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diff --git a/old/52588-0.txt b/old/52588-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 55df067..0000000 --- a/old/52588-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14108 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of sea Power upon the French -Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, vol I, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Influence of sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812, vol I - -Author: Alfred Thayer Mahan - -Release Date: July 21, 2016 [EBook #52588] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER, VOL I *** - - - - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - THE - - INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - - UPON THE - - FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE - - 1793-1812 - - BY - - CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N. - - PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE - - AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783" - OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A - "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT" - - IN TWO VOLUMES - - VOL. I. - - FOURTH EDITION. - - LONDON - - SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON - (LIMITED) - - - - -UNIVERSITY PRESS: JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The present work, like its predecessor, "The Influence of Sea Power -upon History, 1660-1783," is wholly a result of the author's connection -with the United States Naval War College as lecturer upon Naval History -and Naval Tactics. - -When first asked to undertake that duty, the question naturally arose -how to impart to the subject of Naval History an aspect which, in -this very utilitarian age, should not be open to the ready reproach -of having merely archæological interest, and possessing no practical -value for men called upon to use the changed materials of modern naval -war. "You won't have much to say about history," was then the somewhat -discouraging comment of a senior officer of his own service. - -In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author—whose acquaintance -with naval history was at that time wholly superficial—that the part -played by navies, and by maritime power generally, as a factor in the -results of history, and as shaping the destinies of nations and of the -world, had received little or no particular attention. If this were -so, an analysis of the course of events through a series of years, -directed to show the influence of Sea Power upon History, would at -least serve to imbue his hearers with an exalted sense of the mission -of their calling; and might also, by throwing light upon the political -bearings of naval force, contribute to give the service and the country -a more definite impression of the necessity to provide a fleet adequate -to great undertakings, lest, if an occasion should arise for what he -has ventured to call "statesmanship directing arms," we should be found -unprepared, through having no sufficient armed force to direct. - -In avowing this as the original, and, for a time at least, almost the -sole motive of his work, the author practically confesses that he at -the beginning had no scientific appreciation or reasoned knowledge -of the naval history of the past. Upon giving this the attention -required by his new duties, and collating the various incidents with -the teachings of recognized authorities upon land warfare, he soon came -to recognize that the principles which they claimed to be of general -application in their own specialty received also ample and convincing -illustration in naval annals; although the development of the Art of -War at sea has been slower, and is now less advanced, than on shore. -This backward result has been due, partly, to uncertainties peculiar to -the sea, and partly to a contempt for the study of the past, and of -its experience, as "not practical," from which the naval profession has -not yet wholly rid itself. - -Thus, in its course, the author's former work, without abandoning its -first simple motive, expanded into an attempt to analyze the strategic -conduct of the naval campaigns, as well as the tactical features of the -various battles—all too few—in which any clear tactical purpose was -shown by the commanders engaged. The cordial reception given to the -work by his professional brethren, in Great Britain as well as at home, -has been to him not only most gratifying, but wholly unexpected. Its -chief significance is, however, not personal. The somewhat surprised -satisfaction testified is virtually an admission that, in the race -for material and mechanical development, sea-officers as a class have -allowed their attention to be unduly diverted from the systematic study -of the Conduct of War, which is their peculiar and main concern. For, -if the commendation bestowed be at all deserved, it is to be ascribed -simply to the fact that the author has been led to give to the most -important part of the profession an attention which it is in the power -of any other officer to bestow, but which too few actually do. - -That the author has done so is due, wholly and exclusively, to the -Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies. -If further success attend his present venture, it is his hope that -this avowal may help to assure the long uncertain fortunes of the -College, to which,—and to its founder, Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce,—he -gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness for guiding him into a path he -would not himself have found. - -The term of this work is fixed at the year 1812; a date signalized by -Napoleon's invasion of Russia, which wrecked his empire,—or at least -gave the outward and visible token of the wreck,—and also by the -outbreak of war between Great Britain and the United States. To the -latter, as a subject of particular national interest, the author hopes -in the near future to devote a special study. - - A. T. MAHAN. - - OCTOBER, 1892. - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. I. - - - CHAPTER I. - - INTRODUCTORY - - OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783-1793. - - PAGE - - Prominence of the year 1793 1 - - Leading features and results of the war of 1778 2 - - Condition of the different belligerents at its termination 3 - - Success of the second Pitt as a peace minister 5 - - Advantage to Great Britain arising from his secure tenure of power 6 - - Desire of Western Europe for peace 7 - - Causes of disturbance 7 - - Accession of Joseph II. to crown of Austria 7 - - Commercial expansion of Austrian Netherlands during war of 1778 8 - - Question of the navigation of the Scheldt 9 - - Wide-spread interests therein involved 10 - - The Eastern Question, 1780-1790 11 - - Change of relations between Great Britain and Russia from - 1770 to 1785 12 - - Interests of France and of Great Britain in the Levant and - Baltic 14 - - Importance of Antwerp as a naval station 15 - - Interests of European States in Holland and the Netherlands 16 - - Relations between Russia and France, 1780-1790 17 - - Preponderance of French influence in Dutch politics 17 - - Joseph II. drops the question of the Scheldt 18 - - Treaty of alliance between France and Holland, 1785 18 - - Armed interference of Prussia in Holland, 1787 19 - - British party regains ascendency in Holland, 1787 19 - - Meeting of the Notables in France, February, 1787 19 - - Turkey declares war against Russia, August, 1787 19 - - Austria declares war against Turkey, February, 1788 19 - - Great Britain and Holland proclaim a strict neutrality 20 - - Consequent effect upon Russia's maritime projects 20 - - Sweden attacks Russian Finland, June, 1788 21 - - Defensive alliance between Great Britain, Prussia, and Holland, - 1788 21 - - Denmark attacks Sweden 21 - - Interposition of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic 21 - - Significance of this action 22 - - Dawn of the modern Eastern Question 22 - - Conflicting views of British statesmen about Russia, 1791 23 - - External influence of France paralyzed by home troubles 24 - - Progress of the war in southeastern Europe 24 - - Renewed interference of Great Britain and Prussia in the Baltic 25 - - Meeting of the States-General in France, 1789 25 - - Cessation of hostilities between Austria and Turkey, September, - 1790 26 - - Storming of Ismail by Suwarrow, Christmas, 1790 26 - - Peace of Galatz between Russia and Turkey, August, 1791 27 - - General peace in eastern Europe, 1791 27 - - Progress of the Revolution in France, 1789-1791 28 - - Flight of the King, 1791 28 - - Declaration of Pilnitz, August, 1791 28 - - Significant coincidence of this date with Peace of Galatz 29 - - France declares war against Austria, April, 1792 29 - - Disorders in Paris, June-September, 1792 30 - - Suspension of the King, August, 1792 30 - - Battle of Valmy, September 20, 1792 30 - - Meeting of National Convention, September 22, 1792 31 - - Royalty abolished in France 31 - - Battle of Jemappes, November 6, 1792 31 - - The French occupy Austrian Netherlands and open the Scheldt 31 - - Decree of Fraternity, November 19, 1792 31 - - Decree extending the French system with their armies, December - 15, 1792 32 - - Strained relations between Great Britain and France 32 - - Execution of Louis XVI., January 21, 1793 32 - - Dismissal of the French minister by the British court 34 - - France declares war against Great Britain and Holland, February - 1, 1793 34 - - - CHAPTER II. - - THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY THE - FRENCH NAVY. - - Causes of the deterioration of the French navy after 1789 35 - - Ignorance of maritime conditions among French administrators 37 - - Value of the lessons derivable from this experience 38 - - Factors conditioning the effects of any form of military activity 38 - - The gun the one sea-weapon of the period in question 39 - - A ship is a mobile battery 39 - - It is handled by an organic body, whose members are mutually - dependent 39 - - Necessity of special training to such an organization 40 - - Blindness of the French Legislature to these facts 41 - - Rise and growth of insubordination in the navy 41 - - The disturbances in Toulon, 1789 42 - - Maltreatment of Commodore D'Albert de Rions 43 - - Weakness of the National (Constituent) Assembly 43 - - The Nootka Sound trouble between Spain and Great Britain, 1790 44 - - France prepares to support Spain 45 - - De Rions ordered to command the Brest fleet 45 - - Mutiny in the Brest fleet 45 - - De Rions leaves the navy 46 - - His services and distinguished professional reputation 46 - - Disorders in the navy abroad 47 - - Disastrous effects upon the French colonies 48 - - Emigration of French naval officers 49 - - Reorganization of the navy by the Constituent Assembly, 1791 50 - - Previous measures of the monarchical government, 1786 51 - - Reorganization decrees of the Assembly, April, 1791 52 - - Essential spirit of this legislation 53 - - The Second (Legislative) Assembly lowers the qualifications for - officers 54 - - Naval officers in the Reign of Terror 54 - - Further legislation by Third Assembly (National Convention), 1793 55 - - Results of the successive measures 56 - - Action of the Assemblies touching enlisted men 57 - - Singular arguments based on equality of rights 58 - - Extravagancies of the period 59 - - Direct results of these measures as shown in battle 60 - - Indirect effects of the laxness of the Assemblies upon discipline 60 - - Mutiny in the Brest fleet, 1793 62 - - Disorders in the Mediterranean fleet, 1792 63 - - Deterioration of the material of the navy 64 - - Misery of officers and seamen 64 - - Want of naval supplies and equipment 67 - - Effect of these disadvantages upon naval efficiency 68 - - Effect of naval inefficiency upon the general results of the war 68 - - Endurance and success of Great Britain due to her Sea Power 69 - - Condition of the British navy in 1793 69 - - Possesses a body of trained officers having a continuous - tradition 69 - - Embarrassment of Great Britain for seamen 70 - - Condition and health of the crews 71 - - Mutinies in the British navy. How characterized 72 - - Character of the material in the British navy 73 - - Comparative force of the French and British navies 75 - - Numbers and condition of the Spanish navy 75 - - Inefficiency of its officers and seamen 76 - - Navies of Holland, Naples, and Portugal 78 - - Of Turkey and the Baltic States 78 - - - CHAPTER III. - - THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE - EVENTS OF 1793. - - France declares war against Spain, March 7, 1793 79 - - Character of the governments arrayed against France 79 - - Mutual jealousy of Austria and Prussia 80 - - Attitude of the smaller German States 80 - - Military and naval situation of Spain 81 - - Policy of Great Britain 82 - - Attitude of Russia 82 - - Second Partition of Poland 82 - - Course of Sweden and Denmark 83 - - Internal dissensions and external dangers of Holland 83 - - Dutch colonies 83 - - Relations between Portugal and Great Britain 84 - - Attitude of the Italian States 84 - - Extent and disorganization of the Turkish Empire 85 - - Strategic importance of the Mediterranean islands 85 - - Their political distribution 86 - - Value of Malta and of Port Mahon 87 - - Corsica in the beginning of the French Revolution 88 - - Internal commotions in France 89 - - Reverses in Belgium and treason of Dumouriez 89 - - Reorganization of the Committee of Public Safety 90 - - Revolt of Lyon against the Convention 90 - - Fall of the Girondists 90 - - Risings of their followers throughout France 90 - - Siege of Lyon by Conventional troops 91 - - Toulon delivered to the British and Spanish fleets 92 - - French reverses on the eastern and northeastern frontiers 93 - - Desperate state of France 93 - - Mistakes of the allies 94 - - Energy of the Convention and its commissioners 94 - - Effect upon the armies 94 - - Failure to attain similar results in the navy 95 - - Causes of this failure 96 - - Naval unpreparedness of Great Britain in 1793 96 - - Difficulty in manning the fleet 96 - - Distribution of the British naval forces 96 - - Military and naval problem before Great Britain 97 - - Military value of insurrections in an enemy's country 98 - - Measures to compel the French navy to leave port 99 - - Difficulty of blockading French ports 99 - - Maritime claims of Great Britain 100 - - Military character of Lord Howe 101 - - His views of naval policy 101 - - Proper strategic use of the British fleet 102 - - Effects of inactivity upon a naval force 102 - - Successes of the French armies toward the close of 1793 103 - - Disasters of the Vendean insurgents 104 - - Fall of Lyon 105 - - The allies abandon Toulon, Dec. 19, 1793 105 - - Disadvantages of Toulon for the allies 106 - - End of the maritime year 1793 106 - - - CHAPTER IV. - - THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. - - Present importance of the West India islands 109 - - Their value at the end of the eighteenth century 109 - - Control of a maritime region dependent upon the navy 110 - - Interests of Great Britain in the Caribbean Sea 110 - - Condition of Haïti 111 - - Relation of Haïti to the routes of commerce 112 - - Mistaken policy of the British in Haïti 113 - - Military and commercial value of the Lesser Antilles 114 - - Their political distribution in 1793 114 - - Naval weakness of Great Britain in that region 115 - - Expedition of Jervis and Grey in 1794 115 - - Capture of the French islands 115 - - The French retake Guadaloupe 116 - - Disastrous results to British possessions and commerce 117 - - Expedition of Christian and Abercromby, 1796 117 - - Its successes 118 - - Criticism of British military policy in 1794 119 - - Injury to Great Britain of Spanish and Dutch alliance with France 120 - - Capture of Trinidad by the British 121 - - Subsequent events in the West Indies 121 - - - CHAPTER V. - - THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1795, AND BATTLE OF THE - FIRST OF JUNE. - - Distress in France in 1793 and 1794 122 - - Food supplies ordered from the United States 123 - - Ships of war sent to convoy them to France 123 - - Squadrons of Nielly and Villaret sent to meet the convoy 124 - - Determination of British government to intercept it 125 - - Sailing of the Channel Fleet under Lord Howe 125 - - Howe meets the French fleet under Villaret Joyeuse, May 28 126 - - Partial engagement of May 28 127 - - Manœuvres of May 29 129 - - Partial engagement of May 29 130 - - Lord Howe breaks the French line 131 - - Villaret loses the advantage of the wind 131 - - Summary of the results of the two days' engagements 133 - - Merits of Howe's tactics 135 - - Strategic mistake by which Montagu's squadron was not on hand 135 - - Events of May 30 and 31 135 - - Preparations for battle, June 1 136 - - Character of Howe's attack 137 - - Opening of the battle 138 - - Howe's flag-ship again breaks the French line 139 - - General success of the first attack 140 - - The contest between the "Vengeur" and the "Brunswick" 140 - - Sinking of the "Vengeur" 143 - - Results of the encounter 144 - - Villaret's manœuvre to rescue his crippled ships 145 - - Howe's manœuvre to preserve his prizes 146 - - Incomplete results of the British victory 147 - - Physical prostration of Lord Howe 147 - - Tactical analysis of the action 149 - - Inferences deduced therefrom 152 - - Conduct of the French captains 153 - - Study of the strategic conduct of the two admirals 155 - - Howe's tactical success neutralized by strategic error 160 - - Termination of the campaign 161 - - Safe arrival of the convoy at Brest 161 - - - CHAPTER VI. - - THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT. - - Inaction of the British Channel fleet 162 - - Capture of the "Alexander," 74 162 - - Disastrous winter cruise of the French Brest fleet 163 - - Continued inactivity of the British Channel fleet 164 - - Howe leaves the command afloat 165 - - Succeeded by Bridport 165 - - Change in the British Admiralty 165 - - Little change of system 165 - - Dangers incurred by faulty dispositions 166 - - Reign of Terror in France 167 - - Fall of Robespierre, July 27, 1794 167 - - French successes on north-east frontier 168 - - Divergent retreat of Austrians and Anglo-Dutch 169 - - Conquest of Holland by the French 170 - - Establishment of Batavian Republic 170 - - Effect of this event upon the coalition 170 - - War between Great Britain and Holland 170 - - Fall of Dutch colonies 171 - - French successes on the Rhine and in the Pyrenees 171 - - Peace made with France by Prussia, Holland, and Spain 172 - - Treaties of Great Britain with Austria and Russia 172 - - - CHAPTER VII. - - THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT. - - The year 1795 one of reaction in France 173 - - Reactionary measures 174 - - Counter-revolutionary disorders 175 - - Constitution of 1795 175 - - Dissolution of the National Convention 176 - - Six French ships-of-the-line transferred from Brest to Toulon 176 - - Action between Villaret Joyeuse and Cornwallis 177 - - Bridport's action off Île Groix 178 - - French adopt policy of commerce-destroying and withdraw their - fleets from the ocean 179 - - Criticism of this decision 179 - - Military conclusions derivable from Napoleon's naval policy 180 - - Weakness of French military action in 1795 180 - - Serious reverses in Germany 181 - - Suspension of arms in Germany 182 - - Narrative shifts to the Mediterranean 183 - - Summary of results in 1795 183 - - - CHAPTER VIII. - - THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF - TOULON IN 1793 TO THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT - SEA, IN 1796, AND BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT, IN FEBRUARY, - 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE. - - Requirements of a base of operations 184 - - Policy and objects of Great Britain in the Mediterranean 185 - - Inadequacy of Gibraltar to these ends 185 - - Advantages of Corsica as a base 186 - - Expulsion of the French from Corsica 187 - - The crown of Corsica offered to the king of Great Britain 188 - - Strained relations between Paoli and the viceroy 188 - - French Toulon fleet puts to sea, in March, 1795 189 - - Action with the British Mediterranean fleet, March 14 190 - - Lethargy of Admiral Hotham 192 - - Losses in the two fleets 192 - - French re-enforced by a detachment from Brest 192 - - Disturbances in Toulon 193 - - Brush between the fleets off the Hyères Islands 194 - - Military events in Italy, 1795 195 - - Difficulty of suppressing coasting trade along the Riviera of - Genoa 196 - - Sluggish movements of the Austrian general Devins 197 - - Decisive defeat of the Austrians at the battle of Loano 198 - - They retire across the Apennines 198 - - Criticism of the management of the British navy 199 - - Importance of Nelson's services 200 - - Commerce-destroying by the French 201 - - Admiral Jervis assumes command in the Mediterranean, and - General Bonaparte in Italy 203 - - Professional Characteristics of Jervis 203 - - Disastrous results of Hotham's inactivity 207 - - Share of the French flotilla in maintaining Bonaparte's - communications 207 - - Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796 208 - - Sardinia forced to peace 209 - - Successive defeats of the Austrians 210 - - Bonaparte occupies the line of the Adige, and blockades Mantua 210 - - Political results of the campaign 211 - - Naples abandons the Coalition, and the French occupy Leghorn 211 - - Consequent effects upon the British fleet 212 - - Bonaparte's designs upon Corsica 213 - - The British seize Elba 213 - - Offensive and defensive alliance between Spain and France 214 - - Singular conduct of Rear-Admiral Mann 214 - - Critical position of the British Mediterranean fleet 215 - - Ordered to evacuate Corsica 215 - - Junction of French and Spanish fleets 215 - - Jervis withdraws his fleet to Gibraltar 216 - - Policy of thus evacuating the Mediterranean 217 - - Influence of Naples upon Bonaparte's plans 218 - - Succession of disasters to Jervis's fleet 219 - - He repairs with it to Lisbon, January, 1797 219 - - Nelson's detached expedition to evacuate Elba 219 - - Events leading to the battle of Cape St. Vincent 220 - - Battle of Cape St. Vincent 221 - - Nelson's brilliant action 226 - - Merit of Sir John Jervis 228 - - Results of the battle 229 - - Sir John Jervis created Earl St. Vincent 229 - - Public depression in Great Britain at this time 230 - - Influence upon public feeling of the news of the battle 231 - - St. Vincent establishes the blockade of Cadiz 232 - - Critical condition of discipline in the British navy 232 - - Bonaparte's position in Italy 233 - - Capitulation of Mantua 233 - - Bonaparte advances through Carinthia into Austria 234 - - Preliminaries of peace signed at Leoben, April, 1797 234 - - Conditions, both open and secret 235 - - Austria treats alone, apart from Great Britain 235 - - Advantage to Great Britain from her Sea Power 236 - - Note,—incident of the mutinies of 1797 occurring in the fleet - of Earl St. Vincent 236-239 - - - CHAPTER IX. - - THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798. - - BONAPARTE'S EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION—THE RETURN OF THE - BRITISH TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BATTLE OF THE - NILE.—GREAT BRITAIN RESUMES CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - AND THE SECOND COALITION IS FORMED. - - Negotiations for peace between Great Britain and France, 1796 240 - - The British envoy ordered to quit France 241 - - Difficulties between the United States and France 242 - - Death of Catharine II. of Russia and accession of Paul I. 243 - - Reactionary results of the French elections in 1797 243 - - Coup d'État of September 3-4, 1797 244 - - Reactionary members exiled from France 245 - - Renewed negotiations with Great Britain, 1797 245 - - The British envoy again dismissed 246 - - Bonaparte's Eastern projects 246 - - Insidious treatment of Venice 247 - - Nelson's expedition against Teneriffe 249 - - He is repulsed, loses his right arm, and returns to England 250 - - Peace of Campo Formio between France and Austria 250 - - Conditions of the peace 251 - - Venice ceases to exist, and France acquires the Ionian islands 251 - - Bonaparte leaves Italy and returns to Paris 252 - - Commands army intended to invade England 252 - - Difficulties of this enterprise 252 - - The expedition to Egypt determined in its stead 253 - - Absence of the British fleet from the Mediterranean in 1797 254 - - Nelson rejoins the fleet off Cadiz, April, 1798 256 - - Sent with three ships to watch the preparations in Toulon 256 - - Bonaparte sails with expedition for Egypt, May 19, 1798 256 - - Nelson joined by a re-enforcement of ten ships-of-the-line 257 - - Bonaparte seizes Malta, and sails again for Alexandria 257 - - Perplexity of Nelson as to the enemy's designs 258 - - Pursues to Alexandria, but fails to find the French 259 - - Cause of this disappointment 259 - - Retraces his steps to the westward 260 - - Bonaparte anchors off Alexandria, and at once disembarks troops 260 - - Nelson anchors at Syracuse, and again sails for Alexandria 261 - - Discovers the French fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay 261 - - Indecision and lethargy of the French admiral Brueys 262 - - Neglect of Bonaparte's orders 263 - - Description of Aboukir Bay 263 - - Brueys's inadequate preparations against attack 264 - - Comparison with those made by Hood in a like position 265 - - Battle of the Nile 266 - - Concentration upon the head of the French column 268 - - Grounding of the "Culloden" 269 - - Arrival of the British reserve and concentration on the French - centre 270 - - The French flag-ship blows up 271 - - Only two French ships-of-the-line escape 271 - - Discussion of Nelson's claims to the credit of this action 273 - - Successes of Bonaparte in Egypt 277 - - Effect upon French troops of the battle of the Nile 277 - - Effect of the battle upon foreign powers 277 - - Aggressive action of France upon the continent of Europe 278 - - Intervention in Switzerland and Rome 279 - - Dissatisfaction of Naples and Austria 280 - - Hostile attitude of Paul I. of Russia 281 - - Alliance between Russia and Austria 282 - - Effect of the tidings of the battle of the Nile 282 - - Influence of the battle in India 283 - - Nelson ordered to Naples 284 - - Blockade of Malta by the British 285 - - Disposition of the British Mediterranean fleet 286 - - Russo-Turkish attack upon the Ionian islands 286 - - Minorca captured by the British 287 - - Maritime results of the year 1798 287 - - - CHAPTER X. - - THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801. - - BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION AND SIEGE OF ACRE.—THE - INCURSION OF THE FRENCH BREST FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL - BRUIX.—BONAPARTE'S RETURN TO FRANCE.—THE FRENCH - LOSE MALTA AND EGYPT. - - Bonaparte's hopes from the Egyptian expedition 288 - - Weakness of Egyptian institutions 289 - - Conquest of Upper Egypt 289 - - The Pasha of Syria advances against Egypt 290 - - Isolation of the French in Egypt 290 - - Consequent embarrassment of Bonaparte 291 - - Bonaparte hears of the Turkish preparations against him 292 - - Resolves to invade Syria 292 - - The French capture El Arish and advance to Acre 293 - - Character of Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the British squadron - off Acre 294 - - His naval and diplomatic mission to the Levant 296 - - Annoyance thereby caused to Nelson and St. Vincent 297 - - Smith assumes command off Alexandria 298 - - Importance of Acre 299 - - Smith arrives at Acre from Alexandria 299 - - Captures a convoy with Bonaparte's siege train 300 - - Siege of Acre 300 - - Arrival of Turkish re-enforcements from Rhodes 301 - - Final assault by the French 302 - - They raise the siege and retreat to Egypt 302 - - Services of Sir Sidney Smith at Acre 303 - - The French fleet of twenty-five ships-of-the-line, under Admiral - Bruix, escapes from Brest 304 - - Conduct of Lord Bridport 305 - - Excitement in Great Britain 306 - - Bruix appears off Cadiz, and enters the Mediterranean 307 - - Exposed position of the British naval detachments 308 - - Anxieties of Earl St. Vincent 309 - - Measures taken by him 309 - - Action of Nelson 310 - - Activity and sagacity shown by St. Vincent 311 - - The Spanish fleet leaves Cadiz and reaches Cartagena 312 - - St. Vincent's health fails, and he gives up command to Keith 312 - - Bruix eludes Keith's pursuit and joins Spaniards in Cartagena 313 - - The allied fleets pass the Straits and reach Brest 316 - - Keith pursues to Brest and then goes to Torbay 316 - - Discussion of the French objects in this cruise 316 - - Conduct of the British admirals at the same time 318 - - The Turkish army lands in Aboukir Bay to attack the French 321 - - It is destroyed by Bonaparte 322 - - Bonaparte quits Egypt and returns to France 323 - - Criticism of the Egyptian expedition 324 - - Absolute control of the Mediterranean by the British navy 328 - - Surrender of Malta 330 - - Isolation of Egypt 330 - - Convention of El Arish for the evacuation of Egypt by the French 332 - - Ratification refused by British government, because unauthorized 333 - - Abercromby's expedition. Final loss of Egypt by the French 334 - - Assassination of Kleber 334 - - - CHAPTER XI. - - THE ATLANTIC, 1796-1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE - FRENCH EXPEDITIONS AGAINST IRELAND. - - The French resolution to depend upon commerce-destroying 335 - - Consequent effect upon naval war and upon the control of the sea 336 - - Resulting dispositions of French and British navies 337 - - Inefficient character of the blockade of Brest 338 - - Conditions of the maritime problem before Great Britain stated 339 - - Measures proper to be adopted 340 - - Mutual relations of the elements of a defensive system 341 - - Two aspects under which the military value of Brest should be - considered 342 - - Description of the port and its surroundings 342 - - Strategic importance of the winds 344 - - Anchorages available to the British fleets as bases of operations - against Brest 344 - - Theory of the Brest blockade 345 - - Fitness of the British bases relative to this theory 345 - - Policies of St. Vincent, Howe, and Bridport 346 - - Causes leading to the Irish expedition of 1796 347 - - Preparations for the expedition 348 - - Hoche appointed to command it 349 - - Villaret Joyeuse appointed to command the fleet 349 - - His distaste for the enterprise 349 - - He is superseded by Morard de Galles 350 - - Inefficiency of the French navy at this time 350 - - Departure of the expedition 351 - - Its dispersal on the night of starting 353 - - Reunion of the greater part of the ships 354 - - Absence of the two commanders-in-chief 354 - - The expedition reaches the coast of Ireland 355 - - Mishaps in Bantry Bay 356 - - The ships return to France 357 - - Shipwreck of the "Droits de l'Homme" 358 - - Misfortunes of the ship carrying Hoche and Morard 359 - - Inefficiency of the British dispositions against invasion 360 - - Analysis of these dispositions 361 - - Consequent impunity of the French 367 - - St. Vincent succeeds, in 1800, to the command of the Channel - fleet 368 - - His strategic management of the general operations 369 - - His tactical dispositions to maintain the watch of the port 371 - - Dependence of the admiralty upon the commander-in-chief 373 - - St. Vincent's provisions in case of the blockade being forced 374 - - Decisive effects of the system introduced by him 375 - - Paralysis of Brest under this watch 376 - - Napoleon in consequence adopts Antwerp as his chief dockyard 377 - - Purposed expedition against Ireland from the Texel 378 - - Naval battle of Camperdown 378 - - Death of Hoche 378 - - The expeditions of 1798 against Ireland 379 - - Cessation of the attempts upon Ireland 380 - - - - -LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. - - - VOLUME I. - - MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS. - - PAGE - - I. Manœuvres of May 29, 1794, Figures 1 and 2 129 - - II. Manœuvres of May 29, 1794, Fig. 3 131 - - III. Battle of June 1, 1794 137 - - IV. Map of Northern Italy 195 - - V. Battle of Cape St. Vincent 223 - - VI. Map of the Mediterranean 257 - - VII. Coast Map, Alexandria to the Nile 263 - - VIII. Battle of the Nile 266 - - IX. Map of English Channel and North Sea 335 - - X. Map of Brest and its Approaches 342 - - - - -THE - -INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER - -UPON THE - -FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - -INTRODUCTORY. - -OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, 1783-1793. - - -The ten years following the Peace of Versailles, September 3, 1783, -coming between the two great wars of American Independence and of the -French Revolution, seem like a time of stagnation. The muttering and -heaving which foretold the oncome of the later struggle were indeed to -be heard by those whose ears were open, long before 1793. The opening -events and violences which marked the political revolution were of -earlier date, and war with Austria and Prussia began even in 1792; -but the year 1793 stands out with a peculiar prominence, marked as it -is by the murder of the king and queen, the beginning of the Reign -of Terror, and the outbreak of hostilities with the great Sea Power, -whose stubborn, relentless purpose and mighty wealth were to exert the -decisive influence upon the result of the war. Untiring in sustaining -with her gold the poorer powers of the Continent against the common -enemy, dogged in bearing up alone the burden of the war, when one by -one her allies dropped away, the year in which Great Britain, with her -fleets, her commerce, and her money, rose against the French republic, -with its conquering armies, its ruined navy, and its bankrupt -treasury, may well be taken as the beginning of that tremendous strife -which ended at Waterloo. - -To the citizen of the United States, the war whose results were summed -up and sealed in the Treaty of Versailles is a landmark of history -surpassing all others in interest and importance. His sympathies are -stirred by the sufferings of the many, his pride animated by the noble -constancy of the few whose names will be forever identified with the -birth-throes of his country. Yet in a less degree this feeling may -well be shared by a native of Western Europe, though he have not the -same vivid impression of the strife, which, in so distant a land and -on so small a scale, brought a new nation to life. This indeed was the -_great_ outcome of that war; but in its progress, Europe, India, and -the Sea had been the scenes of deeds of arms far more dazzling and at -times much nearer home than the obscure contest in America. In dramatic -effect nothing has exceeded the three-years siege of Gibraltar, -teeming as it did with exciting interest, fluctuating hopes and -fears, triumphant expectation and bitter disappointment. England from -her shores saw gathered in the Channel sixty-six French and Spanish -ships-of-the-line,—a force larger than had ever threatened her since -the days of the Great Armada, and before which her inferior numbers had -to fly, for the first time, to the shelter of her ports. Rodney and -Suffren had conducted sea campaigns, fought sea fights, and won sea -victories which stirred beyond the common the hearts of men in their -day, and which still stand conspicuous in the story of either navy. In -one respect above all, this war was distinguished; in the development, -on both sides, of naval power. Never since the days of De Ruyter and -Tourville had so close a balance of strength been seen upon the seas. -Never since the Peace of Versailles to our own day has there been such -an approach to equality between the parties to a sea war. - -The three maritime nations issued wearied from the strife, as did also -America; but the latter, though with many difficulties still to meet, -was vigorous in youth and unfettered by bad political traditions. The -colonists of yesterday were thoroughly fitted to retrieve their own -fortunes and those of their country; to use the boundless resources -which Divine Providence had made ready to their hands. It was quite -otherwise with France and Spain; while Great Britain, though untouched -with the seeds of decay that tainted her rivals, was weighed down with -a heavy feeling of overthrow, loss and humiliation, which for the -moment hid from her eyes the glory and wealth yet within her reach. -Colonial ambition was still at its loftiest height among the nations -of Europe, and she had lost her greatest, most powerful colony. Not -only the king and the lords, but the mass of the people had set their -hearts upon keeping America. Men of all classes had predicted ruin to -the Empire if it parted with such a possession; and now they had lost -it, wrung from them after a bitter struggle, in which their old enemies -had overborne them on the field they called their own, the Sea. The Sea -Power of Great Britain had been unequal to the task laid upon it, and -so America was gone. A less resolute people might have lost hope. - -If the triumph of France and Spain was proportionate to their -rival's loss, this was no true measure of their gains, nor of the -relative positions of the three in the years after the war. American -Independence profited neither France nor Spain. The latter had indeed -won back the Floridas and Minorca; but she had utterly failed before -Gibraltar, and Jamaica had not even been attacked. Minorca, as Nelson -afterwards said, was always England's when she wanted it. It belonged -not to this power or that, but to the nation that controlled the -sea; so England retook it in 1798, when her fleets again entered the -Mediterranean. France had gained even less than Spain. Her trading -posts in India had been restored; but they, even more than Minorca, -were defenceless unless in free communication with and supported by the -sea power of the mother-country. In the West Indies she returned to -Great Britain more than the latter did to her. "France," says a French -historian, "had accomplished the duties of her providential mission" -(in freeing America); "her moral interests, the interests of her glory -and of her ideas were satisfied. The interests of her material power -had been badly defended by her government; the only solid advantage she -had obtained was depriving England of Minorca, that curb on Toulon, far -more dangerous to us when in their hands than is Gibraltar."[1] - -Unfortunately at this moment France was far richer in ideas, moral -and political, and in renown, than in solid power. The increasing -embarrassment of the Treasury forced her to stay her hand, and to yield -to her rival terms of peace utterly beyond what the seeming strength -of either side justified. The French navy had reaped glory in the five -years of war; not so much, nearly, as French writers claim for it, -but still it had done well, and the long contest must have increased -the efficiency of its officers along with their growing experience. A -little more time only was wanted for France, allied to Spain, to gain -lasting results as well as passing fame. This time poverty refused her. - -Spain, as for centuries back, still depended for her income almost -wholly upon her treasure ships from America. Always risked by war, -this supply became more than doubtful when the undisputed control of -the sea passed to an enemy. The policy of Spain, as to peace or war, -was therefore tied fast to that of France, without whose navy her -shipping lay at England's mercy; and, though the national pride clung -obstinately to its claim for Gibraltar, it was forced to give way. - -Great Britain alone, after all her losses, rested on a solid foundation -of strength. The American contest by itself had cost her nearly -£100,000,000, and rather more than that amount had during the war -been added to the national debt; but two years later this had ceased -to increase, and soon the income of the State was greater than the -outgo. Before the end of 1783, the second William Pitt, then a young -man of twenty-four, became prime minister. With genius and aims -specially fitted to the restorative duties of a time of peace, the -first of British finance ministers in the opinion of Mr. Gladstone,[2] -he bent his great powers to fostering the commerce and wealth of the -British people. With firm but skilful hand he removed, as far as the -prejudices of the day would permit and in the face of much opposition, -the fetters, forged by a mistaken policy, that hampered the trade -of the Empire. Promoting the exchange of goods with other nations, -simplifying the collection of taxes and the revenue, he added at once -to the wealth of the people and to the income of the State. Although -very small in amount, as compared with the enormous figures of later -years, the exports and imports of Great Britain increased over fifty -per cent between the years 1784 and 1792. Even with the lately severed -colonies of North America the same rate of gain, as compared with the -trade before the war, held good; while with the old enemy of his father -and of England, with France, there was concluded in 1786 a treaty of -commerce which was exceedingly liberal for those days, and will, it -is said, bear a favorable comparison with any former or subsequent -treaty between the two countries. "In the course of little more than -three years from Mr. Pitt's acceptance of office as First Lord of the -Treasury," says the eulogist of his distinguished rival, Fox, "great -commercial and financial reforms had been effected.... The nation -overcoming its difficulties, and rising buoyant from depression, began -rapidly to increase its wealth, to revive its spirit, and renew its -strength."[3] - -Such was the home condition of the British people; but fully to -appreciate the advantageous position to which it was rising, in -preparation for the great conflict still unforeseen, it must be -remembered that all things worked together to centre and retain the -political executive power in the hands of Pitt. The feelings of the -king, then a very real force in the nation; the confidence of the -people, given to his father's son and fixed by the wisdom of his -own conduct and the growth of the moneyed prosperity so dear to the -British heart; the personal character of his only rival in ability,—all -combined to commit the political guidance of the State to one man at -the great crisis when such unity of action was essential to strength. -Whether the great peace minister was equal to the wisest direction of -war has been questioned, and has been denied. Certainly it was not -the office he himself would have chosen; but it was a great gain for -England that she was at this time able to give herself wholly to a -single leader. He took office with a minority of one hundred in the -House of Commons, held it for two months constantly out-voted, and then -dissolving Parliament appealed to the country. The election gave him a -majority of over a hundred,—a foretaste of the unwavering support he -received from the representatives of the people during the early and -critical years of the French Revolution, when the yet fluid opinions -of the nation were gradually being cast and hardened into that set -conviction and determination characteristic of the race. - -How different the state of France is well known. The hopeless -embarrassment of the finances, hopeless at least under the political -and social conditions, the rapid succession of ministers, each sinking -deeper in entanglements, the weak character of the king, the conflict -of opinions, the lack of sympathy between classes, all tending to the -assembling of the Notables in February, 1787, and the yet more pregnant -meeting of the States General, May 4, 1789, which was the beginning of -the end. France was moneyless and leaderless. - -But while the Western countries of Europe were by these circumstances -disposed or constrained to wish for the continuance of peace, -restlessness showed itself in other quarters and in ways which, from -the close relations of the European States, disquieted the political -atmosphere. The Austrian Netherlands and Holland, Poland and Turkey, -the Black Sea and the Baltic, became the scene of diplomatic intrigues -and of conflicts, which, while they did not involve the great Western -Powers in actual war, caused them anxiety and necessitated action. - -The Empress-Queen of Austria and Hungary, Maria Theresa, had died in -1780. Her son, the Emperor Joseph II., came to the throne in the prime -of life, and with his head full of schemes for changing and bettering -the condition of his dominions. In 1781, the weakness of Holland being -plainly shown by her conduct of the war with Great Britain, and the -other countries having their hands too full to interfere, he demanded -and received the surrender of the fortified towns in the Austrian -Netherlands; which, under the name of the "barrier towns," had been -held and garrisoned by Holland since the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, as a -bridle upon the ambition of France. At the same time the circumstances -of the great maritime contest, which during the American Revolution -covered all the seas of Europe, impelled every neutral nation having -a seaboard to compete for the carrying trade. Holland for a time had -shared this profit with the nations of the North; but when Great -Britain, rightly or wrongly, forced her into war, the trade which had -been carried on through Holland and her great rivers reaching into the -heart of Germany, being denied its natural channel, sought a new one -through the Austrian Netherlands by the port of Ostend. The growth -of the latter, like that of Nassau during the Civil War in the United -States, was forced and unhealthy,—due not to natural advantages but -to morbid conditions; but it fostered the already strong wish of the -emperor for a sea power which no other part of his dominions could give. - -This movement of Belgian commerce was accelerated by the disappearance -of the British carrying trade. As in the days of Louis XIV., before he -had laid up his ships-of-the-line, so in the American War the cruisers -and privateers of the allies, supported by the action of the combined -fleets occupying the British navy, preyed ravenously on British -shipping. In the days of the elder Pitt it had been said that commerce -was made to live and thrive by war; but then the French great fleets -had left the sea, and British armed ships protected trade and oppressed -the enemy's cruisers. Between 1778 and 1783 Great Britain was fully -engaged on every sea, opposing the combined fleets and protecting as -far as she could her colonies. "This untoward state of things reduced -the English merchants to difficulties and distresses, with respect to -the means of carrying on their trade, which they had never experienced -in any other war. Foreign vessels were used for the conveyance of -their goods, and the protection of a foreign flag for the first time -sought by Englishmen."[4] The writer forgot the days of Jean Bart, -Duguay-Trouin, and Forbin; we may profitably note that like conditions -lead to like results. - -Thus, while America was struggling for life, and the contests of -England, France, and Spain were heard in all quarters of the world, -Netherland ships showed abroad on every sea the flag of an inland -empire, and Ostend grew merrily; but if the petty port and narrow -limits thus throve, how should the emperor bear to see the great city -of Antwerp, with its noble river and its proud commercial record, -shut up from the sea as it had been since the Treaty of Westphalia? -His discontent was deep and instant; but it was the misfortune of -this prince that he took in hand more than his own capacity and the -extent of his estates would let him complete. His attention being for -the moment diverted to southeastern Europe, where Austria and Russia -were then acting in diplomatic concert against the Porte, the question -of Antwerp was dropped. Before it could be resumed, the Peace of -Versailles had left Great Britain, France, and Holland—all so vitally -interested in whatever concerned Belgium—free, though loath, to enter -into a new contention. Matters having been for the time arranged with -Turkey, the emperor again in 1784 renewed his demands, alleging, after -the manner of statesmen, several collateral grievances, but on the -main issue saying roundly that "the entire and free navigation of the -Scheldt from Antwerp to the sea was a _sine qua non_" to any agreement. - -The arguments—commercial, political, or founded on treaty—which were -in this instance urged for or against the natural claim of a country -to use a river passing through its own territory, to the sea that -washes its shores, are not here in question; but it is important to -analyze the far-reaching interests at stake, to note the bearing of -this dispute upon them and so upon the general diplomacy of Europe, -and thereby trace its intimate connection with that Sea Power whose -influence upon the course of history at this period it is our aim -to weigh. Though modified in expression by passing events, and even -at times superficially reversed, like natural currents checked and -dammed by contrary winds, these underlying tendencies—being dependent -upon permanent causes—did not cease to exist during the storm of the -Revolution. Ever ready to resume their course when the momentary -opposition was removed, the appreciation of them serves to explain -apparent contradictions, produced by the conflicts between transient -necessity and enduring interests. - -From that great centre of the world's commerce where the Scheldt, -the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Thames meet in the North Sea, near the -Straits of Dover, there then parted two principal lines of trade -passing through European waters,—through seas, that is, along whose -shores were planted many different powers, foreign and possibly hostile -to each other. Of these two lines, one ended in the Baltic; the other, -after skirting the coasts of France and the Spanish peninsula and -running the gantlet of the Barbary corsairs, ended in the Levant or -Turkish Seas. The great Empire of Russia, which only made itself felt -in the sphere of European politics after the Treaty of Utrecht, in -1713, had since then been moving forward not only its centre, which -bore upon the continent of Europe, but also both its wings; one of -which touched and overshadowed the Baltic on the North, while the -other, through a steady course of pressure and encroachment upon the -Turks, had now reached the Black Sea. This advance had been aided by -the fixedness with which France and England, through their ancient -rivalry and their colonial ambitions, had kept their eyes set upon each -other and beyond the Atlantic; but the Peace of Versailles forced the -combatants to pause, and gave them time to see other interests, which -had been overlooked through the long series of wars waged, between 1739 -and 1783, over commerce and colonies. It was then realized that not -only had Russia, in the past half-century, advanced her lines by the -partition of Poland and by taking from Sweden several provinces on the -Baltic, but also that she had so added to her influence upon the Black -Sea and over the Turkish Empire by successive aggressions, wresting -bits of territory and establishing claims of interference in behalf of -Turkish subjects, as to make her practical supremacy in Eastern waters -a possibility of the future. - -The Western Question, as it may fitly be called, had been settled by -the birth of a new nation, destined to greatness and preponderance in -the western hemisphere; the Eastern Question, phrase now so familiar, -soon loomed on the horizon. Was it to receive a like solution? Was -a great nation, already close to the spot, to win a position of -exceptional advantage for dominating in eastern waters as America must -do in western? for it must be remembered that, although the Levant was -then only the end of a European trade route, both the history of the -past and the well understood possibilities of the future pointed to -it as one of the greatest centres of commerce, and therefore of human -interest and political influence, in the world. The Levant and Egypt -had then, and still keep, the same interest that is now being felt in -the Isthmus of Panama and the Caribbean; and it is hard to imagine -a more threatening condition of naval power than the possession of -the Black Sea and its impregnable entrance, by a vigorous nation, so -close to the Eastern highway of the world. The position in 1783 was -the more dangerous from the close alliance and respective abilities -of the rulers of Austria and Russia; the cool-headed and experienced -Catharine, through her influence on her weaker colleague, directing the -resources of both empires in a path most favorable to Russia. - -The tendency of Russian growth, and the historic events which marked -its progress, were, of course, well enough known in England long -before; but there is a difference between knowing facts and realizing -their full meaning. Circumstances alter cases; and men's minds, when -strongly bent one way, do not heed what is passing elsewhere. Hence, -in 1785, we find the attitude of Great Britain toward Russia very -different from that of fifteen years earlier, when the empress and -the Porte were at war. In 1770, British officers commanded Russian -fleets and ships, and a British admiral had leave to take a place -in the Russian Admiralty, with the promise of his home rank being -restored to him. The Czarina sent a fleet of twenty sail-of-the-line -from the Baltic to the Levant. They stopped and refitted in Spithead; -Russian soldiers were landed and camped ashore to refresh themselves; -English sergeants of marines were employed to drill them; a Russian -eighty-gun ship, flying the flag of an Anglo-Russian admiral, was -docked in Portsmouth and cut down to improve her sailing qualities. -Thus comforted and strengthened they sailed for the Mediterranean; -and, receiving further damage from the poor seamanship of their crews, -they were again fitted at Port Mahon,—then an English dockyard,—for -action in the Levant.[5] When, among the hard knocks of the two -following years, the Russians destroyed a Turkish fleet of fifteen -ships-of-the-line in a port of Asia Minor, British lieutenants -commanded the fire-ships, and a British commodore the covering squadron. - -To us now, with our remembrance of Kars and Silistria, of the Crimea -and Hobart Pasha, of Cyprus and Besika Bay, these things seem like a -dream; and the more so, that the Mediterranean powers of the earlier -day viewed the Russian approach with ill-concealed mistrust, and laid -severe restrictions upon the use of their ports. But Turkey then, -though a good friend to Great Britain, was a yet better friend to -France; the Turkish alliance had been useful to the latter country by -making diversion in her wars with Austria, Great Britain's natural -ally; the French were the favored nation by Turkish commercial -treaties, and a naval war in eastern waters could not but be injurious -to their commerce. Difficulties about trade might even bring about a -collision between France and Russia, which at least could do no harm -to Great Britain at a time when her rival was known to be steadily -building up her navy with a view to revenge past defeats; just as now -she is thought to be looking for a day of reckoning with Germany. -The Baltic trade was also of immense value, and the friendship of -Russia was necessary thereto. Altogether, in 1770, the Russian nation, -notwithstanding the French leanings of the Czarina, was, upon the -whole, the friend of Great Britain's friends, and the opponent of -her enemies,—especially of the one traditional, or, as even generous -Englishmen used to say, the _natural_ enemy, France. Russia bore -especially against Sweden, Poland, and Turkey; and these it was the -consistent aim of the best school of French statesmen to court and -strengthen. - -But in 1785 a great change had taken place. The war of 1770 had planted -Russia firmly on the Black Sea. The treaty of Kainardji in 1774 -admitted her trade freely to the Mediterranean,—a privilege which other -trading nations, in the narrow spirit of the day, considered their own -loss. Russian frigates had entered the Dardanelles on their way to the -Black Sea; and though the Porte, terrified at the consequences of its -action, stopped them at Constantinople, the move was none the less -significant. Then there had come, in 1774, the partition of Poland, -universally condemned as unrighteous and dangerous to the balance of -power, though submitted to by the other States. If Great Britain, -though restless over this, saw still some compensation in the injury -done to France by the weakening of her allies, and hugged herself with -the belief that her insular position made the continental balance of -less moment, she had had a severe reminder of Russia's growing strength -and power to injure, in the Armed Neutrality of 1780. This unfriendly -blow, aimed by a State she had looked upon as almost a natural ally, -which she had so greatly helped but ten years before, and which had now -chosen the moment of her direst straits to attack what she considered -her maritime rights, probably completed the alienation, and opened -the eyes of British statesmen to the new danger with which they were -threatened by the position of Russia upon the Baltic and close to the -Mediterranean. - -France, also, had little less interest than England in this condition -of things, and certainly felt no less. From the days of Henry IV. and -Colbert, and even before, she had looked upon the Levant as peculiarly -her own field, the home of a faithful ally, and the seat of a lucrative -trade which was almost monopolized by her. Although so far foiled in -India, she had not yet lost her hopes of overcoming and replacing the -British hold upon that land of fabled wealth, and she understood the -important bearing of the Levant and Egypt upon the security of tenure -there. It need not then surprise us, in the great maritime war which we -are approaching, to find Napoleon—for all his greatness, the child of -his generation—amid all the glory and bewildering rush of his famous -Italian campaign, planning conquest in Egypt and the East, and Nelson, -that personification of the British sea power of his day, fighting -his two most brilliant battles in the Levant and in the Baltic. Nor -will we be unprepared to see an importance equal to that of Gibraltar -and Mahon in former days, now attached to points like Malta, Corfu, -Taranto, Brindisi, as well as to Sicily and Egypt, by the statesmen, -generals, and admirals, whose counsels directed the military efforts of -the belligerents. Many of these points had heretofore lain out of the -field of action of the Western Powers, but the rising Eastern Question -was bringing them forward. - -Nor was it in the Levant alone that questions vitally affecting the -rival States awaited solution. The trade interests of the Baltic, as -the outlet through which great rivers and the products of immense -regions found their way to the world beyond, made its control also -an object of importance to both the chief parties in the coming -struggle,—to Great Britain who strove to drive her enemy off the sea, -and to France who wished to shut out hers from the land. But, besides -its commercial importance, the secluded character of the sea, the -difficulty of the approach,—aggravated by the severe climate,—and the -immense preponderance in strength of Russia over Sweden and Denmark, -made always possible an armed combination such as that of 1780, which -was in fact renewed in 1800, seriously threatening the naval supremacy -of Great Britain. Such a coalition it was vital to the latter to -prevent, and most desirable to her enemy to effect. If formed, it -was a nucleus around which readily gathered all other malcontents, -dissatisfied with the harsh and overbearing manner in which the great -Sea Power enforced what she considered her rights over neutral ships. - -The nearness of England to the Baltic made it unnecessary to have naval -stations on the way for the repair or shelter of her shipping, but -it was most undesirable that the ports and resources of Holland and -Belgium, lying close on the flank of the route, and doubly strong in -the formidable outworks of shoals and intricate navigation with which -nature had protected them, should be under the control of a great -hostile power. Jean Bart, and his fellow-privateersmen of a hundred -years before, had shown the danger to British shipping from even the -third-rate port of Dunkirk, so situated. Where Dunkirk sent squadrons -of frigates, Antwerp could send fleets of ships-of-the-line. The -appearance of Russia, therefore, and her predominance on the Baltic, -made weightier still the interest in the political condition of the -Low Countries which, for generations past, Great Britain had felt on -account of her commercial relations with them, and through them with -Germany; an interest hitherto aroused mainly by the ambition of France -to control their policy, if not actually to possess herself of a large -part of their territory. She had to fear that which was realized under -Napoleon,—the conversion of Antwerp into a great naval station, with -free access to the sea, and the control of its resources and those of -the United Provinces by a strong and able enemy. - -Great Britain, therefore, had in 1781 seen with just apprehension the -aggressive attitude of Joseph II. toward the Dutch, and the fall of -the "barrier towns." It is true that these fortresses had ceased to -afford much protection to Holland, owing to her military decline, but -the event emphasized her exposure to France; while the power of Austria -to defend her own provinces, or the Dutch, was notoriously less than -that of France to attack, owing to the relative distance of the two -from the scene, and the danger to troops, on the march from Austria, of -being assailed in flank from the French frontier. Now, again, in 1784, -she was forced to look with anxiety—less on account of Austria than -of France—upon this raising of the question of the Scheldt. There was -little cause to fear Austria becoming a great sea power now, when she -had held the Netherlands three fourths of a century without becoming -such; but there was good reason to dread that the movements in progress -might result in increasing her rival's sea power and influence—perhaps -even her territory—in the Low Countries. All these things did come to -pass, though not under the dying monarchy. - -It may be presumed that the wise Catharine of Russia, without in the -least foreseeing the approaching French convulsion which shook her -plans as well as those of other European rulers, realized the true -relations between her country and the Western powers, when she so -heartily supported the emperor in his claim for the free navigation -of the Scheldt. There was no likelihood then, as there is little -likelihood now, that Great Britain and France would act together in -the Eastern Question, then too new to outweigh former prejudices or to -unite old enemies. If the contention of Austria were successful, Russia -would secure a friendly port in a region naturally hostile to her -pretensions. If unsuccessful, as things then looked, the result would -probably be the extension of French influence in the Netherlands and in -the United Provinces; and French gain there meant gain of sea power, -with proportionate loss of the same to Great Britain. The empress -could still reckon on their mutual antagonism; while the British navy, -and the way in which it was used in war, were more serious dangers to -Russia than the French armies. Whatever her reasoning, there is no -doubt that at this time her policy was drawing closer to France. The -French ministers in the East mediated between her and the Sultan in the -unceasing disputes arising from the treaty of Kainardji. A commercial -treaty on most favorable terms was concluded with France, while that -with Great Britain was allowed to lapse, and its renewal was refused -during many years. - -Such were the ambitions and the weighty solicitudes, well understood -on all hands, which, during the eight years succeeding the emperor's -demand for the opening of the Scheldt, underlay and guided the main -tendencies of European policy, and continued so to do during the -revolutionary wars. The separate events which group themselves round -these leading outlines, up to the outbreak of war in 1793, can only be -hastily sketched. - -Notwithstanding the close family relationship between Louis XVI. and -the emperor, the French government looked coldly upon the latter's -action in the matter of the Scheldt. The long-standing struggle in the -United Provinces between partisans of Great Britain and France was -just now marked by the preponderance of the latter, and, consequently, -of French influence. As Austria seemed resolved to enforce her claims -by war, the king first offered his mediation, and, when that was -unavailing, told the emperor he would interpose by arms. His troops -were accordingly massed on the Belgian frontier. It was understood that -the king of Prussia, who was brother-in-law to the stadtholder, would -act with France. Russia, on the other hand, proclaimed her intention -to support Austria. Sweden, as the enemy of Russia, began to put ships -in commission and enlist soldiers; while from Constantinople came a -report that, if war began, the sultan also would improve so good an -opportunity of regaining what he had lately lost. While the quarrel -about the Scheldt was thus causing complications in all quarters, an -incident occurred upon the chief scene of trouble, which under such -conditions might well have precipitated a general war. An Austrian brig -was ordered to sail from Antwerp to the sea, to test the intentions of -Holland. Upon passing the boundary she was fired upon and brought to by -a Dutch armed ship. This happened on the 8th of October, 1784. - -Yet after all war did not come, owing to Joseph's volatile attention -being again drawn from the matter immediately in hand. He proposed to -the elector of Bavaria to take the Netherlands in exchange for his -electorate. This transfer, which by concentrating the possessions of -Austria would greatly have increased her weight in the Empire, was -resisted by the whole Germanic body with Frederic the Great at its -head. It therefore came to naught; but the slackening of the emperor's -interest in his Scheldt scheme promoted, under French auspices, a -peaceful arrangement; which, while involving mutual concessions, left -the real question substantially untouched. Its solution was not reached -until the storm of the Revolution swept city and river into the arms -of the French republic. This compromise was shortly followed by a -treaty of the closest alliance between France and the United Provinces, -engaging them to mutual support in case of war, fixing the amount of -armed ships or men to be furnished, and promising the most intimate -co-operation in their dealings with other States. This agreement, -which, as far as compacts could, established French preponderance in -the councils of Holland, was ratified on Christmas Day, 1785. - -This treaty gave rise to serious and regretful consideration in -Great Britain; but the growing financial embarrassment and internal -disturbance of France were rapidly neutralizing her external -exertions. The following years were marked by new combinations and -alliances among States. In 1786 Frederic the Great's death took away -an important element in European politics. The quarrel between the -two factions in Holland had reached the verge of civil war, when an -insult offered by the French party to the wife of the stadtholder, -sister to the new king of Prussia, led to an armed interference by -this sovereign. In October, 1787, Prussian troops occupied Amsterdam -and restored to the stadtholder privileges that had been taken from -him. Even France had strongly condemned the act of those who had -arrested the princess, and advised ample satisfaction to be given; -but, nevertheless, when the French party appealed for aid against the -Prussian intervention, she prepared to give it and notified her purpose -to Great Britain. The latter, glad again to assert her own influence, -replied that she could not remain a quiet spectator, issued immediate -orders for augmenting her forces by sea and land, and contracted -with Hesse for the supply of twelve thousand troops upon demand. The -rapid success of the Prussians prevented any collision; but Great -Britain had the gratification, and France the mortification, of seeing -re-established the party favorable to the former. - -In February, 1787, the Assembly of Notables, which had not met since -1626, was opened by Louis XVI. at Versailles. But the most striking -event of this year was the declaration of war against Russia by Turkey, -which determined no longer to wait until its enemy was ready before -engaging in an inevitable conflict. The Turkish manifesto was sent -forth August 24; Russia replied on the 13th of September. - -The emperor, as the ally of Russia, declared war against Turkey on the -10th of February, 1788. Operations were carried on by the Austrians -around Belgrade and on the Danube. The Russians, bent on extending -their power on the Black Sea, invested Oczakow at the mouth and on the -right bank of the Dnieper,—Kinburn on the left side having already been -ceded to them by the treaty of Kainardji. The czarina also decided -to renew in the Mediterranean the diversion of 1770, again sending -ships from the Baltic. When the distance and inconvenience of this -operation, combined with the entire lack of any naval station in the -Mediterranean, are considered in connection with the close proximity of -Russia to that sea in mere miles, there will be felt most forcibly her -tantalizing position with reference to commerce and sea power, to whose -importance she has been keenly alive and to which she has ever aspired -since the days of Peter the Great. It is difficult to understand how -Russia can be quiet until she has secured an access to the sea not -dependent upon the good-will of any other State. - -Notwithstanding the many causes of displeasure she had given to Great -Britain, Catharine went on with her arrangements as though assured of -the good-will and help before received. Pilot boats were engaged to -meet the ships in British waters, and take them to British dockyards. -Under her orders, British merchants chartered eighteen large ships to -convey artillery and stores after the fleet. All these arrangements -were quietly frustrated by Pitt's ministry, which forbade seamen to -serve in any foreign ships; and, upon the ground that the nation was to -be strictly neutral, made the contractors renounce their engagements. -Catharine then turned to Holland, which also refused aid, pleading the -same purpose of neutrality. This concert of action between the two -maritime States forced Russia to abandon so distant an expedition and -illustrated the advantage she would have obtained from the emperor's -claim to the Scheldt. It was at this time that the celebrated Paul -Jones, who had distinguished himself by his desperate courage in the -American Revolutionary War, took service in the Russian Navy and was -given a high command; but his appointment so offended the British -officers already serving in the fleet, whom their government had -foreborne to recall, that they at once resigned. The Russians could -not afford to lose so many capable men, and Jones was transferred from -the Baltic to the Black Sea. - -Soon a fourth State took part in the contest. On the 21st of June, -1788, Sweden advanced her troops into Russian Finland, and on the 30th -war against her was declared by Russia. It now proved fortunate for -the latter that she had not been able to get her fleet away from the -Baltic. The fighting on land was there mainly confined to the north -coast of the Gulf of Finland, while in the waters of the Gulf several -very severe actions took place. These battles were fought not only -between ships-of-the-line of the usual type, but by large flotillas of -gunboats and galleys, and were attended with a loss of life unusual in -naval actions. - -War being now in full swing throughout the East, Great Britain and -Prussia drew together in a defensive treaty, and were joined by Holland -also, under the new lease of power of the stadtholder and British -party. The quota of troops or ships to be furnished in case of need by -each State was stipulated. The allies soon had occasion to act in favor -of one of the belligerents. Denmark, the hereditary enemy of Sweden, -and now in alliance with Russia, took this opportunity to invade the -former country from Norway, then attached to the Danish crown. On -September 24, 1788, twelve thousand Danish troops crossed the frontier -and advanced upon Gottenburg, which was on the point of surrendering -when the sudden and unexpected arrival of the king, in person and -alone, prevented. There was not, however, force enough to save the -town, had not Great Britain and Prussia interfered. The British -minister at Copenhagen passed over hastily into Gottenburg, induced the -Swedish king to accept the mediation of the two governments, and then -notified the Danish commander that, if the invasion of Sweden was not -stopped, Denmark would be by them attacked. The peremptory tone held -by the minister swept away the flimsy pretext that the Danish corps -was only an auxiliary, furnished to Russia in accordance with existing -treaty, and therefore really a Russian force. There was nothing left -for Denmark but to recede; an armistice was signed at once and a month -later her troops were withdrawn. - -The true significance of the alliance between the two Western Powers, -to which Holland was accessory, is markedly shown by this action, -which, while ostensibly friendly to Sweden, was really hostile to -Russia and a diversion in favor of the sultan. Great Britain and -Prussia, in consequence of the growing strength and influence of Russia -in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Continent, and to check her -progress, followed what was then considered to be the natural policy -of France, induced by ties and traditions long antedating the existing -state of things in Europe. Sweden then, and Turkey later, traditional -allies of France, and in so far in the opposite scale of the balance -from Great Britain, were to be supported by the demonstration—and if -need were by the employment—of force. This was done, not because France -was as yet less dreaded, but because Russia had become so much more -formidable. It was again the coming Eastern Question in which, from -the very distance of the central scene of action from Western Europe, -and from the character of the interests and of the strategic points -involved, Sea Power, represented chiefly by the maritime strength and -colonial expansion of Great Britain, was to play the leading and most -decisive part. It was the dawning of the day, whose noon the nineteenth -century has not yet seen, during which Nelson and Napoleon, Mohammed -Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, the Sultan Mahmoud and the Czar Nicholas, -Napier, Stopford, and Lalande in 1840, the heroes of Kars, Silistria, -and the Crimea, and of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, were to play -their parts upon the scene. - -But in the years after the Peace of Versailles this was a new -question, upon which opinions were unformed. It was true that, to quote -from a contemporary writer, "England had had full leisure to ruminate -upon, and sufficient cause to reprobate, that absurd and blind policy, -under the influence of which she had drawn an uncertain ally, and an -ever-to-be-suspected friend, from the bottom of the Bothnic Gulf to -establish a new naval empire in the Mediterranean and Archipelago."[6] -These meditations had not been fruitless, as was seen by the consistent -attitude of Pitt's ministry at this time; but on the other hand, when -it was proposed in 1791 to increase the naval force in commission, -in order "to add weight to the representations"[7] being made by the -allies to the belligerents,—in order, in other words, to support Turkey -by an armed demonstration,—Fox, the leader of the Whigs, said that "an -alliance with Russia appeared to him the most natural and advantageous -that we could possibly form;"[8] while Burke, than whom no man had a -juster reputation for political wisdom, observed that "the considering -the Turkish Empire as any part of the balance of power in Europe was -new. The principles of alliance and the doctrines drawn from thence -were entirely new. Russia was our natural ally and the most useful ally -we had in a commercial sense."[9] That these distinguished members -of the opposition represented the feelings of many supporters of the -ministry was shown by a diminished majority, 93, in the vote that -followed. The opposition, thus encouraged, then introduced a series -of resolutions, the gist of which lay in these words: "The interests -of Great Britain are not likely to be affected by the progress of the -Russian arms on the borders of the Black Sea."[10] In the vote on this, -the minister's majority again fell to eighty, despite the arguments -of those who asserted that "the possession of Oczakow by the empress -would facilitate not only the acquisition of Constantinople, but of all -lower Egypt and Alexandria; which would give to Russia the supremacy in -the Mediterranean, and render her a formidable rival to us both as a -maritime and commercial power." After making every allowance for party -spirit, it is evident that British feeling was only slowly turning into -the channels in which it has since run so strongly. - -France, under the pressure of her inward troubles, was debarred from -taking part with her old allies in the East, and withdrew more and more -from all outward action. On the 8th of August, 1788, the king fixed the -1st of May, 1789, as the day for the meeting of the States General; -and in November the Notables met for the second time, to consider the -constitution and mode of procedure in that body, the representation in -it of the Third Estate, and the vote by orders. They were adjourned -after a month's session; and the court, contrary to the judgment of the -majority among them, proclaimed on the 27th of December, 1788, that the -representatives of the Third Estate should equal in number those of -the two others combined. No decision was given as to whether the votes -should be individual, or by orders. - -Oczakow was taken by the Russians on the 17th of December, 1788, -and during the following year the Eastern war raged violently both -in the Baltic and in southeastern Europe. Turkey was everywhere -worsted. Belgrade was taken on the 8th of October by the Austrians, -who afterwards occupied Bucharest and advanced as far as Orsova. The -Russians reduced Galatz, Bender, and other places. Besides losing -territory, the Turks were defeated in several pitched battles. The -conduct of the war on their part was much affected by the death of the -reigning sultan. - -The Swedish war was in its results unimportant, except as a diversion -in favor of Turkey. To keep it up as such, subsidies were sent from -Constantinople to Stockholm. Great Britain and Prussia were obliged -again to threaten Denmark, in 1789, to keep her from aiding Russia. -The British minister, speaking for both States, expressed their -fixed determination to maintain the balance of power in the North. A -defensive alliance was then formed between Russia and Austria on the -one hand, and France and Spain on the other. The Bourbon kingdoms -pledged themselves to a strict neutrality in the Eastern War as it then -existed; but if Russia or Austria were attacked by any other State, -they were to be helped,—Austria, by an army of sixty thousand men; -Russia, by a fleet of sixteen ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates. -The latter provision shows both the kind of attack feared by Russia and -the direction of her ambition. - -On the 4th of May of this year, 1789, the States General met at -Versailles, and the French Revolution thenceforth went on apace. The -Bastille was stormed July 14th. In October the royal family were -brought forcibly from Versailles to Paris by the mob. The earlier -events of the Revolution will hereafter be summarily related by -themselves, before going on with the war to which they led. It will -here be enough to say that the voice of France was now silent outside -her own borders. - -In 1790 the Eastern War was practically brought to an end. On the 31st -of January a very close treaty of alliance was made between Prussia -and the Porte,—the king binding himself to declare war at a set time -against both Russia and Austria. The emperor died in February, and -was succeeded by his brother Leopold, who was disposed to peace. A -convention was soon after held, at which sat ministers of Austria, -Prussia, Great Britain, and the United Provinces; the two latter acting -as mediators because Prussia had taken such a pronounced attitude of -hostility to Austria. A treaty was signed July 27, by which the emperor -renounced his alliance with Russia. On September 20, he agreed to an -armistice with Turkey; which, after long negotiation, was followed by -a definitive peace, concluded August 4, 1791. - -The Russian conflict with Turkey languished during the summer of 1790. -Active operations began in October, and continued during a season whose -severities the Russian could bear better than the Turk. The final blow -of the campaign and of the war was the taking of Ismail by Suwarrow, a -deed of arms so tremendous and full of horrors that a brief account of -its circumstances is allowable even to our subject. - -The town, which was looked on as the key of the lower Danube, was -surrounded by three lines of wall, each with its proper ditch, and -contained a garrison of thirteen thousand. Its population, besides -the troops, was about thirty thousand. Owing to the season, December, -Suwarrow determined not to attempt a regular siege, but to carry the -place by assault, at any cost of life. Batteries were consequently put -up in every available place, and as rapidly as possible, in order to -prepare for and cover the attack. At five o'clock Christmas morning -they all opened together, and, after a furious cannonade of two hours, -the Russians moved forward in eight columns. After a three hours -struggle the assailants were forced back; but Suwarrow, whose influence -over his soldiers was unbounded, ran to the front, and, planting a -Russian flag on one of the enemy's works, asked his men if they would -leave it behind them. Through his efforts and those of the officers, -the troops returned to the charge. The conflict, which must have -resolved itself into a multitude of hand-to-hand encounters, lasted -till midnight, when, after an eighteen hours fight, the third line of -defence was carried and resistance ceased, though bloodshed continued -through the night. It was computed at the time that thirty thousand -Turks, including women and children, and some twenty thousand Russian -soldiers died violent deaths during that Christmas day of 1790. Warlike -operations continued during the spring, but preliminaries of peace -between Russia and Turkey were signed at Galatz on the 11th of August, -1791. - -This put an end to hostilities throughout the East, peace having been -made between Russia and Sweden a year before, on August 11, 1790. The -time of attack had been well chosen by the Swedish king, and had public -opinion in Great Britain approached unanimity, a powerful lever would -have been put in her hands to break down the Russian attack on Turkey -by supporting the diversion in the North. The Russian and Swedish -fleets were so evenly balanced that a small British division would have -turned the scale, controlled the Baltic, and kept open the Swedish -communications from Finland to their own coast. So far, however, was -the nation from being of one mind that, as we have seen, the minister's -majority steadily fell, and he probably knew that among those who voted -straight, many were far from hearty in his support. Prussia also did -not back Sweden as she should have done, after definitely embracing -that policy, though she was both disconcerted and angered at the peace -for which she had not looked. This irresolution on the part of the -allied States limited their action to interposing between Sweden and -Denmark, and prevented the results which might reasonably have been -expected in the north, and yet more in the east of Europe; but it -does not take from the significance of their attitude, nor hide the -revolution in British statesmanship which marks the ten years now being -treated. - -The tendency thus indicated was suddenly, though only temporarily, -checked by the Revolution in France. The troubles that had been so long -fomenting in that country had, after a short and delusive period of -seeming repose, begun again at nearly the very moment that the Eastern -War was ending. This will be seen by bringing together the dates at -which were happening these weighty events in the East and West. - -It was on the 6th of October, 1789, that the king and royal family were -brought from Versailles to Paris, unwilling but constrained. After -this outbreak of popular feeling, comparative quiet continued through -the last months of 1789 and all of 1790, during which were fought in -the East the most important battles of the war, both in the Baltic -and on the Danube, including the bloody assault of Ismail. During -this time, however, Louis XVI. underwent many bitter mortifications, -either intended as such, or else unavoidably humiliating to his sense -of position. In June, 1791, he fled with his family from Paris to put -himself in the care of part of the army stationed in eastern France -under the Marquis de Bouillé and believed to be thoroughly trustworthy. -Before reaching his destination he was recognized, and brought back -to Paris a prisoner. The greeting of the royal family was significant -of the change that had passed over the people within a few years, and -which their unsuccessful flight had intensified. They were met by -perfect silence, while some distance ahead of them rode an officer -commanding the bystanders not to uncover. Despite the distrust it -felt, the Constituent Assembly went on with the work of framing a -constitution in which the king still had a recognized position, and -which he formally accepted on the 14th of September, 1791. During that -summer, peace was signed between Russia and Turkey, and a meeting was -had at Pilnitz between the emperor and the king of Prussia, after which -they put out their joint declaration that the situation in which the -king of France found himself was an object of common concern to all the -rulers of Europe; that "they hoped this common concern would lead them -to employ, in conjunction with the two declaring sovereigns, the most -efficacious means, relative to their forces, in order to enable the -king of France to consolidate in the most perfect liberty, the basis of -a monarchical government equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns -and the welfare of the French nation." The two princes ended by -stating their own readiness to join in such united action with the -force necessary to obtain the common end proposed, and that they would, -meanwhile, give orders to their troops to be ready to put themselves in -a state of activity. - -The close coincidence in date of the Declaration of Pilnitz, August -27, 1791, with the Peace of Galatz, signed August 11, is curious -enough for passing remark; the one formally opening the new channel of -European interest and action, while the other marked the close of the -old. The Declaration, however, was in the same line of effort that the -new emperor had for some time been following. It met with a somewhat -hesitating response. Russia and Sweden agreed to raise an army, which -Spain was to subsidize; but Great Britain, under Pitt, declined to -meddle in the internal affairs of another state. - -The first National or, as it is conveniently called, Constituent -Assembly, dissolved after framing a Constitution; and the following -day, October 1, 1791, the second Assembly, known as the Legislative, -came together. The Declaration of Pilnitz had strongly moved the -French people and increased, perhaps unjustly, their distrust of the -king. This change of temper was reflected in the Assembly. Strong -representations and arguments were exchanged between the ministers -of foreign affairs in Austria and France, through the ambassadors -at either court; but in truth there was no common ground of opinion -on which the new republic and the old empires could meet. The -movements on either side were viewed with studied suspicion, and war -was finally declared by France against Austria, April 20, 1792. The -first unimportant encounters were unfavorable to the French; but more -serious danger than that which threatened from without was arising -within France itself. The king and the Assembly came into collision -through the use by the former of his constitutional power of Veto. The -agitation spread to the streets. On the 20th of June a deputation from -the mob of Paris appeared before the Assembly, and asked permission -for the citizens outside to defile before it, as a demonstration of -their support. The extraordinary request was granted; and an immense -crowd pressed forward, of people of all ages, armed with weapons of -every kind, among which appeared a pike carrying the heart of a bull -labelled an "Aristocrat's heart." From the Assembly the crowd went to -the Louvre, and thence forced their way through the palace gates into -the king's presence. The unhappy Louis bore himself with calm courage, -to which perhaps he, at the moment, owed his life; but he submitted to -put on the symbolic red cap, and to drink to the nation from a bottle -handed him by a drunken rioter. - -Little was left in life for a king thus humbled, and his final -humiliation was close at hand. Prussia had not long delayed to act -in concert with the emperor, after France declared war. On July 26, -a month after the strange scene in the Tuileries, was issued an -exposition of her reasons for taking arms; and at the same time the -Duke of Brunswick, commander-in-chief of the allied armies, put forth a -proclamation to the French framed in such violent terms as to stir to -the utmost the angry passions of a frantic and excitable race. On the -10th of August the Paris mob again stormed the Tuileries, the king and -royal family fled for safety to the hall of the Legislature, the Swiss -Guards were killed and the palace gutted. The Assembly then decreed the -suspension of the king; and on the 13th of August the royal family was -removed to the Temple, the last home on earth for several of them. - -On the 2d of September occurred the butcheries known as the September -Massacres. To this date and this act is to be referred the great change -in British feeling toward the Revolution. On the 20th the battle of -Valmy, by some thought decisive of the fate of the Revolution, was won -by the French. Though being otherwise far from a battle of the first -importance, it led to the retreat of the allied forces and destroyed -for a time the hopes of the royalists. Two days after Valmy met the -third Assembly, the National Convention of terrible memory. Its first -act was to decree the abolition of royalty in France; but the power -that swayed the country was passing more and more to the mob of Paris, -expressing itself through the clubs of which the Jacobin is the best -known. The violence and fanaticism of the extreme republicans and of -the most brutal elements of the populace found ever louder voice. On -the 19th of November the Convention passed a decree declaring, "in -the name of the French nation, that they will grant fraternity and -assistance to all people who wish to recover their liberty; and they -charge the executive power to send the necessary orders to the generals -to give assistance to such people, and to defend those citizens who -have suffered, or may suffer, in the cause of liberty." It was denied -by the French diplomatists that there was any intention of favoring -insurrections or exciting disturbances in any friendly country; but -such intention is nevertheless fairly deducible from the words, and -when a motion was made to explain that they were not so meant, the -Convention refused to consider it. Mr. Fox, the ardent champion of -the Revolution in Parliament, spoke of this edict as an insult to the -British people. - -Meantime the battle of Valmy had been followed by that of Jemappes, -fought November 6. On the 14th the French army entered Brussels, and -the Austrian Netherlands were rapidly occupied. This was instantly -succeeded by a decree, dated November 16, opening the Scheldt, upon the -express ground of natural right; the boisterous young republic cutting -at one blow the knot which had refused to be untied by the weak hands -of Joseph II. Decided action followed, a French squadron entering the -river from the sea and forcing its way up, despite the protests of -the Dutch officers, in order to take part in the siege of Antwerp. -This was a new offence to the British Sea Power, which was yet further -angered by a decree of December 15, extending the French system to all -countries occupied by their armies. The words of this proclamation were -so sweeping that they could scarcely but seem, to those untouched with -the fiery passion of the Revolution, to threaten the destruction of all -existing social order. The British ministry on the last day of the year -1792 declared that "this government will never see with indifference -that France shall make herself, directly or indirectly, sovereign of -the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of -Europe."[11] - -While the Revolution was thus justifying the fears and accusations of -those who foretold that it could not confine itself to the overturn -of domestic institutions, but would seek to thrust its beliefs and -principles forcibly upon other nations, the leaders were hurrying on -the destruction of the king. Arraigned on the 11th of December, 1792, -Louis XVI. was brought to trial on the 26th, sentenced to death January -16, and executed January 21, 1793. This deed brought to a decided -issue the relations between France and Great Britain, which, from -an uncertain and unsatisfactory condition, had become more and more -embittered by the course of events ever since the November decree of -fraternity. As far back as August 10, when the king was suspended, the -British government had recalled its ambassador, who was not replaced; -and had persisted in attributing to the French minister in London an -ambiguous character, recognizing him only as accredited by the king who -had actually ceased to reign—by a government which in fact no longer -existed. Points of form were raised with exasperating, yet civil, -insolence, as to the position which M. Chauvelin, the minister in -question, actually occupied; and his office was not made more pleasant -by the failure of his own government to send him new credentials. -Papers written by him were returned by Lord Grenville, the foreign -minister, because his claim to represent the French republic was not -recognized; or, if accepted, they were only received as unofficial. - -The letters thus exchanged, under forms so unsatisfactory, were filled -with mutual accusations, and arguments marked by the brisk vivacity of -the one nation and the cool aggressiveness of the other; but starting -as they did from the differing bases of natural rights on the one hand, -and established institutions on the other, no agreement was approached. -The questions of the Scheldt, of the decree of fraternity, and of that -extending the French system to countries occupied by their armies, were -thus disputed back and forth; and to them were added the complaints -of France against an Alien Act, passed by Parliament, January 4, -1793, laying vexatious restrictions upon the movements of foreigners -arriving in Great Britain, or wishing to change their abode if already -resident. This act M. Chauvelin rightly believed to be specially aimed -at Frenchmen. It sprang from the growing apprehension and change of -feeling in England; a change emphasized by a break in the Parliamentary -Opposition, a large number of whom, in this same month of January, -1793, definitively took the step in which their great associate, Edmund -Burke, had preceded them, broke their party ties, and passed over to -the support of Pitt. The latter would seem to have become convinced -that war was inevitable; that the question was no longer whether a -nation should exercise a right of changing its institutions, but -whether a plague should be stamped out before it had passed its borders -and infected yet healthy peoples. - -Things had come to this state when news reached London of the death -sentence of the French king. M. Chauvelin had just received and -presented credentials from the republican government. On January 20, -the minister informed him that the king, under present circumstances, -did not think fit to receive them, adding the irritating words: "As -minister of the Most Christian King, you would have enjoyed all the -exemptions which the law grants to public ministers, recognized as -such; but as a private person you cannot but return to the general mass -of foreigners resident in England."[12] On the 24th of January, the -execution of Louis XVI. being now known, Lord Grenville wrote to him: -"The King can no longer, after such an event, permit your residence -here. His Majesty has thought fit to order that you should retire from -the kingdom within the space of eight days, and I herewith transmit -to you a copy of the order which His Majesty has given me to that -effect."[12] - -On the 1st of February, 1793, the French republic declared war against -Great Britain and Holland. It was already at war with Austria, Prussia -and Sardinia; while Russia and Sweden were avowedly unfriendly, and -Spain almost openly hostile. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -THE CONDITION OF THE NAVIES IN 1793—AND ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH NAVY. - - -Before following the narrative of directly warlike action, or -discussing the influence of the naval factor upon the military and -political events, it is proper to examine the relative position, -strength, and resources, of the rival nations, particularly in the -matter of Sea Power,—to weigh the chances of the struggle, as it -were, beforehand, from the known conditions,—to analyze and point out -certain reasons why the sea war took the turn it did, in order that the -experience of the past may be turned to the profit of the future. - -First of all, it must be recognized that the problem to be thus -resolved is by no means so simple as in most wars. It is not here a -mere question of the extent, population, and geographical position of a -country; of the number of its seamen, the tonnage of its shipping, the -strength of its armed fleet; nor yet again, chiefly of the wealth and -vigor of its colonies, the possession of good and well-placed maritime -bases in different parts of the world; not even, at first hand, of the -policy and character of its government, although it is undoubtedly -true that in the action of French governments is to be found the chief -reason for the utter disaster and overthrow which awaited the Sea Power -of France. It was because the government so faithfully and necessarily -reflected the social disorder, the crude and wild habits of thought -which it was powerless to check, that it was incapable of dealing with -the naval necessities of the day. The seamen and the navy of France -were swept away by the same current of thought and feeling which was -carrying before it the whole nation; and the government, tossed to and -fro by every wave of popular emotion, was at once too weak and too -ignorant of the needs of the service to repress principles and to amend -defects which were fatal to its healthy life. - -It is particularly instructive to dwell upon this phase of the -revolutionary convulsions of France, because the result in this -comparatively small, but still most important, part of the body politic -was so different from that which was found elsewhere. Whatever the -mistakes, the violence, the excesses of every kind, into which this -popular rising was betrayed, they were symptomatic of strength, not of -weakness,—deplorable accompaniments of a movement which, with all its -drawbacks, was marked by overwhelming force. - -It was the inability to realize the might in this outburst of popular -feeling, long pent up, that caused the mistaken forecasts of many -statesmen of the day; who judged of the power and reach of the movement -by indications—such as the finances, the condition of the army, the -quality of the known leaders—ordinarily fairly accurate tests of a -country's endurance, but which utterly misled those who looked to them -only and did not take into account the mighty impulse of a whole nation -stirred to its depths. Why, then, was the result so different in the -navy? Why was it so weak, not merely nor chiefly in quantity, but in -quality? and that, too, in days so nearly succeeding the prosperous -naval era of Louis XVI. Why should the same throe which brought forth -the magnificent armies of Napoleon have caused the utter weakness of -the sister service, not only amid the disorders of the Republic, but -also under the powerful organization of the Empire? - -The immediate reason was that, to a service of a very special -character, involving special exigencies, calling for special aptitudes, -and consequently demanding special knowledge of its requirements in -order to deal wisely with it, were applied the theories of men wholly -ignorant of those requirements,—men who did not even believe that they -existed. Entirely without experimental knowledge, or any other kind of -knowledge, of the conditions of sea life, they were unable to realize -the obstacles to those processes by which they would build up their -navy, and according to which they proposed to handle it. This was true -not only of the wild experiments of the early days of the Republic; -the reproach may fairly be addressed to the great emperor himself, -that he had scarcely any appreciation of the factors conditioning -efficiency at sea; nor did he seemingly ever reach any such sense of -them as would enable him to understand why the French navy failed. -"Disdaining," says Jean Bon Saint-André, the Revolutionary commissioner -whose influence on naval organization was unbounded, "_disdaining_, -through calculation and reflection, _skilful evolutions_, perhaps our -seamen will think it more fitting and useful to try those boarding -actions in which the Frenchman was always conqueror, and thus astonish -Europe by new prodigies of valor."