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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #52760 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52760)
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-The Project Gutenberg eBook, Campaign for Petersburg, by Richard Wayne
-Lykes
-
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions 
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at 
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-
-
-
-Title: Campaign for Petersburg
-
-
-Author: Richard Wayne Lykes
-
-
-
-Release Date: August 9, 2016  [eBook #52760]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-
-***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAMPAIGN FOR PETERSBURG***
-
-
-E-text prepared by Stephen Hutcheson, Dave Morgan, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net)
-
-
-
-Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
-      file which includes the original illustrations.
-      See 52760-h.htm or 52760-h.zip:
-      (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52760/52760-h/52760-h.htm)
-      or
-      (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/52760/52760-h.zip)
-
-
-Transcriber’s note:
-
-		Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
-
-
-
-
-
-    [Illustration: Supply ships and wagons.]
-
-
-National Park Service History Series
-
-CAMPAIGN FOR PETERSBURG
-
-RICHARD WAYNE LYKES
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-National Park Service
-U.S. Department of the Interior
-Washington, D.C. 1970
-
-For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
-U.S. Government Printing Office
-Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS
-
-
-  PROLOGUE                                                             2
-  UNION STRATEGY 1864                                                  5
-  STRATEGIC PETERSBURG                                                 7
-  BATTLE OF PETERSBURG                                                10
-  FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG                          17
-  BATTLE OF THE CRATER                                                24
-  FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD                                       36
-  UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES                                        42
-  LEE’S LAST GAMBLE                                                   58
-  FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END                                    64
-  FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND                                     68
-
-    [Illustration: _In the final year of the Civil War in the East, the
-    fighting focused upon Petersburg, an important transportation center
-    for Richmond and Lee’s army. For 10 bloody months of combat, both
-    from behind prepared positions and along the main routes of supply,
-    Lee’s ragged Confederates held the city (shown here from north of
-    the Appomattox River) against Grant’s numerically superior Federals.
-    On April 2-3, 1865, Lee was forced to abandon both Petersburg and
-    Richmond. One week later, he surrendered the Army of Northern
-    Virginia at Appomattox Court House, dooming the South’s bid for
-    independent existence._]
-
-
-
-
-                                PROLOGUE
-
-
-By June 1864, when the siege of Petersburg began, the Civil War had lain
-heavily on both the North and the South for more than 3 years. Most of
-the fighting in the East during this period had taken place on the
-rolling Virginia countryside between the opposing capitals of Washington
-and Richmond, only 110 miles apart, and all of it had failed to end the
-war and bring peace to the land. Various generals had been placed in
-command of the Union’s mighty Army of the Potomac and had faced Gen.
-Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. So far not one had succeeded
-in destroying Lee’s army or in capturing Richmond.
-
-Perhaps Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan had come the closest to success
-when, in the late spring and early summer of 1862, his Northern troops
-had threatened the Confederate capital, only to be repulsed on its
-outskirts. The other Northern commanders who followed McClellan—Pope,
-Burnside, Hooker, and Meade—were less successful. Lee had met and turned
-aside their drives.
-
-After 36 months of bitter conflict the war in the East seemed, to many
-observers, to be far from a final settlement. The failure of Union
-forces to deliver a decisive blow against the Army of Northern Virginia
-was a source of growing concern in Washington. The Confederacy, for its
-part, was no more successful in settling the issue. Attempted invasions
-of the Northern States by Lee were turned back at Antietam in September
-1862 and at Gettysburg in July 1863.
-
-Farther west the picture was brighter for Northern hopes. In the same
-month as the Battle of Gettysburg, the Confederate stronghold of
-Vicksburg, Miss., fell into Union hands. A few days later, Port Hudson,
-La., the last remaining stronghold of the Confederacy on the banks of
-the Mississippi River, surrendered. Later in 1863, the Union capture of
-Chattanooga, Tenn., threw open the gateway to Georgia.
-
-Strategically, despite the stalemate in Virginia, the beginning of 1864
-found the Northern armies in a stronger position than the Confederate
-military forces. Not only was there a distinct possibility that the
-Southern States east of the Mississippi could be split into two parts,
-but the greater resources at the command of the Lincoln administration
-were beginning to count more heavily with each passing day. All that
-seemed to be needed to end the war was an able Union commander who could
-marshal the mighty resources of his country for a last tremendous blow
-at the South.
-
-    [Illustration: _From the Rapidan River to the James, Lt. Gen.
-    Ulysses S. Grant (above), commanding the armies of the United
-    States, found all his efforts to capture Richmond and destroy the
-    Confederacy blocked by Gen. Robert E. Lee (below) and his Army of
-    Northern Virginia. Finally, Grant turned his attention to
-    Petersburg._]
-
-    [Illustration: Gen. Robert E. Lee.]
-
-    [Illustration: Campaign Map.]
-
-
-  Union Movements
-  Confederate Movements
-  Major Battles and Engagements
-    WILDERNESS    MAY 5-7, 1864
-    SPOTSYLVANIA    MAY 8-19, 1864
-    COLD HARBOR    JUNE 3-13, 1864
-    PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN    JUNE 1864-APRIL 1865
-    FIVE FORKS    APRIL 1, 1865
-    SAYLER’S CREEK    APRIL 6, 1865
-
-
-Such a man was found in Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the victor at
-Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge, who was brought east and, on March 9,
-1864, commissioned lieutenant general to be responsible for all the
-Union armies. Unlike his predecessor, Henry W. Halleck, Grant decided
-not to remain in Washington but chose instead to accompany the Army of
-the Potomac, where he would provide general direction to the military
-operations but leave the execution of them to that army’s commander,
-Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.
-
-    [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. George G. Meade commanded the Army of the
-    Potomac during the 1864-65 Virginia campaign. With General Grant
-    actively directing most of the military operations, Meade was in the
-    awkward position of serving much like a corps commander in his own
-    army. He nevertheless functioned well in this difficult situation._]
-
-
-
-
-                          UNION STRATEGY 1864
-
-
-To accomplish the conquest of the Confederacy, the Northern plan called
-for a huge two-pronged attack. Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, in command
-of the southern prong, was assigned the task of destroying Gen. Joseph
-E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee, capturing Atlanta, marching
-to the sea, and then turning north to effect a junction with Grant.
-
-It was the upper arm of the movement which was directly concerned with
-Richmond and Petersburg. This was composed of two armies: the Army of
-the Potomac and the Army of the James. It was the task of these armies
-to capture Richmond, crush the Army of Northern Virginia, and march
-south toward Sherman.
-
-The story of the Army of the James in the early phase of the offensive
-can be briefly told. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler was ordered to advance
-upon Richmond from the southeast and threaten communications between the
-Confederate capital and the Southern States. With some 40,000 Union
-troops, the advance was begun. City Point, located at the junction of
-the James and Appomattox Rivers and soon to be the supply center for the
-attack on Petersburg, was captured on May 4, 1864. Within 2 weeks,
-however, a numerically inferior Confederate force shut up the Army of
-the James, “as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked,” in Bermuda
-Hundred, a loop formed by the winding James and Appomattox Rivers. Here
-Butler waited, while north of him the Army of the Potomac and the Army
-of Northern Virginia engaged in a series of bloody battles.
-
-The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7, 1864, began what proved to be the
-start of the final campaign against the Army of Northern Virginia. Here
-Meade’s Army of the Potomac, numbering approximately 118,000 troops,
-fought the Confederate defenders of Richmond. Lee had about 62,000 men
-with him, while an additional 30,000 under Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard held
-the Richmond-Petersburg area. The battle resulted in a fearful loss of
-men on both sides, although the armies remained intact. This was
-followed by a series of fierce engagements around Spotsylvania Court
-House from May 8 to 21.
-
-Failing to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in these battles, Grant
-moved the Army of the Potomac to the east of Richmond. It was his hope
-that he would outflank the Confederate defenders by persistent night
-marches. Lee was not to be so easily outguessed, however. After minor
-battles at the North Anna River (May 23) and Totopotomoy Creek (May 29),
-Grant arrived at Cold Harbor, about 8 miles northeast of Richmond, but
-Lee’s army still stood between him and that city. On June 3, 2 days
-after he arrived at Cold Harbor, Grant ordered a direct frontal assault
-against the Confederate lines. He was repulsed with heavy losses—about
-7,000 men. “I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor
-was ever made,” Grant would write many years later. By the end of the
-first month of Grant’s campaign, both sides had suffered heavy
-casualties, but the North’s ability to refill its depleted ranks was
-greater than the South’s. Lee’s offensive strength had been sapped. From
-the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House until the end of the war, except
-for counterattacks and the lunge at Fort Stedman during the siege of
-Petersburg, the Army of Northern Virginia was a defensive weapon only.
-
-After Cold Harbor, Grant decided to turn quickly to the south of
-Richmond and isolate the city and the defending troops by attacking
-Petersburg and cutting the railroads that supplied them. Lee knew he
-could not allow this to happen. “We must destroy this army of Grant’s
-before he gets to James River,” he told one of his generals. “If he gets
-there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of
-time.”
-
-
-
-
-                          STRATEGIC PETERSBURG
-
-
-According to the United States census of 1860, Petersburg was a city of
-18,266 people. It was situated on the southern bank of the Appomattox
-River about 8 miles from City Point, where the Appomattox joins the
-James, and 23 miles south of Richmond. As the war progressed and the
-territory to the north and east was shut off, Richmond became
-increasingly dependent on Petersburg for supplies. Through it passed a
-constant stream of war materials and necessities of life from the South
-to sustain the straining war effort. In short, Petersburg was a road and
-rail center of vital importance to the Confederacy, and its capture
-would almost certainly lead to the abandonment of Richmond.
-
-The transportation vehicles of the 1860’s did not require the wide,
-straight highways of the present. However, several good roads came into
-the city from the east, south, and west where they joined with the
-Richmond Turnpike. Along these roads passed supply wagons, couriers,
-and, on occasion, troops on their way to repel the foe. Several were
-built of logs laid across the road to form a hard surface. Because of
-this they were called “plank roads.” Two of the most important arteries
-of traffic into Petersburg were the Jerusalem Plank Road, connecting
-Petersburg with Jerusalem (now Courtland), Va., and the Boydton Plank
-Road which led south through Dinwiddie Court House. Among others of
-importance were the City Point, Prince George Court House, Baxter,
-Halifax, Jordon Point, Squirrel Level, and Cox Roads.
-
-    [Illustration: Railroads and important roads serving Petersburg in
-    1864. The dashed line indicates the original Confederate Defense
-    line built in 1862-63.]
-
-    [Illustration: Map showing the network of railroads and the
-    strategic location of Petersburg to Richmond. The shaded area is the
-    approximate line of Union control in early 1864. The three arrows
-    indicate the major drives planned by the Union army for 1864.
-    (Railroads serving Rich. and Petersburg are in heavy lines.)]
-
-It was the railroads more than the highways, however, which gave to
-Petersburg a significance out of all proportion to its size. Tracks
-radiated from the city in all directions. The Richmond and Petersburg
-Railroad left the city to the north; the Southside Railroad ran west to
-Lynchburg; the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad led south to North
-Carolina; the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad passed through a ravine
-east of the city before turning southeast toward Norfolk; and the
-Petersburg and City Point Railroad struck out for the hamlet of City
-Point, situated at the junction of the James and Appomattox Rivers about
-8 miles away.
-
-Because of its proximity, Petersburg became a part of the transportation
-system of the Confederate capital, serving as a major point of transfer
-to the larger metropolis for products and materials from the vast
-regions to the south and southwest. By June 1864, all but one railroad
-from the south and west into Richmond—the Richmond and Danville
-Railroad—passed through Petersburg. As other lines of supply were cut
-off or threatened, the dependence of Richmond upon Petersburg increased
-and made the security of that city a matter of vital concern.
-
-In the spring of 1862, McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign had threatened
-Richmond from the east and southeast, making that city’s defenders
-acutely aware of the need for a system of fortifications around
-Petersburg. In August a defense line was begun, and work continued until
-its completion about a year later. Capt. Charles H. Dimmock, a
-Northerner by birth, was in charge of it under the direction of the
-Engineer Bureau, Confederate States Army, and the line so constructed
-became unofficially known as the “Dimmock Line.”
-
-When finished, the chain of breastworks and artillery emplacements
-around Petersburg was 10 miles long, beginning and ending on the
-Appomattox River and protecting all but the northern approaches to the
-city. The 55 artillery batteries were consecutively numbered from east
-to west. Although natural terrain features were utilized whenever
-possible, some glaring weaknesses existed, such as the deep ravine
-between Batteries 7 and 8, which could provide a means of penetration by
-an attacking force. The very length and size of the fortifications
-proved to be a disadvantage. It meant that a larger number of troops
-would be necessary to defend the line than General Beauregard, charged
-with this heavy responsibility, had present for duty. Col. Alfred Roman,
-an aide-de-camp to Beauregard, estimated that the long “Dimmock Line”
-would require more than 10 times as many men to defend it as were
-available.
-
-On several occasions raids were made on the railroads south and west of
-Petersburg. The most serious of these occurred on June 9, 1864, when
-3,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry appeared in force along the eastern and
-southeastern sector of the Dimmock Line. The infantry contented itself
-with a menacing demonstration, but the cavalry attacked up the Jerusalem
-Plank Road. After breaking through the defenses, the horse soldiers were
-checked by regular Southern army units assisted by a hastily summoned
-home guard of old men and youths. The damage done by such raids was
-quickly patched up, but they were a constant nuisance to the city’s
-transportation lines. To shut off permanently the supplies that streamed
-along the railroads, the Union forces would have to take permanent
-physical possession of them.
-
-
-
-
-                          BATTLE OF PETERSBURG
-
-
-After the Battle of Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant had abandoned, for a
-time at least, his plan to capture Richmond by direct assault. With
-characteristic zeal he had ordered Meade to move the Army of the Potomac
-across the James River and to invest the more southerly city. On June
-14, Grant and Butler conferred at Bermuda Hundred. At that time, orders
-were given for the attack on Petersburg.
-
-The first of the Northern forces to arrive on the scene of battle was
-the XVIII Corps of the Army of the James, which had fought at Cold
-Harbor. Early in the morning of June 15, these troops, commanded by Maj.
-Gen. W. F. “Baldy” Smith, crossed from Bermuda Hundred to the south side
-of the Appomattox by means of a pontoon bridge at Broadway Landing.
-Eighteen thousand Union soldiers were on their way to face less than
-4,000 under Beauregard. Throughout the day they approached the city and
-assembled for the attack.
-
-    [Illustration: _Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, Confederate commander at
-    Petersburg during the early days of the campaign, defended the
-    “Dimmock Line” against the Federal assaults of June 15-18, 1864.
-    When Lee arrived to direct operations, Beauregard’s troops were
-    merged with the Army of Northern Virginia._]
-
-There was skirmishing throughout the afternoon as the Federals drove in
-the Confederate pickets, and shortly after 7 p.m. on June 15 the XVIII
-Corps launched a fierce attack on the Dimmock Line. Among the first
-points to fall was Battery 5, one of the strongest of the Confederate
-positions. Within a few hours Beauregard had lost not only Battery 5 but
-all the line for more than a mile south. The defenders withdrew and
-threw up a hasty entrenchment behind Harrison’s Creek, well to the rear
-of the captured section of the line. While the Confederate retreat was
-taking place, the Union II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield S.
-Hancock, arrived to reinforce the Federal columns.
-
-The appearance on the field of the II Corps was an ominous sign for the
-Confederates. While the initial attacks were taking place on June 15,
-the Army of the Potomac had been busily engaged in crossing the James
-River farther to the east. The number of Union troops south of the river
-was increasing hourly, until by midnight of June 16 at least 70,000 had
-crossed.
-
-Darkness ended the fighting on June 15, but early the next day the
-attacks were renewed. More of the defense line, south of the portion
-captured the previous day, now gave way. In response to repeated
-entreaties from Beauregard throughout June 15 and 16, Lee ordered more
-divisions to the support of Petersburg, necessitating the draining of
-precious reserves from the Richmond lines. By dawn of that second day,
-Beauregard could muster about 14,000 men to face the enemy. Thus, the
-center of attention rapidly shifted from Richmond to Petersburg, which
-had so recently seemed of but secondary importance.
-
-    [Illustration: _Broadway Landing on the Appomattox River where Maj.
-    Gen. W. F. “Baldy” Smith’s XVIII Corps of the Army of the James
-    crossed on June 15, 1864. It was later used as an ordnance depot by
-    the Union Army._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Pontoon bridge at Broadway Landing constructed by
-    Federal soldiers in 1864._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Confederate Battery 5, shown here under Federal
-    occupation 6 days after its capture, was one of the first points on
-    Petersburg’s outer defense lines to fall to the XVIII Corps during
-    the June 15 attack._]
-
-The third day of battle was practically a repetition of that of the
-preceding day. Again the Northern forces attacked the Confederate
-troops, concentrating their efforts to the south of the positions
-captured earlier. Again the Confederates were forced to draw back. A
-decisive breakthrough of the opposing line was now anticipated by the
-assaulting forces. About 12:30 a.m., June 18, Beauregard ordered his
-troops to begin a withdrawal to new positions about a mile closer to the
-city. Throughout the early morning hours of that day Beauregard had his
-men busily engaged in the construction of this defense line. Colonel
-Roman later recalled that “without a moment’s rest the digging of the
-trenches was begun, with such utensils as had been hastily collected at
-Petersburg, many of the men using their bayonets, their knives, and even
-their tin cans, to assist in the rapid execution of the work.”
-
-    [Illustration: _A section of the Confederate defense lines around
-    Petersburg. Note the use of wickerware (gabions), sharpened stakes
-    (fraises), and branches (abatis) to protect the position._]
-
-A general assault by the Union forces was ordered for 4 a.m. on June 18.
-When the attack began it was soon discovered that the ranks of the enemy
-had not been broken nor had the city fallen into Northern hands. The
-area where the left flank of the Dimmock Line anchored on the Appomattox
-was empty, except for a thin line of skirmishers who were gradually
-forced back. The Northern troops came on, crossing the Norfolk and
-Petersburg Railroad west of where the defenders had constructed their
-new line and continuing on until they were brought face to face with the
-muzzles of Confederate guns. Meanwhile, elements of Lee’s command
-continued pouring in to aid their comrades, and Lee came down from his
-temporary headquarters near Chester, Va., to personally direct the
-defense operations.
-
-Throughout that June Saturday, brisk action occurred on the new
-Petersburg front. The major Union drive, involving elements of five
-corps, came about 4 p.m. Artillery hammered the Confederates. Infantry
-charged, only to be hurled back. During the course of one of these
-futile drives, the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery reportedly suffered the
-most severe losses of any regiment in a single engagement of the entire
-war. This unit, 850 strong, charged from the concealment of the Prince
-George Court House Road north of where Fort Stedman was soon to stand.
-Met by a heavy crossfire, it withdrew in less than one-half hour, with
-632 casualties.
-
-As on the previous days, fighting ended with the coming of darkness.
-Grant’s attempt to capture Petersburg had failed, with a loss of 10,000
-men; but his efforts could not be considered entirely wasted. Two of the
-railroads leading into the city had been cut, and several roads were in
-Union hands. Behind the Northern troops was City Point, which Grant
-speedily converted into a huge supply base.
-
-The major result of the opening 4 days of combat, however, was the
-failure of the Federal forces to break the Confederate defense line.
-First Beauregard, and then Lee, had held against heavy odds. They had
-been pushed back closer to their base—but they had held. Possibly if
-Smith had advanced his XVIII Corps farther into the defenses on the
-opening night, or if Hancock’s II Corps had arrived earlier, Petersburg
-would have fallen on June 15 or 16. But these had not happened, and now
-47,000 to 51,000 Confederates would settle down to defend the city
-against 111,000 to 113,000 Union besiegers.
-
-The defenses of Richmond now ran from White Oak Swamp, east of that
-city, south to Jerusalem Plank Road, 26 miles away. The fate of the Army
-of Northern Virginia—of the Confederate capital itself—would depend upon
-the outcome of the drive against Petersburg.
-
-
-
-
-               FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG
-
-
-The Union Army, having failed in its initial attack on Petersburg, was
-now committed to doing something further to effect its capture. From
-June 19 to July 9, the Union forces were engaged in three kinds of
-activity. First, elements of the army were set to work consolidating the
-positions captured in the 4-day battle and constructing the devices
-needed for siege operations. Second, jabbing cavalry thrusts were made
-at the important supply routes into Petersburg. And third, they
-reconnoitered the Confederate defenses to determine a plan which would
-force Lee out of his lines.
-
-A threatening movement toward the Weldon Railroad was promptly
-undertaken by the Northern troops. Three days after the failure to
-capture the city, two corps (the II and VI) began to push to the
-southwest of Grant’s flank on the Jerusalem Plank Road. The following
-day, June 22, Confederate divisions led by Generals Cadmus M. Wilcox and
-William Mahone advanced from the defense line south of Petersburg and
-rolled by the Federals, capturing 1,700 prisoners, four cannons, and
-eight stands of colors.
-
-    [Illustration: Map.]
-
-
-  Union Troops Advance on Petersburg
-  JUNE 15-18, 1864. Portion of Original Confederate Line Captured and
-          New Line Built Nearer City
-  JUNE 22-24, 1864. Union Attempt to Capture the Weldon R.R. Turned Back
-
-
-The next morning saw the resumption of the advance toward the Weldon
-Railroad. A Union patrol succeeded in reaching the tracks on the 23d and
-promptly started the work of destruction. Alarmed by the threat to this
-important supply line, the Confederates launched a sharp attack that
-forced the withdrawal of the Union forces from the vicinity of the
-railroad. However, the Union lines confronting Petersburg had been
-extended across the Jerusalem Plank Road, thus cutting off its use to
-the city.
-
-In itself, the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road on June 22-24 was not too
-important militarily. The North could quickly replace the loss of 2,300
-men. The Weldon Railroad, although its days were numbered, was still
-able to deliver supplies to Petersburg. But as an indication of Grant’s
-tactics, it pointed the course of the campaign ahead. It marked the
-first of several attempts to encircle Petersburg, and the others to
-follow would not all be as disappointing to Northern hopes. In these
-repeated drives to the west lay the essence of the basic plan to capture
-Petersburg.
