -fifth to exemplify the movement of "reflux" in the particular case of -the Middle Ages. And yet, in spite of this fine architectonic scheme, -the second <i>Scienza Nuova</i> is the most obscure, just as it is the -most rich and complete of Vico's works. If on the other hand, while -keeping his ideas clear in his mind, Vico had used an unfamiliar -terminology or a style of exposition either too compressed or too full -of allusions or implicit presuppositions, he would certainly have been -a difficult writer, but in this case, as in the other, not obscure. -But such a hypothesis does not suit the facts. Vico is very sparing -of scholastic language; he prefers living and popular terminology. -He is not compressed: in fact, he is fond of repeating his ideas, -emphasising them by repetition with great insistence. And he lays all -his cards on the table: that is to say, he shows all the material by -which his doctrines have been suggested. Finally, it amounts to very -little to say that Vico was not fully conscious of his own discoveries: -such consciousness is more or less deficient in every thinker, and in -fact none could have it more fully. The obscurity, the real obscurity -which we find in Vico is not superficial. It does not come either from -merely general or from secondary causes. It really consists in the -obscurity of his ideas; in his insufficient understanding of certain -connections, and the substitution for them of fallacious ones; in the -arbitrary element, that is, which he introduces into his thought, or -to put it more simply in his own downright errors. One might rewrite -the New Science, recasting the order and changing and elucidating the -terminology—the present writer has made the attempt for himself—and -still the obscurity would remain, or even increase; for in such a -translation the work in losing its original form would lose also the -turbid but powerful strength which may at times take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> the place of -clarity, and, while it does not illuminate, stirs the reader's mind and -generates waves of thought as it were by sympathetic vibrations.</p> - -<p>That Vico's obscurity, his mistake or mistakes, is due to the confusion -or lack of distinction in his theory of knowledge mentioned above, on -the question of the relations between philosophy, history and empirical -science—a confusion which exists no less in his actual thought on -the problems of the mind and history of man—that this is so can be -seen by observing how philosophy, history and empirical science pass -into each other by turns in Vico's mind, and vitiating each other in -turn produce the perplexities, ambiguities, exaggerations and hasty -statements which perturb the reader of the New Science. The philosophy -of mind masquerades now as empirical science, now as history: empirical -science now as philosophy, now as history: and historical propositions -assume the universality of philosophical principles or the generality -of empirical schemata. For example, the philosophy of man undertakes -to determine the forms, categories or ideal moments of mind in their -necessary succession, and in this aspect it well deserves the title or -definition of "eternal ideal history" according to which particular -histories proceed in time; while no fragment however small of actual -history can be conceived in which this ideal history is not present. -But, since ideal history is also for Vico the empirical determination -of the order in which the forms of civilisations, states, languages, -styles, and kinds of poetry succeed one another, it comes about that he -conceives the empirical series as identical with the ideal series, and -as deriving validity from it. Hence he asserts that this series must -always be exactly reproduced in the facts, "even if infinite worlds -were produced from time to time through eternity": an assertion which -is plainly false, since there is no reason why the empirical fact of -Greek or Roman aristocracy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> should be repeated for ever, with a "must -have been, must be now, must be hereafter"; or why civilisations -should rise and fall precisely as did those of antiquity. And this -very treatment of the empirical course of events as absolute threw -a shadow of empiricism over their ideal course; since the latter -once identified with the former took over its empirical and temporal -character instead of the eternal and extra—temporal character which it -had as originally conceived. The same must be said of the various forms -of mind which, as ideal and extra—temporal, are always all present -in every fact; but Vico, by confusing them with the real and concrete -facts which empirical science splits up into its schemata, destroyed -them in their ideal form and distinction as soon as he had stated -them. It is true that the moment of force is not that of justice; but -the empirical type of barbaric society founded upon force, precisely -because it is a representative and approximative determination, and is -referred to a concrete and total state of things, contains not only -force but justice as well; and when this ideal moment and this type -of society are interchanged and treated as identical, on the one hand -the philosophical concept of force is confused with that of justice -and becomes impure, contradictory and incoherent, and finally annuls -itself: on the other, the empirical type of barbaric society becomes -exaggerated and unduly rigid. The confusion between the philosophic -and the empirical is clearly expressed in Vico's aphorism defining -the nature of things. "Nature of things is nothing else than their -production at certain times and in certain manners: and whenever these -latter are of such a kind, then the things produced are of such a kind -and no other." Here we see the confusion between time and manner, -between ideal and empirical genesis. Similarly, it is perfectly true -that history ought to proceed in harmony with philosophy, and that a -philosophical absurdity can never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> be a historical event: but, since -the distinction between philosophy and empirical science was not -drawn by Vico, when evidence was lacking and philosophy therefore -inapplicable he felt no less sure of attaining truth. He merely filled -the gap with a conjecture supplied by the schema of empirical science, -and persuaded himself that he had fallen back on a "metaphysical -proof." Or again, if he found himself faced by uncertain facts, -instead of patiently waiting till the discovery of further evidence -should dispel the doubt, he cut the knot by accepting the facts, as -he put it, in conformity with laws: which always means the empirical -schema. A legitimate method, doubtless, when treated as hypothetical. -But this hypothesis became in its turn, for Vico, a "truth meditated -in the idea": so that the comparison with facts, which none the less -he recommends for the sake of confirmation, became strictly speaking -superfluous: or, if the comparison showed that the facts disagreed -with it, the facts, as mere appearance, must be in the wrong, rather -than the hypothesis, which is laid down as philosophical truth, and -therefore indubitable. Hence arises the tendency observed in Vico to do -violence to the facts.</p> - -<p>These examples are enough to indicate the deep-seated fault in the -structure of the New Science, and to establish one point in our -exposition and criticism of Vico's thought, in the course of which -many other examples of the same point will arise of themselves, and -those already given will become more clear. But another point which -must be well established is that this fault is the fault of an organism -in the highest degree healthy, and that the different species of -inquiry between which Vico failed to distinguish were composed of -investigations of extraordinary originality, truth, and importance. -It is in fact the fault often found in highly original and inventive -intellects, which seldom work out their discoveries in accurate detail, -while less inventive minds are generally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> more precise and logical. -Depth and acuteness do not always flourish equally side by side: and -Vico, however much he fell short in acuteness, was always profoundly -deep.</p> - -<p>Light and shade, truth and error, which alternate and interweave at -almost every point in the New Science, are variously distinguished -according to the various temperaments of readers and critics: and in -conspicuous cases, like that of Vico, such variations assume the most -sharply defined form. Some minds are self-willed and suspicious, quick -to mark any trifling contradiction, merciless in demanding proof of -every statement, and indefatigable in wielding the forceps of dilemma -to dismember an unfortunate great man. For them Vico's work, like many -others of the same kind, is a closed book. At most, it will provide -them with a theme for what is known as a "refutation": an easy and -congenial task, yet hardly a successful one, since the man they have -demolished generally emerges from the slaughter more alive than before. -But there is another type of mind, which, at the first word which -reaches the heart, at the first ray of truth which dawns upon the eyes, -opens its whole self in desire, abandons itself in faith, and grows -wild with enthusiasm; which refuses to hear of faults and never sees -difficulties, or the difficulties at once vanish, and the faults find -the easiest of justifications: and when it commits itself to writing, -its writings appear in the guise of "defences." For such a mind we fear -that the New Science is a book all too open. No doubt, if these two -attitudes were the only alternatives, if no third choice were open, -one would have to choose the fault of love rather than that of cold -indifference; the excess of faith, which may yet enrich us by one or -two aspects of the truth, rather than the absence of faith which never -lets us realise one. But a third attitude is possible to, and indeed -incumbent on the critic; namely, that which never takes its eyes off<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> -the light, but yet does not conceal the shade; which transcends the -letter to attain the spirit, yet not ignoring the letter, but always -returning to it, always endeavouring to play the part of a free but not -a fanciful interpreter, a warm lover but not a blind one.</p> - -<p>The two points above established, the strength and weakness essential -to Vico's intellect, his tendency to confusion or his confusion of -tendencies, supply us with a kind of general canon of interpretation; -namely, that of separating analytically at every step his pure -philosophy from the empiricism and history with which he mixes, and -in which so to speak he embodies it, and on the other hand separating -the latter from the former: and of observing, in the process, the -causes and effects of the mixture. The dross cannot be treated as -non-existent, bound up as it is with the gold in its natural state: but -it must not hinder us from recognising and purifying the gold. Or, to -drop the metaphor, the history must be indeed a history, but that it -can only be if guided by intelligence.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE</h4> - -<h4>(POETRY AND LANGUAGE)</h4> - - -<p>The chief, almost indeed the only, forms of the mind studied by Vico in -the New Science are the inferior, individualising activities to which -he gives the general name of "certitude." These are, in the region of -theoretic mind, imagination: in that of the practical mind, power or -will: and in the empirical science corresponding to the philosophy -of mind, the barbaric society and poetic wisdom whose examination -occupies, in his own words, "almost the whole bulk of the work."</p> - -<p>His deep interest in these lower forms, and in the primitive societies -and barbaric histories which display them, is further illustrated -and explained, among his external circumstances, by the studies he -undertook in Roman law and its expressions and rhetorical figures: -by the still living tradition of Italian humanism: by the recently -stimulated pursuit of the archaeological sciences: by his own desire -to investigate the earliest civilisation of Italy, and so forth. But -many of his contemporaries and countrymen were handling the same -materials without acquiring any of his taste for and comprehension of -imagination, simplicity and force: indeed Vico himself, when he wrote -the <i>De antiquissima,</i> had the taste for these things but as yet no -comprehension of them. The full reason for this interest is seen when -we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> consider the development of Vico as a philosopher, without losing -sight of the complexity of his nature in all its opposition to the -Cartesian type of mind. Cartesianism, with its attention confined to -the universalising and abstractive forms, ignored the individualising: -and this necessarily attracted Vico all the more towards them as -towards a mysterious problem. Cartesianism shrank in horror from -the tangled forest of history: Vico plunged eagerly into that very -department of history where the historical flavour, so to speak, is -strongest; namely, that which is furthest and psychologically most -different from civilised periods. Cartesianism extended the psychology -of civilisation to all periods and nations: Vico was led to investigate -in all their profound divergencies and contradictions the modes of -feeling and thought proper to various times.</p> - -<p>The great effort which had to be made, and actually was made by Vico, -in order to penetrate through modern intellectualism and recapture the -point of view of primitive psychology, is expressed in his language -about the "grave difficulties" entailed by his "labour of fully -twenty-five years" in the attempt to "stoop from these civilised -natures of ours to those absolutely wild and savage minds, which we -cannot picture to ourselves at all, and can only understand with great -toil." It is expressed again, rather differently, by his insistence -on the impossibility, now that, even with the common people, the -mind of man is too completely separated from the senses, accustomed -to the free use of abstract terms, sharpened by the art of writing, -and spiritualised so to speak by the employment of numbers,—the -impossibility of entering into the chaotic fancy of primitive man, -whose mind was the very reverse of abstract, acute or spiritual; but -rather sunk in the senses, blunted by passion, and buried in the body: -and of grasping such ideas as that of the "sympathy of nature." This -necessary effort<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>—a painful one, but successful—was another reason -for his feeling that his science was "new." He says indeed that this -study of the ideal form and the historic period of certitude was -entirely lacking to Greek philosophy as a whole. Plato had attempted it -in the <i>Cratylus,</i> but unsuccessfully, because he knew nothing of the -language of the first legislators, the heroic poets, and was deceived -by the altered and modernised forms under which the laws existed in -his time after continual revision at Athens. Among the moderns, J. C. -Scaliger, Francisco Sanchez and Gaspar Schopp had fallen into a similar -mistake when they attempted to explain language by the principles of -logic, and indeed of Aristotelian logic, in spite of its having arisen -centuries after language itself. Grotius, Selden, Puffendorf and the -other writers on natural rights also studied human nature as civilised -by religion and law; so that in retracing the course of history they -began in the middle: that is to say, they confined themselves to the -intellect, ignoring the imagination, and to the will under moral -restraint, passing over the undisciplined passions. Vico himself, while -he had shown his interest in this problem by undertaking to investigate -the "most ancient wisdom of Italy," was yet led astray in his study by -following the lead of the author of the <i>Cratylus.</i></p> - -<p>In its philosophical aspect, the New Science might, owing to this -prominence given to the study of the individualising forms, above all -the imagination (since the doctrine that primitive man is a poet and -thinks in poetic images is in Vico's words the "master key" of the -work) be called, without undue paradox, a philosophy of Mind with -special attention to the Philosophy of Imagination or Aesthetic.</p> - -<p>Aesthetic may in fact be considered as a discovery of Vico's, though -with the reservations to which the determination of discoveries and -discoverers is always subject; and although he did not deal with it in -a separate treatise<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> or give it the happy title with which Baumgarten -christened it ten years or so later. It is interesting however to -notice that the terminology of the New Science lights upon a name -similar to one of the equivalents for Aesthetic which Baumgarten passes -in review; namely that of "the Logic of Poetry." But ultimately the -name matters little: what does matter is the fact: and the fact is that -Vico adopted a theory of poetry which was then and was still for a time -to be a bold and revolutionary innovation. At that time, as is well -known, the old practical or didactic theory held the field: the theory -which, starting late in the history of the ancient world, persisting -through the Middle Ages, and transplanted into the Renaissance, -regarded poetry as an ingenious disguise for the popularising of -lofty philosophical and theological ideas. Beside this theory, though -inferior in authority, stood another, which considered poetry as the -product of or means to diversion and pleasure. These views had come -to alter the original meaning of the Aristotelian treatise on poetry, -so as to be at last introduced into it and discovered there as if -Aristotle himself had held and written them. Nor was this mistake -corrected by Cartesianism, which, as we should expect from its general -direction, rather tended to enfeeble and annul the very object of -these definitions, as a thing of no value, or practically none. At a -time when philosophers were trying to reduce metaphysics and ethics to -a mathematical form, and despised concrete intuition: when men were -devising a literature and a poetry suited to disseminate science among -the common people or the world of fashion: when experiments were being -made in the construction of artificial, logical languages, superior to -those of past or present usage: when, finally, it was thought possible -to lay down rules for composing musical airs without being a musician, -and poems without being a poet: in this atmosphere of detachment, -coolness, hostility and mockery, only a miracle could arouse a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> -different and indeed opposite feeling—a warm and vivid consciousness -of the real nature of poetry in its original function: and this miracle -was worked by the keen, restless and stormy mind of Giambattista Vico.</p> - -<p>He criticised at once the three doctrines of poetry as a means of -adorning and communicating intellectual truth, as merely subservient -to pleasure, and as a harmless mental exercise for those who can do -it. Poetry is not esoteric wisdom: it does not presuppose the logic -of the intellect: it does not contain philosophical judgments. The -philosophers, in finding these things in poetry, have simply put them -there themselves without realising it. Poetry is produced not by the -mere caprice of pleasure, but by natural necessity. It is so far -from being superfluous and capable of elimination, that without it -thought cannot arise: it is the primary activity of the human mind. -Man, before he has arrived at the stage of forming universals, forms -imaginary ideas. Before he reflects with a clear mind, he apprehends -with faculties confused and disturbed: before he can articulate, he -sings: before speaking in prose, he speaks in verse: before using -technical terms, he uses metaphors, and the metaphorical use of words -is as natural to him as that which we call "natural." So far from being -a fashion of expounding metaphysics poetry is distinct from and opposed -to metaphysics. The one frees the intellect from the senses, the other -submerges and overwhelms it in them: the one reaches perfection in -proportion as it rises to universality, the other, as it confines -itself to the particular: the one enfeebles the imagination, the other -strengthens it. The one takes precautions against turning the mind into -body, the other delights in giving body to the mind. The judgments -of poetry are composed of sense and emotion, those of philosophy are -composed of reflection, which if introduced into poetry makes it frigid -and unreal: and no one in the whole course of history has ever been at -once a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> great poet and a great metaphysician. Poets and philosophers -may be called respectively the senses and the intellect of mankind: and -in this sense we may retain as true the scholastic saying "there is -nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses." Without -sense, we cannot have intellect: without poetry, we cannot have -philosophy, nor indeed any civilisation.</p> - -<p>Almost more miraculous than this conception of poetry is the fact -that Vico saw into the true nature of language, a problem much less -canvassed and investigated, and no more satisfactorily solved, by -ancient and modern philosophy down to the present day. Language was -as a rule alternately confused with logic and debased into a mere -external and conventional sign, or else in despair referred to a -divine origin. Vico realised that the divine origin was in this -case a mere refuge of indolence; that language is neither logic nor -convention, and, like poetry, is neither esoteric wisdom nor due to -a decision or agreement. Language arises naturally. In its first -form, men express themselves "by mute actions," or by signs, and -"by bodies having natural connexions with the ideas which they wish -to indicate," <i>i.e.</i> by means of symbolic objects. But in the case -both of articulated languages and of common speech, all philologists -have, "with an excess of good faith," which means a deficiency of -insight, accepted the view that meanings are decided at pleasure: -whereas at the so-called origin of language meanings must have been -natural, and every common word must certainly have started from one -single individual of one nation, and been derived from the primitive -language of gestures and objects. In Latin, as in other tongues, it -is to be noticed that almost all the words are formed to express -natural properties, or used by transference: and the greater part of -every language, in every nation, is metaphorical. The opposite opinion -was due to the ignorance of grammarians, who, meeting with a great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> -number of words expressing confused and indistinct ideas, and not -knowing their origin, which had formerly made them lucid and distinct, -invented for their own peace of mind the conventional theory; and -dragged in Aristotle and Galen as against Plato and Iamblichus. The -serious objection generally brought against the natural origin of -language and in favour of the conventional, namely the variations in -the common speech among different nations, is solved by considering -that owing to diversities of climate, temperament and custom nations -looked at the same useful or necessary objects in different aspects, -and hence produced different languages. This is also seen in the case -of proverbs; which are substantially identical maxims of human life, -but expressed in as many different forms as there are, or have been, -different nations. The insistence, then, with which Vico claims to have -discovered the true origin of languages "in the principles of poetry" -is of especial importance. On the one hand, it entails the assertion of -the spontaneous and imaginative origin of language, and on the other -it tends implicitly if not explicitly to suppress the dualism between -poetry and language.</p> - -<p>In these principles of poetry Vico found not only the origin of -languages, but also that of letters or writing. He pronounced the -separation of the two Origins, connected as they were by nature and -appearing, in the primitive dumb language of signs and objects, as -identical, to be a mere mistake of the grammarians. Here again, it -is no case of esoteric wisdom or convention. Hieroglyphics were not -invented by philosophers as a means of concealing the mysteries of -their lofty thoughts: they were a universal and natural necessity to -all primitive peoples: and only the alphabetic scripts arose among -nations by a free agreement. In other words Vico drew a distinction -(though in a confused manner) within the so-called scripts, between -those which are true scripts and therefore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> conventional, and -others which are directly expressive and are therefore language, -story-telling, poetry and painting. These expressive scripts or -languages are characterised by the inseparability of content from -form. They are poetical just in the sense that the story and its -expression are one and the same thing, namely a metaphor common to -poetry and painting, so that it could be depicted by a dumb man without -verbal expression. As examples, Vico quotes traditional anecdotes; -for instance, the five "real words" (the frog, the mouse, the bird, -the ploughshare and the bow) sent by Idanturas king of the Scythians -to Darius when the latter had declared war on him: and the parable of -the tall poppies which King Tarquin enacted before the eyes of his son -Sextus's ambassador, concerning the means of ruling Gabii—methods -of expression parallel to practices still found among savages and -the lower classes:—and in addition to these, heraldry, flags, and -the emblems upon medals and coins. There is a frivolous legend which -belittles and degrades the true value of heraldry by asserting it to -have been invented in German tournaments as a custom of gallantry -by young men seeking to win the love of noble maidens. But in the -Middle Ages heraldry was a serious thing. It was, so to speak, the -hieroglyphic script of the period: a wordless language to eke out the -poverty of ordinary speech and alphabetic writing. It was only later, -in times of culture, that it became a sport and a pleasure, and gallant -and learned blazonings were adopted which had to be enlivened by means -of mottoes because their own meaning was now merely analogical; while -primitive and natural heraldry was dumb, or rather spoke without -needing an interpreter. Even in the days of culture a few such -expressive forms retained this simplicity and naturalness. Flags or -ensigns for instance form a kind of armed language with which nations, -as if deprived of speech, make themselves understood in the wider -affairs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> of the natural rights of peoples; wars, alliances and commerce.</p> - -<p>Thus in the light of Vico's aesthetical idea poetry, words, metaphors, -writing and graphic symbols are all illuminated and spring to life: -great things and small, epic poetry and heraldry. The doctrine of -imaginary forms was quite a new departure in the history of ideas: for -while Vico opposed his own conceptions to those of the contemporary -schools, especially the Cartesian, he by no means attached himself to -any other more or less remote school or tradition. He himself felt -that he was opposed not to a particular school but to all who had ever -formulated doctrines on the subject. He says that he has "overturned" -all the theories about poetry held by Plato, Aristotle, and so on down -to Patrizio, Scaliger and Castelvetro in modern times, all of whom -had lost themselves in ineptitudes which "even to mention makes one -ashamed." Patrizio made poetry begin with the songs of birds and the -whistling of the wind! As regards language, he had been ultimately -dissatisfied both with Plato and with the moderns Wolfgang Latius, -Scaliger and Sanchez. As regards writing, once the theory of divine -origin supported by Mallinkrot and Ingewald Eling was refuted, or -rather interpreted in his own way, which came to the same thing, he -made an attempt to discredit the futile, vague, ill-founded, misshapen, -pompous and absurd opinions which derived it from the Goths and through -them from Adam and personal instruction from God, or more directly from -the Earthly Paradise, or from a Gothic Mercury as inventor. Finally, -as to heraldry, he remarks that the writers on the subject have never -understood anything about it, and have only by a mere random guess let -fall a hint of the truth in calling it "heroic."</p> - -<p>In fact it would be hard to find real and true precedents for Vico's -aesthetic conceptions. At most, we might<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> indicate vague suggestions -contained in various scattered statements which he collects: a certain -immediate stimulus in the discussions of the seventeenth century on -the distinctions between intellect and genius, reason and imagination, -dialectic and rhetoric: and a certain convergence of external -particulars, such as the collection of rhetorical subtleties expressed -in subtleties of language, made by Tesauro, a rhetorician of the time.</p> - -<p>These conceptions, however, produced as they were by a remarkable -stroke of originality, no sooner passed from general outline to -particular determinations, from the first idea or inspiration to -concrete development, than they appear to become confused, fluctuating -and unstable. We may set aside the various opinions successively held -by Vico, and bound up with the historical growth of his mind, upon -the subjects of poetry, language or metaphor, beginning with his -academic orations, passing thence by way of the <i>De ratione</i> and <i>De -antiquissima</i> to the <i>Diritto universale,</i> from these to the first and -thence to the second <i>Scienza Nuova</i>: a study of these might supply -subject-matter for a special essay, but does not come within the scope -of our treatise. But even in the final form of his aesthetic thought, -contradictory doctrines exist side by side. He is not content with -saying, as he does say, that poetical form is the primary activity of -the mind; that it is composed of feelings of emotion; and that it is -entirely imaginative and devoid of concepts and reflection. He goes on -to add that poetry, as opposed to history, "represents reality in its -best idea," and therefore fulfils the justice and gives every man the -reward or punishment which he does not always get in history, governed -as the latter often is by caprice, necessity and chance. Again, he -says that the end of poetry is "to give life to the lifeless," since -its most sublime task is the attempt to give life and sensation to -insensible objects.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> He says that poetry is "nothing but imitation"; -that children, with their great imitative powers, are poets; and that -primitive races, the children of mankind, were also sublime poets. He -says that poetry has for its special subject-matter "the impossible -made credible": for instance, it is impossible that body should be -mind, and yet it was believed that the thundering sky was Jupiter. -Hence the miracles performed by magicians by means of incantations -were a favourite subject of poetry. He says that poetry is due to -"poverty," that is, that it is a pathological product of the mind. -Since uncivilised man is of low brain-power and cannot satisfy the -thirst he feels for the general and the universal, he fills their place -by inventing imaginary genera, poetical universals or characters. -Consequently the truth of the poet is identical with the truth of the -philosopher: the one abstract, the other clothed in images: the one -a metaphysic of reason, the other a metaphysic of feeling and fancy, -suited to the understanding of the people. From poverty also, that is -from inability to articulate, arises song, and therefore mutes and -stammerers utter sounds which are songs: and metaphor arises from -inability to express things in an accurate manner. He says, finally, -that the aim of poetry is to teach the people to act virtuously.</p> - -<p>These sayings indicate very various ideas about poetry, of which -some are compatible with the central doctrine but thrown out in a -disconnected manner and therefore not in fact reconciled with it: -others are quite incompatible. Vico might have been cited in turn, on -the testimony of single passages, as a supporter of the moralistic -theory of art, the didactic theory, the abstract or typical theory, the -mythological theory, the animistic theory, and so on. And if he neither -falls back into the old theories he hated, nor loses himself among -the new fallacies which followed him, it is due to the fact that all -these waverings and inconsistencies were continually submerged by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> -thought that poetry is the primary form of the mind, prior to intellect -and free from reflection and reasoning.</p> - -<p>Just as he was unable by the use of his leading principle to -distinguish and reconcile the other theories on the nature of poetry -which already existed or had been invented by himself, so he did -not succeed in escaping from the tyranny of old or new empirical -classifications. He struggled to reduce these in their turn to -philosophical form, and tried to deduce successively the various kinds -of poetry, epic, lyric and dramatic: the kinds of verse and metre, -spondaic, iambic and prose: the kinds of figurative language, metaphor, -metonymy, synecdoche and irony: the parts of speech, onomatopoeism, -interjection, pronoun, particle, noun and verb: the moods and tenses of -the verb (in which connexion he refers to a case of aphasia observed -by himself in Naples, "a gentleman seized with a severe apoplexy, -who utters nouns but has completely forgotten verbs"): the kinds of -writing, hieroglyphic, symbolic and alphabetical: and of languages, -according to their increasing complexity, from monosyllables to -compound words and from a preponderance of vowels and diphthongs -to a preponderance of consonants. In the course of these attempts -he frequently offered new and sometimes correct interpretations of -isolated facts: but he did not and could not connect them into a -scientific system. Moreover he never realised the relation between -poetry and the other arts. On the one hand, he unites them, as when he -considers painting and poetry to be fundamentally identical and notes -a number of analogies between the poetry and painting of the Middle -Ages: on the other, he separates them sharply, as when he asserts -that delicacy in art is the outcome of philosophy, and that painting, -sculpture, casting and intaglio are the most delicate arts because they -are compelled to abstract the surface of the material objects they -represent.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p> - -<p>These inconsistencies and errors which we have briefly reviewed are due -partly to Vico's insufficient power of distinguishing and elaborating, -partly—and this is the greater part—to that fundamental fault which -we have already seen to exist in the structure of the New Science. In -this case the fault is, more precisely, Vico's confusion between the -philosophical concept of the poetic form of the mind, and the empirical -concept of the barbaric form of civilisation. "This earliest age of the -world," as he himself says, "can be truly said to have concerned itself -exclusively with the primary activity of the mind." But the earliest -age of the world, composed as it was of men of flesh and blood, not of -philosophical categories, cannot have been concerned with one solitary -activity of the mind. This single activity may have preponderated, -as we generally say: the very word reveals the quantitative and -approximative nature of the conception: but all the others must have -been at work simultaneously, imagination and intellect, perception and -abstraction, will and morality, song and arithmetic. Vico could not -shut his eyes to this obvious fact, and introduced into this phase of -civilisation not only the poet, but also the theologian, the physicist, -the astronomer, the <i>pater-familias,</i> the warrior, the politician, -and the lawgiver; but he tried to regard the activities of all these -as "poetical" in character, as he called it, by a metaphor drawn from -the alleged preponderance of the imaginative form of the mind; and -the whole system he called "poetic wisdom." The metaphorical nature -of the terminology is suggested, in fact leaps to the eye, in certain -characteristic passages, as where the "arts," that is, the mechanical -crafts which produce objects of practical utility, are called "poetry -with a certain kind of reality," and where ancient Roman law, because -of the abundance of formulae and ceremonies with which it was adorned, -is said to be a "serious dramatic poem." But the metaphors are -dangerous, since, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> in the case of the New Science, they light upon -a soil favourable to their growth into concepts: and in point of fact -the historical phase of barbarism, metaphorically expressed as poetic -wisdom, soon turned in Vico's mind into the ideal phase of poetry, and -transferred all its own attributes to this ideal phase. The former -included theologians, and accordingly Vico regarded poetry as theology, -but an imaginative theology: teachers, and poetry became a teacher, -but of the common people: natural scientists, and it became science, -but the science of an imaginary world. And since these barbarians, -uncultivated as they were and confined to the world of images, could -not think in concepts, the imaginations of poetry, individualised and -particular, and its judgments, always expressed in material form, -were falsely interpreted as "imaginative universals," supposed to be -something intermediate between the individualising intuition and the -universalising concept. Poetry, which ought to represent sense and -nothing else, came to represent a sense already intellectualised; and -the saying that nothing is found in the intellect that has not already -been in the sense, acquired the meaning, that the intellect is nothing -but the sense clarified, and the sense nothing but the intellect -confused. Thus there was no further need for the added caution -"except the intellect itself" (<i>nisi intellectus ipse</i>). Conversely, -barbaric civilisation became a kind of mythological or allegorical -representation of the ideal phase of poetry, and primitive tribes were -transformed into crowds of "sublime poets" just as, in the ontogenesis -corresponding to this philogenesis, children had been made into poets. -The concept of the "imaginative universal" unites in itself the double -contradiction of the doctrine; since to the imaginative element must -be joined, in this mental construction, the element of universality -which taken by itself would be a true and proper universal, rational -and not imaginative.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> Hence arises a <i>petitio principii</i> by which the -origin of the rational universal, the point requiring explanation, is -already presupposed. On the other hand, if the imaginative universal is -interpreted as freed from the element of universality, that is, as a -mere imagination, Vico's aesthetic doctrine would certainly become once -more consistent: but his "poetic wisdom" or barbaric civilisation would -be deprived of an indispensable portion of its organism in parting with -every kind of concept: for concepts are, so to speak, the skeleton of -the body.</p> - -<p>To resolve the contradiction it was necessary to separate poetry from -poetic wisdom: and we do find some signs of this separation in Vico. He -sometimes admits, almost against his will, the lack of correspondence -between the philosophical category and the type of society, and in -dealing with the latter is compelled to fall back upon such phrases -as "very nearly" and "more or less." He says, for instance, that -primitive man consisted "exclusively of strong imagination, with no, -or very little, reason": that he was "almost all body, with hardly -any reflection": or again, after making a show of philosophical -distinction between the three languages of gods, heroes and men, he -goes on to observe that "the language of the gods was almost all dumb, -and very little articulate; the language of heroes was composed of -equal quantities of articulation and dumb-show; the language of men -was almost all articulated, and very little in dumb-show." He admits -again in a fine simile that poetic speech out-lived poetic wisdom and -survived far into the historic and civilised period, "as great and -rapid rivers run far out into the sea and keep their waters fresh as -they bear them along with the force of their flow." Even in modern -times we cannot afford entirely to neglect imaginative speech: "to -describe the operations of the pure mind, we must avail ourselves of -poetic language, of metaphors drawn from the senses." It appears that -poetry does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> not end with barbarism, for poets arise even in civilised -times: and if it is said that the poets of the earliest times were -naturally imaginative, those of later days artificially so, that is, -according to Vico, by deliberately forgetting the proper use of words, -freeing themselves from philosophy, filling their minds with childish -and vulgar prejudices and submitting to the bondage of conventions like -the use of rhyme—all these restrictions, besides being easily refuted, -are merely an unsuccessful attempt to diminish the weight of the fact -above mentioned, namely that poetry belongs to all ages, not merely to -that of barbarism: it is an ideal category, not a historic fact. But -the restrictions prove, as also do the infrequency and the unemphatic -nature of the passages quoted, that Vico was not in a position to -effect the separation of poetry from poetic wisdom, hampered as he was -by the hybrid character of the concept and of the actual method of the -New Science.</p> - -<p>If, on the other hand, the idea of poetry as pure imagination had not -remained firmly at the foundation of Vico's thought, in spite of all -the confusions and inconsistencies in which it became involved, and -had not been at work underground, so to speak, in the New Science, -it would have been difficult or perhaps impossible to understand the -leading conception which dominates his philosophy of mind, closely -connected as it is with that idea. This is the conception of the mind -as a development, or, to use Vico's own words, a progress or unfolding -(<i>corso, spiegamento</i>); a conception which improved upon, though it -did not explicitly contradict, the ordinary view which was almost -exclusively confined to the enumeration and classification of the -mind's faculties. The doctrine of imaginative universals as spontaneous -mental products, rudimentary universals but not without an element of -truth in them, was at least an adequate weapon against the empirical -theory which made civilisation the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> outcome of a highly developed and -rational practical wisdom and the personal labour of God or of wise -men who must have sprung from the earth or fallen from heaven in some -unaccountable manner.</p> - -<p>Vico clearly stated the dilemma between the two, and only two, possible -explanations of the origin of society. Either it came from the -reflection of wise men, or from a certain human feeling and instinct -among brutish men. He accepted the latter solution, that of "brutes" -which gradually became human: the theory, that is, of the evolution -of thought from the imaginative to the rational universal, and the -progress of social relations from force to equity. But was this an -adequate foundation for "ideal history" or the philosophy of mind? In -the philosophy of mind, it could be translated into a similar if not -identical view—the doctrine which, owing to Cartesianism and a certain -recrudescence of the Scholasticism of Duns Scotus, lasted down to -Vico's own times and expressed the life of the mind by the successive -stages of the concept, obscurity, confusion, clarity and distinctness. -Leibniz, as is well known, made a special study of obscure and -confused perceptions, the <i>"petites perceptions."</i> The doctrine was -essentially intellectualistic, since the concepts, however confused -or obscure, were never anything else than concepts: and hence it was -unable to account either for poetry or even for mental development, -the dialectic of which cannot be understood if it is regarded as -consisting of merely quantitative differences. Such differences are -in reality not differences at all, but identities and therefore the -negation of change: and in fact the whole of this school of thought was -anti-aesthetic and static, devoid both of a true theory of imagination -and a true theory of development. Vico's thought, on the other hand, -was averse to intellectualism and in sympathy with imagination: it was -entirely dynamic and evolutionary. For Vico, mind is an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> eternal drama: -and since drama demands antithesis, his philosophy of mind is rooted -in antithesis, that is in the real distinction and opposition between -imagination and thought, poetry and metaphysic, force and equity, -passion and morality; although he seems sometimes, for the reasons -given above, to mistake its nature; or rather, although he actually -does sometimes confuse it with empirical inquiries and doctrines, and -with the determinations of history.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE</h4> - -<h4>(MYTH AND RELIGION)</h4> - - -<p>Vico's doctrine of mythology, while no less original and profound than -that of poetry, is also, like the latter, not entirely lucid: for the -relations between poetry and myth are so close that the shadow cast -upon the one must of necessity extend to some degree over the other.</p> - -<p>In proceeding to inquire, as we have hitherto done and shall -continue to do, into the state of contemporary knowledge of the -several sciences and problems with which Vico set out to deal, we -may briefly recall <i>à propos</i> of the study of mythology not only the -great literary collections of myths formed during the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries, of which Boccaccio had already given an example -in the fourteenth century, but also the learned defences of the two -explanatory theories, already known to classical antiquity and not -entirely unknown in the Middle Ages. These were, first, the theory -of myth as allegory of philosophical truths (moral, political and so -forth), and secondly, the theory of myth as the history of actual -persons and events, adorned by the fancy which made heroes into gods -(Euhemerism). The former tendency inspired among other works the -<i>Mythologiae sive explanationis fabularum libri decem</i> of Natale Conti -(1568) and Bacon's <i>De sapientia veterum</i> (1609); in which, however, -this system had been advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> with a certain hesitation, and with -the explicit caution that, even if it were not valid as historical -interpretation, it would always be of value as moralisation (<i>aut -antiquitatem illustrabimus aut res ipsas:</i> "we shall explain either -antiquity or the facts themselves"). The latter was authoritatively -represented by John Leclerc (Clericus), the learned Dutch Genevese for -whom Vico expressed so much respect and gratitude for the attention he -had deigned to bestow upon his <i>Diritto universale.</i> His edition of -Hesiod's <i>Theogony</i> marked an epoch in the study of mythology, and he -was followed among others by Banier, author of the work <i>Les Fables -expliquées par l'histoire</i>(1735). A third system, also not without some -ancient precedent, derived myths from particular nations, the Egyptians -or the Hebrews, or from the original works of individual philosophers -and poets. This view, when it neither resolved itself into a pure and -simple historical supposition as to the origin of some or all myths, -nor appealed to divine revelation, clearly involved the theory that -myth is not an eternal form but a contingent product of the mind, born -at a certain time and capable of dying or already dead.</p> - -<p>Vico strongly opposed the first and third of these views of mythology, -namely the allegorical theory and that of historical derivation. -On the allegorical view, he mentions Bacon's treatise, which had -stimulated him to the study of the subject, out which he considered -"more ingenious than sound": on the other school, which regarded myths -as sacred history altered and corrupted by the Gentiles and especially -by the Greeks, he refers to Vossius's <i>De theologia gentili</i> (1642) -and to a dissertation by Daniel Huet. Myths or fables do not contain -esoteric wisdom, that is to say, rational concepts, subtly concealed by -the veil of fable: hence they are not allegorical. Allegory implies on -the one hand the concept or thing signified, on the other the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> fable -or medium of concealment, and between the two, the art by which both -are kept in equilibrium. But myths cannot be split up into these three -moments, nor even into a thing signified and a thing which signifies -it: their meaning is univocal. The theory also implies that a believer -in the content does not believe in the form: but the makers of myths -believed fully and ingenuously in their own work. Once, for instance, -that first divine fable was created, the myth than which none greater -was ever afterwards invented, that of Jupiter, king and father of gods -and men, in the act of thundering, the very men who had invented him -believed in him, and with their religion of terror feared, reverenced -and worshipped him.</p> - -<p>Myth, in a word, is not fable but history of such a kind as could -be constructed by primitive minds, and strictly considered by them -as an account of actual fact. The philosophers who arose later made -use of myths to expound their doctrines in an allegorical manner; or -deceived themselves into thinking that they found them there owing to -the feeling of veneration which attaches to antiquity, and increases -as our comprehension of it diminishes; or thought it expedient to make -use of such things for political purposes, like Plato Homerising, and -at the same time Platonising Homer: and in doing this they turned the -myths into fables, which they were not originally, and are essentially -not. Thus we may say that the philosophers and students of mythology -who indulged in such strange fancies about the legends were the real -poets, while the primitive poets or myth-makers were the true students, -and intended to narrate the actual facts of their time. For the same -reason, namely, because myth is an essential part of poetic or barbaric -wisdom, and, as such, a spontaneous product of all times and places, -it cannot be attributed to one single nation as its inventor, from -which it passed to others; as if it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> were a particular discovery of a -particular man or the object of revelation.</p> - -<p>This doctrine, superior as it is to the allegorical and historical -theories, is another aspect of Vico's vindication of the non-logical -forms of knowledge as against the intellectualism which denied -them and merely represented them either as artificial forms or as -due to supernatural causes. Nor does the opinion seem acceptable -which attaches Vico to the Neo-Euhemeristic school. He does not -indeed explicitly combat this school, and we may even grant that he -presents certain superficial resemblances to it: but together with -the resemblances there is this radical difference, that for Vico the -stories are not alterations of actual history, but are essentially -history; their supposed alteration is the actual truth as it appeared -to the primitive mind.</p> - -<p>Vico did not and could not give a more precise determination of the -nature of myth, precisely because owing to the fluctuating character -of his concept of poetry, itself he was not in a position to lay down -the boundary between the two forms. He talks generally of poetry and -myth as distinct things, but he does not establish the distinction. -And yet Vico was familiar enough with the concept which supplies -this distinctive criterion, and had enunciated it: but instead of -using it for his doctrine of mythology, he had made of it one or -more of his various definitions of poetry. That "poetic character," -that "imaginative universal" whose introduction into aesthetic as -the explanatory principle of poetry causes so many insuperable -difficulties, is really the definition of mythology, and as such -provides the science of mythology with the true principle that is -required. If the concept of accomplishing great labours for the common -welfare cannot be disengaged from the idea of a particular man who -accomplished one of these labours, this concept becomes for instance -the myth of Hercules: and Hercules<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> is at once an individual man who -does individual actions, and kills the Lernaean hydra and the Nemean -lion or cleanses the stables of Augeas, and also a concept: just as -the concept of beneficent and glorious labour is at once a concept and -Hercules: a universal and an imaginary idea: an imaginative universal.</p> - -<p>Again, that sublime task which Vico declared proper to poetry, the task -of giving life to inanimate objects, belongs properly not to poetry -but to myth. Mythology, embodying its concepts in images, which are -always individual things, at last animates them like living beings. -Thus primitive man, ignorant of the cause of lightning and therefore -not possessing the scientific definition of it, was led by the -mythological tendency to conceive the sky as a vast living being, who, -like man himself when, in the grip of his fierce passions, he shouted, -muttered or roared, spoke and meant something by his speech. It is -mythology again, not poetry, whose origin must be traced to "poverty," -to the weakness of men's minds and their inability to deal with the -problems they would solve, in their incapacity for thinking in rational -universals and expressing themselves in accurate language, whence -arose imaginative universals and metonymy, synecdoche and metaphor -of all kinds. The contradictions we have seen in the imaginative -universal which make it incapable of acting as the foundation of an -aesthetic doctrine are quite in keeping in the doctrine of myth: for -myth consists precisely of these contradictions: it is a concept -trying to be an image and an image trying to be a concept, and hence a -kind of poverty, or even of powerful impotence,—a contrast, a mental -transition where white no longer exists and black has not yet come -into being. Finally, poetic wisdom, that is, the theology, science, -cosmography, geography, astronomy and the whole system of other ideas -and beliefs of primitive nations as Vico describes them, was really -mythology, not, as he says, poetry, for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> the good reason, given by -himself, that these things were their history: and poetry is poetry and -not history, even more or less imaginary history. The Homeric poems are -poetry in so far as they express the aspirations of Hellenism: the same -poems, in so far as they were recited and heard as accounts of actual -facts, are history: the two things being forms of mental products -which, though they seem to be materially united in a single work, are -not for that reason to be identified.</p> - -<p>All this was both seen and not seen, or rather, sometimes realised and -sometimes overlooked, by Vico: and hence he cannot be said to have -succeeded in determining satisfactorily the distinction, and solving -the problem of the relation, between mythology and poetry. Another -problem of importance relating to the science of mythology, and still -the subject of controversy, namely, the question whether myth belongs -to philosophy or to history, might be supposed to have been decisively -solved by Vico: since he repeats over and over again that myths contain -the historical judgments of primitive peoples, not the philosophical. -But in reality when we examine the point closely it appears that he -neither solved the problem nor even propounded it. The historical -judgments of which Vico is speaking are contrasted strictly not with -philosophical judgments in general but with the "mystical judgments -of the earliest philosophy" and the "judgments of analogy" which the -writers criticised by Vico found in mythology. Thus on the one hand his -words repeat the criticism of the allegorical theory and, on the other, -controvert that fallacious method of historical interpretation which -ascribes the ideas and customs of to-day to the nations of antiquity. -The fact is that Vico's theory is just as much in agreement with the -theory connecting myth with philosophy as with that which connects it -with history; and as much with the eclecticism which admits both these -elements as with the speculative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> view which also admits them both, but -because philosophy and history both in themselves and as constituents -of myth are at bottom one and the same.</p> - -<p>Considered as "poverty," myth must be superseded. In the natural -effort of the human mind to rejoin God, the true One, from whom it -has come, and its inability owing to the exuberant animal nature of -primitive man to make use of the faculty, buried as it is beneath his -too keen senses, of abstracting from subjects their properties and -universal forms,—in these circumstances, it constructs for itself -fanciful unities, imaginary genera or myths: but in its subsequent -progress and development, it gradually resolves the imaginary genera -into intelligible genera, poetic universals into rational, and sets -itself free from mythology. Thus the error of myth passes into the -truth of philosophy. Vico knew and employed a concept of error, error -properly so called, which proceeds from the will, not from thought, -which is never in error as regards itself, "for the mind is always -put under compulsion by truth, since we can never lose sight of God" -(<i>mens enim semper a vero urgetur quia numquam aspectu amittere -possumus Deum</i>); the error which consists in the arbitrary conjunction -of unmeaning words, "but words very often, by the will of him who -is lying, escape the force of truth and desert the mind, or even do -violence to the mind and turn away from God" (<i>verba autem saepissime -veri vim voluntate mentientis eludunt ac mentem deserunt, immo menti -vim aciunt et Deo absistunt</i>); the error, in a word, which exists when, -in his own powerful language, "though men speak with their mouth, -they have nothing in their minds; since within their minds there is -falsity, which is nothing." But he also knows that error is never -pure error, simply because there is no such thing as a false idea and -falsity consists only in the wrong combination of ideas, and therefore -it always contains truth, and every fable has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> a certain element of -truth. Hence, far from despising fables, Vico recognised their value -as embryonic forms so to speak of stored-up knowledge or of what will -one day develop into philosophy. The poets (which means, in Vico's new -sense of the word, myth-makers) are the senses (that is, in its new -meaning, rudimentary and imperfect philosophy): the philosophers are -the intellect of mankind, that is the more highly developed philosophy -which derives from the former. The idea of God evolves by degrees from -the God who strikes the imagination of the isolated man, to the God -of the family, <i>divi parentum,</i> the God of a social class or country, -<i>divi patrii,</i> the God of nations, and finally to the God "who is -Jupiter to all men," the God of humanity. The fables stimulated Plato -to understand the three divine punishments which not men but only gods -could inflict, oblivion, infamy and remorse: the passage through the -lower world suggested to him the concept of the purgatorial journey -by which the soul is purified of passions, and the arrival in Elysium -suggested the journey of union by which the mind comes to unite itself -with God by the contemplation of the eternal divine ideas.</p> - -<p>From the similes and metaphors of the poets Aesop drew the examples -and fables by which he gave advice: and the instance founded upon -a single case which satisfies an untutored mind developed into -induction, drawing its validity from several similar cases, as taught -dialectically by Socrates, and thence the syllogism invented by -Aristotle, which cannot exist without a universal. The etymologies -of words reveal the truths observed by primitive man and deposited -by him in his language: for instance the fact, laboriously proved by -modern philosophers, that the senses themselves create the so-called -sensible qualities is already suggested in the Latin word <i>olfacere,</i> -which implies the idea that the sense of smell "makes" the odour. Vico -attaches such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> importance to this connexion between poetic universals -and rational universals, between myth and philosophy, that he is led -to assert that such judgments of philosophers as cannot find parallel -or precedent in poetic and popular wisdom must be wrong. Here we have -another meaning sometimes assigned by him to the relation of philosophy -to philology: namely, a reciprocal confirmation of common wisdom by -esoteric wisdom and <i>vice versa,</i> both of which are united in the idea -of an everlasting philosophy of man.</p> - -<p>Simultaneously with his theory of myth and its relation to philosophy, -Vico expounds his theory of religion, and the relation it bears to -philosophy. Two thoughts on this subject are to be found up and down -the New Science. The first is, that religion arises in the phase of -weakness and savagery from the mind's need to allay its desire to -understand more or less the phenomena of nature and man; for instance, -to explain lightning. The second is, that religion is produced in -the mind by fear of the person who threatens by lightning. We might -describe these two views as theories respectively of the theoretical -and practical origin of religion; and since according to Vico's -doctrine man consists of nothing but intellect and will, clearly -religion can have no other origin than these two. Now, setting aside -religion in its practical aspect, to be discussed later, religion in -its theoretical aspect is surely nothing else than the imaginative -universal, poetic animism, or myth. To it belongs the institution -which Vico calls divination; that is, the methods of collecting and -interpreting the language of Jupiter, the "real words," gestures and -signs of God, formed as imaginative universals and created by the -animating fancy. And as from myth come science and philosophy, so in -like manner from divination comes the knowledge of ground and cause, -philosophic or scientific prediction.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span></p> - -<p>In this way Vico escaped the prejudice which was beginning to prevail -in his time—we may recall Van Dale's history of ancient oracles, -popularised by Fontenelle, and Banier's book already mentioned—and -was to be so powerful for a century, of considering religions as -"some one else's imposture": whereas, he says, they were really due -to "one's own credulity." The man who refused to admit the artificial -origin of myth could not admit it of religion. But just as he denied -no less the supernatural or revealed origin of myth, so at the same -time he proclaimed neither more nor less than the natural, even -the human, origin of religions; and—a fact especially worthy of -notice—placed this origin in an inadequate form of the mind, namely -the semi-imaginative form identical with mythology. Nor need we -attach weight to certain brief and incidental remarks which seem to -contradict this theory, as when he says that religion precedes not only -philosophy but language itself, which presupposes the consciousness -of some community between man and man: such equivocations are due to -the invariable confusedness of his method and his habitual lack of -clearness. The identification of religion with myth, and its human -origin, are ideas not only emphatically expressed, but essential to -Vico's whole system. It is a human origin which in his own words -does not exclude a different concept of religion, namely as revealed -and hence of supernatural origin. In fact he always separates -poetic theology, which is mythology, and natural theology, which is -metaphysics or philosophy, from revealed theology. But this last -concept is admitted by him not because it is connected with the others -and derived from a principle common to them, but simply because Vico -asserted its existence no less than theirs. The human origin, poetic -theology, followed by metaphysical theology, is the form valid for -the Gentile portion of mankind, that is the whole human race except -the Hebrew people with its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> privilege of revelation. The motives that -led Vico to maintain this dualism and the annoying inconsistencies -in which it compelled him to rest will be seen later on in their own -place. But precisely because Vico left this dualism without mediation, -we must in expounding his thought hold fast both terms of the dualism: -and for the time being we will confine ourselves to the merely human -origin—religion as a product of the theoretical needs of man in a -condition of comparative moral poverty. This conception has only an -indirect connexion with Bruno's view of religion as a thing necessary -to the ignorant and undeveloped mob, and with Campanula's theory -of natural or permanent religion, an eternal rational philosophy -coinciding with a Christianity freed from its abuses. Its parallels -in contemporary authors are few and distant: even when they mention -it in passing, they grasp it only in a superficial way and propound -it without connecting it at all with their other ideas: they attack -religion as a form of ignorance, and omit the wisdom of the ignorance, -or religion as truth.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS</h4> - - -<p>Vico's other doctrines on the theoretical reason, that is to say on -the logic of philosophy, of physical and mathematical science and of -historical study, have been expounded above in the statement of his -theory of knowledge, and are drawn almost entirely from his early -works, since in the New Science the phase of the "completely developed -mind" hardly appears except as a limit of the field of study. Here it -will suffice to mention that he also touches upon the problem of the -relation of poetry to history: but, still because of the confusion -of philosophy with social science, he fails fully to solve it. From -one point of view it seems to Vico that history is prior to poetry, -because the latter, as he says, presupposes reality and contains an -"imitation of the second degree": from another, poetry is the primary -form, because among primitive peoples history is poetry, and the first -historians are poets. At any rate he insists upon the poetic element -essential to history: of Herodotus, the father of Greek history, -he observes that not only are "his books full, for the most part, -of fables," but "the style retains a very great Homeric element, a -feature which all subsequent historians retained, using as they did -a phraseology intermediate between the poetic and the colloquial": -"almost the words of the poets," <i>verba ferme poetarum,</i> as he says -elsewhere in a phrase borrowed from Cicero.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> - -<p>Nor are the relations between theory and practice, intellect and -will, explained in detail by Vico, although on the whole he suggests -the general idea that as in God intellect and will coincide, so it -is in man, God's image; whose mind is not divided into thought and -will—thought proceeding according to one method and will according to -another—but his thought and will interpenetrate and form one single -whole: a view far superior to that of the contemporary philosophy -of Leibniz, which retained the idea of a divine arbitrament and -therefore of irrationality. Another view, peculiar to Vico, might -be taken by a hasty interpreter to imply the priority of practice -to theory. He says that philosophers arrive at their conceptions -thanks to experience of social institutions and laws in which men -agree as a kind of universals: that Socrates and Plato, for instance, -presupposed the Athenian democracy and law-courts. But the succession -of religions producing republics, republics producing laws, and laws -producing philosophical ideas, which he calls "a fragment of the -history of philosophy philosophically narrated," is really a theory of -sociological, not of philosophical value.</p> - -<p>As regards his doctrines of practical reason, which we are here -beginning to consider, it might be thought that Vico, unlike his -attitude with regard to the theoretical reason, did not stand in sharp -opposition to the thought of his time, but actually united himself with -a contemporary movement, namely the school of natural rights. The head -of the school and leader of the movement, Hugo Grotius, was called by -Vico one of his "four authors," together with Plato, from whom he had -drawn his aspirations towards an idealistic philosophy, Bacon, who had -aroused in his mind the idea of a positive and historical science of -society, and Tacitus, his debt to whom, or at least the debt which he -believed he owed him, we shall examine later on. Along with Grotius he -frequently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> mentions the other chief authorities on natural rights, -Selden and Puffendorf, omitting their innumerable followers, whom he -considers less as scientific authorities than as "adorners" of the -Grotian system.</p> - -<p>His adherence to the school, in a certain sense, is clear, and is -admitted and proclaimed by Vico himself. But it is also beyond doubt -that he was no mere adherent: he was not a follower of the kind that -retains the general or leading ideas while developing and correcting -details. He was a follower in the dialectical sense only, that is, -in so far as he thought it necessary to contest the primary theses, -or to accept them only in a profoundly modified form. Natural right -offered him not solutions but problems: and of these, while some came -before him already clearly formulated, others, and these were the more -important, arose only in his own mind: problems either unsolved or -unrealised, till Vico propounded and in part solved them.</p> - -<p>Natural rights presented many aspects and many tendencies: and it -would be well to begin by distinguishing and enumerating these. In -the first place, the school taken as a whole and in its essential -character expressed the social progress by which Europe, on emerging -from feudalism and religious warfare, acquired a new consciousness, -distinctively bourgeois and non-clerical in character; and it -observed that the growth of this consciousness was contemporaneous -with the anti-clerical and bourgeois institution of "masonry." The -word "natural" meant, among other things, "not supernatural": and -hence implied hostility or indifference towards the supernatural, -the institutions representing it, and the social conflicts resulting -from it. It was not by accident that Grotius was an Arminian; that -Puffendorf went to law with theologians; that Thomasius is remembered -as one of the champions of freedom of conscience. The protestations of -respect for religion and the church, habitually and liberally inserted -by these publicists in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> their works,—which are draped, so to speak, -with a veil of piety,—were merely politic safeguards, enabling the -author to threaten the enemy unobserved and to strike from under cover. -This caution is praised, in Grotius's case for example, by a follower -of the school (the author of <i>Pauco plenior iuris naturalis historia,</i> -1719), who extols the master as "the instrument of divine providence," -coming like Messiah to redeem the "natural light" from its bondage to -the "supernatural," and as such gifted with all the power and ability -he could need: so that after tasting the persecutions of Scholasticism, -"he behaved with caution, to avoid further irritating the jealousy -against his natural and reasonable prudence that had issued forth from -its lair at his threats" (<i>caute versabatur ... ne maius bilem adversus -prudentiam naturalem et rationalem ex latebris productam tam minis -irritaret</i>), and in proceeding to separate human from divine laws, -did not execute a frontal assault on the theological school when he -attacked its fundamental errors, but even praised it in the preface to -his work. The word "natural" also denoted what is common to individuals -of different nations and ranks: and hence from a practical point of -view provided an admirable war-cry for uniting the bourgeoisie of -different countries in definite common aspirations and struggles. The -treatises of natural rights were for the bourgeoisie of the seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries what the "Manifesto of the communists" and the -cry "Proletariates of the world, unite" attempted to be for the working -classes of the nineteenth.</p> - -<p>In so far as this school and this publicism were signs of a practical -movement, the philosophical interest held in them a secondary place -and discharged a function of minor importance: so that, secondly, the -works on natural right, philosophically considered, did not as a rule -rise above a simple popular empiricism. The principles on which they -rest are not examined and often<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> not even superficially reconciled: the -concepts which they use are less concepts than general representations: -and the form of the writing is systematic in appearance only. Some -of these writers endeavoured to harmonise their doctrines of natural -right with the Platonic, Stoic or Cartesian philosophies, or appealed -to logical or metaphysical axioms, or made use of deduction and the -mathematical method. But all this was mere aggregation, not fusion; -ornament, not reinforcement: at most, it was of value as a proof of -diligence and earnest intentions.</p> - -<p>The philosophy, however, which was more or less implicit in the -pamphleteers of natural rights, and explicit in the philosophers who -set out to elaborate the doctrine, agreed with the spirit of the -time, whose general characteristics are well known. Thus arose the -third or ethical aspect of natural right, namely its utilitarianism; -sometimes more or less concealed, sometimes openly declared, and -worked out from time to time by a philosophy of mathematical or -sensationalistic methods, and of materialistic or rationalistic -tendencies: or else, what comes practically to the same thing, an -abstract and intellectualistic morality, threatening at any moment to -fall into utilitarianism. From this intellectualism and utilitarianism, -combined with the practical and revolutionary character of this mental -movement,—which was bent rather upon bringing about the triumph of -an abstract system of right than upon recognising that which really -develops in history, in all the complexity of its many forms and -vicissitudes—derived its fourth characteristic, the lack of historical -sense, or the anti-historical attitude of the school, which set up the -abstract ideal of a human nature apart from human history instead of -fused with and living in it.</p> - -<p>Finally, bourgeois, anticlerical, utilitarian and materialistic as it -was, the movement of natural right had a fifth important trait, namely -its aversion to transcendence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> and its tendency towards an immanental -conception of man and of society. This characteristic is neither fully -explained nor fully worked out in the doctrines, but is none the less -easily recognised among the total views of the school.</p> - -<p>Now Vico's genius was truly and indeed exclusively theoretical, and not -at all practical or reformatory: his method was profoundly speculative -and contemptuous of empiricism, his mind idealistic and opposed to -materialism and utilitarianism: his theory of knowledge eager for the -concrete, for "certitude," and, as such, of historical sympathies. -Consequently his doctrine of the practical reason, though deriving its -impetus from the theory of natural rights, was bound to emerge in a -shape different from or even contrary to that theory in all the first -four characteristics enumerated above. And if it did in one respect -coincide—which it only does in the conclusion, not in the path by -which the conclusion is reached—it did so in the very point in which -Vico would least have wished it: in its immanental or anti-religious -tendency.</p> - -<p>But since our subject is not the criticisms and modifications which the -theory of natural right received from Vico's thought, but rather that -thought itself, it is time to pick up the thread of the exposition, -following an order somewhat different from that in which we have -summed up the various characteristics of the theory, and beginning by -observing Vico's opposition to the professed or implicit utilitarianism -of the school, and the ethical doctrine by which he replaced it.