[13] "Courage and audacity," says -Captain Chevalier, "had become in his eyes the only qualities necessary -to our officers." "The English," said Napoleon, "will become very small -when France shall have two or three admirals willing to die."[14] So -commented, with pathetic yet submissive irony, the ill-fated admiral, -Villeneuve, upon whom fell the weight of the emperor's discontent with -his navy: "Since his Majesty thinks that nothing but audacity and -resolve are needed to succeed in the naval officer's calling, I shall -leave nothing to be desired."[15] - -It is well to trace in detail the steps by which a fine military -service was broken down, as well as the results thus reached, for, -while the circumstances under which the process began were undoubtedly -exceptional, the general lesson remains good. To disregard the -teachings of experience, to cut loose wholly from the traditions of -the past, to revolutionize rather than to reform, to launch out boldly -on new and untried paths, blind to or ignoring the difficulties to -be met,—such a tendency, such a school of thought exists in every -generation. At times it gets the mastery. Certainly at the present day -it has unusual strength, which is not to be wondered at in view of the -change and development of naval weapons. Yet if the campaigns of Cæsar -and Hannibal are still useful studies in the days of firearms, it is -rash to affirm that the days of sail have no lessons for the days of -steam. Here, however, are to be considered questions of discipline and -organization; of the adaptation of means to ends; of the recognition, -not only of the possibilities, but also of the limitations, imposed -upon a calling, upon a military organization, by the nature of the -case, by the element in which it moves, by the force to which it owes -its motion, by the skill or lack of skill with which its powers are -used and its deficiencies compensated. - -It is indeed only by considering the limitations as well as the -possibilities of any form of warlike activity, whether it be a -general plan of action,—as for instance commerce-destroying,—or -whether it be the use of a particular weapon,—such as the ram,—that -correct conclusions can be reached as to the kind of men, in natural -capacities, in acquired skill, in habits of thought and action, who -are needed to use such weapon. The possibilities of the ram, for -instance, are to be found in the consequences of a successful thrust; -its limitations, in the difficulties imposed by any lack of handiness, -speed, or steering qualities in the ship carrying it, in the skill -of the opponent in managing his vessel and the weapons with which he -is provided for counter-offence. If these limitations are carefully -considered, there will be little doubt how to answer the question -as to the chance of a man picked up at hazard, untrained for such -encounter except by years of ordinary sea-going, reaching his aim if -pitted against another who has at least given thought and had some -professional training directed to the special end. - -Now the one sea-weapon of the period of the French Revolution was -the gun; the cold steel, the hand-to-hand fight, commonly came into -play only toward the end of an action, if at all. In naming the gun, -however, it can by no means be separated from its carriage; using -this word not merely in its narrow technical sense, but as belonging -rightly to the whole ship which bore the gun alongside the enemy, and -upon whose skilful handling depended placing it in those positions of -advantage that involved most danger to the opponent and the least to -one's self. This was the part of the commander; once there, the skill -of the gunner came into play, to work his piece with rapidity and -accuracy despite the obstacles raised by the motion of the sea, the -rapid shifting of the enemy, the difficulty of catching sight of him -through the narrow ports. Thus the skill of the military seaman and -the skill of the trained gunner, the gun and the ship, the piece and -its carriage, supplemented each other. The ship and its guns together -formed one weapon, a moving battery which needed quick and delicate -handling and accurate direction in all its parts. It was wielded by a -living organism, knit also into one by the dependence of all the parts -upon the head, and thus acting by a common impulse, sharing a common -tradition, and having a common life, which, like all other life, is not -found fully ripened without having had a beginning and a growth. - -It would be foolish, because untrue, to say that these things were -easy to see. They were easy to men of the profession; they were not at -all easy to outsiders, apt to ignore difficulties of which they have -neither experience nor conception. The contempt for skilful manœuvres -was not confined to Jean Bon Saint-André, though he was unusually open -in avowing it. But the difficulties none the less existed; neither is -the captain without the gunner, nor the gunner without the captain, -and both must be specially trained men. It was not to be expected that -the man newly taken from the merchant vessel, whose concern with other -ships was confined to keeping out of their way, should at once be -fitted to manœuvre skilfully around an antagonist actively engaged in -injuring him, nor yet be ready to step at once from the command of a -handful of men shipped for a short cruise, to that of a numerous body -which he was to animate with a common spirit, train to act together -for a common purpose, and subject to a common rigorous discipline -to which he himself was, by previous habit, a stranger. The yoke of -military service sits hard on those who do not always bear it. Yet -the efficiency of the military sea-officer depended upon his fitness -to do these things well because they had been so wrought into his own -personal habit as to become a second nature. - -This was true, abundantly true, of the single ship in fight: but -when it came to the question of combining the force of a great -many guns, mounted on perhaps twenty-five or thirty heavy ships, -possessing unequal qualities, but which must nevertheless keep close -to one another, in certain specified positions, on dark nights, in -bad weather, above all when before the enemy; when these ships were -called upon to perform evolutions all together, or in succession, to -concentrate upon a part of the enemy, to frustrate by well combined -and well executed movements attacks upon themselves, to remedy the -inconveniences arising from loss of sails and masts and consequent -loss of motive power, to provide against the disorders caused by -sudden changes of wind and the various chances of the sea,—under these -conditions, even one not having the knowledge of experience begins -to see that such demands can only be met by a body of men of special -aptitudes and training, such as in fact has very rarely, if ever, been -found in perfection, in even the most highly organized fleets of any -navy in the world. - -To these things the French National Assembly was blind, but not because -it was not warned of them. In truth men's understandings, as well as -their _morale_ and beliefs, were in a chaotic state. In the navy, as -in society, the _morale_ suffered first. Insubordination and mutiny, -insult and murder, preceded the blundering measures which in the end -destroyed the fine _personnel_ that the monarchy bequeathed to the -French republic. This insubordination broke out very soon after the -affairs of the Bastille and the forcing of the palace at Versailles; -that is, very soon after the powerlessness of the executive was -felt. Singularly, yet appropriately, the first victim was the most -distinguished flag-officer of the French navy. - -During the latter half of 1789 disturbances occurred in all the -seaport towns; in Havre, in Cherbourg, in Brest, in Rochefort, in -Toulon. Everywhere the town authorities meddled with the concerns of -the navy yards and of the fleet; discontented seamen and soldiers, -idle or punished, rushed to the town halls with complaints against -their officers. The latter, receiving no support from Paris, yielded -continually, and things naturally went from bad to worse. - -In Toulon, however, matters were worst of all. The naval -commander-in-chief in that port was Commodore D'Albert de Rions, -a member of the French nobility, as were all the officers of the -navy. He was thought the most able flag-officer in the fleet; he -was also known and beloved in Toulon for his personal integrity and -charitable life. After working his way with partial success through the -earlier disorders, by dint of tact, concession, and his own personal -reputation, he found himself compelled to send on shore from the fleet -two subordinate officers who had excited mutiny. The men went at once -to the town hall, where they were received with open arms, and a story -before prevalent was again started that the city was mined and would -be attacked the day or two following. Excitement spread, and the next -day a number of people assembled round the arsenal, demanding to speak -with De Rions. He went out with a few of his officers. The crowd closed -round and forced him away from the gates. He went toward his house, -apparently his official residence, the mob hustling, insulting, and -even laying hands on his person. Having reached his home, the mayor and -another city official came to him and asked forgiveness for the two -culprits. He refused for a long time, but at length yielded against -his judgment,—saying truly enough that such an act of weakness, wrung -from him by the commune on the plea of re-establishing order, in other -words of appeasing and so quieting the rabble, would but encourage new -disorders and do irreparable wrong to discipline and the state. - -It proved also insufficient to arrest the present tumult. An officer -coming to the door was insulted and attacked. A rioter rushed at -another, who was leaning over a terrace attached to the house, and cut -his head open with a sabre. Then the windows were broken. The national -guard, or, as we might say, the city militia, were paraded, but did no -service. An officer leaving the house was attacked, knocked down with -stones and the butts of muskets, and would have lost his life had not -De Rions sallied out with thirty others and carried him off. - -The national guard now surrounded the house, forbidding entry or -withdrawal, and soon after demanded the surrender of an officer whom -they accused of having ordered some seamen-gunners to fire on the -mob. To De Rions's explanations and denials they replied that he was -a liar, and that the officers were a lot of aristocrats who wished -to assassinate the people. The commodore refusing to give up his -subordinate, the guards prepared to attack them; thereupon all drew -their swords, but the officer himself, to save his comrades, stepped -quickly out and put himself in the hands of his enemies. - -Meanwhile, the city authorities, as is too usual, made no effective -interference. Part of their own forces, the national guards, were -foremost in the riot. Soon after, De Rions was required to give up -another officer. He again refused, and laid orders upon this one -not to yield himself as the former had done. "If you want another -victim," said he, stepping forward, "here am I; but if you want one -of my officers, you must first pass over me." His manliness caused -only irritation. A rush was made, his sword snatched from him, and -he himself dragged out of the house amid the hoots and jeers of the -mob. The national guards formed two parties,—one to kill, the other -to save him. Pricked with bayonets, clubbed with muskets, and even -ignominiously kicked, this gallant old seaman, the companion of De -Grasse and Suffren, was dragged through the streets amid cries of "Hang -him! Cut off his head!" and thrust into the common prison. Bad as all -this was, there was yet worse. Any age and any country may suffer from -a riot, but De Rions could get from the national authority no admission -of his wrongs. The assembly ordered an investigation, and six weeks -later made this declaration: "The National Assembly, taking a favorable -view of the motives which animated M. D'Albert de Rions, the other -naval officers implicated in the affair, _the municipal officers, -and the National Guard_, declares that there is no ground to blame -any one."[16] De Rions told his wrongs in words equally pathetic and -dignified: "The volunteers," said he, "have outraged the decrees of the -National Assembly in all that concerns the rights of the man and of the -citizen. Let us not here be considered, if you will, as officers, and -I myself as the head of a respectable corps; see in us only quiet and -well-behaved citizens, and every honest man cannot but be revolted at -the unjust and odious treatment we have undergone."[17] His words were -not heeded. - -The Toulon affair was the signal for the spread of mutiny among the -crews and the breaking-up of the corps of commissioned sea-officers. -Similar incidents occurred often and everywhere. The successor of De -Rions was also hauled by the mob to prison, where he remained several -days. The second in command to him, a little later, was dragged to -a gallows, whence he was only accidentally delivered. In Brest, a -captain who had been ordered to command a ship on foreign service was -assaulted as an aristocrat by a mob of three thousand people and only -saved by being taken to prison, where he remained with nineteen others -similarly detained. Orders to release them and prosecute the offenders -were issued in vain by the cabinet and the king. "It was evident," says -Chevalier, "that the naval officers could no longer depend upon the -support of local authorities, nor upon that of the government; they -were outlaws."[18] "Thenceforth," says another French naval historian, -"if some naval officers were found sanguine enough and patriotic enough -to be willing to remain at their post, they but came, on account of -their origin and without further inquiry, to the prison and to the -scaffold."[19] - -In the fleets, insubordination soon developed into anarchy. In the -spring of 1790 a quarrel arose between Spain and Great Britain, on -account of the establishment of trading-posts, by British subjects, at -Nootka Sound, on the north-west coast of America. These posts, with -the vessels at them, were seized by Spanish cruisers. Upon news of -the affair both nations made conflicting claims, and both began to -arm their fleets. Spain claimed the help of France, in virtue of the -still existing Bourbon Family Compact. The king sent a message to the -Assembly, which voted to arm forty-five ships-of-the-line. D'Albert -de Rions was ordered to command the fleet at Brest, where he was -coldly received by the city authorities. The seamen at the time were -discontented at certain new regulations. De Rions, seeing the danger -of the situation, recommended to the Assembly some modifications, -which it refused to make, yet, at the same time, took no vigorous -steps to ensure order. On the same day that it confirmed its first -decree, September 15, 1790, a seaman from a ship called the "Léopard," -visiting on board another, the "Patriote," used mutinous language -and insulted one of the principal officers. The man was drunk. The -case being reported to the admiral, he ordered him sent on board the -flag-ship. This measure, though certainly very mild, called forth great -indignation among the seamen of the "Patriote." De Rions, hearing that -mutiny was beginning, summoned before him a petty officer, a coxswain, -who was actively stirring up the crew. He quietly explained to this man -that the first offender had not even been punished. The coxswain, being -insolent, was sent back, saying, as he went, "that it belonged to the -strongest to make the law; that he was the strongest, and that the man -should not be punished." - -The next morning the admiral went to the "Patriote," mustered the crew, -told them that the first offender had not been punished, but that -the conduct of the coxswain had been so bad that he must be put in -confinement. The crew kept silent so far, but now broke out into cries -of "He shall not go." De Rions, having tried in vain to re-establish -order, took his boat to go ashore and consult with the commandant -of the arsenal. As he pulled away, several seamen cried out to her -coxswain, "Upset the boat!" - -Meanwhile a riot had broken out in the town against the second in -command at the dockyard, based upon a report that he had said he would -soon bring the San Domingo rebels to order, if he were sent against -them. This officer, named Marigny, one of a distinguished naval family, -only escaped death by being out of his house; a gallows was put up -before it. These various outrages moved the National Assembly for a -moment, but its positive action went no further than praying the king -to order a prosecution according to legal forms, and ordering that the -crew of the Léopard, which ship had been the focus of sedition, should -be sent to their homes. D'Albert de Rions, seeing that he could not -enforce obedience, asked for and obtained his relief. On the 15th of -October this distinguished officer took his final leave of the navy and -left the country. He had served at Grenada, at Yorktown, and against -Rodney, and when the great Suffren, bending under the burden of cares -in his Indian campaign, sought for a second upon whom the charge might -fitly fall, he wrote thus to the minister of the day: "If my death, -or my health, should leave the command vacant, who would take my -place?... I know only one person who has all the qualities that can be -desired; who is very brave, very accomplished, full of ardor and zeal, -disinterested, a good seaman. That is D'Albert de Rions, and should he -be in America even, send a frigate for him. I shall be good for more if -I have him, for he will help me; and if I die, you will be assured that -the service will not suffer. If you had given me him when I asked you, -we should now be masters of India."[20] - -It was a significant, though accidental, coincidence that the -approaching humiliation of the French navy should thus be prefigured, -both ashore and afloat, both north and south, on the Mediterranean -and on the Atlantic, in the person of its most distinguished -representative. The incidents, however, though conspicuous, were but -samples of what was going on everywhere. In the West India colonies -the revolutionary impulse transmitted from the mother-country had taken -on a heat and violence of its own, characteristic alike of the climate -and of the undisciplined temper of the colonists. Commotions amounting -to civil war broke out, and both parties tried to command the support -of the navy, even at the price of inciting mutiny. Here the Léopard, -afterwards the centre of the Brest mutiny, first inhaled the germs of -disorder. In July, 1790, the crew revolted, and deprived the captain of -the command, to assume which, however, only one commissioned officer -was found willing. The commandant of the naval station at the Isle -of France, Captain McNamara, after once escaping threatened death, -was enticed ashore under promise of protection, and then murdered in -the streets by the colonial troops themselves. In the peninsula of -India, Great Britain, being then at war with Tippoo Saib, undertook -to search neutral vessels off the coast. The French commodore sent a -frigate to convoy two merchant ships, and the attempt of the British -to search them led to a collision, in which the French vessel hauled -down her colors after losing twelve killed and fifty-six wounded. The -significance, however, of this affair lies in the fact that when the -commandant of the division announced that another such aggression would -be not only resisted, but followed by reprisals, the crews of two ships -told him they would not fight unless attacked. The officer, being thus -unable to maintain what he thought the honor of the flag demanded, -found it necessary to abandon the station. - -Things abroad thus went on from bad to worse. Ships-of-war arriving -in San Domingo, the most magnificent of the French colonies in -size and fruitfulness, were at once boarded by the members of the -party uppermost in the port. Flattered and seduced, given money and -entertainment, filled with liquor, the crews were easily persuaded to -mutiny. Here and there an officer gifted with tact and popularity, or -perhaps an adept in that deft cajoling with words which so takes with -the French people, and of which the emperor afterwards was so great -a master, induced rather than ordered his ship's company to do their -duty up to a certain point. As usual the tragedy of the situation -had a comical side. Three ships, one of the line, anchored in San -Domingo. The seamen as usual were worked upon; but in addition two of -the commanders, with several officers, were arrested on shore and, -after being threatened with death, were deprived of their commands -by the local assembly. The next day the crew of the ship-of-the-line -sent ashore to protest against the deprivation, which, they observed, -"was null and void, as to them alone (the crew) belonged the right to -take cognizance of and judge the motives of their officers."[21] An -admiral on the United States coast was ordered by the French chargé -d'affaires to take his ships, two of-the-line and two frigates, and -seize the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon near Newfoundland. -A few days after sailing, the crews said the orders were nonsense and -forced the officers to go to France[22] No captain knew how long he -would be in his nominal position, or receive the obedience it claimed. -"It was not so easy," says a French historian, speaking of the one -who most successfully kept his dizzy height, "it was not so easy for -Grimouard to leave Port-au-Prince with his flag-ship; he had to get -the consent of a crew which was incessantly told that its own will -was the only orders it should follow. In fifteen months Grimouard had -not taken a night's rest; always active, always on deck, reasoning -with one, coaxing another, appealing to the honor of this, to the -generosity of that, to the patriotism of all, he had kept up on board -a quasi-discipline truly phenomenal for the times."[23] Later on, this -same man lost his life by the guillotine. Nothing more disastrous to -the French colonies could have happened than this weakening of the -military authority, both ashore and afloat, for which the colonists -were mainly answerable. The strife of parties,—at first confined to the -whites, a very small minority of the population,—spread to the mixed -bloods and the negroes, and a scene of desolation followed over all the -islands, finding however its most frightful miseries and excesses in -San Domingo, whence the whites were finally exterminated. - -Such was the condition of anarchy in which the fleet was as early as -1790 and 1791, and to which the whole social order was unmistakably -drifting. In the military services, and above all in the navy, where -submission to constituted authority is the breath of life, the -disappearance of that submission anticipated, but only anticipated, -the period of ruin and terror which awaited all France. The weakness -which prevented the executive and legislature from enforcing obedience -in the fleet was hurrying them, along with the whole people, to the -abysses of confusion; the more highly organized and fragile parts of -the state first fell to pieces under the shaking of the whole fabric. -After what has been said, little surprise will be felt that naval -officers in increasing numbers refused to serve and left the country; -but it is a mistake to say on the one hand that they did so from pure -motives of opposition to the new order of things, or on the other that -they were forced by the acts of the first, or Constituent, Assembly. -Both mistakes have been made. Emigration of the nobility and of princes -of the blood began indeed soon after the storming of the Bastille, but -large numbers of officers remained attending to their duties. The Brest -mutiny was fourteen months later, and complaints are not then found of -the lack of officers. - -After that event their departure went on with increasing rapidity. The -successor of De Rions held his office but one week, and then gave it -up. He was followed by a distinguished officer, De Bougainville. Aided -by a temporary return to sober ideas on the part of the government -and the town authorities, this flag-officer for a moment, by strong -measures, restored discipline; but mutiny soon reappeared, and, from -the complaints made by him later on, there can be little doubt that -he must have asked for his detachment had not the fleet been disarmed -in consequence of the ending of the Anglo-Spanish dispute. In the -following March, 1791, Mirabeau died, and with him the hopes which the -court party and moderate men had based upon his genius. In April the -Assembly passed a bill re-organizing the navy, the terms of which could -not have been acceptable to the officers; although, candidly read, it -cannot be considered to have ignored the just claims of those actually -in service. In June occurred the king's unsuccessful attempt at flight. -On the first of July a return made of officers of the navy showed -that more than three-fourths of the old corps had disappeared.[24] -The result was due partly to royalist feeling and prejudice shocked; -partly, perhaps, to distaste for the new organization: but those -familiar with the feelings of officers will attribute it with more -likelihood to the utter subversion of discipline, destructive to -their professional pride and personal self-respect, and for which the -weakness and military ignorance of the Constituent Assembly are mainly -responsible. - -It is now time to consider the plans upon which that Assembly proposed -to re-create the navy, in accordance with the views popular at that day. - -During the War of the American Revolution, the corps of naval officers -had been found too small for the needs of the service; there was a -deficiency of lieutenants and junior officers to take charge of the -watches and gun-divisions. A systematic attempt was made to remedy -this trouble in the future. By a royal decree, dated January 1, 1786, -the navy was re-organized, and two sources of supply for officers -were opened. The first was drawn wholly from the nobles, the youths -composing it having to show satisfactory proofs of nobility before -being admitted to the position of _élèves_, as they were called. These -received a practical and rigorous training especially directed to the -navy; and, so far as education went, there is reason to believe they -would have made a most efficient body of men. The second source from -which the royal navy was to be supplied with officers was a class -called volunteers. Admission to this was also restricted, though -extended to a wider circle. There could be borne upon its rolls only -the sons of noblemen, or of sub-lieutenants serving either afloat -or in the dockyards, of wholesale merchants, shipowners, captains, -and of people living "nobly." These, though required to pass certain -examinations and to have seen certain sea-service, were only admitted -to the grade of sub-lieutenant, and could be promoted no further except -for distinguished and exceptional acts.[25] - -Such was the organization with which, in 1791, a popular assembly was -about to deal. The invidious privilege by which the naval career, -except in the lower ranks, was closed to all but a single, and not -specially deserving, class, was of course done away without question. -There still remained to decide whether the privilege should in the -future be confined to a single class, which should deserve it by -giving all its life and energies to the career—whether the navy -should be recognized as a special calling requiring like others a -special training—or whether there was so little difference between it -and the merchant service that men could pass from one to the other -without injuring either. These two views each found upholders, but -the latter prevailed even in the first Assembly; those who wished a -wholly military service only succeeded in modifying the original scheme -presented by the committee. - -The new organization was established by two successive acts, passed -on the 22d and 28th of April, 1790.[26] Like the old, it provided two -sources of supply; the one from men specially trained in youth, the -other from the merchant service. The former began in a class called -_Aspirants_, three hundred of whom were in pay on board ships of war; -they were not then officers, but simply youths between fifteen and -twenty learning their business. The lowest grade of officer was the -_Enseigne_; they were of two kinds, paid[27] and unpaid, the former -being actually in the navy. The latter were in the merchant service, -but susceptible of employment in the fleet, and, when so engaged, took -rank with other _enseignes_ according to the length of time afloat in -national ships. Admission to the grade of paid, or naval, _enseigne_ -could be had between eighteen and thirty, by passing the required -examination and proving four years service at sea, no distinction -being then made in favor of those who had begun as _aspirants_ or had -served in the navy. Those passing for _enseigne_ and wishing to enter -the navy had a more severe and more mathematical examination, while, -on the other hand, those who returned to the merchant service had to -have two years longer service, six in all, one of which on board a ship -of war. All _enseignes_ twenty-four years old, and only they, could -command ships in the foreign trade and certain parts of the home, or -coasting, trade. By the age of forty, a definitive choice had to be -made between the two services. Up to that time _enseignes_ could pass -for lieutenant, and there seems to have been no inducement to follow -one branch of the sea service rather than the other, except this: -that five-sixths of the lieutenant vacancies at any one time were to -be given to those who had most service as _enseignes_ on board ships -of war. To pass for lieutenant at the mature age of forty, only two -years of military sea service were absolutely required. Thenceforth the -officer was devoted to the military navy. - -The essential spirit and tendency of the new legislation is summed up -in the requirements for the lieutenancy. Up to the age of forty, that -is, during the formative years of a man's life, it was left to the -choice, interest, or caprice of the individual, how he would pass his -time between the two services. The inducements to stick to the navy -were too slight to weigh against the passing inclinations of young -or restless men. If the navy is the specialty that has been before -asserted, there can be no doubt that this scheme was radically vicious. -A period of commercial prosperity would have robbed it of its best men -during their best years. - -It is due to the Constituent Assembly to say that, while thus -establishing the navy of the future on foundations that reason and -experience have both condemned, it did not, as has sometimes been said, -reject or drive away the able officers still in France; that is, by -direct legislative act. Although the decree of April 22 abolished the -existing corps of the navy, it provided also that the new organization -should be constituted, "for this time only," by a selection made from -the officers of the old service then available; from whom the higher -grades, including lieutenants, were to be, as far as possible, filled. -Those who were not so selected were to be retired with at least -two-thirds of their present pay; and with the next higher grade, if -they had served over ten years in the one they then held. Whatever -dislike these officers may rightly have felt for the new organization, -they personally lost little by it, unless not selected; but the -failure on the part of the Assembly to realize the irreparable loss -with which the country was threatened,—the unique value of a body of -men already, and alone, fitted for the performance of very delicate -duties,—and the consequent neglect to uphold and protect them, were -as fatal in their results as though they had been legislated out of -existence. - -The second, or Legislative, Assembly during its year of existence made -no radical changes in the organization it found; but the increasing -want of officers led inevitably to lowering the qualifications exacted -for the different grades, which was done by several acts. The National -Convention went still farther in the same direction. January 13, -1793, immediately before the war with Great Britain, it decreed that -rear-admirals might be taken from any captains whose commission dated -back the month before. Merchant captains who had commanded privateers -or ships in the foreign trade for five years, could be at once made -post-captains. To be made lieutenant were needed only five years' -sea-service, either in the navy or on board merchant ships. Decree now -followed decree, all in the same direction, winding up on July 28 by -authorizing the minister of marine, until otherwise ordered, to fill -the places of flag and other officers from any grade and without regard -to existing laws. Most of these measures were probably justified by -stern and pressing necessity.[28] - -The reign of terror was now at hand. The scourge fell upon the -naval officers who had not fled the country as well as upon others. -Grimouard, whose activity in the West Indies has been noted; -Philippe d'Orléans, admiral of France, who had commanded the van at -Ushant; Vice-Admiral Kersaint, who had stood in the foremost rank of -revolutionists till the murder of the king; D'Estaing, also admiral -of France, who had held high command with distinguished courage, if -not with equal ability, in the war of American Independence,—perished -on the scaffold. The companions of their glory had for the most died -before the evil days. D'Orvilliers, De Grasse, Guichen, the first -Latouche-Tréville, Suffren, La Motte Piquet, passed away before the -meeting of the States-General. - -Besides the judicial and other murders, the effect of the general -suspiciousness was felt by the navy in new legislation of a yet more -disastrous kind. By a decree of October 7, 1793, the minister of marine -was to lay before the naval committee of the Assembly a list of all -officers and _aspirants_ whose ability or _civisme_,—_i. e._, fidelity -to the new order of things,—was suspected. This may have been well -enough; but, in addition, lists of all officers and _aspirants_ were to -be posted in different places, and all people were invited to send in -denunciations of those whom they believed to be lacking in ability or -fidelity. These denunciations were to be passed upon by an assembly, -made up of the general council of the Commune and all the seamen of the -district. The decision was reached by majority of votes and forwarded -to the minister, who was obliged to dismiss those against whom the -charges were thus sustained.[29] - -The navy being in this way purged, the vacancies were to be filled on -a similar principle. The naval officers, merchant captains and other -seamen of each district, who had qualified for _enseignes_, were to -meet and name three candidates for each of the different vacancies. -In the great want of officers then prevailing, some such system of -nomination might have been very useful in lightening the immense burden -resting on the minister; but it is obvious that the assemblies thus -constituted were too numerous, too popular, too little fitted to carry -on formal discussion, and too destitute of special technical knowledge, -to be good judges. There was found here the same essential defect that -underlay all the conceptions of the different assemblies of the early -republic; ignorant of, and therefore undervaluing, the high and special -requirements of the naval profession, they were willing to entrust its -interests and the selection of its officers to hands that could not be -competent. - -The result was depicted in a letter of Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, who -was at once an officer of the old service, and yet had entered it from -the auxiliary navy, having been captain of fireship; who, therefore, -stood as nearly as possible between the two extremes of opinion. As a -subordinate he had won the admiration of Suffren in the East Indies, -and as admiral he commanded with honor the fleets of the Republic. He -wrote: "The popular societies have been called on to point out the men -having both seamanship and patriotism. The societies believed that it -was enough for a man to have been long at sea to be a seaman, if he was -besides a patriot. They did not reflect that patriotism alone cannot -handle a ship. The grades consequently have been given to men without -merit beyond that of having been much at sea, not remembering that such -a man often is in a ship just as a bale is. It must be frankly said -it is not always the man at once most skilful and patriotic that has -had the suffrages of the societies, but often the most intriguing and -the falsest,—he, who by effrontery and talk has been able to impose -upon the majority."[30] In another letter he says: "You doubtless know -that the best seamen of the different commercial ports kept behind -the curtain in the beginning of the Revolution; and that on the other -hand there came forward a crowd who, not being able to find employment -in commerce, because they had no other talent than the phraseology -of patriotism, by means of which they misled the popular societies -of which they were members, got the first appointments. Experienced -captains, who might have served the republic efficiently by their -talents and skill, have since then steadily refused to go to sea, and -with inexcusable self-love still prefer service in the National Guard -(ashore) to going to sea, where they say they would have to be under -captains to whom they have often refused the charge of a watch. Hence -the frequent accidents met with by the ships of the republic. Since -justice and consequently talents are now (1795) the order of the day, -and all France is now convinced that patriotism, doubtless one of the -most necessary virtues in an officer of the government, is yet not the -only one required to command armies and fleets, as was once claimed, -you are quite right," etc.[31] - -Enough has been said to show the different causes that destroyed the -corps of French naval officers. Some of these were exceptional in their -character and not likely to recur; but it is plain that even their -operation was hastened by the false notions prevalent in the government -as to the character and value of professional training, while the same -false notions underlay the attempts both to fill the vacant places -and to provide a new basis for the official staff of the future. The -results of these mistaken ideas will be seen in the narrative; but it -may be useful to give here the professional antecedents (taken from -a French naval historian) of the admirals and captains in the first -great battle of this war, June 1, 1794, by which time the full effect -of the various changes had been reached. These three admirals and -twenty-six captains of 1794 held in 1791 the following positions: the -commander-in-chief, Villaret Joyeuse, was a lieutenant; the two other -flag-officers, one a lieutenant, the other a sub-lieutenant; of the -captains, three were lieutenants, eleven sub-lieutenants, nine captains -or mates of merchant ships, one a seaman in the navy, one a boatswain, -one not given.[32] - -The action of the Assemblies with regard to the enlisted men of the -fleet was as unreasonable and revolutionary as that touching the -officers. For twenty years before the meeting of the States-General -the navy had contained nine divisions of trained seamen-gunners, -numbering some ten thousand men, and commanded, as in all services, -by naval officers. It is scarcely possible to over-rate the value, -in _esprit-de-corps_ as well as in fighting effect, of such a body -of trained men. In 1792 these were replaced by a force of marine -artillerists, commanded by artillery officers. The precise relation -of these to the sea-officers is not stated; but from the change must -have sprung jealousies harmful to discipline, as well as injury to -the military spirit of the naval officer. In 1794, these marine -artillerists, and also the marine infantry, were suppressed on motion -of Jean Bon Saint-André, so well known in connection with the French -navy of the day. In his opinion, endorsed by the vote of the National -Convention, it savored of aristocracy that any body of men should have -an exclusive right to fight at sea. "The essential basis of our social -institutions," said he, "is equality; to this touchstone you must bring -all parts of the government, both military and civil. In the navy there -exists an abuse, the destruction of which is demanded by the Committee -of Public Safety by my mouth. There are in the navy troops which bear -the name of 'marine regiments.' Is this because these troops have the -_exclusive privilege_ of defending the republic upon the sea? Are we -not _all_ called upon to fight for liberty? Why could not the victors -of Landau, of Toulon, go upon our fleets to show their courage to Pitt, -and lower the flag of George? This right cannot be denied them; they -themselves would claim it, were not their arms serving the country -elsewhere. Since they cannot now enjoy it, we must at least give them -the prospect of using it."[33] - -"Thus," says a French writer, "a marine artillerist, a soldier trained -in the difficult art of pointing a gun at sea and especially devoted -to that service, became a kind of aristocrat."[34] None the less did -the Convention, in those days of the Terror, vote the change. "Take -care," wrote Admiral Kerguelen, "you need trained gunners to serve guns -at sea. Those on shore stand on a steady platform and aim at fixed -objects; those at sea, on the contrary, are on a moving platform, and -fire always, so to speak, on the wing. The experience of the late -actions should teach you that our gunners are inferior to those of -the enemy."[35] The words of common sense could get no hearing in -those days of flighty ideas and excited imaginations. "How," asks La -Gravière, "could these prudent words draw the attention of republicans, -more touched by the recollections of Greece and Rome than by the -glorious traditions of our ancestors? Those were the days in which -presumptuous innovators seriously thought to restore to the oar its -importance, and to throw flying bridges on the decks of English ships -of the line, as the Romans did on board the galleys of Carthage; candid -visionaries, who with simplicity summed up the titles of their mission -in words such as these, preserved among the archives of the Navy: -'Legislators, here are the outpourings of an ingenuous patriot, who -has for guide no other principle than that of nature and a heart truly -French.'"[36] - -The effects of this legislation were soon seen in the fighting at sea. -The British seventy-four, Alexander, fought three French ships of her -own size for two hours; the average loss of each of the latter equalled -that of the one enemy. In June, 1795, twelve French ships-of-the-line -found themselves in presence of five British. There was bad management -in more ways than one, but five of the French had three of the enemy -under their fire for several hours; only thirteen Englishmen were -hurt, and no ship so crippled as to be taken. A few days later the -same French fleet fell in with a British of somewhat superior force. -Owing to light airs and other causes, only a partial engagement -followed, in which eight British and twelve French took part. The -whole British loss was one hundred and forty-four killed and wounded. -Three French ships struck, with a loss of six hundred and seventy; -and the nine others, which had been partially engaged, had a total of -two hundred and twenty-two killed and wounded. In December, 1796, the -British frigate Terpsichore met the French Vestale, of equal force. -The latter surrendered after a sharp action of two hours, in which she -lost sixty-eight killed and wounded against the enemy's twenty-two. -This a French writer speaks of as a simple artillery duel, unmarked -by any manœuvres. These are not instances chosen to prove a case, but -illustrations of the general fact, well known to contemporaries, that -the French gunnery was extremely bad. "In comparing this war with the -American," says Sir Howard Douglas, "it is seen that, in the latter, -the loss of English ships in action with French of equal force, was -much more considerable. In the time of Napoleon, whole batteries of -ships-of-the-line were fired without doing more harm than two pieces, -well directed." - -Nor was it only by direct legislation that the Assemblies destroyed -the efficiency of the crews. The neglect of discipline and its bad -results have before been mentioned. The same causes kept working -for many years, and the spirit of insubordination, which sprang -from revolutionary excess, doubtless grew stronger as the crews -found themselves more and more under incapable officers, through the -emigration of their old leaders. As they threw off wholesome restraint, -they lost unavoidably in self-respect; and the class of men to whom the -confusion of an ill-ordered ship was intolerable, as it becomes even to -the humblest seaman who has been used to regularity, doubtless did as -the merchant officers of whom Villaret Joyeuse wrote. They withdrew, -under cover of the confusion of the times, from the naval service. "The -tone of the seamen is wholly ruined," wrote Admiral Morard de Galles, -on March 22, 1793, a month after the declaration of war with England: -"if it does not change we can expect nothing but reverses in action, -even though we be superior in force. The boasted ardor attributed to -them" (by themselves and national representatives) "stands only in the -words 'patriot,' 'patriotism,' which they are ever repeating, and in -shouts of 'Vive la nation! Vive la République!' when they have been -well flattered. No idea of doing right or attending to their duties." -The government thought best not to interfere, for fear of alienating -the seamen. Morard de Galles's flag-ship, having carried away her -head-sails in a storm, tried unsuccessfully to wear. "If I had had -a crew such as we formerly had," wrote the admiral to the minister, -"I would have used means which would have succeeded; but, despite -exhortations and threats, I could not get thirty seamen on deck. The -army gunners and greater part of the marine troops behaved better. They -did what they were told; but the seamen, even the petty officers, did -not show themselves."[37] - -In May, it being then open war, a mutiny broke out when the Brest -squadron was ordered to get under way. To obtain obedience, the naval -authorities had to call in the city government and the Society of -Friends of Liberty and Equality. In June De Galles wrote again: "I have -sailed in the most numerous squadrons, but never in a year did I see so -many collisions as in the month this squadron has been together." He -kept the sea until toward the end of August, when the fleet anchored -in Quiberon Bay, seventy-five miles south-east of Brest. The Navy -Department, which was only the mouthpiece of the Committee of Public -Safety, directed that the fleet should keep the sea till further -orders. On the 13th of September, news reached it of the insurrection -of Toulon and the reception there of the English fleet. Deputations -from different ships came to the admiral, headed by two midshipmen, -who demanded, with great insolence of manner, that he should return to -Brest, despite his orders. This he firmly refused. The propositions of -one of the midshipmen were such that the admiral lost his temper. "I -called them," says he, "cowards, traitors, foes to the Revolution; and, -as they said they _would_ get under way, I replied (and at the instant -I believed) that there were twenty faithful ships which would fire on -them if they undertook any movements without my orders." The admiral -was mistaken as to the temper of the crews. Next morning seven ships -mast-headed their top-sails in readiness to sail. He in person went on -board, trying to bring them back to obedience, but in vain. To mask his -defeat under a form of discipline, if discipline it could be called, -he consented to call a council of war, made up of one officer and one -seaman from each ship, to debate the question of going back to Brest. -This council decided to send deputies to the representatives of the -Convention, then on mission in the department, and meanwhile to await -further orders from the government. This formality did not hide the -fact that power had passed from the commander-in-chief appointed by the -State to a council representing a military mob.[38] - -The deputies from the ships found the commissioners of the Convention, -one of whom came to the fleet. Upon consultation with the admiral, -it appeared that twelve ships out of twenty-one were in open mutiny, -and four of the other nine in doubt. As the fleet needed repairs, the -commissioner ordered its return to Brest. The mob thus got its way, -but the spirit of the government had changed. In June the extreme -revolutionary party had gained the upper hand in the State, and was -no longer willing to allow the anarchy which had hitherto played its -game. The Convention, under the rule of the Mountain, showed extreme -displeasure at the action of the fleet; and though its anger fell -upon the admirals and captains, many of whom were deprived and some -executed, decrees were issued showing that rank insubordination would -no longer be tolerated. The government now felt strong. - -The cruise of Morard de Galles is an instance, on a large scale, of the -state to which the navy had come in the three years that had passed -since mutiny had driven De Rions from the service; but it by no means -stood alone. In the great Mediterranean naval port, Toulon, things were -quite as bad. "The new officers," says Chevalier, "obtained no more -obedience than the old; the crews became what they had been made; they -now knew only one thing, to rise against authority. Duty and honor -had become to them empty words." It would be wearisome to multiply -instances and details. Out of their own country such men were a terror -rather to allies than foes. An evidently friendly writer, speaking of -the Mediterranean fleet when anchored at Ajaccio in Corsica, says, -under date of December 31, 1792: "The temper of the fleet and of the -troops is excellent; only, it might be said, there is not enough -discipline. They came near hanging one day a man who, the following -day, was recognized as very innocent of the charge made against him by -the agitators. The lesson, however, has not been lost on the seamen, -who, seeing the mis-steps into which these hangmen by profession lead -them, have denounced one of them."[39] Grave disorders all the same -took place, and two Corsican National Guards were hanged by a mob of -seamen and soldiers from the fleet; but how extraordinary must have -been the feelings of the time when a critic could speak so gingerly of, -not to say praise, the temper that showed itself in this way. - -While the tone and the military efficiency of officers and crew -were thus lowered, the material condition of both ships and men was -wretched. Incompetency and disorder directed everywhere. There was -lack of provisions, clothing, timber, rigging, sails. In De Galles's -fleet, though they had just sailed, most of the ships needed repairs. -The crews counted very many sick, and they were besides destitute of -clothing. Although scurvy was raging, the men, almost in sight of -their own coast, were confined to salt food. Of the Toulon squadron -somewhat later, in 1795, we are told almost all the seamen deserted. -"Badly fed, scarcely clothed, discouraged by constant lack of success, -they had but one thought, to fly the naval service. In September, ten -thousand men would have been needed to fill the complements of the -Toulon fleet."[40] The country was ransacked for seamen, who dodged the -maritime conscription as the British sailor of the day hid from the -press-gang. - -After the action called by the British the Battle of L'Orient, and by -the French that of the Île de Groix, in 1795, the French fleet took -refuge in L'Orient, where they remained two months. So great was the -lack of provisions that the crews were given leave. When the ships -were again ready for sea "it was not an easy thing to make the seamen -come back; a decree was necessary to recall them to the colors. Even -so only a very small number returned, and it was decided to send out -singly, or at most by divisions, the ships which were in the port. -When they reached Brest the crews were sent round to L'Orient by land -to man other ships. In this way the fleet sailed at different dates -in three divisions."[41] In the Irish expedition of 1796, part of -the failure in handling the ships is laid to the men being benumbed -with cold, because without enough clothes. Pay was constantly in -arrears. The seamen, whatever might be their patriotism, could not -be tempted back to the discomforts and hardships of such a service. -Promises, threats, edicts, were all of no avail. This state of things -lasted for years. The civil commissioner of the navy in Toulon wrote -in 1798, concerning the preparations for Bonaparte's expedition to -Egypt: "Despite the difficulties concerning supplies, they were but a -secondary object of my anxiety. To bring seamen into the service fixed -it entirely. I gave the commissioners of the maritime inscription the -most pressing orders; I invited the municipalities, the commissioners -of the Directory, the commanders of the army, to second them; and to -assure the success of this general measure, I sent with my despatches -money to pay each seaman raised a month's advance and conduct money. -The inveterate insubordination of seamen in most of the western -ports, their pronounced aversion to the service, making almost null -the effects of the maritime commissioners, I sent a special officer -from the port, firm and energetic," to second their efforts; "at -length after using every lawful means, part of the western seamen have -repaired to this port. There are still many stragglers that are being -pursued unremittingly."[42] - -The chief causes for this trouble were the hardships and the -irregularity of pay, with the consequent sufferings to their families. -As late as 1801, Admiral Ganteaume drew a moving picture of the state -of the officers and men under his command. "I once more call your -attention to the frightful state in which are left the seamen, unpaid -for fifteen months, naked or covered with rags, badly fed, discouraged; -in a word, sunk under the weight of the deepest and most humiliating -wretchedness. It would be horrible to make them undertake, in this -state, a long and doubtless painful winter cruise."[43] Yet it was in -this condition he had come from Brest to Toulon in mid-winter. At the -same time the admiral said that the officers, receiving neither pay nor -table money, lived in circumstances that lowered them in their own eyes -and deprived them of the respect of the crews. It was at about this -time that the commander of a corvette, taken by a British frigate, made -in his defence before the usual court-martial the following statement: -"Three fourths of the crew were sea-sick from the time of leaving Cape -Sepet until reaching Mahon. Add to this, ill-will, and a panic terror -which seized my crew at the sight of the frigate. Almost all thought it -a ship-of-the-line. Add to this again, that they had been wet through -by the sea for twenty-four hours without having a change of clothes, -as I had only been able to get ten spare suits for the whole ship's -company."[44] The quality of the crews, the conditions of their life, -and the reason why good seamen kept clear of the service, sufficiently -appear from these accounts. In the year of Trafalgar, even, neither -bedding nor clothing was regularly issued to the crews.[45] - -Surprise will not be felt, when human beings were thus neglected, -that the needs of the inanimate ships were not met. In the early -part of the war it is not easy to say whether the frequent accidents -were due to bad handling or bad outfit. In 1793, the escape of six -sail-of-the-line, under Admiral Van Stabel, from Lord Howe's fleet, is -attributed to superior sailing qualities of the hulls and the better -staying of the masts.[46] The next year, however, the commissioner -of the Convention who accompanied the great ocean fleet, Jean Bon -Saint-André, tried to account for the many accidents which happened in -good weather by charging the past reign with a deliberate purpose of -destroying the French navy. "This neglect," wrote he, "like so many -more, belonged to the system of ruining the navy by carelessness and -neglect of all the parts composing it."[47] It was well known that -Louis XVI. had given special care to the material and development of -the service; nor is it necessary to seek any deeper cause for the -deterioration of such perishable materials than the disorders of -the five years since he practically ceased to reign. From this time -complaints multiply, and the indications of the entire want of naval -stores cannot be mistaken. To this, rather than to the neglect of the -dockyard officials in Brest, was due the wretched condition of the -fleet sent in December, 1794, by the obstinacy of the Committee of -Public Safety, to make a mid-winter cruise in the Bay of Biscay, the -story of whose disasters is elsewhere told.[48] - -The expedition to Ireland in 1796 was similarly ill-prepared; and -indeed, with the British preponderance at sea hampering trade, the -embarrassment could scarcely fail to grow greater. Spars carried -away, rigging parted, sails tore. Some ships had no spare sails. -This, too, was a mid-winter expedition, the squadron having sailed in -December. In 1798 the preparation of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition -at Toulon met with the greatest difficulty. The naval commissioner -showed much zeal and activity, and was fearless in taking upon himself -responsibility; but the fleet sailed for an unknown destination almost -without spare spars and rigging, and three of the thirteen were not -fit for sea. Two had been condemned the year before, and on one they -did not dare to put her regular battery. In January, 1801, a squadron -of seven sail-of-the-line left Brest under Admiral Ganteaume, having -the all-important mission of carrying a reinforcement of five thousand -troops to the army in Egypt. Becoming discouraged, whether rightly or -wrongly, after entering the Mediterranean, the admiral bore up for -Toulon, where he anchored after being at sea twenty-six days. Here -is his report of his fleet during and after this short cruise: "The -'Indivisible' had lost two topmasts and had no spare one left. The -trestle-trees of the mainmast were sprung and could not support the -new topmast. The 'Desaix' had sprung her bowsprit. The 'Constitution' -and the 'Jean-Bart' were in the same condition as the 'Indivisible,' -neither having a spare main-topmast after carrying away the others. -Both the 'Formidable' and the 'Indomptable,' on the night we got under -way, had an anchor break adrift. They had to cut the cable; but both -had their sides stove in at the water-line, and could not be repaired -at sea. Finally, all the ships, without exception, were short of rope -to a disquieting extent, not having had, on leaving Brest, a single -spare coil; and the rigging in place was all bad, and in a state to -risk every moment the speed and safety of the ships."[49] It will be -unnecessary to quote more of these mishaps, in which lack of skill and -bad equipment each bore its part; nor need we try to disentangle the -one cause from the other. - -Enough has now been said to show the general state of the French navy -in the last ten years of the eighteenth century. The time and space -thus used have not been wasted, for these conditions, which continued -under the empire, were as surely the chief cause of the continuous and -overwhelming overthrow of that navy, as the ruin of the French and -Spanish sea-power, culminating at Trafalgar, was a principal factor -in the final result sealed at Waterloo. Great Britain will be seen -to enter the war allied with many of the nations of Europe against -France. One by one the allies drop away, until the island kingdom, with -two-fifths the population of France and a disaffected Ireland, stands -alone face to face with the mighty onset of the Revolution. Again and -again she knits the coalitions, which are as often cut asunder by the -victorious sword of the French army. Still she stands alone on the -defensive, until the destruction of the combined fleets at Trafalgar, -and the ascendency of her own navy, due to the immense physical loss -and yet more to the moral annihilation of that of the enemy, enable her -to assume the offensive in the peninsula after the Spanish uprising,—an -offensive based absolutely upon her control of the sea. Her presence in -Portugal and Spain keeps festering that Spanish ulcer which drained the -strength of Napoleon's empire. As often before, France, contending with -Germany, had Spain again upon her back. - -There still remains to consider briefly the state of the other navies -which bore a part in the great struggle; and after that, the strategic -conditions of the sea war, in its length and breadth, at the time it -began. - -The British navy was far from being in perfect condition; and it -had no such administrative prescription upon which to fall back as -France always had in the regulations and practice of Colbert and his -son. In the admiralty and the dockyards, at home and abroad, there -was confusion and waste, if not fraud. As is usual in representative -governments, the military establishments had drooped during ten years -of peace. But, although administration lacked system, and agents were -neglectful or dishonest, the navy itself, though costing more than -it should, remained vigorous; the possessor of actual, and yet more -of reserved, strength in the genius and pursuits of the people,—in -a continuous tradition, which struck its roots far back in a great -past,—and above all, in a body of officers, veterans of the last, and -some of yet earlier wars, still in the prime of life for the purposes -of command, and steeped to the core in those professional habits and -feelings which, when so found in the chief, transmit themselves quickly -to the juniors. As the eye of the student familiar with naval history -glances down the lists of admirals and captains in 1793, it recognizes -at once the names of those who fought under Keppel, Rodney, and Howe, -linked with those who were yet to win fame as the companions of Hood, -Jervis, Nelson, and Collingwood. - -To this corps of officers is to be added, doubtless, a large number of -trained seamen, who, by choice, remained in the navy under the reduced -peace complement; a nucleus round which could be rapidly gathered and -organized all the sea-faring population fit for active service. The -strength of Great Britain, however, lay in her great body of merchant -seamen; and the absence of so many of these on distant voyages was -always a source of embarrassment when manning a fleet in the beginning -of a war. The naval service was also generally unpopular with the -sailor; to whom, as to his officer, the rigid yoke of discipline was -hard to bear until the neck was used to it. Hence, in the lack of -any system similar to the French maritime inscription, Great Britain -resorted to the press; a method which, though legally authorized, was -stained in execution by a lawlessness and violence strange in a people -that so loved both law and freedom. Even so, with both press-gang -and free enlistment, the navy, as a whole, was always shorthanded in -a great war, so that men of all nations were received and welcomed; -much very bad native material was also accepted. "Consider," wrote -Collingwood, "with such a fleet as we have now, how large a proportion -of the crews of the ships are miscreants of every description, and -capable of every crime. And when those predominate what evils may we -not dread from the demoniac councils and influence of such a mass of -mischief."[50] - -The condition of the seamen on board left much to be desired. The pay -had not been increased since the days of Charles II., although the -prices of all the necessaries of life had risen thirty per cent. The -exigencies of the service, combined with the fear of desertion, led -to very close enforced confinement to the ship, even in home ports; -men were long unable to see their families. The discipline, depending -upon the character of the captain, too little defined and limited by -law, varied greatly in different ships; while some were disorganized by -undue leniency, in others punishment was harsh and tyrannical. On the -other hand, there was a large and growing class of officers, both among -the sterner and the laxer disciplinarians, who looked upon the health -and well-being of the crew as the first of their duties and interests; -and better sanitary results have perhaps never been reached, certainly -never in proportion to the science of the day, than under Jervis, -Nelson, Collingwood, and their contemporaries, in fleets engaged in -the hardest, most continuous service, under conditions of monotony and -isolation generally unfavorable to health. Nelson, during a cruise in -which he passed two years without leaving his ship even for another, -often speaks with pride, almost with exultation, of the health of his -crews. After his pursuit of Villeneuve's fleet to the West Indies, he -writes: "We have lost neither officer nor man by sickness since we left -the Mediterranean," a period of ten weeks. The number of men in his -ships must have been near seven thousand. Both French and Spaniards of -the fleet he pursued were very sickly. "They landed a thousand sick -at Martinique, and buried full that number during their stay."[51] -Collingwood writes: "I have not let go an anchor for fifteen months, -and on the first day of the year had not a sick-list in the ship—not -one man."[52] And again a year later: "Yet, with all this sea-work, -never getting fresh beef nor a vegetable, I have not one sick man in -my ship. Tell that to Doctor ——." "His flag-ship had usually eight -hundred men; was, on one occasion, more than a year and a half without -going into port, and during the whole of that time never had more than -six, and generally only four, on her sick-list."[53] Such results show -beyond dispute that the crews were well clothed, well fed, and well -cared for. - -Amid ship's companies of such mixed character, and suffering during the -early years of the war from real and severe grievances, it was to be -expected that acts of mutiny should occur. Such there were, rivalling, -if not surpassing, in extent, those which have been told of the French -navy. They also received intelligent guidance at the hands of a class -of men, of higher educational acquirements than the average seaman, -who, through drunkenness, crime, or simple good-for-nothingness, had -found their way on board ship. The feature which distinguished these -revolts from those of the French was the spirit of reasonableness and -respect for law which at the first marked their proceedings; and which -showed how deeply the English feeling for law, duty and discipline, -had taken hold of the naval seamen. Their complaints, unheeded when -made submissively, were at once allowed to be fair when mutiny drew -attention to them. The forms of discipline were maintained by men who -refused to go to sea before their demands were allowed, unless "the -enemy's fleet should put to sea;"[54] and respect to officers was -enjoined, though some who were obnoxious for severity were sent ashore. -One very signal instance is given of military sympathy with obedience -to orders, though at their own expense. A lieutenant, having shot one -of several mutineers, was seized by the others, who made ready to hang -him, and he stood actually under the yard-arm with the halter round -his neck; but upon the admiral saying he himself was responsible, -having given orders to the officer in accordance with his own from the -Admiralty, the seamen stopped, asked to see the orders, and, having -satisfied themselves of their terms, abandoned their purpose. - -Captain Brenton, the naval historian, was watch-officer on board a ship -that for many days was in the hands of mutineers. He says, "The seamen, -generally speaking, throughout the mutiny conducted themselves with a -degree of humanity highly creditable, not only to themselves, but to -the national character. They certainly tarred and feathered the surgeon -of a ship at the Nore, but he had been five weeks drunk in his cabin -and had neglected the care of his patients; this was therefore an act -which Lord Bacon would have called 'wild justice.' The delegates of -the 'Agamemnon'" (his own ship) "showed respect to every officer but -the captain; him, after the first day, they never insulted but rather -treated with neglect; they asked permission of the lieutenants to -punish a seaman, who, from carelessness or design, had taken a dish of -meat belonging to the ward-room and left his own, which was honestly -and civilly offered in compensation."[55] Still, though begun under -great provocation and marked at first by such orderly procedure, the -fatal effects of insubordination once indulged long remained, as in -a horse that has once felt his strength; while the self-control and -reasonableness of demand which distinguished the earlier movements lost -their sway. The later mutinies seriously endangered the State, and the -mutinous spirit survived after the causes which palliated it had been -removed. - -In meeting the needs of so great and widely scattered a naval force, -even with the best administration and economy, there could not but be -great deficiencies; and the exigencies of the war would not permit -ships to be recalled and refitted as often as the hard cruising -properly required. Still, by care and foresight, the equipment of the -fleet was maintained in sufficient and serviceable condition. In the -year 1783 a plan was adopted "of setting apart for every sea-going -ship a large proportion of her furniture and stores, as well as of -stocking the magazines at the several dockyards with imperishable -stores."[56] The readiness thus sought was tested, and also bettered, -by the two partial armaments of 1790 against Spain and of 1791 against -Russia; so that, when orders to arm were received in 1793, in a very -few weeks the ships-of-the-line in commission were increased from -twenty-six to fifty-four, and the whole number of ships of all sizes -from one hundred and thirty-six to over two hundred. The same care and -foresight was continued into the war. It was as much an object with -Great Britain to hinder the carriage of naval stores from the Baltic -to France as to get them herself, and there was reason to fear that -her seizure of ships so laden and bound to France would, as before, -bring on trouble with the northern States. "In 1796 the quantity of -naval stores remaining on hand was too small to afford a hope of their -lasting to the end of the war; but the government, foreseeing that a -rupture must ensue, provided an abundant supply of materials for naval -equipment; ship timber was imported from the Adriatic, masts and hemp -from North America, and large importations were made from the Baltic. -The number of British ships which passed the Sound in one year was -forty-five hundred, chiefly laden with naval stores, corn, tallow, -hides, hemp, and iron. At the same time the most rigid economy was -enforced in the dockyards and on board ships of war."[57] - -A bare sufficiency—to be eked out with the utmost care, turning -everything to account, working old stuff up into new forms—was the -economic condition of the British cruiser of the day. Under such -conditions the knack of the captain and officers made a large part of -the efficiency of the ship. "Some," wrote Collingwood, "who have the -foresight to discern what our first difficulty will be, support and -provide their ships as by enchantment; while others, less provident, -would exhaust a dockyard and still be in want." Of one he said: "He -should never sail without a storeship in company;" while of Troubridge -Nelson wrote that "he was as full of resources as his old 'Culloden' -was of defects." A lieutenant of the day mentions feelingly the -anxieties felt on dark nights and in heavy weather off the enemy's -coast, "doubting this brace or that tack," upon which the safety of the -ship might depend. The correspondence of Nelson often mentions this -dearth of stores. - -The condition of the two navies in these various respects being as -described, their comparative strength in mere numbers is given by -the British naval historian James, whose statement bears every mark -of careful study and accuracy. After making every deduction, the -British had one hundred and fifteen ships-of-the-line, and the French -seventy-six, when war was declared. The number of guns carried by these -ships was respectively 8718 and 6002; but the author claims that, in -consequence of the heavier metal of the French guns, the aggregate -weight of broadside, undoubtedly the fairest method of comparison, -of the line-of-battle in the two navies was 88,957 pounds against -73,957,—a preponderance of one sixth in favor of Great Britain.[58] -This statement is explicitly accepted by the French admiral, La -Gravière,[59] and does not differ materially from other French accounts -of the numerical strength of that navy at the fall of the monarchy. - -The navy of Spain then contained seventy-six ships-of-the-line, of -which fifty-six were in good condition.[60] Particular and detailed -accounts are wanting, but it may safely be inferred from many -indications scattered along the paths of naval records that the valid -strength fell very, very far below this imposing array of ships. The -officers as a body were inexpert and ignorant; the administration of -the dockyards partook of the general shiftlessness of the decaying -kingdom; the crews contained few good seamen and were largely swept -out of the streets, if not out of the jails. "The Spaniards at this -time," says La Gravière, "were no longer substantial enemies. At the -battle of St. Vincent there were scarcely sixty to eighty seamen in -each ship-of-the-line. The rest of the crews were made up of men wholly -new to the sea, picked up a few months before in the country or in the -jails, and who, by the acknowledgment of even English historians, when -ordered to go aloft, fell on their knees, crying that they would rather -be killed on the spot than meet certain death in trying so perilous a -service."[61] - -"The Dons," wrote Nelson in 1793, after a visit to Cadiz, "may make -fine ships,—they cannot, however, make men. They have four first-rates -in commission at Cadiz, and very fine ships, but shockingly manned. I -am certain if our six barges' crews, who are picked men, had got on -board of one of them, they would have taken her." "If the twenty-one -ships-of-the-line which we are to join off Barcelona are no better -manned than those at Cadiz, much service cannot be expected of them, -although, as to ships, I never saw finer men-of-war."[62] A few weeks -later he fell in with the twenty-one. "The Dons did not, after several -hours' trial, form anything that could be called a line-of-battle -ahead. However, the Spanish admiral sent down two frigates, acquainting -Lord Hood that, as his fleet was sickly nineteen hundred men, he was -going to Cartagena. The captain of the frigate said 'it was no wonder -they were sickly _for they had been sixty days at sea_.' This speech -appeared to us ridiculous, for, from the circumstance of our having -been longer than that time at sea do we attribute our getting healthy. -It has stamped with me the measure of their nautical abilities; long -may they remain in their present state."[63] In 1795, when Spain had -made peace with France, he wrote, "I know the French long since offered -Spain peace for fourteen ships-of-the-line fully stored. I take for -granted not manned, as that would be the readiest way to lose them -again." "Their fleet is ill-manned and worse officered, I believe; and -besides they are slow." "From the event of Spain making peace much may -be looked for,—perhaps a war with that country; if so, their fleet (if -no better than when our allies) will be soon done for."[64] - -Captain Jahleel Brenton, a distinguished British officer of that day, -being in Cadiz on duty before the war, sought and obtained permission -to return to England in a Spanish ship-of-the-line, the "St. Elmo," -with the express object of seeing the system of their service. He says, -"This ship had been selected as one in the best state of discipline -in the Spanish navy to be sent to England. She was commanded by Don -Lorenzo Goycochea, a gallant seaman who had commanded one of the junto -ships destroyed before Gibraltar in 1782. I had, during this voyage, an -opportunity of appreciating Spanish management at sea. When the ship -was brought under double-reefed topsails, it was considered superfluous -to lay the cloth for dinner; I was told by the captain that not one -officer would be able to sit at table, all being sea-sick, but that he -had ordered dinner to be got ready in his own cabin for himself and me. -It was the custom in the Spanish navy for the captain and officers to -mess together in the ward-room. We had thenceforth a very comfortable -meal together whenever the weather prevented a general meeting. As the -safe arrival of this ship was deemed of great importance (she carried -the Nootka Sound indemnity money), she had on board an English pilot to -enable her to approach the coast of England in safety. A few nights -before our arrival at Falmouth, the ship, having whole sails and -topping sails, was taken aback in a heavy squall from the north-east, -and I was awoke by the English pilot knocking at my cabin door, calling -out,'Mr. Brenton! Mr. Brenton! rouse out, sir; here is the ship -running away with these Spaniards!' When I got on deck I found this -literally the case. She was 'running away' at the rate of twelve knots, -and everything in confusion; she was indeed, to use the ludicrous -expression of a naval captain 'all adrift, like a French post-chaise.' -It required some hours to get things to rights."[65] - -Napoleon, in 1805, ordered Admiral Villeneuve to count two Spanish -ships as equal to one French; and the latter certainly were not equal, -ship for ship, to the British. It is only fair to add that he said of -the Spanish crews, speaking of Calder's action, that they fought like -lions. - -Holland, first the ally and afterwards the enemy of Great Britain in -the war, had forty-nine ships-of-the-line, but, owing to the shoalness -of her waters, they were mostly of light burden; many would not have -found a place in a British line-of-battle. The frigates were also of -small force. The condition of the ships being, besides, bad, the Dutch -navy was not an important factor on either side.[66] - -Portugal and Naples had, the one six, the other four, -ships-of-the-line, which, during the early years of the war, offered -a respectable support to the British Mediterranean fleet;[66] but the -advance of the French under Bonaparte into the two peninsulas reduced -these States to neutrality before the end of the century. - -The fleets of the Baltic powers and of Turkey played no part in the war -which would, at this time, require a particular consideration of their -strength. - - - - -CHAPTER III. - -THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1793. - - -The declaration of war against Great Britain was followed, on the -part of the National Convention, by an equally formal pronouncement -against Spain, on the 7th of March, 1793. Thus was completed the chain -of enemies which, except on the mountain frontier of Switzerland, -surrounded the French republic by land and sea. - -It is necessary to summarize the political and military condition, to -take account of the strategic situation at this moment when general -hostilities were opening, in order to follow intelligently the -historical narrative of their course, and to appreciate critically the -action of the nations engaged, both separately and, also,—in the case -of the allies,—regarded as a combined whole. - -The enemies of France were organized governments, with constitutions of -varying strength and efficiency, but all, except that of Great Britain, -were part of an order of things that was decaying and ready to vanish -away. They belonged to, and throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic -wars were hampered by, a past whose traditions of government, of social -order, and of military administration, were violently antagonized by -the measures into which France had been led by pushing to extremes -the philosophical principles of the eighteenth century. But while -thus at one in abhorring, as rulers, a movement whose contagion they -feared, they were not otherwise in harmony. The two most powerful on -the continent, Austria and Prussia, had alternately, in a not remote -past, sided with France as her ally; each in turn had sustained open -and prolonged hostilities with the other, and they were still jealous -rivals for preponderance in Germany. They entered the present war as -formal allies; but were unable, from mutual distrust and their military -traditions, to act in concert, or to take advantage of the disorganized -condition into which France had fallen, and from which the despotism of -the Convention had not yet raised her. Divergent lines of operations -were imposed upon them, not by military expediency, but by the want of -any unifying motive which could overcome their divergent ambitions. -The smaller States of Germany followed the two great powers, seeking -each from day to day its own safety and its own advantage in the -troubled times through which Europe was passing. Several of them had -associations with France as a powerful neighbor, who in the past had -supported them against the overbearing pretensions of the great German -monarchies. With the Convention and its social levelling they could -have no sympathy, but when a settled government succeeded the throes of -the Revolution the old political bias asserted itself against the more -recent social prejudice, and these weaker bodies again fell naturally -under French control. - -Spain under good government has, and at that crisis still more had, -a military situation singularly fitted to give her weight in the -councils of Europe. Compact and symmetrical in shape, with an extensive -seaboard not deficient in good harbors, her physical conformation and -remoteness from the rest of the Continent combined to indicate that her -true strength was to be found in a powerful navy, for which also her -vast colonial system imperiously called. Her maritime advantages were -indeed diminished by the jog which Portugal takes out of her territory -and coast line, and by the loss of Gibraltar. Lisbon, in the hands -of an enemy, interposes between the arsenals of Ferrol and Cadiz, -as Gibraltar does between the latter and Cartagena. But there was -great compensation in the extent of her territory, in her peninsular -formation, and in the difficult character of her only continental -frontier, the Pyrenees. Her position is defensively very strong; -and whenever events make France the centre of European interest, as -they did in 1793, and as the genius of that extraordinary country -continually tends to make her, the external action of Spain becomes -doubly interesting. So far as natural advantages go, her military -situation at the opening of the French revolution may be defined by -saying that she controlled the Mediterranean, and menaced the flank -and rear of France by land. Despite Gibraltar, her action was to -determine whether the British navy should or should not enter the -Mediterranean—whether the wheat of Barbary and Sicily should reach the -hungry people of southern France—whether the French fleet should leave -Toulon—whether the French army could advance against the Germans and -Piedmont, feeling secure as to the country behind it, then seething -with revolt. The political condition of Italy, divided like Germany -into many petty States, but unlike Germany in having no powerful -centres around which to gather, left to Spain, potentially, the control -of the Mediterranean. These advantages were all thrown away by bad -government and inefficient military institutions. The navy of Spain was -the laughing-stock of Europe; her finances depended upon the colonies, -and consequently upon control of the sea, which she had not; while, -between an embarrassed treasury and poor military administration, -her army, though at first under respectable leadership, made little -impression upon the yet unorganized levies of France, and an abject -peace soon closed an ignominious war. - -The path of Great Britain, as soon as she had determined to enter the -war, was comparatively clear, being indicated alike by the character -of her military strength and by her history during the past century. -Since the days of Charles II. she had been at times the ally, at times -the enemy, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Holland; she had, in her -frequent wars, found Spain at times neutral, at times hostile, in -neither case a very powerful factor; but, under all circumstances, -France had been her enemy, sometimes secret, usually open. Steeped in -this traditional hostility, both the British government and nation -with single eye fastened upon France as the great danger, and were not -diverted from this attitude of concentrated purpose by any jealousy of -the more powerful among their allies. Spain alone might have been an -unwelcome rival, as well as a powerful support, upon the watery plain -which Great Britain claimed as her own dominion. Spanish ships of war -were numerous; but the admiralty soon saw that the Spanish navy, from -the poor quality of its officers and men, could not seriously menace -British preponderance upon the ocean, although at times it might be -an awkward embarrassment, and even more so as a suspicious ally than -as an open foe. The co-operation of the two navies, however, at the -opening of the war effectually secured for the time the control of the -Mediterranean and of the approaches to southern France. - -Russia, although declaring openly against the French Revolution, took -no active part in the early military operations, except by a convention -made with Great Britain on the 25th of March, 1793, to interdict -the trade of France with the Baltic in grain and naval stores, as a -means of forcing her to peace. Russia was then busily engaged with -her projects against Poland, and a few days later, on the 9th of -April, 1793, an imperial ukase was issued incorporating parts of that -kingdom with the empire. This, with the Prussian decree of March 25, -consummated the second partition of Poland,—the result of a series -of aggressions by the two powers that had extended over the past two -years, and the intermediate step to the final partition in 1795. - -The smaller European States trimmed their course as best they could in -the great convulsion which, far beyond most wars, left little room for -neutrality. Sweden and Denmark strove hard to keep out of the turmoil -and to retain the commercial advantages reaped by neutral flags in -maritime wars. Their distance from the scene of the earlier strifes, -and the peninsular position of Sweden, enabled them long to avoid -actual hostilities; but the concurrence of Russia with Great Britain, -in the latter's traditional unwillingness to concede neutral claims, -deprived the smaller Baltic powers of the force necessary to maintain -their contentions. Holland, as of old, was divided between French and -British parties; but the latter, under the headship of the House of -Orange, in 1793, held the reins of government and directed the policy -of the State in accordance with the treaty of defensive alliance made -with Great Britain in 1788. The ultimate policy of the United Provinces -depended upon the fortune of the war. As France or her enemies -triumphed, so would the party in the State favorable to the victor be -retained in, or restored to, power. Neutrality was impossible to an -open continental country, lying so near such a great conflagration; -but, not to speak of the immediate dangers threatened by the attitude -of the French Convention and its decrees of November 19 and December -15, Holland, with her vast colonial system, had more to fear from the -navy of Great Britain, which had no rival, than from the armies of -France which, in 1793, were confronted by the most powerful military -States in Europe. At this time the United Provinces held, besides Java -and other possessions in the far East, various colonies in the West -Indies and South America, the island of Ceylon and the Cape of Good -Hope. The last two alone Great Britain has finally retained; but all -of them, as years went by, passed by conquest into her hands after -Holland, in 1795, became the dependent of France. - -Portugal retained her traditional alliance with Great Britain, and -so became a point of supreme importance when the secession of Spain -to France compelled the British navy to leave the Mediterranean. The -formal connection between the two countries was for a short time -severed by the genius and power of Napoleon; but, at the uprising of -Spain in 1808, the old sentiment, unbroken, resumed its sway, and -Portugal became the base of the British army, as in an earlier day she -had been the secure haven of the British fleet. - -In northern Italy the extent of Piedmont and its contiguity to the -Austrian duchies of Milan and Mantua gave the means of forming a -powerful focus of resistance to their common enemy, the French -republic, around which the smaller Italian States might feel secure -to rally; but the sluggishness and jealousies of the two governments -prevented the vigorous, combined action which alone could cope with -the energy impressed by the Convention upon its men. In the centre -of the peninsula, the Pope inevitably threw his immense spiritual -influence, as well as such temporal power as he could exercise, against -the revolution; while, in the south, the Bourbon kingdom of the Two -Sicilies, with its capital at Naples, was chiefly controlled by the -queen, herself a sister of Marie Antoinette. The military strength -of this kingdom, like that of Spain, was rendered contemptible by -miserable administration, and was further neutralized by its remoteness -from the seats of actual war; but the bias of the monarchy was -undoubted. Like all weak and corrupt governments, it shuffled and -equivocated under pressure and was false when the pressure was removed; -but, so far as it could, it favored the allied cause and was a useful -base to the British fleet in the Mediterranean. - -In the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish empire was not then the -element of recognized critical hazard to the whole European system -which it has since become; but its territorial limits were far wider -than they now are. Extending on the north to the Save and the Danube, -Turkey held also beyond the river Wallachia and Moldavia to the banks -of the Dniester, and, on the south, the present kingdom of Greece. The -islands of the Archipelago, with Crete and Cyprus, also belonged to -her. Syria and Egypt likewise acknowledged the authority of the Porte, -but in both the submission yielded was only nominal; the former, under -Djezzar Pasha, and the latter, under the Mamelukes, were practically -independent countries. At the outbreak of the French Revolution Turkey -had sunk to the lowest pitch of disorganization and impotence; and her -rulers, keenly feeling her condition and her danger from Russia, sought -to avoid entanglement in the troubles of western Europe, from which -their great enemy kept itself free. In this they were successful until -Bonaparte, by his attack upon Egypt, forced them from their security -and aroused Great Britain and Europe to their common interest in the -East. - -The islands of the western Mediterranean had not only the importance -common to all members of that geographical family in naval wars, nor -yet only that due to their intrinsic values. In so narrow a sheet of -water each possessed an added strategic weight due to its nearness, -either to some part of the mainland or to some one of the maritime -routes traversing the sea. The influence thus exerted would fall -naturally into the hands of the nation which, by controlling the water, -controlled the communications of the island; but this statement, -though generally true, is subject to limitations. The narrowness of -the belts of water, or, to use the military phrase, the shortness of -the communications from land to land, made evasion comparatively easy. -No navy, however powerful, can with certainty stop an intercourse -requiring only a night's run, and which, therefore, can be carried -on by very many small vessels, instead of having to be concentrated -into a few large ones; and this was doubly true in the days of sail, -when the smaller could have recourse to the oar while the larger lay -becalmed. Thus the British found it impossible to prevent French -partisans from passing into Corsica in 1796, when the victories of -Bonaparte had placed the French army in Leghorn; and at a later day -the emperor succeeded, though with infinite trouble, in sending -re-enforcements and supplies from southern Italy to his garrison in -Corfu, upon which his far-reaching genius hoped, in a distant future, -to base a yet further extension of power in the East. These instances, -however, were but the exception, and on the small scale demanded by the -other conditions; for the garrison of Corfu was few in number, and the -French found the Corsicans friendly. As the communications lengthened, -the influence of Sea-Power asserted itself. It was found impossible -to relieve Malta, or even to extricate the large vessels blockaded -there; and the French army in Egypt remained isolated until forced to -surrender, despite the efforts, the uncontrolled power, and the strong -personal interest of Bonaparte in the success of an occupation for -which he was primarily responsible. So also the narrow strip which -separates Sicily from Italy withstood the French arms; not because -it was impossible to send many detachments across, but because, to -support them in a hostile country, with such insecure communications, -was an undertaking more hazardous than was justified by the possible -advantages. - -The political distribution in 1793 of the islands of the western -Mediterranean was as follows. The most eastern, known as the Ionian -islands, extending southward from the entrance of the Adriatic along -the coast of Greece, from Corfu to Cerigo, were in possession of -Venice. When the ancient republic fell before the policy of Bonaparte, -in 1797, the islands passed to France and began that circulation from -owner to owner which ended in 1863 with their union to Greece. Sicily -formed part of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. It became the refuge -of that monarchy from the arms of France, and, by its fertility and -the use of its ports, was a resource to Great Britain throughout the -Napoleonic period. Malta was still in the hands of the Knights of St. -John. Of immense military importance, from its geographical position -and intrinsic strength, its transfer, through the medium of France, -into the hands of the greatest of naval powers was due to Bonaparte. -It is, perhaps, the greatest of Mediterranean strategic positions, -Egypt being rather interoceanic than Mediterranean; but, being of scant -resources, its utility is measured by the power of the fleet which -it subserves. Its fate when in the hands of France, the history of -Port Mahon in the hands of Great Britain, nay, even the glorious and -successful resistance of Gibraltar, give warning that the fleet depends -less upon Malta than Malta upon the fleet. - -Sardinia gave its name to the kingdom of which Piedmont, forming -the Italian frontier of France, was the actual seat, and Turin the -capital. Amid the convulsions of the period, the royal family, driven -from the mainland, found an obscure refuge in this large but backward -island. France could not touch it; Great Britain needed nothing but -the hospitality of its harbors. In Maddalena Bay, at its northern -extremity, Nelson found an anchorage strategically well-placed for -watching the Toulon fleet, and possessing that great desideratum for -a naval position, two exits, one or other of which was available -in any wind. The Balearic islands were in the hands of Spain. The -maritime importance of the other members of the group was dwarfed by -that of Minorca, which contained the harbor, exceptionally good for -the Mediterranean, of Port Mahon. Like Malta, though not to the same -extent, the fate of Port Mahon depends ultimately upon the sea. The -British took possession of the island in 1798, but restored it at the -peace of Amiens. In the later hostilities with Spain, from 1804 to -1808, they appear not to have coveted it. Maddalena Bay, though a less -agreeable and convenient anchorage than Mahon, is far better fitted for -prompt military movement, the prime requisite in the clear and sound -judgment of Nelson. - -Of the greater islands there remains to give account only of Corsica. -This was a recent acquisition of France, received from Genoa in 1769, -somewhat contrary to the wish of the people, who would have preferred -independence. They were certainly not yet assimilated to the French, -and there existed among them a party traditionally well-inclined to -Great Britain. The preponderance of this or of the other national -preference would be decisive of the final political connection; for -if the British navy did control the surrounding sea, it was unable, -as before said, entirely to isolate the island and so to compel an -unwilling submission. On the other hand, France could not introduce -any considerable body of troops, in the face of the hostile ships; and -her standard, if raised, would depend for support upon the natives. In -1793, there was at the head of affairs the old leader of the struggle -for independence, Paoli, who had passed many years in exile in England -and had been recalled to the island by the National Assembly; but the -excesses of the later days had shaken his allegiance to France, and -the commissioners sent by the Convention into Corsica made themselves -obnoxious to him and to the people. Denounced