-
-On July 9, the plan of operations decided upon by the Union high command
-was revealed in an order from Meade’s headquarters giving detailed
-instructions for the building of fortifications and the development of
-siege tactics. It thus became apparent that the Union plan was to reduce
-Petersburg by a process of attrition—a process that was to last for 9
-months.
-
-There were still those in the attacking forces, however, who felt that,
-with a little imagination, the city could be taken by direct assault.
-While most of the troops were digging siege lines, another smaller group
-had already begun work on a unique plan which would, if successful, make
-further encirclement unnecessary.
-
-    [Illustration: _The Federal cavalry saw little battle action during
-    the siege, but it did its share in destroying Lee’s lines of
-    communication. Combat artist Alfred R. Waud of Harper’s Weekly made
-    this sketch of Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson’s troopers tearing up part
-    of the Weldon Railroad, south of Petersburg, during their June 1864
-    raid._]
-
-    [Illustration: _The “Dictator,” also called “The Petersburg
-    Express,” was a 17,000-pound, 13-inch Federal seacoast mortar
-    mounted on a reinforced railroad car. During the early part of the
-    siege, this huge weapon fired 200-pound explosive shells into
-    Petersburg, 2½ miles away, from a curved section of the Petersburg
-    and City Point Railroad. On July 30, 1864, it was part of the
-    artillery support for Union troops during the Battle of the
-    Crater._]
-
-    [Illustration: _The men who commanded the “Dictator”—Col. H. L.
-    Abbot (the man on the left in front) and officers of the 1st
-    Connecticut Heavy Artillery. Next to Abbot is Maj. Gen. Henry J.
-    Hunt, in charge of all artillery operations on the Petersburg
-    front._]
-
-    [Illustration: _The “Dictator” in permanent position near Union
-    Battery IV, formerly Confederate Battery 5._]
-
-    [Illustration: _A 13-inch seacoast mortar on display at Petersburg
-    National Battlefield today, on the site where the “Dictator” stood
-    during most of the siege._]
-
-
-
-
-                          BATTLE OF THE CRATER
-
-
-At several places east of the city the opposing lines were extremely
-close together. One of these locations was in front of Pegram’s
-(sometimes called Elliott’s) Salient, a Confederate strong point near
-old Blandford Church. Here the Confederate position on Cemetery Hill and
-the Union picket line were less than 400 feet apart. Because of the
-proximity of the Union line, Pegram’s Salient was well fortified. Behind
-earthen embankments was a battery of four guns, and two veteran South
-Carolina infantry regiments were stationed on either side. Behind these
-were other defensive works; before them the ground sloped gently
-downward toward the Union advance line.
-
-This forward Union line was built on the crest of a ravine which had
-been crossed on June 18. Through this ravine, and between the sentry
-line and the main line, lay the roadbed of the Norfolk and Petersburg
-Railroad. The front in this sector was manned by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E.
-Burnside’s IX Corps. Among the many units which composed this corps was
-the 48th Regiment, Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry. A large
-proportion of this regiment was made up of onetime coal miners, and it
-apparently occurred to one or more of them that Pegram’s Salient would
-provide an excellent place to use their civilian knowhow. Lt. Col. Henry
-Pleasants, the commanding officer of the 48th and a mining engineer by
-profession, overheard one of the enlisted men mutter, “We could blow
-that damned fort out of existence if we could run a mine shaft under
-it.” From this and similar remarks came the germ of the idea for a Union
-mine.
-
-The 48th Regiment proposed to dig a long gallery from the bottom of the
-ravine behind their picket line to a point beneath the Confederate
-battery at Pegram’s Salient, blow up the position by powder placed in
-the end of the tunnel, and then send a strong body of troops through the
-gap created in the enemy’s line by the explosion. They saw as the reward
-for their effort the capitulation of Petersburg and, perhaps, the end of
-the war.
-
-After obtaining the permission of Burnside and Grant, Pleasants and his
-men commenced digging their mine shaft on June 25. The lack of proper
-equipment made it necessary to improvise tools and apparatus with which
-to excavate. Mining picks were created by straightening army picks.
-Cracker boxes were converted into hand-barrows in which the dirt was
-removed from the end of the tunnel. A sawmill changed a bridge into
-timber necessary for shoring up the mine. Pleasants estimated the
-tunnel’s direction and depth by means of a theodolite sent him from
-Washington. The instrument, although outmoded, served its purpose well:
-the mine shaft hit exactly beneath the salient at which it was aimed.
-
-    [Illustration: _Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, onetime mining engineer
-    and the commanding officer of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment which
-    dug the tunnel under the Confederate line._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Cross-section view of the Federal tunnel under the
-    Confederate line. Colonel Pleasants later recalled that “General
-    Burnside told me that General Meade and Major Duane, chief engineer
-    of the Army of the Potomac, said the thing could not be done—that it
-    was all clap-trap and nonsense; that such a length of mine had never
-    been excavated in military operations, and could not be; that I
-    would either get the men smothered, for want of air, or crushed by
-    the falling of the earth; or the enemy would find it out and it
-    would amount to nothing.”_]
-
-
-  Air tube
-  Air-tight door
-  Fireplace
-  Chimney
-  FEDERAL LINE Established June 18, 1864
-  Tunnel sloped up to avoid heavy clay
-  Air tube
-  JUNE 25, 1864, Tunnel started
-  510-8/10 feet
-  JULY 27, 1864, 8,000 lbs. of powder placed here
-  CONFEDERATE LINE
-  JULY 30, 1864, Pegram’s Battery destroyed by explosion
-
-
-One of the most remarkable features of the gallery was the method
-devised to supply the diggers at the end with fresh air. The longer the
-tunnel grew, the more serious the problem of ventilation became. It had
-been considered impossible to dig a tunnel for any considerable distance
-without spacing shafts at regular intervals in order to replace the
-polluted air with a fresh supply. This problem had been solved by the
-application of the simple physical principle that warm air rises. Behind
-the Union picket line and to the right of the mine gallery, although
-connected with it, the miners dug a ventilating chimney. Between the
-chimney and the mine entrance they erected an airtight canvas door.
-Through that door and along the floor of the gallery they laid a square
-wooden pipe. A fire was then built at the bottom of the ventilating
-shaft. As the fire warmed the air it went up the chimney. The draft thus
-created drew the bad air from the end of the tunnel where the men were
-digging. As this went out, fresh air was drawn in through the wooden
-pipe to replace it.
-
-Work on the tunnel continued steadily from June 25, and by July 17 the
-diggers were nearly 511 feet from the entrance and directly beneath the
-battery in Pegram’s Salient. The Confederates had learned of the mine by
-this time and had dug several countermines behind their own lines in an
-effort to locate the Union gallery. Two were very close, being dug on
-either side of where the Pennsylvanians were at work. Although digging
-in the countermines continued throughout July, Confederate fears seemed
-to lessen during the same period. There were many reasons for this, one
-being the failure of their tunnels to strike any Union construction.
-Another major reason, undoubtedly, was a belief held by many that it was
-impossible to ventilate a shaft of any length over 400 feet without
-constructing air shafts along it, and so far no air shafts could be seen
-between the Union and Confederate lines.
-
-The next step in the Union plan was to burrow out into lateral galleries
-at the end of the long shaft. Accordingly, on July 18, work was begun on
-these branches which extended to the right and left, paralleling the
-Confederate fortifications above. When completed, these added another 75
-feet to the total length of the tunnel which now reached 586 feet into
-the earth. It was about 20 feet from the floor of the tunnel to the
-enemy works above. The average internal dimensions of the shaft were 5
-feet high, with a base 4½ feet wide tapering to 2 feet at the top.
-
-Digging was finally completed on July 23. Four days later the task of
-charging the mine with black powder was accomplished. Three hundred and
-twenty kegs of powder weighing about 25 pounds each were arranged in the
-two lateral galleries in eight magazines. The total charge was 8,000
-pounds. The powder was sandbagged to direct the force of the explosion
-upward and the fuses were spliced together to form a 98-foot line.
-
-Meanwhile, preparations for the large-scale attack which was to follow
-the explosion of the mine had been carried out. Burnside wanted his IX
-Corps to lead the attack, spearheaded by a fresh, 4,300-man Negro
-division, and pressed his wishes on Meade. Both Meade and Grant approved
-the request, but refused to allow the black troops to lead the assault
-for fear that, if the attack failed, the Union commanders could be
-accused of wanting to get rid of the only Negro troops then with the
-Army of the Potomac. Burnside did not learn of this decision until the
-day before the assault, July 29, and he was forced to change his plans
-at the last moment. Three white divisions would make the initial charge,
-with the black division in reserve. Burnside had the commanding generals
-of these three divisions draw straws to see which would lead. Brig. Gen.
-James F. Ledlie of the 1st Division won the draw.
-
-Despite these 11th-hour changes, a plan of battle had been evolved.
-During the night of July 29-30, the bulk of the IX Corps was assembled
-in the ravine behind the mine entrance and in the two approach trenches
-leading to the picket line. Troops from other Union corps were
-marshalled as reinforcements. Artillerymen, manning 110 guns and 54
-mortars, were alerted to begin shelling the Confederate line. To assist
-the attack, Grant sent a cavalry and infantry force north of the James
-to threaten the Richmond defenses and destroy whatever they could of the
-Virginia Central Railroad. The object was to draw as many of Lee’s
-soldiers away from Petersburg as possible. And it worked. When the
-assault came, only 18,000 Confederates were left to guard the city.
-
-At 3:15 a.m., July 30, Pleasants lit the powder fuse and mounted the
-parapet to see the results of his regiment’s work. The explosion was
-expected at 3:30 a.m. Time passed slowly and the men, huddled behind the
-lines, grew more apprehensive. By 4:15 there could be no doubt that
-something had gone wrong. Two volunteers from the 48th Regiment (Lt.
-Jacob Douty and Sgt. Harry Reese) crawled into the tunnel and found that
-the fuse had burned out at a splice. They relighted it and scrambled to
-safety. Finally, at 4:40 a.m., the earth trembled, and with one great
-roar, men, equipment, and debris were hurled high into the air. At least
-278 Confederate troops were killed or wounded in the tremendous blast,
-and two of the four guns in the battery were destroyed beyond repair.
-The crater torn by the powder was at least 170 feet long, 60 to 80 feet
-wide, and 30 feet deep.
-
-The awesome spectacle of the mine explosion caused a delay in the Union
-charge following the explosion. Removal of obstructions between the
-lines caused further delay. Soon, however, an advance was made to the
-crater, where many of the attacking force paused to seek shelter on its
-steep slopes or to look at the havoc caused by the mine. The
-hard-pressed Confederates rallied quickly and soon were pouring shells
-and minié balls into their opponents. Union reinforcements poured into
-the breach; but, instead of going forward, they either joined their
-comrades in the crater or branched out to the immediate right and left
-along the lines. By 8:30 that morning a large part of the IX Corps had
-been poured into the captured enemy salient. More than 15,000 troops now
-milled in and about the crater.
-
-By prompt action and determined effort the Confederates had prevented a
-breakthrough. The attention of three batteries was soon directed on the
-bluecoats at the crater. Artillery hammered with shot and shell the
-huddled groups of increasingly demoralized men. In addition, mortars
-brought to within 50 yards of the crater dropped shells on the soldiers
-with deadly effect.
-
-Successful as these devices were in halting the Union advance, Lee was
-aware that an infantry charge would be necessary to dislodge the enemy.
-By 6 a.m. an order had gone out to Brig. Gen. William Mahone to move two
-brigades of his division from the lines south of Petersburg to the
-defense of the threatened position; Mahone had anticipated the order and
-already had his troops in motion. Then Lee joined Beauregard in
-observing the battle from the Gee house, 500 yards to the rear of the
-scene of action.
-
-    [Illustration: _Colonel Pleasants’ sketch of the Crater._]
-
-
-  _Outline of Crater._
-  _Course of Confederate Works._
-  _S & E_
-  _Magazines._
-
-
-In spite of the Confederate resistance, part of the Northern black
-division and other regiments had, by 8 a.m., advanced a short distance
-beyond their companions at the crater. Shortly thereafter, Mahone’s lead
-Confederate brigade arrived on the scene. The men filed into a ravine
-about 200 yards northwest of the crater and between it and Petersburg.
-No sooner had they entered this protected position than, perceiving the
-danger to their lines, they charged across the open field into the mass
-of Federal soldiers. Although outnumbered, they forced the Northerners
-to flee back to the comparative shelter of the crater. Then they swept
-on to regain a portion of the line north of the Union-held position.
-
-    [Illustration: _To many soldiers, the explosion of the mine and the
-    bitter Battle of the Crater that followed were the most memorable
-    events of the siege. Artist A. R. Waud sketched the explosion from
-    the Union lines._]
-
-By 10:30 another of Mahone’s brigades had reached the point of danger,
-and it charged the Union troops holding the crater, only to be repulsed.
-Meanwhile, the lot of the Northern soldiers was rapidly becoming
-unbearable. Confederate artillery continued to beat upon them. The
-closely packed troops (dead, dying, and living indiscriminately mixed)
-lacked shade from the blazing sun, food, water and, above all, competent
-leadership. Meade had ordered their withdrawal more than an hour before
-the second Confederate charge, but Burnside delayed the transmission of
-the order till after midday. Many men had chosen to run the gantlet of
-fire back to their own lines, but others remained clinging to the
-protective sides of the crater.
-
-The last scene in the battle occurred shortly after 1 p.m. Mahone had
-called up a third brigade, and an attack spearheaded by the fresh unit
-succeeded in gaining the slopes of the crater. Some of the Union men,
-overcome with exhaustion and realizing the helplessness of their
-situation, surrendered; but others continued to fight. At one point
-where resistance centered, the Confederates put their hats on ramrods
-and lifted them over the rim of the crater. The caps were promptly torn
-to shreds by a volley of minié balls. Before their foe could reload,
-Mahone’s forces jumped into the crater where a desperate struggle with
-bayonets, rifle butts, and fists ensued.
-
-Soon it was all over. The Union army had lost more than 4,000 men
-killed, wounded, or captured, as against about 1,500 for the
-Confederates. Again, as on June 15-18, a frontal assault had failed to
-take the Confederate stronghold, even though Union numerical strength
-greatly exceeded that of the Confederates. At the battle’s close Grant
-had more than 83,000 men south of the Appomattox River; Lee had about
-22,000.
-
-    [Illustration: _What 8,000 pounds of powder could do—the crater as
-    it appeared in 1865. The Union soldier seated at the end of the
-    tunnel gives an idea of the crater’s size._]
-
-
-
-
-                     FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD
-
-
-Grant, if he reviewed the fruits of his campaign shortly after July 30,
-could not have felt much comfort. Three hammering blows delivered
-against Petersburg had failed. Moreover, two important railroads still
-connected the city with the South. Lee, despite his numerically inferior
-numbers, was still able to maintain a long line of defenses around
-Petersburg and Richmond. Farther south, the Union outlook was brighter.
-Ten days before the Battle of the Crater, final operations against
-Atlanta had been begun by Sherman. On September 2 it was to fall, and
-the march to the sea followed in 10 weeks.
-
-Yet it was equally certain that Grant had accomplished an important
-objective. By committing Lee’s weakened but still potent Army of
-Northern Virginia to a defensive position in the area adjacent to
-Richmond, he was immobilizing the South’s most powerful striking force.
-Moreover, the Union failure at the crater decided the future direction
-of the campaign to capture Petersburg. All Grant’s energy now turned to
-extending his siege lines around the city and cutting Lee’s supply lines
-in an attempt to force him out of his defenses.
-
-The first step taken in this direction after July 30 was a strong effort
-to capture the Weldon Railroad, which the Confederates had so nearly
-lost in June. On August 16, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, Union V
-Corps commander, received orders to attack, occupy, and hold the Weldon
-Railroad 3 miles below the city.
-
-The seizure of the objective was quickly accomplished on August 18, the
-opening day of battle. More than a mile of track near Globe Tavern, an
-old colonial inn, was soon in Union hands. Then Warren marched most of
-his troops northward toward the city. They were in unfamiliar and
-heavily wooded terrain where they were assailed by two Confederate
-brigades led by Maj. Gen. Henry Heth. The Union troops were forced to
-fall back a short distance and entrench. Here the V Corps was reinforced
-by the IX Corps.
-
-On the afternoon of the 19th, five brigades of Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill’s
-Corps struck the Union infantry. Three of the brigades under Mahone
-managed to slip in behind their opponents by taking advantage of the
-concealment offered by the heavy growth of trees. They inflicted serious
-losses and captured 2,500 prisoners. By nightfall, Warren had been
-forced back one-half mile nearer his new headquarters at Globe Tavern.
-
-    [Illustration: _Globe Tavern, near the Weldon Railroad. During the
-    Battle for the Weldon Railroad, August 18-21, 1864, this building
-    was headquarters for Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren’s V Corps._]
-
-August 20 was marked by comparative inactivity, although there was some
-skirmishing in the morning. Throughout the following day A. P. Hill, who
-had received reinforcements, threw his men at the Union positions around
-the tavern. The attacks were in vain, for the new Union lines held.
-General Lee arrived with more infantry brigades during the afternoon,
-but after discussing the situation with his generals, he determined not
-to renew the attack. By the end of the day Lee realized that the upper
-portion of the Weldon Railroad had been lost and that any attempt to
-regain it would be a needless sacrifice of manpower.
-
-    [Illustration: _Petersburg’s hungry defenders were delighted when
-    Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton’s Confederate horsemen rustled more than
-    2,000 cattle from the Union army in September 1864. Alfred Waud
-    sketched the raid for_ Harper’s Weekly.]
-
-One sentence from a dispatch sent by Lee to the Confederate Secretary of
-War on August 22 shows the seriousness of the loss of the railroad: “Our
-supply of corn is exhausted today, and I am informed that the small
-reserve in Richmond is consumed.” For a time the Confederate government
-was able to utilize the Weldon Railroad as far as Stony Creek, 20 miles
-below Petersburg, where supplies were transferred to wagons and hauled
-around the left of the Northern army to Petersburg and Richmond. In
-December the railroad line was destroyed below Stony Creek and
-henceforth the beleaguered cities had only two direct rail
-communications with the South—the Richmond and Danville Railroad out of
-Richmond and the Southside from Petersburg.
-
-On August 25, 2 days after the fighting at Globe Tavern had ended, the
-Confederates scored a minor victory with a surprise attack. Their blow
-was aimed at Hancock’s II Corps busily engaged in destroying railroad
-tracks at Reams Station, nearly 5 miles below Globe Tavern. The II
-Corps, containing large numbers of inexperienced recruits, was badly
-beaten and more than 1,700 were taken prisoner. The Southern victory was
-shortlived, for the destruction of their rail communications was
-continued. The best that Lee could hope for in the future would be to
-stem the Federal advance.
-
-In mid-September, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, cavalry commander of the Army
-of Northern Virginia since J. E. B. Stuart’s death in May, led a
-remarkable raid of 4,000 mounted troops around the rear of the Union
-army, now numbering 80,000. He succeeded in returning to Petersburg on
-September 17 with about 2,400 head of cattle and more than 300
-prisoners, while suffering losses of only 61 men in two engagements with
-the enemy. Although this raised the morale of the Confederates, it did
-not change the course of the campaign. The iron band being forged
-outside their city was a reality, and Grant, a tenacious man, had not
-loosened his grip.
-
-    [Illustration: _Federal soldiers in the trenches before Petersburg.
-    By 1864, most of the men of the Armies of the Potomac and the James
-    were veteran combat soldiers, but the strain of siege warfare
-    eventually affected even the most hardened of them. “It was hell
-    itself,” one soldier recalled, “and it is wondrous to me that so
-    many of us survived the event.”_]
-
-    [Illustration: _Constructing gabions for the attack on Petersburg.
-    When filled with earth, these cylindrical, basket-like objects
-    offered strong protection against enemy fire._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Federal pickets in front of Union Fort Sedgwick,
-    opposite Confederate Fort Mahone. Note how the gabions are being
-    used._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Rifled siege guns in Union Battery IV. Fire from
-    this battery helped to seal off the Confederate breakthrough at Fort
-    Stedman in March 1865._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Capt. James H. Cooper’s Battery, 1st Pennsylvania
-    Light Artillery, V Corps. While the men were standing to their guns
-    to have this picture taken, a Confederate battery, thinking the
-    Federals were preparing to fire, opened up on them. The famous Civil
-    War photographer Mathew B. Brady is standing with hands in pocket
-    beside the trail of the second gun._]
-
-
-
-
-                      UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES
-
-
-The relentless westerly advance of the besieging force was soon resumed
-after the capture of the Weldon Railroad in August. Constant skirmishing
-occurred between the lines until, in late September, Grant struck again.
-
-The Battle of Peebles’ Farm, September 29 to October 1, was really the
-second section of a two-part struggle. The first took place closer to
-Richmond and was directed at Fort Harrison, a strongly fortified point
-on the outer defense line of the Confederate capital. Fort Harrison was
-approximately midway between Richmond and Petersburg. On the morning of
-September 29, Union troops advanced and captured the fort and held it
-the next day against a counterattack by the former occupants. At the
-same time, Meade was moving toward a further encirclement of Petersburg
-with more than 20,000 troops. The direction of his attack was northwest
-toward Confederate earthworks along the Squirrel Level Road. The
-ultimate goal was the capture of the Southside Railroad.
-
-Fighting began on the 29th as the Federal vanguard approached the
-Confederates in the vicinity of Peebles’ farm. The engagement increased
-in fury on the 30th and continued into the next day. When the smoke of
-battle had blown away on October 2, Meade had extended the Union left
-flank 3 miles farther west and had secured the ground on which Fort
-Fisher would soon be built. (This fort was to be the Union’s biggest and
-was one of the largest earthen forts in Civil War history.) He was,
-however, stopped short of the coveted Southside Railroad. Against the
-gain in territory the Union army had suffered a loss of more than 1,300
-prisoners to the Confederacy and more than 650 killed and wounded. The
-Southerners found that their lines, while unbroken, were again extended.