</p> - -<p>The two chief representatives of utilitarianism in the seventeenth -century, whom Vico always keeps in view, are Hobbes and Spinoza: but in -addition to them, he refers to Locke and Bayle and, in the preceding -century, Machiavelli; and going back to the ancients, the Stoics with -their conception of faith and the Epicureans with that of chance, -Carneades and his scepticism, and finally the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> unconscious theory -contained in the saying "<i>Vae victis</i>" attributed to Brennus, chief -of the Gauls who took Rome. He admired Hobbes's splendid attempt to -enrich philosophy by a theory which had been lacking to the greatest -days of Greece, the theory of man considered in the whole society -of the human race: but he pronounced the result unsatisfactory, and -the attempt, whose outcome, like that of Locke's system, was hardly -distinguishable from Epicureanism, a failure. Hobbes did not observe -that he could never have propounded his problem of the natural rights -of mankind had not his motive been supplied by the Christian religion -itself, which commands not indeed justice but charity to all mankind. -With the Stoics on the other hand, with the fatalism and determinism -which made it impossible for them to reason soundly about the state and -laws, with the so-called "Spinozists of antiquity," he ideally united -Spinoza; the uniqueness of whose utilitarianism, equally removed from -the Lockian spirit and the Hobbist, since Spinoza "judges of the truth -of things by the mind, not by sense" (<i>mente non sensu de veris rerum -diiudicat</i>), did not escape Vico's notice. But unique though it was, -it led Spinoza to think of the state in a somewhat undignified way -"as of a mere society of shopkeepers." These utilitarian doctrines, -with their libels upon human nature, seemed to Vico only fit for men -without hope, too insignificant ever to have a share in the state or -proud enough to believe themselves repressed and denied access to the -positions of which in their arrogance they thought themselves worthy. -Among these he counted the unfortunate Spinoza, who, he thinks, having -as a Jew no country of his own, was moved by envy to devote himself to -the construction of a metaphysic "intended to overthrow all the nations -of the world." He passes stern judgment upon the state of contemporary -ethics, which was all that it could be on the basis of a mechanistic -and materialistic metaphysic without a gleam<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> of finalism. Descartes -produced nothing at all in this field, since his few written remains -on the subject do not amount to a doctrine, and his treatise of the -Passions belongs rather to medicine than to morals. Malebranche and -Nicole were equally sterile, and Pascal's <i>Pensées,</i> the one exception, -are "but scattered lights." Of the Italians, Pallavicino's treatise -<i>Del bene</i> offers no very profound depths of ethics: and Muratori's -attempt in his <i>Filosofia Morale</i> was a very unsuccessful one.</p> - -<p>Utility is not the explanatory principle of morality, because it -proceeds from man's bodily nature, and on that account is subject to -change, while morality, <i>honestas,</i> is eternal. To derive morality -from utility is to confound the occasion with the cause, to confine -oneself to the surface and to offer no explanation at all of the facts. -None of the various modes in which philosophers have successively -called the utilitarian principle to life, fraud or imposture, force, -desire,—none of these accounts for differentiation, that is, for the -social organism. What fraud could ever have seduced and deceived the -supposed simple and frugal first owners of the land, living as they did -perfectly contented with their lot? What force could have succeeded, -if the rich, the alleged usurpers, were few, and the poor, the -robbed, were many? Such explanations are ridiculous, and unworthy of -a serious problem. These strong and powerful men were really powerful -with something other than mere strength: thus they became protectors -of the weak and enemies of destructive and anti-social tendencies: -their rule was one of force, it is true, but "imposed by a more -powerful character" (<i>a natura praestantiori dictata</i>); a fact which -the barbarian Brennus may be pardoned for not knowing, but not so a -philosopher. The force which created and organised the earliest states -was nothing but "noble human nature," to which states must always hark -back, although they may have been won by fraud and force, in order -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> subsist and maintain themselves: which agrees with Machiavelli's -advice to hark back to the beginnings, but with the implication that -the deepest beginnings are to be found in mercy and justice. Men are -held together by something stouter than utility. Human society cannot -originate and endure without mutual trust; unless people accept each -other's promises and take each other's word for facts they cannot -examine. Could this trust be perhaps ensured by strict penal laws -against falsehood? But laws are a product of society, and this mutual -trust is necessary that society may arise. It may be said, as it is by -Locke, that we are dealing with a psychological process, by which men -gradually acquired the habit of believing when some one spoke to them -and promised to tell the truth. But in that case these men already -understood the idea of a truth which by mere disclosure compelled -assent without any personal teaching; and the psychological principle -of habituation is transcended.</p> - -<p>The true cause of human society then is not utility, which only assists -the action of the cause as its occasion, and brings it about that men, -with all the weakness and poverty of their nature, and the divisions -among them due to original sin, are led to extol their social nature -"under compulsion of facts" (<i>rebus ipsis dictantibus</i>), in the phrase -of the jurist Pomponius, quoted with approval by Vico. Objects, facts -and circumstances in morality change, though morality itself does not -change: and hence arises the illusion of the utilitarians, who cling -to the external, confine themselves to the appearance and see the -change but not the permanence. Murder is forbidden: but the approval, -bestowed upon the man who when his life is threatened and he cannot -otherwise save himself kills his unjust aggressor, does not imply that -the moral judgment upon homicide varies; since in these particular -circumstances the case is really one not of homicide but of capital -punishment inflicted by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> unjustly attacked person finding himself -alone: a power tacitly delegated to him so to speak by society. Theft -is forbidden: but the man who in order to preserve his life steals a -loaf from another does not violate morality because he is exercising a -right founded upon equity.</p> - -<p>The only philosophy which carries with it a true ethic seems to Vico -to be the Platonic, resting as it does upon a metaphysical principle, -the eternal idea which draws out of itself and creates matter: while -the Aristotelian ethic is founded upon a metaphysic leading to a -physical principle, that of the matter from which particular forms are -drawn, a principle which makes God a potter shaping objects external -to himself. The ethic of the Roman lawyers was doubtless rich in fine -aphorisms: but it was nothing but a mere art of equity, conveyed by -means of endless minute maxims of natural justice, sought for by the -writers in the reason of the laws and the will of the lawgiver. Hence -it cannot be regarded as a moral philosophy, in which the best method -is to proceed from a very small number of eternal truths, established -by ideal justice in the fabric of metaphysic. For analogous reasons -Vico could not rest satisfied with Grotius and the school of natural -rights: of which in general he makes the perfectly just remark that -their ponderous tomes, in spite of the impressive titles they bear, -contain nothing that is not universally known. If Grotius's principles -be weighed in the accurate balance of criticism, they are all found to -be probable or plausible rather than necessary and incontestable. In -dealing with the question of utility, Grotius missed the exact point by -failing to distinguish the occasion from the cause: nor did he "nail -down"—that is, he did not end—the ancient dispute as to whether right -is a question of nature or of human opinion only, the same controversy -as that carried on by philosophers and theologians with Carneades the -sceptic and Epicurus: he advances the hypothesis of primitive men -who were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> "simpletons," but quite omits to give reasons for it. And -since these "simpletons" of his, after suffering injuries from their -beast-like isolation, initiated a sociable life, a step to which they -were determined by utility, Grotius himself slipped unawares into -utilitarianism and Epicureanism.</p> - -<p>Vico on the other hand answered the question, whether right is natural -or conventional, by the grave aphorism "except in their natural -condition, things neither progress nor endure." To the question, -whence society arises, he replies by mentioning the common feeling of -humanity, the conscience, the need which man feels of escaping from -the internal enemy, which tortures his heart. The origin of society -certainly lies in fear, but it is fear of oneself, not of another's -violence: it lies in the agonies of remorse, the shame whose tinge -suffusing the cheeks of the earliest men lit the first beacon of -morality upon earth. Shame is the mother of all virtues, honour, -frugality, honesty, loyalty to the pledged word, truthfulness in -speech, abstention from others' property, and chastity. In extolling -society, man is extolling human nature.</p> - -<p>Shame or the moral consciousness, translated into terms of the -corresponding empirical science, becomes that common consciousness of -man upon matters of human necessity or utility which is the source of -the natural right of nations. This common consciousness, says Vico, -is an unreflective judgment, felt in common by a whole class, a whole -people, a whole nation and the whole of mankind. An unreflective -judgment is not strictly a judgment at all, since reflection is -inseparable from judgment: it is not judgment, because it is felt -and not thought. But on the other hand it is not what is called a -"feeling,"—a vague term unknown to Vico, as it is to traditional -philosophy. It is rather a practical attitude of mind, similar on the -whole in persons living in similar conditions and producing similar -customs in the various<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> social groups, from the customs of a particular -class to those of all mankind. The attitude is quite spontaneous, and -for this very reason unreflective; so that customs arise from within, -not from without, and their similarity does not depend upon imitation -("without one nation taking example from another"). Through this -<i>sensus communis</i> the moral consciousness embodies itself in compact -and unyielding institutions: and thus the <i>sensus communis</i> reduces to -certitude the free will of man, which is in itself quite uncertain.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></h5> - - -<h4>MORALITY AND RELIGION</h4> - - -<p>But this internal fear, shame or moral consciousness is aroused in man -by religion. The fear is the fear of God, the shame is abasement before -his face. Primitive man wanders over the earth alone, wild, fierce, -without articulate speech, without a permanent mate, at the mercy of -his unbridled and violent passions, a "brute" rather than a man. What -can restrain him? what can rescue him from at last destroying himself? -Wise men cannot direct him, for we cannot say whence or how they can -reach him. The intervention of God cannot save him: God has withdrawn -himself to his chosen people, and has no dealings with the rest of -mankind, the Gentiles. But this "brute" is still a man: God, while -abandoning him, has left a spark of his own essence at the bottom of -his heart. See! the sky lightens: the wild creature stands awestruck -and afraid: in his mind arises the shadowy idea of something greater -than he, something divine. So he conceives or rather imagines a first -God, a Sky-god, a thundering Jupiter: and to this deity he turns to -appease his wrath or invoke his aid. But in order to conciliate him and -secure his help, he must shape his own life conformably to his purpose: -he must humble himself before his God, overcome his own pride and -arrogance, abstain from certain actions and perform others. Thus the -conception of a deity lends power to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> that peculiar possession of the -human will, the attempt, that is, the liberty, to control the movements -communicated to the mind by the body and to annul or to redirect them -simultaneously. With these acts of self-control, with freedom, morality -comes into existence: the fear of God has laid the foundations of human -life. Altars arise all over the earth: the caves of her mountains, -whither the man now bears the woman, ashamed as he is of gratifying his -desires before the face of the sky, which is the face of God, preside -at the first marriage-rites and shelter the first families: her bosom -opens to receive the sacred trust of the bodies of the dead. The first -and fundamental ethical institutions—worship, wedlock and burial—have -arisen.</p> - -<p>This social and ethical power of the idea of God appears again in the -course of subsequent history: since when nations have relapsed into -savagery through warfare, and human laws have no more power over them, -religion is the only means of subduing them. It reappears again in the -individual development of human life: children indeed cannot learn -piety except through the fear of some deity; and when all natural help -fails him man requires a superior being to save him, and this being is -God. All nations believe in a divine providence: tribes living in a -society without any consciousness of God, for instance in some parts of -Brazil, among the Kafirs, and in the Antilles, are travellers' tales, -an attempt to increase the sale of their books by the narration of -portents.</p> - -<p>If this is so,—and doubtless it is—then no doctrine can be more -foolish than that which claims to conceive a morality and civilisation -without religion. Just as no well-established physical science is -possible without the guidance of abstract mathematical truth, so -no knowledge of morality can arise except together with abstract -metaphysical truths, without, that is, the idea of God. When the -religious consciousness is extinguished or obscured<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> the conception -of society and the state is extinguished or obscured with it. Jews, -Christians, Gentiles and Mahommedans possess this conception because -all alike believe in some deity, whether as an infinite free spirit, -or as several gods consisting of mind and body, or as one single God, -an infinite free spirit in an infinite body. The Epicureans did not -possess such a conception, attributing to God as they did body alone, -and chance together with body: nor did the Stoics, who made him subject -to fate. And Cicero made the admirable remark to the Epicurean Atticus, -that he could not discuss laws with him unless he first granted the -existence of the divine providence. Hobbes, who revived Epicureanism, -and Spinoza, who revived Stoicism, as we have seen entirely failed to -understand the nature of society and the state. One must consort with -primitive man, stupid, hirsute, unclean and dishevelled, to refute -those learned authors of "desiccated literature," with Peter Bayle at -their head, who maintain that human society can and indeed does live -without religion.</p> - -<p>The absence of the idea of God supplied the chief argument in Vico's -criticism of Grotius and Puffendorf, two of these authors whom he held -in great honour as "princes" of the school of natural rights. Neither -of these writers, he says, lays down the principle of divine providence -as primary and essential. Grotius does not expressly deny it: but on -account of his very attachment to truth, he endeavours to exclude it, -and asserts that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be -removed. Hence Vico accuses him of Socinianism, since he makes human -innocence consist in the simplicity of human nature. Puffendorf is -still worse: he seems to ignore providential direction, and begins -with the scandalously Epicurean supposition that man is thrown into -this world with no help or attention from God, without even that spark -within his heart which is destined to grow into the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> flame of morality: -and having been reproved for this, he tries to justify himself in a -special essay, but does not succeed in discovering the true principle -on which alone society can be explained.</p> - -<p>Now why, in face of all these energetic declarations and arguments -of Vico's on the necessity of religion to morality, did we say above -that the only point of real resemblance between him and Grotius, -Puffendorf and the natural-right school generally was his purely -immanental conception of ethics? Because, if we examine the point -closely, Vico is not in opposition to the method of that school. Like -them, in constructing his science of human society he excludes with -Grotius all idea of God, and with Puffendorf considers man as without -help or attention from God, excluding him, that is, from revealed -religion and its God. As for these two writers, so for Vico the subject -under consideration is natural rights, not supernatural: the law -of the Gentiles, not of the chosen people: the law which arises of -itself among the caves, not that which comes down from Sinai. Vico's -opposition, which he expresses with his accustomed confusion and -obscurity, turns not upon assertions like these, but upon the actual -conception of religion. In one word, the religion of which he speaks is -not the same as that of which Grotius and Puffendorf spoke, or rather -did not speak.</p> - -<p>Religion, as we have already seen, means for Vico not necessarily -revelation, but conception of reality: either that which expresses -itself as it does in the period of fully developed mind in the form -of intelligible metaphysic, which passes from the thought of God to -explain logic by its reasoning and to condescend to purify the human -heart by morality: or that which takes concrete shape, as it does in -the earliest stage of humanity, in the form of poetical metaphysics. -One may easily ignore revealed religion when inquiring into the -foundations of morality: but how can one ever ignore this natural -religion,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> identical as it is with knowledge of the truth? Plutarch, -discussing the primitive religions of terror, asks the question whether -it would not have been better, instead of worshipping the gods in so -impious a manner, that there should be no religion at all: but he -forgot that from these cruel superstitions brilliant civilisations -developed, and no civilisation could ever have grown from atheism. -Without a religion, whether gentle or fierce, rational or fantastic, to -give the idea, more or less clearly defined, more or less elevated, of -something superior to the individual and uniting all individuals, the -moral will would have no object for its volition.</p> - -<p>At this point we see the meaning of what we have described as the -second, practical or ethical, signification of the word "religion" in -Vico. In this signification, Vico justifies and vindicates the impious -saying that "fear creates the gods": he even places the source of -religion in the longing for eternal life which man feels when stirred -by a universal sense of immortality hidden in the depths of the mind. -In this second signification, religion is a practical fact, indeed it -is morality itself, as in the first meaning it was truth itself.</p> - -<p>If the meaning of religion for Vico, either as the condition of -morality, in the first sense of the word, or as synonymous with it, -in the second, is once understood, it is clear that when he condemned -Grotius and Puffendorf for their omission of this most important -concept, he was substantially doing nothing but clenching his criticism -of the insipid moralising and the concealed utilitarianism of these -two thinkers. On other occasions also he resorted to the valuable -weapon of the concept of religion, with the same end in view. Because -if he sometimes credited philosophy with the task of assisting -mankind by raising and directing fallen human nature, at other times -he decided that philosophy is rather adapted to reasoning, and that -the moral philosophers with the greatest powers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> of reasoning are of -value only to stimulate the senses by their eloquence to perform the -duties of virtue, while religion alone has the power of making men act -virtuously. Then in the empirical science corresponding to this part of -the philosophy of mind, Vico turns religion (or poetical metaphysic) -and philosophy into two historical epochs, making the former -characteristic of the barbaric period and the latter of the civilised. -He maintains, as he is clearly bound to do, that religion is the sole -foundation of all civilisation and of philosophy itself, and rejects -Polybius's saying that if there had been philosophers in the world -religion would have been unnecessary. How could philosophy have arisen, -he objects, had not states, that is, civilisation, arisen first? and -how could states have arisen without the aid of religion? Thus the -saying ought to be reversed: without religion there is no philosophy. -It was religion, it was the divine providence that tamed the sons of -Polyphemus and reduced them to the humanity of Aristides and Socrates, -of Laelius and Scipio Africanus.</p> - -<p>The conception again of the "state of nature," which served in the -treatises of the school of natural rights as an hypothesis and a -means of exposition with a view either to developing the argument -independently of mystical theology without evoking too many protests, -or to conveying implicitly their utilitarian theories, acquired in -Vico's hands a new function and a new content. A perfectly honest -Catholic, having satisfied his conscience by separating revealed from -human religion, he was in a position to assume the state of nature -as a literal and actual reality. It is an ideal reality, in so far -as it represents in the dialectic of the practical consciousness a -moment necessary for the genesis of reality, the pre-moral moment: a -historical and empirical reality, as the approximately actual condition -of those periods of anarchy and disturbance which precede the rise of -civilisations or follow upon their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> fall. The natural-right school -acquiesced more or less in the traditional doctrine of the church, -namely that the Gentiles, in the dispersion following on the confusion -of Babel, had taken away with them a residuum of revealed religion, a -vague memory of the true God, and that hence arose the possibility of -social life and of false gods, shadows of the true God: and thus the -"state of nature" had been put forward in their system as something -abstract and unreal. Vico worked out strictly the distinction between -Jews and Gentiles, and conceived the state of nature as devoid of -any help coming from previous revelation: as a state in which man -stood alone, so to speak, face to face with his own chaotic and -turbulent passions. It was a state actually without morality, but—in -contradistinction to the utilitarian hypothesis—pregnant with moral -requirements, and was transcended by this implicit character becoming -explicit. But this transcendence was brought about naturally, not by -means of divine grace: the true divine grace is human nature itself, -shared by Gentiles no less than Jews, all equally illuminated by a -divine light.</p> - -<p>Man's will is free, weak though it is, to make his passions into -virtues; and in his struggle towards virtue he is helped in a natural -manner by God through providence. Certainly Vico did not intend to deny -the efficacy of direct and personal divine grace as well: but following -his usual method he separates the latter from the natural operation of -providence, which is the only question of importance for him and the -only one he considers. So far as concerns the controversies on grace, -he always likes to maintain a middle position between two extremes -represented typically, according to him, by Pelagianism and Calvinism: -and ever since as a young man he studied the works of Richard, the -theologian of the Sorbonne, he had accepted his demonstration of -the superiority of the Augustinian doctrine, just because it was -intermediate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> between these extremes. A moderate doctrine of this -kind seemed to him, as he says, to provide a suitable foundation for -a principle of the natural rights of nations which should explain the -origin of Roman and other Gentile law, while at the same time remaining -in agreement with the Catholic religion. He was inclined to admit that -there was a privileged nation, namely the Jewish; and that in the -struggle against the passions the Christian had an advantage over the -non-Christian, because in cases where natural grace failed he might be -helped by supernatural. But, in a word, miracles are miracles, and the -New Science is not a science of the miraculous.</p> - -<p>That it is not, is proved by Vico's criticism on the third of the -"principles" of natural rights, against John Selden, a famous man in -his day though forgotten later, and author of <i>De iure naturali et -gentium iuxta disciplinant Hebraeorum</i> (1640). Selden disagreed with -Grotius, in this as in certain other questions, in not denying, and -even in exalting, the value of religion: he conceived moral and civil -life impossible for mankind except through revelation. This revelation, -made by God to the Jewish people, passed from them according to Selden -by several channels to the Gentiles: Pythagoras for instance had learnt -from Ezekiel; Aristotle, at the time of the campaigns of Alexander in -Asia, formed a friendship with Simon the Just; Numa Pompilius acquired -some knowledge of the Bible and the prophets. This was enough to -reassure any believer who had been frightened away from the works of -the natural-right school by their heterodox tendencies. But Vico will -have none of this ultra-religious system. If Grotius ignored providence -and Puffendorf denied it, Selden was wrong, said Vico, in supplying it, -making it a <i>deus ex machina,</i> without explaining it by the essential -character of the human mind. It was a system not only unphilosophical -but incompatible with sacred history, which admits to a certain extent -even in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> the case of the Jews a natural, not revealed, law: and it was -only because, during the captivity in Egypt, they lost sight of this -that the direct intervention of God with the laws given to Moses took -place. Nor did the theory agree, as to the alleged dissemination of -Jewish knowledge and laws among the Gentiles, with the words of the Jew -Josephus and of Lactantius; and in general, it was unsupported by even -the smallest documentary evidence. Vico's conclusion therefore remains -unaltered. The Jews enjoyed in addition the extraordinary aid of the -true God: but the other nations attained civilisation solely through -the ordinary light of providence.</p> - -<p>Whether or no Vico quoted and interpreted Grotius and Puffendorf -accurately is for us a question of small importance. His exposition -and estimate of other philosophers matter less than his own doctrines, -whatever their historical relations, which, to tell the truth, are many -in number. Nevertheless it will be as well to indicate briefly, as -regards the difficulties which may arise upon this point, the answer -which we think plausible. Any one who after reading Vico's censures -opened the <i>De iure belli et pacis</i> and found that Grotius explicitly -includes among his three fundamental principles, with reason and the -social nature, the divine will, and that this ignoring of God amounts -to little more than a mere phrase laying emphasis on the power of the -social nature and reason, which would take effect "even if we were -to grant that God does not exist" (<i>etiamsi dar emus non esse Deum</i>) -or that he does not care for human affairs, "which cannot be granted -without the grossest impiety" (<i>quod sine summo scelere dari nequit</i>): -any one who opened Puffendorf and read a most solemn denunciation of -the Grotian hypothesis as impious and absurd, and a declaration that -natural laws would remain hanging in the air devoid of force apart -from the will of God as legislator; any one who read these words might -be led to accuse Vico of negligence or even of insincerity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> in his -criticisms of his predecessors. But in truth Vico did not know what to -make of a God set side by side with other sources of morality, or set -above them as a superfluous source for the sources: he, searching for -God as he did in the heart of man, saw and felt the gulf fixed between -him and those who no longer had him in their hearts and barely kept -him on their lips through habit or prudence. A more subtle question -would be to ask why,—if Vico agreed with the natural-right school in -ignoring revelation, and if he instead of rejecting it deepened their -superficial immanental doctrine,—why he put himself forward as their -implacable enemy and persisted in boasting loudly before prelates and -pontiffs of having formulated a system of natural rights different from -that of the three Protestant authors and adapted to the Roman church. -The supposition that he acted thus through politic caution might be -advanced if instead of Vico we were dealing with, for instance, a -passionate and powerful but deceitful friar like Tommaso Campanella: -but the spotless character of Vico entirely precludes it, and we can -only suppose that, lacking as his ideas always were in clarity, on -this occasion he indulged his tendency to confusion and nourished his -illusions, to the extent of conferring upon himself the flattering -style and title of <i>Defensor Ecclesiae</i> at the very moment when he -was destroying the religion of the church by means of the religion of -humanity.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></h5> - - -<h4>MORALITY AND LAW</h4> - - -<p>With the dazzling light of his originality still shining before our -eyes, it is impossible to fix our attention upon those doctrines and -classifications which Vico drew from the traditional philosophy and -placed especially in the first book of the <i>Diritto universale</i>: though -it is precisely these that have become favourites with many readers, -and are now almost common property through the frequent quotation of -them. That God is "infinite power knowledge and will" (<i>posse nosse -velle infinitum</i>) and man "finite power knowledge and will struggling -towards the infinite" (<i>posse nosse velle finitum quod tendit ad -infinitum</i>): that the state is the image of God, and because "it has -all things beneath it, nothing above" (<i>omnia infra se, nil superius -habet</i>), therefore "it renders account to God alone and to no one else" -(<i>uni Deo, praeterea reddat rationem nemini</i>), and that just as in God -freedom is inherent in his eternal reason, so the state freely obeys -the laws it has itself established: that justice "directs and equates -utilities" (<i>utilitates dirigit et exaequat</i>), directing, like an -architect, in the building-up of the state, the two particular kinds -of justice, commutative and distributive, the two divine artisans that -measure utility with the two divine measures, arithmetic and geometry, -so that "what is equal when you measure is also just when you choose" -(<i>quod est aequum cum metiris, idem est iustum quum eligis</i>),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> these -and similar assertions seem not merely lacking in originality but -even false or meaningless, adorned though they may be with the name -either of Aristotle or of Campanella or of other philosophers of the -ancient world or the Renaissance. If, to take one, justice consisted -in measuring, a philosophy of justice would be unnecessary, for the -science of calculation and measurement would be enough. Vico himself at -one point involuntarily and ingenuously discloses the vicious circle -of this metaphor substituted for a concept, by saying that men ought -"to share utility equally among themselves, only preserving a <i>just</i> -difference where it is a question of desert, and that to preserve the -equality."</p> - -<p>More profitable than collecting these second-hand formulae would be to -collect the many acute observations of moral psychology found here and -there in his writings, expressed in his gem-like style; or to recall -his little-known theory of laughter, which he derives from disappointed -expectation and from the weakness of the mind, and therefore denies -the faculty both to animals and to the perfect man, considering a man -who laughs to be a satyr or faun, intermediate between a brute and a -man. But abstaining from such a collection, which forms no part of our -plan, we would rather observe that even in the commonplace distinctions -and classifications mentioned above Vico shows a certain merit: he -recognises, even while he propounds them, the necessary confusion -and identification of all or many of these distinctions. Thus after -distinguishing the two kinds of justice, the three kinds of virtue and -the three kinds of law, he ends by declaring that these dualities, -triplicities and multiplicities each form a unity.</p> - -<p>Justice and virtue also, for Vico, form a unity, since that power of -truth, or human reason, which is virtue in so far as it struggles -with selfishness, is also justice in so far as it directs or equates -utilities. This implies that Vico does not distinguish, at least in the -systematic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> exposition of the <i>Diritto universale,</i> between law and -morality: a distinction which indeed received little emphasis in the -doctrine of natural rights, and is barely indicated in Grotius, for -instance, as one between a greater and less degree of morality. Vico's -doctrine of punishment is also purely moral, and deduced from the -ethical concept of remorse. It is inflicted, he says, by the law, and -is nothing but a social reinforcement of the individual conscience, in -the case where the offender does not himself expiate his crime by means -of remorse and internal punishment.</p> - -<p>But the more the problem of the relation between law and morality is -absent in Vico's theoretical formulation and systematic treatment, -the more present it is in his particular observations; indeed it may -be said to pervade the whole of the New Science. Nor could it be -otherwise, seeing that this relation refers to the distinction between -the moral will and the inferior or earlier forms of will; and we know -that all Vico's tendencies were towards exploring the lower and obscure -region of the mind, both cognitive and practical, in the sphere alike -of imagination, will and passion.</p> - -<p>He always realised the supreme importance of the passions; and if -he could not approve of giving them the upper hand, if he always -considered the Epicurean morality a morality "of idlers shut up in -their pleasure-gardens," he did not at all approve of excessively -severe moralities such as that of the Stoics, which was no less than -the other a morality of "solitaries," not one for men living in a -state. Stoicism certainly preaches an eternal and immutable justice, -and makes honour the criterion of human action; but it does violence -to human nature, dehumanises it, annuls it and drives it to despair by -pretending that it is quite insensible to the passions, by ignoring -the utility and necessity of the bodily nature, by inculcating that -rule—a rule "harder than iron"—that sins are all equal and that he -who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> strikes a slave is as guilty as he who kills his father. The -same doubts must have been aroused in Vico's mind by Jansenism, as he -complains that "out of hatred of probability, Christian morality in -France is becoming rigidified." We ought to follow not these solitary -philosophers but rather those political ones, especially the Platonic -type, which recognises that the passions should be not eradicated but -moderated and "converted into human virtues." Thus out of cruelty, -avarice and ambition, the three universal faults of mankind, Providence -elicits the warrior, the merchant and the judge; the bravery, wealth -and wisdom of states. From these three failings, which would destroy -mankind on the earth, civil prosperity is formed.</p> - -<p>Concerning matters of utility, Vico observes that "in themselves," <i>ex -se,</i> they are neither good nor bad (<i>neque turpes neque honestae</i>) but -become so merely through their relation to the moral consciousness -("but their unfairness is baseness, their fairness, honour: <i>sed -earum inaequalitas est turpitudo, acqualitas autem honestas</i>"). In -the empirical science of utility, he defends against Grotius a "prior -natural law," <i>ius naturale prius,</i> to which belong self-defence and -the procreation and upbringing of children: and this right he connects -with the Stoic <i>ἀδιάφορον.</i> That it has no moral authority is proved -by the fact that the law which follows it in the historical order, the -"posterior natural law," <i>ius naturale posterius,</i> defined by Justinian -as "that which is established among all men by natural reason and is -preserved by all nations alike" (<i>quod naturalis ratio inter omnes -homines constituit et apud omnes gentes per aeque custoditur</i>), is -prior in the order of right, <i>prius iure,</i> overcomes the former when -they conflict and sets upon it the seal of immutability. Now, although -this first natural law is defined and exemplified in a merely empirical -manner, it is surely at bottom nothing but pure law, law not yet -moralised.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> - -<p>But it is upon the concept of "certitude" that law as distinct from -morality properly, according to Vico, rests. The word certitude is used -by him in many senses, neither clearly distinguished nor harmonised nor -deduced one from another: though they all as we have seen unite, rather -confusedly, in the general idea of the spontaneous as distinguished, -from the reflective form of the mind. Certitude in its practical -signification implies among other things an opposition to the "truth" -of volition, and is, in a word, force as against equity and justice, -authority as against reason, mere will as against the moral will. -These are distinctions occurring to our own thoughts, rather than -stated by Vico, who both distinguishes and fails to distinguish. For -instance, he affirms that "certitude proceeds from authority, truth -from reason" (<i>certuni ab auctoritate est, verum a ratione</i>) and -immediately afterwards adds that "it is quite impossible for authority -to conflict with reason, for in that case there would be not laws but -abortive laws" (<i>auctoritas cum ratione omnino pugnare non potest, -nam ita non leges essent, sed monstra legum</i>). At any rate, the New -Science seems to him, by reason of this treatment of certitude, to -contain a philosophy of authority, which, he adds, "is the source of -what theological moralists call external justice." That is to say, he -connected the concept of certitude with the distinction and terminology -of external and internal, already employed by the scholastic morality, -which, used about this time by Christianus Thomasius, were destined -without any great philosophical merit on his part to give an impetus -to the investigation of the philosophical relations between law and -morality.</p> - -<p>Another and kindred meaning of practical certitude in Vico is the -so-called letter of the law, <i>formula legum;</i> which may stand in -opposition to reason and the moral consciousness, but none the less -has its own peculiar value: "<i>dura lex, sed certa: durum sed scriptum -est</i>—the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> law is harsh, but it is certain; it is harsh, but so it is -written." It is in a word the value of law simply as law, which though -devoid of any real ethical content yet has always the value that comes -from a command over the will. "The certitude of law" (writes Vico) "is -a darkening of the reason supported merely by authority, and makes the -law harsh in practical experience by laying down their certitude, which -in good Latin (<i>certuni</i>) means particularised, or in the scholastic -terminology individualised." To a certain extent Vico grasped the -individual character which lies at the root of every law. That one -must "judge according to law, not according to example" (<i>legibus non -exemplis iudicandum</i>) is a comparatively late principle: the first laws -were strictly <i>"exempta,"</i> exemplary punishments. From real examples -were derived the ideal examples employed by logic and rhetoric: and -when the intelligible universal was understood, it was recognised that -law had a certain universal character.</p> - -<p>The primitive society sketched by Vico is, in its juristic aspect, -the myth so to speak of pure law or practical force. Once upon a time -men lived possessed of immense bodily strength, and proportionately -feeble in understanding, who thought all strength greater than their -own divine, and this belief constituted their law. They thought of -the gods simply as beings stronger than themselves, whom they were -compelled to obey, though with a bad grace: like Polyphemus, who if he -had been strong enough would have fought Zeus himself, or Achilles, -who told Apollo that if only they were equally matched he would not -hesitate to try his strength against him. The wisdom of providence -decreed that these fierce men, not tamed as yet by the rule of reason, -should at least fear the divine nature of force and measure reason by -its standard. This is the foundation of the principle of the "external -justice of war." But the myth of the period of force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> cannot have the -strictness of a philosophical concept, and consequently these strong -men are considered by Vico from another point of view as ethically the -best: "strongest" and "best," <i>fortissimi</i> and <i>optimi,</i> are regarded -as synonymous terms: and their law, though not truth or rational law, -is not pure certitude, but truth "mixed with certitude," <i>ex certo -mixtum.</i> But the very mixture of certitude with, and its preponderance -over, truth, which is here asserted, postulates the concept of pure -certitude as presupposed by Vico.</p> - -<p>When Vico accused Grotius and the school of natural rights of -commencing their history half-way, with the civilised ages, and -overlooking the earlier periods, the accusation, in its bearing upon -the philosophy of practice, may be translated into a charge of ignoring -the ideal moment of force and confining the attention to justice, -equity and morality. The moment of force, constituting the other -and earlier "half," was the field chosen by Hobbes, before him by -Machiavelli, and still earlier by Epicurus, all of whom treated of this -moment alone, "with impiety towards God, infamy to rulers and injustice -towards nations." Hence the conclusion is easy, that in refuting the -utilitarians and the theorists of force, Vico was at the same time -recognising and absorbing the need which they represented, their only -mistake having been that they developed this need in an abstract and -one-sided way. His "state of nature" is in some respects like that of -Hobbes, with the difference that mankind transcends the latter owing to -the recognition of utility, the former owing to the religious and moral -consciousness. But Vico does not on this account express any gratitude -to Hobbes or Spinoza, Machiavelli or Epicurus, since he believed -himself to have found in a classical author all the materials and the -stimulus he required, all the counter-poise necessary to the Platonic -philosophy. This was one of his "four authors," the one of whom we -said<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> earlier that we had still to see the use which Vico made, namely -Tacitus. This writer for his part contemplates with his unequalled -metaphysical powers man as he is, while Plato contemplates him as he -ought to be. Just as Plato in his universal science explores every -corner of nobility, so Tacitus "descends into every scheme of utility," -in order that among the infinite chaotic chances of malice and fortune -the man of practical wisdom may act well. To the union in his mind -of Greek philosopher and Roman historian, which he interprets, as is -easily seen, in the manner usual among the "Tacitean" politicians of -the seventeenth century, Vico attributes his own success in sketching -a real idea of eternal history, "which the wise man would construct -both of esoteric wisdom such as Plato's, and of common wisdom such as -that of Tacitus." To Tacitus, finally, he owed the impulse towards the -supreme task of making concrete his ideal, and realising the republic -of Plato in the "dregs of Romulus."</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW</h4> - -<p>As the cognitive mind passes from feeling without noticing to noticing -with disturbed and confused faculties, and thence to the reflection -of the clear mind, so analogously the volitional mind passes from -the state of nature to practical certitude and thence to practical -truth. In the correlative empirical science, the transition is more -or less that from the savage to the heroic or barbaric condition and -from the latter to the civilised. In these three types of society, all -the manifestations of life correspond: thus there are three kinds of -character, three kinds of manners and customs, three kinds of law and -therefore of states, three kinds of language and writing, three kinds -of authority, reason and justice, and three divisions of history. -Confused and sometimes self-contradictory though Vico may be in fixing -the particulars of these various correspondences, his general idea is -plain. Where reflection is at a low ebb and imagination flourishes, the -passions also flourish, habits are violent, governments aristocratic -or feudal, families subjected to strict paternal rule, laws severe, -legal procedure symbolical, language couched in metaphor and writing in -hieroglyphics. Where on the other hand reflection predominates, poetry -becomes either separate from or charged with philosophy, manners and -customs lose their violence, the passions are brought into subjection, -the people take the government into their own hands,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> all members of -the family are alike citizens of the state, law is mitigated by equity -and its procedure simplified, language loses its metaphorical clothing -and writing becomes alphabetical. Mixed forms, which some politicians -aim at producing artificially, would be abortions: and though we do -find natural hybrid forms which retain a tinge of the earlier, each -one, by reason of its own unity, always tries so far as possible to -divest its subject of every property belonging to other forms.</p> - -<p>Which of the various social types forms the foundation of the others -and supplies the criterion for judging them? or what is the criterion -and standard by which they must all alike be judged? For Vico, such a -question is meaningless. Governments, he says, must adapt themselves -to the nature of the people governed: the school of princes is the -morality of nations. We may shudder at war, at the law of the stronger, -at the reduction of the conquered to slavery, that is, to chattels: -but the society which expressed itself in these customs was necessary -and therefore good. The worship of strength, as we have said, occupied -the position and discharged the function of the as yet impossible rule -of reason. Later came the period of fully developed human reason, when -men no longer valued each other by the standard of force, but by virtue -of their rational nature, which is the true and eternal human nature, -recognised one another as equals. The change of time brought change of -customs: and the new were no less good, but no more so, than the old.</p> - -<p>It would be as useless to seek the common measure of these various -social types, as to ask what is the real age of the individual life, -the common measure of childhood, youth, maturity and old age. The -comparison is one presented by Vico himself. As children shape all -their ideas according to their whims and carry them out with violence, -as youths animate everything by their imagination,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> as grown men guide -their affairs rather by pure reason and old men by sound prudence; -so it is with the human race, which after its feeble, isolated and -poverty-stricken origins, grows at first in unrestrained liberty, then -rediscovers the necessaries, utilities and comforts of life by genius -and imagination (the age of poetry), and finally cultivates wisdom by -means of reason (the age of philosophy). Similarly, natural right arose -first in laws so to speak of just passion and just violence: then it -was clothed in various myths of just reason: and finally it was openly -proclaimed in its pure rationality and noble truth.</p> - -<p>By such a method of handling and passing judgment upon governments, -laws and customs, Vico, escaped another of the leading doctrines or -suppositions of the school of natural rights, the abstraction and -anti-historicism we mentioned in its own place, which resulted in the -conception of a natural law standing above positive law and therefore -constituting a kind of eternal code, a perfect scheme of legislation, -not yet fully actual but to be actualised, whose outlines show up -clearly in the works of the school through their veil of doctrine and -philosophy. But this eternal code was in its most important part a -contingent and transitory code; or at least it advocated a code in -agreement with the reformatory and revolutionary tendencies of these -writers, publicists as they were rather than philosophers.</p> - -<p>Vico rids himself of the ideal eternal code without seeming to do -so: though he is quite ready to recognise that the "philosophers' -natural right," <i>ius naturale philosophorum,</i> is in idea eternal, and -inexorably laid down "in accordance with eternal reason," <i>ad rationis -aeternae libellam.</i> But from this verbal concession of eternity made -out of respect for the old traditional scholastic philosophy, whose -influence he felt now and then, he goes on to deny its real eternity -and supra-historical character; since instead of placing it above<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> -and outside history he puts it in the place which belongs to it, -within history. The law of violence or heroic law, after passing into -the law of uncivilised society, gradually attains a certain limit of -clarity, in which state the only thing wanting to its perfection is -that some school of philosophers should complete it by establishing it -with reasoned principles, upon the idea of eternal justice: and this -reasoning and systematisation is the <i>"ius naturale philosophorum"</i> the -extreme form of the historical development of law, not its unchanging -rule; a product, not a standard. Hence Vico's charge against Grotius -of confusing the <i>"ius naturale philosophorum,"</i> the law composed of -reasoned principles derived from moralists, theologians and, in part, -jurists, with the natural law of nations, <i>ius naturale gentium</i> (in -Grotius's language, confusing natural law with an arbitrary or positive -form of law): of misunderstanding the Roman jurists, who intended to -speak solely of the latter: and of offering to correct and venturing to -criticise writers whose faults on inspection vanish.</p> - -<p>The eternal code, considered in its essentials, is a Utopia: and since -the first and greatest of Utopias is Plato's Republic, it is important, -in order better to decide the point at issue, to examine Vico's -attitude towards the political scheme of Plato. If we may listen to -his own words, the <i>Republic</i> was another of his many incentives and -examples when he conceived the New Science. With the study of Plato -began the unconscious awakening in him of "the thought of conceiving -an ideal eternal law, to be expressed in a universal state built on -the idea or plan of providence, on which idea, indeed, are founded -all the states of every period and race: an ideal Republic like that -which Plato ought, as a consequence of his divine metaphysic, to have -conceived." He ought, but could not, owing to his "ignorance of the -first man's fall"; ignorance, that is, of the original state of nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -and of the exclusively poetic or "common" wisdom which followed it: -an ignorance maintained by the error, common to the minds of all men, -of measuring by oneself the almost unknown nature of other people, -as Plato exalted the rude and barbaric beginnings of Gentile man to -the perfect state of his loftiest esoteric knowledge of the divine, -and fancied these earliest men to possess a high degree of this -esoteric wisdom, whereas on the contrary they were really "brutes, -all stupidity and ferocity." In consequence of this learned error -Plato, instead of conceiving an eternal Republic and the laws of an -eternal justice by which Providence governs the nations of the world -and directs it by means of the common needs of mankind, by which it is -led to the common consciousness of the whole human race, "conceived -an ideal Republic and a merely ideal justice, by which nations are -not guided at all." In fact, they ought not to be guided by it: since -among the determinations of the perfect state there are some which are -dishonourable and detestable, such as the community of wives. Thus Vico -took from Plato the idea of an eternal state, but entirely inverted it -by the reservation which he added to it, that the true eternal republic -is not the abstract state of Plato, but the course of history in all -its phases, including the brutes at one end and Plato at the other. -This is the "republic of mankind," the "great state of mankind," the -"universal republic" (<i>generis humani respublica, magna generis humani -civitas, respublica universa</i>) of which he means to investigate the -"form, ranks, societies, occupations, laws, crimes, punishments, and -science of jurisprudence" (<i>formam ordines societates negotia leges -peccata poenas et scientiam in ea tractandi iuris</i>) and to follow -the development of all these "from their origin, the beginnings of -humanity, under the control of divine Providence, national custom -and authority" (<i>a suis usque primis humanitatis originibus, divina -providentia moderante, moribus gentium ac proinde<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> auctoritate</i>), that -is to say, "by means of the various elements of human utility and -necessity, or even by means of opportunities arising by the spontaneous -action of circumstances" (<i>per varia utilitatum et necessitatum, -humanarum rudimenta, sive adeo per ipsarum sponte rerum oblatas -occasiones</i>). The "great state of the nations founded and governed by -God" is thus nothing else than History.</p> - -<p>While refusing a fixed code and the draft of a model society, we do -not mean to deny the possibility of a practical aspect of the science -conceived by Vico, the New Science in its triple form of ideal history, -typical history and historical history. Every truth has its practical -side, that is to say, its practical consequences: and thinking in this -or that way of the nature and development of mankind involves this or -that practical line of conduct. A man who believes for instance in -the docile innocence of savage races will approach them with a smile -on his face, kindly words on his lips and the alphabet and catechism -of rights and duties in his hand: one who believes in Vico's "brutes" -will adopt somewhat sterner methods, perhaps even fire and the sword. -One who, like Vico, believes that "custom is more potent than law" and -that "custom changes not at a blow, but gradually and slowly" will -not be inclined to hasty legislation, and will not delude himself -into thinking he can remodel human nature after an ideal of his own -devising. Such conduct in any case is not theory, but practice: and -when the attempt is made to reduce it to theory, either a chaotic -confusion of necessary and contingent determinations results, or else -if we avoid these errors and strive to attain a strictly doctrinal form -of conduct, we get neither more nor less than the scientific theory -itself, from which our conduct derived.</p> - -<p>The thought of following up the New Science with a practical theory -appropriate to it evidently occurred to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> Vico. Even in the first -Italian edition of the work he stated two "practical" corollaries: -first, a new art of criticism, to serve as a light to distinguish -the truth in obscure and legendary history; and secondly an art of -diagnosis, so to speak, for determining the degrees of necessity or -utility in human affairs, and as its ultimate consequence, the chief -end of this science, consisting in the recognition of indubitable -symptoms of the conditions of nations. Properly considered, these arts -of criticism and diagnosis unite into one, namely the better knowledge -which it was possible, owing to the principles laid down by Vico, to -obtain concerning the past and present life of nations.</p> - -<p>This idea is repeated and explained in other parts of the same work. -The sciences, studies and arts developed up to now, says Vico, -deal with particular objects: the New Science, on the other hand, -investigating as it does the principles themselves which lie at the -source of all studies, is able to establish the ἀκμή or state of -perfection of the entire system, and the degrees and extremes by which -and within which human nature like all other mortal things must run -its course and come to an end: so that through this science we can -answer the practical questions how a nation in its rise may come to its -state of perfection, and how in its decadence it may be stimulated to -new life. The state of perfection would consist in a nation's resting -upon fixed principles both demonstrated by unchanging reason and put -into practice by human habits; principles in which the esoteric wisdom -of the philosopher would extend a helping hand to the common wisdom -of nations, thus uniting men of the greatest academic reputation with -all those of wisdom in the state, the philosophers with the statesmen; -and the science of civil matters divine and human, religion and law, a -theology and morality imposed by command and acquired by habituation, -would be supplemented by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> science of natural laws divine and -human, a theology and morality imposed by reason and acquired by -ratiocination: so that to transgress such principles would be true -error, the wandering not of men but of wild animals.</p> - -<p>The practical aspect of the New Science, then, was simply a summary or -duplicate of the science itself, emphasising the two leading elements -of spontaneous and reflective wisdom, certitude and truth, and the -necessity of bearing both in mind.</p> - -<p>Years later, in one of the elaborations of the second <i>Scienza -Nuova</i> made by Vico, we again meet with the idea and the phrase of a -practical aspect of this science, in the title of a special concluding -paragraph which he proposed to add to his work. It begins thus: "The -whole of this work has now been thought out as a mere contemplative -science dealing with the common character of nations: for this reason -it may seem to offer no assistance to human prudence in order either -to prevent or to delay the entire ruin of nations on the path of -decadence, and thus to lack the practical side which every science must -have whose subject-matter is dependent upon the human will, all such -sciences being called practical." Now in what could such a practical -side consist? "This practical application can easily be found from the -contemplation itself of the course of the history of nations: which the -wise men (statesmen) and princes of states observing, could by means -of good ordinances, laws and examples recall peoples to their ἀκμή -or state of perfection." In other words: a man warned is half saved. -Contemplation is the only principle of conduct which the New Science -can supply. The other half of salvation depends not on the person -warning, namely thought, but upon the person warned, upon action. It -does not occur to Vico to try to determine the "ordinances, laws and -examples" whose adoption would be of value in this or that crisis -or situation. This would not be a philosopher's task, as in fact<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -he himself clearly recognises next moment, when he says: "The only -practical principles we philosophers can supply are ones which can be -confined to the academic sphere."</p> - -<p>It would certainly be rash to claim precise knowledge of Vico's -reasons for omitting this note on practical principles in the final -manuscript of the last edition of the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> just as he had -omitted in the second work of that title the assertions on the subject -which had appeared in the first. But we may at least venture to guess -that the principal reason was the obvious emptiness of this passage, -promising as it did a practical application which it failed to provide, -and finally confessing that such a practical application was either -impossible or already included in the theory itself.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></h5> - - -<h4>PROVIDENCE</h4> - - -<p>The true and only reality then, in the world of nations, is the course -of their history: and the principle which regulates this course is -Providence. From this point of view the New Science may be defined as -a "rational civil theology of the divine providence." Bacon, among his -historical sciences, had named a <i>Historia Nemeseos</i> (history of Divine -Retribution). What for Bacon was little more than a mere name was for -Vico a clearly stated problem and a developed theory. Philosophers, -according to him, when they did not ignore Providence entirely, as -materialists and determinists, considered it solely in the sphere of -natural law, calling metaphysic by the name of "natural theology," and -supporting the identification of God with the natural order observed -in the motions of bodies, such as the spheres and the elements, and -with the final cause which was seen to exist over and above the other -natural causes. As against all this it was important to work out the -doctrine of Providence "in the economy of matters civil."</p> - -<p>It was observed by some of his earliest commentators, and the -observation has been frequently repeated since, that Vico used the -word "providence" indifferently in a subjective and an objective -sense: sometimes to indicate the human belief in a provident deity -controlling their doctrine, sometimes to denote the actual operation -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> this providence. The double or triple meaning of a single word in -Vico's terminology is a thing which by now need cause no astonishment. -We have often already been obliged to take pains to distinguish his -homonyms and unite his synonyms. Hence we may at once recognise that -one meaning of "Providence" for Vico might be and indeed is the -belief in Providence, man's idea of God, first in the form of myth -and later in the pure and rational form of philosophy. The Gentile -nations of antiquity, he says, "began their metaphysical poetic wisdom -by contemplating God in the attribute of his providence," upon which -rested augury and divination. Without this idea, then, wisdom, the -consciousness of the infinite, cannot take shape within man, nor can -morality, the fear of and respect for the higher power which governs -the affairs of men, arise. But in this sense of the word a further -discussion of providence is unnecessary, after what we have said on the -subjects of mythology and of the relation between morality and religion.</p> - -<p>We therefore pass at once to Providence in its second sense, the real -and strict conception of it; and here it seems advisable to leave Vico -for a moment and to clear up certain points of doctrine.</p> - -<p>It is a common observation that to create a given fact is one thing, to -know it when created quite another. The knowledge of what a fact really -is often comes in the life of the individual years later, in the life -of mankind centuries later, than the fact itself. The very persons who -are directly responsible for a given fact as a rule do not know it, or -know it in a very imperfect and fallacious manner; so much so that the -illusions which are said to accompany human activity have passed into -a proverb. The poet thinks he is singing of purity when he is really -singing of sensuality, and of strength while he is really singing of -weakness; he believes himself to be a dreadful pessimist and is really -childishly optimistic: imagines<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> himself a devil, when he is a good -fellow without an ounce of vice in him. Philosophers deceive themselves -no less. We need not go far to find examples. The philosopher we are -studying supplies a whole series of them; few have been more in the -dark as to the real tendencies of their own thought. The politician -also deceives himself; very often he believes and declares himself -to be fighting for liberty while he is a mere reactionary, or while -believing himself to be serving the cause of reaction is really -inciting to revolt and aiding the cause of freedom: and so on. Such -illusions are easy to understand. Individuals and nations in the heat -of creation, or scarcely yet passing out of such a state, can perhaps -express their state of mind, but cannot treat it in the critical spirit -of historical narration: and accordingly, when they cannot reconcile -themselves to waiting in silence, they compose imaginary histories of -themselves, <i>Wahrheiten und Dichtungen</i> at once. In fact this proved -difficulty of understanding one's actions while acting is one motive -of the wise advice to speak of oneself as little as possible and of -the suspicion with which autobiographies and memoirs are regarded. -Such works are interesting and possibly even valuable; but they never -present the strict historical truth of the facts they narrate.</p> - -<p>Human labours are thus veiled in the mists of illusion which arise from -individuals. The superficial historian clings to the veil, and in his -attempt to describe the course of events, uses these illusions to make -his voice carry. In this way the history of poetry takes the form of a -narration of the intentions, opinions and aims of poets, or of those -attributed to them by their contemporaries; the history of philosophy -becomes a series of anecdotes concerning the sentiments, whims and -practical aims of philosophers: the history of politics, a tissue -of intrigue, base interests, gossip and greed. But a more careful -historian, or one of a different type, will have nothing to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> do with -history of this kind. His first act is to dispel the mists, to sweep -away the individual and his illusions, and to look facts in the face as -they appeared in their objective succession and their supra-individual -origin. Real, true history arises independently of individuals, as a -product growing to completion behind their backs, the product of a -force apart from individual agents, which may be called Fate, Chance, -Fortune or God. The individual, who at first was everything, and filled -the whole stage with his posturing and declamation, is now, in this -second aspect of history, less than nothing; his actions and cries, -stripped of all serious potency, provoke laughter or pity. We look in -terror at the Fate that dominates him, we stand aghast at the strange -coincidence of chance or the caprices of Fortune, we bow before the -inscrutable designs of the divine providence. The individual appears -in turn as the inert material, the powerless plaything and the blind -instrument of these forces. But deeper thought leads us beyond even -this second view of history. The pity which the individual seems to -arouse and the amusement he evokes are in reality deserved not by him -but by his fancies, or rather, by those individuals who mistake fancy -for truth. Real history is composed of actions, not of fancies and -illusions: but actions are the work of individuals, not indeed in so -far as they dream, but in the inspiration of genius, the divine madness -of truth, the holy enthusiasm of the hero. Fate, Chance, Fortune, -God—all these explanations have the same defect: they separate the -individual from his product, and instead of eliminating the capricious -element, the individual will in history, as they claim to do, they -immensely reinforce and increase it. Blind Fate, irresponsible chance, -and tyrannical God are all alike capricious: and hence Fate passes into -Chance and God, Chance into Fate and God, and God into both the others, -all three being equivalent and identical.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span></p> - -<p>The idea which transcends and corrects alike the individualistic -and supra-individualistic views of history is the idea of history -as rational. History is made by individuals: but individuality is -nothing but the concreteness of the universal, and every individual -action, simply because it is individual, is supra-individual. Neither -the individual nor the universal exists as a distinct thing: the real -thing is the one single course of history, whose abstract aspects -are individuality without universality and universality without -individuality. This one course of history is coherent in all its many -determinations, like a work of art which is at the same time manifold -and single, in which every word is inseparable from the rest, every -shade of colour related to all the others, every line connected -with every other line. On this understanding alone history can be -understood. Otherwise it must remain unintelligible, like a string of -words without meaning or the incoherent actions of a madman.</p> - -<p>History then is the work neither of Fate nor of Chance but of the -necessity which is not determination and the liberty which is not -chance. And since the religious view, that history is the work of God, -has this advantage and superiority over the others, that it introduces -a cause for history other than fate or chance, and therefore not -properly speaking a cause at all, but a creative activity, a free and -intelligent mind, it is natural that out of gratitude to this higher -view no less than by the suitability of the language we should be led -to give to the rationality of history the name of God who rules and -governs all things, and to call it the Divine Providence. In so naming -it, we at the same time purge the title of its mythical dross which -debased God and his providence afresh into a fate or a chance. Thus -providence in history, in this final logical form, has double value -as a criticism of individual illusions, when they come forward<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> as -the entire and only reality of history, and as a criticism of divine -transcendence. And we may say that this is the point of view which -always has been and always is adopted, as if instinctively, without the -profession of an explicit theory, by all minds naturally gifted with -that particular faculty which we call the historic sense.</p> - -<p>If now, to return to Vico, we ask how he solved the problem of the -motive force of history, and what was the precise content for him of -the concept of providence in the objective sense, it is perfectly easy -to exclude the supposition that his was the transcendent or miraculous -Providence which had formed the subject of Bossuet's eloquent -<i>Discours.</i> It is easy both because in all his philosophy he invariably -reduces the transcendent to the immanent, and repeats over and over -again here that his providence operates by natural means or (using -scholastic phraseology) by secondary causes: and because upon this -point his interpreters are practically unanimous.</p> - -<p>No less insistent is his criticism of fate and chance, or according -to his threefold division fortune, fate and chance. He observes that -the doctrine of fate moves in a vicious circle, because the eternal -series of causes in which it holds the world bound and chained, depends -upon the will of Jupiter, and at the same time Jupiter is subject to -fate; whence it results that the Stoics are themselves entangled in -that "chain of Jupiter" with which they would imprison all things -human. These three concepts, corresponding to that of opportunity when -an object of desire is in question, to that of good luck in the case -of unhoped-for events, and to that of accident in the case of the -unexpected, are distinctions of the subjective understanding rather -than anything else: objectively they come under one single law which -may also be called fortune, if with Plato we recognise opportunity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> -as the mistress of human affairs: and all three are manifestations -and paths of the divine Providence which is intelligence, liberty and -necessity. The creator of the world of nations "was indeed Mind, since -men made it by their intelligence: it was not Fate, because they made -it by free choice, nor yet Chance, since to all eternity on doing thus -the same results follow."</p> - -<p>Vico lights up in the most fanciful ways the comedy of errors formed -by man's illusions as to the end of his own actions. Men thought they -were escaping the threats of the thundering sky by carrying their -women into caves to satisfy their animal passions out of God's sight: -and by thus keeping them safely secluded they founded the first -chaste unions and the first societies; marriage and the family. They -fortified themselves in suitable places with the intention of defending -themselves and their families: and in reality, by thus fortifying -themselves in fixed places they put an end to their nomadic life and -primitive wanderings, and began to learn agriculture. The weak and -disorderly, reduced to the extremity of hunger and mutual slaughter, -to save their lives took refuge in these fortified places, and became -servants to the heroes: and thus without knowing it they raised the -family to an aristocratic or feudal status. The aristocrats, feudal -chiefs or patricians, their rule once established, hoped to defend and -secure it by the strictest treatment of their servants the plebeians: -but in this way they awoke in the servants a consciousness of their -own power and made the plebeians into men, and the more the patricians -prided themselves on their patriciate and struggled to preserve it, -the more effectively they worked to destroy the patrician state and to -create democracy. Thus, says Vico, the world of nations issues "from a -mind widely different from, sometimes quite opposed, always superior, -to the particular ends set before themselves by men: which restricted -ends have been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> made means to wider ends, and employed to preserve the -human race upon this earth."</p> - -<p>It may be gathered from some of our quotations from Vico that he -sometimes tended to conceive men as conscious of their own utilitarian -ends but unconscious of moral ends. This would logically lead to -explaining social life on exclusively utilitarian principles, and to -considering morality as an accident relatively to the human will and -therefore not really moral: an external accretion more or less capable -of holding mankind together, or the obscure work of a supramundane -providence. This utilitarianism especially creeps into a passage where -he says that man, on account of his corrupt nature, being under the -tyranny of self-love which compels him to make private utility his -chief guide and to want every useful thing for himself and nothing for -his fellow, unable to hold his passions in check so as to direct them -by justice, in the state of nature desires only his own safety; after -taking a wife and begetting children, desires his safety and the safety -of his family; after attaining civil life, desires his own safety -together with the safety of his city; after extending his rule over -other peoples, he desires the safety of the nation; after joining with -other nations in wars, treaties, alliances and commerce, he desires -his safety and that of all mankind: and "in all these circumstances -he principally desires his own interest." For this reason "it can be -nothing else than divine providence that binds him down within such -ordinances as to maintain by justice the society of the family, the -state and ultimately of mankind; by which ordinances since man cannot -attain what he wants, at least he wants to attain as much utility as -is permitted: and this is what is called justice." The public virtue -of Rome, he writes elsewhere, "was nothing but a good use made by -providence of grave, unsightly and cruel private faults, that states -might be preserved at a time when human minds, being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> in a state of -extreme particularity, could not naturally understand a common good."</p> - -<p>Utilitarianism was however, as we know, strongly repugnant to Vico's -observed ethics, founded as the latter is upon the moral consciousness -or shame; and hence these statements, which unconsciously tend in that -direction, can only be explained as resulting from the disturbance -sometimes produced in his mind by the lingering remains of the -transcendent or theological conception of providence, and also from the -confused character of his thought, which prevented him from keeping -the idea of individual illusions clearly distinguished from that of -individual aims; so that he sometimes substituted the second when he -ought to have been dealing solely with the first. If the provident -deity is "the unity of the spirit which informs and animates the -world of nations," these do not fail to obtain their particular ends -in order that it may move on to its universal ones, but both alike -are realised in them: and man is at every moment both utilitarian and -moral, or at least supposes himself to be moral when he is utilitarian -or utilitarian when he is really moral.</p> - -<p>In any case, and in spite of these vacillations or rather confusions, -the conception of particular ends as the vehicle of universal and -of illusion as accompanying and co-operating with action implies a -dialectical conception of the movement of history, and the transcending -of the problem of evil. This problem is in fact very little emphasised -by Vico, owing to the strength of his belief in the universal -government of providence and of his persuasion that so-called evil is -not only willed by man under the appearance of good, but is itself -essentially a good. In a few rare passages in his earliest writings, -where he encounters the problem of evil, Vico solves it simply in the -sense that we men because of our iniquity which leads us to "regard -ourselves, not this universe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> of things" (<i>nosmetipsos, non hanc rerum -universitatem spectamus</i>) consider as evil those things which run -counter to us, "which yet, since they contribute to the common nature -of the world, are good" (<i>quae tamen, quia in mundi commune conferunt, -bona sunt</i>).</p> - -<p>Vico's conception of history thus became truly objective, freed from -divine arbitrament, but freed equally from the rule of trifling causes -and gossiping explanations, and acquiring a knowledge of its own -essential end, which is to understand the nexus of facts, the logic -of events; to be the rational reconstruction of a rational fact. -Historical study at this time suffered less from the first of these -errors (the theological conception had been ever since the beginning of -the Italian Renaissance falling into universal decay) than from that -form of history which was just then acquiring the name of "pragmatic," -which restricted itself to the personal aspect of events, and failing -by these means to reach full historical truth tried to gain warmth -and life by means of political and moral instruction. A monument of -pragmatic history arose in Vico's own country and contemporaneously -with the <i>Scienza Nuova:</i> Pietro Giannone's <i>Civil History of the -Kingdom of Naples.