by the republicans of -Toulon, Paoli was summoned to the bar of the Convention in April, -1793. The Revolutionary Tribunal had then been constituted, the Reign -of Terror was begun; and Paoli, instead of complying, summoned the -deputies from all the cities and communes of Corsica. These met in May -and sustained him in his opposition; the revolt spread through the -island, and the Commissioners with their handful of adherents were shut -up in a few of the coast towns. - -Amid these surroundings stood, in the spring of 1793, the terrible and -awe-inspiring figure of the French Revolution. The Corsican revolt -against the Convention reflected but faintly the passions agitating -that body itself, and which were rapidly dividing all France into -hostile camps. The four months following the execution of the king were -one long strife between the party of the Gironde and the Jacobins; -but the revolutionary fury demanded an expression more vigorous and -more concentrated than could be had from a contest of parties in a -popular assembly. The Girondists, men of lofty sentiment rather than -of energetic action, steadily lost ground in the capital and in the -legislative body, though retaining the allegiance of the provinces, -with which they were identified. Embittered words and feelings took -material shape in acts as violent as themselves. On the 9th of March -was decreed the Revolutionary Tribunal, the great instrument of the -Terror, from whose decisions there was no appeal. On the 13th of the -same month, La Vendée rose for its long and bloody struggle in the -royal cause. On the 18th, the Army of the North, which only four weeks -before had invaded Holland, was signally defeated at Neerwinden, and -its general, Dumouriez, the victor of Valmy and Jemappes, the most -successful leader the war had yet produced, was forced to retreat -upon France. On the 30th, he evacuated the Austrian Netherlands, -the prize of the last campaign, and his army took positions within -the frontiers, upon which the enemy advanced. On the 1st of April, -Dumouriez, long since violently dissatisfied with the course of the -Convention, arrested the four commissioners and the minister of war -that had been sent to his headquarters. The next day he delivered them -to the Austrians; and on the 4th, finding that the blind attachment of -his army could no longer be depended upon, he completed his treason by -flying to the enemy. - -While disorganization, treason, and fear were spreading throughout -France, from the capital to the frontiers, and seemed about to -culminate in universal anarchy, an important measure was adopted, -destined eventually to restore discipline and order, though at the -expense of much suffering. On the 6th of April the Committee of Public -Safety was reconstituted. Composed previously of twenty-five members -who met in open session, it was now reduced to nine, a more manageable -body, who sat in secret. To it was given authority over the ministers, -and it was empowered to take all measures necessary for the general -defence. The republic was thus provided with an efficient, though -despotic, executive power which it had before lacked. The creature of -the Convention, it was destined soon to become its master; being, as a -French historian has aptly termed it, "a dictatorship with nine heads." - -Time was still needed for the new authority to make itself felt, and -the strife between the parties waxed more and more bitter. On the -15th of April the city of Lyon demanded permission to investigate the -conduct of the municipality appointed by the Jacobin commissioners. The -request, being denied, became the signal for civil war. On the 26th of -May the "sections" of the city rose against the mayor. At the same time -the scenes in Paris and in the Convention were becoming more and more -tumultuous, and on the 31st the sections of the capital also rose, but -against the Girondists. After two days of strife in the streets and in -the legislative halls, the Convention decreed the arrest, at their own -houses, of thirty-two members of the party. Thus, on the 2d of June, -1793, fell the Girondists, but their fall was followed by the revolt -of their partisans throughout France. Marseille, Toulon, Bordeaux and -Lyon all declared against the Convention; and movements in the same -direction were manifested in Normandy and Brittany. In the western -provinces, however, the attempts at resistance were chilled among the -republicans by the proximity of the royalist insurrection in La Vendée. -They were forced to reflect that armed opposition to the Convention, -even as mutilated by the events of June 2, was a virtual alliance with -royalism. In Bordeaux, likewise, the movement, though prolonged for -some weeks, did not take shape in vigorous action. Words, not arms, -were the weapons used; and the Girondist representatives were forced to -fly the very department from which they took their name. - -In the east and south conditions were far more threatening. The rising -of the sections in Lyon had been followed by fighting in the streets -on the 29th of May, and the triumphant party, after the events of -June 2, refused to acknowledge the Convention. The latter sought to -gain over the city peaceably; but its overtures were rejected, a -departmental army was formed, and the leading member of the Jacobin -party formally tried and executed. The Lyonnese also stopped supplies -being carried to the Army of the Alps. On the 12th of July a decree -was issued to reduce the place by force. The troops of the Convention -appeared before it in the latter part of the month; but resistance was -firm and well organized, and the siege dragged, while at the same time -the departments of the south in general rejected the authority of the -central government. The two seaboard cities, Marseille and Toulon, -entered into correspondence with Lord Hood, commanding the British -fleet, who arrived off the coast of Provence in the middle of August, -1793. The party of the Convention, favored by that want of vigor which -characterized most of the measures of their opponents, got possession -of Marseille before the treason was consummated; but in Toulon, which -had long suffered from the violence of a Jacobin municipality, the -reaction swung to the opposite extreme. A movement, beginning in -honest disgust with the proceedings in Paris and with the conduct of -the dominant party in their own city, insensibly carried its promoters -further than they had intended; until a point was reached from which, -before the savage spirit of the capital, it became dangerous to recede. -Long identified with the royal navy, as one of the chief arsenals of -the kingdom, there could not but exist among a large class a feeling -of loyalty to the monarchy. Submissive to the course of events so long -as France had a show of government, now, in the dissolution of civil -order, it seemed allowable to choose their own path. - -With such dispositions, a decree of the Convention declaring the -city outlawed enabled the royalists to guide the movement in the -direction they desired. The leading naval officers do not appear to -have co-operated willingly with the advances made to the British -admiral; but for years they had seen their authority undermined by -the course of the national legislature, and had become accustomed to -yield to the popular control of the moment. The news of the approach -of the Conventional army, accompanied by the rush into the place of -terror-stricken fugitives from Marseille, precipitated Toulon into the -arms of Great Britain. The sections declared that the city adopted -the monarchical government as organized by the Constituent Assembly -of 1789; proclaimed Louis XVII. king; ordered the disarmament of the -French fleet in the port, and placed in the hands of the British -admiral the works commanding the harbor. Lord Hood undertook that the -forts and ships should be restored unharmed to France, when peace was -made. On the 27th, the British and Spanish fleets anchored in the outer -harbor of Toulon, and the city ran up the white flag of the Bourbons. -There were in the port at the time of its delivery to the British -admiral thirty ships-of-the-line of seventy-four guns and upward, being -rather more than one third the line-of-battle force of the French navy. -Of these, seventeen were in the outer harbor ready for sea. There were, -besides, twenty-odd frigates or smaller vessels. - -While one of the principal naval arsenals of France, and the only one -she possessed on the Mediterranean, was thus passing into the hands -of the enemy, disasters were accumulating on her eastern borders. On -the 12th of July, the fortified town of Condé, on the Belgian frontier, -surrendered. This was followed on the 28th by the capitulation of the -first-class fortress of Valenciennes in the same locality, after six -weeks of open trenches. These two prizes fell to the allied Austrians, -British and Dutch, and their submission was followed by an advance of -the combined armies and retreat of the French. Shortly before, on the -22d of July, Mayence, a position of the utmost importance on the Rhine, -had yielded to the Prussians; and here also the enemy advanced into -the Vosges mountains and toward the upper Rhine, the French receding -gradually before them. The great inland city of Lyon was at the same -time holding out against the central government with a firmness which -as yet needed not the support of despair. In its resistance, and in the -scarce smothered discontent of the southern provinces, lay the chief -significance and utility of the British hold on Toulon. As a point upon -which insurrection could repose, by which it could be supported from -without, Toulon was invaluable; but with rebellion put down, surrounded -by a hostile army and shut up to itself, the city would become a -useless burden, unbearable from the demands for men which its extended -lines would make. Had La Vendée rested upon a Toulon, the task of the -republic would have been well-nigh hopeless. - -Among these multiplied disasters, with the Sardinians also operating -on the Alpine frontier and the Spaniards entering their country by -the eastern Pyrenees, France was confronted in every quarter by -disciplined armies to which she could as yet oppose only raw and ragged -levies. She found her safety in the stern energy of a legislature -which silenced faction by terror, in her central position, which of -itself separated from one another many of the centres of disturbance, -and in the military policy of the allies, which increased instead of -seeking to diminish the dissemination of force which was to some extent -unavoidable. The Spaniards could not combine with the Sardinians, -Toulon could not help Lyon, La Vendée had to stand apart from all the -others; but in the east it was possible for the Austrians, Prussians -and British to direct against the forces standing between them and -Paris a combination of effort which, in the then condition of the -French army, might have been irresistible. Instead of so doing, the -Austrians and British on the northeastern frontier decided, early in -August, to cease their advance and to separate; the Austrians sitting -down before Le Quesnoy, and the British undertaking to besiege the -seaport of Dunkirk. On the Rhine, the mutual jealousies of Austria -and Prussia, and the sluggish movements of routine generals, caused a -similar failure to support each other, and a similar dilatory action. - -The opportunities thus lost by the allies, and the time conceded to the -French, were improved to the full by the Committee of Public Safety and -by the commissioners sent from the Convention to the headquarters of -every army. Men, for the most part, without pity as without fear, their -administration, stained as it was with blood, was effectual to the -salvation of France. From the minister in the cabinet to the general in -the field, and down to the raw recruit forced from his home, each man -felt his life to depend upon his submission and his activity. In the -imminent danger of the country and the hot haste of men who worked not -only under urgent pressure, but often with a zeal as blindly ignorant -as it was patriotic, many blunders and injustices were committed; but -they attained the desired end of impressing the resistless energy -of the Convention upon each unit of the masses it was wielding. If -ever, for good or ill, men had the single eye, it was to be found in -the French soldiers of 1793, as they starved and bled and died that -the country might live. Given time,—and the allies gave it,—units -animated by such a spirit, and driven forward by such an impetus as -the Committee knew how to impart, were soon knit into an overpowering -organism, as superior in temper as they were in numbers to the trained -machines before them. - -Where there was conscious life to feel enthusiasm or fear, the -contagion of the rulers' temper caught; but the fiery spirit of the -Convention could not possess the stately ships of war that floated in -the ports of the republic, nor make them yield, to the yet unskilled -hands of the new officers, the docile obedience which their old masters -had commanded from those beautiful, delicately poised machines. It was -a vain hope to conjure victory at sea by harsh decrees,[67] pitched -in unison to the passions of the times, but addressed to men whose -abilities did not respond to their own courage nor to the calls thus -made upon them. To the inexperience of the officers was added the -further difficulty of the indiscipline of the crews, that had increased -to a ruinous extent during the four years' paralysis of the executive -government. With the triumph of the Jacobin party had now come a -unity which, however terrible, was efficient. In September, 1793, -in the mutiny of the Brest fleet in Quiberon Bay, the seamen again -prevailed over their officers, and even over the commissioner of the -Convention; but it was the last flagrant outburst. The past weakness -of other authorities had played into the hands of the Mountain; now -that the latter was supreme, it resolutely enjoined and soon obtained -submission. Years of insubordination and license had, however, sapped -the organization and drill of the crews; and the new officers were not -the men to restore them. The Convention and its commissioners therefore -lacked the proper instruments through which they could impart direction -as well as energy to the movement of the fleet. Ships were there and -guns, men also to handle the one and fight the other; but between -these and the government was needed an adequate official staff, which -no longer existed. The same administrative weakness that had allowed -discipline to perish, had also entailed upon the naval arsenals the -penury of resources that was felt everywhere in the land. From all -these circumstances arose an impotence which caused the year 1793 to be -barren of serious naval effort on the part of France. - -Great Britain herself was in this first year of war unprepared to -take a vigorous initiative. In 1792 she had in commission at home -but twelve ships-of-the-line, and but sixteen thousand seamen were -allowed for the fleet. Not till December 20, six weeks only before -the declaration of war, did Parliament increase these to twenty-five -thousand, a number less than one fourth that employed in the last year -of the American war. In the Mediterranean and in the colonies there -was not then present a single ship-of-the-line, properly so called. -Fortunately, of the one hundred and thirteen actually borne on the roll -of the line-of-battle as cruising ships, at the beginning of 1793, -between eighty and ninety were reported in good condition, owing to -the two alarms of war in 1790 and 1791; and provident administration -had kept on hand in the British dockyards the necessary equipments, -which had disappeared from those of France. More difficulty was -experienced in manning than in equipping; but at the end of 1793, there -were eighty-five of the line actually in commission. From twenty to -twenty-five were allotted to the Channel fleet, cruising from thence -to Cape Finisterre, under the command of Lord Howe; a like number to -the Mediterranean under Lord Hood; and from ten to twelve to the West -Indies. A reserve of twenty-five ships remained in the Channel ports, -Portsmouth and Plymouth, ready for sea, and employed, as occasion -demanded, for convoys, to fill vacancies of disabled ships in the -cruising fleets, or to strengthen the latter in case of special need. - -The mobilization of the fleet, though energetic when once begun, -was nevertheless tardy, and Great Britain had reason to be thankful -that years of civil commotion and executive impotence had so greatly -deteriorated the enemy's navy, and also, at a critical moment, had -thrown so large a portion of it into her hands at Toulon. With a widely -scattered empire, with numerous exposed and isolated points, with a -smaller population and an army comparatively insignificant in numbers, -war with France threw her—and must inevitably always throw her—at first -upon the defensive, unless she could at once lay her grasp firmly upon -some vital chord of the enemy's communications, and so force him to -fight there. She could not assume the offensive by landing on French -soil. No force she could send would be capable of resisting the numbers -brought against it, much less of injuring the enemy; nor should the -flattering hopes of such a force serving as a nucleus, round which to -crystallize French rebellion, have been suffered to delude her, after -the bitter deceptions of the recent American struggle. What hopes had -not Great Britain then based upon old loyalty, and upon discontent -with the new order of things! Yet, though such discontent undoubtedly -existed—and that among men of her own race recently her subjects—the -expeditions sent among them rallied no decisive following, kindled no -fire of resistance. The natives of the soil, among whom such a force -appears, either view it with jealous suspicion or expect it to do all -the work; not unfrequently are both jealous and inactive. It is well, -then, to give malcontents all the assistance they evidently require -in material of war, to keep alive as a diversion every such focus of -trouble, to secure wherever possible, as at Toulon, a fortified port -by which to maintain free entrance for supplies to the country of the -insurgents; but it is not safe to reckon on the hatred of the latter -for their own countrymen outweighing their dislike for the foreigner. -It is not good policy to send a force that, from its own numbers, is -incapable of successful independent action, relying upon the support -of the natives in a civil war. Such support can never relieve such -expeditions from the necessity, common to all military advances, of -guarding their communications while operating on their front; which -is only another way of saying again that such expeditions, to be -successful, must be capable of independent action adequate to the end -proposed. Risings, such as occurred in many quarters of France in 1793, -are useful diversions; but a diversion is only a subordinate part in -the drama of war. It is either a deceit, whose success depends rather -upon the incapacity of the opponent than upon its own merits; or it -is an indirect use of forces which, from their character or position, -cannot be made to conduce directly to the main effort of the enterprise -in hand. To enlarge such diversions by bodies of troops which might be -strengthening the armies on the central theatre of war is a mistake, -which increases in ever greater proportion as the forces so diverted -grow more numerous.[68] - -Offensive action of this character was therefore forbidden to Great -Britain. To use small bodies for it was impolitic; and large bodies she -had not to send. To strike a direct blow at France, it was necessary -to force her to come out of her ports and fight, and this was to be -accomplished only by threatening some external interests of vital -importance to her. Such interests of her own, however, France had not. -Her merchant shipping, in peace, carried less than one third of her -trade, and was at once hurried into her ports when war began. Her West -India colonies had indeed been valuable, that of Haïti very much so; -but the anarchy of the past four years had annihilated its prosperity. -There remained only to strike at her communications, through neutrals, -with the outside world, and this was to be accomplished by the same -means as most surely conduced to the defence of all parts of the -British empire,—by taking up positions off the French coast, and -drawing the lines as closely as the exigencies of the sea and the law -of nations would permit. If possible, in order to stop commerce by -neutral vessels, a blockade of the French coast, similar to that of the -Southern Confederacy by the United States, would have been the most -suitable measure to adopt; but the conditions were very different. The -weather on the coast of the Southern States is much more moderate; the -heaviest gales blow along shore, whereas, in the Bay of Biscay, they -blow dead on shore; and there was almost everywhere good, sometimes -even sheltered, anchorage, which was not generally to be had on the -coast of France. Finally, while steam certainly helps both parties, the -inside and the out, the latter profits the more by it, for he can keep -in with the shore to a degree, and for a length of time, impossible -to the sailing ship; the necessity of gaining an offing _before_ a -gale comes on, and the helpless drifting during its continuance, not -existing for the steamer. - -Despite, therefore, the decisions of the courts, that a blockade was -not technically removed when the ships maintaining it were driven -off by weather; a blockade of the whole French coast does not seem -to have been contemplated by the British ministry. Its offensive -measures against French commerce were consequently limited to the -capture of property belonging to French subjects, wherever found -afloat, even under neutral flags; and to the seizure of all contraband -goods destined to France, to whomsoever they belonged. Both these -were conceded to be within the rights of a belligerent by the United -States and Great Britain; but the latter now endeavored to stretch the -definition of contraband to a degree that would enable her to increase -the pressure upon France. She claimed that naval stores were included -in the category,—a position the more plausible at that time because, -the French merchant ships being unable to go to sea, the stores must -be for the navy,—and further, that provisions were so. Though these -arguments were hotly contested by neutrals, the British navy was strong -enough to override all remonstrances; and the dearth of provisions did -force the Brest fleet out in 1794, and so led directly to the first -great naval battle of the war. - -It cannot be considered a satisfactory result, nor one evincing -adequate preparation, that the Channel fleet, to which belonged the -protection of the approaches to the Channel,—the great focus of British -trade,—to which also was assigned the duty of watching Brest, the chief -French arsenál on the Atlantic, did not get to sea till July 14, and -then only to the number of fifteen ships-of-the-line. A French fleet -of similar size had sailed from Brest six weeks before, on the 4th -of June, and taken a position in Quiberon Bay, off the coast of La -Vendée, to intercept assistance to the insurgents of that province. -The command of the Channel fleet was given to Lord Howe, an officer -of very high character for activity and enterprise in previous wars, -but now in his sixty-eighth year. Age had in no sense dulled his -courage, which was as steadfast and well-nigh as impassive as a rock, -nor impaired his mental efficiency; but it may be permitted to think -that time had exaggerated and hardened a certain formal, unbending -precision of action which distinguished him, and that rigid uniformity -of manœuvre had become exalted in his eyes from a means to an end. This -quality, however, joined to an intimate knowledge of naval tactics, -eminently fitted him for the hard and thankless task of forming into a -well-drilled whole the scattered units of the fleet, which came to him -unaccustomed, for the most part, to combined action. - -Lord Howe brought also to his command a strong predisposition, closely -allied with the methodical tendency just noted, to economize his fleet, -by keeping it sparingly at sea and then chiefly for purposes of drill -and manœuvre. Its preservation in good condition was in his eyes a -consideration superior to taking up the best strategic position; and he -steadily resisted the policy of continuous cruising before the ports -whence the enemy must sail, alleging that the injury received in heavy -winter weather, while the French lay at anchor inside, would keep the -British force constantly inferior. The argument, though plausible and -based on undoubted facts, does not justify the choice of a position -clearly disadvantageous with reference to intercepting the enemy. War -presents constantly a choice of difficulties, and when questions of -material come in conflict with correct strategic disposition they must -give way. The place for the British fleet, as reflection shows and -experience proved, was before the hostile arsenals; or, allowably, if -such a position could be found, in a port flanking the route along -which the enemy must pass. For the Channel fleet no such port offered; -and in keeping it at Spithead, far in rear of the French point of -departure, Howe exposed himself to the embarrassment of their getting -away while he remained in ignorance of the fact until too late to -intercept, and with imperfect knowledge in what direction to follow. -The only solution of the difficulty that the British government should -have adopted was to maintain a reserve of ships, large enough to keep -the necessary numbers of efficient vessels cruising in the proper -station. The experience gained by such constant practice, moreover, -improved the quality of the men more than it injured the ships. -Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with -good ships; over and over again the French Revolution taught this -lesson, which our own age, with its rage for the last new thing in -material improvement, has largely dropped out of memory. - -The embarrassment arising from the British fleet being in a Channel -port received singular, perhaps even exceptional, illustration in -the French expedition against Ireland in 1796. It has been said that -that expedition would have succeeded in landing its force had it had -steam; it would be more just to say that it would never have come so -near succeeding had the British fleet been cruising in the station -which strategic considerations would prescribe.[69] There is also a -certain indefinable, but real, deterioration in the _morale_ of a fleet -habitually in port, compared with one habitually at sea; the habit -of being on the alert and the habit of being at rest color the whole -conduct of a military force. This was keenly realized by that great -commander, Lord St. Vincent, and concurred with his correct strategic -insight to fix his policy of close-watching the enemy's ports. "I will -not lie here," he wrote from Lisbon in December, 1796, "a moment longer -than is necessary to put us to rights; for you well know that inaction -in the Tagus must make us all cowards."[70] Doubtless this practice of -lying at anchor in the home ports contributed to the impunity with -which French cruisers swept the approaches to the Channel during much -of 1793 and 1794. - -The policy of Lord Howe combined with the crippled state of the French -navy to render the year 1793 barren of striking maritime events -in the Atlantic. In the interior of France and on her frontiers, -amid many disasters and bloody tyranny, the saving energy of the -fierce revolutionary government was making steady headway against -the unparalleled difficulties surrounding it. After the ill-judged -separation of the British and Austrians in August, the latter had -succeeded in reducing Le Quesnoy, which capitulated on the 11th of -September; but there their successes ended. Carnot, recently made a -member of the Committee of Public Safety and specially charged with -the direction of the war, concerted an overwhelming attack upon the -British before Dunkirk, and raised the siege on the 9th of September; -then, by a similar concentration upon the Austrians, now engaged in -besieging Maubeuge, he caused their defeat at the battle of Wattignies, -October 16, and forced them to retreat from before the place. In the -north-east, both the allies and the French went into winter quarters -early in November; but the prestige of a resistance that grew every day -more efficient remained with the latter. On the eastern frontier also, -after protracted fighting, the year closed with substantial success for -them. The Prussians of the allied forces in that quarter retreated from -all their advanced positions into Mayence; the Austrians retired to the -east bank of the Rhine. Each of the allies blamed the other for the -unfortunate issue of the campaign; and the veteran Duke of Brunswick, -commanding the Prussians, sent in his resignation accompanied with -predictions of continued disaster. At the same time the king of Prussia -began to manifest the vacillating and shameless policy which made -his country the byword of Europe during the next twelve years, and -betrayed clearly his purpose of forsaking the coalition he had been -so forward in forming. On the Spanish frontiers, the fortune of war -was rather against the French, who were embarrassed by the necessity -of concentrating all the force possible upon the siege of Toulon; -the recovery of that port being urgently required for the national -honor, as well as for the maritime interests of the republic in the -Mediterranean. - -It was, however, in restoring internal submission and asserting -the authority of the central government that the most substantial -results of 1793 were attained. The resistance of the Vendeans, long -successfully protracted through the blunders and lack of unity among -the republican leaders, began to yield, as more concentrated effort was -imparted by the reconstituted Committee of Public Safety. After the -battle of Cholet, October 16, the insurgents, routed and in despair, -determined to leave their own country, cross the Loire, and march -into Brittany. They traversed the latter province slowly, fighting -as they went, and on the 12th of November reached Granville on the -Channel coast, where they hoped to open communications with England. -Their assault on the town failed, and as the hoped-for ships did not -arrive, they started back for La Vendée; but as a coherent body they -never recrossed the Loire, and a pitched battle, fought December 22, -at Savenay, on the north bank, completed their dispersion. The embers -of the civil war continued to burn in La Vendée and north of the Loire -during the following year; but as a general insurrection, wielding -large bodies of fighting men, it had ceased to be formidable to the -nation and wrought its chief harm to the province which supported it. - -The great stronghold of resistance in the east, Lyon, fell on the 9th -of October. Despite the disaffection which had existed in the south -and east, the commissioners of the government were able, without -opposition, to collect round the city a body of men sufficient, -first, to cut off its communications with the surrounding country, -and, finally, to carry the works commanding the place. A spirit of -discontent so feeble as to acquiesce tamely in the reduction of one of -its chief centres gave no hope of support to any efforts made through -Toulon by the allied forces; and the capitulation of Lyon showed that -the port was not worth the cost of keeping, and at the same time -released a large number of men to give activity to the siege. Toward -the end of November, over twenty-five thousand republican troops were -collected round the place. On the night of the 16th of December, -the forts on a promontory commanding the anchorage for fleets were -carried by assault. A council of war among the allies decided that -the ships could not remain, and that the garrison could not hold out -with its communications to the sea cut off. It therefore determined to -evacuate the place, and on the 19th the British and Spaniards departed. -Before sailing, an attempt was made to destroy both the dockyard and -all the French ships that could not be taken away; but the danger -threatening from the commanding positions that had now fallen to the -enemy was so great, the necessity for quick departure so urgent, and -so much had consequently to be done in a very limited time, that the -proposed destruction was but imperfectly effected. Of twenty-seven -French ships-of-the-line still in Toulon, nine were burned and three -accompanied the retreat. The remaining fifteen constituted the nucleus -of a powerful force, and most of them appear in the fleet which went -with Bonaparte to Egypt and was there destroyed by Nelson in 1798.[71] - -The loss of Toulon, after the extravagant hopes excited by its -surrender, gave rise to much complaint in England. It is improbable, -however, that its retention, even if feasible, would have been -beneficial. The expenditure of men and money necessary to hold a -seaport surrounded by enemy's territory, and commanded by a long line -of heights which had to be occupied, would have been out of proportion -to any result likely to follow. The communications, being by sea only, -would ultimately depend upon Great Britain as the power best able to -insure them and most interested in a naval position; and the distance -to England was great. The utter lack of dependence to be placed -upon local discontent, as an element in the usefulness of Toulon to -the allied cause, had been shown by the failure to support Lyon and -by the tame submission made in the southern provinces to the petty -Conventional army sent against them. The country, moreover, was in 1793 -wasted by dearth; and had there been in Toulon an allied force large -enough to advance, it would have had to depend absolutely upon immense -accumulations of food in the port. So great was the scarcity, that the -French at one time thought of abandoning the siege on that account. In -short, Toulon had, for the British, the disadvantage of great distance, -far greater than Gibraltar, without the latter's advantages of -strategic position and easy defence; and its occupation by them would -have caused jealousy among the Mediterranean powers and introduced more -discord into a coalition already mutually suspicious. - -From Toulon Hood retired to Hyères Bay, a sheltered roadstead a few -miles east of Toulon, where the end of the year found him still lying. -Lord Howe took the Channel fleet into port in the middle of December, -and there remained until the following May. Thus ended the maritime -year 1793. - - NOTE (to page 98). The Peninsular War, in its inception, was - justified, not because the odds were favorable, but because there - was a "fighting" chance of great results; just as there was at - Toulon, where the attempt failed. The distinguished historian of - that war claims that the British wrought the work of deliverance; - and, after making every allowance for national prejudice, which in - his case was certainly not undiscriminating, the general failure, - except where the British arms were felt, may be taken to establish - a fact which the disorganized state of Spain herself would alone - render probable. The course of war in the west of the peninsula, - where the British were, shows conclusively the limitations imposed - upon the military enterprises of a state having a relatively - small army with a great navy. Having landed in April, 1809, - Wellesley, notwithstanding his genius and brilliant successes, - notwithstanding the state of the peninsula, and notwithstanding, - also, the immense length and difficulty of the French lines of - communication, was still, in March, 1811, shut up within the - lines of Torres Vedras; that is, he was simply holding on at - Lisbon, unable to keep the country against the French. In external - appearance, the military situation was just the same as at the - beginning. The reasons for holding on were the same in character - as in 1809; but the chances of success had become distinctly - greater, owing to political and economical considerations, and - to the extreme care and foresight by which the British leader - had made his position round Lisbon inexpugnable. Nevertheless, - the retreat and ultimate disaster of the French were due to the - military difficulties of their enterprise, well understood and - carefully improved by Wellington, and to the unmeasured political - combinations of the emperor,—not to the power of the British army - in Portugal, which, though admirable in quality and leadership, - was very inferior in numbers. In the last analysis it was the - emperor's Continental System, directed against the Sea Power of - England, which gave to the army of England in the Peninsula the - opportunity by which alone the weaker force can profitably assume - the offensive. It is not a lessening, but a heightening, of the - merit of the great Englishman, to say that he had the genius to - foresee that the opportunity, though distant, must come, and the - courage to hold on till it came. - - It is instructive to note the essential military resemblances - between the British invasion of the Peninsula, which was finally - crowned with success, and Napoleon's projected invasion of - England, which came to nought. In the one case, a navy supreme on - the ocean and a small military force; in the other, an unrivalled - army, and a navy very inferior because of its quality. In each, - the chances were largely against success. In each, the enterprise, - strictly offensive in character by the inferior force, hinged - upon the occurrence of the favorable opportunity, which it was - the part of the offence to contrive and of the defence to - prevent. That there was, in both cases, a long waiting of nearly - equal duration is a fortuitous coincidence; but the attitude of - unremitting watchfulness and constant readiness, in a skilfully - chosen position, is the distinctive characteristic imposed upon - the inferior force which hopes to escape from a mere defensive - posture, and, by striking a blow, to make itself felt in the - lists of war. The opportunity never came to Napoleon, because the - British leaders never took their eyes off his fleet, upon which - his profound combinations depended as an arch upon its keystone. - It came to Wellington because the emperor turned his attention - from the Peninsula, of whose troubles he was weary, and opposed - inadequate means and divided commands to a single alert enemy. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -THE WEST INDIES, 1793-1810. - - -Among the leading objects contemplated by the British ministry in -this war was the control of the East and West Indies, particularly of -the latter, as among the most important sources as well as markets -of British trade. In the present day, the value of the West India -islands, and of all positions in the Caribbean Sea, is chiefly military -or maritime; due less to the commerce they maintain than to their -relations, as coaling ports or fortified stations, to the commercial -routes passing through that region. It is scarcely necessary to add -that whatever importance of this character they now possess will be -vastly increased when an interoceanic canal is completed. During the -French revolution, however, the islands had a great commercial value, -and about one fourth the total amount of British commerce, both export -and import, was done with them. This lucrative trade Great Britain -had gathered into her hands, notwithstanding the fact that other -nations owned the largest and richest of the islands, as well as those -producing the best sugar and coffee. The commercial aptitudes of the -British people, the superior quality of their manufactures, their -extensive merchant shipping and ingenious trade regulations, conspired -to make it the interest of the foreign colonists to trade with them, -even when by so doing the laws of their own governments were defied; -and to a great extent the British free ports engrossed the West Indian -trade, as well as that to the adjacent South and Central American -coasts, known as the Spanish Main. - -In war, the control of a maritime region depends upon naval -preponderance. When the opposing navies are of nearly equal strength, -it is only by open battle, and by the reduction of one to a state of -complete inferiority, that control can be asserted. If the region -contested be small and compact, as, for instance, the immediate -approaches to the English Channel, the preponderance of the fleet alone -will determine the control and the safety of the national commerce -within its limits; but if it be extensive, the distance between centres -great, and the centres themselves weak, the same difficulties arise -that are felt in maintaining order in a large and sparsely settled -territory on land, as has till very lately been the case in our western -Territories. In such circumstances the security of the traveller -depends upon the government putting down nests of lawlessness, and -establishing, at fitting stations, organized forces, that can by their -activity insure reasonable safety in all directions. - -In the War of the French Revolution, it soon, though not immediately, -became evident, that the British navy could everywhere preponderate in -force over its enemy; but it could not be omnipresent. The Caribbean -Sea offered conditions peculiarly favorable to marauders, licensed or -unlicensed; while its commercial value necessitated the preservation, -and, as far as possible, the monopoly, of so fruitful a source of -revenue. The presence of hostile cruisers not only inflicted direct -loss, which was measured by their actual captures, but, beyond these, -caused a great indirect injury by the friction and delays which the -sense of insecurity always introduces into commercial transactions. The -ideal aim of the British ministry was to banish the enemy's cruisers -absolutely from the region; but, if this was impossible, very much -might be effected by depriving them of every friendly anchorage to -which they could repair to refit or take their prizes,—in short, by -capturing all the French islands. This would put an end to the myriads -of very small craft, which, being able to keep the sea but for a few -days, depended absolutely upon a near base; and would greatly cripple -the operations of the larger vessels by throwing them, for supplies -and refuge, upon the United States, which then extended a benevolent -partiality to French cruisers and their prizes. - -The French islands had vividly reflected during the past four years -the movements and passions of the mother-country; but only in Haïti -did the turbulence, extending through all classes of society until it -ended in a servile insurrection, result in destroying the control of -the home government. The disorder, amounting often to anarchy, which -prevailed through the French part of the island, somewhat simplified -the problem before Great Britain. It was the only base of operations to -the westward then available for French cruisers; and, though too large -to admit the thought of conquest under the climatic conditions with -the force that could be spared for such an attempt, it was possible, -without serious opposition, to occupy many of the ports commanding the -principal trade routes. Such occupation deprived the enemy of their -use, converted them into harbors of refuge for British commerce, and -made them centres for the operations of British cruisers. Unfortunately -the government, misled by the representations of French planters who -saw their property threatened with destruction, conceived the hope of -an easy conquest, or rather transfer of allegiance in the colony. In -pursuance of this idea, several places were taken into possession, -being either delivered or captured with an ease that showed how -readily, in the then disorganized state of the island, most of the -seaports could have been secured; but the motive being conquest, and -not merely maritime control, the choice of objectives was decided -by political or military, instead of maritime, considerations. The -expected local native support followed the general rule noted in the -last chapter, and proved futile; while yellow fever wasted the troops -condemned to excessive exertion and exposure in so sickly a clime. - -Had simple maritime advantages guided the British counsels, it would -have been sufficient to note that Jamaica was the great centre of -British interests in the western Caribbean; that outward-bound ships, -entering the Caribbean through the eastern, or Windward, Islands, ran -down with the trade wind along the south side of Haiti, where were two -harbors, Aux Cayes and Jacmel, favorable as bases for privateers; and -that the homeward trade passed through the Windward Passage, between -Haïti and Cuba, which was flanked by two Haïtian ports, Tiburon to the -south and Mole St. Nicolas on the north. These four were, therefore, -particularly dangerous to British trade, and consequently, so far as -position went, particularly advantageous if in British occupation. It -is true that the topographical conditions of the ground about a seaport -in an enemy's country may make the occupation very hazardous, except by -the employment of more men than can be had; as was the case at Mole St. -Nicolas, where the fortifications of the place itself were commanded by -the surrounding heights. Yet it remained in the hands of the British -from 1793 to 1798; and it may be believed that their interests would -have been well served by strongly garrisoning these ports.[72] At -the least they would so be lost to French cruisers. Instead of this, -with the idea of conquest, the wholly insufficient forces sent were -pushed down to the bottom of the bight of Gonaives, and the southern -coast of the island was left in the enemy's hands. It is not desirable -to give in detail the history of these petty military operations, nor -of the civil commotions with which they were connected. Suffice it to -say, that the course of events finally threw the government into the -hands of a pure negro, Toussaint L'Ouverture. He continued to hold -it till the Peace of Amiens, in 1802; and with him the British, in -1798, concluded a treaty by which they finally abandoned the island. -Though the scheme of conquest had failed, their interference had opened -the country to British trade and caused the loss of Haïti to France, -by contributing to the rise of Toussaint, the negro most capable of -leading his race. He still professed fidelity to the mother-country, -but he acted as one possessing independent power. The British, by the -treaty, recognized the island as a neutral territory, and Toussaint, on -his part, permitted them as well as neutral ships to trade with it.[73] -He also prohibited the sailing of privateers from ports of Haïti, as -they seriously interfered with its commerce.[74] Under his strong and -wise administration the prosperity of the island greatly revived, -though without attaining the proportions of former days. - -The islands known as the Lesser Antilles, which extend from Porto Rico -in a southerly direction to Trinidad and form the eastern boundary of -the Caribbean, are, from their small size, much more dependent than -is Haïti or Cuba upon the control of the sea. Though the aggregate -commercial value of the whole group was far inferior to that of the -French part alone of Haïti, they had a distinct military advantage -which made them, in that point of view and to the West Indies, more -important than Haïti itself. They were to windward of the whole -Caribbean with reference to the trade winds, which blow unceasingly -from east to west; and hence were much nearer in time, that supreme -factor in military combinations, to the great western islands than the -latter were to them. The same circumstance of the trade wind threw -them across the path of vessels bound from Europe to all parts of the -Caribbean, and thus facilitated the intercepting of supplies essential -to the support and industries of the islands, for much of which they -depended upon the mother-countries. - -The largest, by far, of these islands, Trinidad, belonged in 1793 to -Spain, at that time the ally of Great Britain. Its nearness to the -South American continent gave it, as a distributing centre, marked -commercial advantages, of which the unenterprising Spaniards made -little use; but, as the trade winds blow from the north of east, it -was not favorably placed for a naval station. The two next in size, -and among the most fertile, Guadaloupe and Martinique, were French -islands. Being in the centre of the chain and to leeward of none, -except the outlying English Barbadoes, they were admirably situated -for military control, and the strategic advantage of position was -supplemented by the defensive strength of Fort Royal (now Fort de -France), the principal harbor of Martinique; which was then, as it is -now, by far the most powerful naval position in the eastern Caribbean. -Besides them, France owned Santa Lucia, next south of Martinique, -and Tobago. The military importance of these islands, combined with -a distinct though minor commercial value, and the experience in past -wars of the injury done to British commerce by privateering based -upon them, made their reduction advisable to Great Britain; to whom -belonged most of the other Lesser Antilles as well as the trade of the -Caribbean. One of the first acts of the war, before sending a vessel -to the Mediterranean or increasing the Channel fleet, was to despatch -a squadron of seven sail-of-the-line to the West Indies, where there -were at that time, except a few small cruisers, but two fifty-gun -ships, one at Jamaica and one to windward,—a thousand miles apart. No -fact shows more strongly how unprepared Great Britain was for war than -the naval destitution of this region, at a time when France had three -or four ships-of-the-line continually in her colonies. This British -squadron sailed under the command of Admiral Gardner on the 24th of -March, 1793; and there was a strong expectation that Martinique and -Guadaloupe, which had hoisted the old royal standard of France upon -learning the deposition of Louis XVI., would place themselves under -British protection. This hope was disappointed, they having already -resumed their republican allegiance, and Gardner returned to England in -the fall, leaving a part of his squadron behind. - -It was then decided to reduce the French islands by force, and on -the 26th of November Sir John Jervis, afterwards Earl St. Vincent, -sailed with a small force of ships-of-war carrying seven thousand -troops destined for this service. Reaching Barbadoes in January, the -expedition appeared off Martinique on the 5th of February, 1794, and -after a series of successful operations the island capitulated on the -22d of March. A detachment was next sent against Santa Lucia, which -was surrendered on the 4th of April. On the 10th of the same month the -combined naval and military forces anchored off Guadaloupe, and on -the 20th this island, with its off-lying dependencies, Marie-Galante, -Desirade and the Saints, also submitted. Tobago having been seized with -slight resistance in April, 1793, Great Britain was now in possession -of all the hostile Windward Islands, except the petty St. Martin, part -of which belonged to France. A considerable detachment of troops -was next sent to Mole St. Nicolas to assist the undertaking against -Haïti; a reduction of the force in the Windward Islands which led to -disastrous consequences, felt throughout the war by the islands and -commerce of Great Britain. For on the 3d of June, when the British -commanders had departed leaving a garrison in Guadaloupe, there -appeared off the coast a division of ships, two being frigates and the -others transports, which had left France in April, before the loss of -the colonies was known. Landing without opposition, they established -themselves firmly and gained possession of half the island before -Jervis and Grey could appear. The struggle continued with varying -fortunes during the following six months, but the British continually -lost ground and wasted with yellow fever. This dire disease told -likewise severely on the new French arrivals, but these found a native -Creole population of nearly six thousand, the larger part of whom -were faithful to the republic; whereas their enemies, out of a total -original force of seven thousand, had, besides losses in battle and -by disease, been obliged to spare garrisons for the captured islands -and a detachment to Haïti. These causes alone would seem sufficient to -account for the recapture of the island; but the utmost credit must -at the same time be allowed to the French officers concerned, and -especially to the commissioner of the Convention, Victor Hugues, who -accompanied the expedition. This man, who had at Rochefort filled the -rôle of public accuser, which in Paris gained for Fouquier Tinville a -hideous immortality, seems to have embodied in himself the best and -worst features of the men of the Terror, whose fate he escaped by -leaving France betimes. In his report to the Convention he boasted of -having put to death twelve hundred royalists in Guadaloupe. This horror -partakes doubtless of the evident exaggerations discernible in the -French accounts of a military operation which, not so adorned, would -have been brilliant enough. Hugues's brutality is unquestionable, but -to it he joined the vigor, audacity, and unscrupulous determination to -succeed which carried the French armies to victory in all parts. The -British were forced to evacuate their last port in Guadaloupe on the -10th of December, 1794. - -Upon receiving news of Hugues's success the Directory hastened to -send re-enforcements, and on the 6th of January, 1795, a number of -ships-of-war and transports reached Guadaloupe and landed troops -variously stated at fifteen to twenty-five hundred. Hugues, who had -meantime organized a respectable territorial army, used the land and -naval forces now at his disposal with great energy. Santa Lucia was -retaken on the 19th of June, and insurrection fomented and maintained -in Dominica, St. Vincent and Grenada, among the negroes, aborigines and -old French inhabitants, to the great distress of the British. National -vessels and privateers, having once more a secure base of operations, -swarmed throughout the seas and inflicted great losses on the trade. -All this disaster, which continued throughout the year, arose from not -having quite enough men in Guadaloupe to put Hugues down before he had -a foothold; and the British government was now compelled to send a far -larger force to repair in part an evil, which a smaller number, at the -proper moment, would have wholly prevented. - -The disastrous result of the campaign of 1794 in Belgium and Holland, -resulting in the conquest of the latter by the French, the overthrow -of the House of Orange, and the alliance of Holland with France under -a republican government, had both released the British troops employed -on the Continent and thrown open the Dutch colonies to British attacks. -Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had distinguished himself in the recent -operations, was appointed to the command in the eastern Caribbean, and -sixteen thousand troops were assigned to the expedition, which was -to be convoyed by eight ships-of-the-line under Admiral Christian. -They were to have sailed in September for a campaign in the drier and -cooler winter months; but the usual difficulty in moving large bodies, -particularly of sailing ships, delayed their departure until the -15th of November. Two days later the Channel was swept by a gale of -hurricane violence, which caused the loss of many ships and lives, and -forced all that survived to return to Portsmouth, a single transport -alone reaching the destination at Barbadoes. On the 3d of December a -second start was made, but almost equal bad fortune was met. After -battling the ocean for seven weeks, Christian and Abercromby returned -to England with part of the convoy, the remainder finding their way -by driblets to Barbadoes; several, however, were taken by Hugues's -cruisers. Abercromby then took passage in a frigate, reaching the -island on the 17th of March, 1796; and was followed by the admiral, -who arrived on the 21st of April with a fleet of transports. Santa -Lucia was at once attacked, and on the 25th of May the French garrison -capitulated. On the 11th of June, St. Vincent, and a few days later -Grenada, which were in possession rather of insurgents than of enemies, -likewise submitted. Prior to the arrival of Admiral Christian, -Abercromby had sent a detachment of twelve hundred men against the -Dutch colonies on the mainland, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, which -surrendered without resistance in April and May, and were laid open to -British trade. - -Great Britain had now resumed tranquil possession of all the eastern -islands, except Guadaloupe. The strong organization which this had -received from Hugues, and the re-enforcements that had been thrown -in, indicated that prolonged operations would be needed to effect -its subdual. The sickly rainy season was at hand, during which also -hurricanes prevail, so that all reasons combined to postpone the -attempt to the healthier months,—a decision which was amply justified -by the great mortality from yellow fever which ensued among the troops, -despite all the immunity from exposure that care and the cessation of -campaigning could give. By the time that operations could begin, Spain -had declared war against Great Britain; and the prospect of easily -seizing her large and far more valuable islands diverted attention from -Guadaloupe. The latter continued throughout this and the following war, -until 1810, a thorn in the side of British trade. The recapture of -Guadaloupe by the French, and the consequent evils, remain a pregnant -warning against the folly of sending a boy to do a man's work; but -underlying that miscalculation appears to have been the fatal error of -relying upon local support to troops inadequate by themselves to the -task before them. Desirous of doing many things at once, the British -government easily accepted the assurances of a few royalists, as to -the political dispositions of a most excitable and changeable race and -the re-enforcements that could be raised among them. It was an exact -repetition of the blunder which led to the invasion of the Southern -colonies during the American Revolution; and the gist of the mistake is -in the dependence upon unorganized forces to supplement the weakness -of the organized force, which is not by itself alone sufficient to its -undertaking. - -It will not be denied that at times a diversion under such conditions -may be attempted, if it does not take away force needed for serious -enterprises. Upon this ground may perhaps be justified the attempted -French invasion of Ireland in December, 1796, which, though on a -somewhat larger scale, essentially resembled the expedition of Jervis -and Grey against the West Indies. It also depended upon a local rising -in favor of an insufficient force, upon the support of practically -unorganized masses without military antecedents; but it was undertaken -at a period when the tide of affairs elsewhere was running strongly -in favor of France, and, whatever hopes may have been entertained of -possible ultimate results, was essentially a diversion. The immediate -aim was not a direct gain to France, but an indirect advantage, -by accumulating embarrassments for Great Britain. A state entirely -inferior at sea could not count upon lasting military control of a -large island with an alien population; but it could hope that the -insurrection of Ireland, concurring with disaster upon the Continent, -might force a disadvantageous peace upon the arch enemy. The conquest -of the smaller Antilles, on the contrary, was not properly a diversion, -but an object of real importance to a great British interest. It was -feasible for the greater naval power to take and hold them, being -small; and their tenure, by relieving the navy of part of its work, -would have facilitated the protection of Jamaica and its trade, as well -as the general control of the western Caribbean. Haïti was too large -and too populated for conquest; but its power for injury could have -been confronted with more substantial force had Guadaloupe remained a -British garrison. - -The alliance of Spain and Holland with France much increased the -difficulties of Great Britain, by throwing open their colonial ports to -French privateers. The extensive sea-coasts of Cuba and Haïti became -alive with them. In 1807 it was estimated that there were from two to -three hundred depending upon these two islands, and unfitted, from -their size, to go far from them.[75] The number testifies to the extent -and value of British trade in that sea, although the privateer did not -confine his depredations to the enemy, but preyed lawlessly on neutrals -as well. The same authority illustrates the annihilation of French and -Spanish commerce by stating that not more than two or three British -privateers were sailing from Jamaica. - -General Abercromby went for a short time to Europe in the fall of 1796. -Upon his return a strong military and naval expedition was sent against -Trinidad, but did not meet the resistance expected from the size and -importance of the island. It capitulated on the second day, February -18, 1797, and with it the Spaniards lost four ships-of-the-line. Thence -Abercromby moved, in April, against Porto Rico; but upon reconnoitring, -the defences were found too strong, and the troops were re-embarked -after losing two hundred men. This ended the colonial expeditions -in the West Indies for the first war. Quiet possession was taken of -the Dutch colonies of Surinam and Curaçoa in 1799 and 1800; and in -1801, when Sweden and Denmark became involved in hostilities with -Great Britain, their West India islands were also given up without -resistance, but no further fighting took place. - - NOTE. As it does not enter into the author's plan to give in - detail the naval history after Trafalgar, it may be well to state - here, in brief, the subsequent events in the West Indies. At the - Peace of Amiens in 1801, Great Britain restored all her West India - conquests except the Spanish Trinidad. When war broke out again in - 1803, Tobago, Santa Lucia, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice were - at once seized without difficulty, as was Surinam in 1804. There - matters rested till 1807, when Curaçoa and the Danish islands - fell, followed in 1809 by Martinique, and in 1810 by Guadaloupe. - Spain having become again the ally of Great Britain in 1808, the - latter had now no open enemy in the Caribbean; but the long habits - of lawlessness left numerous pirates infesting Cuba, whom the weak - Spanish government failed to control. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE. - - -The pressure of the allied armies upon all her frontiers, combined -with the British mastery of the sea, had thrown France largely upon -her own resources during the year 1793; while the distracted condition -of the country and a bad harvest had united to cause a scarcity of -bread-stuffs, which threatened a famine, with all its consequences -of sufferings to the army and the people, and inevitable increase of -disturbance and sedition. - -The eyes of the government had therefore turned beyond the sea to the -United States, and its representatives there had been directed to -accumulate a quantity of provisions to be shipped to France. It was -intended to despatch these in a great convoy, to be protected on the -voyage by a force of ships-of-war; while its approach to the shores of -Europe would be covered by a sortie of the great fleet from Brest and -Rochefort, to occupy the attention of, and, if necessary, forcibly to -contest the control of the sea with, the British navy. Experience had -not yet corrected the sanguine confidence of the republican government, -based upon the wordy enthusiasm of the crews, nor taught it that, with -the departure of the trained officers and the spread of license among -the men, the navy had ceased to be the strong power which had faced -Great Britain with success in the war of the American Revolution. The -very measures which had most contributed to destroy its efficiency -became, in the excitement and ignorance of the times, the sure gage of -victory. - -The convoying squadron of two ships-of-the-line and three smaller -vessels sailed from Brest for the United States in December, 1793, -under the command of Rear-Admiral Van Stabel, an active and judicious -officer. On the 12th of February it anchored in Chesapeake Bay, and -sailed again for France on the 11th of April. The merchant ships under -its charge numbered one hundred and thirty,[76] among them being many -laden with produce from the French West India islands, which, not -venturing to make the passage home direct and unattended, for fear of -British cruisers, had collected at Hampton Roads to await the time of -sailing. It seems somewhat remarkable that the British government, -which was fairly well informed as to the designs of the French, should -not have attempted to intercept the convoy at its port of departure. -That is the point at which a great maritime expedition, whether purely -military or otherwise, can usually be most effectually watched; and in -this case the more so, because, if the convoy had eluded the blockading -squadron, the latter, few in number and homogeneous, could easily have -outstripped the unwieldy multitude and again awaited it off its port -of arrival. The success of this mass of merchantmen in escaping the -numerous enemies that attended it off the coast of France is a striking -illustration of the uncertainties of commerce-destroying, and of the -chances that favor the safe arrival of a body of ships when the enemy -is in doubt as to their exact destination. - -The French minister to the United States, M. Genêt, had written home -that he would forward a part of the convoy, under the care of two -small ships of war, as soon as possible. With the idea that these -might have sailed before Van Stabel reached America, a force of five -ships-of-the-line with some lighter vessels was directed to protect -their arrival. This squadron accordingly sailed from Brest under the -command of Rear-Admiral Nielly, on the 10th of April.[77] It had been -preceded by a light division, whose mission was to meet the convoy and -inform the officer in charge that Nielly would await him a hundred -leagues west of Belle-Isle. - -Later news corrected the expectations based upon Genêt's first -despatches, and as the close approach of summer made it more easy for -the British fleet to maintain its position in the Bay of Biscay, and -consequently increased the dangers through which the convoy must pass, -the French government determined to send out all the available ships -in Brest. On the 16th of May the great fleet, comprising twenty-five -ships-of-the-line, one of which carried one hundred and twenty guns -and three others one hundred and ten, sailed under the command of -Rear-Admiral Villaret Joyeuse. A representative of the National -Convention, charged with duties resembling those of the representatives -present with the armies in the field, embarked on board the flag-ship, -"La Montagne." This magnificent vessel, called under the monarchy the -"États de Bourgogne," now bore the name of the terrible party dominant -in the National Convention. These were still the days of the Terror, -and Robespierre had yet two months to live when the fleet sailed from -Brest. The admiral's orders were to cruise in the same station that had -already been assigned to Nielly, with whom he was expected to form a -junction, and to protect the approach of the convoy at all hazards, but -not to fight unless essential to secure that end, to which all other -objects were subordinated. The time of waiting was to be utilized for -fleet manœuvres, in which the representative and admiral had too much -reason to fear that the captains were unskilled. - -The anxiety of the French government about the convoy, and the -embarrassment which would be caused by its loss, were obvious -incentives to the British authorities to do all in their power to -intercept it. The Channel fleet, so called from the ports upon which -its operations were based, had returned from its cruises of the -previous year in December, and had since then remained at anchor, -repairing and refitting for the next year's work. Its commander, Lord -Howe, as has before been said,[78] was averse from keeping the sea in -winter with the heavy ships. According to his system of warfare, the -fleet should be anchored at some convenient point on the Channel coast, -and depend upon frigates stationed before the French ports to bring it -word of the enemy's movements. Had, however, the expected convoy in -1794 sailed from America as soon as it was expected to do, it would -have reached its own ports before the British had left their anchors. - -On the 2d of May the Channel fleet, numbering thirty-four -ships-of-the-line and attended by fifteen frigates and smaller -ships-of-war, sailed from Spithead. It had under its charge one -hundred and forty-eight sail of merchantmen, bound to Newfoundland -and to the East and West Indies. Upon arriving two days later off -the Lizard, a promontory near the south-west extremity of England -and a hundred miles due north of the Island of Ushant, Howe detached -eight ships-of-the-line to accompany the convoy to the latitude of -Cape Finisterre, on the north-west coast of Spain. After performing -this service, six, under Admiral Montagu, were to cruise between Cape -Ortegal and the latitude of Belle-Isle, to intercept the convoy from -America. The width, over two hundred miles, of the belt of ocean to -be covered by these six ships with their accompanying frigates, taken -in connection with the chances which night and fog might give the -French convoy for passing unobserved, illustrates the comparative -disadvantages of lying in wait at the supposed point of arrival, -instead of at the known port of departure, for a body of vessels whose -precise destination is in doubt. - -Howe, with the twenty-six ships remaining to him, steered directly -for Ushant, reconnoitred Brest, and, having ascertained that the bulk -of the French fleet was still in port, proceeded to cruise in the Bay -of Biscay, moving backward and forward across the probable track of -the expected convoy. On the 19th of May he again looked into Brest, -and found that the French had sailed. The same evening a frigate from -Montagu joined him, requesting a re-enforcement, as the rear-admiral -had learned from a captured vessel that Nielly's squadron was at sea, -and that Van Stabel's force numbered four of the line. He consequently -anticipated the possibility of falling in with nine ships-of-the-line, -which would be too large a number for his own six to meet. As the -frigate, of course, brought word where Montagu was to be found, Howe, -knowing that the main French fleet was out, steered at once to join -his subordinate; but ascertaining later, from passing vessels, that -Villaret had been seen in a position and heading a course which would -take him well clear of Montagu, he abandoned this purpose and went -directly in pursuit of the enemy. The latter, by the information he -received, numbered twenty-six ships-of-the-line, precisely equalling -his own fleet. - -A week, however, was to elapse before he found the French. On the -morning of the 28th of May, the wind being then south by west, the -lookout frigates signalled a strange fleet to windward. It proved to -be that of Villaret, then steering north-north-east, nearly before the -wind, in three columns. At the time of this meeting, Howe was running -back to the eastward with a fair wind, having actually gone a hundred -miles west of the enemy's rendezvous without finding him. The French -admiral stood on until he could recognize the British, and then hauled -to the wind, intending to form his line-of-battle on the port tack, -heading west or a little south of it. The inexperience of the captains, -of whom a large proportion had no naval training and had never -commanded ships in a fleet, led to a long delay and a poor formation. -Lord Howe, on the contrary, soon had his fleet in manageable condition, -pressing to windward in two columns on the port tack, and with a -flying squadron of four fast and handy seventy-four-gun ships well to -the windward of the main body. The British fleet was now steering the -same course as the French, to leeward, or north, of it, and at noon -the distance between the main bodies was from nine to ten miles. The -place of this first meeting was about four hundred miles west (and a -little south) of the island of Ushant. There was a strong breeze and a -moderately heavy sea. - -Villaret soon found that the slowness of the formation, to facilitate -which many of his ships had to heave-to,[79] was causing the line to -set gradually to leeward, toward the British. Four also of his fleet -were separated from the main body, being some distance astern and to -windward, two of them slightly disabled. To approach these, and at the -same time keep the advantage of the wind, he determined to put the -fleet on the other tack. At ten minutes before two in the afternoon the -French began tacking in succession, and by quarter past three were all -on the starboard tack, heading now east-south-east toward the separated -ships. Meantime, the British flying squadron, acting independently -of the main body, but under orders to attack the enemy's rear, kept -forcing to windward, and at a little after three o'clock one of them -was able to open fire, just before the rear French ships went about. -The main body tacked between three and four o'clock, and being now on -the same course as the French, east-south-east, but entirely out of -cannon-shot, carried a press of sail to overtake them. - -The ships of the flying squadron, being handled for the most part with -vigor and judgment, fulfilled Howe's purpose of making an impression -upon the _rear_ of the enemy's column. As soon as the attack became -pronounced, one of the French one-hundred-and-ten-gun ships, the -"Révolutionnaire," took the extreme rear, and upon her fell the brunt -of the action, which lasted this day until after ten P. M.; daylight, -at that time of the year and in that latitude, continuing till nearly -then. The British advanced ships were joined after some time by -two more from the main body, so that the "Révolutionnaire" had to -encounter, first and last, some half-dozen hostile seventy-fours. No -diagram of this day's fighting need be given. The reader has only to -picture a long column of ships steering to the southward and eastward, -its rear harassed by the repeated but irregular attacks of a superior -hostile detachment. - -The "Révolutionnaire" was nobly fought; and the concentration upon her, -while eminently judicious, served to bring out vividly the advantage, -which should never be forgotten, of one heavy ship over several -smaller, even though the force of the latter may, in the aggregate, be -much superior. The attacks this day made upon her were, from the nature -of the case, not simultaneous. They resembled one of those elaborately -combined movements in land warfare, whereby several separate columns -are intended to be brought at the same time to the same point, but -actually arrive one by one and are beaten off in detail. The result -in the present instance was somewhat more fortunate. As darkness -fell, Howe called off all but two of the assailants,—one having -already been driven off,—in order to form his line for the night. The -"Révolutionnaire" remained in hot action with a small seventy-four, -the "Audacious," alone; for the comrade of the latter took no share. -At ten P. M., having lost her captain and sixty-two men killed and -eighty-six wounded, and with her mizzen-mast shot away, she wore out -of action under charge of her fourth lieutenant, the three seniors -having been killed or seriously hurt. Covered by the dark she passed to -the northward, astern of the British fleet, her remaining masts falling -soon after. The "Audacious" was so badly crippled that it took her long -to get clear of the French line, and she was unable to rejoin her own -that night. The next morning, finding herself isolated and in presence -of some enemy's ships, she was forced to run before the wind and was -permanently separated from the fleet. The two opponents passed within -sight of each other the following day, but they were in no condition to -resume the encounter, and both reached port without further injury. - -[Illustration: Fig. 1 and Fig. 2: Manœuvres of British and French -Fleets, May 29, 1794.] - -During the short summer night the two fleets continued to run on -parallel lines (May 29, Fig. 1. BB, FF,) south-east by east, being -about three miles apart, the French bearing south from the British. -The latter appear to have gained somewhat upon their less practised -adversaries, so that at six o'clock Howe, ever intent upon getting to -windward and thereby obtaining the opportunity to attack, directed -his fleet to tack in succession (a), expecting that the van would -on the new course pass near enough to the enemy's rear to exchange -shots. After the evolution, the British were in column steering west -(B'B'), the French still south-east by east. Villaret, seeing his rear -threatened, wore his fleet in succession at quarter before eight (b), -the van ships running down north-west by west (F'F') parallel to their -previous course, toward the rear of their own column; upon reaching -which the leading ship hauled to the wind again (c), followed by each -of the others in order. These two manœuvres brought both fleets once -more heading in the same direction, following parallel courses and -abreast each other; the French still to windward, but having lost much -of the distance which separated them from their enemies. A few shots -had been exchanged, as Howe expected, between the British van and the -French rear as they passed on opposite tacks (Fig. 1, d). - -Toward ten o'clock the French head ships ran down toward the British -van and opened fire at long range, their centre and rear keeping out -of action (May 29, Fig. 2). The leading British ship, "Cæsar," failed -to carry sail enough, though repeatedly signalled to make more; and -in consequence those astern of her had also to shorten sail, the -flag-ship "Queen Charlotte" in particular being forced to leeward by -the necessity of backing a topsail to keep in her station. At noon -there was a brisk cannonade between the two vans. Dissatisfied with -this partial engagement, which, by crippling some of his ships, might -put out of his power to reach the enemy, Howe at noon signalled to -tack again in succession, and to pass through the French line. The -"Cæsar," which should have begun the manœuvre, made no reply, and it -was necessary to repeat the order. Shortly before one o'clock she -wore instead of tacking. The ships between her and the admiral also -went about; but none, save the "Queen," of ninety-eight guns, second -in the order, appears to have reached the hostile line, except at -its extreme rear. She passed alone, and for a long time unsupported, -along a considerable portion of the enemy's order, which had now been -re-established by the centre and rear bearing down to support the van -(Fig. 2, a); but she was unable to break through, owing at first to -the closeness of the French ships to each other, and afterwards to -the injuries received from their successive broadsides. The "Cæsar" -kept so far from the wind as to neutralize the admiral's purpose; and -of the other van ships all went to leeward of the French line, none -breaking through. So far, therefore, the general result was only to -bring confusion into the British order without attaining the end which -Howe desired. He therefore determined to set the example, directed -the flag-ship to be tacked (Fig. 2, b), and stood under a press of -sail toward the French line, closely followed by two others, the next -ahead and next astern of him. The "Queen Charlotte," which had been -tenth in the British column, reached the enemy at a point not far in -rear of Villaret's flag-ship, and ran along the line (Fig. 3) till -she came abreast of the sixth ship from the rear, astern of which she -luffed through and gained to windward of the French (Fig. 3, a). One -of her two followers passed through the second interval (b) behind -that pierced by herself, and the other through the next (c),—that is, -between the third and second vessel from the enemy's rear. The two -remaining French ships, the "Indomptable" (I), of eighty guns, and -the "Tyrannicide" (T), of seventy-four, were not only far astern but -to leeward of their line. They were therefore easily to be reached by -several of the British, who gradually encircled them. - -[Illustration: Fig. 3: Manœuvres of British and French Fleets, May 29, -1794.] - -With his rear thus for the third time threatened, and much more -seriously than before, Villaret again made signal to wear in -succession. The French van had by now become much separated from the -rest of the fleet, and the leading ship was too disabled to go about. -No other taking the initiative, the admiral, like Howe, was forced -to set the example. The "Montagne" (M) wore out of line (d), and led -down toward the two surrounded ships, with a signal flying to follow -and form in her wake (F' F') without regard to usual station. This -movement of Villaret not only tended to release the "Indomptable" and -"Tyrannicide," but also threatened the "Queen" (Q), which had fallen -to leeward disabled. Howe, after getting to windward and tacking (e), -had endeavored to reach the "Terrible," of one hundred and ten guns, -carrying the flag of the admiral commanding the French rear, which -had been astern of the point at which the "Queen Charlotte" broke the -line; but, while the "Charlotte" was putting about, the "Terrible" -(Te) passed ahead and reached the centre of Villaret's column before -Howe's ship could come up with her. For every reason, therefore, but -especially for the safety of the "Queen," it became imperative for the -British admiral to reverse his course. He therefore wore (f), gathering -round him by signal all vessels within reach, and again stood east, -toward the threatened ships of the two parties,—running in a column -parallel to, but to windward of, that of the French admiral. - -The "Queen," though much crippled, had, with her head to the eastward, -passed astern of the two threatened French ships. These had suffered -from the engagement, in passing, with the British van a few hours -before, as well as with the flying squadron on the previous day; -and the injuries then received had doubtless contributed to place -them in the exposed and dangerous position they now occupied. The -"Leviathan," seventy-four, attacked them to windward, the "Orion," of -the same class, to leeward, and the latter was soon after re-enforced -and replaced by the "Barfleur," of ninety-eight guns. No particular -statement is given in the British narratives of other ships attacking -these two, but several of those astern of the "Queen Charlotte," which -could have reached no other of the French, lost killed and wounded, -and it is probable that these shared in this encounter. The French -accounts speak of their two vessels as "surrounded;" and Villaret wrote -that their resistance "should immortalize their captains, Dordelin -and Lamesle." They came out of the engagement of the 29th of May with -only their lower masts standing; and the heavier of the two, the -"Indomptable," was in such condition that Villaret thought necessary to -send her to Brest that night, escorted by another of his fleet, which -was thus dwindling piece-meal. - -For the moment, however, the French admiral's manœuvre, well conceived -and gallantly executed, rescued the endangered ships. The "Queen -Charlotte" and her immediate supporters, after first tacking, had -barely reached the rear of the French. As the latter continued to -stand on, it was of course impossible for all the fifteen ships behind -the British admiral to come up with them at once. In fact, the failure -of the van to do its whole duty, combined with the remote position of -the rear,—increased probably by the straggling usually to be observed -at the tail of long columns,—had resulted in throwing the British -order into confusion. "As the ships arrived," wrote Lord Howe in his -journal, "they came up so crowded together as afforded an opportunity -for the enemy to have fired upon them with great advantage." (Fig. 3, -C, R.) "The British line was completely deformed," states one French -authority. But, though disordered, they formed a large and dangerous -body, all within supporting distance,—they had on their side the -prestige of an indisputable, though partial, success,—they were flushed -with victory, and it would appear that the French van had not yet come -up. Villaret therefore contented himself with carrying off his rescued -ships, with which and with the rest of his fleet he stood away to the -north-west. - -It is desirable to sum up the result of these two days of partial -encounters, as an important factor in the discussion of the campaign -as a whole, which must shortly follow. On the morning of May 28, the -French numbered twenty-six ships-of-the-line[80] and were, when they -first formed line, from ten to twelve miles to windward of the British, -also numbering twenty-six. On the evening of May 29, in consequence of -Howe's various movements and the course to which Villaret was by them -constrained,—for he acted purely on the defensive and had to conform -to the initiative of the enemy,—the French fleet was to leeward of the -British. As Howe had succeeded within so short a time in forcing action -from to leeward, there was every reason to apprehend that from the -windward position—decidedly the more favorable upon the whole, though -not without its drawbacks—he would be able to compel a decisive battle, -which the French naval policy proscribed generally, and in the present -case particularly. Besides this adverse change of circumstance, the -balance of loss was still more against the French. On the first day -the "Révolutionnaire" on one side and the "Audacious" on the other -had been compelled to quit their fleets; but the force of the latter -was not over two thirds that of the former. By the action of the 29th -the "Indomptable," of eighty guns, was driven from the French fleet, -and the admiral thought necessary to send with her a seventy-four and -a frigate. The "Tyrannicide," seventy-four, had lost all her upper -masts; she had consequently to be towed by one of her consorts through -the next two days and in the battle of the First of June. If Villaret -had had any expectation of escaping Howe's pursuit, the presence of -this disabled ship would have destroyed it, unless he was willing to -abandon her. Besides the mishaps already stated, the leading ship, -"Montagnard," had been so much injured in the early part of the -engagement that she could not go about. Continuing to stand west, while -the body of the fleet was running east to the aid of the "Indomptable" -and "Tyrannicide," this ship separated from her consorts and was not -able to regain them. To this loss of four ships actually gone, and one -permanently crippled, may be added that of the "Audacieux," one of -Nielly's squadron, which joined on the morning of the 29th, but was -immediately detached to seek and protect the "Révolutionnaire." On -the other hand, the British had by no means escaped unscathed; but on -the morning of the 30th, in reply to an interrogatory signal from the -admiral, they all reported readiness to renew the action, except one, -the "Cæsar," which was not among the most injured. This ship, however, -did not leave the fleet, and was in her station in the battle of the -First. - -The merit of Howe's conduct upon these two days does not, however, -depend merely upon the issue, though fortunate. By persistent attacks, -frequently renewed upon the same and most vulnerable part of the -French order, he had in effect brought to bear a large part of his own -fleet upon a relatively small number of the enemy, the result being a -concentration of injury which compelled the damaged ships to leave the -field. At the same time the direction of the attack forced the French -admiral either to abandon the endangered vessels, or step by step to -yield the advantage of the wind until it was finally wrested from him -altogether. By sheer tactical skill, combined with a fine display of -personal conduct, Howe had won a marked numerical preponderance for -the decisive action, which he now had good reason to expect from the -advantageous position likewise secured. Unfortunately, the tactical -gain was soon neutralized by the strategic mistake which left Montagu's -squadron unavailable on the day of battle. - -Towards the close of the day the weather grew thick, and so continued, -with short intervals of clearing, for the next thirty-six hours. At -half-past seven the body of the French bore from the British flag-ship -north-west, distant nine or ten miles; both fleets standing very slowly -to the westward and a little northerly, with wind from the southward -and westward. During most of the 30th, none of the British fleet could -be seen from the flag-ship, but they all, as well as the French, -kept together. On that day also, by a piece of great good fortune -considering the state of the weather, Admiral Nielly joined Villaret -with the three ships still under his command, as did also another -seventy-four belonging to the Cancale squadron. These four fresh ships -exactly replaced the four disabled ones that had parted company, and -again made the French twenty-six to Howe's twenty-five. - -About ten o'clock in the morning of May 31st, the fog lifted for a -moment, allowing Howe to count twenty-seven sail of his ships and -frigates; and, after again shutting down for a couple of hours, it -finally dispersed shortly after noon. The French were then seen -bearing from west to north-west. The British made sail in chase and by -six P.M. had approached to within about three miles. They were not, -however, able to reach the position Howe wished—abreast the enemy—early -enough to permit the intended general engagement, unless by a night -action; which for more than one reason the admiral was not willing -to undertake. He therefore hauled again to the wind, heading to the -westward in order of battle. The French had formed on a parallel line -and were running in the same direction. During the night both fleets -carried all the sail their masts would stand. In the morning the -French, thanks to the better sailing of their vessels, were found to -have gained somewhat on their enemies, but not sufficiently to avoid or -postpone the battle, which they had been directed if possible to shun. -Villaret therefore formed his fleet in close order, and stood on slowly -under short canvas, which at once allowed irregularities in the order -to be more easily corrected and also left the crews free to devote -themselves exclusively to fighting the ships. Howe, by carrying sail, -was thus able to choose his position prior to bearing down. Having -reached it and formed his line, the French being now hove-to to await -the attack, the British fleet was also hove-to, and the crews went to -breakfast. At twelve minutes past eight it again filled-away by signal, -and stood slowly down for the enemy (June 1, Fig. 1). The intention -being to attack along the whole line, ship to ship, advantage was taken -of this measured approach to change the place of the three-decked -ships in the order, so that they should be opposed to the heaviest of -the French. Lord Howe, who in the matter of drill was something of a -precisian, is said to have rectified the alignment of his fleet more -than once as it stood down; and, unless some such delay took place, -it is difficult to reconcile the rate of sailing of the ships with -the time it took them to cover the ground. The combatants had a long -summer's day before them, and such scrupulous care was not wholly out -of place in an attack of the kind; for not only was it desirable that -the shock should be felt everywhere at once, but ships in advance of -the line would invite concentration of fire from the enemy, while those -much in the rear would be embarrassed by smoke concealing the position -it behooved them to take. - -[Illustration: Battle of the First of June, 1794.] - -This difficulty from smoke was the more to be feared because Howe's -plan, as communicated to the fleet by signal, was not merely to attack -on the side from which he approached, but to pass through the intervals -between the enemy's ships, and to engage them on the further, or lee, -side. This method conferred the advantage of a raking fire[81] while -passing through the line, and cut off the retreat of disabled enemies; -for a crippled ship could only retire to leeward.[82] To carry out the -design, however, required not only that the enemy should leave wide -enough intervals, but also that the assailants should be able to see -where the intervals were. - -The British ships were steering each for its opposite in the enemy's -order, heading about north-west; so that, as the French line was -east and west, the approach was not perpendicular but in a slanting -direction. At twenty minutes before nine, the formation was so accurate -that Lord Howe shut the signal book with an air of satisfaction, as -though his work as admiral was done and all that remained was to show -the gallant bearing and example which had ever been associated with -his name. The gesture was, however, premature, and eccentricities of -conduct on the part of some captains compelled him again to open the -book and order them into their stations. Shortly after nine o'clock the -French van began firing. The British ship "Cæsar," on the left flank -of her line, and therefore corresponding to the leader of the French, -instead of pressing on to her station for battle, hauled to the wind -and began firing while still five hundred yards distant,—a position -inconsistent with decisive results under the gunnery conditions of that -day. Lord Howe, who had not thought well of the captain of this ship, -but had permitted him to retain his distinguished position in the order -at the request of the captain of the "Queen Charlotte," now tapped -the latter on the shoulder, and said, "Look, Curtis, there goes your -friend; who is mistaken now?" - -The rest of the fleet stood on. The "Queen Charlotte," in order to -reach her position, had to steer somewhat more to the westward. Either -the French line had drawn a little ahead, or some other incident had -thrown this ship astern of her intended point of arrival. Her course, -therefore, becoming more nearly parallel to the enemy's, she passed -within range of the third vessel behind Villaret's flag-ship, the -"Montagne," her destined opponent. This ship, the "Vengeur," opened -fire upon her at half-past nine. The "Queen Charlotte," not to be -crippled before reaching her place, made more sail and passed on. The -next ahead of the "Vengeur," the "Achille," also engaged her, and -to this the "Charlotte" replied at eight minutes before ten. The -assailant suffered severely, and her attention was quickly engrossed -by the "Brunswick," the supporter of Howe's flag-ship on her starboard -side, which tried to break through the line ahead of the "Achille." - -The "Queen Charlotte" (June 1, Fig. 2, C) continued on for the -"Montagne" (M). Seeing her evident purpose to pass under the stern, -the captain of this ship threw his sails aback, so as to fall to the -rear and close the interval. At the same moment the French ship next -astern, the "Jacobin," increased her sail, most properly, for the -same object. The two thus moving towards each other, a collision was -threatened. As the only alternative, the "Jacobin" put her helm up and -steered for the starboard, or lee, side of the "Montagne." At this -moment the "Queen Charlotte" drew up. Putting her helm hard over, she -kept away perpendicularly to the "Montagne," and passed under her -stern, so close that the French flag brushed the side of the British -ship. One after another the fifty guns of the latter's broadside swept -from stern to stem of the enemy,—three hundred of her crew falling at -once, her captain among the number. The "Jacobin" having moved to the -starboard side of the "Montagne," in the place the "Queen Charlotte" -had intended to take, it was thought that the latter would have to go -to leeward of both; but, amid all the confusion of the scene, the quick -eye of the gallant man who was directing her movements caught a glimpse -of the "Jacobin's" rudder and saw it moving to change the ship's -direction to leeward. Quickly seizing his opportunity, the helm of the -British flag-ship was again shifted, and she came slowly and heavily -to the wind in her appointed place, her jib-boom in the movement just -clearing the "Jacobin," as her side a few minutes before had grazed -the flag of the "Montagne." The latter, it is said, made no reply to -this deadly assault. The "Jacobin" fired a few shots, one of which cut -away the foretopmast of the "Queen Charlotte;" and then, instead of -imitating the latter's movement and coming to the wind again, by which -the British ship would have been placed between his fire and that of -the "Montagne," the captain weakly kept off and ran to leeward out of -action. - -By this time the engagement was general all along the line (Fig. 2). -Smoke, excitement and the difficulties of the situation broke somewhat -the simultaneousness of the shock of the British assault; but, with -some exceptions, their fire from van to rear opened at nearly the same -time. Six ships only passed at once through the enemy's line, but very -many of the others brought their opponents to close action to windward. -In this, the first pitched battle after many years of peace, there were -found the inevitable failures in skill, the more sorrowful shortcomings -of many a fair-seeming man. To describe minutely the movements of -every ship would not tend to clearness, but to obscurity. For general -impression of the scene at certain distinctive moments the reader is -referred to the diagrams; in which, also, an attempt has been made to -represent the relative motions of the ships in both squadrons, so far -as can be probably deduced from the narratives. (See Figs. 2 and 3.) - -There was, however, one episode of so singular, so deadly, and yet so -dramatic an interest, occurring in the midst of this extensive _mêlée_, -that it cannot be passed by. As long as naval history shall be written, -it must commemorate the strife between the French ship "Vengeur du -Peuple" and the British ship "Brunswick." The latter went into action -on the right hand of the "Queen Charlotte;" its duty therefore was -to pierce the French line astern of the "Jacobin." This was favored -by the movement of the latter to support the "Montagne;" but, as the -"Brunswick" pressed for the widened gap, the "Achille" made sail ahead -and threw herself in the way. Foiled here, the "Brunswick" again tried -to traverse the line astern of the "Achille," but the "Vengeur" now -came up, and, as the "Brunswick" persisted, the two collided and swung -side to side, the anchors of the British ship hooking in the rigging -and channels of the French. Thus fastened in deadly embrace, they fell -off before the wind and went away together to leeward (Fig. 2, B). - -As the contact of the two ships prevented opening the lower ports as -usual, the British crew blew off the lids. The "Vengeur" having already -been firing from the side engaged, hers were probably open; but, owing -to the hulls touching, it was not possible to use the ordinary sponges -and rammers, with rigid wooden staves, and the French had no other. The -British, however, were specially provided for such a case with sponges -and rammers having flexible rope handles, and with these they were -able to carry on the action. In this way the contest continued much -to the advantage of the British on the lower decks, where the French, -for the reason given, could use only a few of the forward and after -guns, the form of a ship at the extremities causing the distance there -between the combatants to be greater. But while such an inequality -existed below, above the balance was reversed; the heavy carronades -of the "Vengeur," loaded with langrage, and the superiority of her -musketry,—re-enforced very probably by the men from the useless cannon -below,—beating down the resistance of the British crew on the upper -deck and nearly silencing their guns. The captain of the "Brunswick" -received three wounds, from one of which he afterwards died; and a -number of others, both officers and men, were killed and wounded. This -circumstance encouraged the "Vengeur's" commander to try to carry his -opponent by boarding; but, when about to execute the attempt, the -approach of two other British ships necessitated calling off the men, -to serve the guns on the hitherto disengaged side. - -Meanwhile the "Brunswick's" crew maintained an unremitting fire, giving -to their guns alternately extreme elevation and depression, so that at -one discharge the shot went up through the "Vengeur's" decks, ripping -them open, while at the other they tended to injure the bottom. The -fight had thus continued for an hour when the "Achille," with only -her foremast standing, was seen approaching the "Brunswick" on her -port, or disengaged, side. The threatened danger was promptly met -and successfully averted. Before the new enemy could take a suitable -position, half-a-dozen guns' crews on each of the lower decks shifted -to the side on which she was, and in a few moments their fire brought -down her only remaining and already damaged mast. The "Achille" had no -farther part in the battle and was taken possession of by the British a -few hours later. - -At quarter before one the uneasy motions of the two ships wrenched the -anchors one after another from the "Brunswick's" side, and after a -grapple of three hours they separated. The character of the contest, -as described, had caused the injury to fall mainly upon the hulls -and crews, while the spars and rigging, contrary to the usual result -in so fierce an action, had largely escaped. As they were parting, -the "Brunswick" poured a few final shots into the "Vengeur's" stern, -injuring the rudder, and increasing the leaks from which the doomed -ship was already suffering. Immediately afterwards the mizzen-mast of -the British vessel went overboard; and, being already well to leeward -of her own fleet and threatened by the approach of the French admiral, -she stood to the northward under such sail as her spars would bear, -intending to make a home port, if possible. In this long and desperate -conflict, besides the injuries to be expected to hull and spars, the -"Brunswick" had twenty-three of her seventy-four guns dismounted, and -had lost forty-four killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded out of -a crew of six hundred men.