-Each extension meant a thinner Confederate defense line.
-
-For a period of about 3 weeks after the Battle of Peebles’ Farm, the
-shovel and pick again replaced the rifle-musket as the principal tools
-for soldiers on both sides. Forts were built, breastworks dug, and
-gabions constructed. Then, on October 27, the Union troops moved again.
-This time they turned toward the Boydton Plank Road and a stream known
-as Hatcher’s Run, 12 miles southwest of Petersburg. Again Grant’s
-objective was Lee’s vital supply line—the Southside Railroad.
-
-    [Illustration: Map.]
-
-
-  JULY 30, 1864. The Crater. Union Attempt to Capture Petersburg by
-          Surprise Failed.
-  SEPT. 29-OCT. 1, 1864. Battle of Peebles’ Farm. Union Lines Pushed
-          West of the Weldon R.R.
-  AUGUST 18-21, 1864. Union Troops Capture the Weldon R.R.
-
-
-The general plan of operations was nearly the same as that used at
-Peebles’ farm. Butler’s Army of the James was ordered to threaten attack
-in front of Richmond. Meanwhile, at the left of the Union line, nearly
-43,000 infantry and cavalry of the Army of the Potomac started for the
-Boydton Plank Road. The columns made rapid progress, driving the enemy
-outposts ahead of them and advancing until they neared Burgess’ Mill
-where the Boydton Plank Road crossed Hatcher’s Run.
-
-Near Burgess’ Mill, heavy Confederate opposition was met and a spirited
-engagement took place. The failure of Union Generals Hancock of the II
-Corps and Warren of the V Corps to coordinate the efforts of their
-respective columns, coupled with a slashing thrust by Heth’s infantry
-and dogged resistance by Hampton’s cavalry and horse-artillery, resulted
-in a speedy Northern withdrawal. The Boydton Plank Road, for a time at
-least, remained in Southern hands, and Grant’s encircling movement to
-cut Lee’s railroad was checked.
-
-The approach of winter made any large-scale effort by either side less
-probable, although daily skirmishes and tightening of the siege lines
-continued. The slackening of hostile action was used to good advantage
-by Union and Confederate alike, as it had been in the previous respites
-between battles, in the strengthening of the battlelines and efforts to
-develop some rudimentary comforts in the cheerless camps. Throughout the
-last 2 months of 1864 and the 1st month of the new year there were no
-strong efforts by either side before Petersburg; picket duty, sniping,
-and patrolling prevailed. The only action out of the trenches was the
-Hicksford Raid in December when a strong Union force destroyed the
-Weldon Railroad as far as Hicksford, about 40 miles south of Petersburg.
-Lee now had a 35-mile front, with the left resting on the Williamsburg
-Road east of Richmond and the right on Hatcher’s Run southwest of
-Petersburg. To hold this long line he had in December an effective troop
-strength of only 66,533. Facing these undernourished and ragged soldiers
-were, according to official Union returns of the same month, 110,364
-well-fed and equipped Federals.
-
-The picture throughout the rest of the South was no more reassuring to
-Confederate sympathizers. In the Shenandoah Valley, northwest of
-Richmond, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s army had finally crushed Lt.
-Gen. Jubal A. Early’s Southern forces at Cedar Creek on October 19 and
-was destroying the scattered resistance that remained. Far to the
-southwest, Sherman had captured Atlanta, Ga., in September, and Savannah
-had surrendered on December 21. As the new year dawned, his army was
-prepared to march north toward Grant. To complete the gloomy Southern
-prospects, Fort Fisher, guardian bastion of Wilmington, N.C., the last
-of the Confederacy’s Atlantic coast ports to remain open, was under
-fatal bombardment by mid-January.
-
-    [Illustration: _Not everyone was shooting all the time. Often only
-    handpicked sharpshooters traded shots from the trenches and tried to
-    pick off each other’s artillerymen. An artist caught these men of
-    the Federal XVIII Corps at their daily, deadly business._]
-
-In late January, President Jefferson Davis, hoping that peace might be
-made with the Union, agreed to send commissioners to meet with President
-Lincoln. The Peace Commissioners, on January 31, 1865, crossed over to
-the Union lines at Petersburg. Soldiers of both armies, suspecting their
-mission, cheered as the commissioners slowly walked over the scarred
-earth of the crater battlefield. At Hampton Roads they met Lincoln, but
-the “Peace Conference” ended in failure; Davis’ insistence on Southern
-independence as a condition for peace brought about the impasse. The war
-continued.
-
-The Battle of Hatcher’s Run on February 5-7, 1865, was the result of a
-further drive by the Federals in their attempt to encircle Petersburg.
-Two Union corps (the II and V), reinforced by a cavalry division and
-elements of the VI Corps, advanced across Hatcher’s Run. Their immediate
-objective was the Boydton Plank Road.
-
-As had happened before, the Confederates quickly moved out to engage the
-Union columns. On the afternoon of the 5th, and again the next day, the
-Southerners counterattacked. While many Confederate units displayed
-their customary élan, others did not. There were several reasons for
-this: the inferior numbers of the Southern army, the extremely bad
-weather which made a Union attack appear unlikely, the ravages of cold
-on badly equipped and poorly uniformed men, and, most important, the
-breakdown of the food supply system.
-
-The only Federal units to reach the Boydton Plank Road belonged to the
-cavalry, but in view of the Confederate response and the discovery that
-General Lee was not utilizing this road to supply his army, they were
-recalled. Consequently, no effort was made to hold the Boydton Plank
-Road, but the Federals did occupy and fortify the newly extended line to
-Hatcher’s Run at a point 3 miles below Burgess’ Mill. Thus, again the
-Union lines had been pushed to the west, and, as before, Lee was forced
-to lengthen his defenses. The Petersburg-Richmond front, with its recent
-extension, now stretched over 37 miles, and the army holding it had
-dwindled through casualties and desertion to slightly more than 56,000
-on March 1, 1865.
-
-    [Illustration: _One of the most impressive oddities of the siege was
-    Poplar Grove Church, built about February 1865 by the 50th New York
-    Engineers to while away their leisure hours. It could seat 225 men
-    and was used for recreational and religious purposes until the
-    regiment moved away to take part in the pursuit of Lee. The building
-    was dismantled in 1868. Today, Poplar Grove Cemetery is on the
-    site._]
-
-The Battle of Hatcher’s Run was another fight in the constant movement
-of the Union Army to the west after June 18, 1864. In its relentless
-extension around Petersburg, which continued day by day with the
-addition of a few more feet or yards of picket line and rifle-pits,
-there had occurred five important thrusts aimed by the Northern leaders
-at encircling the city. They included two attacks on the Weldon
-Railroad, in June and August 1864; Peebles’ Farm, in September and
-October; Boydton Plank Road, in October; and, finally, the move to
-Hatcher’s Run in February 1865. They met with varying degrees of
-success, but still the Union noose was not drawn tightly enough.
-
-The enlisted men of both armies, however, remained largely unaware of
-the strategy of their commanders. Their daily existence during the
-campaign took on a marked flavor, different in many respects from the
-more dashing engagements which preceded it. Too often war is a
-combination of bloodshed and boredom, and Petersburg, unlike most other
-military operations of the Civil War, had more than its share of the
-latter. The Petersburg episode—assault and resistance—dragged on to
-become the longest unbroken campaign against a single American city in
-the history of the United States. The romantic and heroic exploits were
-relatively few, and between them came long stretches of uninspiring and
-backbreaking routine.
-
-The men of both sides had much in common, despite the bitterness with
-which they fought. In battle they were enemies, but in camp they were on
-the same common level. Stripped of the emotional tension and
-exhilaration of combat they all appear as bored, war-weary, homesick
-men. The greater part of their time was primarily utilized by digging
-and constructing fortifications, performing sentry and picket duty, and
-striving to speed up the long succession of days. They lived in rude
-improvised shelters, often made of mud and log walls with tent roofs.
-Chimneys were made of mud and barrels. There was some friendly
-interchange of words and gifts between the lines, but enmity was more
-rampant than brotherly regard. Off duty, the amusements and pastimes of
-the soldiers were simple and few—limited in most cases to their ability
-to improvise them. The most striking difference between the armies as
-the Petersburg campaign lengthened was that, while the Northerners
-suffered most from boredom, the Confederates were plagued by the
-demoralizing effects of hunger.
-
-    [Illustration: _In late 1864, with food and supplies dwindling,
-    desertion in the Confederate ranks became a major problem. This
-    Southern cavalryman, completely discouraged and in rags, was one of
-    those who crossed the lines to surrender. By early 1865, more than
-    2,000 Confederates had followed his example. One Union officer
-    concluded that “if we stay here, the Johnnies will all come over
-    before the 4th of July.”_]
-
-    _During the Civil War, a handful of “special artists” followed the
-    Federal armies to supply glimpses of soldier life to news- and
-    picture-hungry readers of such popular publications as the_ New York
-    Illustrated News, Harper’s Weekly, _and_ Frank Leslie’s Illustrated
-    Newspaper. _Artists Edwin Forbes and the Waud brothers, Alfred and
-    William, caught these scenes during the siege of Petersburg._
-
-    [Illustration: _Pickets trading between the lines. At quiet moments,
-    opposing pickets sometimes met between the lines to trade coffee,
-    tobacco, newspapers, and trinkets._]
-
-    [Illustration: _The wagon camp at night. Necessary but thankless was
-    the task of the teamsters, those thousands of soldiers and civilians
-    who drove the supply wagons from the railroads and ships to the
-    front line. Theirs may have been a relatively safe job, but a
-    bone-wearying one._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Pennsylvania soldiers voting, 1864. Volunteers
-    considered themselves citizens first, soldiers second. These men,
-    and thousands like them, took time out from their deadly work to
-    vote in the Presidential election, doubtless, as the campaign song
-    ran, “For Lincoln and Liberty, too.”_]
-
-    [Illustration: _Bivouac in the rifle-pits. Life in the infantry line
-    was anything but pleasant: steaming, stinking mud in summer, frozen
-    muck in winter. These soldiers of the V Corps built wood-and-canvas
-    “shebangs” over their trenches as protection against the elements._]
-
-    [Illustration: Map.]
-
-
-  OCTOBER 27, 1864. Battle of Boydton Plank Road. Union Drive Toward the
-          Southside R.R. Turned Back
-  FEBRUARY 5-7, 1865. Union Troops Extend Line to Hatcher’s Run
-  MARCH 25, 1865. Fort Stedman. Confederate Offensive Fails
-  APRIL 1, 1865. Battle of Five Forks. Union Victory Opens Way to
-          Southside R.R.
-  APRIL 2, 1865. Union Forces Break Through Outer Defenses of City and
-          Reach Appomattox River
-  NIGHT OF APRIL 2-3, 1865. Confederates Evacuate Petersburg and Retreat
-          West.
-  Union Troops Enter City Morning of April 3
-  Union Army Sets Out in Immediate Pursuit of The Confederates on April
-          3
-  FORT GREGG
-  FORT MAHONE
-  FORT SEDGWICK
-  FORT FISHER
-
-
-The Petersburg campaign was grim business. Amusements could lighten the
-heart for only a brief time at best. Ever present were the mud and
-disease which followed every Civil War camp. Both opposing forces felt
-the chill of winter and the penetrating rain. The discouragement of the
-homesick, who never knew when, or if, they would return to their homes,
-was a hardship not peculiar to any rank. However, when spring came to
-warm the air, there was a difference between the two opposing armies. It
-was more than a numerical superiority. Then the Union soldiers felt
-confidence, while the Southern veterans, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and
-nearly surrounded, knew only despair.
-
-    [Illustration: _From June 1864 until April 1865, City Point was the
-    “busiest place in Dixie.” While Lee’s outnumbered Confederates
-    fought and starved behind their slowly crumbling defenses at
-    Petersburg, here, just 8 miles away, Grant built up one of the
-    largest supply depots of the Civil War which, during the 10 months
-    of its existence, kept his army the best-fed, best-clothed, and
-    best-munitioned in the field._]
-
-    _1-4. Scenes at City Point, Va., showing some of the supplies and
-    munitions destined for Grant’s army. An Episcopal bishop from
-    Atlanta, visiting Grant at City Point, was awed by the abundance of
-    military stores that he saw—“not merely profusion, but extravagance;
-    wagons, tents, artillery, ad libitum. Soldiers provided with
-    everything.”_
-
-    [Illustration: _1_]
-
-    [Illustration: _2_]
-
-    [Illustration: _3_]
-
-    [Illustration: _4_]
-
-    [Illustration: _On August 9, 1864, a Confederate spy slipped a time
-    bomb on board one of the ammunition barges tied up at City Point.
-    The bomb’s explosion, sketched by A. R. Waud, killed or wounded 200
-    people and demolished more than 600 feet of warehouses and about 180
-    feet of wharf. Grant himself was shaken up by the blast, and one of
-    his staff members was wounded._]
-
-
-
-
-                           LEE’S LAST GAMBLE
-
-
-By mid-March 1865 the climax of the campaign, and of the war, was close
-at hand. Lee’s forces in both Richmond and Petersburg had dwindled to
-about 55,000. Grant, on the other hand, had available, or within easy
-march, at least 150,000. Moreover, Sheridan, having destroyed the
-remnants of Early’s forces at Waynesboro, Va., on March 2, had cleared
-the Shenandoah Valley of Confederates and was now free to rejoin Grant
-before Petersburg.
-
-Everywhere Lee turned, the military situation was black. Union forces
-under Sherman, driving the Confederates before them, had turned north
-from Savannah and were now hammering Johnston’s forces in North
-Carolina. With President Jefferson Davis’ consent, Lee sent a letter to
-General Grant on March 2 suggesting an interview. In the early morning
-hours of the second day following the dispatch of the letter, Lee and
-Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon discussed the three possible solutions to the
-problem which perplexed them: (1) Try to negotiate satisfactory peace
-terms. (This had already been acted upon in Lee’s note to Grant.) (2)
-Retreat from Richmond and Petersburg and unite with Johnston for a final
-stand. (3) Attack Grant in order to facilitate retreat.
-
-There followed a series of interviews with Confederate government
-officials in Richmond. Each of the plans was analyzed. The first was
-quickly dropped when Grant made it clear that he was not empowered to
-negotiate. Nor was the second proposal, that of retreat, deemed
-advisable by President Davis who wished to strike one more blow before
-surrendering his capital. This left only the third alternative—to
-attack.
-
-Before settling on a definite course of action, however, Lee ordered
-General Gordon to make a reconnaissance of the Federal lines around
-Petersburg to see if they could be broken anywhere. Gordon soon reported
-that the best place for an attack was at Fort Stedman, a Union work
-located near the City Point and Petersburg Railroad and only 150 yards
-to the east of a strongly fortified Confederate position named
-Colquitt’s Salient. Lee agreed with Gordon’s assessment and, on the
-night of March 23, told Gordon to make preparations for an attack on the
-fort.
-
-    [Illustration: _In Petersburg, sometime in the autumn of 1864, Lee
-    was photographed on his horse Traveller for the first time. Although
-    determined to fight on until all hope was gone, already Lee knew the
-    war was going badly and that his tired, hungry, dirty, and cold
-    soldiers could not hold out for long against Grant’s growing
-    might._]
-
-About one-half of the besieged army would be used to charge the Union
-line in the vicinity of Fort Stedman. It was hoped that this would cause
-Grant to shorten his front by withdrawing his left flank to protect his
-endangered right. Then Lee could detach a portion of the Confederate
-army to send to the aid of Johnston as, with shorter lines, he would not
-need as many men in Petersburg. Should the attack fail, he would attempt
-to retreat with all his forces for a final stand with Johnston. This
-would be the last desperate gamble of the Army of Northern Virginia.
-
-The details for the attack were worked out by Gordon. During the night
-preceding the assault, the obstructions before the Confederate lines
-were to be removed and the Union pickets overcome as quietly as
-possible. A group of 50 men were to remove the chevaux-de-frise and
-abatis protecting Fort Stedman; then three companies of 100 men each
-were to charge and capture the fort. When Stedman was safely in
-Confederate hands, these men were to pretend they were Union troops and,
-forming into three columns, were to rush to the rear to capture other
-positions.
-
-The next step was to send a division of infantry to gain possession of
-the siege lines north and south of the fallen bastion. When the breach
-had been sufficiently widened, Southern cavalry were to rush through and
-destroy telegraphic communication with Grant’s headquarters at City
-Point. They were also ordered to cut the military railroad. Additional
-reserves were to follow the cavalry.
-
-The attack was scheduled for the morning of March 25. The 50 axmen and
-the 300 soldiers who were to make up the advance columns were given
-strips of white cloth to wear across their chests to tell friend from
-foe. The officers in charge were given the names of Union officers known
-to be in the vicinity and were told to shout their assumed names if
-challenged. Beginning about 3 a.m., Confederates professing to be
-deserters crossed to the Union pickets offering to surrender. Their
-purpose: to be near at hand to overwhelm the unsuspecting pickets when
-the attack began.
-
-At 4 a.m. Gordon gave the signal, and the Confederates sprang forward.
-At first the attack went as planned. Blue-clad pickets were silenced so
-effectively that not a shot was fired. Union obstructions were quickly
-hewn down by the axmen, and the small vanguard of 300 swept through
-Battery No. X which stood immediately north of Fort Stedman. They then
-rushed into the fort; the occupants were completely surprised and many
-surrendered without a fight. Battery XI to the south of Fort Stedman was
-also soon in Confederate hands. Union resistance in this early stage was
-ineffective, although Battery XI was recaptured for a short time.
-
-    [Illustration: _Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon planned and led the March
-    25 attack on Fort Stedman, one of the most advanced works on the
-    Union line._]
-
-More Confederates pressed into the torn line. While three columns set
-out in the general direction of City Point and along the Prince George
-Court House Road behind Stedman, other infantry units moved north and
-south along the Federal emplacements. To the north, they captured the
-fortifications as far as Battery IX where they were stopped by the Union
-defenders; to the south, they progressed as far as the ramparts of Fort
-Haskell. A desperate struggle ensued, but here, too, the Northerners
-refused to yield. Despite these checks, the Confederates were now in
-possession of almost 1 mile of the Union line.
-
-In the center of the Confederate attack, the three small columns quickly
-advanced as far as Harrison’s Creek—a small stream which winds its way
-north to the Appomattox River 650 yards behind Fort Stedman. One of the
-columns succeeded in crossing the stream and continuing toward a small
-Union artillery post on the site of what had been Confederate Battery 8
-(renamed Fort Friend by the Federals), but canister from the post forced
-the column back to the creek. Confusion took hold of the Confederates
-who were unable to locate the positions they had been ordered to capture
-behind the Union line. Artillery fire from Northern guns on a ridge to
-the east held them on the banks of Harrison’s Creek. By 6 a.m. their
-forward momentum had been checked.
-
-    [Illustration: _Advancing from Colquitt’s Salient (above), Gordon’s
-    men captured Fort Stedman (below) but were driven out by a murderous
-    crossfire from Federal artillery. In the assault, some 4,000
-    Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured._]
-
-    [Illustration: Fort Stedman.]
-
-Union infantry then charged from the ridge to attack the Southerners.
-The forces joined battle along Harrison’s Creek and the Confederates
-were soon forced back to Fort Stedman. For a brief time they held their
-newly captured positions. At 7:30 a.m. Brig. Gen. John F. Hartranft
-advanced on them with a division of Northern troops. Heavy small-arms
-and artillery fire on Gordon’s men threatened them with annihilation
-unless they retired to their own lines. About 8 a.m., Gordon received an
-order from Lee to withdraw his men. The order was quickly dispatched
-across the open fields to the soldiers in the captured Union works. By
-now, however, the line of retreat was raked by a vicious crossfire and
-many Confederates preferred surrender to withdrawal. About the same time
-Gordon was starting back, Hartranft ordered his division of Pennsylvania
-troops to recapture Fort Stedman. Within a few moments the Union line
-was completely restored and the forlorn Southern hope of a successful
-disruption of Northern communications, followed by secret withdrawal
-from the city, was lost. Equally bad, if not worse, to the Confederates
-was the loss of more than 4,000 killed, wounded, and captured as
-compared to the Union casualties of less than 1,500.
-
-Of the three Confederate plans of action before the Battle of Fort
-Stedman, now only the second—retreat—was possible. The situation
-demanded immediate action, for, even as Gordon had been preparing on
-March 24 to launch his attack, Grant had been engaged in planning more
-difficulties for the harassed defenders of Petersburg.
-
-
-
-
-                    FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END
-
-
-The coming of better weather heralded the opportunity for the final
-blows against the city. Grant, who was now passing some of the most
-anxious moments of his life, planned that this effort should be
-concentrated on the extreme right of the long Confederate line which
-protected Richmond and Petersburg. This meant that hostilities would
-soon commence somewhere west of Hatcher’s Run, perhaps in the
-neighborhood of Dinwiddie Court House or a road junction called Five
-Forks which lay 17 miles southwest of Petersburg. On March 24, Grant
-ordered the II and IX Corps and three divisions of the Army of the James
-to the extreme left of the Union lines facing Lee. This resulted in a
-strong concentration northeast of Hatcher’s Run. Two days later Sheridan
-arrived at City Point, fresh from his victorious campaign in the
-Shenandoah Valley, and was ordered to join his troops to those
-concentrated on the left. Finally, it began to appear that the Army of
-Northern Virginia was to be encircled.
-
-Meanwhile, Lee was waiting only until he collected supplies and rations
-to last his men for a week and until the roads were passable before
-leaving to join Johnston. He hoped to leave on or about April 10. The
-information he received about the rapid accumulation of Union forces
-opposite his lightly held right was very disturbing, for, if it was
-true, the Federals not only threatened to cut off his retreat to the
-west and south, but they also posed a serious danger to the Southside
-Railroad—the last remaining communication link between Petersburg and
-the South, which continued to deliver a trickle of supplies to the city.
-
-On March 29 the Union troops moved out. Sheridan’s cavalry crossed the
-Rowanty Creek and occupied Dinwiddie Court House, while the II and V
-Corps crossed Hatcher’s Run. In moving into position on the left of the
-II Corps, Warren’s V Corps soldiers encountered heavy resistance north
-of Gravelly Run. While Sheridan was marshaling his troops around
-Dinwiddie, Lee issued orders on March 29 which sent Maj. Gens. George E.
-Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee to the Confederate right near Five Forks, far
-beyond Petersburg.
-
-Sheridan was prepared to move against the Confederates with his cavalry
-on March 30, but heavy rains lasting from the evening of March 29 until
-the morning of the 31st made a large-scale movement impracticable over
-the muddy roads. On the last day of the month, part of Sheridan’s forces
-which has pushed northwest toward Five Forks was attacked by Southern
-forces which succeeded in driving them back to Dinwiddie Court House,
-where Sheridan had a fresh division. Pickett then found his men badly
-outnumbered and withdrew them to Five Forks without pressing the
-advantage he had gained. This incident, called the Battle of Dinwiddie
-Court House, was a minor Confederate victory, although Sheridan’s men
-were neither demoralized nor disorganized by the attack, and Robert E.
-Lee could find small comfort in the situation.
-
-    [Illustration: Map, Five Forks.]
-
-Meanwhile, there had been a savage clash on White Oak Road between
-Warren’s V Corps and Maj. Gen. Bushrod Johnson’s Confederate division.
-The Confederates at first swept all before them, but in the end numbers
-told and they were compelled to withdraw behind their breastworks.
-
-The Confederates had been able to concentrate on their extreme right in
-the vicinity of Five Forks only about 10,000 cold and hungry soldiers to
-meet the expected Union drive to turn their right flank. Massed against
-this force commanded by Pickett were about 10,000 Northern cavalry and
-12,000 infantry. The desperate urgency of General Lee’s fears was
-indicated in the dispatch he sent to Pickett early on April 1, the day
-of the struggle for Five Forks: “_Hold Five Forks at all hazards._
-Protect road to Ford’s Depot and prevent Union forces from striking the
-south-side railroad. Regret exceedingly your forced withdrawal, and your
-inability to hold the advantage you had gained.”
-
-Throughout April 1, Pickett’s troops worked unceasingly, erecting
-barricades of logs and earth around Five Forks. About 4 p.m., with only
-2 hours of daylight remaining, Sheridan’s cavalry and Warren’s infantry
-attacked. While the cavalry occupied the attention of the Confederate
-defenders along White Oak Road, divisions of infantrymen from the V
-Corps moved to the left of Pickett’s troops and, after crossing the
-White Oak Road which connected Five Forks with Petersburg, hit them on
-the weakly held left flank. Lacking sufficient artillery support,
-infantry reserves, and the presence of their commander, the Southerners
-were quickly overcome. Realizing that their position was no longer
-tenable, portions of the Confederate troops tried to retreat to
-Petersburg, but the avenue of escape had been cut by the Union advance
-across the White Oak Road.
-
-By dusk, the Battle of Five Forks had ended. Union troops were in
-possession of the disputed area. They had cut off and captured more than
-3,200 prisoners, while suffering a loss of probably less than 1,000.
-
-Now the besieging forces were in position for the first time to
-accomplish Grant’s objective of cutting Lee’s supply lines and breaking
-through his fortifications. The western end of Lee’s mobile defenses had
-crumbled.
-
-    [Illustration: _When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (above) sent
-    cavalry and infantry crashing into the Confederate right flank at
-    Five Forks on April 1, 1865, the Southern commander, Maj. Gen.
-    George E. Pickett (below), was at a shad bake in the rear. By the
-    time Pickett returned to his command, both it and the defense line
-    had crumbled. Suddenly, Petersburg was no longer tenable. “It has
-    happened as I told them in Richmond it would happen,” said Lee. “The
-    line has been stretched until it is broken.”_]
-
-    [Illustration: Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett.]
-
-Those Confederates who had survived the Battle of Five Forks had fallen
-back to the Southside Railroad where they rallied for a stand, but
-darkness had prevented a Union pursuit. Grant’s troops were within
-striking distance of the rail line, located less than 3 miles from Five
-Forks. Lee now knew that Petersburg and Richmond must be evacuated
-without delay or the Army of Northern Virginia would be completely cut
-off from outside help and all possible escape routes would be gone.
-
-The problem of assigning a proper significance to Five Forks is a
-difficult one. It is now known that Lee and the Confederate government
-officials were on the verge of abandoning their capital. In June of the
-previous year the Southside Railroad had been a most important objective
-of the invading army, but the plight of Lee’s army had grown so
-desperate during the intervening months that whether the railroad
-remained open or not mattered little. Grant, of course, did not know
-this as a positive fact, although the uncomfortable situation of his
-opponents was something of which he was doubtless aware. The real
-importance of Five Forks lay in the probability that, by making it more
-difficult for Lee to escape, it brought the inevitable a little closer.
-Lt. Col. Horace Porter, of Grant’s staff, was positive more than 30
-years later that news of Sheridan’s success prompted the Union commander
-in chief to issue the orders for the attack that carried the city.
-
-
-
-
-                    FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND
-
-
-Continuously throughout the night following the Battle of Five Forks,
-the Union artillery played upon the Confederate earthworks and dropped
-shells into the city. Troops were prepared for a general assault ordered
-for the following dawn. At 4:40 a.m., April 2, 1865, a frontal attack
-began with the sound of a signal gun from Fort Fisher. A heavy ground
-fog added to the confusion as the Federals drove in the Confederate
-pickets, cut away the abatis, and stormed over the works.
-
-The story of the fighting along the Petersburg front on that spring
-Sunday is one of Union success over stout Confederate resistance. Maj.
-Gen. Horatio G. Wright’s Union VI Corps broke through the works defended
-by troops of A. P. Hill’s Corps and rolled up the Confederate line to
-right and left, while several regiments rushed on toward the Southside
-Railroad. Other elements of Grant’s army swept away the remnants of the
-Confederate lines along Hatcher’s Run. General Hill was killed early in
-the day by a Union soldier near the Boydton Plank Road while on the way
-to rally his men at Hatcher’s Run.
-
-The desperateness of the Southern position was shown when, about 10
-a.m., Lee telegraphed President Davis to inform him of the turn of
-events at Petersburg. The message read: “I advise that all preparations
-be made for leaving Richmond tonight.” Davis received the message while
-attending Sunday services at St. Paul’s Church. He left immediately,
-destroying the calm of worship, to prepare for evacuating the capital.
-The flight of the Confederate government was promptly begun.
-
-By midday the entire outer line to the west of Petersburg had been
-captured, with the exception of Fort Gregg. The city was now completely
-surrounded except to the north. The left of the Union line finally
-rested on the bank of the Appomattox River after months of strenuous
-effort.
-
-It now became apparent to Lee that he must hold an inner line west of
-Petersburg until nightfall, when it would be possible for him to retreat
-from the city. While gray-clad troops were forming along this line built
-on the banks of Old Indian Town Creek, the defenders of Fort Gregg put
-up a stubborn delaying action against the Northern advance.
-Approximately 300 men and two pieces of artillery met an onslaught of
-5,000 Northerners. The outcome of the struggle was determined by the
-numbers in the attacking force, but the capture of Fort Gregg occurred
-only after bitter hand-to-hand combat. The purpose of the defense had
-been accomplished, however, for a thin but sturdy line running behind
-them from Battery 45 to the Appomattox River had been manned.
-Temporarily, at least, street fighting within Petersburg had been
-avoided.
-
-Blows directed at other points, such as Fort Mahone on the Jerusalem
-Plank Road, were slowed after troops of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke’s IX
-Corps had captured 12 guns and 400 yards of the Confederate line to the
-right and left of the road. Desperate counterattacks by Gordon’s
-Confederates kept the Federals from exploiting this breakthrough. Yet
-there was no doubt in the minds of Lee and other Southern leaders that
-all hope of retaining Petersburg and Richmond was gone. It was obvious
-that, if the lines held the Union army in check on April 2, they must be
-surrendered on the morrow. The object was to delay until evening, when
-retreat would be possible.
-
-The close of the day found the weary Confederates concentrating within
-Petersburg and making all possible plans to withdraw. Lee had issued the
-necessary instructions at 5 o’clock that afternoon. By 8 p.m. the
-retreat was under way, the artillery preceding the infantry across the
-Appomattox River. Amelia Court House, 40 miles to the west, was
-designated as the assembly point for the troops from Petersburg and
-Richmond.
-
-Grant had ordered the assault on Petersburg to be renewed early on April
-3. It was discovered at 3 a.m. that the Southern earthworks had been
-abandoned; an attack was not necessary. Union troops took possession of
-the city shortly after 4 o’clock in the morning. Richmond officially
-surrendered 4 hours later.
-
-President Lincoln, who had been in the vicinity of Petersburg for more
-than a week, came from army headquarters at City Point that same day for
-a brief visit with Grant. They talked quietly on the porch of a private
-house for 1½ hours before the President returned to City Point. Grant,
-with all of his army, except the detachments necessary to police
-Petersburg and Richmond and to protect City Point, set out in pursuit of
-Lee. He left Maj. Gen. George L. Hartsuff in command at Petersburg.
-
-Petersburg had fallen, but it was at a heavy price. In the absence of
-complete records, the exact casualties will never be known, but in the
-10-month campaign at least 42,000 Union soldiers had been killed,
-wounded, and captured, while the Confederates had suffered losses of
-more than 28,000. Although the northern forces had lost more men than
-their opponents, they had been able to replenish them more readily.
-Moreover, Grant had been prepared to utilize the greater resources at
-his disposal, and the Petersburg campaign had been turned by him into a
-form of relentless attrition which the Southern army had not been able
-to stand. The result had been the capture of Petersburg and Richmond,
-but more important, it had led to the flight of the remnants of the once
-mighty Army of Northern Virginia.
-
-    [Illustration: _Fort Mahone after its capture, 1865._]
-
-    [Illustration: _Deserted Confederate huts on the abandoned
-    Petersburg line._]
-
-On the Sunday following the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond, Lee’s
-troops were cut off at Appomattox Court House, destroying any hopes they
-might have had for uniting with Johnston in North Carolina. In this
-small Virginia town nearly 100 miles west of Petersburg, the Army of
-Northern Virginia, now numbering little more than 28,000, surrendered to
-the Union forces. Within a week of the fall of Petersburg the major
-striking force of the Confederacy had capitulated. General Johnston
-surrendered his army to General Sherman in North Carolina on April 26.
-By early June 1865, all Confederate forces had been surrendered, and the
-Civil War was over.
-
-    [Illustration: _Union soldiers on Sycamore Street in Petersburg,
-    April 1865. For these men, basking in the aftermath of a successful
-    campaign, the war is almost over. To the west, General Sheridan’s
-    cavalry is racing to cut off the retreating Southern army. “If the
-    thing is pressed,” Sheridan tells Grant, “I think Lee will
-    surrender.” Says Lincoln: “Let the thing be pressed.”_]
-
-    [Illustration: _On April 3, 1865, with Petersburg in Union hands at
-    last, General Grant issued orders sending off the Armies of the
-    Potomac and the James in pursuit of Lee. While the photographer was
-    taking this picture, showing a Federal wagon train leaving the city
-    to join in the chase, the remnants of Lee’s army were marching
-    toward a little crossroad village named Appomattox Court House._]
-
-
-                            PICTURE CREDITS:
-
-
-  Addison Gallery of American Art (from the painting by E. L. Henry):
-          pp. 54-55
-  Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: pp. 25, 31
-  Library of Congress: pp. 3, 13 (top & bottom), 18-19, 20-21, 22-23
-          (bottom, left), 32-33, 38-39, 45, 47, 49, 50-51, 56-57, 61, 62,
-          67 (bottom), 73-75
-  National Archives: pp. 1, 11, 13 (middle), 14-15, 22-23 (top), 34-35,
-          37, 40-41, 63, 67 (top), 71
-  National Park Service: p. 23
-  Washington and Lee University: p. 59.
-
-
-                          FOR FURTHER READING:
-
-
-  Bruce Catton, _Grant Takes Command_, Boston, 1969
-  Bruce Catton, _A Stillness at Appomattox_, New York, 1953
-  Douglas Southall Freeman, _Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command_, 3
-          vols., New York, 1942-46, vol. III
-  Douglas Southall Freeman, _R. E. Lee, A Biography_, 4 vols., New York,
-          1934-35, vols. III and IV
-  Ulysses S. Grant, _Personal Memoirs_, 2 vols., New York, 1885-86, vol.
-          II
-  Andrew A. Humphreys, _The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865_, New
-          York, 1883
-  Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., _Battles and Leaders of
-          the Civil War_, 4 vols., New York, 1887 (reissued, 1956), vol.
-          IV
-  Theodore Lyman, _Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel
-          Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox_, edited by
-          George R. Agassiz, Boston, 1922
-  Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed., _The Photographic History of the Civil
-          War_, 10 vols., New York, 1911 (reissued, 1957)
-  Henry Pleasants, Jr., _The Tragedy of the Crater_, Boston, 1936
-  Horace Porter, _Campaigning With Grant_, New York, 1897 (reissued,
-          1961)
-  Benjamin Quarles, _The Negro in the Civil War_, Boston, 1953
-  Philip Van Doren Stern, _An End to Valor: The Last Days of the Civil
-          War_, Boston, 1958
-  William Swinton, _Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac_, New York,
-          1882
-  U.S. War Department, _War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
-          Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies_, 128
-          vols., Washington, 1880-1901, Series I, vols. 36, 38, 40, 46,
-          51; Series III, vol. 5.
-
-
-                 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES:
-
-
-  Antietam
-  Aztec Ruins
-  Bandelier
-  Campaign for Petersburg
-  Chalmette
-  Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
-  Custer Battlefield
-  Custis-Lee Mansion, the Robert E. Lee Memorial
-  Ford’s Theatre and the House Where Lincoln Died
-  Fort Davis
-  Fort Laramie
-  Fort McHenry
-  Fort Necessity
-  Fort Pulaski
-  Fort Raleigh
-  Fort Sumter
-  Fort Union
-  Fredericksburg Battlefields
-  George Washington Birthplace
-  Gettysburg
-  Golden Spike
-  Guilford Courthouse
-  Hopewell Village
-  Independence
-  Jamestown, Virginia
-  Kings Mountain
-  Manassas (Bull Run)
-  Montezuma Castle
-  Morristown, A Military Capital of the Revolution
-  Ocmulgee
-  Richmond Battlefields
-  Saratoga
-  Scotts Bluff
-  Shiloh
-  Statue of Liberty
-  Vanderbilt Mansion
-  Vicksburg
-  Whitman Mission
-  Wright Brothers
-  Yorktown
-
-
-Pricelists of Park Service publications sold by the Government Printing
-Office may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington,
-DC 20402.
-
-
-                            ADMINISTRATION:
-
-Petersburg National Battlefield is administered by the National Park
-Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superintendent, whose
-address is Box 549, Petersburg, VA 23803, is in immediate charge.
-
-As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the
-Interior has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral,
-land, park, and recreational resources. Indian and Territorial affairs
-are other major concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Resources.”
-The Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our
-resources so each will make its full contribution to a better United
-States—now and in the future.
-
-        U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR    NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
-
-★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 O - 389-735
-
-    [Illustration: Locomotive.]
-
-    [Illustration: Book Jacket.]
-
-
-
-
-	*      *      *      *      *      *
-
-
-
-
-Transcriber’s note:
-
-—A few typographical errors were corrected without comment.
-
-—Retained publication information from the printed edition.
-
-—Moved some captions nearer to the corresponding pictures, and removed
-  (or adjusted) references to picture location in the printed book.
-
-
-
-***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAMPAIGN FOR PETERSBURG***
-
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-<body>
-<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, Campaign for Petersburg, by Richard Wayne
-Lykes</h1>
-<p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
-and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
-restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
-under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
-eBook or online at <a
-href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>.  If you are not
-located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the
-country where you are located before using this ebook.</p>
-<p>Title: Campaign for Petersburg</p>
-<p>Author: Richard Wayne Lykes</p>
-<p>Release Date: August 9, 2016  [eBook #52760]</p>
-<p>Language: English</p>
-<p>Character set encoding: UTF-8</p>
-<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAMPAIGN FOR PETERSBURG***</p>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<h3 class="pg">E-text prepared by Stephen Hutcheson, Dave Morgan,<br />
-    and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br />
-    (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<hr class="full" />
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-
-<div id="cover" class="img">
-<img id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Campaign for Petersburg" width="500" height="764" />
-</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg00.jpg" alt="Supply ships and wagons." width="643" height="999" />
-</div>
-<div class="box">
-<p class="jr1"><span class="smaller">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES</span></p>
-<h1><span class="small">CAMPAIGN FOR</span>
-<br />PETERSBURG</h1>
-<p class="jr1">RICHARD WAYNE LYKES</p>
-<p class="jr1"><span class="smaller">National Park Service
-<br />U.S. Department of the Interior
-<br />Washington, D.C. 1970</span></p>
-</div>
-<div class="verse">
-<p class="t0">For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,</p>
-<p class="t0">U.S. Government Printing Office</p>
-<p class="t0">Washington, D.C. 20402&mdash;Price $1</p>
-</div>
-<h2 class="center">CONTENTS</h2>
-<dl class="toc">
-<dt><a href="#c1">PROLOGUE</a> 2</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c2">UNION STRATEGY 1864</a> 5</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c3">STRATEGIC PETERSBURG</a> 7</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c4">BATTLE OF PETERSBURG</a> 10</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c5">FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG</a> 17</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c6">BATTLE OF THE CRATER</a> 24</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c7">FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD</a> 36</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c8">UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES</a> 42</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c9">LEE&rsquo;S LAST GAMBLE</a> 58</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c10">FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END</a> 64</dt>
-<dt><a href="#c11">FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND</a> 68</dt>
-</dl>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig1">
-<img src="images/pmg01.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="773" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>In the final year of the
-Civil War in the East, the
-fighting focused upon
-Petersburg, an important
-transportation center for
-Richmond and Lee&rsquo;s army.
-For 10 bloody months of
-combat, both from behind
-prepared positions and
-along the main routes of
-supply, Lee&rsquo;s ragged
-Confederates held the city
-(shown here from north of
-the Appomattox River)
-against Grant&rsquo;s numerically
-superior Federals. On
-April 2-3, 1865, Lee was
-forced to abandon both
-Petersburg and Richmond.
-One week later, he
-surrendered the Army of
-Northern Virginia at
-Appomattox Court House,
-dooming the South&rsquo;s bid
-for independent existence.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_2">2</div>
-<h2 id="c1"><span class="small">PROLOGUE</span></h2>
-<p>By June 1864, when the siege of Petersburg began,
-the Civil War had lain heavily on both the North and
-the South for more than 3 years. Most of the fighting in
-the East during this period had taken place on the rolling
-Virginia countryside between the opposing capitals
-of Washington and Richmond, only 110 miles apart,
-and all of it had failed to end the war and bring peace to
-the land. Various generals had been placed in command
-of the Union&rsquo;s mighty Army of the Potomac and had
-faced Gen. Robert E. Lee&rsquo;s Army of Northern Virginia.
-So far not one had succeeded in destroying Lee&rsquo;s army
-or in capturing Richmond.</p>
-<p>Perhaps Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan had come the
-closest to success when, in the late spring and early
-summer of 1862, his Northern troops had threatened
-the Confederate capital, only to be repulsed on its outskirts.
-The other Northern commanders who followed
-McClellan&mdash;Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade&mdash;were
-less successful. Lee had met and turned aside their drives.</p>
-<p>After 36 months of bitter conflict the war in the East
-seemed, to many observers, to be far from a final settlement.
-The failure of Union forces to deliver a decisive
-blow against the Army of Northern Virginia was a
-source of growing concern in Washington. The Confederacy,
-for its part, was no more successful in settling the
-issue. Attempted invasions of the Northern States by
-Lee were turned back at Antietam in September 1862
-and at Gettysburg in July 1863.</p>
-<p>Farther west the picture was brighter for Northern
-hopes. In the same month as the Battle of Gettysburg,
-the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Miss., fell into
-Union hands. A few days later, Port Hudson, La., the
-last remaining stronghold of the Confederacy on the
-banks of the Mississippi River, surrendered. Later in
-1863, the Union capture of Chattanooga, Tenn., threw
-open the gateway to Georgia.</p>
-<p>Strategically, despite the stalemate in Virginia, the beginning
-of 1864 found the Northern armies in a stronger
-position than the Confederate military forces. Not only
-was there a distinct possibility that the Southern States
-east of the Mississippi could be split into two parts, but
-the greater resources at the command of the Lincoln administration
-were beginning to count more heavily with
-each passing day. All that seemed to be needed to end
-the war was an able Union commander who could
-marshal the mighty resources of his country for a last
-tremendous blow at the South.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_3">3</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig2">
-<img src="images/pmg02.jpg" alt="" width="469" height="800" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>From the Rapidan River to
-the James, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S.
-Grant (above), commanding
-the armies of the United
-States, found all his efforts
-to capture Richmond and
-destroy the Confederacy
-blocked by Gen. Robert E.
-Lee (below) and his Army of
-Northern Virginia. Finally,
-Grant turned his attention
-to Petersburg.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg02a.jpg" alt="Gen. Robert E. Lee." width="600" height="495" />
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg03.jpg" alt="Campaign Map." width="600" height="608" />
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt>Union Movements</dt>
-<dt>Confederate Movements</dt>
-<dt>Major Battles and Engagements</dt>
-<dd>WILDERNESS<span class="hst"> MAY 5-7, 1864</span></dd>
-<dd>SPOTSYLVANIA<span class="hst"> MAY 8-19, 1864</span></dd>
-<dd>COLD HARBOR<span class="hst"> JUNE 3-13, 1864</span></dd>
-<dd>PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN<span class="hst"> JUNE 1864-APRIL 1865</span></dd>
-<dd>FIVE FORKS<span class="hst"> APRIL 1, 1865</span></dd>
-<dd>SAYLER&rsquo;S CREEK<span class="hst"> APRIL 6, 1865</span></dd></dl>
-<p>Such a man was found in Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant,
-the victor at Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge, who was
-brought east and, on March 9, 1864, commissioned
-lieutenant general to be responsible for all the Union
-armies. Unlike his predecessor, Henry W. Halleck, Grant
-decided not to remain in Washington but chose instead
-to accompany the Army of the Potomac, where he would
-provide general direction to the military operations but
-leave the execution of them to that army&rsquo;s commander,
-Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_5">5</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig3">
-<img src="images/pmg03a.jpg" alt="" width="428" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. George G. Meade
-commanded the Army of
-the Potomac during the
-1864-65 Virginia campaign.