</i> The author was a man of his own district and age, -and wrote a great work in the sphere of polemic, and even in certain -respects of history: but such that all its greatness only serves to -emphasise the greatness of Vico's book. If Vico had had to describe -the origins of ecclesiastical property and power in the Middle Ages, -he would have been able to write of something very different from the -guile of popes, bishops and abbots, and the simplicity of dukes and -emperors. And as we shall see, whenever he undertook to investigate any -part of history he actually did discover in it something very different -from these things.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE LAW OF REFLUX</h4> - - -<p>The mind, after traversing its course of progress, after rising from -sensation successively to the imaginative and the rational universal -and from violence to equity, is bound in conformity with its eternal -nature to re-traverse the course, to relapse into violence and -sensation, and thence to renew its upward movement, to commence a -reflux.</p> - -<p>This is the philosophical meaning of Vico's "reflux," but not the exact -manner in which we find it expressed in his writings, where the eternal -circle is considered almost exclusively as exemplified in the history -of nations, as a reflux in the civil affairs of man. Civilisation -comes to an end in the "barbarism of reflection," which is worse than -the primitive barbarism of sensation; for while the latter was not -without a wild nobility, the former is contemptible, untrustworthy -and treacherous; and thus it is necessary that this evil subtlety of -malicious intellect should rust away through the long centuries of a -new barbarism of sensation. We must however withdraw and purge the -conception of "reflux" from historical facts and the sociological -scheme, not only to explain the absolute and eternal character -which Vico attributes to it, but also to justify the historical -representation and sociological law founded upon it, and drawing their -cogency primarily from it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span></p> - -<p>The laws of flux and reflux, laid down by the philosophers and -politicians of Greece and of the Italian Renaissance, were founded no -less than Vico's upon a philosophy, but upon a very superficial one; -they assumed their object to possess external and empty political -forms, and endeavoured to fix the succession of these forms upon data -of experience or by vague reasonings. But Vico's object is the forms of -culture, including in themselves all the activities of life, economy -and law, religion and art, science and language, and referring them -back to their inmost source, the human mind, he establishes their -succession "according to the rhythm of the elementary forms of the -mind." Thus all the learning which has been expended in comparing the -Vician reflux with the theories of Plato or Polybius, Machiavelli or -Campanella, is practically wasted: the more so that Vico (who, as we -know, though often misunderstanding his predecessors cannot be accused -of wishing to pass them over: in fact, where he thought he found -parallel or identical ideas in them, he was apt to boast of the fact) -felt no need of mentioning this point, or thought it unimportant. The -"circular movement" (ἀνακύκλωσις) of Polybius, the economy of nature -by which states alter, change and return to the same point, has been -thought almost an anticipation of the eternal ideal history; but Vico -sets Polybius with the others, when he asks the reader to consider "how -(little) philosophers have thought with knowledge upon their principles -of civil government, and with what (little) truth Polybius has reasoned -upon its changes." Campanella connected his historical cycles with -astrological laws; and Machiavelli conceives the catastrophe which -opens the reflux thus: "When human craft and malignity have gone as far -as they can go, it happens of necessity that the world purifies itself -by one of the three methods (pestilence, famine and deluge, beside -the human methods of new religions and languages)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> in order that men, -having become few and chastened, may live more conveniently and become -better." The one precedent to which Vico refers, but only to interpret -it in a way altogether his own and in fact to give it a totally new -content, is the ancient Egyptian tradition of the three successive ages -of gods, heroes and men.</p> - -<p>If the philosophy lying at its root gives strength to Vico's -sociological theory of reflux, the historical element with which it is -leavened to some degree weakens it. Vico was especially versed in and -attached to Roman history, which had been the first of his historical -studies and the object of many years' devotion. The history of Rome -accordingly, whether because of his deeper study of it or because of -its complexity, impressiveness and long duration, came to stand in -Vico's mind as the typical or normal history, to serve as a standard -for all others, and be confused with the law of flux and reflux itself. -Rome showed him the asylum of Romulus, that is, the transition from the -state of nature to the political organism: aristocracies, monarchical -at first in appearance only, later not even in appearance: democracy, -issuing from its struggle with aristocracy and ending in real monarchy, -the perfect form of civil life; thence by a process of degeneration, -the barbarism of reflection or civilisation, incomparably worse than -the primitive noble barbarism, and following in its train a second -condition of wandering in a state of nature and a new barbarism, a new -youth, the Middle Ages. It is the history of Rome hardly generalised -at all and supplemented here and there by that of Greece, that appears -in the Vician aphorisms formulating the laws of social dynamics. Men -first feel the prick of necessity, then the attraction of utility: -next they become aware of convenience, and after that take delight in -pleasure; then dissipate themselves in luxury and finally fall victims -to the madness of abusing their resources. There must at first be men -of brute<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> strength like Polyphemus, that man may obey man in the state -of family life, and to induce him to obey the law in the future state -of civil life. There must be noble and proud men like Achilles, not -inclined by nature to yield to their equals, in order to establish -over the family the aristocratic type of republic. Then valiant and -just men like Aristides and Scipio Africanus are necessary, to open -the path to popular liberty. After this arise men of great apparent -virtues accompanied by faults no less great, like Alexander or Caesar, -acquiring immense popular reputations and introducing monarchy. Later -still there must be serious reflective natures like Tiberius to -consolidate the monarchy; and lastly wild, dissolute and shameless -characters like Caligula, Nero and Domitian to overthrow it.</p> - -<p>Owing to this rarefaction of Roman history into typical history, and -the simultaneous consolidation of typical history into the history of -Rome, Vico's law of reflux is riddled with exceptions, much more common -and serious than those of the corresponding empirical laws; so that if -as he believes his empirical science is identical with the ideal laws -of the mind, its alleged permanency throughout all eternity and the -whole universe seems the merest irony. He says that Carthage, Capua and -Numantia, the three cities which threatened to dispute with Rome the -empire of the world, failed to accomplish the ordained course of human -affairs: since the Carthaginians were thwarted by the acuteness of the -native African temperament, which by maritime commerce they increased -still further: the Capuans by the soft climate and fertility of rich -Campania: and the Numantines by their suppression in the first burst -of heroism at the hands of Rome, led by Scipio Africanus the conqueror -of Carthage, and aided by the forces of the world. And passing from -ancient to modern times, America would now be traversing the path of -human affairs but for its discovery by Europeans:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> Poland and England -are still aristocratic, but would have arrived at perfect monarchy had -not the natural course of civil affairs been hindered by extraordinary -causes. As for the Middle Ages, they cannot be considered as in Vico's -estimation a true return to the state of nature, if they open with -the establishment of Christianity, the religion of the true God; nor -in any case does the return to the state of nature and to barbarism -seem the only path open to a nation that has attained its ἀκμή, its -culmination. The alternative is that a decadent nation should lose -its independence and fall under the rule of a better. Nor, lastly, is -decadence inevitable if statesmen and philosophers working in harmony -can preserve the perfection that has been reached and check the -threatened destruction, and if in point of fact, as he observes, the -aristocratic republics which survived his own day as remnants of the -Middle Ages succeeded in preserving themselves by arts of "superfine -wisdom." His own time Vico thought to be one of high civilisation. -A complete humanity, he says, seems to be scattered to-day over -all nations. A few great monarchs rule the world of nations, and -those barbarian monarchs who still exist do so either owing to the -persistence of the "common wisdom" of imaginative and cruel religions, -or because of the natural temperaments of their respective peoples. The -nations which form the empire of the Czar of Russia are of a sluggish -disposition; those of the Khan of Tartary are an effeminate race; the -subjects of the Negus of Ethiopia and the King of Fez and of Morocco -are few and weak. In the temperate zone Japan maintains a heroic -character not unlike that of Rome in the period of the Punic wars; -her people are warlike, her language resembling Latin, her religion -a fierce one of terrible gods all loaded with formidable weapons. -The Chinese on the other hand, whose religion is mild, cultivate -literature and are humane in the highest degree: the peoples of the -Indies are also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> humane and practise the arts of peace; the Persians -and Turks mingle the rude doctrine of their religion with an Asiatic -softness, the Turks especially tempering their arrogance with pomp, -magnificence, liberality and gratitude. Europe is above all humane, -composed as it is of great monarchies and universally professing the -Christian faith which inculcates an infinitely pure and perfect idea -of God and commands charity to the whole human race. Vico fixed his -attention upon the confederacy of the Swiss cantons and the united -provinces of Holland, which reminded him of the Aetolian and Achaean -leagues, and on the composition of the German Empire, a system of free -states and sovereign princes, which seemed to him a kind of attempt -in the direction of a great aristocratic state; the most perfect -of all, and the ultimate form of civil life, since no other can be -conceived superior to it, reproducing as it does the earliest form, the -aristocracy of patricians each supreme in his own family and all united -in the ruling class of the first state; but reproducing it in a form -not of barbarism but of the highest civilisation. Such is the humanity -by which Europe is on every hand distinguished, that it abounds with -every element contributory to human happiness, mental pleasures no -less than bodily comforts, and all this in virtue of the Christian -religion, teaching as it does sublime truths, supported by the most -learned philosophers of the Gentile races and of the three greatest -languages of the world, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and thus uniting the -wisdom of authority with that of reason, the choicest philosophical -doctrine with the most highly developed philological learning. Can this -lofty civilisation, safeguarded as it is by Christianity, be moving, -or ever likely to move towards a new state of nature? It is difficult -to discover Vico's real opinion on this point. Among his verses there -is a poem of a profoundly pessimistic tone, but this is a youthful -effusion, and in any case refers to the end of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> the world as imminent, -rather than to a future social decadence. In his letters there is a -melancholy picture of the condition of learning in his time: but it -applies to this restricted field only, not to the sphere of social and -political life. On the other hand, in his last philosophical work, the -<i>De mente heroica,</i> referring to those who declared that all things -were now perfect and that no new tasks could arise, he says that the -tide of progress is flowing at its strongest. "The world is still -young: for only in the last seven hundred years, four hundred of which -were spent in barbarism, how many new discoveries have been made! How -many new arts have arisen! How many new sciences have been developed!" -(<i>Mundus iuvenescit adhuc; nam septingentis non ultra abhinc annis, -quorum tamen quadringentos barbaries percurrit, quot nova inventa! quot -novae artes! quot novae scientiae excogitatae!</i>) But we may observe -that the <i>De mente heroica</i> is an official oration, and that Vico may -on that account have suppressed for the occasion his doubts or his -deepest convictions. In any case, how can we reconcile the prophecy of -an imminent collapse with the rise of that creation of providence, the -New Science, shedding upon the life of nations a light which rendered -possible the diagnosis and cure of their ailments? On the whole it is -probable that the difficulty of determining Vico's opinion as to the -fate of contemporary society is due to the fact that he had really no -settled conviction on the subject, and was led hither and thither in -various and contrary directions by the influence of hopes and fears.</p> - -<p>If it had not been disturbed by the scheme of Roman history, the -empirical theory of the reflux would never have been forced to admit -so many and serious exceptions; nor would it have fallen into such -painful confusions. It would have accommodated its author's historical -observations with greater ease, and its general characteristics would -have been much simpler and more general. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> would have consisted -primarily in the determination and illustration of the connexion -between predominantly imaginative and predominantly intellectual, -spontaneous and reflective, periods, the latter periods issuing out -of the former by an increase of energy, and returning to them by -degeneration and decomposition. Political history shows over and -over again the spectacle of aristocracies declining from their first -strength to a debased and contemptible state and yielding before the -onset of classes less refined or even absolutely uncultured, but of -stouter moral fibre; while these again, after becoming civilised in -their turn and attaining the highest development of the historical -idea whose germ they bear within themselves, enter upon a new period -of decay and fermentation, from which issues a new ruling class in the -vigour of a youthful barbarism. The history of philosophy again shows -positive and speculative periods; philosophical solutions congeal into -scholastic theory and dogma, the mind reverts to the mere unthinking -observation of particular fact, and the speculative process arises once -more. Literary history, too, speaks of periods of realism and idealism, -romantic and classical periods: of a corrupt classicism, Alexandrian or -decadent art, and of a romantic barbarism which arises from it. These -are true cases of Vico's reflux. But since the nature of the mind which -underlies these cycles is outside time and therefore exists in every -moment of time, we must not exaggerate the difference of the periods: -and if on the one hand the outline of the law must be distinct, it -must on the other hand not lose a certain elasticity. We must never -forget that at every period, aristocratic or democratic, romantic or -classical, positive or speculative, and even in every individual and -every fact, moments both aristocratic and democratic, romantic and -classical, positive and speculative can be observed; and that these -distinctions are to a great extent quantitative and made for the sake -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> convenience. These facts should lead us to avoid alike maintaining -the law at all costs and so falling into artificiality, and rejecting -it entirely and so refusing the help which may be derived from general -and approximative views.</p> - -<p>Thus understood and amended, not only is the theory free from the -great and striking exceptions which are necessary when it is modelled -upon the history and final catastrophe of Rome, but the accusations of -undue uniformity lodged against Vico disappear. Vincenzo Cuoco, one -of the first, if not the first intelligent student of Vico's works, -remarks concerning and in criticism of the law of reflux, that "nature -never resembles itself; it is man who by compounding his observations -forms classes and names." This is perfectly true; but if applied to -this case it would be an argument not against the Vician reflux but -against every sort of empirical human science. Others accused Vico -of overlooking groups of causes of great historical weight, such as -climate, racial and national character, and exceptional occurrences. -But, omitting the fact that he often mentions these things, for he -connects national character and climate with the forms and changes -of states, and mentions events and circumstances which upset the -natural and ordinary course of national history, for example in his -discussion of Greek history, the truth is that he was bound to ignore -them and could not waste time over such things, since his concern was -with uniformities and not with divergences, or rather with certain -uniformities and not with certain others which compared with the -former were negligible divergences. Similarly—the parallel is an -obvious one, and indeed is more than a parallel—any one who attempts -to trace the general characteristics of the different periods of -life, infancy, childhood, adolescence and so forth, will ignore the -comparative rapidity and slowness of development due to differences -of climate, race or accidental circumstances.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> Another of these -true but irrelevant charges is that Vico denied the communication -and interpenetration of civilisations, and insisted that they arise -separately in different nations without any mutual knowledge and -therefore without reciprocal imitation. This charge has been met by the -observation that Vico does not fail to record cases of the influence -of one people upon another and of the transmission of civilisations -and their products; the transmission for example of alphabetic writing -from the Chaldaeans to the Phoenicians and from them to the Egyptians; -and that in any case his law is not empirical but philosophical and -refers to the spontaneous creative activity of the human mind. The -point at issue is however precisely the empirical aspect of this law, -not the philosophical: and the true reply seems to us to be, as we have -already suggested, that Vico could not take and ought not to have taken -other circumstances into account, just as—to recall one instance—any -one who in studying the various phases of life describes the first -manifestations of the sexual craving in the vague imaginations and -similar phenomena of puberty, does not take into account the ways in -which the less experienced may be initiated into love by the more -experienced, since he is setting out to deal not with the social laws -of imitation but with the physiological laws of organic development. -If it is said that even without imitation or sophistication the sexual -craving arises no less and demands satisfaction, such a statement -doubtless merely asserts the incontrovertible truth of a certain very -ancient Eastern tale included by Boccaccio in the <i>Decameron</i>: but at -the same time it supplies the most complete parallel to the famous and -much controverted aphorism of Vico.</p> - -<p>Nor is the Vician law of reflux necessarily opposed, as has often been -thought, to the conception of social progress. It would be so opposed -if instead of being a law of mere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> uniformity it were one of identity, -in agreement with the idea of an unending cyclical repetition of single -individual facts which has been adopted by certain extravagant minds -of both ancient and modern times. The reflux of history, the eternal -cycle of the mind, can and must be conceived, even if Vico does not -so express it, as not merely diverse in its uniform movements, but -as perpetually increasing in richness and outgrowing itself, so that -the new period of sense is in reality enriched by all the intellect -and all the development that preceded it, and the same is true of the -new period of the imagination or of the developed mind. The return of -barbarism in the Middle Ages was in some respects uniform with ancient -barbarism; but it must not for that reason be considered as identical -with it, since it contains in itself Christianity, which summarises and -transcends ancient thought.</p> - -<p>Whether the conception of progress is formulated and thrown into relief -by Vico is quite another question. Vico does not deny progress; he -even refers to it in speaking of the conditions of his own time as an -actual fact: but he has no conception of it and still less does he -throw such a conception into relief. His philosophy, while it attains -the lofty vision of the process of mind in obedience to its own laws, -nevertheless retains by reason of this failure to apprehend the -progressive enrichment of reality an element of sadness and desolation. -The individual character of men and events is obliterated in Vico; -individuals and events are represented merely as particular cases of -one aspect of the mind or of one phase of civilisation. Hence we always -find Aristides alongside of Scipio and Alexander alongside of Caesar: -never Aristides simply as Aristides, Scipio as Scipio, and Alexander -and Caesar as Alexander and as Caesar. Progress implies that each fact -and each individual has its own unique function; each makes its own -contribution, for which no other can be substituted, to the poem of -history;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> and each responds with a deeper voice to the one that went -before.</p> - -<p>But the reason why Vico was bound to miss the idea of progress and -why his studies in history were inevitably one-sided can be clearly -perceived only after a review of his metaphysics.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></h5> - - -<h4>METAPHYSICS</h4> - - -<p>By "metaphysics" we understand Vico's conception of reality as a -whole, not of the world of man by itself; and we also include in the -meaning of the word his ultimate negative conclusion asserting the -unknowability or the imperfect knowability of one or more spheres of -reality, or of that highest sphere in which the others reunite.</p> - -<p>In point of fact, as we observed in considering the second and latest -form of his theory of knowledge, Vico drew a sharp line between the -world of man and the world of nature: the former transparent to man -because created by him, the latter opaque, because only God its -Creator has knowledge of it. And his conception of the total and -ultimate reality, the metaphysic which he expounds together with his -earlier theory of knowledge, retains the value granted to it by that -theory and no other: it is a probable conjecture, but one incapable -of verification, and reaches completion in the certitude of revealed -theology. Hence this metaphysic remains out of all possible connexion -with the New Science, which proceeds by the certain method of truth and -cuts itself off from revelation. Vico never rejected it. He discusses -it in his autobiography of 1725, the year of the first <i>Scienza Nuova;</i> -he refers to it with satisfaction in 1737, seven years after the -second <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> when his scientific life was, as he himself -considered, at an end. But though he never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> rejected it he always kept -it aside, so to speak, in a corner of his mind.</p> - -<p>This point established, it might seem that there can be nothing more to -be said of any philosophical importance about Vico's metaphysics. But -this is not the case. Since every department of philosophy implies in -itself every other, and since we can therefore always deduce from the -treatment of one of the so-called particular philosophical sciences the -character of the whole, it is legitimate to examine the New Science -and to consider what metaphysic is implicit therein; to determine what -philosophical complement is logically supported and demanded by this -science.</p> - -<p>The New Science, which asserted the full knowability of human affairs, -not merely on the surface, like a psychological treatment, but in -the depths of their nature: the New Science, which transcended the -individual to attain the conception of the mind which informs all -things and is Providence: the Science which with divine pleasure -contemplated the eternal cycle of the mind, elevated as it was to such -a height, necessarily tended to interpret the whole of reality, both -Nature and God, as Mind. That this tendency was objective to the New -Science, and not subjective to Vico, in whose mind the science so to -speak thought itself out, need hardly be repeated. Vico personally not -only did not encourage it but actually curtailed and repressed it so -energetically as to leave no trace of it in his works. There was no -philosophical doctrine of which he had such terror and against which -he so frequently waged war as that of pantheism; and perhaps this -polemical preoccupation is the only trace, though quite an involuntary -trace, visible in his writings of the tendency which he must have -observed in himself. He was, and wished to remain, a Christian and a -Catholic; transcendence, the personality of God, the substantiality -of the soul, though his science did not lead him towards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> them, were -uncontrollable necessities to his consciousness. But just as this fact -allowed Vico to repress but not to eradicate the essential logical -tendency of his thought, so it enables us to recognise that tendency -in the facts themselves. An Italian critic, Spaventa, is right when he -says that in Vico the necessity of a new metaphysic makes itself felt; -another, a German Catholic, is equally right in denning his system -as "semi-pantheistic." It would perhaps be more dangerous to go on -to say, with the Italian above mentioned, that Vico makes an advance -on the Cartesian idea of two substances and the Spinozistic of two -attributes, and even on the Leibnitian doctrine of the monad, and that -he transcends parallelism and pre-established harmony by distinguishing -the two providences, the two attributes, nature and mind, in such a way -that the one is a step to the other, and by conceiving the point of -union and the origin of the opposition as an unfolding or development, -so that nature is regarded as the phenomenon and proper basis of -mind, the pre-supposition which mind creates to itself in order to be -really mind, to be a true unity. For while we may doubt whether the -distinction of the two attributes or two providences, the natural and -the human, is a well-grounded and inevitable consequence of conceiving -substance as mind and thought, it is impossible to deduce the -evolutionary transition from one to the other as a tendency implicit in -Vico's conception of thought. There is certainly particular documentary -evidence for this latter particular tendency: but it is scanty and -unconvincing, and occurs not in the system of the New Science but -rather in the chronologically earlier system.</p> - -<p>For the metaphysic laid down by Vico in the earlier phase of his -thought is not, as it has seemed to some, and as it may at first sight -appear, entirely devoid of significance and value. It shows the same -aversion to materialism and the same love of idealism which inspire<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> -the meditations of the New Science. The philosophy of Epicurus, which -takes as its starting-point matter already formed and divided into -ultimate particles of various shapes, composed of other parts which -are supposed to be indivisible owing to the absence of void between -them, seemed to him a philosophy such as to satisfy the naïve mind of -a child or the uncritical mind of a woman; and the delight with which -he followed the explanation of the forms of material nature according -to this philosopher, in the poem of Lucretius, was equalled by the -amusement and pity with which he watched him forced by stern necessity -to lose himself in countless ineptitudes and follies in trying to -explain the phenomena of thought. Vico accused the Cartesian physics -no less than the Epicurean of a "false position," since it also takes -ready-formed matter as its starting-point, differing from the Epicurean -matter in that, while the latter limits the divisibility of matter at -the atoms, the former makes its elements infinitely divisible; that -the one places motion in the void, the other in the solid; the one -initiates the shaping of its infinite worlds by a casual declination -of atoms from the downward path of their own weight and gravitation, -the other generates its indefinite vortices from an impetus imparted -to a section of inert and therefore not yet divided matter, which on -receiving this motion divides into fragments, and, hampered by its -mass, necessarily makes an effort to move in a straight line, and -being unable to do so through its solidity begins, divided as it is -into fragments, to move about the centre of each fragment. In this way -while Epicurus entrusted the world to chance, Descartes subjected it -to fate; and it was in vain that to save himself from materialism he -superimposed upon his physics a quasi-Platonic metaphysic, by which he -attempted to establish two substances, the one extended and the other -intelligent, and to make room for an immaterial agent; for these two -parts were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> not reconciled in his system, since his mechanical physics -included in itself a metaphysic like the Epicurean, establishing -one kind and one only of active material substance. For similar -or analogous reasons Vico rejected the philosophies of Gassendi, -Spinoza and Locke; and the physical science of other authors such as -Robert Boyle seemed to him valuable for purposes of medicine and the -"spargiric art," but useless for philosophy. Galileo he considered to -have looked at physical science with the eye of a great geometrician, -but without the aid of the full light of metaphysics. He had sympathy -with philosophers who were also geometricians, and therefore with the -Pythagorean or Timaean physics, according to which the world consists -of numbers; with the Platonic metaphysics, which from the form of our -minds without any other hypothesis establishes, upon our knowledge -and consciousness of certain eternal truths which are in our mind and -cannot be ignored or denied, the eternal idea as the principle of all -things; with the doctrine of metaphysical points, attributed by him -to Zeno the Stoic; and finally with the philosophy of the Italian -Renaissance, the period adorned by Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, -Steuco, Nifo, Mazzoni, Piccolomini, Acquaviva and Patrizio.</p> - -<p>The fundamental concept of his cosmology was supplied by the -metaphysical point, in which the employment of mathematics in -metaphysics, a process admitted by Vico as analogous to that of -construction, found expression. Just as from the geometrical point -proceed the line and the surface, and the point which is defined as -having no parts supplies the proof that lines otherwise incommensurable -can be divided equally into their component points, so it is legitimate -to postulate points not geometrical but metaphysical, which though not -extended generate extension. Between God, who is rest, and matter, -which is motion, the intermediate place is taken by the metaphysical -point, whose attribute is conation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> the indefinite energy and attempt -on the part of the universe to bring into being and sustain each -particular thing. The existence of matter is nothing but an indefinite -power of keeping the universe extended, which underlies all extended -objects equally however unequal they may be, and also an indefinite -power of motion underlying all particular motions, however unequal. -Behind a grain of sand lies something which when this particle is -divided gives to it and preserves in it an infinite extension and -magnitude; so that the whole mass of the universe is included in the -grain of sand, if not actually, yet potentially and in capacity. This -effort of the universe, underlying each smallest particle of matter, -is neither the extension of the particle nor the extension of the -universe: it is the thought of God, which, free from all materiality, -gives motion and impulse to the whole. Every particular determination -of reality agrees with this fundamental truth. Time is divisible, -eternity indivisible; disturbances of the mind wax and wane, its -quiescence has no degrees; extended things are corruptible, unextended -things permanent in their indivisibility; body can be divided, mind -cannot; possibilities are at a single point, accidents are everywhere; -science is one, while opinion produces differences; virtue is neither -in one place nor another, vice walks up and down in every direction; -the good is one, the bad is innumerable; in every kind of thing in a -word the best occurs in the category of the indivisible.</p> - -<p>Substance in general, which underlies and sustains things, is divided -into two species, extended substance or that which equally supports -unequal extensions, and thinking substance which equally supports -unequal thoughts. And just as one part of extension is divided from -another but indivisible in the substance of the body, so one part of -thought, that is to say a determinate thought, is divided from another -but indivisible in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> substance of the soul. Activity or freedom is -peculiar to the soul, and entirely denied to body: and Descartes, in -making a conation of body the beginning of his physics, was strictly -adopting the methods of a poet and falling into the anthropomorphic -conceptions of primitive races. The phenomena which students of -mechanics call activities, forms, or powers, are insensible movements -by which bodies move either, as the ancients said, towards their -centres of gravity, or, as the modern theory of mechanics asserts, away -from their centre of motion. The communication of motion, moreover, -is just as inconceivable in body as is activity. To grant it would be -equivalent to granting the interpenetration of bodies, since motion -is nothing but matter in motion; the blow given to a ball is only the -occasion for the energy of the universe, which was so weak in the ball -as to make it seem at rest, to expand and thus to give it an appearance -of more sensible motion. On the other hand, Vico agreed with the -Cartesians, especially Malebranche, as to the origin of ideas, which -he inclined to believe that God creates in us from time to time. He -also held with the Cartesians that the lower animals are automata; -and he agreed with all contemporary thought as to the subjectivity of -secondary qualities.</p> - -<p>Setting aside these last doctrines, which are not Vico's own, indeed -he scarcely refers to them, the fundamental doctrine of metaphysical -points is all his own. His attribution of it to an imaginary Zeno, -in whose person were combined and confused the Eleatic and the Stoic -(a mistake common in the philosophical literature of the time), can -deceive nobody, and did not even deceive Vico himself, who when pressed -explained how he had been led to that interpretation of Aristotle's -statements about Zeno, and finally says that if the doctrine cannot -be accepted as that of Zeno, he will adopt it as his own, without -the patronage of any great names. Nor on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> other hand can it be -traced to the Leibnitian monadology. We cannot be sure that Vico -was acquainted with this doctrine. In any case he does not mention -it, while Leibniz he does mention in terms of deep respect: and the -resemblance is very vague, for the metaphysical points are not monads. -The discovery by Leibniz and Newton of the differential calculus may -however be said to have influenced him. It was then for the first time -becoming known in Italy; and its terminology of maximum infinities, -greater and less infinities, and so on would, says Vico, completely -baffle the human understanding, since the infinite admits neither of -degrees nor of multiplication, but for the help of a metaphysic which -shows that all actual extension and actual movement is a power or -capacity for extension and motion always equal to itself and infinite. -The contributions of Platonic lines of thought (the Platonism of the -Renaissance) and those of Galileo, especially the latter, to Vico's -conception have been worked out with even more justice: his originality -however is in no degree impaired by these facts.</p> - -<p>The idea in which his originality found expression was, no doubt, -fantastic and arbitrary, and in consequence bound to remain undeveloped -and without influence on Vico's other conceptions. To the reviewer -in the <i>Giornale dei letterati,</i> who called this metaphysic a mere -sketch, the author replied that it was quite complete: an abortion in -fact, rather than a sketch, and, as such, complete. And in the <i>Scienza -Nuova,</i> beside a few references to the refusal to attribute activity to -matter, there is one fugitive but interesting attempt at a connexion -with a geometrical or arithmetical metaphysic on the model of that -described above. In this passage it is stated that upon the order of -material and complex civil affairs the order of numbers, which are -abstract and absolutely simple, is imposed: and the fact is noted that -governments begin with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> one, in domestic monarchy, pass to the few -in aristocracy, advance to the many and the all in popular republics, -and finally return to the one in civil monarchies, so that humanity -moves perpetually from the one to the one, from domestic monarchy to -civil monarchy.</p> - -<p>But if we can and must deny all value to Vico's cosmology, if the -contradictions and obscurities in which he involves himself are -manifest, and were observed by critics of his own time, still we cannot -deny its dynamic nature as opposed to the mechanicism of contemporary -philosophy. The theory of metaphysical points, in which God appears as -the great geometrician who creates by knowing and knows by creating the -realities of the universe, is as it were a symbol of the necessity of -interpreting nature in idealistic language. We find here and there a -theologian Vico, an agnostic Vico, or even a fanciful Vico composing -cosmological and physical romances: but look where we will among his -works, we shall never find a materialistic Vico.</p> - -<p>Even this by no means overbold metaphysic aroused suspicions of -pantheism, though the author insisted upon the theological doctrine -that God's activity is convertible <i>ab intra</i> with the thing created -and <i>ab extra</i> with the fact, and that therefore the world was created -in time; that the human soul, which as a mirror of the divine thinks -infinity and eternity, is not bounded by the body and therefore not -by time, and is therefore immortal; and that man, even if God were to -reveal it to him, cannot understand how the infinite enters into finite -objects. However, he thought it necessary to conclude his replies to -his critics by collecting statements demonstrating his orthodoxy, and -clinching the matter with the remark that "since God is in one sense -substance and in another His creatures, and since the <i>ratio essendi</i> -or essence is proper to substance, the created substances even as -regards their essence are diverse and distinct from the substance of -God."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span></p> - -<p>Vico's thought was limited by the idea of transcendence, which -prevented him from attaining not only the unity of reality, but also -a truly complete knowledge of that world of man which he had so -powerfully explained by means of the opposite principle. We now see why -Vico, though he did not deny the fact of progress, could have no real -conception of it. It has been observed that the conception of progress -is foreign to Catholicism and dates from the Protestant Reformation, -and that therefore the Catholic Vico was bound to deny himself the -use of it. But the conception of an immanent providence is no less -irreconcilable with Catholicism, and yet Vico is saturated with this -idea. This means that he did not lack the impulse: rather he was unable -to pass a certain point beyond which his faith would have been too -obviously defeated. Progress, deduced from the immanent providence and -introduced into the New Science, would have accentuated the difference -within the uniformity, the origin at every moment of something new, -the perpetual enrichment of the flux at every reflux: it would have -changed history from an orderly traversing and retraversing of the line -drawn by God under the eye of God to a drama whose <i>ratio essendi</i> is -contained within itself: it would have enmeshed and drawn with it the -whole universe and realised the thought of infinite worlds. In face -of this vision Vico paused in apprehension and stubbornly refused to -proceed: the philosopher in him had yielded to the Catholic.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XIII" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII</a></h5> - - -<h4>TRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY</h4> - -<p>It is clear from the facts above discussed that the historical portion -of the New Science could not take the shape of a history of the human -race in which peoples and individuals were recognised as playing each -its own unique part in the whole course of events. To enable it to -fulfil such a function Vico would have had to close up his system of -thought, which was still at one point incomplete and not impervious -to the religious idea, and to elevate his provident deity into a -progressive deity, determining flux and reflux as the eternal rhythm -of the process. Or on the other hand in order to attain the vision of -individuality, in the diametrically opposite sense, in history, he -would have had to abandon his rudimentary idealistic philosophy, break -down the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary providence, -and trace the history of man on the plan which God had revealed or -permitted him to discover. Vico's orthodoxy rebelled against the former -alternative, while his philosophy kept him from the second: and the -result of his dilemma was that the history he reconstructed was not and -could not be a universal history.</p> - -<p>In consequence, it was not what is called a philosophy of history, if -that phrase is taken in its original sense of a "universal history -"—one which concentrates its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> attention upon the broadest and -least obvious connexions of facts—"philosophically narrated," more -philosophically, that is, than is usual with annalists, anecdotists and -compilers dealing with courts, politics and nations. The controversy -as to whether Vico or Herder can claim to be the founder of the -philosophy of history must be frankly decided in favour of Herder, -whose work shows just that procedure of universal history which is -lacking in the New Science. On the other hand it would be easy to -find numerous predecessors for Herder, beginning with the Hebrew -prophets and the scheme of the Four Monarchies, which remained not -only in the Middle Ages but well into modern times the constructive -scheme of universal history. Nor would it be out of place to add that -the so-called philosophy of history, in so far as it is a universal -history, constitutes neither a special philosophical science nor a form -of history capable of sharp distinction from the rest, except when the -passion for making it self-subsistent gives it the appearance of an -abstract history or a historicised philosophy. Thus when Vico or Herder -is credited with the foundation of a new science in the philosophy of -history, the compliment is a doubtful one: a fact which especially in -the case of Vico has gone far to obscure the value of their work. In -fact, the "New Science of the common character of nations," understood -as the equivocal science of the philosophy of history, has eclipsed the -New Science as a new philosophy of mind and a rudimentary metaphysic of -thought.</p> - -<p>The conflict which for the general consciousness existed between -science and faith reappears in Vico's treatment of history as a -distinction and opposition between Jewish and Gentile history, sacred -history and profane. Jewish history was not subjected, he believed, -to the laws of history in general. Its course was unique, and its -development proceeded on principles peculiar<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> to itself, namely, the -direct action of God. The New Science, which in its philosophical -part did not give the explanatory principles of this process, was in -consequence not compelled to deal with it in its historical part. -This is perhaps what Vico would have wished. But the wish was met, -setting aside the necessity of guarding against the charge of impiety, -which was certainly a danger, by his scruples as a believer, and a -conscientious believer; which urged him to look for some kind of -harmony between the two histories, since however sharply distinguished -(he recalled how even a Gentile writer, Tacitus, had described the Jews -as "unsociable"), both alike developed under terrestrial conditions -and had points of mutual contact, at least in the origin of mankind -and its regeneration by means of Christianity. Following the inherent -tendencies of his thought, Vico ought to and would willingly have -avoided the narration of universal history and confined himself -exclusively to questions of philosophy and philology. But as it -happened, he was compelled now and then to depart from his programme -and to attempt at once a unification of the two histories and a defence -of sacred history based on arguments supplied by science and profane -history.</p> - -<p>This is the least successful, but a profoundly significant part of -his work. He was forced to admit, though the admission was opposed by -all his discoveries and outraged his whole system of thought, that -the Hebrews had enjoyed the privilege of always keeping intact their -memories of the beginning of the world, a memory which other nations -claimed in vain; and hence sacred history must supply the true origin -and succession of universal history. The necessity of connecting his -views on primitive civilisation with Biblical chronology, with the date -usually assigned to the creation of the world, with the traditions of -a universal deluge and of a race of giants—the necessity of finding, -as he says, the "continuity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> of sacred with profane history"—led him -to the most extravagant flights of fancy. After the flood, in the year -1656 from the creation, at the separation of the sons of Noah, while -the Hebrews began or continued their sacred history with Abraham and -the other patriarchs and then with the laws given to Moses by God, all -the other descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, the first race more -slowly and for a shorter period, the second and third with greater -rapidity and for a longer time, lapsed into the state of nature and -wandered over the earth as insensible and savage brutes. And while the -Hebrews, subjected to their theocratic government, strictly educated -and practising ablution, remained of normal stature, the members of -the other races, living without either physical or moral discipline, -wallowing in dirt and excrement and absorbing nitrogenous salts (just -as the earth is enriched and made fertile by excrement), grew to -monstrous and gigantic size. The state of nature lasted a hundred years -for the Semites and two hundred for the other two races; at the end of -which the earth which had long been sodden with the moisture of the -universal deluge began to dry up and emit dry exhalations or fiery -matter into the air so as to generate lightning. With lightning, as -we already know, and with the mythology of the thundering sky, which -is Jupiter, arose in these brutes the consciousness of God and of -themselves, by which they became human. Thus begins the "age of the -gods," which, socially, is that of domestic monarchy where the father -is king and priest. In the course of this age the system of greater -deities was gradually established, and the giants, by means of their -religions of terror and their domestic education taming the flesh -and developing the spiritual element in them, and by the practice of -washing, shrank by degrees to the normal size of the men whom we find -at the beginning of the next or heroic age.</p> - -<p>Such are the chief points in Vico's quaint reconstruction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> of the -earliest history of man upon the earth, harmonised with the account -in sacred history. We shall be less inclined to amusement or ridicule -if we reflect upon the tragedy underlying the comedy: the tormented -conscience of the believer which in its struggle with the philosopher -seeks refuge in these extravagant ideas. At any rate, they gave Vico -a series of insecure stepping-stones—the flood, the giants, the dry -exhalations—which enabled him to cross the torrent of religious -tradition and reach the dry land of critical history, where he found -the primary starting-point of his philosophy of mind, the state of -nature. It may further be suggested that the contact with Hebrew -history—the only one which presented itself to him as a history in the -strict sense, a <i>unicum,</i> something absolutely individualised even if -in a miraculous manner—suggested to him the few attempts met with in -his works to assign to various peoples a special function or mission; -thus it sometimes appeared to him that the Hebrews represented <i>mens,</i> -the Chaldeans <i>ratio,</i> and the Japhetic races <i>phantasia.</i></p> - -<p>Parallel to this imaginary history of the origin of the human race -on the earth is Vico's attempt at Biblical apologetics. He lost no -opportunity of adducing proofs from profane sources to confirm the -statements of sacred history. For instance, a confirmation of the flood -and the giants is supplied by the similar traditions of Greek and other -nations. The theocratic government, which is not definitely mentioned -by any profane history but merely alluded to obscurely by poets in -their tales, is met with in the government of the Hebrews before and -after the flood. The Hebrews again knew nothing of divination because -they lived in direct contact with the true God, while the Chaldees -had a system of magic or divination according to the movements of the -stars, and the European peoples a system of augury. One certainly -feels in all this something of an effort, a will to see or not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> to -see: a kind of self-interruption and stimulation to belief. It is not -infrequent among cultured and scientifically educated believers. Again, -in his exposition of the historical genesis of grammatical forms, where -he says that verbs began with the imperative, the monosyllabic command -given by the father to wife, child or slave (<i>es, sta, i, da, fac,</i> -etc.), Vico draws from this an indirect demonstration of the truth of -Christianity, because the roots of Hebrew verbs are always found in -the third person singular of the past tense; a clear proof that the -patriarchs must have given their commands to their families in the -name of a single God (<i>Deus dixit</i>). This, in Vico's opinion, is "a -lightning to confound all those writers who have believed the Hebrews -to be a colony proceeding from Egypt; since from the beginning of its -foundation the Hebrew tongue had its origin in a single God." But in -truth these lightnings instead of descending upon the head of the -unbeliever serve only to illuminate the poverty of the arguments upon -which apologetics rest, even with a man like Vico; and, objectively -considered, the division introduced by religious scruple between sacred -and profane history, and the consequent dogmatic treatment of the one, -with its strange hypotheses and defences, and critical treatment of the -other, produced and still produces an irresistible impression that the -seclusion of sacred history from human science is due to the impotence -not of the human science but of the sacred history; its impotence, that -is, to preserve itself intact within the limits of science. Seldom has -a religious scruple so endangered the cause of religion.</p> - -<p>But Vico had far too genuine and exacting a scientific sense added -to his natural antipathies to permit him ever to become a Selden -or a Bossuet; and hence this apologetic for and harmonisation of -sacred history remains in him a mere episode, which it is possible to -ignore. And since on the other hand he was not permitted to treat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> -philosophy and history as entirely profane and to represent the -complex movement of history according to the fundamental criterion of -progress, his only course was to look at the facts from the point of -view which his philosophy left open to him, that of flux and reflux, -the eternal process and the eternal phases of the mind. Here lay his -strength. Here he could recognise the specific, if not strictly the -individual, character of laws, customs, poetry and myth, of whole -social and cultural formations which history down to his own time -had entirely misunderstood. For this reason, in narrating history he -was bound to confine himself to emphasising the common aspects of -certain groups of facts belonging to various nations and periods. In -the New Science, he says, "the whole history of the laws and deeds of -Rome and Greece is set forth, not in its particularity and in time, -but following the substantial identity of intention and diversity of -the modes of expression." Elsewhere he says, "the facts are adduced -after the fashion of examples, because they are understood by means of -principles," for "to see the principles confirmed by the innumerable -host of their consequences is a thing which must await certain other -works of ours, which are either as yet unpublished or now in process -of publication." In other words, as we know, this science contains on -the one hand a philosophical side, and on the other a descriptive or -empirical, exemplified in history, in which the Romans figure not as -Romans but in virtue of the common nature which they share with Greeks -and possibly with Japanese; the history of Rome under the kings or in -the early Republican period demonstrates its affinity with that of the -earlier centuries of the Middle Ages; and Homer stands not as Homer but -as an example of primitive poetry, and across the centuries finds and -greets his brother in Dante. It is at once a strength and a limitation, -because history emphatically does not fundamentally consist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> of these -resemblances; but without the perception of the resemblances how could -we ever determine the differences? Dante is not Homer, the barons -are not the "patres," the Athenian Solon is not the Roman Publilius -Philo; but certainly Dante is in some respects more closely related to -Homer than to Petrarch, the early barons are nearer to the "patres" -than to the later courtier-nobles, and Solon is more akin to a Roman -tribune or dictator than to any other of the seven sages among whom -he is usually placed. To observe these resemblances means denying -or rejecting other more superficial ones, and preparing the way for -knowledge of individuality by indicating the approximate place where -the truth is to be found. Vico classifies, rather than narrates and -represents; but there is classification and classification; it may be -pressed into the service of a superficial thought or of a profound one. -And the historical side of the New Science is one great substitution of -profound for superficial classifications.</p> - -<p>In this process, which constitutes the strength of Vico's treatment -of history, the deficiencies and errors come not from outside the -limits of the process but from causes at work within these limits -themselves. It has been alleged in defence of Vico that a great part -of his errors is due to the scantiness and inadequacy of the materials -at his disposal. But the materials for any study are always scanty -and inadequate compared to our thirst for knowledge; and in judging -a historian the question is not this, but the method, cautious or -incautious, on which he employs the materials that are at his disposal. -Again, it has been said that Vico has the faults of his age; but this -is to forget that he was born in the century which saw the development -of the highly critical philology of Joseph Scaliger and the whole Dutch -school, and that Zeno, Maffei and Muratori were his contemporaries -in Italy. The truth is that just as the attitude of thought<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> already -described in Vico confused pure philosophical method with the -determinations of empirical science and historical data, so it confused -historical research with the mixture of philosophy and empirical -science. Vico was in a state similar to that of drunkenness; confusing -categories with facts, he felt absolutely certain <i>a priori</i> of what -the facts would say: instead of letting them speak for themselves he -put his own words into their mouth. A common illusion with him was to -seem to see connexions between things where there was really none. This -made him turn every hypothetical conjunction into a certainty, and read -in other writers instead of their actual words things that they had -never written, but which were internally spoken by himself unawares -and projected into the writings of others. Exactitude was for him an -impossibility, and in his mental excitement and exaltation he almost -despised it: what harm can ten, twenty, a hundred errors do to what is -substantially true? Exactitude, "diligence," as he says, "must lose -itself in arguments of any size, because it is a minute, and because -minute also a slow-footed virtue." Fanciful etymologies, daring and -groundless mythological interpretations, changes of name and date, -exaggerations of fact, false quotations are met with throughout his -pages, and many may be found noted in the fine edition of the second -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> by Nicolini. Thus, as we observed in speaking of his -philosophy that Vico's was not an acute mind, so now in speaking of his -historical work we must say that it was not critical. But as while we -denied him acuteness on a small scale we acknowledged his profundity -or acuteness on a large scale, so here also we ought to add that if -Vico lacked the critical sense in small matters, in great matters he -had abundance of it. Careless, headstrong and confused in detail; -cautious, logical and penetrative in essentials; he exposes his flank -or rather his whole body to the attacks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> of the most miserable and -mechanical pedant, and over-awes and inspires respect in every critic -and historian however great. And, <i>totus mens</i> though he is and all -absorbed by his own discoveries, often he does not give his power of -investigation and observation time and room to develop, and instead of -history he invents myths and investigates romances; but when he allows -the power free play, it does wonders in the field of history too, as we -shall try to show in the following chapters.</p> - -<p>But to judge the historical views of Vico by confronting them, as many -have done, with those of modern historical research and praising or -depreciating them accordingly would hardly be conclusive. Where the -two terms of the comparison agreed the agreement might be fortuitous: -where they diverged, the later doctrine might be but a development or -consequence of the earlier attempt, and in any case the modern state -of historical knowledge by no means provides an absolute standard. On -the other hand it would be out of place, as well as beyond our power, -to rehandle all the problems dealt with by Vico to see what there is of -truth and falsehood in his conclusions. That would mean no less than -writing a third <i>Scienza Nuova</i> more adapted to our own times. Our task -is merely to indicate the principal historical problems which Vico set -before himself, to state the solutions he gave, and always to keep in -mind the state of knowledge not in our own day but in Vico's, so as -to determine what progress in historical study may be set down to his -influence.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XIV" id="CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV</a></h5> - - -<h4>NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS</h4> - - -<p>The period of historical research which preceded the life of Vico -was, as we have said, by no means credulous or uncritical. The day -was past when "chronicles of the world" were compiled, when any fable -and any falsification however gross was accepted as history: and the -seed sown by a few humanists had borne fruit in the Italian men of -learning, the French juridical school, the school of Scaliger mentioned -above, and all the great chronologists, epigraphists, archaeologists, -topographers and geographers who in the seventeenth century formed -the first immense critical collections of sources for ancient -history. While the philologists were thus improving and perfecting -their methods, detecting impostures and bridging lacunae, Bayle, -Fontenelle, Saint-Évremond and many others were engaged in spreading a -scepticism or historical Pyrrhonism as it was also called, due to the -intellectualistic philosophy; and thus anticipating the polemic against -the truth and utility of history which was to arise with immense vigour -in the following century.</p> - -<p>This latter tendency was hypercritical rather than critical, its end -being the destruction of history in general: and since historical -scepticism was very apt to assume the character of a paradox adapted -to the needs of elegant society and the wits, its influence on the -progress of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> research was very small, or at most it succeeded in -producing strong reactions, one of which is represented by Vico, in -favour of tradition and authority. It is on the other hand only proper -to observe the failings of the first seriously scientific efforts -of philologists and antiquaries. They rehabilitated witnesses, laid -bare falsifications, reconstructed lists of rulers and magistrates, -connected chronology and contradicted certain legends: but, whether -owing to the tendencies of thought usual among pure scholars and -philologists or because of the general atmosphere of their century's -culture, they neither had nor conveyed a feeling for the antique and -the primitive. Strong in detail, they were weak in essentials. When -one of the most brilliant grasped, for instance, the importance of -ballad-literature as a means of transmitting history at a period when -the use of writing was unknown or uncommon, he did not receive from -this observation and others like it such a shock as might stimulate him -to recast from top to bottom his intuition and conception of primitive -life, as was the case with Vico, who almost in a flash grasped the -philosophical form of certitude and the two periods of mental and -social life corresponding to it in actual history: the periods of -obscurity and of legend.</p> - -<p>Vico himself started from a kind of scepticism, a scepticism as -regards the prejudices of scholars and nations generally about the -character and facts of antiquity: and in combating these prejudices -he drew up a series of principles or "aphorisms," inspired apparently -by Bacon's "idola," to which they present an analogy in the field -of historical research. Vico puts the student on his guard first -against the "magnificent opinions" which have been held up to his own -day "concerning the most remote and least known antiquity": a naïve -illusion whose origin he traces to the fact that man when in a state of -entire ignorance erects himself into a rule for the universe. Here is -the closest analogy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> with Bacon: for this statement is precisely like -the class of "<i>idola tribus,</i>" in which thought makes itself the rule -of things "on the analogy of man, not of the universe" (<i>ex analogia -hominis, non ex analogia universi</i>). On the same observation is founded -the remark that "rumour grows in its course," <i>fama crescit eundo,</i> and -Tacitus's <i>omne ignotum pro magnifico est,</i> everything unknown is taken -for something great. Hence arises the habit of interpreting ancient -customs in the expectation of finding them similar or superior to those -of modern civilised life. Thus Cicero admired the humanity of the early -Romans in calling enemies in war "guests": not realising that the fact -was precisely the opposite of this, and that guests were <i>hostes,</i> -strangers and enemies. In the same way Seneca, by way of proving the -duty of kindness to slaves, recalled that masters were anciently called -"fathers of the family"; as if <i>"patres familias"</i> might not have been -the very reverse of kind not only to slaves and servants but to their -own children, regarded as on the level of slaves. The same prejudice -led Grotius, in his desire to show the gentleness of the ancient -Germans, to collect a great number of barbaric laws in which homicide -was punished by a fine of a few pence: which is on the contrary really -a proof of the cheapness of the blood of poor rustic vassals, who are -precisely the "<i>homines</i>" mentioned by these laws.</p> - -<p>In the second place, he warns us not to trust to the "conceit of -nations," all of which, Greek or barbarian, Chaldean, Scythian, -Egyptian, or Chinese, claimed, as Diodorus Siculus observes, to have -founded humanity, discovered the amenities of life, and preserved their -memory intact from the beginning of the world. Each of them, having -for several thousand years had no communication with the others which -might have led to the sharing of ideas, resembled in the obscurity of -its chronology a man who sleeping in a very small chamber is misled by -the darkness into believing it much too large ever to touch<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> it with -his hand. He who accepts these dreamer's boasts for certain knowledge -finds himself in the difficulty of having to choose between the various -memories of various nations, all of which with equal justification -claim to be original.</p> - -<p>By the side of national conceit Vico placed the "conceit of the -learned," who desire their own knowledge to be as old as the world, -and consequently delight in fancying an inaccessible esoteric wisdom -among the ancients, coinciding miraculously with the opinions professed -by each one of themselves, which they dress in the garb of antiquity -in order to enforce their acceptance. Such was the mistake not only -of Plato, especially in the researches of the <i>Cratylus,</i> but of all -historians, ancient and modern: Vico himself had fallen into it, and -was therefore able to study it closely in his own case, when in the <i>De -antiquissima</i> he believed himself to have found in the etymologies of -Latin words the proof of an Italian metaphysic exactly agreeing with -his own doctrines of the conversion of the <i>veruni</i> with the <i>factum</i> -and of metaphysical points.</p> - -<p>From these three prejudices, especially from the conceit of the -learned, follows the fourth, here called that of the "sources" or -"channels of culture," ironically called by Vico the theory of -"scholastic succession among nations." Upon this theory Zoroaster for -instance instructed Berosus for Chaldaea, Berosus in his turn Mercurius -Trimegistus for Egypt, Mercurius taught Atlas the Ethiopian lawgiver, -Atlas Orpheus the Thracian missionary, and finally Orpheus established -his school in Greece. Long journeys these, and easy forsooth to those -primitive nations which, scarcely out of the state of savagery, lived -perched on mountains in almost inaccessible situations, unknown even -to their neighbours! And these long journeys were undertaken with -the object of spreading discoveries, which any nation could make -for itself. If, when nations came to know each other through wars -and treaties, they were found to agree,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> that was because they all -contained some motive of truth and sprang from the same needs of man. -Was it necessary to suppose the Athenian or Mosaic law to have affected -that of the Romans, as did these "comparers" or delivers of laws, in -order to explain the origin of the right recognised in Palestine, -Athens and Rome to kill the thief by night? Was it necessary for -Pythagoras to travel spreading the doctrine of the transmigration of -souls, which we find as far afield as India?</p> - -<p>There remained the prejudice of considering the ancient historians -as best informed about primitive times: whereas in the history of -origins they knew as little as, or less than, ourselves. As for Greek -history, Vico found, or rather imagined that he found, in Thucydides, -a confession that the Greeks up to the generation preceding that -historian knew nothing of their own antiquity: and he also observed -that it was only in the time of Xenophon that Greek historians began -to have any precise information upon Persian affairs. Roman historians -commonly began with the foundation of Rome: but the beginning of Rome -was certainly not the beginning of the world. Rome was a new city -founded in the midst of a large number of small and more ancient -peoples in Latium: and even in the case of Rome Livy refuses to -guarantee the truth of the facts of the earlier centuries of its -history up to the Punic wars, which he is in a position to describe -more accurately. He even confesses frankly that he does not know at -what point Hannibal made his great and memorable entry into Italy, -whether by the Cottian Alps or the Apennines. So well informed were the -ancient historians!</p> - -<p>Owing to these and similar sceptical principles, the whole of Greek -history to the time of Herodotus and of Roman down to the second Punic -war seemed to Vico quite uncertain, an unclaimed territory, so to -speak, where one might enter and take possession by squatter's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> right. -He entered armed with positive principles directly issuing from the -negative ones we have enumerated. For if Vico denied the credibility -of historians distant in time from the facts they described, if -he discounted national pride, if he laid bare the illusions and -charlatanism of the learned, he nevertheless did not rest content with -this work of destruction. In place of the old untrustworthy method -he had banished, he endeavoured to supply a new, of better qualities -and greater tenacity; a system of methods by which it was possible to -acquire new historical documents and also to improve the study of those -already known. No advance in historical knowledge is in fact ever made -except by thus turning from the received narrative to the document -underlying it, which alone has the power of confirming, correcting and -enriching the narrative.</p> - -<p>The first of Vico's contributions to historical method, the first -source for the knowledge of the earliest civilisations which he -exposed, is the etymology of language. The usual methods of this study -in his time were purely arbitrary: it proceeded by considering the -sound of each syllable or letter and looking for other superficial -resemblances, and inferring from these facts the derivation of a word -from this or that language, Latin, Greek or Hebrew. But etymology -becomes a fruitful study only when it is remembered that language is -the best evidence for the ancient life of a people, the life lived -by them while the language was in the making: and when the student -accordingly never ceases to explain language by customs and customs -by language. Thus the etymology of abstract words leads us into the -heart of a purely rustic society; for <i>intellegere,</i> to understand, -for example, recalls <i>legere,</i> to collect the produce of the fields -(hence <i>legumina,</i> vegetables); <i>disserere,</i> to discuss, refers to -scattering seed; and the majority of words for inanimate things reveal -relations with the human body and its members,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> and the sensations -and passions of man; thus "mouth" means any aperture, "lip" the edge -of a pot, "forehead" and "back" are used for before and behind; and -so on. Vico aimed at one science of etymology common to all native -languages, composed of monosyllabic, and largely onomatopoeic roots: -another of foreign loan-words, introduced after nations became mutually -acquainted: a third, of universal application, for the science of -international law, from which it should appear how the same men, facts -or objects, looked at from the different points of view of different -nations, received different names; and finally a dictionary of mental -words, common to all nations, which should explain the uniform ideas of -substances and the different modifications of them in national thought -concerning the human needs and utilities common to all, according to -the differences of their situation, climate, character and customs, and -should thus narrate the origins of the various vocal languages, all -converging in an ideal common language.</p> - -<p>The second source revealed by Vico is the interpretation of myths or -fables, which agreeably to his doctrine were not allegories, fictions -or impostures, but the science of primitive man. In the <i>Diritto -universale</i> Vico distinguished four different and successive characters -of the gods. At first they represented natural facts, Jupiter the sky, -Diana the flowing water, Dis or Pluto the lower earth, Neptune the sea, -and so on; secondly, natural human affairs, for instance, Vulcan fire, -Ceres corn, Saturn the seed; thirdly, social facts; and finally they -rose to heaven and were translated to the stars, and terrestrial and -human things were distinguished from divine. But in the two <i>Scienze -Nuove</i> he emphasised almost exclusively the third or social meaning, -which became in his eyes the original; since, he appears to have -thought, the earliest nations were too much intent upon themselves, -too much immersed in their hard and difficult<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> life, to speculate in -abstraction from social matters. Hence he found reflected in mythology -the institutions, inventions, social cleavages, class-struggles, -travels and warfare of primitive nations. Even in considerably advanced -periods Vico was hostile to naturalistic or philosophical explanations. -The saying "know thyself" attributed to the ancient sage seemed to him -merely a piece of advice to the Athenian democracy, to know its own -strength, later transferred to a metaphysical and moral sense. Beside -this principle of social interpretation he established another of great -importance: namely, that indecent meanings were inserted in myths at a -late and corrupt period when men interpreted early customs in the light -of their own, or tried to justify their own lusts by fancying that the -gods had set them the example. Hence arose the adulterous Jupiter, -Juno as the implacable enemy of Hercules' virtue, the chaste Diana -soliciting the embraces of the sleeping Endymion, Apollo persecuting -modest maidens even to their death, Mars, not content with committing -adultery with Venus by land, but pursuing her even into the sea, and, -worst of all, the love of Jupiter for Ganymede and of Jupiter again, -transformed into a swan, for Leda. Such representations can only result -in unrestrained vice, as happened in the case of the young Chaereas in -Terence's comedy. But in their original shape and meaning all myths -were serious and austere, worthy of the founders of nations. The -pursuit of Daphne by Apollo for instance referred to the magicians or -diviners who arranged weddings and followed women through the woods -where they were still liable to promiscuous ravishing; Venus, covering -her nakedness with the cestus, was a modest symbol of solemn matrimony; -the heroes, sons of Jupiter, were not the offspring of adultery, but -born of permanent and solemn marriages celebrated according to the will -of Jupiter as revealed by the diviners. To the pure all things are -pure, and impure to the impure:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> the forests and mountain-tops could -never beget the fancies of the closet and the brothel.</p> - -<p>Beside these two rich sources, language and mythology, Vico names and -employs a third, which he calls the "great fragments of the ancient -world," that is to say, the memories preserved by historians and poets, -such as the Egyptian tradition of the three ages of gods, heroes -and men; the language of the gods mentioned in Homer; the thirty -thousand names of the gods collected by Varro and referring to a like -number of needs in the natural, moral, economic and civil life of the -earliest times; the grove of Romulus, which Livy calls "the ancient -plan of founding cities," and a few other golden sayings of ancient -historians. Till now these fragments had been useless for the purposes -of science, lying as they did in dirt, confusion and incompleteness: -but when cleaned, restored and fitted together they conveyed valuable -information. Nor did he overlook the monuments of architecture and -sculpture, though the use he made of them was slight, and he saw that -they were in the long run of little practical value. He declared that -as for the historic period the most certain documents are the public -coins, so for the legendary and obscure period their place is taken by -"certain traces remaining in marble," as proofs of ancient customs, -like the Egyptian pyramids with their hieroglyphic inscriptions and -other fragments of the ancient world found in every region and bearing -similar pictographic characters. It is also worthy of remark that he -gives examples of arguments founded on technical observations and -leading to conclusions in the sphere of prehistoric archaeology: as -for instance when he says that one early period of human life is -distinguished by the eating of roasted flesh, the simplest and least -elaborate kind of food, because it requires nothing except the fire: a -later period by boiled flesh, which also requires water, caldron and -tripod.