[83] - -Soon after the dismasting of the "Achille," the British ship -"Ramillies," commanded by the brother of the "Brunswick's" captain, had -been seen coming slowly down toward the two combatants. She arrived -but a few moments before their separation, and, when they were far -enough apart for her fire not to endanger the "Brunswick," she also -attacked the "Vengeur," but not long after left her again in order to -secure the "Achille." This fresh onslaught, however, brought down all -the "Vengeur's" masts except the mizzen, which stood for half an hour -longer. The French ship was helpless. With numerous shot-holes at or -near the water line, with many of her port lids gone, she was rolling -heavily in the waves, unsteadied by masts, and taking in water on -all sides. Guns were thrown overboard, pumps worked and assisted by -bailing, but all in vain,—the "Vengeur" was slowly but surely sinking. -At half-past one the danger was so evident that signals of distress -were made; but among the disabled or preoccupied combatants they for -a long time received no attention. About six P.M., fortunately, two -British ships and a cutter drew near, and upon learning the state of -the case sent all their boats that remained unhurt. It was too late to -save every survivor of this gallant fight, but nearly four hundred were -taken off; the remainder, among whom were most of the badly wounded, -went down with their ship before the British boats had regained their -own. "Scarcely had the boats pulled clear of the sides, when the most -frightful spectacle was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades -who remained on board the 'Vengeur du Peuple,' with hands raised to -Heaven, implored with lamentable cries the help for which they could no -longer hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the unhappy victims which -it contained. In the midst of the horror with which this scene inspired -us all, we could not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled with our -grief. As we drew away, we heard some of our comrades still making -prayers for the welfare of their country; the last cries of these -unfortunates were: 'Vive la République!' They died uttering them."[84] -A touching picture of brave men meeting an inevitable fate, after doing -all that energy and courage could to avoid it; very different from -the melodramatic mixture of tinsel verbiage and suicide which found -favor with the National Convention, and upon which the "Legend of the -Vengeur" was based.[85] Of the seven hundred and twenty-three who -composed her crew, three hundred and fifty-six were lost; two hundred -and fifty of whom were, by the survivors, believed to have been killed -or wounded in the three actions. - -Long before the "Vengeur" and the "Brunswick" separated, the fate -of the battle had been decided, and the final action of the two -commanders-in-chief taken. It was just ten o'clock when the British -flag-ship passed under the stern of the "Montagne." At ten minutes past -ten the latter, whose extensive injuries were mainly to the hull, made -sail in advance,—a movement which the "Queen Charlotte," having lost -both fore and main topmasts, was unable to follow. Many of the French -ships ahead of the "Montagne" had already given ground and left their -posts; others both before and behind her had been dismasted. Between -half-past ten and eleven the smoke cleared sufficiently for Villaret to -see the situation on the field of battle. - -Ships dismasted not only lose their power of motion, but also do -not drift to leeward as rapidly as those whose spars are up, but -which are moving very slowly. In consequence, the lines having some -movement ahead, the dismasted ships of both parties had tended astern -and to windward of the battle. There they lay, British and French, -pell-mell together. Of the twelve ahead of the French admiral when -the battle began, seven had soon run out of action to leeward. Two of -these, having hauled to the wind on the other tack, were now found -to be astern and to windward of both fleets; to windward even of the -dismasted ships. Of the rest of the twelve, one, having lost main and -mizzen masts, was unavoidably carried to leeward, and the remaining -four were totally dismasted. Of these four, three finally fell into the -hands of the British. Of the thirteen ships astern of the "Montagne," -six had lost all their masts, and one had only the foremast standing; -the remaining six had their spars left in fairly serviceable condition, -and had, some sooner and some later, retreated to leeward. Four of the -dismasted ships in the rear, including among them the "Vengeur," were -captured by the British. - -When Admiral Villaret Joyeuse had recognized the situation, as thus -briefly described, he directed the "Montagne" also to be headed to -leeward, and made signals to gather the serviceable ships round the -commander-in-chief. A column of twelve was thus formed (June 1, Fig. -3, F' F') on the starboard tack, standing, that is, to the eastward -again,—the "Montagne" leading and the rear being brought up by the -"Terrible," the flag-ship of the second in command, which had only -her foremast left and was therefore taken in tow by an uninjured -seventy-four. Villaret considered it imprudent, if not impossible, -to get far enough to windward to interpose in favor of the dismasted -vessels. He determined, therefore, to place himself to leeward of them, -in such position as to receive and cover those that could run down to -him, or which his frigates could reach and tow away. In this manner -the "Scipion," the "Jemappes," and the "Mucius," totally disabled, -were restored to the French fleet between two and four o'clock. The -last named had actually struck to a British ship, but had not been -taken into possession. Villaret remained for some time, hove-to in this -position, until satisfied that no more of the separated vessels could -join him, and then made sail to the north-west (F" F").[86] - -Lord Howe was unable to follow with his own ship the comparatively -rapid movements of the French commander-in-chief. At eleven o'clock, -however, a signal was made for those that could to close around the -admiral, and the "Queen Charlotte" was with difficulty put on the other -tack. Howe then led the column thus formed (B' B') to the eastward, a -step that was necessary not only in order to cover dismantled British -ships and secure the prizes, but also to relieve the "Queen," which was -threatened by Villaret and in a critical situation. This ship, which -had behaved with so much forwardness and gallantry in the British van -on the 29th of May, had on the First of June been stationed in the -rear. The antagonist which she attacked went away rapidly to leeward; -and the "Queen," following with unrelenting ardor, found herself at -the end of the engagement again between the lines, with a dismantled -enemy, indeed, near by, but with her own mainmast gone and other spars -tottering. Eight of Villaret's column cannonaded her as they passed, -but without doing much harm, and Howe's approach extricated her. - -The escape of some of the French dismasted ships was severely -criticised at the time, and there was also an opinion that Howe should -have renewed the attack after gathering about him his less injured -vessels. There can be little question that more promptitude and energy -would have secured some of the French that got away; many competent -eye-witnesses thought so, and much discontent was openly expressed -in the fleet. It is more doubtful whether the admiral would have -done well to order the attack renewed. Several captains had behaved -indifferently, either through lack of judgment or lack of nerve, and -the best were naturally among those whose ships, being well-placed -and hard-fought, were now out of condition for fighting. A decisive -practical reason for ceasing the action is to be found in Howe's -physical condition. He was then sixty-eight years old; and, although -possessed of the calm, unworrying temper which bears responsibility -lightly, he had undergone great fatigue during the five days of -battle and chase,—his only resting-place from the time the enemy was -encountered being an arm-chair. "When the report was brought to him," -says the signal lieutenant, "that the French fleet showed every symptom -of determination to sustain a battle, I watched his face when he came -to the quarter-deck to look at them; it expressed an animation of -which, at his age, and after such fatigue of mind and body, I had not -thought it capable;" but the reaction came possibly a little too soon -for reaping the full fruits of the victory. "He went to bed," wrote the -same officer, "completely done up after the action of the First. We all -got round him; indeed, I saved him from a tumble; he was so weak that -from a roll of the ship he was nearly falling into the waist. 'Why, -you hold me up as if I were a child,' he said good-humoredly."[87] It -is not surprising that, under such circumstances, he could not do all -that a younger man might, nor that he yielded to the influence of his -chief-of-staff, Sir Roger Curtis, a distinguished and gallant officer, -but who appears to have been more impressed than was his superior by -the disadvantages under which the British fleet labored. - -Many years later, Admiral Stopford, who commanded a frigate in the -action, made the following statement, which he allowed to be published: -"Having observed the 'Marlborough' dismasted and surrounded by enemy's -ships, I bore down and took her in tow,—which bringing me very near -the 'Queen Charlotte,' I went on board for orders. The cool, collected -manner in which I was received by Lord Howe, and the desire he -expressed to get the ships set to rights to continue the action, showed -that such was his intention; and for the purpose of exonerating Lord -Howe's memory from the charges I have heard alleged against him for not -following up his victory, I think it right to state that, when standing -on the 'Queen Charlotte's' poop, close to Lord Howe, Sir Roger Curtis -came up in haste and apparent perturbation, exclaiming, 'I declare -to God, my Lord, if you don't assemble the fleet, they will turn the -tables upon us.' I must confess that I did not see anything to warrant -such an exclamation, except a French ship passing under the 'Queen -Charlotte's' stern and firing a few guns into her. The admiral and Sir -R. Curtis then retired to another part of the poop, and nothing more -was done."[88] - -The responsibility of a commander-in-chief is not affected by the -advice given him by any subordinate, however high his reputation or -confidential the relations between them; but in the state of bodily -weakness from which Howe suffered, he must, for subsequent action, -have depended largely upon Curtis, and it was probably well not to -undertake an undeniable risk against the judgment of the officer who -might be called upon to superintend the operation. The battle therefore -terminated with the movement of the two commanders-in-chief, with their -serviceable ships, to the eastward, through which three French vessels -escaped, the "Queen" was extricated, and seven dismasted enemies were -cut off by the British. At quarter past one the general firing ceased, -though a few random shots continued to be exchanged by scattered -vessels. - -Such were the principal features of the battle of the First of June, -1794, which, being fought so far from any land,[89] has received no -other distinctive name. It has not been thought desirable to attempt -narrating, in words, the innumerable incidents of the fight. While -avoiding a superfluity of details, however, a tactical analysis of -the course of the action may be not uninteresting to the professional -reader. The method of attack undertaken by Lord Howe, single ship -against single ship, was identical with that employed on many previous -occasions by British admirals, and is to be justified only by the -evidence he had received, on the 28th and 29th of May, of the enemy's -professional incompetency and indifferent gunnery. He was probably -right in concluding, from the events of those days, as was decisively -proved by the issue on June 1st, that the French line was at every -point weaker than the ships he could thus bring against it. Under -such conditions it may be permissible to the assailant to throw away -the opportunity, which the offensive gives him, of combining an -attack in superior force upon a part of the enemy's order. It is very -possible that Howe might have reaped better results by making such -a combination, for the tactical inefficiency of the French fleet, -which he had observed, assured him that it could not, in the moment of -action, remedy any disadvantage under which he might place it; but, -on the other hand, the drill of his own captains was not yet very -good, nor were they all tried men upon whom he could depend. It was, -therefore, not improbable that an attempt to execute a combination -would result in a muddle, whereas he could count upon superior -seamanship and superior gunnery, ship to ship, and the movement of -approach which he made, though somewhat difficult in execution, is -perfectly simple in idea. Upon the whole, weighing the pros and cons, -it is the opinion of the author that Howe judged soundly in directing -the simple attack that he did.[90] - -It is instructive to observe that the results of the movement, -though far more decisive in this than in previous battles, are, upon -dissection, found to be closely analogous. The British fleet, in -running down together, was ranged on a line parallel to the French, -but steering a course (north-west) that was oblique to its own front -as well as to that of the enemy. The issue in every other instance had -been indecisive,—scarcely ever was a ship taken or sunk. But while in -this respect different, the experience of previous engagements was -otherwise repeated. That flank of the assailant which in column had -been the van came, as a whole, promptly and orderly into action, while -delay and disorder, attended with imperfect execution, ensued in the -rear. This feature of simultaneous fleet attacks was emphasized by -the strenuous and brilliant efforts of three of the rear division, -which prevented indeed a general failure there, but brought out all -the more clearly how great the shortcoming would have been but for -their exertions, unparalleled in former battles. The proportion of -loss undergone in the different parts of the British column gives a -fair measure of the vigor displayed by each. This test is indeed most -misleading as a means of comparison between any two single ships. -Instances can readily be chosen, from this very case, in which vessels -skilfully placed and vigorously fought received less injury than -others, which were badly handled and did little harm to the enemy; but -when an average is taken of many ships, the specific causes of error -in different directions tend to balance each other, and if the general -conclusion is confirmed by the experience of other battles, it may -be accepted with much confidence. Now, on the First of June, taking -the total number of casualties in the British fleet, it will be found -that in every hundred men killed the eight van ships lost forty-three, -and in every hundred wounded forty-one; whereas the eight rear lost -seventeen killed and twenty-two wounded, or rather less than half the -proportion of the van. Nor does this tell the whole story, for four -fifths of the entire loss of the rear fell upon the three vessels,[91] -leaving but eight killed and thirty-three wounded to be divided among -the remaining five; whereas, in the eight van ships, though there are -marked individual differences, the loss is much more equally divided. -The inference, were the truth not otherwise known, would amount -almost to proof that the van ships went down in good order, attacked -vigorously, and so afforded mutual support, whereas the rear, whatever -the cause, did not impress themselves strongly on the enemy's line; -while the exceptional casualties of the three which did their duty well -indicate a lack of support from the others, which also appears to be -confirmed by the ascertained facts. - -When a result is thus reproduced in various battles, it cannot be -attributed wholly to the fault of the captains. The exceptions to the -rule on the First of June were not the rear ships which failed in -gaining for themselves a fair share in the action, but those which -succeeded in so doing. The cause of this usual result seems to be that -the van ship is the pivot upon which the operation hinges, and in -proportion as the distance from the pivot grows greater, irregularities -become more frequent, while each one that occurs is propagated and -increased, until at last, in a long line, an approach to disorder -ensues. When this happens, the efficiency of each ship depends less -upon her normal relations to the line than upon the initiative of her -captain; and the differences between men, which had been controlled by -the exigencies of the order, where it still existed, begin to tell. -Short lines will suffer less than long ones from this cause; whence it -follows that in a long line new pivots, or points of departure for the -order beyond them, should be provided. On the 1st of June the "Queen -Charlotte," by her steady action and the authority conveyed by the -example of the commander-in-chief, served as such a pivot, and the -conduct of the ships on her right was better than that of those on her -immediate left, which were regulating their position by the van.[92] -As it seems probable, from the character of modern ships and weapons, -that attacks will be made in a line of front, it is a matter of -interest to naval officers to provide against this tendency to disorder -and imperfect execution, which seems to inhere in the part of an order -distant from the guide, or pivot. - -The French line, by awaiting Howe's attack, laid itself open to any -combination he might see fit to make, but the plan actually adopted -threw the burden of resistance upon the individual captains, rather -than upon the admiral. Whenever a ship was vigorously attacked by an -enemy, her captain's task was simple, however arduous; nor does there -seem to have been an instance of a French officer in this position -failing to do his duty manfully. The superior gunnery of the British -at this time, however, generally beat down the resistance of the -opponent, and the latter then bore up and ran to leeward, unless his -masts had been shot away, or unless the assailant by piercing the -line had barred retreat. Thus the "Mucius," seventh in the line, was -engaged to leeward by the "Defence." She tried, therefore, to escape -by passing to windward of the British "Marlborough," next ahead, but -fell on board of her and there lost all her masts. This circumstance -of inferior gunnery, together with the fixed idea of keeping the line -closed, appear to have governed the movements of the French ships after -the battle joined. Now the duty of keeping the line closed is most -important and essential to mutual support, but it is not paramount -to every other consideration, particularly when an action, as this -inevitably must, had passed into a _mêlée_; but the French captains, -having few other ideas on fleet-fighting, clung to this one in its -simplest form,—that of following close upon the heels of the next -ahead. Thus the leading ship, "Convention," though not hotly attacked, -wore out of the line and was closely followed by the "Gasparin," -though the latter was vigorously engaged. The next five ships were hard -pressed and fought manfully. The eighth, after a short engagement, ran -to leeward and was followed by the three astern of her. This brings -us to the twelfth, or nearly to the centre of the French line, and of -the six that followed, down to and including the seventeenth, four -were taken after a desperate resistance. The two that escaped were -the flag-ship "Montagne," whose career has already been told, and -the "Jacobin," next astern of her. The eighteenth, nineteenth, and -twentieth seem to have received little injury, but yet ran to leeward; -whether independently, or one following another, does not certainly -appear. The remaining six suffered the fierce assault of the three -of the enemy's rear, and four were reduced to such a condition that -they must have been taken—and not two only of them—had the rest of the -British division done their full duty. - -Although the French officers, lacking both experience and instruction -in fleet warfare, failed to do all they might in the battle, distinct -misconduct by doing what should not have been done appears only in two -cases. The first was the captain of the leading ship, for whose act in -forsaking his post in the van no good reason appears. The second and -much more serious fault was committed by the captain of the "Jacobin." -The course of this officer in making sail to close upon the flag-ship, -when the intention of the "Queen Charlotte" to pass between the two -became evident, was perfectly proper. His keeping away, when collision -with the "Montagne" threatened, was probably the only way of avoiding a -disaster. Being thus forced to leeward of the line, he still retained -the power of attacking the British ship to starboard, while she was, or -should have been, engaged on the other side by the "Montagne." Instead -of using this opportunity, Captain Gassin kept off and ran to leeward. -This fault, grave in any case, was especially blameworthy in the next -astern or next ahead of the commander-in-chief. Those were posts of -peculiar honor, held by heavy vessels, chosen with the special object -of supporting their leader and strengthening the part of the order in -which he was. For Captain Gassin, personally, there may have been many -excuses; but for the course of the ship, considered from a military and -tactical point of view, no excuse whatever appears, for she suffered -little in the fight. The void caused by the "Jacobin" was filled by -the ships astern of her pressing up, and this forward movement, being -transmitted to the end of the line, was partly the cause why the rear -British ships did not reach their numerical opposite in the French -order. - -Some attention is due to the naval strategy, to the general conduct -and results of this short maritime campaign, which covered only four -weeks,—from the 16th of May, when Villaret sailed from Brest, to the -11th of June, when he again anchored just outside the port. In order to -form a just opinion there must be considered the objects of each party, -the forces at their control, and the measures pursued by them. - -The object of the French was to insure the arrival of the convoy -from America. For this purpose they had at sea, at the first, two -detachments,—one of five ships-of-the-line under Nielly, the other of -twenty-five under Villaret. The rendezvous for the two was the same, -and the important point where their intended junction should take place -was known to their admirals and unknown to the British. It may be again -said that the instructions of the French government to its officers -compelled the latter to avoid, if possible, any decisive engagement. - -The object of the British was twofold: to intercept the expected -convoy, and to bring the French fleet to battle. The two might, and -did, interfere with each other,—might, by divergence of interest, -prompt a separation of the force. Of the two, fighting the French fleet -was indisputably the more important, and was doubtless so considered -by Howe, in accordance with the usual British naval policy, which aimed -at the destruction of the enemy's organized force afloat. The ships at -his disposal, including Montagu's squadron, amounted to thirty-two of -the line. He was ignorant of the rendezvous of the French fleets and of -the exact course that would be followed by the convoy; but of both he -could form approximate estimates. - -From the 4th of May, when Montagu's squadron first separated, until -the 19th, Howe supposed the French to be in Brest. On the latter day -his lookouts reconnoitred the port for the second time, and he then -learned that they had sailed. The same evening he was joined by a -frigate from Montagu, bearing a request for a re-enforcement. Fearing -that his subordinate might fall in with Villaret's greatly superior -force, Howe next morning made all sail to join him; making a course of -west by south, while the French had been steering west one-half south. -On the 21st he fell in with and recaptured a number of Dutch ships, -which had been taken by Villaret on the 19th. From the logs of these -ships, the position and course of the French fleet two days before was -ascertained; and Howe, concluding that they would not go near Montagu, -who was well to the southward, dismissed the latter from his mind -and devoted himself thenceforth to finding the enemy. This decision -challenges criticism, because Montagu's orders were, if unsuccessful in -finding the convoy, to abandon his cruise on the 20th and rejoin the -admiral off Ushant. If he complied strictly with these instructions, he -should not now have been very far from the main fleet. - -Montagu, however, had seen reason for delaying some days on his -cruising ground, and while thus waiting retook some of the Dutch -prizes taken by Villaret and which had escaped recapture by Howe on -the 21st. He then first learned of the French sailing, and at the -same time that Howe was in pursuit. Instead of making any attempt to -rejoin his superior, or to take a position where he might further the -general objects of the cruise, he on the 24th or 25th of May bore up -for England and anchored at Plymouth on the 30th. The British naval -historian, James, says this was done in compliance with the spirit -of his orders. It would be more convincing to be told what was the -letter of orders that could admit such a construction, and what the -condition of his ships that could justify forsaking the field of action -with so strong a detachment at such a critical moment. His decision, -on whatever grounds made, seems not to have met the approval of the -government, and orders were at once sent for him to sail immediately, -accompanied by all the ships-of-the-line ready for sea at Plymouth. He -accordingly did sail on the 4th of June with nine ships, and on the 8th -reached the rendezvous appointed by Howe off Ushant, which was also the -station indicated by the last instructions of the admiralty to him. -On the 3d of June, the day before he left, the "Audacious" arrived, -bringing the first tidings of the meeting of the fleets on the 28th of -May, in which she had been disabled. - -It appears from this account that neither Howe nor Montagu attached -sufficient importance to the concentration of the British fleet. -Howe's immediate pursuit might indeed be defended on the ground of the -necessity to overtake Villaret, before he had effected his junction -with Nielly; but, as both these admirals knew their rendezvous, while -he did not, and as Villaret had three days' start, the chances all -were that he would not come up before they met. Actually, one of -Nielly's ships joined before Howe found him, another on the 29th, and -the remainder on the 30th; thus neutralizing the advantages gained by -the fine tactical efforts of the British admiral on the 28th and 29th. -Had Montagu's six ships, however, come up, the full profit of the two -previous days' fighting would have been preserved; and it is hard to -over-estimate the effect which they would have had upon the results, -even if maintained simply as a reserve. To these considerations may be -added the risk of missing both fleet and convoy, by going in search of -them, instead of simply taking a position near which they must pass, -and there uniting the British fleet. That this was very possible is -shown by the facts of the chase. "On the 27th, at 9 A.M., having got a -few leagues to the northward of the latitude in which he had reason to -think Villaret was cruising, Lord Howe bore up and ran to the eastward, -with the wind on the starboard quarter."[93] The fleet had been running -on this course, with a fair and apparently fresh wind for twenty-one -hours, when the French were first seen in the south-south-east. -Although no precise data are at hand, it is reasonable to conclude from -the above that Howe had gone over a hundred miles to the westward of -the French rendezvous, which Villaret had reached a week before.[94] If -in the meantime the convoy had appeared, as it perfectly well might, -Villaret would at once have sailed for Brest, and the British admiral -would not improbably have lost both fleet and convoy. - -The question presented is purely strategic. It was certain that the -French fleet, if undisturbed, would meet the convoy; therefore after -it had sailed from Brest the two objects of the British were merged -into one. There was no occasion thenceforth to remain divided into two -detachments. For what point precisely the convoy would aim was not -known, but Brest and Rochefort marked the two extreme points of the -coast line, between which it would probably arrive. The approach of so -large a body of ships, tied down to a common movement, is necessarily -slow. It would be as ignorant of the point where the British would -concentrate, as the latter were of the rendezvous where the different -French detachments were to meet. Fast single ships, well scattered to -the westward, might reasonably be expected to meet it and to return to -their main body in time to warn this where to look for the prey. That -there were no difficulties in this line of action will not, certainly, -be contended; but it was more sure and militarily sounder thus to -concentrate the British force of thirty-two ships-of-the-line in a well -chosen position, and with adequate lookouts, than to lead it hither -and thither in search of the enemy's whereabouts. It is a singular and -instructive fact that from first to last not a single British ship -appears to have laid eyes on the convoy from America. Ships both of -commerce and war, belonging to other bodies, were taken and retaken -in the Bay of Biscay; but those coming from America wore invisible -garments. - -The strategic aim of the French admiral, after he had been so -unfortunate as to be found by the British fleet, was to draw it away -from the rendezvous appointed for the convoy. Both his orders and the -tactical condition of his fleet forbade the attempt to secure this -by bringing the enemy to battle. When first met, the French were to -windward, south of the British. If they had been north, with the same -advantage of the wind, the situation would have been most satisfactory -to them; for the convoy was approaching from the west-south-west, and -by retreating to the northward and westward Villaret would have led the -enemy directly from the position endangering it. As things were, it was -impossible to steer to the northward without bringing on the battle -he had to avoid; and if defeated where he then was, the victorious -fleet would be left too near the convoy. Villaret, therefore, kept the -advantage of the wind and steered a west course, which diverged slowly -from the convoy's path, and, if long enough continued, would allow -it to pass out of sight. The slowness of this divergence, however, -doubtless contributed to reconcile him to the loss of the weather -gage on the 29th, and immediately upon finding himself north of the -enemy he went to the northward and westward during the two following -days.[95] The result was eminently successful. It is stated by the -latest French authorities[96] that on the 30th the convoy passed over -the ground where the partial engagement of the 29th was fought. If so, -it must have been under cover of the dense fog which then prevailed, as -the fleets had not moved very far. - -It is impossible not to admire heartily the judicious and energetic -measures by which Howe, on the 28th and 29th of May, succeeded in -gaining the weather gage, while inflicting, at the same time, a heavy -loss upon the enemy. Whatever judgment may be passed upon his tactics -on the 1st of June,—and in the opinion of the writer they were the best -adapted to the situation and to the condition of his fleet,—it cannot -be denied that those of the preceding days were well conceived, and, -on the part of the admiral, vigorously and gallantly executed. But the -strategic mistake, or misfortune, wherever the fault lay, by which -Montagu's detachment was absent, neutralized the tactical advantage -gained; while the correct strategy of the French, which brought the two -parts of their fleet within supporting distance of each other, restored -the balance of strength. Thus was again confirmed the maxim of military -writers, that a strategic mistake is more serious and far-reaching in -its effects than an error in tactics. - -After the two fleets separated each made the best of its way to a -home port. Lord Howe waited until the morning of the 3d, securing and -refitting his prizes and disabled ships, and reached Portsmouth on -the 13th of June. Villaret Joyeuse went to Brest. On the morning of -the 9th he fell in with Montagu's squadron, a little south of Ushant. -The condition of the French, encumbered with injured ships, would -have afforded an opportunity to a quick-moving fleet; but two of the -British were excessively slow and the admiral did not dare approach -a much superior force. Villaret pursued for a short distance, but, -fearing to be drawn to leeward of his port in his crippled state, he -soon gave over the chase. On the 11th of June, all his fleet anchored -in Bertheaume roads, outside of Brest. Montagu, on the 10th, departed -for England, a movement which finally closed the campaign on the part -of the British. On the night of the 12th the French crews saw a number -of lights in the Raz de Sein, the southern passage by which Brest is -approached. They were those of the long-expected convoy. Admiral Van -Stabel, fearing to find a hostile fleet before the usual and safer -entrance, had steered for the Penmarcks, a rocky promontory thirty -miles south of the port, and thence for the Raz de Sein. On the same -day that Van Stabel made the land Montagu anchored in Plymouth. Two -days later, June 14, the convoy and the remnant of Villaret's squadron -entered Brest together. Thus ended the cruise, which was marked, -indeed, by a great naval disaster, but had insured the principal object -for which it was undertaken. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT. - - -While the British ships engaged on the 1st of June were refitting, -Admiral Cornwallis, on the 22d of the month, sailed in command of -Montagu's division for a cruise to the westward, from which he -returned to port on the 8th of July. With this short exception, both -the Channel and the Bay of Biscay were left unguarded until the 3d of -September, when Howe again sailed with thirty-four ships-of-the-line, -five of which were Portuguese, returning on the 21st to Torbay after a -tempestuous cruise. The fleet remained in port until November 8, when -the "Canada" seventy-four arrived with the news that her consort, the -"Alexander," of similar force, had been captured two hundred miles -west of Ushant by a French division of five ships-of-the-line, from -which she herself had escaped by better sailing. The British at once -put to sea, but, it is needless to say, failed to find the French -ships, which had cruised with impunity during their absence; and on -the 29th the fleet anchored again at Spithead, a station so far to the -eastward as to indicate little expectation of interfering with any of -the operations of the enemy from Brest. There accordingly it remained -until the 14th of the following February. The protection of commerce -was entrusted to squadrons of frigates, whose young and enterprising -commanders did much service by capturing or dispersing the French -forces of a similar character. - -The Committee of Public Safety determined to use the opportunity which -was permitted them by the diligent care of the British admiral to -economize his fleet. There were, at this time, in Brest and the other -Biscay ports as many as forty-six ships-of-the-line, either afloat or -building; whereas in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the disaster -at Toulon, there were only fifteen. The Committee therefore decided -to send six ships round, and Villaret Joyeuse was directed to sail -with the entire Brest fleet, thirty-five in all, for the purpose of -escorting this division clear of the Bay of Biscay; after which he was -to cruise for a fortnight against British commerce. The destitution -of the Brest arsenal, however, still continued; for, with the enemy's -command of the Channel, the naval stores of the Baltic could reach -Brest only by going north of the British islands, and then running -the risk of capture in the Atlantic by hostile cruisers. There had -therefore been great difficulty in repairing the injuries received in -the actions with Lord Howe, as well as in equipping the ships not then -engaged. When the orders were received, vivid remonstrances were made, -and the condition of the vessels fully represented to the Committee as -being entirely unfit for a winter's cruise. Many masts wounded in the -battle could not be replaced, the rigging was in bad condition, the -crews were untrained. Several of the ships it was proposed to send were -old and worn out; and so great was the dearth of provisions that only -those for Toulon received enough for some months, the others for no -more than four weeks. - -Robespierre had fallen five months before, and the Reign of Terror -was now over; but the Committee were still unaccustomed to admit -objections, and did not find in their limited knowledge of sea matters -any reason for recalling orders once given. On the 24th of December, -1794, the fleet began to leave Brest, and, in so doing, one of the -largest, of one hundred and ten guns, was wrecked on a rock in the -entrance. On the 29th the remaining thirty-four had cleared the harbor -and anchored in the road outside, whence they sailed on the 30th. On -the night of January 1, 1795, a furious gale sprang up, followed by -a spell of violent weather. Two eighty-gun ships and a seventy-four -foundered, the crews being with difficulty saved. Two yet larger, of -one hundred and ten guns, had seven feet of water in the hold and would -have been lost had the storm lasted for twenty-four hours longer. -Another seventy-four had to be run on the coast to save the lives -of her people. In the midst of these difficulties, which caused the -separation of the fleet, it was necessary to transfer provisions from -the Toulon division to the other ships, an herculean undertaking, but -imperative to keep the latter from starving. On the 2d of February -the greater part of the survivors again reached Brest; but some had -to scatter to other ports as the weather permitted. The Toulon ships -returned with the rest. This mid-winter cruise had cost the republic -five ships-of-the-line; it brought in one British corvette and seventy -merchantmen as prizes. - -The stars, or rather the winds, in their courses had fought for Great -Britain; but in no wise did she owe anything to her own efforts. Not -till the 14th of February did the Channel fleet put to sea, nearly a -fortnight after the French had returned to Brest. Whatever may be said -of the inexpediency of exposing the heavy ships to winter weather, -it seems clear that the opposite system left the enemy at perfect -liberty to combine his movements; and that there was little likelihood -of these being made known to the commander-in-chief in Torbay soon -enough for him to follow efficaciously. Howe himself felt this, and, -from instructions issued by him to Sir James Saumarez on the 15th of -January, it would appear that this escape of the French roused him for -a moment to contemplate the close watch off Brest, afterwards practised -by Jervis and Cornwallis.[97] This was the last occasion on which the -veteran admiral actually went to sea in command of a fleet; although, -from an apparent reluctance to try new men, the government insisted -upon his exercising a nominal charge from quarters on shore. He was -now in his seventieth year and suffering from many infirmities. The -command afloat devolved upon a man not much younger, Lord Bridport, -one of the naval family of Hood, but whose career does not bear the -impress of great ability which distinguished so many of its members. -Immediately before this, general dissatisfaction had caused a change -in the Admiralty, over which, since 1788, had presided Pitt's elder -brother, the Earl of Chatham. He was succeeded, in December, 1794, by -Earl Spencer, a more vigorous and efficient man, who remained First -Lord until the fall of Pitt's administration in 1801. - -The new head, however, did not make any substantial variation of -system, calculated to frustrate the enemy's naval combinations by -the strategic dispositions of the British fleet. More activity was -displayed by keeping a small squadron of half a dozen ships-of-the-line -constantly cruising in the soundings and to the westward, and the -great Channel fleet was more continuously at sea during the summer -months; but the close blockade of Brest was not attempted, nor was -Bridport the man to persuade the government to the measures afterwards -so vigorously, and in the main successfully, carried out by Lord -St. Vincent, both as successor to Bridport in the Channel fleet and -subsequently as First Lord of the Admiralty. To this faulty policy -contributed not a little the system of telegraphs, adopted in 1795, by -which communications were quickly transmitted from height to height -between London and Portsmouth. This great improvement unfortunately -confirmed the tendency of the Admiralty to keep the Channel fleet -at the latter point, regardless of the obvious, but unappreciated, -strategic disadvantage of a position so far east of Brest, with winds -prevailing from the western quarters. To have the commander-in-chief -just there, under their own hand, to receive orders from them, seemed -much safer than to put him and his fleet in a central position whence -he could most certainly intercept or most rapidly follow the enemy, and -then to trust to the judgment of a trained and competent sea-officer -to act as the emergency required. The plan came near resulting very -disastrously when the French attempted to invade Ireland; and would -have done so, had not the elements again interfered to remedy the -absence of the British fleet. "If," says Osler in his life of Lord -Exmouth,[98] from whom he probably received the idea, "if Lord Bridport -(in 1796) had been waiting at Falmouth, with discretional powers, Sir -Edward Pellew having been instructed to communicate directly with him, -he might have sailed early on December 21st" (Pellew reached Falmouth -from before Brest on the 20th) "and found the enemy in Bantry Bay, -when perhaps not a ship would have escaped him. It is, however, to be -remembered that, as the destination of the French armament was unknown -to the last, the Admiralty might very properly determine that he should -receive his final instructions from themselves, and therefore would -keep the fleet at Spithead (Portsmouth) for the convenience of ready -communication." But why! How could they in London judge better than a -good admiral on the coast? - -During the year 1794, now closing, the Revolution in France had been -rapidly devouring its children. After the overthrow of the Girondists -in June, 1793, the Terror pursued its pitiless march, sweeping before -it for the time every effort made in behalf of moderation or mercy. The -queen was put to death on the 16th of October, and her execution was -followed on the 31st by that of those Girondists who had not deigned -to escape from their accusers. Dissension next arose and spread among -the now triumphant party of the Jacobins; resulting in March and April, -1794, in the trial and death of the Hébertists on the one side, and -of Danton and his friends on the other. More and more power fell into -the hands of the Committee of Public Safety, whose tokens to the world -were Robespierre and his chief supporters, St. Just and Couthon, ruling -the Convention which passively decreed their wishes, and, through the -Convention, France. For three short months Robespierre now appeared -as the master of the country, but was himself carried on and away by -the torrent which he had done so much to swell. The exigencies and -dangers of his position multiplied the precautions he deemed necessary -to secure his authority and his safety; and the cold relentlessness -of his character recognized no means so sure as death. On the 10th of -June, by his sole authority, without the intervention of the Committee -of Public Safety, he procured a decree modifying the procedure of the -Revolutionary Tribunal, and suppressing the few checks that restrained -its uncontrolled power. In the fourteen months preceding this decree -1256 persons had been by the tribunal condemned to death; in the six -weeks that followed, until Robespierre himself fell, the executions -were 1361.[99] So extreme an access of fury betokened approaching -exhaustion; no society could endure the strain; the most violent and -blood-thirsty, as well as the most timid, felt their own lives in -danger. Bitter opposition to the dictator arose both in the Committee -of Public Safety and in the Legislature. The doubtful struggle, between -the prestige of his power and long continued success and the various -passions of fear and vengeance animating his opponents, culminated in a -violent scene in the Convention on the 27th of July. For some hours the -issue was balanced, but in the end the arrest and trial of Robespierre -and his chief supporters were decreed. The following day he, St. Just -and Couthon, with some others of lesser note, died on the guillotine. - -No immediate change in the form of government ensued. The Committee -of Public Safety, reconstituted, continued to exercise the executive -functions which nominally depended upon the Convention; and the impulse -which it had imparted to the soldiers and armies of France continued -for a time to carry them resistlessly forward. But the delirious -intensity of the popular movement had reached its climax in the three -months' unrestrained power of Robespierre, with whose name it has -been ever associated. Though the external manifestations of strength -continued for a time unabated, the inner tension was relaxing. Weakness -was about to succeed the strength of fever, to spread from the heart -throughout the whole organism, and, by threatening social dissolution, -to prepare the way for concentrated absolute power. - -The onward swing of the French armies on the north-east still -continued. The year 1794 had opened with the investment of Landrecy by -the allies, and its surrender to them on the 30th of April. The French -began their campaign with the plan, especially affected by Carnot in -all his military combinations, of attacking at the same time both -flanks of the allied Austrians, Dutch and English, concentrating at -each extremity of the line a force greatly superior to the enemy before -it. As Jourdan, commanding the French right, threatened the allied -stronghold of Charleroi, he drew thither the greater effort of the -allies, and Pichegru, on the left, found his task easier. Five times -did Jourdan cross the Sambre to attack Charleroi, and four times was -he compelled to re-cross; but on the fifth, before the allies could -come up in sufficient force, the place capitulated,—the guns of the -relieving force being heard just as the garrison was marching out. -The following day, June 26, 1794, Jourdan fought and won the battle -of Fleurus; the Austrians retreating upon Nivelles towards the future -field of Waterloo. The allies on both flanks continued to fall back; -Ostend and Nieuport, ports on the North Sea facilitating communication -with England, were successively surrendered, and Brussels uncovered. -On the 10th of July Pichegru entered Brussels and formed his junction -with Jourdan. On the 15th the allies lost Landrecy, the first and only -prize of the campaign. On the same day the French attacked in force -the centre of the allied line, where the Anglo-Dutch left touched the -Austrian right. The former being gradually turned fell back, and the -Austrians, finding their flank uncovered, did the same. From this time -the allies retired in divergent directions, the Anglo-Dutch north-east -toward Holland, the Austrians eastward toward Coblentz; thus repeating -in retreat the unmilitary and ruinous mistake which had rendered -abortive the offensive campaign of 1793. - -The French advance was now stayed by the Committee of Public Safety, in -deference to an emotion of patriotism, until the towns surrendered the -year before should be retaken. On the 11th of August Le Quesnoy opened -its gates, on the 27th Valenciennes, and on the 30th Condé. The siege -corps now rejoined the armies in the field and the advance was resumed; -Pichegru following the British and Dutch toward Holland, Jourdan, by -a series of flank attacks which threatened the communications of the -Austrians, forcing the latter from one position to another, until on -the 5th October they recrossed to the east side of the Rhine, the -French occupying Coblentz and Bonn on the west bank. The advance of -Pichegru was marked by less of battle and more of siege than that of -Jourdan, but was alike successful. By the middle of October his army -had reached the Rhine; which in Holland divides into two branches, -the Waal and the Leek, between which the enemy lay. A month later -they had retreated beyond the latter, the French being for a moment -stopped by the floating ice in the rivers; but the winter was one of -unusual severity, and early in January the waters were frozen hard. -On the 17th of January, 1795, the Prince of Orange left Holland for -England, and on the 20th Pichegru entered Amsterdam. The provinces and -cities everywhere declared for the French, and a provisional republican -government was established; while the pursuit of the British troops was -continued with unremitting diligence until they had escaped into German -territory, whence they returned, in April, to England. - -The occupation of Belgium and Holland by the French was in every -way a matter of concern to the other European powers. It threatened -Great Britain in the North Sea, where her flank had previously been -strengthened by the Dutch alliance, and compelled her at once to -weaken the Channel fleet by a detachment of five ships-of-the-line to -confront the Dutch squadrons. The merchants of Holland being among -the great money-lenders of Europe, large revenues were opened to the -needy French; and the resources thus gained by them were by the same -blow lost to the allies. Great Britain thenceforth had to bear alone -the money burden of the war. But on the other hand the republican -commissaries sucked like leeches the substance of the Dutch; and -the sources of their wealth, commerce and the colonies, were at the -same time threatened with extinction by the British sea power, whose -immediate hostility was incurred by the change in their political -relations. Within a month, on the 9th of February, orders were issued -to arrest all Dutch ships at sea; temporary provision being made to -restore neutral property found on board them, because shipped while -Holland was an ally. Vigorous measures were at once taken for the -seizure of the rich Dutch colonies in all parts of the world; and -before the year 1795 closed, there passed into the hands of Great -Britain the Cape of Good Hope, Malacca, all the Dutch possessions -on the continent of India, and the most important places in Ceylon; -the whole island submitting in 1796. Besides these, other colonies -were taken in the farther East and in the West Indies. The Dutch -navy remained inoffensively in its ports until the year 1797, with -the exception of a small expedition that escaped from the Texel in -February, 1796, prepared to retake the Cape of Good Hope. Unable to go -through the English Channel, which was completely under the enemy's -control, it passed north of the British Islands and eluded capture -until Saldanha Bay, near the Cape, was reached. Upon hearing of its -arrival the British admiral on that station sailed in pursuit, and, -having a greatly superior force, received its instant surrender. - -The success that followed the French standards in Belgium and Holland -during 1794 accompanied the less striking operations on the Rhine and -in the South. At the end of the year the Austrians and Prussians had -abandoned the west bank of the river, except Luxembourg and the very -important fortress of Mayence. Luxembourg also was closely invested, -and capitulated in June, 1795. In the Pyrenees, the Spaniards were -driven across the frontiers, and had, in the early autumn, established -themselves in a strong entrenched camp at Figueras. On the 17th and -20th of November the French assaulted this position, and on the latter -day drove the enemy from all their works round the place, forcing -them to retreat upon Gerona. The garrison of Figueras, ten thousand -strong, capitulated a week later, and the French then invested Rosas, -which held out for two months longer; but the resistance of Spain was -completely broken, and the further events of the war in that quarter -are unimportant. - -On the Italian frontier the year opened with substantial successes -on the part of the French, who got possession of important mountain -passes of the Alps; but progress here was stopped, in May, by reverses -attending the operations on the Rhine, causing troops to be withdrawn -from the Army of the Alps. The belligerents rested in the same relative -positions during the remainder of 1794. - -The important political results of the French military successes in -the campaign of 1794 were demonstrated and sealed by treaties of peace -contracted in 1795 with Prussia, Spain, and Holland. That with the -latter power was one not only of peace, but also of alliance, offensive -and defensive. The principal naval conditions were that the United -Provinces should furnish twelve ships-of-the-line, with frigates, to -cruise in the North Sea and Baltic, and should admit a French garrison -into the important seaport of Flushing. This treaty was signed May -15, 1795. The Prussian treaty was concluded on the 5th of April. It -stipulated, generally, the surrender of Prussian possessions on the -left bank of the Rhine, and by a later agreement established a neutral -zone in North Germany under Prussian guarantee. The treaty with Spain -was signed at Basle on the 22d of July. It maintained the integrity -of the Spanish possessions in Europe, but provided for the cession to -France of Spain's part of Haïti. - -On the other hand, Great Britain during the same year drew closer the -ties binding her to her still remaining allies. An agreement was made -in May with the emperor of Germany that he should provide not less than -two hundred thousand men for the approaching campaign, while Great -Britain was to pay a large subsidy for their support. This was followed -by a treaty of defensive alliance, each government engaging not to make -a separate peace. With Russia also was made a defensive alliance, and -the czarina sent twelve ships-of-the-line to cruise with the British -fleet in the North Sea. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -THE YEAR 1795 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT. - - -The year 1795 was for France one of reaction and lassitude. The wave of -popular ferment which had been rushing forward since the fall of the -royalty, gathering strength and volume, and driving before it all wills -and all ambitions, crested and broke in July, 1794. Like the breakers -of the seashore, a part of the accumulated momentum was expended in -a tumultuous momentary advance, of increased force but diminishing -depth, and then recession followed. The forward and backward impulses -met and mingled, causing turmoil and perplexing currents of popular -feeling, but the pure republican movement had reached the highest -point it was destined to attain. It had stirred France to its depths, -and brought to the surface many a gem which under quieter conditions -would have remained hidden from the eyes of men; but, in the confusion -and paralysis which followed, these were left stranded and scattered, -waiting for the master hand which should combine them and set each in -its proper sphere for the glory of France. - -The recoil which followed the death of Robespierre took shape in -several ways, all tending at once to lessen the internal vigor of -the government, and to deprive it of means hitherto possessed for -external effort. The revulsion to mercy provoked by his bloody tyranny -was accompanied by sentiments of vengeance against the men who were, -or were supposed to be, identified with his policy. The indulgence -extended to those before proscribed brought them back to France -in numbers, clamorous for revenge. These discordant sentiments, -agitating the Convention as well as the people, the provinces as well -as Paris, shattered that unity of purpose which had been the strength -of the government after the fall of the Girondists, and during the -domination of the Jacobins. At the same time were revoked the measures -by which the Revolutionary Government, living as it did from hand to -mouth, had provided for its immense daily necessities. The law of the -Maximum, by which dealers were forbidden to charge beyond a certain -fixed price for the prime necessaries of life, was repealed. The paper -money, already depreciated, fell rapidly, now that the seller could -demand as much as he wished for articles of universal consumption. The -government, obliged to receive the assignats at their face value in -payment of dues, sought to meet its difficulty by increased issues, -which accelerated the decline. At the same time, requisitions in kind -having been suppressed, as part of the reaction from a rule of force, -supplies of all sorts were with difficulty obtained. Distress, lack of -confidence, abounded in all directions; speculation ran riot, and the -government, having relaxed the spring of terror, that most powerful -of motives until it becomes unendurable, found itself drifting into -impotence. These various measures were not completed till near the end -of 1794; and the evil effect was, therefore, not immediately felt in -the armies,—whose wants were also in part supplied by liberal demands -upon their new allies in Holland. Boissi d'Anglas, in a speech made -January 30, 1795, in the Convention, and adopted by that body as -voicing its own sentiments, declared that the armies would demonstrate -to Europe that, far from being exhausted by the three years of war, -France had only augmented her resources. The year then opening was to -witness to the emptiness of the boast, until Bonaparte by his military -genius laid the Continent again at her feet. - -The internal history of France during this year, though marked by -many and important events, can be briefly summed up. The policy -of reconciliation towards the classes who had most suffered under -Jacobin rule was pursued by the government; but against the party -lately dominant the reaction that set in was marked by many and bloody -excesses. If in the North and West the insurgent Vendeans and Chouans -accepted the proffered pardon of the Convention, in the South and -East the reactionary movement produced a terror of its own; in which -perished, by public massacre or private assassination, several thousand -persons, many of whom had not been terrorists, but simply ardent -republicans. In Paris, the Jacobins, though depressed and weakened by -the loss of so many of their leaders, did not at once succumb; and the -tendency to agitation was favored in that great centre by the poverty -of the people and the scarcity of food. On the 1st of April, and again -on the 20th of May, the halls of the Convention were invaded by crowds -of men, women and children, demanding bread and the constitution of -1793. On the latter occasion a member of the Convention was shot while -endeavoring to cover the president with his body, and the greater part -of the deputies fled from the hall. Those who remained, belonging -mostly to the old Mountain, voted certain propositions designed to calm -the people; but the next day the crowd was driven out by the national -guard from some sections of the city, and the reaction resumed its -course with increased force and renewed thirst for vengeance. The -deputies who had remained and voted the propositions of May 20 were -impeached, and the arrest was ordered of all members of the Committees -which had governed during the Terror, except Carnot and one other. - -The following month, June, the project for a new constitution was -submitted to the Convention, and by it adopted on the 22d of August. It -provided for an Executive Directory of five members, and a Legislature -of two Chambers; the upper to be called the Council of the Elders, the -lower the Council of Five Hundred. To this scheme of a constitution, -the Convention appended a decree that two thirds of the new Legislature -must be taken from the members of the existing Convention. The -Constitution and the decree were submitted to the country in September. -The Provinces accepted both, but Paris rejected the decree; and the -protest against the latter took form on the 4th of October in the -revolt of the Sections,—a movement of the bourgeoisie and reactionists -against the Convention, which on this occasion fell back for support -upon the party identified with the Jacobins. The defence of the -Hall of Legislature and of its members was entrusted to Barras, who -committed the military command to General Bonaparte, from whose skilful -dispositions the assault of the Sections everywhere recoiled. On the -26th of October the National Convention dissolved, after an existence -of three years and one month. On the 27th the new Legislature began -its sittings; and the upper council at once elected the Executive -Directory. Among its five members was Carnot. - -On the sea the year 1795 was devoid of great or even striking events. -On the 22d of February the six ships destined for Toulon, which had -been driven back early in the month with the rest of the Brest fleet, -again set sail under the command of Admiral Renaudin, and, although -much delayed by heavy westerly winds in the Atlantic, reached their -destination in safety early in April. Not an enemy's ship was seen on -the way. The Channel fleet had gone back to Spithead as soon as Howe -learned that the Brest fleet had returned to port after the disastrous -January cruise; while in the Mediterranean the British, now under -Admiral Hotham, were at anchor in a roadstead of Corsica when Renaudin -drew near Toulon. This made the French in the Mediterranean twenty to -the British thirteen. "What the new Lords of the Admiralty are after," -wrote Nelson, "to allow such a detachment to get out here, surprises us -all."[100] - -Under the new admiralty small divisions of the Channel fleet continued -to cruise to the westward or in the Bay of Biscay; but not until the -12th of June did the main body, under Lord Bridport, put to sea. Ten -days later, numbering then fourteen sail-of-the-line, it fell in with -Villaret's fleet of twelve ships close in with its own coast, about -eighty miles south of Brest. This meeting was due to a succession of -incidents which are worthy of narration, as showing the conditions of -the war and the prostration of the French navy. The supplies of the -squadron at Brest and L'Orient, as well as much of the local traffic -of the country, were carried by small coasting vessels rather than -by inland roads. A division of three ships-of-the-line was sent to -protect a numerous convoy coming from Bordeaux. On the 8th of June -these vessels encountered the British division of five ships cruising -in the Bay of Biscay, which took from it eight of the convoy before -they could escape under the land. When news of this reached Brest, -Villaret was ordered to take the nine ships that alone were then ready -for sea and join the other three. This junction was made, and on the -16th of June the twelve again fell in with the British five, which, -after temporarily withdrawing, had returned to their cruising ground. -Chase was of course given, and as two of the British sailed very badly -there was a good prospect that either they would be taken, or the rest -of the division compelled to come down to their aid; which, with the -disparity of force, ought to result in the capture of the whole. The -admiral, Cornwallis, behaved with the utmost firmness and coolness; but -with such odds and the disadvantage of speed, no courage nor conduct -can avert some disaster. The inefficiency and bad gunnery of the French -saved their enemies. After a cannonade which lasted from nine in the -forenoon of the 17th until six in the evening, one British ship had -thirteen men wounded, and Villaret abandoned the pursuit. - -Five days later Bridport's fleet was sighted, and the French being -inferior stood in for their coast, intending to anchor and await action -under the island called Groix. The pursuit continued with light airs -all day and night; but at daybreak of June 23 the fastest British were -within three miles of the slowest of the French, which opened fire at -six A.M. All Villaret's signals could not bring his fleet into line, -nor induce the undoubtedly brave, but ill trained, men who commanded -the faster ships to take station for the support of the slower. A -desultory action continued till half-past eight, ending in the capture -of three French vessels, the last hauling down her flag within a mile -of Île Groix. Bridport then called his ships off. It is the opinion -of French writers, apparently shared by English critics,[101] that -if he had pursued energetically, the remainder of the enemy must -either have been taken or run ashore to avoid that fate. As it was, -Villaret was permitted to get into L'Orient without molestation, -although to do so he had to wait till the tide served. Such was the -extreme circumspection characterizing the early naval operations of -the British, until Jervis and Nelson enkindled their service with the -relentless energy of spirit inspired by Bonaparte on land. Those to -whom St. Vincent and the Nile, Algesiras and Copenhagen, have become -history, see with astonishment nine ships of capital importance -permitted to escape thus easily from fourteen; forgetting the hold -tradition has on the minds of men, and that it belongs to genius to -open the way into which others then eagerly press. How the admiralty -viewed Bridport's action may be inferred from his retaining command of -the fleet until April, 1800. The ships that reached L'Orient had to -remain till the winter, when they slipped back two or three at a time -to Brest. - -The disaster at Île Groix, with some similar small misfortunes in the -Mediterranean,[102] accompanied as they were by evidences, too plain -to be any longer overlooked, of the inefficiency both of officers and -men in the French fleets, determined the government to abandon all -attempt to contest the supremacy of the sea. To this contributed also -the extreme destitution, in the dockyards, of all sorts of stores for -equipment or provision. With the English Channel and the forests of -Corsica in the hands of Great Britain, the customary sources of supply -were cut off; and moreover the providing for the navy—not the most -cherished of the national institutions—met with the same difficulty -as was experienced by other branches of the public service in the -depreciation of the assignats, with which alone naval administrators -could pay contractors. At the end of 1795 twelve hundred francs -in paper were worth scarce twenty in gold. Having accepted naval -inferiority as a necessary condition, the Committee of Public Safety -resolved to maintain the great fleets in the ports simply as a threat -to the enemy, and to send to sea only small divisions to prey upon his -commerce and to levy tribute upon his colonies. - -From the end of 1795 forward, this policy prevailed and was finally -accepted even by the emperor after several attempts, fruitless through -the incompetence of his sea-officers, to realize on the sea that -employment of great masses in which he so wonderfully excelled on -land. The reluctance of his supreme genius to accede to this system -of petty war may be accepted as testimony that on sea, as on shore, -great results can only be expected by wielding great masses. Upon -this conclusion history too has set its seal; for the squadron and -division warfare of the French navy, seconded though it was by hosts -of commerce-destroyers, public and private, produced practically -no results, had absolutely no effect upon the issue of the war. On -the other hand, that Napoleon, when convinced that he could expect -nothing decisive from his fleet, accepted the use of it as a means of -harassment or of diversion, must be received as a weighty indication -of the naval policy suited to the inferior power. To assume a menacing -attitude at many points, to give effect to the menace by frequent and -vigorous sorties, to provoke thus a dispersion of the enemy's superior -force, that he may be led to expose detachments to attack by greater -numbers,—such must be the outline of conduct laid down for the weaker -navy. But that such a course may be really effective,—that the inferior -may, as in some of Bonaparte's wonderful campaigns, become ultimately -superior,—there must be at some fitly chosen point of the sea frontier -a concentrated body of ships; whose escape, if effected, may be the -means of inflicting a great disaster upon the enemy by crushing -one or more of the exposed fractions of his fleet. Unless there be -such a central mass, mere dissemination is purposeless. Inferiority -carried beyond a certain degree becomes impotence; nor will all the -commerce-destroyers fancy can picture restore the balance to the nation -hopelessly weaker in ships of the line-of-battle. - -On land as well as on sea weakness was stamped on the military -movements of the year 1795. Its diplomatic successes were due to the -arms of 1794. Early in the year Pichegru was removed from Holland -to the upper Rhine, being succeeded by Moreau. Between the armies -commanded by these two lay that of the Sambre and Meuse, still under -Jourdan, concentrated on the left bank of the Rhine between Dusseldorf -and Coblentz. It was provided that, in case of the three armies acting -together, the chief command should be with Pichegru. The removal of -the restraint enforced by the Terror was evidenced in these Northern -forces by the number of desertions during the severity of this unusual -winter. In the army of Italy the case was even worse; and the frightful -destitution of the soldiers, made known a year later in Bonaparte's -celebrated proclamation upon taking command, led to even greater -losses from the ranks. Toward the end of January seventeen thousand -men were detached from this army to Toulon to take part in a projected -invasion of Corsica. The expedition never sailed; but such was the -horror inspired by the sufferings they had undergone that the hardiest -soldiers forsook their colors, and of two fine divisions not ten -thousand men rejoined the army.[103] - -Under such conditions military operations could not but be sluggish; -the genius of a Bonaparte was needed to supply the impetus which the -emasculated central government could no longer impart. The great -Carnot, also, had been removed from the direction of the war, March -4, 1795, under the law prescribing periodic changes of members in the -Committee of Public Safety. The fall of Luxembourg, already mentioned, -was obtained only by the slow process of blockade. Not till September, -when the season was nearly over, did the French armies move; Jourdan -and Pichegru being then directed to undertake a concerted invasion, -from their widely separated positions, intending to form a junction in -the enemy's country. Jourdan crossed the Rhine, advanced south as far -as the Main, and invested Mayence, the Austrians retiring before him. -Pichegru received the capitulation of Mannheim, which opened its gates -upon the threat of bombardment without receiving a shot. He showed -no vigor in following this success, and his dilatory ill-combined -movements permitted the Austrian general, Clairfayt, to concentrate his -armies in a central position between the Main and Mannheim, parting the -two French leaders. The new direction of war, either through folly, or -from sharing the growing inefficiency of the general government, had -failed to accumulate the supplies of all kinds needed by the masses -thus gathered in a wild and impoverished region. Clairfayt combined a -powerful movement against the destitute and suffering army of Jourdan, -compelling him to retreat and recross the Rhine. Leaving a corps of -observation before him and holding Pichegru in check on the south, -he then himself crossed the river at Mayence and assaulted vigorously -the lines on the left bank with which the enemy during the past year -had surrounded the place. The blockading forces were driven back in -divergent directions; and the Austrians in increasing numbers poured -into the country west of the river, separating Jourdan from Pichegru. - -It was at this moment that the National Convention was dissolving and -the Directory assuming the reins of government. Carnot became one of -its five members. Impressed by the importance of retaining Mannheim, -the loss of which was threatened by the recent reverses, he sent urgent -orders to Jourdan to move south to the support of his colleague, using -his own judgment as to the means. It was too late. The mingled weakness -and ignorance of the preceding government had caused a destitution of -means and an inferiority of force wholly inadequate to cope with the -superior strategic position of the Austrian masses. Mannheim, which -had surrendered on the 20th of September, was regained on the 22d of -November by the Austrians, who at once re-enforced the troops on the -west bank, acting against Pichegru, while Clairfayt pushed further -back the other French army. With this success his brilliant operations -closed for the year. The weather had become excessively bad, causing -great sickness; and on the 19th of December he proposed an armistice, -which Jourdan was only too glad to accept. The Austrians, who when the -year opened were east of the Rhine, remained in force on the west bank, -holding well-advanced positions based upon Mayence and Mannheim,—the -two capital places for sustaining operations on either side of the -river. - -The suspension of arms lasted until May 30, 1796, when the French, -having given the notification required by the terms of the armistice, -again crossed the river and began hostilities. But, although great -and instructive military events followed this new undertaking, the -centre of interest had by this time shifted from the north and east -to the Italian frontier of the republic, where the successes of -Bonaparte enchained it until the Peace of Campo Formio dissolved the -coalition against France. That dazzling career had begun which becomes, -thenceforth until its close, the main thread of French history, to -which other incidents have to be referred, and by following which -their mutual relations are most easily understood. We have reached -therefore the period when a naval narrative reverts naturally to the -Mediterranean; for Bonaparte's Italian campaigns profoundly affected -the political and maritime conditions in that sea. Upon it also he -next embarked for the extraordinary enterprise, condemned by many as -chimerical, and yet so signally stamped by the characteristics of -his genius, in which he first came into collision with the Sea Power -of Great Britain, destined to ruin his career, and with the great -seaman in whom that Sea Power found the highest expression it has ever -attained. - -"During the year 1795," says the distinguished military historian of -these wars, "France, after a twelvemonth of victory, came near losing -all her conquests; threatened with a dangerous internal reaction, she -only with difficulty succeeded in freeing herself from embarrassments -and modifying the defects of her institutions. The next year we shall -find her launched in a yet vaster career, by the great captain who so -long presided over her destinies, who raised her to the pinnacle of -glory by his victories, and thence plunged her to the abyss through -disregard of justice and moderation."[104] - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY.—FROM THE EVACUATION OF TOULON IN 1793 TO -THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT SEA, IN 1796, AND THE BATTLE OF CAPE -ST. VINCENT, FEBRUARY, 1797.—AUSTRIA FORCED TO MAKE PEACE. - - -After the evacuation of Toulon, on the 19th of December, 1793, Lord -Hood had taken his fleet to Hyères Roads,—an anchorage formed by the -group of islands of the same name a few miles east of Toulon. There he -remained during the greater part of January, revictualling his ships -and considering what steps should next be taken to assure British -interests in the Mediterranean. - -It is essential to a fleet, as to an army, to have always near at hand -depots of supplies, upon which it can depend to replace the consumption -of the limited stores carried on board, and to which it can resort for -refit. The way from the depots to the fleet, or the army, technically -called the communications, should be such as can most easily be -defended by the armed force itself, without impairing its liberty in -movements necessary to obtain the objects of the war. In other words, -this depot, or base, should be near the scene of operations and, when -practicable, so situated that the fleet, while actively engaged, -interposes directly or indirectly between it and the enemy. Nearness -was doubly important in the days of sailing ships, whose movements -depended upon the fickle element of the wind; for then a ship going in -for refit not only took more time to perform the voyage, but also in -returning made a heavier draft upon her resources, and consequently -could remain a shorter period at the seat of war. - -Toulon, while securely held, served as such a base; although, being -exposed to overpowering attack from the land side, its situation called -for excessive expenditure of effort. Toulon was, however, now lost, and -the British were thrown back upon Gibraltar, at the very entrance of -the Mediterranean, and nine hundred miles from the seat of hostilities, -for a secure depot in which to land stores and a safe anchorage for -transports and crippled ships-of-war. - -Although the possession of a strong place, suited in itself for a -base, may decide the character of operations projected, logically -the necessary operations should first be determined, and the choice -of the base be decided by them. In the Mediterranean, as elsewhere -generally at this time, the policy of Great Britain was to control -the sea for the protection of commerce, and to sustain on shore the -continental powers in the war against France,—chiefly by money, but -also by naval co-operation when feasible. To support the land warfare, -her diplomatic negotiations strove to unite, in the general military -effort, as many as possible of the small independent states into which -Italy was divided, to promote among them unity of action, and to foster -the sense of security, in taking a decided step against France, which -they could only derive from the presence among them of a strong power, -such as Great Britain showed in her fleet. Neither their traditions -nor the character of their rulers enabled them to combine strongly -as equals; nor, as has before been said, was there any one state so -predominant as to give a nucleus around which the others could gather. -The only possible centre was Great Britain, present as a power in her -fleet. Moreover, if unable, as she proved, to stir them up to positive, -harmonious, concerted action, it was her interest to impose upon -them a benevolent neutrality towards herself and her allies, and to -deter them from inimical measures into which they might otherwise be -impelled by the demands of the republic and their fear of the French -army. Friendly ports along the whole coast were essential for the -security of her shipping and the promotion of her commerce. Finally, -it must be added that the character of the shore between Nice and -Genoa, interposing between the French and Austrian armies, particularly -favored direct naval co-operation. The Maritime Alps and the Apennines, -coming down close to the sea, left but a single narrow, and yet long, -line of communications along the beach, traversed by a very bad road, -in many parts under fire from the sea.[105] This condition made the -armies using that line chiefly dependent for supplies upon coasters, -whose movements ships-of-war could harass and impede,—though not, when -sailing vessels, entirely stop. - -Corsica, in its existing political conditions of revolt against -France under the leadership of Paoli, appeared to offer the strategic -situation which Hood was seeking. It was near and centrally placed with -reference to the probable operations on shore; San Fiorenzo Bay, which -became the chief anchorage for the fleet, being equidistant, about -one hundred miles, from Nice and from Genoa. Leghorn also, one of the -greatest depots of British trade in the Mediterranean and the seaport -of Tuscany, over which Great Britain wished to enforce her influence, -was but sixty miles from Cape Corso at the northern extremity of the -island. All the trade with northern Italy had to pass close to Corsica, -and was consequently exposed to capture if the seaports remained -in French hands; especially as calms prevail around the island, -facilitating the operations of row-galleys and neutralizing the powers -of a sailing navy. Being an island, Corsica depended upon the control -of the sea; and, though its size and rugged surface precluded conquest, -there was believed to be a disposition to accept the protection of -Great Britain as the only means of dispossessing the French troops, -who still held the seaports of San Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi. - -Sir Gilbert Elliott, who had been the Civil Commissioner of Great -Britain in Toulon during the last month of its occupation, left -Hyères Bay early in January to confer with Paoli, who had proposed -the annexation of the island to the British crown. His enthusiastic -reception by the people and the assurances of the Corsican chieftain -convinced him that the measure was sincerely desired; and in -consequence of his representations, Hood, on the 24th of January, -sailed from Hyères with his whole fleet for San Fiorenzo Bay. The -weather proving very tempestuous, and the three-decked ships, of which -there were several, being ill-fitted to contend with it, the admiral -was forced to take them to Porto Ferrajo in Elba, and to send against -San Fiorenzo a detachment only. This appeared off the place on the 7th -of February; and after a series of combined operations, in which the -navy bore a very conspicuous share on land, the French evacuated the -town and works on the 19th of the month, retreating upon Bastia. The -admiral then urged an attack upon Bastia; but the general thought he -could not spare enough men. Nelson, who had been blockading there for -some time, strongly represented the feasibility of the enterprise; and, -after a sharp altercation between the two commanders-in-chief, Hood -determined to undertake the siege with the navy and the troops who were -serving on board as marines. The landing began on the 3d of April; but -the place held out till the 21st of May, when it capitulated. Calvi -was next taken in hand, the operations beginning on the 19th of June, -and ending with its surrender on the 10th of August. The whole island -was thus freed from the presence of French troops,—a result due almost -wholly to the navy, although the army bore a share in the operations -at San Fiorenzo and Calvi. To the determination of Hood and the ardent -representations of Nelson was due that Bastia was besieged at all; -and, as thirty-five hundred regular troops then surrendered to an -outside force of fourteen hundred seamen and marines, the opinion of -Sir Gilbert Elliott that "the blockade of the port was the chief means -of reducing it," can scarcely be disputed. At the siege of Calvi Nelson -lost his right eye. - -Between the siege of Bastia and that of Calvi, the General Assembly -of Corsica met, and on the 19th of June, 1794, tendered the insular -crown to the king of Great Britain. With the successful issue of the -military operations, this political act consummated the possession of -the island. But, to quote the words of Elliott, the claim to Corsica -rested upon superior force,[106] and by that only could be asserted; -and this superior force the British government failed to provide. The -love of the people for Paoli, and the period of anxiety through which -he and they had passed, caused the connection to be eagerly desired, -and accepted with demonstrations of the warmest delight; but as -security succeeded the sense of danger, the first-love between nations -so radically distinct in temperament and institutions was followed by -the symptoms attending ill-assorted unions. Still, with prompt action -and strong garrisons, the benefit of the foreign occupation might have -been manifest, dissatisfaction might have yielded to considerations of -interest, and the island been retained. The British government acted -slowly. Elliott had urged that authority should be sent him beforehand -to take over the executive functions at once, as soon as the Act of -Union passed; instead of which, Paoli was left for four months in his -old position, and developed a jealousy of his destined successor not -unprecedented in the heads of states. This feeling, which he held -with Corsican intensity, communicated itself to his followers; and an -inauspicious division of sentiment already existed when, in October, -after an interval of four months, Elliott received his powers as -viceroy. Paoli continued for a year longer to reside in Corsica, and up -to the time of his departure was a cause of trouble to the viceroy, and -so of strength to the partisans of France, who became numerous. - -During the year 1794 the superior importance of the operations on -the frontiers of Belgium and Germany, as well as in Spain, caused -the French armies of Italy and the Alps to remain quiet, after some -early successes which had placed in their hands the chief passes of -the mountains and advanced their line on the coast as far as Vado, on -the borders of Genoese territory. Early in 1795 a force of eighteen -thousand men was detached to Toulon for the invasion of Corsica; -but, although the French had in the port fifteen ships-of-the-line, -they felt that neither the admiral nor the officers possessed the -tactical skill necessary to handle the fleet in presence of an enemy -of nearly equal force, if encumbered with a large body of transports. -The case reproduced that of Conflans, when expected in 1759 to cover -the French invasion of England. As a rule, in combined military and -naval expeditions the fleet and the army should start together; but -the tactical embarrassment of transports is indisputable. If the fleet -cannot encounter the enemy successfully when not so hampered, it but -encourages disaster to incur the meeting with them in company. Not -improperly, in such a case of doubt, it was decided that the Toulon -fleet should sail alone; and, accordingly, on the 2d of March, 1795, -Admiral Martin put to sea with fifteen of the line, seven frigates, and -five smaller vessels. Despite these respectable numbers, the efficiency -of the force was poor. Out of twelve thousand officers and men on board -the ships-of-the-line, seventy-five hundred had never before been to -sea; and Martin reported that, deducting officers and petty-officers, -he had but twenty-seven hundred seamen to man the fleet.[107] - -Hood had gone home the previous November, expecting to return; and -the British were now commanded by Admiral Hotham. The latter had -cruised off Toulon for three weeks in mid-winter, on account of the -indications of the French coming out, and after a succession of most -violent weather returned to San Fiorenzo Bay on the 10th of January. He -sailed again, apparently about the 22d of the month, to cover a convoy -expected from England, leaving in port the "Berwick," seventy-four; -which, through the carelessness of her officers, had been permitted to -roll her masts overboard at her anchors. After some more hard cruising, -the fleet put into Leghorn on the 25th of February, leaving still in -San Fiorenzo Bay the "Berwick," the delay in whose repairs can only -be attributed to the penury of naval resources. The presence of the -fleet in Leghorn was probably necessary both for its own supplies and -to remind the wavering Tuscany of the power of Great Britain at her -doors; but the "Berwick" incident served powerfully to illustrate the -far-reaching effects of individual carelessness and the impolicy of -exposing small detachments not covered, directly or indirectly, by -the main body. On the 7th of March the French fleet came in sight of -Cape Corso, and almost at the same moment discovered the "Berwick," -which had only the previous day succeeded in leaving San Fiorenzo for -Leghorn. Being still crippled, she was easily overtaken, and forced to -surrender at noon. - -The following day Hotham in Leghorn learned that the enemy had sailed, -and the next morning at dawn put to sea in pursuit. On the 11th the -two fleets came in sight of each other, the French far south and to -windward of the British, out of gun-shot, and thus continued during -the 12th. That night one of the French seventy-fours lost a topmast -and parted company, reducing their numbers to fourteen. The following -morning the "Ça-Ira," an eighty-gun ship, ran into her next ahead, -losing both fore and main topmasts, and thus became the source of -anxiety and danger which a crippled ship ever is in the fleet to which -she belongs. As she dropped out of the line, a British frigate ran -close to her on the side encumbered with the fallen spars, annoying her -there for some time with comparative impunity, and was then succeeded -by Nelson in the "Agamemnon," who hung about on her quarters until -several ships bore down to her relief. - -During the night the "Sans Culottes," of one hundred and twenty guns, -the heaviest vessel in the French fleet, dropped out of the line to -leeward, and in the morning was out of sight. The "Ça-Ira" was taken -in tow by, the "Censeur," seventy-four, and at daybreak these two -were some distance from, and to the north-east of, their fleet. Both -parties were at this time much scattered from the irregularities of -the wind; but it shifting now to the north-west favored the British, -and those nearest the separated ships speedily brought them to action. -While this partial engagement was going on, both fleets shaped their -course for the scene, the French intending to cover the "Censeur" -and "Ça-Ira" by passing between them and the British, but owing to -some misunderstanding this was not done. As the two vans went slowly -by on opposite tacks, a sharp exchange of shots took place, in which -the British, not being well closed up, were overmatched, and two of -their number suffered severely; but as the French allowed the enemy -to interpose between them and the disabled vessels, these were forced -to surrender after a very gallant resistance, in which they lost four -hundred men and were partially dismasted. Each fleet continuing its -course in opposite directions, they soon separated and passed out of -sight. - -The baffling character of the wind, combined with the indifferent -sailing qualities of the British three-deckers, deprive this action of -any special tactical significance; and the very mediocre calibre of -the two admirals was not calculated to overcome the difficulties they -encountered. The numerous accidents in Martin's fleet, and the parting -of the "Sans Culottes" at such a moment, show the indifferent character -of the French captains, and probably justify the comment that Hotham -owed his success to the initiative of the admirable officers under -his command rather than to his own capacity. "I went on board Admiral -Hotham," wrote Nelson, "as soon as our firing grew slack in the van and -the 'Ça-Ira' and 'Censeur' had struck, to propose to him leaving our -two crippled ships, the two prizes, and four frigates, and pursue the -enemy; but he, much cooler than myself, said, 'We must be contented, we -have done very well.' Admiral Goodall backed me; I got him to write to -the Admiral, but it would not do; we should have had such a day as I -believe the annals of England never produced."[108] "Admiral Hotham," -says Chevalier,[109] "showed great circumspection. He probably did not -appreciate the improvised fleets of the republic. To fight, there are -needed ships in good condition, capable seamen, skilful gunners, and -officers accustomed to order, to military dispositions, and to squadron -manœuvres. These we did not have." "The enemy," wrote Nelson about the -same fleet, a few months later, "are neither seamen nor officers."[110] -The immediate consequence of this defeat was the abandonment of the -projected expedition against Corsica. - -After the battle a gale of wind forced the British into Spezia and -caused the wreck of the "Illustrious," seventy-four, which, from -injuries received in the action, was not able to keep off shore. -This, with the capture of the "Berwick," equalized the losses of -the two fleets. The French anchored in Hyères Bay, where they were -rejoined by the "Sans Culottes," and on the 24th of March returned to -Toulon. Admiral Renaudin's arrival from Brest[111] on the 4th of April -raised the available force to nineteen or twenty ships-of-the-line; -to which the enemy could now oppose only thirteen of their own and -two Neapolitan. But, although the British were very destitute of -material for necessary equipment and repair,[112] the superiority -of organization, discipline, and officer-like training, allowed -them little real cause for anxiety. In the month of May a Jacobin -outbreak occurred in Toulon. The government had ordered Martin to take -advantage of Renaudin's junction, and again to seek the enemy while -thus superior. The mob raised the cry that as soon as the fleet sailed -the enemies of the Revolution would enter the town and massacre the -patriots. The seamen, except those belonging to the Brest squadron, -left their vessels, under pretext of deliberating on the dangers of -their country, and took part in all the street demonstrations. An -expedition was even set on foot against Marseille; but the central -government was getting stronger, or rather anarchy was becoming -wearisome, and after a paltry engagement the Toulonese fell back upon -their city and submitted. A great number of seamen, however, had -deserted; and the necessity of recovering them delayed the departure of -the fleet, which finally put to sea on the 7th of June with seventeen -ships-of-the-line. The time for a favorable sortie was, however, past; -the British having at last received a large re-enforcement. - -After partially refitting in Spezia, Hotham took his fleet to San -Fiorenzo, arriving there on the 30th of March. On the 17th of April -he sailed again for Minorca, where he hoped to meet a re-enforcement -and a much-needed convoy; but a succession of westerly winds caused -the fleet to lose ground, instead of gaining, until the 27th, when -it unexpectedly and most fortunately met a body of store-ships from -Gibraltar. With these the admiral at once bore up for Leghorn, arriving -there next day. Had the French in their own dockyards refitted as -rapidly as the British did in a foreign port, and gone to sea with -the increase of strength that Renaudin brought, they should have -intercepted this important convoy, if they did not bring the fleet to -action. The correspondence of Nelson, still a simple captain, testifies -continually, in his own vivid style, to the critical state of the -campaign at this moment. - -On the 8th of May Hotham sailed again for Minorca, and continued to -cruise off that island until the 14th of June, when Rear-admiral -Robert Mann joined him with a re-enforcement from England of nine[113] -ships-of-the-line, making the British superior in number as in quality -to the enemy. As a convoy was also expected, the fleet kept the same -station until it arrived on the 22d, when the whole body sailed for -San Fiorenzo, anchoring there June 29. On the 4th of July Hotham sent -Nelson with his own ship and some smaller vessels to co-operate on the -Riviera of Genoa with the Austrian advance against the French; but -the detachment fell in with Martin's fleet, and had to return to San -Fiorenzo, being, says Nelson, "hard pressed" by the enemy, who pursued -until they saw the British fleet at anchor. The latter weighed as soon -as possible, but did not come up with the French until the 14th, near -the Hyères Islands, where a trifling brush took place, resulting in -the capture of the "Alcide," seventy-four, which immediately after -surrendering caught fire and blew up. This small affair was the last in -which Admiral Hotham was directly concerned. Hood had been definitively -relieved of the Mediterranean command before he could sail from England -on his return; and Hotham, weary of a burden to which he felt himself -unfitted and had proved himself unequal, applied for relief, and struck -his flag on the 1st of November, 1795. - -Prior to the naval brush off Hyères, little had been done in Italy by -the armies on either side. The French, whose forces were far inferior -to those of the allies and in a state of great destitution, were -compelled to stand on the defensive over a very long line, of which -the advanced post on the sea was at Vado. The Austrians had imposed -upon the Sardinians their own plan of campaign, which was to strike the -extreme right of the French at Vado, and then drive them back along -the Corniche, while the Sardinians attacked on the other flank through -the passes of the Apennines up to the Col di Tende, where the Maritime -Alps begin. The British fleet was to co-operate with the movement -on the side of the sea,—a consideration which had much to do with -determining the Austrian plan. By occupying Vado and the Riviera east -of it, the coasting trade heretofore carried on from the ports of Genoa -and Tuscany to southern France would be stopped; a matter of great -consequence to the republic, as those departments only raised grain for -three months' consumption and depended for the rest upon that which -came from Barbary and Italy by way of Tuscany. With a British squadron -at Vado, the populace of Provence, the navy at Toulon, and the army of -Italy, would have to be supplied from the north of France by bad inland -roads.