-With General Grant actively
-directing most of the
-military operations, Meade
-was in the awkward position
-of serving much like a
-corps commander in his
-own army. He nevertheless
-functioned well in this
-difficult situation.</i></p>
-</div>
-<h2 id="c2"><span class="small">UNION STRATEGY 1864</span></h2>
-<p>To accomplish the conquest of the Confederacy, the
-Northern plan called for a huge two-pronged attack.
-Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, in command of the
-southern prong, was assigned the task of destroying Gen.
-Joseph E. Johnston&rsquo;s Confederate Army of Tennessee,
-capturing Atlanta, marching to the sea, and then turning
-north to effect a junction with Grant.</p>
-<p>It was the upper arm of the movement which was directly
-concerned with Richmond and Petersburg. This
-was composed of two armies: the Army of the Potomac
-and the Army of the James. It was the task of these
-armies to capture Richmond, crush the Army of Northern
-Virginia, and march south toward Sherman.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div>
-<p>The story of the Army of the James in the early phase
-of the offensive can be briefly told. Maj. Gen. Benjamin
-F. Butler was ordered to advance upon Richmond from
-the southeast and threaten communications between the
-Confederate capital and the Southern States. With some
-40,000 Union troops, the advance was begun. City
-Point, located at the junction of the James and Appomattox
-Rivers and soon to be the supply center for the
-attack on Petersburg, was captured on May 4, 1864.
-Within 2 weeks, however, a numerically inferior
-Confederate force shut up the Army of the James, &ldquo;as if
-it had been in a bottle strongly corked,&rdquo; in Bermuda
-Hundred, a loop formed by the winding James and Appomattox
-Rivers. Here Butler waited, while north of
-him the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern
-Virginia engaged in a series of bloody battles.</p>
-<p>The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7, 1864, began
-what proved to be the start of the final campaign against
-the Army of Northern Virginia. Here Meade&rsquo;s Army of
-the Potomac, numbering approximately 118,000 troops,
-fought the Confederate defenders of Richmond. Lee had
-about 62,000 men with him, while an additional 30,000
-under Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard held the Richmond-Petersburg
-area. The battle resulted in a fearful loss of
-men on both sides, although the armies remained intact.
-This was followed by a series of fierce engagements
-around Spotsylvania Court House from May 8 to 21.</p>
-<p>Failing to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in
-these battles, Grant moved the Army of the Potomac to
-the east of Richmond. It was his hope that he would
-outflank the Confederate defenders by persistent night
-marches. Lee was not to be so easily outguessed, however.
-After minor battles at the North Anna River
-(May 23) and Totopotomoy Creek (May 29), Grant
-arrived at Cold Harbor, about 8 miles northeast of Richmond,
-but Lee&rsquo;s army still stood between him and that
-city. On June 3, 2 days after he arrived at Cold Harbor,
-Grant ordered a direct frontal assault against the
-Confederate lines. He was repulsed with heavy losses&mdash;about
-7,000 men. &ldquo;I have always regretted that the last
-assault at Cold Harbor was ever made,&rdquo; Grant would
-write many years later.
-<span class="pb" id="Page_7">7</span>
-By the end of the first month of Grant&rsquo;s campaign, both
-sides had suffered heavy casualties, but the North&rsquo;s ability
-to refill its depleted ranks was greater than the
-South&rsquo;s. Lee&rsquo;s offensive strength had been sapped. From
-the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House until the end of
-the war, except for counterattacks and the lunge at Fort
-Stedman during the siege of Petersburg, the Army of
-Northern Virginia was a defensive weapon only.</p>
-<p>After Cold Harbor, Grant decided to turn quickly to the
-south of Richmond and isolate the city and the defending
-troops by attacking Petersburg and cutting the railroads
-that supplied them. Lee knew he could not allow
-this to happen. &ldquo;We must destroy this army of Grant&rsquo;s
-before he gets to James River,&rdquo; he told one of his generals.
-&ldquo;If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then it
-will be a mere question of time.&rdquo;</p>
-<h2 id="c3"><span class="small">STRATEGIC PETERSBURG</span></h2>
-<p>According to the United States census of 1860, Petersburg
-was a city of 18,266 people. It was situated on the
-southern bank of the Appomattox River about 8
-miles from City Point, where the Appomattox joins the
-James, and 23 miles south of Richmond. As the war
-progressed and the territory to the north and east was
-shut off, Richmond became increasingly dependent on
-Petersburg for supplies. Through it passed a constant
-stream of war materials and necessities of life from the
-South to sustain the straining war effort. In short, Petersburg
-was a road and rail center of vital importance
-to the Confederacy, and its capture would almost certainly
-lead to the abandonment of Richmond.</p>
-<p>The transportation vehicles of the 1860&rsquo;s did not require
-the wide, straight highways of the present. However,
-several good roads came into the city from the east,
-south, and west where they joined with the Richmond
-Turnpike. Along these roads passed supply wagons,
-couriers, and, on occasion, troops on their way to repel
-the foe. Several were built of logs laid across the road to
-form a hard surface. Because of this they were called
-&ldquo;plank roads.&rdquo; Two of the most important arteries of
-traffic into Petersburg were the Jerusalem Plank Road,
-connecting Petersburg with Jerusalem (now Courtland),
-Va., and the Boydton Plank Road which led south
-through Dinwiddie Court House. Among others of importance
-were the City Point, Prince George Court
-House, Baxter, Halifax, Jordon Point, Squirrel Level,
-and Cox Roads.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig4">
-<img src="images/pmg04.jpg" alt="" width="596" height="547" />
-<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Railroads and important roads serving Petersburg in
-1864. The dashed line indicates the original
-Confederate Defense line built in 1862-63.</span></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig5">
-<img src="images/pmg04a.jpg" alt="" width="595" height="412" />
-<p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Map showing the network of railroads
-and the strategic location of Petersburg
-to Richmond. The shaded area is the
-approximate line of Union control in
-early 1864. The three arrows indicate
-the major drives planned by the Union
-army for 1864. (Railroads serving Rich.
-and Petersburg are in heavy lines.)</span></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_9">9</div>
-<p>It was the railroads more than the highways, however,
-which gave to Petersburg a significance out of all proportion
-to its size. Tracks radiated from the city in all
-directions. The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad left
-the city to the north; the Southside Railroad ran west to
-Lynchburg; the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad led
-south to North Carolina; the Norfolk and Petersburg
-Railroad passed through a ravine east of the city before
-turning southeast toward Norfolk; and the Petersburg
-and City Point Railroad struck out for the hamlet of
-City Point, situated at the junction of the James and
-Appomattox Rivers about 8 miles away.</p>
-<p>Because of its proximity, Petersburg became a part of
-the transportation system of the Confederate capital,
-serving as a major point of transfer to the larger metropolis
-for products and materials from the vast regions to
-the south and southwest. By June 1864, all but one
-railroad from the south and west into Richmond&mdash;the
-Richmond and Danville Railroad&mdash;passed through
-Petersburg. As other lines of supply were cut off or
-threatened, the dependence of Richmond upon Petersburg
-increased and made the security of that city a
-matter of vital concern.</p>
-<p>In the spring of 1862, McClellan&rsquo;s Peninsular Campaign
-had threatened Richmond from the east and southeast,
-making that city&rsquo;s defenders acutely aware of the need
-for a system of fortifications around Petersburg. In August
-a defense line was begun, and work continued until
-its completion about a year later. Capt. Charles H. Dimmock,
-a Northerner by birth, was in charge of it under
-the direction of the Engineer Bureau, Confederate States
-Army, and the line so constructed became unofficially
-known as the &ldquo;Dimmock Line.&rdquo;</p>
-<p>When finished, the chain of breastworks and artillery
-emplacements around Petersburg was 10 miles long, beginning
-and ending on the Appomattox River and protecting
-all but the northern approaches to the city. The
-<span class="pb" id="Page_10">10</span>
-55 artillery batteries were consecutively numbered from
-east to west. Although natural terrain features were utilized
-whenever possible, some glaring weaknesses existed,
-such as the deep ravine between Batteries 7 and 8,
-which could provide a means of penetration by an attacking
-force. The very length and size of the fortifications
-proved to be a disadvantage. It meant that a larger
-number of troops would be necessary to defend the line
-than General Beauregard, charged with this heavy responsibility,
-had present for duty. Col. Alfred Roman,
-an aide-de-camp to Beauregard, estimated that the long
-&ldquo;Dimmock Line&rdquo; would require more than 10 times as
-many men to defend it as were available.</p>
-<p>On several occasions raids were made on the railroads
-south and west of Petersburg. The most serious of these
-occurred on June 9, 1864, when 3,000 infantry and
-1,300 cavalry appeared in force along the eastern and
-southeastern sector of the Dimmock Line. The infantry
-contented itself with a menacing demonstration, but
-the cavalry attacked up the Jerusalem Plank Road. After
-breaking through the defenses, the horse soldiers were
-checked by regular Southern army units assisted by a
-hastily summoned home guard of old men and youths.
-The damage done by such raids was quickly patched up,
-but they were a constant nuisance to the city&rsquo;s transportation
-lines. To shut off permanently the supplies that
-streamed along the railroads, the Union forces would
-have to take permanent physical possession of them.</p>
-<h2 id="c4"><span class="small">BATTLE OF PETERSBURG</span></h2>
-<p>After the Battle of Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant had
-abandoned, for a time at least, his plan to capture Richmond
-by direct assault. With characteristic zeal he had
-ordered Meade to move the Army of the Potomac
-across the James River and to invest the more southerly
-city. On June 14, Grant and Butler conferred at Bermuda
-Hundred. At that time, orders were given for the
-attack on Petersburg.</p>
-<p>The first of the Northern forces to arrive on the scene of
-battle was the XVIII Corps of the Army of the James,
-which had fought at Cold Harbor. Early in the morning
-of June 15, these troops, commanded by Maj. Gen. W.
-<span class="pb" id="Page_11">11</span>
-F. &ldquo;Baldy&rdquo; Smith, crossed from Bermuda Hundred to
-the south side of the Appomattox by means of a pontoon
-bridge at Broadway Landing. Eighteen thousand Union
-soldiers were on their way to face less than 4,000 under
-Beauregard. Throughout the day they approached the
-city and assembled for the attack.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig6">
-<img src="images/pmg05.jpg" alt="" width="393" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard,
-Confederate commander at
-Petersburg during the early
-days of the campaign,
-defended the &ldquo;Dimmock
-Line&rdquo; against the Federal
-assaults of June 15-18, 1864.
-When Lee arrived to direct
-operations, Beauregard&rsquo;s
-troops were merged with the
-Army of Northern Virginia.</i></p>
-</div>
-<p>There was skirmishing throughout the afternoon as the
-Federals drove in the Confederate pickets, and shortly
-after 7 p.m. on June 15 the XVIII Corps launched a
-fierce attack on the Dimmock Line. Among the first
-points to fall was Battery 5, one of the strongest of the
-Confederate positions. Within a few hours Beauregard
-<span class="pb" id="Page_12">12</span>
-had lost not only Battery 5 but all the line for more than
-a mile south. The defenders withdrew and threw up a
-hasty entrenchment behind Harrison&rsquo;s Creek, well to the
-rear of the captured section of the line. While the
-Confederate retreat was taking place, the Union II
-Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock,
-arrived to reinforce the Federal columns.</p>
-<p>The appearance on the field of the II Corps was an
-ominous sign for the Confederates. While the initial attacks
-were taking place on June 15, the Army of the
-Potomac had been busily engaged in crossing the James
-River farther to the east. The number of Union troops
-south of the river was increasing hourly, until by midnight
-of June 16 at least 70,000 had crossed.</p>
-<p>Darkness ended the fighting on June 15, but early the
-next day the attacks were renewed. More of the defense
-line, south of the portion captured the previous day,
-now gave way. In response to repeated entreaties from
-Beauregard throughout June 15 and 16, Lee ordered
-more divisions to the support of Petersburg, necessitating
-the draining of precious reserves from the Richmond
-lines. By dawn of that second day, Beauregard could
-muster about 14,000 men to face the enemy. Thus, the
-center of attention rapidly shifted from Richmond to
-Petersburg, which had so recently seemed of but secondary
-importance.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_13">13</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig7">
-<img src="images/pmg06.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="456" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Broadway Landing on
-the Appomattox River where
-Maj. Gen. W. F. &ldquo;Baldy&rdquo;
-Smith&rsquo;s XVIII Corps of the
-Army of the James crossed
-on June 15, 1864. It was
-later used as an ordnance
-depot by the Union Army.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig8">
-<img src="images/pmg06a.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="377" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Pontoon bridge at Broadway
-Landing constructed by
-Federal soldiers in 1864.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig9">
-<img src="images/pmg06g.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="283" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Confederate Battery 5,
-shown here under Federal
-occupation 6 days after its
-capture, was one of the first
-points on Petersburg&rsquo;s outer
-defense lines to fall to the
-XVIII Corps during the
-June 15 attack.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div>
-<p>The third day of battle was practically a repetition of
-that of the preceding day. Again the Northern forces
-attacked the Confederate troops, concentrating their efforts
-to the south of the positions captured earlier.
-Again the Confederates were forced to draw back. A
-decisive breakthrough of the opposing line was now anticipated
-by the assaulting forces. About 12:30 a.m.,
-June 18, Beauregard ordered his troops to begin a withdrawal
-to new positions about a mile closer to the city.
-Throughout the early morning hours of that day Beauregard
-had his men busily engaged in the construction
-of this defense line. Colonel Roman later recalled that
-&ldquo;without a moment&rsquo;s rest the digging of the trenches was
-begun, with such utensils as had been hastily collected
-<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span>
-at Petersburg, many of the men using their bayonets,
-their knives, and even their tin cans, to assist in the
-rapid execution of the work.&rdquo;</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig10">
-<img src="images/pmg07.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="737" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>A section of the Confederate
-defense lines around
-Petersburg. Note the use of
-wickerware (gabions),
-sharpened stakes (fraises),
-and branches (abatis) to
-protect the position.</i></p>
-</div>
-<p>A general assault by the Union forces was ordered for 4
-a.m. on June 18. When the attack began it was soon
-discovered that the ranks of the enemy had not been
-broken nor had the city fallen into Northern hands. The
-area where the left flank of the Dimmock Line anchored
-on the Appomattox was empty, except for a thin line of
-skirmishers who were gradually forced back. The
-Northern troops came on, crossing the Norfolk and Petersburg
-Railroad west of where the defenders had constructed
-their new line and continuing on until they were
-<span class="pb" id="Page_16">16</span>
-brought face to face with the muzzles of Confederate
-guns. Meanwhile, elements of Lee&rsquo;s command continued
-pouring in to aid their comrades, and Lee came down
-from his temporary headquarters near Chester, Va., to
-personally direct the defense operations.</p>
-<p>Throughout that June Saturday, brisk action occurred
-on the new Petersburg front. The major Union drive,
-involving elements of five corps, came about 4 p.m.
-Artillery hammered the Confederates. Infantry charged,
-only to be hurled back. During the course of one of
-these futile drives, the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery reportedly
-suffered the most severe losses of any regiment in a
-single engagement of the entire war. This unit, 850
-strong, charged from the concealment of the Prince
-George Court House Road north of where Fort Stedman
-was soon to stand. Met by a heavy crossfire, it
-withdrew in less than one-half hour, with 632 casualties.</p>
-<p>As on the previous days, fighting ended with the coming
-of darkness. Grant&rsquo;s attempt to capture Petersburg had
-failed, with a loss of 10,000 men; but his efforts could
-not be considered entirely wasted. Two of the railroads
-leading into the city had been cut, and several roads
-were in Union hands. Behind the Northern troops was
-City Point, which Grant speedily converted into a huge
-supply base.</p>
-<p>The major result of the opening 4 days of combat, however,
-was the failure of the Federal forces to break the
-Confederate defense line. First Beauregard, and then
-Lee, had held against heavy odds. They had been
-pushed back closer to their base&mdash;but they had held.
-Possibly if Smith had advanced his XVIII Corps farther
-into the defenses on the opening night, or if Hancock&rsquo;s
-II Corps had arrived earlier, Petersburg would have
-fallen on June 15 or 16. But these had not happened,
-and now 47,000 to 51,000 Confederates would settle
-down to defend the city against 111,000 to 113,000
-Union besiegers.</p>
-<p>The defenses of Richmond now ran from White Oak
-Swamp, east of that city, south to Jerusalem Plank Road,
-26 miles away. The fate of the Army of Northern Virginia&mdash;of
-the Confederate capital itself&mdash;would depend
-upon the outcome of the drive against Petersburg.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div>
-<h2 id="c5"><span class="small">FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG</span></h2>
-<p>The Union Army, having failed in its initial attack on
-Petersburg, was now committed to doing something further
-to effect its capture. From June 19 to July 9, the
-Union forces were engaged in three kinds of activity.
-First, elements of the army were set to work consolidating
-the positions captured in the 4-day battle and constructing
-the devices needed for siege operations. Second,
-jabbing cavalry thrusts were made at the important
-supply routes into Petersburg. And third, they reconnoitered
-the Confederate defenses to determine a plan
-which would force Lee out of his lines.</p>
-<p>A threatening movement toward the Weldon Railroad
-was promptly undertaken by the Northern troops. Three
-days after the failure to capture the city, two corps (the
-II and VI) began to push to the southwest of Grant&rsquo;s
-flank on the Jerusalem Plank Road. The following day,
-June 22, Confederate divisions led by Generals Cadmus
-M. Wilcox and William Mahone advanced from the defense
-line south of Petersburg and rolled by the Federals,
-capturing 1,700 prisoners, four cannons, and eight
-stands of colors.</p>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg08.jpg" alt="Map." width="800" height="479" />
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt><span class="ss">Union Troops Advance on Petersburg</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">JUNE 15-18, 1864. Portion of Original Confederate Line Captured and New Line Built Nearer City</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">JUNE 22-24, 1864. Union Attempt to Capture the Weldon R.R. Turned Back</span></dt></dl>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_18">18</div>
-<p>The next morning saw the resumption of the advance
-toward the Weldon Railroad. A Union patrol succeeded
-in reaching the tracks on the 23d and promptly started
-the work of destruction. Alarmed by the threat to this
-important supply line, the Confederates launched a
-sharp attack that forced the withdrawal of the Union
-forces from the vicinity of the railroad. However, the
-Union lines confronting Petersburg had been extended
-across the Jerusalem Plank Road, thus cutting off its use
-to the city.</p>
-<p>In itself, the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road on June
-22-24 was not too important militarily. The North could
-quickly replace the loss of 2,300 men. The Weldon Railroad,
-although its days were numbered, was still able to
-deliver supplies to Petersburg. But as an indication of
-Grant&rsquo;s tactics, it pointed the course of the campaign
-ahead. It marked the first of several attempts to encircle
-Petersburg, and the others to follow would not all be as
-disappointing to Northern hopes. In these repeated
-drives to the west lay the essence of the basic plan to
-capture Petersburg.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_19">19</div>
-<p>On July 9, the plan of operations decided upon by the
-Union high command was revealed in an order from
-Meade&rsquo;s headquarters giving detailed instructions for
-the building of fortifications and the development of
-siege tactics. It thus became apparent that the Union
-plan was to reduce Petersburg by a process of attrition&mdash;a
-process that was to last for 9 months.</p>
-<p>There were still those in the attacking forces, however,
-who felt that, with a little imagination, the city could be
-taken by direct assault. While most of the troops were
-digging siege lines, another smaller group had already
-begun work on a unique plan which would, if successful,
-make further encirclement unnecessary.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig11">
-<img src="images/pmg09.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="597" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>The Federal cavalry saw little battle action during the
-siege, but it did its share in destroying Lee&rsquo;s lines of
-communication. Combat artist Alfred R. Waud of Harper&rsquo;s
-Weekly made this sketch of Brig. Gen. James H.
-Wilson&rsquo;s troopers tearing up part of the Weldon
-Railroad, south of Petersburg, during their June 1864 raid.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_20">20</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig12">
-<img src="images/pmg10.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="987" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>The &ldquo;Dictator,&rdquo; also called &ldquo;The Petersburg Express,&rdquo;
-was a 17,000-pound, 13-inch Federal seacoast mortar mounted on a reinforced
-railroad car. During the early part of the siege, this huge weapon fired 200-pound
-explosive shells into Petersburg, 2&frac12; miles away, from a curved section of the
-Petersburg and City Point Railroad. On July 30, 1864, it
-was part of the artillery support for Union troops during
-the Battle of the Crater.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_22">22</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig13">
-<img src="images/pmg11.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="607" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>The men who commanded
-the &ldquo;Dictator&rdquo;&mdash;Col. H. L.
-Abbot (the man on the left
-in front) and officers of the 1st
-Connecticut Heavy Artillery.
-Next to Abbot is Maj. Gen.
-Henry J. Hunt, in charge
-of all artillery operations
-on the Petersburg front.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig14">
-<img src="images/pmg11a.jpg" alt="" width="603" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>The &ldquo;Dictator&rdquo; in permanent
-position near Union
-Battery IV, formerly Confederate
-Battery 5.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig15">
-<img src="images/pmg11b.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="1192" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>A 13-inch seacoast mortar
-on display at Petersburg
-National Battlefield today,
-on the site where the
-&ldquo;Dictator&rdquo; stood during
-most of the siege.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_24">24</div>
-<h2 id="c6"><span class="small">BATTLE OF THE CRATER</span></h2>
-<p>At several places east of the city the opposing lines were
-extremely close together. One of these locations was in
-front of Pegram&rsquo;s (sometimes called Elliott&rsquo;s) Salient, a
-Confederate strong point near old Blandford Church.