</p> - -<p>One powerful method of investigation in Vico's hands<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> is the -comparative method, consisting in the comparison of better-known -processes of development with those known imperfectly or in parts only, -and the consequent reconstruction of the latter on the basis of the -former. So for instance the principle of heroism, revealed by evidence -found in Roman history, helps to explain the legendary history of the -Greeks, to supply the deficiencies of that of Egypt and to shed light -on the unknown history of all other nations of antiquity. Without -denying the fact of transmission from one nation to another, Vico -poured scorn upon the abuse of this conception, and minimised its value -in the case of primitive societies: using in its place the idea of -spontaneous development and endeavouring to reconstruct the process by -the comparative method. But he took this method in a very broad sense, -and made use in it of materials drawn from the most widely varying -countries and periods. To explain for example how the thundering sky -suggested to primitive man the idea of a god, he mentions the fact that -the natives of America, when first they heard the noise and recognised -the deadly effects of firearms in the hands of the Spaniards, believed -them to be gods: the rhapsodists of the Homeric poems reminded him of -the singers on the quay at Naples with their ballads of Roland and the -paladins: the transformations or metamorphoses described by the ancient -poets resembled the tales of goblins and fairies still told by mothers -to amuse little children, or the widely-scattered mediaeval legends of -the magician Merlin: he traces the mythology of the hearth down to the -custom of the log which in Boccaccio's time at Florence the head of -the family used to light upon the hearth at the new year, sprinkling -incense and wine on it, and the Christmas-eve log among the lower -classes at Naples; not to mention the custom in the Neapolitan kingdom -of counting families by "hearths." He brought the serpent Python and -all other mythical serpents into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> relation with the viper of the -Visconti "che i milanesi accampa" ("which calls to arms the Milanese") -and the hieroglyphic script with the <i>"rébus de Picardie"</i> used in the -north of France.</p> - -<p>It would be useless to look in earlier or contemporary philology -for clear general precedents for these principles, negative and -positive, established by Vico for the history of obscure and legendary -periods. They are too closely bound up with and essential to his whole -philosophical thought ever to have originated apart from this thought -itself. The rude fragments of ancient Roman laws, customs and formulae, -the Homeric poems, the words of the Latin language, when examined with -unprejudiced eyes—the power which enables a man of genius to see -things without distortion—and worked over by a mind ready to accept -them in their true nature, were bound to excite in Vico, compared with -the learned but colourless or falsely-coloured historical research of -his day, a rebellion and upheaval like that which took place a century -later in the mind of Augustin Thierry when he saw, depicted in the -pages of Chateaubriand's poetical prose, Pharamond and his Franks, -with their unrestrained movements, their rude and savage arms, their -terrible war-cries and their barbaric songs.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV</a></h5> - - -<h4>HEROIC SOCIETY</h4> - - -<p>As the Franks, in the compilations of national history made by the -Jesuit colleges and other French schools, appear stripped of all -their characteristic features and reduced to wise monarchs, pious -queens and devoted warriors of the Church, so ancient and primitive -history, thanks to the rhetoric and the naïve ideas of scholars, has -been painted in brilliant and untrue colours of the same kind as -those with which Lebrun or Luca Giordano painted their pompous and -theatrical pictures. Kings who devoted themselves to sage counsel in -order to aid their subjects while at the same time not diminishing the -splendour of their courts and the brilliancy of their happy nobles, -philosopher kings such as made Plato sigh for the day when philosophers -should rule or kings philosophise; loyal and valiant knights, eager -to sacrifice themselves for the common welfare; statesmen who used to -accomplish pilgrimages at speed in order to bring back from afar to -their waiting citizens laws more wise than their own; good fathers of -families, admirable mothers, brave and obedient young men, loving and -modest maidens, every one a personification of some virtue or even of -all virtues at once, models of human perfection: such are the figures -which sanctified by their venerable antiquity fill alike volumes -and imaginations. These are the heroes of Greek and Roman history: -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> all this splendid cloth-of-gold decoration must be torn off and -cleared away if we would attempt to discover in the deepest recesses -of the memory of mankind the true heroes, the heroes of reality, not -of literature, of life, not of the stage: ignorant, superstitious, -fierce, selfish, harsh to their families, cruel to their inferiors, -avaricious, grasping, and yet, in spite of or even because of these -same characteristics of barbarism, heroes: virtuous with the one kind -of virtue possible and necessary in primitive times, the virtue of -strength, discipline, and a deep and uncompromising sense of religion.</p> - -<p>The misrepresentation of the primitive hero as a wise and virtuous -member of a civilised society reaches its height, so far as political -history is concerned, in the failure to understand the three chief -words which sum up the constitution of the state: king, people and -freedom. By a misunderstanding of the first, it is believed that the -original form of the state was monarchy, the absolute monarchy which -rests on the strength of the people and keeps in check the nobles: -which is really a late development in history, if not the latest. -Into this error had fallen Jean Bodin, whom Vico chose as the object -of his polemic. But Bodin, more acute than other political writers, -involved himself in a contradiction, because though he accepted the -common error he nevertheless, observing the effects of an aristocratic -republic in the supposed freedom of ancient Rome, propped up his system -by distinguishing between state and government, and asserting that -Rome in the earliest period was popular in state but aristocratically -governed; and since this prop was too weak to bear the whole weight -of the facts he at last confessed that this republic was aristocratic -both in government and in state, thus contradicting the whole of his -own doctrine as to the necessary succession of states. The truth is -that the kings of these earliest periods were at Rome, as at Sparta and -elsewhere, not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> monarchs at all. The fathers, patricians or heroes were -monarchical kings only in the period of domestic monarchy, when each -family lived separately; but they were kings of a special kind, subject -to no one but God, armed with religions of terror and consecrated with -the most cruel penalties. On emerging from this first state, when -the fathers united into a patrician order, their king was simply one -or more of themselves, the mere magistrate of the order. Hence Rome, -after expelling the Tarquins by a purely aristocratic revolution, did -not change her state at all. She preserved her kings in the shape of -two consuls, "annual kings," two aristocratic kings who were "deprived -of no single detail of the royal power." The two kings of Sparta had -the same character; they were liable like the consuls to be held -accountable for their actions and could be condemned to death by the -ephors.</p> - -<p>As these states had been falsely considered monarchical, so, no less -falsely, they had been taken as popular in character. The people -referred to in this way does not coincide with, in fact it excludes, -the plebs: the <i>"populus"</i> was simply the patrician order, and freedom -meant simply the freedom of the patricians, the liberty of the master: -and the "<i>patria</i>" was appropriately so called, because it really was -<i>res patrum,</i> the property of a few fathers. It is absurd to think that -the plebs, a horde of the most worthless labourers treated as slaves, -could possess the right of electing the king, and that the fathers -confined themselves to merely approving this election in the senate. -The relations between fathers and plebeians were quite other than -neighbourly peace, mutual trust and hearty co-operation. The heroes, -according to a passage of Aristotle, took a solemn oath to be eternal -enemies of the plebs: that was the form their democratic spirit took. -And the "Roman virtue" which sets before us so many and such glorious -examples,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> gives no example of kindliness to the common people. Brutus, -who dedicated his house in the persons of his two sons to the cause of -freedom: Scaevola, who terrified Porsena by punishing his own right -hand in the fire: the stern Manlius, who executed his own son when he -returned victorious through a successful breach of military discipline: -Curtius, who leapt in full armour with his horse into the fatal chasm: -Decius, who devoted himself for the safety of his army: Fabricius -and Curius, who refused the Samnite gold and the kingdom of Pyrrhus: -Attilius Regulus, who went to certain death to preserve the sanctity -of a Roman's oath: what did these men ever do for the commons, except -increase their miseries by war, plunge them deeper into the waters of -usury, and immure them more closely in the private dungeons of the -nobles where they were flogged bare-backed like the vilest slaves? -And woe to any aristocrat who allowed himself the slightest desire -to alleviate these miseries! He was promptly accused of sedition and -treason and sent to his death; the fate that in Rome befel Manlius -Capitolinus, who saved the Capitol from the fires of the Gaul, and -yet for his democratic sympathies was thrown from the Tarpeian rock; -the fate that came in Sparta, the hero-city of Greece as Rome was the -hero-city of the world, to the great-souled king Agis, the Manlius -Capitolinus of Lacedaemon, who, for trying to lighten the burden of the -unhappy commons by a law abolishing debts and to aid them by another -giving them testamentary rights, was strangled by the ephors. The -famous "Roman virtue" amazes any one who is obsessed by the modern idea -of a virtue consisting in justice and benevolence to all mankind. What -virtue could live with such pride? What moderation with such avarice? -What mercy with such cruelty? What justice with such inequality?</p> - -<p>The heroes treated their own families no less harshly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> than the plebs. -The education of children was stern, rough and cruel. The Spartans, in -order that their sons might not fear pain and death, beat them within -an inch of their lives in the temple of Diana, so that they often fell -dead in agonies of pain beneath their father's blows. In Greece as in -Rome it was lawful to kill innocent new-born children, a custom the -reverse of the modern, by which the delights which surround little -children shape the softer side of human nature. Wives were bought by -the dowries of the heroic period, a survival of which was the practice -solemnly observed in Rome of marriage <i>"coemptione et farre"</i> (a -similar custom is ascribed by Tacitus to the ancient Germans and must -be considered universal among barbarous peoples), and were maintained -simply as a necessity of nature for the procreation of children and in -other respects treated like slaves; as can still be seen in many parts -of the old world and almost everywhere in the new. The acquisition of -children and the thrift of the wife were simply reckoned as so much -profit to the father and husband.</p> - -<p>The counterpart of this political and domestic system is found in -the ordinary life of the period, which was innocent of all luxury, -refinement and ease. Pastimes were arduous, such as wrestling and -hunting, to harden body and mind, or else dangerous, like jousting or -hunting big game, to accustom men to think lightly of wounds and death. -Wars were carried on under a religious aspect and were always therefore -extremely bitter. From such wars resulted the system of heroic slavery, -by which the conquered were held to be men without God, so that they -lost civil and natural liberty at once. Foreigners were considered -enemies: the earliest nations were intensely inhospitable. Brigandage -and piracy were recognised; and Plutarch says that the heroes -considered it a great honour and prize of valour to be called "robbers."</p> - -<p>It was, in fine, a society immediately proceeding out<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> of that of the -gods, which as we know was the climax of the state of nature. In its -passage from the prehistoric age as we should say in modern language -into the dawn of history it still retained much of the earlier customs, -those customs which Vico thinking of the lonely Polyphemus in his -cave called "Cyclopean rules." The age of gold out of which it came, -innocent, kindly, humane, tolerant and dutiful, as scholars and poets -believed, was in reality one perpetual "superstitious fanaticism," -tormented by a continual terror of the gods, to placate whom men used -to offer human sacrifice, traces of which remain among the historic -Phoenicians, Scyths and Germans, the tribes of America and even the -Romans themselves, who afterwards substituted for it the ceremony -of throwing straw puppets into the Tiber. Even the sacrifice of -children was not unknown; memories of it are preserved in Agamemnon's -sacrifice of Iphigenia and elsewhere. But in this age of the gods, -in spite of or by means of this cruel superstition, were founded -the great institutions of humanity; religious cults together with -augurial divination, marriage and burial. Weddings, judgment-seats -and altars, and the removal of the bodies of the dead from the reach -of the malignant air and the wild beasts "taught the human brutes to -be pious" as Foscolo says in his <i>Sepolcri,</i> merely versifying Vico's -prose. These "Cyclopes" who conjoined and confused in themselves the -functions of king, wise man (that is divination) and priest, at first -placed their dwellings on the heights of mountains, in places airy and -therefore healthy, naturally fortified, and near the perennial springs, -where were the nests of eagles and vultures, the birds with which -augury dealt. Hence the importance of water and fire, which became -symbols of the family; the earliest marriages were solemnised <i>"aqua -et igni"</i> between parties who shared a common spring and hearth, and -therefore belonged to the same household; so that they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> must have been -between brothers and sisters. The period of the cyclopes was a strongly -moral period. It was not true of it that "pleasure and law were one" -in the sense fancied by later effeminate poets; for these men, whose -minds like those which we may still find among the peasants of to-day -were insensible to the refinements of vice, found that alone pleasant -which was lawful and that alone lawful which was useful. They were -just with the justice of a savage towards his god; continent, for they -had made an end of promiscuous intercourse; brave, hard-working and -high-spirited, as they were bound to be, surrounded as they were by -hardships and perils. It was only later that these primeval groups of -humanity descended into the plains and began to till them, and then, -from living inland as they did at first, travelled gradually to the -sea, learnt the art of navigation and founded colonies.</p> - -<p>In this way families or <i>gentes</i> existed before states. States were in -fact formed of families grouped into an order of <i>gentes maiores</i> or -"ancient noble houses" as they were afterwards called to distinguish -them from others added later to the order (for instance at the time -of Junius Brutus, to fill the vacancies in the Roman senate after -the expulsion of the kings) and called <i>"gentes minores."</i> But these -<i>gentes</i> had within themselves an element of differentiation and -strife. Families were not composed, as is generally believed owing -to the common mistake of giving modern meanings to ancient words, of -wives and children alone; but also of slaves, <i>famuli,</i> those who, -being less strong and remaining longer in the nomadic state of nature, -finally "as sometimes wild animals, driven either by extreme cold or by -hunters, to save their life betake themselves to inhabited places" had -sought refuge with the stronger, in the fortresses of the fathers. In -return for the protection thus granted they tilled the father's land, -and were bound and as it were tied to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> them, and hence called <i>nexi</i>; -they followed them and served them, and therefore gained the name of -<i>clientes.</i> The relation of slaves to fathers was the second form -of human relation, the first being the natural one of matrimony; it -constituted the feudal status, which has wrongly been believed peculiar -to a certain definite period of barbarism, the Middle Ages, whereas it -existed in all heroic societies, and was the eternal feudal principle -whence sprang all the republics of the world. As Tacitus says, speaking -of the Germans, the chief oath of these slaves and clients was to -guard and defend each his own master and to assign to his master's -glory his own deeds of valour (<i>suum principem defendere et tueri, -sua quoque fortia facta gloriae eius adsignare, praecipuum iuramentum -erat</i>); which is one of the severest conditions of the feudal system. -Moreover the father's children are rather confused with the slaves -than distinguished from them. They are distinguished by their title of -<i>liberi,</i> but are identified by their similar position of obedience and -lack of separate personality.</p> - -<p>The need felt by the fathers of securing themselves against the -frequent mutinies of the slaves led to the mutual alliance of fathers, -the patrician order and the heroic state. Of this state the slaves -constituted the first plebs. They had no citizen's rights, since they -were not citizens; no solemnities of marriage, since the auspices -were a monopoly of the fathers; nor the right of making wills, since -that right had and always kept the political character of a command. -They were therefore excluded from the <i>comitia curiata</i> held by the -patricians under arms, which survived later for dealing with sacred -questions; profane matters being everywhere in the earliest times, at -Rome as in Greece and Egypt, considered as sacred. The king of the -patricians, whom we have called the magistrate of the order, was thus -especially their leader and general in their resistance to the slaves -or plebeians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span></p> - -<p>But the heroes did not provide for the stability of their order by -means of forcible resistance alone. Just as, when they abdicated -their position of sovereignty in their respective families for one of -subordination to the higher sovereignty of the order, they formed a -kind of noble or armed feudal system, so to keep their slaves more or -less reconciled to obedience they granted them, without admitting them -to citizenship, a kind of rustic feudalism. The origin of property is -thus explained in a way entirely different on the one hand from the -charmingly poetical theory according to which men adorned with all -the virtues of the golden age when justice dwelt on earth, foreseeing -the disorder that might result from communism, themselves with kindly -arbitration marked out the limits of fields, endeavouring not to assign -to one nothing but fertile, to another nothing but barren ground; to -one a waterless portion, to another one abounding in perennial streams: -and different on the other hand from the "philosophical" origin by -a voluntary submission to the wise, or that invented by "politician -kings" who derived property from violence. The granting of this rustic -feudalism, which might be called the first agrarian law, distinguished -three kinds of land-tenure: bonitary for the people, quiritary or -noble, supported by arms, for the fathers, and eminent, belonging -to the whole order. And since the strength of the order rested upon -its wealth, it did all in its power to prevent the enrichment of -the plebs; and in war—here we see the social motive of the "Roman -clemency"—deprived the conquered of their arms only, leaving them in -bonitary possession of their lands and imposing upon them a suitable -tribute. For the same reason the patricians were very reluctant to go -to war, for then the plebeian multitude gained experience of warfare -and became dangerous.</p> - -<p>The detachment of law from force was slow, and traces of the latter -remained in every part of the former. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> the heroic republic there -were at first no laws providing for the punishment of offences and -the restitution of private injuries; hence, failing judiciary laws, -arose the need of duels and reprisals, which perpetuated the customs -of the age of innocence or of the gods. Poetry and history describe -some of these duels, which were armed judgments: for instance, that of -Menelaus and Paris under the walls of Troy, and that of the Horatii and -Curiatii, between Rome and Alba. It was a plan of divine providence, -in order that between barbaric nations of scanty understanding and -incapable of listening to reason war should not always beget war: that -right and wrong might be to some degree determined by a belief in the -favour or disfavour of the gods as the cause of victory or defeat.</p> - -<p>These ordeals by battle were accompanied and superseded by ordeals by -verbal formulae, used in their religious habit of mind with the most -minute and scrupulous exactitude and with care not to alter a single -letter (<i>religio verborum</i>). Horatius, who by killing his sister fell -under the law "<i>horrendi carminis,</i>" could never have been acquitted -by the decemvirs, however free from blame they thought him; and the -people acquitted him, says Livy, "more through admiration of his valour -than the justice of his cause" (<i>magis admiratione virtutis quant iure -causae</i>). In later days Roman law still retained this character of -verbal precision to such a degree that it forms the crux of several -of Plautus's comedies, in which panders are at the mercy of enamoured -young men who have led them to violate some legal formula.</p> - -<p>The private law of this society corresponded closely with its economic -constitution. It was an entirely natural society, confined to the -necessaries of life, and did not use money; hence the law knew nothing -of contracts formed, according to the law of a later period, by mere -consent. All obligations were ratified by giving the hand; the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> first -buying and selling was barter; the rent of a house consisted in a -mortgage on the soil for building it, the rent of land in planting it; -companies and credit were unknown.</p> - -<p>The material character of the first contracts and the forcible -character of early legal processes were gradually modified as time went -on, and became symbolic. As the fiction of force in marriage-rites -recalled the actual force with which the giants dragged the first women -into caves, so no less the ceremonies of <i>mancipatio, usucapio</i> and -vengeance had formerly been acts really performed. <i>Mancipatio</i> was -performed as we said with the actual hand, that is with real force; -for instance, in occupation, the original source of all rights of -possession; <i>usucapio</i> by the permanent planting of the body upon the -thing possessed; vengeance was originally a duel or a <i>"conditio,"</i> -private retaliation. Then they became ceremonies or fictions: -<i>mancipatio</i> became a civil transference with solemn acts and phrases -(<i>si quis nexum faciet mancipiumque uti lingua nuncupassit ita ius -esto</i>—"If any one makes a thing bond to him and his possession, let -the law be so that he publish it with his tongue"); <i>usucapio</i> a tenure -which is supposed to last as long as life; retaliation a series of -personal actions accompanied by a solemn declaration of them to the -debtor. There were worn in the forum as many masks as there were legal -personalities, and under the "person" or mask of a paterfamilias were -hidden all the children and all the slaves of the house. Instead of -abstract forms, which were not yet thought of, living bodily forms were -used. Heredity for instance was invented as mistress of hereditary -property, and imagined to exist completely in every particular piece of -inherited goods; the idea of indivisible right again, was materialised -in the glebe or clod of earth presented to the judge with the formula -<i>"hunc fundum"</i> This ancient jurisprudence was throughout poetical; -its fictions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> turned facts into falsehoods and falsehoods into facts, -made the unborn live, the living dead, and the dead to survive in their -posterity. It created numbers of empty legal personalities without -subjects (<i>iura imaginaria</i>), rights invented by the imagination; and -the formulae in which the laws were expressed were called because of -their strict rhythm of such and so many words "verses"<i>—carmina.</i> -The fragments of the Twelve Tables, if carefully considered, end their -sentences for the most part in an Adonian verse, which is ultimately -a fragment of the hexameter metre; and Cicero, realising this, begins -his "Laws" with the sentence <i>Deos caste adeunto pietatem adhibento.</i> -Cicero also tells us that the Roman boys used to sing the laws of the -twelve tables "like a regular song" (<i>tanquam necessarium carmen</i>), and -Aelian says the same of the Cretan children and the laws of Minos. The -Egyptian laws according to one tradition were "poems of the goddess -Isis," and those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans and by Draco to the -Athenians were formulated in verse. The whole of the ancient Roman -law was a "serious poem," or as Vico says elsewhere a "kind of Roman -drama," <i>poema quoddam dramaticum Romanum,</i> performed by the Romans in -the forum; and ancient jurisprudence was a "severe poetry."</p> - -<p>This poetic atmosphere in heroic society and this metrical tendency -in its language are facts borne out by many witnesses and proofs, by -the observations and conjectures of scholars and by the narrations of -travellers and missionaries. Hebraists are divided upon the question -whether Hebrew poetry is metrical or rhythmical; but Josephus, Origen -and Eusebius are in favour of metre, and St. Jerome asserts that a -great part of the book of Job is in hexameter verse. The Arabs, who had -no knowledge of writing, preserved their language down to the time when -they overran the eastern provinces of the Greek empire by handing on -the memory of their national<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> poems. The Egyptians wrote the lives of -the dead in verse; the Persians and Chinese committed to verse their -earliest history, as also, according to Tacitus, the Germans and, -according to Justus Lipsius, the Americans. And since of these two last -nations the former was only known to the Romans late in their history -and the latter to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century, there -is good reason to suppose that the same is true of all other barbaric -nations ancient and modern.</p> - -<p>The earliest metre, found not only in Greece but in Assyria, Phoenicia -and Egypt, was the heroic or hexameter. Owing to the slowness of -thought and the difficulties of pronunciation it was bound at first -to have a spondaic character (hence the final foot in the line was -always a spondee) and only later when mind and tongue became more -active did it admit the dactyl. Then, when this activity still further -increased, arose the iambic (<i>pede praesto</i> as Horace calls it) which -approximates most nearly to prose; so much so, indeed, that the early -prose writers before Gorgias practically used the iambic metre of -poetry, and prose frequently passed over into iambic verse. Tragedy was -composed in iambics, a metre which is naturally adapted to it, produced -as it was to give expression to wrath, according to the story which -makes Archilochus invent it to express his anger against Lycambus; -and if comedy afterwards adopted the same metre, it was only by the -"meaningless following of example," not because the iambic metre was -naturally suited to it as it was to tragedy.</p> - -<p>The primitive language of these societies was poetical not only -through its use of metre but also by being composed through and -through of lively metaphors, vivid fancies, striking resemblances, -apt comparisons, expressions by means of cause or effect, whole or -part, elliptic or pleonastic figures of speech, onomatopoeisms or -imitations of sounds by words, abbreviations,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> compound words, minute -circumlocutions, characteristic epithets, contortions in syntax and -episodes. All these are ways of making oneself understood devised -by men ignorant of the precise words required, or of a word, if in -conversation, understood by both parties. The episode is characteristic -of women and peasants, who are unable to select what they need and -omit what is alien to their subject; contorted language is the result -of inability to express oneself directly, or of being prevented from -doing so, as may be seen in the case of irascible or contemptuous -persons, who make use of the nominative and oblique cases but do not -utter verbs. The very words of these languages taken one by one reveal -in the frequency of their diphthongs a trace of the song out of which -speech arose; and this abundance of diphthongs still remains in the -Greek and French languages, which passed rapidly and prematurely from -the age of spontaneity to that of reflection. The German language -would certainly offer a rich store of heroic forms, with its abundance -of compound words which so happily translate those of Greek, and its -syntax which exceeds Latin in complexity as Latin does Greek. If German -scholars, says Vico several times with a wistful glance at a field of -study closed to himself, would use the principles of the New Science in -research upon the origins of their language, they would certainly make -wonderful discoveries.</p> - -<p>The conception of the universe prevalent among the men of this period, -and the histories of themselves which they related, of their origins, -warfare and fortunes, were also poetical, or rather mythical. It was -even the case as we have seen that their conceptions in the sphere -of social history preceded those of a cosmological, physical or -psychological character. By a rigid application of this principle Vico -developed his doctrine of "natural theogony," arising naturally in the -imagination on the occasion of certain human needs and utilities: the -genesis of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> twelve greater Gods, <i>Di maiores,</i> that is to say, -the gods invented by the <i>gentes maiores</i> and, to a great extent, -brought by them to the foundation of the state. Jupiter or the sky, -with his language of lightning, was the author of the first laws of the -family; Juno symbolised marriage, Diana matrimonial chastity, Apollo -the light of civilisation; Vulcan, Saturn and Cybele were respectively -the fire with which the forests were burnt to make clearings, the -sowing of seed and the tilling of land; Mars symbolised the warfare -of the heroes <i>"pro aris et focis,"</i> and Venus civilised beauty. In -addition to this celestial Venus arose a plebeian Venus to whom was -given the attribute of doves; not as typifying the passion of love, but -because they were <i>"degeneres"</i> common birds in comparison with the -eagle. A double signification, patrician and plebeian, was given in -the same way to Vulcan and Mars. The stormy relations of the fathers -with the slaves, the struggles and penalties referred to in the myths -of Tantalus and Sisyphus, begin to be reflected in the twelve greater -gods. Hercules, struggling with Antaeus, signifies the nobles of the -heroic cities, and Antaeus the mutinied slaves led back into the -primitive cities on the mountain-tops (Antaeus lifted up into the air) -and overcome and bound down to the earth, that is to say forced back -to their servile labour. The birth of the tenth divinity, Minerva, -expresses the weakening and diminution of the heroic power, since the -plebeian Vulcan (the mutinied slaves) strikes the head of Jupiter with -an axe, the tool of a servile art. Mercury represents the granting of -bonitary rights to the plebs and the maintenance of quiritary rights -by the fathers. The last of the twelve deities, Neptune, arose when -the peoples descended to the sea-coast; and the legends of Minos, the -Argonauts, the Trojan war, the return of Ulysses, Europa and the bull, -the Minotaur, Perseus and Theseus refer to colonisation and piracy. -The mythological interpretation of history does not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> cease with the -foundation of states. The founders of civilisation, Zoroaster and -Mercurius Trimegistus, Orpheus and Confucius, even if they are not -strictly gods, are at least poetical characters. Aesop is typical of -the <i>"socii"</i> or slaves of the heroes and hence is represented as ugly, -that is, devoid of civilised beauty (<i>honestas</i>); and his fable of the -lions' society shows to perfection the real relation of the heroes to -their slaves, in which the latter share the toils, but not the spoils. -Draco, of whom Greek historians tell us nothing but that he imposed -a stern code of laws, symbolises the cruelty of the heroes to their -slaves. Solon was either a party-leader of the Athenian plebs, or else -a simple personification of the plebs itself, considered from the point -of view of its vengeance. In the history of Rome we find poetical -figures in Romulus, to whom were ascribed all the laws of the orders; -in Numa, author of the laws dealing with sacred matters and religious -ceremonies; in Tullus Hostilius, who organised and legislated for the -military system; in Servius Tullius the author of the census (which -has been imagined, contrary to all historical truth, the foundation -of a popular republic, whereas it was really the foundation of an -aristocratic); and in Tarquinius Priscus, who invented insignia of rank -and military uniforms; lastly, the Decemvirs and the Twelve Tables are -turned into poetical figures, since to these events and persons were -ascribed a great number of laws favourable to liberty and really dating -from a later period.</p> - -<p>Thus, before philosophers began to elaborate the system of myths by -creating new ones when they believed they were interpreting the old -(Plato for instance introduced into the myth of Jupiter the idea of -the omnipresent and all-pervading ether, his own invention, and other -philosophers saw in the birth of Minerva from the head of Jupiter a -description of the divine wisdom, or in Chaos and Orcus the confused -mass of the universal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> seeds of nature and the primitive matter of -the world), poet-theologians had expressed their ideas in mythology, -ideas in which the metaphysical and physical elements were very small, -but containing a large nucleus of human and political fact. The Chaos -of these theologian-poets was the confusion of human seed during the -period of brutal community of women; it was confused because devoid of -human regulation, obscure because devoid of the light of civilisation. -The misshapen monster Orcus devoured everything because men in this -community had no human shape, and were absolved by the void, because -through the impossibility of knowing their offspring they left no trace -of themselves behind. The four elements of the world corresponded to -the four elements of social life: the air where Jupiter lightened, -the water of the perennial springs, the fire that burnt the forests, -and the earth, the scene of man's labours. Being and subsisting were -conceived the former as the act of eating (peasants still say of a -sick man, meaning that he is not dead yet, that he is "still eating") -and the latter as "standing upon one's feet." The composition of the -body was analysed into solids and liquids, that of the soul into -air: generation into the act of <i>"concipere"</i> or <i>"concapere,"</i> that -is, taking hold of neighbouring material bodies, overcoming their -resistance and adapting and assimilating them to one's own nature: and -all the internal functions of the soul were ascribed to the head, the -breast or the heart.</p> - -<p>Cosmographical ideas were narrow, confined as they were to the life -of these societies. The first heaven was placed no farther off than -the tops of the mountains, where the giants saw the lightning play: -the lower world was no deeper than a ditch, and was only by degrees -enlarged and sunk into the valleys as opposed to the sky, that is to -say to the mountain-tops; the earth was identified with the limits -of the cultivated fields. In the course of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> time the sky, the object -of contemplation from which auguries were drawn, was lifted to a -greater height, and with it the gods and heroes who were attached to -the planets and constellations; and thus arose poetical astronomy. -Geographical knowledge extended no farther than the country inhabited -by each nation; and this is the reason why peoples travelling into -foreign and distant lands gave to the new cities and to the mountains, -hills, passes, islands and promontories the same names which were -borne by those of their native land. Asia or India was at first for -the Greeks the eastern part of Greece itself, Europe or Hesperia its -western, and Thrace or Scythia its northern district.</p> - -<p>But we will not enter into further details; indeed we have omitted much -already. It is not the detail that gives its value to Vico's picture -of the heroic age. His etymologies, his mythical interpretations, the -genesis and chronological succession of his gods, the genesis and -succession of his phonetic, metrical and stylistic forms—each, taken -by itself, may be contested; but taken as a whole they are rich with -a truth which transcends the single propositions. This truth is the -mighty effort to recall a form of humanity and society still doubtless -living in surviving records and monuments, still recognisable here and -there in a fragmentary form in various parts of the modern world; but -for centuries, even in Vico's days, buried beneath a mass of irrelevant -fancies, conventional types, and prejudices of every kind, which -prevented its true characteristics from appearing.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI">CHAPTER XVI</a></h5> - - -<h4>HOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY</h4> - - -<p>The poet of primitive society was Homer: and if such was his character, -he could not have enjoyed the profound wisdom, the delicate and lofty -sense of morality, and the supreme knowledge of all the sublimest -arts and sciences which ancient philosophers and writers fancied him -to possess, and the common opinion of literary men and critics still -attributed to him in the seventeenth century.</p> - -<p>What an extravagant philosopher Homer would have been, if he had -indeed been a philosopher: how miserably, had he set out to do so, -would he have organised Greek civilisation! His Jupiter indicates -force, brute force, as the standard of the respect due to him; his -Minerva despoils Venus, knocks Mars down with a stone, strikes Diana -and is in turn insulted by Mars; and both Venus and Mars are wounded -by Diomed, a mere mortal. The heroes Achilles and Agamemnon exchange -insults such as would hardly be used by servants in a comedy to-day: -they call each other "dogs" and quarrel in the most uncivil manner for -the possession of Briseis and Chryseis. Ferocious in their customs, -they leave the bodies of their enemies to dogs and crows: intemperate -in their pleasures, they drink to excess. Lofty intelligence, kindness -of heart, balance of mind may be sought in vain in all their actions -and sentiments. The fact is, these heroes show themselves men of the -scantiest understanding, the wildest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> imagination, the most violent -passions; boorish, barbarous, intractable, fierce, arrogant, defiant -and obstinate in their resolves and at the same time flighty in the -extreme, at the mercy of any new object that presents itself to -their eyes. Here again, the most striking parallel may be found in -the psychology of the peasant, who as may be seen every day embraces -any reasonable motive proposed to him but owing to the weakness of -his intellect soon abandons the idea he has been persuaded to adopt -and slips naturally back to his first intention. In the same way the -Homeric heroes sometimes acquiesce in the first word of opposition -offered to them; sometimes at a sudden mournful recollection they burst -into bitter lamentation in the midst of their anger: or else, if while -in the greatest misery they meet with something pleasant, like Ulysses -at the feast of Alcinous, they lose all memory of their sorrows and -become completely cheerful; or else, when in a calm and peaceful state -of mind, they take offence at a harmless word and flying into a blind -passion threaten the speaker with a cruel death. Even the virtues which -they possess in an eminent degree, their frankness, vigour, magnanimity -and generosity, are tinged with this same character of unreflective -passion.</p> - -<p>The hero of heroes, Achilles, who bears on his shoulders the destinies -of Troy, owing to a private wrong he had received from Agamemnon—a -grave wrong, but an insufficient motive for the ruin of his country and -his whole nation—condemned all the Greeks to defeat and destruction -at the hands of Hector; and he only determined to aid them in order -to assuage the personal grief caused by Hector's slaying his friend -Patroclus. If only this extreme aloofness had been due to passion and -jealousy! But though when Agamemnon deprived him of Briseis he made -enough noise to fill heaven and earth and supply the plot of the entire -<i>Iliad,</i> yet he never in the whole course of the poem shows a spark -of real love: just as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> Menelaus mustered the whole of Greece against -Troy to avenge the rape of Helen but never suffers the least pang of -jealousy against Paris who is enjoying her. So devoid is Achilles of -common humanity, that when Hector wishes to arrange that the victor in -the fight shall bury the vanquished, he forgets that they are equals in -rank and that death levels all, and savagely answers: "When have men -ever made a truce with lions, and when have wolves and lambs had the -same wish?" and he adds, "If I slay thee, I will drag thee bound naked -to my chariot round the walls of Troy three days" (as he actually did -in the sequel) and finally, "I will give thee to my hounds to devour." -And he would have carried out his threat, had not the unhappy father -Priam come to him to ransom the corpse. But even in this deeply-moving -interview, when he has received Priam in his tent after the latter has, -escorted by Mercury, passed alone through the midst of the Greek camp, -when he has welcomed him to his table, at a single involuntary word -that falls from the lips of the unhappy old man as he bewails the loss -of so valiant a son Achilles forgets the sacred law of hospitality; -and, ignoring the full and complete trust which Priam had placed in -him, untouched by the terrible misfortunes of such a king, by the -respect due to a father and the veneration due to so old a man, without -reflecting on the reversal of his fortunes, of all things the most apt -to excite pity, flies into a bestial rage and shouts a threat that he -"will cut off his head"! Death itself does not end his anger at the -loss of Briseis, were it not that the beautiful and unhappy princess -Polyxena, daughter of the once rich and powerful Priam and now a -wretched slave, is sacrificed on his tomb, that the shade glutted with -revenge may drink the last drop of her innocent blood; and in the lower -world, when Ulysses asks him what state he prefers, Achilles answers -that he "would rather be the commonest slave, but alive"! Such is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> the -hero whom Homer adorns with the permanent epithet of "without reproach" -(ἀμύμων) and celebrates in the hearing of Greece as a pattern of -heroic virtue. Such a hero, whose reasoning powers are concentrated in -his spear-point, can only be classed with those self-satisfied persons -of whom we say nowadays that they are too fine to breathe the common -air.</p> - -<p>If Homer's greatest characters are so discordant with our civilised -nature, the similes which he uses are drawn from savage beasts and wild -nature generally. If the life which he represents—a life of children -in its intellectual futility, of women in its imaginative vigour, and -of headstrong youths in the violence of its passion—and the tales -of which the <i>Odyssey</i> is full, tales worthy of an old woman engaged -in amusing children, prevent our attributing any esoteric wisdom to -Homer, the striking success of these wild similes is certainly not -characteristic of a mind tamed and civilised by philosophy of any sort. -Nor could that truculent and savage style in which he describes the -various sanguinary battles, the diverse and extravagantly bloodthirsty -species of butchery which especially go to make the sublimity of the -<i>Iliad,</i> have originated in a mind humanised and softened by philosophy.</p> - -<p>But who was Homer? What opinions as to him can we find in ancient -writers, and what facts can we draw from his poems? An unprejudiced -reader of the <i>Iliad</i> and <i>Odyssey</i> is at every step aware of and -baffled by extravagant and inconsistent statements. The life portrayed -is inconsistent: it takes us now here, now there, over a long period -of time; on the one hand we find Achilles the hero of force, on the -other Ulysses the hero of wisdom: on the one hand, cruelty, barbarism, -ferocity and brutality, on the other the luxury of Alcinous, the -delights of Calypso, the pleasures of Circe, the songs of the Sirens -and the pastimes of suitors who tempt and even win over the chaste -Penelope. On the one hand we are shown boorish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> and uncivilised -manners, on the other jewels, magnificent clothing, exquisite foods -and the arts of sculpture in bas-relief and metal-founding; on the one -hand a strictly heroic society, on the other some signs of popular -liberty. This delicate life fits ill with the savage and cruel life -which especially in the <i>Iliad</i> is ascribed to the same heroes at the -same time. To regard them thus as contemporaneous is an impossibility. -From the customs of the Trojan period we have leapt abruptly into -those of the time of Numa, to such an extent that "<i>ne placidis coeant -inmitia</i>" we are compelled to suppose that the two poems were the work -of many hands extending over many ages. The geographical allusions are -equally inconsistent. These, no less, bring us into varied and distant -physical surroundings. The scene of the <i>Iliad</i> lies to the east of -Greece, inclining to the northward: that of the <i>Odyssey</i> in the west, -inclining to the southward. The language, again, is inconsistent. The -confusion of dialects persists in spite of the revision of Aristarchus, -and has been explained by the most extraordinary hypotheses, such as -the theory that Homer drew the elements of his vocabulary from all the -various Greek nationalities.</p> - -<p>Passing from the poems to the traditions of their author, the lives -of Homer by Herodotus (if Herodotus really wrote it) and Plutarch -are valueless. The most elementary facts about Homer are unknown: it -is precisely concerning the man whom they considered the greatest -luminary of Greece that the ancients leave us most completely in the -dark. We know neither Homer's date nor his birthplace: each one of -the Greek peoples claimed him as their citizen. It is said indeed -that he was poor and blind, but it is just these details which excite -our suspicion, as our laughter is aroused by the argument of Longinus -which makes the <i>Iliad</i> the work of his youth and the <i>Odyssey</i> that -of his old age. It would be indeed remarkable if such knowledge were -current<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> concerning a man in whose case the two trifling details of -time and place were unknown! Above all, criticism must ask how a single -man could ever have composed two poems of such a length at a time when -writing was not in existence: since the three inscriptions of heroic -age, one of Amphitryon, another of Hippocoön and a third of Laomedon -mentioned with an excess of good faith by Vossius are mere forgeries -like those made by the strikers of false coins.</p> - -<p>All these considerations led Vico to suspect that Homer himself was not -a real person but one of those poetic characters to whom the ancient -world ascribed long series of actions, works and events. If we try to -conceive the Homeric poems not as the work of an individual but as -two great storehouses of the manners and customs of earliest Greece, -containing the history of its natural law and heroic period; if instead -of a single poet we imagine a whole nation of poets, and instead of a -single act of creation, a national poetry developing in the course of -centuries, everything falls into its place and finds an explanation. -The extravagance of the legends is explained by the fact that the -composition of the <i>Iliad</i> and <i>Odyssey</i> falls in the third period of -their existence. In the hands of the theological poets they were true -and severe, by the heroic poets they were altered and corrupted, and -in this corrupt state they were incorporated in the two poems. The -variety of customs is explained if we consider the various periods of -composition, and so also the "young Homer" and "old Homer," which are -symbolic of the earlier and later periods of primitive Greece. The -diversity of sites assigned to his birth and death and the variety -of his dialects are accounted for by the fact that different peoples -produced the lays. Finally, it is explained why every Greek people -claimed him as a citizen, just because these peoples were themselves -Homer; and why he was called blind and a beggar,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> because such were -as a rule the singers who went about from fair to fair reciting their -tales. Thus in order to be rightly understood Homer must lose himself -in the crowd of Greek peoples and be considered an idea or heroic -character; a type of the Greeks in so far as they narrated tales in -ballad form. Thus facts which had only caused confusion and lacked -plausibility in Homer as then understood became natural and necessary -elements of the Homer now rediscovered. Above all, this latter Homer -deserves the high praise of being the first of all historians of -Greece known to us. In Homer we have a proof of the original identity -of history and poetry, and a confirmation of Strabo's assertion that -before Herodotus, before even Hecataeus of Miletus, the history of the -Greek peoples was written by their poets. In two golden passages of the -<i>Odyssey</i> a man is praised for having told a story well and said to -have "told it as a musician and a singer."</p> - -<p>Vico did not undertake a detailed investigation into the way in which -the Homeric poems were elaborated. He seems however to incline towards -two chief poet-authors, one, a native of the east of Greece, towards -the north, for the <i>Iliad,</i> the other for the <i>Odyssey,</i> a native of -the west towards the south: and by the title "Homer" he understands a -composer and compiler of legends. But on the other hand, owing to the -purely ideal meaning which this name has for him, we must not rule out -the interpretation that the two Homers in their turn may be two streams -of poetry and two groups of peoples or of popular singers. The historic -figures whom Vico finds before him are the rhapsodes, men of the people -who wandered independently about the fairs and festivals of the Greek -cities reciting the songs of Homer. From the time of their primitive -composition long ages elapsed before the Pisistratidae had them -divided and arranged into two groups, the <i>Iliad</i> and the <i>Odyssey,</i> a -fact which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> shows clearly that in their time only a confused mass of -material was to be found, and decreed that they should henceforth be -sung by the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea.</p> - -<p>It is however certainly not in the resolution, materially understood, -of the individual Homer into a myth or poetic character that the -importance of Vico's theory lies: and the same is perhaps the case -with its truth. From the inconsistencies observed by him, and not -always accurately observed (which are moreover unimportant, since -the inaccuracies he notes might easily be balanced by the correct -statements he omits), there was no strictly logical passage to the -denial of the existence of an individual Homer, the principal author -of one or both poems. These inconsistencies might serve to demonstrate -that the poet or poets were working upon a rich fund of traditional -material, of origin very various both as to time and place, and not -regularly stratified according to origin, but having its strata -confused and contorted. One or more poets, or even many poets and an -able compiler of their lays, or a society of able compilers: these and -similar hypotheses might equally well have been suggested, as happened -later, and supported, as was later the case, by arguments neither more -nor less cogent, because incapable of documentary proof. But underlying -this resolution of Homer into a poetic character, as it underlay other -resolutions made or attempted by Vico, lay the discovery of the long -and laborious historical genesis through which the matter of these -poems had passed, so that in this sense they might really be called a -product of collaboration on the part of the whole Greek people. The -substitution of a nation of Homers for a single Homer was only another -case of mythology constructed according to the principles discovered -by Vico himself: mythology which must be retranslated into scientific -prose. In the same way Vico's analysis of the customs described in the -Homeric<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> poems may be, and is, not only here and there adulterated with -a few inaccuracies, but is on the whole exaggerated and one-sided. -Still, this analysis taken as a whole was a great advance and opened -new paths to Homeric criticism. How could the stubborn illusion of the -noble Homeric hero, a great lord and a good ruler, a shining example -of all civil, military and domestic virtues, be dispelled except by -setting against it the picture of a boorish Achilles, full of elemental -passions, violent, stubborn, unreasoning, quick to a generous impulse -but no less quick to outbursts of brutal wrath?</p> - -<p>Vico's progress in artistic appreciation of the Homeric poetry was -no less marked. The recognition that a sound and rational philosophy -was not to be found in the poet Homer would, in the mouth of any -other critic of the time, have amounted to a slur on the poet: as -expressed by Vico and as the consequence of his new aesthetic ideas it -was a compliment. The errors which intellectualism and neo-classical -criticism discovered in Homer led the critics to repeat freely the -saying of Horace that "good Homer nods at times": whereas Vico on -the contrary exclaims "if he had not nodded so often he would never -have been good!" (<i>nisi ita saepe dormitasset, nunquam bonus fuisset -Homerus</i>). Homer was a great poet precisely because he was not a -philosopher. He had a retentive memory, a strong imagination and a -sublime mind; and neither the philosophies nor the arts of poetry -and criticism which came after him could ever produce a poet at all -like him. He was the only poet who could conceive heroic characters: -his comparisons are incomparable, his speeches sublime, expressive -of the individuality of the speaker, and created by the power of a -vivid imagination: his diction is clear and splendid, his language -composed entirely of similes, images and comparisons, and has none of -those ideas of genus and species by which things are intellectually -defined. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> is not delicate but grand, for delicacy is a small virtue -and grandeur naturally despises small things: or even, just as a great -and rushing torrent cannot help the turbidness of its water, and must -perforce sweep rocks and trees with it in the violence of its course, -so too in Homer we may find things of no value. But the torrent with -all its impurities sweeps on its way superb and impetuous; and Homer in -spite of and partly because of his ruggedness is for ever the father -and prince of all sublime poets.</p> - -<p>This new departure in Homeric criticism brought with it implicitly a -complete revolution in the history of ancient literature. But on this -subject Vico made only a few scattered remarks. He was no specialist: -he did not write from a specialist's point of view, and too often when -documentary evidence and thought were unable to solve a difficulty he -solved it by means of his fancy, a faculty which was however in his -case radiant with gleams of insight. Thus, the cyclic poets were not -so called because of the circle of listeners in the centre of which -they declaimed their poems, like the "Rinaldi" or ballad-singers whom -Vico saw on the quay at Naples, and this circle had no connexion with -the <i>vilem patulumque orbem</i> of Horace: but the observation that they -differed little from these ballad-singers was sound. In the same way, -we need not linger on his guesses at the dates of Homer and Hesiod, -nor need we take literally his division of lyric poetry into three -periods, namely those respectively of religious hymns, funeral chants -for dead heroes and melic lyrics or "musical airs," the last including -Pindar, and admired, flourishing as it did at the epoch of the "pompous -virtue" of Greece, at the Olympic games where these poets sang. But -still Vico has here put his finger on the difference between primitive -and refined or cultured lyric poetry. The origin of tragedy he ascribes -to the dithyramb or dramatic satire, of which no example has come down -to us, and in rural customs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> compared by him to those which were still -in evidence during his own lifetime in Campania at vintage season; and -he notes the relation between tragedy and the epic. Tragedy had its -rude beginnings at a time when the heroic spirit was already dead: -it perfected itself by becoming subordinate to the Homeric poetry, -deriving its inspiration from Homeric characters and avoiding original -ones. The old comedy was closely related to tragedy. Like the latter -it was derived from a chorus, and it preserved its archaic character -in that it displayed living persons and real actions. The new comedy -on the other hand was marked off by a profound change of spirit. Here -the effects of philosophy were directly felt. Imaginative genera were -superseded by intelligible and rational universals: and Menander and -the other poets of the new comedy, living in the most humane period -of Greek history, took their intelligible genera from human life and -depicted them in their comedies, over which one feels that the breath -of Socratic philosophy has passed. The persons of the new comedy were -cast in a mould, and were not public but private characters: and as -the chorus represents the public and argues about public affairs only, -there is no room for it in the new comedy. About this time began the -practice of inserting idealised heroes of perfect morals into poetry. -Aristotle, remembering the strongly individualised characters of -Homer, still maintained as a principle of poetic composition that -the heroes of tragedy should be neither very good nor very bad, but -rather a mixture of great virtues and great faults. But the poets of -the late period, making use of the idea originated by philosophers, -formed a "heroism of virtue": a heroism which may be called "gallant." -Accordingly they either invented entirely new legends or else used old -legends which had originally presented themselves to the founders of -the nation in an appropriately stern and severe form, but softened them -by adapting them to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> softening of manners. Equally gallant is the -"shepherd" of the Greek Bucolic poets, Bion and Moschus, "wasting away -with the most delicate love," He makes the general observation on Greek -and Latin literature, that the boundary between verse and prose was so -strictly guarded on both sides that no ancient writer ever composed -both orations and poems—a rule to which perhaps the only exception -is the wretched verses (<i>ridenda poemata</i>) of Cicero: and Vico tried -to explain this fact by the democratic habits which compelled orators -studiously to avoid the cultivation of lofty and fanciful modes of -expression, which would have puzzled the people and hindered their full -and clear comprehension of the point at issue.</p> - -<p>Vico does not treat Roman literature so fully as Greek, which provided -him with much more primitive documents. But he detected certain -analogies between the origins of Latin and Greek literature. The first -poets and authors in the Latin language were the Salii, sacred poets; -and this was natural in the beginning of a nation's culture; for in the -primitive religious period the gods are the only object of praise. And -just as the earliest fragments of Latin known to us, the remains of -the hymns of the Salii, give an impression of hexameter verse, so the -same metre is felt in the records of Romans who celebrated triumphs, -such as the <i>"duello magno dirimendo, regibus subiugandis"</i> of Lucius -Aemilius Regillus and the <i>"fudit fugat prosternit maximas legiones"</i> -of Acilius Glabrio. The first Roman poets, too, sang true stories: this -was the case with Livius Andronicus and his Romanid containing the -annals of early Rome, and with Naevius, and later Ennius, who described -the Punic wars. Satire also was levelled against real and for the most -part notorious persons. The Romans however differed from the Greeks -in advancing with a more measured step and not making the swift and -abrupt transition from barbarism<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> to effeminacy: so that they entirely -lost the history of their gods (which Varro called the "obscure period" -of Rome) and preserved their heroic history, extending down to the -Publilian and Petelian laws, in common speech only. In its greatest -manifestations the literature of Rome is the work of cultivated poets -like Virgil, whom Vico admires for his profound knowledge of heroic -antiquity, but says of him that so far as poetical power is concerned -he is not to be compared with Homer; a verdict agreeing with that of -Plutarch and Longinus, but in opposition to the view of neo-classical -criticism. Another example of cultivated and reflective poetry is to -be found in Horace, who like Pindar in the pompous period of Greece -composed his odes at the most "ostentatious" epoch of Roman history, -the Augustan age.</p> - -<p>The Biblical literature would have given Vico materials of great value -for the study of primitive poetry; and he actually did move a few steps -towards it when he observed that poetry was the primitive language of -all nations "including the Hebrews"; and that Moses made no use of the -esoteric wisdom of the Egyptian priests and wrote his history "in a -style which has much in common with that of Homer and often surpasses -him in sublimity of expression." But Vico drops the subject at once, as -if he instinctively guessed what might come of treating the Pentateuch -as he had done the <i>Iliad,</i> and Moses like Homer. So he prefers to wax -enthusiastic over the phrase in which God describes himself to Moses -<i>"Ego sum qui sum,"</i> to which he ascribes a metaphysical profundity -only attained by the Greeks when Plato conceived God as to<i> on,</i> and -unknown to the Latins down to the latest period, for the word <i>ens</i> is -not pure Latin but belongs to debased Latin. Or he contents himself -with emphatically pointing out that at a time when Greece was under -the sway of a superstitious and natural law, God gave to his people a -code "so full of weight as regards the dogmas of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> divinity and so full -of humanity as regards the practice of justice, that not even in the -humanest period of Greek history could a Plato have conceived or an -Aristides executed it"; a code "whose ten chief enactments contain an -eternal and universal justice founded upon the excellent conception -of a purified human nature, and are capable of forming by habituation -a character such as the maxims of the greatest philosophers could -only with great difficulty form by ratiocination; whence Theophrastus -called the Hebrews philosophers by nature." The success that attended -the "will to believe" was all the more striking if as we suspect Vico -had read the abhorred Spinoza's <i>Tractatus Theologico-politicus,</i> -where the Hebrew prophets, while their "piety" is recognised, are -said to be entirely devoid of "sublime thoughts." Spinoza maintains -that they only taught "very simple things which any one could easily -discover, and adorned these with a style and supported them by reasons -most calculated to move the mind of the multitude to devotion towards -God"; and that the laws revealed by God to Moses were "nothing but -the laws of the particular government of the Jews": and he sets out -to examine the text of the Bible and the problem of the authenticity -of the Pentateuch and the respective authors of its various books. We -might almost venture to say that it was Spinoza's Biblical criticism -that suggested to Vico his criticism of the composition and spirit of -the Homeric poems; but that the latter, after passing in this way from -sacred to profane history, from Moses to Homer, set his face stubbornly -against the opposite transition from Homer to Moses, from profane -history to sacred.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XVII" id="CHAPTER_XVII">CHAPTER XVII</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY</h4> - - -<p>Heroic society in the period of youthful vigour above described -contains within itself, rigorously repressed, and in fact made into a -support, the element of opposition; the slaves, clients or vassals, -that is to say the plebs. But this element little by little succeeds in -detaching itself from and opposing itself to the society, engaging it -in a continual and undisguised conflict, so as by degrees to overthrow -this old society and give life and form to a new society of which it -is itself the material: a democratic society, the popular republic. -Vico believes this process to be uniform in all peoples; but since -references to histories other than that of Rome are either absent or -very vague (he hardly mentions the origin of the Athenian democracy) -the description of this process appears in the pages of the New Science -as a fragment of Roman history, or as we should nowadays call it the -social history of Rome.</p> - -<p>Vico's guesses about the population and primitive culture of Italy are -of no great importance. The subject belongs rather to archaeology and -ethnography than to history, and Vico did not make a special study -of it. In the <i>De antiquissima sapientia Italorum</i> he had provided -the origins of Rome with a basis in an Italian civilisation of high -antiquity, earlier than the Greek and derived<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> from Egypt, which -the Romans absorbed in a manner agreeing with their character; by -rejecting, that is to say, its theoretical hypotheses while taking over -their practical results, just as they adopted from the Etruscans their -tragic religion and their art of tactics, and as they later adopted -laws from Athens and Sparta. In this way their ignorance and savagery -remained unchanged, and hence they spoke the language of philosophers -without being philosophical. In his later writings Vico still for a -time maintained the priority and independence of the earliest Italian -civilisation as regards that of Greece, and considered Pythagoras less -as the founder than as the student of Italian wisdom. Finally, however, -he seems to have given up this view, just as he definitely abandoned -that which explained the origins of Roman religion, language, customs -and law by the imitation of foreign peoples and "frankly confessed that -he had been in error here" owing to the example of Plato's <i>Cratylus.</i> -What conditions brought about the rise of Rome Vico does not precisely -say. He is certain that if Rome and the world did not begin together, -at least the foundation of Rome was a new beginning. The point of -departure which he assumes is the asylum of Romulus, consisting of -the "families" of fathers who gave their hospitality to wanderers -and made them into <i>famuli.</i> There was no Trojan colonisation; Vico -knows Bochart's treatise (1663) criticising the legend of Aeneas's -arrival in Italy and accepts its conclusions, which only confirm the -doubts already entertained by certain ancient historians. For Vico, -the Trojan origin of Rome is a legend sprung from the union of two -different examples of national arrogance: that of the Greeks, who made -such a noise about the Trojan war and forced their Aeneas into the -history of Rome, and that of the Romans, who accepted him in order to -boast of a distinguished foreign origin. The legend moreover could -not have arisen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> much before the time of the war with Pyrrhus, when -Rome began to acquire a taste for things Greek. In order to explain -the infusion of Greek names and myths into the story of primitive Rome -and the similarity of the Roman alphabet to the ancient Greek, Vico -would incline rather to the hypothesis that early in their history the -Romans conquered and destroyed some Greek colony on the Latin coast, of -which all trace has since been lost in the mists of antiquity; and that -through receiving its inhabitants in Rome as refugees and allies, they -came under the influence of several Hellenic traditions and customs.</p> - -<p>Vico does not spend much time over the historical events of the royal -period. Here in fact lay one of the chief differences between his -criticism and that which had already been originated and was continued -after his time dealing with the first centuries of Roman history. Vico -aims not at substituting historical for legendary anecdotes but at -understanding the essence of institutions and the ways in which they -change. He uses two guiding principles, as we have seen in considering -the royal period: first, that it was a period not of monarchy but -of aristocracy and that therefore the type of heroic society or the -patriarchal republic is applicable to it: secondly, that the names -of the kings are symbols or "poetic characters" for the institutions -of this society. In Vico's judgment, as we have had occasion to -observe, the constitution of Servius Tullius should not be considered -the basis of popular liberty, as the later Romans considered it; it -was really the basis of the liberty of the feudal lords, since by it -the patricians granted to the plebeians the bonitary tenure of their -land together with the duty of paying rent to and serving at their -own expense in war themselves, the patricians. And Junius Brutus, in -driving out the Tarquins and replacing them by two consuls or annual -aristocratic kings, restored to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> the Roman republic its primitive form; -that is to say, he delivered the lords from the domination of their -tyrants but left the people under the domination of their lords.</p> - -<p>The patricians' oppression of the plebeians after the restoration -of Junius Brutus and the struggles and resistance caused by it -constitute the soul of the new development and contain the secret of -the greatness of Rome, the "key to universal Roman history," <i>clavis -historiae Romanae universae.</i> Polybius's explanation of this greatness -is too vague. He describes it as due to the virtue or the religion -of the patricians and relates the facts of this virtue rather than -their cause. Vico also criticises Machiavelli, at one time because he -adduces certain civil and military institutions as the cause of Rome's -greatness without investigating the cause of those institutions, that -is to say the character of Roman society: at another time for adducing -what was only a partial cause, the high spirit of the plebeians. He -thinks Plutarch worst of all, since envy of the virtue and wisdom -of Rome leads him to ascribe her greatness to fortune. The fact was -that Rome subjugated the other cities of Latium and then Italy and -the world because her heroism was still young, while among the other -Latin peoples it had begun to decay. Thanks to this youthful vigour -the patricians were strong enough to preserve their order and the -religion which formed its foundation and safeguard (the nobles, Vico -observes at this point, were always and everywhere religious, so that -the first sign of contempt for religion among them is a symptom of -national decadence); the plebeians were spirited enough to demand a -share in religion, auspices and all civil rights; the lawyers, lastly, -were wise enough to interpret the old laws and apply them to any new -case that might arise, and strove with all their might to alter the -text of these laws as little and as slowly as possible. These were the -chief causes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> of the growth and permanence of the Roman empire; for -in all its political changes it contrived to remain faithful to its -principles. Prowess in war was another result of the rivalry of the -orders; since the nobles were naturally consecrated to the safety of -their country, as the only means of preserving the civil privileges of -their order, and the plebeians accomplished brilliant deeds in order -to prove themselves worthy of patrician honours. And when the Romans -extended their conquests and their victories over the whole world, they -made use of four rules which they had already applied to the plebeians -within Rome itself. They reduced barbarian provinces to the position of -clients by planting colonies in them: they granted civilised provinces -bonitary tenure of their land: to Italy they gave the quiritary tenure: -and to the municipia, the towns which had earned better treatment, they -accorded the same equality with themselves which the plebs had finally -won.</p> - -<p>The result of the first struggles, in which the point at issue was -according to Vico the bonitary possession of land (a right already -recognised in the constitution of Servius, but cancelled by the -nobles in return for arrears of rent), is seen in the tribunate, and -later, when the plebeians claimed the right of quiritary tenure, in -the laws of the Twelve Tables, ratifying this plebeian victory. But -the law of the Twelve Tables represented at the same time the victory -of written law, the end of the secrecy with which the laws had been -fenced round by the patricians, who alone knew, understood, interpreted -and therefore applied them as they thought fit. This publication and -codification of a written law cannot have been benevolently granted by -the patricians out of that anxiety "not to despise the wishes of the -plebs" of which Livy speaks; rather they must have resisted it with -all the stubbornness which Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes and -expresses in the phrase "<i>mores patrios servandos,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> leges ferri non -oportere</i>" (our fathers' customs must be preserved, and laws must not -be passed).</p> - -<p>Later historians decorated the origin of the Twelve Tables with -various legends. They told, among other things, of the mission sent -by the decemvirs to Athens to bring back new laws: a tale given by -Livy and Dionysius, but unknown to Polybius and discredited by Cicero. -How, in the savage aloofness of primitive nations, between whom oral -communication could only have been instituted by the necessities of -warfare, alliances and commerce, could the fame of Solon's wisdom have -crossed the seas from distant Attica to Rome? How could the Romans of -that time have possessed such accurate knowledge of the quality of -Athenian law as to believe it capable of setting at rest the strife -between their plebeians and their nobles? How could ambassadors have -travelled between Greece and those Romans whom seventy-two years later -the Greeks of Tarentum could still maltreat as strangers? And what -shall we say of ambassadors who returned carrying with them the Greek -laws from Athens but without knowing what they meant; so that but -for the coincidence by which Hermodorus the pupil of Heraclitus, an -exile from his country, happened to be in Rome, the Romans would have -been unable to make any use of this unintelligible and inaccessible -treasure? Again, how could Hermodorus have translated the laws into -Latin of such purity that Diodorus Siculus pronounced it devoid of the -slightest taint of Hellenism, and with a perfection unattained by any -subsequent writer of any period in a translation from the Greek? How -did he contrive to clothe Greek ideas in Latin words so appropriate -(for instance, <i>auctoritas</i>) that Greeks, Dio Cassius among them, -declare that their own language has no corresponding words by which -to explain them? Heraclitus's letter to Hermodorus must have been -conveyed by the same mail that served Pythagoras in his distant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> -voyages up and down the world: it is, in fact, an imposture of the -first quality, and the whole story of the Athenian origin of these laws -is due to the arrogance of scholars, who derived them first from the -other Latin peoples (such as the Aequi), then from the Greek cities -of Italy, then from Sparta and finally from Athens, with whose name, -thanks to the renown of the Athenian philosophers, they were at last -satisfied. No doubt, the laws of the Twelve Tables present resemblances -not only to Athenian or Spartan laws but to those of various nations, -the Mosaic code among others; but this is due to the uniformity of -national history. No doubt, the decemvirs were in antiquity supposed -to have originated laws bearing clear traces of Greek influence, such -as that prohibiting the Greek style of mourning at funerals: but this -is because as we have seen the decemviral legislation, like the names -of the various kings, became a "poetic character," and to it were -referred all laws later recorded in the public archives which tended -to the equalisation of liberty. But the original law of the Twelve -Tables, with its primitive rudeness, inhumanity, cruelty and ferocity, -which agrees so ill with the period of highly-developed civilisation at -Athens, is a document of the greatest value for the ancient natural law -of the Latin peoples, and the customs which had existed among them from -the age of Saturn.