[114] Vado Bay was, moreover, the best anchorage between Nice and -Genoa. Devins, the Austrian general, began his movement on the 13th of -June, passing through Genoese territory against the protest of that -neutral government. The French resisted sturdily; but the odds were too -great, and by the end of June they had fallen back to a line extending -from Borghetto on the sea to Ormea in the mountains, abandoning Vado -and the intermediate coast towns. Devins now called on Hotham for naval -support, and the British admiral detached Nelson, as has already been -seen, to give it; but the encounter with the French fleet delaying his -arrival for some days served Devins with a pretext for inaction. He -employed the mean time in fortifying his position and improving the -roads in his rear. - -[Illustration: Northern Italy and Corsica.] - -On the 17th of July Nelson reached Genoa, took on board the British -minister to that republic, and went to Vado, anchoring there on the -21st. He immediately conferred with Devins, who gave it as his opinion -that the Austrians could not advance further until the French were -compelled to retire by want of provisions,—a result he expected from -the action of the navy. Nelson explained to the minister that the food -supplies being carried in neutral vessels he was powerless to stop -them; for he had stringent orders from the admiralty that no legal -measures should be instituted against such, when arrested, until full -particulars in each case had been sent to England and instructions -had come back what to do. Meanwhile the cargoes, being perishable, -would be spoiled. Such utterly inconsequent proceedings, though -highly characteristic of the military action of cabinets, were most -exasperating to a man of Nelson's temper, always prone to cut knots; -but, as he was pecuniarily answerable and a poor man, he could not -disregard them on his sole authority. The British ministers to Genoa -and Sardinia both concurred in advising him to carry out Devins's -wishes; and then Nelson, with the fearlessness of responsibility he -always showed,—and sometimes out of, as well as in, season,—issued -orders to his frigates to take every vessel bound to France or to ports -within the French lines, to whatsoever nation it might belong. At the -same time the general also sent out small cruisers; and it is roundly -asserted by Jomini that he laid a tax on all coasting vessels brought -in by them, forcing them to pay for a passport and appropriating the -proceeds to himself. The utmost diligence, however, could not insure -the interruption of a traffic carried on by very small vessels, having -to make but short night runs close along a coast;[115] and Nelson's -orders, while doubtless productive of some results in stopping large -vessels from Tuscany and Algiers, could not prevent supplies getting -in by Genoese coasters. The difficulty was increased by the fact that a -number of the ports in rear of the French positions belonged to Genoa, -and the inhabitants depended upon her for food. To turn a deaf ear to -their cries of suffering, and to prevent supplies landed there being -used by the French, were alike impossible. - -These considerations should have led Devins to regard naval -co-operation simply as the efforts of a light force, competent to -harass, not to destroy, the enemy's communications; and should have -induced him to force his own way, by early and vigorous action, while -the French were inferior in numbers and before their positions became -too strong. Instead of this, he used the Sardinians and British, -not as allies, but as excuses for not moving; action of one kind or -another on their part was necessary before he could advance. Thus the -summer slipped away, the French busily strengthening their lines and -bringing up the army of the Pyrenees to re-enforce that of Italy, -after peace was made with Spain. Nelson was full of projects to embark -a corps of Austrians, who should seize and occupy a coast position -in rear of the French; but Devins only played with a proposition of -which Jomini speaks with scant respect, and which was certainly open -to the objection that, if carried out with adequate force, it divided -the Austrian army. Nelson, it is true, guaranteed its retreat to his -ships in case of need; but the Austrian, not unnaturally, preferred -a less uncertain line. The British captain, who had at first felt -respect for Devins's abilities, wrote on the 17th of September that it -had for some time appeared to him "that the general intended to go no -further than his present position, and meant to lay the miscarriage -of his enterprise against Nice to the non-co-operation of the British -fleet and the Sardinian army."[116] Whatever his purpose, Devins did -not advance, but quietly awaited the French attack. Early in November -a severe illness caused him to give up the command; and on the 23d -of the month the enemy, under General Schérer, assaulted vigorously -the centre of the allied position, where the Sardinians touched the -Austrians. This point had always been weak, and after a short struggle -was forced. The original intention of Schérer had been to turn, after -piercing the centre, against the Sardinians, as Bonaparte did in the -following year; but a very heavy fall of snow in the mountains decided -him to swing round to the right, drive the Austrians back upon the -coast, and, if possible, anticipate them upon their line of retreat to -the eastward. In this he was not entirely successful; but the imminent -danger forced the enemy to abandon all their line of works and fall -back precipitately, with a loss of seven thousand men, killed, wounded -and prisoners, besides their depots at Loano, Vado, and Savona. This -action, which was a brilliant and decisive victory, is known as the -battle of Loano. By the first of December the Austrians had recrossed -the Apennines and were again in the positions from which they had set -out the previous June. - -The military plan and execution of the campaign by the land forces -scarcely falls within the scope of the present work. An advance by the -armies of a coalition, whose respective troops and lines of operation -are separated by a chain of mountains, even of the height of the -Apennines, with difficult communication across them, does not present -a combination promising mutual support and probable success. To this -disadvantage is to be added that of the long and narrow line by which -all the Austrian supplies had to be forwarded; and which any successful -advance would make yet longer and more difficult. On the other hand, -the Austrians counted much upon the help that could be extended by -the navy of Great Britain, in whose interest the occupation of the -shore line was undertaken.[117] By their advance they controlled Vado -Bay,—the best anchorage between Villefranche (Nice) and Genoa; and -their presence imposed a restraint upon the latter republic, whose -attitude was largely determined by the comparative forces of the -belligerents. Did then the British navy, under these circumstances, do -all that it could have done to insure the success of the common cause? - -The answer can scarcely be yes. Nelson, indeed, exerted himself with -the energy that never failed him; but his correspondence shows that he -did not think the force assigned him equal to its task. Could it then -have been increased? The answer again is scarcely doubtful. The British -fleet of the line was slightly superior in numbers to the French at -Toulon, and far superior in the quality of its officers and men. It -was doubtless embarrassed by numerous duties,—by those conflicting -interests whose divergence imposes the great test of capacity upon a -general officer. The French fleet at Toulon, co-operation with the -Austrian advance, the protection of trade, the covering of Corsica, the -political interests involved in controlling the action of the small -Italian states,—all these cares fell upon the British admiral. Of -these, the French fleet was the most important; but all other interests -of Britain and her allies were better served by co-operation with the -Austrian advance,—by victory in the field,—than by any dissemination -of force for other purposes. A decisive Imperial success would have -determined the policy of every state in the western Mediterranean and -closed every port to French cruisers. - -In short, offensive action, and not the merely defensive attitude -maintained through the campaign, was here clearly indicated. Nelson -intimates that the only course by which the navy could practically -intercept the French communications was to enter the coasting ports -and destroy the coasters. These little vessels defied detection on -their voyages; only by chasing them into their nests could their -wings be clipped. "A few days ago," he writes, "I scoured the coast -between Monaco and Borghetto so completely, that although I was only -able to take one ship loaded with corn, yet I forced the others into -the Bay of Alassio, where they are so completely under the protection -of formidable batteries _that not less than three sail-of-the-line_ -could attempt to take or destroy them. The number of vessels loaded -and unloaded at those places is near one hundred, the greater part -loaded with stores and corn for France."[118] Here was the strategic -direction to be given to the British navy, after providing for the -watch off Toulon. "You will now," wrote Nelson five years later to -Lord Keith, "bear me out in my assertion, when I say that the British -fleet could have prevented the invasion of Italy; and if our friend -Hotham had kept his fleet on that coast, I assert, and you will agree -with me, no army from France could have been furnished with stores or -provisions; even men could not have marched."[119] If the fleet proved -unequal to this task, final condemnation was passed on the allied plan -of campaign, which was not in its conception characterized by sound -military judgment. But Admiral Hotham, as Nelson said, had "no head -for enterprise, perfectly satisfied that each month passes without -any losses on our side."[120] Nelson never had under his orders any -other ship-of-the-line than his own "Agamemnon;" and at the time of -the decisive battle of Loano all his little squadron had been taken -away except two, so that French gunboats harassed with impunity the -left flank of the Austrians.[121] He himself at that critical moment -had to remain in Genoa with the "Agamemnon," at the request of the -Imperial minister, to prevent the crew of a French frigate then in -port, supported as it would have been by French partisans, from -seizing Voltri,—an important point upon the line of retreat of the -Austrians, where a few resolute men could have stopped them until -the pursuing army came up. To him alone was therefore attributed -the escape of several thousand Imperial soldiers, among whom was -the commander-in-chief himself.[122] Prior to the battle Genoa had -permitted French intrigues and armed enterprises of this character to -be concerted, almost openly, in her territories. This she would not -have dared to do, had the British navy been present in force on the -coast, acting under such a commander as Nelson; for the probabilities -of final success would have been with the allies. In short, this -campaign of the British fleet contributes another to the numerous -lessons of history, upon the importance of having sufficient force -at the decisive point and taking the offensive. It may be added that -Hotham could better have spared ships to Nelson, if he had not thrown -away his two opportunities of beating the Toulon fleet. - -While Nelson was co-operating with the Austrians as far as his force -admitted, the British fleet was generally cruising off Toulon, -returning from time to time to San Fiorenzo or Leghorn for refit and -stores. It was in this latter part of the year 1795 that the Directory, -as will be remembered, decided to abandon the policy of fleet-fighting -and to enter upon that of commerce-destroying, directed against -exposed colonies of the enemy as well as against his trade afloat. Two -squadrons, numbering in all seven ships-of-the-line and eight smaller -vessels, were ordered fitted out at Toulon, which was with difficulty -done for want of seamen. Since the action of July off Hyères, nearly -all the sailors in Martin's fleet had deserted, disgusted with the -bad food, scanty clothing, and constant disaster that were their -portion. Enough, however, were at last gathered to man the ships -selected; and on the 14th of September six of the line and three -frigates got away under the command of Captain Richery. It does not -appear whether the British fleet was then at sea or at San Fiorenzo; -but in either case it was at this port, and not until September 22d, -that Hotham learned their escape. On the 5th of October this leisurely -commander-in-chief sent Admiral Mann with six of the line in pursuit; -but the French, having so great a start, could not be overtaken. They -passed the Straits of Gibraltar early in October, bound to the British -possessions in North America. On the 7th of the month, when a hundred -and fifty miles west of Gibraltar, they fell in with an enemy's convoy -of thirty-one merchant ships from the Levant, under the protection of -three seventy-fours. Richery succeeded in capturing one of the latter, -which had lost a topmast, and all the merchant ships except one. Having -so valuable a booty, he decided to escort it into Cadiz, where he -anchored on the 13th and was soon after found by Mann, whose arrival -prevented his departure to fulfil his original mission. At about the -same time some French frigates in the Atlantic took eighteen ships out -of a Jamaica convoy. The other Toulon division, of one ship-of-the-line -and six smaller vessels, cruised in the Levant; and, having made a -number of prizes, returned safely to Toulon. Its commander, Captain -Ganteaume, though undistinguished by any great achievements, was -throughout his career remarkably fortunate in escaping the search of an -enemy. It was he who commanded the flotilla on board which Bonaparte -stole unseen through all the British cruisers, on his return from Egypt -to France in 1799. - -These results, coinciding so closely with the adoption of the new -policy of commerce-destroying, confirmed the government in favor of -this course, to which the French have always been strongly disposed. -They hoped from it, to use the words of a representative in the -Convention, "to force the English to a shameful bankruptcy;" what they -obtained was the demoralization of their navy, the loss of the control -of the sea and of their own external commerce, finally Napoleon's -Continental System and the fall of the Empire. - -The battle of Loano, decisive of the campaign of 1795, is yet more -distinguished as marking the entrance upon the scene of two of the most -remarkable figures in the war of the French Revolution. During the week -after it was fought, Admiral Sir John Jervis, better known by his later -title of Earl St. Vincent, arrived at San Fiorenzo, as the regular -successor to Hood in the Mediterranean. During the winter Napoleon -Bonaparte was chosen by the Directory to relieve Schérer in command of -the Army of Italy. - -The career and character of the youthful republican general are too -well known, have been too often described, to be attempted by the -author, from whose immediate theme, moreover, they stand apart. The -personality of the already aged admiral, whose iron hands stamped -his own image on the British navy and fashioned it into the splendid -instrument with which the triumphs of Nelson were won, is, on the -contrary, familiar to few except the students of naval history. -Born in 1734, Sir John Jervis, when he assumed command of the -Mediterranean fleet in his sixty-second year, had had no opportunity of -distinguishing himself in the eyes of the world outside of the service -to which he belonged. With the members of that service, however, he -had long been a marked man. The child of a poor though well-born -family, he had in early life, under the pressure of poverty, required -of himself the same stern discipline and submission to the duty of -the moment which he afterwards so rigorously exacted of others. Grave -and unbending in his official relations, immovable as a rock when his -determination was once formed, unrelenting almost to mercilessness in -suppressing insubordination, then rife throughout the British navy, -he had the high-bred polish of a man used to good society, and his -demeanor was courteous, and, when occasion demanded, even courtly. A -traveller by land as well as by sea, a constant and judicious reader, -in a period when such habits were rarer than now among seamen, he -was well informed in matters other than those relating merely to his -profession. Of the latter, however, he was a master. His ship was the -model of the British fleet during the American Revolution, and his -high reputation drew to her quarter-deck youths from the best families -of England, when they could obtain interest to get there. Yet no man -was ever less swayed, in an age when social and political influence -counted for so much, by any extrinsic claims of that character. -Personal merit first, after that a family claim upon the navy, that a -father or brother had given his life for the service,—nay, the very -friendlessness of a deserving man,—such were the considerations that -determined him in the use of patronage at his own disposal. - -Yet, with all these strong attributes, capable too of a tenderness -which could mourn long and deeply the loss of a valued comrade, the -rule of Jervis was one of fear rather than love. It is impossible to -criticise adversely measures whose extreme severity was justified, if -not imperatively demanded, by the appalling crisis of the mutinies of -1797; impossible to withhold admiration, not unmingled with awe, from -the impressive figure of the chief who stood unmoved and unyielding -amid the smothered discontent, revolt threatening from below, the -enemy's coast in sight from the deck, knowing that in every other fleet -the crews had taken the ships from their officers, but determined it -should not be so in the Mediterranean. Yet admiration is qualified by -the feeling that to the ruthless temper of the man the position was not -wholly displeasing,—that he was in his natural element when crushing -opposition. A captain, who with great personal courage had quelled a -rising in his ship, dragging the ringleaders with his own hands from -among their followers, interceded on behalf of one of the condemned -because he had previously borne a good character. "I am glad of it," -replied Jervis; "hitherto we have been hanging scoundrels. Now men will -know that no good character will atone for the crime of mutiny." In -lesser matters, also, his tendency was to exaggerate restraint as well -as punishment. "Where I would take a penknife," said Nelson, "Lord St. -Vincent takes a hatchet." - -With such characteristics, accompanied though they were by resolution -and high professional accomplishments, it is not to be expected that -the fire of genius will be found. Though not an ungenerous man, Lord -St. Vincent lacked the sympathetic qualities that made Nelson at -once so lovable and so great a leader of men. Escaping the erratic -temper and the foibles of his great successor, upon whose career these -defects have left marks ever to be regretted by those who love his -memory, Jervis fell short too of the inspiration, of the ardor, which -in moments of difficulty lifted Nelson far above the common plane of -mankind, and have stamped his actions with the seal of genius. But -after Nelson, Jervis, though of a different order, stands first among -British commanders-in-chief. For inspiration he had a cool, sound, -and rapid professional judgment; for ardor, a steady, unflinching -determination to succeed; and these, joined to a perfect fearlessness -of responsibility such as Nelson also showed, have won for him a place -in the first rank of those chieftains, whether sea or land, who have -not received the exceptional endowments of Nature's favorites. In -the one general action which Fortune permitted to him, the battle of -Cape St. Vincent, he illustrated these traits to a high degree; as -Nelson then also showed that faculty of quick appreciation and instant -action, in which all the processes of thought and will blend into one -overpowering conviction and impulse that lesser men never know. Whether -we consider the vastly superior numbers then deliberately engaged, the -tactics of the admiral on the battle-field, or his appreciation of the -critical position in which Great Britain then stood, Sir John Jervis's -conduct on that occasion must make the battle of Cape St. Vincent ever -illustrious among the most brilliant sea-fights of all ages. - -To these powerful elements of his nature, Jervis added a capacity -for comprehensive and minute attention to the details of discipline, -order and economy, without which mere severity would become aimless -and productive of none but bad results. He was fortunate in finding -among the Mediterranean captains an unusual number of men of consummate -seamanship, energy and resources, in all the vigor of a prime still -youthful, who were only waiting for a master-hand to combine and -give direction to their abilities. With such a head and with such -subordinates, the British Mediterranean fleet soon became a model -of efficiency and spirit, which was probably never equalled in the -days of sailing ships. Nelson so considered it; and the old admiral -himself bewailed its memory several years later, when commanding -the Channel fleet, and complained testily of the "old women in the -guise of young men," whom he found in charge of ships off Brest. -As an administrator, when First Lord, the economy of Jervis became -exaggerated into parsimony, and his experience of the frauds connected -with the dockyards of the day led him into a crusade against them, -which was both well meant and necessary, but particularly ill-timed. -It has consequently left a stigma of failure upon his administration, -which is due, however, not to his executive inefficiency, but to a -misapprehension of the political signs of the times. Absorbed in -reform, and for it desiring quiet, he saw only peace while the dark -clouds of war were gathering thick on the horizon. Therefore the -British navy, well-worn by the first war, was not ready for that which -followed it in 1803. - -Jervis's arrival in the Mediterranean was too late to remedy the -impending evils. It was a singular misfortune for Great Britain, that -the interregnum between two such able men as Hood and Jervis should -have coincided with the determination of the French to try the chance -of battle with their Mediterranean fleet, and that the opportunities -they lost should have fallen to so sluggish and cautious an admiral -as Hotham. "To say how much we wanted Lord Hood on the 13th of July," -wrote Nelson, "is to say, Will you have all the French fleet, or -no action?"[123] Accepting this opinion in the light of Nelson's -subsequent achievements, it may be permitted to think that, if not all -the fleet, so many ships would have fallen as to have prevented the -sailing of Richery's squadron and the consequent necessary detachment -of Admiral Mann; while the loss of seamen captured would have seriously -crippled the operations of the flotilla, which from Toulon supplied -the Army of Italy with ammunition, artillery and stores. Light guns -on mountain carriages could be carried along the Corniche; but at -the opening of Bonaparte's operations all heavy guns, and artillery -outfits of all kinds, had to be taken by sea from Nice to Savona.[124] -The demands of this flotilla necessitated the laying up of the -fleet,[125]—a matter of less consequence as the determination to resort -to commerce-destroying had then been reached. The French navy therefore -became, through the flotilla, a very important part of Bonaparte's -communications; and it has already been pointed out that sailing ships -could not break up, though they might much disturb, the voyages of the -smaller vessels employed on a difficult coast, with batteries under -which to take refuge. - -After the battle of Loano, Nelson, whose occupation on the Gulf of -Genoa was for the time over, went to Leghorn to refit his ship, then -nearly three years in commission. Not till January 19,1796, did he -join Jervis, who since his arrival on the station had, for the most -part, remained in San Fiorenzo organizing his fleet. The new admiral -showed him the same confidence as his predecessors, and sent him at -once to his old station, with a light division, to prevent any small -number of men making a descent upon Italy. A predominant idea, one -might almost call it a fad, in Nelson's mind, was the landing of a -body of men from ships in rear of the enemy. As has been seen, he was -forward to recommend such an attempt to Devins, promising to support -it with his squadron; and the intelligence concerning flat-boats and -gunboats prepared in the French ports suggested nothing to his mind so -much as transporting troops to Tuscany, in rear of the Austrians, while -the main French army operated in their front. Like Bonaparte, Nelson -recognized the resources which the plains of Piedmont, Lombardy and -Tuscany would offer to the needy enemy. He called them a gold mine; -but he did not understand the weakness of the French in seamen, nor -realize the improbability of Bonaparte's attempting such a use of his -troops as would put them far out of mutual support and away from his -own control. Certainly no indication of such a purpose is to be found -in his correspondence or in the instructions of the Directory to him. -On the contrary, he had strongly advised against a pet project of the -Committee of Public Safety, early in 1795, to land an expedition in the -papal states,—unless with control of the sea.[126] - -Had the Austrians again advanced to the sea and occupied Vado, Jervis -would undoubtedly have supported them and harassed the French to a very -important extent. Nelson gave express assurances on that point.[127] -Bonaparte, however, allowed him no opportunity. Leaving Paris on the -14th of March, 1796, the young general reached Nice on the 27th of -the month. On the 5th of April he moved his headquarters to Albenga, -and on the 9th to Savona. On the 10th Beaulieu, the new Austrian -general, began to move his left wing by the pass of La Bochetta, his -right by that of Montenotte; the junction to be formed at Savona. -Quick as lightning, Bonaparte struck at once where the Austrian right -touched the Sardinian left. Blow followed blow upon the centre of the -allies, and after six days' fighting their armies were definitively -separated. Driving the Sardinians before him in unremitting pursuit, -Bonaparte on the 28th granted an armistice, by which three of the -principal fortresses of Piedmont were put into his possession and -plenipotentiaries dispatched to Paris to treat for peace. This was -concluded and signed on the 15th of May. Sardinia abandoned the -coalition, surrendered the counties of Savoy and Nice, and yielded -other conditions favorable to France,—particularly in the boundary -lines traced on the crests of the mountains, where the commanding -military positions were given to the republic. Thus the gates of Italy -were forced; and Austria, stripped of her ally on shore and cut off -from the British at sea, alone confronted Bonaparte. - -The French were now in the plains of Piedmont, with Lombardy before -them. Beaulieu, expecting an advance against Milan by the north bank -of the Po, had withdrawn across that river, intending to dispute its -passage. If forced, he would cover Milan by falling back successively -upon the lines of the Sesia and the Ticino, tributaries of the main -stream. Bonaparte, however, was not the man to attack an enemy in -front and force him back along his natural line of retreat to his -proper base. Weighing accurately the political and military conditions -of the peninsula, he had fixed his eye upon the line of the Adige -as that which he wished to reach and hold, and which, under all the -circumstances, he believed he could master. The Adige flows from the -Tyrol south along the east shore of the Lake of Garda, then turns -to the eastward and enters the Adriatic between the Po and Venice. -Occupying it, the French army would cover all the valleys of the Po, -lay tribute upon their resources as well as upon those of the small -states south of the river, interpose between Austria and southern -Italy, and isolate Mantua, the enemy's great stronghold. Making, -therefore, a feint of following Beaulieu by the methodical front -attacks expected by him, Bonaparte pushed his main force stealthily -along the south bank of the Po. On the 7th of May the advance-guard -reached Piacenza, and crossed at once by boats. On the 9th a bridge -was completed over the river, which at this point is fifteen hundred -feet wide and very rapid. Beaulieu's intended positions on the Sesia -and Ticino were thus turned, and the Austrians necessarily fell back to -the line of the Adda. On the 10th of May, just one month after Beaulieu -began his forward movements, the bridge of Lodi, over the Adda, was -carried; and the Austrians again fell back to the Mincio, the outlet -of the Lake of Garda, uncovering Milan. On the 15th Bonaparte entered -Milan in triumph. Here he paused for ten days, and, after quitting -the place, had to return to punish a revolt which broke out among the -people; but on the 30th of May the French crossed the Mincio, the -Austrians retreating northward toward the Tyrol, along the east shore -of the Lake of Garda. - -This retrograde movement left Mantua to itself. On the 3d of June -Bonaparte's headquarters were at Verona,—a strongly fortified place -bestriding the Adige, thus insuring an easy transit to either side of -the river, and which derives further strategic importance from its -topographical position. A number of spurs run south from the Tyrol -along the Lake of Garda and fall into the plain at Verona, which thus -stands at the foot of the valleys formed by them. On either side of -this cluster of spurs lie the valleys of the Adige and the Brenta, -the two probable lines by which an Austrian attack would come. -Verona, therefore, was a central point with reference to any offensive -movements of the enemy, and became the pivot upon which Bonaparte's -strategy hinged. On the 4th of June Mantua was blockaded. Having now -compassed his first objective, Bonaparte passed temporarily from the -offensive to the defensive, ceased his advance, and occupied himself -with assuring the line of the Adige and pressing the siege of Mantua. - -There remained only to realize the political advantages gained by his -wonderful successes. The Duke of Parma had entered into a convention -on the 9th of May, followed in the same course on the 17th by the -Duke of Modena. On the 5th of June the Court of Naples, startled out -of its dream of security, signed an armistice, withdrawing its troops -from the coalition and its ships from the British fleet,—a precipitate -abandonment of the common cause as ill-judged as it was cowardly. At -that very moment the French leader was writing, "I see but one means -not to be beaten in the autumn; and that is, so to arrange matters that -we shall not be obliged to advance into southern Italy."[128] The Pope -still holding out, Bonaparte improved the time which the Austrians must -need to prepare a new movement, by marching into the papal states a -corps under Augereau, whom he followed in person. On the 19th Bologna -was reached, and on the 24th the Pope signed an armistice. Coincidently -with this advance, it was felt safe and opportune to send into Tuscany -a division taken from the corps occupying Piedmont. This detachment -entered Leghorn on the 28th of June, occupied the port despite the -neutrality of Tuscany, drove out and broke up the great British -commercial and naval interests centred there, and obtained a secure -base for the intended attempt upon Corsica. - -The failure of the Austrians to reach the coast, and their subsequent -retreat, of course put an end to any direct co-operation between them -and the British fleet. Jervis was forced to confine himself to watching -the Toulon ships,—an operation conducted in the same spirit and on -the same system which he afterwards imparted to the Brest blockade, -and generally to that of all hostile arsenals. For over six months, -from the beginning of April to the middle of October, he cruised with -fifteen sail-of-the-line off the port; the heavy ships remaining some -distance from it, but near enough to support a light division of three -seventy-fours, which kept just out of range of the batteries, about -two miles from the entrance. By unremitting care and foresight, the -ships on this arduous service were provisioned, watered and repaired -on the spot, without going into harbor. Nelson, as the year before, -was actively employed in the Gulf of Genoa, harassing the coast -communications, and was on one occasion fortunate enough to capture -a convoy with guns and entrenching tools for the siege of Mantua. In -the Adriatic, a few frigates and a flotilla of small vessels were -engaged in protecting the Austrian communications by way of Trieste. -Admiral Mann, with seven ships-of-the-line, was still off Cadiz, in the -station assigned him by Hotham to watch Richery. Besides these strictly -military operations, ships were called for in every direction to convoy -trade, to cover the passage of storeships, and generally to keep the -sea safe for unarmed British vessels, whether traders or government -transports, upon whom depended the supplies of the fleet and those of -Gibraltar drawn from Barbary. Between thirty and forty frigates and -smaller vessels were thus occupied, and were found insufficient to meet -the varied demands arising from the wide diffusion of British commerce -and the activity of French cruisers. - -Bonaparte's rapid successes and wide flight of conquest materially -affected the British fleet; and the question of supplies became very -serious with the ports of Tuscany, Naples and the Pope closed to -its aid. Growing symptoms of discontent made the tenure of Corsica -doubtful, with the French in Leghorn, and with Genoa tolerating their -intrigues through fear of their armies. As early as May 20, immediately -after entering Milan, Bonaparte had sent agents to Genoa to concert -risings in the island; and in July he began to collect in Leghorn a -body of Corsican refugees, at whose head he put General Gentili, also -a native. The threatening outlook of affairs, and the submission of -Tuscany to the violation of her neutrality by the French, determined -the viceroy of Corsica to seize Elba, although a Tuscan possession. -Nelson, with a small squadron, appeared before Porto Ferrajo on the -10th of July, and to a peremptory summons received immediate surrender. -Being very small, Elba was more immediately under naval control than -Corsica, and to hold it required fewer troops. In case of the loss of -the larger island, it would still assure the British a base in the -Mediterranean and continued control, so long as their fleet could -assert predominance over those of their enemies. - -Some doubt, however, was felt on this latter point. The attitude of -Spain, far from cordial when an ally, had been cold as a neutral, and -was now fast becoming hostile. The decrepit kingdom had a navy of over -fifty sail-of-the-line; and, although its discipline and efficiency -were at the lowest ebb, the mere force of numbers might prove too -much for even Jervis's splendid fleet of only twenty-two,—seven of -which were still before Cadiz, a thousand miles from the main body off -Toulon. Foreseeing the approaching danger, Jervis, about the time Elba -was seized, sent Mann orders to rejoin him; and accordingly, on the -29th of July, the blockade of Cadiz was raised. It was just in time, -for on the 19th of August Spain, moved by the successes of Bonaparte -and the French advance into Germany,—which had not yet undergone the -disasters afterwards inflicted upon the separated armies of Jourdan -and Moreau by the Archduke Charles,—had signed a treaty of offensive -and defensive alliance with the republic. As soon as Mann's ships -disappeared, Richery demanded the help of the Spanish fleet to cover -his departure, and on the 4th of August sailed in company with twenty -Spanish ships-of-the-line. These escorted him three hundred miles to -the westward, and then returned to port, leaving the French to fulfil -their original mission against British North America, after a detention -of nearly ten months. Richery, who had been promoted to rear-admiral -during this time, made his cruise successfully, harassed the fishing -interests on the coasts of Newfoundland, captured and burned a hundred -British merchant vessels, and got back to Brest in time to take part in -the unfortunate expedition against Ireland, which sailed in December of -this year. - -Admiral Mann, though a brave and good officer, showed bad judgment -throughout this campaign. Apparently, to use Napoleon's expression, -"Il s'était fait un tableau" as to the military and naval situation; -and to such a frame of mind the governor of Gibraltar, O'Hara, a -pessimist by temperament,[129] probably was a bad adviser. In his -precipitation to join the commander-in-chief, he forgot the difficulty -about stores and left Gibraltar without filling up. Jervis consequently -was forced to send him back at once, with orders to return as quickly -as possible. On his way down, on the 1st of October, he was chased by -a Spanish fleet of nineteen sail-of-the-line under Admiral Langara. -His squadron escaped, losing two merchant vessels under its convoy; -but, upon arriving in Gibraltar, he called a council of captains, and, -having obtained their concurrence in his opinion, sailed for England, -in direct disregard of the commands both of Jervis and the Admiralty. -Upon his arrival his action was disapproved,[130] orders were sent him -to strike his flag and come ashore, and he appears never again to have -been employed afloat; but, when it is remembered that only forty years -had elapsed since Byng was shot for an error in judgment, it must be -owned men had become more merciful. - -Mann's defection reduced Jervis's forces by one third, at a time when -affairs were becoming daily more critical. Not only did it make the -tenure of the Mediterranean vastly more difficult, but it deprived -the admiral of his cherished hope of dealing a staggering blow to -the Spanish fleet, such as four months later he inflicted at Cape -St. Vincent. After meeting Mann, Langara was joined by seven ships -from Cartagena, and with this increase of force appeared on the 20th -of October about fifty miles from San Fiorenzo Bay. Jervis had just -returned there from off Toulon, having on the 25th of September -received orders to evacuate Corsica,—an operation which promised -to be difficult from lack of transports. On the 26th of October -Langara entered Toulon, where the new allies had then thirty-eight -ships-of-the-line collected. - -During the summer months Nelson had blockaded Leghorn, after its -occupation by the French; and this measure, with the tenure of Elba, -seems to have effectually prevented any large body of men passing -into Corsica. On the 18th of September the little island of Capraja, a -Genoese dependency and convenient refuge for small boats, was seized -for the same object. On the 29th, however, Nelson received orders -from Jervis for the evacuation of Corsica, the operations at Bastia -being assigned to his special care. As soon as the determination of -the British was known, discontent broke out into revolt. Gentili, -finding the sea clear, landed on the 19th of October, pressing close -down upon the coast; and the final embarkation was only effected in -safety under the guns of the ships. On the 19th Nelson took off the -last of the troops, and carried them with the viceroy to Elba, which it -was intended still to hold. Jervis held on at San Fiorenzo Bay to the -latest moment possible, everything being afloat for a fortnight before -he left, hoping that Mann might yet join, and fearing he might arrive -after the departure of the fleet. On the 2d of November provisions were -so short that longer delay was impossible; and the admiral sailed with -his whole force, reaching Gibraltar, after a tedious voyage, on the -1st of December, 1796. During the passage, in which the crews were on -from half to one third the usual rations, Jervis received instructions -countermanding the evacuation, if not yet carried out. If executed, -Elba was still to be held. - -The policy of thus evacuating the Mediterranean admits, now as then, of -argument on both sides. The causes for the vacillation of the British -government are apparent. The first orders to leave everything, Elba -included, were dated August 31. Generals Jourdan and Moreau were then -far in the heart of Germany; and the archduke having but just begun -the brilliant counter-move by which he drove first one, and then the -other, back to the Rhine, the effects of this were in no way foreseen. -From Italy the latest possible news was of Bonaparte's new successes -at Lonato and Castiglione, and the fresh retreat of the Austrians. -The countermanding orders, dated October 21, were issued under the -influence of the archduke's success and of Wurmser's evasion of -Bonaparte and entrance into Mantua; whereby, despite repeated defeats -in the field, the garrison was largely increased and the weary work -of the siege must be again begun. While Mantua stood, Bonaparte could -not advance; and the Austrians were gathering a new army in the Tyrol. -The British government failed, too, to realize the supreme excellence -of its Mediterranean fleet and the stanch character of its leader. -"The admiral," wrote Elliott[131] on the spot, "is as firm as a rock. -He has at present fourteen sail-of-the-line against thirty-six, or -perhaps forty. If Mann joins him, they will certainly attack, and -they are _all_ confident of victory." The incident of Mann's conduct, -under these circumstances, is full of military warning. It is within -the limits of reasonable speculation to say that, had he obeyed his -orders,—and only extreme causes could justify disobedience,—the -battle of Cape St. Vincent would have been fought then in the -Mediterranean,[132] instead of in the Atlantic after the fall of -Mantua, and would have profoundly affected the policy of the Italian -States. With such a victory, men like Jervis and Elliott would have -held on for further orders from home. "The expulsion of the English," -wrote Bonaparte, "has a great effect upon the success of our military -operations in Italy. We must exact more severe conditions of Naples. -It has the greatest moral influence upon the minds of the Italians, -assures our communications and will make Naples tremble even in -Sicily."[133] - -In the opinion of the author, Sir Gilbert Elliott expresses the correct -conclusion in the words following, which show singular foresight as -well as sound political judgment: "I have always thought that it -is a great and important object in the contest between the French -republic and the rest of Europe, that Italy, in whole or in part, -should neither be annexed to France as dominion, nor affiliated in -the shape of dependent republics; and I have considered a superior -British fleet in the Mediterranean as an essential means for securing -Italy and Europe from such a misfortune."[134] Elliott's presentiments -were realized by Napoleon at a later day; the immediate effect of -the evacuation was indicated by a treaty of peace between France and -Naples, signed October 10, as soon as the purpose was known. In 1796 -the British fleet had been three years in the Mediterranean, and since -the acquisition of Corsica had effected little. What was needed at -the moment was not an abandonment of the field, but a demonstration -of power by a successful battle. The weakest eyes could count the -units by which the allied fleets exceeded the British; acts alone -could show the real superiority, the predominance in strength, of the -latter. That demonstrated, the islands and the remote extremities of -the peninsula would have taken heart, and a battle in the Gulf of Lyon -had the far-reaching effects produced by that in Aboukir Bay. At the -time of the evacuation the three most important factors in the military -situation were, the siege of Mantua, the Austrian army in the Tyrol, -and, last but not least, the British fleet in the Mediterranean. This -sustained Naples; and Naples, or rather southern Italy, was one of -Bonaparte's most serious anxieties. Finally, it may be said that the -value of Corsica to the fleet is proved by Nelson's preference of -Maddalena Bay, in the straits separating Corsica from Sardinia, over -Malta, as the station for a British fleet watching Toulon. - -Immediately upon reaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders to take the -fleet to Lisbon, in consequence of a disposition shown by the allied -French and Spanish governments to attack Portugal.[135] The limits -of his command were extended to Cape Finisterre. Before sailing, he -despatched Nelson up the Mediterranean with two frigates to bring -off the garrison and stores from Elba, the abandonment of which was -again ordered. On the 16th he sailed for Lisbon, arriving there on the -21st; but misfortunes were thickening around his fleet. On the 10th, -at Gibraltar, during a furious gale, three ships-of-the-line drove -from their anchors. One was totally lost on the coast of Morocco, and -another struck so heavily on a rock that she had to be sent to England -for repairs. Shortly after, a third grounded in Tangiers Bay, and, -though repaired on the station, was unfit for service in the ensuing -battle. A fourth, when entering the Tagus in charge of a pilot, was -run on a shoal and wrecked. Finally, in leaving the river on the 18th -of January, a ninety-eight-gun ship was run aground and incapacitated. -This reduced the force with which he then put to sea to seek the enemy -to ten ships-of-the-line. - -Nelson, his most efficient lieutenant, was also nearly lost to him -on that interesting occasion, when his fearlessness and _coup d'œil_ -mainly contributed to the success achieved. Sailing from Gibraltar on -the 15th of December, he fought on the 20th a severe action with two -Spanish frigates, which would have made a chapter in the life of an -ordinary seaman, but is lost among his other deeds. His prizes were -immediately recovered by a heavy Spanish squadron, but his own ships -escaped. On the 26th he reached Porto Ferrajo, and remained a month. -He was there joined by Elliott, the late viceroy of Corsica, who had -been in Naples since the evacuation. General De Burgh, commanding the -garrison, refused to abandon his post without specific orders from -the government, and as Nelson had only those of Jervis, he confined -himself to embarking the naval stores. With these and all the ships of -war he sailed from Elba on the 29th of January, 1797. On the 9th of -February he reached Gibraltar; and thence, learning that the Spanish -fleet had repassed the Straits, he hurried on to join the admiral. Just -out of Gibraltar he was chased by several Spaniards,[136] but escaped -them, and on the 13th fell in with the fleet. At 6 P. M. of that day -he went on board his own ship, the "Captain," seventy-four, at whose -masthead flew his broad pennant[137] during the battle of the following -day. - -The meeting which now took place between the Spanish and British fleets -was the result of the following movements. Towards the end of 1796 -the Directory, encouraged by Bonaparte's successes and by the Spanish -alliance, and allured by the promises of disaffected Irish, determined -on an expedition to Ireland. As the first passage of the troops and -their subsequent communications would depend upon naval superiority, -five ships-of-the-line were ordered from Toulon to Brest. This force, -under Admiral Villeneuve, sailed on the 1st of December, accompanied -by the Spanish fleet of twenty-six ships, which, since October, had -remained in Toulon. On the 6th Langara went into Cartagena, leaving -Villeneuve to himself, and on the 10th the French passed Gibraltar in -full sight of the British fleet, driving before the easterly gale, -which then did so much harm to Jervis's squadron and prevented pursuit. -They did not, however, reach Brest soon enough for the expedition. -The Spaniards remained in Cartagena nearly two months, during which -time Admiral Cordova took command; but under urgent pressure from the -Directory[138] they finally sailed for Cadiz on the 1st of February, -passing the Straits on the 5th with heavy easterly weather, which -drove them far to the westward. They numbered now twenty-seven -ships-of-the-line. - -Sir John Jervis, after leaving Lisbon on January 18, 1797, had convoyed -to the westward some Portuguese merchant ships bound to Brazil, and -then beaten back towards his station off Cape St. Vincent. On the 6th -of February he was joined by a re-enforcement of five ships, which were -sent from England as soon as the scare about Ireland had passed. With -these fifteen he cruised off the Cape, knowing that he there must meet -any squadron, from either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, bound to -Cadiz. At 5 A.M. of February 14, the frigate "Niger," which had kept -sight of the Spanish fleet for some days, joined the admiral, and -informed him that it was probably not more than ten or twelve miles -distant, to the southward and westward. The wind, which had been strong -south-easterly for several days, had changed during the night to west -by south, enabling the Spaniards to head for Cadiz, after the weary -battling of the past week; but this otherwise fortunate circumstance -became a very dangerous incident[139] to a large, ill-officered, and -ill-commanded body of ships, about to meet an enemy so skilful, so -alert, and so thoroughly drilled as Jervis's comparatively small and -manageable force. At daybreak, about 6.30, the Spaniards were seen, -stretching on the horizon from south-west to south in an ill-defined -body, across the path of the advancing British. Their distance, though -not stated, was probably not less than fifteen to twenty miles. The -British fleet being close hauled on the starboard tack, heading from -south to south by west, while the Spaniards, bound for Cadiz, were -steering east-south-east, the two courses crossed nearly at right -angles. At this moment there was a great contrast between the arrays -presented by the approaching combatants. The British, formed during -the night in two columns of eight and seven ships respectively, -elicited the commendation of their exacting chief "for their admirable -close order."[140] The Spaniards, on the contrary, eager to get to -port, and in confusion through the night shift of wind and their own -loose habits of sailing, were broken into two bodies. Of these the -leading one, as all were sailing nearly before the wind, was most to -leeward. It was composed of six ships, the interval between which and -the other twenty-one was probably not less than eight miles. Even -after the British fleet was seen, no attempt was for some time made -to remedy this fatal separation; a neglect due partly to professional -nonchalance and inefficiency, and partly to misinformation concerning -the enemy's force, which they had heard through a neutral was only nine -ships-of-the-line.[141] - -[Illustration: Battle of Cape St. Vincent, February 14, 1797.] - -The weather being hazy and occasionally foggy, some time passed before -the gradually approaching enemies could clearly see each other. At 9 -A.M. the number and rates of the Spaniards could be made out from the -masthead of the British flag-ship, so that they were then probably -distant from twelve to fifteen miles. At half-past nine Jervis sent -three ships ahead to chase, and a few minutes later supported them -with three others. This advanced duty enabled these six to take the -lead in the attack. About ten[142] the fog lifted and disclosed the -relative situations. The British, still in two columns, were heading -fair for the gap in the Spanish order. The six lee ships of the latter -had realized their false position, and were now close to the wind on -the port tack, heading about north-north-west, in hopes that they could -rejoin the main body to windward, which still continued its course for -Cadiz. Jervis then made signal to form a single column, the fighting -order of battle, and pass through the enemy's line. It soon became -evident that the lee Spanish ships could not cross the bows of the -British. For a moment they wavered and bore up to south-east; but soon -after five of them resumed their north-west course, with the apparent -purpose of breaking through the hostile line whose advance they had not -been able to anticipate.[143] The sixth continued to the south-east and -disappeared. - -The weather division of the Spaniards now also saw that it was not -possible for all its members to effect a junction with the separated -ships. Three stood on, and crossed the bows of the advancing enemy; -the remainder hauled up in increasing disorder to the northward, -steering a course nearly parallel, but directly opposite, to the -British, and passing their van at long cannon shot. At half-past -eleven the "Culloden," Captain Troubridge, heading Jervis's column, -came abreast the leading ships of this body, and opened fire. Sir John -Jervis now saw secured to him the great desire of commanders-in-chief. -His own force, in compact fighting order, was interposed between the -fractions of the enemy, able to deal for a measurable time with either, -undisturbed by the other. Should he attack the eighteen weather, or -the eight lee ships, with his own fifteen? With accurate professional -judgment he promptly decided to assail the larger body; because the -smaller, having to beat to windward, would be kept out of action longer -than he could hope if he chose the other alternative. The decision was -in principle identical with that which determined Nelson's tactics -at the Nile. The signal was therefore made to tack in succession, in -pursuit of the weather ships. Troubridge, anticipating the order, had -already hoisted at the masthead his answering flag of recognition, -rolled up after the manner of the sea, needing but a turn of the wrist -to unloose it. Quick as the admiral's signal flew the reply fluttered -out, and the "Culloden's" sails were already shaking as she luffed up -into the wind. "Look at Troubridge," shouted Jervis, in exultation: -"he handles his ship as if the eyes of all England were upon him! -and would to God they were!" The rear of the Spaniards was just -passing the "Culloden" as she thus went round. Ship after ship of the -British line tacked in her wake and stood on in pursuit; while those -still on the first course, south by west, interposed between the two -Spanish divisions. Of these the lee, led by a hundred-gun ship under a -vice-admiral's flag, headed towards Jervis's flag-ship, the "Victory," -the seventh in the British order, as though to go through the line -ahead of her. The "Victory" was too prompt; and the Spaniard, to avoid -collision, went about close under the British broadsides. In doing -this he was exposed to and received a raking fire, which drove him out -of action, accompanied by his consorts. The "Victory," which had backed -a topsail a moment to aim more accurately, then stood on and tacked in -the wake of the "Culloden," followed by the rest of the British column. - -It was now nearly one o'clock. The action so far had consisted, first, -in piercing the enemy's line, cutting off the van and greater part -of the centre from the rear; and, second, in a cannonade between two -columns passing on opposite parallel courses,—the Spanish main division -running free, the British close to the wind. Naval history abounds in -instances of these brushes, and pronounces them commonly indecisive. -Jervis, who had seen such,[144] meant decisive action when he ordered -the "Culloden" to tack and follow the enemy. But a stern chase is a -long chase, and the Spanish ships were fast sailers. Some time must -pass before Troubridge and his companions could overtake them; and, -as each succeeding vessel of the British line had to reach the common -point of tacking, from which the Spaniards were steadily receding, -the rear of Jervis's fleet must be long in coming up. That it was so -is proved by the respective losses incurred. It has, therefore, been -suggested that the admiral would have done well to tack his whole -fleet, or at least the rear ships together, bringing them in a body on -the Spanish van. The idea is plausible, but errs by leaving out of the -calculation the Spanish lee division, which was kept off by the British -rear ships. Those eight lee ships are apt to be looked on as wholly -out of the affair; but in fact it was a necessary part of Jervis's -combination to check them, during the time required to deal with the -others. Admiral Parker, commanding in the van, speaks expressly of the -efforts made by the Spanish lee division to annoy him, and of the -covering action of the British rear.[145] - -Thus, one by one, the British ships were changing their course -from south by west to north-north-east in pursuit of the Spanish -main division, and the latter was gradually passing to the rear of -their enemy's original order. When they saw the sea clear to the -south-east, about one o'clock, they bore up, altering their course -to east-south-east, hoping to pass behind the British and so join -the lee division. Fortunately for Jervis, Nelson was in the third -ship from the rear. Having fully divined his chief's purpose, he saw -it on the point of defeat, and, without waiting for orders, wore at -once out of the line, and threw the "Captain," alone, in front of the -enemy's leading ships. In this well-timed but most daring move, which -illustrates to the highest degree the immense difference between a -desperate and a reckless action, Nelson passed to the head of the -British column, crossing the bows of five large Spanish vessels, and -then with his seventy-four engaged the "Santisima Trinidad," of one -hundred and thirty guns, the biggest ship at that time afloat. The -enemy, apparently dashed by this act of extraordinary temerity, and as -little under control as a flock of frightened sheep, hauled up in a -body again to north-north-east, resuming what can only be described as -their flight. - -Their momentary change of course had, however, caused a delay which -enabled the British leaders to come up. Troubridge in the "Culloden" -was soon right behind Nelson, to whom he was dear beyond all British -officers, and three other ships followed in as close array as was -consistent with the free use of their guns. The Spaniards, never in -good order, lay before them in confusion, two or three deep, hindering -one another's fire, and presenting a target that could not easily be -missed. This closing scene of the battle raged round the rear ships of -the Spanish main body, and necessarily became a _mêlée_, each British -captain acting according to his own judgment and the condition of -his ship. A very distinguished part fell to Collingwood, likewise a -close associate of Nelson's, whose ship, the "Excellent," had brought -up the rear of the order. Having, probably from this circumstance, -escaped serious injury to her spars, she was fully under her captain's -control, and enabled him to display the courage and skill for which -he was so eminently distinguished. Passing along the enemy's rear, he -had compelled one seventy-four to strike, when his eye caught sight -of Nelson's ship lying disabled on the starboard side, and within -pistol shot, of the "San Nicolas," a Spanish eighty; "her foretopmast -and wheel shot away, not a sail, shroud, or rope, left,"[146] and -being fired upon by five hostile ships. With every sail set he pressed -ahead, passing between the "Captain" and her nearest enemy, brushing -the latter at a distance of ten feet, and pouring in one of those -broadsides of which he used to assure his practised crew that, if -they could fire three in five minutes, no vessel could resist them. -The "San Nicolas," either intentionally or from the helmsman being -killed, luffed and fell on board the "San Josef," a ship of one hundred -and twelve guns, while the "Excellent," continuing her course, left -the ground again clear for Nelson. The latter, seeing the "Captain" -powerless for continued manœuvre, put the helm to starboard; the -British ship came up to the wind, fetched over to the "San Nicolas," -and grappled her. Nelson, having his men ready on deck, rushed at their -head on board the Spaniard, drove her crew below, and captured her. The -"San Josef," which was fast to the "San Nicolas" on the other side, -now opened a fire of musketry; but the commodore, first stationing -sentinels to prevent the "San Nicolas's" men regaining their deck, -called upon his own ship for a re-enforcement, with which he boarded -the three-decker and carried her also. On her quarter-deck, surrounded -by his followers still hot from the fight, he received the swords of -the Spanish officers. - -This dramatic ending to the distinguished part played by him, and -the promptitude of his previous action, by which, while assuming a -great responsibility, he saved the success of the day, have made -Nelson the most striking figure in the battle of Cape St. Vincent; -or, as it is sometimes called, of St. Valentine's Day. This splendid -movement of his genius in no way detracts from the credit due to the -commander-in-chief; as it was no lessening of Nelson's own fame that -the leader of the van at the Nile conceived on the moment the happy -thought of passing inside the French line. To Jervis alone belongs -the honor of attacking such heavy odds, as well as of the correct -and sufficient combination by which he hoped to snatch victory from -superior numbers. He was happy, indeed, in having such a lieutenant, -so right a man in so right a place, and at so critical a moment; but -the whole responsibility and the whole original plan was his, and no -man can take it from him. To him, too, was primarily due the admirable -efficiency of his fleet, which removed from his enterprise the reproach -of rashness to bestow upon it the praise of daring. A yet higher meed -of glory is due to this bold admiral. As the dull morning light showed -him the two fleets, he was heard to say, "A victory is very essential -to England at this moment." Honor to the chief who can rise above his -own anxieties and his local responsibilities to think of the needs of -his country, and who is willing to risk his own reputation to support -her credit. - -Four Spanish ships were now in the possession of the British, and the -great "Santisima Trinidad" was without fore or mizzen mast,—some said -she had struck; but the lee division of the enemy was at last coming -up, and many of the weather were still uninjured. Jervis, therefore, -about four in the afternoon formed his fleet in line on the starboard -tack, interposing it between the enemy and his prizes. This ended -the battle. It has been thought that further pursuit of a fleet so -disgracefully beaten would have increased the British triumph; but -Jervis was not the man to risk a substantial success, securely held, -for a doubtful further gain. The victory essential to Great Britain -was won; the worthlessness of the Spanish navy was revealed,—it could -no longer be accounted a factor in the political situation. In the -opinion of the author, Jervis was right not to expose this, the great -and attained result of Valentine's Day, to those chances of mishap that -cannot be excluded from the operations of war. - -Among the numerous rewards bestowed for this action, the admiral was -advanced to the peerage as Earl St. Vincent, while upon Nelson was -bestowed the then distinguished honor of Knight of the Bath. On the -20th of February he was made a rear-admiral. The captains of the fleet -received medals, and the senior lieutenant of each ship was promoted. - -Jervis had well said that Great Britain was then in essential need -of a victory; and never was one better timed for political effect. -Deep gloom prevailed throughout the country, and in every quarter the -horizon was black with clouds, when, on the 3d of March, the bearer -of the dispatches reached the admiralty. Since Bonaparte had seized -the line of the Adige and cut off Mantua, three distinct attempts -had been made by the Austrians in superior force to dislodge him -and relieve the city; and in all three they had been beaten with -heavy loss. The news was but lately come that Mantua had capitulated, -leaving Bonaparte free to assume the offensive and advance, as he -shortly did. The British fleet had been forced to abandon Corsica and -the Mediterranean. Peace negotiations, begun with the republic, had -ended by the British envoy being peremptorily ordered to leave France -in forty-eight hours; and although the government had not expected a -favorable issue, the effect on the people was disheartening. Consols -fell to 51, a depression greater than any reached during the American -Revolution.[147] The expedition of the French against Ireland had -indeed failed; but so little share had the Channel fleet borne in -their defeat, that the country was forced to ascribe to the direct -interposition of Divine Providence a deliverance, which it would have -preferred to see wrought through the instrumentality of the navy. That -trusted arm of the national defence seemed palsied in every quarter. -Finally, among the greater of many discouraging circumstances, specie -payments were stopped by the Bank of England on the 26th of February, -in obedience to an order of the government. The profuse subsidies paid -to continental states, and the demands for coin to meet the expenses -of the navy in all parts of the world, were the chief causes of a -drain against which the bank directors had frequently remonstrated -during two years as threatening ruin. To these causes for scarcity was -added at this time another, temporary in its character and arising in -great part from loss of confidence in the navy's efficiency,—the fear, -namely, of invasion. People had begun to call for and to hoard coin -against an evil day. Such was the outlook as Jervis's captain posted -from Falmouth, where he landed, to London, keeping the secret of his -good news within his breast. The frigate which had borne him went on to -Plymouth with the viceroy of Corsica, returning with his suite from his -lost principality. When they landed on the 5th of March, news had just -reached the town of the suspension of cash payments, and, as they told -of the great achievement off Cape St. Vincent, people at first refused -to believe that the tide had turned. They were expecting to hear of -a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and an approaching -invasion. So great was the financial panic, that fifteen guineas -were with difficulty collected among government officials to pay the -expenses of Elliott's journey to London.[148] - -The revulsion was great, and was proved by the profusion with which -rewards were distributed. The Spanish navy had been but a bugbear, -but as a bugbear it was great. The veil that covered its rottenness -was stripped away, and at the same time were revealed to the nation, -which feared it had no naval chiefs, the striking and brilliant figures -of Jervis and Nelson. In vain did the Opposition, in the true spirit -of faction, seek to turn men's eyes from the brilliant achievements -of the warriors to the imbecility affirmed of the government, which -had opposed fifteen ships to twenty-seven. Thinking men realized -that the administration could not be held responsible for Mann's -unauthorized return at Christmas-tide, nor for the extraordinary -series of misfortunes by which five more of the Mediterranean fleet -were in one short month incapacitated. They saw, too, that no popular -government would have dared to replace Mann's ships so long as the fate -of Ireland, then in the balance, was uncertain. But most men did not -care to think. It was enough for them that fifteen British ships had -dashed into the midst of twenty-seven enemies, had collared and dragged -out four of the biggest and severely handled the rest. It was enough -to hear that the crew of one British seventy-four, headed by a man -whom few out of the navy yet knew, had, sword in hand, carried first a -Spanish eighty and then another of one hundred and twelve guns. With -such men to rule the fleet, and with Pitt at the helm of state, they -thanked God and took courage. Speculation is often futile; yet it is -hard to see how the country could have borne the approaching crisis of -the mutinies, on top of its other troubles, had not the fear of the -Spanish navy been removed and the hope of better naval leaders been -afforded. That the hope was well founded is no speculation. With St. -Vincent began a series of victories and achievements which have thrown -the great deeds of earlier years into undeserved obscurity. - -Immediately after the battle the Spanish fleet entered Cadiz, and -Jervis returned to Lisbon to refit his ships. On the 31st of March, -having received further re-enforcements, he left Lisbon with twenty-one -ships-of-the-line and took position off Cadiz, where the Spaniards -had twenty-six of the same class. After cruising for six weeks under -sail, he anchored the fleet for a long blockade, and this disposition -continued with little intermission for two years,—until May, 1799, -when the successful sortie of Admiral Bruix from Brest, related in -another place,[149] and the consequent chase by the British blockading -force, gave the Spaniards the opportunity to slip out. This tedious -watching was unfruitful in events of military interest; but the burden -of the commander-in-chief was increased by the spirit of mutiny, -rife throughout the whole period, which triumphed temporarily in the -Channel and North Sea fleets, and was by Jervis kept down only by a -stern vigilance of which few but he were capable. Stamped out time -and again by his unflinching energy, it was continually renewed by -the fresh ships sent out from home, under officers of temper inferior -to his captains, and with seamen who knew not yet by experience -the indomitable will which they sought to bend. Execution followed -execution; but never once did the old man's courage quail nor his -determination falter. Seaman and officer alike were made to feel that -while his flag flew his authority should prevail; and with such -backing the officers showed themselves incapable of the weaknesses too -often manifested in the home ports.[150] It is probable too that a -strong nucleus of support existed among the crews that fought at St. -Vincent,—due to admiration for the admiral himself, and for Nelson, -Collingwood, Troubridge, Saumarez and others, who there distinguished -themselves. - -While these various events were transpiring at sea, from the evacuation -of Corsica to the battle of St. Vincent, Bonaparte in Italy was still -holding the line of the Adige and blockading Mantua. His posture -therefore was essentially one of defence. The vigor and sagacity with -which he resorted to offensive movements the instant the enemy drew -down from the Tyrol to attack him, and the brilliant character of the -victories won by him, obscure to most the fact that he was really on -the defensive; holding on, amid risks and discouragements, to the -conquests already made, and unable to attempt more until Mantua fell. -The glories of Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, conceal this crucial -feature of his situation, and the consequently important bearing of the -presence of the British fleet, encouraging the dispositions of Naples -and the Pope, which were distinctly hostile to the French. Nothing less -than Bonaparte's energy and genius could have grappled successfully -with such a situation; and his correspondence betrays his fear that, by -the co-operation of the fleet, these dangers in the rear might become -too great even for him. When Mantua capitulated on the 2d of February, -Bonaparte turned first upon the Pope, whom he accused of violating the -armistice concluded the previous June. His Holiness at once submitted, -and on the 19th of February signed a peace, abandoning his right to -his northern provinces,—Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna,—and ceding -to France, until the end of the war, Ancona, a good seaport on the -Adriatic. - -On the 10th of March, having completed all the dispositions that seemed -necessary to secure his rear, Bonaparte advanced against the Austrians. -The young Archduke Charles, whom the campaign of 1796 on the Danube -had revealed to Europe as gifted with military talents of a very high -order, had been sent to oppose him; but it was too late to resist on -the plains of Italy, or even on the Italian side of the mountains. The -French crossed the Tagliamento on March 16, and pushed up through the -gorges of that stream and of the Isonzo into the eastern Alps. On the -23d Trieste was occupied. The Archduke retired continuously, barely -disputing difficult positions with the enemy. His mind was fixed not to -fight until he had drawn the French far into Germany, and had collected -his own resources,—a decision whose wisdom Bonaparte sealed with his -own commendation. "If the enemy had committed the folly of awaiting -me," he wrote to the Directory, "I should have beaten them; but if they -had continued to fall back, had joined a part of their forces from the -Rhine, and had overwhelmed me, then retreat would have been difficult, -and the loss of the Army of Italy might entail that of the republic. We -must not shut our eyes to the fact that, though our military position -was brilliant, we have not simply dictated the conditions."[151] Italy, -too, was fermenting behind him. The moral effect, however, of this -unopposed advance through the mountains of Carinthia brought the House -of Austria to terms; and on the 18th of April preliminaries of peace -were signed at Leoben, only sixty miles from Vienna. Though the formal -treaty was not concluded until six months later, this transaction -marked, for that time, the end of hostilities between Austria and -France, which had then lasted five years,—from April, 1792, to April, -1797. - -The preliminaries of Leoben stipulated a mutual cessation of -hostilities between the republic and the emperor, and extended this -provision to all the states of the German Empire, as well as to the -particular dominions of the emperor himself. Austria surrendered -definitively the Netherlands (Belgium), and "recognized the limits of -France as decreed by the laws of the French Republic." In this phrase -was imbedded the rock upon which negotiations with Great Britain split. -The republic, on its part, undertook to furnish to the emperor at the -final peace a "just and suitable compensation" for the provinces he -lost. - -The "suitable compensation," thus mysteriously alluded to, was defined -in the "secret preliminary agreements," contracted at the same moment. -It was furnished by depriving the republic of Venice, with which -Bonaparte had reasons for serious discontent, of all its possessions on -the mainland of Italy, as well as of Istria and Dalmatia on the east -coast of the Adriatic. The provinces thus taken were divided: Austria -receiving all east of the Oglio and north of the Po, with Istria and -Dalmatia. The country between the Oglio and the Adda, previously owned -by Venice, was taken to constitute a new, independent republic; into -which were also incorporated all possessions of Austria west of the -Oglio conquered by the French in the recent campaign. This was to be -known as the Cisalpine Republic. Thus the lords of the Adriatic were -shorn of their glory, and brought to the brink of the precipice from -which, six months later, at the final peace, the Corsican conqueror -hurled them headlong. For the moment there were spared to them their -ancient city and the Ionian Islands; and the legations of Bologna, -Ferrara, and the Romagna, taken from the Pope, were given to them,—a -like transient possession. - -Such, in brief outline, were the principal terms of the preliminaries -of Leoben. The great and significant feature does not ostensibly appear -among the articles. Bonaparte, in diplomacy, had achieved the great -end at which he aimed in his plans of campaign. He had separated his -enemies. "The French Republic," wrote he, "in granting at Leoben -preliminaries so advantageous to his Imperial Majesty, had as its -principal end the conclusion of a _separate peace_ with his Majesty, -in order to be in a position to turn all its forces against England, -and oblige her to a prompt peace." He alone made and signed the -preliminaries, and this quotation gives the strategy and policy of his -life in a nutshell.[152] The crucial fact at Leoben was that Austria -then, as Sardinia a year before, treated alone,—without her ally. This -Great Britain, to her honor, absolutely refused to do in 1796, and as -long as her ally stood by her. There is, of course, a great difference -between the position of a state which finds a victorious enemy in the -heart of its territories, and that of an island empire; and great -allowance must be made for Austria, even though the calm retrospect of -history sees that she failed rightly to appreciate the extreme hazard -of Bonaparte's situation. But this allowance merely emphasizes the -important truth, that the imposing attitude maintained by Great Britain -throughout this tremendous contest depended absolutely and wholly upon -the control of the sea,—upon Sea-Power. - - NOTE.—It now only remains to be seen how, when insubordination, - and accompanied by villany of this magnitude, did make its open - appearance, Lord St. Vincent dealt with it. A remarkable occasion - will be mentioned, not indeed the first outbreak of mutiny, - nor its last effort, but that one which excited the greatest - sensation in the fleet,—that which came with most untoward - circumstances,—that of which the enforcement of the penalty had, - in Lord St. Vincent's opinion, the most salutary effect. - - * * * * * - - No sooner had Sir Roger Curtis arrived, than applications came to - the commander-in-chief for courts-martial on mutineers from three - of those ships,—the "Marlborough," the "Lion," and the "Centaur." - Selection will be made of the sequel to the "Marlborough." - - As the squadron approached, and before the request for a - court-martial, this ship being known to the commander-in-chief - to have been among the most disorganized at Spithead had been - ordered to take her berth in the centre, at a small distance from - the rest of the fleet. It, however, had so happened that a very - violent mutiny in her had broken out at Beerhaven, and again - during the passage, which had been suppressed by the officers, - but chiefly by the first lieutenant. The very object too of this - mutiny was to protect the life of a seaman who had forfeited it - by a capital crime. A court-martial on the principal mutineers - was immediately assembled; and one was no sooner sentenced to die - than the commander-in-chief ordered him to be executed on the - following morning, "_and by the crew of the 'Marlborough' alone, - no part of the boats' crews from the other ships, as had been - usual on similar occasions, to assist in the punishment_,"—his - Lordship's invariable order on the execution of mutineers. On - the receipt of the necessary commands for this execution, the - captain of the "Marlborough," Captain Ellison, waited upon - the commander-in-chief, and reminding his Lordship that a - determination that their shipmates should not suffer capital - punishment had been the very cause of the ship's company's mutiny, - expressed his conviction that the "Marlborough's" crew would never - permit the man to be hanged on board that ship. - - Receiving the captain on the "Ville de Paris'" quarter-deck, - before the officers and ship's company, hearkening in breathless - silence to what passed, and standing with his hat in his hand - over his head, as was his Lordship's invariable custom during the - whole time that any person, whatever were his rank, even a common - seaman, addressed him on service, Lord St. Vincent listened very - attentively till the captain ceased to speak; and then, after a - pause, replied,— - - "What do you mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that you cannot - _command_ his Majesty's ship the 'Marlborough'? for if that is the - case, sir, I will immediately send on board an officer who can." - - The captain then requested that, at all events, the boats' crews - from the rest of the fleet might, as always had been customary in - the service, on executions, attend at this also, to haul the man - up; for he really did not expect the "Marlborough's" would do it. - - Lord St. Vincent sternly answered: "Captain Ellison, you are an - old officer, sir, have served long, suffered severely in the - service, and have lost an arm in action, and I should be very - sorry that any advantage should be now taken of your advanced - years. That man _shall be_ hanged, at eight o'clock to-morrow - morning, _and by his own ship's company_: for not a hand from any - other ship in the fleet shall touch the rope. You will now return - on board, sir; and, lest you should not prove able to command your - ship, an officer will be at hand to you who can." - - Without another word Captain Ellison instantly retired. After - he had reached his ship, he received orders to cause her guns - to be housed and secured, and that at daybreak in the morning - her ports should be lowered. A general order then issued to the - fleet for all launches to rendezvous under the "Prince" at seven - o'clock on the following morning, armed with carronades and twelve - rounds of ammunition for service; each launch to be commanded - by a lieutenant, having an expert and trusty gunners'-mate and - four quarter-gunners, exclusive of the launch's crew; the whole - to be under the command of Captain Campbell, of the "Blenheim." - The written orders to the captain will appear in their place. - On presenting them, Lord St. Vincent said, 'he was to attend - the execution, and if any symptoms of mutiny appeared in the - "Marlborough," any attempt to open her ports, or any resistance - to the hanging of the prisoner, he was to proceed close touching - the ship, and to fire into her, and to continue his fire until - all mutiny or resistance should cease; and that, should it become - absolutely necessary, he should even sink the ship in face of the - fleet.' - - Accordingly, at seven the next morning, all the launches, thus - armed, proceeded from the "Prince" to the "Blenheim," and thence, - Captain Campbell having assumed the command, to the "Marlborough." - - Having lain on his oars a short time alongside, the captain then - formed his force in a line athwart her bows, at rather less than - pistol-shot distance off, and then he ordered the tompions to be - taken out of the carronades, and to load. - - At half-past seven, the hands throughout the fleet having been - turned up to witness punishment, the eyes of all bent upon a - powerfully armed boat as it quitted the flag-ship; every one - knowing that there went the provost-marshal conducting his - prisoner to the "Marlborough" for execution. The crisis was come; - now was to be seen whether the "Marlborough's" crew would hang one - of their own men. - - The ship being in the centre between the two lines of the fleet, - the boat was soon alongside, and the man was speedily placed on - the cathead and haltered. A few awful minutes of universal silence - followed, which was at last broken by the watch-bells of the fleet - striking eight o'clock. Instantly the flag-ship's gun fired, and - at the sound the man was lifted well off; but then, and visibly - to all, he dropped back again; and the sensation throughout the - fleet was intense. For, at this dreadful moment, when the eyes - of every man in every ship were straining upon this execution, - as the decisive struggle between authority and mutiny, as if it - were destined that the whole fleet should see the hesitating - unwillingness of the "Marlborough's" crew to hang their rebel, - and the efficacy of the means taken to enforce obedience, - by an accident on board the ship the men at the yard-rope - unintentionally let it slip, and the turn of the balance seemed - calamitously lost; but then they hauled him up to the yard-arm - with a run,—the law was satisfied, and, said Lord St. Vincent at - the moment, perhaps one of the greatest of his life, "Discipline - is preserved, sir!" - - When the sentence was executed, and not any disturbance appeared, - that it might be again made perceptible to all the fleet that - abundant force had been provided to overpower any resistance - which a line-of-battle ship could offer, Captain Campbell broke - his line, and rowing down, placed his launches as close alongside - the "Marlborough" as their oars would permit; and then re-forming - them, resumed his station across her bows, continuing there until - the time for the body's hanging having expired, it was taken - down, sewed up as is usual in its own hammock with a shot, and - was carried in one of the "Marlborough's" boats to half a mile - from the ship, and sunk; upon which, Captain Campbell withdrew his - force, and the "Marlborough's" signal was made to take her station - in the line. - - This was the fatal blow to the mutiny in the fleet before Cadiz; - not that violent insubordination, treasonable conspiracies, and - open resistances did not again and again occur, to be as often - and as instantaneously quelled; for the ships were many that were - sent out from England, several arrived in almost open mutiny, and - they brought a profusion of infection to the rest. The dreadful - sentence was again and again inflicted, and in all cases of - insubordination the crews were invariably the executioners of - their own rebels; but never again was the power of the law doubted - by any one.—_Tucker's Memoirs of Earl St. Vincent_, vol. i. pp. - 303-309. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1797 AND 1798. - -BONAPARTE'S EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION.—THE RETURN OF THE BRITISH TO THE -MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BATTLE OF THE NILE.—GREAT BRITAIN RESUMES CONTROL -OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND THE SECOND COALITION IS FORMED. - - -The Preliminaries of Leoben silenced the strife of arms and permitted -all eyes to turn to the field of diplomacy, upon which, for the twelve -months following, the interest of Europe was chiefly fixed. Moreau -and Hoche, commanding the two armies of France upon the Rhine, had -crossed the river, to enter upon a campaign in Germany, at the very -moment when Bonaparte was signing the articles. On the 22d of April, -a courier, bearing news of the suspension of hostilities, arrived at -the headquarters of each general, and put an immediate stop to their -advance. War continued only upon the sea, between Great Britain and the -nations allied with France against her. - -The confidence of the Directory had grown with each successive -victory of Bonaparte, and had induced a tone in their transactions -with foreign governments which the latter looked upon as arrogant, if -not presumptuous. Yielding to politic considerations of effect upon -popular opinion, Pitt had sent to France, in October, 1796, a practised -diplomatist, Lord Malmesbury, to treat for peace. The terms proposed -by Great Britain were substantially a restitution of conquests on -both sides. If France would give back to the emperor the Netherlands -and Lombardy, Great Britain, who had lost nothing of her own, would -return to France her possessions in the East and West Indies, as well -as in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, with the _status ante bellum_ of the -fisheries. As regards the colonies taken from Holland, the disposition -would be to restore them, if the government of the stadtholder were -replaced; but if the republic set up by the assistance of French arms -were maintained, Great Britain and the emperor, from whom the former -refused to dissociate herself, would insist upon indemnification -elsewhere for the injury thus done to their political position in -Europe. With these understandings as a basis, the British government -would be willing to enter upon negotiations for a general peace; to -which it expressly required that Russia and Portugal, as well as the -emperor, should be admitted. The French government replied that Great -Britain had no authority to speak here for her allies; and further, -that to cede territory which had been incorporated by the edicts of the -Convention, as the Netherlands had, was inconsistent with the organic -law of the republic. This latter plea was treated by the British -government as trifling; no negotiation to close a war could go on, -if results, favorable to one party, were secluded from discussion by -the _ægis_ of its constitution. As the case stood, France and Great -Britain were both conquerors; the chief allies of each were losers. -Great Britain proposed that each should surrender its winnings for -the benefit of its allies. France refused, because its conquests -were now part of the national territory, and as such inalienable. -Taking exception, moreover, to delays caused by Malmesbury's frequent -references to his government for instructions, the Directory, on the -20th of December, ordered him to leave Paris, within the not very civil -space of forty-eight hours. - -Similar cavalier treatment was at the same time experienced by the -United States. Our government, after the maritime war began, had -frequent disputes with both belligerents,—concerning the treatment -of American ships by the British and French cruisers,—the protection -of enemies' goods by the neutral flag,—the stipulations of Jay's -treaty of commerce and navigation, in 1794, regarded by France as -unduly favorable to Great Britain,—and the attitude of the United -States towards French privateers, which were at first allowed and -afterwards forbidden to sell prizes in her ports. These difficulties -were fundamentally due to the fact that, the United States having -practically no navy, neither belligerent felt under any bonds to -respect her rights. To Great Britain, however, friendly relations -were important on account of trade interests; while France, having no -merchant ships, found an advantage in using Americans as carriers, -and their ports as bases from which her cruisers could harass British -commerce. The former of these benefits Great Britain curtailed by the -claim that enemy's goods were, by international law, seizable under -a neutral flag. The United States admitted this, and also, in the -interests of her own peace and neutrality, declined longer to favor -French commerce-destroying. Mutual discontent followed, and resulted -in the recall of the French embassy from America, in November, 1796. -At the same time President Washington, being dissatisfied with Munroe, -the minister at Paris, removed him. When the latter, on the 30th -of December, took his leave, the President of the Directory made a -speech, highly complimentary to him personally, but offensive to the -United States government; and evinced, as President Adams justly said, -"a disposition to separate the people of the United States from the -government, and thus to produce divisions fatal to our peace." The -same theory of the divergent interests of rulers and people, with -which the French republic started on its self-imposed mission forcibly -to regenerate ancient despotisms, was thus impartially applied to -the free American people under the government of their chosen and -beloved fellow-citizen, Washington. The Directory refused to receive -Pinckney, the new envoy from the United States. He remained in Paris, -unrecognized, for a month; but the morning after hearing of the -victory of Rivoli, the Directory ordered him to leave France. - -By a somewhat singular coincidence, while the republic was thus -embroiling itself with the two chief maritime states, a change of -rulers took place in Russia; which, if not strictly a maritime power, -was yet well placed, through her preponderance on the Baltic, to affect -the naval interests of the world. The Empress Catherine II. died on -the 17th of November, 1796, when about to conclude an agreement with -the courts of London and Vienna to abandon her rather passive attitude -of hostility towards France, and send an army of sixty thousand men to -the support of Austria. Her successor, Paul I., allowed this treaty -to drop, and resumed a bearing of cold watchfulness, until Bonaparte, -by the seizure of Malta, and the Directory by a threat of war if -commerce were permitted between his empire and Great Britain, drove his -half-insane temper into open hostilities. But this was a year later. - -These events at the end of 1796 coincided in time with the close -alliance of the republic with Spain and Holland and its formal treaties -of peace with the Italian states. By these and by the preliminaries of -Leoben were defined the external relations of France in April, 1797. -At the same moment her internal condition became alarming. The time -had come to choose new members to replace one third of each body of -the legislature; and the elections, still influenced by the memory -of the Terror, resulted in the return of so many reactionaries as -to give these a majority in both houses, especially in the lower. -The latter at once showed its spirit by electing for speaker, by a -large majority, General Pichegru, who was in open quarrel with the -Directory; and followed up this significant act by a series of measures -calculated to thwart the executive power and enfeeble its action. The -opposition between the legislature and the Directory grew more and -more pronounced throughout the summer months; but the reactionists -failed to read aright the signs of the times. They allowed themselves, -by the machinations of the royalists and through injudicious acts of -their own, to seem enemies of republican government, which aroused the -anxiety of Hoche, commanding the army of the Sambre and Meuse; and -they directly brought into question the conduct of Bonaparte towards -Venice, thus stirring up the more personal and violent enmity of the -brilliant conqueror of Italy. The legislature thus found itself opposed -by the two generals who stood highest in public esteem as essential -to the safety of France, and who, each according to his own nature, -transmitted his feelings to the troops under his command, and prepared -them for a _coup d'état_. Inflammatory speeches and toasts prevailed -throughout the armies, to which the republic was dear rather as a name -than as a reality, and they were easily led to think that the two -houses were contemplating a return to royalty. - -The majority of the Directory, half-believing the same thing, and -chafed by an opposition which seriously hampered the working of the -government, were ready for violent measures. Two of its members, -however, were not prepared for such action; and one of these, Carnot, -the organizer of the republic's early victories, was then serving his -turn as president of the Directory. Unknown to him the three plotters -matured their scheme, and called upon Bonaparte to send them Augereau, -the most revolutionary of the generals in Italy, to direct the troops -in such forcible proceedings as might be necessary. Upon his arrival -he was made commandant of the military division of Paris, despite the -opposition of Carnot. The latter's presidency expired on the 24th of -August, and he was succeeded by one of the conspirators. On the night -of September 3d Augereau surrounded the castle and garden of the -Tuileries with twelve thousand troops and forty cannon, driving out -the legislators who were then there, together with their guard. The -Directory ordered the arrest, by its own guard, of the two members -not in the plot. Carnot escaped into Switzerland; but Barthélemi, -their other colleague, was seized. The next day the members of the -two houses who had not been imprisoned met and passed a resolution, -invalidating a number of the recent elections, and exiling to Cayenne -the two directors and fifty-three representatives. The legislature, -thus purged, was brought into harmony with the executive. An address -was next issued to the departments and to the armies, declaring that -the country had been invaded and disorganized by the Counter-Revolution -and that patriotism, with the social and public virtues, had taken -refuge with the armies. "In this," says a republican historian, "there -was unhappily some truth. The middle class had become reactionary or -inert; the populace now intervened but little in political movements; -active democracy scarcely showed itself out of the armies. But if -armies can defend liberty, they cannot put it in practice and maintain -its life when abandoned by civil society. The revolution just effected -with the consent of the soldiery was leading to another revolution -to be effected by and for the soldiers."[153] The 18th of Fructidor, -1797, was the logical forerunner of the 18th of Brumaire, 1799, when -Bonaparte seized the reins of government. - -The strife between the Directory and the legislature kept all Europe -in suspense; for its result would profoundly affect the course of -existing discussions. The emperor, repenting of his precipitation at -Leoben, kept holding off from a final treaty, seeking to introduce -Great Britain as a party to the deliberations. This Bonaparte -indignantly refused; for it would defeat his principal aim of separate -negotiations. Pitt, more desirous than before of peace, again sent -Malmesbury. The Directory kept him dancing attendance at Lille, the -appointed place of meeting, during its struggle with the Councils. -It made several demands most unlikely to be conceded, and upon these -prolonged a discussion, to which the ministry, who now really wished -a favorable termination, patiently submitted. A week after the _coup -d'état_ the French negotiators were recalled, and in their place were -sent others, who immediately upon arrival demanded of the British -ambassador whether he had "powers to restore to France and its allies -_all_ the possessions which since the beginning of the war have passed -into the hands of the English." An answer was required in the course -of the same day. Malmesbury coolly replied that he neither could, nor -ought to, treat on any other principle than that of compensations. -The French envoys then sent him orders from the Directory to return -within twenty-four hours to his Court and get powers to make those -restorations. This, of course, put an end to the conference, and the -war went on for four years more. - -During these eventful months Bonaparte, already the most influential -man in the nation through his hold upon men's imaginations, was -ripening projects deeply affecting the control of the sea and the -future direction to be given the gigantic efforts of which France had -shown herself capable. On the 5th of April, under his management, there -had been concluded with the king of Sardinia, subject to ratification -by the Directory, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, to -which was prefixed a secret article ceding to France the island of -Sardinia upon condition of compensation on the continent.[154] Soon -after, however, events occurred which opened to his penetrating genius -a more satisfactory combination. During his invasion of Carinthia the -people in his rear, throughout the possessions of Venice on the Italian -mainland, rose against the French, massacring several hundred soldiers -who fell into their hands. This gave him a pretext for disposing of -these territories, as already stated,[155] in the secret articles of -Leoben, and at the same time drew from him the sinister prediction that -the government of Venice, shut up to its small island, would not be -of long duration.