-Here the Confederate position on Cemetery Hill and the
-Union picket line were less than 400 feet apart. Because
-of the proximity of the Union line, Pegram&rsquo;s Salient was
-well fortified. Behind earthen embankments was a battery
-of four guns, and two veteran South Carolina infantry
-regiments were stationed on either side. Behind these
-were other defensive works; before them the ground
-sloped gently downward toward the Union advance line.</p>
-<p>This forward Union line was built on the crest of a
-ravine which had been crossed on June 18. Through this
-ravine, and between the sentry line and the main line,
-lay the roadbed of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad.
-The front in this sector was manned by Maj. Gen.
-Ambrose E. Burnside&rsquo;s IX Corps. Among the many
-units which composed this corps was the 48th Regiment,
-Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry. A large proportion
-of this regiment was made up of onetime coal
-miners, and it apparently occurred to one or more of
-them that Pegram&rsquo;s Salient would provide an excellent
-place to use their civilian knowhow. Lt. Col. Henry
-Pleasants, the commanding officer of the 48th and a
-mining engineer by profession, overheard one of the
-enlisted men mutter, &ldquo;We could blow that damned fort
-out of existence if we could run a mine shaft under it.&rdquo;
-From this and similar remarks came the germ of the idea
-for a Union mine.</p>
-<p>The 48th Regiment proposed to dig a long gallery from
-the bottom of the ravine behind their picket line to a
-point beneath the Confederate battery at Pegram&rsquo;s Salient,
-blow up the position by powder placed in the end of
-the tunnel, and then send a strong body of troops through
-the gap created in the enemy&rsquo;s line by the explosion.
-They saw as the reward for their effort the capitulation
-of Petersburg and, perhaps, the end of the war.</p>
-<p>After obtaining the permission of Burnside and Grant,
-Pleasants and his men commenced digging their mine
-shaft on June 25. The lack of proper equipment made it
-necessary to improvise tools and apparatus with which
-<span class="pb" id="Page_25">25</span>
-to excavate. Mining picks were created by straightening
-army picks. Cracker boxes were converted into hand-barrows
-in which the dirt was removed from the end of
-the tunnel. A sawmill changed a bridge into timber necessary
-for shoring up the mine. Pleasants estimated
-the tunnel&rsquo;s direction and depth by means of a theodolite
-sent him from Washington. The instrument, although
-outmoded, served its purpose well: the mine shaft hit
-exactly beneath the salient at which it was aimed.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig16">
-<img src="images/pmg12.jpg" alt="" width="435" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants,
-onetime mining engineer and
-the commanding officer of the
-48th Pennsylvania Regiment
-which dug the tunnel
-under the Confederate line.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_26">26</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig17">
-<img src="images/pmg13.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="561" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Cross-section view of the Federal tunnel under the
-Confederate line. Colonel Pleasants later recalled that
-&ldquo;General Burnside told me that General Meade and
-Major Duane, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac,
-said the thing could not be done&mdash;that it was all clap-trap
-and nonsense; that such a length of mine had never
-been excavated in military operations, and could not be;
-that I would either get the men smothered, for want of
-air, or crushed by the falling of the earth; or the
-enemy would find it out and it would amount to nothing.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt><span class="ss">Air tube</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Air-tight door</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Fireplace</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Chimney</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FEDERAL LINE Established June 18, 1864</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Tunnel sloped up to avoid heavy clay</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Air tube</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">JUNE 25, 1864, Tunnel started</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">510-8/10 feet</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">JULY 27, 1864, 8,000 lbs. of powder placed here</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">CONFEDERATE LINE</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">JULY 30, 1864, Pegram&rsquo;s Battery destroyed by explosion</span></dt></dl>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
-<p>One of the most remarkable features of the gallery was
-the method devised to supply the diggers at the end with
-fresh air. The longer the tunnel grew, the more serious
-the problem of ventilation became. It had been considered
-impossible to dig a tunnel for any considerable
-distance without spacing shafts at regular intervals in
-order to replace the polluted air with a fresh supply.
-This problem had been solved by the application of the
-simple physical principle that warm air rises. Behind the
-Union picket line and to the right of the mine gallery,
-although connected with it, the miners dug a ventilating
-chimney. Between the chimney and the mine entrance
-they erected an airtight canvas door. Through that door
-and along the floor of the gallery they laid a square
-wooden pipe. A fire was then built at the bottom of the
-ventilating shaft. As the fire warmed the air it went up
-the chimney. The draft thus created drew the bad air
-from the end of the tunnel where the men were digging.
-As this went out, fresh air was drawn in through the
-wooden pipe to replace it.</p>
-<p>Work on the tunnel continued steadily from June 25,
-and by July 17 the diggers were nearly 511 feet from
-the entrance and directly beneath the battery in Pegram&rsquo;s
-Salient. The Confederates had learned of the mine by
-this time and had dug several countermines behind their
-own lines in an effort to locate the Union gallery. Two
-were very close, being dug on either side of where the
-Pennsylvanians were at work. Although digging in the
-countermines continued throughout July, Confederate
-fears seemed to lessen during the same period. There
-were many reasons for this, one being the failure of
-their tunnels to strike any Union construction. Another
-major reason, undoubtedly, was a belief held by many
-that it was impossible to ventilate a shaft of any length
-over 400 feet without constructing air shafts along it,
-and so far no air shafts could be seen between the
-Union and Confederate lines.</p>
-<p>The next step in the Union plan was to burrow out into
-lateral galleries at the end of the long shaft. Accordingly,
-on July 18, work was begun on these branches
-which extended to the right and left, paralleling the
-Confederate fortifications above. When completed, these
-added another 75 feet to the total length of the tunnel
-which now reached 586 feet into the earth. It was about
-20 feet from the floor of the tunnel to the enemy works
-above. The average internal dimensions of the shaft
-were 5 feet high, with a base 4&frac12; feet wide tapering to 2
-feet at the top.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_29">29</div>
-<p>Digging was finally completed on July 23. Four days
-later the task of charging the mine with black powder
-was accomplished. Three hundred and twenty kegs of
-powder weighing about 25 pounds each were arranged
-in the two lateral galleries in eight magazines. The total
-charge was 8,000 pounds. The powder was sandbagged
-to direct the force of the explosion upward and the fuses
-were spliced together to form a 98-foot line.</p>
-<p>Meanwhile, preparations for the large-scale attack
-which was to follow the explosion of the mine had been
-carried out. Burnside wanted his IX Corps to lead the
-attack, spearheaded by a fresh, 4,300-man Negro division,
-and pressed his wishes on Meade. Both Meade and
-Grant approved the request, but refused to allow the
-black troops to lead the assault for fear that, if the
-attack failed, the Union commanders could be accused
-of wanting to get rid of the only Negro troops then with
-the Army of the Potomac. Burnside did not learn of this
-decision until the day before the assault, July 29, and he
-was forced to change his plans at the last moment.
-Three white divisions would make the initial charge,
-with the black division in reserve. Burnside had the
-commanding generals of these three divisions draw
-straws to see which would lead. Brig. Gen. James F.
-Ledlie of the 1st Division won the draw.</p>
-<p>Despite these 11th-hour changes, a plan of battle had
-been evolved. During the night of July 29-30, the bulk
-of the IX Corps was assembled in the ravine behind the
-mine entrance and in the two approach trenches leading
-to the picket line. Troops from other Union corps were
-marshalled as reinforcements. Artillerymen, manning
-110 guns and 54 mortars, were alerted to begin shelling
-the Confederate line. To assist the attack, Grant sent a
-cavalry and infantry force north of the James to threaten
-the Richmond defenses and destroy whatever they could
-of the Virginia Central Railroad. The object was to draw
-as many of Lee&rsquo;s soldiers away from Petersburg as possible.
-And it worked. When the assault came, only
-18,000 Confederates were left to guard the city.</p>
-<p>At 3:15 a.m., July 30, Pleasants lit the powder fuse
-and mounted the parapet to see the results of his regiment&rsquo;s
-<span class="pb" id="Page_30">30</span>
-work. The explosion was expected at 3:30 a.m.
-Time passed slowly and the men, huddled behind the
-lines, grew more apprehensive. By 4:15 there could be
-no doubt that something had gone wrong. Two volunteers
-from the 48th Regiment (Lt. Jacob Douty and Sgt.
-Harry Reese) crawled into the tunnel and found that
-the fuse had burned out at a splice. They relighted it
-and scrambled to safety. Finally, at 4:40 a.m., the earth
-trembled, and with one great roar, men, equipment, and
-debris were hurled high into the air. At least 278
-Confederate troops were killed or wounded in the tremendous
-blast, and two of the four guns in the battery
-were destroyed beyond repair. The crater torn by the
-powder was at least 170 feet long, 60 to 80 feet wide,
-and 30 feet deep.</p>
-<p>The awesome spectacle of the mine explosion caused a
-delay in the Union charge following the explosion. Removal
-of obstructions between the lines caused further
-delay. Soon, however, an advance was made to the crater,
-where many of the attacking force paused to seek
-shelter on its steep slopes or to look at the havoc caused
-by the mine. The hard-pressed Confederates rallied
-quickly and soon were pouring shells and mini&eacute; balls
-into their opponents. Union reinforcements poured into
-the breach; but, instead of going forward, they either
-joined their comrades in the crater or branched out to
-the immediate right and left along the lines. By 8:30
-that morning a large part of the IX Corps had been
-poured into the captured enemy salient. More than
-15,000 troops now milled in and about the crater.</p>
-<p>By prompt action and determined effort the Confederates
-had prevented a breakthrough. The attention of
-three batteries was soon directed on the bluecoats at the
-crater. Artillery hammered with shot and shell the huddled
-groups of increasingly demoralized men. In addition,
-mortars brought to within 50 yards of the crater
-dropped shells on the soldiers with deadly effect.</p>
-<p>Successful as these devices were in halting the Union
-advance, Lee was aware that an infantry charge would
-be necessary to dislodge the enemy. By 6 a.m. an order
-had gone out to Brig. Gen. William Mahone to move two
-brigades of his division from the lines south of Petersburg
-<span class="pb" id="Page_31">31</span>
-to the defense of the threatened position; Mahone
-had anticipated the order and already had his troops in
-motion. Then Lee joined Beauregard in observing the
-battle from the Gee house, 500 yards to the rear of the
-scene of action.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig18">
-<img src="images/pmg14.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="663" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Colonel Pleasants&rsquo; sketch
-of the Crater.</i></p>
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt><i>Outline of Crater.</i></dt>
-<dt><i>Course of Confederate Works.</i></dt>
-<dt><i>S &amp; E</i></dt>
-<dt><i>Magazines.</i></dt></dl>
-<p>In spite of the Confederate resistance, part of the Northern
-black division and other regiments had, by 8 a.m.,
-advanced a short distance beyond their companions at
-the crater. Shortly thereafter, Mahone&rsquo;s lead Confederate
-brigade arrived on the scene. The men filed into a
-ravine about 200 yards northwest of the crater and
-between it and Petersburg. No sooner had they entered
-this protected position than, perceiving the danger to
-their lines, they charged across the open field into the
-mass of Federal soldiers. Although outnumbered, they
-<span class="pb" id="Page_32">32</span>
-forced the Northerners to flee back to the comparative
-shelter of the crater. Then they swept on to regain a
-portion of the line north of the Union-held position.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig19">
-<img src="images/pmg15.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="643" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>To many soldiers, the explosion of the mine and the
-bitter Battle of the Crater that followed were the most
-memorable events of the siege. Artist A. R. Waud
-sketched the explosion from the Union lines.</i></p>
-</div>
-<p>By 10:30 another of Mahone&rsquo;s brigades had reached the
-point of danger, and it charged the Union troops holding
-the crater, only to be repulsed. Meanwhile, the lot of
-the Northern soldiers was rapidly becoming unbearable.
-Confederate artillery continued to beat upon them. The
-closely packed troops (dead, dying, and living indiscriminately
-mixed) lacked shade from the blazing sun, food,
-water and, above all, competent leadership. Meade had
-ordered their withdrawal more than an hour before the
-second Confederate charge, but Burnside delayed the
-transmission of the order till after midday. Many men
-had chosen to run the gantlet of fire back to their own
-lines, but others remained clinging to the protective
-sides of the crater.</p>
-<p>The last scene in the battle occurred shortly after 1 p.m.
-<span class="pb" id="Page_33">33</span>
-Mahone had called up a third brigade, and an attack
-spearheaded by the fresh unit succeeded in gaining the
-slopes of the crater. Some of the Union men, overcome
-with exhaustion and realizing the helplessness of their
-situation, surrendered; but others continued to fight. At
-one point where resistance centered, the Confederates
-put their hats on ramrods and lifted them over the rim
-of the crater. The caps were promptly torn to shreds by
-a volley of mini&eacute; balls. Before their foe could reload,
-Mahone&rsquo;s forces jumped into the crater where a desperate
-struggle with bayonets, rifle butts, and fists ensued.</p>
-<p>Soon it was all over. The Union army had lost more
-than 4,000 men killed, wounded, or captured, as against
-about 1,500 for the Confederates. Again, as on June
-15-18, a frontal assault had failed to take the Confederate
-stronghold, even though Union numerical strength
-greatly exceeded that of the Confederates. At the
-battle&rsquo;s close Grant had more than 83,000 men south
-of the Appomattox River; Lee had about 22,000.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_34">34</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig20">
-<img src="images/pmg16.jpg" alt="" width="898" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>What 8,000 pounds of
-powder could do&mdash;the crater
-as it appeared in 1865.
-The Union soldier seated at
-the end of the tunnel gives
-an idea of the crater&rsquo;s size.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div>
-<h2 id="c7"><span class="small">FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD</span></h2>
-<p>Grant, if he reviewed the fruits of his campaign shortly
-after July 30, could not have felt much comfort. Three
-hammering blows delivered against Petersburg had
-failed. Moreover, two important railroads still connected
-the city with the South. Lee, despite his numerically
-inferior numbers, was still able to maintain a long line
-of defenses around Petersburg and Richmond. Farther
-south, the Union outlook was brighter. Ten days before
-the Battle of the Crater, final operations against Atlanta
-had been begun by Sherman. On September 2 it was to
-fall, and the march to the sea followed in 10 weeks.</p>
-<p>Yet it was equally certain that Grant had accomplished
-an important objective. By committing Lee&rsquo;s weakened
-but still potent Army of Northern Virginia to a defensive
-position in the area adjacent to Richmond, he was
-immobilizing the South&rsquo;s most powerful striking force.
-Moreover, the Union failure at the crater decided the
-future direction of the campaign to capture Petersburg.
-All Grant&rsquo;s energy now turned to extending his siege
-lines around the city and cutting Lee&rsquo;s supply lines in
-an attempt to force him out of his defenses.</p>
-<p>The first step taken in this direction after July 30 was a
-strong effort to capture the Weldon Railroad, which the
-Confederates had so nearly lost in June. On August 16,
-Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, Union V Corps commander,
-received orders to attack, occupy, and hold the
-Weldon Railroad 3 miles below the city.</p>
-<p>The seizure of the objective was quickly accomplished
-on August 18, the opening day of battle. More than a
-mile of track near Globe Tavern, an old colonial inn,
-was soon in Union hands. Then Warren marched most of
-his troops northward toward the city. They were in unfamiliar
-and heavily wooded terrain where they were
-assailed by two Confederate brigades led by Maj. Gen.
-Henry Heth. The Union troops were forced to fall back
-a short distance and entrench. Here the V Corps was
-reinforced by the IX Corps.</p>
-<p>On the afternoon of the 19th, five brigades of Lt. Gen.
-A. P. Hill&rsquo;s Corps struck the Union infantry. Three of
-the brigades under Mahone managed to slip in behind
-their opponents by taking advantage of the concealment
-offered by the heavy growth of trees. They inflicted
-<span class="pb" id="Page_37">37</span>
-serious losses and captured 2,500 prisoners. By nightfall,
-Warren had been forced back one-half mile nearer
-his new headquarters at Globe Tavern.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig21">
-<img src="images/pmg17.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="678" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Globe Tavern, near the
-Weldon Railroad. During
-the Battle for the Weldon
-Railroad, August 18-21,
-1864, this building was
-headquarters for Maj. Gen.
-Gouverneur K. Warren&rsquo;s
-V Corps.</i></p>
-</div>
-<p>August 20 was marked by comparative inactivity, although
-there was some skirmishing in the morning.
-Throughout the following day A. P. Hill, who had received
-reinforcements, threw his men at the Union
-positions around the tavern. The attacks were in vain,
-for the new Union lines held. General Lee arrived with
-more infantry brigades during the afternoon, but after
-discussing the situation with his generals, he determined
-not to renew the attack. By the end of the day Lee
-realized that the upper portion of the Weldon Railroad
-had been lost and that any attempt to regain it would be
-a needless sacrifice of manpower.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig22">
-<img src="images/pmg18.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="385" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Petersburg&rsquo;s hungry defenders were delighted
-when Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton&rsquo;s Confederate
-horsemen rustled more than 2,000 cattle from the Union
-army in September 1864. Alfred Waud sketched the
-raid for</i> <b>Harper&rsquo;s Weekly.</b></p>
-</div>
-<p>One sentence from a dispatch sent by Lee to the
-Confederate Secretary of War on August 22 shows the
-seriousness of the loss of the railroad: &ldquo;Our supply of
-corn is exhausted today, and I am informed that the
-small reserve in Richmond is consumed.&rdquo; For a time the
-Confederate government was able to utilize the Weldon
-Railroad as far as Stony Creek, 20 miles below Petersburg,
-where supplies were transferred to wagons and
-hauled around the left of the Northern army to Petersburg
-and Richmond. In December the railroad line was
-destroyed below Stony Creek and henceforth the beleaguered
-cities had only two direct rail communications
-with the South&mdash;the Richmond and Danville Railroad
-out of Richmond and the Southside from Petersburg.</p>
-<p>On August 25, 2 days after the fighting at Globe Tavern
-had ended, the Confederates scored a minor victory
-with a surprise attack. Their blow was aimed at Hancock&rsquo;s
-II Corps busily engaged in destroying railroad
-tracks at Reams Station, nearly 5 miles below Globe
-<span class="pb" id="Page_39">39</span>
-Tavern. The II Corps, containing large numbers of inexperienced
-recruits, was badly beaten and more than
-1,700 were taken prisoner. The Southern victory was
-shortlived, for the destruction of their rail communications
-was continued. The best that Lee could hope for in
-the future would be to stem the Federal advance.</p>
-<p>In mid-September, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, cavalry
-commander of the Army of Northern Virginia since J.
-E. B. Stuart&rsquo;s death in May, led a remarkable raid of
-4,000 mounted troops around the rear of the Union
-army, now numbering 80,000. He succeeded in returning
-to Petersburg on September 17 with about 2,400
-head of cattle and more than 300 prisoners, while suffering
-losses of only 61 men in two engagements with the
-enemy. Although this raised the morale of the Confederates,
-it did not change the course of the campaign. The
-iron band being forged outside their city was a reality,
-and Grant, a tenacious man, had not loosened his grip.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_40">40</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig23">
-<img src="images/pmg19.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="590" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Federal soldiers in the
-trenches before Petersburg.
-By 1864, most of the men
-of the Armies of the Potomac
-and the James were veteran
-combat soldiers, but the
-strain of siege warfare
-eventually affected even the
-most hardened of them.
-&ldquo;It was hell itself,&rdquo; one
-soldier recalled, &ldquo;and it is
-wondrous to me that so many
-of us survived the event.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_41">41</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig24">
-<img src="images/pmg19b.jpg" alt="" width="492" height="254" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Constructing gabions for
-the attack on Petersburg.
-When filled with earth, these
-cylindrical, basket-like
-objects offered strong
-protection against enemy fire.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig25">
-<img src="images/pmg19d.jpg" alt="" width="494" height="244" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Federal pickets in front
-of Union Fort Sedgwick,
-opposite Confederate Fort
-Mahone. Note how the
-gabions are being used.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig26">
-<img src="images/pmg19e.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="224" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Rifled siege guns in Union Battery IV. Fire from
-this battery helped to seal off the Confederate
-breakthrough at Fort Stedman in March 1865.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig27">
-<img src="images/pmg19g.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="394" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Capt. James H. Cooper&rsquo;s Battery, 1st Pennsylvania
-Light Artillery, V Corps. While the men were standing
-to their guns to have this picture taken, a Confederate
-battery, thinking the Federals were preparing to fire,
-opened up on them. The famous Civil War photographer Mathew B.
-Brady is standing with hands in pocket beside the trail of the second gun.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div>
-<h2 id="c8"><span class="small">UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES</span></h2>
-<p>The relentless westerly advance of the besieging force
-was soon resumed after the capture of the Weldon Railroad
-in August. Constant skirmishing occurred between
-the lines until, in late September, Grant struck again.</p>
-<p>The Battle of Peebles&rsquo; Farm, September 29 to October
-1, was really the second section of a two-part struggle.
-The first took place closer to Richmond and was
-directed at Fort Harrison, a strongly fortified point on
-the outer defense line of the Confederate capital. Fort
-Harrison was approximately midway between Richmond
-and Petersburg. On the morning of September
-29, Union troops advanced and captured the fort and
-held it the next day against a counterattack by the
-former occupants. At the same time, Meade was moving
-toward a further encirclement of Petersburg with more
-than 20,000 troops. The direction of his attack was
-northwest toward Confederate earthworks along the
-Squirrel Level Road. The ultimate goal was the capture
-of the Southside Railroad.</p>
-<p>Fighting began on the 29th as the Federal vanguard
-approached the Confederates in the vicinity of Peebles&rsquo;
-farm. The engagement increased in fury on the 30th and
-continued into the next day. When the smoke of battle
-had blown away on October 2, Meade had extended the
-Union left flank 3 miles farther west and had secured
-the ground on which Fort Fisher would soon be built.
-(This fort was to be the Union&rsquo;s biggest and was one of
-the largest earthen forts in Civil War history.) He was,
-however, stopped short of the coveted Southside Railroad.