</p> - -<p>Quiritary tenure of land and a written code of law once gained, the -struggle recommenced over the question of the right of marriage. The -true meaning of this contest has been lost among the absurdities -written on the subject by the ancient historians themselves, in the -belief that its basis was the desire on the part of the plebeians (who -were little more than wretched and common slaves) to be allowed to form -connexions with the nobles. This error has made Roman history even less -credible than the legendary history of Greece; for if we do not know -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> meaning of the latter, the former is in opposition to the true -order of human desires. It shows us a plebs aspiring first to nobility, -secondly to offices and magistracies, and finally to wealth: whereas -men desire first of all wealth, then offices in the state, and lastly -nobility. What the Roman plebs really claimed was not <i>"connubio, cum -patribus"</i> but <i>"connubio, patrum"</i>: not the right of connexion by -marriage with the nobles—a claim which they would not have wished -to make, and was at bottom unimportant—but the right of contracting -solemn marriages as the nobles did. For without such solemn marriages, -without privilege of the auspices, the plebeians were in fact unable -to enjoy the quiritary tenure of land and to transmit it to their -families, deprived as they were of descent, kindred and relatives. The -demand for <i>connubio</i> was, in a word, simply equivalent to a demand for -the rights of citizens, and it was satisfied by the Canuleian law.</p> - -<p>The next demand of the plebeians was for privileges depending on -public rights. Of these they gained first the <i>imperium</i> together -with the consulship, and lastly the offices of priest and pontifex, -which carried with them knowledge of the law. In this way the system -of seigneurial liberty planned by Servius Tullius grew into a system -of popular liberty, and the census, which was originally paid to the -patricians, was paid hereafter into the public treasury, out of which -the expenses of the plebeians in war were paid. The tribunes now -proceeded to demand the power of legislation; for the previous laws, -the Horatian and Hortensian, had not made plebiscites binding on the -whole people, except upon the two special occasions which led to the -secession of the plebs to the Aventine and Janiculum respectively. -This new victory, which established the superiority of the plebs and -transformed the aristocratic into a popular republic, was the Publilian -law due to the Dictator Publilius Philo and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> decreeing that plebiscites -should "be binding on all the Quirites" (<i>omnes quirites tenerent</i>). -The authority of the senate came out of the struggle somewhat -impaired, for while formerly the fathers had acted as "<i>auctores</i>" -for the deliberations of the people, they were now the proposers of -law to the people, which the latter then approved according to the -formula submitted to them by the senate, or else "antiquated" the -proposal (<i>antiquo,</i> to vote against a measure) and decided to make no -innovation. Besides this, the plebs won the last office to be conceded -to them, that of censor. The Petelian law, a few years later, abolished -the last remnant of feudalism, the bond (<i>nexus</i>) which made the -plebeians the bondmen of the nobles for debt and often compelled them -to spend their lives working in their private prisons.</p> - -<p>Some time later, when the division between patriciate and plebs with -the corresponding <i>comitia curiata</i> and <i>tributa</i> was replaced by -Fabius Maximus's division according to the property of citizens, who -were now grouped into three classes of senators, knights and plebeians, -the order of the nobles disappeared entirely: "senator" and "knight" -were no longer synonymous with "patrician," nor "plebeian" with -"base-born." The Senate however preserved sovereign dominion over the -finances of the Roman Empire, though the Empire itself had passed to -the plebeians; and thanks to the so-called "<i>senatusconsultum ultimum</i>" -it maintained this dominion by force of arms as long as Rome remained -a popular republic. Whenever the people attempted to take it into -their own hands, the Senate armed the Consuls, who forthwith declared -traitors and put to death plebeian tribunes who had originated these -attempts. This may be explained as a right of feudal sovereignty -subject to a higher sovereign, a view confirmed by the language of -Scipio Nasica when he armed the people against Tiberius Gracchus: -"whoever wishes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> for the safety of the republic, let him follow the -consul" (<i>qui rempublicam salvam velit, consulem sequatur</i>). And -indeed, once the road to office was opened by law to the multitude -which rules in a popular republic, there was nothing left in time of -peace but to contest its rule not by laws but by force of arms, and -for those in power to pass laws for self-enrichment like the Gracchan -agrarian measures, resulting at once in civil wars at home and unjust -wars abroad.</p> - -<p>With the triumph of the plebs and the change of constitution from -aristocratic to popular, the whole face of society changed. In the -first place, the aspect of the family changed. Here, during the rule -of the patriciate, testamentary succession was admitted only at a late -date and was easily cancelled, in order to keep wealth in patrician -hands: kindred even in the seventh degree excluded the emancipated son -from the paternal heritage: emancipation had the effect of a penalty: -legitimising was not allowed: and it is doubtful whether a woman could -inherit. But in the democratic society, since for the plebs wealth, -strength and power all depended on the number of their children, family -feeling began to grow up, and the praetors began to consider its claims -and to satisfy them by means of the <i>"honorum possessiones,"</i> thus -remedying the faults or shortcomings of wills and facilitating the -diffusion of wealth, the only thing desired by the common people.</p> - -<p>A change took place, again, in the meaning of the institutions of -property. The civil tenure was no longer a matter of public right, -but was dispersed among the various private tenures of the citizens -now forming the body of the popular state. "Eminent" tenure no longer -signifies the strongest kind of tenure, unencumbered by any actual -charge, even a public charge, but applies simply to an estate free -from any private charge. Quiritary tenure is no longer that of which -the noble<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> was feudal lord and under the obligation to aid his client, -the plebeian, if ousted from it: it has become a private civil tenure, -capable of being defended by a civil suit as opposed to the bonitary -which could be maintained by possession only.</p> - -<p>The forms of legal process were pruned of the luxurious growth -of fictions, solemn formulae and symbolic acts, simplified and -rationalised: the intellect, the thought of the legislator was -brought into play and the citizens conformed to an idea of a common -rational utility, understood as spiritual in value. Causes, which were -originally formulae safeguarded by accurate and precise language, -became affairs or negotiations solemnised by agreement and, in the -case of transference of tenure, by natural tradition; and it was only -in contracts said to be completed by word of mouth, that is to say -in stipulations, that the safeguards remained "causes" in the strict -ancient meaning of the word. Thus the certitude of the law, when the -human reason was fully developed, passed into the truth of ideas -determined by the circumstances of fact, a "formula devoid of any -particular form" (<i>formula naturae,</i> as Varro calls it) which, like -a light, informs in all the minutest details of their surface the -details of fact over which it extends. In popular republics the ruling -principle is the <i>aequum bonum,</i> natural equity.</p> - -<p>The harsh punishments of the periods of domestic monarchy and heroic -society (the laws of the Twelve Tables condemned those who set fire -to another's crops to be burnt alive, perjurers to be thrown from the -Tarpeian rock, and insolvent debtors to be cut in pieces while living) -were replaced by milder penalties, since the multitude, whose members -are weak, is naturally disposed to clemency.</p> - -<p>Laws, which under the aristocracy were few, inflexible and religiously -observed, multiplied under the democracy and became liable to change -and modification. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> Spartans, who preserved their aristocracy, -said that at Athens they had many laws and wrote them; at Sparta few, -but they obeyed them. The Roman plebs, like the Athenian, passed new -laws every day, and the attempt by Sulla, the leader of the noble -party, to reduce them by the institution of "<i>quaestiones perpetuae</i>" -or permanent courts was in vain, for after his time laws were again -multiplied.</p> - -<p>War itself, which was under the aristocratic republics very cruel -and resulted in the destruction of conquered towns and the reduction -of the vanquished to the condition of labourers scattered over the -country-side and cultivating it on behalf of the victors, was mitigated -by the popular republics, which while they deprived the conquered of -the rights of heroic society left them in possession of the natural -rights of the human race. Empires grew, since a popular republic is -much more adapted to conquest than an aristocratic, and a monarchy most -of all.</p> - -<p>But with all this humanisation of customs, the power of wise rule, -political virtue, diminished. The ancient patricians enforced a rigid -respect for law; and each, possessing a large share of the public -utility, set his own minor personal interests below this greater -particular interest, guaranteed as it was by the state. Hence all -courageously defended and wisely consulted for the good of the state. -In a popular state on the other hand since the citizens controlled -the state property by dividing it among themselves into as many small -portions as there were citizens in the body of the people, and through -the causes which produced that form of state, ease, paternal affection, -conjugal love and desire of life, men were led to consider the smallest -details favourable to their own private interest; that is to regard -nothing but the <i>aequum bonum,</i> the only interest of which a multitude -is capable.</p> - -<p>At this point arises spontaneously a new form of government, which has -long been preparing and has now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> become inevitable, namely monarchy. -The ordinary political writers make monarchy originate, without any of -the numerous and complex causes which are necessary to produce it, at -the very outset of human history, "as a frog," says Vico, "is born of a -summer shower." Still less did it originate artificially by the royal -law which Tribonian believes to have deprived the Roman people of its -free and sovereign power and conferred it upon Octavius Augustus. The -law which brought monarchy into being was a natural law whose formula -of eternal validity is as follows: when in a popular republic every one -seeks his private interest only and presses the public forces into its -service at risk of destruction to the state, to preserve the latter -from ruin a man must arise, as Augustus did at Rome (who as Tacitus -says "received under his sovereign power the whole state, worn out with -civil wars, taking the title of Princeps": <i>qui cuncta bellis civilibus -fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit):</i> a single man, who by -force of arms takes in hand all the affairs of the state and leaves his -subjects to look after their own affairs or after any public business -he may entrust to them; surrounding himself with a small number of -statesmen as a cabinet to discuss public questions or principles of -civil equity. Such a monarch is welcomed by nobles and plebeians alike: -by the nobles, who after having been already humiliated by their -subjection to plebeian rule abandon their ancient aristocratic claim -to sovereignty and think only of securing a comfortable life; and by -the plebeians, who after an experiment in anarchy or unbridled demagogy -(than which no tyranny is worse, since it produces as many tyrants as -there are bold and dissolute men in the state) are led by their own -misfortunes to welcome peace and protection.</p> - -<p>Monarchy is then a new form of popular government. In order that a -powerful man may become sovereign, it is necessary that the people -shall take his side, and that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> he should rule in a popular manner; -making all his subjects equal, humiliating the great to protect the -multitude against their oppression, keeping the people satisfied -and content as regards the necessaries of life and the enjoyment of -natural liberty, and employing a well-balanced system of concessions -and privileges granted sometimes to whole classes (in which case they -are called "privileges of liberty") sometimes to particular persons, -by promoting into a higher class men of unusual merit and exceptional -virtues.</p> - -<p>In monarchy, a "humane" government no less than democracy, the -process of humanisation or softening of customs and laws, already -begun under popular republics, still continues. The rigid bonds of -the patriarchal family and kinship relax further. The Emperors, who -tended to be overshadowed by the splendours of the nobility, made -efforts to promote the rights of human nature common to nobles and -plebeians. Augustus strove to safeguard the trusteeships by which -formerly property had passed to persons incapable of inheritance thanks -only to the conscientiousness of the injured heir; he transformed -such understandings from a right into a necessity, by obliging heirs -to execute them. A number of senatusconsulta followed which placed -<i>cognati</i> (relations generally) on a level with <i>agnati</i> (relations -through the father). Finally, Justinian abolished the difference -between property inherited and property in the hands of trustees, -confused the Falcidian quarter with the Trebellian and put <i>cognati</i> -and <i>agnati</i> on precisely the same footing as regards inheritance -<i>"ab intestato."</i> The latest Roman law was so entirely on the side -of testaments that, while originally these could be broken for the -slightest cause, they now had to be interpreted in the way most -adapted to secure their validity. Once the "cyclopean" right of the -father over the persons of his children had disappeared, his economic -right over property acquired by them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> disappeared also; and hence -the emperors first introduced the <i>peculium castrense</i> (property -obtained during military service) to attract young men to war, then the -<i>peculium quasicastrense,</i> to attract them into the praetorian guard, -and finally to satisfy those who were neither soldiers nor scholars -the <i>peculium adventitium. </i> They deprived the <i>patria potestas</i> of -its influence over adoptions, now no longer restricted to the small -circle of relations; they uniformly countenanced formal adoption -(<i>arrogatio</i>) which was somewhat difficult owing to the difficulty -of a father's becoming a subordinate member of another family; they -considered emancipation as a benefit and gave to legitimization "by a -subsequent marriage" all the efficacy of solemn wedlock. The <i>imperium -paternum,</i> as an arrogant title seeming to detract from the imperial -majesty, was altered into <i>patria potestas.</i> The humane tendencies of -the monarchs extended moreover to that part of the ancient "family" -which consisted of slaves: for the emperors restrained the cruelty of -masters towards these, and benefited them by increasing the force and -decreasing the solemnity of manumission; and citizen rights, which were -given originally only to distinguished foreigners who had deserved well -of the Roman people, were granted to every one born in Rome, even of a -slave father provided his mother were free or enfranchised. Punishments -were also made milder, and the monarchs distinguished themselves by -the gracious title of "clement." The letter of the law always tended -to be more freely interpreted in the light of natural equity, and it -may be said that Constantine absolutely cancelled the letter when he -laid down the principle that any particular motive of equity should -override the law. Thus was attained the precise opposite of the -<i>"privilegia ne irroganto"</i> of the Twelve Tables ("that no exceptions -be made"): all privileges were exceptions to the law dictated by some -particular merit in the facts which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> lifted them out of the sphere of -legal generalisations. The restriction of rights to particular peoples -was by degrees abolished: under Caracalla the whole Roman world was -converted into a single Rome, since great monarchs desire the whole -world to become one city, according to the thought of Alexander the -Great, when he said that for him all the world was a single city of -which his phalanx was the citadel. The praetor's edict gives place, -under Hadrian, to the "perpetual edict" of Salvius Julianus, almost -exclusively composed of provincial edicts.</p> - -<p>With monarchy, the natural law of races gives place to the natural law -of nations; and hence this political, social and juridical form is the -most suitable to human nature at its fullest rational development. Here -too, as we have already had occasion to remark, we reach again after -a long process the unity which existed in the person of the primitive -father under domestic monarchy; and the course of national history must -be considered as absolutely complete. To go further is impossible: the -only possibility, at this stage of the highest human civilisation and -refinement, is corruption, the return of barbarism as a "barbarism of -reflection" and a relapse into a kind of new state of nature, to return -once more into a new and heroic barbarism.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII" id="CHAPTER_XVIII">CHAPTER XVIII</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES</h4> - - -<p>Of this kind of "reflux" Vico mentions and examines only one instance: -the period of European history which had in his own days for the first -time been marked out definitely by historians and given the name -(though Vico does not use it) of the "Middle Ages."</p> - -<p>That this was a period of decadence and barbarism was certainly not -a new thought for consciousness: for, especially in the humanistic -period, a general feeling of estrangement and repulsion had been felt -towards these centuries of "middle and low Latinity" in which the -treasures of the classical literatures were neglected and scattered, -and humane studies either lost their vigour or disappeared completely. -This consciousness, general on the part of cultivated Europe, was -especially full and vivid in Italy; for that country could never forget -that though for other peoples the Middle Ages had seen the rise of -their fortunes, power and civilisation, for her they had meant the end -of Rome's greatness, the humiliation of her name before the arrogant -Vandal, Visigoth and Lombard, the devastation of rich cities, and -the destruction of majestic monuments whose miserable wreckage could -be seen on every hand. Machiavelli had opened his <i>Histories</i> with -a famous and striking picture of the general change which followed -the fall of the Western Empire. But to pass in review the ruins or -to collect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> the antiquities of the Middle Ages was not the way to -penetrate into the spirit of the period, any more than to note a -man's faults and the marks which distinguish him from another is the -same thing as understanding the soul of either. Vico was the first to -understand the soul of the Middle Ages, that is to say, the mental, -social and cultural constitution of the period.</p> - -<p>Though living in a part of Italy rich not only in documents but in -survivals of the Middle Age, Vico confesses that this second period -of barbarism is much more obscure to him than the first, and that -it is only the first that has enabled him to throw light upon the -second. This he expressed by the mere fact that he named the period -"the second barbarism," or the "return" or "reflux" of barbarism, -and thus considered it as an instance of his ideal law of reflux. -The Middle Ages seemed to him both a representation of the primitive -conditions of life, and in consequence a reproduction of the social -process developing out of them. It was a view as original as it was -rich in truth: and it is no objection to it to say that Vico reveals -the generic characters rather than the particular traits of the Middle -Ages, because we know that the problem he set before himself was -precisely the investigation of generic characters or uniformities, and -that he avoided history properly so called in order to escape a dilemma -between science and faith, between the purely immanental conception of -history, excluding revelation and miracle, and the purely transcendent -conception, miraculous and therefore difficult to treat in a scientific -manner. Even in our own times, it is a fact worth noticing that we have -seen a recrudescence of this attempt to harmonise religion and history -by abstracting from the individual aspect of events and reducing -history to a history of institutions and uniformities.<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> In this -position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> assumed by the problem in Vico's mind we may see the reason -for the fact, which some have thought very strange in a Catholic, that -he lays no stress on Christianity, and when he encounters it at the -outset of the Middle Ages dismisses it in a few words; saying that God, -having by superhuman ways shown clearly the truth of the Christian -religion, when he opposed the virtue of the martyrs to the power of -Rome, and the doctrine of the Fathers, together with the miracles, -to the empty wisdom of Greece, and knowing that armed nations must -arise on every hand ready to fight for the divinity of that religion's -author, permitted the birth of a new order of civilisation among the -nations, in order that the true religion might be established according -to the natural course of human affairs.</p> - -<p>We must be content then with the resemblances observed by Vico between -mediaeval society and that of the early centuries of Greece and Rome, -and not take offence if his exemplifications and proofs very often seem -fallacious and fanciful. His main historical thought as we know already -is robust enough to pass over the errors or to live in the midst of -them unimpaired.</p> - -<p>We see (to reconstruct his story or picture, with some rearrangement) -in the Middle Ages groups of dwellings everywhere springing up on the -mountains, each dominated by its fortress as in the divine age of -the "Cyclopes"; for the unhappy people, ground down by the violence -of barbarian invasions and intestine strife, had no other means of -defence. The most ancient cities built in the Middle Ages and almost -all capitals of states are as a matter of fact placed upon heights; -all new seigneuries formed at the time were called "castella" by the -Italians; and this perhaps is also the reason why nobles were called -men "born in a high or conspicuous position" (<i>summo, illustri loco -nati</i>) while the plebeians living in the plains below were "born in a -low or obscure place" (<i>imo, obscuro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> loco nati</i>). We find asyla or -sanctuaries again open especially with the ecclesiastical lords, who -were in humanity in advance of their savage times; here took refuge the -oppressed and the terrified, to seek protection for person or property. -Hence in Germany, a country which must have been wilder than the other -parts of Europe, there remained almost more ecclesiastical than secular -lords. A famous example of these political formations was the Abbey -of St. Laurence at Aversa in the kingdom of Naples, with which was -incorporated that of St. Laurence at Capua. This monastery governed -either directly or by abbots or monks dependent upon it no less than a -hundred and ten churches in Campania, Samnium, Apulia and the ancient -Calabria, from the river Volturnus to the gulf of Tarentum; the abbots -of St. Laurence were lords or barons of almost the whole of this -country. The small chapels which they built in mountainous and remote -places for the celebration of the mass and other religious offices -became natural sanctuaries for the population, and they built their -houses round them: and this is the reason why in Europe so many cities, -lands and castles bear the names of saints, and why the churches are -the most ancient monuments of this period. Consequently we also find -feudalism, not establishing itself in Europe for the first time, but -appearing once more. It has been mistakenly believed to be a relic of -Roman law after its destruction by the barbarians (such is the theory -of Oldenorp and all other jurists) whereas really Roman law itself -arose out of the ruins of the feudalism of early Latin barbarism, and -mediaeval feudalism was not a new law of the European nations, but -a very ancient law renewed by the last barbarism. This feudalism is -far from being the "vile matter" which Cujas calls it: it is a heroic -matter, one worthy to be celebrated by the most erudite and profound -learning of Greece and Rome. And to what is it due, if not to this -essential unity of nature, that the choicest expressions of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> Roman law, -which Cujas himself allows to mitigate the barbarism of feudalistic -learning, are so precisely adequate to express the properties and -attributes of the system that no better terminology could be desired?</p> - -<p>With the Middle Ages, then, we return to the fundamental division -between heroes and slaves, between <i>"viri"</i> or "barons" ("<i>varones</i>" is -the word still used for men, <i>"viri"</i> in Spanish) and mere "<i>homines</i>" -as the vassals were called: between <i>"patres"</i> or "patrons" and -serfs. The learned students of feudalism who translate <i>"feudum"</i> -by <i>"clientela"</i> are really giving something, much more than a good -linguistical equivalent; they are unawares giving a historical -definition of the feoff. The first feoffs of the Middle Ages were -necessarily personal, like the first <i>clientelae</i> of Romulus: a form -of vassalage still extant in Vico's time in the north, especially in -Poland, where the <i>"kmet"</i> were a kind of slaves who were often used -as stakes in their lord's games, and passed with their families into -the hands of the winner. Then came rustic feoffs, real in character -and consisting in uncultivated land assigned by the victors to the -conquered for their sustenance, while they themselves kept the -cultivated land: these feoffs were called by the feudalists, with -a new elegance of Latinity and an equally sound historical truth, -<i>"beneficia."</i> The ancient "<i>next</i>" were the new "liege" or bound men, -who were compelled to join in all the friendships and quarrels of their -lord, and supplied what in Rome was called <i>"opera militaris,"</i> and in -the Middle Ages <i>"militare servitium."</i> The feudal bond extended itself -to larger political relations, and just as conquered kings became -allies or <i>socii</i> of Rome and "upheld the majesty of the Roman people," -so there were sovereign feoffs subordinated to higher sovereignties -whose representatives, the great kings and lords of large kingdoms and -numerous provinces, took the title of "majesty."</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span></p> - -<p>Republics became aristocratic once more in government if not in -constitution: this is admitted by political writers, among others -by Bodin, who even says that his own kingdom of France was purely -aristocratic in constitution under the Merovingian and Capetian -dynasties. Till the end of the sixteenth century living witnesses -to the past remained in the aristocratic kingdoms of Sweden and -Denmark; and Poland, mentioned above, preserved the same constitution -down to Vico's own time. The first state parliaments of Europe must -have consisted like Romulus's senate of the elders of the nobility -(<i>seniores,</i> hence <i>seigneurs</i>); and were armed courts of barons -or peers like the <i>comitia curiata</i> of old. In these parliaments -were decided feudal causes concerning rights or successions or the -devolution of feoffs through felony or default of heirs: which causes, -confirmed many times by these judgments, formed the customs of -feudalism. Vico saw a relic of these parliaments in the Sacred Royal -Council at Naples, the president of which assumed the title of "Sacred -Royal Majesty," as the councillors did the title of <i>"milites,"</i> and -whose sentences admitted of no appeal to any other tribunal, but only a -request for revision by the Council itself.</p> - -<p>The governments, beside being aristocratic, were enveloped in an -atmosphere of religion to such an extent that not only were bishops -and abbots very often, as we saw, feudatories, but feudatories and -sovereigns adorned themselves freely with religious insignia; Catholic -kings everywhere, in order to defend the Christian religion whose -protectors they were, wore the dalmatic of the diaconate, consecrated -their persons (whence the title "Sacred Royal Majesty"), and took -rank in the church, as Hugh Capet took the title of Count and Abbot -of Paris; thus as we see from the earliest documents the French lords -called themselves dukes and abbots or counts and abbots simultaneously. -These early Christian kings<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> were the first to institute armed -religious orders, by the help of which they defended Catholicism -against Arians, Saracens and other infidels. <i>"Pura et pin bella"</i> -returned once more as in the heroic period; the globe surmounted by -the cross worn by the Christian potentates on their crowns recalls -the cross upon the standards in the holy wars or crusades. Heroic -slavery returns, and lasts a long time among Christian nations because, -considering war as the judgment of God, the victors believed the -vanquished to be abandoned by God and held them no better than beasts -(thus the Christians called the Turks "dogs" and were in turn called -"pigs" by them). The ancients deprived the conquered of all things -human and divine. The new barbarians on occupying a city endeavoured -above everything to search out and carry off the tombs or relics of -saints, which the peoples of that time buried and concealed with all -possible care; and thus almost all translations of relics took place -at this time. A trace of this custom survives in the rule by which a -conquered nation must buy back from the victorious generals all the -bells in the cities they have taken.</p> - -<p>Analogous resemblances may be found in the juridical regulation of -property. The primary division of property in feudal law is that -into feudal goods and allodial goods. Allodial tenure was in origin -a highly secure right, unencumbered by any external charge, even a -public one; and applied to property directly acquired or conquered by -the patricians or barons. Feudal tenure required the approval of the -lord by whom it had been granted. Allodial tenure thus corresponded to -quiritary <i>ex optimo iure,</i> and feudal to bonitary; and it was only -when later in modern Europe as previously in ancient Rome a new census -and treasury were formed, and when allodial property was made subject -to public charges, that it could be contemptuously described as "goods -of the spindle" as opposed to feudal, "goods of the lance." Thus, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> -take an example, the provinces which were later incorporated into the -French kingdom had formerly been sovereign principalities feudally -dependent upon the ruler of the said kingdom; their sovereign princes -being free from all public charge in the tenure of their (allodial) -possessions. Later, when through succession, rebellion or failure of -heirs these provinces became part of the kingdom, the property was -made liable to taxation and tribute; the tenure <i>ex optimo iure</i> was -confused with private non-feudal tenure subject to these charges, and -allodials in the noble sense of the word were identified with allodials -in the common sense. The later students of feudalism missed the point -of the primitive distinction just as the late Roman jurists forgot -the meaning of tenure <i>ex optimo iure.</i> To the feudal tenure belonged -emphyteosis (so that the allodial right ultimately signified both what -the vassal paid to the sovereign and the planter to his immediate -lord): "commendations," identical with the ancient <i>clientela</i>: the -"census" by which the vassals were bound to serve their lords in war -(the tributaries, <i>angarii</i> or <i>perangarii,</i> being equivalent to the -Roman <i>assidui</i>): the <i>"precaria,"</i> which must originally have been -land granted by lords in response to the prayers of the poor: and -"<i>libelli</i>" or transferences of non-movable property which in this -agricultural economy took the place of commerce. The exclusion of women -from inheritance, which went back to the beginnings of Roman law, was -renewed in the form of the "salic law" in Germany and among all the -early barbarian nations of Europe, though it preserved its force only -in France and Savoy.</p> - -<p>Punishments were cruel; death was called the "ordinary penalty." But -there was in the Middle Ages no real penal law and procedure dealing -with private offences. The murder of a plebeian was committed either -by his own lord, whom nobody could accuse, or by another lord, who -could indemnify the man's own lord for his loss<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> as if he had been a -slave. This custom was still in force in Poland, Lithuania, Denmark, -Sweden and Norway. Under the name of "canonical purgations" (though -unrecognised by canon law) certain kinds of divine judgments or duels -were practised throughout Europe; and private vengeance flourished down -to the time of Bartolo. In judgments concerned with allodial rights, -the lords met in arms; and in the kingdom of Naples even in Vico's own -days barons avenged intrusions upon their own feoffs on the part of -other barons not by civil suits but by duels. In a society ruled by -force, what wonder that the robbers of the heroic age returned, and -that "pirate" became a title of nobility? Never has the fortune of -kingdoms been so various or so inconstant.</p> - -<p>The Roman law of Justinian, penetrated as it was by the idea of equity, -was abandoned and fell into oblivion. In France and Spain any one who -dared to appeal to it in a cause was severely punished; in Italy it -is certain that the nobles considered it dishonourable to regulate -their affairs by Roman law, and professed to live according to that -of the Lombards; while the plebeians, slower in throwing off ancient -customs, continued to practise certain parts of the Roman law by force -of habit. In fact the law of the period consisted rather of habits than -of statutes: rigid formulae and solemn ceremonial once more acquired -importance, and a distinction was made between <i>pacta nuda,</i> naked -agreements, and <i>pacta vestita,</i> agreements clothed and reinforced -by these formulae and ceremonies. An example of the respect in which -formulae were held is afforded by the action of the Emperor Conrad -III. On taking Weinsberg, a town which had supported his rival for the -empire, he condemned it to extermination, making an exception only -in favour of the women and all they could bring out with them. The -women came out of the doomed city carrying on their backs their sons, -husbands and fathers: and the Emperor,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> standing before the gate at the -head of his army with swords drawn and lances in rest to satisfy their -leader's terrible wrath, watched them and allowed them to pass safe and -sound out of respect for the letter of his own decree.</p> - -<p>It was an illiterate period, a fact expressed by Vico in the statement -that languages again became "mute" or hieroglyphic. The common tongues, -Italian, French, Spanish and German, were not written down: only a few -ecclesiastics wrote a barbarous Latin, and hence "cleric" and "scholar" -became synonymous terms; but among the very priests such ignorance -prevailed that we find documents signed by bishops with the sign of -the cross, as they were unable to write their own names. Owing to this -paucity of learning an English law laid down that a man condemned to -death should be reprieved if he could write, as a valuable craftsman; -and "man of letters" as well as "cleric" or "clerk" remained a name for -a learned man. Hence the value and general employment of family arms -to indicate the owners of a house, a tomb, land or livestock, and the -frequency with which coats-of-arms are found on buildings of the time.</p> - -<p>With barbarism returned the predominance of verse over prose. The prose -of the Fathers of the Latin Church—and the same is true of those -of the Greek—is full of poetic rhythms, so as to resemble a chant. -The first modern lyric poetry was religious; and if there was not -strictly a Christian religious poetry, this was because the subjects -of our theology transcend all intelligence and imagination and crush -the poetic faculty. Poetry and history were once more confounded; the -romantic poets, the heroic poets of the return to barbarism, believed -their own stories to be true, and thus Boiardo and Ariosto took as -subject for their poems Turpin, Bishop of Paris. And just as the French -language, when owing to the famous Parisian school and the highly -subtle scholastic theology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> it passed at a stroke from spontaneity to -reflection, preserved pure diphthongs in great number while adopting -abstract terms, so the story of Turpin survived in France like a -Homeric poem. These authors of Latin poems confined themselves entirely -to history, for instance, William of Apulia's <i>De gestis Normannorum in -Italia</i> and Gunther's <i>Carmen heroicum de rebus a Frederico Barbarossa -gestis.</i> The first writers in the vernacular were in Italy poets no -less than in Provence and France. A punctilious virtue like that of -Achilles again appeared, the complete morality of the duellist; hence -arose the proud laws, the lofty duties and the vindictive satisfactions -of the knight-errants sung by the romantic poets. Does not Cola di -Rienzo seem to be a real Homeric character in his swift outburst of -emotion when, as we read in his life, while speaking of the unhappy -state of Rome he excited both himself and his listeners to unrestrained -tears? Hyperbole was a common type of thought, as in children; for "I -often remember," writes Vico, "when walking abroad that the gentle -slopes which unfold themselves before my eyes appeared when I was a -child to be steep and lofty mountains." Thus in the Middle Ages Roland -and the other paladins were represented as gigantic in stature: and -images of divine beings, the eternal Father, Christ, or the Virgin, -painted or sculptured, were of colossal dimensions.</p> - -<p>But the human mind is like land which, after lying waste for long -centuries, when first cultivated bears crops of wonderful quality, -size and abundance. Thus at the close of barbarism in Italy after four -savage and stormy centuries, arose Dante, the Homer of the second -barbarism, just as somewhat later flourished the delicate verse of -Petrarch and the gallant and graceful prose of Boccaccio; all three -incomparable in their way. And since barbarism is, as we have already -indicated, truthful, frank, faithful, generous and magnanimous by -nature, Dante puts on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> the stage real persons and real actions of the -dead; and his poem is called a "comedy" in allusion to the ancient -comedy which followed the same principle. It is a poem in which both -the <i>Iliad</i> and the <i>Odyssey</i> find parallels; the former in the -<i>Inferno,</i> where Dante employs his choleric genius and all his vast -imagination in describing the effects of implacable wrath and recalling -numbers of merciless punishments, a worthy companion-picture to the -horrid slaughters of Homer (whose descriptions of them inspire pity in -us, but gave nothing but pleasure to his own audience); the latter, -the <i>Odyssey,</i> which celebrates the heroic endurance of Ulysses, is -paralleled by the <i>Purgatorio,</i> a spectacle of severe punishments -borne with immovable patience, and the <i>Paradiso</i> where infinite -joy is experienced with an infinite tranquillity of mind. Another -similarity between Dante and Homer lies in the physiognomy of the -former's language, which is so varied that some suppose him to have -collected it like Homer from all the dialects of his nation; an opinion -of sixteenth-century scholars which will not stand criticism, for it -is certain that when Dante used them these expressions must have been -current at Florence, and that a lifetime would have been insufficient -to collect them from this side and from that when there were no writers -in the various dialects. But the most important resemblance of Dante -to Homer is in poetic sublimity. Dante is a divine poet who to the -delicate imaginations of to-day seems rough and uncivilised, and often -shocks by unwonted harmonies an ear that has become morbidly sensitive -through effeminate music. But he is received very differently by men -of severe tastes who refuse to be satisfied with flowers, ornaments -and graces. Like Homer too he is great not in esoteric wisdom but in -the vigour of his imagination. Dante was undoubtedly a very learned -theologian, but that was his weakness rather than his strength. If he -had known neither Scholasticism nor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> Latin, he would have been a still -greater poet, and perhaps the Tuscan language would have had what Latin -never had, a poet who could in everything bear comparison with Homer.</p> - -<p>The man who wrote this page of criticism on Dante and vindicated him -once more after centuries of anti-Dantesque taste (or mere Dantesque -grammar or Dantesque scholasticism) and vindicated him in the very -height of the prosperity of the Arcadianism so hostile to him, deserved -to have made the acquaintance of William Shakespeare genius, which he -was perhaps the only man alive capable of understanding. But in Italy, -as in most countries outside England, nothing was known of Shakespear -at this time, and Vico has only the vague and belated remark about him -that the English, untouched by the prevailing delicacy of the century, -took no pleasure in tragedies which had not an element of atrocity in -them, just as the earliest taste of Greek drama was for the abominable -feast of Thyestes and Medea's impious slaughter of her brother and -children. The tendency towards Teutonic poetry and literature remained -in Vico as we know an aspiration only; he was unable to get a clear -view of it however closely he tried to examine it; and when he does -mention it upon the strength of second-hand information, it is only to -say that in the German nation, especially in the purely agricultural -province of Silesia, "poets arose naturally"; in his search for -an unsophisticated popular poetry he had in fact stumbled without -realising his mistake upon the Silesian school of Hoffmanswaldau and -Löhenstein, the German imitators of the Neapolitan Marino. But the only -value of the anecdote is to illustrate anew the tricks played upon Vico -by his lively fancy.</p> - -<p>How the world emerged from the second barbarismi and the feudal -constitution, Vico does not say. He does not seem to have fixed his -attention upon the communal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> movement which presents so many analogies -with the struggles of the Roman plebs and the formation of ancient -democracy. He makes game, here again, of those who traced the genesis -of modern monarchies such as the French to a simple law like that of -Tribonian by which, he explains ironically, the paladins of France -deprived themselves of their power and conferred it upon the kings of -the Capetian dynasty. He also observes that the baronial power, being -dispersed and dissipated by reason of civil wars in which they were -obliged to depend upon the people, was the more easily gathered up -by sovereign monarchs; and that thus the "<i>obsequium</i>" of vassals to -their baron passed into the "<i>obsequium principis.</i>" But he gives quite -a special importance to the rediscovery of Roman law (that "natural -law of the European nations" as Grotius had called it) by the studies -undertaken in the Italian universities. Men thus learnt anew the -principles of natural equity; the nobles and plebeians became equal in -the eyes of civil law as they are already in human nature, the secrets -of the laws passed out of the hands of the feudatories, whose power -consequently diminished by degrees, and the humane government of free -republics and perfect monarchies came into being. The reflux of heroic -society had now undergone a contrary reflux; it was no longer possible, -under the conditions of modern civilisation, to recall it to life, -just as it was impossible for the attempts of the Pythagoreans and -Dion of Syracuse to restore the ancient aristocracies. The plebeians, -once recognised as naturally equals of the nobles, no longer submitted -to remaining inferior to them in civil life. And the few aristocratic -republics which here and there survived in Europe were compelled to -take infinite pains and all manner of wise measures in order to keep -quiet and contented the multitudes whom they governed.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See my preface to Sorel's <i>Reflections on Violence</i> -(Italian tr., Bari, 1909). pp. xxii-xxvii.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XIX" id="CHAPTER_XIX">CHAPTER XIX</a></h5> - - -<h4>VICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE</h4> - - -<p>Having reached, in his review of the course of history, his own time, -a time of civilisation spread over all nations, Vico gives a rapid -description of the contemporary world and then says no more: perhaps -unsatisfied, at any rate uncertain or cautious. As he was not led to -embark upon the New Science by the direct call of political problems,1 -at least in the ordinary meaning of the phrase, he never descends from -the contemplations of the New Science to: the practical life, even -in the form which it most usually takes with a philosopher, a work -or short treatise criticising laws and institutions or suggesting -improvements. Even when he does dimly conceive the idea of a "practical -aspect" of his science, he never supposes that so far as he is -concerned it could ever exist except "within the academies."</p> - -<p>Practical philosophy "within the academies," that is to say, within the -sphere of culture, is however still practical and political; and it is -assuredly not the least important branch of politics. And a historian -or philosopher can never entirely avoid it, though he can emphasise it -more or less and develop it more or less fully.</p> - -<p>Vico does emphasise and develop it freely. The first expression of -his scientific life was precisely an examination of modern methods -of study and education as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> compared with those of the ancients: an -examination which after various attempts and uncertainties in his first -discoveries, took form in his University inaugural lecture of 1708, <i>De -nostri temporis studiorum ratione.</i> In the following years, engaged as -he was upon the New Science, he gave no further public demonstration -of his discontent with the prevailing tendency of studies; but he -expressed his feelings on the subject all the more often and all the -more strongly in private letters, and did not wish to pass over the -question in his autobiography. We need not then infer his polemical -attitude from hints and chance phrases of his chief work; since he has -himself more than once converted these hints into explicit statements -and these chance phrases into leading propositions.</p> - -<p>This polemic occupies two closely-related spheres corresponding to -the double aspect of the New Science as a Philosophy of Mind and a -Generalising Science. Under the first aspect Vico had vindicated -the claims of imagination, the imaginative universal, probability, -certitude, experience and authority, and therefore also of poetry, -religion, history, observation of nature, scholarship and tradition. -Under the second, he had traced a scheme of the natural development of -the mind both in the history of mankind and in that of the individual, -which he brings into constant relation with the phases of history. -Hence his examination was bound to extend on the one hand to the mental -condition of his own time and on the other to the way in which the -education of children and young people was conceived and undertaken. -In both spheres Vico saw the same defects; he was met by the same and -intellectualism which had made impossible the process of thought and -had mutilated and falsified the truth of human history.</p> - -<p>On emerging from grammar-schools, boys were immediately plunged into -logic. The logic studied might be, according to the teacher's taste, -either the scholastic or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> more often that composed by Arnauld and -called the Port-Royal Logic, itself in substance Aristotelian and -Scholastic, but full of dry judgments concerning abstruse subjects in -advanced sciences and far removed from common knowledge; overloaded -in fact with examples drawn from such sciences. Such a discipline was -meant to make boys critical and to eradicate from their minds not -only false, but even probable and plausible opinions. As a matter of -fact it eradicated nothing, since their minds were still empty or -scantily furnished, and unable to make any use of criticism for lack -of matter to criticise. They were to be taught to judge before being -taught to apprehend, an order false to the natural course of ideas, -which are first apprehended, then judged, and finally reasoned. The -result was that minds educated in this way became arid and unfruitful -in development, and believed themselves capable of judging everything, -while able to create nothing. They remained all their lives intensely -acute in formal thinking, but incapable of any great labour; critical, -in fact, but sterile. This caused not only unsoundness and arrogance of -judgment but incapacity in practical life, dealings with men, and civil -eloquence, which is founded less upon criticism than upon plausibility, -and attains its end by making opportune remarks, understanding the -psychology of one's inter-locutor and acting in a manner adapted to it. -Vico himself had suffered from the logico-critical method of education. -One of his first teachers, the Jesuit Del Balzo, had put into his hands -the works of the epitomist Paulus Venetus: and his mind, being too weak -as yet to cope with this kind of Chrysippean logic, almost broke down -under the strain; so that having given up his studies in despair it was -eighteen months before he resumed them. He preserved a happier memory -of his youthful essays in poetry in the wildest style of the Neapolitan -school of Marino: a form of diversion, he says, almost necessary to -the mind<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> of the young when metaphysic has rendered it too subtle and -too rigid in precisely those years when the ardour of youth ought to -lead the mind into errors, so as to save it from becoming chilly and -dry. This age, the "barbarism of intellect," vigorous in imagination -and also, through the close connexion that exists between the two, -in memory, requires to be nourished and exercised by the reading of -poetry, history and rhetoric as well as by the study of languages. The -art which it ought to learn is not criticism but "topic," the true -art of the "<i>ingenium</i>" or faculty of invention. By means of this art -children acquire materials which enable them to form sound judgments in -later life; for sound judgment depends upon a complete knowledge of its -subject-matter, and "topic" is the art of discovering the whole content -of any given thing. In this way young people simply by following the -course of nature become at once philosophers and good speakers.</p> - -<p>Some antidote is doubtless necessary to the exuberance of the -imagination. But this must be sought in linear geometry rather than in -logic: for geometry is to some extent pictorial in character, while it -strengthens the memory by the great number of its elements, ennobles -the imagination by the delicacy of its figures and stimulates the -inventive faculty by forcing it to review all these figures in order to -choose those suitable to the demonstration of the quantity required. -But the whole value of geometry also was annulled by the method then -in favour with the schools, the algebraic method; which like the -scholastic logic numbs all the vigour of youthful faculties, obscures -the imagination, enfeebles the memory, and renders the inventive power -and the understanding sluggish; thus damaging the liberal arts in four -distinct ways, in the knowledge of languages and history, in invention -and in prudence. More particularly algebra is fatal to the inventive -faculty, because in using the algebraic method one is conscious only of -the immediate field of vision;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> it weakens the memory because once the -second sign is found the first need no longer be remembered; it blinds -the imagination, because that faculty is not used at all; it destroys -the understanding, because it lays claim to the power of divination. -Young men who have devoted their time to it on proceeding to deal with -the affairs of civil life find themselves, to their great grief and -remorse, unfitted for such a life. Hence, to make it useful in some -degree and to prevent these ill effects, it should be studied for a -short time only at the close of the mathematical course, and employed -only as a means of abbreviation. The habit of reasoning is formed much -better by metaphysical analysis, which in all questions begins by -taking truth in the infinity of being, and then descends by degrees; -through the genera of the substance, eliminating in every species that -which the thing is not, till it arrives at the ultimate differentia -constituting the essence of the thing we wish to know.</p> - -<p>Education as a whole was suffering from an excess of mathematics and -a lack of concreteness. As if boys, on emerging from academic life, -were to enter a human world composed of lines, numbers and algebraic -symbols, their heads were crammed with the magnificent phrases -"demonstration," "demonstrative truth," and "evidence," and the rule -of probability was condemned; though this rule is the only guide of -statesmen in their counsels, generals in their campaigns, orators in -their treatment of a cause, judges in giving a decision, physicians in -treating bodily diseases, and moralistic theologians in treating those -of the conscience; the rule which the world accepts, and upon which -it rests in all disputes and controversies, in all measures, and in -all elections; which are universally determined by unanimity or the -majority of votes. Such an education bred up an empty and inflated -generation, pedantry without wisdom and argument without truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span></p> - -<p>The educators themselves, that is to say, the general atmosphere of -culture, resembled this scheme of education. Poetry was dead. The -analytic methods had "numbed" (to repeat once more a word which Vico -uses with great frequency and force) "all the generosity of the better -poetry." And indeed Europe was never so entirely barren of all poetic -growth as it was in the first half of the eighteenth century. Italy -was reduced to the drama of Metastasio; France had produced no one to -succeed Corneille and Molière; in Spain the national drama, that great -outburst of the national spirit, was dead, and a rationalism imitating -that of France was taking its place; England seemed to have entirely -forgotten that she once gave birth to Shakespear, and even Germany was -wasting her time over neo-classical imitations. Not only did nobody -create new poetry, but nobody wanted it. The philosophers, following -Descartes and Malebranche, had declared a war of extermination against -all the faculties of the mind which depend upon sense, and especially -against the imagination, which they hated as the source of every -error. They condemned the poets on the false pretext that they told -"fables," as if the fables they told were not those eternal properties -of the human mind which to the political philosophers, economists and -moralists are the subject-matter of reasoning, and to the poets that of -representation.</p> - -<p>The Cartesians also used their authority to belittle the study of -languages. Did not Descartes say that the knowledge of Latin was no -greater knowledge than was possessed by Cicero's servant-girl? Serious -scholarship in Latin and Greek had come to an end with the writers -of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the study of oriental -languages was confined to the Protestants; and Holland was the only -country in which law was still a subject of research. The famous -library of Valletta at Naples, rich in the finest editions of Greek -and Latin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> works, was generously bought by the fathers of the Oratory, -but for less than half its original value owing to the depreciation -of books. In France the library of Cardinal Dubois found no purchaser -and was sold in small lots. Princes no longer loved good Latin, and -none of them thought of preserving to posterity by the pen of pure -Latin scholarship even an event so weighty as the War of the Spanish -Succession, comparable only to the second Punic war.</p> - -<p>New methods were in great favour: but none of these could point to new -facts discovered by their help. New formulae, old facts; and instead of -facts, a futile hope of attaining universal knowledge in the shortest -time and with the smallest effort. Civil and political learning was -neglected for physical science, and physical science for mathematical; -experience was almost ignored; the inventive thought of the previous -century all but entirely exhausted. Scepticism, the result of the -Cartesian method, invaded the field of knowledge.</p> - -<p>The whole of Europe was during this period still under the dominion -of the French language, a language which differs from the Italian in -its hostility to poetry and eloquence; rich, says Vico, in terms of -substance, and consequently, since substance is a brutal and immobile -thing and does not admit of comparisons, incapable of giving colour, -amplitude or weight to its statements; it resists inversion and is -barren of metaphor. The French have no periods but only members -of periods: their prosody has no verse better than the so-called -Alexandrine, a system of couplets more thin and lifeless than the -elegiac: and their words admit of no accent except those on the last -two syllables. French is a language incapable of the sublime, but well -adapted to the petty: owing to its abundance of terms of substance or -abstract terms it is adapted also to the didactic style, and instead of -eloquence it offers <i>esprit.</i> It was not unfitting that criticism and -analysis originated in France and made use of the French tongue.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span></p> - -<p>The only possession of value which grew up day by day in all this -poverty was the abstracts, the encyclopaedias, the dictionaries of -science which bore the names of such men as Bayle, Hoffmann and Moreri: -the idlest and most casual method of learning that could possibly -be devised. The genius of the age was more drawn towards expounding -second-hand knowledge in an abbreviated form than towards attempting to -enlarge its bounds. That seemed impossible: so men went on compiling -dictionaries of mathematics. Every one felt a thirst for cheap science. -To be thought good, a book must be clear and simple, capable of being -discussed with ladies as a pastime; if it demanded wide and copious -erudition of the reader, and forced upon him the unpleasant exercise of -thought and synthesis, it was condemned as unintelligible.</p> - -<p>These dictionaries and abstracts recalled to Vico's mind the similar -products of the Greek decadence, the anthologies, lexicons and -encyclopaedias of Suidas, Stobaeus and Photius. The whole culture -of his time seemed to him to be repeating the downfall of Greek -science, exhausting itself in a metaphysic either useless or harmful -to civilisation and a mathematics engaged in investigating quantities -intangible by rule and compass, and incapable of application. Like -others among the best minds of his country he was persuaded that -the republic of letters was approaching dissolution, if the divine -providence failed by one of its innumerable secret paths to infuse -new vigour into it. Where was now the wise man, the real "<i>sapiens</i>" -whom Vico had found in history, first in the barbaric figure of the -theologian-poet, then in the civilised and rational figure of Greek -philosopher and Roman jurist, the man whom for to-day he hoped to find -in the master of eloquence like himself, called to give unity, life and -power to all knowledge? Wisdom is indeed not this or that science, nor -yet the sum total of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> science; it is the faculty which rules over all -studies and by which all the sciences and arts that go to make humanity -are acquired. And since man is both thought and spirit, intellect and -will, it must satisfy both these sides of man, the second as a result -of the first: it must teach the knowledge of divine things, to bring -to perfection things human. The wise man is man in his totality and -entirety, the whole man.</p> - -<p>The ideal is no doubt lofty, and the criticism upon the educational -method and tendencies of thought current in his age are, no doubt, -perfectly just. And yet among all these admirable truths, far in -advance of the eighteenth century as they are, we feel in Vico the -educationalist and critic something of the reactionary. We feel -that, in his exclusive care for the fate of the highest and most -austere science and his exclusive attention to the most complete -form of human life, he failed to grasp the revolutionary importance -of this scepticism or rationalism, this rebellion against the past, -the necessary weapon of a warfare against kings, nobles and priests; -of these abstracts and dictionaries which were to develop into the -Encyclopaedia; of this popular science, the forerunner of journalism, -and these booklets for the use of ladies in fashionable conversation -which were the nourishment of the eighteenth-century salons and -prepared men's minds for the radicalism of the Jacobins. We feel in -him here as in his philosophical system, the Catholic chained to the -philosopher, the Christian pessimist weighing down the dialectic -of immanence. Unable to realise his adversaries' progress, he does -not comprehend their real nature as lower than himself, but yet -constituting steps leading up to himself, steps which he ought to -have traversed in order to attain a truer understanding and grasp -of himself. His polemical attitude towards the culture of his time -completes and confirms the analysis already given of the merits and -defects of his philosophy.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XX" id="CHAPTER_XX">CHAPTER XX</a></h5> - - -<h4>CONCLUSION: VICO AND THE LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF</h4> - -<h4>PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL THOUGHT</h4> - - -<p>The reader need not expect that having brought our exposition to -a close we shall add a verdict upon Vico's work, or what is known -as an "appreciation" of it. If the verdict has not already emerged -as a result of the exposition itself, or as identical with it, if -description and criticism have been not one and same, the fault lies -either with ourselves or with the reader's lack of attention; and -in either case it cannot now be repaired by ornamental additions or -redundant repetitions.</p> - -<p>We confess also that we feel no sympathy with the chapters commonly -placed at the conclusion of critical works upon philosophers and -narrating the later history of their ideas. For if these "ideas" are -understood in an extrinsic sense, in their influence upon society and -culture, such a review may indeed have a value of its own,<a name="FNanchor_1_3" id="FNanchor_1_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_3" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> but is -foreign to the history of philosophy properly so called: if on the -other hand they are considered as real and living philosophical ideas, -their later history amounts to neither more nor less than the history -of subsequent philosophy, and there is no reason for appending it to a -study of one philosopher rather than another. Any other method implies -the uncritical theory that ideas are something solid and crystallised, -like precious stones<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> handed on from one generation to another, whose -shape and glitter can always be recognised unaltered in the new diadems -they compose and the new brows they adorn. But in reality ideas are -nothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them -is nothing less than transformation.</p> - -<p>It is nevertheless a fact that no one has written on Vico without -feeling a need of casting his eyes over later years and noting the -resemblances and analogies between the Neapolitan philosopher's -doctrines and those of fifty or a hundred years after. And further, -we ourselves, in spite of the antipathy we admittedly feel, and the -methodical criteria we professedly employ, yet recognise now the -same necessity. Why is this? Because Vico in his own day passed for -an eccentric and lived as a recluse; because the later development of -thought was almost entirely untouched by his direct influence; because -even to-day, though well enough known in certain restricted circles, -he has not taken the place he deserves in the general history of -thought. How then can we show the manner in which his doctrines, true -or false, respond to the deepest needs of the mind, more simply than by -recording the similarity of the ideas and attempts which later appeared -in such profusion and intensity as to stamp their individuality upon -the philosophical and historical labours of a whole century? And even -if after our intrinsic examination of his thought this comparison with -the facts of later history seems unnecessary, it will at least be -granted that if our discourse like any other must have its rhetorical -conclusion, no peroration occurs more naturally than one consisting in -a rapid review of subsequent philosophy and philology and emphasising -their points of contact with the thought of Vico.</p> - -<p>We might even adopt the method by which he compares the second -barbarism with the first, and present the later history of thought -as a "reflux" of Vico's ideas. In the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> first place his criticism of -Descartes' immediate knowledge recurs, together with his conversion -of the true with the created, in the speculative movement beginning -with Kant and Hegel and culminating in the doctrine of the identity of -truth and reality, thought and existence. His unity of philosophy and -philology recurs in the vindication of history against the scepticism -and intellectualism of the eighteenth century due to Cartesianism; -in the à priori synthesis of Kant which reconciles the real and the -ideal, experience and the categories; and in the historical philosophy -of Hegel, the greatest exponent of nineteenth-century historical -tendencies. This unity of philosophy and philology, a unity with Vico -sometimes confused and impure in method, recurred in its faulty aspects -also in the Hegelian school; so that this mental tendency might with -justice be entitled "Vicianism." The limitation which Vico tried to -impose on the value of mathematics and exact science recurred, as -did his criticism of the mathematical and naturalistic conception of -philosophy, in Jacobi's critique of Spinozistic determinism and Hegel's -of the abstract intellect; and in the case of mathematics in particular -Dugald Stewart and others recognised that its validity lay not in the -postulates but in the definitions, and the "fictions" of which Vico -speaks reappear in the modern terminology of the philosophy of these -sciences. His poetical logic or science of the imagination passes -into Aesthetic, so ardently studied by the philosophers, literary men -and artists of Germany in the eighteenth century, brought by Kant -into great prominence by his criticism of the Leibnitian doctrine of -intuition as confused conception, and further advanced by Schelling and -Hegel, who place art among the pure forms of the mind and so approach -the position of Vico. Romanticism too, especially in Germany but also -more or less in other countries, was Vician, emphasising as it did -the original function of the imagination. His doctrines of language<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> -recurred when Herder and Humboldt treated it not intellectualistically -as an artificial system of symbols, but as a free and poetic creation -of the mind. The theory of religion and mythology abandoned the -hypotheses of allegory and deception, and with David Hume recognised -that religion is a natural fact, corresponding to the beginnings of -human life in its passionate and imaginative state; with Heyne, that -mythology is "symbolic speech," a product not of arbitrary invention -but of necessity and poverty, of the "lack of words," which finds -expression "in comparisons with things already known" (<i>per rerum iam -tum notarum similitudines);</i> and with Ottfried Müller, that it is -impossible to understand mythology without entering into the very heart -of the human soul, where we may see its necessity and spontaneity. -Religion was regarded no longer as something extraneous or hostile to -philosophy, as a piece of stupidity or of deception practised by the -unscrupulous upon the simple, but according to Vico's own doctrine -as a rudimentary philosophy; so that the whole content of reasoned -metaphysic was already to a certain extent implicit in poetical or -religious metaphysic. Similarly, poetry and history were no longer kept -distinct or set face to face to destroy each other; and as one of the -great inspirers of the new German literature, Hamann (who in many ways -resembles Vico in tendency, though unequal to him in mental power), -had already foreseen when he uttered the warning, "if our poetry -is worthless, our history will become leaner than Pharaoh's kine," -a breath of poetry revived the historical study of the nineteenth -century; once colourless, it became picturesque: once frigid, it -regained warmth and life. The criticism of Hobbes' and Locke's -utilitarianism, and the affirmation of the moral consciousness as a -spontaneous sense of shame and a judgment entirely free from reflection -reappeared in full panoply with the Critique of the Practical Reason; -and that of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> their social atomism and consequent contractualism in -Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The liberty of conscience and religious -indifferentism professed and inculcated by the publicists of the -seventeenth century were negated as a philosophical doctrine; and a -nation without God seemed to Hegel, as it did to Vico, a phenomenon not -to be found in history and existing only in the gossip of travellers in -unknown or little-known lands. Carrying on the work of the Reformation, -which Vico could neither grasp nor truly appreciate, the idealistic -philosophy of Germany aimed not at exterminating religion, but at -refining it, and at giving philosophy itself the spiritual value of -religion. The certitude, the hard certitude which Vico distinguished -from truth in the sphere of law, formed the subject of thought from -Thomasius to Kant and Fichte and so on to the most recent writers, who -have sought even if they have never found the distinctive criterion -of the two forms; all or nearly all show a vivid consciousness of -what is called "constraint" or "compulsion," a fact which had been -almost forgotten in the old superficial and rhetorical moral theory. -The historical school of law, in its reaction against the abstract -revolutionary and reformatory tendencies of the eighteenth century, -was bound to recall Vico's polemic against the Platonic or Grotian -theory of an ideal republic or a natural law above and outside history -and serving as a standard for history, and to recognise with Vico that -law is correlative to the whole social life of a people at a given -moment of its history and capable of being judged only in relation to -it; a living and plastic reality, in a continual process of change -like that of language. Finally, Vico's providence, the rationality -and objectivity of history, which obeys a logic different from that -attributed to it by the fancies and illusions of the individual, -acquires a more prosaic name, but without changing its nature, in -the "cunning of the reason" formulated by Hegel: it appeared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> again, -ingeniously but perversely treated, in Schopenhauer's "cunning of -the species," and again, treated with little ingenuity on a purely -psychological method, in Wundt's so-called law of the "heterogenesis of -ends."</p> - -<p>Almost all the leading doctrines of nineteenth-century idealism, we -have seen, may be regarded as refluxes of Vician doctrines. Almost -all; for there is one of which we find in Vico not the premonition but -the necessity, not a temporary filling but a gap to be filled. Here -the nineteenth century is no longer a reflux of, but an advance upon -Vico; and discordant voices of warning or reproach rise up against -him. His distinction of the two worlds of mind and nature, to both of -which the criterion of his theory of knowledge, the conversion of the -truth with the thing created, was applicable, but applicable to the -former by man himself because that world is a world created by man, -and therefore knowable by him, to the second by God the Creator, so -that this world is unknowable by man; this distinction was not accepted -by the new philosophy, which, more Vician than Vico, made the demigod -Man into a God, lifted human thought to the level of universal mind or -the idea, spiritualised or idealised nature, and tried to understand -it speculatively in the "Philosophy of Nature" as itself a product of -mind. As soon as the last remnant of transcendence was in this way -destroyed, the concept of progress overlooked by Vico and grasped and -affirmed to some extent by the Cartesians and their eighteenth-century -followers in their superficial and rationalistic manner shone out in -its full splendour.</p> - -<p>But if in this point Vico cannot stand the comparison with later -philosophy, the failure is amply atoned by the full agreement -between his historical discoveries and the criticism and research -of the nineteenth century. Above all, he agrees with his successors -in his rules of method, his scepticism as regards the narrative of -ancient historians,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> his recognition of the superiority of documents -and monuments over narrative, his investigation of language as a -store-house of primitive beliefs and customs, his social interpretation -of mythology, his emphasis on spontaneous development rather than -external communication of civilisation, his care not to interpret -primitive psychology in the light of modern psychology; and so on. -In his actual solutions of historical problems he also agrees with -later historians. These restated the archaic and barbaric character -of primitive Greek and Roman civilisation, and the aristocratic and -feudal tendency of its political constitution: they took up the view -of ancient legal ceremonial as a dramatic poem containing allusions to -the actions of fighting: the transformation of the Roman heroes into -heroes of democracy came to an end with the Jacobins in France and -their imitators in Italy and elsewhere; Homer was considered great in -proportion to his ruggedness; the history of Rome was reconstructed -chiefly on the basis of Roman law, and the names of the seven kings -appeared as symbols of institutions and the traditional origin of -Rome as a late invention derived from Greece or from Greek models: -the substance of this history was seen to consist in the economic and -juridical struggle between patriciate and plebs, and the plebs was -derived from the <i>famuli</i> or clients: the struggle of the classes, -which Vico was the first to illuminate clearly, was recognised as a -criterion of wide application to the history of all time and serving -as an explanation of the most sweeping social revolutions: the Middle -Ages, especially during the Restoration which followed the Napoleonic -period, exercised a powerful appeal to sentiment and influence -on thought, being admired and regretted as the antithesis of the -rationalistic bourgeois society, and understood in consequence as the -religious, aristocratic and poetical period discovered by Vico, the -youth of modern Europe. Thus Italy rediscovered the greatness of her -own Dante,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> and the criticism of that poet which Vico had initiated -was carried to completion by De Sanctis. In the same way, Niebuhr and -Mommsen brought to maturity his view of Roman history; Wolf, his theory -of Homer; Heyne, Müller and Bachhofen, his interpretation of mythology; -Grimm and other philologists his projected reconstruction of ancient -life by means of etymology; Savigny and the historical school, his -study of the spontaneous development of law, and his preference for -custom rather than statute and code: Thierry and Fustel de Coulanges in -France, Troya in Italy and a host of scholars in Germany his conception -of the Middle Ages and of feudalism: Marx and Sorel his idea of the -struggle of classes and the rejuvenation of society by a return to a -primitive state of mind and a new barbarism: and lastly the superman -of Nietzsche recalls in some degree Vico's hero. These are merely a -few names picked without care and almost at random; for to mention -all, and each in his right place, would mean writing the whole history -of the latest phase of European thought, a history which is not yet -finished, though it has undergone, under the name of "positivism," a -parenthetical recurrence of the abstract and materialistic thought of -the eighteenth century, a parenthesis which now however seems to be at -an end.