[156] On the 2d of May, having returned to Italy, he -issued a proclamation,[157] setting forth his many causes of complaint -for the commotions excited in his rear, endangering the army "then -plunged in the gorges of Styria." He ordered the French minister to -leave Venice, all Venetian agents to quit Lombardy and the Venetian -possessions, and the French general to treat the troops of the republic -as enemies, and to tear down her standard throughout the mainland. - -This declaration of war was followed, on the 16th of May, by the -abdication of the ancient oligarchy in favor of a provisional -government, which requested the presence of a French division in the -city to maintain order during the transition period. This Bonaparte -granted, sending five thousand men, and observing cynically in his -despatch to the Directory that it would thus be possible to avoid the -odium attendant upon the execution of the secret preliminaries with -Austria, and at the same time to quiet the clamors of Europe; since -"it is apparent that the occupation is only temporary and at the -demand of the Venetians themselves."[158] Ten days later he despatched -General Gentili, recalled from Corsica, to Corfu with some two thousand -troops, directing him to secure his hold both upon the islands and the -Venetian squadron lying there, but always to act as though supporting -the Venetian commissioners who were to accompany him. "If the islanders -incline to independence," wrote he, "flatter them, and talk about -Greece, Athens, and Sparta."[159] To the Venetian government he wrote -that the expedition was sent to second its commissioners; and on the -same day to the Directory, that Corfu ought to be irrevocably possessed -by the French. "The island of Malta," he added, "is of the utmost -importance to us.... Why should not our fleet seize it before entering -the Atlantic? That little island is priceless to us. Secret articles -with the king of Sardinia stipulate for us the occupation of the little -islands of San Pietro. Now is the moment to fortify them;"[160] for the -British Mediterranean fleet was before Cadiz, and the Channel fleet in -full mutiny. - -Four months later Bonaparte again wrote, "With San Pietro, Corfu, -and Malta, we shall be masters of the whole Mediterranean."[161] -"The islands of Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia are of more consequence -to us than all Italy. If we had to choose, better restore Italy to -the emperor and keep the four islands.... The empire of the Turks -crumbles daily. The possession of the four islands will enable us to -sustain it, or to take our share. The time is not far distant when we -shall feel that, truly to destroy England, we must take possession -of Egypt. The vast Ottoman Empire, which is perishing daily, puts on -us the obligation to take means for the preservation of our Levant -trade."[162] "If at the peace we have to consent to the cession of the -Cape of Good Hope to England, we should seize Egypt. That country has -never belonged to a European nation. It does not now belong to the -Grand Turk. We could leave here with twenty-five thousand men, convoyed -by eight or ten ships-of-the-line, and take possession of it. I wish -you would inquire, Citizen Minister, what effect upon the Porte would -result from our expedition to Egypt."[163] "Our occupation of Corfu and -the other islands entails relations with the pashas of Albania. These -are well affected to the French. In vain should we seek to sustain the -Turkish Empire; we shall see its fall in our day. Corfu and Zante give -us mastery of the Adriatic and the Levant."[164] In these quotations, -which could be multiplied, is seen the genesis of the great Egyptian -expedition, to which, until it was carried into effect, Bonaparte -recurred again and again with the persistency characteristic of his -conceptions. - -While he was thus employed, on the one hand flattering Venice with -the hope of continued national existence, and on the other treating -with Austria for her extinction and a division of the spoil, in which -France was to have the Ionian Islands and the Venetian navy,[165]—while -Malmesbury was negotiating at Lille, and the Directory was in bitter -conflict with the Councils,—there was painfully sailing for England, -crippled and suffering, the man who was destined to dispel the gorgeous -dreams of Eastern achievement which filled Bonaparte's brain, and to -shatter the French navy,—the all-essential link which alone could knit -together these diverse maritime possessions, the one foundation upon -which stood the whole projected fabric of Mediterranean control. During -the wearing times of the Cadiz blockade, Lord St. Vincent, aware how -much the listlessness of such inactive service contributed to foment -mutiny, endeavored ingeniously to contrive fighting to occupy the minds -of the seamen. For that purpose, largely, he bombarded Cadiz; and for -that purpose he sent Nelson, with a detached squadron, to seize the -town of Santa Cruz in the Canary Islands by a sudden and vigorous -assault, hoping also there to take the rich cargo of a galleon, laden -on account of the Court of Spain. The attack was made on the night -of July 24, with all the vigor to be expected of Nelson, but under -great disadvantage. It resulted in a disastrous repulse with heavy -loss; and the admiral himself suffered amputation of the right arm. It -became necessary for him to go to England, where he remained through -a long and painful convalescence until the following April; when he -again sailed to join the Mediterranean fleet, arriving just in time to -command the squadron sent in pursuit of Bonaparte. - -The dissensions which weakened the external action of the French -government having been silenced by the _coup d'état_ of September -4, Bonaparte rapidly drew to an end the negotiations with Austria. -On the 17th of October, 1797, he, as sole representative of France, -signed the treaty of Campo Formio; which followed the general lines -of the Leoben preliminaries, yet with important differences. The -dissimulation concerning Venice was thrown aside, and the ancient state -wholly disappeared. The city, with the mainland as far as the Adige, -were given to Austria. West of the Adige, the old Venetian provinces -went to the Cisalpine Republic, which was also dowered with the papal -legations attributed for a brief moment to Venice. The countries and -islands east of the Adriatic which had belonged to her were divided at -the Gulf of Drino. All inside that point went to Austria; all outside, -to France, which thus became possessed of the desire of Bonaparte's -heart, Corfu and its sister islands, with some slight territory on -the adjacent mainland. The cession of the Netherlands to France was -confirmed, and provision was made for a Congress to be held at Rastadt -for the pacification and rearrangement of the German Empire; for -Bonaparte had persisted in treating with the emperor on account only -of his own dominions, and apart from the rest of the empire. By secret -stipulations, the two great powers agreed to support each other's -demands and interests in the Congress; where France wished to secure -a certain line of the Rhine, and Austria to indemnify herself, at the -expense of some German minor states, for the losses undergone by the -treaty. - -The salient features of this treaty were therefore the cession of -Belgium; the annihilation of Venice; the settlement of the Cisalpine -Republic as a powerful dependency of France; the strengthening of the -latter as a Mediterranean state by the gain of the Ionian Islands; -and, finally, the loosing of her hands against Great Britain, which -now stood without a strong ally in all Europe. Bonaparte justified his -action to his critics on these grounds, but especially on account of -the necessity of dealing with Great Britain single-handed. "When the -Cisalpine has the best military frontier in Europe, when France gains -Mayence and the Rhine, when she has in the Levant Corfu, extremely well -fortified, and the islands, what more would you wish? To scatter our -force, in order that England may continue to take from us, from Spain, -from Holland, our colonies, and postpone yet further the restoration -of our trade and our navy?... Either our government must destroy -the English monarchy, or must expect itself to be destroyed by the -corruption and intrigue of those active islanders. The present moment -offers us a fine game. Let us concentrate all our activity upon the -navy, and destroy England. That done, Europe is at our feet."[166] -Thus did Bonaparte demonstrate that the scene of strife was to be -transferred to the sea. - -The Directory at once ratified the Treaty of Campo Formio, and named -Bonaparte one of three plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Rastadt. -The general remained in Italy for a month longer, organizing the -new state, and distributing the army with a view to support the -interests of France, while withdrawing some thirty thousand men for -the intended army of England. On the 17th of November he left Milan, -and on the 25th arrived at Rastadt. He remained there, however, but -a week; and then, apparently at the call of the Directory,[167] -started for Paris, which he reached on the 5th of December. He was -avowedly to command the army of England, and during the two following -months his correspondence betrays no sign of any other purpose; his -orders to various subordinates, and especially to Berthier, his -celebrated chief-of-staff, at the time commanding in Italy, abound with -dispositions and instructions to transfer troops thence towards the -Channel. Particularly significant of such intention were the orders -sent from him to Admiral Brueys, commanding the French division in -Corfu, to start for Brest,[168]—a mission which would make his force -inaccessible for the Egyptian expedition. Too much stress, however, -cannot be laid upon such indications coming from so crafty a nature; -and the first intimation of a change of purpose has more the appearance -of stripping off a mask than of awakening from a dream. "Make what -efforts we will," wrote he to the Directory, on February 23, 1798, "we -shall not for many years acquire the control of the seas. To make a -descent upon England, without being master of the sea, is the boldest -and most difficult operation ever attempted."[169] Most true, but not -new. Nor was the veil under which he covered his change of attitude -very difficult to pierce. On the 7th of February, 1798, he wrote to -the Minister of War that he was about to visit the Channel coast, near -Dunkirk, sending Kleber and Desaix to Havre and Brest. On the 12th from -Dunkirk he sends engineers to examine Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleteuse, -and Calais,—ports on which he, five years later, based his more serious -projects of invasion; and at the same time two others are dispatched to -Holland to demand help of various kinds. The very next day, February -13, he sends orders to Toulon, in the name of the Directory, not only -to hold on to the ships ordered for Brest, but to send despatch vessels -in every direction to recall to Toulon all ships-of-war cruising in the -Mediterranean.[170] Returning to Paris, he addressed a letter to the -government, setting forth what needed to be done by the month of April -in order to make the attempt upon Great Britain even possible,—a long -array of requirements, which only he, if his heart were in the matter, -was capable of accomplishing. He concluded by saying there were but -three ways of reaching England. One was by direct invasion; the second, -by an attempt upon Hanover and Hamburg,—the continental centres of her -trade; the last, by an expedition to the Levant. - -On the 5th of March Bonaparte communicated to the government a note -containing the dispositions necessary for an expedition to seize Egypt -and Malta. The same day the Directory issued a number of decrees, -constituting a commission on the Coast Defences of the Mediterranean, -under cover of which the needed preparations were to be carried on, -and defining the various steps to be taken. The ships at Toulon were -required to be ready for sea on the 4th of April. Admiral Brueys, who -had been unable to sail for Brest on account of want of provisions, was -on February 12 ordered to Toulon. He arrived there with, his squadron -on the 2d of April, and was appointed to command the naval part of -the expedition, to consist of thirteen ships-of-the-line with smaller -vessels. All arrangements were pushed with the greatest activity -possible, though much retarded by the extreme want of naval stores, -of provisions, and of money. Still greater difficulty was experienced -from scarcity of sailors; the inducements offered by privateers having -drawn away almost all the seamen of the republic, and landed great -numbers of them in British prisons,—a sad result of the much-vaunted -commerce-destroying. Through all, the pretence of invading England -was maintained; and Bonaparte himself, to mislead opinion, stayed -till the last moment in Paris. The Spanish fleet at Cadiz was, by -the urgent demands of the Directory, made to assume positions which -threatened an approaching departure, in order to fasten St. Vincent's -ships to the port and foster in British minds the easily aroused fear -of an invasion of Ireland. But measures so extensive could not long -escape comment and suspicion. The actual intentions of the Directory -were kept so impenetrably secret that, after the expedition sailed, -the senior naval officer at Toulon wrote to the Minister of Marine, "I -know no more of the movements of the squadron than if it did not belong -to the republic;"[171] but it was not possible to conceal the patent -fact that Marseille, Toulon, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica were -alive with hurried preparations for a great naval undertaking, whatever -its destination might be. It was evident, therefore, that France was -about to expose herself for a time upon the sea to the blows of Great -Britain, and the ministry determined not to let such an opportunity -slip. - -During the year 1797 no British fleet, and, with the rare exception of -one or two scattered cruisers, no British ship-of-war, had entered the -Mediterranean. The gathering of the Spanish navy at Cadiz, and of the -greater part of the French in Brest, with the apparent design to invade -Ireland or England, had dictated the concentration of the British navy -before those two ports; either immediately, as St. Vincent at Cadiz, or -by the dispositions—less fitted to compass their purpose—of the Channel -fleet, by which bodies of ships were gathered at points other than -Brest, with the hope of combining them against any sortie from that -port. Great Britain, during the time following St. Vincent's retreat -from the Mediterranean, was in the position of a nation struggling -for existence,—for so she felt it,[172]—which had been compelled to -contract her lines through loss of force, due to the gradual submission -of her allies to her enemies. To this had further conduced the -threatening attitude of the Dutch navy in the Texel, requiring a strong -North Sea fleet. To her other embarrassments had been added, in this -year of distress, the extensive mutinies in the navy. Though appeased -in some instances and quelled in others, the spirit which caused them -still existed. Under these circumstances Bonaparte, in 1797, had met -no naval obstacle to his plans for the control of the Mediterranean, -which had, moreover, been so covert as to escape detection. Admiral -Brueys had gone from Toulon to the Adriatic, remained there several -months, and returned in peace; and all minor naval movements went on -undisturbed. The destiny of Corfu was not revealed till the end of the -year; the purpose to get hold of Malta, seriously entertained by Brueys -at the instigation of Bonaparte,[173] never transpired; and the talk -about the army of England combined with the actual positions of the -allied fleets to retain the British in the same stations. Toward the -end of 1797 several circumstances occurred to relieve the pressure. In -October Admiral Duncan inflicted upon the Dutch fleet, off the Texel, -a defeat so decisive and complete as to throw it out of the contest -for a long time. Of fifteen ships opposed to him, nine were taken. The -condition of the French fleet in Brest, if not accurately known to -be as bad as Bonaparte represented it,[174] was still sufficiently -understood. No attempt had been made during the summer or winter of -1797 to renew the Irish expedition; and when the opening spring of 1798 -permitted the Channel fleet in a body to keep the sea, the ministry -felt it safe to detach a force to the Mediterranean. - -Sir Horatio Nelson sailed from England on the 10th of April, and -joined the fleet off Cadiz on the 30th. Lord St. Vincent welcomed -him gladly, and at once sent him with three ships-of-the-line to the -Mediterranean, to watch the impending armament, and, if possible, learn -its destination. Nelson left the fleet on the 2d of May, the day before -Bonaparte quitted Paris. On the 17th, having been unavoidably delayed -at Gibraltar, he was in the neighborhood of Toulon, and captured a -French corvette just leaving port; from which he learned particulars -as to the naval force of the enemy, but nothing as regarded its -destination. On the night of the 20th, in a violent gale of wind, his -own ship was dismasted and with difficulty saved from going ashore. -By great exertions she was towed by her consorts into the San Pietro -Islands, at the south end of Sardinia, where she anchored on the -23d. On the 19th Bonaparte had sailed with the Marseille and Toulon -divisions of the expedition. He was to be joined on the way by the -detachments from Genoa, Corsica, and Civita Vecchia,—the total number -of troops amounting to between thirty and thirty-five thousand. - -On the same day that Nelson parted from St. Vincent, May 2, the -admiralty wrote to the latter that it was essential to send twelve -ships-of-the-line into the Mediterranean to counteract the French -armament; and that to replace them eight ships had been ordered from -England. A private letter from the First Lord, by the same mail, -authorized St. Vincent to take his whole force for this object, if -necessary, but hoped a detachment would be sufficient. In the latter -case, while the choice of its commander was left to the admiral, it was -intimated that Nelson, though junior to two other flag-officers, was -by all means the proper man. Jervis had already made the same decision; -and now at once told off and prepared the nine ships-of-the-line, -forming the inshore squadron of the blockade, to start the moment the -expected re-enforcement arrived. The junction of the latter with the -main fleet was made May 24, out of sight of the port; and during the -night Captain Troubridge sailed with the inshore ships, their places -being taken by vessels similarly painted, so that no suspicion of the -transaction might arise in Cadiz. On the 7th of June Troubridge joined -Nelson, having picked up two more ships by the way; so that the British -were now thirteen seventy-fours and one of fifty guns. By a very -strange fatality, however, the frigates at first with Nelson had parted -company the night his ship was dismasted, and had never rejoined. -Troubridge brought only one little brig; and, as it was inadmissible to -scatter the ships-of-the-line, the want of lookout vessels seriously -affected all Nelson's movements in the long and harassing pursuit, -covering nearly eight weeks, that lay before him. - -[Illustration: Mediterranean Sea.] - -After leaving Toulon, Bonaparte directed his force along the Gulf of -Genoa, where, on the night of May 20, he experienced the same gale that -dismasted Nelson. The next day the convoy from Genoa joined. Steering -south along the east coasts of Corsica and Sardinia, the division from -Corsica met him on the 26th off the south end of the island, but that -from Civita Vecchia failed to appear. Here the French first heard that -Nelson was in the Mediterranean with three ships, and expected ten -more. Bonaparte then continued on for Malta, which he reached on the -9th of June, and found there the division from Civita Vecchia, thus -bringing his whole force under his hand. The island was immediately -summoned, and after a faint show of resistance capitulated on the 12th; -the French fleet and convoy, numbering four hundred sail, entering the -port of La Valetta on the 13th. Bonaparte remained the time necessary -to secure his conquest temporarily; then leaving a garrison of four -thousand men, and notifying the Directory that at least four thousand -more with ample supplies were needed, he sailed again on June 19 for -Egypt. - -The British fleet, after its junction, was becalmed for several days. -It then made the best of its way round the north end of Corsica, and -thence south between Italy and the islands. Not till June 14, off -Civita Vecchia, was probable information received that the French -had been seen ten days before off the south-west point of Sicily, -steering to the eastward. As yet there was no certainty as to their -destination, and Nelson had no light vessels for scouts. St. Vincent -in his instructions had said, reflecting the ideas of the government, -that the enemy's "object appears to be either an attack upon Naples -or Sicily, the conveyance of an army to some part of Spain to invade -Portugal, or to pass through the Straits with the view of proceeding -to Ireland." The whole situation vividly illustrates the difficulty -of pursuit by sea, and the necessity of stationing and keeping the -detaining force near the point of the enemy's departure before he can -get away. By whatsoever fault, certainly not that of Nelson or St. -Vincent, the British fleet was a fortnight too late in entering the -Mediterranean. It would have been yet more so, had the resources of the -French dockyards answered to the spur of Bonaparte's urgency; but it is -ill goading a starved horse. - -An easterly course, however, with a fresh north-west wind, indicated -that neither Spain nor the Atlantic was the destination of the French -armament; and Nelson at once decided it must be Malta, to be used as a -base of operations against Sicily. "Were I," said he, "the admiral of -the fleet attending an army for the invasion of Sicily, I should say to -the general: 'If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of the fleet -and the transports, and your own safe retreat, if necessary;' _Malta is -in the direct road to Sicily_."[175] Pausing a moment to communicate -with Naples, he there heard, on the 17th of June, that the French had -landed at Malta; and pushing on, received off Messina the news of its -surrender. This was on the 20th, the day after Bonaparte sailed from -the island for Egypt. On the 22d, off Cape Passaro, the south-east -extremity of Sicily, a vessel was spoken, from which Nelson gained the -information of Bonaparte's departure, supposed to be for Sicily; but he -had meantime learned from Naples that the French had no intention of -molesting any part of that kingdom. Utterly in the dark, and without -frigates, he concluded, after weighing all the chances, that Egypt -was the enemy's destination, and with a fair wind and a press of sail -shaped his course for Alexandria. On the 28th the fleet came off the -port, and sent a boat ashore. No French vessels had been seen on the -coast. - -This remarkable miscarriage, happening to a man of so much energy and -intuition, was due primarily to his want of small lookout ships; and -secondly, to Bonaparte's using the simple, yet at sea sufficient, -ruse[176] of taking an indirect instead of a direct course to his -object. This, however, in a narrow sea, with so numerous a body of -vessels, would not have served him, had the British admiral had those -active purveyors of information, those eyes of the fleet, which are so -essential to naval as to land warfare.[177] On leaving Malta, Bonaparte -directed the expedition to steer first for Candia. After a week's quiet -navigation he was off the south side of the island, and on the 27th of -June was joined by a frigate from Naples, to tell him of Nelson, with -fourteen sail, being off that port ten days before. At this moment the -British admiral had already outstripped his chase. On the 25th the two -fleets had been about sixty miles apart, the French due north of the -British, steering in nearly parallel directions.[178] When Bonaparte -knew that his enemy was somewhere near upon his heels, he again changed -the course, ordering the fleet to make the land seventy miles west of -Alexandria, and sending a frigate direct to the port to reconnoitre. On -the 29th of June, the day Nelson sailed away from Alexandria, the light -squadron signalled the coast, along which the fleet sailed till July -1st, when it anchored off the city. Determined to run no chance of an -enemy's frustrating his objects, the commander-in-chief landed his army -the same evening. - -If, in this celebrated chase, Nelson made a serious mistake, it was -upon his arrival at Alexandria. He had reasoned carefully, and, as the -event proved, accurately, that the French were bound to Egypt; and had -justly realized the threat to the British supremacy in India contained -in such an attempt. Knowing the time when the French left Malta, as he -did, and that they were accompanied by so great a train of transports, -it seems a fair criticism that he should have trusted his judgment a -little further, and waited off the suspected port of destination to -see whether so cumbrous a body had not been outsailed by his compact, -homogeneous force. He appears, on finding his expectations deceived, -to have fallen into a frame of mind familiar to most, in which a false -step, however imposed by the conditions under which it was taken, can -be seen only in the light of the unfortunate consequences, and therein -assumes the color of a fault, or at best of a blunder. "His active -and anxious mind," wrote Sir Edward Berry, who, as captain of the -flag-ship, was witness of his daily feelings, "would not permit him to -rest a moment in the same place; he therefore shaped his course to the -northward for the coast of Caramania."[179] His one thought now was to -get back to the westward, taking a more northerly course on the return, -so as to increase the chance of information. The fleet accordingly -stretched to the northward until the coast of Asia Minor was made, and -then beat back along the south shore of Candia, not seeing a single -vessel until it had passed that island. On the 19th of July it reached -Syracuse, whence Nelson wrote to the British minister at Naples that, -having gone a round of six hundred leagues with the utmost expedition, -he was as ignorant of the situation of the enemy as he had been four -weeks before. The squadron now filled with water, which was running -short, and on the 24th again sailed for Alexandria; the admiral having -satisfied himself that the French were at least neither in Corfu nor to -the westward. On the 1st of August the minarets of the city were seen, -and soon after the port full of shipping, with the French flag upon the -walls, but, to Nelson's bitter disappointment, no large ships of war. -At one in the afternoon, however, one of his fleet made signal that -a number of ships-of-the-line were at anchor in Aboukir Bay, twelve -or fifteen miles east of Alexandria; and Nelson, prompt to attack as -Bonaparte had been to disembark, gave slippery fortune, so long unkind, -no chance again to balk him, but with a brisk breeze flew at once upon -the foe. - -Neither by the character of the anchorage nor by its own dispositions -was the French fleet prepared for the attack thus suddenly, and most -unexpectedly, precipitated upon it. Two days after the army landed, -the commander-in-chief gave Admiral Brueys explicit and urgent orders -at once to sound the old port of Alexandria, and, if possible, take -his ships in there; if not, and if Aboukir Bay would admit of defence -at anchor against a superior force, he might choose a position there. -Failing both, he was to go with his heavy vessels to Corfu.[180] That -and the other Ionian Islands were within Bonaparte's district, by the -decree of April 12 making him commander of the Army of the East. In a -much later dispatch, which Brueys did not live to receive, he explains -that it was indispensable to preserve the fleet from serious injury -until the affair in Egypt was settled, in order to check any movement -of the Porte; for, though the allegiance of the Mamelukes was but -nominal, it was possible the Sultan might resent the French invasion. -The justice of this cautious view was shown by the action of the Porte -as soon as the destruction of the fleet became known. Brueys ordered -the necessary soundings, and the report which he received on July 18, -a fortnight before the battle, was favorable; with good weather it -was possible to take the ships-of-the-line inside.[181] The admiral, -however, was an invalid, and of a temper naturally undecided; unable -to make a choice of difficulties, he hung on the balance and remained -inactive, taking refuge in a persuasion that the British would not -return. Bonaparte thought the same. "All the conduct of the English," -wrote he on the 30th of July, "indicates that they are inferior in -number, and content themselves with blockading Malta and intercepting -its supplies." But the great soldier, prone as he always was to tempt -fortune to the utmost for a great object, found in this opinion no -reason for running unnecessary risks and in the same breath insisted -upon Alexandria or Corfu for the fleet. Brueys had taken his ships -to Aboukir Bay on the 8th of July, and there remained. He had the -orders of his commander; but the latter, at a distance and absorbed -in the cares of his operations ashore, could not communicate to his -vacillating subordinate the impulse of his own energy. All the work of -the squadron proceeded listlessly; the belief that the British fleet -would not return sapped every effort; carelessness, indiscipline and -insubordination, among officers and men, caused constant complaint and -trouble. In such delusion and lethargy went by the priceless days which -were passed by Nelson in unresting thought and movement, in "a fever of -anxiety"[182] that scarcely allowed him to eat or drink. - -[Illustration: Coast Map from Alexandria to Rosetta Mouth of the Nile.] - -The Bay of Aboukir,[183] in the western portion of which the French -fleet was anchored, and where was fought the celebrated Battle of the -Nile, is an open roadstead, extending from the promontory of Aboukir, -fifteen miles east of Alexandria, to the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. The -distance between the two extreme points is about eighteen miles. In -the western part, where the French were lying, the shore-line, after -receding some distance from Aboukir Point, turns to the south-east and -continues in that direction in a long narrow tongue of sand, behind -which lies the shallow Lake Madieh. North-east from the point is a line -of shoals and rocks, rising at two and a half miles' distance into a -small island, then bearing the same name, Aboukir, but since known as -Nelson's Island; beyond which the same stretch of foul ground continues -for another mile and a quarter. Behind this four-mile barrier there -is found fair shelter from the prevailing north-west summer wind; but -as, for three miles from the beach, there were only four fathoms of -water, the order of battle had to be established somewhat beyond that -distance. The north-western ship, which with the prevailing wind would -be to windward and in the van, was moored a mile and a half south-east -from Aboukir Island, in five fathoms of water.[184] This was scant for -a heavy vessel, but it does not seem that she was carried as close to -the shoal as she might have been. As the van ship in the column, she -was on one flank, and that the most exposed, of the line-of-battle, -whose broadsides were turned to the sea. She should, therefore, have -been brought so near the shoal as not to leave room to swing, and -there been moored head and stern. So placed, the flank could not have -been turned, as it actually was. This was the more necessary because -the few guns established by Brueys on the island were so light as to -be entirely ineffective, in range and weight, at the distance between -them and the flank they pretended to strengthen. They were a mere toy -defence, as futile as the other general dispositions taken. This being -so, it would seem that the frigates might have been placed along the -shoal ground ahead, where the enemy's ships-of-the-line could not reach -them, and thence have supported the flank ship. From the latter, the -line extended south-east to, and including, the eighth in the order, -when it turned a little toward the beach; making with its former -direction a salient angle, but one very obtuse. The distance from ship -to ship was about one hundred and sixty yards; from which, and from the -average length of the ships, it may be estimated that the whole line -from van to rear was nearly a mile and three quarters long. In case of -expecting attack, a cable was to be taken from ship to ship to prevent -the enemy passing through the intervals; and springs also were then to -be put upon the cable by which each vessel was anchored.[185] - -It will be instructive to a professional reader to compare the -dispositions of Admiral Brueys, in Aboukir Bay, with those adopted by -Lord Hood in 1782, at St. Kitt's Island, when expecting an attack at -anchor from a very superior force.[186] The comparison is historically -interesting as well as instructive; for it has been said that Nelson -framed his own plan, in the cogitations of his long chase, upon Hood's -scheme for attacking the French fleet under Admiral DeGrasse while -lying at the anchorage from which he first drove it, before occupying -it himself. The parallel is quite complete, for neither at St. Kitt's -nor Aboukir was the anchored fleet able to get substantial assistance -from batteries. The decisively important points in such a disposition, -as in any order of battle, land or sea, are—(1) that the line cannot -be pierced, and (2) that the flanks cannot be turned. Hood thrust one -flank ship so close to the shore that the enemy could not pass round -her, and closed up his intervals.[187] Brueys left the same flank—for -in both cases it was the van and weather ship—open to turning, with -long spaces between the vessels. In his arrangement for the other -flank, for the lee ships, Brueys was equally inferior. Hood threw his -eight lee ships at right angles to the rest of the fleet, so that their -broadsides completely protected the latter from enfilading fire. Brueys -simply bent his line a little, with a view of approaching the rear -to shoal water. Failing thus to obtain a fire at right angles to the -principal line of battle, the rear did not contribute to strengthen -that; while, not actually reaching to shoal water, it remained itself -in the air, if attacked by the enemy in preference. This was the more -singular, as Brueys had expected the rear to be the object of the -British efforts. "I have asked," he wrote, "for two mortars to place -upon the shoal on which I have rested the head of my line; but I have -much less to fear for that part than for the rear, upon which the enemy -will probably bring to bear all their effort."[188] Nelson, however, -whether illumined by Hood's example, through that historical study of -tactics for which he was noted, or inspired only by his own genius, had -well understood beforehand that, if he found the French in such order -as they were, the van and centre were at his mercy; and he had clearly -imparted this view to his captains. Hence, when the enemy were seen, he -needed only to signal "his intention was to attack the van and centre -as they lay at anchor, according to the plan before developed,"[189] -and could leave the details of execution to his subordinates. - -[Illustration: Battle of the Nile.] - -The evening before the eventful first of August, as the British -fleet expected to make Alexandria the next day, the "Alexander" and -"Swiftsure" were sent ahead to reconnoitre. In consequence of this -detachment, made necessary by the want of frigates, these ships, -when the main body at 1 P.M.[190] sighted the French fleet, were -considerably to leeward, and did not get into action until two hours -after their consorts. As soon as the enemy were seen, the British fleet -hauled sharp up on the wind, heading about north-east, to weather -Aboukir Island and shoal; the admiral at the same time making signal -to prepare for action, anchoring by the stern. As they drew by the -shoal, being in eleven fathoms,[191] Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the -"Zealous," and asked if he thought they were far enough to the eastward -to clear it; for the only chart in the fleet was a rough sketch taken -from a captured merchant vessel, and no British officer knew the -ground. Hood replied that he would bear up, sounding as he went, so -that the other ships keeping outside of him would be safe. Thus the -fleet was piloted into action; one ship, the "Goliath," being ahead -of the "Zealous," but on her outer bow, and the admiral very properly -allowing others to pass him, until he was sixth in the order, so as -to be reasonably certain the flag-ship would not touch the bottom. -Captain Foley of the "Goliath," still keeping the lead, crossed ahead -of the French column, over the ground left open by Brueys's oversight, -intending to attack the van ship, the "Guerrier;" but the anchor hung -for a moment, so that he brought up on the inner quarter of the second, -the "Conquérant," while Hood, following close after, anchored on the -bow of the "Guerrier." These two British ships thus came into action -shortly before sundown, the French having opened fire ten minutes -before. Five minutes later, just as the sun was sinking below the -horizon, the foremast of the "Guerrier" went overboard. "So auspicious -a commencement of the attack was greeted with three cheers by the whole -British fleet."[192] The "Orion" followed with a much wider sweep, -passing round her two leaders, between them and the shore, and anchored -on the inner side of the fifth French ship; while the "Theseus," which -came next, brought up abreast the third, having gone between the -"Goliath" and "Zealous" and their antagonists. The "Audacious," the -fifth of the British to come up, chose a new course. Steering between -the "Guerrier" and the "Conquérant," she took her place on the bow of -the latter, already engaged on the quarter by the "Goliath." These five -all anchored on the inner (port) side of the French. Nelson's ship, -the "Vanguard," coming next, anchored outside the third of the enemy's -vessels, the "Spartiate," thus placed between her and the "Theseus." -The "Minotaur," five minutes later, took the outer side of the fourth, -heretofore without an opponent; and the "Defence" attacked, also on the -outer side, the fifth ship, already engaged on her inner side by the -"Orion." Five French seventy-fours were thus in hot action with eight -British of the same size, half an hour after the first British gun was -fired, and only five hours from the time Brueys first knew that the -enemy were near. - -This most gallant, but most unfortunate, man had passed suddenly -from a condition of indolent security face to face with an appalling -emergency. When Nelson's fleet was first reported, numbers of men were -ashore, three miles or more away, getting water for the ships. They -were recalled, but most of them did not return. Brueys still cherished -the belief, with which indeed he could not have parted without despair, -that the enemy would not brave the unknown perils of the ground with -night falling; nor could he tell their purpose until they had passed -Aboukir Island and opened the bay. A hurried council of senior officers -renewed the decision previously reached, to fight, if fight they -must, at anchor; but Brueys betrayed the vacillations of an unsteady -purpose by crossing the light yards, a step which could have no other -significance than that of getting under way. Still, he hoped for the -respite of a night to make the preparations so long neglected. Little -did he know the man whom England herself still hardly knew. Without -a moment's pause, without a tremor of uncertainty, yet with all the -precautions of a seaman, Nelson came straight onward, facing with mind -long prepared the difficulties of navigation, the doubts and obscurity -of a night action. Hurriedly the French prepare for battle; and, secure -that the enemy will not dare go within the line, the batteries on that -side are choked with the numerous encumbrances of ship economy, the -proper disposal of which is termed "clearing for action." - -For half an hour Brueys was a helpless and hopeless, though undaunted, -spectator of an overwhelming attack, which he had never expected at -all, delivered in a manner he had deemed impossible upon the part of -his order he thought most secure. Soon he was freed from the agony -of mere passive waiting by the opportunity to act. The "Bellerophon" -and "Majestic," both seventy-fours, anchored outside and abreast, -respectively, of the flag-ship "Orient," of one hundred and twenty -guns, and of the "Tonnant," eighty, next astern. Darkness had just -settled down upon the water as the arrival of these two ships completed -the first scene of the tragedy; and the British vessels, which were -fighting under their white ensign,[193] as more easily seen at night, -now hoisted also four lanterns, horizontally arranged, whereby to -recognize each other. - -Meanwhile a woeful mishap had befallen Nelson's chosen brother-in-arms, -Troubridge. His ship, the "Culloden," had been some distance from the -main body of the fleet when the latter rounded the shoal, and, doing -her own piloting, ran upon its outer extremity at a quarter before -seven. There she stuck, despite all the efforts of her most able -commander, until two o'clock the next morning, when the battle was -over. There also, however, she served as a beacon to the two remaining -ships, "Alexander" and "Swiftsure," who had to make the perilous -passage in the dark. These vessels, with the "Leander," fifty, arriving -after eight o'clock, at a critical moment of the battle, played the -part of a reserve in a quarter where the British were meeting with -disaster. - -Neither the "Bellerophon" nor the "Majestic" was equally matched with -the French ship opposed to it; but the "Bellerophon" especially, having -to do with a vessel double her own force and having brought up fairly -abreast, where she got her full fire, was soon nearly a wreck. In -three quarters of an hour her main and mizzen masts were shot away, -and in thirty minutes more, unable longer to endure her punishment, -the cable was cut and she wore out of action. As she did so, the -foremast also fell, and, with forty-nine killed and one hundred and -forty-eight wounded, out of a ship's company of six hundred and fifty -men, the "Bellerophon" drifted down the line, receiving the successive -broadsides of the French rear. As she thus passed, without flag or -light, the "Swiftsure" came up. Withholding his fire, Captain Hallowell -hailed, and finding her to be a British ship, let go at once his -anchor, bringing up on the starboard bow of the "Orient." Immediately -afterwards the "Alexander" arrived and anchored on the port quarter of -the three-decker, while the "Leander," with the discretion becoming -her size, placed herself on the port bow of the "Franklin," the next -ahead to the "Orient," in a position of comparative impunity, and thus -raked both the French ships. The French centre was thus in its turn the -victim of a concentration, similar to that with which the action began -in the van, and destined to result in a frightful catastrophe. - -At about nine in the evening the French flag-ship was observed to be -on fire, from what cause has never been certainly known. The British -guns, trained on the part in flames, helped to paralyze all efforts -to extinguish them, and they gained rapidly. The brave and unfortunate -Brueys was spared the sight of this last calamity. Already twice -wounded, at half-past eight a cannon-ball carried away his left leg at -the thigh. He refused to be taken below, and passed away calmly and -nobly a few moments before the fire broke out. At ten the "Orient" blew -up. Five ships ahead of her had already surrendered, and the eighty-gun -ship "Franklin" also hauled down her flag before midnight. - -Six of the French still had their colors flying; but either from their -cables being cut by shot, or from the necessity of slipping to avoid -the explosion of the "Orient," they had drifted far astern. The three -in the extreme rear had been but slightly engaged; of the others, the -"Tonnant" was totally dismasted, while the "Heureux" and "Mercure" had -received considerable injury.[194] The following morning these vessels -were attacked by some of the least injured of the British, with the -result that the "Tonnant," "Mercure," "Heureux" and "Timoléon," the -last of which had been the extreme rear, or flank, ship of the original -order, ran ashore. There the three first named afterwards hauled down -their flags, and the fourth was burned by her officers. The two other -French ships, "Guillaume Tell" and "Généreux," escaped. The former bore -the flag of Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, who had commanded the rear in this -battle, and was hereafter to be commander-in-chief of the allied fleet -at the memorable disaster of Trafalgar. His inaction on this occasion -has been sharply criticised, both in his own time and since. Upon the -whole, the feeling of later French professional writers appears to be -that his courage, though unquestionable, was rather of the passive than -the active type; and that in Aboukir Bay there was afforded him a real -opportunity and sufficient time to bring the rear ships into action, -which he culpably failed to improve.[195] Bonaparte, on the contrary, -wrote to Villeneuve, soon after the battle, that "if any error could -be imputed to him, it was that he had not got under way as soon as the -'Orient' blew up; seeing that, three hours before, the position Brueys -had taken had been forced and surrounded."[196] - -Such was, in its main outlines, the celebrated Battle of the Nile, the -most complete of naval victories, and among the most decisive, at least -of the immediate course of events. In it the French lost eleven out of -thirteen ships-of-the-line[197] and thirty-five hundred men, killed, -wounded, or drowned;[198] among them being the commander-in-chief -and three captains killed, a rear-admiral and six captains wounded. -The British loss was two hundred and eighteen killed—-of which one -captain—and six hundred and seventy-eight wounded, among whom was the -admiral himself, struck in the head by a heavy splinter. The hurt, -which he at first thought fatal, disabled him for the moment and -seriously affected his efficiency for some days. "I think," wrote he, -four weeks later, "that if it had pleased God I had not been wounded, -not a boat would have escaped."[199] - -The particular circumstances under which the British attack was -undertaken, the admirable skill as well as conduct shown by all the -captains, and the thoroughly scientific character of the tactical -combination adopted, as seen in its execution, unite with the -decisiveness of the issue to cast a peculiar lustre upon this victory -of Nelson's. Lord Howe, inferior to none as a judge of merit, said -to Captain Berry that the Battle of the Nile "stood unparalleled -and singular in this instance, that every captain distinguished -himself."[200] It has been disputed how far belongs to the admiral -the credit of the bold manœuvre, whereby the leading ship, passing -ahead of the French line, showed to her successors the open path -through which the operation of doubling on the enemy could be most -effectually carried out. Into this discussion the author has no -intention of entering, beyond noting an omission in the full treatment -of the question made by the careful and laborious editor of Nelson's -correspondence, Sir Harris Nicolas, who was not able to reach a -decision.[201] In Ross's "Life of Admiral Saumarez" it is stated -that, while discussing the various modes by which the enemy might be -attacked, Saumarez offended Nelson by saying that he "had seen the evil -consequences of doubling upon an enemy, especially in a night action;" -and had differed with the admiral in the plan of attack, because "it -never required two English ships to capture one French, and that the -damage which they must necessarily do each other might render them -both unable to fight an enemy's ship which had not been engaged."[202] -Saumarez's objection, though not without some foundation, was justly -over-ruled; but it could scarcely have been raised had Nelson never -contemplated the precise method of doubling employed,—a British ship on -each side of a single enemy,—for in no other position could the risk -of mutual injury have been serious. - -It is in entire keeping with Nelson's well-known character, that, after -discussing all likely positions and ascertaining that his captains -understood his views, he should with perfect and generous confidence -have left all the details of immediate action with them. In the actual -case he could not, without folly, have rigorously prescribed to Captain -Foley what path to follow. Only the man on the "Goliath's" deck, -watching the soundings, could rightly judge what must each instant be -done; and it was no less a transcendent merit in Nelson that he could -thus trust another, than that, with falling night and unknown waters, -he could reach the instant decision to attack an enemy of superior -force, in an order which he must have supposed to be carefully and -rationally assumed. In fact, however, the operation of doubling on -the enemy,—in contradistinction to doubling the head of the line,—was -really begun by Nelson himself; for his ship was the first to anchor -on the side opposite to that taken by her five predecessors. It was -open to him to have followed them, for the same reasons that prompted -Foley's action.[203] Instead of that, he deliberately anchored outside -the third French ship, already engaged on the inside by the "Theseus;" -thus indicating, as clearly as example can, what he would have those -succeeding him to do. The first two French ships were already so -engaged or crippled as to be properly passed. The fullest credit -therefore can be allowed to Captain Foley for a military decision of a -very high order, without stripping a leaf from Nelson's laurels.[204] - -"The boldness and skill of Admiral Nelson," says Captain Chevalier, -"rose to a height which it would have been difficult to surpass."[205] -"The action of Nelson," said Napoleon, "was a desperate action which -cannot be proposed as a model, but in which he displayed, as well -as the English crews, all the skill and vigor possible."[206] This -sentence is susceptible of a double construction. The condemnation, if -the words be meant as such, comes ill from the man who pushed on his -desperate advance to Leoben in 1797, who at Marengo stretched his line -till it broke, and who in 1798 ventured the Mediterranean fleet and the -Army of Italy on the Egyptian expedition, with scarce a chance in his -favor, except a superstitious reliance upon a fortune which did not -betray him. The arrangements of Brueys being what they were, the odds -were with the British admiral. - -It has been said that, with better gunnery on the part of the French, -disaster must have resulted to the attacking force; and precisely the -same criticism has been applied to Trafalgar.[207] Now, putting out -of consideration that Great Britain had at this date been for five -years at war with France, and that British seamen had thus gained -an experience of French gunnery upon which Nelson could reckon, the -justice of this criticism further depends upon the circumstances of -the wind and the character of the approach. An attack made with a very -light wind, leaving the assailant long under the enemy's fire, or -with a fresh breeze on a course that lies close to the wind, thereby -bringing the greatest strain upon the spars, is a very different thing -from one made with a good working breeze well abaft the beam, which -was the case at the Nile. One cannot dogmatize on probabilities when, -from the nature of the case, there are few precedents on which to rest -an opinion. In bearing down against a fleet under way, of which there -are many instances, the experience in scarcely any case was that so -many spars were lost as to prevent the assailant reaching the hostile -line; and at the Nile, once the anchor was down, the loss of a spar -or two was of little consequence. It seems altogether probable that, -had the French gunnery been much better than it was, the British ships -would yet have reached their station; and once there, the tactical -combination adopted would still have given them the victory, though -more dearly bought. If, however, Brueys's arrangements had been more -skilfully made, resembling those of Hood at St. Kitt's, and if the -French gunnery had been very good, it may safely be conceded that the -British admiral would have needed more circumspection in making his -attack. To say that under totally different circumstances different -results will obtain, is a species of prophecy with which no one need -quarrel. If, in the shock of war, all things on both sides are exactly -equal,—if the two admirals, their captains and crews, the ships of -the fleets, the tactical arrangements, are equal, each to each,—there -can be no result. When inequality, whether original or induced by -circumstance, enters in any one of these factors, a result will follow -proportional to the disparity. When this is great, the result will be -great; when small, small. At the Battle of the Nile, the difference -in admirals, in captains, in crews, in gunnery, and in tactical -combination, were all greatly against the French, and the result was a -disaster more than usually complete. - -During the month passed by Brueys in indolent security, Bonaparte -had advanced steadily in his projected conquest of Egypt. On the -21st of July the battle of the Pyramids was fought, the next day -Cairo submitted, and on the 25th the general-in-chief entered the -city. Remaining there a few days to repose his troops and secure his -position, he departed again on the 7th of August to complete the -conquest of lower Egypt; leaving Desaix to take care of Cairo and -prepare the corps destined for the subjugation of the upper Nile. By -the 12th of August the Mamelukes, still under arms in the Delta, had -been driven into the Isthmus of Suez, whence they retired to Syria; and -there, on the borders of the desert, Bonaparte received from Kleber -the news of the disaster in Aboukir Bay. Under this tremendous reverse -he showed the self-control of which he was always capable at need. The -troops gave way to despair. "Here we are," said they, "abandoned in -this barbarous country, without communication with home, without hope -of return." "Well," replied their general, "we have then laid on us the -obligation to do great things. Seas which we do not command separate us -from home; but no seas divide us from Africa and Asia. We will found -here an empire." - -The magical influence he exerted over the soldiers, most of whom -had followed him to victory in Italy, restored their courage, and -French lightheartedness again prevailed over despondency. The blow, -nevertheless, had struck home, and resounded through the four quarters -of the world. The Mamelukes, Ibrahim Bey in Syria, and Mourad Bey -in upper Egypt, cast down by their reverses, were preparing to -treat; upon the news of Nelson's victory they resumed their arms. -The Porte, incensed by the invasion of Egypt, but still hesitating, -notwithstanding the pressure exerted by the ministers of Great Britain -and Russia, took heart as soon as it knew that the French fleet was no -more. Bonaparte had rightly warned Brueys that the preservation of his -ships was necessary to hold Turkey in check. The Sultan and his Pashas -of Egypt and Syria rejected the French advances. On the 2d of September -a memorial was sent to all the foreign ministers in Constantinople, -expressing the surprise of the Porte at Bonaparte's landing, and -stating that a considerable force had been despatched for Egypt to -stop his progress. On the 11th of the month war was formally declared -against the French Republic.[208] - -Throughout the year 1798 the state of affairs on the continent of -Europe had grown continually more threatening. The politico-military -propagandism of the Revolution had given birth to, and was now being -replaced by, an aggressive external policy, to which the victories of -Bonaparte gave increased vigor and extension. It became the recognized, -if not the avowed, aim of French diplomacy to surround France with -small dependent republics, having institutions modelled upon the same -type as her own, with all local powers merged in those of a central -government.[209] The United Provinces, in becoming a republic, had -retained their federal constitution; but in January, 1798, they -underwent a revolution, promoted by the French Directory, which did -away with the provincial independence inherited from past ages. The -Cisalpine Republic and Genoa had received a similar organization at the -hands of Bonaparte. In many of the cantons of Switzerland there were -discontent and disturbance, due to the unequal political conditions of -the inhabitants. The Directory made of this a pretext for interference, -on the plea of France being interested both in the internal quiet of a -neighboring country and also in the particular persons whose discontent -was construed as evidence of oppression. French troops entered -Switzerland in January, 1798. The canton of Berne fought for its -privileges, but was easily subdued; and a packed convention, assembled -at Aarau, adopted for Switzerland a centralized constitution in place -of the old cantonal independence. This was followed some months later, -in August, 1798, by an offensive and defensive alliance between the -Helvetian and French republics. - -The invasion of Berne had had another motive than the political -preponderance of France in the councils of her neighbors. The revenue -of the Directory still fell far short of the expenditure, and money was -particularly wanted for Bonaparte's approaching expedition. Seventeen -million francs were found in the Bernese treasury and appropriated. -Eighteen million more were raised by requisitions, and other cantons -were drained in proportion.[210] The same motive contributed,[211] at -the same instant, to the occupation of Rome, for which a more plausible -pretext was found. In the papal states, as elsewhere throughout Europe, -French agents had secretly stirred up a revolutionary movement. On the -28th of December, 1797, this party had risen in Rome, and a collision -between it and the papal troops had occurred in the neighborhood of -the French embassy. General Duphot, who was then residing there, was -killed while attempting to interpose between the combatants. The -French ambassador at once left the city; and the Directory, refusing -all explanations, ordered Berthier, Bonaparte's successor in Italy, to -advance. On the 10th of February he entered Rome, recognized the Roman -Republic, which was proclaimed under his auspices, and forced the Pope -to retire to Tuscany. It was owing to this occupation that a contingent -of the Egyptian expedition embarked at Civita Vecchia, as the most -convenient point. - -Neither Naples nor Austria ventured on overt action in behalf of -the Pope; but the dissatisfaction of both was extreme. Never under -Bonaparte himself had French troops come so near to the kingdom of the -Two Sicilies, whose importance to the common cause of the Continent, -from its geographical position, was perfectly understood. But while the -situation of Naples at the far end of the peninsula made it a serious -danger to the flank and rear of the French, when engaged with an enemy -in upper Italy, its remoteness from support, except by way of the sea, -was a source of weakness to a state necessarily dependent upon allies. -This was especially felt in February, 1798, when the British fleet, -after a year's absence, had as yet given no sign of returning to the -Mediterranean, and the ships which accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt were -still in Toulon. The latter would doubtless have been directed upon -Naples, had Naples moved against Rome. The Bourbon kingdom therefore -swallowed its vexation, but drew closer to Austria; which, in addition -to the affront offered to the Pope, had its own motives for discontent -in the occupation of Switzerland by the French, and in the changes -introduced into the political complexion of the Continent by these -aggressive actions of the republican government. The course of the -Directory during the continental peace of 1797 and 1798 was closely -parallel to that of Bonaparte four years later, which made impossible -the continuance of the Peace of Amiens. With less ability and less -vigor, there was the same plausible, insidious, steady aggression, -under color of self-protection or of yielding to popular demand, -which forced on the power of France at the expense of other states. -An occurrence in Vienna at this moment came near to produce war and -stop the Egyptian expedition. When Bonaparte entered Germany in April, -1797, the youth of Vienna had offered themselves in mass to defend the -country. In April, 1798, the anniversary of the day was celebrated -with a popular demonstration, which the French ambassador resented -by hoisting the tricolor. The crowds in a rage broke into and sacked -the embassy.[212] So great was the excitement over this affair that -the troops in Toulon and other ports were ordered not to embark, and -Bonaparte himself was directed to go as plenipotentiary to Rastadt; but -the emperor made explanations, and the incident passed. Still, as a -French historian says, "things were getting spoiled between Austria and -France."[213] - -Russia at the same time was fairly forced from her attitude of reserve, -maintained since the death of Catherine II., by the same policy which -drove the United States into the _quasi_ war of 1798 with France.[214] -A decree of the French legislature had made lawful prize any neutral -ship which had on board, not merely British property, but any goods -of British origin, even though the property of a neutral. This was -given a special application to the Baltic by a notification, issued -January 12, 1798, that "if any ship be suffered to pass through the -Sound with English commodities, of whatever nation it may be, it -shall be considered as a formal declaration of war against the French -nation."[215] Although immediately directed against Sweden and Denmark, -as the two countries bordering the Sound, this was resented by the -Czar, in common with all neutral governments; and on the 15th of May, -he "ordered twenty-two ships-of-the-line and two hundred and fifty -galleys to proceed to the Sound, to protect trade in general against -the oppression of the Directory."[216] - -Once enkindled, the violent and erratic temper of Paul I. soon rushed -into extremes; and he received further provocation from the capture -of Malta. When Bonaparte took possession of that island, he found -there a treaty, just signed, by which the Czar stipulated a payment -of four hundred thousand rubles to the Order, in which to the end -of his days he preserved a fantastic interest. As a measure of -precaution, the French general decreed that any Greeks in Malta or -the Ionian Islands maintaining relations with Russia should be shot, -and Greek vessels under Russian colors sunk.[217] Hence the members -of the Order in Russia made, in August, a violent protest against -the seizure, throwing themselves upon the Czar for a support which -he eagerly promised.[218] He then drew near to Great Britain, and -offered to aid Austria with troops. The emperor at first answered that -nothing could be done without Prussia; and the three governments then -applied themselves to obtain the accession of this kingdom to a new -coalition. On the 19th of May—the very day, it may be observed, that -Bonaparte sailed from Toulon—Austria and Naples signed a defensive -alliance.[219] The conferences at Rastadt, so far as the emperor was -concerned, were broken off on the 6th of July, although those with the -empire dragged on longer. The imperial envoy, Cobentzel, at once went -to Berlin, where he entered into cordial relations with the British -and Russian plenipotentiaries. On the 10th of August a convention was -signed between the two emperors, by which the Czar undertook to send -thirty thousand troops into Galicia to support the Austrian army. Great -Britain, as ever, was ready to help the cause with ships and money. -Prussia refusing to join, the Russian envoy took his leave, saying: "We -will make war on France with you, without you, or against you."[220] - -On governments so prepared to be enkindled, yet hesitating before the -prestige of French success and feeling the mutual distrust inseparable -from coalitions, the news of the battle of the Nile fell like a brand -among tinder. The French fleet was not only defeated, but annihilated. -The Mediterranean from the Straits to the Levant was in the power of -the British navy, which the total destruction of its enemy relieved -from the necessity of concentration and allowed to disperse to every -quarter where its efforts were needed. The greatest general and thirty -thousand of the best troops France possessed, with numbers of her most -brilliant officers, were thus hopelessly shut off from their country. - -After the victory, conscious of its far-reaching importance, Nelson -took measures to disperse the news as rapidly as his want of small -vessels would permit. The "Leander" sailed on the 5th of August with -the first despatches for Lord St. Vincent off Cadiz, but was on -the 18th captured by the "Généreux," seventy-four, one of the two -ships which had escaped from Aboukir Bay. To provide against such an -accident, however, the brig "Mutine" had also been sent on the 13th to -Naples, where she arrived on the 4th of September, bringing the first -news that reached Europe, and which Nelson asked the British minister -to see forwarded to all the other courts. The captain of the "Mutine" -started the next day for England, by way of Vienna, and on the 2d of -October, 1798, two full months after the battle, reached London with -the first accounts. - -Conscious of the effect which events in Egypt might have upon British -influence in India, Nelson also sent a lieutenant, on the 10th of -August, to make his way overland through Alexandretta and Aleppo to -Bombay. This officer bore dispatches to the governor, informing him -both of the landing and numbers of Bonaparte's expedition, and also of -the fatal blow which had just befallen it. The news was most timely. -The French had been actively intriguing in the native courts, and -Tippoo Saib, the son and successor of Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, -their former ally in the days of Suffren, had openly committed himself -to his father's policy. It was too late for Tippoo to recede, and he -was erelong embarked in a war, which ended in April, 1799, in his death -at the assault of Seringapatam and the overthrow of his kingdom; but -on the other native states the striking catastrophe produced its due -impression. In their operations against Tippoo the British were not -embarrassed by troubles in other quarters. - -"The consequences of this battle," sums up a brilliant French naval -writer, "were incalculable. Our navy never recovered from this terrible -blow to its consideration and its power. This was the combat which -for two years delivered the Mediterranean to the English, and called -thither the squadrons of Russia; which shut up our army in the midst of -a rebellious population, and decided the Porte to declare against us; -which put India out of the reach of our enterprise, and brought France -within a hair's-breadth of her ruin; for it rekindled the scarcely -extinct war with Austria, and brought Suwarrow and the Austro-Russians -to our very frontiers."[221] Great Britain, the Sea Power so often and -so idly accused of backwardness in confronting France, of requiring -continental support before daring to move, was first to act. Long -before news of the battle, before even the battle was fought, or the -alliance of Austria and Russia contracted, orders had been sent to -St. Vincent to detach from Nelson's force to the support of Naples, -hoping there to start the little fire from which a great matter should -be kindled. These "most secret orders" reached Nelson on the 15th of -August.[222] He had just dispatched to Gibraltar seven of the British -fleet with six of the captured French vessels, the whole under charge -of Sir James Saumarez. Setting fire to the three other prizes, he -intrusted the blockade of Alexandria to Captain Hood, with three -ships-of-the-line, and with the three then remaining to him sailed for -Naples on the 19th. From the wretched condition of his division[223] -the passage took over a month; but on the 22d of September he anchored -in the bay, where the renown of his achievement had preceded him. - -On his way, Nelson had been informed that a Portuguese squadron, -commanded by the Marquis de Niza, had entered the Mediterranean to -support his operations. At his request this division, which had -appeared off Alexandria on the 29th of August,[224] but refused to -remain there, undertook the blockade of Malta, until such time as the -repairs of the British ships should allow them to do so. The natives -of the island had risen against the French on the 26th of August, and -driven them from the open country into the forts of La Valetta. Niza -took his station off the port, about the 20th of September, and on the -24th Sir James Saumarez appeared with his division and the prizes. -The following day the two officers sent General Vaubois a summons to -surrender, which was as a matter of course refused. Saumarez went on -to Gibraltar; but before doing so gave the inhabitants twelve hundred -muskets with ammunition, which materially assisted them in their -efforts, finally successful, to deprive the enemy of the resources -of the island. Nelson sent off British ships as they were ready, and -himself joined the blockading force on the 24th of October, though only -for a few days, his presence being necessary in Naples. The garrison -was again by him formally summoned, and as formally rejected his -offers. From that time until their surrender in September, 1800, the -French were in strict blockade, both by land and water. - -In October of this year Lord St. Vincent went to live ashore at -Gibraltar, both on account of his health, and because there, being the -great British naval station of the Mediterranean, he was centrally -placed to receive information, to give orders, and especially to -hasten, by his unflagging personal supervision, the work of supply -and repair upon which the efficiency of a fleet primarily depends. -The division off Cadiz, numbering generally some fifteen of the line, -kept its old station watching the Spaniards, under the command of -Lord Keith,—one of the most efficient and active of the generation of -naval officers between St. Vincent and Nelson, to the latter of whom -he was senior. Within the Mediterranean Nelson commanded, under St. -Vincent. The blockade of Egypt and Malta, and co-operation with the -Austrian and Neapolitan armies in the expected war, were his especial -charge. He was also to further, as far as in him lay, the operations -of a combined Russian and Turkish fleet, which had assembled in the -Dardanelles in September, 1798, to maintain the cause of the coalition -in the Levant. This fleet entered the Mediterranean in October; but -instead of assuming the blockade of Alexandria and the protection of -the Syrian coast, it undertook the capture of the Ionian Islands. All -of these, except Corfu, fell into its power by October 10; and on the -20th Corfu, the citadel of the group, was attacked. Nelson saw this -direction of the Russo-Turkish operations with disgust and suspicion. -"The Porte ought to be aware," he wrote, "of the great danger at a -future day of allowing the Russians to get a footing at Corfu."[225] -"I was in hopes that a part of the united Turkish and Russian squadron -would have gone to Egypt,—Corfu is a secondary consideration.... I -have had a long conference with Kelim Effendi on the conduct likely -to be pursued by the Russian Court towards the unsuspicious (I fear) -and upright Turk.... A strong squadron should have been sent to Egypt -to have relieved my dear friend Captain Hood; but Corfu suited Russia -better."[226] At the same time Turkish troops, under the pashas whose -good dispositions Bonaparte had boasted, swept away from France the -former Venetian territory on the mainland, acquired by the treaty of -Campo Formio. - -While Bonaparte's Oriental castles were thus crumbling, through -the destruction in Aboukir Bay of the foundation upon which they -rested,—while Ionia was falling, Malta starving, and Egypt isolated, -through the loss of the sea—the Franco-Spanish allies were deprived of -another important foothold for maritime power. On the 15th of November -Minorca with its valuable harbor, Port Mahon, was surrendered to a -combined British military and naval expedition, quietly fitted out by -St. Vincent from Gibraltar. - -The year 1798 in the Mediterranean closed with these operations -in progress. At its beginning France was in entire control of the -land-locked sea, and scarcely a sail hostile to her, except furtive -privateers, traversed its surface. When it closed, only two French -ships-of-the-line fit for battle remained upon the waters, which -swarmed with enemy's squadrons. Of these two, refugees from the fatal -bay of Aboukir, one was securely locked in Malta, whence she never -escaped; the other made its way to Toulon, and met its doom in a vain -effort to carry relief to the beleaguered island. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - -THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM 1799 TO 1801. - -BONAPARTE'S SYRIAN EXPEDITION AND SIEGE OF ACRE.—THE INCURSION OF -THE FRENCH BREST FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL BRUIX.—BONAPARTE'S RETURN TO -FRANCE.—THE FRENCH LOSE MALTA AND EGYPT. - - -After the destruction of his fleet, Bonaparte resumed the task of -subduing and organizing Egypt, which had by that misfortune become -more than ever essential to his projects. In the original conception -of his eastern adventure the valley of the Nile had borne a twofold -part. It was, in the first place, to become a permanent acquisition -of France, the greatest of her colonies,—great not only by its own -natural resources, susceptible as was believed of immense development, -but also by its singular position, which, to a power controlling the -Mediterranean waters, gave the military and commercial link between -the eastern and western worlds. To France, bereft of the East and the -West Indies, childless now of her richest colonies, Egypt was to be the -great and more than equal compensation. But this first object obtained, -though in itself a justification, was but the necessary step to the -more dazzling, if not more useful, achievement of the destruction -of the British power in India, and the creation there of an empire -tributary to France. "Thus, on the one side Egypt would replace San -Domingo and the Antilles; on the other, she would be a step towards the -conquest of India."[227] - -Measured by the successes of a few handfuls of British in the empire -of the Moguls, the army brought by Bonaparte into Egypt was more than -able to subdue that country, and to spread far and wide the obedience -to the French arms. Like the founders of the British Indian Empire, -the French general found himself face to face, not only with military -institutions incomparably weaker and less cohesive than those of -Europe, but with a civil society—if such it can be called—from which -the element of mutual confidence, and with it the power of combined -resistance, had disappeared. The prestige of success, the knowledge -that he could command the services of a body of men superior in numbers -as in disciplined action to any aggregation of units that could be kept -steadily together to oppose him, was sufficient to insure for him the -supremacy that concentrated force will always have over diffused force, -organized power over unorganized. In military matters two and two do -not make four, unless they are brought together in concerted action. -Unfortunately, at the very moment of the most brilliant demonstration -of his genius and of the valor of his troops, there had fallen upon one -part of his command a reverse more startling, more absolute, than his -own victories, and inflicted by a force certainly not superior to the -one defeated. The Orientals, who could count upon no sufficient stay -in men of their own race, now saw hopes of succor from without. They -were not disappointed. Again a British naval captain, in the moment of -triumphant progress, stopped the advance of Bonaparte. - -The autumn and early winter of 1798 were passed in the conquest and -overrunning of upper Egypt by Desaix, who left Cairo for this purpose -on the 25th of August, and in the settlement of the affairs of the -lower Nile upon such a basis as would secure quiet and revenue during -the absence of the commander-in-chief. An insurrection in Cairo in -October, provoked partly by dissatisfaction with intended changes, -partly by the rumor of the Porte having declared war upon France, -gave Bonaparte in quelling it an opportunity to show the iron firmness -of his grip, and afterwards to manifest that mixture of unrelenting -severity towards the few with politic lenity towards the many, which is -so well calculated to check the renewal of commotion. - -In November, when the weather became cooler, a detachment of fifteen -hundred men was sent to occupy Suez, and toward the end of December -Bonaparte himself made a visit of inspection to the isthmus, by which -he must advance to the prosecution of his larger schemes. While thus -absent he learned, through an intercepted courier, that Djezzar, the -Pasha of Syria, had on the 2d of January, 1799, occupied the important -oasis of El Arish in the desert of Suez, and was putting its fort in a -state of defence.[228] He at once realized that the time had come when -he must carry out his project of advance into Syria, and accept the -hostility of Turkey, which he had wished to avoid. - -The singular position of isolation in which the French in Egypt were -placed, by the loss of the control of the sea, must be realized, in -order to understand the difficulties under which Bonaparte labored in -shaping his course of action, from time to time, with reference to the -general current of events. Separated from Palestine by two hundred -miles of desert, and by a yet wider stretch of barren sand from any -habitable land to the west, Egypt is aptly described by Napoleon -himself as a great oasis, surrounded on all sides by the desert and -the sea. The intrinsic weakness of the French navy, its powerlessness -to command security for its unarmed vessels in the Mediterranean, had -been manifested by the tremor of apprehension and uncertainty which ran -through the officials at Toulon and in Paris, when, after the sailing -of Bonaparte, they learned of Nelson's appearance. The restless -activity of the British admiral, and the frequent sight of his ships -in different places, multiplied, in the imagination of the French -authorities, the numbers of hostile cruisers actually on the sea.[229] -A convoy of twenty-six large ships, for the completion of whose lading -the expedition could not wait, lay in Toulon during the summer months, -ready to sail; but no one dared to despatch them. From time to time -during the outward voyage Bonaparte sent urgent messages for their -speedy departure; but they never came. - -If this fear existed and exercised such sway before the day of the -Nile, it may be imagined how great was the influence of that disastrous -tidings. Not only, however, did a moral effect follow, but the -annihilation of the French fleet permitted the British cruisers to -scatter, and so indefinitely increased the real danger of capture to -French ships. Surrounded by deserts and the sea, the commander-in-chief -in Egypt saw, on and beyond both, nothing but actual or possible -enemies. Not only so, but being in utter ignorance of the attitude of -most of the powers as well as of European events, he could not know -what bad effect might result from action taken by him upon imperfect -information. His embarrassment is vividly depicted in a letter dated -December 17, 1798: "We are still without news from France, not a -courier has arrived since July 6; this is unexampled even in the -colonies."[230] The courier mentioned, leaving France in July, had -reached Bonaparte on the 9th of September; but the vessel which brought -him had been obliged to run ashore to escape the British cruisers, and -only one letter from the Directory was saved.[231] The next tidings -came on the 5th of February, when a Ragusan ship, chartered by two -French citizens, succeeded in entering Alexandria. "The news," he -said, "is sufficiently contradictory; but it is the first I have -had since July 6." He then first learned definitely that Turkey had -declared war against France.[232] His troops were at that moment in the -desert, marching upon Syria, and he himself on the point of following -them. - -Up to that time Bonaparte had hoped to cajole the Porte into an -attitude of neutrality, upon the plea that his quarrel was solely -with the Mamelukes on account of injury done by them to French -commerce. On the 11th of December he had sent to Constantinople a M. -Beauchamp, recently consul at Muscat, with instructions how to act in -the twofold contingency of war having been declared or not. At that -time he expected that Talleyrand would be found in Constantinople as -Ambassador of France.[233] The news by the Ragusan enlightened him -as to the actual relations with Turkey; but the disquieting rumors -before received, coinciding with his ultimate purpose to advance -upon India through Syria, had already determined him to act as the -military situation demanded.[234] He had learned that troops were -assembling in Syria and in the island of Rhodes, and divined that he -was threatened with a double invasion,—by the desert of Suez and by -the Mediterranean Sea. True to his sound and invariable policy, he -determined to use his central position to strike first one and then the -other, and not passively to wait on the defensive until a simultaneous -attack might compel him to divide his force. During the violent winter -weather, which would last yet for six weeks or two months, landing on -the Egyptian coast was thought impracticable.[235] For that period, -probably for longer, he could count upon security on the side of the -sea. He would improve the interval by invading Syria, driving back the -enemy there, breaking up his army, and seizing his ports. Thus he would -both shut the coast to the British cruisers off Alexandria, which drew -supplies from thence, and make impossible any future invasion from the -side of the desert. He counted also upon the moral effect which success -in Syria would have upon the negotiations with the Porte, which he -conceived to be in progress.[236] - -The first essential point in the campaign was to possess El Arish, just -occupied by the troops of Djezzar. General Reynier advanced against -it with his division on the 5th of February, 1799. The Turks were by -him routed and driven from the oasis, and the fort besieged. Bonaparte -himself arrived on the 15th, and on the 20th the garrison capitulated. -The corps destined for the expedition, numbering in all thirteen -thousand men, having now assembled, the advance from El Arish began -on the 22d. On the 25th Gaza was taken. On the 3d of March the army -encamped before Jaffa, and on the 7th the place was carried by storm. -A port, though a very poor one, was thus secured. The next day there -entered, from Acre, a convoy of Turkish coasters laden with provisions -and ammunition, which fell a welcome prize to the French, and was sent -back to Hayfa, a small port seven miles south of Acre, for the use of -the troops upon arrival. On the 12th of March the army resumed its -march upon Acre, distant about sixty miles. On the 17th, at five in the -afternoon, a detachment entered and held Hayfa, to provide a place of -safety for the flotilla, which, coasting the beach, slowly followed -the advance of the troops. From Hayfa Bonaparte could see the roadstead -of Acre, and lying there two British ships-of-the-line, the "Tigre" and -the "Theseus," both under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, the captain -of the former; who, as ranking officer on the spot, represented the -naval power of Great Britain, about again to foil the plans of the -great French leader. - -Sir Sidney Smith, to whom now fell the distinguished duty of meeting -and stopping the greatest general of modern times, was a man who has -left behind him a somewhat singular reputation, in which, and in the -records commonly accessible, it is not always easy to read his real -character. He was not liked by St. Vincent nor by Nelson, and their -feeling towards him, though much intensified by the circumstances -under which he now came to the Mediterranean, seems to have depended -upon their previous knowledge of his history. The First Lord, in -assigning him to this duty, felt obliged to take an almost apologetic -tone to Earl St. Vincent. "I am well aware," he wrote, "that there -may perhaps be some prejudices, derived from certain circumstances -which have attended this officer's career through life; but, from a -long acquaintance with him personally, I think I can venture to assure -your lordship that, added to his unquestioned character for courage -and enterprise, he has a great many good points about him, which those -who are less acquainted with him may not be sufficiently apprised -of. I have no doubt you will find him a very useful instrument to -be employed on any hazardous or difficult service, and that he will -be perfectly under your guidance, as he ought to be."[237] In the -concluding sentence Earl Spencer sums up Sir Sidney's real character, -as far as it can be discerned in the dim light of the recorded facts—or -rather in the false lights which have exaggerated some circumstances -and distorted others. He was bold and enterprising to Quixotism; -he was a most useful instrument; but so far from having no doubt, -the First Lord must have had very serious, if unacknowledged, doubts -as to how far he would be under the guidance of St. Vincent, or any -one else, out of signal distance. A self-esteem far beyond what the -facts warranted, a self-confidence of the kind which does not inspire -confidence in others, an exaggerated view of his own importance and -of his own services, which was apt to show itself in his bearing and -words,[238]—such seem to have been the traits that alienated from Sir -Sidney Smith the esteem of his contemporaries, until his really able, -as well as most gallant, conduct at Acre showed that there was more in -him than the mere vainglorious knight-errant. His behavior even there -has been distorted, alike by the malevolence of Napoleon and by the -popular adulation in Great Britain, which, seizing upon the brilliant -traits of energy and valor he exhibited, attributed to him the whole -conduct of the siege;[239] whereas, by entrusting the technical -direction of the defence to an experienced engineer, he made proof of a -wisdom and modesty for which few of his contemporaries would have given -him credit. At this time Smith had received some severe snubbings, -which, administered by men of the standing of St. Vincent and Nelson, -could not be disregarded, and may have had a wholesomely sobering -effect. - -The circumstances of his coming to the Mediterranean were as follows. -Having been a prisoner of war in Paris for nearly two years, he escaped -through the stratagem of a French royalist, Phélippeaux, about a week -before Bonaparte left the city for Toulon.[240] The incidents of his -release were dramatic enough in themselves, and, in common with all -his adventures, were well noised abroad. He became a very conspicuous -figure in the eyes of the government, and of the public outside the -navy. In October, 1798, he was given command of the "Tigre," with -directions to proceed to Gibraltar and put himself under St. Vincent's -orders. At the same time he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to -the Porte, being associated in that capacity with his younger brother, -Spencer Smith, who was already ambassador at Constantinople; the object -being that, with the diplomatic rank thus conferred, he should be able -to direct the efforts of the Turkish and Russian forces in the Levant, -in case the military officers of those nations were of grade superior -to his. This somewhat complicated arrangement, which presupposed in -the Turks and Russians a compliance which no British naval officer -would have yielded, was further confused by the instructions issued, -apparently without concert, by the Foreign Office to Smith himself, and -by the Admiralty to St. Vincent. The latter clearly understood that -Smith was intended to be under his command only, and that merely _pro -formâ_;[241] but under no obedience to Nelson, although his intended -scene of operations, the Levant, was part of Nelson's district. This -view, derived from the Admiralty's letter, was confirmed by an extract -from the Foreign Office instructions, communicated by Smith to Nelson, -that "his (Smith's) instructions will enable him to take the command -of such of his Majesty's ships as he may find in those seas (the -Levant) unless, _by some unforeseen accident_, it should happen that -there should be among them any of his Majesty's officers of superior -rank."[242] - -Nelson, of course, was outraged. Here was intruded into his command, -where he had achieved such brilliant success, and to the administration -of which he felt fully equal, a man of indifferent reputation as -an officer, though of unquestioned courage, authorized to act -independently of his control, and, as it seemed, even to take his -ships. He was hurt not only for himself, but for Troubridge, who -was senior to Smith, and would, so Nelson thought, have done the -duty better than this choice of the Government. The situation when -understood in England was rectified. It was explained that diplomatic -rank was considered necessary for the senior naval officer, in order -to keep in the hands of Great Britain the direction of combined -operations, essentially naval in character; and that Smith had been -chosen to the exclusion of seniors because of his relationship to the -minister at Constantinople, who might have felt the association with -him of a stranger to be an imputation upon his past conduct. Meanwhile -St. Vincent, indignant at what seemed to him Smith's airs, had sent him -peremptory instructions to put himself under Nelson's orders. Thus, -in the double character of naval captain and minister plenipotentiary -to Turkey, Smith went up the Mediterranean; where he did first-rate -service in the former capacity, and in the latter took some action of -very doubtful discretion, in which he certainly did not trouble himself -about the guidance or views of his naval superiors. - -In compliance with orders from Lord St. Vincent, Nelson in January -sent Troubridge with some bomb-vessels to Alexandria, to bombard the -shipping in the port; after performing which service he was to turn -over to Sir Sidney Smith the blockade of Alexandria and the defence -of the Ottoman Empire by sea, of which Nelson thenceforth washed his -hands.[243] The bombardment was maintained during several days in -February, doing but little harm; and on the 3d of March Sir Sidney, -having made his round to Constantinople, arrived and took over the -command. Troubridge left with him the "Theseus," seventy-four, whose -captain was junior to Smith, with three smaller vessels; and on the -7th sailed to rejoin Nelson. This was the day that the French stormed -Jaffa, and the same evening an express with the news reached the -"Tigre." Smith at once sent the "Theseus" to Acre, with Phélippeaux, -the French officer who had aided him to escape from Paris and had -accompanied him to the East. - -Of the same age as Bonaparte, Phélippeaux had been his fellow-pupil -at the military school of Brienne, had left France with the royalists -in 1792, and returned to it after the fall of Robespierre. He had -naturally, from his antecedents, joined the party of reaction; and, -after its overthrow in September, 1797, was easily moved to aid in Sir -Sidney's escape from Paris. Accompanying him to England, he received -from the Crown a colonel's commission. To the guidance of this able -engineer the wisdom and skill of the defence was mainly due. Never did -great issues turn on a nicer balance than at Acre. The technical skill -of Phélippeaux, the hearty support he received from Smith, his officers -and crews, the untiring activity and brilliant courage of the latter, -the British command of the sea, all contributed; and so narrow was the -margin of success, that it may safely be said the failure of one factor -would have caused total failure and the loss of the place. Its fall was -essential to Bonaparte, and his active, far-seeing mind had long before -determined its seizure by his squadron, if the British left the Levant. -"If any event drives us from the coast of Egypt," wrote Nelson on the -17th of December, 1798, "St. Jean d'Acre will be attacked by sea. I -have Bonaparte's letter before me."[244] As the best port and the best -fortress on the coast, Acre was the bridgehead into Palestine. To Syria -it bore the relation that Lisbon did to the Spanish Peninsular War. -If Bonaparte advanced, leaving it unsubdued, his flank and rear would -through it be open to attack from the sea. If it fell, he had good -reason to believe the country would rise in his favor. "If I succeed," -said he at a late period of the siege, when hope had not yet abandoned -him, "I shall find in the city the treasures of the Pasha, and arms for -three hundred thousand men. I raise and arm all Syria, so outraged by -the ferocity of Djezzar, for whose fall you see the population praying -to God at each assault. I march upon Damascus and Aleppo. I swell my -army, as I advance, by all malcontents. I reach Constantinople with -armed masses. I overthrow the Turkish Empire. I found in the East a new -and great empire which shall fix my place in posterity."[245] Dreams? -Ibrahim Pasha advanced from Egypt in 1831, took Acre in 1832, and -marched into the heart of Asia Minor, which the battle of Konieh soon -after laid at his feet; why not Bonaparte? Damascus had already offered -him its keys, and the people were eager for the overthrow of the pashas. - -On the 10th of March Sir Sidney Smith himself left the blockade of -Alexandria, and on the 15th anchored with the "Tigre" off Acre. -He found that much had already been done, by Phélippeaux and the -"Theseus," to make the obsolete fortifications more fit to withstand -the approaching siege. Sending the "Theseus" now to cruise down the -coast towards Jaffa, it fell to himself to deal the heaviest and most -opportune blow to Bonaparte's projects. Some light coasters had sailed -with a siege train from the Damietta (eastern) mouth of the Nile, -which the British never had ships enough to blockade. On the morning -of the 18th they were seen approaching Acre, under convoy of a small -corvette. The "Tigre" at once gave chase, and captured all but the -corvette and two of the coasters. The cannon that should have been -turned against the walls were landed and served to defend them; while -the prizes, receiving British crews, thenceforth harassed the siege -works, flanking the two walls against which the attacks were addressed, -and enfilading the trenches. The French, having by this mishap lost -all their siege guns proper, had to depend upon field-pieces to breach -the walls until the 25th of April, when half a dozen heavy cannon -were received from Jaffa.[246] This time was simply salvation to the -besieged and ruin to the assailants; for, in the interval, the skill of -Phélippeaux and the diligence of the men under him prepared the place -to withstand attacks which at an early period would have caused its -fall. - -Into the details of this siege, petty in itself but momentous in -its bearing upon events, it will not be expected that this work -shall enter. The crucial incident was the capture of the siege train -and the precious respite thus obtained. Orders were indeed sent to -Rear-Admiral Perrée to come as speedily as possible, with his small -squadron of three frigates and two corvettes, to Jaffa and land -guns; but Alexandria was already blockaded, and, from the narrowness -of the entrance, very difficult to leave in face of a foe. On the -5th of April, however, the blockading force had to go to Cyprus for -water,[247] and on the 8th Perrée got away. On the 15th he landed -at Jaffa six ship's guns, and so much ammunition as left his little -squadron with only fifteen rounds. He then received orders to cruise -to the westward of Acre and intercept the communications of the Turks -with Candia and Rhodes. Returning from this duty on the 14th of May, he -was seen and chased by the "Theseus." An accidental explosion on board -the latter forced her to give over pursuit; but Perrée, recognizing the -danger of capture, and being short of water and supplies, determined -to go to France, as his instructions allowed in case of necessity. On -the 17th of June, when only sixty miles from Toulon, he met a British -fleet, by which all five vessels were taken. - -On the 4th of May, when the besieged and besiegers had been mining, -countermining, and daily fighting, for over six weeks—separated by but -a stone's throw one from the other—a breach thought practicable by -the French general was made, the mine for blowing in the counterscarp -was finished, and a general assault was ordered for the 5th; but -the engineers of the besieged countermined so industriously that by -daybreak they had ruined the mine before being discovered. This caused -the assault to be postponed to the 9th. On the 7th, towards evening, -some thirty or forty sail were seen on the western horizon. They bore -the long expected Turkish succors from Rhodes; whose commander even -now had only been induced to approach by a peremptory exercise of Sir -Sidney Smith's powers as British minister. Bonaparte saw that no more -time could be lost, and ordered the assault at once; the weather being -calm, twenty-four hours might still elapse before the re-enforcements -could enter the place. Under a heavy fire from one side and the other, -the attack was made; and in the morning the British seamen saw the -French flag flying on the outer angle of one of the towers. It marked -the high water of Bonaparte's Syrian expedition. - -On the 8th the assault was renewed. As the French columns advanced, -the Turkish ships were still detained in the offing by calms, and -the soldiers were being brought ashore in boats, but still far from -the landing. Then it was that Sir Sidney Smith, seeing that a few -critical moments might determine the success or failure of his weary -struggle, manned the boats of his ships, and pulling rapidly ashore -led the British seamen, armed with pikes, to help hold the breach -till the troops could arrive. The French carried the first line, the -old fortifications of the town; but that done, they found themselves -confronted with a second, which Phélippeaux, now dead, had formed by -connecting together the houses and garden walls of the seraglio within. -The strife raged throughout the day, with varied success in different -quarters; but at nightfall, after a struggle of twenty-four hours, -the assailants withdrew and Acre was saved. On the 20th the siege was -raised, the French retreating during the night. Upon the 25th they -reached Jaffa, and on the 29th Gaza. Both places were evacuated; and -the army, resuming its march, next day entered the desert. On the 2d -of June it encamped in the oasis of El Arish. The garrison of the fort -there was re-enforced, the works strengthened with more artillery, and -the place provisioned for six months. It was the one substantial result -of the Syrian expedition,—an outpost which, like Acre, an invader must -subdue before advancing. On the 7th, after nine days' march through the -desert under the scorching heat of the June sun, the army re-entered -Egypt. It had lost since its departure fifteen hundred killed or dead -of disease, and more than two thousand wounded. - -The reputation of Sir Sidney Smith with posterity rests upon the -defence of Acre, in which he made proof of solid as well as brilliant -qualities. Bonaparte, who never forgave the check administered to his -ambition, nor overcame the irritation caused by sixty days fretting -against an unexpected and seemingly trivial obstacle, tried hard to -decry the character of the man who thwarted him. "Smith is a lunatic," -he said, "who wishes to make his fortune and keep himself always before -the eyes of the world. He is a man capable of any folly, to whom no -profound or rational project is ever to be attributed."