-Against the gain in territory the Union army had
-suffered a loss of more than 1,300 prisoners to the
-Confederacy and more than 650 killed and wounded.
-The Southerners found that their lines, while unbroken,
-were again extended. Each extension meant a thinner
-Confederate defense line.</p>
-<p>For a period of about 3 weeks after the Battle of
-Peebles&rsquo; Farm, the shovel and pick again replaced the
-rifle-musket as the principal tools for soldiers on both
-sides. Forts were built, breastworks dug, and gabions
-constructed. Then, on October 27, the Union troops
-moved again. This time they turned toward the Boydton
-Plank Road and a stream known as Hatcher&rsquo;s Run, 12
-<span class="pb" id="Page_43">43</span>
-miles southwest of Petersburg. Again Grant&rsquo;s objective
-was Lee&rsquo;s vital supply line&mdash;the Southside Railroad.</p>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg20.jpg" alt="Map." width="800" height="480" />
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt><span class="ss">JULY 30, 1864. The Crater. Union Attempt to Capture Petersburg by Surprise Failed.</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">SEPT. 29-OCT. 1, 1864. Battle of Peebles&rsquo; Farm. Union Lines Pushed West of the Weldon R.R.</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">AUGUST 18-21, 1864. Union Troops Capture the Weldon R.R.</span></dt></dl>
-<p>The general plan of operations was nearly the same as
-that used at Peebles&rsquo; farm. Butler&rsquo;s Army of the James
-was ordered to threaten attack in front of Richmond.
-Meanwhile, at the left of the Union line, nearly 43,000
-infantry and cavalry of the Army of the Potomac started
-for the Boydton Plank Road. The columns made rapid
-progress, driving the enemy outposts ahead of them and
-advancing until they neared Burgess&rsquo; Mill where the
-Boydton Plank Road crossed Hatcher&rsquo;s Run.</p>
-<p>Near Burgess&rsquo; Mill, heavy Confederate opposition was
-met and a spirited engagement took place. The failure of
-Union Generals Hancock of the II Corps and Warren of
-the V Corps to coordinate the efforts of their respective
-columns, coupled with a slashing thrust by Heth&rsquo;s infantry
-and dogged resistance by Hampton&rsquo;s cavalry and
-<span class="pb" id="Page_44">44</span>
-horse-artillery, resulted in a speedy Northern withdrawal.
-The Boydton Plank Road, for a time at least,
-remained in Southern hands, and Grant&rsquo;s encircling
-movement to cut Lee&rsquo;s railroad was checked.</p>
-<p>The approach of winter made any large-scale effort by
-either side less probable, although daily skirmishes and
-tightening of the siege lines continued. The slackening of
-hostile action was used to good advantage by Union and
-Confederate alike, as it had been in the previous respites
-between battles, in the strengthening of the battlelines
-and efforts to develop some rudimentary comforts in the
-cheerless camps. Throughout the last 2 months of 1864
-and the 1st month of the new year there were no strong
-efforts by either side before Petersburg; picket duty,
-sniping, and patrolling prevailed. The only action out of
-the trenches was the Hicksford Raid in December when
-a strong Union force destroyed the Weldon Railroad as
-far as Hicksford, about 40 miles south of Petersburg.
-Lee now had a 35-mile front, with the left resting on the
-Williamsburg Road east of Richmond and the right on
-Hatcher&rsquo;s Run southwest of Petersburg. To hold this
-long line he had in December an effective troop strength
-of only 66,533. Facing these undernourished and ragged
-soldiers were, according to official Union returns of the
-same month, 110,364 well-fed and equipped Federals.</p>
-<p>The picture throughout the rest of the South was no
-more reassuring to Confederate sympathizers. In the
-Shenandoah Valley, northwest of Richmond, Maj. Gen.
-Philip H. Sheridan&rsquo;s army had finally crushed Lt. Gen.
-Jubal A. Early&rsquo;s Southern forces at Cedar Creek on
-October 19 and was destroying the scattered resistance
-that remained. Far to the southwest, Sherman had captured
-Atlanta, Ga., in September, and Savannah had
-surrendered on December 21. As the new year dawned,
-his army was prepared to march north toward Grant.
-To complete the gloomy Southern prospects, Fort
-Fisher, guardian bastion of Wilmington, N.C., the last
-of the Confederacy&rsquo;s Atlantic coast ports to remain
-open, was under fatal bombardment by mid-January.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig28">
-<img src="images/pmg21.jpg" alt="" width="361" height="800" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Not everyone was shooting all the time. Often only
-handpicked sharpshooters traded shots from the
-trenches and tried to pick off each other&rsquo;s artillerymen.
-An artist caught these men of the Federal XVIII Corps
-at their daily, deadly business.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_46">46</div>
-<p>In late January, President Jefferson Davis, hoping that
-peace might be made with the Union, agreed to send
-commissioners to meet with President Lincoln. The
-Peace Commissioners, on January 31, 1865, crossed
-over to the Union lines at Petersburg. Soldiers of both
-armies, suspecting their mission, cheered as the commissioners
-slowly walked over the scarred earth of the crater
-battlefield. At Hampton Roads they met Lincoln, but
-the &ldquo;Peace Conference&rdquo; ended in failure; Davis&rsquo; insistence
-on Southern independence as a condition for peace
-brought about the impasse. The war continued.</p>
-<p>The Battle of Hatcher&rsquo;s Run on February 5-7, 1865,
-was the result of a further drive by the Federals in their
-attempt to encircle Petersburg. Two Union corps (the
-II and V), reinforced by a cavalry division and elements
-of the VI Corps, advanced across Hatcher&rsquo;s Run.
-Their immediate objective was the Boydton Plank Road.</p>
-<p>As had happened before, the Confederates quickly
-moved out to engage the Union columns. On the afternoon
-of the 5th, and again the next day, the Southerners
-counterattacked. While many Confederate units displayed
-their customary &eacute;lan, others did not. There were
-several reasons for this: the inferior numbers of the
-Southern army, the extremely bad weather which made
-a Union attack appear unlikely, the ravages of cold on
-badly equipped and poorly uniformed men, and, most
-important, the breakdown of the food supply system.</p>
-<p>The only Federal units to reach the Boydton Plank
-Road belonged to the cavalry, but in view of the
-Confederate response and the discovery that General
-Lee was not utilizing this road to supply his army, they
-were recalled. Consequently, no effort was made to
-hold the Boydton Plank Road, but the Federals did
-occupy and fortify the newly extended line to Hatcher&rsquo;s
-Run at a point 3 miles below Burgess&rsquo; Mill. Thus, again
-the Union lines had been pushed to the west, and, as
-before, Lee was forced to lengthen his defenses. The
-Petersburg-Richmond front, with its recent extension,
-now stretched over 37 miles, and the army holding it
-had dwindled through casualties and desertion to
-slightly more than 56,000 on March 1, 1865.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig29">
-<img src="images/pmg22.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="677" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>One of the most impressive
-oddities of the siege was Poplar
-Grove Church, built about
-February 1865 by the 50th
-New York Engineers to while
-away their leisure hours.
-It could seat 225 men and
-was used for recreational
-and religious purposes until
-the regiment moved away to
-take part in the pursuit of Lee.
-The building was dismantled
-in 1868. Today, Poplar Grove
-Cemetery is on the site.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_48">48</div>
-<p>The Battle of Hatcher&rsquo;s Run was another fight in the
-constant movement of the Union Army to the west after
-June 18, 1864. In its relentless extension around Petersburg,
-which continued day by day with the addition of a
-few more feet or yards of picket line and rifle-pits, there
-had occurred five important thrusts aimed by the Northern
-leaders at encircling the city. They included two
-attacks on the Weldon Railroad, in June and August
-1864; Peebles&rsquo; Farm, in September and October; Boydton
-Plank Road, in October; and, finally, the move to
-Hatcher&rsquo;s Run in February 1865. They met with varying
-degrees of success, but still the Union noose was
-not drawn tightly enough.</p>
-<p>The enlisted men of both armies, however, remained
-largely unaware of the strategy of their commanders.
-Their daily existence during the campaign took on a
-marked flavor, different in many respects from the more
-dashing engagements which preceded it. Too often war
-is a combination of bloodshed and boredom, and Petersburg,
-unlike most other military operations of the Civil
-War, had more than its share of the latter. The Petersburg
-episode&mdash;assault and resistance&mdash;dragged on to
-become the longest unbroken campaign against a single
-American city in the history of the United States. The
-romantic and heroic exploits were relatively few, and
-between them came long stretches of uninspiring and
-backbreaking routine.</p>
-<p>The men of both sides had much in common, despite
-the bitterness with which they fought. In battle they
-were enemies, but in camp they were on the same common
-level. Stripped of the emotional tension and exhilaration
-of combat they all appear as bored, war-weary,
-homesick men. The greater part of their time was primarily
-utilized by digging and constructing fortifications,
-performing sentry and picket duty, and striving
-to speed up the long succession of days. They lived in
-rude improvised shelters, often made of mud and log
-walls with tent roofs. Chimneys were made of mud and
-barrels. There was some friendly interchange of words
-and gifts between the lines, but enmity was more rampant
-than brotherly regard. Off duty, the amusements
-and pastimes of the soldiers were simple and few&mdash;limited
-in most cases to their ability to improvise them. The
-most striking difference between the armies as the Petersburg
-campaign lengthened was that, while the
-Northerners suffered most from boredom, the Confederates
-were plagued by the demoralizing effects of hunger.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_49">49</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig30">
-<img src="images/pmg23.jpg" alt="" width="358" height="801" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>In late 1864, with food and
-supplies dwindling,
-desertion in the Confederate
-ranks became a major
-problem. This Southern
-cavalryman, completely
-discouraged and in rags, was
-one of those who crossed
-the lines to surrender.
-By early 1865, more than
-2,000 Confederates had
-followed his example. One
-Union officer concluded that
-&ldquo;if we stay here, the
-Johnnies will all come over
-before the 4th of July.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_50">50</div>
-<p class="pcap"><i>During the Civil War, a
-handful of &ldquo;special artists&rdquo;
-followed the Federal armies
-to supply glimpses of soldier
-life to news- and picture-hungry
-readers of such popular
-publications as the</i> <b>New York
-Illustrated News, Harper&rsquo;s
-Weekly,</b> <i>and</i> <b>Frank Leslie&rsquo;s
-Illustrated Newspaper.</b> <i>Artists
-Edwin Forbes and the Waud
-brothers, Alfred and William,
-caught these scenes during
-the siege of Petersburg.</i></p>
-<div class="img" id="fig31">
-<img src="images/pmg24.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="528" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Pickets trading between
-the lines. At quiet moments,
-opposing pickets sometimes
-met between the lines to trade
-coffee, tobacco, newspapers,
-and trinkets.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig32">
-<img src="images/pmg24a.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="273" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>The wagon camp at night.
-Necessary but thankless was
-the task of the teamsters,
-those thousands of soldiers
-and civilians who drove the
-supply wagons from the
-railroads and ships to the
-front line. Theirs may have
-been a relatively safe job,
-but a bone-wearying one.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig33">
-<img src="images/pmg24b.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="286" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Pennsylvania soldiers
-voting, 1864. Volunteers
-considered themselves citizens
-first, soldiers second. These
-men, and thousands like
-them, took time out from
-their deadly work to vote in
-the Presidential election,
-doubtless, as the campaign
-song ran, &ldquo;For Lincoln and
-Liberty, too.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig34">
-<img src="images/pmg24e.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="615" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Bivouac in the rifle-pits.
-Life in the infantry line was
-anything but pleasant:
-steaming, stinking mud in
-summer, frozen muck in
-winter. These soldiers
-of the V Corps built
-wood-and-canvas &ldquo;shebangs&rdquo;
-over their trenches as
-protection against the elements.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_52">52</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg25.jpg" alt="Map." width="1000" height="559" />
-</div>
-<dl class="undent"><dt><span class="ss">OCTOBER 27, 1864. Battle of Boydton Plank Road. Union Drive Toward the Southside R.R. Turned Back</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FEBRUARY 5-7, 1865. Union Troops Extend Line to Hatcher&rsquo;s Run</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">MARCH 25, 1865. Fort Stedman. Confederate Offensive Fails</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">APRIL 1, 1865. Battle of Five Forks. Union Victory Opens Way to Southside R.R.</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">APRIL 2, 1865. Union Forces Break Through Outer Defenses of City and Reach Appomattox River</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">NIGHT OF APRIL 2-3, 1865. Confederates Evacuate Petersburg and Retreat West.</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Union Troops Enter City Morning of April 3</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">Union Army Sets Out in Immediate Pursuit of The Confederates on April 3</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FORT GREGG</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FORT MAHONE</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FORT SEDGWICK</span></dt>
-<dt><span class="ss">FORT FISHER</span></dt></dl>
-<p>The Petersburg campaign was grim business. Amusements
-could lighten the heart for only a brief time at
-best. Ever present were the mud and disease which followed
-every Civil War camp. Both opposing forces felt
-the chill of winter and the penetrating rain. The discouragement
-<span class="pb" id="Page_53">53</span>
-of the homesick, who never knew when, or if,
-they would return to their homes, was a hardship not
-peculiar to any rank. However, when spring came to
-warm the air, there was a difference between the two
-opposing armies. It was more than a numerical superiority.
-Then the Union soldiers felt confidence, while the
-Southern veterans, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and nearly surrounded,
-knew only despair.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig35">
-<img src="images/pmg26.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="494" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>From June 1864 until April 1865, City Point was the
-&ldquo;busiest place in Dixie.&rdquo; While Lee&rsquo;s outnumbered
-Confederates fought and starved behind their slowly
-crumbling defenses at Petersburg, here, just 8 miles
-away, Grant built up one of the largest supply depots
-of the Civil War which, during the 10 months of its
-existence, kept his army the best-fed, best-clothed, and
-best-munitioned in the field.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_56">56</div>
-<p class="pcap"><i>1-4. Scenes at City Point, Va., showing some of the
-supplies and munitions destined for Grant&rsquo;s army.
-An Episcopal bishop from Atlanta, visiting Grant at
-City Point, was awed by the abundance of military stores
-that he saw&mdash;&ldquo;not merely profusion, but extravagance;
-wagons, tents, artillery, ad libitum. Soldiers provided
-with everything.&rdquo;</i></p>
-<div class="img" id="fig36">
-<img src="images/pmg27.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="278" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>1</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig37">
-<img src="images/pmg27a.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="182" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>2</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig38">
-<img src="images/pmg27b.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="303" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>3</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig39">
-<img src="images/pmg27e.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="413" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>4</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig40">
-<img src="images/pmg27g.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="769" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>On August 9, 1864, a
-Confederate spy slipped
-a time bomb on board one of
-the ammunition barges
-tied up at City Point. The
-bomb&rsquo;s explosion, sketched
-by A. R. Waud, killed or
-wounded 200 people and
-demolished more than 600
-feet of warehouses and about
-180 feet of wharf. Grant
-himself was shaken up by
-the blast, and one of his staff
-members was wounded.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div>
-<h2 id="c9"><span class="small">LEE&rsquo;S LAST GAMBLE</span></h2>
-<p>By mid-March 1865 the climax of the campaign, and of
-the war, was close at hand. Lee&rsquo;s forces in both Richmond
-and Petersburg had dwindled to about 55,000.
-Grant, on the other hand, had available, or within easy
-march, at least 150,000. Moreover, Sheridan, having
-destroyed the remnants of Early&rsquo;s forces at Waynesboro,
-Va., on March 2, had cleared the Shenandoah
-Valley of Confederates and was now free to rejoin
-Grant before Petersburg.</p>
-<p>Everywhere Lee turned, the military situation was black.
-Union forces under Sherman, driving the Confederates
-before them, had turned north from Savannah and were
-now hammering Johnston&rsquo;s forces in North Carolina.
-With President Jefferson Davis&rsquo; consent, Lee sent a letter
-to General Grant on March 2 suggesting an interview.
-In the early morning hours of the second day following
-the dispatch of the letter, Lee and Maj. Gen. John B.
-Gordon discussed the three possible solutions to the
-problem which perplexed them: (1) Try to negotiate
-satisfactory peace terms. (This had already been acted
-upon in Lee&rsquo;s note to Grant.) (2) Retreat from Richmond
-and Petersburg and unite with Johnston for a final
-stand. (3) Attack Grant in order to facilitate retreat.</p>
-<p>There followed a series of interviews with Confederate
-government officials in Richmond. Each of the plans
-was analyzed. The first was quickly dropped when Grant
-made it clear that he was not empowered to negotiate.
-Nor was the second proposal, that of retreat, deemed
-advisable by President Davis who wished to strike one
-more blow before surrendering his capital. This left only
-the third alternative&mdash;to attack.</p>
-<p>Before settling on a definite course of action, however,
-Lee ordered General Gordon to make a reconnaissance
-of the Federal lines around Petersburg to see if they
-could be broken anywhere. Gordon soon reported that
-the best place for an attack was at Fort Stedman, a
-Union work located near the City Point and Petersburg
-Railroad and only 150 yards to the east of a strongly
-fortified Confederate position named Colquitt&rsquo;s Salient.
-Lee agreed with Gordon&rsquo;s assessment and, on the night of
-March 23, told Gordon to make preparations for an
-attack on the fort.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig41">
-<img src="images/pmg28.jpg" alt="" width="563" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>In Petersburg, sometime in the autumn of 1864, Lee was
-photographed on his horse Traveller for the first time.
-Although determined to fight on until all hope was gone,
-already Lee knew the war was going badly and that his
-tired, hungry, dirty, and cold soldiers could not hold
-out for long against Grant&rsquo;s growing might.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_60">60</div>
-<p>About one-half of the besieged army would be used to
-charge the Union line in the vicinity of Fort Stedman. It
-was hoped that this would cause Grant to shorten his
-front by withdrawing his left flank to protect his endangered
-right. Then Lee could detach a portion of the
-Confederate army to send to the aid of Johnston as,
-with shorter lines, he would not need as many men in
-Petersburg. Should the attack fail, he would attempt to
-retreat with all his forces for a final stand with Johnston.
-This would be the last desperate gamble of the Army of
-Northern Virginia.</p>
-<p>The details for the attack were worked out by Gordon.
-During the night preceding the assault, the obstructions
-before the Confederate lines were to be removed and
-the Union pickets overcome as quietly as possible. A
-group of 50 men were to remove the chevaux-de-frise
-and abatis protecting Fort Stedman; then three companies
-of 100 men each were to charge and capture the
-fort. When Stedman was safely in Confederate hands,
-these men were to pretend they were Union troops and,
-forming into three columns, were to rush to the rear to
-capture other positions.</p>
-<p>The next step was to send a division of infantry to gain
-possession of the siege lines north and south of the
-fallen bastion. When the breach had been sufficiently
-widened, Southern cavalry were to rush through and
-destroy telegraphic communication with Grant&rsquo;s headquarters
-at City Point. They were also ordered to cut
-the military railroad. Additional reserves were to follow
-the cavalry.</p>
-<p>The attack was scheduled for the morning of March 25.
-The 50 axmen and the 300 soldiers who were to make
-up the advance columns were given strips of white cloth
-to wear across their chests to tell friend from foe. The
-officers in charge were given the names of Union officers
-known to be in the vicinity and were told to shout their
-assumed names if challenged. Beginning about 3 a.m.,
-Confederates professing to be deserters crossed to the
-Union pickets offering to surrender. Their purpose:
-to be near at hand to overwhelm the unsuspecting
-pickets when the attack began.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_61">61</div>
-<p>At 4 a.m. Gordon gave the signal, and the Confederates
-sprang forward. At first the attack went as planned.
-Blue-clad pickets were silenced so effectively that not a
-shot was fired. Union obstructions were quickly hewn
-down by the axmen, and the small vanguard of 300
-swept through Battery No. X which stood immediately
-north of Fort Stedman. They then rushed into the fort;
-the occupants were completely surprised and many surrendered
-without a fight. Battery XI to the south of Fort
-Stedman was also soon in Confederate hands. Union
-resistance in this early stage was ineffective, although
-Battery XI was recaptured for a short time.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig42">
-<img src="images/pmg29.jpg" alt="" width="557" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon planned and led the March
-25 attack on Fort Stedman, one of the most advanced
-works on the Union line.</i></p>
-</div>
-<p>More Confederates pressed into the torn line. While
-three columns set out in the general direction of City
-Point and along the Prince George Court House Road
-behind Stedman, other infantry units moved north and
-south along the Federal emplacements. To the north,
-they captured the fortifications as far as Battery IX
-where they were stopped by the Union defenders; to the
-south, they progressed as far as the ramparts of Fort
-Haskell. A desperate struggle ensued, but here, too, the
-<span class="pb" id="Page_62">62</span>
-Northerners refused to yield. Despite these checks, the
-Confederates were now in possession of almost 1 mile of
-the Union line.</p>
-<p>In the center of the Confederate attack, the three small
-columns quickly advanced as far as Harrison&rsquo;s Creek&mdash;a
-small stream which winds its way north to the Appomattox
-River 650 yards behind Fort Stedman. One of
-the columns succeeded in crossing the stream and continuing
-toward a small Union artillery post on the site of
-what had been Confederate Battery 8 (renamed Fort
-Friend by the Federals), but canister from the post
-forced the column back to the creek. Confusion took
-hold of the Confederates who were unable to locate the
-positions they had been ordered to capture behind the
-Union line. Artillery fire from Northern guns on a ridge
-to the east held them on the banks of Harrison&rsquo;s Creek.
-By 6 a.m. their forward momentum had been checked.</p>
-<div class="img" id="fig43">
-<img src="images/pmg30.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="437" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Advancing from Colquitt&rsquo;s Salient (above), Gordon&rsquo;s
-men captured Fort Stedman (below) but were driven out by a murderous crossfire
-from Federal artillery. In the assault, some 4,000
-Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg30a.jpg" alt="Fort Stedman." width="600" height="508" />
-</div>
-<p>Union infantry then charged from the ridge to attack the
-Southerners. The forces joined battle along Harrison&rsquo;s
-Creek and the Confederates were soon forced back to
-Fort Stedman. For a brief time they held their newly
-captured positions. At 7:30 a.m. Brig. Gen. John F.