</p> - -<p>These innumerable reappearances of the work of an individual in the -work of several generations, this parallelism between a man and a -century, justify a fanciful phrase with which we might draw from the -later developments in order to describe Vico; namely that he is neither -more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ. The description may -serve to summarise our reconstruction and exposition of his doctrines, -and to contribute towards a right understanding of his place in the -history of modern philosophy. He may rightly be placed side by side -with Leibniz, with whom he has so often been compared;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> but not, as -has been believed, because of any resemblance (the comparisons made in -this belief have been shown to be false or superficial) but precisely -because he is unlike him and in fact his very opposite. Leibniz is -Cartesianism raised to its highest power; an intellectualist, in spite -of the <i>petites perceptions</i> and the confused knowledge; a mechanicist, -in spite of his dynamism, which perhaps exists in his fancy rather than -in his actual thought; hostile to history, in spite of his immense -historical erudition; blind to any knowledge of the true nature of -language, though deeply interested in language all his life; devoid of -dialectic, in spite of his attempt to explain the evil in the universe. -In relation to later idealism, the Leibnitian philosophy stands as -the most complete expression of the old metaphysic which had to be -transcended: that of Vico is the sketch of the new metaphysic, only -needing further development and determination. The one spoke to his own -century, and his century crowded round him and echoed his words far and -wide. The other spoke to a century yet to come; and the place in which -he cried was a wilderness that gave no answer. But the crowd and the -wilderness add nothing to and take nothing from the intrinsic character -of a thought.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_3" id="Footnote_1_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_3"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See Appendix II.</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a><br /> -<a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a><br /><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span></p> -<h3><a name="APPENDICES" id="APPENDICES">APPENDICES</a></h3> - - - - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_I" id="APPENDIX_I">APPENDIX I</a></h5> - - -<h5>ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO<a name="FNanchor_1_4" id="FNanchor_1_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_4" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h5> - - -<h5>I</h5> - -<p>The transformation, half rhetorical, half mythical, which the heat of -the national reawakening effected in poets, philosophers, and almost -every character of any importance in Italian history, representing -them as patriots, liberals, and in open rebellion or secret revolt -against the throne and the altar, tried for a time to touch with its -magic wand and to work its will upon Giambattista Vico. It was said, -among other things, that Vico, conscious of the severe blow dealt by -his thought to the traditional beliefs of religion, and warned by his -friends, took pains to plunge the New Science into such obscurity -that only the finest intellects could perceive its tendencies. But -though this legend, energetically spread as it was by the patriots and -republicans of 1799, was believed here and there, it could not long -stand out against criticism or even against common sense; and Cataldo -Iannelli was right to pass over it with a few words of contemptuous -irony.<a name="FNanchor_2_5" id="FNanchor_2_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_5" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> It is certain from an objective point of view that Vico's -doctrines implicitly contained a criticism of Christian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> transcendence -and theology as well as of the history of Christianity. From the -subjective point of view it may be that Vico during his youth (of which -we know very little) was the victim of religious doubts. Such doubts -may have been suggested to him not only by his reading, but by the -society of young men of his own age, among whom "libertines," or as -contemporary literature still called them "epicureans" or "atheists," -were not uncommon.<a name="FNanchor_3_6" id="FNanchor_3_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_6" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In a letter of 1720 to Father Giacchi, he says -that at Naples the "weaknesses and errors dating from his early youth" -are remembered against him, and that these, fixed in the memory, became -as often happens "eternal criteria for the judgment of everything -beautiful and complete which he subsequently succeeded in doing."<a name="FNanchor_4_7" id="FNanchor_4_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_7" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -What can these errors and weaknesses have been?</p> - -<p>Again when the <i>De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno</i> appeared, -or rather the "Synopsis" which announced its programme, "the first -voices" which Vico heard raised against him "were tinged with an -assumed piety." He found protection and consolation in the face of -such criticism in religion itself, that is to say in the approval of -Giacchi, "the leading light of the strictest and most holy order of -religious."<a name="FNanchor_5_8" id="FNanchor_5_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_8" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> But just as we possess no detailed information as to the -criticisms levelled against him on this head, so we have no certain -knowledge even of the most general kind as to the religious doubts that -may have troubled him. All Vico's writings show the Catholic religion -established in his heart, grave, solid and immovable as a pillar of -adamant; so solid and so strong that it remained absolutely untouched -by the criticism of mythology inaugurated by himself. Nor was Vico -an irreproachable Catholic in external demonstration only. He not -only submitted every word he ever printed to the double censorship, -public and private, of ecclesiastical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> friends, and led his life as a -philosopher and writer among priestly vestments and monastic cowls no -less than among legal gowns; he was even scrupulous enough to desist -from his commentary on Grotius, thinking it unseemly that a Catholic -should annotate a Protestant writer;<a name="FNanchor_6_9" id="FNanchor_6_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_9" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and so delicate was his sense -of Catholic honour that he refused to admit polemic upon matters of -religious feeling. "As to this difficulty," he says to his critics -of the <i>Giornale dei letterati</i>, "like that which you propound to me -concerning the immortality of the soul, where it appears that you have -in hand seven distinct arguments, if they had not been prepared for me -by you, I should judge that they go deeper and penetrate to a region -which is not only protected and secured by my life and conduct, but -which to defend is to outrage. But let us return to our subject."<a name="FNanchor_7_10" id="FNanchor_7_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_10" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> -His Catholicism was untainted by the superstition so general and so -deeply rooted at the time, especially at Naples, where St. Januarius -intervened as an actor and director in every event of public and -private life. It was the Catholicism of a lofty soul and mind, not the -faith of a charcoal-burner. But Vico never assumed the part of censor -of superstitions. He was content with not speaking of them, as one -keeps silence concerning the failings of persons or institutions which -command one's respect.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_4" id="Footnote_1_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_4"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Since the preceding portions of this work are strictly -confined to the analysis of Vico's philosophy and give no information -as to his life and personal character, the reader will not be -displeased to find in this appendix a lecture delivered by myself upon -the latter subject before the Neapolitan <i>Società di storia patria</i> on -April 14, 1909, and later written down and published in the Florence -<i>Voce</i>(1st year, No. 43, October 7, 1909). I add for convenience of -memory that Vico was born at Naples on June 23, 1668 (not 1670 as he -says in his autobiography), and died on January 23 (not 20 as all -his biographers say), 1744: the new edition of the <i>Autobiografia, -carteggio e poesie varie</i> (Bari, Laterza, 1911), pp. 101, 123, 124.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_5" id="Footnote_2_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_5"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See for the whole question Croce, <i>Bibliografia vichiana,</i> -pp. 91-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_6" id="Footnote_3_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_6"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In the <i>Giornali</i> of Confuorto (MSS. in the library of -the Neapolitan Historical Soc. xx. c. 22, vol. iii. f. 111) under -August 1692, we find "certain civil persons were imprisoned in the -prisons of St. Dominic by the tribunal of the Holy Office; among them -the doctor Giacinto de Cristofaro, son of the doctor Bernardo; many -others escaped, members of the Epicurean or Atheist sect, who believe -the soul to perish with the body." This De Cristofaro is the famous -Neapolitan mathematician and jurisconsult, for whom see F. Amodeo, -<i>Vita matematica napoletana,</i> part iii. (Naples, Giannini, 1905), pp. -31-44; he was Vico's friend. For other notices of the "Epicureans" at -Naples at this time see Carducci, <i>Opere,</i> vol. ii. pp. 235-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_7" id="Footnote_4_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_7"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Letter of October 12, 1720.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_8" id="Footnote_5_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_8"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_9" id="Footnote_6_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_9"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Autobiografia,</i> in <i>Opere,</i> ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. iv. p. -367.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_10" id="Footnote_7_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_10"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The "subject" is therefore not the religious objections, -which he regarded as a personal insult (<i>Riposta al Giornale dei -letterati,</i> in <i>Opp.</i> ii. p. 160).</p></div> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>II</h5> - -<p>Vico's attitude towards social and political life resembles in more -than one respect his attitude towards religion. There is in him -no trace of the missionary, the propagandist, the agitator or the -conspirator as there was in some of the Renaissance philosophers, -notably Giordano Bruno and Campanella, whom although—perhaps -because—a Neapolitan, Vico never mentions. Certainly, his age and his -country were not the time or place for heroes; there was none of that -rapid social change and revolution from which heroes spring. Political -parties however were active in favour of Austria and France, and men -were arising who devoted their labours and their lives to one or other -of these parties, or were persecuted and fled into exile: and above all -this was the period in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> culminated the struggle between Church -and State, between Naples and Rome, in the person of Pietro Giannone, -a man of whom Vico never speaks, just as he never mentions and in fact -seems to ignore the entire movement. Political life rolled past over -his head, like the sky and its stars, and he never wasted his strength -in a vain attempt to reach it. Political and social controversy, like -religious, was outside the sphere of his activity. He was indeed a -non-political person. We cannot describe it as a fault or a weakness, -for every one has his limitations; one struggle excludes another, and -one labour makes others impossible.</p> - -<p>Not that he avoided all contact with political life and its -representatives. Only too often he was compelled to pay his respects -to both, in the form of histories, speeches, verses and epigrams in -Latin and Italian; and these alone would be sufficient material for the -reconstruction of Neapolitan history in all its vicissitudes from the -end of the seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth: the -Spanish viceregency, the conspiracy and revolution attempted by the -partisans of Austria, the reaction and re-establishment of the Spanish -viceregency, the Austrian conquest, the Austrian viceregency, the -Spanish reconquest and the reign of Charles Bourbon. But Vico, "very -pliant because of his necessity"<a name="FNanchor_8_11" id="FNanchor_8_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_11" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> and as professor of eloquence in -the royal university, was compelled to supply the literary compositions -required by the solemnities of the day, just as the draper supplied -hangings and the plasterer volutes and arabesques. And what hangings -and arabesques he produced! The Spanish style of the seventeenth -century was still predominant in literature; and this fact is alone -almost enough to explain the extravagance and ornateness, as it seems -to us, of Vico's flood of panegyrics. The indifference and innocence of -his own attitude may be illustrated by the passage in his autobiography -where after mentioning the <i>Panegyricus Philippo V inscriptus</i> composed -by himself to the order of the Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Ascalona, -he goes on as if it was a mere nothing, with no connexion but a simple -"soon after": "soon after, this kingdom having passed under the rule of -Austria, the lord Count Wirrigo of Daun, at that time governor of the -imperial armies in this country, <i>ordered me</i>" to compose inscriptions -for the expiatory monuments to Guiseppe Capece and Carlo di Sangro,<a name="FNanchor_9_12" id="FNanchor_9_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_12" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> -the two rebels against Philip V. executed by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> previous government -some years before in the suppression of the conspiracy of Macchia -described by Vico from the Bourbon point of view in his <i>De Parthenopea -coniuratione.</i></p> - -<p>But this implies no baseness of character on Vico's part. It must -be said that in these writings of his, orator and panegyrist though -he is, he can never be called a flatterer. The flatterer, the man -without a conscience, reviles and calumniates the enemies of the man -he is praising, or even strikes the conquered: and this is servility. -But Vico, who though he knew who the Italian or Neapolitan was that -sent to the <i>Acta Lipsiensia</i> the note injurious to himself, and -might easily have ruined him, since the note was anti-Catholic in -tendency, generously refused to reveal his name,<a name="FNanchor_10_13" id="FNanchor_10_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_13" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> gave no doubt his -services as professor of eloquence but refrained from trafficking in -the interests of the patrons whom he praised. Of the <i>Life of Antonio -Carafa</i> which he composed for a commission and married one of his -daughters on the proceeds, he says that the work was "tempered by -honour towards the subject, reverence towards princes and the just -claims of truth."<a name="FNanchor_11_14" id="FNanchor_11_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_14" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> And to return to the case of Capece and Sangro -mentioned above, when he spoke in the <i>De Parthenopea coniuratione</i> -of the death of these two enemies to the triumphant party, he shows -here too in various details the nobility of his spirit: of Capece, who -refused to surrender to the Spanish soldiers, he writes "exposing his -breast to death, and demanding death with his warlike arms, he fell -unrepentant, a most valiant manner of death, were it only honoured in -its cause" (<i>ostentans pectus neci eamque infensis armis efflagitans, -inexoratus occubuit, fortissimum mortis genus si causa cohonestasset</i>). -Of Sangro too, having reported the rumour that Louis XIV. sent him a -reprieve which arrived too late, he adds: "whence the condemned man, -who had already suffered the penalty, is the more to be pitied" (<i>unde -maior damnati qui iam poenas persolverat, miseratio</i>).<a name="FNanchor_12_15" id="FNanchor_12_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_15" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>He must have known, and doubtless did know, that most of the persons -whose praises he composed were of very little worth. To read his -panegyrics, one would suppose that Naples was adorned with a nobility -resplendent in its virtue, cultivation and learning: and yet, in -giving Father De Vitry the information he desired upon the condition -of studies in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> Naples, Vico did not conceal the facts: "the nobles -slumber amid the enjoyments of a life of pleasure."<a name="FNanchor_13_16" id="FNanchor_13_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_16" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> His pupil -Antonio Genovesi has preserved to us one of his satirical expressions -upon this nobility, often in extreme poverty but always proud and -ready to go hungry at home in order to drive abroad in coaches -sumptuously dressed.<a name="FNanchor_14_17" id="FNanchor_14_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_17" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> With reference to the literary duke of -Laurenzano, he formulated the theory that "noble" writers could not -fail of excellence:<a name="FNanchor_15_18" id="FNanchor_15_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_18" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> and yet I have discovered among his papers -the manuscript of a book by this duke, rewritten from end to end by -the same Vico.<a name="FNanchor_16_19" id="FNanchor_16_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_19" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Such are the contradictions and the transactions -into which a poor man falls when the pressure of want has made him -timid and cautious; so that it is not easy to determine how far his -admiration was merely assumed at command or by complaisance, or how -far his feeling of social inferiority developed into a real admiration -for those above him in the scale, who possessed riches and dignity and -everything he lacked and were the "seigneurs."</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_11" id="Footnote_8_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_11"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_12" id="Footnote_9_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_12"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 394.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_13" id="Footnote_10_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_13"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Letter of December 4, 1729: in <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 32.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_14" id="Footnote_11_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_14"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 366.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_15" id="Footnote_12_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_15"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> i. pp. 367, 368.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_16" id="Footnote_13_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_16"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_17" id="Footnote_14_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_17"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> He said that many of them "dragged their carriages with -their own guts" (<i>Suppl. alla Bibl. vich.</i> p. 10).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_18" id="Footnote_15_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_18"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 95.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_19" id="Footnote_16_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_19"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 27-8.</p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>III</h5> - -<p>For, as is well known, his financial state was always of the gloomiest. -The son of a small Neapolitan bookseller, he was at first compelled to -go as a private tutor to a wild town of the Cilento; later, returning -to Naples, he tried in vain to obtain the position of secretary of the -city, and having in 1699 been elected to the chair of rhetoric, he held -that position for thirty-six years at an annual stipend of a hundred -ducats (<i>£</i>17). His attempt to pass to a chair of greater importance in -1723 failed, whether owing to ill-luck or to inability—he recognised -that he was a "man of little spirit in matters of utility,"<a name="FNanchor_17_20" id="FNanchor_17_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_20" class="fnanchor">[17]</a>—he was -compelled to give up hopes of academic advancement. He was therefore -obliged to eke out his resources by literary work such as we have -mentioned, and still more by private lessons; he not only kept school -at his own house as well as at the university, but he went up and down -other men's steps to teach grammar to youths or even to children. His -family fife was not a happy one. His wife was illiterate, and had not -the qualities with which her sex<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> sometimes compensates the defect; -she was incapable of any domestic employment whatever, so that her -husband had to take her place. Of his children, one girl died after a -long illness and the heavy expenses which embitter the diseases of the -poor; one boy showed such strong vicious tendencies that the father was -compelled to seek the intervention of the police and place him in a -house of correction. So sublimely irrational was his fatherly affection -that upon this occasion when he saw from the window the police officers -he had called in, coming to take his miserable and beloved son away, he -ran to him crying, "my son, flee!"<a name="FNanchor_18_21" id="FNanchor_18_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_21" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>He was indeed of an extremely affectionate disposition; a fact which -may be gathered for instance from the noble and touching speech he -composed on the death of his friend Donna Angela Cimini, from the -tone of pity and indignation with which in the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> he -spoke of the oppressed plebeians whose history he is investigating or -of the tragic figures of Priam and Polyxena, the romance of which he -feels keenly; and finally, from certain stylistic details scattered -here and there, such as the aphorism (no. xl.) where he says that -witches in order to solemnise their rites "slay without pity and -cut in pieces most lovely and innocent children," quite upset, in -the most inopportune but significant fashion, by the fate of these -little persons, whom his excited imagination adorns with a superlative -loveliness. His greatest domestic happiness came from his daughter -Luisa, a cultured and poetical soul, and his son Gennaro, who shared -with him and ultimately succeeded to his chair. When, in his panegyric -on the Countess of Althann, he calls ironically upon the philosophers -who dispute as they walk in pleasant gardens or beneath painted -porticoes, free from the agony and weariness of "wives in travail" and -"children wasting away with disease,"<a name="FNanchor_19_22" id="FNanchor_19_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_22" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> we feel that he is speaking -from his own experience and smarting under the memory of domestic -troubles.</p> - -<p>We often meet, especially in these days, with men of some talent who -consider themselves freed from this or that humble duty: and we ought -the more to admire this man of genius who on the contrary accepted -them every one, and (to use a phrase of Flaubert's) while thinking the -thought of a demigod lived the life of a townsman or even that of a man -of the people. He had acquired the habit of reading, writing, thinking -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> composing his works "while discussing matters with his friends -amid the uproar of his children."<a name="FNanchor_20_23" id="FNanchor_20_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_23" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>His health was never very good: his friends called him "Mastro -Tisicuzzo":<a name="FNanchor_21_24" id="FNanchor_21_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_24" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> very weak in youth, he was in his old age afflicted -with ulcers in the throat and pains in his thighs and legs. In a word, -the repose, the peace, the tranquillity which other philosophers enjoy -all their life or for long periods together was always lacking to Vico. -He was forced to play both Martha and Mary: working at every moment for -his own and his family's practical needs and working at the same time -to fulfil the mission to which he was devoted from his birth and to -give concrete form to the spiritual world that moved within him.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_20" id="Footnote_17_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_20"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 349.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_21" id="Footnote_18_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_21"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Villarosa in the additions to the <i>Autobiography (Opp.</i> -iv. p. 420).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_22" id="Footnote_19_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_22"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 235.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_23" id="Footnote_20_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_23"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 366.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_24" id="Footnote_21_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_24"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> "Mr. Skin-and-bones": cf. <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 87.</p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>IV</h5> - - -<p>Thus we need not invent or demand a heroic Vico, looking for him -in the life of religion, society or politics. The true hero is the -Vico who stands before us, the hero of the philosophic life. Others -beside ourselves have noticed his love for the word "hero" and all -its derivatives, "heroism," "heroic," and so on: and the continual -use and varied application he makes of it. Heroism was for him the -mighty virgin force which appears in the beginning and reappears in the -reflux of history. This force he must surely have felt in himself as -he laboured for the truth and, overthrowing obstacles of every kind, -opened up new paths of science. It was this force that enabled him to -overcome the youthful uncertainties, fears and defeats which sometimes -plunged him in a profound individual and cosmic pessimism, visible -in the poem entitled "Feelings of One in Despair," to rise to the -certainty of scientific method enunciated in the <i>De nostri temporis -studiorum ratione</i> and his first attempt at philosophico-historical -research represented by the <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia</i>; -and from this point, abandoning in part his own thought and weaving -a new tissue of what remained, led him to the <i>De uno universi iuris -principio et fine uno</i> and to the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> "after twenty-five -years," as he says of the discoveries contained in that work, "of -unremitting and toilsome thought."</p> - -<p>The work completed by this poor teacher of grammar and rhetoric, by -this pedagogue whom a contemporary satirist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> saw "lean, with a rolling -eye, ferule in hand,"<a name="FNanchor_22_25" id="FNanchor_22_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_25" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> by this unhappy <i>paterfamilias,</i> is amazing -and almost terrifying; such is the mass of mental power compressed into -it. It is a work at once reactionary and revolutionary: reactionary in -relation to the present, by its attachment to the traditions of the -ancient world and the Renaissance; revolutionary as against the present -and the past in laying the foundations of that future later to be known -as the Nineteenth century.</p> - -<p>Within the domain of science, this humble man of the people became an -aristocrat: and the "lordly style"<a name="FNanchor_23_26" id="FNanchor_23_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_26" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> which he falsely ascribed to the -wretched writings of the proud nobles and pompous prelates of his day -was in reality his own. He loathed the polite and social literature -which was gradually spreading in France and Italy and other European -countries, the "ladies' books."<a name="FNanchor_24_27" id="FNanchor_24_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_27" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> But he avoided no less that other -class of treatise which we nowadays call "handbooks," which explain in -detail elementary definitions and facts ascertained by others; books -useless except to the young.<a name="FNanchor_25_28" id="FNanchor_25_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_28" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> Vico, who suffered quite enough from -the young within the circle of his school, saw no need to sacrifice to -them any part of his own inviolable life of science. The public towards -which he looked was not composed of boys, lords and ladies. When he -wrote, his first practical thought was, "what would a Plato, a Varro -or a Quintus Mucius Scaevola think of the fruits of his thought?" and -secondly, "what will posterity think?"<a name="FNanchor_26_29" id="FNanchor_26_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_29" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Among his contemporaries he -looked only at the republic of letters, the brotherhood of scholars, -the Academies of Europe: a public which did not require him to -repeat what had been already discovered and stated in the course of -the history of science, and was perfectly familiar to him, but only -demanded the exposition of such thoughts as constituted a real advance -of knowledge: not voluminous works, but "little books, all full of -original things."<a name="FNanchor_27_30" id="FNanchor_27_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_30" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> His public was an ideal one, which sometimes -in his simplicity he confused with the actual professional scholars -and the critics of literary reviews: and the mistake often caused him -surprise. Short books on metaphysical subjects seemed to him to have -a peculiar power, as in fact they have; he compares them very justly -with religious meditations "which briefly set forth a small number of -points" and are more valuable for the development of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> Christian -spirit than "the most eloquent and lucid sermons of the most gifted -preachers."<a name="FNanchor_28_31" id="FNanchor_28_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_31" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> This love of brevity inspires his refusal to burden -with many books the republic of letters, which, he says, is already -sinking beneath the weight. He left his discourses unpublished, only -printed his <i>De ratione</i> out of a sense of duty, and often expressed a -desire that the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> alone should survive him, as the work -which summed up in itself the concentrated and perfected fruits of all -his earlier efforts.</p> - -<p>His aristocratic ideal was accompanied by the loftiest dignity and the -profoundest loyalty in his conception of the life of science. From his -polemics we might compile a whole catechism on the right method of -conducting literary controversy. We must aim at victory, he says, not -in the controversy but in the truth; hence he desires that it should -be conducted "in the calmest manner of reasoning," because "he who is -strong does not threaten, and he who is right does not use insults"; -the dispute must at any rate be interspersed with peaceful words -"showing that the minds of the disputants are placid and tranquil, not -excited and perturbed." To opponents whose objections are vague he -replies, "the judgment is in too general terms: and serious men never -deign to reply except to particular and determinate criticisms made -upon them." When these same opponents appeal to the "refined taste of -the age, which has banished," etc., etc., he replies contemptuously, -"a grave criticism this, in truth: it is no criticism at all. In thus -taking refuge from one's opponents before the tribunal of one's own -judgment, by saying that what they say is a thing of which one has no -idea, from an opponent one becomes the judge." He refused to rely upon -his authorities, but yet did not undervalue them; authority ought to -"make us attentive to seek the causes which could have induced authors, -especially the most weighty, to adopt such and such opinions." Again, -accused of attributing errors to philosophers so as to be able to -refute them with ease, like Aristotle, he protests with dignity: "I -would rather enjoy my own small and simple stock of knowledge than be -compared in bad faith with a great philosopher." His moderation may be -illustrated by his splendid eulogy of Descartes, though he spent the -best part of his mental powers in opposing him. His loyalty is shown -by his prompt recognition<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> of his own errors: "I admit," he says at -one point to the critics of the <i>Giornale dei letterati</i>, "that my -distinction is faulty."<a name="FNanchor_29_32" id="FNanchor_29_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_32" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> "The reader must not think it ostentatious -in us" (he writes in the second <i>Scienza Nuova</i>), "that not satisfied -with the favourable judgments of such men as these upon our works, -we yet disapprove and reject these works. On the contrary, it is a -proof of the high veneration and respect in which we hold these men. -For rude and haughty writers uphold their works even against the just -accusations and reasonable corrections of others: some, who by chance -are of a small spirit, sate themselves with the favourable judgments -they receive and because of these go no further towards perfection: -but in our case the praise of great minds has increased our courage to -amend, to complete, and even to recast in a better form this work of -ours."<a name="FNanchor_30_33" id="FNanchor_30_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_33" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> - -<p>His scientific life was upright, worthy of a serious searcher after -truth; his emotional life disturbed and restless, worthy of one who -sees face to face the truth he has long sought and desired, and -rejoices in the power of laying it before mankind. Hence his lofty -poetry, expressed not in verse but in prose, and especially in the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i>. "Vico is a poet," writes Tommaseo: "he brings -fire from smoke, and lively images from metaphysical abstractions: -he reasons as he narrates and depicts while he reasons: over the -mountain-tops of thought he does not walk, he flies; and in one -sentence he often compresses more lyrical feeling than may be found in -many an ode."<a name="FNanchor_31_34" id="FNanchor_31_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_34" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> De Sanctis saw in the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> the progress -of a poem, almost a new <i>Divina commedia.</i> Sublime like Dante, he was -more severe than Dante himself; if the lips of the Ghibelline show at -times the flicker of "a passing smile," Vico looks at history with -a face "that never smiles." Moreover, the man whose style has been -so often criticised is not a commonplace writer; he was as careful a -student of pure Tuscan<a name="FNanchor_32_35" id="FNanchor_32_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_35" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> as he was a fine connoisseur, according to -Capasso, of Latin phraseology.<a name="FNanchor_33_36" id="FNanchor_33_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_36" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> But he was faulty in the arrangement -of his books, because his mind did not master all the philosophical and -historical material it had accumulated;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> he wrote carelessly because -wildly and as if possessed by a demon: and hence arise the lack of -proportion and the confusion in the various parts of his work, within -single pages and single paragraphs. He often gives the impression of -a bottle of water quickly inverted, in which the liquid trying to -issue forth so presses against the narrow opening "that it comes out -painfully, drop by drop." Painfully, by fragments, and disjointedly. -One idea while he is expressing it recalls another, that a fact, and -that another fact: he tries to say everything at once, and parenthesis -branches off into parenthesis in a manner to make one's brain reel. But -these chaotic periods, weighted as they are with original thoughts, are -no less woven of striking phrases, statuesque words, phrases full of -emotion, and picturesque images. A bad writer, if you will, but his is -the kind of bad writing of which only great writers possess the secret.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_25" id="Footnote_22_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_25"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Bill. vich.</i> p. 82.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_26" id="Footnote_23_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_26"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 93.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_27" id="Footnote_24_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_27"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> vi. p. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_28" id="Footnote_25_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_28"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> v. p. 50 (note).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_29" id="Footnote_26_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_29"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii. p. 123.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_30" id="Footnote_27_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_30"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> ii. p. 148.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_31" id="Footnote_28_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_31"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> For instance in his letter to Saliani, November 18, -1725, published in <i>Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 97-8, the autograph being in my -possession.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_32" id="Footnote_29_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_32"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> See the <i>Riposte</i> in <i>Opp.</i> ii. <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_33" id="Footnote_30_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_33"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> v. p. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_34" id="Footnote_31_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_34"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>G. B. Vico e il suo secolo</i> in the volume <i>La Storia -civile nella letteratura</i> (Turin, Loescher, 1872), p. 104: cf. a -judgment on Vico as a writer, <i>ibid.</i> pp. 9-10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_35" id="Footnote_32_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_35"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> iv. pp. 333-4; vi. pp. 41, 140.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_36" id="Footnote_33_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_36"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 87.</p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>V</h5> - - -<p>The philosophical heroism of Vico asserts itself not only in the -internal struggle with himself for the elaboration of his science. -It was exposed to other and sterner trials. The position reached by -his thought, opposed as it was to the present, and while apparently -reactionary turned in reality towards the future, inevitably prevented -him from being understood. No doubt this is the fate of every man -of genius: his inmost thought is never understood, even when social -fortune seems to favour him, even when he arouses enthusiasm and finds -a host of disciples and imitators. The words which Hegel is said -to have uttered on his deathbed—"one only of my pupils understood -me, and he misunderstood me"—admirably express this historical -necessity: the man whom his age fully understands dies with his age. -And yet the disproportion between the value of a man's thought and -his contemporaries' failure to understand it has seldom if ever been -greater than in Vico's case. If he had been free from other causes of -discontent, this alone would have been sufficient. The "desire for -praise," which in other than commonplace minds is a desire to see what -they think true and good shared, approved and universalised among other -minds, was always with him a "vain desire."</p> - -<p>He was the more afflicted by this misunderstanding and indifference -because, as we may well suppose, he was fully<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> conscious of the -importance of his own discoveries. He knew that Providence had -entrusted to him a lofty mission: he knew himself to be "born for -the glory of his country, and therefore in Italy; since, being born -there and not in Morocco, he became a scholar."<a name="FNanchor_34_37" id="FNanchor_34_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_37" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> When he published -the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> he believed that he had fired a mine whose -loud explosion he expected every minute. Nothing happened: nobody -mentioned it to him: so that he wrote some days later, to a friend: -"In publishing my work in this city I seem to have launched it upon a -desert. I avoid all public places, so as not to meet the persons to -whom I have sent it, and if by chance I do meet them, I greet them -without stopping; for when this happens, these people give me not -the faintest sign that they have received my book, and so confirm my -impression of having published it in a wilderness."<a name="FNanchor_35_38" id="FNanchor_35_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_38" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> He had frankly -expected a swift and immediate effect: he had hoped to find, among his -contemporaries and acquaintances at Naples, minds ready and intellects -open to receive and bear fruit of his thoughts: and he hoped this -of monks engaged in composing and learning by rote wordy sermons, -poetasters rhyming in sonnets and advocates compiling second-hand -speeches!</p> - -<p>Instead of this, he found many sceptical and indifferent, and several -inclined to laugh. His <i>Diritto universale</i> had been as Metastasio -informs us<a name="FNanchor_36_39" id="FNanchor_36_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_39" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> generally "blamed for obscurity" on its publication; it -was not widely read and was hastily criticised for the extravagances -which an inattentive and superficial reading revealed at every -point.<a name="FNanchor_37_40" id="FNanchor_37_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_40" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> Father Paoli, to whom the author had given a copy, wrote in -it a couplet making a joke of its unintelligibility.<a name="FNanchor_38_41" id="FNanchor_38_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_41" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The <i>Scienza -Nuova</i> was in an even worse case. We know that Nicola Capasso, a -scholar and well disposed towards Vico, on trying to read it fancied -he had lost his wits, and by way of a joke hurried off to his doctor -Cirillo, to have his pulse felt.<a name="FNanchor_39_42" id="FNanchor_39_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_42" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> A Neapolitan nobleman when asked -by Finetti at Venice what opinion was held of Vico at Naples, said that -for a time he had passed for a really learned man, but that later his -strange opinions had won him the reputation of an eccentric. "And when -he published the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>?" insisted Finetti. "Oh, by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> then," -replied the other, "he was quite mad!"<a name="FNanchor_40_43" id="FNanchor_40_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_43" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> His detractors even attacked -him in the modest profession by which he earned his living; they said -he was "good at teaching youths who had completed their course, that -is to say when they already knew all they needed," or again, more -insidiously, that he was fitted less for teaching than for "giving good -advice to the teachers themselves;"<a name="FNanchor_41_44" id="FNanchor_41_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_44" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> so that they recognised his -superiority only to use it in damaging his private interests.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_37" id="Footnote_34_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_37"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 385.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_38" id="Footnote_35_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_38"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Letter to Giacchi, November 25, 1725, in <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. -28.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_39" id="Footnote_36_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_39"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_40" id="Footnote_37_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_40"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_41" id="Footnote_38_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_41"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_42" id="Footnote_39_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_42"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 87.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_43" id="Footnote_40_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_43"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 86: cf. <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 416.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_44" id="Footnote_41_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_44"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 416.</p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>VI</h5> - - -<p>The indifference of the public and the insincerity or malignity -of critics could not for Vico be compensated by the friends and -appreciative readers of whom Vico had a certain number. How indeed -could it have been otherwise, when he cultivated them artificially -with such care and anxiety? Consider for instance the way in which -he cultivated the friendship of Giacchi the Capucin. He praised his -"admirable works," his "most divine talents," the "rare sublimity" of -his "marvellous and divine ideas." He tells him that he has given to -the scholars of the city the eulogistic letter sent to him by Giacchi -and that they all admire "the sublime workmanship of the conception"; -and yet he himself used to rewrite in scholar's Latin the inscriptions -Giacchi composed in monk's Latin!<a name="FNanchor_42_45" id="FNanchor_42_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_45" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> On another occasion he wrote that -the praises of a Giacchi had excited envy and had in certain quarters -been described as flatteries. He took no less pains to propitiate -the Archbishop of Bari, Muzio di Gaeta, a conceited creature full -of his own merits and incapable of speaking except about himself. -Muzio wrote a panegyric on Pope Benedict XIII., a work of which, -though Vico praised it again and again, he had never heard enough, -and was always covertly or openly demanding new praises. So Vico used -to besprinkle him patiently with the desired fluid: "the marvellous -work of Your Excellency"; his "lordly diction"; his "demosthenic -digressions"; his eloquence, that philosophic speech employed in -Greece by the Academic school, in Rome by Cicero, and "among the -Italians by none but Your Excellency!" To the advocate Francesco -Solla, who had been his pupil and had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> subsequently retired into the -country, he hinted that the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> looked towards him as one -of the few men in the world possessed of a mind penetrating enough -to receive it unhampered by any prejudices concerning the origin of -mankind.<a name="FNanchor_43_46" id="FNanchor_43_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_46" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Such were the guileless artifices and the pitiful little -schemes by which he contrived to give an illusory satisfaction to his -thirst for recognition and praise, and a narcotic to his overwrought -nerves. But the final results were miserable enough. Giacchi's -letters contain not a word to show that he had ever grasped one of -Vico's doctrines or even that he had examined them with any serious -interest. Monsignor di Gaeta, after a labyrinth of circumlocutions, -admits that he "admired more than he understood" of Vico's works;<a name="FNanchor_44_47" id="FNanchor_44_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_47" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> -and possibly he was so much occupied in admiring his own prose that -he never read them at all. Solla, in whom Vico placed such hopes, -thought the discourse on the death of Angela Cimini superior to all -the author's other works, including the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> itself. Vico -received a no less incautious compliment from another admirer; though -a warm and affectionate one,—Esteban.<a name="FNanchor_45_48" id="FNanchor_45_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_48" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Compliments of a vague and -unintelligent kind sometimes reached him in return for the copies of -his works which he sent not only to Neapolitan scholars but to those -of Rome, Pisa, Padua and even Germany, Holland and England: he sent a -copy to Isaac Newton.<a name="FNanchor_46_49" id="FNanchor_46_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_49" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Generally, however, these gifts were received -in contemptuous silence. At most, Vico acquired the reputation of a -scholar among hundreds of scholars, a man of letters among thousands of -similar men; a learned man, but nothing more.</p> - -<p>Among the modest, the insignificant, and the young, Vico no doubt had -strong admirers. Among these were the poet, later a sacred orator, -Gherardo de Angelis, Solla and Esteban whom we have mentioned, the monk -Nicola Concina of Padua, and some more. But though their affection -was strong their intelligence was weak. Even Concina admitted while -rhapsodising his enthusiasm that he did not very clearly comprehend -his master: "Oh, what fruitful and sublime lights are here! If only -I had the talent to make use of them, to comprehend their depth and -the wonderful art of which I seem to catch a glimpse!"<a name="FNanchor_47_50" id="FNanchor_47_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_50" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> The best -service that these friends could do him was to soothe with kindly words -Vico's embittered spirit,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> if they could not do so by following his -inmost thoughts. This is what Esteban does at the close of the letter -in which he excuses himself for his foolish remark on the funeral -speech of Angela Cimini in phrases he must have gathered from the -master's lips: "Be confident, Sir, that Providence, through channels -unimagined by yourself, will cause to spring up for you a perennial -fountain of immortal glory!"<a name="FNanchor_48_51" id="FNanchor_48_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_51" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> The Jesuit Father Domenico Lodovico, -who wrote the couplet inscribed beneath Vico's portrait, on receiving -the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> sent to the author with much sound sense a little -wine from the cellar and a little bread from the oven of the Jesuit -house of the Nunziatella, together with a graceful letter begging -the author to accept "these trifles, simple as they are, since the -infant Jesus himself did not refuse the rude offerings of pastoral -peasants." He suggested too that at the side of the alphabet in the -symbolic frontispiece to the work a little dwarf should be added in the -posture of one dumb with astonishment like Dante's mountaineer, and -that beneath him should be written, "with a significant diaeresis," -the name Lodo-vico!<a name="FNanchor_49_52" id="FNanchor_49_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_52" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Among the young men of his school there were -some who, nourished upon his doctrines, were ready to defend their -master with their swords;<a name="FNanchor_50_53" id="FNanchor_50_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_53" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> but we all know the value of these -youthful enthusiasms. If these scholars had really assimilated Vico's -doctrines or any part of them, we should have found traces of it in -the literature or culture of the next generation after Vico; but such -traces are entirely absent. Hardly a single one of his formulae, his -historical statements, or conceptions even superficially understood -is to be found in Conti at Venice, Concina at Padua, Ignazio Luzan -in Spain—though the last named was living at Naples when the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> was published;<a name="FNanchor_51_54" id="FNanchor_51_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_54" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> or even, within the author's own -neighbourhood, in Genovesi or Galiani.</p> - -<p>Envy, insincerity, gossip, calumny and stupidity provoked violent -outbursts of anger on Vico's part. He confesses this fault in his -autobiography where he says that he inveighed in too severe a manner -against the errors of conception or doctrine or the incivility of his -literary rivals, when in Christian charity and as a true philosopher -he ought to have ignored or pardoned them.<a name="FNanchor_52_55" id="FNanchor_52_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_55" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> But as a matter of fact -this fault did not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> greatly distress him: he thought it rather an -ornament. The funeral speech for Angela Cimini contained a kind of hymn -to anger, the "heroic wrath which in noble spirits disturbs and shakes -to the depths by its boiling all those evil thoughts of the mind, -which beget the vile swarm of fraud, deceit and falsehood, and renders -the hero frank, truthful and loyal; and thus making him a partisan of -truth, arms him as the valiant knight of reason to do battle with wrong -and offence."<a name="FNanchor_53_56" id="FNanchor_53_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_56" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p>Although in his writings he guards "with all his power" against falling -into this passion<a name="FNanchor_54_57" id="FNanchor_54_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_57" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> we feel a scarcely repressed torrent of wrath in -his private letters whenever he denounces the "miserable pedants" who -"love learning more than truth," or the common tendency of man to be -"all memory and imagination," and so forth. In conversation also, it -seems, he could be very violent. When in 1736 Damiano Romano published -a work controverting his theory of the Twelve Tables, Vico, although -according to Romano himself he had been spoken of as "most learned" -and "most famous," together with other titles of respect, "tore the -book to pieces with his teeth in a way that made every one present -tremble with horror," rinding a sign of the deepest malignity in the -fact that "a lad like myself should join issue with him."<a name="FNanchor_55_58" id="FNanchor_55_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_58" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> But his -outbursts of wrath were succeeded by fits of the deepest dejection. In -a sonnet he speaks of himself as over-whelmed by that fate "which the -unjust hate of others often creates," and says that for this reason he -has separated himself from human society to live with himself alone. -Sometimes he shakes off this torpor for a moment: then, he says:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -I draw within myself again, and pressed<br /> -By heavy cares, return to where I stood:<a name="FNanchor_56_59" id="FNanchor_56_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_59" class="fnanchor">[56]</a><br /> -My fate and not my fault I do lament.<br /> -</p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_45" id="Footnote_42_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_45"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> Published by me in <i>Napoli nobilis,</i> xiii. (1904), f. 1., -and again in <i>Secondo suppl. alla Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 70-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_46" id="Footnote_43_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_46"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_47" id="Footnote_44_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_47"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 103-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_48" id="Footnote_45_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_48"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 145.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_49" id="Footnote_46_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_49"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 110.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_50" id="Footnote_47_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_50"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Opusc.,</i> ed. Villarosa, ii. p. 277.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_51" id="Footnote_48_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_51"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 105.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_52" id="Footnote_49_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_52"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> "I praise Vico." Letter published by me in <i>Bibl. vich.</i> -p. 107.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_53" id="Footnote_50_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_53"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 87-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_54" id="Footnote_51_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_54"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 44.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_55" id="Footnote_52_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_55"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 416: cf. the evidence of a -pupil in <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 89.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_56" id="Footnote_53_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_56"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 254.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_57" id="Footnote_54_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_57"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 416.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_58" id="Footnote_55_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_58"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> p. 88.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_59" id="Footnote_56_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_59"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> Sonnet published by G. Gentile, <i>Il Figlio di G. B. Vico</i> -(Naples, Pierro, 1905), p. 173.</p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>VII</h5> - - -<p>But among all these troubles, obstacles and disappointments, in -the midst of this sadness which often draped his life in black, -Vico enjoyed one of the loftiest joys accessible to man; the "life -of meditation" freed and purified from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> passion, lived by man in -solitude without the turbulent and grievous company of the body: -the life of security, because it is "made one with the soul always -ready and present which shows man his being rooted in the Eternal -that measures all times and walking in the Infinite that comprehends -all finite things; it crowns him with an eternal and immeasurable -joy not restricted invidiously to certain places nor grudgingly to -certain times; but it can grow up within himself only if without envy -of rivalry or fear of diminution it spreads and communicates itself -unceasingly to more and more human minds."<a name="FNanchor_57_60" id="FNanchor_57_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_60" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> That he has attained -truth he never doubts, though he never ceases to elaborate it further; -with the system presented in the work on <i>Universal Law,</i> his mind, -he says, "rested content."<a name="FNanchor_58_61" id="FNanchor_58_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_61" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> The weariness and even the pain he -had suffered were dear to him, because through them he arrived at -his discoveries: "I bless the twenty-five full years I have spent -in meditation upon this subject, in the midst of the adversities of -fortune and the checks I have often received from the unhappy example -of great thinkers who have attempted new and weighty discoveries."<a name="FNanchor_59_62" id="FNanchor_59_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_62" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> -How could he have done anything but bless these fatigues, pains and -adversities, if, whenever he rose above the passionate perturbations -of the empirical man and the struggles of the practical man, his mind -showed him the inevitable necessity of his toil and of his sufferings, -two necessities fused into one another so as to become one and -indivisible?</p> - -<p>His own philosophical doctrine then brought him the remedy for his -ills, and worked in his spirit the <i>catharsis</i> of liberation; the -doctrine of the immanent Providence, or as it was later called, -historical necessity, which was his central thought. "Praise be to -Providence for ever, which, when the weak sight of mortals sees in it -nothing but stern justice, then most of all is at work on a crowning -mercy! For by this task I see that I am clothed upon with a new man; -I feel that everything that goaded me to bewail my hard lot and to -denounce the corruption of literature that has caused that lot, has -vanished; for this corruption and this lot have strengthened me and -enabled me to perfect my task. And more, it may perhaps not be true, -but it would please me, were it true, that this labour has filled me -with a certain spirit of heroism, through which no fear of death any -longer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> disturbs me and my mind feels no disquietude at the words of my -rivals. Lastly, it has established me as upon a mighty rock of adamant -before the judgment of God, who rewards the work of creation by the -approval of the wise, who are always and everywhere few in numbers ... -men of the loftiest intellect, of a learning all their own, generous -and great-hearted, whose only labour is to enrich with deathless works -the commonwealth of letters."<a name="FNanchor_60_63" id="FNanchor_60_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_63" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> Thus Providence showed him the -necessity of all that had befallen or should befall him in his life, -taught him resignation and promised him glory.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_60" id="Footnote_57_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_60"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 287.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_61" id="Footnote_58_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_61"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_62" id="Footnote_59_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_62"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> pp. 153-4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_63" id="Footnote_60_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_63"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> pp. 29-30.</p></div> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>VIII</h5> - - -<p>So the hot-tempered man became at last tolerant: tolerant with that -tolerance, that lofty indulgence which must not be confused with common -toleration. The University, in which he had hoped for advancement and -towards which he directed the thought of his earlier works, would -have none of him; he retired within himself to think out the <i>Scienza -Nuova.</i> Now, says he with a smile in which we may still see a trace of -bitterness, I owe this work to the University, which, by judging me -unworthy of the chair and not wishing me to be "occupied in treating -paragraphs," gave me leisure for meditation: "what greater obligation -could I have?"<a name="FNanchor_61_64" id="FNanchor_61_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_64" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> A friend, Sostegni the Florentine, in a sonnet to -Vico, let slip some words in condemnation of the city of Naples for -making so little of her distinguished son. Vico in his reply justifies -his native place in noble words, as being stern towards him because she -expected and desired much of him:</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;" > -Stern mother, she caresses not her son,<br /> -Lest so she fall into obscurity,<br /> -But gravely listens, watching as he speaks.<a name="FNanchor_62_65" id="FNanchor_62_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_65" class="fnanchor">[62]</a><br /> -</p> - -<p>This was the spirit that found expression in the Autobiography, a -work which has been misjudged and in fact entirely misunderstood by -Ferrari, who censures its prevailing teleological tendency and laments -the absence of a "psychological" explanation of Vico's life;<a name="FNanchor_63_66" id="FNanchor_63_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_66" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> -as if Vico had not himself explained that he was writing it from a -"philosophical"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> point of view.<a name="FNanchor_64_67" id="FNanchor_64_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_67" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> And what is the meaning of a -philosophical treatment of a philosopher's life but an understanding -of the objective necessity of his thought and a perception of the -scaffolding it involves even where the author at the moment of thinking -did not clearly perceive it? Vico "meditates upon the causes, natural -and moral, and upon the occasions of his fortunes; he meditates upon -the inclinations or aversions he felt from childhood towards this or -that branch of study; he meditates upon the opportunities or hindrances -which assisted or retarded his progress; he meditates, lastly, upon -certain efforts of his own in right directions which bore fruit in the -reflections upon which he built his final work, the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> -which work was to demonstrate that his literary life was bound to have -been what it was and not different."<a name="FNanchor_65_68" id="FNanchor_65_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_68" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> Vico's <i>Autobiography</i> is, -in a word, the application of the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> to the life of its -author, the course of his own individual history: and its method is as -just and true as it is original. Vico succeeded in part only of his -attempt, and could not form a criticism and history of himself to the -same extent to which a modern critic and historian is in a position -to do—whose efforts will again be improved upon by those of the -future—is too obvious to need emphasising. The <i>Autobiography</i> itself -concludes with a blessing upon the author's hardships, a profession of -faith in Providence and a sure expectation of fame and glory.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61_65" id="Footnote_61_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_64"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62_65" id="Footnote_62_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_65"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 446.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_63_66" id="Footnote_63_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_66"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> In the Introduction to vol. iv. of the <i>Opere.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_64_67" id="Footnote_64_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_67"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> in <i>Opp.</i> iv. p. 402.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_65_68" id="Footnote_65_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_68"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> - - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>IX</h5> - - -<p>In the last years of his life Vico, enfeebled by age, domestic trouble -and illness, "entirely gave up his studies":<a name="FNanchor_66_69" id="FNanchor_66_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_69" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -My pen is slipping from my palsied grasp;<br /> -The door of my thought's treasury is closed,<a name="FNanchor_67_70" id="FNanchor_67_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_70" class="fnanchor">[67]</a><br /> -</p> - -<p>he cries in two mournful lines of a sonnet in 1735. He prepared at -this time additions and corrections for a possible reprint of the -second <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> and incorporated them in the final manuscript -of the work; he thought for a time of printing his small work "on the -Equilibrium of the Living Body" (<i>De aequilibrio corporis animantis</i>) -composed many years earlier and now lost;<a name="FNanchor_68_71" id="FNanchor_68_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_71" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> he still discharged -some of the duties<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> of his office, such as the speech on the marriage -of the king, Charles Bourbon, in 1738. But from 1736 or 1737 his son -began to assist him in his professional work, and in January 1741 he -was definitely appointed to the chair on his father's resignation.<a name="FNanchor_69_72" id="FNanchor_69_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_72" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> -Vico henceforth lived among his family like an old soldier <i>exacta -militia,</i> thinking over his past battles and conscious of having -done his life's work. His good son read to him for some hours every -day out of the Latin classics he had once loved and studied so well. -And in this evening of his life he was at least spared the crowning -agony suffered in his last years by a philosopher more fortunate than -himself, Immanuel Kant; the agony of continuing and completing his -system of philosophy, and wearing himself out in a fruitless struggle -with thoughts that eluded his grasp and words that no longer obeyed -him. Vico had said all he had to say; a great historian of his own -life, he knew the moment at which Providence had finished its work in -him, closed the door of thought it had so freely opened, and ordered -him to lay down his pen.<a name="FNanchor_70_73" id="FNanchor_70_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_73" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_66_69" id="Footnote_66_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_69"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 415.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_67_70" id="Footnote_67_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_70"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> vi. p. 425 (Sonnet on the marriage of Raimondo di -Sangro, 1735).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_68_71" id="Footnote_68_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_71"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>Bibl. vich.</i> pp. 38-9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_69_72" id="Footnote_69_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_72"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Gentile, <i>II Figlio di G. B. Vico,</i> pp. 30-48.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_70_73" id="Footnote_70_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_73"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> The documents and the scattered notes used in this -lecture and quoted from the contents of my <i>Bibliografia vichiana</i> are -now all collected in my edition of the <i>Autobiografia, carteggio e -poesie varie:</i> cf. the present vol. <i>infra,</i> p. 308.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_II" id="APPENDIX_II">APPENDIX II</a></h5> - - -<h5>THE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT<a name="FNanchor_1_74" id="FNanchor_1_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_74" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h5> - - -<p>The history of the vicissitudes of Vico's reputation must not be -allowed to replace or be confused with the exposition and valuation of -his thought, by losing sight of the history of philosophy properly so -called or confusing it with the history of culture.<a name="FNanchor_2_75" id="FNanchor_2_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_75" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> But even when -we pass to this second history, we must guard against another kind of -error, namely the pretence of determining by its means whether Vico's -work was or was not of use in the advancement of culture, and what -degree of utility we should grant it. The inquiry is meaningless, and -the degree cannot be measured: for rightly considered one disciple may -be worth tens or hundreds, one effect produced after centuries may -compensate its age-long delay, one point undeservedly forgotten may -become as notable and instructive as the best-deserved reputation, -and one single truth twice discovered independently may from this -re-discovery and seeming superfluity receive a confirmation of its -inevitable necessity. The work of Vico—such is the usual verdict—was -entirely useless, because it appeared out of its due time and -prematurely, and remained unknown or was known only because it could -convey nothing new. Such language is a blasphemy against history, which -allows nothing to be useless and is always and throughout the work of -Providence, whose vast utilities must not be measured by the pettiness -of the human span.