[248] "Sir -Sidney Smith occupied himself too much with the detail of affairs on -shore, which he did not understand, and where he was of little use; he -neglected the maritime business, which he did understand, and where -he had everything in his power." This accusation was supported by the -circumstantial mis-statement that six big guns, with a large quantity -of ammunition and provisions, were landed by Perrée, undetected, seven -miles from Smith's ships.[249] - -That there was a strong fantastic and vainglorious strain in Smith's -character seems certain, and to it largely he owed the dislike of his -own service; but so far as appears, he showed at Acre discretion and -sound judgment, as well as energy and courage. It must be remembered, -in justice, that all power and all responsibility were in his hands, -and that the result was an eminent success. Under the circumstances -he had to be much on shore as well as afloat; but he seems to have -shown Phélippeaux, and after the latter's death, Colonel Douglas, the -confidence and deference which their professional skill demanded, as he -certainly was most generous in recognizing their services and those of -others. When the equinoctial gales came on he remained with his ship, -which had to put to sea; an act which Bonaparte maliciously attributed -to a wish to escape the odium of the fall of the place. Whether -ashore or afloat, Smith could not please Bonaparte. The good sense -which defers to superior experience, the lofty spirit which bears -the weight of responsibility and sustains the courage of waverers, -ungrudging expenditure of means and effort, unshaken determination to -endure to the end, and heroic inspiration at the critical moment of -the last assault,—all these fine qualities must in candor be allowed -to Sir Sidney Smith at the siege of Acre. He received and deserved -the applause, not only of the multitude and the government, but of -Nelson himself. The deeds of Acre blotted out of memory the exaggerated -reports of the almost total destruction of the French fleet at his -hands when Toulon was evacuated; reports which had left upon his name -the imputation of untrustworthiness. But, whatever the personal merits -of Sir Sidney Smith in this memorable siege, there can be no doubt -that to the presence of the British ships, and the skilled support -of the British officers, seamen, and marines—manning the works—is -to be attributed the successful resistance made by the brave, but -undisciplined Turks. - -During the last days of the siege of Acre and while Bonaparte was -leading his baffled army through the sands of the desert back into -Egypt, the western Mediterranean was thrown into a ferment by the -escape of the French fleet from Brest. This very remarkable episode, -having led to no tangible results, has been little noticed by general -historians; but to the student of naval war its incidents are most -instructive. It is scarcely too much to say that never was there a -greater opportunity than that offered to the French fleet, had it -been a valid force, by the scattered condition of its enemies on -this occasion; nor can failure deprive the incident of its durable -significance, as illustrating the advantage, to the inferior navy, of -a large force concentrated in a single port, when the enemy, though -superior, is by the nature of the contest compelled to disseminate his -squadrons. The advantage is greatest when the port of concentration is -central with reference to the enemy's positions; but is by no means -lost when, as was then the case with Brest, it is at one extremity -of the theatre of war. It was a steady principle in the policy of -Napoleon, when consul and emperor, to provoke dissemination of the -British navy by threatening preparations at widely separated points of -his vast dominions; just as it was a purpose of the British government, -though not consistently followed, to provoke France to ex-centric -efforts by naval demonstrations, menacing many parts of the shore line. -The Emperor, however, a master of the art of war and an adept at making -the greatest possible smoke with the least expenditure of fuel, was -much more than a match in the game of deception for the unmilitary and -many-headed body that directed the affairs of Great Britain. - -Although in 1799 the Channel fleet had attached to it as many as -fifty-one ships-of-the-line,[250] of which forty-two upon the alarm -that ensued very soon got to sea,[251] Lord Bridport had with him but -sixteen when he took command off Brest, on the 17th of April, relieving -the junior admiral who, with eight or nine ships, had done the winter -cruising. On the 25th Bridport looked into the port and saw there -eighteen ships-of-the-line ready for sea. The wind being fresh at -north-east, the British admiral stood out until he reached a position -twelve miles west-south-west of Ushant Island. The entrance being thus -clear and the wind fair, the French fleet, numbering twenty-five of -the line and ten smaller vessels, slipped out that night under command -of Admiral Bruix, then minister of marine, who, by his close official -relations to the government, was indicated as a proper person to fulfil -an apparently confidential mission, for which his professional ability -and activity eminently fitted him. - -Being bound south and the wind favoring, Bruix passed through the -southern passage, known as the Passage du Raz,[252] distant thirty -miles or more from the spot where Bridport had stationed his fleet, -which consequently saw nothing, though it had great reason to suspect -a movement by the French. At 9 A. M. on the 26th, however, a British -inshore frigate caught sight of the enemy just as the last ships were -passing through the Raz, and hastened toward her fleet. At noon she -lost sight of the French, and an hour later, the signal being repeated -from vessel to vessel, Bridport learned that the enemy were out. He at -once made sail for Brest, assured himself on the 27th that the news -was true, and then steered for Ireland to cover it from a possible -invasion, sending at the same time warning to Keith off Cadiz and to -St. Vincent at Gibraltar, as well as orders into the Channel ports for -all ships to join him off Cape Clear. The whole south coast of England -was at once in an uproar; but the government, knowing how scattered -were the vessels in the Mediterranean, had a double anxiety. On the -6th of May, five ships-of-the-line sailed from Plymouth to join St. -Vincent.[253] The rest of the Channel fleet got off as fast as they -could to Bridport, who, in spite of the reports from merchant vessels -that had seen the French to the southward, and steering south, refused -to believe that Ireland was safe. In this delusion he was confirmed by -a barefaced and much-worn ruse, a small French vessel being purposely -allowed to fall into his hands with dispatches for Ireland. On the -12th of May there remained in Plymouth but a single ship-of-the-line, -and that detained by sickness among the crew,—"a circumstance scarcely -ever remembered before."[254] Despite this accumulation of force, it -was not till June 1 that Bridport detached to the southward sixteen -sail-of-the-line,[255] of which twelve went on to the Mediterranean. - -On the morning of the 3d of May Admiral Keith, off Cadiz, was joined by -a British frigate chased the day before by Bruix's fleet, of which she -had lost sight only at 4 P. M. The next morning the French appeared, -twenty-four ships to the British fifteen, which were to leeward of -their enemy. The wind, that had been blowing fresh from north-west -since the day before, rapidly increased to a whole gale, so that -though there were nineteen Spanish ships in Cadiz and twenty-four -French outside, the British remained safe; and not only so, but by -making it impossible for the French to enter without an engagement, -prevented this first attempt at a junction. "Lord Keith," wrote St. -Vincent, "has shown great manhood and ability, his position having -been very critical, exposed to a hard gale of wind, blowing directly -on shore, with an enemy of superior force to windward, and twenty-two -ships-of-the-line in Cadiz ready to profit by any disaster that might -have befallen him."[256] Bruix, who knew that his captains, long -confined to port by the policy of their government, were not able to -perform fleet manœuvres in ordinary weather, dared not attack on a -lee shore with a wind that would tax all the abilities of experienced -seamen.[257] He therefore kept away again to the south-east, -determining to lose no time, but at once to enter the Mediterranean; -and the following day Lord St. Vincent, gazing from the rock of -Gibraltar through the thick haze that spread over the Straits, saw, -running before the gale, a number of heavy ships which, from dispatches -received the day before, he knew must be French. - -The situations of the vessels in his extensive command, as present -that morning to the mind of the aged earl, must be realized by the -reader if he would enter into the embarrassment and anxiety of the -British commander-in-chief, or appreciate the military significance -of Bruix's appearance, with a large concentrated force, in the midst -of dispositions taken without reference to such a contingency. The -fifteen ships off Cadiz, with one then lying at Tetuan, on the Morocco -side of the Straits, where the Cadiz ships went for water, were the -only force upon which St. Vincent could at once depend, and if they -were called off the Spanish fleet was released. At Minorca, as yet -imperfectly garrisoned,[258] was an isolated body of four ships under -Commodore Duckworth. Lord Nelson's command in the central Mediterranean -was disseminated, and the detachments, though not far out of supporting -distance, were liable to be separately surprised. Troubridge with four -vessels was blockading Naples, now in possession of the French, and -at the same time co-operating with the resistance made to the foreign -intruders by the peasantry under Cardinal Ruffo. Nelson himself, with -one ship, was at Palermo, and the faint-hearted court and people -were crying that if he left them the island was lost. Captain Ball, -with three of the line, blockaded Malta, the only hope of subduing -which seemed to be by rigorous isolation. Far to the eastward, up the -Mediterranean, without a friendly port in which to shelter, Sidney -Smith with two ships, unsuspicious of danger from the sea, was then -drawing to an end the defence of Acre. - -Each of these British divisions lay open to the immensely superior -force which Bruix brought. Not only so, but the duties of an important -nature to which each of them was assigned were threatened with -frustration. So large a fleet as that of Bruix might, and according -to the usual French practice probably would, have numerous troops -embarked.[259] No amount of skill could rescue Troubridge's division -from such a disproportion of force, and with it would fall the -resistance of Naples. Only flight could save the ships off Malta, and -St. Vincent saw the blockade raised, the garrison re-enforced and -re-victualled; as within his own memory had so often been done for -Gibraltar, in its famous siege not twenty years before. Duckworth's -little squadron could not prevent the landing of an army which would -sweep Minorca again into the hands of Spain, and the British commodore -might consider himself fortunate if, in so difficult a dilemma, he -extricated his ships from a harbor always hard to leave.[260] Spain -also had in Cartagena and Majorca a number of soldiers that could be -rapidly thrown into Minorca under cover of such a fleet. - -The British admiral instantly decided to sacrifice all other objects to -the concentration of his fleet in such a position as should prevent the -junction of the French and Spaniards; against which the presence off -Cadiz of Keith's squadron, though inferior in numbers to either, had so -far effectually interposed. He at once sent off dispatches to all his -lieutenants; but the westerly gales that were driving Bruix to his goal -made it impossible to get ship or boat to Keith. This admiral was only -reached by an indulgence from the Spanish officials, between whom and -the British an intercourse of courtesy was steadily maintained. These -granted to Admiral Coffin, who had been appointed to a post in Halifax, -passports to proceed to Lisbon through Spain; and Coffin on the way -contrived to get a boat sent off to Keith, with orders which brought -him to Gibraltar on the 10th. To Nelson the earl wrote that he believed -the enemy were bound to Malta and Alexandria; and that the Spaniards, -whom he was forced to release from Cadiz, would descend upon Minorca. -Nelson received this message on the 13th of May. The day before, a -brig coming direct from the Atlantic without stopping at Gibraltar had -notified him of the escape from Brest, and that the French had been -seen steering south. On the strength of this he drew from Naples and -Malta all the ships-of-the-line except one before each, directing a -rendezvous off Port Mahon, where he would join Duckworth; but when St. -Vincent's letter came, he called them all in, leaving only frigates -on each station, and ordered the heavy vessels to meet him off the -island of Maritimo, to intercept the French between Sicily and Africa. -He also sent to Duckworth to ask his help; but the commodore declined -until he could communicate with the commander-in-chief, from whom he -had received orders to keep his division in readiness to join the main -fleet when it appeared. - -St. Vincent's position, in truth, was one of utter and dire perplexity. -If the French and Spaniards got together, he would have forty-four -enemy's vessels on his hands; against which, by sacrificing every other -object, he could only gather thirty until re-enforced by the Channel -fleet, upon whose remissness he could hardly fail to charge his false -position. To lose Minorca and Sicily, to see Malta snatched from his -fingers when ready to close upon it, the French position in Naples -established, and that in Egypt so strengthened as to become impregnable -to either attack or reduction by want, such were the obvious probable -consequences of Bruix's coming. Besides these evident dangers, he very -well knew from secret official information that the Spanish court were -in constant dread of a popular insurrection, which would give the -French a pretext for entering the peninsula,—not, as in 1808, to impose -a foreign king upon an unwilling nation, but to promote a change in -the government which the distress of the people, though usually loyal, -would probably welcome. In March he had received a communication from -the Spanish prime minister, asking that a British frigate might be -detailed to bring remittances from the Spanish colonies to Gibraltar, -to be afterwards conveyed into Spain. The reason given for making -this request of an enemy was that the want of specie, and consequent -delay in public payments, especially to the soldiery, made revolution -imminent. St. Vincent recommended his government to comply, because of -the danger, in case of disturbances, that both Spain and Portugal might -fall under subjection to France.[261] - -Fortunately, amid the conflicting claims of diverse interests, the -path of military wisdom was perfectly clear to one understanding its -principles. St. Vincent might be agitated by apprehensions; but he -knew what he must do, and did it. To get his own fleet together and at -the same time prevent the allies from uniting theirs, was the first -thing; and the point of concentration indicated for this purpose -should be one that would cover Minorca, if he arrived before it was -reduced. For Sicily, Malta, and all to the eastward, he must trust to -the transcendent abilities of Nelson and his "band of brothers."[262] -On the 12th, after two days of hurried preparations, the British -fleet sailed from Gibraltar. On the 20th it reached Minorca, found it -still safe, and was joined by Duckworth's division, raising the force -to twenty ships-of-the-line. St. Vincent here received information -that the French had on the 12th been seen north of Minorca, heading -for Toulon.[263] Sending this news to Nelson he sailed on the 22d in -pursuit; but learning that the Spaniards after Keith's departure had -left Cadiz, as he had expected, he decided to cruise off Cape San -Sebastian on the Spanish coast. Seventeen sail of Spaniards had indeed -reached Cartagena on the 20th; but in the passage from Cadiz eleven had -been partly or totally dismasted, and this circumstance was sufficient -excuse for not proceeding to a junction, to which the policy of their -court was but little inclined. - -On the 30th of May St. Vincent heard that the French had sailed again -from Toulon, but for what purpose was not known. As it might follow the -course of Bonaparte's expedition, east of Corsica, and fall upon Sicily -and Malta, he sent Duckworth with four ships to Nelson at Palermo, -and four hours later was joined by the first detachment of five -sail-of-the-line from the Channel,[264] of whose nearness he doubtless -had some intimation before parting with Duckworth. With twenty-one sail -he now stood south-west toward Barcelona, then north-east for Toulon. -On the 2d of June, when seventy miles from this port, his health gave -way altogether. He turned over the command to Keith and departed to -Port Mahon. - -Keith continued steering to the northward and eastward. On the 5th of -June he was joined by a small cruiser, which had seen the French fleet -in Vado Bay the day before. Bruix had reached Toulon May 14, and sailed -again on the 26th, taking with him twenty-two ships; the others being -left in port for repairs. He steered east, carrying supplies and a few -recruits for the army of Italy. On the 4th of June he had anchored in -Vado Bay. A detachment from the fleet threw the supplies into Genoa, -and it would seem that Bruix there had an interview with General -Moreau, then commanding the army of Italy. On the 6th,[265] turning -short round, he doubled on his tracks, following close along the coast -of Piedmont and Provence to avoid the British,[266] passed again in -sight of Toulon to obtain information,[267] and from there pushed on to -Cartagena, where he anchored on the 22d; thus making with the Spanish -fleet the junction which had been frustrated before Cadiz. - -On the same day that Bruix turned, Lord Keith, who had also passed -close along the French coast between Cannes and Nice,[268] standing to -the eastward, reached as far as Monaco. Then the wind shifted to the -eastward, and he wrote as follows to Nelson: "Soon after I despatched -the 'Telegraph'" (the vessel which saw the French in Vado Bay) "last -night, _the wind came fresh from the east_, which is of course a fair -wind for the enemy, if bound towards you" (by the east of Corsica) "and -a foul wind for me to follow them, which is unfortunate; for, if my -information was just, I had no doubt of overtaking them before they had -left the coast of Italy; ... but _the defenceless state of Minorca_, -without a fleet, the great force prepared (at Cartagena) to attack it, -added to my having so far exceeded my orders already, will oblige me to -relinquish the pursuit, and return to the protection of that island. -But I have detached to your lordship the 'Bellerophon' and 'Powerful' -(seventy-fours), which I hope will arrive in time, as I am confident -_the French are not thirty leagues hence at this moment_."[269] - -Being close in with the shore with an east wind, Keith could only stand -off on the port tack, and it would appear that he still clung to the -hope of a shift favorable for reaching Bruix; for on the 8th he was -sixty miles south of Monaco,[270] not on the route for Minorca. There -he received from St. Vincent, who, though relinquishing the immediate -command of the fleet, retained that of the station, pressing orders -to take a position off the Bay of Rosas. This was evidently intended -to block the junction of the two fleets, though St. Vincent could not -have known Bruix's purpose to return. Keith did not obey the order; but -seems under its influence to have abandoned definitively his hope of -overtaking the French, for he made sail for Minorca, and arrived there -on the 12th.[271] Had he obeyed St. Vincent he could scarcely have -failed to meet Bruix, for at the moment of receiving his letter the two -fleets were hardly sixty miles apart, and both would have passed within -sight of Cape San Sebastian, the natural landfall of vessels going from -Toulon to Cartagena. - -Keith remained at Minorca but a few days, during which St. Vincent -turned over to him the command of the station as well as of the -fleet.[272] He sailed again on the 15th for Toulon; but the British had -completely lost trace of the French from the time that they surrendered -the touch of them obtained on the 5th of the month. From the 15th of -June to the 6th of July[273] was passed groping blindly in the seas -between Minorca, Toulon, and Genoa. On the latter date Keith regained -Minorca, and there found the twelve ships-of-the-line which Bridport -had detached from Ireland on the 1st of June, and which seem to have -reached Port Mahon about the 17th of that month.[274] Scarcely an hour -after his arrival,[275] information was received of the French having -entered Cartagena. The ships that had accompanied Keith on the recent -three weeks' cruise had to fill with water; but on the 10th he started -for the Straits of Gibraltar with thirty-one ships-of-the-line, on a -stern chase—proverbially a long chase—after the allies, known to be -bound to the westward. - -The latter, however, had a long start. Bruix, aware of the reluctance -of the Spaniards, and secretly informed that in case of attack they -could not be depended upon, hurried them away after a week's waiting, -in virtue of stringent orders wrung from Madrid by the persistence of -the French ambassador. On the 29th of June he sailed, having sixteen -Spanish ships-of-the-line in company. On the 7th of July, just as Keith -reached Minorca from his profitless cruise off Toulon, the allies -were passing the Straits; and it happened, somewhat singularly, that -the old Earl of St. Vincent, who had seen them pass Gibraltar, bound -in, had arrived in a frigate twenty-four hours before,—just in time -to hear their guns as they went out. They entered Cadiz on the 11th -of July, the day after Keith sailed in pursuit from Minorca. On the -21st, still numbering forty sail, they sailed from Cadiz, and on the -30th Keith with his thirty-one passed the Straits, after a moment's -delay at Gibraltar. The British pressed their chase, and, despite its -long start, came off Brest barely twenty-four hours after the French -and Spaniards, who entered the port on the 13th of August. Lord Keith -then went on to Torbay. The news of the junction of the French and -Spaniards, and of their entering the Atlantic, had preceded him, and -caused a renewal of the excitement about intended invasion to which -Great Britain at this epoch was always prone. The arrival of the -large force under his command restored confidence; but although, in -conjunction with the Channel fleet, there were now as many as fifty-six -ships-of-the-line assembled in Torbay, some time elapsed before the -country would part with any of them, while so many enemies lay in -Brest. Keith did not return to the Mediterranean until December, the -chief command there being exercised by Nelson during his absence. - -The exact aims of the French in this cruise, which from the -inefficiency of their officers and seamen was as hazardous in its -undertaking as it proved barren of results, have never been precisely -ascertained. This uncertainty is probably due to the fact that the -Directory itself was not clear as to what could be accomplished, and -that Bruix had somewhat unlimited powers, based upon his confidential -knowledge of the views of the government. It would seem that the first -object, both in importance and in order, was a junction with the -Spaniards in Cadiz. This being frustrated by Keith's division and by -Bruix's distrust of the efficiency of his captains, the opportunities -for offensive action, offered by the scattered condition of the -British ships, were neglected in favor of going to Toulon; for Bruix -seems to have neither felt nor betrayed any doubt as to his course. -"The Brest squadron had such a game to play at Malta and Sicily," wrote -St. Vincent to the First Lord, "that I trembled for the fate of our -ships employed there, and for the latter island. Your lordship made a -better judgment by fixing their operations to the coast of Genoa."[276] -As a matter of fact, this is true; but as a question of military -forecast, St. Vincent was perfectly right, and the action of the -French can only be explained on the ground of distrust of their navy, -or by the old faulty policy—traditional in all French governments, -republican, royal, or imperial—of preferring ulterior objects to the -destruction of the enemy's ships. - -That the relief or re-enforcement of Bonaparte was intended seems -improbable; although both St. Vincent and Nelson entertained this -suspicion, upon which the latter acted. M. Thiers, indeed, finds -Bruix's cruise inexplicable on any other supposition, but he does -not assert the fact.[277] The feelings of the Directory towards that -general were not strictly benevolent, and the ships carried neither -troops nor supplies of importance; but the destruction of Nelson's -scattered detachments, coupled as that might have been with the -victualling of Malta, would have been a most worthy object, and one -of very probable fulfilment. It is noteworthy that Nelson received -his first news of Bruix's approach on the 12th of May, at Palermo, -and on the 14th the French admiral entered Toulon. Now the distance -from Gibraltar to Toulon is only one hundred and fifty miles less -than that from Gibraltar to Palermo. Nelson could not have collected -his ships in time to present a united front; and even could he, his -whole force did not exceed ten or twelve to the enemy's twenty-four. -As it was, Bruix's adventure, though daring in conception and active -in execution, resulted merely in bringing back to France sixteen -Spanish ships-of-the-line to be hostages for the continuance of the -Spanish alliance, tottering under the adverse events of 1799; and this -possibly was the great purpose of the Directory. If so, the excursion -was political rather than military; and hence an opportunity, of a -kind which, when rightly improved, has always been most pregnant of -military consequences—concentration opposed to dispersion—remains to us -merely an impressive lesson of what might have been, but was not. "Your -lordship," wrote Nelson four years later to St. Vincent, "knows what -Admiral Bruix might have done had he done his duty."[278] "The cruise -of Admiral Bruix," says Captain Chevalier,[279] "was well conceived, -but failed through the weakness of our allies and the inexperience of -our own officers and crews.... The Spanish squadron brought to Brest, -the gage of an alliance then very tottering, was the only result of -this campaign. It is impossible to have any illusion as to the extent -of the services rendered by the fleet on the coast of Italy. A division -of frigates would have done as much." - -The conduct of the British admirals in the Mediterranean, caught at -so serious a disadvantage through no fault of their own, deserves -to be considered. Dispersed in a fashion that was perfectly proper -and efficient under the previous conditions, the arrival of Bruix -imposed concentration, with a consequent enforced abandonment of some -positions. St. Vincent's first step was to order Nelson to concentrate -in the neighborhood of Sicily, while he himself drew Keith and -Duckworth together at Minorca. This effected, the British would present -two squadrons; one of twenty ships-of-the-line in the west, centring -about Minorca; the other, four hundred miles distant, of fifteen or -sixteen ships,[280] gathered off the west end of Sicily to dispute -the passage to Malta and Alexandria. This smaller division thus seems -to have been much exposed; but, independently of its greatly superior -efficiency to the French, it must be remembered that St. Vincent, -as soon as he reached Minorca, knew that Nelson was in no immediate -danger, for the French had given him the go-by and gone to Toulon. -Cruising therefore off Cape San Sebastian, to intercept the junction -of the Spaniards to the French, he was in constant touch of Minorca, -barely one hundred miles distant, and, at the same time, was as near -to Nelson as were the French in Toulon, whether they went east or west -of Corsica. Being only one hundred and twenty miles from Toulon, and -in such a position that a wind fair for the French to sail was also -fair to bring his lookouts down to him, he could hope to overtake -them,—if not in time to save Nelson, yet with the certainty of finding -the French so badly handled that they could scarcely escape him. He no -doubt reasoned as did Nelson to the ministry just before Trafalgar: "I -ventured without any fear [to predict] that if Calder [with eighteen -ships] got fairly alongside their twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail, -by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly, they would do us -no harm this year."[281] Save Malta, which could not have maintained -the twenty thousand men in their fleet for a month and was otherwise -barren of resources, the French would have had no port to fall back on -and would have been lost to the republic.[282] Had St. Vincent cruised -off Cartagena, where the Spaniards were, he would have been in better -position to check them, but he would have uncovered both Minorca and -Nelson to the French; both being nearer to Toulon than to Cartagena. -Not only so, but Cartagena being three hundred miles farther from -Toulon than Cape San Sebastian is, the British lookout ships would have -had all that greater distance to go to their admiral, who, when found, -would then be further from his chief points of interest than when off -the Cape. As soon, however, as St. Vincent learned that the French had -gone east from Toulon, being relieved from any immediate apprehension -concerning the Spaniards, he re-enforced Nelson with four ships, -raising his squadron to sixteen British against a possible French -twenty-four. - -It was during the week following the detachment to Nelson that St. -Vincent left the fleet, and that Keith made the false move which -has been so severely blamed. It appears to the author, from all the -information accessible to him, that Keith took this step wholly -independent of St. Vincent's special orders, which are alleged as -controlling him. He acted in deference, partly, to the general orders -given before turning over the command, and partly to his own views -of the situation.[283] These seem to have differed from those of St. -Vincent, who laid most stress on disabling the enemy's fleets; whereas -Keith was dominated by the fear of losing Minorca. This feeling led -him to deviate from the order to cruise off the Gulf of Rosas, as it -also led him soon after, on two occasions, to direct Nelson to detach -ships for the defence of the island; which Nelson, with very doubtful -propriety, refused to do.[284] Minorca, in this case, very appositely -illustrates the embarrassment of a fleet upon which an important -seaport wholly depends for security. In the present instance the -beating of the French fleet and the protection of Minorca introduced -two apparently divergent motives, which became personified in St. -Vincent and his lieutenant. The former saw the best protection to the -island to be in beating the fleet; Keith subordinated the latter to the -former. With St. Vincent agreed Nelson's simple but accurate view of -naval strategy: "I consider the best defence for his Sicilian Majesty's -dominions is to place myself alongside the French."[285] Keith, on the -other hand, in a somewhat later letter, expresses almost pathetically -the embarrassment caused by his inferior strategic insight. "It is -very hard I cannot find these vagabonds in some spot or other, and -that I am so _shackled_ with this defenceless island."[286] Properly -every seaport should be able to hold out for a length of time, longer -or shorter, according to its importance, entirely independent of the -fleet. The latter will then be able to exert its great faculty, its -mobility, unfettered by considerations of what is happening at the -port. For so long the latter is safe; meanwhile the fleet may be -absent. The best coast-defence is a navy; not because fortifications -are not absolutely necessary, but because beating the enemy's fleet is -the best of all defences. - -After the vain pursuit of Admiral Bruix, Lord Keith brought his fleet -into Torbay on the 17th of August. On the 18th Earl St. Vincent landed -at Portsmouth, thus formally quitting the Mediterranean command, which -he had held for three years and nine months. Four days afterwards, on -the 22d of August, 1799, Bonaparte secretly embarked at Alexandria to -return into France. - -After the Syrian campaign the French army had re-entered Cairo on the -14th of June. On the 11th of July Sir Sidney Smith, with his two ships, -anchored in Aboukir Bay, accompanying, or being accompanied by, a -Turkish fleet of thirteen ships-of-the-line with a hundred other sail -of frigates and transports. Embarked on board the latter were troops -variously estimated at from ten to thirty thousand men.[287] On the -15th Bonaparte, at Cairo, learned that his anticipations of an attack -by sea, during the fine season, had been realized. He promptly ordered -Desaix to evacuate upper Egypt for the security of Cairo, and rapidly -drew together in the neighborhood of Alexandria the detachments in -lower Egypt. This concentration was effected on the 19th, but by that -time the Turks had landed and stormed the Castle of Aboukir, which fell -on the 16th. On the 25th the French attacked the enemy on the peninsula -of Aboukir, and the same scene that had witnessed the destruction of -Brueys's squadron a year before now saw the entire overthrow of the -Mahometan army. All who had landed were either killed, driven into the -sea and drowned, or taken prisoners. Among the latter was the Turkish -commander-in-chief. - -After the defeat flags of truce passed between Bonaparte and the -British commodore, through which the former received English newspapers -up to the 10th of June.[288] By them he learned the victorious advance -of the second coalition, and the defeats of the French in Germany -and Italy. His resolution was speedily taken to return to France. It -has been disputed whether this was a sudden determination not before -entertained, as asserted by his secretary Bourrienne; or whether -it represents a purpose gradually and naturally formed. Napoleon -himself in later years attributed his decision to information obtained -from Phélippeaux in the trenches before Acre; when the combatants, -separated by but a few yards, often exchanged words.[289] It is, -however, certain that the thought had long been familiar to him; -for, in a letter to the Directory as early as October 7, 1798, he -had announced his intention of returning to Europe in certain very -probable contingencies.[290] The same message was repeated a few -months later.[291] In truth his keen military sagacity, resembling -the most delicate yet most highly cultivated intuitions, had divined -the misfortunes awaiting France at the time he learned by the Ragusan -ship that Naples had declared war and that all[292] the powers were -arming. During his own Italian campaign, even after the British had -left the Mediterranean, his mind had been preoccupied with the danger -from Naples; and he foresaw in Egypt the disasters that must result -from an ex-centric movement of the French army in that quarter, if -followed by any reverses in upper Italy. Bourrienne tells a story -which illustrates vividly the superstitious vein in his character, -as well as the foreboding of evil that he had carried with him into -Syria. While before Acre, news was received that a Nile boat named the -"Italy," in the employ of the French army, had after a gallant defence -been blown up by her crew to avoid capture by the Arabs. The incident -and the name made a strong impression upon Bonaparte. "My friend," -said he to Bourrienne, "Italy is lost to France. All is over; my -presentiments never deceive me;" nor could any argument rid his mind of -this conviction, dependent rather upon his instinctive perceptions than -upon a slight and fortuitous coincidence.[293] So, when he read Sidney -Smith's gazettes, he cried again: "My presentiment did not deceive me! -Italy is lost!"[294] - -Admiral Ganteaume was directed to prepare rapidly two of the frigates -which had fallen to France in her share of the spoil of Venice; and -the persons intended to accompany the general were quietly notified. -After the defeat of the Turks at Aboukir, Sidney Smith had resumed -the blockade of Alexandria; but on the 9th of August he withdrew -to Cyprus, probably for water. Taking advantage of the opportunity, -Bonaparte sailed, and after a tedious passage landed at Fréjus on the -9th of October. One month later the Directory was overthrown and the -supreme power in France passed into Bonaparte's hands. - -Thus ended, so far at least as the great designer was concerned, -Bonaparte's Oriental Expedition; an undertaking which has been freely -stigmatized as a dream, marked by the eccentricities of its author's -genius, not by his usual keen intelligence. A dream it was, it is true; -but not for its Eastern impossibilities, nor for its wide flights of -imagination, the faculty which Bonaparte possessed in so eminent a -degree, without which he never could have conceived his extraordinary -policy, and to which he usually joined a width and depth of practical -wisdom which balanced his imagination and made possible the realizing -of his visions. That it was no dream to rouse and combine the nations -of the East under the headship of one man, witness the careers of the -adventurers who there, from age to age, have risen to empire; and who -certainly were not superior in genius, nor as leaders of men, to the -great Corsican. Witness, too, the motley host which he gathered under -one standard, from all the highly organized nations of continental -Europe, for that other great Eastern expedition in which he wrecked -his fortunes. The Egyptian enterprise and all its brilliant hopes -definitively failed at Acre, in the march against Turkey through -Syria; and it failed,—why? Because a British seaman, by his command -of the sea and his support to the garrison, maintained the possession -of a place, to advance beyond which, unsubdued, would entail ruin. -Forty years later an army, not of the superb soldiers of the French -revolution, but of native Egyptians, led by Ibrahim Pasha, whom none -will equal to Napoleon, undertook the same march, captured Acre, and -had progressed victoriously into the heart of Asia Minor when the -British navy again interfered and called a halt. How came it that a -naval captain, with two ships-of-the-line and a few small vessels, -controlled absolutely the far east of the Mediterranean? Because in -Aboukir Bay, nine months before, Nelson had destroyed the French fleet. -That magnificent battle not only signalized the genius for war of the -British admiral, but proclaimed aloud the existence of a power destined -ever, and in all parts, to clip the wings of the coming emperor. The -Eastern enterprise of Bonaparte failed, not because of miscalculations -as to what was possible in that far East, which Western people so ill -can understand; but because he, to the end of his career, was never -able rightly to appreciate the conditions of naval warfare. His perfect -military insight was not mistaken in affirming that the principles of -war upon the sea must be the same as upon land; it was by the failure -to comprehend the circumstances to which the principles must be -applied—the failure to realize the possibilities and the limitations -of the naval warfare of his day—that the general and the emperor -were alike led into fatal miscalculations. The Nile and Trafalgar, -each the grave of a great conception, proclaimed the same cause and -the same effect; underlying each was the inability of Napoleon to -understand what ships could do and what they could not, according to -the conditions of the sea and the capacity of the seamen. - -There was, however, one radical fallacy underlying Bonaparte's -Egyptian, or rather Oriental, expedition,—for in his mind it far -outleaped the narrow limits of the Nile valley,—and that lay in the -effect he expected to produce upon Great Britain. It is all very -well to stigmatize, after Lanfrey's fashion, as the vagaries of a -distempered fancy, the vast projects of Eastern conquest and dominion, -which unquestionably filled his mind with dreams of a sweep to his arms -rivalling that of Alexander and of the Roman legions. An extraordinary, -perhaps even an extravagant, imagination was one of the necessary -conditions of Napoleon's wonderful career. That it should from time -to time lead him into great mistakes, and ultimately to his ruin, was -perhaps inevitable. Without it, or with it in a markedly less degree, -he might have died in his palace an old man and left his throne to -a son, if not to a dynasty; but also without it he would not have -produced upon his own age and upon all subsequent history the effects -which he has left. To it were due the Oriental visions, to which, -regarded as a military enterprise, the present writer is certainly not -ready to apply the word "fantastic." But, as a blow directed against -Great Britain, there was in them a fatal defect of conception, due more -to a miscalculation of the intellect, a prejudice of his day, than to a -wild flight of fancy. - -In the relations of India to Great Britain, Bonaparte, in common with -all Frenchmen of his age, mistook effect for cause. The possession -of India and of other colonies was to them the cause of British -prosperity; just as at a later time, and now, the wide extent of -British commerce has seemed to many the cause of Great Britain's wealth -and eminence among the nations. That there is truth in this view is not -to be denied; but it is the kind of truth compatible with putting the -cart before the horse, mistaking the fruit for the tree, the flower -for the plant. There was less excuse for a blunder of this kind in a -quick-witted nation like the French, for they had before their eyes -the fact that they had long owned some of the richest colonies in -the world; and yet the British had, upon their own ground, amid all -disadvantages of position, absorbed the commerce of the West Indies, -French as well as Spanish. In local advantages, Great Britain in the -West Indies had not the tenth of what France and Spain had; yet she so -drank the wealth of the region that one fourth of her envied commerce -then depended upon it. So in India; Great Britain sucked the wealth -of India, because of the energy and commercial genius of her people. -Had Bonaparte's visions been realized and India dominated, Great -Britain would not have been overcome. A splendid bough would have been -torn from a tree, and, in falling, would have carried to the ground -the fruit depending from it; but not only was the amount of the fruit -exaggerated, but the recuperative power of the root, the aptitude -of the great trunk to throw out new branches, was not understood. -Had Bonaparte converted the rule of India from England to France, he -would have embarrassed, not destroyed, British traffic therein. Like -the banyan tree, a new sucker would have been thrown out and reached -the soil in some new spot, defying efforts at repression; as British -commerce later refused to die under the far more searching efforts of -the Continental System. - -The strength of Great Britain could be said to lie in her commerce -only as, and because, it was the external manifestation of the wisdom -and strength of the British people, unhampered by any control beyond -that of a government and institutions in essential sympathy with -them. In the enjoyment of these blessings,—in their independence and -untrammelled pursuit of wealth,—they were secured by their powerful -navy; and so long as this breastplate was borne, unpierced, over the -heart of the great organism, over the British islands themselves, Great -Britain was—not invulnerable—but invincible. She could be hurt indeed, -but she could not be slain. Herein was Bonaparte's error. His attempt -upon India was strategically a fine conception; it was an attack -upon the flank of an enemy whose centre was then too strong for him; -but as a broad effort of military policy,—of statesmanship directing -arms,—it was simply delivering blows upon an extremity, leaving the -heart untouched. The same error pervaded his whole career; for, with -all his genius, he still was, as Thiers has well said, the child of -his century. So, in his later years, he was beguiled into the strife -wherein he bruised Great Britain's heel, and she bruised his head. -Yet his mistake, supreme genius that he was, is scarce to be wondered -at; for after all the story of his career, of his huge power, of -his unrelenting hostility, of his indomitable energy, unremittingly -directed to the destruction of his chief enemy,—after all this and its -failure,—we still find men harping on the weakness of Great Britain -through her exposed commerce. Her dependence upon trade, and the -apparent slackening of the colonial ties, foretell her fatal weakness -in the hour of trial. So thought Napoleon; so think we. Yet the -commercial genius of her people is not abated; and the most fruitful -parts of that colonial system existed scarcely, if at all, in those old -days, when her commerce was as great in proportion to her numbers as it -is now. To paralyze this, it must be taken by the throat; no snapping -at the heels will do it. To command the sea approaches to the British -islands will be to destroy the power of the State; as a preliminary -thereto the British navy must be neutralized by superior numbers, or by -superior skill. - -Like the furtive intrusion and hasty retreat of Bruix's fleet, the -stealthy manner of Bonaparte's return to Europe proclaimed the control -of the Mediterranean by the British navy, and foretold the certain fall -of his two great conquests, Egypt and Malta. His own personal credit -was too deeply staked upon their deliverance, both by his original -responsibility for the expedition and by the promises of succor made to -the soldiers abandoned in Egypt, to admit a doubt of his wish to save -them, if it could be done. His correspondence is full of the subject, -and numerous efforts were made; as great, probably, as were permitted -by the desperate struggle with external enemies and internal disorder -in which he found France plunged. All, however, proved fruitless. The -detailed stories of the loss of Egypt and of Malta by France have much -interest, both for the military and unprofessional reader; but they -are summed up in the one fact which prophesied their fall: France had -lost all power to dispute the control of the sea. From February, 1799, -when a small frigate entered La Valetta, to January, 1800, not a vessel -reached the port. In the latter month a dispatch-boat got in, bringing -news of Bonaparte's accession to power as First Consul; which event, -though two months old, was still unknown to the garrison. On the 6th -of February Admiral Perrée, who had served on the Nile and in Syria to -Bonaparte's great satisfaction, sailed from Toulon with the "Généreux," -seventy-four, one of the ships that had escaped from Aboukir Bay, three -smaller vessels, and one large transport. A quantity of supplies and -between three and four thousand troops for the relief of Malta were -embarked in the squadron. On the 18th they fell in with several British -ships, under Nelson's immediate command; and after the exchange of a -few shots, one of which killed Perrée, the "Généreux" and the transport -struck to a force too superior to be resisted. The other ships returned -to Toulon. - -All further attempts to introduce relief likewise failed. During the -two years' blockade, from September, 1798, to September, 1800, only -five vessels succeeded in entering the port.[295] The "Guillaume -Tell," which had lain in Valetta harbor since the battle of the -Nile, attempted to escape on the night of the 31st of March, being -charged with letters to Bonaparte saying that the place could not -hold out longer than June. The ship was intercepted by the British, -and surrendered after a brilliant fight, in which all her masts were -shot away[296] and over a fifth of her crew killed and wounded. One of -the vessels sharing in this capture was Lord Nelson's flag-ship, the -"Foudroyant," but the admiral himself was not on board. Swayed by a -variety of feelings, to analyze which is unnecessary and not altogether -pleasant to those who admire his fame, he had asked, after the return -of Lord Keith, to be relieved and granted a repose to which his long -and brilliant services assuredly entitled him. He thus failed to -receive the surrender of the last of the ships which escaped from the -Nile, and to accomplish the reduction of Malta, whose ultimate fate had -been determined by his previous career of victory. The island held out -until the 5th of September, 1800. Nelson on the 11th of July struck his -flag in Leghorn, and in company with the Hamiltons went home overland, -by way of Trieste and Vienna, reaching England in November. - -The story of Egypt is longer and its surrender was later,—due also to -force, not to starvation. An army powerful enough to hold in submission -and reap the use of the fertile valley of the Nile, could never be -reduced like the port of a rocky island, blocked by sea and surrounded -by a people in successful insurrection. Nevertheless, the same cause -that determined the loss of Malta operated effectually to make Egypt a -worse than barren possession. - -Bonaparte, though wielding uncontrolled sway over all the resources -of France, found as great difficulty in getting news from his -conquest or substantial succor to it as he had had, when in Egypt, to -obtain intelligence from home. Unwearying official effort and lavish -inducements to private enterprise alike proved vain. In the first -week of September, 1800, the return of the "Osiris," a dispatch-boat -that had successfully made the round voyage between France and Egypt, -was rewarded by a gift of three thousand dollars to the captain and -two months' pay to the crew. This extravagant recompense sufficiently -testifies the difficulty of the feat; and over seven weeks later, on -October 29, Bonaparte writes to Menou, "We have no direct news of you -since the arrival of the 'Osiris.'" This letter was to be entrusted -to Admiral Ganteaume; but three months elapsed before that officer -was enabled by a violent gale to evade the British blockade of Brest. -Appeals were made to Spain, and government agents sent throughout -the south of France, as well as to Corsica, to Genoa, to Leghorn, to -the Adriatic, to Taranto, when Italy after Marengo again fell under -Bonaparte's control. Numerous small vessels, both neutral and friendly, -were from every quarter to start for Egypt, if by chance some of them -might reach their destination; but no substantial result followed. For -the most part they only swelled the list of captures, and attested the -absolute control of the sea by Great Britain. - -Kleber, the illustrious general to whom Bonaparte left the burden he -himself dropped, in a letter which fell into the hands of the British, -addressed to the Directory the following words:[297] "I know all the -importance of the possession of Egypt. I used to say in Europe that -this country was for France the fulcrum, by means of which she might -move at will the commercial system of every quarter of the globe; but -to do this effectually, a powerful lever is required, and that lever -is a Navy. Ours has ceased to exist. Since that period everything -has changed; and peace with the Porte is, in my opinion, the only -expedient that holds out to us a method of fairly getting rid of an -enterprise no longer capable of attaining the object for which it was -undertaken."[298] In other words, the French force of admirable and -veteran soldiers in Egypt was uselessly locked up there; being unable -either to escape or to receive re-enforcement, they were lost to their -country. So thought Nelson, who frequently declared in his own vehement -fashion that not one should with his consent return to Europe, and who -gave to Sir Sidney Smith most positive orders on no account to allow -a single Frenchman to leave Egypt under passports.[299] So thought -Bonaparte, despite the censure which he and his undiscriminating -supporters have seen fit to pass upon Kleber. Six weeks before he -sailed for Europe[300] he wrote to the Directory: "We need at least -six thousand men to replace our losses since landing in Egypt.... With -fifteen thousand re-enforcements we could go to Constantinople. We -should need, then, two thousand cavalry, six thousand recruits for the -regiments now here; five hundred artillerists; five hundred mechanics -(carpenters, masons, etc.); five demi-brigades of two thousand men -each; twenty thousand muskets, forty thousand bayonets, etc. etc. _If -you cannot send us all this assistance it will be necessary to make -peace_; for, between this and next June, we may expect to lose another -six thousand men."[301] But how was this help to be sent when the sea -was securely closed? - -Bonaparte and Kleber held essentially the same view of the situation; -but the one was interested, like a bankrupt, in concealing the state -of affairs, the other was not. Kleber therefore gladly closed with a -proposition, made by the Turks under the countenance of Sir Sidney -Smith, who still remained in the Levant, by which the French were to -be permitted to evacuate Egypt and to be carried to France; Turkey -furnishing such transports as were needed beyond those already in -Alexandria. A convention to this effect was signed at El Arish on the -24th of January, 1800, by commissioners representing Kleber on the -one hand and the commander-in-chief of the Turks on the other. The -French army would thus be restored to France, under no obligations -that would prevent its at once entering the field against the allies -of Great Britain and Turkey. Sir Sidney Smith did not sign; but it -appears from his letter of March 8, 1800,[302] to M. Poussielgue, one -of Kleber's commissioners, that he was perfectly cognizant of and -approving the terms of an agreement in direct contravention of the -treaty of alliance between Turkey and Great Britain, and containing an -article (the eleventh) engaging his government to issue the passports -and safe conducts for the return of the French,[303] which depended -absolutely upon its control of the sea, and which his own orders from -his superiors explicitly forbade. - -The British government had meantime instructed Lord Keith that the -French should not be allowed to leave Egypt, except as prisoners of -war. On the 8th of January, over a fortnight before the convention -of El Arish was signed, the admiral wrote from Port Mahon to notify -Smith of these directions, which were identical in spirit with -those he already had from Nelson. With this letter he enclosed one -to Kleber, "to be made use of if circumstances should so require." -This letter, cast in the peremptory tone probably needed to repress -Smith, informed Kleber curtly that he had "received positive orders -not to consent to any capitulation of the French troops, unless they -should lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and -deliver up the ships and stores in Alexandria." Even in this event -they were not to be permitted to return to France until exchanged. -The admiral added that any vessel with French troops on board, having -passports "from others than those authorized to grant them," would -be forced by British cruisers to return to Alexandria.[304] Smith, -knowing that he had exceeded his authority, had nothing to do in face -of this communication but to transmit the letters apologetically to -Kleber, expressing the hope that the engagement allowed by him would -ultimately be sustained. In this he was not deceived. The British -cabinet, learning that Kleber had executed an essential part of his -own agreements, under the impression that Smith had authority to -pledge his government, sent other instructions to Keith, authorizing -the carrying out of the convention while expressly denying Smith's -right to accede to it. Owing to the length of time required in that age -for these communications to pass back and forth, such action had been -taken by Kleber, before these new instructions were received, that the -convention never became operative. The French occupation lingered on. -Kleber, being assassinated on the 14th of June, 1800, was succeeded -by Menou, an incapable man; and in March, 1801, a British army under -General Abercromby landed in Aboukir Bay. Abercromby was mortally -wounded on the 21st, at the battle of Alexandria; but his successor was -equal to the task before him, and in September, 1801, shortly before -the preliminaries of peace with Great Britain were signed, the last of -the French quitted Egypt. - -The terms under which the evacuation was made were much the same as -those granted at El Arish; but circumstances had very greatly changed. -The battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800, and the treaty of Lunéville, -February 9, 1801, had restored peace to the Continent; the French -troops would not now re-enforce an enemy to the allies of Great -Britain. Not only so, but since the power of Austria had been broken, -Great Britain herself was intending a peace, to which the policy of -Bonaparte at that time pointed. It was therefore important to her that -in the negotiations the possession of Egypt, however barren, should not -be one of the cards in the adversary's hand. No terms were then too -easy, provided they insured the immediate departure of the French army. - -[Illustration: English Channel and North Sea.] - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - -THE ATLANTIC, 1796-1801.—THE BREST BLOCKADES.—THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONS -AGAINST IRELAND. - - -The decision taken by the French executive in the latter part of -1795,—after the disastrous partial encounters of Martin with Hotham -in the Mediterranean and of Villaret Joyeuse with Bridport in the -Bay of Biscay,—to discontinue sending large fleets to sea, and to -rely upon commerce-destroying, by single cruisers or small squadrons, -to reduce the strength of Great Britain, remained unchanged during -the following years, and was adopted by Bonaparte when the Consular -government, in 1799, succeeded that of the Directory. This policy was -in strict accord with the general feeling of the French nation, as well -naval officers as unprofessional men, by which the action of the navy -was ever subordinated to other military considerations, to "ulterior -objects," as the phrase commonly ran,—a feeling that could not fail to -find favor and expression in the views of the great director of armies -who ruled France during the first fourteen years of this century. It -amounted, however, simply to abandoning all attempt to control the sea. -Consequently, whenever any enterprise was undertaken which required -this to be crossed, resort was necessarily had to evasion, more or less -skilfully contrived; and success depended, not upon the reasonable -certainty conferred by command of the water, by the skilful massing -of forces, but upon a balance of chances, which might be more or less -favorable in the particular instance, but could never be regarded -as reaching the degree of security which is essential, even in the -hazardous combinations of the game of war. This formal relegation of -the navy to a wholly inferior place in the contest then raging, was -followed, under the embarrassments of the treasury, by a neglect of -the material of war, of the ships and their equipments, which left -France still at Great Britain's mercy, even when in 1797 and 1798 her -Continental enemies had been shaken off by the audacity and address of -Bonaparte. - -Thrice only, therefore, during the six years in question, ending -with the Peace of Amiens in 1802, did large French fleets put to -sea; and on each occasion their success was made to depend upon the -absence of the British fleets, or upon baffling their vigilance. As -in commerce-destroying, stealth and craft, not force, were the potent -factors. Of the three efforts, two, Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition -and Bruix's escape from Brest in 1799, have been already narrated -under the head of the Mediterranean, to which they chiefly—-the former -wholly—belong. The third was the expedition against Ireland, under -the command of Hoche, to convoy which seventeen ships-of-the-line and -twenty smaller vessels sailed from Brest in the last days of 1796. - -The operations in the Atlantic during this period were accordingly, -with few exceptions, reduced to the destruction of commerce, to the -harassment of the enemy's communications on the sea, and, on the part -of the British, to an observation, more or less vigilant, of the -proceedings in the enemy's naval ports, of which Brest was the most -important. From the maritime conditions of the two chief belligerents, -the character of their undertakings differed. British commerce covered -every sea and drew upon all quarters of the world; consequently French -cruisers could go in many directions upon the well known commercial -routes, with good hope of taking prizes, if not themselves captured. -British cruisers, on the other hand, could find French merchant -vessels only on their own coast, for the foreign traffic of France -in ships of her own was destroyed; but the coasting trade, carried -on in vessels generally of from thirty to a hundred tons, was large, -and in the maritime provinces took in great measure the place of -land carriage. The neutrals who maintained such foreign trade as was -left to the enemies of Great Britain, and who were often liable to -detention from some infraction, conscious or unconscious, of the rules -of international law, were naturally to be found in greatest numbers in -the neighborhood of the coasts to which they were bound. Finally, the -larger proportion of French privateers were small vessels, intended to -remain but a short time at sea and to cruise in the Channel or among -its approaches, where British shipping most abounded. For all these -reasons the British provided for the safety of their distant commerce -by concentrating it in large bodies called convoys, each under the -protection of several ships of war; while their scattered cruisers were -distributed most thickly near home,—in the English Channel, between the -south coast of Ireland and Ushant, in the waters of the bay of Biscay, -and along the coasts of Spain and Portugal. There they were constantly -at hand to repress commerce-destroying, to protect or recapture their -own merchantmen, and to reduce the coasting trade of the enemy, as well -as the ability of his merchants to carry on, under a neutral flag, the -operations no longer open to their own. The annals of the time are -consequently filled, not with naval battles, but with notes of vessels -taken and retaken; of convoys, stealing along the coast of France, -chased, harassed and driven ashore, by the omnipresent cruisers of the -enemy. Nor was it commerce alone that was thus injured. The supplying -of the naval ports, even with French products, chiefly depended upon -the coasting vessels; and embarrassment, amounting often to disability, -was constantly entailed by the unflagging industry of the hostile -ships, whose action resembled that which is told of the Spanish -guerillas, upon the convoys and communications of the French armies in -the Peninsular War.[305] - -The watch over the enemy's ports, and particularly over the great and -difficult port of Brest, was not, during the earlier and longer part of -this period, maintained with the diligence nor with the force becoming -a great military undertaking, by which means alone such an effort can -be made effective in checking the combinations of an active opponent. -Some palliation for this slack service may perhaps be found in the -knowledge possessed by the admiralty of the condition of the French -fleet and of the purposes of the French government, some also in the -well-known opinions of that once active officer, Lord Howe; but even -these circumstances can hardly be considered more than a palliation for -a system essentially bad. The difficulties were certainly great, the -service unusually arduous, and it was doubtless true that the closest -watch could not claim a perfect immunity from evasion; but from what -human efforts can absolute certainty of results be predicted? and -above all, in war? The essential feature of the military problem, by -which Great Britain was confronted, was that the hostile fleets were -divided, by the necessities of their administration, among several -ports. To use these scattered divisions successfully against her mighty -sea power, it was needed to combine two or more of them in one large -body. To prevent such a combination was therefore the momentous duty of -the British fleet; and in no manner could this be so thoroughly carried -out as by a close and diligent watch before the hostile arsenals,—not -in the vain hope that no squadron could ever, by any means, slip out, -but with the reasonable probability that at no one period could so many -escape as to form a combination threatening the Empire with a crushing -disaster. Of these arsenals Brest, by its situation and development, -was the most important, and contained usually the largest and most -efficient of the masses into which the enemies' fleets were divided. -The watch over it, therefore, was of supreme consequence; and in the -most serious naval crisis of the Napoleonic wars the Brest "blockading" -fleet, as it was loosely but inaccurately styled, by the firmness -of its grip broke up completely one of the greatest of Napoleon's -combinations. To it, and to its admiral, Cornwallis, was in large -measure due that the vast schemes which should have culminated in the -invasion of England, by one hundred and fifty thousand of the soldiers -who fought at Austerlitz and Jena, terminated instead in the disaster -of Trafalgar. Yet it may be said that had there prevailed in 1805 -the system with which the names of Howe and Bridport are identified, -and which was countenanced by the Admiralty until the stern Earl St. -Vincent took command, the chances are the French Brest fleet would have -taken its place in the great strategic plan of the Emperor. - -This far-reaching combination, so tremendous in its risks and in its -issues that men have doubted, and always will doubt, whether Napoleon -seriously meant to carry it through, was but the supreme example of -the dangers to which Great Britain was exposed, and from which her -fleets had to shield her. It was aimed, with the true insight of -genius, directly at her heart; and except from occasional assertions -of the emperor, whose words can never be implicitly believed, there is -really little cause for doubt that he was prepared to take many chances -of ruin in order to execute an enterprise which, both in conception -and details, was so clearly stamped with the characteristics of his -intellect and temperament. But the widely scattered dominions of Great -Britain offered many points, besides the British islands themselves, -to the blows of an enemy; and her navy had to protect not merely the -heart but the extremities, each and all of which were threatened, -in proportion to their value and their means of resistance, when a -hostile squadron was loose upon the sea. How, then, should this service -be performed? By dividing the fleet among the points threatened, -and establishing the line of defence close before the region to be -defended? Not so should the true maxim, that the British navy was -the first line of defence, have been interpreted. As in all military -campaigns, the front of operations of a powerful fleet should be pushed -as far towards the enemy as is consistent with the mutual support of -the various detachments, and with secure communication with their base. -By so doing, not only are the great national interests placed more -remote from the alarms of war, but the use of the region behind the -front of operations, in this case the sea, is secured to the power that -can afford to maintain its fighting line close to the enemy's positions. - -Not merely to check great combinations threatening great disasters, -but to protect as far as possible minor but important interests, and -for the security of commerce itself, the true station for the British -fleets, superior in temper if not in numbers to the enemy, was before -the hostile ports and as close to them as might be. There, though their -function was defensive, as in the last analysis that of the British -Empire also was, they were ever ready, did opportunity offer, to -assume the offensive. "Every opportunity will be given to the Toulon -squadron to put to sea," wrote Nelson, "for it is on the sea that we -hope to realize the expectations of our country,"—a hope which it was -given him to fulfil at Trafalgar, where the greater designs of Napoleon -were forever crushed. This hope of Nelson's was, however, based upon -a close watch of his port, to establish which by constant cruising -before it he avowed his purpose;[306] and the enforced abandonment of -this plan, from the crazy condition of several of his ships, was the -first cause of the perplexities which pursued him through the campaign. -Did an enemy's division escape, as from Toulon and at other times, the -general policy was not invalidated by such occasional failure. The -first line of defence had been pierced at a single point; there still -remained the other lines, the fortified ports and the soldiers behind -them, or, in a maritime region like the West Indies, a detachment of -ships more or less adequate to contest the ground until re-enforced. - -A wisely co-ordinated system of defence does not contemplate that -every point is to hold out indefinitely, but only for such time as -may be necessary for it to receive the support which the other parts -of the whole are intended to supply. That the navy is the first line -of defence, both in order and in importance, by no means implies -that there is or should be no other. This forced and extravagant -interpretation, for which naval officers have been largely responsible, -of the true opinion that a navy is the best protection for a sea -frontier, has very much to do with that faulty strategy which would tie -the fleet, whatever its power, to the home ports, and disseminate it -among them. Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with armies; -but when wisely handled, they may save their country the strain which -comes when these have to be called into play,—when war, once remote, -now thunders at the gates, and the sea, the mother of prosperity, is -shut off. This kindly office did British seamen for Great Britain in -the days of Napoleon, and mainly through those close blockades of which -St. Vincent set the pattern before Toulon in the Mediterranean,[307] -and afterwards before Brest, when he took command of the Channel fleet. - -The port of Brest, regarded as the principal hostile arsenal round -which must centre the operations of a great part of the British navy, -has to be considered under two sets of conditions: 1st, as to its -position, relatively to the British bases of operations and to points -of British territory open to attack; 2d, as to its own immediate -surroundings, how far they facilitated the action of the French navy, -and what dispositions of the British fleet were necessary in order -best to impede that action. The former question is strategic in its -character, the latter tactical. - -[Illustration: Brest and Its Approaches.] - -At the end of the peninsula which forms the north-western extremity of -France, there is a deep recess in the land, between two capes which -lie nearly in the same north and south line, and are called Pointe St. -Mathieu and Pointe du Raz. The former is the more northerly, and the -distance separating the two is seventeen miles. A promontory making -out from the bottom of the recess divides it into two bays of unequal -dimensions, of which the southern is known as the Bay of Douarnenez -and the northern as that of Brest. The entrance to the former is five -miles wide and unobstructed, so that only partial shelter is obtained; -it gives, however, a safe though rough anchorage, even in westerly -gales. The Bay of Brest, of smaller surface, is entered by a passage -three miles long and only one wide, called the Goulet. With such an -approach, and further favored by the configuration of the surrounding -land, perfect security is found there, as well as facility for carrying -on the work of a fleet, when it would be impossible at the more exposed -anchorage of Douarnenez. From the Goulet to Pointe St. Mathieu the -distance is seven miles; and immediately outside the former are two -open roadsteads, Bertheaume to the north and Camaret to the south, -frequently occupied by French ships prior to a final start on an -expedition, or when waiting for a wind. - -Had these features constituted the whole of the hydrographic -surroundings of Brest Harbor, the task of a British admiral would -have been simpler. A singular combination of dangers conspired to -force him, even in favorable weather, to a station much further from -the coast, and at the same time tended to facilitate the exit of the -French. From both Pointe St. Mathieu and Pointe du Raz a strip of foul -ground, comparatively narrow, extends for fifteen miles directly out -to sea. That from St. Mathieu trends west-north-west and terminates -in the island of Ushant;[308] while from Pointe du Raz a succession -of reefs, shoals, and low islands, the whole known as the Chaussée de -Sein, stretches nearly due west to a point due south of Ushant and -distant from it twenty-two miles. Between these two long, low barriers -lay the principal approach to Brest, the Iroise Channel,—fifteen miles -long and of a width varying from seventeen to twenty-two, nearly double -that of the Straits of Gibraltar,—in which it was not possible to -maintain a body of heavy vessels, particularly the three-decked ships, -of ninety guns and over, which formed a large fraction of the Channel -fleet and were singularly wanting in weatherly qualities. Their short, -high hulls and heavy top-hamper caused them to drift rapidly in bad -weather; and they needed plenty of open sea to leeward for this reason, -and also that they might run before the wind, if too violent. To try -to keep these formidable but unhandy vessels in the Iroise during the -heavy westerly gales which prevail in the Bay of Biscay,[309] with no -refuge from the sea save the enemy's port under their lee, was to court -destruction. - -To keep the English Channel open in case of very heavy weather was -therefore essential to the British fleet. The Island of Ushant, as -favoring this object and also as a conspicuous, easily recognized -off-shore position, became the strategic centre around which the -movements of the main body of the fleet revolved, and to which all -dispositions made to ensure the watching of Brest must have regard, as -to their natural point of reference. - -Given the superiority of force which the British navy usually -possessed, a superiority none too great to bear the tremendous strain -imposed by the dangerous weather and coasts it had to encounter, the -supreme strategic factor was the wind. Brest is farther west than any -English Channel port except Falmouth, which is on the meridian of -Ushant. Falmouth, however, did not stand well as a port in the general -naval opinion of the day, though it had warm advocates;[310] and it -was undoubtedly wanting in room for a number of heavy ships to anchor -together. East of Falmouth there were available the anchorages of -Plymouth, Torbay, and Spithead, distant from Ushant respectively 120, -135, and 210 miles, Falmouth being only 100; but with the exception -of Spithead, they were not secure in all winds. Plymouth Sound was -exposed to the point of danger in south-west gales. Torbay, though safe -in westerly weather, was at times dangerous, as well as difficult to -leave, in the south-easterly storms, which were, however, exceptional. - -Spithead was secure, and was moreover the roadstead of a great naval -arsenal, as was also Plymouth Sound; but its distance, a hundred miles -east of Torbay, with the wind prevailing three-fourths of the time from -the westward, should have been considered an insuperable strategic -objection to sailing ships destined to watch Brest, and especially to -fleets. A sailing ship of fair qualities, proceeding against a dead -head wind, makes good only one third of the distance she actually -sails. With such a wind a port one hundred miles distant is actually -three hundred, and with fleets progress is even slower. To this was -added at Spithead a difficulty seemingly trivial, yet so insuperable -as to be humiliating. With a south-east wind, favorable to go down -Channel, three-decked ships could not get from the anchorage to St. -Helen's (the outer roads only three miles distant), whence they could -sail with a fair wind. - -The whole theory of the blockade of Brest rested on the fact that the -French fleet could not sail in such westerly weather as forced the -British to take refuge in port,[311] and upon the expectation that the -latter by diligence could regain their station with the first of the -east wind, in time to prevent the enemy's escape. This expectation -depended upon the greater rapidity of the British movements and -consequently upon the distance of the point of refuge. For this reason -Spithead was singularly unfit to be the rendezvous of the fleet; yet it -was chosen and maintained by both Howe and Bridport during the seven -years of their consecutive commands. To this they added the practice of -keeping the main body of the fleet in port during the winter months. -The Admiralty, doubtless, was ultimately responsible; but, even with -the sharp lessons of the Irish expedition and Bruix's escape, it needed -the advent of an admiral of St. Vincent's sagacity and temper to insure -the adoption of a more rational and vigorous system. In his words -to the second in command,—when the wild winter weather and his own -declining years compelled him to withdraw from the flag-ship,—"You are -on _no_ account to authorize any ships to go to Spithead, unless you -receive special orders from the Admiralty or from me,"[312] is summed -up the simple, yet fundamental, difference between his policy and that -of his predecessors. All his other careful arrangements to expedite -the refitting of ships, and prolong their stay on the station, are but -detailed instances of the same effort to save time, to keep his fleet -concentrated at the decisive point, and in the largest mass possible. - -After Howe finally retired from the command, Bridport established his -headquarters at Spithead, where during the winter and early spring the -main body of the fleet was commonly assembled. The commander-in-chief -seems himself to have lived ashore, being in April, 1796, created -general port-admiral with liberal appointments. Squadrons of seven or -eight ships-of-the-line, about a fourth of the total force, cruised -to the westward of Ushant, "in the soundings," during the winter, for -periods of two or three months, returning to Spithead when relieved. -Thus was practically realized Lord Howe's policy, to economize the -ships and depend upon vessels kept in good order by staying in port to -follow the French, when information of their sailing was received. This -also was the general plan at the time of the French expedition against -Ireland in the winter of 1796-1797. - -The widespread discontent in Ireland, especially in the Protestant -North, was well known to the Directory, with which, through the French -minister at Hamburg, Irish agents had been in communication as early -as April, 1796. Another, the somewhat celebrated Wolfe Tone, had in the -first months of the year arrived in Paris from the United States with a -similar mission. To their efforts was added the powerful influence of -General Hoche, who had in other fields of action shown military ability -of the highest order; and who, having established his claims upon the -gratitude of his country by the pacification of La Vendée and Brittany, -was now in command of the army in that quarter. In all directions -circumstances seemed favorable. Bonaparte was in the midst of his great -Italian successes; and the reverses inflicted upon Jourdan and Moreau -in Germany by the Archduke Charles were neutralized, for the winter -at least, by the necessity of drawing upon his troops to renew the -Austrian armies in Italy. Spain had declared war against Great Britain; -and there were hopes, destined to be frustrated by the lethargy of her -movements and by the battle of Cape St. Vincent, that the Spanish fleet -could be made to combine with the French for the purposed invasion. The -mission of Lord Malmesbury, although the British government held its -head high, seemed to indicate failing confidence; and the British navy, -however successful in seizing the colonial possessions of its enemies -in all parts of the world, had been unable, through the retirement of -the French fleets from the sea, to win any of those brilliant victories -which restore the courage of nations. St. Vincent, Camperdown, and the -Nile were still in the future. - -The proposed invasion was consequently resolved. It depended avowedly -upon the co-operation of the disaffected inhabitants; but Hoche did -not make the mistake of trusting to them for the most serious part of -the work. No less than twenty thousand troops were to be embarked; and -as the general recognized that the difficulties would by no means be -over when Ireland was reached,—that the British navy, if successfully -eluded by the expedition, would nevertheless seriously interfere -with subsequent supplies,—he insisted upon carrying with him as much -of these, and consequently as many ships, as could be had in Brest. -Efforts were made to increase the force in that port. Five ships under -Admiral Villeneuve were ordered round from Toulon;[313] Richery's -squadron was expected from North America,[314] and the Spaniards were -also called upon. These efforts, however, only caused delay, and -contributed but two of Richery's ships to swell the expedition, the -others being found too shaken to be sent at once to sea. Villeneuve did -not arrive in time, and the Spaniards remained in the Mediterranean. - -The number of seamen at the disposal of the government was limited, -owing to many causes; among which the principal were discontent with -the navy, and the superior attractions of privateering, which had led -not merely to their choosing that service, but also to many being -captured at sea and so lost to their country. This deficiency imposed -a proportionate limit to the number of ships that could be fitted. -There was a dearth likewise of good watch officers. Besides these -controlling circumstances, there were also some manifest advantages in -reducing to the smallest numbers the vessels composing an expedition, -which was to avoid action, to make a short passage at the stormiest -season of the year, and which it was all important should keep united -and arrive together. For these reasons it was decided that the troops -should be embarked on the ships-of-war to their fullest capacity. Each -ship-of-the-line carried six hundred soldiers, making with her crew -a ship's company of thirteen hundred souls. The frigates received -about two hundred and fifty each. Although in this particular instance -the arguments in favor of transporting the army in the ships-of-war -outweighed those against, there is always a grave disadvantage to the -handling and fighting of vessels encumbered by so many useless and -generally sea-sick men. - -Never, however, was a great expedition, destined to encounter -extraordinary risks and to brave one of the stormiest of seas, -more favored than this at the first was by the elements and by the -mismanagement of its enemies. For nearly six weeks before it sailed the -winds prevailed from the east; and during the passage, in mid-winter, -fine weather with favorable winds lasted until the bulk of the fleet -reached the Irish coast. Nor was an enemy's vessel met, to take -advantage of the crowded and inefficient condition of the French ships. -Like Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, though from other causes, Hoche's -ships passed to their destination unseen by any foe powerful enough to -molest. To the enfeebled state of the French navy, to the decay of its -material, to the want of seamen, to the disappearance of the trained -officers, and to the consequent disinclination of the superiors to -undertake the expedition, is to be attributed the failure of an attempt -in which their sympathies had never been enlisted. Hoche, who had -supreme command of both army and navy,[315] found by bitter experience -the delays which incompetent or ill-affected subordinates can impose, -especially in a branch of service of which the commander-in-chief -has not particular knowledge. Villaret Joyeuse, first appointed to -command the fleet, being keenly aware of its defects, was averse from -an enterprise which, in all reasonable probability, would lead to a -meeting at once with the British and with excessively bad weather. He -wished, as did also Truguet, the Minister of Marine, to take a heavy -squadron of eight ships to India; whereby, if the first encounter with -the enemy were evaded, a long passage with much good weather would -permit the crews to be trained, while in the Indian seas they would be -superior in force to their opponents. Truguet, however, harmonized this -object with the proposed expedition by purposing to send the ships to -India after their return from Ireland; while Villaret, who had spent -in the ports the years which the minister had passed in Paris, and -knew intimately the deplorable state of both men and ships, had little -hope of the latter coming back in any state to undertake his favorite -project. - -The hardly concealed bias of the admiral, and the apathy of the -naval officers generally, inspired Hoche with doubts of Villaret's -faithfulness to his task; and upon his urgent remonstrance Morard de -Galles, who fifteen years before had been like Villaret among the -bravest captains of the great Suffren, succeeded to the command. The -new admiral brought to his duty the submissive devotion of a military -man, and had not, as Villaret had, any counter-project of his own; but -the radical defects of an organization, vitiated by years of neglect -and false standards, could not be overcome by a man already advanced -in years in the few short days of hurried preparation. Such as the -French navy had become, through the loss of its heads and the vagaries -of the legislature, such it sailed on the expedition to Ireland. "God -keep me from having anything to do with the navy!" wrote Hoche. "What -an extravagant compound! A great body whose parts are disunited and -incoherent; contradictions of all kinds, indiscipline organized in a -military body. Add to that, haughty ignorance and foolish vanity, and -you have the picture filled out. Poor Morard de Galles! he has already -aged twenty years; how I pity him!"[316] - -The administrative difficulties, caused by poverty of resources, -conspired with the non-arrival of Richery and Villeneuve to delay the -expedition. Fixed first for the early autumn and then for the first of -November, it was not able to sail till the middle of December. Richery -had reached the anchorage of Île d'Aix[317] on the 5th of November with -five ships-of-the-line; but not till the 8th of the following month -could his vessels, racked by their long cruise, sail for Brest. On the -11th they entered the port, where upon examination two only of them -were found fit for the Irish voyage; and the wait for these entailed a -delay which had a singular effect upon the fortunes of the undertaking. - -On the 15th of December the whole body of ships, except Richery's two, -got under way, stood through the Goulet, and anchored that evening in -Bertheaume and Camaret roads, ready for a start,—the wind still fair as -fair could be, at east. The British, under the lax and cautious system -pursued by Bridport and his lieutenants, had then no ships-of-the-line -close up to the port, but only two or three frigates, and these Morard -de Galles drove off with a small detached squadron, hoping thus to -deprive the enemy of precise knowledge of his movements. Sir Edward -Pellew, the senior officer of the frigates, sent one of them, the -"Phœbe," to Admiral Colpoys, commanding the division of Bridport's -fleet then cruising; which, in consequence of the preparations known to -be going on in Brest, had been increased to fifteen sail-of-the-line, -double the usual winter squadron. Contrary to Lord St. Vincent's sound -maxim, "Well up with Ushant in an easterly wind," Colpoys's rendezvous -was about eight leagues to the west of the island, and thither -the frigate went to seek him; but his force, composed largely of -three-deckers, having let go the shelter of the land, had been driven -farther still to leeward, and being nearly fifty miles from Ushant was -not found by the "Phœbe" till the 19th, three days after the French -finally sailed. - -Pellew, one of the most active frigate captains of the time, retired -but a short distance from his pursuers, and next day, the 16th, again -stood in for the French anchorage with his own ship,—well named the -"Indefatigable,"—and the "Révolutionnaire." At noon the enemy were -again sighted, and not long after, Pellew's vigilance was rewarded -by seeing them get under way. Richery's two ships, "Pégase" and -"Révolution," came through the Goulet towards noon, and all the -expedition began at once to lift their anchors between two and three P. -M. of the short winter day. Dispatching the "Révolutionnaire" to the -admiral, Pellew himself remained to watch the course taken by the enemy. - -The imperative need of the French being to escape meeting the British, -and to reach Ireland with force undiminished either by capture or -straggling, Morard de Galles' first object was to avoid Colpoys's -fleet. This was known to be in the direction of Ushant, having been -seen on more than one occasion from the island, and by Richery when -entering Brest. If the departure were unperceived, the uncertainty -of the enemy as to the destination might be counted on to favor the -further movements of the expedition. The French admiral therefore -determined to use the advantage, inestimable to a naval port, which -Brest possesses in a double entrance. Between the Pointe du Raz and the -Chaussée de Sein[318] there is a channel known as the Passage du Raz. -It is narrow, being less than three miles wide in one part, and is sown -with dangers, formidable above all in the night season, during which -it must be passed if the enemy were to be kept in ignorance; but with -a fair wind and good pilots the thing could be done. Morard de Galles -therefore gave the order to the fleet to head, upon getting under way, -for the Passage du Raz, and informed the captains that, after clearing -it, he intended to steer west for one hundred miles. Having provided -for keeping the fleet together so far, each commanding officer was also -given a sealed packet, directing him what to do in case of separation. -It may be said here that these packets,—which were not to be opened -unless in case of parting company,—directed to make Cape Mizen Head -on the south coast of Ireland, near the entrance of Bantry Bay, the -anchorage whence the landing was to be made. There the separated -vessels were to cruise five days, waiting for orders. - -At three o'clock the whole fleet was under sail, the sun was sinking -fast, the weather gloomy and squally; and the vessels, unable to form -from the inexperience of their officers, were running disorderly for -the dangerous pass, the entrance to which, being fifteen miles from -the anchorage they were leaving, could not be reached before dark. The -flag-officers, except Richery, had quitted their own ships-of-the-line -and gone aboard frigates, the two commanders, Hoche and Morard de -Galles, being together on board the "Fraternité." As night fell, -the wind hauled to the southward, threatening to become foul, under -which conditions the passage of the Raz would be impossible. Moved -by the danger, and considering that Colpoys was not within sight, -the admiral by signal countermanded his order, and directed the -fleet to put before the wind and run out by the Iroise channel. In -the confusion and growing darkness this order was not understood. -Morard's own ship and half a dozen more, one only of which was of the -line, obeyed; but all the others continued for the Passage du Raz. -Thus, at the very moment of starting, the two principal officers were -separated from their command. In vain did Morard send a corvette to -enforce his order by voice or by signal,—she was not understood; and -the confusion was increased by Pellew, who, attaching himself to the -leading ships, kept on with them through the Iroise, and by burning -rockets and blue lights, and firing guns, rendered utterly incoherent -the attempts of the French admiral to convey by similar means his -meaning to his fleet.[319] In the midst of the turmoil the "Séduisant," -of seventy-four guns, ran on a rock which lies across the entrance to -the passage, and was totally wrecked, her guns and signals of distress -adding to the uproar.[320] At half-past eight, the "Indefatigable" -saw the ships with which she had kept company pass round the outer -end of the Chaussée de Sein and steer to the southward, with the -hope, doubtless, of rejoining their consorts. Pellew then made sail -for Falmouth, where he arrived on the 20th of December. Had this port -then been the rendezvous of the Channel fleet, or even of a strong -detachment, there would still have been time, for the French did not -reach Bantry Bay till the 22d; the wind was east, and the distance but -two hundred and fifty miles. - -On the morning of the 17th of December, the French were divided -into three bodies out of sight of each other. With the two -commanders-in-chief were one ship-of-the-line and three frigates. -Rear-Admiral Bouvet, the second in command, had with him eight -ships-of-the-line and nine other vessels. In accordance with his -orders he continued to steer west during the 17th and 18th. On the -19th, having opened his sealed instructions and reached the longitude -of Mizen Head, he changed the course to north, and the same day was -joined by the third section of the expedition, thus concentrating under -his command fifteen ships-of-the-line, and, with three unimportant -exceptions, all the other vessels except those with Hoche and Morard. -Grouchy, second to Hoche, was with Bouvet; so that the admiral now had -with him practically the whole body of the expedition. Unfortunately -the soul, the young, gallant, and skilful Hoche, the emulous rival of -Bonaparte's growing glory, who saw in the Irish expedition the great -hope of restoring the brilliancy of his own star, paling before that of -his competitor,—Hoche was absent. - -With a brief exception of southwesterly weather, the wind continued -from the eastward during the whole of Bouvet's passage; and -notwithstanding a good deal of fog, at times very dense,[321] all those -who were with him on the 19th—thirty-five out of the forty-three -which composed the expedition—found themselves on the early morning -of December 21st together, and in full sight of the Irish coast. "It -is most delicious weather," wrote the eager, restless Irishman, Wolfe -Tone, who was on board one of the ships, "with a favorable wind and -everything we can desire, except our missing comrades. At the moment -I am writing we are under easy sail, within three leagues at most of -the coast, so that I can discern patches of snow upon the mountains. -What if the general do not join? If we cruise here five days according -to our instructions, the English will be upon us and all will be over. -_Nine o'clock_ (P. M.). We are now at the rendezvous appointed; stood -in for the coast till twelve (noon), when we were near enough to toss -a biscuit ashore. At twelve tacked and stood out again, so we have now -begun our cruise of five days in all its forms.... We opened Bantry -Bay; and in all my life rage never entered so deep into my heart -as when we turned our backs. Continue making short tacks; the wind -foul."[322] - -The wind was now foul, not because of its own change, but because -from the entrance of Bantry Bay to its head the direction is -east-north-east. The wind that had been favorable for leaving Brest -and for the passage was for the short remaining distance, not over -thirty miles at the most, nearly dead ahead. Unfortunately, also, in -sailing north along the meridian of Bantry Bay, the east wind had set -the fleet imperceptibly to the westward, so that the land first seen -was not Mizen Head, at the eastern side of the entrance, but Dursey -Island, at the western.[323] Had the intended landfall been made, the -ships might, by hauling close round Mizen Head, have fetched a point -at least twelve miles inside of Dursey Island and there anchored. Now -that fortune ceased to waft them with favoring gales, the weaknesses -of the expedition became painfully apparent. Crews composed mainly of -landsmen, with a very small sprinkling of able seamen, crowded and -impeded at every turn by the swarming mass of soldiery, were ill able -to do the rapid handling of ropes and canvas necessitated by a dead -beat of thirty miles, against a strong head wind in a narrow bay, where -every rod lost tells, and requires three or four rods of sailing to -be regained; where sails must be reefed or hoisted, set or furled, -at a moment's notice, and the canvas spread varies from half-hour to -half-hour. Such a tug tasks the skill, as it proclaims the excellence, -of the smartest single ship, though she find the channel clear of other -vessels; but to a fleet of thirty-five, manned and equipped as those -of Bouvet, and compelled to give way continually as they crossed each -other's paths, it proved impossible to reach the head of Bantry Bay, -where shelter would have been found from the east winds, which for the -following week blew with relentless fury. - -Through the night of the 21st and all day of the 22d, the fleet -continued turning to windward; and toward nightfall the admiral -anchored with eight of-the-line and seven other vessels off Bear -Island, still twelve miles from the head of the bay. The other twenty -ships remained outside under way. All the 23d it blew hard from the -eastward, and nothing was done. On the 24th the weather moderated, -and it was decided to attempt a landing, although no more ships had -come in,—the twenty outside having been blown to sea. Those at the -anchorage got under way, but made no progress. "I believe," wrote the -exasperated Wolfe Tone, "that we have made three hundred tacks, and -have not gained a hundred yards in a straight line." At sunset the -division again anchored; and during the night the wind rose to a gale, -which continued all the 25th and prevented any boat work. Several -ships dragged, and some cables parted. Soon after nightfall the cable -of Bouvet's flag-ship gave way, and the "Immortalité" began to drive -upon Bear Island. A second anchor failing to hold her, the admiral cut -both cables and put to sea, signalling the other vessels to do likewise -and hailing to the same effect those near whom he passed, among others -the ship on board which Wolfe Tone was. This, however, held on—her -captain becoming the senior naval officer present—till the 27th. -The wind then falling, a council of war was held, and decided that -as there were but four thousand soldiers in the bay, and as neither -cannon, ammunition nor provisions necessary for the landing remained -at the anchorage, the attempt must be abandoned. The wind now changing -to south-west and threatening a storm, this little division, reduced -to six ships-of-the-line and four smaller vessels, sailed for Brest, -where they arrived on the 12th of January. Rear-Admiral Bouvet had long -preceded them, having reached Brest on the 1st of the month.