-Hartranft advanced on them with a division of Northern
-<span class="pb" id="Page_63">63</span>
-troops. Heavy small-arms and artillery fire on Gordon&rsquo;s
-men threatened them with annihilation unless they retired
-to their own lines. About 8 a.m., Gordon received
-an order from Lee to withdraw his men. The order was
-quickly dispatched across the open fields to the soldiers
-in the captured Union works. By now, however, the line
-of retreat was raked by a vicious crossfire and many
-Confederates preferred surrender to withdrawal. About
-the same time Gordon was starting back, Hartranft ordered
-his division of Pennsylvania troops to recapture
-Fort Stedman. Within a few moments the Union line
-was completely restored and the forlorn Southern hope
-of a successful disruption of Northern communications,
-followed by secret withdrawal from the city, was lost.
-Equally bad, if not worse, to the Confederates was the
-loss of more than 4,000 killed, wounded, and captured
-as compared to the Union casualties of less than 1,500.</p>
-<p>Of the three Confederate plans of action before the
-Battle of Fort Stedman, now only the second&mdash;retreat&mdash;was
-possible. The situation demanded immediate
-action, for, even as Gordon had been preparing on
-March 24 to launch his attack, Grant had been engaged
-in planning more difficulties for the harassed
-defenders of Petersburg.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_64">64</div>
-<h2 id="c10"><span class="small">FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END</span></h2>
-<p>The coming of better weather heralded the opportunity
-for the final blows against the city. Grant, who was now
-passing some of the most anxious moments of his life,
-planned that this effort should be concentrated on the
-extreme right of the long Confederate line which protected
-Richmond and Petersburg. This meant that hostilities
-would soon commence somewhere west of Hatcher&rsquo;s
-Run, perhaps in the neighborhood of Dinwiddie
-Court House or a road junction called Five Forks which
-lay 17 miles southwest of Petersburg. On March 24,
-Grant ordered the II and IX Corps and three divisions
-of the Army of the James to the extreme left of the
-Union lines facing Lee. This resulted in a strong concentration
-northeast of Hatcher&rsquo;s Run. Two days later Sheridan
-arrived at City Point, fresh from his victorious
-campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and was ordered to
-join his troops to those concentrated on the left. Finally,
-it began to appear that the Army of Northern Virginia
-was to be encircled.</p>
-<p>Meanwhile, Lee was waiting only until he collected supplies
-and rations to last his men for a week and until the
-roads were passable before leaving to join Johnston. He
-hoped to leave on or about April 10. The information
-he received about the rapid accumulation of Union
-forces opposite his lightly held right was very disturbing,
-for, if it was true, the Federals not only threatened to cut
-off his retreat to the west and south, but they also posed
-a serious danger to the Southside Railroad&mdash;the last
-remaining communication link between Petersburg and
-the South, which continued to deliver a trickle of supplies
-to the city.</p>
-<p>On March 29 the Union troops moved out. Sheridan&rsquo;s
-cavalry crossed the Rowanty Creek and occupied Dinwiddie
-Court House, while the II and V Corps crossed
-Hatcher&rsquo;s Run. In moving into position on the left of the
-II Corps, Warren&rsquo;s V Corps soldiers encountered heavy
-resistance north of Gravelly Run. While Sheridan was
-marshaling his troops around Dinwiddie, Lee issued orders
-on March 29 which sent Maj. Gens. George E.
-Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee to the Confederate right near
-Five Forks, far beyond Petersburg.</p>
-<p>Sheridan was prepared to move against the Confederates
-<span class="pb" id="Page_65">65</span>
-with his cavalry on March 30, but heavy rains
-lasting from the evening of March 29 until the morning
-of the 31st made a large-scale movement impracticable
-over the muddy roads. On the last day of the month,
-part of Sheridan&rsquo;s forces which has pushed northwest
-toward Five Forks was attacked by Southern forces
-which succeeded in driving them back to Dinwiddie
-Court House, where Sheridan had a fresh division.
-Pickett then found his men badly outnumbered and
-withdrew them to Five Forks without pressing the
-advantage he had gained. This incident, called the Battle
-of Dinwiddie Court House, was a minor Confederate
-victory, although Sheridan&rsquo;s men were neither demoralized
-nor disorganized by the attack, and Robert E. Lee
-could find small comfort in the situation.</p>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg31.jpg" alt="Map, Five Forks." width="800" height="439" />
-</div>
-<p>Meanwhile, there had been a savage clash on White
-Oak Road between Warren&rsquo;s V Corps and Maj. Gen.
-Bushrod Johnson&rsquo;s Confederate division. The Confederates
-at first swept all before them, but in the end numbers
-<span class="pb" id="Page_66">66</span>
-told and they were compelled to withdraw behind
-their breastworks.</p>
-<p>The Confederates had been able to concentrate on their
-extreme right in the vicinity of Five Forks only about
-10,000 cold and hungry soldiers to meet the expected
-Union drive to turn their right flank. Massed
-against this force commanded by Pickett were about
-10,000 Northern cavalry and 12,000 infantry. The
-desperate urgency of General Lee&rsquo;s fears was indicated
-in the dispatch he sent to Pickett early on April 1, the
-day of the struggle for Five Forks: &ldquo;<i>Hold Five Forks at
-all hazards.</i> Protect road to Ford&rsquo;s Depot and prevent
-Union forces from striking the south-side railroad. Regret
-exceedingly your forced withdrawal, and your inability
-to hold the advantage you had gained.&rdquo;</p>
-<p>Throughout April 1, Pickett&rsquo;s troops worked unceasingly,
-erecting barricades of logs and earth around Five
-Forks. About 4 p.m., with only 2 hours of daylight
-remaining, Sheridan&rsquo;s cavalry and Warren&rsquo;s infantry attacked.
-While the cavalry occupied the attention of the
-Confederate defenders along White Oak Road, divisions
-of infantrymen from the V Corps moved to the
-left of Pickett&rsquo;s troops and, after crossing the White Oak
-Road which connected Five Forks with Petersburg, hit
-them on the weakly held left flank. Lacking sufficient
-artillery support, infantry reserves, and the presence of
-their commander, the Southerners were quickly overcome.
-Realizing that their position was no longer tenable,
-portions of the Confederate troops tried to retreat
-to Petersburg, but the avenue of escape had been cut by
-the Union advance across the White Oak Road.</p>
-<p>By dusk, the Battle of Five Forks had ended. Union
-troops were in possession of the disputed area. They
-had cut off and captured more than 3,200 prisoners,
-while suffering a loss of probably less than 1,000.</p>
-<p>Now the besieging forces were in position for the first
-time to accomplish Grant&rsquo;s objective of cutting Lee&rsquo;s
-supply lines and breaking through his fortifications. The
-western end of Lee&rsquo;s mobile defenses had crumbled.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_67">67</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig44">
-<img src="images/pmg32.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="694" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (above) sent cavalry
-and infantry crashing into the Confederate right flank
-at Five Forks on April 1, 1865, the Southern
-commander, Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett (below), was
-at a shad bake in the rear. By the time Pickett
-returned to his command, both it and the defense line
-had crumbled. Suddenly, Petersburg was no longer
-tenable. &ldquo;It has happened as I told them in Richmond
-it would happen,&rdquo; said Lee. &ldquo;The line has been
-stretched until it is broken.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg32a.jpg" alt="Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett." width="500" height="622" />
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_68">68</div>
-<p>Those Confederates who had survived the Battle of Five
-Forks had fallen back to the Southside Railroad where
-they rallied for a stand, but darkness had prevented a
-Union pursuit. Grant&rsquo;s troops were within striking distance
-of the rail line, located less than 3 miles from Five
-Forks. Lee now knew that Petersburg and Richmond
-must be evacuated without delay or the Army of Northern
-Virginia would be completely cut off from outside
-help and all possible escape routes would be gone.</p>
-<p>The problem of assigning a proper significance to Five
-Forks is a difficult one. It is now known that Lee and
-the Confederate government officials were on the verge
-of abandoning their capital. In June of the previous
-year the Southside Railroad had been a most important
-objective of the invading army, but the plight of
-Lee&rsquo;s army had grown so desperate during the intervening
-months that whether the railroad remained open or
-not mattered little. Grant, of course, did not know this
-as a positive fact, although the uncomfortable situation
-of his opponents was something of which he was doubtless
-aware. The real importance of Five Forks lay in the
-probability that, by making it more difficult for Lee to
-escape, it brought the inevitable a little closer. Lt.
-Col. Horace Porter, of Grant&rsquo;s staff, was positive more
-than 30 years later that news of Sheridan&rsquo;s success
-prompted the Union commander in chief to issue the
-orders for the attack that carried the city.</p>
-<h2 id="c11"><span class="small">FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND</span></h2>
-<p>Continuously throughout the night following the Battle
-of Five Forks, the Union artillery played upon the
-Confederate earthworks and dropped shells into the
-city. Troops were prepared for a general assault ordered
-for the following dawn. At 4:40 a.m., April 2, 1865, a
-frontal attack began with the sound of a signal gun from
-Fort Fisher. A heavy ground fog added to the confusion
-as the Federals drove in the Confederate pickets, cut
-away the abatis, and stormed over the works.</p>
-<p>The story of the fighting along the Petersburg front on
-that spring Sunday is one of Union success over stout
-Confederate resistance. Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright&rsquo;s
-Union VI Corps broke through the works defended by
-troops of A. P. Hill&rsquo;s Corps and rolled up the Confederate
-line to right and left, while several regiments
-<span class="pb" id="Page_69">69</span>
-rushed on toward the Southside Railroad. Other elements
-of Grant&rsquo;s army swept away the remnants of the
-Confederate lines along Hatcher&rsquo;s Run. General Hill
-was killed early in the day by a Union soldier near the
-Boydton Plank Road while on the way to rally his men
-at Hatcher&rsquo;s Run.</p>
-<p>The desperateness of the Southern position was shown
-when, about 10 a.m., Lee telegraphed President Davis
-to inform him of the turn of events at Petersburg. The
-message read: &ldquo;I advise that all preparations be made
-for leaving Richmond tonight.&rdquo; Davis received the message
-while attending Sunday services at St. Paul&rsquo;s
-Church. He left immediately, destroying the calm of
-worship, to prepare for evacuating the capital. The flight
-of the Confederate government was promptly begun.</p>
-<p>By midday the entire outer line to the west of Petersburg
-had been captured, with the exception of Fort
-Gregg. The city was now completely surrounded except
-to the north. The left of the Union line finally rested on
-the bank of the Appomattox River after months of
-strenuous effort.</p>
-<p>It now became apparent to Lee that he must hold an
-inner line west of Petersburg until nightfall, when it
-would be possible for him to retreat from the city. While
-gray-clad troops were forming along this line built on
-the banks of Old Indian Town Creek, the defenders of
-Fort Gregg put up a stubborn delaying action against
-the Northern advance. Approximately 300 men and two
-pieces of artillery met an onslaught of 5,000 Northerners.
-The outcome of the struggle was determined by
-the numbers in the attacking force, but the capture of
-Fort Gregg occurred only after bitter hand-to-hand
-combat. The purpose of the defense had been accomplished,
-however, for a thin but sturdy line running behind
-them from Battery 45 to the Appomattox River
-had been manned. Temporarily, at least, street fighting
-within Petersburg had been avoided.</p>
-<p>Blows directed at other points, such as Fort Mahone
-on the Jerusalem Plank Road, were slowed after troops
-of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke&rsquo;s IX Corps had captured
-12 guns and 400 yards of the Confederate line to the
-right and left of the road. Desperate counterattacks by
-<span class="pb" id="Page_70">70</span>
-Gordon&rsquo;s Confederates kept the Federals from exploiting
-this breakthrough. Yet there was no doubt in the minds
-of Lee and other Southern leaders that all hope of retaining
-Petersburg and Richmond was gone. It was obvious
-that, if the lines held the Union army in check on
-April 2, they must be surrendered on the morrow.
-The object was to delay until evening, when retreat
-would be possible.</p>
-<p>The close of the day found the weary Confederates concentrating
-within Petersburg and making all possible
-plans to withdraw. Lee had issued the necessary instructions
-at 5 o&rsquo;clock that afternoon. By 8 p.m. the retreat
-was under way, the artillery preceding the infantry
-across the Appomattox River. Amelia Court House, 40
-miles to the west, was designated as the assembly point
-for the troops from Petersburg and Richmond.</p>
-<p>Grant had ordered the assault on Petersburg to be renewed
-early on April 3. It was discovered at 3 a.m. that
-the Southern earthworks had been abandoned; an attack
-was not necessary. Union troops took possession of the
-city shortly after 4 o&rsquo;clock in the morning. Richmond
-officially surrendered 4 hours later.</p>
-<p>President Lincoln, who had been in the vicinity of
-Petersburg for more than a week, came from army
-headquarters at City Point that same day for a brief
-visit with Grant. They talked quietly on the porch
-of a private house for 1&frac12; hours before the President
-returned to City Point. Grant, with all of his
-army, except the detachments necessary to police
-Petersburg and Richmond and to protect City Point,
-set out in pursuit of Lee. He left Maj. Gen. George
-L. Hartsuff in command at Petersburg.</p>
-<p>Petersburg had fallen, but it was at a heavy price. In the
-absence of complete records, the exact casualties will
-never be known, but in the 10-month campaign at least
-42,000 Union soldiers had been killed, wounded, and
-captured, while the Confederates had suffered losses of
-more than 28,000. Although the northern forces had
-lost more men than their opponents, they had been able
-to replenish them more readily. Moreover, Grant had
-been prepared to utilize the greater resources at his
-disposal, and the Petersburg campaign had been turned
-by him into a form of relentless attrition which the
-Southern army had not been able to stand. The result
-had been the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, but
-more important, it had led to the flight of the remnants
-of the once mighty Army of Northern Virginia.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_71">71</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig45">
-<img src="images/pmg33.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="576" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Fort Mahone after its capture, 1865.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig46">
-<img src="images/pmg33a.jpg" alt="" width="587" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Deserted Confederate huts on the abandoned Petersburg line.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_72">72</div>
-<p>On the Sunday following the evacuation of Petersburg
-and Richmond, Lee&rsquo;s troops were cut off at Appomattox
-Court House, destroying any hopes they might have had
-for uniting with Johnston in North Carolina. In this
-small Virginia town nearly 100 miles west of Petersburg,
-the Army of Northern Virginia, now numbering
-little more than 28,000, surrendered to the Union
-forces. Within a week of the fall of Petersburg the major
-striking force of the Confederacy had capitulated. General
-Johnston surrendered his army to General Sherman
-in North Carolina on April 26. By early June 1865,
-all Confederate forces had been surrendered, and the
-Civil War was over.</p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_73">73</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig47">
-<img src="images/pmg34.jpg" alt="" width="655" height="600" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>Union soldiers on Sycamore
-Street in Petersburg, April
-1865. For these men, basking
-in the aftermath of a
-successful campaign, the
-war is almost over. To the
-west, General Sheridan&rsquo;s
-cavalry is racing to cut off
-the retreating Southern army.
-&ldquo;If the thing is pressed,&rdquo;
-Sheridan tells Grant, &ldquo;I think
-Lee will surrender.&rdquo; Says
-Lincoln: &ldquo;Let the thing be
-pressed.&rdquo;</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_74">74</div>
-<div class="img" id="fig48">
-<img src="images/pmg35.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="665" />
-<p class="pcap"><i>On April 3, 1865, with
-Petersburg in Union hands
-at last, General Grant issued
-orders sending off the
-Armies of the Potomac and
-the James in pursuit of Lee.
-While the photographer was
-taking this picture, showing a
-Federal wagon train leaving
-the city to join in the chase,
-the remnants of Lee&rsquo;s army
-were marching toward a
-little crossroad village named
-Appomattox Court House.</i></p>
-</div>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_76">76</div>
-<h3 id="c12">PICTURE CREDITS:</h3>
-<dl class="undent"><dt>Addison Gallery of American Art (from the painting by E. L. Henry): pp. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55</dt>
-<dt>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: pp. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></dt>
-<dt>Library of Congress: pp. <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a> (top &amp; bottom), <a href="#Page_18">18</a>-19, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-21, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>-23 (bottom, left), <a href="#Page_32">32</a>-33, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-39, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>-57, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a> (bottom), <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-75</dt>
-<dt>National Archives: pp. <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a> (middle), <a href="#Page_14">14</a>-15, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>-23 (top), <a href="#Page_34">34</a>-35, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-41, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a> (top), <a href="#Page_71">71</a></dt>
-<dt>National Park Service: <a href="#Page_23">p. 23</a></dt>
-<dt>Washington and Lee University: <a href="#Page_59">p. 59</a>.</dt></dl>
-<h3 id="c13">FOR FURTHER READING:</h3>
-<dl class="undent"><dt>Bruce Catton, <i>Grant Takes Command</i>, Boston, 1969</dt>
-<dt>Bruce Catton, <i>A Stillness at Appomattox</i>, New York, 1953</dt>
-<dt>Douglas Southall Freeman, <i>Lee&rsquo;s Lieutenants: A Study in Command</i>, 3 vols., New York, 1942-46, vol. III</dt>
-<dt>Douglas Southall Freeman, <i>R. E. Lee, A Biography</i>, 4 vols., New York, 1934-35, vols. III and IV</dt>
-<dt>Ulysses S. Grant, <i>Personal Memoirs</i>, 2 vols., New York, 1885-86, vol. II</dt>
-<dt>Andrew A. Humphreys, <i>The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865</i>, New York, 1883</dt>
-<dt>Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>, 4 vols., New York, 1887 (reissued, 1956), vol. IV</dt>
-<dt>Theodore Lyman, <i>Meade&rsquo;s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox</i>, edited by George R. Agassiz, Boston, 1922</dt>
-<dt>Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed., <i>The Photographic History of the Civil War</i>, 10 vols., New York, 1911 (reissued, 1957)</dt>
-<dt>Henry Pleasants, Jr., <i>The Tragedy of the Crater</i>, Boston, 1936</dt>
-<dt>Horace Porter, <i>Campaigning With Grant</i>, New York, 1897 (reissued, 1961)</dt>
-<dt>Benjamin Quarles, <i>The Negro in the Civil War</i>, Boston, 1953</dt>
-<dt>Philip Van Doren Stern, <i>An End to Valor: The Last Days of the Civil War</i>, Boston, 1958</dt>
-<dt>William Swinton, <i>Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac</i>, New York, 1882</dt>
-<dt>U.S. War Department, <i>War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies</i>, 128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901, Series I, vols. 36, 38, 40, 46, 51; Series III, vol. 5.</dt></dl>
-<h3 id="c14">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES:</h3>
-<dl class="undent"><dt>Antietam</dt>
-<dt>Aztec Ruins</dt>
-<dt>Bandelier</dt>
-<dt>Campaign for Petersburg</dt>
-<dt>Chalmette</dt>
-<dt>Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields</dt>
-<dt>Custer Battlefield</dt>
-<dt>Custis-Lee Mansion, the Robert E. Lee Memorial</dt>
-<dt>Ford&rsquo;s Theatre and the House Where Lincoln Died</dt>
-<dt>Fort Davis</dt>
-<dt>Fort Laramie</dt>
-<dt>Fort McHenry</dt>
-<dt>Fort Necessity</dt>
-<dt>Fort Pulaski</dt>
-<dt>Fort Raleigh</dt>
-<dt>Fort Sumter</dt>
-<dt>Fort Union</dt>
-<dt>Fredericksburg Battlefields</dt>
-<dt>George Washington Birthplace</dt>
-<dt>Gettysburg</dt>
-<dt>Golden Spike</dt>
-<dt>Guilford Courthouse</dt>
-<dt>Hopewell Village</dt>
-<dt>Independence</dt>
-<dt>Jamestown, Virginia</dt>
-<dt>Kings Mountain</dt>
-<dt>Manassas (Bull Run)</dt>
-<dt>Montezuma Castle</dt>
-<dt>Morristown, A Military Capital of the Revolution</dt>
-<dt>Ocmulgee</dt>
-<dt>Richmond Battlefields</dt>
-<dt>Saratoga</dt>
-<dt>Scotts Bluff</dt>
-<dt>Shiloh</dt>
-<dt>Statue of Liberty</dt>
-<dt>Vanderbilt Mansion</dt>
-<dt>Vicksburg</dt>
-<dt>Whitman Mission</dt>
-<dt>Wright Brothers</dt>
-<dt>Yorktown</dt></dl>
-<p>Pricelists of Park Service publications sold by the Government Printing Office may be obtained from
-the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402.</p>
-<h3 id="c15">ADMINISTRATION:</h3>
-<p>Petersburg National Battlefield is administered by the National Park Service,
-U.S. Department of the Interior. A superintendent, whose address is Box 549, Petersburg, VA 23803, is
-in immediate charge.</p>
-<p>As the Nation&rsquo;s principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior
-has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral, land, park, and recreational resources.
-Indian and Territorial affairs are other major concerns of America&rsquo;s &ldquo;Department of Natural Resources.&rdquo;
-The Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our resources so each will make its
-full contribution to a better United States&mdash;now and in the future.</p>
-<p class="center"><span class="small">U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR</span> <span class="hst"><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</span></span></p>
-<p><span class="smaller">&#9733; U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 O - 389-735</span></p>
-<div class="pb" id="Page_77">77</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/pmg36.jpg" alt="Locomotive." width="502" height="800" />
-</div>
-<div class="img">
-<img src="images/endpaper.jpg" alt="Book Jacket." width="1000" height="758" />
-</div>
-
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<hr />
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-
-<h2><span class="small">Transcriber&rsquo;s Note</span></h2>
-<ul>
-<li>A few typographical errors were corrected without comment.</li>
-<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition.</li>
-<li>Moved some captions nearer to the corresponding pictures, and
- removed (or adjusted) references to picture location in the printed book.</li></ul>
-
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<p>&nbsp;</p>
-<hr class="full" />
-<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAMPAIGN FOR PETERSBURG***</p>
-<p>******* This file should be named 52760-h.htm or 52760-h.zip *******</p>
-<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br />
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