</p> - -<p>Was Vico appreciated in the course of the eighteenth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> century? Did any -one read him, understand him and follow his lead? The question has -been answered with equal decision in the affirmative and the negative. -The affirmative answer has been supported by a diligent collection of -scattered passages up and down the writers of the century mentioning -his name and doctrines and an accumulation of possible or apparent -traces of his thoughts visible though unacknowledged in Italian and -foreign literature. But a thinker like Vico can only be said to be -known when his fundamental thought has been grasped and the spirit -that animated him has been felt. Now the majority of the facts alleged -as proof of the efficacy of his work concerns particular doctrines -detached from the whole and accepted or contested just like those of -any other scholar and critic or any paradox-monger of his time. This -is true in the first place of his theory on the origin of the Twelve -Tables, discussed in the controversy between Bernardo Tanucci and Guido -Grandi from 1728 to 1731, contested in 1736 by Damiano Romano, accepted -in France by Bonamy in 1735 and recalled in 1750 by Terrasson; of the -views on the history and primitive government of Rome, mentioned by -Chastellux, adopted and expanded by Duni, and used by Du Bignon who -learnt them from Duni; of the hypotheses as to the prehistoric period -and the origins of humanity, employed and modified by Boulanger in -France and Mario Pagano in Italy; and lastly, of some conceptions upon -poetry and language which reappear in Pagano, Cesarotti and some others.</p> - -<p>A more essential question was that of the method of studying and -judging political institutions and laws; a question upon which -Montesquieu has been compared with Vico and accused of freely using the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> without acknowledging his debt. It is now established -through Montesquieu's journal that in 1728 Antonio Conti at Venice -advised the future author of the <i>Esprit des Lois</i> to buy Vico's book -at Naples; and Montesquieu must have followed this advice on reaching -Naples in the following year; for a copy of the 1725 edition of the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> is still preserved in the library at the château of La -Brède. But the mind of the French writer was too different from and -inferior to that of Vico to draw vital nourishment from a work such as -the <i>Scienza Nuova;</i> and the traces of imitation alleged to have been -discovered in the <i>Esprit des Lois</i> are very doubtful and in any case -of minor importance. It must be said on the other hand that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> merit -generally attributed to Montesquieu of having introduced the historical -element into positive laws and thus considering legislation in a truly -philosophical manner (as Hegel said later), that is, as a moment -depending upon a totality relative to all the other determinations -which go to form the character of a people or a period; this merit, in -order both of time and of excellence, belongs in reality to Vico.</p> - -<p>Like Montesquieu in the science of legislation, so Wolf in the Homeric -question has been suspected of tacitly deriving help from Vico's -speculations. But at the time when he published the <i>Prolegomena ad -Homerum</i> in 1795 Wolf did not know the <i>Scienza Nuova</i>; which he -knew in name only in 1801 and in fact the year after, when Cesarotti -presented him with the book. We must observe that Vico's judgment as -to the barbaric nature of the Homeric epos and the absence in it of -esoteric wisdom had been published in 1765 by the <i>Gazette littéraire -de l'Europe</i>; and further, that the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> was known and -used by the Danish philologist and archaeologist Zoega, who quotes it -in an essay on Homer composed in 1788 though not published till long -afterwards; and that Zoega corresponded with Heyne, who afterwards -accused Wolf of having derived from his own lectures the theory set -forth in the <i>Prolegomena.</i> Heyne had in fact expressed the idea of -a gradual genesis of the Homeric poems in 1790. In a word we may say -that Vico's views had to some extent penetrated into the atmosphere of -German philology: in which case Wolf may have originally had a certain -indirect knowledge of them. Even apart from this indirect communication -the fact remains, and is recognised by all students of the question, -that the Homeric theory conceived by Wolf must really be called -not Wolfian but Vician, since such it truly is in its fundamental -characteristics. Moreover, Wolf, as a philologist far superior to Vico -but much less great as a thinker, was not in a position to understand -the ideas which had led his predecessor to the doctrine he held -concerning Homer: a fact which is clear from the somewhat superficial -article he wrote on the subject in 1807.</p> - -<p>There was certainly at Naples during the eighteenth century a vague -consciousness in many minds of the greatness of Vico's work; but in -what precisely this greatness consisted nobody could determine, owing -to the lack of adequate experience and preparation. Outside Italy, -especially in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> Germany, where this preparation existed or at least was -much greater, Vico's work remained generally unknown, partly through -the discredit into which Italian books had fallen since the end of the -seventeenth century, and partly through the dimculties which Vico's -style presented to a foreign reader. When the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> did -fall into the hands of men competent to understand it, a series of -insignificant accidents interposed to prevent such an understanding. -Hamann procured the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> from Florence in 1777, at which -time he was engaged upon economics and physiocracy, fancying that it -dealt with these subjects; and the delusion was not dispelled when in -glancing over it he found himself faced by a collection of philological -studies and studies carried out with considerable carelessness. Goethe -received it at Naples in 1787 from Filangieri, who warmly recommended -it, took it back to Germany and lent it in 1792 to Jacobi; but it was -a happy coincidence rather than a true knowledge or a clear intuition -that led him to couple Vico's name with that of Hamann. Herder, who may -also have known Vico's work less through his correspondence with Hamann -in 1777 than by his travels in Italy in 1789, speaks of it in 1797 -in quite general terms, without noticing one of the many connexions -between Vico and himself, especially as regards the theory of language -and poetry.</p> - -<p>The only men in the eighteenth century who really to some extent -penetrated into the fundamental thought of Vico and proclaimed though -unwillingly his genuine greatness were—and this is another proof of -the solid mental fibre of Catholicism—his Catholic opponents, of whom -there were plenty: Romano, Lami, Rogadei, and above all Finetti. They -saw that in spite of his stubborn protestations of religious orthodoxy -Vico held a conception of Providence very different from that of -Christian theology; and that though he continually used the name of God -he never allowed him to operate effectively in history as a personal -God; that he made so sharp a distinction between sacred and profane -history as to reach a purely natural and human theory of the origin of -civilisation, by means of the state of nature, and of the origin of -religion, by means of fear, shame and the imaginative universal; while -the traditional Catholic doctrine admitted a certain communication -between sacred and profane history, and recognised in pagan religion -and civilisation the leaven of some kind of vague recollection of the -primitive revealed truth;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> that though protesting that he accepted and -reinforced the authority of the Bible, he threatened and shook it on -many points; and that his criticism of profane historical tradition, -conducted in a haughty spirit of rebellion against the past, might -open the road to the most dangerous abuses, since it provoked the -application of the same spirit and method to sacred history, which -happened in the case of Boulanger.<a name="FNanchor_3_76" id="FNanchor_3_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_76" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In this accusation are faithfully -indicated all the points destined later to enter into the nineteenth -century's solemn eulogy of Vico. Thus churchmen began to be suspicious -of him; and this bore fruit later in the restoration period, in the -anti-Vician polemic of Bishop Colangelo, and somewhat earlier in a -verdict of the royal censor Lorenzo Giustiniani, who pronounced the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> "a work marking a most unfortunate crisis in European -history."</p> - -<p>This tendency was opposed by the enthusiastic young students of -social and political matters at Naples at the end of the eighteenth -century, preparing themselves for an active part in the imminent -revolution. Among them Vico came to be considered as an anti-clerical -and anti-Catholic, and the legend arose, mentioned elsewhere in this -volume, that Vico purposely and deliberately made his work obscure -in order to escape ecclesiastical censure. These young men applied -themselves to the study and praise of the <i>Scienza Nuova;</i> they -proposed to reprint it, since it had become rare, together with the -other works and unpublished manuscripts of the author; they prepared -expositions and criticisms of Vico's philosophical and historical -system; some like Pagano tried to work it up afresh by adding to it -the ideas of French sensationalism, others like Filangieri did not let -their admiration of it dispel their rosy dreams of reform. In 1797 -the German Gerning on coming to Naples noted the zeal with which Vico -was studied, and projected a translation or at least a summary of the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> in German. When the fall of the Neapolitan Republic -in 1799 drove these young men, or rather those of them who escaped -the massacres and the gallows of the Bourbon reaction, into exile in -Northern Italy and especially in Lombardy, the cult of Vico was for the -first time ardently propagated. Vincenzo Cuoco, Francesco Lomonaco, -Francesco Salfi and other southern patriots passed the knowledge of the -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> to Monti, who mentioned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> it in his inaugural lecture -at Pavia in 1803, to Ugo Foscolo, who absorbed many of its ideas into -his poem the <i>Sepolcri</i> and his critical essays: to Alessandro Manzoni, -who was later to institute in his <i>Discorso sulla storia longobarda</i> -a famous comparison between Vico and Muratori: and to others of less -importance. Cuoco introduced Vico's work to Degérando, then at work on -his <i>Histoire comparée des systèmes philosophiques</i>; another exile, -De Angelis, put the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> into the hands of Jules Michelet; -Salfi mentioned Vico in articles in the <i>Revue Encyclopédique</i> and in -books and minor works in French. It was also through the suggestion -of these Neapolitans that the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> was reprinted at Milan -in 1801; and other editions and collections of Vico's smaller works -were not long in appearing. Thus in the first decade of the nineteenth -century Vico's reputation, which had till then been merely local to -Naples, spread over the whole of Italy.</p> - -<p>But, suitably to their personal disposition and to the spirit of the -times, the first and chief debt which the patriotic students of Vico -owed to his thought was political in character or rather belonging to -political philosophy; and consisted in a criticism of that Jacobinism -and philo-Gallicism of which they had had such unhappy experience -in the events of 1799.<a name="FNanchor_4_77" id="FNanchor_4_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_77" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Vico's thought led them to more concrete -concepts; and this is particularly visible in Vincenzo Cuoco's -admirable <i>Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana</i> (1800). -Similarly Ballanche some decades later in his <i>Essais de palingénésie -sociale</i> (1827) wrote that if Vico had been known in France in the -eighteenth century he would have exercised a beneficial influence on -the subsequent social revolutions. Another particular aspect of Vico's -work, the reform undertaken by him of historical methodology and social -science as an aid to history, was observed and emphasised by the -archaeologist Cataldo Iannelli in his work <i>Sulla natura e necessità -della scienza delle cose e delle storie umane</i> (1818). Foscolo and -those who drew their inspiration from him chiefly introduced into -literary criticism and history something of Vico's conceptions on the -historical interpretation of poetry.</p> - -<p>In Germany on the other hand Jacobi, who had read the <i>De -antiquissima,</i> immediately placed himself in the centre of the Vician -philosophy by discovering and pointing out in 1811, in his work <i>Über -den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung,</i> the close connexion -between the principle of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> convertibility of the true and the -created and the Kantian theory that one can perfectly conceive and -understand only what one is able to construct: a single step from -which position leads, as he observes, to the system of identity. The -same fact was recognised by Baader, who found in this system the -confirmation and foundation of the principle enunciated by Vico. But -the translation of the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> made by Weber in 1822 seems to -have been unsuccessful; and it does not appear that Vico was known to -Hegel, with whom he has so many substantial and formal affinities, -especially in the <i>Phenomenology</i>; and whose mania for triads might be -blamed just as the Catholic Finetti had blamed Vico for always standing -"upon rule of three." The resemblances again of Vico's theories to the -new German philological doctrines of Niebuhr, Müller, Böckh and many -others were not at all willingly admitted. The attitude of Niebuhr is -characteristic. Whether he knew Vico's work or not when he published -the first edition of his <i>Römische Geschichte,</i> he certainly knew -it later through Savigny and through the article entitled <i>Vico und -Niebuhr</i> published in 1816 by the Swiss Orelli; and yet he continued to -ignore him, through some kind of contempt or depreciation; an attitude -hardly praiseworthy but imitated by Mommsen.</p> - -<p>In France, the spread of knowledge concerning Vico's thought was due -to Michelet, who translated his works and in his last years described -Italy as "the second mother and nurse who in my youth suckled me upon -Virgil, and in my maturity nourished me with Vico; potent cordials that -have many times renewed my heart." Michelet was the first or one of the -first to proclaim, in his introduction, that Vico was not understood -in the eighteenth century because he wrote for the nineteenth. -Michelet was joined by Ballanche, of whom we spoke above, and also by -Jouffroy, Lerminier, Chateaubriand, and Cousin, some of whom grasped -the connexion between Vico and the German philosophy that Cousin was -at this time propagating in France; and later by Laurent, Vacherot, -De Ferron, Franck, Cournot and many others. Vico was read and admired -by Comte, who mentioned him in a letter to John Stuart Mill in 1844, -and lastly Léon Gambetta conceived in his youth a general history of -commerce upon the scheme of the Vician "reflux." The popularity of -Vico's name in France at this period was so great that it is several -times mentioned in joke in passages of Balzac's novels<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> and in -Flaubert's <i>Bouvard et Pécuchet.</i> But thought of the quality of Vico's -could never have a very deep or lasting influence in the persistently -intellectualistic and spiritualistic atmosphere of France. Perhaps the -most conspicuous results it produced were the theories of Fustel de -Coulanges on the ancient city and the origin of feudalism.</p> - -<p>But, to return to Italy, if the aspirations towards a national -uprising, which tended to vindicate and glorify all the ornaments -Italy could boast, raised Vico's name almost to a level with that of -Dante, the simultaneous renaissance of philosophy, which was shaking -off the sensationalism and materialism of the eighteenth century, was -bound to attach itself to the last great idealistic philosopher, to -use his thoughts and to shelter itself behind his authority. Vico's -complete works were now collected and editions of the single treatises -multiplied. And since in the national uprising two currents could be -distinguished, partly successive and partly fused, the neo-Guelphian -and the radical, and since this distinction was represented in -the philosophical awakening by that between Catholic idealism and -rationalistic idealism, the schools of Rosmini and Gioberti on the one -hand and Bruno and Hegel on the other; Vico, at once a Catholic and a -free philosopher, lent himself admirably, as is easy to understand, to -the contrary sympathies and interpretations of the two schools. Thus -originated two different pictures of him, both historically justified, -though the one painted him as he would have wished to be, the other as -he was. The Vico of the liberal Catholics was above all the Vico of -the metaphysical points, the Platonist, the mystic of the unknowable -God, the traditionalist of the prologues to the <i>Diritto universale,</i> -and hence the strictly Italian philosopher as opposed to those of -the rest of Europe, sons of the Reformation: whereas the Vico of the -rationalists, the bold and heretical author of the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> -is a European philosopher to be set side by side with Descartes and -Spinoza, Kant and Hegel. The former picture may be seen in the works -of Rosmini, Gioberti, Tommaseo and many others, among which we must -not forget those of a Neapolitan writer of lofty spirit, Enrico Cenni, -perhaps the best of all, who draws a loving picture of the Vico of -the Catholics. The latter portrait is found in the philosophers and -critics who from 1840 onwards acquired their education in the school -of German idealism; especially Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco de -Sanctis, who were the first to see<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> clearly Vico's relations to earlier -and later European thought and to substitute for mere observations -and vague impressions on the subject a scientific interpretation and -a determinate judgment. That the second school of interpreters and -critics were in the right, and that the liberal or idealistic Catholics -had taken up an untenable position and reproduced in their irresolution -and incoherence the irresolution and incoherence of Vico himself, was -proved by the fact, among others, that less liberal but more consistent -Catholics like the Spaniard Jaime Balmes show an inflexible distrust -and hostility towards the author of the <i>Scienza Nuova.</i></p> - -<p>The study of history in Italy during this period was less deeply -modified by Vico's influence; chiefly perhaps because the impulse of -the national uprising led to the neglect of primitive and Roman history -and the devotion of all its best energies to research into the origin -and vicissitudes of the Italian republics, a subject Vico had entirely -ignored. On the other hand, jurisprudence especially in the south was -dominated by his thought; and though it produced in this field no great -scientific results, it gave to the jurists a loftiness and breadth of -judgment and a concreteness of view which were long remembered and -regretted.</p> - -<p>After 1870, with the decay of philosophy in Italy and elsewhere, the -study of Vico also decayed: and for more than forty years there was no -demand for a reprint of his works. The monograph by Cantoni in the year -1867, in spite of some valuable passages, already shows unmistakable -signs of the decadence, founded as it is upon the idea that Vico's -value is greater according as he is less of a metaphysician and more -of a psychologist and historian: a position due not so much to the -intrinsic weakness ascribed to him by Cantoni in philosophical matters -as to the implicit conviction on the critic's part that metaphysic -in general is a valueless thing, useful only for rousing enthusiasm -in the addled heads of southern Italians. The great idealist of the -New Science was subjected, as a final insult, to the praises of the -positivists, who in their astonishing ignorance almost amounting -to innocence did not—and still do not—hesitate to allege as a -confirmation of their formal profession of faith the words "verum ipsum -factum," which according to them means that the truth is the fact -which we see and touch. Writings making any serious contribution to -the knowledge of any particular point on Vico's doctrines were rare. -Interest in Vico only reawoke<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> within the last decade with the general -reawakening of philosophical studies.</p> - -<p>Of the two best comprehensive works on Vico published towards the end -of last century one is due to the German Catholic Karl Werner (1881) -who expounds his philosophical and historical doctrines with great -care, judging them from the point of view of speculative theism, a -theory evolved under the influence of Baader and the second philosophy -of Schelling, and tending much more to the comprehension of Vico than -the psychology of Cantoni. The other is the work of an Englishman, -Robert Flint (1884), who wrote for the collection of Philosophical -Classics a brief monograph upon the subject, accurate in detail, and -if not profound at least guided by clear and sound sense. Recently -Sorel in France has shown the fruitfulness of certain views of Vico's, -especially that of the reflux, by applying them to the history of -primitive Christianity and the theory of the modern proletarian -movement, while in Germany Biese and Mauthner have brought his -conceptions of metaphor and language once more into favour.</p> - -<p>But in spite of all this Vico has never had justice done him in works -devoted to the history of modern philosophy. These, in the case both -of Höffding's book and of the greatly superior work of Windelband, and -in fact of all others, either pass over the Italian philosopher in -complete silence or else merely mention him as an experimenter, later -than Bossuet and earlier than Herder, in the dubious science of the -"philosophy of history." This lack of attention arises partly from an -insufficient knowledge of Vico's real nature; his fertile activities -in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, in aesthetic, in law and in -religion are all hidden behind that one label "philosopher of history." -Partly however it is due to the reaction of the history of politics -and culture on the history of philosophy; which produces the effect -that thinkers whose social influence came to an end with the fall of -the peoples or states to which they belonged, or who for some reason -or other had no considerable influence on European civilisation, are -sacrificed to others much less important from a philosophical point of -view but more influential or better known as exponents of social life -and representatives of cultural tendencies; so that where it would -be thought impossible to ignore, for example, Paley or d'Holbach or -Mendelssohn, it seems natural to pass over Giambattista Vico, though in -such company he is a giant among pigmies. The historical injustice of -this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> course has been already shown theoretically by the distinction we -have emphasised between the history of philosophy and the history of -culture; and in Vico's special case by our whole work, which clearly -shows the lacuna left by the omission of Vico in the general history of -European thought at the beginning of the eighteenth century.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_74" id="Footnote_1_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_74"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This appendix briefly recapitulates the chief results of -my researches into the subject set forth in the <i>Bibliografia vichiana</i> -and its two supplements (cf. the present volume, <i>infra,</i> <a href="#Page_310">p. 310</a>), -to which work I refer for fuller details and for the evidence for the -facts here laid down.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_75" id="Footnote_2_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_75"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_76" id="Footnote_3_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_76"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Labanca has devoted a highly instructive volume to the -Catholic criticisms of Vico: see the present volume, <i>infra,</i> <a href="#Page_309">p. 309</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_77" id="Footnote_4_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_77"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See above, <a href="#Page_247">pp. 247-9</a>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_III" id="APPENDIX_III">APPENDIX III</a></h5> - - -<h5>THE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE<a name="FNanchor_1_78" id="FNanchor_1_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_78" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h5> - - -<p>My statement, that the criterion of knowledge contained in Vico's -formula of the conversion of the true with the created is an original -and modern principle, has been contradicted by certain Catholic -editors; who state that this doctrine, however true, is not original -to Vico, and is indeed far from modern, being a purely Scholastic -doctrine. If I thought otherwise, this was only due to my insufficient -knowledge of Scholasticism.</p> - -<p>I might indeed ask at the outset how such complete ignorance of -scholasticism were possible: an ignorance not of its manifold -varieties and the tangled forest of its distinctions—that would be -comprehensible: but of no less a matter than the fundamental criterion -of its theory of knowledge, the starting-point of modern thought and -as such, it would seem, inevitably familiar to every student of the -elements of philosophy. But since it is always useful to suspect -oneself of ignorance, or even to believe oneself more ignorant than -one really is, I will make so far as concerns myself a voluntary -display of humility. I find it less easy, I confess, to extend the -accusation of ignorance to all who, like myself, have failed to run -Vico's criterion to earth in the scholastic lumber-room: Jacobi for -instance, who on reading it as expressed in the <i>De antiquissima,</i> sees -in it the first manifestation of Kantianism and absolute idealism:<a name="FNanchor_2_79" id="FNanchor_2_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_79" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -or the Catholic theologian Baader, who finds its later development -in Schelling's philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> of identity:<a name="FNanchor_3_80" id="FNanchor_3_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_80" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> or the learned and subtle -Spanish Thomist, Jaime Balmes, who treats it as a unique idea and -attacks it from the scholastic point of view:<a name="FNanchor_4_81" id="FNanchor_4_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_81" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> or the equally learned -Catholic Bertini, who accepts and develops Jacobi's observation:<a name="FNanchor_5_82" id="FNanchor_5_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_82" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -or the eminent historian of philosophy Wilhelm Windelband, who, while -unacquainted with Vico's doctrines, on coming across indications of a -similar thought in Sanchez's <i>Quod nihil scitur</i> was greatly struck by -it and endorsed its value by the assertion that it was to bear fruit -at a later date and in the hands of a greater philosopher, Immanuel -Kant:<a name="FNanchor_6_83" id="FNanchor_6_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_83" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> or again the specialist in the history of scholasticism, Karl -Werner, the author of a careful monograph on Vico,<a name="FNanchor_7_84" id="FNanchor_7_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_84" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> who nowhere -notices the alleged scholastic character of Vico's theory of knowledge. -Scholasticism must indeed be a difficult and mysterious doctrine, if it -is inaccessible to all these students, qualified and bound though they -are to understand it.</p> - -<p>But we cannot pause on the threshold to speculate: we must plunge -straight into the argument. In what part of scholasticism can we find -Vico's criterion converting knowledge with creation?</p> - -<p>The Thomistic saying, "truth and reality are convertible," <i>ens et -verum convertuntur,</i> has been quoted:<a name="FNanchor_8_85" id="FNanchor_8_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_85" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> but quotations of this kind -are perhaps more calculated to confuse by words than to convince by -facts. The same value attaches to the statement that Vico himself -confessed the scholastic origin of his principle, since the very first -chapter of the <i>De antiquissima</i> begins with the words "in Latin, -the truth and the fact reciprocate, or, as the scholastic mob says, -convert," <i>"Latinis verum et factum reciprocantur, seu, ut scholarum -vulgus loquitur, convertuntur."</i> Here it is perfectly clear to any -one on a moment's thought that Vico, Latinist as he was, meant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> -simply to substitute the Ciceronian "<i>reciprocari</i>" for the barbarous -"<i>converti.</i>"</p> - -<p>St. Thomas explained the meaning of his formula quite clearly, -especially in the Summa Theologica, Part I. question xvi. art. 3. -Here he asks whether the truth and the reality are convertible, -<i>utrum verum et ens convertantur;</i> to which he replies as follows: -"that as the good is of the nature of the desirable, so the truth -has the nature of knowledge. But in so far as a thing has existence -in itself, thus far it is knowable. And for this reason it is said -in <i>De anima,</i> Bk. III. text. 37 (431 b 21) that 'the soul is in a -sense all things' according to sense and intellect. And hence as the -good is convertible with the existent, so is the true. But yet as the -good adds to existence the nature of the desirable, so also the truth -adds a reference to the intellect." (<i>Quod sicut bonum habet rationem -appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem cognitionis. Unumquodque autem -in quantum habet de esse, in tantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc -dicitur in</i> 3 <i>de Anima, text.</i> 37, <i>quod 'anima est quodammodo omnia' -secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo sicut bonum convertitur cum -ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis -supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum.</i>) Nothing then -can be known except what exists, and nothing can exist but what is -good: existence, truth and goodness are all convertible. Thus, too, -things are called good in so far as they correspond to the idea in -their Creator's mind. "Each single thing partakes of the truth of -its own nature in so far as it imitates the knowledge of God, like -an artefact in so far as it agrees with the art": "the knowledge of -God is the cause of things": "the knowledge of God is the measure of -things." (<i>Unumquodque in tantum habet de veritate suae natura, in -quantum imitatur Dei scientiam sicut artificiatum in quantum concordat -arti</i> I. xiv. 12. <i>Scientia Dei est causa rerum</i> I. xiv. 12. <i>Scientia -Dei est mensura rerum</i> I. xiv. 12.) But truth and goodness, the -objects of intellect and will respectively, if on the one hand they -are "convertible in reality," <i>convertentur secundum rem,</i> on the -other they are "distinguishable in thought," <i>diversificantur secundum -rationem</i> (I. lix. 2). What have these thoughts in common with Vico's -idea that the condition of knowing a truth is to create it? In fact, -what is here stated is that the condition of making a thing is to -know it, or as St. Thomas says in the same place (I. xiv. 8)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> in St. -Augustine's words (<i>De Trinitate</i> xv. 13) "<i>Universas creaturas et -spirituelles et corporales non quia sunt ideo novit Deus, sed ideo -sunt quia novit.</i>" (God does not know all His creatures corporeal and -spiritual because they exist: but they exist because He knows them.)</p> - -<p>Vico makes no kind of mention of the formula <i>ens et verum -convertuntur,</i> though he knows and quotes—a fact which has escaped my -critics—the analogous phrase "the true and the good are convertible," -<i>verum et bonum convertuntur:</i><a name="FNanchor_9_86" id="FNanchor_9_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_86" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> a formula which he diverts to his -own purposes, or rather unites it with his own. "In the first place," -he writes, "I establish a truth which is convertible with the created, -and in this sense I understand the good of the schools, convertible -with existence: and hence I infer that the one and only truth is in -God, since in Him is contained all Creation."<a name="FNanchor_10_87" id="FNanchor_10_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_87" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> This union is reached -quite openly by identifying <i>verum</i> with <i>factum,</i> then <i>factum</i> -with <i>ens,</i> and finally the <i>verum-factum-ens</i> with the <i>bonum</i>: by -substituting the doctrine of Vico for that of the schools. By such a -method of interpretation one could reduce all doctrines to a single -one, a <i>perennis philosophia.</i> I do not say that it would be a method -entirely devoid of truth; but it is certainly not a historical method.</p> - -<p>That Vico's criterion is not only different from but inconsistent -with Thomism was shown, as I have already said, by Balmes; who -pronounced it "specious but devoid of solid foundation." He uses St. -Thomas's statements to controvert Vico's theological doctrine that God -understands because He creates, opposing to it the Scholastic view -that He creates because He understands. He denies, that the Word was -conceived by the mere knowledge of what is contained in the divine -omnipotence, for it is conceived not simply by creatures but also and -chiefly by the cognition of the divine essence ("for the Father by -understanding himself and the Son and the Holy Ghost and all other -things embraced by His knowledge conceives the Word, so that thus -the whole Trinity is implied in the Word, and also every creature": -<i>Pater enim intellegendo se et Filium et Spiritum sanctum et omnia -alia quae ejus scientia continentur concipit Verbum, ut sic tota -Trinitas Verbo dicatur, et etiam omnis creatura);</i> he objects that, -granting this criterion, God could never know himself, because He -is not His own cause. He denies that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> intelligence is only possible -through causality, inasmuch as it is also possible through identity. -He accuses Vico's criterion of involving scepticism: in a word he -maintains that the facts of knowledge are known by reason, even if they -are not the products of reason.<a name="FNanchor_11_88" id="FNanchor_11_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_88" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> I am not concerned to ask whether -Balmes is right, or whether Vico's criterion can be reconciled with -Christian theology. I am concerned merely with establishing, not only -by quotation from St. Thomas but also by the help of the judgment of -an authoritative interpreter of his system that this doctrine is not -Thomistic.</p> - -<p>Even granting that the criterion in question is irreconcilable with -Thomism but not with an improved Christian theology, it is certainly -irreconcilable with both in the form it adopts in what I have called -"Vico's second theory of knowledge," in the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> which -Balmes either did not know or omitted to mention, and is passed over by -my critics with a light-heartedness that is not particularly enviable. -One of them asserts that "the alleged distinction" (the distinction -that is drawn by myself) "between Vico's first and second theories of -knowledge does not in point of fact exist, and produces no effects of -any kind." What? Has it no effects, when those historical studies and -sciences of mind, which in the <i>De antiquissima</i> occupied the lowest -position among mere probabilities became in the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> the -truest of all—true even in a higher degree than mathematics itself -as dealing with the human world which "is man's creation?" when their -form is found "in the modifications of the actual human mind itself?" -when they have "a reality as much greater, as the reality of the laws -of human affairs is greater than that of points, lines, areas and -figures?"<a name="FNanchor_12_89" id="FNanchor_12_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_89" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Is there no distinction, when we pass from the scepticism -of the <i>De antiquissima</i> to the rationalism of the statement that these -"proofs are of a divine nature," and must produce "a divine pleasure, -since in God to know and to create are one and the same"?<a name="FNanchor_13_90" id="FNanchor_13_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_90" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>It is true that upon this point my attention has been recalled to a -well-known passage of Galileo (<i>Dialogo dei massimi sistemi</i>), an -especial favourite of our own Spaventa,<a name="FNanchor_14_91" id="FNanchor_14_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_91" class="fnanchor">[14]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> where we find the thought -that the human intellect differs from the divine <i>extensivè,</i> but -not <i>intensivè,</i> and that if the divine intellect knows infinitely -more about mathematical propositions because it knows them all, yet -"of these few facts known by the human intellect, its knowledge is -equal to that of the divine in objective certainty, since it attains -comprehension of the necessity than which no greater certainty, it -seems, can exist." But in any case Galileo was not a Schoolman, and -moreover this pronouncement of his seemed so dangerous to the Christian -theory of ideas, that he himself was obliged to alter it by admitting -that while "so far as the truth of which mathematical proof gives no -knowledge is concerned, this is identical with that which the divine -wisdom knows," yet "the manner, in which God knows the infinitely -numerous propositions of which we know a few, is immensely superior to -our own, which proceeds discursively from one conclusion to another, -while His is simple intuition." It is important too not to forget -that this very statement figures among the heads of the accusation in -Galileo's trial.<a name="FNanchor_15_92" id="FNanchor_15_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_92" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> - -<p>If the formula of the conversion of the true with the created is not -found in Thomism, it may perhaps be found, at least in its original, -sceptical or mystical, intention, in other tendencies of scholasticism -or mediaeval philosophy generally. With Thomism Vico seems to have had -neither acquaintance nor sympathy: but from his autobiography it is -plain that he studied nominalism and the summaries of Petrus Hispanus -and Paulus Venetus, though with little profit,<a name="FNanchor_16_93" id="FNanchor_16_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_93" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and later also, -much more profitably, the Scotist philosophy; which he considered the -most Platonic of the Scholastic systems.<a name="FNanchor_17_94" id="FNanchor_17_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_94" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Traces of this appear in -several views expressed in the <i>De antiquissima,</i> especially in those -dealing with universals and ideas. In this direction, the direction -that is to say of the Scotist system and the closely allied system of -Occamism, I have attempted various researches, without attaining any -remarkable results: further, I have applied for assistance to various -specialists in Scholasticism, but in vain; they would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> do nothing -but express their own superficial impressions or lose themselves -in idle disputation. In general it seems possible to say that Duns -Scotus's theory of knowledge presents points of affinity to that of -Vico: for example, in the polemic against the Thomistic doctrine of -the <i>adaequatio intellectus et rei,</i> which he refutes by applying it -to the divine knowledge, since God knows objects as willed by Him, -and they exist because He wills their existence without His being -necessitated by them.<a name="FNanchor_18_95" id="FNanchor_18_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_95" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> For Occam again the thought of objects has -no reality and objectivity (or subjectivity according to the usage of -Scholastic terminology, which is the reverse of modern) in God, and is -nothing else than the objects themselves, known by God according to the -possibility of creating them, in virtue of which they are thinkable -to the divine mind.<a name="FNanchor_19_96" id="FNanchor_19_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_96" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> But the question for Vico is not merely the -priority of creation to knowledge or knowledge to creation, but the -convertibility or identity of knowledge and creation.</p> - -<p>In certain recently published philosophical observations by Paolo -Sarpi,<a name="FNanchor_20_97" id="FNanchor_20_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_97" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> a nominalist of Occam's school,<a name="FNanchor_21_98" id="FNanchor_21_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_98" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> the following statements -are to be found. They are the more notable because standing as they -do without any results in Sarpi's thought and being undeveloped in -subsequent philosophy, they seem to be not his own invention but a -mere repetition of scholastic dicta. "We have certain knowledge both -of the existence and of the cause of those things which we understand -fully how to create: of those which we know by experience, we know the -existence, but not the cause. We can however guess at it, and look -simply for a possible cause: but out of many found to be possible -we cannot be certain which is the true one. This fact may be seen -in descriptions of astronomical theories, and would also be true in -the case of a man who saw a clock for the first time. Of the various -guesses, that of a man who knew how to make similar objects would -be nearest the truth, <i>e.g.</i> one who understood the construction of -machinery when he saw a different kind of machine: but none the less -he will never on that account<a name="FNanchor_22_99" id="FNanchor_22_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_99" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> know for certain. There are then -three kinds of knowledge:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> first, knowledge how to make the object: -secondly, experience of it: and thirdly, guessing at possibilities." -This thought, then, namely that objects are known by their creator, -and that God knows objects because He creates them, seems to have been -current in the schools: and this explains the fact of its reappearing -in an incidental manner and as an obvious truth in Francesco Sanchez's -<i>Quod nihil scitur</i> (1581) where it is declared impossible "<i>perfecte -cognoscere quis quae non creavit; nec Deus creare potuisset nec creata -regere quae non perfecte precognovisset</i>"<a name="FNanchor_23_100" id="FNanchor_23_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_100" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> (that one should know -perfectly things which he has not created: nor could God have been able -to create nor after creating them to control things which He had not -perfectly foreknown).</p> - -<p>But need we continue to look for it in the guise of a casual remark -or an isolated proposition, devoid of philosophical connexion, in the -works of philosophers or the lecture-rooms of the schools? Did it not -simply form a part of the common thought which daily declares that the -man who has made a thing knows it better than he who has not made it? -Probably a little attention would reveal it in many and dissimilar -treatises; and for my own part, while reading the <i>Chronicon</i> of Otto -of Freising the other day, I came across it in the introduction to -the third book, where the chronicler, writing as is well known under -the influence of St. Augustine's <i>Civitas Dei,</i> is arrested by the -objection that God's designs in history are inscrutable, and delivers -himself of the following reflections: "What then shall we do? If we -cannot understand, shall we hold our peace? Then who will reply to -those who flatter, repel those who attack, and by the reason and might -of his words confute those who would destroy the faith that is in us? -So we cannot understand the secret counsels of God, and yet we are -often compelled to give a reasonable account of these things. What? -Shall we reason about things which we do not understand? We can give -reasons, but human reasons, when yet we cannot understand the divine -reasons. And thus it happens that when we speak of theological matters, -lacking the right words for them, we being men use our own words; and -in speaking of so great a God in human language, we use our words the -more boldly <i>quo ipsum figmentum nostrum cognoscere non dubitamus,</i> -because we never doubt that we know the thing we have ourselves formed: -<i>quis enim melius cognoscit quam qui creavit?</i> for who knows<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> a thing -better than he who has created it?"<a name="FNanchor_24_101" id="FNanchor_24_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_101" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> The logic of the Abbot of -Freising at this point may be thought a trifle sophistical: but the -fact remains that he refers to a common opinion that he knows things -who has made them.</p> - -<p>But probably Vico was stimulated to the establishment of his criterion -less by certain tendencies of Scotism or by current opinions than by -the philosophers of the Renaissance, which he considered the golden -age of metaphysical study, when shone, as he says, "Marsilio Ficino, -Pico della Mirandola, Augustino Nifo and Augustino Steuco, Jacopo -Mazzoni, Alessandro Piccolomini, Matteo Acquaviva and Francesco -Patrizio."<a name="FNanchor_25_102" id="FNanchor_25_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_102" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> In Ficino, whose name he couples with those of Plato -and Plotinus,<a name="FNanchor_26_103" id="FNanchor_26_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_103" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> and especially in his <i>Theologia Platonica,</i> Vico -could read a magnificent description of the productive character of -the divine wisdom and its parallelism with that of the geometrician. -Nature, says Ficino, which is divine art, differs from human art in -that it produces its creations from within, by living reasons: and "it -does not touch the surface of matter by means of a hand or any other -external instrument, as the soul of a geometer touches the dust when -he describes figures upon the earth, but <i>perinde ut geometrica mens -materiam intrinsecus phantasticam fabricat,</i> it operates like the mind -of a geometer creating an imaginary matter from within itself. For -as the geometer's mind, while it considers within itself the nature -of figures, forms internally by pictures the image of figures, and -by means of this image forms an imaginary spirit without any toil or -design, so in the divine art of nature a wisdom of some kind by means -of intellectual processes endows with natural seeds the life-giving -and motive force itself which is its companion."<a name="FNanchor_27_104" id="FNanchor_27_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_104" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> Vico must have -recalled this passage in Ficino when in his inaugural lecture of 1699 -he compared God, "the artist of nature," to the human mind which -"we may without impiety call the God of art," just as he must have -remembered it in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> <i>De antiquissima</i> where he compares God to the -geometrician.<a name="FNanchor_28_105" id="FNanchor_28_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_105" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Vico might however have found thoughts of this -kind in various Renaissance philosophers, not only in Ficino: among -others, in Girolamo Cardano, who contrasts divine and human knowledge, -though with a different conclusion; and restricts the one to finite -objects ("for understanding is brought about by a kind of proportion, -<i>proportione quaderni fit,</i> and there is no proportion between the -infinite and the finite"), denying that man can know God, for as Vico -said later in almost the same words, "if I knew God, I should be God," -<i>si scirem Deus essem.</i> Thus he postulated "other sciences, and other -modes of understanding, entirely different from this of ours; more -true, more solid, more firm, as a body is than its shadow: and again -other principles which we can by no reason apprehend." And not only did -he postulate them, but among the human sciences he observed one which -as opposed to the natural sciences reached not merely the surfaces of -things but almost the things themselves, namely mathematics. "The human -soul, situated in the body, cannot attain to the substances of things, -but wanders about upon their surfaces by the help of the senses, -examining measurements, actions, resemblances and doctrines. But the -knowledge of the mind, which creates the fact, is in a sense itself the -fact, just as even among human sciences the knowledge of a triangle, -that it has three angles equal to two right angles, is practically -identical with the truth itself (<i>scientia vero mentis, quae res -facit, est quasi ipsa res, veluti etiam in humanis scientia trigoni, -quod habeat tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, eadem ferme est ipsi -veritati</i>), whence it is clear that there is in us a natural science -of a different kind from true science."<a name="FNanchor_29_106" id="FNanchor_29_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_106" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Here, in the definition of -divine knowledge and of the procedure of human knowledge in the case of -mathematics, as opposed to that of physical science, is implicit the -principle that true knowledge consists in the identity of thought with -its object.</p> - -<p>The idea of the opposition of mathematics to physical science, in the -certainty of the one and the uncertainty of the other, persisted in the -Neapolitan philosophers and scientists<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> of Vico's youth, even if they -lost sight of the reason of this opposition. Tommaso Cornelio in his -"progymnasma" <i>De ratione philosophandi</i> (1661) after reviewing the -errors produced by the illusions of sense in physical science, says, -"the contemplations of mathematics are not subjected to errors of this -kind, dealing as they do with things whose images are not introduced -into the mind by the senses; for the mind can by itself adequately -conceive figures and numbers, whose properties and analogies are -examined by mathematicians, without aid from sense."<a name="FNanchor_30_107" id="FNanchor_30_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_107" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> This ought to -be emphasised, since it seems highly probable that Vico was stimulated -to the establishment of his general theory of knowledge by reflection -upon mathematics and the contrast between it and physical science. -In fact the Latin speeches, our earliest documents for his studies, -though they show the influence of Ficino and a certain amount of -Cartesianism,<a name="FNanchor_31_108" id="FNanchor_31_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_108" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> are never dominated by this general criterion. It is -only in the last of these speeches, that of 1707, that the distinction -between mathematics and natural science begins to appear; in the next -year it is clearly stated in the <i>De ratione studiorum,</i> where it takes -the form of a general criterion. "We demonstrate geometry because we -make it: if we could demonstrate physical facts, we should be creating -them. For the true forms of things exist only in God the greatest -and best, and to these the nature of them conforms" (<i>geometrica -demonstramus quia facimus: si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus. -In uno enim Deo Opt. Max. sunt verae rerum formae, quibus earundem est -conformata natura</i>). And this theory attained its full development in -1710 in the <i>De antiquissima.</i></p> - -<p>Such are the probable precedents, or as the common but inaccurate -metaphor expresses it, "sources" of Vico's theory of knowledge. I do -not think that the formation of this theory can have been influenced by -the propositions of Geulinx and Malebranche which have been pointed out -to me,<a name="FNanchor_32_109" id="FNanchor_32_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_109" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> namely that "no one can make that which he does not know," -and that "God alone knows his works, because he foreknows his action." -In these propositions the old Thomistic doctrine is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> substantially -summarised. Much more tenable would be a connexion or at least a -comparison with Spinoza; we may recall the Spinozistic identification -of the <i>ordo et connexio idearum</i> and the <i>ordo et connexio rerum.</i> -Another ingenious, but I think, inaccurate view is that "the analytic -geometry of Descartes was the introduction of the genetic principle -into the study of geometrical objects," so that the principle <i>verum -ipsum factum</i> "before being formulated by Vico had been practised by -Descartes"; and Vico in the <i>De antiquissima</i> "adopted the scientific -method of Descartes, which he stated as the convertibility of the true -with the created," raising it "from a certitude to a criterion."<a name="FNanchor_33_110" id="FNanchor_33_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_110" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> -We are dealing here not with practice, but simply with the theory of -method: for this method, conceived in its universality, just so far as -it is practical has always been practised; not by Descartes alone, and -not only by analytic geometry.</p> - -<p>We should certainly be better informed as to the precedents of Vico's -criterion if we knew more of his studies preparatory to the <i>De -antiquissima,</i> and if in general we had more literary evidence about -his youth. Perhaps even the precedents I have indicated, which I only -called probable, are not quite free from an element of chance; they -may be connexions only imagined by myself and non-existent for Vico's -mind, while others not accidental may perhaps be still unknown, or -await discovery by a student more fortunate than myself. But it may -not be out of place to remark that the search for "precedents" does -nothing to explain the new thought that followed them; much less does -it detract from the value of that thought. Such information, though on -the one hand it enriches our knowledge of the history of philosophy, on -the other hand has absolutely no effect upon the determinate thought -under examination. It is valuable in the biography of a philosopher, -but valueless for the comprehension of the proper meaning of the new -theory, which must be sought essentially in the new problem which it -faces and attempts to solve. In the history of philosophy the same -principles hold good as in that of literature. Take for example the -episode of Argante and Tancred in canto xix. of "Jerusalem Delivered"; -Argante, while taking up his position for the fight with his adversary, -turns "as if in doubt" to the "afflicted city," towards Jerusalem -attacked by the crusaders; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> when Tancred brutally mocks him, asking -whether he does this out of fear, he replies:—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 20%;"> -I was but thinking how this city,<br /> -The immemorial green of Juda's realm,<br /> -Is falling, vanquished; whose unhappy fate<br /> -I have in vain endeavoured to repel.<br /> -</p> - -<p>Here the precedents are easily found; Hector parting from Andromache -and foreseeing the unhappy fate of Ilion, Priam and all his people -(ἒσσεται ἧμαρ, etc., <i>II.</i> vi. 448-9); or Aeneas as he gazes upon its -downfall (<i>ruit alto a culmine Troia: ... si Pergama dextra,</i> etc., -<i>Aen.</i> ii. 290-92). And yet the tragic melancholy of Argante is an -entirely new creation, and altogether original to Tasso.</p> - -<p>Ficino, Cardano, Tommaso Cornelio, Scotus and Occam, and any others who -have been or shall be added to the list, have or may have anticipated -this or that element of Vico's formula: and yet when we turn from their -statements to the <i>De antiquissima</i> and the polemics that follow it, -and read the definition of science, of true science, as the conversion -of the true with the created, it strikes us as an entirely original -theory. The fact is that Vico had not to face the same opponents and to -solve the same problems that were faced and solved by the schoolmen, -nominalists and mystics of the Middle Ages or by the Platonists and -naturalists of the Renaissance, nor yet those of Descartes in his -<i>Discours sur la méthode;</i> and the saying that "he alone knows things -who creates them" acquires a new value, a new meaning (and this is its -proper meaning) from its being used to refute the Cartesian <i>cogito</i> -and the doctrine of immediate knowledge. Vico takes an old rusty -sword and makes of it at least a glittering and trenchant weapon. For -the same reason the phrase is no longer a mere accident or incident, -but the starting-point of a special study, the foundation of a new -philosophy, and Vico could quite well describe it as something not -learnt from another but thought out and established by himself. And -when he wants to find some original for it, he invents a history which -is really a fiction or a myth; namely the history of ancient Italian -wisdom which used this criterion as its supreme guide and left a trace -of it in the Latin language in the synonymity of the words <i>verum</i> and -<i>factum.</i></p> - -<p>The refutation of the Cartesian criterion (which De Sanctis thought -"complete," the "last word of criticism"<a name="FNanchor_34_111" id="FNanchor_34_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_111" class="fnanchor">[34]</a>) is the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> negative aspect -of Vico's theory of knowledge. Its positive side, absent in the <i>De -antiquissima,</i> is developed as we have said in the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> -where the human knowledge of the mind and of history is raised to -the level of divine knowledge. And since some critics have not only -chosen to ignore the obvious difference between these two phases of -Vico's thought but have spoken of a too easy transition from the -one to the other, it will be well to observe that this transition -was for Vico if not entirely conscious at least very slow and very -difficult. He must at one time have shared Descartes' and Malebranche's -contempt for history; in the speech of 1701 he even echoed a saying -of Descartes against philologists:—"You, Philologist, boast of -knowing everything about the furniture and clothing of the Romans -and of being more intimate with the quarters, tribes and streets of -Rome than with those of your own city. Why this pride? You know no -more than did the potter, the cook, the cobbler, the summoner, the -auctioneer of Rome."<a name="FNanchor_35_112" id="FNanchor_35_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_112" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> But eleven years later, in the second reply -to the <i>Giornale dei letterati,</i> Vico refers to the same phrase with -the contrary conclusion, and deplores that "the study of languages is -to-day considered profitless, thanks to the authority of Descartes, -who says that to know Latin is to know no more than did Cicero's -servant-girl."<a name="FNanchor_36_113" id="FNanchor_36_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_113" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> Vico had in the meantime become conscious of the -importance of the "probable" knowledge of history and politics. He -refers to his former anti-historical Cartesianism in a passage of -the <i>De constantia philologiae</i> which has generally escaped notice. -Speaking of philology he says: "I, who have all my life delighted -in the use of reason more than in memory, seem to myself the more -ignorant the more facts I know in philology. Whence René Descartes and -Malebranche were not far wrong when they said that it was alien to the -philosopher to work much and for long at philology." But he adds that -later he perceived that "these two most notable philosophers ought, -it they had been zealous for the common glory of Christendom, not for -the private glory of philosophers, so to have pressed forward the -study of philology as to see whether philology could be attached to -the principles of philosophy (<i>ut viderent philosophi an philologiam -ad philosophiae principia revocare possent</i>)."<a name="FNanchor_37_114" id="FNanchor_37_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_114" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> The elevation of -philology<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> to the rank of philosophy, of the knowledge of the world of -man to the level of divine knowledge, is the positive aspect of Vico's -theory of knowledge. It is this that is developed in the <i>Scienza -Nuova,</i> towards which the <i>De antiquissima,</i> with the indication of the -historical sciences as against Cartesianism, only prepared the way.</p> - -<p>Thus of the three points in which I placed the originality and value -of Vico's first theory of knowledge, two, namely the criterion of -knowledge opposed to that of Descartes and the defence of concrete as -opposed to abstract sciences, are not only left intact by the inquiries -into their sources which I have just described, but are actually -reinforced.</p> - -<p>There remains the third of my points: the Vician theory of the -arbitrary nature of mathematics, the originality of which has also been -impugned by arguments which seem to me to have even less foundation -than those I have examined above.</p> - -<p>Do we find the doctrine that the fundamental objects of mathematics, -the unit of arithmetic and the point of geometry, are unreal or -fictitious, propounded before Vico's time? Do we find it—this is the -chief point—propounded not as a casual remark or an intuition of a -truth, but as a consciously reasoned concept from which legitimate -consequences are drawn as to the limitations of mathematics and its -inability to furnish real knowledge of mind, nature and history?</p> - -<p>All through the Middle Ages the Aristotelian theory of mathematics is -continually enunciated. According to this theory mathematics is the -most certain of the sciences because the simplest; it abstracts from -all sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter (ὖλη νοητή) which -exists in sensible objects but not qua sensible (ἐν τοῑς ἀἰσθητοῑs -ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾖ ἀἰσθητά)<a name="FNanchor_38_115" id="FNanchor_38_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_115" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> According to Cassiodorus it constituted the -body of <i>doctrinalis</i> as opposed to <i>naturalis</i> (physical) science and -<i>divina.</i> Albertus Magnus followed Aristotle in defining mathematical -entities as separable "in imagination," "in thought" but not "in -reality" (<i>in phantasmate, secundum rationem, non secundum esse</i>) -from the sensible matter to which "they are conjoined by existence" -(<i>per esse sunt coniunctae</i>); and St. Thomas said that mathematics -"though the objects it considers are not separate, yet considers them -in so far as they are separate"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> (<i>etsi sunt non separata ea quae -considerat, tamen considerat ea in quantum sunt separata</i>).<a name="FNanchor_39_116" id="FNanchor_39_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_116" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> The -arbitrary character of its foundations was never suspected. Dante, when -he wished to indicate "the things which not being subject to our power -we can only contemplate and not create," enumerated "the objects of -mathematics, physical science and divinity" (<i>mathematica, physica et -divina</i>).<a name="FNanchor_40_117" id="FNanchor_40_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_117" class="fnanchor">[40]</a></p> - -<p>Just as mathematics was not always equally valued in antiquity, so, -and much more so, after the Renaissance of learning, it was variously -exalted or despised. Giordano Bruno satirised the abuse of it, and -said that without physical science "to be able to calculate and -measure, to understand geometry and perspective, is but a pastime of -ingenious fools," and warned his readers against confusing mathematical -"signs" and real "causes": "a reflected or direct ray, an acute or -obtuse angle, a perpendicular, incident or straight line, a greater -or smaller are of a circle, such and such an aspect, are mathematical -circumstances and not natural causes. To play with geometry is one -thing, to prove by means of nature is another. It is not lines -and angles that make the fire more or less hot, but near and far -situations, short and long spaces of time."<a name="FNanchor_41_118" id="FNanchor_41_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_118" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> Campanella flatly -denied Aristotle's assertion of the superiority of mathematics to -physical science, declaring that its alleged purity was really weakness -(<i>debilitas</i>), its simplicity was inability to include more things -(<i>plura accipere</i>), its universality a contradiction against the nature -of true science which is always of particulars (<i>de singularibus</i>), -its demonstrative method by signs not by causes (<i>per signa, non per -causas</i>); and finally that it is not a science investigated for its -own sake and is valueless unless it is applied to physical matters -(<i>nisi applicentur physicis rebus</i>).<a name="FNanchor_42_119" id="FNanchor_42_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_119" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Bacon is of the same opinion, -that mathematics taken by itself is useless, and is useful only as an -"auxiliary science," a "great appendix" to the physical sciences.<a name="FNanchor_43_120" id="FNanchor_43_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_120" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> -These definitions and restrictions, and others like them, might have -yielded as a conclusion the entirely instrumental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> and practical -character of mathematical science: but the conclusion was not drawn, so -far as I know; and Bacon himself considered mathematics as in itself -too exclusively and uselessly theoretical. "For since," he goes on in -the passage above quoted, "it is a fact of human nature, no doubt to -the great detriment of science, that it rejoices in the open plains -of generalities, so to speak, rather than in the forests and closes -of the particular, no discovery is more pleasant and gratifying than -mathematics wherewith to sate this love of wandering and of meditation."</p> - -<p>The "creation" of mathematics spoken of by Ficino, Cardano and -others signified a mental production entirely free from material -presuppositions, and for that reason not less true but true in a -higher sense. It is almost the same sense as that found in Descartes -and his followers. Locke asserts the reality of mathematical truths, -though he admits that there are in nature no figures corresponding -to the archetypes existing in the mind of the geometrician;<a name="FNanchor_44_121" id="FNanchor_44_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_121" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> and -Leibniz, commenting on this passage, says that "the ideas of justice -and temperance are no more our own invention than those of the circle -and the square."<a name="FNanchor_45_122" id="FNanchor_45_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_122" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Tommaso Cornelio, whom we have quoted on the -contrast between physical science and mathematics, also believed that -mathematics rested on "certain notions and understandings which nature -has put into the minds of men as foundations of science."<a name="FNanchor_46_123" id="FNanchor_46_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_123" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p> - -<p>Another kind of "creation," and one which seems to have more connexion -with Vico's <i>"fingere"</i> is discussed in a passage of Aristotle's -<i>Metaphysics</i> which has had a good deal of influence. "We find also," -Aristotle says, "geometrical figures by actualising them (ἐνεργεἰα), -because they are found by being divided: if they <i>were</i> divided, they -would be obvious, but in reality they exist potentially. Why has the -triangle two right angles? Because the angles round one point are equal -to two right angles. If then we construct the angle along one side, it -would become plain to any one looking at it. Why is the angle in the -semicircle equal to a right angle? Because if there are three equal -lines, two in the base and one drawn perpendicular to it, it is plain -to any one who sees it and knows that. Whence it is evident that we -discover things that exist potentially by reducing them to actuality.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> -This is because the actuality is understanding, and the potentiality -proceeds from the actuality; so we know by making (Greek: καὶ διὰ τοῡτο -ποιοῡντες γιγνώσκουσιν)."<a name="FNanchor_47_124" id="FNanchor_47_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_124" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> But these observations belong to the -explanations given by Aristotle in this passage of the conceptions of -potentiality and actuality; they are not at all opposed to his theory -of mathematics as studying the intelligible matter which subsists -in sensible matter, and they only explain the difference between -potential and actual truth. In the same way we sometimes find in later -philosophers the assertion that mathematical truths are demonstrated -and problems resolved "by making them." Thus Sarpi writes in the -passage mentioned above: "in mathematics, he who constructs knows -because he makes, and he who analyses learns because he seeks how the -thing is made. The mode of composition then belongs to the inventive -faculty and that of analysis to the discursive: the former is that -of problems, the latter of theorems; the latter are demonstrated by -analysis, the former by composition."<a name="FNanchor_48_125" id="FNanchor_48_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_125" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> - -<p>It has also been recently asserted that the Vician philosophy of -mathematics reappears bodily in Galileo and his school;<a name="FNanchor_49_126" id="FNanchor_49_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_126" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> an -astounding fact when baldly stated, since even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> though Vico opposes -and prefers the great Pisan to Descartes for the moderate use he makes -of mathematics in physical science, it is certain that for Galileo as -for Leonardo da Vinci mathematics had an objective validity, and the -book of nature is written in mathematical characters and geometrical -figures. In any case, the passage of Galileo which has been quoted -in this reference, on the intensive identity of human with divine -knowledge, has nothing to do with the present question, and another -passage which asserts that the explanations of terms are free, and it -is in the power of every workman to circumscribe and define in his own -way the things he is dealing with, without ever being led by this into -error or falsehood, and that for instance one may call the bow the -stern and the stern the bow, says nothing but a platitude hardly worth -saying except by way of adorning a page of controversial rhetoric.<a name="FNanchor_50_127" id="FNanchor_50_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_127" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> -In controversy one is often obliged to insist upon platitudes, and -the controversy upon which I am now engaged itself presents too many -examples.</p> - -<p>A passage from the <i>Lezioni accademiche</i> of Galileo's pupil Evangelista -Torricelli in which he speaks of the difference between physical and -mathematical definitions seems at first sight more convincing. But the -critic who has called attention to this passage<a name="FNanchor_51_128" id="FNanchor_51_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_128" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> says too much when -he asserts that "it is beyond doubt that Vico had read it," since it is -unquestionable that Vico had <i>not</i> read it. The <i>Lezioni accademiche</i> -were published first posthumously in 1715<a name="FNanchor_52_129" id="FNanchor_52_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_129" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> and Vico's theory of -mathematics is expounded in the <i>De ratione</i> in 1708 and the <i>De -antiquissima,</i> 1710. This, it is true, is of secondary importance, for -Vico may have known Torricelli's doctrine through indirect channels, -through other books or even orally through some Neapolitan friend or -pupil of Torricelli; in any case, if the latter's theory though unknown -to Vico was really identical with his own, the similarity of ideas -between the two would be of the greatest interest. Unfortunately the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> -critic has been too hasty, as it seems to me, even in his study and -interpretation of the pages of Torricelli.</p> - -<p>In the passage in question, a lecture <i>Della leggerezza,</i> read to -the Accademia della Crusca, Torricelli controverts, as based on mere -appearances and not confirmed by facts and reasoning, Aristotle's -definition in the <i>De coelo</i>: "heavy is that which has a natural -property of going towards the centre." He remarks upon this: "The -definitions of Physics differ from those of Mathematics in that the -former are obliged to adapt and adjust themselves to the object -defined, while the latter mathematical definitions are free and can be -formed at the will of the geometrician who is defining. The reason is -perfectly plain: the things defined in Physics do not come into being -with the definition, they exist already by themselves and are found -in nature previously. But the things defined by geometry, that is by -the science of abstraction, have no existence in the universe of the -world other than that which definition gives to them in the universe -of intelligence. Thus whatever objects of Mathematics are defined, -the same objects will come into existence simultaneously with the -definition."<a name="FNanchor_53_130" id="FNanchor_53_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_130" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p>The arbitrary character of mathematics seems here to be clearly stated. -But let us reserve our judgment and read on. "If I were to say, the -circle is a plane figure with four equal sides and four right angles, -this is not at all a false definition; but for the rest of my book I -should have to mean, whenever I spoke of a circle, a certain figure -which others have called a square. But if a man should say in Physics, -'the horse is a rational animal,' should we not be justified in calling -him the horse? We must first look very carefully to see whether the -horse is a rational animal or not and then define it as it is, in -order that the physical definition may conform to the object and not -be counted defective." Here we see that what appeared to be a profound -thought has turned out to be a platitude; it is indifferent whether we -call the bow the stern or the stern the bow, said Galileo, or, says -Torricelli in his turn, whether we call a square a circle or a circle a -square; while it does not seem to him an indifferent matter whether we -call a horse a rational animal. But even this does not prevent him from -admitting later some degree of arbitrariness in physical terminology, -when he says, "since then it is not demonstrated that the intrinsic -principle of downward motion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> exists upon the earth, I will accept this -definition, if the tests will allow me, as the simple imposition of a -name, and, replacing the verb 'to be' by the verb 'to be called,' I -will adapt the definition to my own requirements thus: That is called -heavy which descends to the centre. Whenever any one says, the earth is -heavy, I will agree, but always with the interpretation that the word -'heavy' only signifies descending in a lighter medium."