[324] By -the 14th, four weeks and a day after sailing from Brest, thirty-five -of the expedition had returned safe, though greatly battered, to -French ports, after various adventures not necessary to relate. Five, -including the "Séduisant," wrecked on the night of sailing, had been -lost or destroyed by their officers, and six captured[325] by the -British. - -The one still to be accounted for closed dramatically the adventure, -which, having begun by the wreck of one ship-of-the-line, ended with -the yet more deplorable destruction of another. This, called by the -good revolutionary name "Droits de l'Homme," had clung tenaciously -to the Irish coast till January 5th; but, finding herself alone and -no hope remaining, started then to return to Brest. On the 13th she -fell in with two British frigates, one the "Indefatigable," Pellew's -ship. The two closed with her, and just before nightfall the French -vessel carried away her fore and main topmasts. The wind was blowing -hard from the westward, and her captain, fearing momentarily to meet -enemy's ships of greater force and numbers, decided to run steadily -for his own coast. At half-past five the "Indefatigable," whose sail -power was untouched, drew up, and the battle began. An hour later her -consort, the "Amazon," came within range. Through the long night, with -a few intermissions at the choice of the uncrippled British frigates, -the strife went on,—the embarrassed condition of the "Droits de -l'Homme" being increased by the fall of her mizzen mast at half-past -ten. The sea was running so high that the crews of the frigates fought -up to their middles in water, while the ship-of-the-line could not -use her lower tier of guns; and at the end the "Indefatigable," the -sole survivor of the conflict, had four feet of water in her hold. At -half-past four on the morning of the 14th, land, for which a lookout -had been anxiously kept, was suddenly seen. The two British ships -were then holding positions a little ahead, and on either bow, of the -"Droits de l'Homme." Each hauled to the wind on its own side of the -enemy; the "Indefatigable" to the south, the "Amazon" to the north. All -three were embayed in Audierne Bay, an unsheltered beach thirty-five -miles south of Brest, between Pointe du Raz and the Penmarck rocks. By -strenuous efforts the "Indefatigable," after wearing twice, cleared -the latter by three quarters of a mile. As she passed them in broad -daylight, the "Droits de l'Homme" lay on her side at the bottom of -the bay, the surf beating over her. The "Amazon," whose situation -had allowed too little time for skill to play, was also aground two -miles to the northward. Here, however, the resemblance ceased. The -trained and disciplined British crew got safe to land. The unfortunate -French ship, crowded to repletion with men for the most part wholly -unaccustomed to the sea, had had the further misfortune to take the -bottom on a bank at a great distance from the beach. Three days of -awful exposure, without food or water, followed. Not till the 17th did -the subsidence of the gale allow relief from shore, and only on the -18th did the last survivor quit the wreck. Out of thirteen hundred men -on board her when the battle began, two hundred and sixty were killed -and wounded, and two hundred and seventeen lost their lives through the -wreck. - -The singular circumstance that, despite the first separation of the -fleet on the night of sailing, the disconnected units were yet for the -most part brought together and together reached the coast of Ireland, -and yet that from this happy meeting the most important vessel of -all, carrying the two commanders-in-chief, was excepted, creates a -legitimate curiosity as to the movements of the "Fraternité" during -these critical days. On the 17th, this ship had with her two frigates -and one ship-of-the-line,—the "Nestor." On the 20th the other frigates -had disappeared, the "Nestor" alone remaining; but it was found, -from subsequent examination of the logs, that had the fog which then -covered the ocean lifted, the "Fraternité" would have been in sight -of the main body, which then, under Bouvet, was steering north to -make Mizen Head. That night the "Nestor" parted company. On the 24th -of December the "Fraternité" was pursuing her course for Bantry Bay, -where the main body had already arrived, when a ship resembling a -ship-of-the-line was seen. As the stranger did not reply to the signals -made, the "Fraternité" took flight to the westward, and, finding -herself outsailed, threw overboard some of her guns. During the night -the pursuer was thrown off, and the frigate again shaped her course -for Bantry Bay; but the same easterly gale which drove Bouvet from -the anchorage was now blowing in her teeth. On the 29th Hoche and -Morard fell in with the first of the expedition they had seen since -the "Nestor" left them, and a sad meeting it was. One, the "Scevola," -was sinking; the other, the "Révolution," which had been badly injured -by a collision in Bantry Bay, was saving the "Scevola's" crew. In the -dangerous condition of the "Révolution," now having twenty-two hundred -souls on board, with provisions for but eight days, and having learned -the dispersal of the vessels in Bantry Bay, Hoche and Morard determined -to return. The two ships reached Rochefort on the 13th of January. -Whether Hoche, with his military ardor, the high prestige of his fame, -and the intense personal interest felt by him in the success of the -expedition, could have triumphed over the material obstacles which -defeated the lukewarm energies of Bouvet, may be questioned; but it was -certainly an extraordinary circumstance that, of the whole large body -of ships, the one containing the two commanders was almost alone in her -failure to reach the Irish coast. - -From the preceding account, it is evident that the success or failure -of the French landing depended entirely upon their ability to make the -thirty miles intervening between the entrance and the head of Bantry -Bay. Whatever may be thought of their prospects of ultimate success in -the conquest or deliverance of Ireland,—a matter of pure speculation, -dependent upon many conditions rather political and economical than -military,—it cannot be questioned that they had succeeded in crossing -the sea and reaching almost their point of destination, not only -despite the British navy but without even seeing it. On December 21st -the bulk of the expedition was at the mouth of Bantry Bay. Not till the -22d did Colpoys, commanding the fleet watching, or rather detailed to -watch, off Brest, know they had actually sailed; and then he did not -know in what direction. Bridport at Portsmouth received the news on -the same, or possibly on the previous day, through Pellew's diligence -and forethought. Not till the 31st of December was it known in London -that the enemy had actually appeared off the Irish coast, and at that -time Bridport's fleet had not even sailed. Only continued bad weather, -and that ahead, prevented the landing which even Bouvet would not have -hesitated to make under better conditions. Had no other harm resulted, -the capture of Cork, only forty-five miles distant, was certain. "We -propose to make a race for Cork as though the devil were in us," wrote -Wolfe Tone in his journal; and how severe the blow would have been may -be imagined, for in that place were collected stores and supplies to -the value of a million and a half sterling, including the provisions -for feeding the navy during the next year. Ireland was then the great -source from which naval provisions were drawn. - -Such a failure on the part of the British navy, with its largely -superior forces, can scarcely be called less than ignominious, and -invites now, as it did then, an examination into the causes. The -outcry raised at the time by panic and disappointment has long ceased; -but the incident affords a fruitful field for study, as to how far -the disposition of the Channel fleet conformed to a reasonable -interpretation of the principles of war, as applied to the sea. - -It must be obvious to any one stopping to think, that, for a fleet -charged with thwarting the combinations of an enemy's navy, there -can be no point so well adapted as one immediately before the port -from which the greatest fraction must sail. Once away, to an unknown -destination, the position to be taken becomes a matter of surmise, of -guess, which may be dignified by the name of sagacity if the guess -prove right, but which should not be allowed to cover the original -fault of disposition, if it could have been avoided. To multiply -instances would be tedious; but reference may be made to two detailed -elsewhere in this work, viz: Bridport, upon the escape of Bruix in -1799,[326] and Nelson after the escape of Villeneuve in 1805,[327] -though in the latter case the admiral's reasons for not cruising -before Toulon were not only adequate, but imperative. - -A similar perplexity existed in the closing months of 1796. The -government and the admiral of the Channel fleet knew that a large -expedition was preparing in Brest, and they had reason to fear the -co-operation with it of the Spaniards. Opinion was somewhat divided -as to the objective; according to reports industriously circulated by -the French government, it might be Portugal the ally, Gibraltar the -outpost, or Ireland the dependency, of Great Britain. One thing only -was certain, that the surest and largest component of the undertaking -was in Brest. There soldiers were gathering, and there also arms were -being shipped largely in excess of the troops,[328] pointing to a hope -of co-operation by inhabitants at the point of landing. Such conditions -dictated certainly three things: 1, a force before Brest superior to -that of the enemy inside; 2, inasmuch as the heavier ships must keep -the channel open, against the danger of violent westerly gales, there -should be an advance squadron of handier vessels close in with the -port, powerful enough to hold its ground if the enemy came out and -to keep touch with him if he sailed; 3, since Ireland was by far the -most important of the interests threatened, the government should have -indicated it to the admiral as the point to be covered, in case he did -lose knowledge of the hostile fleet. The first of these provisions sums -up the main strategic requirement, to effect which all other strategic -dispositions should conduce. The second is tactical in character, -relating to the disposition of the force upon the ground to which -strategic considerations assign it. The third presents the alternative, -the second line of defence, upon which, in case the first is forced, -the defending fleet falls back. - -Colpoys's fleet of fifteen sail was certainly not superior to the -French. It might be considered adequate to frustrate the expedition, -if met, but not sufficient to inflict the crushing blow that the -policy and needs of Great Britain imperatively demanded. Moreover, -a military body is not an inanimate object, like a rock, which once -placed abides unchanged for years. It is rather a living organism, -depending on daily nourishment, subject to constant waste, and needing -constant renewal. If to station a competent force before Brest met the -chief strategic requirement, its maintenance there embraced a number -of subordinate strategic provisions, which in terms of land warfare -are called communications. Ships meet with accidents; they degenerate -by wear and tear; they consume water and provisions, their crews -diminish by illness and need rest by occasional returns to port. These -communications were not threatened by the French; but they were open -to injury by insufficient forethought and by excessive distance, and -from both they suffered. A division like Colpoys's may be renewed in -two ways. Either it may be relieved by a body of similar number and go -home; or it may be continually receiving fresh ships and continually -sending old ones to the rear for rest. It need scarcely be said that -the latter is by far the better, preserving a continuity of life and -administration which the former breaks. Not only so; but the other -system presupposes a squadron in port equal to that cruising, a -reserve equal to the body in the field,—a fantastic proportion, which -sacrifices every principle of warfare, and divides the available force -into two masses, which do not even pretend to support but merely to -replace each other. - -A fleet charged with duty like that before Brest needs to be fixed at -the highest number the resources of the nation can supply and supported -by a reserve so proportioned that, by a constant coming and going, no -ship at the front should ever be suffering from an exhaustion, either -of condition or of supplies, against which diligent human forethought -could have provided. The station of this reserve is obviously a matter -of the utmost importance. It should, of course, be as near as possible -to the main body, and, for sailing ships, favorably situated with -reference to prevailing winds; for a head wind meant not merely the -loss of time caused by itself, but often the loss of an opportunity -which passes with the time. Thus, on this very occasion, when the wind -blew fresh from the eastward, fair to go from Portsmouth to Ireland, -Bridport's ships were unable to use it, because they could not make -the stretch of three miles from Spithead to St. Helen's. Nor is the -nearness of a dockyard a controlling condition for the reserve, though -it may be admitted that dockyards should be placed with reference to -probable theatres of war. On the contrary, a yard is the last place to -which to send an active ship. Naval officers knew then, as they know -now, that vessels at dockyards become valetudinarians, whose doctors, -like some others, flatter the ailments of their patients to increase -their practice. An available reserve is one thing, a ship needing -dockyard repairs quite another; and no countenance should be given to -any confusion of the two by keeping the reserve at, or close by, a -yard. Properly, the reserve should be simply that portion of the active -force which, for the benefit of the whole, is for a moment resting, but -is ready at once to proceed. - -How very little the government of the day and the then admiral of the -Channel fleet realized these principles, is evident by a few facts. The -reserve was at Spithead, a roadstead over two hundred miles distant. -It was equal in force to the division before Brest. "The government -thought it the wisest plan," said its authorized defender in the -Commons, "to separate the fleet into different divisions. One fleet -was off Brest to watch the enemy and intercept the sailing of the -expedition; and another at home to relieve the fleet off Brest, if -necessary, or to pursue the enemy, if he should sail."[329] When the -French had escaped, Colpoys received the news December 22d. His orders -did not cover the contingency, and in his uncertainty he first decided -to keep his station,[330] than which nothing could be more satisfactory -to the French, who had made a long circuit to avoid that particular -spot. Like all men in the dark, however, the admiral soon changed his -mind and concluded to go off the Lizard, a cape near Falmouth, where he -might receive information.[331] Here, in the entrance to the Channel, -he found several ships in want of necessaries, and the weather such -that he could not provide them from others.[332] This statement was -disputed by the Admiralty, which, however, admitted that some of these -ships had not water in abundance.[333] With a properly worked reserve, -a few ships might have been short,—those, that is, whose turn was to -go in next,—but it is evident that a very disproportionate number were -here affected; for the explanation of these short ships being still -out was, that Curtis's squadron of _seven_ ships was to have relieved -them, but had been delayed for certain causes.[334] Whatever the -reason, the important conclusion was that Colpoys, a good officer under -a bad system, put his helm up and ran into Spithead, where he arrived -December 31st, more than a week after the French reached Bantry Bay. - -While the subordinate was thus badgered by the inadequate measures -of his government and his chief, the latter was leisurely preparing -to relieve him off Brest. On the 21st or 22d, he was spurred up by -news of the French sailing, and replied that in _four_ days he would -be ready,—a truly handy reserve with the British Islands about to be -invaded. On the 25th he got under way, and demonstrated at once the -fitness of Spithead as a station for the reserve. Eight ships only -succeeded in getting to St. Helen's that day, a sudden change of wind -to south-east supervening; "which, although favorable for his getting -to sea, was directly on the bows of the ships coming to join him from -Spithead."[335] It was not thought prudent to sail with only eight -ships, and through the delay of waiting for the others Bridport did -not get away from St. Helen's (Portsmouth) until January 3, 1797,—the -day before the last of the French abandoned Bantry Bay,—when he sailed -with fourteen of-the-line, a mass equal to Colpoys's division which had -just returned. An inadequate force at the decisive point, inadequately -maintained, and dependent upon a reserve as large as itself, but -unready and improperly stationed,—such were the glaring faults of the -strategic disposition. - -The tactical mistakes are equally apparent. The main fleet was -stationed so far at sea as to derive no shelter from easterly storms. -It contained several three-decked ships,[336] whose poor sailing -qualities exaggerated to the last degree the drift consequent upon -bad weather. As a result, at the critical moment, Colpoys, instead of -being, according to St. Vincent's maxim, "close in with Ushant in an -easterly wind," was over forty miles west of it, "working up against a -fresh east-south-east wind,"[337] and the next day was driven to the -northward by southerly weather. Under such conditions any lookouts in -the "Iroise" were almost a vain show. It is of the essence of such -a lookout, however, that it should not be driven from its post by a -detachment so small that the enemy does not weaken himself by making -it. Of what consequence in this way were three or four frigates, which -the French could and should have driven off by a half dozen, backed -by two sail-of-the-line? Properly to watch Brest required a strong -detachment of line-of-battle-ships of the medium class, which were -handy and weatherly, and whose grip could only be loosened by fighting. -The correlative, however, of such a big detachment is the main body -close up, ready to support it. The whole theory hangs together. The -advanced detachment close up, else it cannot watch; big enough, else -it cannot stay; the main body also close up, else the advance guard is -hazarded. - -Under all these circumstances it is not strange that the careful -British chronicler, James, has to record that "during the three or four -weeks the French ships were traversing in every direction the Irish -and English Channels, neither of the two British fleets (Bridport's -nor Colpoys's), appointed to look after them, succeeded in capturing -a single ship;" and "the principal losses by capture sustained by the -enemy arose from the diligence and activity of a sixty-four-gun ship -and four or five frigates, which, on the 29th of December, were lying -in the harbor of Cork."[338] Yet, after satisfying himself that the -French had gone back to Brest, Bridport returned to Spithead, and the -old system was resumed. In Parliament the ministry strongly maintained -that they had done all that could be expected; and the First Lord went -so far as to say that even an inquiry would be considered an unmerited -censure.[339] - -It is no more than just to note, in this slack and shiftless conduct -of the war, the same sluggish spirit that, after making all allowances -for the undeniable grievances of the seamen, was also responsible for -the demoralization of discipline in the Channel fleet, which soon after -showed itself openly,—among the crews in the mutinies of 1797, and -among the officers, at a later day, in the flagrant insubordination -with which St. Vincent's appointment was greeted. Both show a lax hand -in the chief naval commander; for, while a government is responsible -for its choice of the latter, it must, especially in so technical a -profession as the navy then was, depend upon him for the enforcement -of discipline and for the choice of measures, at once practicable and -adequate, to compass the ends of the war. Upon him, more than upon -any other, must fall the responsibility of failure; for he knows, or -should know, better than the government, what the fleet can be made to -do, what the state of discipline really is, and what his own capacity -to carry out the one and support the other. Only through him can the -government act. When it disregards or overrides, without displacing -him, mischief ensues; but the correlative of the generous confidence -and hearty support it owes to him is, on his part, unceasing intense -effort, or resignation. - -It is a relief, and instructive, to turn to the methods of Earl St. -Vincent. Having returned from the Mediterranean in August, 1799, -he was chosen to succeed Bridport upon the latter's resignation -in the following April. It is told that, when his appointment -became known, one of the naval captains, at the table of the former -commander-in-chief, gave the toast, "May the discipline of the -Mediterranean never be introduced into the Channel fleet." If, as is -said, the admiral (presumably Lord Bridport) suffered this to pass -unrebuked, no words could depict more forcibly than the simple incident -the depths to which his own dignity and control had sunk.[340] It is, -perhaps, needless to say that St. Vincent met this temper with the same -unbending firmness that he had shown in his former command. - -It is not, however, in his discipline, but in his management of the -Brest blockade, and the Channel fleet for the support of that blockade, -that we are here interested. The force before Brest was largely -increased, consisting at this time of never less than twenty-four -sail-of-the-line, and, until ordered by the Admiralty to be reduced, -was maintained by St. Vincent at thirty.[341] The rendezvous, or -central station round which the main body was to revolve, and where, -if possible, it was always to be found, was changed from eight leagues -west of Ushant to "well in with Ushant in an easterly wind." How the -commander-in-chief understood this order is shown by his instructions -to his second in command, when the fleet was for a time turned over to -him. "I recommend you in the strongest manner _never_ to be farther -than six or eight leagues from Ushant with the wind easterly; and if -westerly to make the Saintes (Chaussée de Sein) as often as the weather -will permit; and when the wind is such as to permit the French to slip -out of Brest, to stand in on the first of the flood so far as to see -the inshore squadron."[342] In another letter to the same he says: -"The principle on which the squadron acts, with the wind easterly, is -to wear ... during the night, so as to be within a couple of leagues -of Ushant at daylight."[343] So constant was this practice during the -summer and early autumn months, while he himself remained on board, -that in one hundred and twenty-one days there was but one, and then -owing to fog, in which the main body did not communicate by signal with -the inshore squadron stationed between Ushant and Brest.[344] - -To sustain the ships in the greatest and most constant efficiency, in -other words to maintain the communications, his care and watchfulness -are incessant; and, though not expressly so stated, it is evident from -the general tenor of his correspondence that the ships went in to -refit and rest not in large numbers, but singly, or in small groups. -"I am at my wits' end," he writes, "to compose orders to meet every -shift, evasion, and neglect of duty. Seven-eighths of the captains who -compose this fleet are practising every subterfuge to get into harbor -for the winter."[345] A constant pressure is kept upon all officers -of the fleet, and especially upon those stationed to supervise at the -anchorages for refittal and taking in stores, that vessels should -lose no time and should come back as full as possible. The time for -remaining "in Plymouth Sound or Cawsand Bay _never_ ought to exceed -six days, unless a mast is to be shifted, and in that event not more -than ten days."[346] "A thousand thanks are due you," he writes to -Rear-Admiral Whitshed, "for the pains you have taken to dispatch the -ships which were necessarily sent into Cawsand Bay. Without such -powerful aid, all my endeavors to fulfil the wishes of the Cabinet -would be vain."[347] It was for this purpose he gave the order, so -bitterly resented, that no officer, from the captain down, should sleep -out of his ship, or go more than three miles from the beach. - -Throughout he strove, according to his own practice and that of Suffren -and Nelson,[348] to make the ships self-dependent, and to keep them -out of the dockyards and on the station to the last moment. "Under -the present impending storm from the North of Europe," wrote he in -January, 1801, "and the necessity there is of equipping every ship -in the royal ports that can swim, no ship under my command must have -anything done to her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this -anchorage."[349] The question of wind and distance weighed heavily with -him. Torbay and Cawsand Bay, an anchorage in Plymouth Sound, were made -the ordinary resorts of ships going in to refit; and his orders to the -second in command, when left in charge off Brest, were "on no occasion -to authorize any ships to go to Spithead, unless by special orders -from the Admiralty or from me." Finally, when his health compelled him -to abandon the immediate command afloat, he again, as at Gibraltar -during his Mediterranean career, took up his station at the point of -next importance to the efficiency of the Brest fleet, settling himself -in a house near Torbay, overlooking the anchorage, whence he directly -supervised the refitting and speedy dispatch of the ships sent in for -repair and refreshment. In short, when unable to be with the main body, -he made a point of seeing personally to the reserve and to the supplies. - -To mass the fleet before Brest,—to maintain it in a high state of -efficiency, by the constant flow of supplies in transports and the -constant exchange between worn and fresh ships,—and to fix a rendezvous -which assured its hold upon the enemy,—such were the strategic measures -adopted and enforced by St. Vincent. The disposition of the ships when -before the port, with a view to prevent the evasion which was the -height of French naval ambition, and to compel the enemy to battle if -he came out, may be more properly called tactical. It may be given -nearly in his own words. "A squadron of five ships-of-the-line is -_always anchored_ during an easterly wind between the Black Rocks and -Porquette Shoal" (about ten miles from the entrance). "Inside, between -them and the Goulet, cruise a squadron of frigates and cutters plying -day and night in the opening of the Goulet; and outside, between the -Black Rocks and Ushant, three sail-of-the-line cruise to support the -five anchored."[350] A group of eight line-of-battle ships was thus -always on the lookout,—a force too strong to be driven off without -bringing on the general engagement which was the great object of the -British, and so disposed that, if not the inner, at least the outer -members could be signalled every day by the main body. The mutual -support of all parts of the fleet was thus assured. "Unless this is -done," wrote St. Vincent, "the ships appointed to that important -service may not feel the confidence necessary to keep them in their -post,—a failure in which has frequently happened before I was invested -with this command."[351] - -The seamanlike care with which, as a general officer, he studied -his ground, is also evidenced by his remarks, some of which have -already been quoted. "I never was on a station so readily, and with -so little risk maintained as that off Ushant with an easterly wind" -(with which alone the enemy could get out), "owing to the length and -strength of flood-tide;"[352] and he adds, in another place, "If the -flood flows strong, you will find _much shelter_ between Ushant and -the Black Rocks during the day."[353] The investment of Brest was -completed by stationing detachments, amounting in all to from two to -four ships-of-the-line with numerous frigates, to the southward of -the Passage du Raz and thence to Quiberon Bay, forming a chain of -lookouts to intercept vessels of all kinds, but especially the coasters -upon which the port depended for supplies; while other cruisers -were stationed all along the shores of the Bay of Biscay, from the -mouth of the Loire to Cape Finisterre, and their captains specially -incited and encouraged to approach and scour the coast. In the various -"cutting out" expeditions engaged in by these, the numerous small -vessels captured are usually stated to have been loaded with stores -for the Brest fleet. By this means, if the enemy did not come out and -fight to break up the blockade, he must soon be reduced to impotence -by exhaustion of the commonest supplies. As there were in Brest, in -1800, forty-eight ships-of-the-line, French and Spanish, a combination -resulting from Bruix's cruise of the year before, this end was soon -obtained, as French accounts abundantly testify.[354] - -The immediate adoption and enforcement of these measures, after St. -Vincent succeeded to the command, illustrate clearly the inevitable -dependence of the government upon the admiral of the Channel fleet, -and its inability to conceive or enforce the system by which alone so -necessary yet hazardous a service could be effectually performed. Only -a thorough seaman, and of exceptional force of character, could both -devise and execute a scheme demanding so much energy and involving so -heavy a responsibility. It was hard to find a man of St. Vincent's -temper to carry out his methods; and the government was further -handicapped by a tradition requiring a certain rank for certain -commands. So strong was the hold of this usage that even St. Vincent, -in 1801, yielded to it, lamenting that Nelson, "of whom he felt quite -sure, had not rank enough to take the chief command" of the vitally -important expedition to Copenhagen; which was entrusted to Sir Hyde -Parker, "of whom he could not feel so sure, because he had never been -tried."[355] Later, when First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl St. Vincent -was fortunate enough to find in Admiral Cornwallis a man who, whatever -his intellectual grasp, possessed all the nerve and tenacity of his -predecessor; but the necessary rank was too apt to bring with it a -burden of years, accompanied by the physical weakness which, in lesser -men, led to failing energy and shrinking from responsibility, and by -actual prostration drove even St. Vincent ashore in the winter weather. -His predecessor, Lord Bridport, had been well on in the seventies, and -his first successor, Sir Hyde Parker, announced his intention "not to -risk staying with the whole fleet off Brest at this season [winter], -when it blows hard from west or west-south-west,"[356]—a decision which -may have been no more than prudent, but the open avowal of which, -taken with Nelson's opinion of him,[357] seems to show that, though a -brave and good officer, he was not equal to the stern work demanded. - -Lord St. Vincent, though perfectly satisfied with his own arrangements, -doubtless never cherished the vain hope that no evasion of them could -ever be practised. On the contrary, he had at the very outset of his -command, and in the comparatively genial month of May, the experience -of a terrific hurricane, which drove his fleet headlong to Torbay, -and rejoiced the hearts of the cavilling adherents of the old system. -That the fleet must at times be blown off, he knew full well; and also -that the escape of the enemy, in whole or in part, before its return, -was possible, though it ought not to be probable. To provide against -this contingency, he recommended the government to give to the officer -commanding the inshore squadron, who would remain, special orders in -a sealed packet to be opened only in case the enemy got out.[358] The -failure to provide Colpoys with such specific directions had been -charged by the Opposition, and most justly, as a grave fault of the -government in 1796.[359] It is right and wise to leave great discretion -to the officer in command on the spot,—minute instructions fetter -rather than guide him; but a man in Colpoys's situation, bewildered as -to the enemy's objects, aware only that the first line of defence is -forced, but ignorant where the second will be assailed, is entitled -to know precisely what the government considers the most important -among the interests threatened. This decision is one for the statesman -rather than the seaman. Not only, in 1796, was Ireland distinctly the -most vulnerable point, but the ministers had information, almost to -certainty, that there was the enemy's aim. - -In 1800, as when Bruix escaped in 1799, circumstances were somewhat -different. The disaffection, or at least the disloyalty, of the -Irish had been shown to be a broken reed for the enemy to lean on; -while in the Mediterranean the French had acquired, in Egypt and -Malta, interests peculiarly dear to the First Consul. Those valuable -possessions were in deadly straits, and the attempt to relieve them was -more probable than another attack on Ireland. St. Vincent, therefore, -wrote to the then head of the Admiralty, saying with perfect propriety -that it became him, "in the situation I stand at this critical period, -to suggest to your lordship any ideas for the good of the public -service," and suggesting that Sir James Saumarez, commanding the -inshore squadron, should have specific orders that, "if the combined -fleets get out before I can return to the rendezvous, he should in that -case push for Cadiz with the eight ships-of-the-line stationed between -me and the Goulet; for I," he added, "shall have sufficient force to -protect England and Ireland, without counting upon his eight sail." -Such instructions completed the scheme; precise, but not detailed, -they provided for the second line, in case the careful precautions for -guarding the first were foiled. - -The dispositions adopted by St. Vincent remained the standard to -which subsequent arrangements for watching Brest were conformed. From -Commander-in-Chief of the Channel fleet he became, in February, 1801, -First Lord of the Admiralty. In this position he naturally maintained -his own ideas; and, as has before been said, found in Cornwallis a man -admirably adapted to carry them out. In May, 1804, the ministry with -which he was connected resigned; but, although as an administrator -he provoked grave criticism in many quarters, and probably lost -reputation, his distinguished military capacity remained unquestioned, -and the methods of the Brest blockade were too sound in principle and -too firmly established to be largely modified. During the strenuous -months from 1803 to 1805, when Great Britain and France stood alone, -face to face, in a state more of watchful tension than of activity, -the Channel fleet kept its grip firm on the great French arsenal. -Nelson's justly lauded pursuit of Villeneuve would have been in vain, -but for the less known tenacity of Cornwallis; which, by preventing the -escape of Ganteaume, was one of the most potent factors in thwarting -Napoleon's combinations. Wherever else the great naval battle which -has immortalized the name of Trafalgar might have been fought, the -campaign would have taken a different form but for the watch over Brest -conducted on St. Vincent's lines. - -The result of this strict blockade and of the constant harrying -of the French coasts from Dunkirk on the North Sea to the Spanish -border, was to paralyze Brest as a port of naval equipment and -construction, as well as to render very doubtful the success of any -combination in which the Brest fleet was a factor. This result has -been, historically, somewhat obscured; for abortive attempts to get out -obtained no notoriety, while an occasional success, being blazoned far -and wide, made an impression disproportioned to its real importance. -When Ganteaume, for instance, in January, 1801, ran out with seven -ships-of-the-line,—the blockading fleet having lost its grip in a -furious north-east gale,—more was thought of the escape than of the -fact that, to make it, advantage had to be taken of weather such -that six of the seven were so damaged they could not carry out their -mission. Instead of going to Egypt, they went to Toulon. The journals -of the day make passing mention of occasional sorties of divisions, -which quickly returned to the anchorage; and Troude, in a few condensed -sentences, under the years 1800 and 1801,[360] vividly shows the -closeness of the watch and the penury of the port. Remote from the -sources of naval supplies in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, with the -sea approaches to both swarming with enemy's cruisers, and in a day -when water carriage, always easier and ampler than that by land, was -alone adequate to the transport in sufficient quantity of the bulky -articles required for ship building and equipment, it became impossible -to fill the storehouses of Brest. - -Partly for this reason, yet more because his keen military -perceptions—at fault only when confronted with the technical -difficulties of the sea—discerned the danger to Great Britain from a -hostile navy in the Scheldt, Napoleon decided to neglect Brest, and -to concentrate upon Antwerp mainly his energies in creating a navy. -In later years this prepossession may have partaken somewhat of the -partiality of a parent for a child; and he himself has said that there -was a moment, during his receding fortunes in 1814, when he could have -accepted the terms of the allies had he been able to bring himself to -give up Antwerp. In close proximity to the forests of Alsace, Lorraine, -and Burgundy; able to draw from the countries bordering on the Rhine -and its tributaries flax and hemp, and from the mines of Luxemburg, -Namur and Liège iron, copper and coal,—the naval resources of Antwerp -could be brought to her on the numerous streams intersecting those -countries, and were wholly out of reach of the British. Many were the -difficulties to be overcome,—docks to be excavated, ships to be built, -seamen gathered and trained, a whole navy to be created from nothing; -but the truth remained that the strategic position of Antwerp, over -against the mouth of the Thames and flanking the communications of -Great Britain with the Baltic, was unequalled by any other single port -under the emperor's control. - -The expedition against Ireland, thwarted by the elements in 1796, -was never seriously renewed. It remained, to the end of his short -life, the dream of Hoche. Transferred from the army of the Ocean to -that of the Sambre and Meuse, his career there was cut short by the -preliminaries of Leoben, by which Bonaparte extricated himself from -the dangers of his advance into Carinthia. Sacrificed thus, as he -felt, to the schemes of a rival, Hoche supported with all the weight -of his interest an expedition of fifteen thousand men, who, under the -pressure of the Directory, were gathered in the Texel in the summer of -1797 for an invasion of Ireland under convoy of the Dutch navy. Here -again Wolfe Tone for two months fretted his heart out, waiting for the -fleet to sail; but, though the period seemed most propitious, through -the mutinies in the British fleet and the cessation of hostilities on -the continent, a peculiar combination of wind and tide were wanting -to cross the bar, and that combination did not come. In October the -Dutch ships-of-war, numbering sixteen small ships-of-the-line, put to -sea by themselves, and on the 11th met the fleet of Admiral Duncan, -of equal numbers but distinctly superior in broadside force. The -British, having the wind, bore down and attacked—passing when possible -through the enemy's line, so as to cut off his retreat to the Dutch -coast, then less than ten miles distant. The battle, known by the -name of Camperdown, from a village on the adjoining shore, was fought -with all the desperation that in every age has marked the meetings of -the British and the Dutch. It closed with the defeat of the latter, -who left nine ships-of-the-line and some frigates in their enemy's -hands. This put an end to the Texel expedition. Hoche had died a few -weeks before, on the 18th of September; and with him passed away the -strongest personal interest in the invasion of Ireland, as well as the -man most able to conduct it. - -The following year, 1798, open rebellion existed in Ireland, and -the Directory undertook to support it with troops and arms; but the -equipment of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition absorbed the energies of -the Ministry of Marine, and there was no Hoche to give the enterprise -the development and concert essential to a great success. A small -division of four frigates sailed from Rochefort on the 6th of August, -carrying twelve hundred troops under General Humbert, who had served -in the expedition of 1796 and shared the shipwreck of the Droits de -l'Homme. This squadron escaped observation, landed its detachment on -the 21st of the month, and returned safely to France; but the small -corps, unsupported by regular troops, again demonstrated the imprudence -of trusting to the co-operation of insurgents. On the 8th of September -Humbert was obliged to surrender with the bulk of his force. - -A week later, before the news reached France, a ship-of-the-line, -appropriately called the "Hoche," and eight frigates, under the command -of Commodore Bompart, sailed from Brest, carrying a second division -of three thousand troops. Though they escaped the eyes of Bridport's -vessels, if there were any in the neighborhood, by running through the -Passage du Raz, they were seen on September 17, the day after sailing, -by three British frigates; one of which, after ascertaining that the -French were really going to sea, went to England with the news, while -the others continued to dog the enemy, sending word to Ireland of the -approaching danger as opportunity offered. On the 4th of October, in -a gale of wind, the enemies separated, and the French commodore then -made the best of his way towards his destination, in Lough Swilly, at -the north end of Ireland; but the news had reached Plymouth on the 23d -of September, and when he drew near his port he found the way blocked -by three British ships-of-the-line and five frigates, which had sailed -at once for the insurgent district. An engagement followed, fought on -the 12th of October, under circumstances even more disadvantageous than -that of mere numbers, for the "Hoche" shortly before the action had -lost some of her most important spars. Of the little squadron, she and -three frigates were compelled to surrender that day, and three more -were intercepted later by British vessels, so that only two of the -expedition regained a French port. The enthusiastic and unfortunate -Irishman, Wolfe Tone, was on board the "Hoche" and wounded in the -action. He shortly afterwards committed suicide in prison. A third -French division had sailed from Rochefort on the very day the "Hoche" -was captured. It succeeded in reaching Ireland; but learning the fate -of Bompart's squadron, returned without landing the troops. This was -the last of the expeditions against Ireland that sailed from French -ports. Other interests and other rulers combined with the pronounced -naval ascendency of Great Britain to give a different direction to the -efforts of the republic. - - END OF VOL. I. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Martin, Histoire de France, vol. xix. p. 370. - -[2] Nineteenth Century Review, June, 1887, p. 922. - -[3] Lord John Russell's Life of Fox, vol. ii. p. 137. - -[4] Annual Register, vol. 27, p. 10. - -[5] See Annual Register, 1769, pp. 2-4; 1770, pp. 27-41, 67, 71, 75. - -[6] Annual Register, 1788, p. 59. - -[7] King's Message, March 29, 1781. - -[8] Fox's Speeches (London, 1815), vol. iv. p. 178. - -[9] Parl. Hist., vol. xxix. pp. 75-79. - -[10] Annual Register, 1791, p. 102. - -[11] Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, p. 118. - -[12] Annual Register, 1793; State Papers, pp. 127, 128. - -[13] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 49. - -[14] Nap. to Decrès, Aug. 29, 1805. - -[15] Troude, Batailles Nav., vol. iii. p. 370. - -[16] Moniteur, Jan. 19, 1790, p. 82. - -[17] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, p. 11. - -[18] Ibid., p. 12. - -[19] Guérin, Histoire de la Marine, vol. iii. p. 156 (1st ed.). - -[20] Troude, Batailles Nav. de la France, vol. ii. p. 201. - -[21] Guérin, Hist. Mar., vol. iii. p. 195 (1st ed.). - -[22] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. 2, p. 320. - -[23] Guérin, vol. iii. p. 213. - -[24] Guérin, vol. iii. p. 153. - -[25] See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp. 20-23. - -[26] The decree of April 22 is in the Moniteur of the 23d. That of -the 28th is not; but it will be found in the "Collection Générale des -Décrets rendus par l'Ass. Nat." for April, 1791. - -[27] The word _entretenu_, here rendered "paid," is difficult to -translate. The dictionary of the French Academy explains it to mean -an officer kept on pay, without necessarily being employed. Littré -says that an officer "non entretenu" is one not having a commission. -The word carries the idea of permanence. By the decree of April 28, -"enseignes non entretenus" had no pay nor military authority, except -when on military service; nor could they wear the uniform, except when -so employed. - -[28] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 260. - -[29] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. pp. 261, 262. - -[30] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 397. - -[31] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 396. - -[32] Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 411 (note). (Ed. 1848.) - -[33] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126. - -[34] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 126. - -[35] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 138 (1st ed.). - -[36] Ibid., vol. i. p. 139 (1st ed.). - -[37] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 51, 52. - -[38] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 97-101. - -[39] Chevalier, p. 42. - -[40] Chevalier, Rép. p. 219. - -[41] Tronde, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 423. - -[42] Letter of the Ordonnateur de la Marine, Najac; Jurien de la -Gravière, Guerres Mar. (4th ed. App.). - -[43] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 47. - -[44] Ibid., p. 49. - -[45] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. iii. p. 337. - -[46] La Gravière, Guerres Mar., p. 51. - -[47] Chevalier, Rép., p. 132. - -[48] See Chapter VI. - -[49] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 43. - -[50] Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 48. (First American from fourth -London edition.) - -[51] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. vi. p. 480. - -[52] Collingwood's Correspondence, pp. 265, 266. - -[53] Collingwood's Correspondence, p. 208. - -[54] Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 415. (Ed. 1823.) - -[55] Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 455. - -[56] James' Nav. Hist. vol. i. p. 53 (ed. 1878). This system had been -adopted in France a century before by Colbert (Revue Mar. et Coloniale, -September, 1887, p. 567). - -[57] Brenton's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 105. - -[58] James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. pp. 57, 58. - -[59] Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 49 (1st ed.). - -[60] James, vol. i. p. 55. - -[61] Guerres Mar., vol. i. p. 164 (note). - -[62] Nels. Disp. i. 309-311. - -[63] Nels. Disp., i. p. 312. - -[64] Ibid., ii. pp. 70, 77, 241. - -[65] Life of Sir Jahleel Brenton. - -[66] James' Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 54. (Ed. 1878). - -[67] For example, that any captain surrendering to a force less than -double his own should suffer death; and if of a ship-of-the-line, to -any number of enemies unless the vessel was actually sinking. The same -fate awaited him who, in a fleet action, allowed the line to be broken. -So also the decree not to give quarter. See Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous -la Rép., p. 128; Guérin, Hist. de la Mar., vol. iii. p. 395. - -[68] The Peninsular War, so brilliant in many of its features and in -the end so triumphantly successful, has some analogies to the smaller -expeditions here criticised, and may be thought to refute the remarks -in the text. The analogy, however, fails in some very decisive points. -The landing and base of operations at Lisbon were in the territory of -an ally of long standing; the projected advance was into a country in -general insurrection against foreign rule; above all, the position of -Lisbon and its distance from France imposed upon the French, in case -they advanced against it in great force as they did in 1810, a long and -very difficult line of communication, while the British had the sea -open. Toulon, in 1793, was disadvantageous to the British as compared -with Lisbon in 1809, because farther from England and in France. For -remarks on Peninsular War see note at end of this chapter. - -[69] For the strategic discussion of the British naval dispositions on -the occasion of the Irish Expedition of 1796, see Chapter XI. - -[70] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 295. - -[71] Of the thirty ships-of-the-line in Toulon when occupied by the -allies, three or four had been sent to Rochefort without guns, carrying -French prisoners whom it was inconvenient to keep. - -[72] The author is keenly aware that this policy, of garrisoning -several somewhat separated ports, is seemingly inconsistent with -sound military principles as to concentration, as well as with what -he himself has elsewhere said about the proper dispositions for -maintaining military control of a maritime region. It is, therefore, -well to explain that those principles and dispositions apply where the -belligerent navies are so far equal as to create a real struggle. This -was not the case in the French Revolution. Great Britain had undisputed -naval supremacy in the West Indies, and the question before her was, -not to beat the enemy's fleet, but to secure her own commercial routes. -To this end it was necessary to disseminate, not concentrate her ships, -and to provide them with convenient centres of refuge and supply along -the routes. The case was analogous to the police arrangements of a -city. In ordinary quiet times the police are distributed to cope with -individual offenders; when a mob gathers and threatens the peace they -are concentrated in large bodies. - -[73] Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. p. 454. - -[74] Ardouin, Études sur l'Hist. de Haïti, vol. iv. p. 45. - -[75] Account of Jamaica, London, 1808, pp. 51, 52. - -[76] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 326. - -[77] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 327. James says May 6. - -[78] See _ante_ p. 101. - -[79] A ship is said to be hove-to when some of the sails are so -arranged as to move her ahead and others to force her astern,—the -result being that she remains nearly in the same spot, but drifts -slowly to leeward. - -[80] Villaret had been joined on the 19th of May by a ship-of-the-line, -which had separated from Nielly's squadron; this raised his force from -twenty-five to twenty-six. - -[81] A raking shot is one that passes from end to end, lengthwise, of a -ship, instead of across, from side to side. It not only ranges through -a greater space within, but attacks more vital parts, particularly -about the stern, where were the rudder and the more important officers -of a ship. - -[82] Another advantage in engaging to leeward was that the lower-deck -batteries, which contained the heaviest guns, were so near the water -that a ship heeling over with a strong breeze could not always open -her lee ports. The lee ship of two opponents, using her weather guns, -would escape this inconvenience and have a proportionate advantage. On -the First of June the weather was too moderate to affect the use of the -lower-deck batteries; but on the 29th of May, the "Queen Charlotte," -using her lee as well as her weather guns as she broke through the -French line, had the lower deck full of water. One of her officers, -Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral) Codrington, being knocked down by the -recoil of a gun and thrown to the lee side of the deck, could, when -leaning on his left arm, barely keep his head out of water. (Life of -Admiral Codrington.) - -[83] A whimsical incident is told as occurring in this grim scene of -slaughter and destruction. "The 'Brunswick' had a large figurehead of -the Duke, with a laced hat on. The hat was struck off by a shot during -the battle. The crew of the ship sent a deputation to the quarter-deck -to request that Captain Harvey would be pleased to order his servant to -give them his laced cocked-hat to supply the loss. The captain, with -great good-humor, complied, and the carpenter nailed it on the Duke's -head, where it remained till the battle was finished." (Barrow's Life -of Howe.) - -[84] Official narrative of the loss of the "Vengeur," by the survivors. -Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 355. - -[85] The speech of Barrère in the National Convention was as follows: -"Imagine the 'Vengeur' ship-of-the-line pierced with cannon shot, -opening in all directions, and surrounded by English tigers and -leopards, a crew composed of wounded and dying men, battling against -the waves and the cannon. All at once the tumult of the action, the -fear of danger, the pain-stricken cries of the wounded cease; all mount -or are carried upon deck. Every flag, every pennant is hoisted. Cries -of 'Vive la République!' 'Vive la Liberté et la France!' are heard -on all sides; it is the touching and animated spectacle of a civic -festival, rather than the terrible moment of a shipwreck. For a moment -they must have thought upon their fate. But no, citizens, our brothers -thought no more upon that, they see only the English and their country. -They choose rather to be engulfed than to dishonor her by a surrender. -They hesitate not an instant. Their last prayers are for liberty and -for the Republic. They disappear." - -[86] The French accounts state that he remained until eight P.M., -during all which time he might have been attacked. The English on the -contrary say that the whole French fleet was out of sight by quarter -past six. The question is not material, for it is certain that Villaret -did remain for some time, and that he would not have been attacked had -he stayed longer. - -[87] Life of Admiral (then Lieutenant) Codrington. - -[88] Barrow's Life of Lord Howe, p 256. There are similar statements as -to the bearing of Howe and Curtis made by Admiral Codrington. - -[89] At noon of June 1, by the "Queen Charlotte's" log-book, the island -of Ushant bore east one-half north, distant 429 miles. - -[90] The carelessness with which naval affairs are too often described -by general historians may be illustrated by the account of this battle -given by one of the most distinguished. "Lord Howe gained so decisive -a success from the adoption of the same principles which gave victory -to Frederic at Leuthen, to Napoleon at Austerlitz, and to Wellington -at Salamanca, viz.: _to direct an overwhelming force against one half -of the enemy's force_, and making the attack obliquely, keeping the -weather gage of the enemy, to render it impossible for the ships to -leeward to work up to the assistance of those engaged. By this means -he reduced one half of the enemy's fleet to be the passive spectators -of the destruction of the other.... Had he succeeded _in penetrating -the line at all points_, or had his captains implicitly obeyed his -directions in that particular, and engaged the whole to leeward, he -would have brought twenty ships-of-the-line to Spithead." (Alison's -"History of Europe.") How an attack upon one half of the line is -consistent with penetrating the same line at all points does not -clearly appear; but the statement concerning Lord Howe's principle of -action on the 1st of June is absolutely contrary to all the facts, -although Alison had James's painstaking work before him and refers -to it frequently. His statement is that of Jomini's "Guerres de la -Révolution Française;" but the latter author writes only as a military -man, introduces naval matters merely incidentally, and was doubtless -misled in the scanty information attainable when he wrote. - -[91] It is a curious coincidence, though not necessarily significant, -that the number of men hit in each of these ships was nearly the same. -The "Royal Sovereign" lost fifty-four, the "Queen" fifty-four, and the -"Glory" fifty-two. - -[92] Brenton, in his naval history of Great Britain, tells an amusing -story of the captain of one of the ships a little to Howe's left, which -at once characterizes a type of officer and illustrates the above -remark. He was, Brenton says, so occupied with preserving his station -by the azimuth compass that he lost sight of his intended antagonist, -and in the smoke never found him. - -[93] James, Nav. Hist., vol. i. p. 144. (Ed. 1878.) - -[94] Troude says that he reached his station on the 21st of May. Bat. -Nav., vol. ii. p. 330. - -[95] Many years later Admiral Villaret was governor of Martinique. When -that island was taken by the British in 1809, he went to England as -a passenger in a ship commanded by Capt. E. P. Brenton. This officer -in his naval history states that Villaret told him that Robespierre's -orders were to go to sea, and that, if the convoy fell into Howe's -hands, his head should answer for it. Therefore he avoided action -so long, and endeavored to draw Lord Howe out of the track of the -convoy. The loss of the ships taken was to him a matter of comparative -indifference. "While your admiral amused himself refitting them, I -saved my convoy, and I saved my head." - -[96] Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. ii. p. 337. Chevalier, Hist. de la Mar. -Fran. sous la Rép., p. 144. - -[97] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 146. - -[98] Page 140. - -[99] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p 240. - -[100] Nels. Disp., ii., p. 32. - -[101] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 216. Life of Adm. -Codrington, vol. i. pp. 36, 37. - -[102] See _post_, Chap. VIII., Martin's actions with Hotham. - -[103] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 74. - -[104] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre ix. p. 341. - -[105] L'horrible route de la Corniche sous le feu des cannonières -anglaises.—JOMINI, _Guerres de la Rév._, livre x. p. 62. - -[106] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 274. - -[107] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 174. - -[108] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 26. - -[109] Mar. Fran. sous La Rép., p. 186. - -[110] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 50. - -[111] See _ante_, p. 176. - -[112] "We cannot get another mast this side of Gibraltar." (Nels Disp., -May 4, 1795.) - -[113] James, vol. i. p. 297. Nelson says six. (Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p -47.) - -[114] Jomini, Guerres de la Rév., livre viii. p. 75. - -[115] The effects were, however, very severely felt in France. (Corr. -de Nap., vol. i., pp. 65, 79, 95.) - -[116] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 84. - -[117] The Austrian generals say, and true, they were brought on the -coast at the express desire of the English to co-operate with the -fleet, which fleet nor admiral they never saw.—_Nels. Disp._, vol. ii. -p. 213. - -[118] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 98a. See also p. 110. - -[119] Nels. Disp., June 6, 1800. - -[120] Ibid., vol. ii., p. 64. - -[121] For Nelson's complaints about the force under his command, see -ibid., pp. 106-114. - -[122] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 118. - -[123] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 63. - -[124] Commentaires de Nap., vol. i. p. 112. - -[125] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép. p. 251. - -[126] Comment. de Nap., vol. i. p. 71. - -[127] Nels. Disp., vol. ii. p. 128. - -[128] Corr. de Nap., vol. i. p. 465. - -[129] For O'Hara's characteristics, see life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. -pp. 190, 195. - -[130] See Nelson's Disp., vol. ii. p. 258, note. - -The letter of the Admiralty to Admiral Mann may possess some interest -as an example of the official correspondence of the day, as well as an -expression of disapprobation too profound for reproach:— - -SIR,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the -Admiralty your letter to me of the 29th December, giving an account of -your proceedings and of the severe [several?] occurrences which have -taken place during your passage from Gibraltar, with the squadron under -your command; and I have their Lordships' commands to acquaint you that -they cannot but feel the greatest regret that you should have been -induced to return to England with the squadron under your orders, under -the circumstances in which you were placed. - -I have their Lordships' further commands to acquaint you that orders -will be to sent to you, either by this or to-morrow's post, to strike -your flag and come on shore. I am, &c., - - EVAN NEPEAN, - _Secretary to the Admiralty_ - -Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 216. - -[131] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 358. - -[132] This was Jervis's opinion. (See Life of St. Vincent by Tucker, -vol. i. p. 240; also Nelson's Dispatches, vol. ii. p. 294.) - -[133] Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 76. See also generally -pp. 73-80. The relief obtained by Bonaparte from the departure of the -British crops out on every page. - -[134] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 373. - -[135] The project of forcing the entrance to the Tagus by a squadron -from Brest had been openly discussed in France. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. -sous la République, p. 258.) - -[136] An exciting incident occurred during this chase. In the height -of it a man fell overboard. A boat was lowered and picked him up; but -the enemy's ships were so close it became doubtful whether the British -frigate could afford to await her return. Nelson, always generous to -the verge of rashness, backed a topsail, saying "I won't let Hardy go," -and succeeded in carrying him off. The anecdote gains in interest when -it is remembered that Hardy, who was taken in the prize of December -20, had just been released from Spain; and that, as captain of the -flag-ship at Trafalgar, he was witness of Nelson's fall and death-scene. - -[137] The distinguishing flag which shows a commodore is on board the -ship. - -[138] A favorite project with the Directory, as with Napoleon, was to -mass the French and Spanish navies in one great body; as had several -times been done under Louis XVI. during the American Revolution. Such -a combination was hoped for the Irish expedition of 1796; and, though -too late for that purpose, the movement from Cartagena to Cadiz was -regarded by the Directory as a step toward uniting the fleets. This was -one of the objects of Bruix's adventurous sortie from Brest in 1799, -when he actually brought back to that port in his train fifteen Spanish -ships,—nominal allies, actual hostages. The combination at Trafalgar is -well known. Later on the Emperor sought to build up a patch-work fleet -out of all the minor navies of the Continent, as he pieced together -out of all the nations the immense army which was swallowed up in his -Russian enterprise. But here, as usually, a homogeneous body, centrally -placed, triumphed over an incongruous coalition. - -[139] The stringent exactions of the close-hauled line-of-battle -imposed upon a fleet, in the presence of an enemy, the tactical -necessity of rectifying the order with any considerable change of -wind,—an evolution whose difficulty increased in direct proportion to -the number of the ships; and in a more than geometrical progression, -when they were badly drilled. - -[140] Tucker's Life of St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 255. - -[141] James's Nav. Hist., vol ii. p. 37. - -[142] Nelson's Narrative. Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 343. - -[143] James states that these ships first came to the wind on the -starboard tack, heading as did the British, "as if intending to weather -the whole British fleet." The superior speed and weatherliness of the -Spanish ships, if well handled, might have enabled them very seriously -to molest the British in their attack; but, from the whole conduct -of the Spaniards on this day, it is probable that the movement, if -made, was only one of the successive vacillations of men who had put -themselves in a false position. (Vol. ii. p. 39.) - -[144] Notably in Keppel's action in 1778, in which he bore a -distinguished part. See Mahan's Influence of Sea Power upon History, -1660-1783, p. 351. - -[145] "When the 'Prince George' tacked, the two three-deckers [of -the Spanish lee division] tacked after us, and which the rest of the -enemy's rear were about to do; but the commander-in-chief, with the -ships of [our] centre and rear, following close, _covered us from their -attack upon the rear of the ships with me_, and obliged them to re-tack -... and effectually divided the enemy's fleet." (Sir William Parker's -narrative of the conduct of the British van. Nelson's Dispatches, vol. -ii. p. 473.) The gallant admiral's style is confused, but his meaning -is clear enough after half a dozen readings. He must not be taken -for the very distinguished officer of the same name, but of the next -generation. - -Both Parker and Nelson (Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 340, 344) speak of -the main Spanish division as "the van." In truth, when the "Culloden" -interposed, the whole enemy's fleet were so nearly joined on the port -tack as to seem in line, though disorderly and not quite connected. - -[146] Nelson's Narrative, Dispatches, vol. ii. pp. 341, 345. - -[147] Annual Register, 1797, p. 148. - -[148] Life of Lord Minto, vol. ii. p. 379. - -[149] See Chapter X. - -[150] For a striking incident of St. Vincent's energy in suppressing -mutiny, see note at end of this chapter. - -[151] April 19, 1797. Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 655. - -[152] Napoleon's Correspondence, vol. iii. p. 346. - -[153] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. ii. p. 479. - -[154] Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 590. - -[155] See page 235. - -[156] Corr. de Nap., vol. ii. p. 622. - -[157] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 21. - -[158] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 73. - -[159] Ibid., p. 89. - -[160] Corr. de Nap., May 26, 1797, vol. ii. pp. 86, 87. - -[161] Ibid., Sept. 13, 1797, vol. ii. p. 392. - -[162] Ibid., Aug. 16, 1797, vol. ii. p. 311. - -[163] Bonaparte to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corr., vol. iii. p. 392. - -[164] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 313. - -[165] "Upon reaching Venice, Commodore, you will call, in company with -the commanding general and the Minister of France, on the provisional -government. You will tell them that the conformity of principles -existing between the French and Venetian republics, and the protection -granted by us to them, exact the prompt equipment of their navy, in -order to concert with us, to maintain the mastery of the Adriatic -and the islands; that for this purpose I have sent troops to Corfu, -to preserve it to the Venetian Republic; and that henceforth it is -necessary to work actively to put their navy in good condition. - -"You will get possession of everything under this pretext; having -continually on your tongue the unity of the two republics, and using -always the name of the Venetian Navy.... It is my intention to seize -for the (French) Republic all the Venetian ships, and all the stores -possible for Toulon." To Commodore Perrée, June 13, 1797.—_Napoleon's -Correspondence_, vol. iii. p. 155. See also instructions to Admiral -Brueys, ibid., p. 291. - -[166] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. pp. 519, 520. - -[167] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 597. - -[168] Ibid., vol. iii. p. 609 (Dec. 14, 1797). - -[169] Ibid., p. 644 (Feb. 23, 1798). - -[170] Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 643. - -[171] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (4th ed.), vol. i. p. -350. - -[172] So moderate a man as Collingwood wrote (Jan. 26, 1798): "The -question is not merely who shall be conqueror, ... but whether we shall -be any longer a people,—whether Britain is still to be enrolled in the -list of European nations."—_Collingwood's Memoirs._ - -[173] See Correspondence of Brueys with Bonaparte; Jurien de la -Gravière, Guerres Maritimes (Appendix, 4th ed.). - -[174] "There are fitting out at Brest but ten ships-of-the-line, which -have no crews, and are still far from being in condition to keep the -sea.... The expedition against England would appear not to be possible -before next year." (Corr. de Nap., vol. iii. p. 644, Feb. 23, 1798.) -The British Channel fleet at this time numbered forty-seven of the -line, exclusive of sixteen in the North Sea. - -[175] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 35. - -[176] Marmont attributes the approach to Candia to a wish to give the -shelter of the island to the numerous coasters in the convoy. (Mémoires -du Duc de Raguse, vol. i. p. 362.) - -[177] Bonaparte in his preparations laid special stress on having -enough small vessels. "It is indispensable to have with the squadron -the greatest attainable number of corvettes and despatch vessels. Send -orders to all the ports for all such to join the fleet."—_Corr. de -Nap._, vol. iv. pp. 79, 80. - -[178] This statement is based on the plate in the "Commentaires de -Napoléon," vol. ii. p. 190. There are evident inaccuracies in the -British positions there given (_e.g._, for June 22, and in the approach -to Alexandria); but that of the 25th seems probable. James states that -on the night of June 22 the tracks of the two fleets crossed, but at -a sufficient interval of time to prevent a meeting,—the more so as a -constant haze prevailed. (Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 177.) - -[179] Narrative in Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 48. - -[180] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 275-277. - -[181] In a chart of the old port of Alexandria, made in 1802 by Major -Bryce of the Royal Engineers, attached to Abercromby's expedition, it -is said that not less than five fathoms will be found throughout the -middle passage. The directions add that heavy ships cannot get out -unless with good weather for warping. This was Brueys's great objection -to entering, and it was well taken; but the alternative of destruction -was worse. - -[182] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 128. - -[183] See Coast Map, Alexandria to Rosetta, and Plan of the Battle of -the Nile. - -[184] Chevalier, Mar. Fran, sous la République, p. 365. - -[185] A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship at anchor and -fastened either to the riding cable or to an anchor suitably placed, so -as to turn the broadside in the direction wished. Owing to the boats -being away to get water when Nelson appeared, to the failure of many -of them to return, and to the rapidity with which the attack was made, -these precautions were not carried out. - -[186] Mahan's "Influence of Sea-Power upon History," pp. 469-478. -Plates XVIII. and XIX. - -[187] Letter of DeGrasse to Kerguelen, Jan. 8, 1783. Hood "ranged his -vessels in very close order (_très-serrés_), and it was impossible -to pass between the land and them, as I wished."—_Kerguelen's Guerre -Maritime de 1778_, p. 259. - -[188] Letter of Brueys to Bonaparte, July 13, 1798; La Gravière, -Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 367. This is a somewhat singular example -of following a rule, the principle of which is not grasped. The rear of -a column of sailing ships under way was the weaker end, because less -easily helped by the van; but in a column of ships at anchor, head to -wind, the weather ships were incomparably more exposed, the lee having -a very hard pull to get up to them. - -[189] Narrative of Sir Edward Berry. See Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52. - -[190] James, ii. p. 177. The Vanguard's Journal, quoted by Sir Harris -Nicolas, Nelson's Disp. vol. iii. p. 49, says 4 P. M. - -[191] The ships-of-the-line needed nearly five fathoms in smooth water, -more if there was much sea. - -[192] James's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 184 (ed. 1878). In the main, -the author has followed James in the details of this and other battles, -though not without careful comparison with other sources of information -accessible to him. - -[193] Until after the middle of this century there were in the British -navy three flags of the same general design, but with red, white, and -blue grounds. Admirals were divided into three classes, of the Red, -the White, and the Blue; and, according to their classification, ships -under their immediate command showed the corresponding ensign. Nelson -being at this time a rear-admiral of the Blue, his ships would usually -carry the blue flag, almost invisible at night. - -At the present day all British naval vessels wear the white flag, and -merchant ships the red. - -[194] The first attack of the thirteen British ships (counting among -them the "Leander," fifty,) was confined to the eight head ships of -the French line, down to and including the "Tonnant." As these were -one by one crushed, the British dropped down and engaged those in the -rear,—but with a vigor necessarily diminished by the injuries they -had themselves received, not to speak of the physical fatigue induced -by the labor and excitement of the previous hours. Nevertheless the -"Mercure," when she hauled down her flag, had lost one hundred and -five killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and had but six -guns that could be used. The loss of the "Heureux" is not stated, but -she had nine feet of water in her hold. (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la -Rép., pp. 376, 377.) - -[195] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. pp. 228-230; -Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la République, pp 386-388. A letter from -Villeneuve, justifying his inaction, is to be found in the former work, -p. 231, and in Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 121. - -[196] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 520. - -[197] The two that escaped were captured by Lord Nelson's squadron -before July, 1800, when he resigned the Mediterranean command. - -[198] Chevalier, p. 381. - -[199] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 10. - -[200] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 84. - -[201] For this discussion see Nelson's Dispatches and Letters, vol. -iii. pp. 62-65; also App. p. 474. - -[202] Ross's Life of Saumarez, vol. i. p. 228. - -[203] Nelson's Disp., vol. iii.; Appendix, p. 474. Letter of Admiral -Browne. - -[204] The American novelist and naval historian, Fenimore Cooper, in -the preface to the "Two Admirals," has attributed the whole tactical -combination to the captains, on the authority of Captain Ball of the -"Alexander," speaking to the late Commodore Morris of the United -States Navy, who in turn was Cooper's informant. This constitutes a -perfectly respectable oral tradition, coming through intelligent men of -unquestioned integrity; but when opposed to the contemporary written -statement of Captain Berry, Nelson's flag-captain, who had the fullest -opportunity of knowing the facts, it becomes impossible to doubt that -somewhere in the chain of witnesses there has been a misunderstanding. -That Captain Foley conceived on the moment the plan he executed is -perfectly credible; but that the whole body of captains were inspired -to carry out, as by mutual consent, a combination of which there -had been no previous mention, is a marvel of which Berry's account -of Nelson's constant discussions and explanations with his officers -effectually disposes. (See Narrative of an Officer of Rank, etc. Naval -Chronicle, vol. i. p. 52.) - -[205] Marine Fran. sous la République, p. 381. - -[206] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. ii p. 350. - -[207] "Good gunners would assuredly have modified the issue of these -sinister dramas, for they would have crushed the English fleet at the -first act." (Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Mar., vol. ii. p. 225, 1st -ed.). "If Nelson had led in upon an American fleet, as he did upon the -French at the Nile, he would have seen reason to repent the boldness of -the experiment." (Cooper, preface to "The Two Admirals.") - -[208] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, pp. 267-272. - -[209] Martin, Histoire de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 6. - -[210] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 9. - -[211] Ibid., p. 11. - -[212] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 16. - -[213] Martin, Hist. de France depuis 1789, vol. iii. p. 24. - -[214] See _post_, Chapter XVII. - -[215] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 237. - -[216] Ibid. Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 23. - -[217] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. pp. 226, 233. - -[218] Annual Register, 1798; State Papers, p. 276. - -[219] Martin, Hist. de France, vol. iii. p. 27. - -[220] Ibid. pp. 24, 25. - -[221] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 229 (1st -ed.). - -[222] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 105. - -[223] This division consisted of the "Vanguard," flag-ship, which had -not had proper lower masts since she was dismasted immediately after -entering the Mediterranean (p. 256); the "Culloden," that had beaten -heavily on Aboukir reef for seven hours during the battle; and the -"Alexander," both masts and hull in very bad order. - -[224] Corr. de Nap., vol. iv. p. 660. - -[225] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 160. - -[226] Ibid., p. 204. - -[227] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 19, 20. - -[228] Of all obstacles that can cover the frontiers of an empire, a -desert like that of Suez is indisputably the greatest. It is easy to -understand that a fort at El Arish, which would prevent an enemy from -using the wells and encamping under the palm-trees, would be very -valuable.—_Commentaires de Napoléon_, vol. iii. p. 16. - -[229] For a graphic account of the anxieties of the French officers in -Toulon, illustrated by letters, see Jurien de la Gravière's Guerres -Maritimes (4th edition), pp. 352-362. (Appendix.) - -[230] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 276. - -[231] Ibid., vol. iv., Letter to Directory, Sept. 8, 1798 (postscript). - -[232] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. pp. 385, 391, 392. It is interesting to -note that by this mail Bonaparte seems first to have heard the word -"conscript," applied to the system of which he later made such an -insatiable use (p. 387). - -[233] Instructions pour le citoyen Beauchamp, Corr. de Nap., vol. v. -pp. 260-263. - -[234] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 24. - -[235] The roadstead of Aboukir is not safe in winter. It can protect a -squadron during the summer. (Commentaires de Nap., vol. ii. p. 235.) -In Abercromby's expedition, 1801, "all the pilots accustomed to the -Egyptian coast declared that till after the equinox it would be madness -to attempt a landing." (Sir R. Wilson's History of British Expedition -to Egypt, 2d edition, p. 6.) The fleet then lay in Aboukir Bay from -March 2 to March 8, before landing could be made. - -[236] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 402, where the reasons for the Syrian -expedition are given categorically, and can probably be depended upon -as truthful. - -[237] Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 244. - -[238] The opinion of a French officer may be worth quoting. "Although -every one knows what he is, I will nevertheless say a word about -Sir Sidney Smith. He has something at once of the knight and of the -charlatan. A man of intelligence, yet bordering upon insanity, with -the ability of a leader, he has thought to honor his career by often -running absurd risks, without any useful end, but only to be talked -about. Every one ridicules him, and justly; for in the long run he is -wearisome, though very original." (Mémoires du Duc de Raguse (Marmont), -vol. ii. p. 30.) - -[239] The melodramatic painting of Sir Sidney Smith in the breach at -Acre represents graphically the popular impression of his character. -See frontispiece to Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith. - -[240] Smith escaped from Paris on the 25th of April; Bonaparte left -Paris May 2; Nelson sailed from Cadiz on his great mission May 2,—a -very singular triple coincidence. - -[241] Brenton's Life of Lord St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 6; Barrow's Life -of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 236. - -[242] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 216. The Admiralty, upon -remonstrance, emphatically denied any such purpose. (Ibid., p. 335.) - -[243] For Nelson's attitude until he received orders (Feb. 1, 1799) -from St. Vincent to take Smith under his orders, see Dispatches, vol. -iii. pp. 223, 224. - -[244] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 204, 205. - -[245] Mémoires de Bourrienne, vol. ii. pp. 243-245. - -[246] "The siege of Acre lasted sixty-two days. There were two periods. -The first from March 19 to April 25, thirty-six days, during which -the artillery of the besiegers consisted of two carronades, 32 and 24 -pound, taken from British boats, and thirty-six field guns. The second -period was from April 25 to May 21, twenty-six days." (Commentaires de -Napoléon, vol. iii., p. 63.) "During the latter period the park was -increased by two 24-, and four 18-pounders." (Ibid, p. 82.) - -[247] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 351. - -[248] Corr. de Nap., June 26, 1799, vol. v. p. 617. - -[249] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. pp. 81, 82. It is only fair -to say that an attempt was made by Perrée a few weeks later to land -ammunition back of Mt. Carmel, when he was discovered and chased off. -(Barrow's Life of Sir Sidney Smith, vol. i. p. 300.) Napoleon may have -confused the two circumstances. His own correspondence (vol. v., pp. -517, 518) contradicts the landing near Acre. The guns were put on shore -at Jaffa and thence dragged to Acre. - -[250] Schomberg's Naval Chronology. Appendix No. 374. - -[251] Ibid. Appendix No. 376. - -[252] See map of Brest in next chapter. - -[253] Naval Chronicle, vol. i. p. 537. - -[254] Ibid., p. 539. - -[255] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 81. Osler's Life of Lord Exmouth, p. 191. - -[256] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 17. - -[257] "Admiral Bruix, being able to rely more on the devotion of his -captains than upon their exactitude and precision in manœuvring, took -pains before sailing to lay down the duties of a captain under all -circumstances; carefully refraining, however, from making a special -application of these lessons to any one individual, that their -self-love might not be wounded. This wise precaution did not prevent -new mistakes, whose consequences would have been much aggravated had -we been obliged, by meeting the enemy, to manœuvre either to avoid -or compel action." (Journal of Captain Moras, special aide-de-camp -to Admiral Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 373. -Appendix, 4th edition.) - -The gunnery, apparently, was equally bad. "I will cite only one fact to -give an idea of the effects of our artillery. When Admiral Bruix was -bringing to Brest the French and Spanish fleets, at least nine hundred -guns were fired in very fine weather at an Algerian corsair without -doing any harm. I do not believe that ever, in a combat of that kind, -was so much useless firing done." (Article by "an officer of marine -artillery;" Moniteur, 3 Fructidor, An 8 [Aug. 20, 1800].) - -[258] Two months later Lord Keith, having succeeded St. Vincent in the -command, wrote to Nelson: "If Minorca is left without ships it will -fall." (Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 415, note.) - -[259] Bruix did not have over a thousand troops with him, the pressure -on the land frontiers by the Second Coalition demanding all the force -that could be raised to resist it; but the fleet carried twenty-four -thousand seamen or artillerists, a force capable by itself of -accomplishing much. The reputation of the admiral caused both officers -and men to flock to his flag. - -[260] "Port Mahon is a very narrow harbor, from which you cannot get -out without great difficulty." (Collingwood's letters, August 18, -1799.) "Ships had better be under sail off Port Mahon than in the -harbor." (Nelson's Dispatches, May 12, 1799.) - -[261] Brenton's St. Vincent, vol. i. p. 493. - -[262] "I had the happiness to command a band of brothers." (Nelson's -Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 230) The best of his Nile captains were, for -the most part, still with him. - -[263] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. pp. 366, 374. - -[264] See ante, p. 306. - -[265] Jurien de la Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, vol. i. p. 288 (4th -edition); also James, Naval History, vol. ii. p. 264 (edition 1847). -Other authorities say the 8th. The reconcilement seems to be that Bruix -did not take his fleet to Genoa, but only a detachment; the main body -anchoring in Vado Bay. He would thus leave Genoa the 6th, Vado the 8th. - -[266] "We avoided the enemy by skirting very close, and under cover -of foggy weather, the coasts of Piedmont and Provence." (Journal of -Captain Moras, special aid to Bruix. La Gravière, Guerres Maritimes, -vol. i. p. 376. Appendix, 4th edition.) - -[267] "In our passage before Toulon we learned the vexatious accidents -which had happened to the Spanish fleet, and went to rejoin them at -Cartagena." (Ibid. Also James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 264.) - -[268] The British fleet was sighted off St. Tropez (Troude, vol. iii. -p. 158); and fired upon by coast batteries near Antibes on June 6th. -(James, Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 262). - -[269] Nelson's Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 379, note. This east wind seems -to have been overlooked in the criticisms of Keith's conduct. - -[270] Cape delle Melle bore, on the 8th, N. N. E., distant ninety -miles. James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 262. - -[271] Lord Keith's biographer (Allardyce) says he determined "to take -Minorca on his way to Rosas" (p. 165); which was certainly a liberal -construction, though not beyond the discretion of an officer in Keith's -position. To take Minorca on his way to Rosas, from his position on -the 8th, was to go two hundred miles to the former and one hundred and -fifty more to Rosas, when the latter at the moment was not two hundred -distant. He was a few miles nearer Rosas than Minorca, when he took the -decision which finally wrecked the cruise. - -[272] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 24. - -[273] It was during this time that Perrée's squadron was captured. See -ante, p. 301. - -[274] Mutineers belonging to the "Impétueux," one of the division, were -tried by court martial in Port Mahon, June 19 and 20. (Osler's Life of -Lord Exmouth, p. 192. Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 415, note.) - -[275] James, Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 265 (edition 1847). Nels. Disp., -vol. iii p. 415 note. - -[276] Brenton's Life of St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 25. - -[277] Histoire de la Révolution, vol. x. p. 392, note. - -[278] Nels. Disp., July 4, 1803, vol. v. p. 116. - -[279] Mar. Fran, sous la Rép. p. 415. - -[280] Ten or twelve British, four or five Portuguese; the former -exceptionally well-ordered ships. (Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 365.) - -[281] Nels. Disp., vol. vii. p. 16. - -[282] To this must be added that, from conditions of wind and weather, -Malta was very far from Toulon, much farther than Toulon from Malta. -Of this Nelson complained often and bitterly in the later war, when -commander-in-chief off Toulon. Malta was valuable, he said (Disp., vol. -v. p. 107), as a most important outwork to India and for influence in -the Levant; valueless against Toulon. - -[283] This is plain from his letter of June 6 to Nelson. (Ante, -p. 313.) Keith's failure is usually attributed to St. Vincent's -dispatches, received June 8; whereas the letter shows that he had -decided to return to Minorca two days before receiving them. - -[284] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. pp. 408 and 414, with notes. - -[285] Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 380. - -[286] Keith to Nelson, July 12, 1799; Nels. Disp., vol. iii. p. 419, -note. - -[287] The larger number is the estimate in Napoleon's Commentaries, -which ordinarily exaggerate the enemy's forces. (Vol. iii. p. 107.) - -[288] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 710. - -[289] Commentaires de Napoléon, vol. iii. p. 89. - -[290] Corr. de Nap., vol. v. p. 56. - -[291] Ibid., p. 403 (Feb. 10, 1799). - -[292] See ante, p. 291. - -[293] Mém. de Bourrienne, vol. ii. p. 238. - -[294] Ibid., p. 305. - -[295] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, etc., p. 16. - -[296] Nels. Disp. vol iv. p. 219, note. - -[297] Naval Chronicle, vol. iii. p. 149. - -[298] Napoleon's Commentaries give Sept. 26, 1799, as the date of this -letter,—only a month after Bonaparte sailed. (Vol. iii. p. 183.) - -[299] Nels. Disp. vol. iii. p. 296. - -[300] June 28, 1799. Corr. de Nap. vol. v. p. 622. - -[301] At the same time he made requisitions for clothing for double -the number of men actually in Egypt, notifying the officers concerned -that he did so to deceive Europe as to the strength of the army. Corr. -de Nap. vol. v. p. 721. This has a significant bearing on the charges, -made by him against Kleber, of exaggerating his weakness. - -[302] Annual Register, 1800; State Papers, p. 225. It may be added the -commissioners first met on board Smith's ship. - -[303] For the convention of El Arish, see Annual Register, 1800, State -Papers, p. 217. - -[304] Allardyce's Life of Lord Keith, pp. 226, 227. - -[305] "At the theatre last night I had a conversation with General -Kilmaine [commanding the division intended to send into Ireland]. He -told me ... the arsenals at Brest are empty; and what stores they -have in other ports they cannot convey thither, from the superiority -of the naval force of the enemy, which kept everything blocked up." -(Wolf Tone's Journal, June 16, 1798.) In 1801 "the port of Brest lacked -provisions. The difficulty of getting the convoys into it decided the -First Consul to break up the fleet there and send part to Rochefort.... -The Spanish admiral (who had come there with Bruix in 1799) was invited -to escort the division. To equip the necessary ships, this officer had -to give them equipments taken from the others of his squadron, and -could obtain provisions only for seventeen days. Baffled by the winds -and by the constant presence of the enemy, the ships did not sail." A -combined expedition against the Cape of Good Hope failed for the same -reason. "The blockade of the Dutch ports was no less rigorous than -that of the coast of France." "At Brest, they lived from day to day. -Villaret Joyeuse was ordered to go out with ten French and ten Spanish -ships to support the entry of convoys. He did not go, and received -another mission." (Troude, Batailles Navales, vol. iii. p. 222.) - -[306] Nelson's Disp., vol. v. pp 300, 306, 411, 498. - -[307] See ante, p. 212. - -[308] There is between Ushant and the reefs a narrow passage, -practicable for ships-of-the-line, which was surveyed under Lord St. -Vincent; but it could only be used with pilots, and was rather a -convenience than an important feature. - -[309] In the English Channel and the neighboring western coasts of -Europe, winds from S.W. to N.W. prevail during three fourths of the -days of the year, and are often exceedingly violent. - -[310] See "Twelve letters to the Rt. Hon. Spencer Perceval," by Capt. -James Manderson, 1812; in which it is also said that Mr. Pitt was -towards the end of his life much impressed with the advantages of -Falmouth's position. To this opinion is probably due the following -statement in a magazine of the day, during Pitt's short second -administration: "It is now (Feb. 1805) determined that the Channel -fleet shall in future rendezvous at Falmouth, and moorings are -immediately to be laid down for fifteen sail-of-the-line." (Nav. -Chron., vol. xiii. p. 328.) Lord Exmouth seems to have shared this -opinion. (Life, p. 140.) While Falmouth was by position admirably -suited for a rendezvous, ships running for refuge to Torbay would have -the wind three points more free, an advantage seamen will appreciate. - -[311] With the wind to the southward of south-east we know full well -that no ship-of-the-line can get out of Brest.—_Letter of St. Vincent_; -Tucker's Life, vol. ii. p. 119. - -[312] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14. - -[313] See ante, p. 220. - -[314] See ante, pp. 202, 214. - -[315] Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., p. 265. - -[316] Rousselin's "Vie de Hoche," quoted by Troude, Bat. Nav., vol. -iii. p. 6. - -[317] Before Rochefort. - -[318] See map of Brest, p. 343. - -[319] In performing this audacious service Pellew was somewhat favored -by the fact that his ship was a French prize, easily mistaken for one -of the expedition. He kept close, often within half gun-shot of the -leading ship. - -[320] The greater part of the "Séduisant's" crew was saved. - -[321] "Fog so thick we cannot see a ship's length. Has been foggy all -day." (Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 18.) "The state of the weather was -such that it was impossible for Admiral Colpoys to keep his own fleet -under observation, and the air so hazy that fog guns had continually to -be fired." (Parliamentary Hist. xxxiii, p. 12. March 3, 1797.) - -[322] Wolfe Tone's Journal, Dec. 21, 1796. - -[323] James Nav. Hist. vol. ii. p. 7. Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous la -Rép. p. 281. - -[324] Bouvet was broken without trial by the Directory on the 15th of -February, 1797, and was not restored to the navy until 1801, under the -Consulate. Captain Chevalier's judgment is that "he despaired too soon -of the success of the expedition, ... and forgot that he should have -been inspired only by the great interests entrusted by accident to his -hands." (Mar. Fran. sous la Rép., pp. 309, 311.) - -[325] Chevalier. James makes the number captured to be seven. - -[326] See ante, p 306. - -[327] See post, Chap. XVI. - -[328] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 113, 116. Wolfe Tone -states that there were on board the ships of the expedition 41,160 -muskets. (Journal, Dec. 22, 1796.) - -[329] Dundas's Speech, Mar. 3, 1797, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 12. - -[330] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. 13. - -[331] Ibid., vol. xxxiii. pp. 109, 111. - -[332] Speech of Lord Albemarle, ibid., p. 109. - -[333] Speech of Earl Spencer, First Lord of Admiralty, ibid., p. 111. - -[334] Dundas, Parl. Hist. vol. xxxiii. p. 13. - -[335] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. p. 21. - -[336] Of fifteen ships four were of ninety-eight guns or over. -(Schomberg's Nav. Chronology, vol. iv. p. 525.) - -[337] James, vol. ii. p. 20. - -[338] James's Nav. Hist., vol. ii. pp. 20, 22. - -[339] Earl Spencer's Speech, Parl. Hist., vol. xxxiii. p. 115. - -[340] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 10 and 70; the -latter reference being to a letter from St. Vincent to the First Lord -of the Admiralty. The incident occurred on board Bridport's flag ship, -the "Royal George." - -[341] Tucker's Life of Earl St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 58. - -[342] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 13. - -[343] Ibid., p. 114. - -[344] Ibid., p. 24. - -[345] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 114. - -[346] Ibid., p. 80. - -[347] Ibid., p. 78. - -[348] See Nelson's letter to Earl St. Vincent, Feb. 1, 1800. (Nelson's -Dispatches.) - -[349] Tucker, vol. ii. p. 121. Modern ships, so much more complex, are -much more liable to derangement than those of St. Vincent; and, unless -such pains as his are taken to make them self-sufficing, their officers -and the dockyards will make a heavier drain on the force of the fleet -than in his day. Perhaps in no point will provident administration more -affect the efficiency of the fleet than in this. - -[350] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. pp. 13, 88. - -[351] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 14. - -[352] Ibid., p. 14. - -[353] Ibid., p. 115. - -[354] See Troude, Batailles Navales, 1800, 1801, vol. iii. pp. 190, -222, 223. "We had at Brest (in 1800) neither provisions nor material. -The Franco-Spanish fleet there was of consideration only from its -numbers." (Chevalier, Mar. Fran. sous le Consulat, p. 10.) - -[355] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 136. - -[356] Naval Chronicle, vol. iv. p. 520. - -[357] See _post_, Chap. XIII. - -[358] Tucker's St. Vincent, vol. ii. p. 105. - -[359] Parliamentary History, vol. xxxiii. pp. 111-116. - -[360] Batailles Navales, vol. iii. pp. 187-190, 222, 223. - - - - - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - | | - | Transcriber's Note: | - | | - | Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note. | - | Other corrections are noted below. I - | | - | Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. | - | | - | Word combinations that appeared with and without hyphens were | - | changed to the predominant form if it could be determined. | - | | - | Italicized words are surrounded by underline characters, _like | - | this_. | - | | - | Mid-paragraph illustrations have been moved between paragraphs | - | and some illustrations have been moved closer to the text that | - | references them. The paginations in the List of Illustrations | - | have been adjusted accordingly. | - | | - | Footnotes were moved to the end of the book and numbered in one | - | continuous sequence. | - | | - | Other corrections: | - | p. 278: "which did away the provincial independence" changed to | - | "which did away with the provincial independence." | - | | - | p. 365: "the impotent conclusion" changed to "the important | - | conclusion." | - +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Influence of sea Power upon the -French Revolution and Empire 1793-1, by Alfred Thayer Mahan - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER, VOL I *** - -***** This file should be named 52588-0.txt or 52588-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/2/5/8/52588/ - -Produced by StevenGibbs, Christian Boissonnas and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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