<a name="FNanchor_54_131" id="FNanchor_54_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_131" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> - -<p>It seems to me then that the difference which he begins by laying down -between mathematics and physical science is considerably obscured in -the sequel. And indeed how could Torricelli have seriously thought that -the foundation of mathematics was a "fiction," when among his lectures -one heard the title "in Praise of Mathematics"? In this lecture he -says, quite in the Galilean style: "That to read the great Book of the -Universe, the book on whose pages may be found the true philosophy -written by God, mathematics are indispensable, will be seen by any -one who with noble thoughts aspires to the science of the integral -parts and greatest members of this huge body we call the World. The -one alphabet, the only characters with which we can read the great -manuscript of the divine philosophy in the book of the Universe are -those poor figures you see in the text-books of geometry."<a name="FNanchor_55_132" id="FNanchor_55_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_132" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> The most -we can see in these statements is a vague and hazy presentment of the -profound difference between physical truths and the so-called truths of -mathematics.</p> - -<p>In conclusion, until for the third of my three points we can discover -much more obvious "sources" than those suggested up till now, I shall -see no cause to modify my verdict upon the originality of Vico's -conception of mathematics. This originality is further proved by the -important consequences drawn by Vico from his theory of mathematics for -his philosophical method; for every one knows that a thought taken over -bodily from another remains inert and sterile, while an original idea -is always active and fruitful.</p> - -<p><i>Note.</i>—I have selected, of the various criticisms directed against -my book on Vico, that concerning his "originality," because this gave -me opportunities for researches and explanations of some value. But my -book has been subjected to two general criticisms which do not lend -themselves to the same treatment.</p> - -<p>It has been said that in my exposition of Vico's philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> I have -followed my personal philosophical convictions: and sermons and -epistles have been showered upon me preaching the duty of casting -off prejudices, etc., and narrating the history of philosophy in an -objective manner, etc. But I should like my critics to believe that my -"convictions" cannot have, to my mind, the character of prejudices, -but precisely that of liberation from prejudice, which is what they -demand: that detachment and purity of understanding which is necessary -for the comprehension of historical facts, and is not, as some fancy, -a primeval innocence, but the fruit of laborious cultivation. To -grasp Vico historically in his strict reality I have been compelled -to undergo a <i>catharsis</i> of prejudices, consisting in my case of -the philosophy to which my own efforts had led me. My ideas may be -untrue, but that is another question; and that means that if their -falsity is proved I am bound to clear and purify my mind by means -of less false ideas; but these in their turn must always be ideas -and become convictions. In point of abstract method, no objection at -all can be made to any one who looks at Vico through the spectacles -of scholasticism if he thinks they make his sight more distinct and -penetrating; the most we can do is to try and persuade him that -there are better spectacles on the market. But we certainly have -the right to smile if this same scholastic goes on to warn us that -"in studying a philosopher, in investigating and reconstructing his -thought, it is absolutely necessary to bring to the task a mind free -from preconceptions and hostile to prejudices"; while all the time he -is trying to pass off his scholastic opinions and religious beliefs -under the banner of objectivity, sincerity and freedom from prejudice. -"Philosophers"—I have seen this assertion too—"are unfitted for -writing the history of philosophy, because they have ideas of their -own." And who is fitted for it? People who are not philosophers? Does -not Vico teach us precisely this, that where he who makes the facts (as -the philosopher makes philosophy) himself narrates them, there history -reaches its highest certainty?</p> - -<p>The other criticism concerns the idealistic interpretation which I -have given to some of Vico's doctrines. It is contended that Vico -was a Catholic, and that fact is supposed to prove that he could not -have entertained the ideas which I find in his works. But that Vico -professed himself an entirely orthodox Catholic, and that he clung to -Catholicism with all the strength and zeal of his mind I have myself -said again and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> again: I have even defended him against the accusations -or praises dealt out to him by other critics for deceit or prudence in -his attitude to the Church. But is it really so amazing, so unheard-of -a thing, to find heterodox ideas in an orthodox writer? Are they not -found in the Early Fathers and the Schoolmen, in mediaeval and modern -theologians and mystics? To take an example of the many that occur, -an example for a double reason above suspicion: Nicholas of Cusa was -a Catholic and in fact a Cardinal of Holy Church, and in his lifetime -the intimate friend of three popes. And yet the Catholic historian of -Scholasticism, De Wulf, wrote of him "Le Cardinal catholique est-il -donc panthéiste?... Il s'en défend vivement dans son <i>Apologia doctae -ignorantiae,</i> mais on peut dire de lui comme d'Eckehart: 'il fait -fléchir la logique au profit de son orthodoxie et retient de force les -conséquences de ses prémisses'" (<i>Hist. de la philos. médiévale,</i> p. -389). If this happened to the Cardinal of Cusa or the Franciscan Master -Eckehart, could it not happen to the Catholic Vico? M. de Wulf the -Catholic historian is allowed to use this admirable method of criticism -and to distinguish intention and action, will and logic. Why should it -be denied to me? But enough.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_78" id="Footnote_1_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_78"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A lecture delivered before the <i>Accademia pontaniana</i> on -March 10, 1912, and here reprinted from the <i>Atti</i> of that society, -vol. xlii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_79" id="Footnote_2_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_79"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung</i> (1811), -W.W. iii. 351-354.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_80" id="Footnote_3_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_80"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Vorlesungen über religiose Philosophie,</i> W.W. i. 195, and -<i>Vorles. über spekul. Dogmatik, ib.</i> ix. 106 (passages quoted by K. -Werner, G. B. Vico, p. 324).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_81" id="Footnote_4_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_81"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>La Filosofia fondamentale,</i> translated from the Spanish, -Naples, 1851, bk. i. ch. 30-31.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_82" id="Footnote_5_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_82"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Storia critica delle prove metafisiche di una realità -sovrasensibile (Atti dell' Accademia di Torino,</i> i. 1866), pp. 640-41.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_83" id="Footnote_6_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_83"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Geschichte der neueren Philosophie</i> (1878), 5th edition, -i. 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_84" id="Footnote_7_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_84"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>G. B. Vico als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher</i> (Wien, -1881). It is well known that Werner has written upon St. Thomas, Duns -Scotus, late Scholasticism, Suarez, Augustinianism, nominalism, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_85" id="Footnote_8_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_85"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Th. Neal (A. Cecconi), <i>Vico e l'immanenza,</i> in the Roman -<i>Cultura contemporanea,</i> iii. (1911) parts 7-8, pp. 1-24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_86" id="Footnote_9_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_86"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Cf. <i>Summa Theol.</i> i. q. v. a. I: q. xxi. a. 1-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_87" id="Footnote_10_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_87"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Prima risposta al Giornale dei letterati (Opere,</i> ed. -Ferrari, ii. 117).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_88" id="Footnote_11_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_88"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Balmes, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_89" id="Footnote_12_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_89"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> ed. Nicolini, i. 187-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_90" id="Footnote_13_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_90"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 188.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_91" id="Footnote_14_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_91"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Scritti filosofici,</i> ed. Gentile, pp. 383-7, and -<i>Esperienza e metafisica,</i> p. 218 <i>sqq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_92" id="Footnote_15_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_92"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See Gentile's note, <i>loc. cit.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_93" id="Footnote_16_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_93"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le poesie varie,</i> ed. -Croce, pp. 4-5. Mauthner's assertion (<i>Beiträge zu einer Kritik der -Sprache,</i> Berlin, 1901, ii. 497-8) that Vico was a nominalist and -that the great discoveries of the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> were due to his -nominalism, is quite arbitrary and not founded correctly on his -autobiography.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_94" id="Footnote_17_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_94"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Autobiography,</i> ed. cit. pp. 5-6. Pietro Giannone was -also studying Scotism about 1690 (<i>Vita scritta da lui medesimo,</i> ed. -Nicolini, pp. 6-7).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_95" id="Footnote_18_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_95"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Werner, <i>Johannes Duns Scotus</i> (Wien, 1881), p. 76.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_96" id="Footnote_19_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_96"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Werner, <i>Die nachscotistische Scholastik</i> (Wien, 1883), -p. 82.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_97" id="Footnote_20_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_97"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Scritti filosofici inediti,</i> ed. Papini (Lanciano, -Carabba, 1910).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_98" id="Footnote_21_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_98"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> See Gentile's observations on Papini's edition, in the -<i>Critica,</i> review viii. 62-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_99" id="Footnote_22_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_99"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Papini's edition has "po'" (little): but his source, the -Marcian MS., has an abbreviation to be read as "però" (therefore).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_100" id="Footnote_23_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_100"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Appendix to his <i>Opera medica</i> (Tolosae Tectasogum, -1636), p. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_101" id="Footnote_24_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_101"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Ottonis Episcopi Frisigensis Opera,</i> ex recens. R. -Wilmans, i. <i>Chronicon</i> (Hannoveriae, 1867), pp. 118-19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_102" id="Footnote_25_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_102"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Autob.</i> ed. cit. p. 21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_103" id="Footnote_26_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_103"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_104" id="Footnote_27_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_104"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Theologia Platonica</i> (Bale, 1561), i. 123. This passage -of Ficino has been quoted and commented on by my friend Gentile, in a -highly important monograph on <i>La prima fase della filosofia di G. B. -Vico</i> (viz. the "inaugural lectures"), published in the miscellany in -honour of Francesco Torraca (1912, see <i>infra,</i> p. 310) and read in MS. -by myself, thanks to the courtesy of the author.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_105" id="Footnote_28_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_105"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_106" id="Footnote_29_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_106"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> These passages of the <i>Tractatus de arcanis -aeternitatis,</i> ch. iv., and of the <i>De subtilitate,</i> bks. xi. and -xxi. are quoted and commented on by Fiorentino, <i>Bernardino Telesio -ossia studi storici su l' idea della natura nel risorgimento italiano</i> -(Florence, Le Monnier, 1872), i. 212-13, who does not fail to observe -the relations with Vico's criterion.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_107" id="Footnote_30_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_107"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> Thomae Cornelii consentini <i>Progymnasmata physica</i> -(Naples, MDCLXXXVIII.), p. 70: cf. also p. 64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_108" id="Footnote_31_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_108"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_109" id="Footnote_32_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_109"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> By A. Pastore in a review of my monograph on Vico in the -<i>Giorn. stor. d. left. ital.</i> lviii., cf. pp. 400-402.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_110" id="Footnote_33_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_110"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> A. A. Zottoli, <i>G. B. Vico,</i> in <i>Cultura,</i> Rome, xxx. -(1911) pp. 422-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_111" id="Footnote_34_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_111"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_112" id="Footnote_35_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_112"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>Orazioni latine,</i> ed. Galasso, p. 28.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_113" id="Footnote_36_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_113"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Opp.</i> ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_114" id="Footnote_37_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_114"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> 232.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_115" id="Footnote_38_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_115"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> vi. 1036 a.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_116" id="Footnote_39_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_116"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> The passages of Cassiodorus, Albertus and St. Thomas may -be found collected in Mariétan, <i>Problème de la classification des -sciences d'Aristote à saint Thomas</i> (Paris, 1901), see pp. 80, 168-9, -182-3, 185-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_117" id="Footnote_40_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_117"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>De monarchia,</i> i. c. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_118" id="Footnote_41_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_118"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>La Cena delle ceneri</i> (1584) in his <i>Opere italiane,</i> -ed. Gentile, i. 62, 107-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_119" id="Footnote_42_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_119"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Logicorum libri très,</i> bk. ii. art. 7-10 (in the -<i>Philosophiae rationalis pars secunda,</i> Parisiis, 1637, pp. 433-7).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_120" id="Footnote_43_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_120"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,</i> bk. iii. c. 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_121" id="Footnote_44_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_121"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Essay,</i> iv. ch. 4, § 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_122" id="Footnote_45_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_122"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>Nouveaux essais,</i> iv. ch. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_123" id="Footnote_46_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_123"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_124" id="Footnote_47_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_124"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>Metaphys.</i> viii. 1051 b. I append the passage: -εὑρἰσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεἰᾳ · διαιροῡντες γὰρ -εὑρἰσκουσις. εὶ δ' ἧν διῃρημένα φανερὰ ἂν ἧν · νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει -δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τò τρίγωνον ὃτι αἱ περἱ μἱαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι -ἲσαι δύο ὀρθαῑς. εὶ oὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τἡν πλευρὰν ἰδόντι ἂν ἧν εὐθὺς -δῆλον. διὰ τί ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρΘὴ καΘόλου; διὀτι ἐὰν τρεῑς, ἤ τε βάσις -δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταΘεῑα ὀρΘὴ, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῑνο εἰδὀτι. ὤστε -φανερòv ὄτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργεἰαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρἰσκεται. αἴτιον -δ' ὄτι νὀησις ἡ ἐνεργεἰᾳ · ὤστ ἐξ ἐνεργεἰας ἡ δυνάμις. καὶ διὰ τοῡτο -ποιοῡντες γιγνώσκουσιν.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_125" id="Footnote_48_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_125"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Scritti filosofici,</i> ed. Papini, p. 7. In a passage of -the <i>Arte di ben pensare</i> (<i>Scritti,</i> p. 72) Sarpi returns to mathematics -and, while agreeing that it is less uncertain than the other sciences -because in it "the mode and the proposition" are more clearly shown, -goes on to say "it is also made in the same manner (as the others): it -is not free from the suspicion of being not quite true." But clearly -he is here speaking of the application of mathematics, of the act of -counting and measuring physical objects: "this alone is certain: I -count and reason in this manner, just as in eating honey I feel the -effect which I call sweet; where I may be in error is the question -whether this effect comes from the object or from the disposition of my -taste: and there is no science where there are number and measurement, -for all we can know is that we measure or count like this, and that -the measure comes in or is used as many times as the thing seems to be -equal to one such part and that equality is a concept of ours by which -we express what then seems to happen."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_126" id="Footnote_49_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_126"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> G. Papini, <i>La Novità di Vico</i> in <i>L'Anima,</i> Florence, -September 1911, pp. 264-6; cf. on this article, <i>Critica,</i> x. 56-8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_127" id="Footnote_50_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_127"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Papini probably owes this passage to a small anthology of -Galileo by Favaro (Florence, Barbèra, 1910), p, 303, which refers to -the national edition of his <i>Opere,</i> iv. 631; here the passage occurs -in the <i>Considerazioni sopra il discorso di Colombo</i> (1615).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_128" id="Footnote_51_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_128"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> G. Papini, <i>loc. cit.</i> pp. 265-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_129" id="Footnote_52_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_129"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Lezioni accademiche di Evangelista Torricelli, -mathematico e filosofo del serenissimo Ferdinando II Granduca di -Toscana, lettore delle matematiche nello studio di Firenze e accademico -della Crusca</i> (Florence, MDCCXV.). The editor's preface shows that the -work had not been previously published.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_130" id="Footnote_53_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_130"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> pp. 31-2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_131" id="Footnote_54_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_131"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 33.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_132" id="Footnote_55_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_132"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Op. cit.</i> p. 66.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="APPENDIX_IV" id="APPENDIX_IV">APPENDIX IV</a></h5> - - -<h5>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES</h5> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>I. WORKS OF VICO</h5> - - -<p>Vico's earliest extant work is the poem entitled <i>Feelings of one in -despair,</i> composed certainly before the author's twenty-fifth year at -Vatolla in the Cilento, where he lived for nine years as a tutor at -the Casa Rocca, printed by Gonzatti at Venice and dated 1693. This was -followed by verses and speeches of a merely rhetorical character.</p> - -<p>The philosophical characteristics are accentuated in the six speeches -read by Vico at Naples University, 1699-1707, not printed by him, and -rediscovered and published by Galasso (Naples, Morano, 1869). In these -speeches, though some tendencies of his thought show themselves, his -philosophy is still the traditional system, not without some traces of -Cartesianism. Vico's opposition to Cartesianism and formal adoption of -his own views are announced for the first time in the inaugural lecture -for the year 1708, entitled <i>De nostri temporis studiorum ratione,</i> -published next year by the author himself (Naples, Mosca, 1709). A -long digression (§§ 12-15) contains a sketch of the history of Roman -jurisprudence, his first essay in the historical studies which led -later on to the <i>Diritto universale</i> and the two <i>Scienze Nuove.</i></p> - -<p>The following year appeared Vico's first constructively philosophical -and historical work: the <i>De antiquissima Italorum sapientia ex -linguae Latinae originibus eruenda,</i> or rather the first book of that -work (Naples, Mosca, 1710): the other two were never written, but -we can form an idea of their intended contents from what is said in -the Autobiography. Beside Vico's theory of knowledge in its first -form and the metaphysic which he always maintained in its entirety, -the <i>De antiquissima</i> contained an attempt to reconstitute for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> -first time primitive wisdom, or rather one particular instance of -primitive wisdom, that of Italy; but as we have already said in the -text of our exposition the attempt was founded on the idea that this -wisdom was philosophical, and conducted according to the criterion -of the transmission of culture which Vico subsequently rejected, as -he rejected the traditional opinion, accepted in this work, of the -Athenian origin of the laws of the Twelve Tables. We must accordingly -refuse to accept Cantoni's verdict (<i>G. B. Vico,</i> p. 38) that the -<i>De antiquissima</i> forms "a strange anomaly in the history of Vico's -thought, being contrary to his whole scientific life, his tendencies, -his principles, and the method which later he almost universally -applies in his historical researches." The reverse is in fact the case: -namely that this work is the starting-point of his future developments -and that without it we cannot understand his later thought.</p> - -<p>The criticisms directed by the <i>Giornale dei letterati d' Italia</i> -(1711, vols. v. and viii.) against the historical and some of the -philosophical positions of the <i>De antiquissima</i> evoked Vico's two -important <i>Replies</i> (Naples, Mosca, 1711 and 1712) in which he defends -and elucidates his views on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. -The part of the <i>De antiquissima</i> that never went to the press included -his meditations on the philosophy of medicine, from which he extracted -an essay <i>De aequilibrio corporis animantis:</i> this he thought of -publishing many years later, but it is now lost. Of these studies, -therefore, as of his speculations upon physics intended to constitute a -<i>Liber physicus,</i> we know only what he tells us in his autobiography.</p> - -<p>Setting aside his rhetorical and occasional compositions, the largest -of which is the <i>De rebus gestis Antonii Caraphaei</i> (Naples, Mosca, -1716), the continuation of his thought, now concentrating upon moral -and historical problems, is sketched in a lecture of 1719 (of which -an abstract is included in the autobiography) and developed first in -1720 in a printed prospectus of four double-columned pages known as the -<i>Sinopsi del diritto universale,</i> and secondly in the vast treatise, -<i>De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno liber unus</i> (Naples, -Mosca, 1720) completed next year with the <i>Liber alter qui est de -constantia iurisprudentis,</i> and supplemented in 1722 by the <i>Notae in -duos libros,</i> etc. (same publisher); a work which is usually referred -to briefly following the author's example as the <i>Diritto universale.</i></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span></p> - -<p>This book, according to Cantoni (<i>op. cit.</i> p. 243) represents the -culminating point of Vico's scientific activity. The verdict is no -more acceptable than that quoted above. The author (<i>Opp.</i> v. 10-11) -rejected the <i>Diritto universale</i> because he seemed to find persisting -there the prejudice and the pretence of "descending" from the thought -of Plato and other philosophers to that of primitive man, a tendency -which led him astray "in certain matters"; but he also calls it, and -rightly, a "sketch for the <i>Scienza Nuova,</i>" which it really is. -The ideas about poetry are here still confused, Homer is not yet a -myth, the mythological canons have less unity than they acquired -later, the theory of reflux is only faintly adumbrated, and in a -word both the ideal eternal history and the theory of knowledge upon -which it is founded are as yet immature. The book is all contained, -under a new form, in his later work, except the general ethical and -juridical philosophy, which is not highly original, and some historical -developments which are merely alluded to in the later writings.</p> - -<p>The MS. of an Italian work in two books, in which Vico expounded his -doctrines "by a negative method," has been lost. But he expounds them -positively and at less length in the <i>Principi di una Scienza Nuova -intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, per la quale si ritrovano i -principi di altro sistema del diritto naturale delle genti</i> (Naples, -Mosca, 1725) which is known by the title (again authorised by himself) -of First <i>Scienza Nuova.</i></p> - -<p>In 1725, the year of the publication of the first <i>Scienza Nuova,</i> Vico -related the history of his studies: <i>Vita di G. B. Vico scritta da -se medesimo,</i> which was inserted in Calogerà's <i>Raccolta di opuscoli -scientifici e filologici</i> (Venice, Zani, 1728, vol. i. pp. 145-256). -Among the minor writings of this period may be noted the two speeches -on the death of the Countess of Althann (1724) and the Marchesana della -Petrella Angiola Cimini (1727); the little volume <i>Vici vindiciae</i> -(Naples, Mosca, 1729) containing a personal defence (together with an -important theoretical digression on "laughter") against a malevolent -notice inserted in the <i>Acta Lipsiensia</i> of 1727, about the <i>Scienza -Nuova;</i> and some fine letters to Giacchi, Degli Angioli, Esperti, De -Vitry and Solla on the contrast between his works and the state of -learning at this time.</p> - -<p>To the first <i>Scienza Nuova</i> Vico thought of adding a long series of -<i>Annotations</i> in a reprint of it which he was preparing at Venice -between 1728 and 1730. But since this scheme was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> not carried out, -and on the other hand he was dissatisfied with the book not so much -on account of the matter, he says, as on account of the arrangement -(<i>Opp.</i> vi. 11), he resolved to publish an entirely new exposition -of his doctrines in the <i>Cinque libri de' principi di una Scienza -Nuova d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, in questa seconda -impressione con più propia maniera condotti e di molto accresciuti</i> -(Naples, Mosca, 1730), which form the second <i>Scienza Nuova.</i> While -Cantoni (<i>op. cit.</i> pp. 238-9) considers this work the dotage of -Vico's thought, it is really the necessary result and perfect form in -which his previous attempts issued; it is the book which with the <i>De -antiquissima</i> and the autobiography supplies all the necessary material -for a knowledge of his thought. In the <i>Diritto universale</i> and the -first <i>Scienza Nuova</i> we can find a few details omitted in the later -work; but those treatises display the same doctrines as the second -<i>Scienza Nuova</i> in a manner much less profound and solid, and certainly -less characteristic of the author. The detailed comparison of these -three works has been made with great care in the short summaries added -by Ferrari to his editions of the first and second <i>Scienza Nuova.</i></p> - -<p>Even the 1730 edition was increased by the author from 1731 to about -1740 by many variations and additions, though without changing the -arrangement or the substance of the work. These additions were taken -for the most part incorporated in a final MS. on which was based the -edition of the <i>Principi di una Scienza Nuova intorno alla comune -natura delle nazioni,</i> published the very year of Vico's death (Naples, -Stamperia Muziana, 1744). In the National Library at Naples are -preserved the autographs both of this MS. and of two earlier MSS. of -additions and corrections, unpublished fragments of which have been -published by Giordano (Naples, 1818) and Del Giudice (Naples, 1862). -All the unpublished fragments and variants have been now collected by -Nicolini in the edition hereafter mentioned (p. 307).</p> - -<p>After the second <i>Scienza Nuova</i> Vico wrote hardly anything. We may -note among these few productions the speech <i>De mente heroica</i> (Naples, -1732), the addition to the autobiography (1731), and a few sonnets -in which, composed though they were, like almost all his verses, by -request and as occasional pieces, a personal note may at times be felt.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>II. REPRINTS, COLLECTIONS, AND TRANSLATIONS</h5> - -<p>Two collections of Vico's minor works have been made, one of the -<i>Latinae orationes</i> alone by F. Daniele (Naples, 1766), and the other, -rich in unpublished matter, of the Italian and Latin <i>Opuscoli,</i> -in four volumes, by C. A. de Rosa, Marchese di Villarosa (Naples, -1818-23). Vico's son Gennaro furnished Villarosa with all his father's -extant papers; and these priceless autographs are still preserved at -Naples in the house of my intimate friends the engineers Tommaso and -Vincenzo de Rosa di Villarosa.</p> - -<p>The first and only edition as it may be called, since all others -are merely reproductions of it, of Vico's complete works is that of -Giuseppe Ferrari, in six volumes (Milan, <i>Classici italiani,</i> 1835-37) -reprinted with improvements in 1852-54. The <i>Opere</i> edited by N. M. -Corcia (Naples, Tipografia della Sibilla, 1834, 2 vols.) are only a -selection; and the <i>Opere</i> edited by F. Predari (Milan, Bravetta, 1835) -never went beyond one ill-arranged volume. The edition which followed -that of Ferrari (Naples, Iovane, 1840-41) is also incomplete and -ill-arranged, but contains some small unpublished works. The Neapolitan -edition of the <i>Opere</i> in eight volumes (i.-ii. 1858, iii. 1861, iv. -1859, v.-vi. 1860, vii. 1865, viii. 1869, the earlier volumes at the -Tipografia dei Classici Italiani, the others by the publisher Morano) -is based mainly upon Ferrari, but somewhat incorrect; it is however the -most complete of all, as containing the <i>Sinopsi,</i> the <i>Istituzioni -oratorie,</i> and the <i>Orazioni latine</i> published by Galasso subsequently -to Ferrari's edition, as well as the Italian translations by the -advocate F. S. Pomodoro of the <i>De ratione, De antiquissima,</i> and -<i>Diritto universale.</i></p> - -<p>Unpublished or scattered works of Vico not appearing in any of these -editions have been collected by Croce, <i>Bibliografia vichiana</i> and -<i>Primo</i> and <i>Secondo supplemento</i>: see below.</p> - -<p>A critical edition of the second <i>Scienza Nuova</i> is now being printed -in the <i>Collezione dei classici della filosofia modernadiretta da -B. Croce e G. Gentile</i> (Bari, Laterza): the first volume is to be -published at the same time as the present monograph.<a name="FNanchor_1_133" id="FNanchor_1_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_133" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> It is being -edited by Dr. Fausto Nicolini, who by using the autograph MSS. has -enriched Ferrari's edition, which contained the fragments suppressed in -the 1730 issue, by all the fragments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span> of the intermediate redactions -down to the 1744 text; Vico's quotations have been checked and -references given in notes to the passages of classical and modern -authors to which he refers; and, finally, in deference to a wish -often expressed by men of letters as authoritative as Tommaseo, the -orthography and punctuation have been corrected. Ferrari's valuable -summaries are reproduced, with a few emendations, in Nicolini's edition.</p> - -<p>Nicolini is also at work on a new edition of the complete works, to -form part of Laterza's collection of <i>Scrittori d' Italia,</i> the scheme -and detailed index of which may be seen in Croce, <i>Secondo supplemento -alla Bibliografia vichiana</i> (pp. 102-13). The fifth volume of this -collection, edited by Croce, is also to appear with the present -monograph.</p> - -<p>Vico's Latin works have frequently been translated into Italian: the -<i>De antiquissima</i> anonymously, perhaps by Vincenzo Monti (1816), and -later by Sarchi (1870): the first book of the <i>Diritto naturale</i> by -Corcia (1839), Amante (1841), Giani (1855), and Sarchi (1866), and both -books, with the <i>De ratione</i> and <i>De antiquissima,</i> as we have said, by -Pomodoro.</p> - -<p>The second <i>Scienza Nuova</i> was translated into French, much -abbreviated, by Jules Michelet, under the title of <i>Principes de la -philosophie de l'histoire</i> (Paris, Renouard, 1827) and frequently -reprinted; and again, in full, by an anonymous translator described as -"l'Auteur de l'Essai sur la formation du dogme catholique," in reality -Cristina Trivulzi, Princess of Belgioioso (Paris, Renouard, 1844). -Michelet also translated some of Vico's minor works, published with -the <i>Scienza Nuova</i> in the edition of the <i>Oeuvres choisies de Vico</i> -(Paris, Hachette, 1835) and frequently reprinted.</p> - -<p>In German there is a translation in full with good notes by W. E. -Weber (Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1844). There is also a summary of the first -book of the <i>Diritto universale</i> by K. H. Müller, forming the first -volume of a series of Vico's <i>Kleine Schriften</i> which was not continued -(Neubrandenburg, Brunslow, 1854).</p> - -<p>The only English translation is a version of the book on Homer based -on Michelet's French translation and inserted in H. Nelson Coleridge's -<i>Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets</i> (3rd ed., -London, Murray, 1846).</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_133" id="Footnote_1_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_133"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> By now (1913) the second volume has appeared: the third -will appear next year.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span></p></div> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>III. BIOGRAPHY OF VICO</h5> - -<p>By way of supplement to the autobiography, Villarosa collected -information on Vico's last years and published it as a continuation of -that work in his edition of the <i>Opuscoli,</i> vol. i. (1818).</p> - -<p>This supplement, together with everything else that has been published -in the way of documents or contemporary records of Vico, may be found -collected in the fifth volume of the new edition of his works above -mentioned (p. 307) and entitled: <i>L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le -poesie varie,</i> ed. B. Croce (Bari, Laterza, 1911).</p> - -<hr class="app" /> -<h5>IV. LITERATURE ON VICO</h5> - -<p>There are only three monographs on Vico which may still be read with -profit (that of Ferrari, <i>La Mente del Vico,</i> admirable editor though -he was, may best be consigned to merciful oblivion); they are as -follows:—</p> - -<p>1. Carlo Cantoni, <i>G.B.V., studi critici e comparativi</i> (Turin, -Civelli, 1867). Cf. for certain reservations A. Faggi, in <i>Rivista -filosofica italiana,</i> vol. ix., 1906, pp. 593-606, and G. Gentile, in -<i>Critica,</i> vol. v., 1907, pp. 197-201.</p> - -<p>2. Karl Werner, <i>G.B.V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher,</i> (Wien, -Braumüller, 1881). Cf. <i>Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philos. -Kritik,</i> vol. lxxii., 1883, pp. 139-52.</p> - -<p>3. Robert Flint, <i>Vico</i> (Edinburgh and London, 1884). (Italian -translation by F. Finocchietti, Florence, 1888).</p> - -<p>See what has been said of these above, <a href="#Page_277">p. 277</a>. Of short and general -studies the following are the best:—</p> - -<p>1. B. Spaventa, <i>G.B.V.,</i> in <i>Prolusione è introduzione alle lezioni -di filosofia</i> (Naples, Vitale, 1862), pp. 83-102, reprinted under the -title <i>La Filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia -europea,</i> ed. G. Gentile (Bari, Laterza, 1908); see pp. 111-35 of this -reprint.</p> - -<p>2. F. de Sanctis, <i>Storia della letteratura italiana</i> (Naples, Morano, -1870; new ed. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1912), vol. ii. pp. 342-62.</p> - -<p>3. F. Fiorentino, <i>Lettere sopra la "Scienza Nuova"</i> (Florence, 1865), -reprinted in <i>Scritti vari</i> (Naples, Morano, 1871), pp. 161-211.</p> - -<p>4. E. Cauer, <i>G.B.V. und seine Stellung zur modernen Wissenschaft</i> -(in <i>Deutsches Museum,</i> edited by R. Prutz and W. Woelfsohn, Leipzig, -Hinrichs, year I, 1851, vol. i. pp. 249-65).</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p> - -<p>For special points the following may be consulted:—</p> - -<p>1. F. A. Wolf, <i>G.B.V. über den Homer</i> (in <i>Museum der -Alterthumswissenschaft,</i> Berlin, 1807, vol. ii. pp. 555-70).</p> - -<p>2. J. K. von Orelli, <i>Vico und Niebuhr</i> (in <i>Schweizerisches Museum,</i> -Aarau, vol. i. p. 184 <i>sqq.</i>).</p> - -<p>3. C. Iannelli, <i>Sulla natura e necessità della scienza delle cose e -delle storie umane</i> (Naples, Porcelli, 1818, and Milan, Fontana, 1832).</p> - -<p>4. Emerico Amari, <i>Critica di una scienza della legislazione -comparata</i> (Genoa, Istituto dei Sordomuti, 1857). Cf. on this book K. -Werner, <i>E.A. in seinem Verhältnis zu G.B.V.</i> (Wien, 1880; from the -<i>Sitzungsberichte der phil.-histor. Klasse</i> of the Imperial Academy of -Vienna, vol. xcvi.).</p> - -<p>5. F. Acri, <i>Teoria del V. intorno alle idee O paradimmi</i> (in <i>Abbozzo -di una teoria delle idee,</i> Palermo, Lao, 1870; and with modifications -in the volume <i>Videbimus in aenigmate,</i> Bologna, Mareggiane 1907, pp. -287-313).</p> - -<p>6. E. Cenni, an exposition of Vico's metaphysic in the volume entitled -<i>Considerazioni sull' Italia ad occasione del traforo del Gottardo</i> -(Florence, Cellini, 1884), pp. 109-82.</p> - -<p>7. E. Bouvy, <i>De V. Cartesii adversario</i> (Paris, Hachette, 1889).</p> - -<p>8. E. Bouvy, <i>La Critique dantesque au dix-huitième siècle: Dante et -V.</i> (Paris, Leroux, 1892).</p> - -<p>9. G. Sorel, <i>Étude sur V.</i> (in <i>Devenir social,</i> Paris, vol. ii., -1896) and see esp. the same author's <i>Le Système historique de Renan</i> -(Paris, Jacques, 1905), <i>passim.</i></p> - -<p>10. B. Labanca, <i>G.B.V. e i suoi critici cattolici</i> (Naples, Pierro, -1898).</p> - -<p>11. G. Rossi, <i>V. nei tempi di V.</i> (in <i>Rivista filosofica italiana,</i> -vol. ii., 1899, pp. 294-319, and part 2, <i>ibid.</i> vol. x., 1907, pp. -602-34).</p> - -<p>12. A. Olivieri, <i>Gli studi omerici di G.B.V.</i> (in <i>Atti della r. -Accad. di archeologia, lettere e belle arti,</i> Naples, vol. xxiv., 1905).</p> - -<p>13. C. Trabalza, <i>Storia della grammatica italiana</i> (Milan, Hoepli, -1908), ch. xii. pp. 364-76.</p> - -<p>14. P. Garofalo, <i>Acrisia vichiana nella "Scienza Nuova,"</i> critical -annotations (Naples, Detken, 1909): cf. F. Nicolini, in <i>Critica,</i> vol. -viii., 1910, pp. 374-8.</p> - -<p>15. G. Maugain, <i>Étude sur l'évolution intellectuelle de l'Italie de -1657 à 1750 environ</i> (Paris, Hachette, 1909).</p> - -<p>16. On my own previous work upon Vico, it should be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> observed that -the materials of the chapter on Vico's aesthetic doctrine in Croce, -<i>Estetica</i> (4th ed., Bari, Laterza, 1912, ch. v. pp. 255-71), have been -worked up in a more mature form into ch. iv. of the present monograph: -the essay on Vico's Ethics (in <i>Critica,</i> vi., 1908, pp. 71-7) has been -absorbed into chaps, vi.-viii.; and similarly that on the <i>Lineamenti -di storia letteraria in G.B.V.</i> (<i>ibid.</i> pp. 460-80) into chaps, xvi. -and xviii.; my other scattered writings have in general been only of -technical, philological, or polemical interest. In the miscellaneous -<i>Studi in onore di F. Torraca</i> (Naples, Perrella, 1912) is a short -essay by me upon <i>La Dottrina del riso e dell' ironia in G.B.V.</i></p> - -<p>The whole of the literature on Vico, together with extracts from rare -books, minor works, and articles, and with unpublished documents -together with fully detailed notes on the editions of Vico's writings, -is collected in the three works to which I have frequently referred, -namely: B. Croce, <i>Bibliografia vichiana contenente nella parte I -il catalogo delle edizioni, traduzioni e manoscritti delle opere di -G.B.V.; nella parte II, quello dei giudizi e lavori storico-critici -intorno al V. sino al-l' anno corrente; nella parte III lettere -inedite del V. e al V., documenti e altri scritti inediti o rari, e -varie appendici illustrative</i> (Naples, 1904: reprinted from <i>Atti -dell' Accademia pontaniana,</i> Naples, vol. xxxiv.; pp. xii. 127, -4to);—<i>Supplemento alla Bibliografia vichiana</i> (Naples, 1907; -reprinted from <i>Atti,</i> vol. xxxvii. pp. 34, 4to)—and <i>Secondo -Supplemento</i> (Naples, 1911, reprinted from <i>Atti,</i> vol. xl. pp. 116, -4to); the whole collected in one volume under the title: <i>Bibliografia -vichiana; raccolta di tre memorie presentate all' Accademia pontaniana -di Napoli nel 1903, 1907 e 1910,</i> with an appendix by F. Nicolini -(Bari, Laterza, 1911).<a name="FNanchor_1_134" id="FNanchor_1_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_134" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_134" id="Footnote_1_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_134"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Since the publication of the Italian edition of this work -in 1911 several studies of Vico have appeared. The following may be -noted:— -</p> -<p> -G. Gentile, <i>La Prima Fase della filosofia di G.B.V.,</i> Naples, 1912 (in -the <i>Studi in onore di F. Torraca</i>), quoted <i>supra,</i> p. 287 n. -</p> -<p> -F. Pessico, <i>Ripensando la Scienza Nuova</i> (in <i>Rassegna nazionale,</i> -November 1, 1912). -</p> -<p> -G. Folchieri, <i>Il Carattere dell' opera di G.B.V.</i> (Perugia, Bartelli, -1913). F. Nicolini, <i>Spigolature vichiane; sul testo delle Vindiciae</i> -(in <i>Scritti vari in onore di R. Renier,</i> Turin, 1912). -</p> -<p> -B. Croce, <i>Il V. e la critica omerica</i> (in the volume <i>Saggio sullo -Hegel e altri scritti di storia della filosofia,</i> Bari, Laterza, 1913, -pp. 269-282). -</p> -<p> -Cf. also W. Windelband, <i>Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,</i> 5th -ed. Leipzig, 1911, vol. i. pp. 597-8.</p> -<hr class="app" /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span></p></div> - - -<h5>NOTE</h5> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">PASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE -COURSE OF THE EXPOSITION</p> - -<p>Chapter I.—For this chapter see the <i>De ratione,</i> the <i>De -antiquissima,</i> the two <i>Riposte al Giornale dei letterati,</i> and the -first part of the Autobiography. For the note (p. 8) on the spirit of -the Reformation, see <i>Opere,</i> ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. vi. 5.</p> - -<p>Chapter <i>II.—Opp.</i> v. 147, 239, 136-7, 51; iv. 33; v. 50-51, 147; -iv-33, 63-4; iii. 200; v. 17, 97, 103, 149-50, 174; iv. 20, 248; iii. -232; iv. 20; v. 562.</p> - -<p>Chapter III.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 147, 162, 99, 42; iv. 73, 81, 174-5; v. 91, 145.</p> - -<p>Chapter IV.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 141, 166, 42; iii. 232, 272-3; iv. 20; v. 175, -259, 107; iv. 22, 33; v. 180, 441, 209-10, 201; iv. 205, 206; iii. 274, -275; v. 230, 211, 169; iv. 201, 233, 365; v. 55, 82, 187, 196-7; iv. -224; v. 110, 112, 168, 212, 237, 217, 379, 440, 212, 238; iv. 24.</p> - -<p>Chapter V.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 80-81; iv. 20, 21, 74; v. 169; v. 161-7; iv. -191-3, 168-9, v. 18; iv. 169, 50-51; iii. 26; ii. 96-7; v. 166, 43, -169, 420-21, 387, 192, 379, 108.</p> - -<p>Chapter VI.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 437, 18; iv. 165; v. 109, 110, 534; vi. 15; v. -532; iii. 12; v. 106; v. 49; iv. 343; vi. 127; iii. 30; iv. 87; iii. -57; v. 490; iv. 40-41; iii. 30; iv. 334; iv. 35; iii. 12, 30; v. 97; -iii. 234-40; iv. 49; v. 98, 131; iv. 42-3.</p> - -<p>Chapter VII.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 142, 168, 173, 248, 250; iv. 291; v. 106, 242, -142, 137-8, 290; iv. 175-7, 42-3; v. 153, 241; iv. 9; v. 96, 242, 574; -iv. 332; v. 97; iv. 176-7, 43; v. 176, 131.</p> - -<p>Chapter <i>VIII.—Opp.</i> iv. 309-13; v. 185; iii. 55, 28, 43-4; v. 97; -iii. 47-52, 52-3; iv. 14, 45, 57; v. 148, 133; iii. 53, 85-7, 58; v. -240-41, 484; iv. 170-71, 180, 351.</p> - -<p>Chapter <i>IX.—Opp.</i> v. 462-3, 544; iv. 43-4, 46; iii. 94, 192-3, 85, -87; iv. 18, 335, 15; v. 129-30, 563, 564; iii. 55; v. 571; iv. 245, 13, -159-60; <i>Scritti inediti,</i> Del Giudice, pp. 11-14.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p> - -<p>Chapter X.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 13-14, 128, 143-4, 172, 570; iii. 22; iv. 42; v. -97, 572, 45-6, 463.</p> - -<p>Chapter <i>XI.—Opp.</i> iv. 62; v. 116, 183, 558, 559, 561, 570; vi. 127; -iii. 95; iv. 249.</p> - -<p>Chapter XII.—Same sources as for Ch. I. and also vi. 105-6; v. 524-5.</p> - -<p>Chapter XIII.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 60; iii. 249; v. 157, 167-70, 108; iii. -251-61; iv. 17, 253; v. 103, 217-18, 562; <i>Scritti inediti,</i> p. 9.</p> - -<p>Chapter XIV.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 94-6, 58, 79, 321, 63-4, 84-5, 96, 93, 100; iv. -27-8, 29-30, 97, 169, 200, 271; v. 182-3, 61-4; iii. 230; iv. 236-43, -184; iii. 450-59; v. 113, 115, 149, 211, 59, 74, 100, 183; iv. 75-6, -89; v. 206; iv. 99; iii. 273; v. 260; iii. 280; v. 430-31, 202-3, 98-9.</p> - -<p>Chapter XV.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 356, 357, 255, 355, 121, 361-3, 363-365. 340, -341, 253, 251-3, 259, 132, 118, 278, 311, 309, 307, 118-19, 120, 121, -481, 484-6, 293-4, 246, 526, 528, 530-31, 223-5, 444, 43, 114-15, -222-3, 460, 220, 194, 191-3, 186, 249, 369, 371, 372, 375, 382, 403, -69; iv. 54, 83-4, 225-6.</p> - -<p>Chapter XVI.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 380-81, 422-5, 452, 277, 360-61, 381, 426, -435-6, 465, 425, 427, 442, 427-32, 440-41, 445. 448-9, 451, 455, 428-9, -445, 449-56, 445-6, 448, 452, 378-81, 441-2, 453-4, 78, 446-7, 458-60, -433-4, 439; iv. 178; vi. 46; v. 100-101, 467-80, 381, 223-4, 457, 100. -102, 226, 438; iv. 163, 25, 63, 200, 128; iii. 295.</p> - -<p>Chapter XVII.—<i>Opp.</i> iv. 249-50, 228; v. 183, 188; iii. 306-10; iv. -93, 34, 155; v. 86, 277, 322-3, 416, 129, 413-416, 81, 326, 86; iii. -473; v. 509-10, 102; iii. 469-75, 87, 122-3; iv. 67-71; v. 123-4, 191, -85, 100, 88, 290-91, 310, 496, 88-92, 123, 495-505. 502, 327. 525-30, -531, 534, 596, 474-476, 401, 551, 555, 514, 476, 515, 537-8, 122, 503, -521, 508, 523, 503, 514.</p> - -<p>Chapter XVIII.—<i>Opp.</i> v. 550, 537, 259, 540-41. 546, 555-556; iv. 101, -545, 347-8, 552, 555, 544, 554, 537, 539, 538, 551, 328, 547, 552, -512, 553, 550, 508-9, 68, 488, 547, 538-9, 231, 233, 204, 222, 226, -361, 425, 428-39, 457; iii. 357. vi. 37, 45-6; iii. 270; vi. 35, 37-8, -42, 48; v. 429, 439; iv. 198-200; vi. 38; v. 43, 226, 555, 544, 508-9, -557-8; iv. 235-6, 71.</p> - -<p>Chapter XIX.—For this chapter see the <i>De ratione,</i> the first pages of -the Autobiography and the letters to Esperti, De Vitry, and Solla. On -wisdom see also <i>Opp.</i> v. 153.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span></p> - - - - -<p class="caption"><a name="INDEX_OF_NAMES" id="INDEX_OF_NAMES">INDEX OF NAMES</a></p> - -<p> -ABRAHAM, <a href="#Page_147">147</a><br /> -Achilles, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Acilius Glabrio, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Acqua viva, M., <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Acri, F., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Aelian, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Aeneas, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -Aesop, <a href="#Page_69">69</a><br /> -Agamemnon, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -Agis, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Albertus Magnus, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a><br /> -Alexander, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -Amante, E., <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Amari, E., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Amodeo, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Andronicus, Livius, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Angelis (de), A., <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Angelis (de), G., <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Angioli (degli), <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Antaeus, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Archilochus, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Ariosto, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Aristarchus, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -Aristides, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Aristotle, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>,<br /> -167, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-6<br /> -Arnauld, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Atlas, <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> -Augustine, St., <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Augustus, <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -<br /> -Baader, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Bachhofen, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Bacon, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> -Ballanche, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Balmes, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a><br /> -Balzac, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Balzo (del), A., <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Banier, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Bartolo, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Baumgarten, <a href="#Page_47">47</a><br /> -Bayle, P., <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Berosus, <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> -Bertini, <a href="#Page_280">280</a><br /> -Biese, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Bignon (du), <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Bion, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Boccaccio, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Bochart, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -Böckh, A., <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Bodin, J., <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Boiardo, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Bonamy, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Bossuet, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> -Boulanger, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Bouvy, E., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Boyle, R., <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Brennus, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> -Bruno (Giordano), <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a><br /> -Brutus (Junius), <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /> -<br /> -Caesar, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a><br /> -Caligula, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> -Campanella, T., <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a><br /> -Cantoni, C, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>-4<br /> -Capasso, N., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -Capet (Hugh), <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -Caracalla, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -Carafa, A., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br /> -Cardano, G., <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Carducci, <a href="#Page_248">248</a> <i>n.</i><br /> -Carneades, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -Cassiodorus, <a href="#Page_294">294</a><br /> -Castelvetro, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Cauer, E., <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Cenni, E., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Cesarotti, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Chastellux, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Chateaubriand, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Cicero, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Cirillo, N., <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -Cola di Rienzo, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Colangelo, F., <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span>Coleridge, Nelson, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Comte, A., <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Concilia, N., <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Confucius, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Confuorto, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Conrad III., <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -Constantine, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br /> -Conti, A., <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Conti, N., <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -Corcia, N. M., <a href="#Page_306">306</a>-<a href="#Page_307">7</a><br /> -Corneille, <a href="#Page_232">232</a><br /> -Cornelio, T., <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Coulanges, Fustel de, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Cournot, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Cousin, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Cristofaro (G. de), <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -Croce, B., <a href="#Page_306">306</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Cujas, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Cuoco, V., <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Curiatii, <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Curtius, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Cusa (N. of), <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> -Cyclic poets, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -<br /> -Dale (van), <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br /> -Daniele, F., <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -Dante, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-<a href="#Page_225">5</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Darius, <a href="#Page_51">51</a><br /> -Decius, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Degérando, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Descartes, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>-<a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Dio Cassius, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Diodorus Siculus, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Dion of Syracuse, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Dionysius of Halicarnassus, <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br /> -Domitian, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> -Draco, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Dubois, Cardinal, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br /> -Duni, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -<br /> -Eckehart, <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> -Eling, Ingewald, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Ennius, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Epicureans, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -Epicurus, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -Esperti, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -Esteban, E., <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Euclid, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -Eusebius, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Ezekiel, <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -Fabius Maximus, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Fabricius, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Faggi, A., <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Ferrari, G., <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Ferron (de), <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Fichte, <a href="#Page_240">240</a><br /> -Ficino, M., <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Filangieri, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Finetti, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Finocchietti, F., <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Fiorentino, F., <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Flaubert, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Flint, R., <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Folchieri, G., <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Fontenelle, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -Foscolo, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Franck, A., <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -Gaeta (di), M., <a href="#Page_260">260</a><br /> -Galasso, A., <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -Galiani, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Galen, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -Galileo, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-<a href="#Page_297">7</a><br /> -Gambetta, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Garofalo, P., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Gassendi, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Genovesi, A., <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Gentile, G., <a href="#Page_263">263</a> <i>n.</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a> <i>n.</i>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Gerning, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Geulinx, <a href="#Page_289">289</a><br /> -Giacchi, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Giani, C, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Giannone, P., <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> <i>n</i>.<br /> -Gioberti, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Giordano, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a><br /> -Giudice (del), G., <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br /> -Giustiniani, L., <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Goethe, <i>viti</i>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Gorgias, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Gracchi, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Grandi, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Gravina, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -Grimm, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Grotius, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br /> -Gunther, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -<br /> -Hadrian, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -Hamann, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Hannibal, <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br /> -Hecataeus, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -Hegel, <a href="#Page_238">238</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>-<a href="#Page_275">5</a><br /> -Heraclitus, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Hercules, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Herder, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Hermodorus, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Herodotus, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -Hesiod, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Heyne, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Hobbes, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -Höffding, H., <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span>Hoffmann, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Hoffmannswaldau, <a href="#Page_225">225</a><br /> -Holbach (d'), <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Homer, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Horace, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Horatii, <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Huet, D., <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Humboldt, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -Hume, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Iamblichus, <a href="#Page_50">50</a><br /> -Iannelli, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Idanturas, <a href="#Page_51">51</a><br /> -Iphigenia, <a href="#Page_170">170</a><br /> -<br /> -Jacobi, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Jansenism, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -Jerome (St.), <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Josephus, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Jouffroy, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Jupiter and the Twelve Gods, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -Justinian, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -<br /> -Kant, <a href="#Page_238">238</a> <i>seqq.</i>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a><br /> -Kircher, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Labanca, B., <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Lactantius, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -Laelius, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -Lami, G., <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Latius, W., <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Laurent, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Laurenzano (Duke of), <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br /> -Leclerc, J., <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -Leibniz, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Leonardo da Vinci, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br /> -Lerminier, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Lex Canuleia, <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br /> -Lex Petelia, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Lex Publilia, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br /> -Lipsius, <a href="#Page_177">177</a><br /> -Livy, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a><br /> -Locke, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -Lodovico, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Löhenstein, <a href="#Page_225">225</a><br /> -Lomonaco, F., <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Longinus, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Lucretius, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -Lulle, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -Luzan, I., <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -Lycurgus, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -Machiavelli, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -Maffei, <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br /> -Malebranche, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a><br /> -Mallinkrot, B., <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Manlius, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Manlius Capitolinus, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Manzoni, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -Marino (cavalier), <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Marx, K., <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Maugain, G., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Mauthner, F., <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a> <i>n</i>.<br /> -Mazzoni, I., <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Menander, <a href="#Page_193">193</a><br /> -Mendelssohn, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Menelaus, <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Mercurius Trimegistus, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Merlin, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -Metastasio, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -Michelet, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Mill, J. S., <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Minos, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Molière, <a href="#Page_232">232</a><br /> -Mommsen, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Montesquieu, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Monti, V., <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Moreri, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Moschus, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Moses, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-<a href="#Page_196">6</a><br /> -Müller, K. H., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Müller, O., <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Muratori, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Naevius, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Neal, Th., <a href="#Page_280">280</a> <i>n.</i><br /> -Nero, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> -Newton, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -Nicole, P., <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> -Nicolini, F., <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Niebuhr, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Nietzsche, F., <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Nifo, A., <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Noah, <a href="#Page_147">147</a><br /> -Numa Pompilius, <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -Occam, William of, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -Oldenorp, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -Olivieri, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Orelli, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Origen, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -Orpheus, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Otto of Freising, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -<br /> -Pagano, M., <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Paley, <a href="#Page_277">277</a><br /> -Pallavicino, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> -Paoli (Father), <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -Papini, G., <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -Paris, <a href="#Page_174">174</a><br /> -Pascal, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span>Pastore, A., <a href="#Page_289">289</a><br /> -Patrizio, F., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Paulus Venetus, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Pessico, F., <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Petrarch, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Petrus Hispanus, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -Photius, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Piccolomini, A., <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Pico della Mirandola, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Pindar, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Plato, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a><br /> -Plautus, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -Plotinus, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Plutarch, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -Polybius, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Polyxena, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Pomodoro, F. S., <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -Pomponius, <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -Port Royal, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -Predari, F., <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -Priam, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -Proclus, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -Publilius Philo, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br /> -Puffendorf, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -Pyrrhus, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /> -Pythagoras, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -Pythagoreans, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -<br /> -Regillus, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -Regulus, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Richard, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -Rinaldi, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -Rogadei, G. D., <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Roland, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -Romano, D., <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a><br /> -Romulus, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -----and the other kings of Rome, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Rosa (de), C. A., <i>see</i> Villarosa<br /> -Rosmini, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Rossi, G., <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -<br /> -Saint-Évremond, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -Salfi, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -Salvius Julianus, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -Sanchez, F., <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /> -Sanchez, F. (the Brocense), <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -Sanctis (de), F., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Sarchi, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Sarpi, P., <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -Savigny, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Scaevola, Mucius, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -Scaevola, Q. Mucius (jurist), <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -Scaliger, J. C., <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -Schelling, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -Schopenhauer, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -Schopp, G., <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br /> -Scipio Africanus, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a><br /> -Scipio Nasica, <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -Scotus, Duns, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -Selden, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> -Seneca, <a href="#Page_156">156</a><br /> -Servius Tullius, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /> -Shakespear, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a><br /> -Simon the Just, <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -Socrates, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -Solla, F., <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -Solon, <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br /> -Sorel, G., <a href="#Page_214">214</a> n., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Sostegni, <a href="#Page_265">265</a><br /> -Spaventa, B., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Spinoza, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a><br /> -Steuco, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -Stewart, Dugald, <a href="#Page_238">238</a><br /> -Stobaeus, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Stoics, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a><br /> -Strabo, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -Suidas, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -Sulla, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br /> -<br /> -Tacitus, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a><br /> -Tanucci, B., <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Tarquins, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /> -Tasso, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -Terence, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -Terrasson, <a href="#Page_269">269</a><br /> -Tesauro, E., <a href="#Page_53">53</a><br /> -Theophrastus, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -Thierry, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Thomas Aquinas (St.), <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>-3, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a><br /> -Thomasius, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a><br /> -Thucydides, <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br /> -Tiberius, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> -Timaeus, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -Tommaseo, N., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -Torricelli, E., <a href="#Page_297">297</a>-<a href="#Page_299">9</a><br /> -Trabalza, C, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Tribonian, royal law of, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a><br /> -Trivulzi, Cristina, princess of Belgioioso, <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Troya, C, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -Turpin, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -Twelve Tables, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a><br /> -<br /> -Ulysses, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a> <i>seqq.</i><br /> -<br /> -Vacherot, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -Valletta, G., <a href="#Page_232">232</a><br /> -Varro, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span>Vico (Gennaro), <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a><br /> -Vico (Luisa), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -Villarosa, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a><br /> -Virgil, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -Visconti, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -Vitry (de, Father), <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -Vossius, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -Weber, W. E., <a href="#Page_307">307</a><br /> -Werner, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>-9<br /> -William of Apulia, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -Windelband, <a href="#Page_5">5</a> ff., <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -Wolf, F. A., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -Wulf (de), <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /> -Wundt, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Xenophon, <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br /> -<br /> -Zeno, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br /> -Zeno, A., <a href="#Page_151">151</a><br /> -Zoega, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -Zoroaster, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a><br /> -Zottoli, A. A., <a href="#Page_290">290</a><br /> -</p> - -<h4>THE END</h4> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, by -Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO *** - -***** This file should be named 52814-h.htm or 52814-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/8/1/52814/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe (and FreeLitOrg online gains -some more weight, incl. free education worldwide: moocs, -educational resources,...) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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